errour non-plust, or, dr. stillingfleet shown to be the man of no principles with an essay how discourses concerning catholick grounds bear the highest evidence. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) errour non-plust, or, dr. stillingfleet shown to be the man of no principles with an essay how discourses concerning catholick grounds bear the highest evidence. sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. s.n.], [s.l. : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . in answer to stillingfleet's "faith of protestants reduced to principles". index: p. [ ]-[ ] errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng stillingfleet, edward, - . -- faith of protestants reduced to principles. catholic church -- doctrines. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion errour non-plust , or , dr. stillingfleet shown to be the man of no principles . with an essay how discourses concerning catholick grounds bear the highest evidence . multum necesse est ut propheticae & apostolicae interpretationis linea secundum ecclesiastici & catholici sensus normam dirigatur . vinc. lir. cap. . printed in the year , . preface to the learned of this nation . is it possible then that errour can admit principles ? or ( which is equivalent ) that truth cannot admit any , but must be quite destitute of such firm supports ? or is it even possible that falshood dare so much as pretend to such evident grounds , and offer to make good her pretence , and not sink in deepest disgrace for laying claim to a thing to which it must needs be evident she has not the least shadow of a title ? certainly , whoever considers attentively that principles are ( properly speaking ) first truths , either absolutely , or with restriction to such a matter , and withall that these must be most perfectly self-evident , and other principles con●ining upon the former , must needs partake a very high degree of conspicuousness by their near approach to those great luminary truths , will , upon the joyning these two consider●tions , easily conclude such a pretence unmain●ainable , if things be rightly stated and propos'd . besides , since all true judgments are built on the things being such as we judg'd it to be , and what●s true is impossible to be false , it must needs follow that ( all circumstances taken in ) it was impossible , and so , a contradiction , the thing , at what time we fram'd that right judgment of it , should have been otherwise then it was . a contradiction i say ; for that which is in the thing or object an impossibility , is a contradiction in our minds inform'd by that object . whence results this great and clear truth , that every error necessarily involves a contradiction , and every truth a first principle ; and that , though not in formality of expression , yet in reality of sense they are both of them such . and is it possible that these best evidences now spoken of should be held obscure or false ; or that contradictions ( their opposits ) which principle all falshoods , should gain the repute of clearest truths ? surely , there must needs be a strange perversion of nature somewhere , when such monsters in rationality can obtain the esteem of being legitimate production● of reason : and , this must be either in the mindes of the persons to be inform'd , who are violently sway'd by passion or interest to those of their own party , so as not to consider at all what evidence there is in what they say , but to accept themselves and cry up to others any piece of empty rhetorick , plausible talk , or pretty irony for solid conviction : or else in the discoursers who are to inform those readers ; and the chief engin with which they work upon their want of skill is to talk indeed of principles , because 't is the highest credit that can be to be thought to have such invincible grounds : but they never look into the nature of principles and thence make out to their readers what kind of sayings those must be which can deserve that excellent name , lest they should disgrace themselves and shame their cause ; while the whole strength of their discourse is built on this , that those propositions they rely on are indeed right principles ; and yet , when look't into , are no more like what they are pretended to be then so many old wives tales . it seems then to me both most conducive to the clearing of truth , as also the most candid and equal way of proceeding to look first into the nature of principles , and by laying it open to determin thence what propositions deserve that name , what not . for , if i rightly perform this , and it appear thence that dr. st. has indeed produc't such grounds as have in them the true nature of principles and proceeded upon them , all his discourse thus built , must necessarily be convictive , and the result of it a certain truth . but , in case he has not produc't any such , his whole discourse is convinc't to be meer trifling and folly. a principle then , taken as distinguish 't from other propositions or sayings , involves two perfections in it's notion : evidence and influence upo● some other truths that partake their evidence from it. for , were it never so evident in it self , yet , if it deriv'd none of that evidence to another , nor had relation to any thing besides it self , it might be indeed in that case a great truth , but it would no more be a principle , then that can be said to be a beginning which has neither middle nor end , nor any thing following it . evidence is twofold , self-evidence and evidence by way of proof . the former belongs to first principles as hath been at large prov'd in reason again●t raillery , disc. . & d. evidence by proof , belongs to subordinate principles , which are conclusions in respect of those above them , and yet themselves influential to prove other things . and the evidence of these must be resolvable finally into self-evident ones , otherwise it would follow that all proof must proceed higher and higher in infinitum , and so nothing could ever be prov'd at all . now other kindes of evidence besides these two ( speaking of speculative evidence ) are unimaginable ; since 't is most manifest , that what is neither self-evident , nor made-evident is not evident at all . hence is seen , that 't is impossible , the nature of principles once rightly understood , errour ( on whose side soever it be ) should maintain it's pretence to principles ; since 't is impossible that any thing should either be self-evident or made-evident which is not a real truth ; as also impossible that what 's evident any way ( or , which is all one , a truth ) should patronize or abett errour . this way then of managing controversies is perfectly decisive ; for which reason i have frequently prest his party to it in my letter to my answerer and other places , and have been seconded therein by the learned and worthy author of protestancy without principles ; but none was ever found so hardy to attempt it , till this man of mettle , hoping his tinkling expression and gingling wit would baffle even truth it self , took the confidence to talk of what he never understood . however he is to be thank't by us both and acknowledg'd a generous adversary , that , laying aside at present those frivolous inconclusive ways of quoting authorities which himself holds may deceive us in all they say , as also those insignificant devices of pretty jests and other rhetorical dexterities , he accepts our challenge to such a manner of fight , as must necessarily be fatal to one side and victorious to the other . had he stated also the nature of principles exactly , and shown his to be such , how formidable a goliah had he appear'd , and how terrible a man of his hands ? whereas now , if it comes to be discover'd that what he call'd a sword , or a canon , is indeed but a bul-rush , or pot-gun ( a pygmy's proper weapons , ) that is , if it be prov'd that those things he bragg'd of and rely'd on as principles , are in reality but so many paradoxes or impertinences , i hope we may s●●cease our fears , and turn them into a more pleasant humour . though the prognostick be very obvious what he can do in this case , yet who knows but for once he may work an impossibility , who ( as will appear in the ensuing treatise ) has told us so many contradictions . in the mean time , if he thinks fit to attempt any reply , 't is evident from the former discourse what he is to do , unless he will strangely prevaricate from his duty ; viz. either to disallow my settling here the nature of principles , and state them better , that is either to deny that they are to have any evidence or influence at all ; or else , if he allows it , to make out that his pretended principles have those qualifications ; which is best done by resolving them into first principles and connecting them distinctly with their respective consequences . and let him remember that , till he does this , he neither defends himself against my present answer , nor gives a home reply to protestancy without principles ( whatever gay things or things he sayes to particular passages in it ) since himself acknowledges these principles of his were intended an answer to that book ▪ and out of the nature of both treatises they appear to be the proper return to it . i have no occasion , nor is it my intent here to write against the church of england or any of her legitimate sons : rather i must declare that , in case they all hold as m. thorndike ( a man of eminent learning & esteem amongst them ) declares himself to do ( just weights , p. . ) that the scripture interpreted by the perpetual practice of god's church is the ground of faith , which implies , that practical tradition is that which gives them christs sense or faith , and so is their rule i must heartily applaud their joyning with catholicks in the main point of all , and which settled is apt to unite us in all the rest . what i impugn then here is a pestilent tenet , destructive to all episcopacy , and the very essence of church ; making church-governors useless in their main duty of teaching faith to their flock , and lame in that of government : for , if every private man is to rely on his own interpretation , he ought neither believe nor obey the church when the contrary seems to his fancy to be grounded in scripture ; and , if that man do but alledge he judges in clear in scripture , and consequently that the church is corrupt and errs : i see not with what iustice , according to these principles , the church can either excommunicate him or bind him to his duty . i expect dr. st. will object , that i deny divers of his principles which some of ours have granted ; for his friend dr. t. and he abound in such sleight topicks ; to which , though i could answer , that unusquisque in sensu suo abundat in productions of human reason , yet i need only alledge dr. st's ambi-dextrous and ambigu●us way of contriving his principles to look so with different faces that even the same man may sometimes apprehend them to mean thus , sometimes otherwise . besides , all his confuters aym n●t at one end : mr. e. w. intending only to shew they conclude not the point they pretend , and which is superscribed to them : mr. n. o. to shew their destructiveness to government ; while i take for my task to discover their oppositness to all logick ; true learning , and common rationality , and that there is nothing at all in him of what was pretended , neither principles , consequences , connexion , conclusions , reduction , influence nor end : nor must he think that every thing that is granted by any for dispute s●ke is allowed for good by the respondent ; 't is frequent to express we grant things which we only pass as nothing to the main point which is to be concluded ; nor can dr. st. pretend with any reason that others have yeelded them to be principles whereas i deny it : the authour of reason and religion , p. . has pithily declared his 〈◊〉 of them and their true merit , in 〈◊〉 words : — whether the fore-mentioned principles be true , false , controverted , or obscure , no verity peculiar to 〈…〉 be deduc't from them , — which expresses their want of clear evidence , and so quite degrades them from the dignity of principles . if any think the title prefixt to this book forestals immodestly the readers iudgment ; my reply usust be , that i hope for readers of more prudence then to receive prejudice from so easie an occasion . a counterfeit modesty sprung from sceptical despair or disregard of truth will naturally dislike such expressions ; but those who heartily hold there is such a thing as truth and intirely love it , will esteem the open avowing her compleat victoriousness both fitting and necessary : and that she conquers at present , i have all the best maxims of rational nature engag'd for my security . index . absolute certainty of faith asserted . p. . . . . attributes of god not engaged to preserve private interpreters of scripture from damnable errours . p. . to . not to be argu'd from alone . p. . . much less from power alone . p. . . certainty how abusively taken . p. . . . . . . . . true certainty asserted and from its deepest grounds explain'd . p. . . moral certainty in faith discust , p. . . . a christian life spiritual . p. . . . . . to . the church turn'd with the heels upward by dr. st. p. . . his six conclusions examin'd . p. . the nature of conclusions laid open . p. . faith in catholicks rational , p. . infallibility requisit to faith. p. . to . . . . . how found in the vulgar , how in others p. . to . mankind how infallible and in what . p. . to . necessary to the being of a church . p. . . . principles agreed to by both sides examin'd p. . . &c. shown to be two-fold p. . principles not agreed to , examin'd . the st p. . the d p. . the d. p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th th th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . the th p. . rule of faith distinctly clear'd . p . . . . . &c. vnanimously held by catholicks . p. . . how held by the council of trent . p. . . scripture not the rule p. . to . p. . . how perfect , p. . . &c. . to . sophistry in dr. st. laid open p. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ignorance in divinity p. . . in logick , p. . . . his performances reduc't to their proper principles , contradictions . p. . tradition the rule of faith p. . . . . vnion how to be hoped . p. . . writing how capable to be the rule of faith. p. . . . errata . page . line . receive . p. . l. . perfectly . p. . l , . disparate . p. . l. ● . then we can p. . l. . again . p. . l. . dele and this as far &c. to the end of the th line after . p. . l. . dele of . p. . l. . endeavorers . l. . endeavorers . p. . l. . dele we . p. ● . l. . his . p. . l. . and. p. . l. . dele in the. p. ● . . l. . infallibly . l. . then . p. . l. . be false . l. . about . p. . l. . if . p. ● . l. . as . l. . dele be . p. . l. . dele if . p : . l. . to a higher degree . p. . l. . which are . p. . l. . degree . p. . l. . ground . p. . l. . reason given . l. . keep men . p. . l. . is . p. . l. . dissatisfaction . l. . some . p. . l. . conformable . l. . it . l. . by her all . p. . l. . our . p. . l. . receiv'd . p. . l. . in wisemen in this point . p. . l. ult . the th and th . p. . l. . dele to . p. . l. . its . p . l. . dr. st. p. . l. . applying it . p. . l. . produc't one . p. . l. . not . the first examen concerning dr. stillingfleet's design in this discourse , as exprest in his title . . in the first place , the title superscribed to this discourse , and signifying to us the nature and design of it , is to be well weighed ; that so , we may make a right conceit of what we are justly to expect from dr. st. in this occasion : 't is this , [ the faith of protestants reduc'd to principles . ] . now principles , as we have discours'd in the preface , must either be evident to both parties , or at least , held and granted by both ; else no discourse can proceed for want of agreement in that on which all rational process is grounded . also , they must be proper for the end intended , or influential upon the conclusion which the arguer aims to evince : otherwise , if the thing in question deceive not its evidence and truth from them , though those propositions be never so evident in themselves , yet they cannot be to it , or in this circumstance a principle , whatever they may be in others . wherefore , to make good this title , dr. st. is to produce nothing for a principle , but what is either granted at first by both parties , or else is of so open and undeniable an evidence , as all the world must see and acknowledge it ; such as are either first principles , or those which immediatly depend upon them , and are comprehended under them : or , if he builds on any propositions as principles , which are not thus evident but need proof , he is at least to render them evident ere he builds upon them , and , lastly , he is to apply them close to that which he professes to conclude from them ; otherwise , he can never show them to be principles in this occasion , any more than one can be a father who has no off-spring , or than any thing can be a ground which has no superstructures . . next , we are to consider what dr. st. means by the word [ faith ] in this place . and , i hope , he will not think i injure him in supposing he has so good thoughts of the faith of protestants , as to hold 't is more than a bare opinion , whose grounds may all be false : for if so , the assent of protestants as faithful , may possibly be an error , and all the tenets they profess to be truths , and hope to be sav'd by believing them , liable to be prov'd nothing , perhaps in reality but a company of lies . if then ( as in this supposition he must ) he hol●s the 〈◊〉 of protestants impossible to be fa●●e , he is 〈◊〉 to reduce it into 〈◊〉 grounds and principles as are likew●●e impossible to be false ; and , consequently , if it relies on authority , he is to bring infallible authority for it ; all that is fallible ( as common sense teaches ) admitting possibility of falshood in whatever is grounded on it . such grounds then or principles he is oblig'd to produce for the faith of protestants , in case he holds it may not perhaps be an error for any thing he or his church knows but , in case he judges this assent or belief of protestants may be true faith though the grounds of it may be false , then he ows me an answer to faith vindicated , where the contrary is prov'd by multitudes of arguments ; not one of which has yet receiv'd one word of sober reply from him or dr. tillotson ; though , as appears by the inferences at the end of that book , it most highly concerns them both to speak to the several reasons it contains . . in the third place we are to reflect what may be meant by the word [ reduc'd ] in the said title . and , since all truths not self-evident , nor known by immediate impression on sense , are at first deriv'd or deduc'd from principles ; this word [ reduc'd ] having a signification directly contrary to the other , intimates to us , that dr. st. makes account he has begun by putting the faith of protestants which is the conclusion , and brought it back ( for so the word [ reduc'd ] imports ) to principles ; whereas 't is evident to every scholar , he proceeds in a way quite contrary to what he here pretends . first , laying six principles agreed on , then thirty others , which , since they go before his conclusions we are to think he meant for principles too , and thence drawing in the close , six inferences or sequels ; which is most manifestly to deduce from principles , not to reduce to them . . but , however it be blameable in one who owns himself a scholar , especially pretending the rigorous and learned way of proceeding by principles , not to understand the nature of the way himself takes ; yet let us kindly suppose that dr. st. out of an unwariness only , made use by chance of an improper word ; which being but a human lapse , is more easily pardonable ; especially , since the method he here undertakes , viz. to begin with principles , is ( if rightly manag'd and perform'd ) the most honorable for a scholar , and the most satisfactory that may be , and , so , deserving to make amends for many greater faults . let him then by [ reduc'd to principles ] mean deduc'd from principles ] yet since both reducing and deducing , imply the showing a connexion between those principles , and what 's pretended to be drawn from them ; and this either immediate , as to every particular conclusion , or mediate : we are to expect dr. st. should still show us this connexion : which is best and most clearly done , by relating each of his six conclusions to their respective premisses or principles : that so , by this distinct proceeding and owning particularly whence each deduction follows , we may be better enabled to discover the goodness of his consequences , and thence discern clearly the truth of those conclusions ; which we are to suppose , his intention in making those discourses . . in the last place we are to weigh very well what is meant by that signal and particularizing word [ protestants : ] for 't is the faith of these and these only , which he undertakes here to reduce to principles . and i will have the kindness for him , as to suppose he so much zeals the purity of the protestant church , as not to defile her with the mixture of anabaptists , independents , quakers , and such like , much less the most abominable socinians who deny the trinity , and the godhead of christ. therefore , these being secluded from the notion and name of protestants , we are encouraged by this title to expect such a discourse as is not proper for socinians , or any of those other sects to alledge for themselves ; otherwise it might and ought with as much right be entitled the faith of socinians , quakers , &c. ( as the faith of protestants ) reduc'd to principles . the sum then of what we are by this title to expect from dr. st. is this ; viz. to shew us such grounds for our assent to points as divinely reveal'd , as are impossible to be erroneous ; and such as are not competent allegations for socinians , arians , &c. but proper to protestants only : also , that these grounds or principles are such as are either self-evident or made evident . and this he is oblig'd necessarily to do , unless he will sustain either that socinians , fift-monarchists , &c. are protestants ; or , that the faith of protestants is but opinion ; or , that there can be any principles which are neither evident of themselves nor by means of others , that is , no ways evident , or not evident at all : or , lastly , that he can show us any conclusion reduc'd to principles , or deduc'd from them , without shewing us that it is connected with them . this then is what dr. st's words bid us expect from him ; let us see now how he answers this expectation . second examen . six principles agreed on by both sides examin'd , and their import and vse weigh'd . . he begins with laying down six principles agreed on by both sides ; and they are ( as to the main ) all of them very true and granted by us , if rightly understood : wherefore in case any ambiguous word do occur , i am to explain it , that so our perfect concurrence with him in admitting them may be rightly apprehended , and the discourse more unoffensively proceed , in case these principles should come hereafter to be made use of . they are these . . that there is a god from whom man and all other creatures had their being . . that the notion of god doth imply that he is a being absolutely perfect , and therefore , iustice , goodness , wisdome and truth must be in him to the highest degree of perfection . these two first are rigorously and literally true , and worded very exactly . . that man receiving his being from god , is thereby bound to obey his will , and consequently is liable to punishment in case of disobedience . this proposition is also most true ; yet that it may more throughly be penetrated and rightly apprehended , it were not amiss to note , that though the word [ obey ] generally amongst us signifies doing some outward action will'd by another , yet in this occasion 't is to signifie also , nay principally , the exercising interiour acts of our soul , viz. of faith , hope and charity ; in which kind of acts consists our spiritual life , as we are christians . that then this principle may be better understood , i discourse it thus ; that , because god , as far as concerns his own inclination ( or rather nature ) precisely , out of his over-flowing goodness will all good , and amongst the rest , the means to eternal happiness to his creatures ; and the believing in him , hoping all good from him , and loving him are such virtues or perfections of the soul as are apt and connatural means to raise and dispose it towards the attainment of bliss or fruition of the deity , hence he wills that man should believe on him , hope in him , and love him ; whence are apt to follow the outward observances of his law , and if they follow not out of these motives they are not properly virtues or truly perfective of the soul in order to its last end , nor available in the least to the attainment of bliss ; nor acts of obedience to god's will , nor in true speech the keeping his commandments . god therefore willing us happiness to be attain'd through the proper means to it , it follows that those who disobey this holy will of his , that is , those who do not cultivate their minds with the said virtues of faith , hope and charity , become liable by such their disobedience to eternal misery ; as wanting through this neglect , the proper means which is to elevate them to the capacity of attaining heaven . . that in order to man's obeying the will of god , it is necessary he know what it is ; for which some manifestation of the will of god is necessary , both that man may know what he hath to do , and that god may justly punish him , if he do it not . . whatever god reveals to man is infallibly true , and being intended for the rule of man's obedience may be certainly known to be his will. i approve very wel of these two principles . and to this end i make it my request to the proposer of them , that the word [ manifestation ] and [ certainly known ] may be understood in their proper signification for that which is true , or absolute certainty ; and not be taken abusively as dr. t. still takes it for such a certainty as is indeed incertainty , as is shown at large in reason against raillery and faith vindicated . again , that we may know whether this be a principle agreed to by both sides , as dr. st. pretends , i shall first put down our tenet , which is ; that ( at least ) the pastors of the church , who are to teach the faithful , convert unbelievers , ( amongst whom are many acute wits ) as also to defend their faith , and make out the truth of it , may , nay must have infallible grounds , and so be infallibly or knowingly certain of what god revealed to man , that is , of their faith. if then dr. st. grants the wisest portion in gods church to be thus infallibly certain of their faith , we agree with him in this proposition ; but if he denies this kind of certainty to them , and consequently ( there being no middle between infallible and fallible ) says they , and so , the whole church is only fallibly-certain of what they believe ; he both speaks non-sense , and lays for a principle agreed on by both sides , that which is absolutely deny'd by us , and indeed the main point in controversy between us . . god cannot act contrary to those essential attributes of iustice , wisdom , goodness and truth in any way which he makes choice of to make known his will unto man by . this principle is absolutely granted , having no fault in it , but that it expresses not all the truth it ought ; for god not only cannot act contrary to those essential attributes , but he is oblig'd by his very nature to act perfectly according to them , in making choice of such a way or rule to make known his will unto man by , as shall be ( all things consider'd ) most proper for mankind ; that is , most suitable to the respective capacities of those who are to be led by it , that so their acts of faith ( as far as they spring from the provision of motives laid by god ) may be pefectly rational ; and also most effectual to the end for which god intended that rule and faith which depends on it . these are the six principles dr. st. proposes as agreed to by both sides ; which ( in the main , and thus understood ) are of so universal a nature , and such sacred truths , that if he draws any necessary consequences from them to the establishing the faith of protestants , or overthrowing that of catholicks ( which latter seems chiefly intended ) his victory is likely to be very compleat ; if he does not , but rather makes no use at all of them in concluding from them what he pretends , and his title imports , it must needs be understood that they were only produc'd to make a plausible show , and to prepare the readers mind to apprehend he must necessarily conquer all before him , having such sacred principles engag'd in his patronage . one thing more i am to add on this occasion ; which is , that no discourse at all can proceed , unless all the principles be agreed to by both sides ; for , if the person against whom we argue deny our principles , 't is a folly to hope by means of them , to force him to admit of the conclusion depending solely on those principles for its truth and evidence . but we are to reflect , that an adversary may two manner of ways grant us our principles ; either voluntarily and of his own accord ; or else forcibly , that is , convinc'd by strength of argument , if the principles be subordinate ones , and so can admit proof ; or for fear of shame from human nature , if they either be first principles , or that the controversy by discourse be reduc'd to that most evident test. since then dr. st. makes account we yeild him but these six voluntarily , we are to expect from him such manifest proofs for the other thirty , as may make us by the clearness of their evidence , or under the penalty of having mankind our enemy for deserting rational nature , assent to their verity : otherwise , there is no hopes for him to conclude any thing at all , while we are at liberty to deny every thing he builds on . but alas ! how far is it from such talking disputants , even to think of such performances ; though the necessity of his duty , if he pretends to principles , obliges him unavoidably to it . third examen . sifting the first nine principles that seem to concern the nature of divine revelation in common , and its several ways . after these six principles agreed on , follow thirty other paragraphs , or whatever else we may guess it fit to call them ; and they are introduc'd by this transition . these things being agreed on both sides , we are now to inquire into the particular ways which god hath made choice of for revealing his will to mankind . i expected that since dr. st. had promis'd us to reduce the faith of protestants to principles , he would after he had put down the principles voluntarily agreed to by both sides , have pursu'd the method himself had made choice of , and have produc'd next , the principles made use of by him in this particular matter which we are not voluntarily agreed on ; and either have maintain'd them to be first principles , and so , self-evident ; or else subordinate ones , and deriving their evidence from those first , and therefore have shown us their derivation from them , or connection with them . this had been a method becoming a man pretending to ground himself on principles , especially in a discourse where this , and this only was pretended ; for by this means it might , as reason requires , have been examin'd first , whether those principles had subsisted or no in themselves ; which , if they had , then only the consequences had needed examination ; and so the business of truth had been quickly decided . . but , instead of this candid and clear and methodical proceeding , thirty odd kind of sentences , sections , paragraphs , or i know not what , come hudling in one after another , of such uncouth fashions , such desperate and disagreeing natures , so void of coherence with one another , that none knows well what to call them , not even dr. st. himself , as appears by the carriage of the matter . some of them seem deductions from the principles agreed on . others seem to contain intire discourses of themselves . the illative particle [ therefore ] or its equivalent , which necessarily ushers in all conclusions , is so rarely heard of here , that one would verily think they were all premisses or principles ; but this conceit is again thwarted , because divers of them are meerly hypothetical propositions , involving sometimes such a condition as never was put ; others are bare voluntary assertions and false into the bargain . some few of them pretend modestly to own themselves deductions from some other paragraphs , but yet onely hint it afar off , as it were , not speak it out plainly , as if they fear'd some danger : others pretend to draw a consequence in their close , not at all following from the part foregoing . lastly , the whole mass of them hang together like a rope of ●and for want of declaring their relation to others ; and , though now and then they counterfeit a semblance of some sleight coherence , yet their whole frame is loose and ill-built for want of an orderly and visible dependance of one part on another . now , this odd variety in their complexions puts an attentive considerer at some loss what to name them ; no apellation fitting the thirty but that which is common to such quantities of matter or multitudes of lines ( whether it be sense or non-sense ) such as are paragraphs , sections , and such like : since their motly nature will neither let us call them deductions , nor conclusions , nor principles , nor propositions , nor discourses , nor inferences , nor postulatums , nor axioms , nor maxims , nor proofs , nor any thing of any such nature ; and yet all this while the superscription is , the faith of protestants reduc'd to principles . . it were not amiss for all that , to consider what dr. st. himself calls them , and to hope thence for some better knowledge of their nature than we could attain to by our own consideration . but he is at variance with himself about the point , no one common name being capable to fit them all , where the things to be named are of so many parishes or families . all he does ( as appears by his transition ) to make them all taken together , amount to an inquiry into the particular ways which god had made choice of for revealing his will to mankind . i do not by any means like this insignificant word [ inquiry ] 't is so very safe , that 't is absolutely inconfutable . had he said candidly and plainly , [ here follow the principles not agreed on voluntarily which therefore i will make evident , that my adversary's reason may be forc'd to acknowledg their verity , and by that means my discourse proceed , and way be made towards some conclusion ] he had offer'd me some play , for then i might possibly have discover'd the weakness or inevidence of his principles , or the slackness of his consequences ; but now all my attempts are defeated by this one pretty word [ inquiry ] for though i should hap to confute every line in all the thirty paragraphs , yet still after all this , none can deny but he has inquir'd into the point in hand , whether he have produc'd one word to evince it , or no : thus dr. t. ( in his late preface ) got rid of the hardest and mainly concerning passage in sure-footing , by vertue of two insignificant words , alledging that he had [ sufficiently consider'd ] it in his rule of faith , which words were perfectly verify'd , though ( as appears in reason against raillery disc. th ) he readily granted all i contended for as to that point . once more i desire our learned readers to reflect on the different manner in which i and my adversaries bear our selves towards one another . i candidly avow my grounds to be evident principles , my consequences to be necessary , my arguments to be absolutely - conclusive or demonstrative ; and by so doing i offer them all the fair play imaginable ; and , ( trusting to the invincible force of truth ) expose my self freely for them to lay hold of my discourse where they see it their best advantage . they on the other side make a show indeed of bringing their faith to principles , because the very pretence is honorable ; but when it comes to performance are so far from owning the principles they proceed on for such , that ( except in those six agreed on , which , as shall be shown , are not one jot influential to the point they are aim'd to evince ) they not so much as name the word [ principle ] nor vouch any argument conclusive , or any consequence to be necessary , much less candidly affirm such in particular to be thus qualifi'd ; but hide and obscure all these in one dow-bak'd slippery word [ inquiry ] by which means none can tell where to take any sure hold of any part of their discourse . . notwithstanding that dr. st. is thus shy to name these thirty paragraphs , principles , in regard they are so monstrously unlike those clear and evident truths , which use , and ought to bear that sacred name ; yet 't is manifest by his carriage he meant them for such , and would have them thought such too ; for they immediately follow after the six principles voluntarily agreed on , as if they were the other sort of principles , not voluntarily agreed to ; and all of them antecede his six conclusions or sequels which he puts immediately to follow out of them . again , the running title superscrib'd to them is , [ the faith of protestants reduc'd to principles : ] all which manifests to us beyond evasion that he makes use of and relies on them as principles , though he be something bashful to call them so directly . wherefore in compliance with his intention , we will for once strain a word to the highest catachresis that may be , and by a strange antiphrasis , call black , white , and all these paragraphs , principles . . yet , though there be nothing of candid and clear and consonant to any maxims even of natural logick in this discourse , yet i must allow that there is as much cunning and slight and sophistry in it , as could well be stufft into so narrow a room : wherefore , that i may not be like him , i shall openly profess before hand what i undertake , viz. to show plainly that he hath not spoke one efficacious word to the purpose he intended ; that is , he has not produc'd any one principle , one reason , one argument , either settling in the least , the faith of protestants , nor unsetling that of catholicks . this will be seen by our examination of each particular principle in order , and the answer to them . to which i now address . . an entire obedience to the will of god being agreed to be the condition of mans happiness , no other way of revelation is in it self necessary to that end ; than such whereby man may know what the will of god is . love of god above all things , and of our neighbour for his sake being the fulfilling of the law , does by consequence include in it self eminently an intire obedience to the will of god , and is agreed to be the condition of mans happiness . yet this love or charity presupposing hope , and both hope and love presupposing faith as their basis ; both of these do by consequence come within the compass of obeying the will of god , and are in their several manners and according to their several natures [ conditions of mans happiness . ] as i doubt not but all sober protestants will grant . again , faith being part of our obedience to the will of god , and so , commanded by him , and it being against those attributes of god agreed on by both sides , to command man to act contrary to the right nature himself had given him and establish'd it essential to him , that is , contrary to true reason ; also , faith being a virtue , and so agreeable to right nature , nay more , a supernatural virtue , and so , perfecting and elevating right nature or true reason , not debasing or destroying it ; it follows , from these and many other reasons alledg'd in faith vindicated , that this part of our obedience call'd [ faith ] must be rationabile obsequium , a reasonable obedience , and that our assent call'd [ belief ] taking it as impos'd by god , is conformable to maxims of right reason , and that it perfects , and not in the least perverts human nature . but it is directly opposit to human nature as given us by god , or to right reason , to assent and profess that points of faith are true ( as the nature of christianity settled by our saviour enjoyns us ) in case we are to rely solely on the divine authority for the formal motive of this our believing or holding them such , and yet when we come to doubt concerning their truth , cannot possibly arrive to see any grounds absolutely certain , that the divine authority is indeed engag'd for the truth of the said points . also , 't is quite opposite to human nature to love heaven above all things , in case there be not grounds absolutely certain that god has told us there is such a thing as heaven , or such a blissful state attai●●ble by us in the sight of him : wherefore , when dr. st. says no other way of revelation is in it self necessary to this end , or to the entire obedience to gods will , than such whereby man may know what the will of god is ; we are to mean by the word [ know ] that at least the governing part of gods church , or ecclesia docens , may be absolutly-certain that the points of faith , ( the assenting to and professing which , and grounding upon them hope and this all-over-powering love of heaven , the main part of our obedience ) are true or impossible to be false . if then dr. st. takes the word know in this signification , this principle is granted : if in any other , or for a great hope only that they are true ( as i fear when it comes to the point , he intends no more ) i must for the reasons here given , and many more alledg'd in faith vindicated , and reason against raillery , deny that no other way of revelation is necessary , and put him to prove it , which he neither has done , nor can do . . man being fram'd a rational creature capable of reflecting upon himself may antecedently to any external revelation , certainly know the being of god and his dependance upon him ; and those things which are naturally pleasing unto him ; else there could be no such thing as a law of nature , or any principles of natural religion . i suppose he means by the word [ god ] the true god , and then 't is not so evident that every man in the state of corrupt nature may arrive to know him , however some few may , and in the state of right nature , all. and in case he takes the words [ certainly know ] in their proper signification , then he may consider how ill his friend dr. tillotson discourses , who professes not to have , even with the assistance of christianity , that certain knowledge of the being of god , which ( as dr. still says ) was attainable by the meer light of natural reason . . all supernatural and external revelation must suppose the truth of natural religion ; for , unless we be antecedently certain that there is a god , and that we are capable of knowing him , it is impossible to be certain that god hath reveal'd his will to us by any supernatural means . if he means here priority of nature ; 't is to be granted ; for this proposition [ god has reveal'd ] implies and presupposes as its basis [ god is ] but , if he understands it of priority of time , as i conceive he does , then i both deny the proposition , and the validity of the reason given for it . for , 't is evident both by reason and experience , that manifest and convictive miracles ( which are supernatural and external revelations ) done before the heathens , who yet know not the true god , in testimony of christianty , at once or at the same time made it certain that he whom we adore is the true god , and also that god reveal'd his will by supernatural means : and so 't is not impossible ( as dr. st. here affirms ) to be certain of such a revelation , without knowing any time before hand that there is a god , nor must all supernatural and external revelation needs suppose the truth of natural religion , that is , of the knowledge of the true god , as he pretends ; since such a revelation may cause that knowledge , and so antecede it , not be antecedent to it . ▪ nothing ought to be admitted for divine revelation which overthrows the certainty of those principles which must be antecedently suppos'd to all divine revelation . for that were to overthrow the means whereby we are to judge concerning the truth of any divine revelation . this discourse seems at the first show to carry so clear an evidence with it , that nothing appears so irrational as to doubt or dispute it . and indeed 't is no less , if the words in which it is couch'd be not equivocally taken , but still be meant in the same sence . to prevent then the growth of a witty piece of sophistry which i foresee creeping in under the disguise of an ambiguous word , i am to provide against it with a distinction both pertinent and necessary to the present matter . these words [ divine revelation ] may either mean the way or act of revealing , or else they may mean the thing divinely reveal'd , that is , the point of faith : which differ as showing and thing shown , or as an action and it's effect . in the same manner as the word tradition is sometimes taken for the way of delivery , sometimes for the thing or point delivered . when they are taken for the one , when for the other , partly the circumstances and the aim of the discourse determin , partly some annext particle or variation of the word ; so that , if they be taken for the thing reveal'd or deliver'd , and be express'd singularly , 't is call'd a divine revelation , or a tradition ; if plurally , divine revelations , or traditions . now it seems something doubtful in whether sense it be taken here , for § . . he speaks of the way of revelation , which can onely mean revealing , and in the two following ones 't is taken in the same sense as appears by the words [ god hath reveal'd ] found in the third . but this matters not much , so it be here taken in the same sense throughout ; which i fear 't is not ; for , the word [ revelation ] is here made use of thrice ; and , in the first and last place it seems plainly to mean the points revealed ; in the middle the way or act of revealing ; yet the two following principles incline the doubtfulness of the expression to mean the points of faith themselves ; though this be , to speak moderately , by far the more preposterous and absurd tenet , as shall hereafter be shown . but i am to provide for both parts since i am to skirmish with such an ambidextrous adversary ; and therefore , applying this discourse to his proposition , i distinguish thus , and grant that nothing ought to be admitted for divine revelation ( taking those words to signifie the act of revealing ) which overthrows the certainty of those principles which must be antecedently supposed to the act of revealing : also i grant that nothing ought to be admitted for divine revelation ( taking those words to signifie points of faith revealed ) which overthrows the certainty of those principles which must be antecedently suppos'd to those points . this is candid and clear dealing , and far from that sophistical and equivocating ambiguity which ( contrary to the genius of truth ) he so constantly and so industriously affects . . there can be no other means imagin'd whereby we are to judge of the truth of divine revelation , but a faculty in us of discerning truth and falshood in matters proposed to our belief ; which if we do not exercise in judging the truth of divine revelation , we must be impos'd upon by every thing which pretends to be so . here are many quaint things to be considered . for , if dr. st. means that we cannot judge of truth without a faculty to judge of truth , 't is a 〈…〉 principle , though very litt●● 〈◊〉 his purpose . but 't is most 〈◊〉 para●oxical to say that no other means can be imagin'd to judge of divine revelation , but such a faculty . for , if there can be no other means imagin'd but this faculty , then this is all the means ; and so those knowledges which are to inform and direct this faculty are no means at all : whence all motives to faith , rule of faith , all teaching , nay scripture it self are to no purpose ; for none of these are our faculty of discerning truth and falshood . again , what is meant here by [ divine revelation ? ] if it be meant of the formal act of revealing , then 't is false that there can be no other means to judge of its truth but a faculty in us of discerning truth and falshood in matters proposed to our belief : for these matters are points of faith , and 't is a madness to think we must begin with examining their truth ere we can know that god has truly or indeed reveal'd them ; since the knowledge that god has reveal'd or spoken is had ordinarily by natural means antecedent even to the revelation it self , much more antecedent to those points ; viz. by the rule of faith , which shows the divine authority engag'd for their truth . but , if he means by divine revelation the things or points divinely reveal'd , and ( as appears by those words [ matters propos'd to our belief ] he bends strongly that way ) then the sense is evidently this , that we must judge the truth of the points of faith by exercising a faculty of judging of the truth of those points : and since to judge is to exercise our faculty of judging , it amounts plainly to this , that we must judge of the truth of points of faith by judging of the truth of points of faith ; which is an identical proposition and perfectly true , but not at all to his purpose . yet it is too : for 't is creditable now and then to speak clear evidences , however in reality they prove impertinencies . but if dr. st. means nothing but that we must use our faculty of discerning truth and falshood , that is indeed our reason even in assenting to things above reason , or to mysteries of faith , he says very right : for 't is most rational to believe that to be true which god , who is essential verity , has said ; and exceedingly rational to believe god has said it , or ( which is all one in our case ) that christ and his apostles have taught it , upon an authority inerrable in that affair . and thus my faith may be most rational without exercising my reason in scanning and debating the truth or falshood of the matters propos'd to my belief , or examining the points of faith themselves . nay more this method of his is most preposterous and absurd ; for , the mysteries or points of faith being elevated above the pitch of our ordinary natural reason , and such , ( for the most part ) in which gods infinity most exerts ( as we may say ) it 's utmost , but the knowledge of the rule of faith which is to ascertain to us the divine revelation or that god has told us them , lying level to our reason as inform'd by natural knowledges ; hence , to relinquish the method of examining the truth of divine revelation by those knowledges which lie within our own ken , and to begin with those which are most elevated above it ( as it is to comprehend the extent of gods infinite power ) is both against all art and common sense : both which tell us we must begin with what 's more easily knowable and thence proceed to what is less knowable . nor is there any danger of being impos'd upon by everything that pretends to be divine revelation ( as the dr. scruples , ) as long as we are certain that god cannot lie , and that god has said this ; for these put , the thing is most certainly true. . the pretence of infallibility in any person or society of men must be judged in the same way that the truth of a divine revelation is ; for that infallibility being challeng'd by virtue of a supernatural assistance , and for that end to assure men what the will of god is , the same means must be us'd for the trial of that , as for any other supernatural way of god's making known his will to men . here the words [ a divine revelation ] which he now first uses , give us to understand that dr. st. means a point of faith and not gods revealing it or divine revelation ; which words he us'd formerly . and this is farther confirm'd by his saying that that infallibility which is challeng'd by vertue of a supernatural assistance must be judg'd in the same way that the truth of a divine revelation is : for , such an infallibility through supernatural assistance of the holy ghost , consists in the sanctity of the church , which is a point of faith , and so the words [ a divine revelation ] which he joyns and parallels to it , must mean a point of faith also . whence is discern'd what marvellous dexterity dr. st. hath us'd to gain a notable point against us , and how smoothly he hath slided from gods revealing faith to us , or the act call'd revelation , to the points of faith reveal'd : in hope by this confounding one with another to perswade his unattentive reader ; that , because 't is the only right way of procedure to begin with the using our natural reason so to judge whether god hath revealed such a point or no ; therefore 't is fit to begin with the same method in examining the points of faith themselves which pretend to be reveal'd , and thence conclude whether they be indeed divinely reveal'd or no : which how absurd it is hath lately been shown . but to come closer and apply this to his present discourse . the pretence of infallibility by virtue of supernatural assistance must indeed be judged in the same way that the truth of a divine revelation is ; for both of them being points of faith must be judged by the same way all other points of faith are ; viz. by the evidence there is that the divine authority cannot deceive , and that it stands engaged for those points . . it being in the power of god to make choice of several ways of revealing 〈◊〉 will to us , we ought not to dispute from the attributes of god the necessity of one particular w●y to the exclusion of all others , but we ought to enquire what way god himself hath chosen ; and whatever he hath done , we are sure cannot be repugnant to infinite iustice , wisdome , goodness and truth . i do not remember to have heard that any man living ever went about to dispute from the attributes of god alone , the necessity of one particular way to the exclusion of all others , nor does it appear how 't is possible to do it without considering also the nature of those several ways of revealing : in doing which if we come to discover that only one is ( as things stand ) of it self sufficient for that end , and all others pretended to by those against whom we dispute depend on it for their certainty , then they can safely argue from the attributes of god , particularly his wisdome that none but this could have been actually chosen by him . so that dr. st. seems here to counterfeit an imaginary adversary , having never a real one . this will better appear if we attempt to frame a discourse from gods attributes alone . in endeavouring which it will appear that all we can argue from that single head is this ; that , what 's disagreeable to gods infinite iustice , wisdome , goodness , and truth cannot be will'd by him , and what 's agreeable can . now who sees not that this signifies nothing either to the exclusion or admission of any particular way , unless we subsume thus , but this or that is most agreeable or disagreeable to the said attributes ; whence follows , therefore it is to be admitted , or rejected by him . whence 't is clearly seen that no argument can be drawn from those attributes alone without taking in the consideration of the nature of the way it self , and its sufficiency or insufficiency , as dr. st. himself confesses in common at the end of the th principle , though he perpetually avoids to examin the particular nature of his way , and its fitness of mankind to build faith upon its evidence . yet let us see at least though it be so plain a point how weakly he proves that we are not to argue from those attributes , it being ( says he ) in the power of god to make choice of several ways , &c. we ought not to dispute from the attributes of god the necessity of one particular , &c. so that the argument stands thus , because 't is within the extent of gods power , therefore it crosses not but agrees with all those other attributes ; otherwise , if it did , we could with good reason argue from them against gods having made choice of such a way . now this reason of his is so palpably absurd that i admire the meanest divine living could stumble upon it . for what man who holds god omnipotent can doubt but that his power can reach to reveal his will to every single man by hourly apparitions , the flying of birds , nocturnal dreams , or throwing of dice upon a fortune-book : yet no wise man will doubt but were we to inquire what is the way fit for god to reveal his will to mankind by , we should reject these as misbecoming gods wisdom , &c. and for the same reason all others but one , in case nonex but that one were of it self qualified to do that effect as it ought , and so befitting gods wisdome to make choice of it ; and yet , notwithstanding all this , it might lie within the the compass of the power of god to chuse several others . it follows ; but we ought to enquire what way god himself hath chosen ; and whatever he hath done we are sure cannot be repugnant to infinit iustice , wisdom , goodness and truth . all this is yeilded to , unless he means this to be the only way of arguing from gods attributes , as he would seem ; which i must deny , and demand of him why 't is not equally argumentative to say , this way of revealing or rule of faith , as both experience and reason shows , is evidently incompetent to give faith that certainty which its nature and the many effects to be produc'd by it , and obligations incumbent on it , require it should have ; therefore i am sure 't is repugnant to gods justice , wisdom , goodness and truth , and so can never have been chosen by him . or thus ; god is infinitly wise , good , iust and true ; therefore he hath not chosen a way so incompetent to those ends. in the same manner as out of the known incapacity of a sieve to draw water , or to ferry one over the sea to the indies , we may conclude demonstratively that 't is unbeseeming gods infinite wisdome , goodness , justice and truth to assign that for a means to attain that end : or , if god in some extraordinary case intends such a miracle , 't is necessary all those who are to use those means be absolutely assur'd of this wonderful assistance ; otherwise if they compass not that end , but perish in the sea , they may blame their own presumptuous rashness ( which would needs tempt god ) for their miscarriage and not god , who never bound himself by promise in frequent and ordinary transactions to bring about effects miraculously by imcompetent causes . how weakly dr. st. presumes rather than proves that god has chosen scriptures letter to be the rule of faith will be seen hereafter . . whatever way is capable of certainly conveying the will of god to us may be made choice of by him for the means of making known his will in order to the happiness of mankind . so that no argument can be sufficient à priori , to prove that god cannot chuse any particular way to reveal his mind by , but such which evidently proves the insufficiency of that means for conveying the will of god to us . first , taking the words [ certain conveying ] to mean absolute certainty as i prov'd before in this , and in divers treatises of mine to be requisit , i am next to distinguish the word [ capable ] which may either mean that the way in common may possibly bear it , in case it shall please god to use his best power to improve it , and make up its defects with all the assistances it can need . or it may mean that such a way or manner , as it stands now on foot in the world ( for example the scriptures letter as 't is now contriv'd ) is of it self capable of conveying the will of god to us with absolute certainty , without needing any other thing to regulate us in the understanding it . whatever is capable in the later sense i grant may be made choice of by god for the means of making known his will : for , this being suppos'd to have in it self actually all that is requisite for such an effect , is fitting to be made use of by god , whose wisdome and goodness it becomes ( when he acts not miraculously ) to use every thing as it is or according to its nature establish'd by the same wisdome . but i deny that what is capable in the former sense may alwaies be thus made choice of by god ; for , however such a way in common may be made capable to do that effect , if it should please god to exert his power to support its natural defectiveness , as is exemplifi'd before in dreams , apparitions , and those other odd methods there mention'd ; yet 't is unsuitable to gods wisdome , goodness or other attributes to show himself so extraordinarily in things which reach the generality of mankind , and this for a perpetuity , and so ought to be allow'd onely his ordinary concourse ; especially if other means be already plac'd in the world able to perform this with a constant , orderly and connatural assistance . if then we can prove the insufficiency of any particular means ( taking it alone as 't is now found extant ) belonging to such a way in common , for example of the scriptures letter as it now is , to give mankind absolute certainty of gods sense , or faith ; then , however the way of writing in common can possibly be supported by gods infinit power so as to be able to work the effect of thus certifying us of its sense , yet not being such of its own nature , taking it as it stands now thus contriv'd , 't is not a fitting instrument for gods ordinary providence to make use of for such a general effect as is the certifying all sorts of people of their faith. there are several ways conceivable by us how god may make known his will to us ; either by immediate voice from heaven , or inward inspiration to every particular person ; or inspiring some to speak personally to others ; or assisting them with an infallible spirit in writing such books which shall contain the will of god for the benefit of distant persons and future ages . all this is granted and much more ; for there are innumerable other ways conceivable how god may make known his will to us , besides those here recounted , in case we regard only gods power to do it , and set aside his wisdome and other attributes ; namely those four ways mention'd by me above , and multitudes of other such . but , out of all these , gods wisdome , which has pre-establish'd the nature of all things , will make choice of that which is fittest to perform the effect intended , that is , to certifie absolutely the first deliver'd faith to us who live now . and , left it should be too early understood which way is best for that end , which would forestall and render void dr. st's future discourses , he therefore very politickly quite leaves out any peculiar mention of our rule of faith , which one might have thought deserv'd a place amongst the rest . leaves out i say , for those words [ or inspiring some to speak personally to others ] sute better with prophetical messengers than with the tradition of gods church . wherefore , premising this note , that it is agreed christ and his apostles taught and settled the whole body of faith at first , and therefore that there needs no more for us to know gods will now , but to find out what is the best means of conveying the same down to our days , i beg leave to supply dr. st's . neglects , and to insert into the middle of this § . these words , [ or else by the way of open attestation of a world of immediate christian fathers to a world of children by living voice and constant practice of what they had learn'd by their daily sensations . ] which had dr. st. done , any considerate reader , whom his much talking of gods power and what god may do , had not diverted from reflecting that his wisdom determins his power in ordinary and general effects to do what accor●ing to the establish'd natures of things is the fittest means to compass such an end , would quickly have inclin'd to judge this the most connatural and fittest way , and therefore actually to have been made choice of by god ; being assisted or supported by the basis of human nature according to its sensations which are naturally fram'd to receive right impressions , and according to his rational faculty , which determins him to speak truth still in open and undisguisable matters of fact ; and , if that body of men call'd the church had any effectual means of goodness in practice amongst them , super-assisted also by grace not to v●ry from right faith , and knowingly deliver a false for a true one . and thus ends the first division of dr. st's . discourse promising to reduce the faith of protestants to principles . in which i observe but a few things even hinted that can make for his purpose : and not so much as any one of them prov'd , but either slightly and slily insinuated , or dexterously brought in , not by connexion of terms , ( far be any such piece of confidence from so learned and profound a jeerer at demonstration ) but by the virtue of some pretty equivocation . i remind the reader of the chief of them by putting some of my opposite propositions , each of which is made good in its respective place . . an entire obedience to the will of god is principally performed by a heartily-assenting faith , a lively hope , and an ardent charity , and not by outward actions otherwise than as they spring from these ; therefore the way of gods revealing his will to us , or the rule of faith which grounds these , must be absolutely-certain or impossible to be false . . the nature of the mysteries or points of faith are more remov'd from our knowledge than those maxims which assure us that god reveal'd them ; therefore 't is not proper to begin with examining those points but the grounds for gods revealing them . . this way of proceeding is perfectly secure ; for , the divine authority being granted veracious , if there be infallible grounds that god has said them , those points are infallibly true : if not , they are not points of ●aith ; and so , not worth examining whether they be true or no. . gods power alone gives us no light what is or is not the rule of faith , but his wisdom , goodness , &c. joyn'd with the knowledge of the fitness or vnfitness of the thing pretended to be so . . gods wisdome makes choice of that way to reveal his will to the generality of mankind , which , according to its nature as now establish'd , is a capable or fit instrument to such an effect ; and not by that way which is only capable to do it by an extraordinary working of his power . these may serve for antidotes to the opposite positions , if he thinks fit to own them . for , though he is able to deliver himself as clearly as most men , if he pleases , yet he affects all over this discourse a strange perplext intricacy and ambiguity ▪ and he puts down his principles in the same manner as a crafty lawyer who had a mind to bring an estate afterwards into dispute , pens writings . much shifting wit there is in them , but nothing of candid , clear and down right . and this intricacy is made greater by his unconnected way of discoursing ; no man living being able to discern in better half of his odd-natur'd principles what influence they have , either immediate or mediate , upon any thing following . the rest of what is contain'd in these nine , are either absurdities , already laid open ; or else impertinent truths , as will be seen by their uselesness in the process of this discourse . a discourse concerning the rule of faith , necessary to the better clearing the following principles . the several ways of revealing , ( at least as many as dr. st ▪ thought fit , ) being propos'd , he goes about in the next place to establish one of them , viz. writing , to have been intended by god to be the rule of faith , or , the fittest means to ascertain faith to us who live now ; and this he does in the first five principles ▪ whence he proceeds to reject the infallibility of any church whatever either to attest or explain those writings ; and this he attempts to prove in the five ●ex● . on this occasion it were not amiss to declare before hand , what i mean by rule of faith , or rather to repeat something of that much i have writ formerly concerning that point in my second appendix to sure-footing , and elsewhere ; that so ( all equivocation being taken away ) it may more clearly be seen where the point sticks on dr. st's . side , as also that his understanding me to have different sentiments from some catholick divines in this matter may be remov'd ; for , if i understand my self or them , there is no variance at all between us in the thing , but only in the word . it being agreed then amongst us all that what christ and his apostles taught is gods word , or his will , and the means to salvation ; all that is to be done by us , as to matters of faith , is to know with absolute certainty what was the first taught doctrine , or christs sense ; and whatever can thus assure us of that , is deservedly call'd the rule of faith. now , the word rule made use of to mean a spiritual or intellectual direction , is metaphorical , or translated from some material thing , as most words that express spiritual notions are ; and 't is one of those kind of metaphors which are transferr'd from one thing to another for some proportion or resemblance between them . for , as a material rule is such a thing , as , if one endeavour to go according to it , and decline not from it , preserves one from going crooked ; so , this intellectual rule call'd the rule of faith , is of that nature , that , if one go according to it , and swerve not from it , it preserves one from going wrong or from erring , in his knowledge of what is true ( or first-deliver'd ) faith ; and faith being intended for persons of all sorts or capacities , the rule of faith must be able to preserve even those of the meanest capacity from erring in faith while they relie upon it. agian , this being the proper and primary effect of the rule of faith , and every nature that is , having essentially in it self a power to produce of its self , and without the assistance of any other its primary effect ( or rather being it self that power ) as man to discourse , fire to burn , &c. it follows that , since to preserve all that relie on it in right faith is the proper effect of the rule of faith , what has not in it self the power to do this , and this of its self , independently on any thing else but on god ( who establishes the natures of all things to be certain powers to produce their proper effect ) is not in true speech a rule of faith : since then not one catholick in the world holds that scriptures letter of it self and independently on something else ( viz th● church's tradition attesting the truth of the same letter , and interpreting it ) has in it self power thus to certifie persons of all capacities of christian faith , without possibility of erring , nor any one but holds the churches authority is able alone to do this effect , ( since 't is known and confest it actually perform'd this in the beginning ) there is not one catholick that i know of who holds either that the scripture is the rule of faith ( taking the words in this sense ) or that any thing but the churches living voice and practice , or tradition is it ; and , so taking the words properly , as i do , they all agree with me . on the other side , taking those words [ the rule of faith ] for any thing that contains faith , or that may signify it with absolute certainty to people of all sorts , not of it self , but meerly by vertue of another , whose power of asserting the truth of the letter in those passages ( at least ) that concern christian faith , and of unerringly interpreting it lends it to be thus certainly significative of gods will ; taking , i say , [ rule of faith ] in this sense , as some of ours do , i grant with them that scripture is a rule of faith. so that still i agree with them in the thing ; only i dissent from them in the word , and judge that this container of christs doctrin , as now describ'd , is but improperly call'd a rule of faith ; as not having in it self the nature of such a rule , that is , not , having a power in it self , and of its self thus to ascertain faith by absolutely engaging the divine authority . this distinction now given i learned from the council of trent ; which no where says that scripture is a rule of faith , as it does expresly of tradition ( sess. . ) but only that it contains faith , as also tradition does ; but whether it contains it in such a manner that all those who are to have faith by relying on it , may by so doing , be absolutely secur'd from erring , which is requisite over and above to make it in true speech deserve the name of a rule , the council says nothing . i am sure it is far from saying that people of all sorts reading the scriptures and attending solely to the letter as interpreted and understood by their private selves , shall be sure never to erre in right faith ; nay , it engages not for their security from erring so much as in any one point ; which yet ought to be said , if scripture in it self , and of it self have the power of regulating them in their faith or be a rule . rather the council by its carriage says the direct contrary ; for , though being about to define against hereticks it professes to follow in its definitions the written word , yet 't is observable * that it no where builds on any place of scripture , but it professes at the same time to build its interpretation of that place on tradition ; which evidently argues that though scripture in the judgment of the council contain'd the point , yet that which indeed regulated the council in its definitions , was the tradition of the church , as it also expresly declares where ever it defines . and i dare say that there is not one catholick in the world who thinks the council knew not both what and how to define against luther and calvin at that time , without needing to seek its faith anew in texts of scripture ; which plainly concludes that the council was not regulated by it , or look'd upon it as her rule , but only consider'd it as of a sacred authority and available against hereticks professing to rely on scripture , and accusing the church for going contrary to the word of god. nay the council defines that none should dare to interpret scripture contrary to the sense which our h. mother the catholick church hath held and does hold ; which clearly takes it out of private hands , and makes the sense of the church , ever held , the only interpreter of scripture , especially in matters of faith , and extends to all scripture ; which unavoidably makes it no rule of faith. i am sure the distinction now given shows my sentiment consistent , if not perfectly agreeing with that common opinion of our divines , that scripture is a partial rule ; or that scripture and tradition integrate one compleat rule . for they clearly mean by those words that faith is partly contain'd in scripture , partly in the tradition of the church . so that what they had an eye to in so doing was not the evidence requisit to a rule , but only the degree of extent of scripture to the matter contain'd in it ; whence 't is evident they meant onely that scripture contain'd some part of faith , which i perfectly allow to it , and perhaps more . this is my judgment concerning the notio● of the rule of faith and what is such a rule ; and these my reasons for that judgment : if any one thinks he can go to work more logically and exactly in finding out the true nature and notion of a rule , and show me i take it improperly , i shall heartily thank him , and acknowledge my mistake . but i never yet discern'd any such attempt , nor do i see any reason to fear any such performance . and i much doubt should any catholick divine out of a charitable intention of union ( which i shall ever commend and heartily approve ) trusting to the equivocalness of the word , say scripture is the rule or a rule , i much doubt ( i say ) that , when the thing comes to be examin'd to the bottom , it will scarce tend to any solid good ; for , however words may bend , yet the true grounds of catholick faith are inflexible ; and we must take heed lest , while we yield them the word , they expect not ( as they may justly , having such occasion ) that we should grant the thing properly signify'd by that word ; which if they do , we must either recede , or else forgo catholick grounds . but now the difference between me and dr. st's party is in the very thing it self , and this as wide as contradiction can distance us . for * dr. t. ( whom he still abetts ) makes it possible that he has neither true letter nor true sense of scripture : that is makes his rule of faith , and consequently his faith built solely on it , possible to be false . and all that go that way fall unavoidably into that precipice , while they admit no grounds but what are fallible , as i have shown at large in faith vindicated and reason against raillery . whereas i still bear up to the impossibility that christian faith should be a ly , and consequently i maintain that the rule of faith which engages the divine authority on which its truth solely depends , and without engaging which it might be all false , must be impossible to be false , or infallibly certain . and hence , taking my rise from the nature of faith , in which all protestants and indeed all that have the name of christians ( except some few speculators ) agree with me , viz. that , taking it as built on those motives left by god for his church to embrace faith , that is , taking it as it ought to be taken , 't is above opinion and impossible to be false ; hence , i say , building on this mutual agreement , i pursue a solid union , which i declare my self most heartily to zeal ; hoping that this point once distinctly clear'd against the sophisms and blinding crafts of some weak heterodox writers , it will quickly appear that 't is every mans concern , who is of capacity , to look after such grounds that the divine authority ( on which the truth of all faith depends ) is engag'd for the points he holds , as are absolutely certain or impossible to be false . and i make account , that , were this quest heartily pursu'd , it would quickly appear , both by others confessing the possible falsehood of theirs , as also by inforcing reasons , nay by dr. tillitsons yielding to the sufficiency of this rule , even when he was to impugn it , that nothing but tradition or the testimony of the church can be such a ground . perhaps also it might be shown that both more learned and more sober protestant authors have own'd the admitting tradition and a reliance on the churches authority for their faith , and for the true sense of scripture in order to the attaining true faith , than those are who have maintain'd this private-spirited way so zealously advanc'd by dr. st. of leaving it to be interpreted by every vulgar head ; to the utter destruction of church , and church-government . this is and shall be my way of endeavouring vnion , which beginning at the bottom , and with our mutual agreement in so main a point that it bears all along with it , viz. the absolute certainty of faith , is hopeful to be solid and well built , and , so , effectual ; if it please god to inspire some eminent and good men to pursue home a principle which themselves have already heartily embrac'd . if not , i have this satisfaction that i have done a due right and honor to christian faith , and given it that advantage by asserting its perfect security from error , as , gods grace assisting , is apt to make it work more efficaciously both interiourly and exteriourly in those who already possess it . fourth examen . sifting the the ten following principles concerning the letter-rule and living rule of faith. the right nature of the rule of faith being thus stated , 't is high time to address to our examen how dr. st. from principles settles us such a rule beginning from his tenth . . if the will of god cannot be sufficiently declar'd to men by writing , it must either be because no writing can be intelligible enough for that end , or that it can never be known to be written by men infallibly assisted . the former is repugnant to common sense , for words are equally capable of being understood , spoken or written ; the later overthrows the possibility of the scriptures being known to be the word of god. i have already said , and in divers books manifoldly prov'd , that no declaration of god's will , or ( which is all one in our case ) no rule of faith , is sufficient , con●●dering the nature and ends of faith , 〈◊〉 obligations arising from it , but 〈…〉 to be false , and built on infallible grounds . this premised , we are to inquire , whether writing be the best way for thus assuring it in all ages to the end of the world . to come then closer to our answer . we are first to reflect again what dr. st. means by the will of god , at least what he ought to mean by it : for , these words at the first sight , seem to signifie onely some external actions commanded by god to be performed or avoided ; and it is the dr's interest they should be taken onely in this sense ; for such a will is more easie to be signifi'd by writing than some other things of a more abstruse , spiritual and dogmatical nature , which yet are of absolute necessity to be believ'd by the church , such as are the points of the trinity , incarnation and godhead of christ who dy'd for us : since then gods will extends not only to aim at mankinds attainment of his last end or true happiness , but also to provide for the best means to it , or , to give us knowledg of those motives which are apt to create in man a hearty love of heaven above all things ( the best condition of mans happiness or immediate disposition to it ) it follows that the holding all those tenets which contain in themselves such motives , do all come within the compass of the will of god. to omit many others , i will instance in two points , of main concern and influence towards christian life ; namely the godhead of christ , and the real presence of christs body in the sacrament . now , who sees not how wonderful an ascendent both these , if verify'd , must needs have over christian hearts ? can any amulet of love be so charming , or apt to elevate to the love of god above all things , as to be ascertain'd that he who was really god , infinite in all his attributes , and infinitely happy in himself , should , purely out of his overflowing goodness toward miserable mankind , take his nature upon him , become his brother , friend , physician , master , nay suffer for his sake many hardships during his life , and at length buffeting , scourging , crowning with thorns , and a most cruel death on the cross ; and to keep the remembrance of these many benefits warm in our hearts to give us after a wonderful manner his most precious body and bloud in a sacrament instituted for that end ; by this means not only reviving the memory of the former incomparable love-motive , but also adding new incitements to that best of virtues by our apprehending lively that he so dearly embreasts and embosoms himself with us by his uniting himself to us through his corporal presence , that so our souls may by means of the love springing from this consideration , feed on , and be united to him spiritually ? on the other side , if these be not truths , but that the church may perhaps erre in embracing them , who sees not that the church it self is idolatrous ( at least , materially ) in giving true divine honor which is proper only to the creator , to a creature ? each of these two points then is of that high concern as to christian life and practice , that it must needs be of its own nature either a most wicked and damnable heresy to deny or else to assert it : wherefore 't is the highest impiety to imagin that god has left no way to ascertain mankind whether these two points ( omitting many others ) be true or false ; since 't is unavoidable they are , if true , the greatest and most efficacious helps to christian devotion that can be ; if false , the greatest hindrances to the same ; as corrupting the best devotions of those christians into idolatrous worship . the knowing then the truth of these and such like , being most certainly will'd by god , we are to expect such a rule of faith as is declarative of these , and such as these , with absolute certainty . let us now consider whether writing be the best means for such an end ; which if it be not , it may certainly be concluded from gods wisdome , goodness , &c. that it hath not been made choice of , or intended by god for it . but 't is observable that dr. st. perpetually waves any discourse of this nature , and chuses rather to argue from gods power ; which though i have already shown how incompetent and absurd it is , let us examine at least what works he makes of it . if ( says he ) the will of god cannot be sufficiently declared to men by writing , it must either be , &c. i must distinguish the words [ cannot be declared by writing ] as i did formerly ; and affirm that they may either mean , that the way of writing , as taken in the whole latitude of its nature and standing under gods infinite power ordering it with all possible advantage to the end intended , cannot sufficiently declare gods will , as to such points : or , they may mean that gods revelation of his will by writing , so qualifi'd as it is now actually found in the scripture , cannot sufficiently , or with absolute certainty declare gods will as to the points aforesaid to men of all capacities in all future ages . taking them in the former sense , i deny the proposition , and say that gods will as to such points can be sufficiently declar'd by writing . for , 't is absolutely within the compass of gods power to contrive a book on that manner as might define exactly , or else explicate at large in what precise sense every word that expresses each point of faith is to be taken , and to provide that it should never be taken in that book in more than that one sense ; or , if in more , to notifie to us in which places 't is taken in a different meaning . he could also have laid it so , that a hundred or two of originals of these books might be preserv'd publickly in several distant countries from the beginning , which might by their perfect agreement bear testimony to one another ; and , so assure us the text was kept hitherto inviolate even to a tittle , and also remain a standard to correct all the multitudes of diverse readings which , as experience shows us , is apt otherwise to set the copies at variance with one another . he could also have so order'd it that the original languages might have been as well understood by the generality of the church as their own is , & so have avoided the uncertainty of translations : again , lest crafty hereticks should at any time for the future , by wittily alluding places , or playing upon words , or other sophistries , pervert the sense ; gods power could have caus'd a book to be written after the manner of a large prophecy , foretelling that in such a time 〈◊〉 place , such and such a heretick should arise , perverting such and such a point , and forewarn men of his sophisms and errours . this and much more might have been effected by gods power to establish writing such an absolutely certain and intelligible way : which why his wisdome should not have done , in case faith be an assent which , while it relies on the ground god has left for mankind cannot be an error , ( as it may be if none can be absolutely certain both of the text and sense of scriptures ) i would gladly be informed : especially since dr. st. tells us here ( princ. . ) there is no need of an infallible society of men , either to attest or explain them , and all that is fallible ( as common sense tells us ) falls short of elevating it above possibility of being an errour : whence follows that there being no means on foot in the world , tradition of the church failing , or being set aside , to secure us absolutely of this ; it can only be had by the extraordinary operation of gods power securing the letter of such writings , and rendering those vvritings themselves perfectly intelligible in the manners assign'd , in case vvriting be indeed the rule of faith . vvriting then can be the rule of faith , or able thus to ascertain faith to us if gods infinit power undertakes the framing it such as i have express'd ; but , because experience tells us 't is not so order'd , let us leave this platonick way of considering how thing , should be in that supposition , and following the aristotelian , consider things as they are ; and accordingly examin how g●ds wisdome has thought fit to order such writings actually ; and thence gather whether ( however 't is agreed between us , they be most excellent for other uses and ends ) they were ever intended by the same wisdome for a rule of faith. to evince the contrary of which , ( not to repeat those many arguments i have brought elsewhere , ) i fartner offer these reasons . first , if the writings of men divinely inspir'd were meant for a rule of faith , then either all such writings , as such , are therefore to belong to that rule , or some onely ; if all , then since some writings granted to have been written by such persons are known to be lost , it may be doubted , nay it ought to be granted that the present written rule is defective in the nature of a rule , unless it be well made out that those divinely-inspir'd writings which were lost were of another nature then these extant , and therefore that they had no part in being a rule : the proofs for which point ought to be very pregnant and convincing ; otherwise it may be question'd whether any books writ by men divinely inspir'd had in them the nature of a rule , or were intended for that end by god. and this is particularly inforc'd , because , dr. s● here ( princ. . ) makes scripture the rule and measure of what we are to believe ; and if the measure fall short , 't is to be fear'd the thing measur'd or faith will fall short likewise . but , if he says onely some of those divinely-inspir'd writings were sufficient , 't is very necessary it should be made out how many are needful ; that so it might be throughly understood what are the precise grounds of christian faith : concerning which yet there is much difference in opinion amongst those who hold the letter-rule ; which signifies that none of them know distinctly what themselves assign or hold to be that rule . or , if he says that onely those which gods providence has preserv'd are that rule ; then he must either say that gods providence therefore preserv'd these because they contain'd holy doctrin and were writ by men divinely-inspir'd , or were apt to benefit future mankind ; and then , by the same reason , those which perish'd should have been preserv'd too ; or else , that god preserv'd these in particular because these which remain are , besides those qualifications , proper and sufficient to be the rule of faith. and then he begs the question , and supposes his own tenet true , even while he is proving it so . nex● , supposing the originals of these books now extant to have been once the rule of faith ▪ it was requisite the church in the beginning shou●d have look'd upon them as such ; and consequently have made account for the first years ( till when they were not collected or universally propos'd ) it had no absolute certainty or entire body of their faith. but , of this we hear not that any had the least jealousie , or that they lookt after books of scripture as things without which the church was not either absolutely certain of its faith , or had not all its faith. again , had those books been then the rule of faith as ( considering that some of them were unacknowledg'd , one scatter'd here , another there accidentally ) is sensless to imagin . yet , how can we ●ow , or , future ages hereafter have absolute certainty that some substantial word or other is not alter'd , omitted , or inserted in those places that concern the main points of faith ( for example , the godhead of christ , or the real presence ) in case there be no infallible authority to attest the truth of it , which dr. st. denies here princ. . it is not evident he must say that none of these can be made out with absolute certainty , and consequently confess with * dr. t. that all this may be otherwise ; unless he have recourse to gods extraordinary assistance to the multitudes of transcribers and translators , because of the necessity the letter should be thus preserv'd still unchang'd , in regard otherwise none could say his faith is true : which again begs the question , and supposes it the rule of faith instead of proving it so . farther , let the letter be suppos'd exactly like the original , how will that letter secure from all possible error all that rely on it , as the rule of faith ought , or , to use dr. st's words ( princ. . ) reveal so plainly the whole will of god , that no sober enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation ? now if they cannot miss of what 's necessary for salvation , they must needs hit on it , and so are in a manner infallible , as to that point , while they rely thereon . to put it to the tryal , let us consider what disputes there are out of scriptures letter , between socinians and their opposers about a trinity and the godhead of christ : and what between catholicks and their adversaries about the real presence . how many interpretations of [ this is my body . ] how many allusions of one place to another in both those points to hammer out the truth , and these agitated on both sides , by bodies of eminent men , excellent scholars , acute scripturists ? must every sober enquirer , and every private ignorant person who sincerely endeavours needs hit on the right , and judge better of these points than all those learned men ? or , must we needs conclude that all those learned enquirers found in each of those vast different parties are mad or insincere ? i wish he would prove this : 't is his best interest , and would give his argument some likelihood ; which till then has none : for the fact being so notorious , how earnestly they all endeavour to find out the truth of these points by the letter , none will judge but that if their heads or hearts be not strangely disorder'd by folly or insincerity , the letter which shou●d inform them , is strangely incompetent for that end . but 't is remarkable how neatly dr. st. skips aside from the point . he undertakes not to give us any assurance that his sober or sincere enquirers shall by vertue of this his rule of faith , find out that any one point of his faith is an absolutely certain truth , but only that he shall not miss of what is necessary for salvation , that he shall not erre , or at least , not be damn'd for it . so that , for any thing appears by his discourse , let him but read the scripture , though he holds nothing but error by so doing , yet he is still in the way to salvation by the very reading and running into errour . but this deserves a particular reflexion hereafter . lastly , the very nature and genius of the scripture , as it now is , shows that , however it be excellently vseful for perfecting the lives of the faithful in many regards , yet it was never intended for the rule of faith. for , ( to omit innumerable other reasons frequently alledg'd by our authors , ) its several parts were evidently writ on several emergent occasions , and have not the least semblance as if the whole had been purposely compil'd to deliver an intire body of faith. nor does it observe any method tending to clear each several point . for , it neither begins with defineing or explaining every word made use of in signifying those points , which is the best means to avoid equivocation , the ground of all mistake : nor does it pursue home the evidencing any one point , by making us aware of the sinister senses in which each word expressing that point might seem to be taken ; nor does it put objections against each tenet , and establish us in the right apprehension of it by solving them , nor distinguish by laying common rules to know when the words are to be taken properly , when metaphorically , much less tell us particularly in which places each word is to be taken thus or thus : nor can it justifie with absolute or infallible certainty either its text or copy to be substantially like the original , nor ( if we may trust dr. st. here princ. . ) can any authority on earth supply that necessary duty for it : nor , ( it being requisite to compare one place to another so to find out the sense ) does it tell us which place is to be compar'd to another as its proper explainer , nor of the two alluding places which is to stand firm and be taken as the letter lies ; which to bend its signification in correspondency to that other ; without fore-knowledg of which 't is pure folly to think to avail our selves by comparing places . none of these things , i say , are found in the scriptures letter as it lies ; which notwithstanding , and perhaps many other such like , it had been agreeable to gods wisdome and goodness to have given it , in case it had been intended by him for a rule of faith , or such a direction by relying on which , people of all capacities might have so well-grounded an assent to those points , as is impossible to be an errour while they thus relie on it ; which assent in christian language we call [ faith ] on the other side 't is evident that of some points it gives onely accidental hints here and there without insisting upon them amply or explaining them fully ; and that book which was most designedly intended to assert christs divinity , was yet so far from putting it out of all dispute or preserving it from being oppos'd and call'd in question , that never yet did heresie prevail so much against gods church as did the arians , who deny'd that very point of faith. but what needs more to evince this point than these two arguments , one à priori , the other à posteriori . all words are either proper or improper and metaphorical ; of which proper ones express that the thing is indeed or in reality so : but improper ones that 't is not indeed or in reality so : whence it happens that in matters of so exact truth as points of faith ( especially when the points are of main concern ) it imports a plain heresie either to take a proper word for an improper , or , an improper one for a proper : for example , those texts expressing that god has hands , feet , repents , grieves , is mov'd by our prayers , &c. are , if taken properly wicked heresies and destroy the spiritual and unchangeable nature of the godhead . also , to take those words christ is man , suffer'd , dy'd , rose again , &c. improperly , are wicked heresies too , and take away the main supports of our salvation : this being so , it follows that the absolutely-certain knowledg when the words of scripture are taken properly , when not , being determinative of what 's true faith , what heresie , it must be had from the rule of faith it self , and so from the letter of scripture , if that be indeed the rule . but this knowledge is not had from the scriptures letter ; for this must either be done by that letters signifying in each place expresly or equivalently that the words are properly or improperly there taken , which is impossible to be shown , nor was ever pretended ; or else by signifying the contrary point in another place ; and this , as far as the bare letter carries , or abstracting from all interpretation , can onely signifie that the letter in one place seems to contradict it self in another place ; and this , as far as the bare letter carries , or abstracting from all interpretation , can onely signifie that the letter in one place seems to contradict it self in another place , which is far short of giving us an unerring security which side is truth . or , if it be said , the letter alone gives us not this security without some interpretation , then this interpretation performs what the letter ( if it be a rule ) ought , but could not , and determines with absolute certainty when the words are taken properly , when not ; that is gives us our faith ; and consequently that light or knowledge , whatever it was , which the interpreter brought with him , and had it not from the letter , gave us the right sense of scripture ; and , so , it , not the scripture was the true rule of faith. from the effect , or à posteriori i argue thus : we experience that great bodies of men of divers sects , with equal earnestness ( as far as appears to us ) go about to find their faith in the scriptures letter , and equally profess to rely upon gods assistance to that end ; wherefore either we must be forced to judge that none of those several sects do sincerely desire to find true faith in the scriptures , and so by dr. st's principles no sort of men in the whole world has right faith : which quite takes away all christianity ; or else we must think all of them truly desire to find right faith in the scripture , and rely on gods help to assist them , in which case , since the fault is not in them taken as applying themselves to their rule , and relying on it , and yet 't is mani●e●t they differ ( that is one side errs ) in most fundamental points , as in the trinity , divinity of christ , real presence of christs body in the sacrament , &c. it follows unavoidably that the faul● is in those persons in holding it their rule , for , in case they err'd not in holding it to be a rule , that is in case it were indeed apt to ascertain them absolutely if they apply'd it , and that they did actually apply it , it is impossible they should have ever err'd . scriptures letter then is far from securing men of all sorts , while they rely on it , from errour ; since whole bodies of men , and , amongst those , multitudes of great scholars and learned scripturists erre grievously and that in most fundamental points , even while they rely upon it : which if it destroy not the nature of a rule , i know not what does . this discourse being forelaid , we shall be able to make shorter work with his principles , to which we now address . whereas then in his tenth principle , he contend ; that the will of god can be sufficiently declar'd to men by writing . i answer , that by extraordinary contrivances and actings of gods wisdome and power it may ; but that this will avail him little , since 't is evident that de facto god has not thus exerted his wisdome and power in making scriptures letter fit for that end ; whence we conclude that it was never meant for a rule : and , whereas he says that words are equally capable of being understood , spoken or written ; i deny it absolutely ; for nature teaches us that the countenance and carriage of the speaker , the accent of the voice , the giving a due and living emphasis to the words , with the whole complexion of circumstances in which the speaker is found , and which generally are not unknown to the person to whom he speaks ; and , amongst these , principally , his applying himself pertinently to the present exigency , thoughts and expectation of the hearer : all these , i say , and many others give living voice an incomparable advantage over dead characters in point of intelligibleness and expressiveness : and , though dr. st. may contend that whatever advantage in signifying , that has over this , may possibly be put in writing and exprest by means of many large explications writ by the person himself that was to deliver his mind , yet he can never show that those multitudes of words in those very explications have the same degree of significativeness and intelligibility as if they had been spoken vivâ voce by their author ; since they will still want all or most of the advantages now spoken of , which manifestly determine the signification of words . to omit , that all this will little make for his purpose when he comes to apply it ; since scripture has no such large explications writ upon it to supply that less clearness of expressing which the way of writing is necessarily subject to , if compar'd with that of speaking : much less if daily practise go along with living voice to declare mens minds , as is found in tradition . as for what he adds , and builds on , that scripture may be known to be the word of god : if he means it may be known to be such according to the grounds he proceeds on , he ought either to have put it amongst principles agreed on by both sides , or else have prov'd it ; which he no where attempts , but afterwards ( princ. . ) very solidly and learnedly disproves and confutes : while he denies the necessity of any infallible society of men to attest or explain those vvritings ; for , since in the bare letter as it lies , there are found many passages which contradict one another , and , abstracting from all interpretation and attestation of the letter , no part of it is to be held truer than other ( for if it once lose the repute of being gods word , as in that case it must , 't is all equally liable to be false ) it follows that if there be neither any men infallible in attesting nor in explaining those writings , all the world may be deceiv'd in performing both those duties ; and , so , all mankind may be deceived both in judging the scriptures which we now have to be the same book which was writ at first , since there is no infallible attestation of it , and also may be deceiv'd in judging there are not contradictions in it , since there is no infallible explanation of it to secure it from many such imputations , evident in the bare letter taking it as un explain'd or uninterpreted . any man of reason would think that to leave scripture in such a pickle , were but a slender provision to give it such a certainty as will fit it to be a rule of faith , if he but reflects that that rule must be the basis of all our knowledg that god ever reveal'd any thing at all ; that is , of all mankinds way to salvation . but suppose it thus granted that the will of god can be fufficienty declared to men by writing , in the manner declared above , let 's see what follows . . it is agreed among all christians that although god in the first ages of the vvorld did reveal his mind to men immediately by a voice or secret inspirations , yet afterwards he did communicate his mind to some immediatly inspir'd to write his vvill in books to be preserv'd for the benefit of future ages , and particularly that these books of the new testament which we now receive were so written by the apostles and disciples of iesus christ. this is granted : only it is not agreed among all that bear the name of christians of what nature this benefit is which god intended men in future ages by the scriptures , whether of strengthening them in faith , and stirring them up to good life , or teaching them their faith at first and assuring it to them nor how this benefit comes to be deriv'd to the generality , whether by immediate reading and penetrating it themselves : or , through the preaching and instruction of some others deputed by god for that end , who have faith in their hearts already by some other means : but we are to expect dr. st. will in the process of his discourse clear this point solidly and throughly , for 't is the main hinge of all this controveesie : he goes forward thus . . such writings have been received by the christian church of the first ages , as divine and infallible , and being deliver'd down as such to us by an vniversal consent of all ages since , they ought to be owned by us as the certain rule of faith ; whereby we are to judge what the will of god is in order to our salvation ; unless it appear with an evidence equal to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of god , that they were never intended for that end because of their obscurity or imperfection . this whole paragraph amounts to one proposition , which is this , such writings , ( viz. penn'd by men divinely inspir'd for the benefit of future ages ) receiv'd at first , and deliver'd down ever since as divine and infallible , are to be held the certain rule of faith , unless there be evidence of their defectiveness , equal to that of their being gods word . which is a bare assertion , neither prov'd from any principle agreed or not agreed on , and therefore perfectly groundless , and unprov'd ; and false into the bargain , though the main stress of his whole discourse relies on it . now that 't is false i prove , because its contradictory is true. for , there may be writings penn'd by men divinely inspir'd and deliver'd down to us as divine and infallible , and yet we need not be bound to hold them the rule of faith , though we have not equal evidence of their defect as we have that they are the vvord of god. since to be writ by men divinely-inspir'd , to be divine , infallible , and the word of god , signifies no more but that they are perfectly holy and true in themselves , and beneficial to mankind in some way or other ; and this is the farthest these words will carry ; but that they are of themselves of sufficient clearness to give sincerely-endeavouring persons such security of their faith while they rely on them as cannot consist with error ( which is requisit to the rule of faith ) these words signifie not : they may be most holy , they may be most true in themselves , they may be exceedingly vseful or beneficial to mankind , and yet not be endow'd with this property , which yet the rvle of faith must have . and whereas he says they are for these reasons to be owned for the rule of faith ( that is we are for these reasons to judge and profess them such ) unless it appear with an equal evidence , &c. that they are defective ; sure he never understood what iudging and professing is built on , who can make such a discourse : our assent or iudgment is built on the grounds or reasons which conclude the thing to be as we judg , and not on our seeing nothing to the contrary : for , in case the reasons produc'd conclude not the thing to be so , the not appearing to be otherwise will avail nothing to conclude it so : all it can effect is to make us maintain our liberty of suspence and indifferency that so we may be void of forestalment or prejudice and free to believe it when competent or conclusive reasons shall appear to evince it . what then dr. st. is to do , is to produce conclusive reasons to evince that the letter of scripture has such a perspicuity and other perfections belonging to such a rule as must ground that most firm , vnalterable and ( if rightly grounded ) inerrable assent call'd christian faith , and this considering the nature of faith , the effects which are to proceed from faith , and obligations issuing from it , and incumbent on the faithful , as such ; but in stead of performing this necessary duty of his , to argue as if , though the reasons he brings conclude it not , yet it must needs be so because we have no evidence 't is not so , is , so pleasant and new invented a way of arguing , that he must find the vvorld a new logick , and mankind it self a new nature ere he will arrive by means of such discourse at any conclusion . and , whereas he seems to build much on the word [ equal , ] alledging that we must , for the reasons there given , hold the scriptures the rule of faith unless it appear they are defective with an evidence [ equal ] to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of god : 't is absolutely deny'd , not only for the reason lately given in common , that , none can be bound in reason to hold or own any unprov'd position ; but particularly because of the peculiar nature of the thing we are discoursing of ; for , the rule of faith being that which is to tell us god said such or such things , or engages the divine authority for their verity , if we should happen to misuse scriptures letter , by letting loose people of all capacities to rely on it as their rule of faith , then , in case it should peradventure not have been intended by god for this end , but for some others , we expose our selves and others to the desperate danger of running into endless errors by this misusage of scripture , and of adhering to those errors as firmly as if god himself had spoke them ; that is , we hazard erring irrecoverably in matters which ate the proper means of salvation , and blaspheming god daily in making him the patron of lies . in this case then there is particular caution to be used , and so , if upon sincere and strict examination it be but any thing dubious that scripture was never intended by god for a rule of faith , we can never be obliged to hold or own it for such , especially not having any certain argument to conclude it such ; much less must we be oblig'd to hold it to be such unless we have eqval evidence of its unfitness to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of god , unless dr. st. will say that nothing ought to restrain a man from hazarding the greatest mischiefs in the world but perfect evidence , that no harm will come of it . so that still his main business , and without which he does nothing at all , remains yet to be done ; which is , to bring solid convincing proofs that god intended scripture , or his written word for the rule of faith ; that is , for such a rule as people of all sorts relying on it should be infallibly or absolutely-secur'd from error by so doing . in making good which concerning point he hath hitherto trifled exceedingly . nay himself here is afraid to own the goodness of his own proof ; otherwise he would never have thought it fit to annex those words , vnless it appear with an evidence equal to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of god , that they were never intended for that end because of their obscurity or imperfection . for , the evidence whereby it appears those books are the word of god must be conclusive ( else according to his grounds , we can never conclude one word of faith true ) and so an evidence equal to it must be conclusive likewise : if then he had thought his reasons to prove scripture the rule of faith were good and conclusive , common sense would have forbid him to add these cautious words vnless it appears with an equal evidence , &c. for common sense tells us no conclusive reason can possibly be brought for the negative , if conclusive reasons be once produc'd , or be producible for the affirmative ; it appears then by this behaviour of his on this occasion that he distrusts that either he has produc'd any conclusive reason for that main point of scriptures being intended for the rule of faith , or that any can be produc'd . lastly , that we may give perfect satisfaction to this fundamental principle of his , though perhaps there is not evidence scriptures letter was never intended for the rule of faith equal to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of god , in regard we believe this upon the authority of gods church which is supported with the whole strength of best nature and supernaturals , yet we have rigorous and conclusive evidence that it is not penn'd in the very best way imaginable to avoid all ambiguity of words and forestall mistakes , as being immediately inspir'd by god , whose works are perfect , if it had been intended by him to be our rule of faith , it ought to be . and i shall presume i have already brought conclusive evidences both à priori and also à posteriori in my answer to his th principle to evince that it has not in it the nature of such a rule , nor consequently was it intended by god to be such a rule . how incomparably excellent soever it be for other ends for which it was indeed and solely intended . but omitting all the rest at present , i remind him of one ( which i cannot too often repeat ) and enforce it upon him thus . he cannot deny but the points of a trinity , and christs godhead are most fundamental points of faith , he cannot deny but both protestants and socinians rely on the letter of scripture for the sole rule of their faith , and sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them , which is all he requires on the persons side : he cannot deny but that , notwithstanding this , one party holds there is no trinity , and that christ is not god , the other that there is a trinity , and that christ is god , and so one side erres most fundamentally : he cannot deny but , error being a defect , there must be a fault somewhere to beget this error , that is , either in the persons judging of what the rule of faith tells them , or else in judging that to be a rule which is not the rule ; for in case they erre in neither of these , 't is impossible they should erre or misconceive at all in matters of faith. he cannot deny in any reason , but the persons on both sides being such acute men and excellently well vers'd in the letter of scripture have both capacity enough , and apply that capacity to their power by as great a diligence as any ; nor can he in charity deny but they sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of it in such points . therefore he cannot deny but the persons attending to the rule are faultless either in understanding scripture in these points , if it be to private understandings clearly intelligible , or vvill to understand it if they could ; and indeed 't is incredible they should not will or desire this , since they use such exact diligence in it , and solemnly profess to rely on the letter alone , or that did they indeed sleight the letter or purposely decline relying on it , their byass should not manifestly appear in so long time , and they be branded for evident insincerity : he cannot deny then but the persons are faultless as to their capacity and will to understand the rule ; therefore , unless he will renounce his reason , he cannot deny but the fault must be in the same persons , judging that to be the rule , which is not ; and consequently that the letter of scripture is not alone and of it self clear and intelligible enough to preserve private men , both capable and diligent and relying solely on it from possibility of error , no not from actually erring in most fundamental points of faith , nor consequently has it in it the true nature of the rule of faith , and so , since god never intends any thing should do what its nature reaches not to do , that is should do what it cannot do , 't is manifest scriptures letter was never intended by god for that end , or to be such a rule . . although we cannot argue against any particular way of revelation from the necessary attributes of god , yet such away as writing being made choce of by him , we may justly say , that it is repugnant to the nature of the design , and the wisdome and goodness ●f god , to give infallible assurance to persons in writing his will , for the benefit of mankind , if those writings may not be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all such things as are necessary for their salvation . it is not yet prov'd , nor ever will , that god hath made choice of the way of writing for a rule of faith , nor design'd it for that end , nor that the benefit he meant mankind by such writings was to ground their faith on what appear'd to their private judgments to be the sense of the letter ; therefore 't is no wonder if all persons stould hap to misunderstand it even in such things as are necessary for their salvation , notwithstanding their sincere endeavour to know the meaning of them , since god has never promis'd that any who takes a way never intended by him for such an end , shall infallibly arrive at that end by such a way ; nor is the wisdome and godness of god at all concern'd in preserving any from error if they take such a way , especially if we reflect upon these following considerations . first , that god hath no where engaged his word to secure every single or private man from error who shall sincerely endeavour to find his faith in the scripture , in case he rely on his own private judgment & neglect to hear his pastors : whence if such private persons rely on gods promis'd assistance to such an end , they rely on what neither is , nor ever was , and so no wonder their hopes fail them , if those hopes be groundless . secondly , they cannot but know , if but meanly vers'd in the world ; that whole bodies of men , and amongst them divers of great learning , interpret scripture several ways in very concerning points of faith , and it must needs favour of a proud self-conceit in any person to think god regards his single self more than he does whole bodies and great multitudes . again , it cannot without a strange unreasonableness & uncharitableness be imagin'd or judg'd that not one person of those many who adhere to the opposite tenet as clear to them in scripture according to their best judgment , does sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of these sacred books ; and , if they do , then common sense tells this private person that the whole foundation on which his hope is built , is unsound ; and that more is requisite than the letter of scripture and a sincere endeavour to understand it ; and that if these suffice to direct him right , they ought for the same reason be sufficient to direct another ; and so he ought to doubt whether himself or those others proceeding on the same grounds and having the same means , be in the right , that is , he ought to doubt of his faith no better grounded . lastly , this private man belongs to some particular church , and so has pastors and governors set over him to teach and instruct him , and those too ( as wee 'l suppose ) read and rely on the scriptures ; also , he must judg this church sincerely endeavours to know the meaning of scriptures ; for this being the requisit condition to find right faith , without this his church has no right faith , and so is no church : now for a private man who is subject to such a church , and ought to be taught by the pastors of that church , not to submit to the judgment of that church and his lawful pastors , as to the sense of scriptures or his faith , even though they be sincere endeavours as well as he , but to adhere to that for his faith which appears to his private self to be in the scriptures , though he contradict and defy all the church he his a member of in so doing ( which he ought to do , if he proceed on this principle that scriptures may be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all things necessary for his salvatiou , for he ought not for any mans sake relinquish his faith or its rule . ) i say , to behave himself thus , as in that supposition he ought , is such an intolerable , ma apert presumption , so sensless and unnatural and self-condemning a rebellion , and such a fanatick spiritual pride , as i much doubt will give a man but small title to hope for especial assistance from gods wisdom and goodness , at present i onely remarke the faults of this principle which are these . first , that it supposes god has made choice of , or designd the scriptures to be this rule of faith for private persons . next , that gods wisdome and goodness is engag'd that it be thus intelligible to every sin●ere eadeavourer ! neither of which is in the least prov'd or proveable . lastly , when he comes to the close ; instead of making it so intelligible as that all sincere endeavors might therby be absolutely secur'd from erring as to the truth of their faith , ( which is the duty of the rule of faith ) seeing very well these slight grounds were not able to carry so far , he substitutes in their room these waty words [ in all such things as shall be necessary for their salvation ] so that though they erre in all the main points of christianity , yet for any thing we know , or these crafty common words inform us , they have still all that is needfull to save them , that is though they go wrong all their lives they are still all the while in the way to heaven . but , i suppose dr. st. means that no more is necessary for any ones salvation than just as much as he can understand in scripture . which i wish he would once begin to set himself to prove & make out by some convincing argument : i am heartily weary of speaking still to his unprov'd and voluntary assertions . . to suppose the books so written to be imperfect , i. e. that any things necessary to be believed , or practised are not contained in them , is either to charge the first author of them with fraud , and not delivering his whole mind , or the writers with insincerity in not setting it down , and the whole christian church of the first ages with folly , in believing the fulness and perfection of the scriptures in order to salvation . as far as i apprehend , the foregoing principle was intended to shew that scripture was sufficirntly intelligible to be the rule of faith , and this under examination is to prove it to be the measure of faith as he calls it , princ. . and all he contends here is that it contains all that is necessary to be believ'd and practic'd . and , that we may not multiply disputes , i grant those holy books contain all he pretends , some way or other either implicitly or explicitly ; either in exprest words , or by necessary con●equence . but , that those books contain , or signifie ( for they are the same ) all that is to be believed and practiced , so evidently that all persons who sincerely endeavor to know their meaning , and this for all future ages , may thence alone ( as his discourse aims to evince ) that is , without the churches interpretation , arrive to know what 's necessary for their salvation , with such a certainty as is requisite for the nature and ends of faith , and the obligations annext to it , i absolutely deny , and if he means this by the word [ perfection ] which he adds to [ fulness ] i deny also that either the first author can be charg'd with fraud , since he promis'd no such thing ; or the writers with insincerity , since they were not commanded , nor did intend thus to express it ; nor , as far as appears , had any order from god to set down his whole mind , but only writ the several pieces of it occasionally : nor did the christian church in the first ages , ever attribute to scriptures such an intelligibleness as that private persons should ground their faith upon their evidence without needing the churches interpretation , if we speak of all points necessary to mankinds salvation , as he seems and ought to do . and here i desire to enter this declaration to all the world , that i attribute not the least imperfection to the holy scriptures ; every thing has all the perfection it ought to have , if it can do what it was intended to do , and in the manner it was intended . treatises of deep philosophy are not imperfect , if they be not as plain , as plainest narrative histories ; no not if they be ita editi ut non sint editi , in case they were meant as a matter for the author to explain and dilate upon to his scholars ; nor are the laws imperfect , though they often need learned judges to interpret them . nor are we to expect that the prophecy of isaiah should be as plain as the law of moses . the immediate end of writing each piece , as far as appears to us , was occasional , st. pauls epistles were evidently so ; nor can i doubt but they were perfect in their kind , and apt to signify competently to those to whom he writ what he intended ; so that , if they had any farther doubt , they might send to ask him , or do it viva voce ; and yet we see that even in those days when the complexion of all the circumstances was fresher and neerer then now , some unlearned persons err'd damnably in mistaking and misconceiving them , that is , while they went about to frame their faith out of them ; 't is questionless also they rely'd upon them as gods word , or dictated by the holy ghost , else they had not so built upon them , or adher'd to them . they might sincerely endeavour too to know their meaning ; yet , if the writings were disproportion'd to their pitch they migh erre damnably for all that . what farther end god intended the h. scriptures for , appears not by any expresse either promise or declaration of our saviour ; but out of the knowledge that they were writ by persons divinely inspir'd and the experience the church had of their vsefulness towards instruction and good life , joyn'd with the common knowledg we have that all goods that come to the church , happen through the ordering of gods providence , hence we justly conclude ( as dr. st. well says ) that they were intended and writ also for the benefit of future ages . and from their vsefulness and the success of their use , we may gather how god intended them for the church . the learned and stable sons of the church read them with much fruit to excite their wills to goodness . the pastore of the church make excellent use of them in exhorting , preaching , catchising , &c. and in many other uses of this sort they are excellently beneficial , which are so many that were it now seasonable for me to lay them open at large as i truly hold them , none would think i had little reverence for scriptures ; but in deciding controversies , or finally silencing hereticks , as the rule of faith ought to do , by the unavoidable evidence of the text to private persons no use was ever made of them ( alone ) with any success as the fathers also complain ; unless the the churches authority , going along , animated the dead letter in dogmatical passages , and shew'd the sense of the places to have been perpetually held from the beginning , and so give it the sense , majesty authority and force of gods vvord , elevating it thus above the repute of being some private conceit or production of skill and wit interpreting the letter . scripture then is perfect , or has all due to the nature god intended it ; if , duly made use of as the churches best instrument , it be able to work those effect● spoken of , though it be not so evident or self-authoriz'd as to be the rule of faith. we give it absolute pre-eminence in its kind , that is , above all other writings that ever appear'd in the world ; but we prefer before it tradition or gods church , which is the spouse of christ , the pillar and ground of truth , and consisting of the living temples of the h. ghost , for whose sole good , as its final end , scripture it self was intended and written . . these writings being owned as containing in them the whole will of god so plainly reveal'd , that no sober enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation ; there can be no necessity supposed of any infallible society of men either to attest or explain these writings among christians , any more than there was for some ages before christ of such a body of men among the iews , to attest or explain to them the vvritings of moses or the prophets . he that owns this , must own it without reason for any thing appears yet ; for dr. st. has afforded us hitherto nothing to prove this point but a few words craftily laid together , which , when look'd into , have not a jot of reason in them . and the like empty inside we find in this present principle . for , if the whole will of god be plainly reveal'd in scripture , then in case nothing else be requisit to understand gods will but the disposition of soberly enquiring ( as he puts no other ) it must follow that no sober enquirer can miss of knowing there the whole will of god ; and since every article of faith is part of gods vvill , it would follow hence that every sober enquirer may understand all faith in scripture , which yet the dr. is not dispos'd to say ; as appears by his avoiding to put down what the tenour of his discourse requir'd , namely , that the whole will of god is so plainly reveal'd in scripture that no sober enquirer can miss [ of knowing his whole will there ; ] and instead of it substituting , that the whole will of god is so plainly reveal'd in scripture , that , no sober inquirer can miss of [ what is necessary for salvation ] which words may be true though they fall far short of knowing the whole will of god by that means . next , it is very material , and it would be very requisi●e to know how a man must be qualify'd to be a sober enquirer . in order to which , we may reflect that ( as was said before ) it ought in reason be judged gods will that we should know whether christ be god , and whether his body ( and consequently himself ) be really in the sacrament ; lest we either want the best incitements to devotion if he be , and we judge he is not ; or else commit material idolatry by judging him to be so , when he is not so . now i would have him clearly show ( clearly , i say , for all depends upon it , according to his grounds ) in what either the roman - catholicks or the socinians fall short in point of being sober enquirers ; for 't is plain they must both fall short of being such if the whole will of god be clearly reveal'd in scripture , since the former holds christ is really in the sacrament ; the other , that he is not god , the contrary to both which i suppose dr. st. holds to be the true sense of scripture . farther , if there can be no necessity of any infallible society of men either to attest or explain those writings , 't is evident there can be no need of a fallible society of men for those ends. for if writings which are attested or explained by a fallible society of men be the rule of faith , or the grounds god has left us to build our faith on , and it be evident that a fallible attestation or explication may possibly lead us into nothing but errour , it would follow that god himself may possibly have led all christians hitherto and still leads them to the end of the world into actual errour ; since a reliance on fallible means of knowing the letter and sense cannot possibly raise any assent beyond possibility of being erroneous . there needs therefore by dr. st's discourse neither infallible nor fallible societies ; and so according to his principles , farewell all church , both catholick and protestant , as far as concerns these two main duties , on which all else depends . again , though all this were true , and that the scriptures were own'd as containing in them the whole vvill of god so plainly reveal'd that no sober enquirer can miss of what 's necessary to salvation , and that therefore there needed no church to explain them . yet 't is a strange consequence that therefore there can be no necessity of any infallible society of men to attest , them , or to witness that the letter of scripture is right . this is so far from following out of the former part of his disc●●●se that the contrary ought to follow ; 〈…〉 prejudicing his own pretence , that 〈◊〉 conduces exceedingly to it ; for , certain●y , his sober enquirer would less be in doubt to miss of what is necessary to salvation in case the letter , on which all depends be well attested , than if it be not , and most certainly an infallible society of men can better attest that letter than a fallible one , and those writings can with better show of reason be owned to contain in them the vvill of god , if their letter be attested beyond possibility of being wrong , than if left in a possibility of being such ; for if the letter be wrong , all is wrong in this case . it might seem wonderful then what it is that thus byasses dr. st. against his own interest ; and i wish i had reason to think it were not a kind of innate antipathy against not onely our church but church in common , and a desire to attribute as little to it as he can possibly though he hazzard some prejudice to his own cause and even all christian faith into the bargain . his whole way of discourse here bends strongly towards the taking away all divine institution of pastors ( for this would oblige the people to hear them ) and levelling all into a fanatick anarc●y . i would gladly interpret him otherwise ; and imagine that perhaps he means that , since 't is own'd the scriptures thus contain gods will , therefore there needs not be supposed any infallible society of men either to attest or explain them ; but i cannot conceive he should think scriptures letter must be own'd to be right without some either fallible or infallible authority to attest it to be such ; or that , however he may sceptically dread no authority can be infallible , yet that he will deny but that it were good there were such an authority to attest scriptures letter , nay needful too in case he heartily held that christian faith built ( according to his grounds ) solely on that letter may not possibly all be a ly ; which common sense tells us , it may be , in case we may all be deceiv'd in the truth of the letter . lastly , that for some ages before christ there was no necessity of such a body of men among the iews to attest or explain to them the vvritings of moses and the prophets , is first not prov'd , and yet dr. st. builds upon it as confidently as if it were evidently concluded , or else self-evident . next , what mean those words [ for some ages before christ ? ] if the whole time of the mo●ai●al law ; then 't is evidently false , since ( deut. . v. , ▪ &c. ) god commanded upon pain of death to do according as some persons he had appointed for that end should explain the writings belonging to that law ; and if these men had not some way or other been secured from errour , god by commanding the subject laity under so heavy a penalty to act as they adjudg'd , had both led them into actual errour , and punisht them thus grievously in that case for adhering to truth ; which are too horrid blasphemies to be heard or imagin'd . but , if they mean onely , for some time of that law , or some ages immediately before christ when the synagogue was most corrupt , this implies a confession that such a society was necessary in the ages foregoing ; and then dr. st. is to show us why it was not equally necessary in the later as in the former , and not suppose it gratis . nor was the synagogue ever more corrupt than in our saviour's days , and yet we see how severely he enjoins the jews of that time to obey the scribes and pharisees because they sate in moses his chair ; which it were blasphemy to say christ could do , if he had not secur'd their doctrine from being erroneous , that is , preserv'd them inerrable in that affair . add , that were all granted , yet there is far more necessity of explaining the scriptures now , than at that time : for the law was in a manner all of it , either matters of fact to be done , or moral duties and so agreeable to nature ; whence both of these were far more easily expressible in proper language , and consequently intelligible , than the sublime , spiritual and mysterious tenets of the law of grace ; which are more hard to be exprest in per words ; and being more removed from our knowledg , the natures of the things are more hard to be penetrated , and so those words more difficult to be rightly comprehended and understood without an interpreter , than were those other . . there can be no more intolerable usurpation upon the faith of christians than for any person or society of men to pretend to an assistance as infallible in what they propose as was in christ or his apostles without giving an equal degree of evidence that they are so assisted as christ and his apostles did ; viz. by miracles as great publick and convincing as theirs were ; by which i mean such as are wrought by those very persons who challenge this infallibility , and with a design for the conviction of those who do not believe it . thus the dr. makes sure work against the infallibility of any church ; which overthrown , his single self nay any private man or woman that has but self-conceit and confidence enough to proceed openly upon these principles of his , is upon even ground with the best nay all the churches in the world at the main point of understanding and determining what 's faith , what not : nay more , may defie all the governours of all churches in the world , if he or she be but conscious to themselves that they sincerely endeavour and soberly enquire for the true meaning of the divine writings ; for these being their rule of faith , and being assu●ed by dr. st. that they cannot miss , if they soberly enquire , of what is necessary for salvation , and being inform'd by common reason that 't is a point very necessary to the salvation of a christian , or one who is to follow and adore christ , to know whether he be god , and so may without fear of idolatry have divine honour given him or no ; these things being so , in case it should seem to the best judgement of such a man ( and let him be , for example , one brought up in the church of england and newly turn'd socinian ) that christ is not god , he ought not to relinquish his rule of faith at any rate , nor what he judges the scriptures sense of it ( this being his faith ) but maintain it boldly against all his pastors ; talk , and quote scripture as briskly as the best of them all ; desy them to their faces , nay , dye in defence of his interpretation of it , and be a special martyr though he take his death upon it , that all his lawful pastors and the whole church of which he is a member , are most hainons idolaters for giving the worship proper to god , to a man. in this case 't is plain , the church cannot pretend to oblige him to believe her interpretation of scriptu●e ; alas ! all such power is quite taken out of her hands by these new principles ; not to act exteriourly as she does ; for that were to oblige him to deny his faith in his actions and carriage , and this in so hainous a point as committing flat idolatry , and which his rule of faith tells him is such . nor to acquiesce so far as to hold his tongue and not contradict the church ; for 't is both ingratitude to god who has so plainly reveal'd it to him in scripture , not to stand up for his honour so wickedly violated by the church ; and withall most uncharitable to his neighbour not to communicate to him the light he has receiv'd by such plain revelation from god's word , and to endeavour his reducement from so grievous an idolatry , especially if this man be a minister of the church of england , whose office and duty 't is to hold forth or preach what he judges god's word : nay , though it were a lay-man or a lay-woman , all 's a case ; why may they not with as much reason make known so concerning a truth plainly reveal'd to them , as aquila and priscilla did of old . as for all power of the church to restrain them that 's quite thrown out of doors . humane commands can have no force when the best duties to god and man are neglected by obeying ; and the more the church is obstinate and opposes this private man or woman , by so much greater is the necessity of his ( or her ) informing the church right , and standing up for the truth . hereafter more of this : at present let us see how he destroyes infallibility in the church , which is his chief design , and indeed it makes very much for his purpose ; for i so far concurr with him , that if it be but fallible in attesting or explaining scripture , 't is little available to the grounding christian faith , so that if infallibility be but overthrown and these principles setled in its stead , every private man is a church ; which ( our corrupt nature loving liberty ) will no doubt be very taking , and please the rabble exceedingly . he is so earnest at his work that he stumbles for hast . for , first , who did ever pretend to an infallibility equal to what was in christ or his apostles , as his words import ? christ was essentially infallible ; the apostles by immediate inspiration from god : the church pretends indeed to be infallibly assisted , but that she pretends to have it either essentially as god has it , or by way of immediate inspiration , as the apostles had it , is a thing i never yet learnt . 't is enough to justify her constant claim of infallible assistance , that she have it mediately , or by means of the ordinary working of natural and supernatural causes , so shee but have it . and to have it this way seems far more agreeable to reason than the other of immediate inspiration , as to have by way of immediate inspiration was far more fitting for the apostles ; for neither was it in their dayes accepted by a great portion of the world that christ was god , or his doctrine truth , that so they might receive it transmitted from the foregoing divinely assisted church , that these and these doctrines were his , but they were the first that were to propagate this doctrine ; and publish and make out the truth of it : not could their own testimony avail to the end in●ended ; for what could they testify ? that christ said thus , and did such and such miracles to testify the truth of his doctrine , or that the h. ghost inspir'd them ? the latter was latent , and the hearers had but their own words for it ; the other was patent indeed , and so fully convictive to those who knew and convers'd with them , and were acquainted with the circumstances , but to remote nations , whither two or three of them were to go and preach , it signifi'd little , and depended upon their bare words . hence miracles were at first ( and shall till the end of the world in like cases be ) absolutely necessary , to make such unheard of tenets enter and sink into the hearts of great multitudes how circumstanc't soever . but , when afterwards a world , or vast body of men were by those extraordinary means settled unanimously in a firm beleif that christ was god , or at least that his doctrine was true , there could need no more but to know it was continu'd down all along the same , to make deserters of his church ( against whom we dispute at present ) accept it ; and it being visible , audible and practical , and so subject to sense ; hence attestation of the foregoing age to the age succeeding was the most proper way to continue it down ; and perfectly certain , being now grown so ample and vast ; and the attesters being intelligent persons , and having the sense of christ's law written in their heart , could deliver and explain themselves pertinently to all arising difficulties , and clear all possible misunderstandings , which the dead letter could not ; and so this living rule is perfectly intelligible too . i omit here the supernatural assistances , which those who comprehend what most effectual means of sanctity there is in the doctrine , sacraments , and discipline of the church , and consequently ( as appears by divers excellent effects of it ) the product also of those means , or holiness in great multitudes of the faithful , will see and acknowledge , do incomparably strengthen the authority of the church , in delivering down right faith. hence appears our d●s . unreasonableness intimated to us in this principle : that though connatural and ordinary means be now laid in the world to continue christ's doctrine from ou● time forwards , and were laid in the first age to continue it along hitherto : though common reason and ( as i remember ) st. austin have taught him that , into the place of miracles succeeded the consent of countries & nations ; though mr. baxter , whom perhaps he holds as holy a father , as great a saint , and as eminent a scholar as st. austin himself , have told him in his more reasons for the christian religion , &c. p. . that humane testimony may be so circumstanc't as amounts to a natural infallible certainty , instancing in the existence of king iames ▪ and our laws being made by king and parliament ( which how dr. t. his schollar will like i know not ) and so the churches infallibility in faith to the end of the world might descend down to us by testimony to have been the doctrine of christ and his apostles , without needing new miracles done still to evince it : nay , though himsel● in correspondency to both these doctors , does in his rational account p. . make tradition of the same use to us now which our eyes and ears had been , if we had been actually present when christ delivered his doctrine and wrought his miracles , and so could as well certify us of the first taught doctrine , as if we had seen and heard it , and consequently of the infallibility of the church in case that were a point of doctrin taught at first ; yet now , one of his principles must be , that no argument though never so strong and convictive , no tradition how well qualifi'd soever it be , nor any plea in the world though never so legal and evident , shall acquit the church from a most intolerable usurpation if she challenge infallibility , but down right miracles , full as great ( observe his ●igour ) publick and convincing as were those of christ and his apostles , and wrought by those very persons that challenge this infallibility , nay , and wrought with a design too for the conviction of those who do not beleeve it . how shrewdly sure this rome●destroying principle is laid ! but if one should ask seriously whether a convincing reason to prove this infallibility , i mean such a one as evidently concluded the point , might not do without a miracle , i know no rational man that ever would deny his assent upon such a condition ; nor would dr. st. perhaps in another occasion ; but here , oh here 't is another case ! his hatred against the church of rome's infallibility is so vigorous that he professes to desy demonstration it self , that is , renounce humane nature rather than admit it ; nothing but miracle with all the nice cautions imaginable shall serve the turn . a notable resolution , and only parallel to his whom nothing would satisfy of the truth of christianity , but the miraculous appearance of his angel guardian : but the miracle not being granted him , he dy'd an atheist . in a word , if the church ever usurpt't the pretence of infallibility , i hope she first invaded it at one time or other : now , since as long ago as st. paul's time she we was called by that good man columna & firmamentum veritatis , the pillar and ground of truth ; which words ill consist with a fallible proposer of such truths as belong to her sphear o● points of faith , he ought to shew and make out when the church lost that title and preheminence ; otherwise , since she is found claiming it now , and actually holding and possessing it upon the tenure of tradition as promis'd her by christ , we have very good reason to hold , she never usurp'd it at all , but inherited it by a continued line of succession from the beginning of christianity to this very day : nor has it ever seem'd intolerable to any but to those whom nothing would content but new fangled innovation , and altering the long-establish'd doctrine of christ , deliverd down perpetually from his time . . nothing can be more absurd then to pretend the necessity of such an infallible commission and assistance to assure us of the truth of these writings , and to interpret them , and at the same time to prove that commission from those writings from which we are told nothing can be certainly deduc'd such an assurance not being supposed ; or to pretend that infallibility in a body of men is not at liable to doubts and disputes as in those books from whence only they derive their infalliblity . the first part of this principle is granted as to the absurdity of the position , abating the degree of it ; for , i take it to be equally or more absurd not to assent to the infallibilty of a great body of men ( which is all that is pretended ) whatever reason or tradition appear for it , without an evident miracle . the second part is likewise granted , in case it suppose ( as it seems to do ) the knowledge of their infallibility deriv'd only from those very books which they recommend , and in passages which they are to explicate , ere they can be sure of such an infallibility . otherwise , 't is possible a book ; obscure in multitudes of other passages may be clear in that one which relates them to the church or that body which they are to hear and obey as to the proper interpreters of the scriptures in dogmatical and controverted passages which belong to faith. but the dr. should do well to shew us any society of men or church , that pretends to build her infallibility only on the scriptures interpreted by that very infallibility . otherwise it will not touch our church who claimes the supernatural assistance of the holy ghost upon her rule of faith , tradition : and , as for her being naturally supported from errour in attesting former doctrines 't is grounded by those who discourse of that point upon humane nature as to its infallible sensations and on its rationality , which renders it incapable to do any thing without a motive , as they must do , should they transmit a not-deliver'd , that is , an evidently-new doctrine for an old or deliver'd one . . there can be no hazard to any person in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in those books , supposing he use the best means for understanding them comparable to that which every one runs who beleeves any person or society of men to be infallible who are not ; for in this later he runs unavoidably into one great error , and by that may be led into a thousand ; but in the former god hath promis'd either he shall not erre , or he shall not be damn'd for it . this whole paragraph is built on a false and unprov'd supposition , viz. that any adversary of his beleeves any society of men to be infallible which is not . other faults there are in it , and that good store ; as , granting in effect here what he lately deny'd , that a man using the best means for understanding scripture may mistake the meaning of any particular place , though not with a hazard incomparable to that of the other : whereas , if scripture be the rule of faith as he contended , 't is impossible that a man relying and proceeding upon it , and using that means in the best manner he can possibly , should come to erre in his faith ; for in this case the man having done all that can be done by him as to the understanding the rule , the fault must needs be in his judging that to be a rule which is none . but this main and fundamental error is coucht in the last words ; [ in the former , god hath promis'd he shall not erre , or shall not be damn'd for it , what mean [ in the former case , &c. ] this certainly and nothing but this , if we may trust his own words ; in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in th●se books supposing he use the best means for understanding them : now 't is a strange thing to me , that god should promise that a man mistaking the meaning of these books should not erre in so doing : but omitting this slip of dr. st's . reason or memory ; i ask what means this disjunctive promise , either of not erring or not being damn'd for it ? why it means that dr. st. knows not well himself what to say to the point , or whether he should stand to it or no , that a man using the best means for understanding scripture , that is , according to him , the best means lest by god for him to arrive at faith , should not erre , and therefore he warily subjoyn'd [ or he shall not be damn'd for it ] and then he thinks himself secure enough from confute ; it being a hard thing to conclude of any particular well● meaning man when he is damn'd , when not ; whereas it might perhaps be no such hard matter to prove whether what he held was true or not . i could ask him whence or how he comes to this assurance of god's disjunctive promise here so confidently asserted , on the truth of which the salvation of so many souls necessarily depends ? not by tradition : for this would make him rely on a society of men , or a church , which he hates with all his heart ; not by scripture , for this would make the same thing be the proof to it self : not by reason , for we are to suppose he has done his best in that already , and yet ( as is shown ) has effected nothing . but i would demand of him seriously ; did god ever promise that if one takes such a way as ( for want of a due intelligibleness in proportion to his capacity ) is not able to secure him from error , he shall not erre , or that if he will needs be wiser than his pastors and chuse a means for such an end which god never intended for that end , he shall yet be sure to arrive at that end by that means ; or that , if by relying on it and erring , he shall happen to fall short of sufficient means , he shall notwithstanding miraculously be sav'd without sufficient means ? these are the points he is to consider well , and speak to , and not thus confidently call every thing a principle which he thinks fit to say on his own head , though never so extravagant . in a word , let him prove scripture to have in it the nature of a rule of faith , or ( which will fall into the same ) to have been intended by god for that end , that is , to be of it self such to people of all capacities that soberly enquire , as secures them from erring in faith while they rely on it , and this of it self without needing any society of men , or church to attest or explain it , and then i shall yeild his discourse to run as currently as his own heart can wish : but in proving this , he hitherto hath and ever must fall short most miserably . he hath often , as i noted formerly , instead of saying his rule of faith should preserve those who endeavour to follow it from error or from missing of truth , substituted those words , cannot miss of what is necessary for their salvation , and such like : the examination of which words i have reserved till now ; and , that i may do him all right imaginable , i will press his argument ( or rather indeed bare saying ) in behalf of scripture as far as my reason can carry it . none can deny but that the knowledge of a very few points are sufficient for well-meaning particular persons , as appears by the iewe● that were sav'd , and many silly and weak christians since ; nor can it be deny'd but every one that reads scripture or hears it read by one they dare trust , may understand some few good things , to which if they live up heartily ( and if they do not 't is their own fault ) they shall be sure to be sav'd : and as for such points as a trinity , christ's godhead , real presence , and such like , the knowledge of them ( even in case they are truths ) is not of necessity to salvation , since none doubts but tis , absolutely speaking , possible to be sav'd without knowledge of them since many have been actually sav'd who never heard of any such points . having impartially said in short the best i could in dr. sts. behalf , and much more than he has said for himself ; let us see now what ought to be reply'd in behalf of truth . to make way to it , i premise these maxims . . that according to the ordinary course of god's providence , men are sav'd by means . . that all points of faith , are to some degree means of salvation . . that according to the several circumstances and exigencies of particular persons , one needs more means than another . . that , therefore , it must be said some have miscarry'd because they had no more of those means of salvation apply'd to them , who might yet have been sav'd had they had more . this being so , how great a presumption and madness it is to affirm that every man who reads the scripture shall be sure to understand there so much as is sufficient means for his salvation ; or motives to work up his soul to a disposition for heaven , considering his exigencies , without needing the knowledge of other points which contain other motives ten times more forcible perhaps to move and excite him to true interior goodness ? is it not manifest , that ( considering mens several capacities , which 't is a perfect phrenzy to think they must needs be perfectly adjusted to their spiritual necessities ) one may as well say that every one who throws a die upon a fortune book shall most certainly light on his own lot , as that every one who reads scripture shall , let his exigencies be what they will , find motives sufficient for his salvation ? if dr. st. sayes that some one or two points have prov'd sufficient for some few , therefore they might have serv'd all if they would , and that god's goodness towards christians obliges him to no more ; i reply , first , that he speaks against nature , since t is evident some temptations require greater motives to overcome them than others , and no man can assure us , that those who have fewest motives shall not have the strongest temptations . and if it were but rightly comprehended that t is love of god which unites us to him , and so saves us , and that 't is for want of this those miscarry , who do miscarry , it would be easily understood that many excellent and incomparable motives , as the godhead of christ and such like are lost to weak souls , and consequently heaven , by their not understanding them ; and not only so , but by the necessary connexion of truths with one another , while they misunderstand the scripture , and so , by their holding opposite to such great truths oppose in their thoughts other points of faith , those also lose their motive force , whence their souls become tainted with multitudes of erroneous maxims and practices . secondly , this answer takes away the necessity of all other points of faith but of such a few of them only , which have hapt by the very especial assistance of god's preventing and assisting grace to have accidentally ( as it were ) suffic'd to have sav'd some few . if he sayes that , proceeding on this manner , none can hold an error ; for they are to hold nothing but what they see to be evidently there , and in all other things which they see not they are to suspend . i would know what should hinder them from thinking they see that to be evidently there , which is not evidently there ; since 't is acknowledg'd the vulgar or generality are but bad judges and distinguishers of a true evidence from a counterfeit one ; besides , there are in the open letter as it lyes , many heresies ; and if they know these to be such , how can they be sure of any thing they read there to be true , since nothing is plainer in the letter than are those heresies ; unless it be said that natural or moral maxims taught them these places are to be literally understood , and did not tell them so of the other ; and then , they are beholding to those maxims and not to scripture for their faith , since in that case it has taught them no more than they knew before . again , may not an acute wit make out to the generality of d. sts. faithfull , that to know the meaning of scripture right , they must compare one place with another ; and then , by doing so dexterously , make them beleeve a thousand errours to be pure scripture , and god's word , which are not . much more might be said on this occasion ; but i only make one reflexion on this principle , and so proceed . his intent in it is to shew which party runs greater hazard . the adherers to scripture us'd on his fashion , or those who hear the church ; and he would run us down by vertue of an unprov'd supposition , that the church is not infallible . to offer him fair play , let us grant him all the advantages he pretends to in scripture , and let him grant us all we pretend to secure us , in the church , and then compare the two hazards together ; nay more , let us condescend as much as himself can imagine , even so as to abate the infallibility of the church , and to grant that she is fallible ; and yet the very light of nature will stand on the side of our faithfull against his . for , this teaching them that superiours are to be obey'd , and their teachers to be heard and believ'd in things not known to be against god's command , and experience telling them that scripture is oft times liable to dispute in passages that to both sides seem clear ; both humility , prudence , obedience , and the due care of their salvation and all virtues that can be concern'd in this kind of action , incline them strongly rather to adhere to what persons wiser then themselves , or their pastors conceive to be the meaning of scripture , than to what seems so to themselves , in opposition to the same pastors and multitudes of other christians , who are evidently of greater knowledge , and , as far as they can be inform'd , of equall sincerity . . the assistance which god hath promis't to those who sincerely desire to know his will , may give them greater assurance of the truth of what is contain'd in the books of scripture , than it is possible for the greatest infallibility in any other persons to do , supposing they have not such assurance of their infallibility , god hath promis't no assistance that those should arrive at their end who take a way disproportion'd to that end ; otherwise god should oblige himself to work constant miracles as oft as well-meaning people out of weakness should act imprudently . next , if men desire sincerely to know gods will and be humble ( and if they be not 't is doubtfull their desire is not sincere as is ought ) they will , as god's command , the order of the world , and common reason obliges them , be rather willing to trust their pastors who are better qualifi'd for such knowledge , and whom god hath set over them to instruct them , what is the sense of scriptures , than trust their own private shallow judgments . and , 't is observable that dr. st's . discourse all along concerning this point , is a plain begging the question ; for , if god have left a church and commanded the faithfull to hear it , and conform to it's faith , and consequently to receive the sense of scripture as to points of faith from it , then there is no necessity of scripture's being intended to be plain to all capacities of it self , nor of thinking men may sincerely desire to know god's will in scriptures , and use due means to understand it , without making use of the churches judgment in that affair ; upon which false supposition dr. st. wholly builds his otherwise perfectly ruinous discourse ; wherefore , his supposition being deny'd , i must reply , that those who sincerely desire , to know gods wisl , have a certain virtue in them called humility ; and this teaches them not to overween in their own opinion , but to think that their pastors appointed by god to teach them are generally wiser then those who are to be taught , and that those who are wiser know better than those who are lesse wise . a little of this plain , honest , rational humility would quite spoil all dr. st's discourse , and convince all his principles to be a plausible piece of sedition and licentious presumption , tending of its own nature utterly to destroy all church and church-government ; and , if applied to that subject , temporal too . i should be glad to know what means the word [ such ] in the last line ; if he means infallible , and that the church pretending to infallibility must have infallible assurance that she is infallible , t is asserted by us ; and his supposition that she is not , is absolutely deny'd : for the church is infallibly certain that christ's promise to her shall not fail ; and also infallibly certain by constant tradition and the beleef of good christians in all ages that christ has promis'd her this security or immunity from errour in faith , none questioning it but those who have rebel'd and revolted from her . in a word , this whole principle is faulty , being built on a false and unprov'd supposition ; and were the supposition granted , and that the church were fallible , still it were false , that his faithfull would have greater assurance of their faith than ours , as hath been partly now shown , and more amply in my reply to the foregoing principle . recapitulation . the sum then of dr. st's performances in these ten principles of his , which most fundamentally concern his faith , and the pretended reduction of it to principles , is briefly this ; that he hath not brought so much as one single argument proving either that scripture's letter is the rule of faith , nor that tradition or the infallible testimony of gods church is not it . and as for the particular maxims or sayings of his , on which he chiefly relies , they have been one by one disprov'd , and the opposite truths establish't ; as , . that faith being such an assent , as when built ( as it ought to be ) on the means left by god for mankinde to rely ou , is impossible to be false , and so that means or the rule of faith being necessarily such as while men rely upon , it is impossible they should erre ; these things , i say , being so ( as i have largely prov'd in faith vindicated , and the introductory discourse to this present examin ) dr. st. has not so much as made an offer or attempt , to show that scripture is the rule of faith. . that since 't is agreed god can contrive writings sufficiently intelligible for that end , or sufficiently clear to ascertain those who rely upon them of their faith , and yet , on the other side , 't is evident god has not de facto done this , or contriv'd such methods and ways as our reason tels us evidently , are proper means to keep those writings call'd the scriptures from being thus mis-understood by severall parties , even in fundamental points , as we experience they are it follows hence most manifestly that god never intended the way of writing for the rule of faith. . since several parties of excellent capacities in understanding words aright , and both owning scripture for their rule , and applying themselves with greatest diligence to know the true sence of it , do notwithstanding differ in those fundamental points of a trinity and the god-head of christ ; 't is manifest that scripture is not able so secure those who rely on it to their power of the truth of their faith , and so is not the rule of faith. . again , since in passages that concern faith the knowing whether the words be taken properly or improperly is that which determines what is faith , what not ; and this knowledge is not had from scripture , it follows , that scripture is not the rule of faith. . god has no where promis'd that he will still assist those who sincerely endeavour to compass an end , in case they take a way disproportion'd to attain that end ; and which way was ( consequently ) never intended by him for such an end : for this were to engage himself to do perpetual miracles , when ever any one should act irrationally . wherefore , unless it be first solidly prov'd that scripture is the rule of faith , or apt of its own nature to give those who rely on it inerrable security of the truth of their faith while they thus rely on it , and consequently that it was intended by god for such an end , none can justly lay claim to god's assistance , or tax his justice or veracity if they fall into errour ; much lesse , if they neglect those duties which nature makes evident to them , and common christianity teaches , viz. to obey and hear their governours , pastors and teachers ordain'd by god , and rely on their own private wit , or god's immediate assistance to their single selves rather than to those publick officers of the church god had appointed to govern and direct them , for this intolerable spiritual pride is so odious and pernicious that it most justly entitles them to delusion , errour , and heresie . . hence , since god has left some means for faith , and 't is blasphemy to say that those who rely according to their utmost power on the means left and intended by god to lead men into truth , can , while they do so , run into errour ; which yet private understandings ( as was seen ) may , relying on the written word ; it follows 〈◊〉 unavoidably that some other way is left ( which is not writing ) to secure the relyers on it from errour in faith , or to be to them the rule of faith. . scripture not being the rule , and christ's doctrine being once settled and accepted in the christian part of the world , by means of miracles , there needed no more but to derive it down to future ages ; and , this doctrine being practicall , and , so , objected to to our sences , testimony was sufficient to do it , so it were sufficiently qualify'd , that is , the best and on the best manner supported that any ordinary means can be ; such was the testimony of the church ( or tradition ) which , besides what is found in humane testimony , has also the whole body & joynt force of supernaturall motives to preserve the testifiers attentive and veracious . thus the church or the christian society of men being establish't infallible in delivering down faith , needs not prove her infallibility by miracles ; but 't is sufficient the faithfull beleeve that christ promis't to protect her from errour ( and consequently to beleeve the an est of her infallibility , or that she is infallible ) upon the same rule they beleeve all their faith and the scriptures too , viz. upon tradition ; and that her controversiall divines who are to defend faith , by way of reason or argument prove the quid est of this infallibility or make out in what it consists or in what second causes this ordinary and constant assistance is founded , and consequently prove it's force by such maxims as ground the certainty of humane testimony , and ( if the reader comprehends them ) by the strange efficacy of supernaturall motives also conspiring to strengthen nature as to that effect of rightly testifying the doctrine received and beleeved to be christ's . . there is no necessity then of proving this infallibility meerly by scripture interpreted by virtue of this infallibility ; nor do the faithfull or the church commit a circle in beleeving that the church is infallible upon tradition . for first , taking them as faithfull precisely they are meerly beleevers not reasoners , or such as put one proposition artificially before or after another . next , they beleeve only the supernaturall infallibility built on the assistance of the holy ghost , that , is , on the churches sanctity ; and this is prov'd by the human testimony of the church to have been ever held since the beginning , and the force of the human testimony of the church is prov'd by maxims of meer reason . add that the certainty of such a va●t testimony is self-evident practically ; in the same manner as 't is self-evident that the testimony of all england cannot deceive us in telling us there was such a man as king iames : whence no circle can possibly be committed , if it be beleeved for it's own sake , or rather known by its own light though there would be if discoursing it rationally we should put the same proposition to be before and after it self . . since those who have the least capacity of penetrating scripture , and consequently ( according to dr. st. ) have the fewest motives of good life applyed to them may frequently live amongst greatest temptations , that is , in circumstances of needing the most ; 't is a blind undertaking , and no securer nor wiser , than idle fortune-telling , to bear men in hand that persons of all capacities who sincerely endeavour shall understand scripture in all such things as are necessary for their salvation . . since 't is most evident that private iudgments may err in understanding scripture but not evident that christ has not promis'd his church security from erring in faith , they run the greater hazard by far who rely on their private sense of scripture , then those do who rely on the church ; especially , since the church denyes not scripture but professes to go according to it , and so in common reason is likely to comprehend its meaning far better than private men ; but most especially since our moderns when they first began to rely on their own judgments of scripture for their faith , revolted from hearing the church , and rebell'd against pastours and lawfull superiours , which both gods law and the light of nature taught them they were to follow and submit to . thus our new apostle of the private spirit of gifts and new light , hath endeavour'd to pull down the church and subvert the foundation laid by christ ; and instead thereof to set up as many churches as there are private and proud fancies in the world . each of which may by this devillish doctrine defy the church for teaching him his faith ; or for governing him as as a church , that is , governing him as one of the faithfull ; for she can bind never a subject in conscience to any thing but what her self and each man judges to be true and sound ; wherefore , if any or each private person understands scripture another way then she does , he is enfranchis'd by his rule of faith ( which he ought not relinquish ) from her authority ; she may in that case wish him well and pity him as every old wife may also do ; and he in return may wish well to the church end pity her ; she may endeavour to admonish and instruct him better , so to pluck him out of his errour ; and he in requital , that he may not be behind-hand with the church in courtesy , may with equal nay better title admonish the church of her failing , and endeavour to pull her out of her errour , or ( as the new phrase is ) reform her ; for , being conscious to himself that he reads the scripture and sincerely indeavours to know the meaning of it , he has all the security of his faith , ( and consequently of the churches being in an errour , ) that may be ; nor can he being thus gifted , want power to preach to her and others ; for , certainly the world would be most perversly ordered , if they who are in errour , should have licence and power to propagate their errours , and those who follow truth should have no leave to propagate truth . thus the church has lost all power , that is , has lost her self , being able neither to lead nor drive her equally-gifted subjects : so that her exercising jurisdiction over them would by this wicked doctrine be a most tyrannical persecution , and every such private man's refractory disobedience ( see the wonderful gifts of the private spirit ! ) would become a most glorious confession of christian faith ; and every rebell acting against the church , ( so he be but so self-conceited as to judge he knows more of god's mind in the scripture then all the church besides ) would by this doctrine ( in case the secular power should think fit to curb his insolence ) be a most blessed martyr , such , no doubt , as john fox'es were . the fifth examen . sifting the eleven remaining principles , which seem chiefly to concern the nature of faith. whoever hath perus'd the foregoing examin , and reflected well upon what a sandy foundation dr. st. has built his faith , will doubtless expect that he will assigne it such a nature as is of no exceeding great strength ; for fear lest his weak grounds ' should not support his superstructures nor his proofs carry home to his conclusions . now the conceit which the generality of christians have of faith , importing it's true nature , is that 't is such an assent as is impossible to be an errour or false ; whence follows , that its grounds are likewise such : and indeed , since all hold , that faith is an immoveable and unalterable assent which is to bide by us and we by it all our whole lives till we arrive at our future state , the region of light , where we shall see facie ad faciem , who sees not that it must be held ; and so ( since there can be no necessity to hold a thing to be what 't is not ) must be impossible to be false ? for , otherwise were we to hold it , that is , were it self possible to be false , it ought to be held alterable , when ever more light should appear discovering it to be an errour . to evince this truth i have produc't multitudes of arguments in faith vindicated , none of which has been thought fit to be reply'd to , though mine and faith's opposers still craftily persist to insinuate the contrary errour ; but i will at present make use only of one , which will , i conceive , best conclude the point between us . for , dr. st. makes scripture the rule of faith , and so speaks of faith as standing under what he conceives the firmest and clearest ground , and which was left by god for mankind to embrace faith. i do the same when i assert the churches testimony or tradition to be the rule . so that neither of us speak of the particular odd ways by which some persons casually come to have faith , nor of faith as had by such means , but of the common road-way left by god for mankind to attain to faith , and of faith as standing under such a means or rule . upon this agreement if we joyn issue , and proceed , it seems that nothing but evident obstinacy against manifest truth can hinder us from agreeing in our conclusion . for since , if we may be deceiv'd in beleeving even while we follow the direction of that rule which god himself has appointed to light us to faith , it would follow that there is no means imaginable likely to do that effect , as also that god himself had deceived us , which is both blasphemous and impossible , it must follow , that faith built upon the rule left by god ( whether scripture or tradition ) must be impossible to be an errour , and consequently its ground or rule must be impossible to be false or erroneous . wherefore dr. st. is oblig'd as well as i am to hold heartily this double conclusion , and , if he attempts to discourse of that point , to make it out , that the rule he assignes is such as cannot leave us in errour and our infinitely-perfect god in the blame . how far short he hath fallen hitherto of making out his pretended rule of faith ( viz. scripture as standing under the judgement of every private person ) to be impossible to suffer men to err while adhering to that way , is already shown ; how heartily now he asserts faith it self , built on the means or rule left by god , to be impossible to be erroneous or false , comes next to be examined . . no mans faith can therefore be infallible meerly because the proponent is said to be infallible : because the nature of assent doth not depend upon the objective infallibility of any thing without us ; but is agreeable to the evidence we have of it in our mind●s ; for assent is not built on the nature of things , but their evidence to us . this principle begins with a fallacy of non causa pro causa : for what man in his witts ever said or held , that faith must therefore be infallible , meerly because the proponent is said to be infallible ; must a meer saying , that is , a saying neither self-evident nor prov'd , be held a competent ground to build the existence of any thing upon ? but let us suppose that dr. st. by the words [ is said to be ] meant [ is ] or [ prov'd to be ] as is indeed our true tenet , let 's see how he confutes us . our tenet is , that in case the proposer of faith be infallible , all that rely on it for that particular are by so doing infallible likewise . he argues against us from the nature of assent which he sayes depends not on the objective infallibility of any thing without us , but is agreeable to the evidence we have of it in our minds . if he means by the words [ depends not ] such a dependence as is immediate , i grant it ; for our assent being an effect wrought in our soul , and a result of some foregoing knowledges , notions or natures of things within us , which produce that assent if it be a conclusion ; or compound it if a first principle ; 't is impossible any thing without us , and staying there , without evidencing it self to our minds , or breeding some interiour discovery of it●elf there , should beget any assent at all concerning it . but , if he means by those words that our assent depends not mediately , or depends not at all on the object without us , as his large expression seems to signify , then 't is absolutely deny'd ; for the evidence of the thing in us , is an effect of the nature of the thing without us ; nor could evidence of the thing in us cause assent without such dependence on the object or thing without us , for , unless by means of the object and dependence on it , this evidence it self could not be . the last words , [ for assent is not built on the nature of things but their evidence to us ] is but a tautology or short rehearsall of the reason lately given , and so needs no new answer . yet , however d. st. for want of logick expresses himself ill & confusedly , there is notwithstanding a kind of knot in in his discourse , and i shall lend my best assistance to loose it ; but , first it will be necessary to put down his three next principles , since they all seem to club into one dilemma against infallibility 〈◊〉 proponent . . it is therefore necessary in order to an 〈◊〉 assent , that every particular person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be beleeved ; so that the ground on which a necessity of some externall infallible proponent is asserted , must rather make every particular person infallible , if no divin faith can be without an infallible assent ; and so renders any other infallibility useless . . if no particular person be infallible in the assent he gives to matters proposed by others to him , then no man can be infallibly sure that the church is infallible : and so the churches infallibility can signify nothing to our infallible assurance without an equal infallibility in our selves in the belief of it . . the infallibility of every particular person being not asserted by those who plead for the infallibility of a church , and the one rendring the other useless ( for , if every person be infallible , what need any representative church to be so ! ) and the infallibility of a church being of no effect if every person be not infallible in the belief of it , we are farther to inquire what certainty men may have in matters of faith , supposing no externall proponent to be infallible . ere i begin my discourse i am to note dr. st's . shuffling way of contriving his sentences here , or of penning his principles as he call's them . his st contends 't is necessary to infallible assent that every particular person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be beleev'd . and the d in consonancy to it , mentions the infallibility of particular persons in the assent they give to matters proposed by others to them , which clearly signify that faith cannot be infallible unless we have infallibility or infallible knowledge of the points of faith ; for what can [ matters propos'd to us to be beleev'd ] signify else ? on the other side in the st princ. he seems only to aim at proving , there must be infallibility in us that the proponent is infallible . also princ. . he concludes , that to our infallible assurance there is required equal infallibility in our selves in the belief of the churches infallibility . and lastly , princ. . he concludes , the infallibility of the church of no effect if every person be not infallible in the beleef of it . which expressions are of quite different sense from the former ; and require not in●●llibility in the in the matters propos'd to beleeved , as did the other , but only in knowing the proponent to be infallible . now , because i have no mind to cavill but am heartily glad when he gives me occasion to handle any good point , i will not take him as his former words sounded , it being perfect nonsense to require evidence of the points . propos'd ere we can be certain of the authority that proposes them ( for what need can there be either of any proposer , or of knowing him infallible , if we be infallible certain antecedently of the points themselves , ) but i shall willingly pass by those expressions as effects either of a strange unwariness , or of a crafty preparing for future evasion , and discourse of the later thesis ; for in truth it hints at a very excellent difficulty , though he proposes it but ill and pursues it worse . i will therefore clear his discourse from his contradictory expressions , and put it home and close as well as i can , and so as i hope himself will not say i at all wrong it . he seems them to argue thus . objective infallibility in another ( viz. the proponent ) avails nothing to make my faith or assent infallible , unles i be also infallibly certain that the proponent is infallible , wherefore ( in case infallibility be requisit to faith ] every one of the faithfull must be also infallible . but this renders both these infallibilities useles and insignific●nt ; for the infallibility of the church is of no effect , if every person be not infallible , and if every person be infallible what need any church representative or councill be so : therefore , this doctrine of an infallible proponent is frivolous and inconsistent . to make way towards the clearing this considerable difficulty , i premise these few notes . . that a man may be infallible , or out of the power of being deceiv'd in some particular thing two manner of wayes : either , from his penetrating the reasons which conclude the thing to be as he judges , that is , from his knowledge that the thing is so , which we may fitly term formally infallible . or else by adhering , not through knowledge , but accidentally as it were , to some thing which is a reall truth , though he penetrate not the grounds why it is true ; or by adhering to the judgment of another person in some thing or tenet whose judgment is indeed well grounded and certain as to that thing , though he see not 't is so . and such a man may fitly be said to be materially infallible . both of them are absolutely secur'd from errour or infallible fundamentally by the thing 's being such as they judge it to be , that is , ( in our case ) by relying on a proponent which is infallible ; and they differ only in the wayes by which they come to rely upon that proponent ; the one being led to it by perfect sight that the thing must be so , or that the proponent must be infallible ; the other perhaps blindly , at best not out of clear discernment embracing that judgment , yet , as long as he adheres to the judgment of another man who cannot be deceiv'd or in an errour as to that thing , himself is actually secur'd from possibility of erring ; and so , infallible or incapable to be in an errour likewise . to this difficulty i had regard in my faith vindicated when i distinguish't between faith's being true in us , and true to us . for the blindest assenter that is , though he stumble upon a truth , yet if he really hold it , his judgment is truly and really conformable to the thing or object , and consequently true or impossible to false , and so himself undeceivable or uncapable to be in an errour in holding thus : yet , if we go abut to relate that truth which is in him , to evident reasons or grounds in his mind , connaturally breeding that conformity of his judgment to the thing , there is no such thing perhaps to be found ; whence , 't is not true to him , or evident to him 't is true , since he sees not or knows not that 't is true ; yet still , as i said before , he is infallible or impossible to be in an errour while he adheres to it as true , because that judgment of his is in reality comformable to the thing . . 't is requisit and necessary that the assent of faith in every particular beleeyer be at least materially infallible , provided it be built ( as it ought ) upon the means laid by god for mankind to embrace faith , that is , upon the right rule of faith. for ( omitting many other mischiefs and inonveniencies ) otherwise , as was lately prov'd , it would follow that god , who is essential truth , did lead mankind into errour , in case relying sincerely on what god order'd them to rely on , their judgment , by so doing , did become erroneous . . 't is requisit and necessary that the assent of faith in diverse particular beleevers be formally infallible , or that those persons be infallibly certain by evident reason , that the authority or rule of faith they rely on cannot herein deceive them . else great witts and acute reflecters whose piercing understandings require convictive grounds for their faith , would remain for ever unsatisfy'd ; nor could the wisest christians sincerely and heartily assent to , nor with honesty profess the truth of their faith , nor could any prove it true to establish rational doubters in it , or convert men of exact knowledge to it , or convince hereticks calling the truth of it in question . nor could governours and leading persons with any conscience or credit propose and preach the truth of faith to the generality : also it 's truth being otherwise unmaintainable , the best vigour of faith and it's efficacy to work through charity , must needs be exceedingly enfeebled & deaded . 't is necessary then that the grounds of faith be both conclusive of it's truth , and also penetrable by those whose proper work it is to make deep inspection into them ; whence they will become formally or knowingly-infallible that the authority they rely on for faith's conveyance cannot possibly deceive them . . besides these men who are to be formally infallible in the grounds of faith , and so able to discourse of those grounds , and make out their absolute certainty by way of skill or art , there ought to be moreover another sort of men in the church formally-infallible in discerning the true and distinct notion of each point of faith and this is the proper work of the governours of the church . for these , by reason of their state of life , which is to meditate on god's law day and night , their perpetual converse with the affair of faith , by preaching , teaching , catechizing , exhorting ; their concern to overlook their flock lest any innovatour should infect them with novelties ; their constant addiction to observe exactly their rule , tradition , the standard by which they govern themselves in distinguishing the true faithfull from revolting apostats . or hereticks ; their duty to be well vers't in the doctrine of fathers , and acts of former councils , and according to these soberly and gravely ( not quirkingly and with witty tricks ) to understand and interpret holy scripture : these eminent personages , and chief magistrates and m●sters of the faithfull being t●us furnisht with all requisite endowments to give them a most dist●nct and exact knowledge of the doctrine descended to them by tradition , and of the sense of the church , in case any heretick revolts openly from the formerly deliver●d faith , these men , i say , are by the majesty and sway of their mo●t venerable and most ample authority to quash and subdue his petty party newly sprung up ; and either reduce him to his duty by wholsome advice and discipline , or , if he persists in his obstinacy to cut him off solemnly from the church by excommunication , that so the sounder faithfull may look upon him ( according to our saviours command ) as on a heathen or a publican● , it being thus made evident , that he stands against all his superi●urs , and rebels against the most sacred authority upon earth . or , in case that heretick cloak his poisonous doctrine in a●biguous expressions , or goes about to pervert the words used formerly by the church , by drawing them to a sinister sense never intended by her ; they , being perfectly acquainted with the language and sense of the church , are to invent and assign proper words to express the churches sence , and such as are pertinent and effectual for the present juncture and exigency to defeat the crafty attempts of those quibbling underminers of faith : or else , they are to clear the true sence of the former words us'd by the church by declaring in what meaning the church takes and ever took them ; and sometimes too , beating the heretick at his own weapon , scripture's letter , by avowing this to be the sence in which the church ever took such and such places . hence , they are said to define faith , that is , to expresse in distinct words it 's precise limits and bounds , that so no leaven of errour may possibly intermingle it self ; and , to seal and recommend their acts by stamping on them the most grave , most venerable , and most sacred authority in the whole christian world . now , that this authority of the church representative is infallible in knowing the points of faith , and that on the best manner is prov'd hence , because , if such a learned body , consisting of the most eminent and knowing personages in the world , can be deceiv'd while they rely on the means left by god to preserve mankinde from errour in understanding the points of faith , 't is evident no man in the world can be ●●cur'd thereby from errour , and so the means would be no means to arrive at truth , but rather a means to leade men into errour , since they err'd relying solely on that , which , it being supposed to have been intended by god for a contrary end , is absolutely impossible . . though the substance or essence of faith consists in believing what is true upon the divine authority certainly engag'd for those truths , which is the formal motive of believing , and therefore 't is enough for trne faith that the ●generality of the church or the vulgar be materially infallible in their faith ; yet it addes evidently a great perfection to faith that they be formally infallible , and that the faithfull see with infallible certainty that the divine authority is actually engag'd when they believe . first , because faith is an intellectual virtue , and so to proceed knowingly upon it's grounds , makes it more agreeable to the understanding and perfective of it . . because the more evident 't is , that the divine authority is engag'd , the more heartily those who reverence it , are dispos'd to submit their iudgments by believing : whence faith in such persons is more lively , firm and immoveable , also more efficacious and ( if other considerations be equal ) more apt to work through charity , than it is in others . moreover , such faithful are incomparably more able to satisfy and convert others ; being able ( as is supposed ) to make ●ut evidently the grounds of their faith ; wherefore , every thing being then in it's perfectest state when 't is able to produce it's like , or another of it 's own kinde , 't is a signe that faith in such men is ripe , manly , and perfect ; since 't is able to propagate it s●lf to others , or ( as s. paul phrases it ) gignere in evangelio . whence , those who are to convert souls and propagate faith , are oblig'd to labour all that may be to accomplish themselves in this particular , lest they fall short of this perfection which seems properly and peculiarly due to their state . for 't is not so opprobrious to the layity to be unable to perform this , but 't is highly so to them , because they are lame without it . . notwithstanding this , 't is god's will that all the faithfull should be formally infallible in their faith , or know infallibly the grounds of faith cannot be false , as far as they are capable . for , this being ( as was lately shown ) a perfection in faith , and god , who is essential goodness , not being envious , but desirous his creatures should have all the good they are capable to receive , especially such goods as tend to the bettering their souls and promoting them towards heaven , it follows that he wills them this perfection in faith , as far as it can stand with the universal order of the world , or the particular natures of things , that is , as far as they are capable to receive it . . he hath therefore ordain'd such a means by which to know his will as far as concerns our belief , or what he would have us believe , that is , he has constituted such a rule of faith , that it's certainty may be most easily penetrable by all degrees and sorts of the faithfull . whence follows most evidently that tradition and not scripture is that rule . for , of all ways of knowing and ascertaining imaginable , nothing is more easie to be comprehended or to satisfy people of all sorts then is that of witnessing authority ; as we experience in their perfect belief of k. iames or k. h. ths existence , and such like . the grounds of which truths , not needing to be learnt at school , but being either inbred or by an ordinary converse with the world instil'd into them , nothing is easier then for the wiser sort of them to fall into the account of it of themselves , occasion being given ; as also to awaken , as it were , those dormant knowledges in the vulgar , and make them reflect and see ( not with a clear and distinct sight as do the wiser portion of the church , but ) with a gr●sse and confused , yet solid knowledge , and suitable to their pitch , that a rule of such a nature is certain ; and so , those who professedly own and proceed upon it are in the truth ; they who reject it , in an errour ; whereas yet they are utterly incapable by any maxims in their rude understandings either to know that the letter of the scripture , on the rightness of which all depends was preserv'd from errour , among so many translatious and transcriptions ; or that the sense is necessarily such as they conceive it to be , amidst such multitudes of commentators and sects wrangling about the meaning of that letter ; nor yet are they competent judges of the skill of all those several sects and sorts of men whom they see and hear differ about the sense of it . tradition then of the church being thus prov'd the rule of faith , 't is both farther shown how unreasonable , unnatural and unsafe dr. st's private-spirited rule of faith is , and also ( even hence ) demonstrated against him here that tradition of the church is infallible ; since being by this moans prov'd to be the rule appointed by god to light mankinde to their faith , 't is impossible that those who rely and proceed upon it , should be led into errour , and also impossible that faith it self thus grounded should be false . but i needed not have gone thus far to confute d. st's four principles now under hand . the four first notes had abundantly given them their answer ; and 't is time we now begin to apply them to that purpose . whereas then he grounds them all on our tenet , that no divine faith can be without an infallible assent , he may please to know that we only mean by those words there materially infallible , or so as cannot possibly be an errour : and in this sense we own the position , and so must he too unlesse he will speak open blasphemy ; for , divine faith being a believing upon the divine authority , and ( as we both suppose ) upon some means laid by god himself by which he proposes to us what we are to beleeve , by telling us he has said it , in case an assent thus grounded could possibly be an errou● , it would follow necessarily that god himself would be the cause of that errour . the substance then of faith could be preserved , and the chief end of faith ( our salvation ) on some fashion attained , were there no more than this , that is , though never a man in the whole world did know or could come to know that the rule of faith were infallible ; provided none in the church did speculate , and so , looking into the grounds of his faith , and finding them ( as far as he could see ) inconclusive , did begin to suspect the truth of it ; nor any out of the church did oppose faith ; for the faithfull would in that case be in actual possession of those excellent truths call'd points of faith , firmly assented to by their understandings , which were apt to produce tho●e good dispositions of their wills , call'd virtues ; in the same sort ( though not in the same degree ) as they do now ; and , by means of them , they might arrive at heaven . thus the dr. may see that all he builds on is a pure mistake ; and that all the faithfull may be thus infallible in their assent , and thus infallible in judging the proposer does not , nay cannot deceive us ; nay infallible in judging thus of the matters propos'd to us to beleeve , and yet not one man be infallibly sure by way of evident knowledge that the church is infallible ; because all this proceeds not in the least ( in this supposition ) from the reach of any man's intellective faculty , but purely from the goodnesse and conclusivenesse of the grounds laid by god , and his good providence which led those men to embrace them , though they neither penetrate nor went about to discourse them , but simply to believe them ; on the same manner as our ruder unreflecting vulgar are led now . but , in this case , were all the world no wiser , the wisest in the church would be no wiser then the weakest and rudest vulgar now mention'd ; wherefore , both for that reason , and many others ' assign'd in my d and th note , it was absolutely requisite to the church , and so becoming god's providence to order that it should be otherwise ; and that the conclusiveness of those infallible grounds on which god has founded our faith should be penetrable by those who set themselves to such speculations , or fall into doubts concerning them , according as the exigencies of the church shall be found to need such helps . if this will not serve dr. st. ( i am sure it will serve to defeat all his arguments ) i shall farther tell him that the generality or main body in the church is formally infallible in judging the church to be such in delivering down the first-taught faith , as i have prov'd in my th and th note and elsewhere . besides my reasons given there and in other places , i must desire him and the rest of my readers that in conceiving how this may be , they would take their measures from the absolute certainty such people are capable of in parallell matters , and not from their ability to explain or defend this absolute certainty , or their constancy in adhering to it if combated by plausible reasons ; for he is a very mean reflecter upon nature , who observes not that the vulgar have absolute natural evidence of many truths , which yet they can neither give reason for , declare , defend , nor , perhaps ( through levity incident to such weak souls ) do very firmly adhere to ; and no wonder , since so great a man as sextus empiricus speculated himself out of the conceit of the certainty of his senses ; of which yet none doubts but nature , till he began to pervert it by wrong speculations , had given him as infallible certainty as to any other , also , they are to reflect how infallibility ) or , which is all one , certainty ) may be in a thousand different degrees according to the greater or lesser capacity of the subject ; which they will best comprehend by reflecting with how different a clearness many things appear to us now we are at age , and how dimly when we were young , which yet we were absolutely certain of at that time . nor yet does one of those infallibilities spoken of render the other vseless ; for they may either be about different objects , as if the church officers were formally infallible in knowing what particular points came down from christ's time , and penetrat●ng the distinct limits of each point ; and those other particular persons be only infallible in judging the church to be so ; as it happens in many controvertists , who are well instructed in the grounds of their faith , yet not so well verst in the nature of particular points , but believe them only by implicit faith ; or else one of their knowledges may be more clear and distinct than the others , and so serve to perfect and advance it , in the same manner as art does nature . least of all can it follow that the infallibility of the church representative is needless ; for this is not intended to teach the faithfull their faith at first , nor do i remember ever to have seen a generall council cited in a catechism ; but this is performed by the church diffusive by her practise and language , and by her pastors in their catechisms , and instructions ; but it 's use is to secure and preserve faith already taught and known , from receiving any taint by the equivocating heretick , and to recommend it more authoritatively to the faithfull , when clear'd . and , whoever reads my th note will see so many particularities in the members which compound a representative church above others who are purely parts of ecclesia credens , that he cannot in any reason judge them vseless , though those others be in an inferiour degree certain of their faith too , for all this while the word [ infallible ] which seems to have so loud a sound , and is made such a monstrous peece of business by the deniers of it , is in plain terms no more but just barely certain , as i have prov'd faith vind. p. . . and reason against rail . p. . to come closer up then to my adversary ; his th principle which speaks of assent in common is wholly built upon a false supposition , that it can only be grounded upon evidence ; for however indeed in perfect reflecters that are unbyast , evidence of the object or of the credibleness of the authority , is alwayes requisit to breed assent , yet experience teaches us that assent , in weak and unre●lecting persons , is frequently built on a great probability , sometimes a very little one , and sometimes men assent upon little or no reason at all , their passion or interest byassing their wills , and by it their understandings , and this many times even against such reason as would be evident to another . again , matteriall infallibility , which is enough to that assent we speak of , precisely and solely consider'd , depends solely , at least principally , on the object , contrary to what is there asserted . and , whereas he says princ. . that the infallibility of every particular person is not asserted by those who plead for the infallibility of a church , he sees by this discourse it both is and must be asserted , and that we maintain that every particular person must be materially infallible or incapable of erring while he relies on the grounds laid and recommended by god ; that is , while he believes the church , which yet is far from rendring the formal infallibility of the church useless ; unless he will say , that because it suffices for the pitch of weak people , ( whose duty 't is not to maintain and make out the truth of their faith ) that they be simply in the right , or void of errour , and that they see after a gross manner that the thing is so , though they cannot defend it ; therefore there is no need that those whose duty 't is to do so , should be able to penetrate the grounds of faith , and , so , explicate , prove and maintain it to be true. nor will it follow , that though the generality were after a rude and gross manner formally infallible in their belief that the church is infallible , and therefore that the points she proposes are all likewise infallibly-true , it will not follow , i say hence , that a greater and clearer and more penetrative degree of formal infallibility is useless in church-governours ; for , as appears by my th note , there are many other things to be done by them of absolute necessity for the church , which far exceed the pitch and posture of those dull knowers of the lowest class , ( which is the next degree above ignorance ) and are unauthoriz'd to meddle in such affairs . unless he will say , that art is needless because there is nature , or that there needs no iudges to decide such cases in which the law seems plain . and thus much for the clearing this concerning point . in the rest of his principles i shall be briefer . but i must not pass over his transition to them , which is this [ we are further to enquire what certainty men may have in matters of faith , supposing no external proponent to be infallible . ] and he need not go far to satisfie his enquiry : for , it being most evident by the disputes between the protestants and socinians that scripture needs some external proposer of it's true meaning in such kinde of points , as also some external proposer or attester that this is the true text of it ( on which all is built . ) also it being evident that dr. st. ( princ. . ) denies any infallible proposers of either of these , and that here again he pursues close the same doctrin ; lastly , this proposer being such , that , however we can have certainty without it that the divine authority is to be believed , yet we must depend on it for the knowledge when and where 't is engag'd , that is , we must depend on it for the certainty of our faith ; it follows , that in case this proponent be not infallible , it can never be made out with infallible certainty that the divine authority stands engag'd for the truth of any one point of faith , and consequently that the certainty men have in matters of faith is not an infallilible one . and if it be not an infallible certainty which faith has ( as he no where challenges , but very laboriously disproves it ) he need not go far to enquire or learn what certainty it must have ; for common sense tels him and every man who has the least spark of natural logick , that , if faith must have certainty ( as he grants ) and have not infallible certainty , it must either have fallible certainty or none at all ; there being no middle between them ; and so , we must make account , that because it overstrains d. st's weak grounds to assert faith to be infallibly certain , therefore his next attempt must be to overstrain common sense , and to the inestimable honour of christian religion , maintain that all christian faith is fallibly-certain . but he must do it smoothly and warily ; and , however he nam'd the word [ infallible ] loud enough and oft enough when he was confuting it , yet he must take heed how he names the word [ fallible ] certainty when he is asserting it , lest it breed laughter or dislike ; though it be evident out of the very terms that he who confutes infallible certainty must maintain fallible certainty , sf he maintains any . but now he begins his defence of faiths fallible certainty , and 't is fit we should listen : monstrous things use to challenge and even force attention from the most unconcern'd . . there are different degrees of certainty to be attained according to the different degrees of evidence , and measure of divine assistance ; but every christian by the use of his reason and common helps of grace may attain to so great a degree of certainty from the convincing arguments of the christian religion and authority of the scriptures ; that , on the same ground on which men doubt of the truth of them , they may as well doubt of the truth of those things which they judge to be most evident to sence & reason . i wish d. s. had explain'd himself here what he means by [ different degrees of evidence ] whether some glances or likely appearances of truth call'd greater or lesser probabilities ; or such intelle●tual sights at the least of them discovers the th●ng , th●● evidenc't , to ●e be indeed so , or true. i suspect much he means the former , because th●se are the most proper grounds for fallible certainty which he is now going to establish whereas the latter sort of evidences would hazard to carry too far and to beget infallible certainty , which would quite spoil his most excellent design of setling the fallible certainty of faith ▪ for those evidences which show the thing to be true , show it at the same time to be impossible to be false ; whence 't is a thousand to one that such evidences as these would utterly destroy his beloved fallible certainty , and endanger to introduce again by necessary and enforcing consequence that popish doctrine of infallibility which he had newly discarded when he adds that every christian may by the means here assigned attain to so great a degree of certainty &c. i had thought he had meant certainty of the points of his faith ; but my hopes were much defeated , when , coming to the point , he flyes off to his christians not doubting the truth of the convincing arguments of christian religion and of the authority of the scriptures ; for this is far wide of our purpose and his promise , which was to reduce the faith of protestants to principles ; whereas these words signify no more but not to doubt of christianity being the true religion , or scriptures being god's word ; but reaches not to what are those points of christianity or determinate sense of scripture in particular , which constitutes protestantism , and only concerns our debate . now 't is evident that the roman-catholicks profess not to doubt of the convincing grounds of christianity , nor yet of scripture , but to hold that christianity is the only-tr●e religion , and that the scriptures are holy and god's word : and yet we differ so much from protestants that he thinks us idolaters . what we are then in reason to expect from dr. st. is , that he would bring us grounds for the certainty of his faith as to determinate points ; viz. christ's god-head , a trinity , reality or not-reality of christ's body in the eucharist and such like ; and those so certain as that we may as well doubt of what we judge to be most evident to sense and reason , as doubt of them , as he here pretends ; and not put us off with common words in stead of particular satisfaction concerning his faith and the certainty thereof . i would ask him then how it comes to pass that the socinian whom he will not deny to have both use of his reason and common helps of grace , and both the convincing arguments of the christian religion and authority of scriptures to make use of , how , i say , he comes so to fall short of evidence and consequently certainty springing from that evidence concerning christ's god-head ( which is a fundamental point of christian faith , ) that he doubts it , nay utterly denies it , whereas yet the protestant having the same means to work with , judges he has evidence and certainty grounded on that evidence that christ is god ; yet all this while they dissent not at all in things most evident to sense or reason ? i much fear our drs. big words concerning his degrees of evidence and the certainty of his faith built on those degrees will , when examin'd , amount to a very obscure evidence and a problematical kind of assuredness ; much like those comfortable lights which both parties have when they lay even wagers at cock-fighting & such games ; giving good hopes to both sides , but good security to neither . but , so it ought to be , if the grounds of faith be not infallibly but only fallibly-certain . which is all he is bent to prove . . no man who firmly assents to any thing as true , can at the same time entertain any suspicion of the falshood of it ; for that were to make him certain and uncertain of the same thing : it is therefore absurd to say that these who are certain of what they believe , may at the same time not know but it may be false ; which is an apparent contradiction , and overthrows any faculty in us of judging of truth and falshood . this principle and the next were , i conceive , intended to preserve the dr's and his friends credit against the inference at the end of faith vindicated and diverse other passages , shewing them either to be far from good christians in holding that all christian faith may possibly be an errour and lying imposture , or else very bad discoursers of their own thoughts whilst they equivalently exprest themselves in divers places to be possibly in an errour in all they believe , nay more all christians in the whole world to be in the same condition . this , if justified , cannot but reflect on them , being so concerning a lapse , and i have at dr. st's brisk instigation charg'd it home in reason against raillery ; though i still expres't my self to incline to the more civil and more charitable side ; and rather lay the blame on their understandings then on their wills and intentions . which book had dr. st. seen when he writ this , he would have discern'd the triflingness of these weak excuses . but let 's see what he says . his fir●t part is built on a most gross and senseless errour , which is , that he who firmly assents to a thing as true is certain of it , as appears by those words , [ for this were to make him certain and vncertain of the same thing . ] i wonder exceedingly where the dr. ●earn't this notion of certainty ? not from mankinde i am sure , at least not from those who had the use of their reason . for all these already know it to be evident that a man may firmly assent to a thing as true , and yet that thing be false ; must that man therefore be certain of that falshood , and that it is , though in reality it be not ? we experience , that opposite parties firmly assent to contrary tenets as true ; for example , the socinians firmly assent , that christ is not god , we and the protestants that christ is god ; catholicks assent firmly that they are not idolaters when they make use of holy images in divine worship : d. st. firmly assents they are ; at least he would perswade his 〈◊〉 by his books he does so : are all these opposite sides certain of their several tenets because each side firmly assents to them as true. it were an excellent world for hereticks if this notion of certainty would take : for these being ●bst●nate in their errours no men more firmly assent to falshoods then they ; and questionle●s the generality of them judg'd what they held , true too : nay , they must all do so , if they once be put firmly assenting , as in our case : for to assent to a thing is to judge it to be indeed true ; by which means all hereticks in the world are certain of their errours ; and , if they be certain of them common sense tels them they ought to hold what they are certain of . again , ●light probabilities make many weak people firmly assent , so does passion and interest ▪ yet they are all by this new doctrin certain of what they hold , and so all 's well . 't is now come to light what kinde of certainty d. st. intended to pr●scribe for faith after he had rejected infallibility ; namely , such a certainty as one might have whether the thing be true or no , meerly by vertue of firmly assenting to it as true. and in this sense i think i may say he is certain of his faith , and i hope he will be so civil as to requite me with maintaining that i am certain of my faith too , for we ●oth firmly assent to them as truths , and so we are both very good friends , and by the same method so are turks and jews atton'd to christians . nothing is so proper to reconcile contradictions , as a chimaera , viz. a fallible certainty , or such a certainty as is none : identical propositions are meer toys to them ; or , as dr. t. says , good for nothing ; but fallible certainty , or certainties that are no certainties , can work wonders , and even do more then miracle . ridiculous folly ! not to see that when any one says [ i am certain af such a thing ] all mankind understands him to mean he has such grounds as infer that thing is as he says , and not only that he has a firm assent to it as true , without intending that he has any grounds to enforce the truth of it . this is what i often reflected upon in dr. t. ( reason against railery , ) that his discourse still aim'd to take the business of certainty out of the hands of the object , and put it constantly upon the subject , and to make account he was sure the thing was so , because he verily judg'd it , or did not doubt it to be so ; and dr. st. is here carrying on the same wise plot to which he begun to make way in his th princip . where he told us that assent is not built on the nature of things but their evidence to us ' indeed , if he speak of an assent which it matters not whether it be true or false , or , rather which is or may be false 't is meerly built on our own fancies and conceits ( which i suppose he must mean there by the word evidence ) but if the assent we speak of , and to which himself applies it , be that of faith , which must necessarily be true ; both it and the evidence which immediately breeds it must forcibly either be built on the nature of things , or else on nothing , and so both the pretended evidence is a false light , and the assent it self false and chimerical . on the other side , in case if the evidence and consequently the assent be built on the nature of things , which are footsteps of gods infinite wisdom in which he has imprinted all created truths , and establisht them under penalty of the highest folly and contradiction to be inerrably what they are ; it follows , that ; in case the evidence had from those things be indeed a true evidence or a right knowledge of their natures , our understanding power will be the same within as they are without , and so inerrable in it's assent and it's certainty built on those natures ; so that as their metaphysical verity immediately depending on god , is fixt by that essentially unchangeable being in a participated ( but yet absolute ) unchangeableness in being what they are ; so formal verity or truth in us being an immediate effect of those natures thus establisht , working upon our understanding transfuses into it , that is , into our knowledge , and consequently our assent an● certainty such a proper effect of themselves as sutes with the subject in which 't is received , viz. an intellectual unchangeableness or an unchangeableness built on knowledge of those natures , that is an infallibleness . no wonder then both our drs. in their weak discourses fly off so from depending for their assents or faith on the objects or natures of things , and recurr still to the subject , for by this means common sense is driven out of the world , and non-sense and contradiction grow in great request . and , first , infallibility or true certainty is radically destroyed , which otherwise ( according to the discourse now made ) must forcibly be admitted : then fallible certainty comes into great credit , or such a certainty as is firmly assenting to a thing as true whether ●t be true or no ; that is , such certainties as are no certainties but wilful adhesions ; such a faith as is no faith but fancy ; such a religion as is no religion but folly or interest ; and such truths as are no truths but possible falshoods : in a word , the object set aside and the dependence of our assents upon things without us , as the dr. would have it , the subjects are at liberty to hold and say what best likes the spirit within them , or their voluntary fancy ; in which consists the glorious liberty of d. st's blessed reformation . i grant him then ●hat no man who firmly assents to any thing as true , can at the same time entertain any suspicion of it's falshood . but i deny that this plea will either acquit him or dr. t. from the imputation of making christian faith possible to be false which was objected ; for why may not this man who firmly assents to a thing as true , now , or to day , both suspect and see it to be false to morrow , unless he can shew that that assent of his depends on the object or is built on the unchangeably-fixt natures of things , which dr. st. denies in express terms , princ. . or what can establish him in his assent of faith , if that do not ? is it not evident he may change if he may see true reason may be brought against it ? what would do him credit in this case is to offer to make it out that , ( assent requiring evidence , and , so , firm assent clear evidence , ) he has this clear evidence from the object to ground this firm assent , for then we may be sure his assent will be unalterable and solidly-grounded , or impossible to be false , as becomes faith ; not desultory , inconstant and weakly-built , as is the nature of opinion . but this my two adversaries must not do : for how can they pretend to an unalterable assent , if assent be not built on the nature of things only which are unchangeable ? or how to clear evidence , if they may , notwithstanding that evidence be still deceiv'd : as they must say all the church may in the grounds of their faith if infallibility be denied : or lastly , how will their evidence be clear , if the nature of m●ral things will not bear so clear an evidence or afford us so much light of themselves as by it to conclude absolutely the thing is so ; as when it comes to the point i foresee both these profound admirers of morall certainty will heartily maintain , and dr. t. in his prefa●e to his sermons p. . in express terms blames me for expecting in the grounds of faith. and whereas he says , 't is absurd to say that th●se who are certain of what they believe , may at the same time not know but it may be false . i grant it absurd ; nay more , i affirm that in case they be truly certain , that is , in case their certainty be taken from the thing or object , then not only they may not kn●w at the same time , but it may be false , but not at any time ever afterwards , unless the thing it self hap to be in that regard alterable . for true certainty is built on the thing 's being as it is , and nothing can ever be truly known to be otherwise than it is : but , if he takes certainty in a wrong sense for a firm assent to a thing as true , however that assent be grounded ; then , though upon supposition he firmly assents , he cannot at the very same time be shaken in that assent or not firmly assent , yet he is far in that case from any knowledge or intellectual certainty one way or other : because he regards not the thing or object , whence only true knowledge can be had , whatever he deems or imagines concerning the truth of that which he firmly assents to . la●tly , these excuses are quite besides the purposex : i never accused their thoughts ; they are beyond the reach of my sight ; but their discourse and writings i can see , and discover that they make faith possible to o● false , as i have shown at large in reason against ra●ll●ry : i meddle not then with what they assent to , or whether or no they can or do hold the contrary ; what i objected was that their words in their books imported the possible falshood of faith : for which they yet owe satis●action to all christians for the common injury done to faith , and as yet they have given none at all . . whatever necessarily proves a thing to be true , does at the same time pr●ve it imp●ssible to be false ; because 't is impossible the same thing should be true and false at the same time : therefore they who assent firmly to the doctrin of the gospel as true , do thereby declare their belief of the impossibility of the falshood of it . the first part i easily grant , and the reason for it to be most valid . and , for the same reason , i expect he will in counterchange grant me this proposition , that whatever words say , prove or imply a thing possible to be false , do at the same time say , prove , or imply that 't is not necessarily true . and then dr. t. must consider how he will avoid the force of it , who makes scripture the sole rule of faith , or the only means for mankind to be assur'd of their faith , and yet ( rule of faith , p. . ) professes that both the letter and sense of it are possible to be otherwise than the protestants take them to be ; which , in case they take their sense of scripture or faith to be true , must mean , possible to be otherwise than true , that is , possible to be false . whether his own contrary positions hang together or no , is not my concern . as for his inference , i deny that assenting ( being an interiour act ) is declaring ones belief . but i suppose he meant it thus . therefore they who [ declare they ] assent firmly to the doctrin of the gospel as true , do thereby declare their belief of the impossibility of the falshood of it ; and thus , this is readily also granted ; only in requital i expect he should ( for i am sure he must ) grant me this counter-proposition , that therefore they who declare their belief of the possibility of falsh●od in faith and it's grounds , or of the letter and sense of the gospel , do thereby declare they do not assent firmly to the doctrin of the gospel as true . which done , let dr. st. and his friend look to the consequences of it . it lies still very heavy upon their credit as writers , and ever must till they retract it . no sincere protestant who loves his faith more then their writings , will ever be brought to endure it , if he once set himself seriously to consider it . . the nature of certainty doth receive several names , either according to the nature of the proof or the degrees of the assent . thus moral certainty may be so called , either as it is opposed to mathematical evidence , but implying a firm assent upon the highest evidence that moral things can receive ; or , as it is opposed to higher degrees of certainty in the same kind . so moral certainty implyes only greater probabilities of one side than the other ; in the former sense we assert the certainty of christian faith to be moral , but not only in the latter . this principle is pernicious to human nature as well as to faith , and destructive to all principles in the world that are true ones and not like it self . first , it designs to give us the several names which the nature of certainty doth receive , but it does indeed acquaint us with some species or kinds of certainty , unless he will say that the moral certainty he assignes to faith is of the same kind with probability , which i perceive he is loath to own . next , to what purpose is it to discourse of one or more sorts of certainty or to distinguish it's notion , unless we fir●t knew the common notion of certainty it self . the word moral which is one of it's differences , and chiefly intended to be explained here is hard enough of it self alone ; but when to this shall be added a new difficulty of not knowing what [ certainty ] which is the genus means , we are like to make a wise business of it . now , all the knowledge we have hitherto gain'd of certainty in a discourse purposely intended to make us under●tand the certainty of faith , is this , that 't is a firm assent to a thing as true , and that there may be a fallible certainty , both manifestly imply'd in his discourse : where , all that we can gather of the nature of certainty by the former , is that perhaps 't is a fixing or resting in some tenet without any ground ; and by the later that 't is a chimaera or nonsense . thirdly , he distinguishes certainty according to the nature of the proof , or the degree of the assent ; but i vehemently deny it as the most absurd position imaginable , that there can be any kind of certainty taken from the degrees ●f the assent in contradistinction to the nature of the proof , for this would make as if the subject's or person's assenting more or less did constitute some certainties without any kind of nature of proof , that is without any regard had to the object . after this he acquaints us with one kind of [ mor●l certainty ] watch , he says is oppos'd to mathematical evidence . now i neither discern how moral and mathematical come to be opposite to one another , more then moral or physical , and metaphysical or theological ; less do i see how certainty an● evidence have such an opposition and a●tipathy ; i thought they might have been both on the same side : but i conceive that the goodness of natural reason made him at unawares joyn certainty to moral , and evidence to mathematical ; thereby confess●ng that this moral certainty , ( as he apprehends it ) is indeed the issue of no kind of evidence at all but of meer obscurity , or at best of some conjectural glance of likelihood . but he describes or gives us some distinct knowledge of this moral certainty , telling us that it implies a firm assent upon the highest evidence that moral things can receive , and this he assigns to christian faith. where , first i would know whether this moral certainty here mention'd , be an infallible certainty , or a fallible one ; and i presume he will answer 't is a fallible one , for infallible and moral certainty are opposite ; which is a fair beginn●ng towards the ascertaning faith. next , i would desire him to speak out candidly and tell me whether this moral certainty put faith absolutely out of possibility of being false ; or whether , notwithstanding this certainty , it may with truth be said , that still absolutely speaking all christian faith may be an errour or mistake of the world . i presume he will not say 't is absolutely impossible it should be all a mistake because 't is so protected by this moral certainty ; for he makes this a less degree of certainty than mathematical certainty is , and dr. t. has told us there can be no degrees in absolute impossibilities ; besides , i see not how a fallible certainty can establish any tenet impossible to be false , for an infallible certainty , which is incomparably above that , can do no more . and yet , for all that , 't is dangerous to his credit , ( for 't is indeed blasphemous ) to say that all christian faith may possibly be a lying imposture for any thing any man living knows ; or that all the christians in the world , though relying and proceeding to their power on the means god has appointed to establish them in true faith , may notwithstanding be possibly in an errour . i suppose then he will recurr to his late excuse and tell us , that no man who firmly assents to any thing as true can at the same time entertain any suspicion of it's falshood . but this is nothing to our purpose . 't is not his iudgment but his doctrin which stands impeach't ; not his thoughts , but his words , and discourses ; let him clear those to the world , and i am to remit secret things to god and his own conscience . i leave then him and his fr●end to shuff●le about for better evasions , which i am sure can never be candid and scholar-like , but some learned quirks and jeers , and address my self to a farther examination of this worthy principle . ly , then i would ask , whether the firmness of this assent which he says here moral certainty implies , be taken from the object , or from the subject ? i suppose he will say here from the object , because he says 't is upon the highest evidence moral things can receive ; but i perceive him dispos'd even while he says so to blame the things for receiving no more . i doubt he should rather blame himself for receiving no more from those moral objects , who are both as able and as ready to afford him perfect evidence as perhaps any other things in nature , did he dispose himself to receive it . for , are not moral things as firmly establisht in their respective determinate natures as natural and mathematical things , from which establishment all our science is taken ? is not a will as certainly a will , and liberty as necessarily liberty as a triangle is a triangle ? again , are not voluntary , liberty , virtue , vice and such like , very intelligible words , aud consequently the natures of moral things knowable as well as others in other sciences . i wonder then why the evidences of moral things cannot be as high as that of mathematical things , since the natures of both are equally firm , both natures can be known , and so engaged in our discourses of them and from them , and all science or evidence springs from engaging the natures of things . the sum then is , dr. st. hath given faith excellent good words , in telling us it's moral certainty implys a firm assent upon the highest evidence moral things can receive : but , looking to the bottom of his meaning , he intends it only a fallible certainty or such as may still permit it to be false ; and so the right descant upon his fine words is in true construction this . he allows faith such a certainty as is vncertain ; such a firmness as may both bow and break ; such an evidence in it's grounds as is obscure , and consequently makes it such an assent as is irrational : all which and much more must needs follow from this rejecting infallible certainty in the gronnds of faith. if he thinks i wrong him , let us put it to the test ; let him take the best of those evidences or proofs which ground his moral certainty , and put it with the help of a little logick into a syllogism or two , and then tell me whether it does necessarily conclude the truth of faith or no. if it concludes , why does he not say faith is absolutely certain , but mince it with moral ? if it concludes not , how can all the world avoid but his pretended evidence is obscure ; his pretended certainty built on that evidence , vncertain ; the firmness of that assent , infirm ; and the assent it self to a conclusion thus unprov'd , and no ways evident ( in a man capable to comprehend what ought in due of right reason cause assent ) privatively irrational , or faulty . . a christian being thus certain , to the highest degree of a firm assent , that the scriptures are the word of god , his faith is thereby resolved into the scriptures as into the rule and measure of what he is to believe ; as it is into tht veracity of god as the ground of his believing what is therein contained . a christian who is no better certain then thus ; that is by grounds allowing only such a certainty as is not absolutely or truly conclusive of the truth of faith ( as dr. st. intends no more by his moral certainty ) is not certain at all : as appears farther by the next words , certain [ to the highest degree of a firm assent . ] the meaning of which must be that this highest degree of a firm assent either is the same with the certainty he intends his faith according to his former doctrin , and constitutes or explicates it ; or else that at least it helps to make up this certainty , that is perfect it within it's notion , and make it more a certainty or a better certainty ; which makes the conclusiveness or evidence had from the object needless to create a certainty , and signifies thus much in plain terms [ think or imagine what you will , so you imagine it strongly , and hold it stifly , you are as certain of it as may be . ] had he said , a christian is or may be thus certain by such a proof had from the object as was truly conclusive of the thing , how genuin , coherent & clear had his expression been , which now is forc't ; incongruous and obscure ? how agreeable to reason and the nature of certainty as all mankind understands it ; which now is most irrational and unsuitable to the same nature ? how honourable and creditable had it been to his cause , and to himself too as a writer ? but men that have not truth on their side , and consequently are quite destitnte of found principles and true grounds , must not dare to speak sense . himself told us ( princ. . ) that the nature of assent is agreeable to the evidence we have of it in our minds , let him remember then that the highest degree of a firm assent requires in reason the highest gree of clear evidence to beget it , which yet he lately deny'd to be had from moral things , and attributed it peculiarly to the mathematicks . so that all is incoherent , all is common and big words , hollow and so of a loud and high sound , but without any determinate sense . again , how does it follow , that because a christian is thus certain that the scriptures are the word of god , that therefore his faith is thereby resolved into the scriptures as into the rule and measure of what he is to believe ? there is not the least show of consequence for this , unless he had first prov'd that god had intended to speak so clear in the scripture as every private understanding should not sail of being secur'd from mistake while it rely'd upon it ; as also that god had spoken to us no other way but by the written word , which he has no where prov'd , nor can ever prove . and , if the former of these ( as experience tels us 't is ) be wanting , 't is not a rule to those persons ; if the latter , 't is not necessarily the measure of what they are to believe . . no christian can be oblig'd under any pretence of infallibility to believe any thing as a matter of faith , but what was revealed by god himself in that book wherein he believes his will to be contained , and consequently is bound to reject whatsoever is offer'd to be imposed upon his faith which has no foundation in scripture , or is contrary thereto ; which rejection is no making negative articles of faith , but only applying the general grounds of faith to particular instances , as because i believe nothing necessary to salvation , but what is contain'd in scripture , therefore no such particular things which neither are there nor can be deduc't thence . if christians were bound to hold that god had reveal'd his whole will in that book , and this so clearly that all or most chri●tians could not miss of understanding it right so as thereby to be absolutely certain of their faith , then indeed the first half of his principle here runs very currently and smoothly : but these rubs lying still in the way which dr. st. has not in the least remov●d , they being also satisfy'd by the general conceit of christianity , and by the nature and genius of christian faith , that it cannot possibly be an errour or lye , and , consequently , mu●t have such grounds as cannot possibly permit all the world to be in an errour while they rely on them , that is , grounds which are infallibly secure , and , on the other side , observing both by experience and reason that scripture is not such a ground as that private understandings applying to it , are thereby perserv'd from possibility of erring ( as dr. st. also confesses in his next principle ) hence they are invited strongly to conceive that god has left some persons on earth easily to be found who may supply what is wanting of clearness to scriptures letter in the highest points of faith ; and that god will some way or other perserve them from erring , and that while thus protected by god's signal providence ( whether this be performed naturally , supernaturally , or both wayes ) they cannot erre in that affair , or in acquainting us with right faith. so that , unless dr. st. make out solidly that scripture has in it the true nature of the rule of faith , of it self and without needing any church , he must expect in reason that the very nature of faith will necessarily incline all sincere persons , who have due care of their souls and of finding out true faith , to beleeve the infallibility of the church . and , whereas he says that their rejection of such points which have no foundation in scripture or are contrary thereto is no making new articles of faith , but only applying the general grounds of faith to particular instances , he discourses therein very consonantly to his own grounds were they worth any thing ; yet , i have one thing to propose to his consideration , which is , that to justify his reformers he must produce grounds full as good or rather better for the rejection of those points as for his faith ; or to speak more distinctly , he must have as perfect ( or rather perfecter ) certainty for these two propositions [ nothing it to be beleeved which has no foundation in scripture ] and [ this or that rejected point has no foundation in scripture ] as he has for any point of christian faith for , since upon the evidence they had of these two propositions they disobey'd and rebell'd against their then lawful superiours and church pastors , and broke church-union , which was evidently forbidden by god's law , and so the preserving union & obeying them , is a point of faith , and which themselves confess is such and binds them as such in case the reasons for their imposing new points be not valid , that is , if these two propositions on whose evidence they rely'd when they alledged they were wrongfully impos'd , and thence rejected them , be not true ; it follows that they must at least have equal evidence ( nay more , for bare equality would only balance them in a doubtful suspence berween either side ) that those propositions on which they grounds their rejection of those articles , and disobedience to their pastours aad superiours , are true , as they have for their faith. and , if the grounds of this rejection ought to be more certain then the grounds of their faith , there is either some thing wrong in the pretended grounds of their faith , or else their negative articles ought to be allow'd the honour of being points of faith too , since their greater certainty gives them fair and equal title to it , if not absolute preemin●nce . . there can be no better way to prevent mens mistakes in the sense of scripture ( which men being fallible are subject to ) than the considering the consequence of mistaking in a matter wherein their salvation is concern'd : and there can be no sufficient reason why that may not serve in matters of faith , which god himself hath made use of as the means to keep them from sin in their lives : vnless any imagine that errours in opinion are far more dangerous to mens souls then a vicious life is , and therefore god is bound to take more care to prevent the one then the other . the dr. being conscious to himself that he had , notwithstanding all his promises to reduce faith to principles , and to prove it's certainty , left it still vncertain , thought it his best expedient to close his blinde principles with a speeding one , which ( to the shame of all principles ) should maintain that it need not be certain ; though he couches this sense warily as it behooves him . he seems to ground his sceptical discourse on this , that men are fallible , and so subject to mistake the sence of the scriptures . i wish he would speak out once in his life and tell us plainly whether all mankinde be fallible in every thing or only in some things , and in some circumstances ? again , whether he means that men are naturally fallible , or supernaturally , that is by means of god's infinite power , if it should set it ●elf to deceive them . if the later , 't is not , nor ought to be our question ; for no man who has any reverence for god or his attributes , will ever think that he will do miracles still to leade mankind into errour , but rather judge it becomes his goodness to provide , in case the good of the world or the church should require that some extraordinary thing be done , that mankind should have notice of it by some certain way to prevent his erring , as it happens in the case of the eucharist . taking him then to mean that man is naturally fallible , we enquire further ; is all mankind ( however one sence or another accidentally may be insincere in one or another particular ) yet is all mankind naturally fallible in their daily sensations , or which is all one , are the senses of all mankind so fram'd as to convey wrong impressions into his knowing power ? if not , they cannot erre naturally : nor do i think dr. st. will say our senses thus and in this are fallible ; if he does , i know not what to say of him ; which is , that he is a perfect pyrrhonian and unworthy of mankind's conversation or discourse with him ; for , to what end should men discourse with him , if , all his senses being fallible , himself knows not whether they discourse or no ? i ask still further , are men naturally fallible in some things not had immediately from sense , for example , in knowing that the world was on foot a year before we were born ? or in first principles , as aequale est aequale sibi , an equal equal to it self ? or in a conclusion immediately depending on such principles , as that therefore three lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal , and such like ? i think he will not say it . we see then men are capable of infallibility or certainty of their own nature : wherefore they can aim at it and desire it , especially in faith , which is of so high a concern to their souls and the basis of all their spiritual building , therefore , both for that reason and very many others recounted and inforced by me in faith vindicated and elsewhere , they ought to have this certainty ( especially since the truth of faith is neither proveable , maintainable nor professible without it ) in case such a certainty be not in it self impossible , and that 't is not so , i have said something both in my reason against raillery , p. . to . and p. . to p. . as also in this present treatise in my answer to the . principle . but , setting this aside , we will proceed and demand still farther ; are men deceivable in knowing what one another means in ordinary conversation or domestick affairs ? can the ma●●er and the man the mistress and her maid understand one another ? or , in case some ambiguous expression intermingle it self , cannot the speaker upon the other 's signifying his dissatisfaction , absolutely clear his doubt , and make himself be throughly understood ? experience tels us they can , and that they may as easily be mistaken in their sensations as in such kinde of expressions . we see then men are infallible in many things , and even in understanding words aright in same cases . if then they be fallible in understanding scriptures , and this in the main and fundamental points of christianity , as was shown above , 't is evident this fallibility is not to be refunded totally into the subject or man ( since he is capable of infallible certainty in other things ) but into the want of clearness in the letter of scripture ( as to such points ) in proportion to private understandings , and consequently that it was never intended by god for their rule of faith ; since , though both sides rely on this , yet one ( even while doing thus ) is still in an errour ; and such an errour as is a heresie . since then what we hold is , that men are infallible in affairs belonging to faith , and this while they rely on the grounds left by god for them to embrace faith , i would ask him in a word , whether he holds all men may be deceived in that very affair even while they do this to the best of their power ? if he says they can , 't is unavoidable all the christian world may possibly be now in an errour , and all christian faith be a meer lye : as also , 't is evident , that in that case god would have left no ordinary means to secure his church or any man in it from errour ; & lastly , that god leads men into errour , s●nce they acting to the best of their power ( as is supposed ) their errour cannot be refunded into them but into the de●ectiveness of those means , that is their want of perspicuity or sufficient plainness to their addicted and faithfully-endeavouring understandings , even as to those main points . thus much to show how craftily dr. st. to avoid reflexion on the unfitness of the rule he assigns , puts it only upon men's being fallible , and how unreasonably he behaves himself in so doing : let us now see how he provides against this fallibility lest otherwise all mankind should erre in their faith. he tels us that there can be no better way to prevent men's mistakes in the sense of scripture , which men being fallible are subject to , than the considering the consequence of mistaking in a matter wherein their salvation is concern'd . well , put this consideration in men , are any of them by vertue thereof yet infallible , or secur'd from erring in understanding scripture ? if not , all mankind may yet according to his grounds be in an errour in matters belonging to faith , and so all christian faith may still possibly be false , notwithstanding all the provision put by him to secure them and it. but if this render them absolutely secure from erring , then we may hope god's church too may have the grace given her by god as well as a private man , to consider the consequence of mistaking also , i am sure it as much concerns her , and so the church ( or , as he cals it a society of men ) may also be infallible in understanding and explaining scripture ; and , by this means , we are come about again to an infallible proponent , which we have so zealously labour'd to avoid . in a word , after he has put all means left by god to be certain of our faith , and all the diligence and care possible to be used by man to lay hold on those means , let him either acknowledge that any particular man in the world , and so a fortiori god's church or any s●ciety of men exactly following & relying on those means to arrive at right faith , is by so doing infallible in that thing or in interpreting scripture , and by consequence that christian faith is infallibly certain , or else confess that , notwithstanding all means us'd , all christian faith is still either not certain at all , or else fallibly certain , which is a peece of most profound nonsense ; and , were it sense , signifies plain all may be false . the later half of this principle , is still more admirable nonsense than the former , and shows how meanly he is verst in solid divinity ; he conterposes there the certainty in matters of faith , to that which god has made use of as the means to keep men from sin in their lives ; as if faith were not intended by god to make men virtuous and the certainty of faith the most effectual part of those means . but because i see dr. st. though he have a very good witt , yet by reason of his sole application to verbal divinity , which never reaches the ground or bottom of any thing it talks of , is very ignorant of what is meant by christian life and it's opposite vice , or sin , i will take a little pains to inform him better . he may please then to know that it suting best with god's wisdom to govern the world by way of causes and effects , he carries on the course of his ordinary providence even in supernaturalls by means of dispositions the whole design then of his goodness is to plant those dispositions in our soul by means of religion as may make us most comfortable to himself , that so ascensiones in corde nostro disponendo , asceendamus de virtute in virtutem donec videatur deus deorum in sion . that is , by ordering those rising steps in our heart we may ascend from virtue to virtue till the god of gods be seen in sion . hence the life of a chri●tian , as such , is spiritual , and the proper way for him to worship god is in spirit , that is by spiritual acts or habits to perfect his soul , or that part in us which is spiritual , and dispose is for heaven ; but errour is also spiritual , and yet is far from perfecting our soul , therefore truth must go along with it , and so we are to worship god in spirit and truth ; hence , the first of virtues , in priority of nature is true knowledge of god , and of the motives or means to attain him , and the only way for the generality to arrive at these is by beleeving his divine authority upon some way of revelation which gives his church and by her and all others absolute certainty 't is engaged ; by which means we are perfectly secure that what we proceed upon is god's sense , or truth , which is the basis of all our spiritual building . out of these knowledges are apt to spring adoration , reverence , hope , and love of him above all things , in christian language call'd charity , the queen of all virtues , ( major autem horuni charitas , says st. paul ) and out of this love of god above all things , love of our neighbour as our self ; in the heartiness of which , or the having that rational disposition in our hearts to do as we would be done to , consists the keeping all the commandments of the second table ; which is also our good ; for , so , more undisturb'd by passion , or vexation from the exteriour world whose order we violate in transgressing against these , we are more free to practice those other vertues which are to elevate us towards heaven and fit us according to the measure of out pitch appointed by god , for the attainment of bliss . hence is seen what is meant by sin or vice ; for , this , being formally a defect , is only a want of the opposit good disposition or virtue . the chief vice then is hatred of god , or a very sleighting and perfectly deliberate dis-regard & posthabition of his incomparable self , our final bliss , to a creature ; next , despair , irreverence , infidelity , totally , as in heathenism , or in some particular , as tur●ism , iudaism , heresy : in the last place comes the want of that due love of our neighbour for god's sake as leaves our will dispos'd ( as far as that motive carries us ) to do him any injury for our own temporal convenience ; in which consists the violation of the commandments of the second table . insomuch as , though a man commits not one of those acts there forbidden , out of the motive of worldly honour , civility , fear or any other such like , yet if he wants that rightly-grounded interiour love of his neighbour and builds not his avoidance of harming him on that motive , that is , if he be dispos'd to commit them all for any thing that motive would hinder him , however in the sight of man or exteriourly he keeps those commandments , yet is he guilty of them all interiourly or in the sight of god. to apply this then to our present purpose . 't is seen hence that faith is the basis of all virtuous life , and consequently the want of it the ruin of all virtue and the ready way to all vice and sin : for , external acting or avoiding are nothing to christian virtue , unless they spring from a christian motive : and 't is only faith which gives us those motives ; and the stability , well-groundedness or truth of faith , which renders those motives effectual . wherefore , unless the faithful be materially infallible while they believe god has revealed such and fuch things , that is , unless god did indeed reveal them , and so their faith be really true ; all gods worship and good life is ill-built , ruinous and fals to the ground : and unless some of them , or those who are capable to understand it to be true , be formally infallible , it would work less effectually in all those who should re●lect that they saw not but it might be false , or be made so reflect by others who were enemies to faith ; nor could the truth of christian faith be defended , or made out , or be justifiably recommended to others as true , nor with wisdom and honesty be profest true , by those who judge themselves capable to look through it's grounds and yet see nothing conclusive of truth in them . wherefore this fallible certainty of his destroys all efficacy , all defence and even essence of faith , and consequently radically subverts and overthrows all christian virtue , and all true goodness . which , i attest the authour and finisher of our faith , is the true reason why i with so much zeal and earnestness oppose him and his friend , for advancing vncertainty , and consequently scepticism in faith , however they and their angry passionate party are pleas'd to apprehend me . i perceive dr. st. will hope to evade by saying that christian virtue may be upheld by the certainty we have of some points of faith , though others be vncertain : which points , to make his uncertainty of faith go down the better , he cals here opinions . but , if he means by opinions the tenets of a trinity , christs godhead and presence in the b. sacrament ( all most highly concerning christian life one way or other ) in which we discern great parties differing who all ●dmit the scripture and use the best means to interpret it as far as we can perceive ; nay , and consider the consequence of mistaking too , which he makes the very best means of all : if , i say , these and such as these be the opinions he speaks of , and counterposes them to means to keep men ▪ from sin in their lives ; and that the rule of faith he assigns leaves whol bodies of reliers on it in actual errour in such fundamental points of faith and of most high concernment to good life , as has been shown , even while they proceed upon it ; 't is evident 't is not the rule god intended his church and mankinde to build their faith on , and so none can presume of security of mistake by relying purely upon it ; but all of concern not known before by some other means , that is all which it alone holds forth , may be also liable to be a mistake likewise ; unless some other authority more ascertainable to us then it abets it's letter in such passages as are plain because they are either meerly moral or narrative ; or explain it's sense in others which are more spiritual and supernatural and so more peculiar and fundamental to christianity . recapitulation . to meet with the absurd positions exprest or else imply'd in the doctrin deliver'd here by dr. st. in these last eleven principles of his , i take leave to remind the reader of these few opposit truths establisht in my former discourse . . that assent call'd faith , taken as built on the motives left by god to light mankind to the knowledge of his will , ( that is taken as it ought to be taken , and as 't is found in the generality ) is for that reason absolutely ( that is , more then morally ) certain , or impossible to be false . . though the nature of assent depend immediatly on the evidence we have of it in our minds when 't is rational ; yet in case it be true , as the assent of faith ought to be , it must necessarily be built and depend fundamentally on the nature of the thing ; since without dependance on it , this evidence it self cannot possibly be had . . a man may be materially infallible , or out of possibility of being actually deceiv'd in judging the divine authority is engag'd , by adhering to another's iudgment who is infallible , or in the right in thus judging , though he penetrate not the reason why that other man comes to be infallible . also he who is thus infallible , being in possession of those truths ( reliev'd upon the divine authority as the formal motive of believing them ) which truths as principles beget those good affections in him in which consist our christian life : such a man , i say , has consequently enough ( speaking abstractedly ) for the essence of saving faith , though he be not formally or knowingly infallible by penetrating the conclusiveness of the grounds of faith. . to be thus materially infallible , or thus in the right in judging the divine authority is engag'd , is requisite and necessary for the essence of faith ; otherwise the believing upon the divin authority when 't is not engag'd , and so perhaps the believing and holding firmly to abominable errours and hereticall tenets might be an act of faith ; to assert which , is both absurd and most impious . . 't is requisite to the perfection of faith to be formally or knowingly infallible that the divine authority is engag'd . for , since it hazards heresy and errour to judge that the divine authority is engag'd for any point when 't is not , it ought to breed suspence and caution in reflecters till they see it engag'd : & consequently the better they see this the more he●rtily they are apt to assent to the point upon the divine auth●rity : so that the absolute certainty of the grounds which conclude the divine authority engag'd , betters and strengthens the act of faith. . however it be enough for the faith of those whose downright rudeness lets them not reflect at all , to be only materially infallible that god's authority is engag'd , yet 't is besides of absolute necessity to reflecters who raise doubts , especially for those who are very acute , to discern some reason which cannot deceive them , or to be formally or knowingly infallible that 't is indeed actually engag'd for those points . otherwise it would follow that provision enough had been made by god to satisfy or cause saving faith in fools , and none at all to breed faith wise men ; which , without satisfaction in this in point is in possible to be expected in such through-sighted reflecters . the same formal infallibility is necessary for the wisest sort of men in the church , both to de●end faith and establish it's grounds in a scholar-like way , as also for their profession of the truth of faith , and other obligations incumbent on them as faithfull , and lastly , for the effects which are to be bred in them by faith's certainty . . though then the rule of faith needs not to be actually penetrated by all the faithfull while they proceed unreflectingly , yet it ought to be so qualifi'd that it may satisfy all who are apt to reflect and so to doubt of their faith ; that is , it 's ruling power ought to be penetrable or evidenceable to them if they come to doubt : and also so connatural and suitable to the unelevated and unreflecting thoughts of men of all sorts , that it be the most apt that maybe to establish the faithfull in the mean time and preserve them from doubting of their faith. both these are found in tradition , or testifying authority , and not in scripture's letter . that therefore , and not this is the rule of faith. . infallible certainty of faith being rejected , the moral certain●y he substitutes must either be a fallible certainty or none ; this later is impious , the former is non-sense ; wherefore all dr. st's discourse of faith , while he rejects infallibility , must forcibly have the one or the other of these qualifications . . a firm assent to a thing as true renders no man certain of what he thus assents to ; for so hereticks might be truly certain of all the pestilent errours they hold , so they but firmly assent they are true. . faith being the basis of all christian virtues , on which all our spiritual edifice is built , and from whence we derive all the certainty we have of all that concerns it , ought by consequence be better grounded and firmer then any or all it's superstructures . also , 't is ill divinity to counterp●se matters of faith to the means to keep men from sin in their lives , since matters of faith or christ's doctrin is the very best of those means ; or to pretend that errours in opinion ( i suppose he means in faith , that being the point ) are not more dangerous to mens . souls than a vicious life ; for this supposes faith no part of a christian life , nor infidelily , heresy ; iudaism or turcism to be vices : which , by consequence , degrades christian faith from being a virtue , contrary to the sentiment of all christianity since the beginning of the church . i shall hope from any impartial and intelligent reader who is a christian , that he will acknowledge these posi●ions of mine bear a clear evidence either in the● s●lves , or in their pr●ofs ; and consequently , that the opposite ones advanc't either explicitely or implicitly by dr. st. are both obscure and ( which is worse ) vntrue . the total account of dr. st's principles . thus have i spoken distinctly and fully to dr. st's . principles . it were not amiss to sum up their merits in brief , and give a short character of them ; that so it may be seen how infinitly short they fall of deserving so honorable a name . but , first , we are to speak a word or two to the principles agreed on by both sides : of which the first and third are great truths , and the word , god and obedience due to god , now & then barely nam'd ; but no kind of conclusions , are drawn from those two particular propositions influential to the end intended , viz. to reduce the faith of the protestants to principles ; whence , though they are most certain truths , yet , as standing here , they are no principles . the d and th which concern god's attributes , are not at all us'd neither . for he cannot use them alone to evince scripture's letter is the rule , unless he first prove that scripture's letter is the fittest for that end , and that therefore it become gods's attributes to chuse it ; which he no where does : and whereas he would argue thus , princ. . god hath chosen it for a rule , therefore 't is agreeable to his attributes ; 't is both frivolous , because all is already concluded between us if he proves god has chosen scripture for that end , for then 't is granted by all it must be agreeable to his attributes ; and also preposterous , for he makes that the conclusion which should be , in case he argu'd from god's attributes , the principle : for his argument ought , in that case , to run thus ; gods wisdom and goodness has chosen that for a rule which is wisest and best to be chosen ; but scriptures letter is such ; therefore he has chosen it for a rule . the th and th are either never made use of by him as principles , or else they make directly against himself ; for fallible certainty , only which , having discarded that which is infallible , he sustains , can never make any one know what is god's will. this is an ill beginning , and a very slender success hitherto ; let us see next whether he has better luck with his own principles . the first , taking the words literally and properly as they ought to be taken in principles , is against himself : for he confesses there that such a way of revelation is in it self neccessary to our intire obedience to god's will , as may make us know what the will of god is ; but common sense tells us that fallible certainty ( which only , having rejected infallible certainty he can maintain ) is farr from making us know : this principle therefore is either against himself , or , if he means to go less by the word know than what is apt absolutely and truly to ascertain , 't is nothing to his purpose ; for so , it can only settle opinion and not faith. the second is useless , impertinent , and in part false . the third is false and impertinent to boot , the fourth is ambiguous , and , taken in that sense , when distinguish't , which he seems to aym at , 't is absolutely false . the th is absur●d , preposterous and against all art , in putting us to argue from what 's less known to what 's more known ; and withal totally false . the th is sophi●tically ambiguous and in great part false . the th builds on a groundless pretence , and contains a notorious 〈…〉 . the th is to no purpose ; or sin●● ( as appears in the process of his discourse ) he means by the words [ certainly ] and [ know ] only fallible certainty which is none at all , he cannot possibly advance by such a discourse towards the settling us a certain rule of faith. besides he either supposes scripture , as it now stands , sufficient , which is to beg the question ; or else , he confounds god's ordinary power working with the causes now on foot in the world , which only concern'd the present point , with his extraordinary , or what he can possibly effect by his divine omnipitence : the th only enumerates the several ways how god may be conceiv'd to make known his will , and , in doing so either minces or else quite leaves out the tradition of gods church : as if it were vnconceivable god should speak to men by their lawfull pastors in the church ; whereas yet himself must confess that in the beginning of the church faith either was signify'd and certify'd by that or no way . the th goes upon a false supposition and includes two fallaces , call'd by logicians non causa pro causa , or assigning a wrong cause , and omitting the true one ; also , 't is in part false , in saying words are equally oapable of being understood spoken or written : and lastly , it confounds again god's ordinary power with his extraordinary . the th makes account there is no benefit of divine writings but in being the rule of faith , which is against common sense and daily experience . the th comes home to the point ; but 't is perfectly groundless , unprov'd , false , and as full of absurdities of severall sorts as it can well ●old . the th begins with a false position , proceeds with a false and unprov'd supposition , and endeavours to induce a most extravagant conclusion only from premisses granted kindly by himself to himself without the least proof . the tb contains three false and unprov'd suppositions : viz. that god promis't his church to deliver his whole will in writings ; or that the writers of scripture had any order from god to write his whole will explicitly ; or , that the primitive church beleev'd it to have such a perfection as to signify ( without needing the church ) all saving truth to every sincere reader with such a certainty as is requisit to faith. the th begins again with a false and unprov'd supposition , and draws thence a consequence not contain'd in the proof , and , in part , against the interest of his own tenet ; and , lastly , brings in confirmation of it an instance which makes against himself . the th putts upon catholicks a tenet they never held , and is wholly false , irrational and absurd : assuming gratis this position , that nothing but miracle ought to serve , whether there be other means laid or no ; or , that no proof but miracle can possibly be sufficient to satisfy mens reasons in a thing subject to reason . for , the natural assistance of the church is such of it self , and the suppernatural , supposing the knowledge of sanctity in the church , is as plain reason as that the greatest motives to goodness , and interiour goodness caus'd by those motives , will make those good men who have it act as good men ought and are apt to do . the th proceeds wholly upon a false imputation laid on our church , and on his confounding most absurdly the notion of the church with that of the schools ; or rather taking a few speculative divines , and those the weakest , to be the church . the th is again built on an unprov'd supposition ( of which kind of grounds he is still very free ) and on a falsely pretended promise from god so to secure any private-spirited contemner of the church that he shall be in the way to salvation whether he err● or no ; though ( as common sense and the order of the world gives it ) he forfeit both his reason and his virtue by not hearing his lawfull and learned pastors rather than his self-conceited ignorant self . the th has the same faults with the former , and is wholly false , even though his own supposition , mention'd in the close , were freely granted him , which 't is not . the four principles following are made up of these errours . . that we hold that no man can have a true and saving faith unless he sees and knows that the proponent is infallible . . that the nature of assent ( when rational ) depends not on the object . . that one cannot have an infallible assent in faith without infallible assistance to judge of the points of faith themselves . . that there is no middle between no particular person , and every particular person being formally infallible ; whereas my tenet is that some must be so , most may be so , and all need not be so . . that because all must be materially infallible , or in the true faith , but know not how they are so ; therefore 't is useless that any should know how to make out those grounds , to settle , explain , and defend faith and it's certainty . these with his self-contradiction are the jarring elements which compound these four terrible principles , with which he hopes to undermine and blow up the churches infalibility , and the absolute certainty of all christian faith. the th gives good words in common of certainty and evidence , but he means by the former fallible certainty , by the later only some probability or improbability , so it but appears so to the subject . and is a total prevarication , from settling the truth of faith to not doubting the truth of the scripture ; of which there is no question . the th holds forth a most wicked and gross absurdity , destructive of all certainty , evidence , faith , christianity , and even man-hood , viz. that to assent firmly to any thing as true , is to be certain of it : and intimates two others , viz. that a man who is now certain of a thing , may at another time know that thing to be false , though not at the same time ; as also , that such a certainty is competent for belief or faith. the . speaks evident truth in the beginning of it , but is nothing available to his cause , but rather against him . the inference thence is false , being defectively exprest ; and when rectify'd , is also a clear truth , but highly prejudices himself . the . is utterly 〈◊〉 of common sense , certainty , faith and christianity . the . principle is a weak and inconsistent discourse . the . supposes scriptures intelligible enough in all points of faith without the church , and to contain expresly god's whole will , o● every article of faith , or at least with such a ground of it there as that 't is deducible thence by private understandings with a certainty competent for faith ; none of which he has at all prov'd , nor ever will. the th and last confesses all men liable to errour in faith , though relying on the means left by god to secure them from it ; which evidently makes that means to be none : and assigns a way for their best security , which all erring sects in the world ( as far as we can discern ) take , and yet still erre . and , lastly , for an upshot , he makes account , like a solid divine , that our christian life is not at all interiour , but only exteriour ; and , consequently , that faith is no part of a christian's life , nor the means to the other parts of it , nor infidelity and heresy a sin or vice ; and then all 's safe , and his principles stand firm : for then 't is evident that every private man may reject the church at pleasure , and be sure to understand as much in scripture as is necessary to salvation ; for , if these be no sins , and so do not damn a man either immediatly or mediatly , there is nothing that will. but indeed , in dr. st's kind of reformation , they are rather to be accounted cardinal and fundamental virtues . such sensless principles ought to produce no better fruit ; for this sutes their practice and his principles : rebel against god's church , break the most sacred order of the world , and do but talk stoutly and with a bold grace and a pretty way of expression of scripture and god's word , and then all is holy and good. reflecting then back on the nature of principles , and considering that to deserve that name they must necessarily have in them two qualifications , viz. evidence in themselves , and influence upon some other propositions which are to derive their evidence from them ; and it being manifest , both out of this short review , and much more out of the full replies to each of them , that not one of those which d. st. here cals principles , but is either vnevident and false ; or , if true , impertinent and void of any the least influence upon the point he aym'd to prove by them : they are clearly convinc't to have nothing in them like principles , or entitling them to the honour of that name ; and that he might with far more reason have call'd them , conceits , paradoxes , quodlibets , or crotchets . and i know no better way for him to vindicate them , but to entreat his fellow-hater of infallibility dr. t. who has a special gift at* putting principles into categorical and hypothetical syllogisms , to undertake these ; that so the world may see the rare consequences that arise from them ; to which , lest he should fail his friend , we now address . the sixth examen of dr. st's six conclusions . any man , who had either heard of logick or reflected a little upon nature , would verily have thought that such obscure principles should necessarily have produc't more obscure conclusions , since the evidence of the later , being deriv'd only from the former and participated from them , must needs be found in a lesser degree of perfection in these , than is the evidence of those former from whence 't is borrow'd and caus'd . but herein consists dr. st's masterpiece ; that though his principles be never so dark , his conclusions are yet as light as noon-day . but i m●st not forestall the reader 's mirth . what i am to do is to declare in short what kind of things conclusions ought to be ; in doing which i will say no more than all men of art in the world , and all who understand common reason will yeeld to be evident . a conclusion , then , . is a proposition which follows out of premisses which are it's principles . . the knowledge of it's verity depends on our knowing that the premisses ( it's prinples ) are true. . therefore , the verity of these premisses must be more known to him whom we intend to convince of the truth of the conclusion , than is the truth of the conclusion it self ; otherwise 't is in vain to endeavour to convince him of this by the other . . the consequence or following of the conclusion out of the premisses , or the con●uxion between them , must be made known ; for if by vertue of this coherence it follow not thence , it may be perhaps a great truth , but 't is not at all a conclusion . . to do this , 't is requisite that each particular conclusion should either be put immediatly after it●s particular premisses , or else be related to them ; otherwise , how shall any one be able to judge whether they cohere or no , if he know not what things are to cohere . lastly , the conclusion must be such as that in the granting it the victory of the opponent consists ; and so it must come home and close to the very point in difference between the two disputing parties . these short notes duely reflected on , we advance to a nearer view of his pretended conclusions . they are introduc't with these three dry words [ it follows that ] . and here is our first defeat : the consequences are six , the principles thirty ; and yet no light is thought fit to be given us , which conclusion follows out of which principles ; but we are left to grope in the dark , and guess at a thing , which ( as shall be seen hereafter ) no sphynx or o●dipus can ever make any probable nor even possible conjecture of . i wonder to what end he with such exact care noted all both principles and consequences in due order with numbring figures : was it only to give us a sleeveless notice that there were just thirty principles and just six conclusions ? i see no such great mystery or remarkableness in that observation as should deserve such a caution or care. he should then either have omitted these , or else , to shew them usefull , have afforded us a few figures more , relating each conclusion to to it 's respective premisses or principles . but the reason of this carriage is manifest : for , had he done this , we might have examin'd what coherence each conclusion had with it's premisses , and whether it follow'd from them by necessary consequence or no : also , whether the premisses were more evident then it self was : and all those other properties of a conclusion lately noted ; without which 't is the height of non-sense to call any saying a conclusion . had these considerations come to the test , his consequences had come off as ill or worse than his principles . let themselves tell us whether i wrong them or no. it follows that . there is no necessity at all or use of an infallible society of men , to assure men of the truth of those things which they may be certain of without , and cannot have any greater assurance , supposing such infallibility to be in them . this proposition is so far from being a conclusion from any principles , much less from his , that 't is self-known to all men of common sense , and amounts indeed to a first principle . for , an infallible society of men , so circumstanc't as he describes , is most evidently needless , and to no purpose ; and so this conclusion amounts in plain terms to this identical proposition , only paraphras'd a little , what 's needless is needless , or , 't is to no purpose to put that which is of no purpose when put , or of no purpose to be put : which are known by the light of nature , and so cannot admit proof . is not this a rare man , who first lays such obscure principles as need proof , and so ought to be call'd conclusions ; and then pretends to infer such conclusions as cannot possibly need proving , being self-evident , and so ought rather to be call'd first principles ? what i desire at present is that he would please to acquaint us out of which of his ●o principles it follows , that what needs not , needs not . if out of none , this is no conclusion , though it be a most evident truth . . the infallibility of that society of men who call themselves the catholick church must be examin'd by the same faculties in man , the same rules of triall , the same motives , by which the infallibility of any divine revelation is . this is of the same nature with the foregoing . for , the former part , which says that this infallibility must be examin'd by the same faculties in man , is as plain as 't is that nothing can be examin'd without a faculty or power to examin ; or , that nothing can examin but what can examin , which is evident beyond all possibility of proof : or , was ever any man in this world so silly as to imagin that , whereas we must use our reasoning faculty in judging the infallibility of any divine revelation , yet perhaps we are to make use not of the same faculty , but of our loco-motive , expulsive or retentive faculty , in examining the infallibility of the church ? as for the rest of it ; if he means , by rules of trial and motives , the maxims and reasons we have for holding the truth of any thing ( as he can mean no other ) then 't is manifest that , taking divine revelation for a point of faith reveal'd , 't is infallibility is to be examin'd by the same means other points of faith are , and so 't is to be concluded infallibly true , as other points of faith also are , because the divine authority is shown to be engag'd for the truth of it . again , taking those words to signify the act or way of revealing , which goes before faith , and so is the object of meer natural reason , 't is evident its infallibility is to be examin'd by the same maxims as the infallibility of other human authorities also are , or rather , thus taken , the infallibility of the church testifying deliver'd faith , and the infallibility of the divine revelation are one and the same thing . so that , distinguishing his words to clear his sense , his conclusion plainly amounts to this , that [ points of faith are to be examin'd in the same manner as points of faith are to be examin'd ; ] or else [ that things of such a nature subject to human reason , are to be examin'd in the same manner as things of that nature subject to human reason are to be examin'd . ] or rather , which will fit both of them , that [ things of any nature are to be examin'd as things of that nature are to be examin'd . ] which is so evident to all men of common sense that it cannot need proof , and can scarce admit any ; i am sure is never prov'd by him : that is , 't is no conclusion drawn from any of his principles , but putting in stead of [ the same rules of tryal and motives ] these words [ the same way ] which includes them both equivalently , 't is only a repetition of his th and th principle , and continues the same affected ambiguity in the word revelation as he us'd formerly ; nay and is the same nonsense too , in case he takes revelation in either place for a point of faith reveal'd , and the infallibility of the church for that only which is built on natural assistance , that is , for it 's human testimony : for so 't is most manifest the same motives neither are nor can be common to both . for points of faith are receiv'd upon authority as their proper motive , and are relative to that ; and the human authority of the church depends on maxims of meer natural reason , and not at all on authority : which evidence they depend upon different motives , and so must be examin'd by motives which are not the same . this pretended conclusion then is no new proposition from his premisses , as a conclusion ought to be , but the self same with them ; and is either self-evident , or else a meer peece of folly and nonsense , that is ( the terms of it being clear'd ) both false and unprov'd , and so again no conclusion , which must be made evident or prov'd . . the less convincing the miracles , the more doubtfull the marks , the more obscure the sense of either what is call'd the catholick church , or declar'd by it ; the less reason hath any christian to beleeve upon the account of any who call themselves by the name of the catholick church . no man in his wits could any more doubt of this then of what 's most evident by the light of nature ; for , convincingness of miracles , evidence of the marks , and sense of the church , being evidently means or reasons to believe , this conclusion , putting less of 〈◊〉 these reasons , amounts in plain terms to this indentical proposition [ where there is less reason to believe , there is less reason to believe ] which is dr. st. can show possible to follow out of any of his principles as premisses , as he here pretends , he will do more then miracle . for he hath not there prov'd in the least that our miracles are less conv●ncing , our marks doubtful , our sense obscure ; nor so much as mention'd those points , much lesse gone about to confute our pretence of their convincingnesse and evidence : and , without doing this , to pretend this is a conclusion , and that it follows from his principles , whereas it is incomparably more evident then the best of those he makes use of , is to abuse the common regard due to his readers , and to declare he makes account they never knew what belong'd to ordinary natural logick , or the common light of reason . . the more absurd any opinions are and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason which any church obtrudes upon the faith of men , the greater reason men shill have to reject the pretence of infallibility in that church as a grand imposture . this is just such another as the former ▪ for it being self-evident that absurdities and contradictions are not to be held ; and self-evident likewise that that which recommends such things to our belief 〈◊〉 to be rejected ; this pretended conclusion amounts to this plain truth that [ what has more reason to be rejected , has greater ( or more ) reason to be rejected : ] which is an identical proposition , so plain that it cannot need or admit proof ; and , if it did , or could , there is not the least semblance of any thing offer'd in his principles to prove it by , nor any sentence or clause in them concerning that matter , which has the tenth part of the ●lear evidence that shines in this proposition which he pretends follows from them , as a conclusion . . to disown what is so taught by such a church , is not to question the veracity of god , but so firmly to adhere to that , in what he hath revealed in scriptures , that men dare not out of love to their souls reject what is so taught . the first part of this , is of the same nature with the former : for the words [ such a church ] and [ so taught ] meaning absurdly and repugnantly to first principles , the truth of it is full as self-evident to all christians who hold god the authour of truth , as 't is that [ the authour of truth is not the authour of lies . ] the rest of it , which would seem to put the opposite to the foregoing part , and tels us that to disown what is so taught by such a church is firmly to adhere to what 's revealed in scripture , &c. is absolutely false ; for to disown what is so taught by such a church , amounts to no more but to hold to the first principles of sense and reason in points conrrary to those principles , obtruded by that church ; which a man may do and yet be an athiest , for any thing dr. st. has brought to make him adhere to scripture : for i much doubt that a profest fallible certainty , for such wonderful & extraordinary points as he will be bound to believe if he becomes a christian , will scarce be able to give him full satisfaction of their truth , if he guide himself by the first principles of reason , as dr. st. pretends he should . nor is it in dr. st's love of his soul , as he like a saint pretends here , but humour and interest , to adhere so firmly to his private interpretation of scripture for his rule of faith ; which he cannot but see has not in it the nature of such a rule , nor consequently was ever intended by god for such an end : since , renouncing infallibility in men , he must confess that all possible means being used to finde out truth by interpretations of scripture no better grounded , it still leaves all the reliers on it in a possibility of being mistaken ( as himself also confesses princ. . ) that is , insecure that their faith is true , or only fallibly certain of their faith. before i proceed to his sixth and last conclusion , it were not amiss to examine these according to the no●es put down formerly containing some qualifications necessarily belonging to all conclusions ; and to show by their want of all those how utterly unlike these five last are to what they pretended to be . and first , not one of them follows out of his principles as from their premisses , as i show'd in each of them . . their verity is known and evident to all mankind independently on those principles of his . . their verity is more known than is that of those principles . for , speaking of the main import and weight of them ( abstracting from some particular words and phrasing his notions ) they are all in a manner self-evident and unexceptionable ; whereas his thirty principles are liable to multitudes of exceptions , as hath been shown in the proper answers to each . ly and ly the consequence , connexion or following of these pretended conclusions out of their premisses is not so much as attempted to be shown , nor any one of them related to any principle or principles ; but all the figures which distinguish both the one and the others stand for cypher● and are useless . lastly , were all these conclusions , granted him , yet still he is never the nearer having prov'd or compas't what he intended . for , suppose we granted that there can be no necessity of an infallible society of men to do that which can be done as well without them ? what if the supernatural infallibility of the church must be examin'd by the fame faculty and the same ways points of faith are , or it 's natural infallibility the same way it 's natural or human authority is examin'd ? what if we have less reason to believe it , if it's miracles be less convincing , it's marks more doubtfull , and it's sence more obscure ; and greater reason to reject it , the more absurd it's opinions are , and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason ? what if to disown such doctrines be not to question god's veracity ? what , i say , if all these were granted by us ( as they would have been very readily at the first , though he had never skirmish't and flourish't and kept this pother with laying so formally six principles agreed on by both sides , and then thirty other of his own ? ) yet , he is not one jot the nearer the reducing the faith of protestants to principles which was promis't us at the beginning , and so we ought to expect the performance of it when he had deduc't his conclusions , which use to infer the intent propos'd to himself by the disputant , and to come home to the very point the arguer would be at . indeed , if he could show us solidly that infallibility in a church were useless ; that , examin'd by such ways and means as it ought , it would be overthrown and could not stand the trial ; that it's miracles were unconvincing , it's marks doubtfull , it 's sense declar'd by it obscure , or that it's opinions were indeed absurd and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason : very great matters had indeed in that case been done against our church and faith , yet still nothing at all to the establishment of his own . a catholick might in that case have indeed lost his own faith , and be to seek for another , but never find any meerly by means of these destructive positions alone ; unless dr. st. can settle him some other ground built on better principles and such as are competent to settle faith on , which fallible certainty ( were it sense ) will never reach . so that were all his conclusions hitherto freely granted , he is still as far from having attain'd what he propos'd to himself and promis't others , as at the beginning , nor can ▪ it be imagined why he makes us this mock-shew of consequences , but only , that as at the beginning he put down most undeniable and most sacred principles agreed on both sides , so to make his readers apprehend before-hand he must needs conquer who had such sure cards to play ( though by his shynesse to make use of them and apply them home it appear'd he had no title to them . ) so now he puts five undeniable propositions for conclusions to make weak nnattentive readers imagine he had actually conquer'd , for nothing sounds a more compleat victory , that to in●ferr evident conclusions ; but the ill luck is , not one of them is a conclusion , not has that kind of evidence in it which is peculiar to such propositions , viz. evidence-had by means of proof , but they are all evident of themselves or self-evident , and so a good plot is unluckily spoil'd , i have yet one thing more to say to them , that they have all of them evidently the nature of premisses in them , and would do extraordinary service to his cause taken in that capacity ( as far , i mean , as he ayms to overthrow the catholick church ) if the badness of it would let him pursue them and stand by them and apply them . to show which i will put them down in a clear method , that it may be seen where the point sticks . the first conclusion then has in it the nature of a major proposition ; and put in a discourse , stands thus . that infallibility without which men may be certain of faith , and cannot have greater assurance of faith were it put , is not necessary to be put . but suoh is the infallibility of the church of rome . therefore the infallibility of the church of rome is not to be put . the second stands thus , ( if it can at all concern the purpose . ) that infallibility which is to be examin'd by the same faculties , rules of trial and motives by which the infallibility of any divine revelation is , cannot bear the test , but must be overthrown . but the infallibility of the roman catholick church is to be thus examin'd . therefore it cannot stand the test , but must be overthrown . the third stands thus . that church whose miracles are less convincing , marks more doubtfull , sense more obscure , has less reason to be beleev'd . but such is the church of rome . therefore she has less reason to be beleev'd . the fourth thus . the infallibility of that church whose opinions are absurd and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason has great reason to be rejected as a grand imposture . but the infallibility of the church of rome is the infallibility of such a church whose opinions are absurd and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason . therefore it 's infallibility ought to be rejected as a grand imposture . the fifth thus . they who disown doctrins thus absurd and repugnant to the first principles of sense and reason do own and not question therein the veracity of god. but we ( in disowning the roman church ) disown such doctrins ; therefore , we in so doing own , or do not question the veracity of god. by which discourses 't is evidently seen that the natural posture and place for these five propositions , in an attempt to overthrow the roman churches infallibility , and to excuse the protestants for not obeying her , as is here intended , ( for they are nothing at all to the reducing the faith of protestants to principles , which they were pretendedly brought for ) is to make them the major propositions , where the chief principles to all conclusions use and ought to be placed . 't is evident also that these premisses or principles stand firm in their own undeniable verity ; and the only thing for him to do is to make good all the minor propositions ; which done , all the conclusions must necessarily follow , and so his work is done ; as indeed it always ought to be when the conclusion is inferr'd . whereas , making these major propositions the conclusions , 't is manife● he is to begin again and argue from them , when he had concluded , and so was at an end o● his discourse . so that 't is most palpably evident , that dr. st. most absurdly , unskilfully and prepo●cerously made those his principles which were obscure and ungranted and had hundreds of exceptions against them , and so needed proof , that is , made those his principles which ought to have been his con●lusions ; and put those for his conclusions which were in a manner self-evident and must be granted by all mankind , and which naturally ought to be the majors in any discourse on this subject ; that is , he mistook principles for conclusions and conclusions for principles ; which perhaps was the reason he made use of those words [ reduc't to principles ] in stead of deduc't from principles ; intimating thereby , that his conclusions were all of them indeed principles . did ever logick and common sense go thus to wrack ? his th ▪ conclusion remains yet to be spoke to , and 't is this . . though nothing were to be believed as the will of god , but what is by the catholick church declareed to be so , yet this doth not at all concern the church of rome , which neither is the catholick church , nor any sound part , or member of it . this is far from being self-evident as were the former , but of it self as obscure as may be , and in that regard is capable of being a conclusion , had there been any premisses to inferr it . it comes home also to the point as far as his intent was to impugn catholicks ; for were that which it contains concluded , it would import no less than the utter overthrow of the roman cause . but , where are the premisses or principles which are to infer it ? must every bold and unprov'd saying , and which begs the whole question , be cal'd a conclusion whether it have any principles or no to prove it by ? if then it have none , why does he put it for a conclusion , and so pretend he has concluded it ? if any , why does he not show us them , and relate to them ? is there any thing more important then to be acquainted with those perillous all-overturning principles on which a conclusion so desperately destructive to rome is grounded ? or , may we not justly suspect that not giving us notice with which of his insignificant thirty principles this romantical sixth conclusion had any commerce , he was conscious to himself it follow'd from none of them ; and yet notwithstanding having a mighty mind to be thought to have concluded it , he therefore very politickly call'd his own saying a conclusion . i know he has pretended elsewhere idolatrous worship ( forsooth ) has corrupted her and made her unsound , and twenty other flaws he findes in her ; but then he ought to have made this proposition be related to those discourses , and not pretend they follow out of his thirty principles where not a word to that purpose is found . moreover , these churches now in communion with rome were once true churches ; how came they then , or when , to be now so rotten and unsound : let the time be assign'd when by altering their faith and worship they became corrupt : let the persons , place , manners of beginning , proceeding and other circumstances be particulariz'd , that so a matter of fact of this manifest and concerning nature may be made credible : above all , how it happen'd that matters of this notorious and important nature should remain unrecorded , and still believ'd that no such change was , and this upon the score of a testifying authority , so great , that it must be confest even by our enemies , that it was never heard since the foundation of the world , that so many vast nations should swallow so prodigious an errour so tamely in a most manifest and most concerning matter of fact , and which , if it be indeed an errour , none can be absolutely secure of the existence of any former kings or actions done before our times , much less of the authority or text of any book in the world . but , i suppose , if these things be prest , the best answer will be some text of scripture , as that the enemy sowed tares while men slept ; which , interpreted by dr. st's private spirit , shall sanctifie to us this prodigious piece of non-sense , that the roman-catholick church alter'd her faith and christian practise , and yet none observ'd it or took notice of it ; that is , that those many millions of her subjects begun ( as they must at one time or other if she indeed alter'd her faith ) to believe and practice otherwise then they did , yet none of them knew they did so : all slept , and were wrap't up ( god wot ) in the dark night of ignorance , till owl-ey'd luther even at that mid-night of infidelity most blessedly espy'd the light of the gospel dawning , and show'd it to dr. st's predecessors . now , whoever reflects how considerable a part of christianity those churches in communion with rome make , and how many abominable corruptions or sicknesses there are in her , if those of dr. st's private-spirited church may be trusted , will with good reason conclude that the church has as many diseases in her as an old horse , and very few limbs of her free ; so that it will appear she for whose sake whole nature was made is the greatest monster for wretchedness , and that her condition is more miserable then any other thing in nature : and consequently , that god's providence has a slenderer care of his church then of the most trifling toy in the world ; which ill sutes with the great wonders and extraordinary things he has done for her ; as being made man , dying for her , and such like . it were good too to know how long a memb●● of the church may remain unsound ere it be time to cut it off ; also , whether it can be cut off , or who are likely to cut it off : without which the churches case must needs be most desperate , to be almost from top to to● as full of diseases as she can well hold , and no means extant to give her help . but alas , 't is so evident that there are none in the world but her self and some few sects that have manifestly gone out from her , and it sounds so unnaturally , to say the tree can be cut off from it's branches , that whatever such talkers may say in common , yet come once to put it in execution the absurdity of the practice of it bewrays the falshood of tenet . but to come closer to this voluntary saying of his ; either the church of rome relies for the certainty of her faith , on , the right rule of faith appointed by god , or she does not : if not , she has no faith at all , but only opinion ( however she may hap to be in the right in many points she holds ) for her assent will want the certainty requisite to faith , as not being built on the stable grounds god had laid to give it that certainty ; and , if the church of rome have no faith 't is impossible she should be a church , or any part of a church , sound or unsound , as wanting what 's most essential , true faith ; and so dr. st. has provided rarely well for the mission of his own church ; for , if ours were no church , she had no church-authority ; and if she had none her self , 't is evident she could give none : whence will follow that the reformed churches deriv'd nothing which was constitutive of a church from any foregoing one , but were wholly erected anew ; and then i would know what authority , under that of iesus christ who constituted the church at first , had power to constitute it anew . but if dr. st. says , that the church of rome rely'd on the means left by god to ascert●● faith , then 't is manifest that doing so she could not erre in faith , and so is as sound as may be , whatever our talking disputant says . since then there is no middle between [ relying on the means left by god to ascertain faith ] and [ not relying on it ] and so that body in communion with the roman church must necessarily do one of them ; and if she does rely on it she must needs have all true faith , and so be very healthfull or sound ; if she does not , she m●st needs have no true faith at all , and so not only lose her health but her essence too , which by consequence un-churches the reformers also , it were good dr. st. would consider the point over again , and not talk thus any thing at random without proof . as for his saying ( for saying things craftily , and prettily is his only talent ) that the church of rome , by which i presume he means , as we do , those churches in communion with the roman , is not the catholick church , this will be best decided by settling the certain rule of faith , and then , by applying of it , to consider whether any body out of her communion have not deserted that rule ; which if they have , they will be prov'd thence to have no faith , nor consequently to have in them the essence of a church ; and so if this defect appear in them all , they can be in true speech no parts of the church ; in which case it must necess●●ily follow that those in communion with the roman are the catholick church . let us begin with grounds and pursue them by close discoursing and things will easily be decided : but this talking voluntaries , this countersfeiti●g and pretending to principles and conclusions when there is in reality neither the one nor the other , is good for nothing but empty show . these excellent performances having emboldend this man of confidence to conceit he has done wonders , he sounds the triumph of his own victory in these words . this may suffice to shew the validity of the principles on which the faith of protestants stands , and the weakness of those of the church of rome . these words give us occasion to reflect back on his promise and his performances : his promise was to reduce the faith of protestants to principles ; what he has perform'd is this . he has not yet laid one proposition which is to him a principle ; ( that is , which he makes use of to conclude what he designs ) but what is both obscure and false ; he has settled no faith at all but brought all into opinion , by discarding infallible , and maintaining only fallible certainty . and had he indeed settled any faith , yet he has not produc't own word to settle the faith of protestants in particular , but all will equally fit a socinian or a quaker ; and his way of managing his rule will much better sute with a quaker or any fanatick than with a protestant . also , in stead of reducing to principles , he at first begins to deduce from principles , and in the process of his discourse he puts conclusions for principles , and principles for conclusions ; and so reduces and deduces , that is draws backwards and forwards , blows and sups both at once . in a word , the total sum of his heroick atchievments amounts to this . he has layd thirty principles , which wanting either evidence or else necessary influence upon what he pretends to prove , are no principles : he hath so reduc't to those principles that he makes six conclusions follow , that is , he deduces from them ; and , so , he has so reduc't to principles , that he has not reduc't to them . he has put that for a rule , which wanting power to direct aright those who are ro rely on it , is evidently no rule ; he has attributed such a certainty to his faith , as is a fallible one , that is no certainty but a chimaera : and consequently he has so principl'd faith as makes it no faith , but opinion only . he has made six propositions so follow out the thirty , which for want of necessary coherence with them do not follow ; lastly , he has made those to be conclusions which for want of premisses , and by reason of their greater evidence than is fonnd in his prin●iples , and for many other regards , are not conclusions but rather principles . all which is shown in their proper places . so that , his perplexing intricacy in contriving and posturing his words oddly , being once unravell'd , their affected ambiguity clear'd , and his insignificances and incoherences layd open , the common light of nature will inform any attentive and intelligent reader that dr. st. has not reduc't the faith of protestants to principles , but that his whole discourse attempting it is reduc't to contradictions . yet in confidence of his vast performances he ventures upon this grand conclusion that shall strike all dead . from all which it follows that it can be nothing but wilfull ignorance , weakness of iudgment , strength of prejudice , or some sinful passion , which makes any one forsake the communion of the church of england , to embrace that of the church of rome . but with how much greater reason may i conclude , that ( in case the church of england owns his way of discoursing her● , and holds not that the tradition , practice and sense of gods church is to give us that assurance of the meaning of scripture as to build faith on it , but that 't is to be left to every priv●te mans fancy to be his own iudge in that affair ) nothing but either an invincibly-weak ignorance , or the wicked sin of spiritual pride ; making private men scorn to submit their judgments to persons wiser than themselves , or to be taught by their lawfull pastors whom god has appointed for that end , can make any man remain in the communion of the church of england , and not unite himself to the communion of the church of rome . especially , since they all hold that faith cannot possibly be false , & so must hold that the means to faith cannot possibly lead the reliers on it into errour , and yet ( if but meanly verst in the world ) they must needs experience that those who do rely on their own sense of scripture differ in most fundamental points of christianity , and so , oneside necessarily erre in so doing . finis . transition to the following discourse . having thus totally defeated dr. st's . attempt to reduce his faith to principles , and shown that in stead of performing this , all the most substantiall parts of his discourse are reduc't to so many contradictious , it may perhaps be expected i should assert the truth of my own by showing that 't is built on such firm and evident grounds . but i presume i have already perform'd this in my sure-footing and its corollaries , as also in faith vindicated and its inferences ; and , if it shall appear needfull or be requir'd of me by learned men , it may perhaps hereafter be brought into a closer and more rigorous form. yet , that it may be seen how easily our discourses concerning the certainty and ground of faith are resolvable into evident principles , i shall annex for an instance a small peace of mine ; whi●h , though it was never pretended to be a severe process by way of principles , but only meant for a connected discourse , yet i doubt not but i shall show that each main ioynt of it where it speaks assertively , has a firm and evident principle at the bottom , giving it stability and evidence , and through vertue of these qualifications , rendering it solidly and absolutely convictive● the method ▪ to arrive at satisfaction in religion . . since all superstructures mn●t needs be weak whose foundation is not surely laid ; he who desires to be satisfy'd in religion , ought to begin with searching out , and establishing the ground on which religion is built ; that is , the first principle into which the several points of faith are resolv'd , and on which their certainty , as to us , depends . . to do this , 't is to be consider'd , that a church is a congregation of faithful , and faithful are those who have true faith ; wherefore , till it be known which is the true faith , it cannot be known which is the true church . again , a council is a representative , a father , an eminent member of the church , and a witness of her doctrin ; wherefore , till it be known which is the true church , it cannot be known which is a council , or who a father . lastly , since we cannot know which is scripture , but by the testimony of those who recommend it ; and of hereticks we can have no security that they have not corrupted it in favour of their false tenets ; neither can we be secure which is scripture , till we be satisfy'd who are the truly faithful , on whose testimony we may safely rely in this affair . . wherefore , he who sincerely aims at satisfaction in religion ought first of all to find out and establish some assured means or rule by which he may be secured which is true faith ; for till this be done , he cannot be secure either of scripture , church , council , or father , but having once done this , is in a ready way to judge certainly of all ; whereas if he begin with any of the other , or indeed argue from them at all , till the rule of faith be first settled , he takes a wrong method , and breaks the laws of discourse , by beginning with what is less cortain , and indeed to him as yet uncertain ; and in effect , puts the conclusion before the premisses ; unless he argue , ad hominem , or against the personal tenets of his adversary , which is a good way to confute , but not to satisfie . . and , because the rule of faith must be known before faith can be known , and faith before scripture , church , councils and fathers ; it appears , that to the finding out this rule no assistance of books will be requisite , for every one who needs faith , is not capable to reade and understand books : there is left then only reason to use in this inquiry ; and , since people of all capacities are to be saved , much sharpness and depth of wit will not be requisite , but plain n●tural reason rightly directed will suffice . . this being so , the method of seeking satisfaction in religion , is become strangely both more short and easie . for , here will need no tedious turning over libraries , nor learning languages , nor endless comparing voluminous quotations , nor so much as the skill to read english , all being reduc'd to the considering one single point ( but such an one as bears all along with it ) and this too comprehensible , ( as will appear ) to a mean understanding . again , the large debating particular points in a controversiall way is by this means avoided . for , when the right rule of faith is certainly known , then as certainly as there is any faith in the world , all that is received on that rule is certain , and of faith . not but that 't is of excellent use too , to cherish and strengthen the faith , especially of young believers , by shewing each particular point agreeable to right reason and christian principles , and recorded expresly in , or deduced by consequence from the divinely-inspired books . . lastly , this method is particularly suitable to the nature of sincere inquirers ; who , if they want the liberty of their own native indifferency , and be aw'd by any authority whatever before that authority be made out , cannot but remain unsatisfy'd , and inwardly feel they proceed not according to nature and the conduct of unbyast reason ; whereas , when the authority is once made evident , reason will clearly inform them that it becomes their nature to assent to it . . but how will it appear that 't is so easily determinable by common reason , which is the right rule of faith ? very evidently . but first we must observe , the assent called faith , depends upon two propositions , [ what god hath said is true ] and [ god hath said this ] out of which two necessarily follows the conclusion , that this or that in particular is true . of these two we are concerned only in the later : for to examin why god is to be believed when he has said any thing , which they call the formal motive of faith , is not a task for those who own christianity . but all we have to do is to finde out what god hath said , or ( which in our case is all one ) what christ has taught ; and that , whatever it be which acqnaints us with this , we call the rvle of faith ; as that , which regulates our belief concerning christs doctrine , or the principles of religion . now i affirm i● may be obvious reason be discover'd which this rule is ; and that by looking into the nature of it , or considering what kinde of thing it ought to be ; which is no more than attentively to reflect what is meant by those two ordinary words , rule & faith . . and both of them acquaint us that the rule of faith must be the means to assure us infallibly what christ taught . for , in case a rule , though we apply it to our power , and swerve not from it , leave us still deceivable in those points in which it should regulate us ; we need another rule to secure us that we be not actually deceiv'd , and so this other and not the former is our rule . next , faith ( speaking of christian faith ) differs ●rom opinion in this , that opinion may be false ; but faith cannot : wherefore the rule of faith , both as 't is a rule , and as it grounds faith , doubly involves infallibility in its notion . . let us apply this to scripture and tradition , ( for setting aside the light of the private spirit grounding phanaticism , there are no more which claim to be rules of faith ) & see to which of them this notion fits ; that is , whic hath trnly the nature of the rule of faith . and this is perform'd by examining which of them is of its own nature , if apply'd and held to , able to assure us infallibly , that christ taugbt thus and thus . . and for the letter of scripture , not to insist that , if it be deny'd , as many , if not all the parts of the new testament have been by some or other ; or mention that those who receive the bo●ks , do often and always may doubt of almost any particular text alledged , whether some fault through malice , negligence , or weakness be not crept into it ; in which cases the letter cannot evidence it self , but needs another rule to establish it ▪ i say , not to insist upon these things , which yet are undeniable , we see by experience multitudes of sects differing from one another , and some in most fundamental points , as the trinity and godhead of christ ; yet all agreeing in the outward letter . and it is not onely uncharitable , but even impossible to imagin that none among so v●st multitudes do intend to follow the letter to their power , while they all pro●ess to reverence it as much as any , read it frequently , study it diligently , quote it constantly , and zealously defend the sense which they conceive of it , fo far that many are even ready to die for it : wherfore it cannot be suspected but they follow it to their power ; and yet 't is so far from infallibly teaching them the doctrine of christ , that , all this notwithstanding , they contradict one another , and that in most fundamental points . the bare letter then is not the rule of faith , as not being of its own nature able to assure us infallibly , though we follow it to our power , what christ has taught ▪ i would not be mistaken to have less veneration than i ought for the divine books , whose excellence and vsefulness as it is beyond man to express , so peradventure among men there are not many who conceit this deeper than my self ; and i am sure not one amongst those who take the confidence to charge us with such irreverent thoughts : but we are now about another question . they are the word of god , and their true sense is faith ; we are enquiring out the rule of faith ; whose office t is not to satisfy us that we ought to believe what god has said , which none doubts of , but what it is which god has said . and i affirm , that the letter alone is not a sufficient means to assure us infallibly of this ; and the experience of so many erring thousands , is a lamentable but convincing proof of it . . on the other side , there needs but common sense to discern , that tradition is able , if follow'd to ones power , to bring infallibly down to after ages , what christ and his apostles taught at first . for ; since it means no more but delivery of faith by daily teaching and practise of immediate forefathers to their respective children ; and it is not possible that men should be ignorant of that to which they were educated , of that which they daily saw ; and heard and did ; let this rule be follow'd to ones power , that is , let children resolve still to believe and practise themselves what they are taught by , and practis'd with their fathers ; and this from age to age ; and it is impossible but all succeeding children which follow this rule , must needs from the apostles time to the end of the world , be of the same faith which was taught at first : for , while they do thus , there is no change ; and if there be no change , 't is the same . tradition then , thus understood , has in ▪ it the nature of the rule , of faith , as being able , if held to , to bring down infallibly what christ and his apostles taught . . we have found the rule of faith , there remains to find which body of men in the world have ever , and still do follow this rule . for , those , and onely those , can be infallibly assured of what christ taught , that is , can onely have true faith ▪ whereas all the rest , since they have but fallible grounds , or a rule for their faith which may deceive them , cannot have right faith , but opinion onely ; which may be false , whereas faith cannot . . and first , 't is a strong presumption that those many particular churches in communion with the roman , which for that reason are called roman-catholicks , do hold their doctrine by this infallible tenure ; since they alone own tradition to be an infallible rule , whereas the deserters of that church write whole books to disgrace and vilify it : and , since no man in his wits will go about to weaken a tenure by which he holds his estate , 't is a manifest sign that the deserters of that church hold not their faith by the tenure of tradition , but rather acknowledge by their carriage that tradition stands against them ; and that 't is their interest to renounce it , lest it should overthrow their cause : wherefore , since tradition [ § . . ] is the only means to derive christs doctrin infallibly down to after ages , they , by renouncing it , renounce the only means of conveying the docttine of faith certainly to us , and are convinc'd to have no faith , but only opinion . and not only so , but even to oppose and go point-blank against it , since they oppose the only-sure method by which it can with certainty come down to us . besides , since tradition ( which i always understand as formerly explicated to be the teaching the faith of immediate forefathers by words and practise ) hath been proved the only infallible rule of faith , those who in the days of k. henry viii . and since have deserted it , ought to have had infallible certainty that we receded from it formerly : for , if we did not , but still cleav'd to it , it could not chuse but preserve the true faith to us ; and if they be not sure we did not , they know not but we have the true faith ; and manifestly condemn themselves in deserting a faith , which for ought they know was the true one : but , infallible certainty that we had deserted this rule , they can have none , since they neither hold the fathers infallible , nor their own interpretation of scripture ; and therefore unavoidably shipwaack themselves upon that desperat rock . which is aggravated by this consideration , that they built not their reformation upon a zealous care of righting tradition , which we had formerly violated , nor so much as testimonial evidence ( as shall be shown presently ) that we had deserted it ; but all their pretence was that we had deserted scripture : and , because they assign no other certain means to know the sense of the holy books but the words , and those are shown to be no certain means [ § . . ] 't is plain the reformers regarded not at all the right rule of faith , but built their reformation upon a weak foundation , and incompetent to sustain such a building . whence , neither had the first reformers , nor have their followers , faith at all , but only opinion . . on the contrary , since 't is known and agreed to by all the world , at what time all deserters of our church , of what name soever , broke from us ; as also who were the authors and abettors , and who the impugners of such new doctrins ; besides , in what places they first begun , and were thence propagated to others : but no such thing is known of us even by our adversaries , whom it concerns to be most diligent searchers after it ; seeing they are in a hundred mindes about the time when , and the persons who introduc'd these pretended new doctrins of ours , which they say vary from scripture ; as may be seen by their own words in several books , and amongst others , one call'd , the progeny of protestants , and this for every point in which they pretend we have innovated : 't is plain that when we charge them with deserttng the known doctrin of the former church , and the rule of faith , we speak open ▪ and acknowledg'd evidence ; when they accuse us of the same , their charge is obscure and unknown even to the very accusers ; nay , plainly prov'd false by the necessity of the things being notorious , if it happen'd , and the constant disagreement of those who alledge it , when or how it happen'd . . i say notorious ; for , since points of faith which ground all christian practise , are the most concerning truths in the world , it cannot be but the denyal of such truths must needs raise great commotions before the opposite truths could be nniversally spread ; and the change of christian practise and manners which depend on those truths , must be wonderfully manifest and known to every body ; wherefore ; had we been guilty of such a change , and introduc'd new tenets , and propagated them over the christian world as is pretended , it must needs be manifestly and universally known that we did so ; neither is it possible the change should be so insensible and invisible , that our very adversaries cannot find it out ; especially this alone making their victory over us so certain and perfect . for , seeing we own tradition as an infallible rule , we are irrecoverably overthrown , if they make out that we ever deserted it : and , surely , nothing should be more easie than to make out that , than which , if true , nothing can possibly be more notorious . . moreover , since it cannot be , that multitudes of men should profess to hold points both infinitely concerning and strangely difficult to believe , and yet own no ground upon which they hold them : if we ever , as 't is said we have , deserted tradition , we must , till the time we took it up again , have proceeded upon some other ground or rule of faith : and , because none ever charged ●s with proceeding upon the letter of scripture or phanaticism , and besides th●se there is no other but tradition , 't is plain we never deserted , but always stuck to tradition . . besides , 't is impossible that that body of men whi●h claim for their rule of faith , an uninterrupted tradition from the apo●●les days , should not have held to that rule of faith from the beginning : for , otherwise they must have taken it up at some tim● 〈◊〉 other , and by doing so , profess to the 〈◊〉 , that nothing is to be held of faith , but what descended by an uninterrnpted delivery from the beginning ; and yet at the same time acknowledge that all they then held was not so descended , but received by another rule , this of tradition or uninterrupted delivery being then newly taken up ; which is so palpable a contradiction , that , as humane nature could not fall into it : so , if it could , the very pretence would have overthrown it self , and needed no other confutation . . add to this , that none of tbose many sects who from time to time have deserted our church's faith and discipline , and so become her adversaries , ever yet pretended to assign the time when we took up this rule of tradition ; and yet a change in that on which we profess to build all the rest , must needs be of all changes the most visible , and most apt to justifie the carriage of those revolters . wherefore , 't is demonstrably evident on all sides , that , as this present body of men , call'd the roman-catholick church , does now hold to tradition , so their predecessors uninterruptedly from the apostles days did the same ; that is , did hold to it ever . and , since 't is shown before [ § . . ] that this rule , if held to , will certainly convey down the true faith unchang'd to all after ages , 't is likewise demonstrable , that they have the true faith , and are the truly faithful , or true church . . and hence by the way , is clearly seen what is meant by vniversal tradition , and where 't is to be look'd for and found ; which puzzles many men otherwise very judicious and sincere ; who profess a readiness , nay , a duty to follow vniversal tradition , but they are at a loss , how we may certainly know which is ie. for , since 't is evident that to compleat the notion of the vniversality of mankind , ( for example ) it were absurd to think we must take in brutes too , which are of an opposite nature to mankind , but 't is sufficient to include all in whom the nature of mankind is found ; so , to make np the notion of vniversal tradition , it were equally absurd to think we ought to take in those in whom the nature of tradition is not found , but its opposit , that is , deserters of tradition or their followers ; but 't is sufficient to include those in whom tradition is found as in its subject , that is , adherers to traedition , or traditionary christians . all , therefore , that have at any time deserted the teoching and practise of the immediately fore-going church , how numerous and of what name soever they behave no show of title to be parts of vniversal tradition , ; and only they who themselves do , and whose ancestors did ever adhere to it , how few soever they seem , are the only persons who can with any sense pretend to be those , of whom , as parts , vniversal tradition consists . whence also that rule of vincentius lirinensis , directing us to hold that which is believ'd in all places , all times , and by all , which is so mis-apprehended by our modern dissenters , is clearly understood ; viz. by taking it with restriction to all those who hold to tradition . for , otherwise , should we not restrain it to those only who have adher'd to the rule of faith , but enlarge it to the utmost extent of the words , so as to comprehend also those who have deserted that rule , nothing could possibly be held of faith whlch any heretick had ever deny'd : and so , in stead of being a rule to dist●nguish or know what we are to believe , it would by thus confounding right faith with all the heresies in the world render it utterly impossible ever to know what 's faith , what not , or discern christ's true doctrin from diabolical errours . but to return whence we digrest . . it follows from the former discourse , that those men who stick to tradition , can , by applying that their rule , certainly know who have true faith , and which body of men is the true church ; likewise , that a representative of that body is a true council , and that an eminent member of it delivering down to the next age the doctrine believ'd in his , whether by expresly avouching it the chnrches sense , or confuting hereticks , is a true father . lastly , they can have infallible certainty both of the letter and sense of scripture , as far as concerns faith : for , if any fault which shocks their faith , whether of translator or transcriber , creep into any passage , or , if the text be indeed right , but yet ambiguous , they can rectifie the letter according to the law of god written in their hearts , and assign it a sense agreeable to the faith which they find there ; between which and that of the holy writers , they are sure there can be no disagreement , as being both inspir'd by the same unerring light. . contrariwise , those that follow not this rule , and so are out of this church , of what denomination soever , first ; can have no true faith themselves : 't is possible indeed and usual that some , and not seldom , many of the points to which they assent , are true , and the same the truly faithful assent to , yet their assent to them is not faith ; for faith ( speaking of christian faith ) is an assent , which cannot possibly be false ; and not only the points assented to , but the assent it self must have that distance from falshood , ( as is prov'd at large in faith vindicated ) else 't is not faith , but degenerates into a lower act , and is call'd opinion : now the strength of an assent rationally made , depends upon the strength of its grounds ; & all grounds of that assent call'd faith , ( i mean such grounds as tell us what christ taught ) besides tradition , are proved ( § . . ) weak and none : without it , therefore , there can be no true faith . next , for want of that only infallble ground they cannot have certainty which is true faith , who truly faithful , which the true church , which a true council , who a true father , nor lastly , which is either the letter or sense of scripture in dogmatical passages that concern faith. and , since they have no certainty of these things , they have no right , nor ought in a discourse about faith be admitted to quote any of them ; but are themselves , and the whole cause concluded in this single inquiry . who have a competent , that is , an impossible to be false , or infallible rule to arrive at faith. . the solid satisfaction , therefore of those who inquire after true faith , is onely to be gain'd by examining who has , or who has not such a rule . this method is short and easie , and yet alone goes to the bottom . all others , till this be had , are superficial , tedious , and , for want of grounds , insignificant . the former discourse reduc't to principles . to shew the precedent discourse built on most firm and most evident principles , and such as i have describ'd in my preface , i request the reader to look back with attentive consideration upon it's several parts , and he will discern that § . . the first paragraph is only a descant upon this proposition [ the ground is to be laid before the superstructures ] or ( which comes to the same ) that [ he who builds must build upon something ; ] or , to put it in more immediate terms [ what 's first is to be begun with ] that is [ what 's first is to be first ] which is resolv'd finally into this proposition supremely identical [ a thing is to be what it is . ] § . . the second relies on that famous maxim of logicians , that [ the definition is more known then the thing defin'd ] which is self-evident speculatively : for the words once understood , it comes to this that [ what clears another thing must be clearer it self ; ] that [ what explains , must explain ] the latter part of it implies , that in plain things depending on authority [ honest men are to be trusted before knaves ] which is self-evident practically . § . . the third is but an inference from the two fore-going ones , and manifestly depends on the same self-evident principles . § . . the fourth is a farther deduction ; and ( since to satisfy rationally is to make men know one way or other ) plainly amounts to this [ what 's to be known by all must be possible to be known by all ] which is as self-evident as 't is that [ that cannot ( or is impossible to ) be done , which is impossible to be ●tne . § . . the fifth is only a short descant upon the fore-going parts of this discourse , and so is reduc't into the same grounds with them . § . . the sixth is as evident as 't is that [ men are not to assent upon authority ( or believe ) if there be no reason for it ] or that [ rational agents are to act rationally . ] § . . the seventh states the question concerning the right rule of faith , and shows the way to look after it by vertue of this plain truth , [ the meaning of the word signifying any natune is the nature signify'd by that word : ] or , which is the very same [ what 's meant by any word is meant by that word . § . . the former part of the th is resumed into this clearest truth [ what leaves us in need of a rule is not a rule ] or [ a rule is able to regulate ] which is perfectly equivalent to this [ a rule is a rule . ] the second part averrs , that faith ( taking it for an assent upon the motives laid by god which cannot leade into errour ) is not ( it's opposit ) opinion ; which is equivalent to this [ faith is faith. ] § . . the ninth only directs our application of the two preceding paragraphs to the same purpose . § . . the former part of the tenth is full as evident as 't is that [ those who are not scholars ( as the generality of the faithfull are not ) cannot be satisfy ; d rationally in those things which require scholarship ] which , since to be satisfy'd rationally signifies to know , imports thus much that [ those who cannot know , cannot know . ] and the second part is as clear as 't is , that [ that is not the way which multitudes take & yet go wrong ] which , since a way is that which is to carry one right , is as palpably self-evident as 't is that [ a way is a way . ] § . . the eleventh which contains the main and in a manner the only point , has two parts : one , that mankind cannot be ignorant of what they see , and hear , and do . for , since both reason and experience tels us , that senses in men are conveyers of outward impressions to the knowing power , should impressions upon those parts not be conveyed thither , they would , in that case , not be sensitive or animals , and so no men : and , did they not perceive when such impressions are convey'd as they ought , they would be destitute of a power receiving knowledge by senses , and so again , no men. so that this first part is as evident as 't is that [ mankind is mankind . ] and the second part of this § directly engages this identical proposition [ the same is the same with it's self . ] that is , both of them are self-evident , or immediatly implying what is so . § . . the twelfth has nothing new but what is built on this manifest truth [ none can be assur'd without means to assure ] which , since [ means ] speaks that by virtue of which as a necessary requisit an end s to be compas't , that is , without which it cannot be compas't , amounts to this self-evident truth ; [ that cannot be done which cannot be done . ] § . . the thirteenth has for it's basis this undeniable verity ; 't is presumable that they who constantly maintain a tenet do hold the same tenet and judge it available to their cause , or for their purpose , and that they who write against it and vilifie it do not hold it in their hearts , nor judge it to be available to their cause . both which are perfectly the same with this proposition which practice makes self-evident . [ men not frantick or in some high passion will not act directly against their own interest or to their own overthrow ; ] or to this which is self-evident speculatively [ rational agents left to their nature will act as they are , that is , rationally . the rest of this § is shown to be self-evident in our discussion of the th . § . . the fourteenth supposing the evidence of the th , th , and th is reduc't to this clear truth [ they act irrationally and unjustifiably who relinquish a rule infallibly-certain upon vncertain grounds ] or that [ 't is better to proceed upon certainty than vncertainty ] which nature teaches all mankind . § . . the fifteenth contains these two truths for it's supporters , both of them self-evident practically . [ that charge is irrational which is grounded on a thing unknown to the accusers , and that rational which is grounded on matter of fact notorious to the whole christian world . ] § . . the sixteenth subsists by vertue of this evident truth [ an vniversal change in matters both manifest to sense and most concerning must needs be notorious . ] which engages that principle [ man is sensitive or an animal . ] whence , this being a direct part of the definition of man , 't is consequently self-evident . § . . the seventeenth is reduc't to this plain proposition [ men of reason cannot hold and own themselves and propose to others points most difficult to believe , upon pretence that they came from christ , and yet yield nor own any reason why they held they came from christ ] or thus , [ men either have or else yeeld no reason where there is most need of both : ] which comes to this that [ a pressing necessity ( which is the most violent of causes , & which in our case strains humane nature & if it act nor , frustrates it of it's end ) has no effect at all ] which destroys all causality , and consequently all science in the world. § . . the eighteenth is as plain as it is that mankind ( amongst which were in all ages persons of great wit & goodness ) in matters of highest moment and which require the best and surest ground can continue to hold such things , and yet confess the ground on which they hold it naught and insufficient ; or upon second thoughts going about to settle a better , palpably and directly contradict their own pretence ; which is to say [ where there is most need of reason men do not use it at all ] and , since effects are not done without causes , ( which in our case are motives ) and the greatest necessity is the most powerful of motives or causes , if that move them not to act rationally nothing will do it ; and so it implies by consequence the contradictory to this identical proposition [ rational agents are capable to act rationally . ] § . . the nineteenth has the same basis with the th and th . § . . the th is meerly this identical proposition dilated [ all in any kind are the vniversality ( or all ) in that kind . § . , the twenty first and second are grounded on those evident truths [ those who have means to arrive at an end can arrive at that end ; and those who have not means cannot . ] and , since [ means ] speaks that which makes an end compassable , they amount to this [ that wh●●●c●● be done can be done , and that which cannot , cannot . ] § . . the last paragraph , supposing the fore-going ones true , is of the same strain ; and full as evident as it is , that [ none can arrive at an end without what 's necessary to arrive at that end ] or that [ that cannot be done which is impossible to be done . ] postscript . having thus attempted to reduce the main parts of my discourse concerning the ground of my faith to first principles . it is required of dr. st. that in maintaining his , he would not decline the same test : this if he thinks it safe to undertake , it will quickly and evidently appear on whose side truth stands . and this is mainfestly his task who pretends to principles . for he must either vouch those he produces to be first principles , or reducible to the first , else he must confess them to be none at all . i have little hopes he will think it fit to expose his discourses to this noon-day-evidence ; nor indeed will the genius of errour endure such a triall as the going about to connect it with first and self-evident truths : for what communication can that darkness have with this clearest light ? and i conceive it was clearness of style , that is , a grammatical or rhetorical clearness , and not a logical or rational one , ( which consists in resolving his discourse into first principles , ) that dr. tillotson boastingly attributed to him in his sermon-preface ; for himself ( as is evident by his whole way of writing ) never dream't of any other . 't is more to dr. st's purpose ( which is to keep things from being understood ) to avoid by all means this discovering method and all arguing from the nature of the thing ( whence he foresees no small danger of too great evidence is likely to spring ) and to leade his reader into a wilderness of words ( whole libraries of authors ) where , by his way of managing citations , which is by criticising , upon ambiguous words and phrases , they may dance in the maze till they be weary . i hear he is about this stratagem ; and that he ayms , out of some high expressions of the fathers concerning the excellency and self-sufficiency of the scriptures to prove the vselesness of the church to ascertain faith. but , alas ! how he will be defeated ? not one testimony of any authority will be found which comes home to his purpose , or proves that private men need not the churches interpretation ere they can securely build their faith on it ? to save him therefore the labour of collecting and printing multitudes of these to no purpose ; and his readers from the fruitless toil of troubling themselves with impertinences , i produce him one out of vincentius lirinensis worth thousands ; for it speaks with as high reverence of scripture , and of it's fulness , perfection , and self-sufficiency as any , perhaps more ; and so he cannot not with any reason except against it ; and being intended purposely to speak to this point must needs be the most apposit decider of the question that can be ; not to add the acceptation and esteem that excellent treatise of his ever had from the church , which argues it's perfect conformity to the churches sense in setling and stating the right rule of faith. i transcribe then from this ancient and learned father his whole second chapter ( in his treatise entitled against the profane innovations of heresy ) which is this . hic for sit an requirat aliquis , &c. here perhaps some may ask , since the canon of the scriptures is perfect , and enough nay more th●● enough suffices to it self for all things , what need is there that the authority of the churches sense should be joyn'd to it ? because all men do not take the holy scripture , by reason of its depth , in one and the same meaning , but divers men interpret it's sayings diversly , so that as many opinions in a manner as there are men seem possible to be drawn thence . for novatian expounds it one way , photinus another , sabellius another , and donatus another ; arius , eunomius , macedonius , take it in one sense ; apollinaris , priscillianus in another sense : jovinian , pelagius , coelestius understand it thus ; and lastly , nestorius otherwise . and therefore it is very necessary by reason of so great windings of so various error that the line of the prophetical and apostolical interpretation may be directed according to the rule of the ecclesiastical and catholick sense . from which place we may note , . that though he allows the canon of scripture perfect and sufficient for all things , yet by showing it interpretable divers ways , and this by great and learned men , and so that they fall into multitudes of errors by those inerpretations , and thence requiring the authority of the churches sense as necessary to understand it right so as to build faith on it , he plainly shows , that scripture alone is not sufficient for this end , since it needs another to atchieve it . and hence it is not said simply [ it suffices for all things ] but [ sufficit sibi ad●omnia , it is sufficient to it self for all things ] which can only mean that it has all the perfection due to it 's own nature ( as i shew'd above , p. , , . ) or is sufficient for the ends god intended it for , reckon'd up by s. paul to timothy , amongst which no such thing is found as , sufficiency of clearness to every sober enquirer , so as to build his faith on his private interpretation of it , without the direction of the churches sense ; only which will come to dr. st's purpose . since then i allow scripture all sufficiency and perfection but this of being sufficiently clear to private understandings so as to build their faith on their own interpretations of it , i allow it all this learned father or the ancient church ever did . . 't is observable that he puts not the fault in the persons , but gives for the reason of their misunderstanding it , the depth or deep sense of the scriptures : which argues that though some few out of wickedness wilfully mistake , yet the general reason of the miscarriage is the disproportion of the seripture to private vnderstandings in dogmatical points of christianity , as i constantly maintain . . he cals the interpretation of it [ a line ; ] which is flexible and dirigible ; and the sense of the catholick church the rule ; which lies firm , as apt to direct another ; and so with me he makes the sense of the catholick church the only rule of faith. . this sense of : he church is intimated to be antecedent to all interpretation of scripture , and therefore the church must have had this sense or knowledge of faith by tradition ; there being no other way becoming gods ordinary providence but these two . . these things being so , 't is most evident that when in the former chapter he mentions the authority of the divine law ( meaning the scripture ) and the tradition of the catholick church , he meant them jointly , as appears expresly by the very next words beginning this present chapter ; nor did he speak there of the means of bringing men to faith , as the rule of faith ought to do , but of keeping them in faith or preserving them from sliding into heresie ; and since he attributes in this chapter , convictiveness of what 's faith only to the churches sense ; 't is manifest all that remains to be attributed to scripture is agreeableness of it's letter ( if a good pastor expound it ) to the present faith of the church ; to see which , exceedingly comforts faith in the hearts of the already-faithful , who must need 's have a high reverence for the holy scriptures authority . the whole strain then of my discourses here against dr. st. concerning the rule of faith is perfectly consonant to this learned father of the church and to all antiquity . only our frequent and close contests with our acute modern dissenters have obliged us to a more scholar-like way of distinguishing our notions exactly which the ancients did not , and ( faith being contain'd in two things , the scriptures and the breast of the church ) of determining which of them is the proper ascertainer of faith to all the faithful and those which are to be converted ; and so in true and exact speech the rule of faith ; and both this father and evident reason give it to be the church . what then dr. st. is to do in this point ; if he makes any such attempt , is to alledge convincing testimonies that the ancient fathers held scripture so plain to every sober enquirer as to give him such certainty that he may safely build his faith on his own interpretation thereof , without needing the churches ; when he produces such testimonies as come home to this or an equivalent sense he will work wonders ; and , unless he does this , he does just nothing . but i foresee two unlucky difficulties ; one , that he will not find one testimony of any authority which excludes the church from this office , as himself directly does ; next , that could he produce thousands , he would spoil them all at the next word , and render them inconclusive , that is , insignificant , with telling us very soberly they are all fallible as to that effect ; and consequently were perhaps in an error in all they say . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * see sure footing d ed. p. , . * rule of faith. p. . rule of faith p. . reason against raillery p. , , &c. notes for div a -e * rule of faith. p. . notes for div a -e see his preface to his sermons , p. last . a letter of thanks from the author of sure-footing to his answerer mr. j.t. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter of thanks from the author of sure-footing to his answerer mr. j.t. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. [s.n.], paris : . attributed to john sergeant. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng tillotson, john, - . -- rule of faith. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter of thanks from the author of sure-footing to his answerer mr. j. t. quis autem magis de his novit , hic ne seductus homo qui etiam nunc superest , & hucusque in hoc mundo versatur , aut qui ante nos testes fuerunt , habentes ante nos traditionem in ecclesiâ ; quique etiam à patribus suis traditum acceperunt , quemadmodum etiam hi à patribus suis didicerunt qui ante ipsos fuerunt , quomodo ecclesia acceptam à patribus suis veram fidem usque huc continet , itemque traditiones . epiphan : contra aerium . haer . . paris , . sir , . your friend mr. stillingfleet , who , i thank him , professes a great deal of real kindness for mee , tells your self in the beginning of his appendix , that your performances in your book have been so clear and satisfactory , that hee hopes mr. s. in stead of another letter of directions to his answerer , will write you one of thanks , for the reason and kindness you have shew'd him throughout your book . i hate to be ungratefull , and have that reall kindness for him and your self too as not to suffer your hopes to be defeated . my obligations of gratitude hee concieves to spring from a twofold head ; the reason and the kindness you have shown mee . the former of which is to be examin'd by reducing the respective parts of your discourse to grounds or principles ; which i shall do when it shall please god to give me leasure and health to answer your book ; and i promise you faithfully to own as much reason in it as these will allow mee : i fear you may dislike the verdict of principles and think them discourteous because of their inflexible genius , and self-confident too , because they love naturally to express themselves with an assuredness , and are oft so bold as ( unconcern'd in the sceptical humour of others ) to talk of those bug bears to fancy , evidence and demonstration ; but be assur'd , sir , though they are not altogether so good-natur'd nor bashfull as your timorous quivering probabilities , which you phrase modest , yet they are very just and honest ; and , as they cannot flatter you , so neither will they injure you in the least . my other obligation to gratitude is the kindness you have shew'd me ; and , as mr. stillingfleet sayes very truly , throughout your book , which it were a sin to deny . for i know no greater kindness from one that opposes me than to write in such a manner as to put himself upon the greatest disadvantages imaginable to give me so many advantages against him and his cause . nor am i to expect your intention should go along with your favours ; 't is abundant kindness in an adversary that by his means i enjoy the reality of the benefit ; and this i have receiv'd from you , never to bee forgotten but with ingratitude . as oft as you omit what 's important , mistake either voluntarily or weakly , triumph causlesly , injure me undeservedly , cavill groundlesly , prevaricate from the business purposely , revile bitterly , jeer sillily ; or falsify and pervert my meaning or words palpably ; so many reall kindnesses you conferr upon your poor servant , of which in this letter of mine both to your self and the world i here make my hearty profession and acknowledgment . . and first i am to give you very humble thanks for totally waving to take notice of my letter to my answerer . the whole scope of it was to request you would hold to a method which was evidently conclusive ; that you would begin with some first principles , and vouch them to bee , as first principles should bee , self-evident ; that ( as all art and common sence gives it ) you would not produce any thing against tradition till you show it depends not on tradition for its certainty ; that you would either confess your testimonies unapt to certify , or declare in what their virtue of certifying consists , which must needs either show them feeble if they be such ; or , if otherwise , enforce and strengthen them : that you would uphold your arguments satisfactory , that is , able to subdue the understanding to assent , and show us how they come by that virtue ; with diverse other requests , not prescriptions as you call them , onely tending to make a short end of controversy by bringing truth quickly to a clearing by the way of principles . now , who sees not that i had oblig'd my self to the same severe laws of concluding , by proposing them to you ; and so , had you had any principles worthy to be call'd such , or the confidence in your cause to venture upon any conclusive method , you had gain'd a notable advantage against me in laying hold of that method and obliging me to stand to it , because i was the proposer of it . at least you might have pleas'd to have shown my way inconclusive , and substituted and establish't a better , in case you had thought any evident or conclusive method your advantage . but 't is a manifest signe you judg'd any rigorous way of concluding unsutable to your causes and your own interest ; and that to continue still on foot inconclusive & endlesly-talking wayes of discourse , ( as is yours , which consists in being able to say a great many pretty plausible any-things to every thing ) was more proportion'd and advantageous to your moderate , modest , courteous and probable faith ; which is ( i dare say for it ) far from that boldness and self-confidence as to talk of principles , evidence , demonstration , or even certainty , unless minc't and allay'd with the epithet sufficient ; though you will never show us how acknowledg'd possibility to be otherwise can ever convince us sufficiently to assent the thing is so , or why a capacity to bee false for any thing wee know , is not the very notion of incertainty , and so most abusively pinn'd to the notion of certainty . now , that you should so perfectly wave speaking to that letter , it being particularly directed to your self , whereas the book you pretend to answer was not ; the end aym'd at in it being by all men's confession very importantly good , that is to shorten controversies and bring our disputes to a period ; also the method of discoursing being ( as logick tells us ) one of the praecognoscenda to the discourse it self , and so either disputant has right to require it should be first treated of , though i civilly requested it of you : lastly , it being so indifferently fram'd to your or my interest , or rather totally for his who had truth or grounds on his side ; that is , for you , were your cause so qualify'd ; and , as such , equally lik't by judicious protestants as well as catholicks : this being so , that you should so totally sleight and disregard it in these circumstances , is a clear argument you think it not safe to venture your cause and credit upon principles or any evident or conclusive method of discoursing ; and a plain confession by way of fact that all your discourse against my book has neither principles to subsist by , nor evidence to conclude by . which acknowledgment of yours though tacitly and modestly exprest ( for you are a modest man in all your rationall performances , and onely very brag and brisk when some jest haunts your fancy or when you are dispos'd to flout and rail at the impudence of my assertions ) is as high a favour as your great wit could have invented ; and so i am bound to yeeld you a return of infinit thanks for it ; which i beseech you accept in part of requitall , till i come to show hereafter out of the nature of that letter that all your probable talk in this book had been marr'd in case you had yeelded to do me the reason which i there requested . next i am to thank you heartily that you begin your impugnation with the most disingenuous cavill that perhaps has ever been heard of intending to frame my discourse as plain and unexceptionable as i could concerning the rule of faith , i declared ( page . ) that i intended not rigorous definitions of either word , but onely to reflect on and make use of some attributes , predicates or properties , which in the sence of such who intelligently use those words , are apprehended to bee involved in or truly appertaining to their signification , i added that i gave that caution to avoid mistake and cavill : which might ensue upon pretence of defining , but could not upon meerly predicating , so my propositions were true : this done , i begun with the plainest sayings i could use , and thence drew on the process of my discourse by the most immediate steps i could invent . the tenour of my first discourse was thus : a rule signifies a thing which is able to regulate him who uses it , therefore it must have in it those qualities by which 't is able to do that it 's proper effect ; therefore it must bee knowable as to it 's existence to the persons it is to regulate ; as also , it must be knowable to have in it a vertue to regulate or guide them right . again , the word faith being equivocall , and sometimes taken for conscience , sometimes for a strong trust or reliance , sometimes for fidelity or honesty &c. i had a mind to restrain it to our present purpose as it is taken for an assent of the understanding upon authority ; and , so , exprest my self § . . that , faith is the same with beleeving ; thence i affirm'd something of divine beleef , as much as would bring me to evince this that faith in a christian sence imported knowledge of supernaturall things ; which is all i aym'd at in this branch of my discourse . so that i us'd all the art and care i could to avoid cavil . but sr , i perceive to my comfort your disingenuity ( which is one of your chief kindnesses ) is beyond all prevention . first , you can by no means think my explication of those terms sufficient p. . you should have said those affirmations true , or , those predicates , truely pronounc't of the subject ; for this is all i aym'd at , and not to compile explications . next , you say , this proposition a rule is to regulate or guide him that uses it , is a discription ; which i beseech you beleeve was never intended . afterwards you complain i confound rule and guide , by making regulating and guiding equivalent ; and i defend my self , that those words being vulgarly confounded may without wronging art be us'd so till wee have occasion to distinguish them , which i have no where in my whole book : nor had i blam'd mr. whitby for this but that in the very discourse where he profest to distinguish rule from guide , he notwithstanding , even there confounded their notions . were i to distinguish them , i should ( if you would not be angry ) put this difference between them , that guide hath something personall in its signification , which rule abstracts from . but you proceed with your kindnesses ; and ( pag. . ) call those words my definition ; though ( so unparallelld is your candor ) you quote my words a little after that i inrended here no definitions : and then shew my definition ( forsooth ) faulty , because i fell englishmen for their clearer understanding this word , that 't is a thing able to regulate &c. whereas regulate is less removed from the latin & so , less plain then rule the word defined . whereas your self know i meant not to define ; and i beseech you beleeve mee when i tell you i as little meant to write to any english-men that did not understand the word regulate as well as the word rule . yet i must define whether i will or no , though there be no other occasion why it should be so but onely that you might break a jest , which tickled your fancy , and so your fingers itcht to put it down ; 't is a definition of your own parallell to my counterfeited one , that a law-giver is one that hath the power of legislation ; and in this you have hit right ; for t is just such another definition as mine was . . after this you bring in my other definition ( as you call it ) that faith is the same with beleeving , and immediatly add my words disowning any sayings of mine in this first discourse to be definitions at all , as had you transcrib'd a little farther you might have let the reader see more visibly . and , so kind you are , that my very not intending to define which is alone able , one would think , to excuse all the pretended faults in my mistaken definitions must have a little touch of a cavill notwithstanding from that fertil wit of yours , which minds not desert nor misdesert , but follows it 's own genius , & indifferently pours out it self meerly to vent its exuberancy . now the reason why those words faith is the same with beleeving must needs be a definition too , is evident : you had another witty conceit came into your fancy , which was a country-fellows definition , saying that an invasion was as if hee should say an invasion ; which would not have fitted , unless you had made my words faith is the same beleeving a definition too ; and it had been a thousand pitties such a pretty jest should have been lost . but , sr. since i ment to bring my notion from a more equivocall to a less equivocall word , & thence proceeded ( as you call it ) defining a great way farther , that is indeed predicating or affirming diverse other things in that § . why you should catch at my very first words , faith is the same with beleeving , and make that alone a definition , neglecting all the following ones , is impossible for such dull heads as mine to divine ; unless it were that the country-definition had a very great ascendent and influence over your conscience and sincerity as well as your fancy . . this definition of mine ( to see how things will come about ) puts you in mind ( p. . ) of my first principles 〈…〉 is a rule , faith is faith. upon which you triumph thus . this ie the right self-evident method hee talks so much of ; and his principles agree admirably well with his definitions . if hee had proceeded in the same method , and added that a rule of faith is a rule of faith , orall tradition is orall tradition , and that to say orall tradition is the rule of faith is as much as to say orall tradition is the rule of faith , the whole business had been concluded without any more ado , and i think no body would have gone about to confute him . what a terrible thing it is to deal with your great wits ! let 's see how a little honest plain logick will dissipate this vapour . to conclude is to show evidently that two notions wee call the subject and predicate are identify'd or connected in that proposition we call the conclusion . to do this wee find a third notion , call'd a medium or argument to bee identify'd with those two , whence wee infer them to be the same : but how shall wee know that third notion to bee identify'd with those two others , that is , how shall wee know the major and minor propositions to bee true ? by finding another medium connected with them : and how far must this go on ? endlesly , or no ? if endlesly , since every following connexion is prov'd by some foregoing ones , in case wee cannot come to see some first connexion or principle , wee could conclude or deduce nothing . and how must we evidence the connexion of the terms ( or of the subject and predicate ) in these first principles ? by another antecedent connexion of those terms with a third ? no ; for these are suppos'd the first connexions . wherefore , since they cannot be evidenc't by any thing out of themselves and yet must be evident , else nothing could bee evidenc't by them , it follows they must bee evident of themselves or self-evident . and in what consists this self evidence ? meerly in this that no medium , middle term or argument can come between the notions of their subject and predicate ; which devolves finally into this , that the subject and predicate are perfectly the same notion : so that all science about any thing is finally resolv'd into the nature or essence of that thing , that is into that things being what it is , or which is all one it 's being the same with its self , which your great learning laughs at . hence , what is , is ; or every thing is what it is , as plain and course as it looks , is the last resort of all evidence in the world ; and , in particular sciences , that the subject of that science is what it is ; as that man is a man , quantity is quantity , and so , a rule is a rule , faith is faith , must principle all that can bee solidly concluded either about man , quantity , rule or faith. . had you reflected on any maxims of art , and not stood pursuing your affected buffonerie when it became you to discourse like a solid scholler , you would have seen how little ground you had for your taunting non-sence . to say that a rule is a rule is a first principle , had not been held a just occasion of giggling , much less had you been so indiscreet as to parallell my conclusion orall tradition is the rule of faith with my principle a rule is a rule ; or to put it upon mee that because i make my terms in my principle self-evidently identicall , therefore i ought to do so in my conclusion too ; whereas your conscience tells you and my whole book informs the reader i go about at least to prove it in so rigorous a method that as you fear to admit , and so wave speaking to my letter , so you and your fellow probable-christians judge it your best play to laugh at it . and 't is a cheap way if you had a fool to deal with who would let such weak evasions serve your turn . but let mee summ up my obligations to you at present . you have manifestly falsify'd my intention : pretending i mean't to define , whenas i expresly disown'd it , sure footing p. . you omit to answer whether those propositions or predications of mine bee true or false ; and , if true , whether my consequences bee right or no ; which was all your task at present : you lay the gull you have rais'd for your ground , and thereupon cavill and flout all the way without sense , reason , or the least occasion : you laugh at the nature of first principles , bewraying either your ignorance of those things on which all solid discourse can onely bee built , or your necessity of scorning such unfriendly discoverers of your weakness : & , which is the worst of all , you make this unsavoury kind of talk , the first part of your onset , and the first tast you give your reader of your sincerity and depth of reasoning . and now , sir , bee judge your self , whether the confessing your self thus amply to bee a disingenuous and weak caviller , bee not strangely obliging to your thankfull servant . really , sir , unless you will bee so good as to take the telling you candidly of your faults to bee sufficient payment , i am exceedingly afraid i shall live and dy in your debt . i could make good sport with the word measure in your definition ( for you will define to excell mee though none requires it of you ) but i dare not imitate you , nor pretend to so great a degree of witty and pleasant eloquence . onely i will beg leave to transcribe your words which introduce your definitions p. . rejecting then his way of definition as inept and frivolous , and no wayes tending to give a clearer notion of things , i shall endeavour to explain a little better ( if i can ) the meaning of these terms . and certainly , sir , a man may with a little astrology prognosticate your victory ; for you combat nothing but a chimera your own brain had coin'd . in the mean time 't is another small kindness to show your self so vain as to build your own triumphs on a voluntary misprision . but right or wrong you are resolv'd to conquer , and i must have patience . . i hop't when i came to your second section your reason which as your friend mr. stillingfleet ( who hummes your book as loud as you can do his for your heart ) tells us runs throughout your book , would have given some respite to your kindnesses , and my thanks for them ; but i discern in this and your following section that your very reason it self is compounded of kindness , and that your soberest impugnation of my discourse is made up of groundless cavills and ( which i am loath to say ) voluntary mistakes . i am sorry to see it , because i intended to throw aside the rubbish of your book in this letter , that in my answer i might better lay open the admirable fabrick of your discourse , and have nothing there to do but to speak to solid points . but in this disappointment i must behave my self as well as i can , and your goodness must help mee out by pardoning me if i omit to thank you for innumerable kindnesses which are involv'd in your rational performances , till god gives me health and leasure . . you are pleas'd to honour me with a very loud and heavy calumny all over your book , as reviling scripture , vilifying , disgracing it , and what not . now , sr , i use still to distinguish in scripture the sence of it from the outward letter , which distinction if you admit not , i have no more to do but to alledge experience confest by all , that many sects who have the outward letter inform it with different sences ; which evidently argues a divisibility or distinction between that letter and it's sence . admitting then this distinction , and that the sence of words is the soul of , them , i cannot allow that letter with any propriety to be called gods word , unless inform'd and enlivened with gods sence ; but onely dead characters ; for sincerely , sr , i never saw a bible creep about and move it self that i should call it , that is , the paper and characters , living . now , taking those letters in complexion with gods sence , and , as inform'd by it , i challenge your utmost spight which most of your book , especially the end of this section , shows to be very bitter against me , whether you ever read any man give a higher respect to those oracles then my self . see my words sure-footing p. . & . which you might have had the candour to acknowledge . and as for the author of rushworths dialogues whom you accuse of the same crimes i know not whether you will take my word or no , but i assure those who will , that when on occasion i was moving him to write a comment on the books of the new testament , he shook his head and reply'd ! ah , sr , do you know what you ask ? they are so full of profound heavenly sence , that 't is beyond the wit of man to declare it without injuring it ; assuring me it was to sublime a task and required such perfection of science especially divinity , that he durst not undertake it . i challenge you therefore as you hope to bee held an honest man , to show mee any one expression in all my writings , where i speak of the letter of scripture in complexion with it's sence , ( which onely is truly gods word ) ; otherwise then with highest reverence ; nay of that very letter as manag'd by any method of arriving at a certain and determinate sence of it but with respect . for otherwise the meer letter of scripture quoted by the devill and taken in his sence is the devills word , not gods , and for the same reason the same letter cited by you to signify your sence is your word , ( though you tell your auditors boldly that all is gods word you talk out of the pulpit ) unless you first make evident you adhere to a certain method of interpreting it right , which you shall never evince ; nay certainer & solider then is the living voice and practice of the church essentiall , which you so laugh at , and would perswade your readers to renounce and disbeleeve it to adhere to your grammatical quibbling & criticisms . so that all your anger at us in reality springs hence that we will , not let your word bee taken for gods , and honour'd ( forsooth ) and reverenc't with a sacred and divine veneration . hence all this heat and foam of ill language . and , good reason , for this one point of not permitting your private interpretations of scripture that is your word to be held gods , so deeply concerns your copy-hold , that , if this cheat bee once discover'd , your self , all the books you write , nay all your whole profession signifies just nothing . this short and plain discourse once understood by our readers , as i hope it will , your fierce calumny against mee as a blasphemous person devolves to this that you venerate your own talent or fancy in sencing the letter of scripture as a most sacred thing , nay place it in stead of the holy ghost who first dictated that sence to the divine writers . and can you do mee a greater kindness than to discover this , and bee so highly concern'd for it ? . you tell the reader p. . that whatever i attribute to scripture for fashion's sake , or ( say you ) to avoid calumny with the vulgar , as hee sayes very ingeniously in this explication of the th . corollary ; nevertheless 't is plain that according to his own hypothesis , hee cannot but look upon it as perfectly useless and pernicious . by which words you would make mee acknowledge i attribute nothing to scripture but to avoyd calumny with the vulgar : whereas in the place you cite there is no such matter ; but only that some of our controvertists ( not i ) condescended to the protestants sleight-way of quibbling out of scripture , lest they should calumniate them to desert scripture it self . but this is your usuall sincerity . . you quoted ( after you have discours't as if there could bee no use of scripture besides making it the rule of faith ) and that it is intolerably pernicious according to his hypothesis is plain , because every silly upstart heresy fathers it self upon it ; and then quote for these words sure-footing . p. . but look there and one may read , i speak of scripture only as ill-manag'd by you ; that is , putting it without any distinction of the persons in the peoples hands , and leaving it to their interpretation to make use of it for a rule of faith. now , if scripture as mis-manag'd bear the same notion with scripture it self , then you have dealt very honestly , and done mee no kindness in falsifying my intentions evident from my words in that very place , and inveighing against mee accordingly . as for your next citation , that scripture-words , not senc't , nor having any certain interpreter ( under which notion i express my self to take them ) are waxen-natur'd , that is , appliable to diverse sences , 't is so beat out by manifest experience , that 't is beyond cavill to confute it ; and the very disputes between iohn biddle and the protestants is sufficient to evince it . but your candour is pleased to confound scripture's letter taken as unsenc't , with the same letter as taken with it's true sence , that is , taken as god's word ; and that letter as taken without any certain interpreter , with the same letter as certainly interpreted , and then who so abhominable miscreants as the poor papists ; who must bee forc't to say , not what themselves in reality say , but what their disingenuous ( though even therein kind adversaries ) will needs have them say . . your third section tells us that you are much puzled for instances of traditions followers differing in faith ; and you are so put to it that you cannot i mean ( you will not ) distinguish between the head of our church acting as a definer of faith or proceeder upon tradition , and acting as a prudent governour . please then to take notice how this affair of censuring books is manag'd . diverse books , perhaps of twenty severall authors are order'd to bee read over by some divines , and their judgments concerning them to bee given in , which they do : the chief officers of the church perhaps have twenty other things to handle that very day ; and themselves have neither leasure to peruse the books , nor discuss the propositions ; which coming clad in a theologicall dress would in prudence require a great deal of deliberation ere any of them were expresly and particularly to bee declar'd against with it's peculiar censure . all that the nature of their circumstances permits them to do is to trust those divines , and to proceed accordingly , to warn the faithfull to beware of those books , in which they are inform'd there is such danger . so that the motive those governours proceed upon is their care of preserving the faithfull untainted , and the judgment of divines , not christian tradition . and , what motive proceed those divines upon in these censures ? upon their best skill as divines ; that is their best skill in drawing consequences ; in which neither themselves nor any else say they are infallible ; thus much for the censurers . now come wee to the person censur'd and his books . of what nature are they ? theologicall discourses . and what do such discourses rely on formally ? on tradition ? nothing less : on this hee rely'd as a beleever or christian , not as a divine , but on his own humane skill in explicating faith or it's ground , and his talent in deducing right consequences , in which also hee and every man living is fallible : you see , sir , by this time the ripe fruits of your performance in this point , and that you have brought a worthy instance of difference amongst reliers on tradition , in a passage wherein neither side rely on tradition oh , but they contradict one another in the very point of tradition : 't is your weak and unproud conjecture ; and besides you cannot ( i mean still , will not ) distinguish between the substance of tradition ( that is the infallibility of the living voice and practice of the church essentiall in conveying down uninterruptedly christ's doctrine ) and the explication of it ; show the church of rome condemns the former and you have my free confession i am at a loss for my faith. but , though you show shee condemns and censures all the later , that is all the explications whether made by that authour , my self , or any other , yet , as long as she condemns not the former , shee hath done nothing against tradition ; and so your wise instance is spoil'd , as it was no other likely , being the weakest you could have invented against tradition , and the least concerning it ; in regard there is not one learned catholick in the church that looks upon the acts of the roman inquisition in censuring books , as on infallible definitions of faith. . you 'l ask , where lies the fault in such cases ? i answer , no where that i know ; not in the head of the church , who acted the most prudently and carefully that could be in such an affair ; neither censuring any particular proposition , where there was no more certainty to ground that censure , than the judgment of some divines ; and yet providing by the caution his censure imported that the conceived harmfullness in those books might work no ill effects : whence 't is but an invidious presumption of your own , that perhaps the pope is censur'd for it in england . nor , were those roman divines faulty in case they judg'd secundum ultimum potentiae ; but were bound in conscience to give in to the court what they thought . again , those explications of divinity-points looking new to them , and it being the naturall genius of the followers of tradition to bee jealous of any thing that is new , and this not onely in faith but also in explications of faith , in regard these pretend a coherence and connexion with faith it self , it seems to mee to sound a laudable zeal both in them and others to bee suspicious of and less a friend at first to what 's new , 'till it bee farther lookt into and appear innocent . nor can i say 't is a fault in the person censur'd , in case hee sincerely ment to write what he judg'd was truth and so most advantageous to the church , and submits to the orders of his chief eccesiasticall superiour . you see , sir , the whole case : in which i am larger because you are kinder here than ordinary ; and , your instance falling pittifully short , you peece it out with falshoods ( p. . ) that wee in england censure perhaps the pope for this action ; that the person censur'd disobeyes the summons of his chief pastour ; that p. . the governours of the church do professedly cherish ignorance in the generality of the papists for the increasing their devotion . these are grear favours indeed : you are too liberall , sir , and will undo your self unless you restrain your hand from this profuseness of kindness . your th . section is all reason , & ( like the foregoing one in which you laid your grounds and fell to build ) so strong and firm that it needs more than an ordinary blast to blow it down . therefore i conceive 't is best to stay a while and gain more breath , which is something short with mee at present . . but your fifth even kills me with kindness , and acquaints the reader with a dangerous oversight of mine enough to overthrow my whole book . 't is this , that i make traditions certainty a first and self-evident principle , and yet go about to demonstrate it ; which you soberly admonish mee to take heed how i take it upon me ; that aristotle never demonstrated first principles , because they could not bee demonstrated ; that most prudent men are of opinion that a self-evident principle , of all things in the world , should not bee demonstrated , because it needs not ; you ask , to what end should a man write a book to proove that , which every man must assent to without proof so soon as 't is propounded to him &c. now , sr , in my mind you should onely have combated this , and have given no other answer to my whole book but to this onely : for nothing can bee so senceless nor so impertinent as to go about to proove that which that which can need no proof , nor consequently less meriting an answer . i would then , had i been in your case , have thought it my best and most honourable play , to omit all counterfeitings of my adversaries defining , all those multitudes of groundless cavills , voluntary mistaks , calumnies , laughing at his first principles , evidence , demonstration , &c. together with all my wordish exceptions at his rumbling rethorick , perching upon the nature of things , and other such expressions ; and have solely apply'd my self to this one folly evacuating his whole book and so excusing my answer ; and this you might have done with far greater hopes of conquering than in any of the rest ; because , that a first and self-evident principle cannot bee evidenc't seems so clear that it even looks like a first principle it self , of which no other part of your confutation has the least countenance or resemblance : and be assur'd , sr , since you would not use this advantage against mee as you might , you shall never have mee upon the like lock again . caught in these streights by your entangling logick i endeavour my escape on this manner . self-evidence is two-fold , speculative and practicall . speculative self-evidence it that which cannot bee made evident by any speculation or skill , but is known meerly by the common light of understanding : such is that which is found in those principles i dicourst of before , which were therefore self-evident speculatively because , their subject and predicate being the very same notion , no other middle notion could come between them , by connexion with which they might bee shown connected with one another : you remember them i suppose ; it was they that made you and your friends such sport in your book . practicall self-evidence is that which wee are not thus imbu'd with by nature through the common light of understanding , nor yet is it acquir'd by rationall discourses , ( for this is evidence by-deduction , not self-evidence ) but that which is stoln into us as it were at unawares by a common converse with things in this world , which all mankind in a manner even those who are very rude are acquainted with . examples of the former are ( if you have done laughing ) a rule is a rule , faith is faith , also a whole ( or a part and more ) is more than a part ; or , is a part and more . examples of the later , for your better satisfaction , i propose three or four . one shall bee that in a square space 't is a neerer way to go from one corner to that which is opposite , by the diameter , than to go by the two sides . another shall bee that , things look less afar off and bigger neerer-hand . a third shall bee that ( abstracting from madness ) 't is impossible mr. t. or any other such ( you see how kind i am to you ) should take for his text the fool hath said in his heart there is no god , and at the same time , and in the same circumstances things stand now in england , should preach atheism and endeavour to perswade them out of that very text , there is no god. the last shall bee the existence of q. elizabeth or k. henry the th . now i affirm that all these are practically-self-evident : for it was not by virtue of speculative discourses the vulgar arriv'd to the knowledge of these and such like things ( as is evident by this that they know not how to prove these , or give an account of their assent by way of evident discourse ) but by virtue of the common knowledges of things in the world they are acquainted with . now what is thus self-evident is so far from being impossible to bee evidenc't speculatively , that 't is the proper task of learned men ( by which i mean not those tedious mighty men of talk , who think it an excellent confutation of sence to cavill at words and expressions ) to look into nature , and discover or ( if you bee not offended ) demonstrate what were the proper causes which wrought thus , after a naturall manner , that effect call'd certainty in rationall souls as to all the aforesaid particulars ; which found , they will appear to bee the mediums fit to demonstrate that effect . that this is so in the two first examples , you are so well skilled in euclid , & the mathematicks ( though one prophet t. say's i have not read him ) as to know that notwithstanding this practical-self-evidence all mankind has of them , mathematicians notwithstanding go about to demonstrate them speculatively without fearing to do a needless action , out of the nature of quantity ; as i make account i could demonstrate the th . & the d. too out of the nature of man , or out of this ( if you please ) that a man is a man or a rationall creature , that is a thing that acts not , if hee have the use of reason , without a motive . to come nearer home , i concieve that 't is to all unprejudic't and unpreoccupated understandings , as are all catholikes who have not their faith from skill but by the naturall way of education . self-evident practically , that the doctrine deliver'd now as taught by christ and his apostles , by such as profess to have it by way of tradition or uninterrupted succession from them , is truly their doctrine ; or , that the certainty of traditions conveying down matters of fact is practically-self-evident ; and thence i proceed to look speculatively into the causes of such an assurance , and so demonstrate it . which when i go about , i discover that , besides what ascertain'd humane tradition in witnessing the existence of henry the th . or any other matter of fact , infinite advantages were found in christian tradition enabling it to bring down the first-preach't doctrine above what was found in them . but i expatiate too far . i hope by this , sir , you see at length what my whole book ayms at ; though ( good man ) you were so taken up with cavilling at little wordish exceptions you spy'd it nor before ; that is , to demonstrate by way of speculation what i conceiv'd before to bee self-evident practically ; you see also at the same time how infinitely you oblige mee by professing your ignorance of this point ; for in so doing you profess withall that you are utterly ignorant of what my whole book meant . and , are not you rarely qualify'd to bee an impugner of my book , who are so perfectly to seek in knowing what 's the main end it drives at ? is it not evident hence that your endeavours to confute mee can never go to the bottom of the difficulty , but onely talk superficially , that is wordishly and withall mistakingly to some passages in it ? surely , plain reason tells us in every ordinary affair that if one man understands not the main end the other ayms at , however hee may talk prettily and express himself in good language , yet hee can never speak home and to the purpose . and as this is plain à priori from it's proper cause , your ignorance of my main intent , so you have abundantly demonstrated the same à posteriori in your whole book ; which no where ( as i hope to show you hereafter ) begins at the bottom ; but is wholly made up of a great many aiery gay prettinesses , such as best befits one who mocks at evidence and demonstration . but 't is no matter your friend mr. stillingfleet will extoll you for it the more , and the generality of your party , who are accustom'd and educated by you to loose sermonary discourses will like it the better ; whereas , had you profest the way of evidence , you had been character'd by him as monstrously opinionated of your self , and that kind of readers , your onely admirers , would not have understood you . . your second part treats about the properties of the rule of faith , and whether they agree solely to orall tradition . i assign'd seven ; of which you are pleas'd to mistake quite no fewer than all . but i must not here take notice too much of your reason , but of your kindnesses contradistinguisht by your friend mr. stillingfleet to your reasons , that is , which are irrationall . you tell mee p. . that i might have learn'd something from the same authour from whom i borrow'd my chief properties of the rule of faith , if i had but had the patience to have consider'd his explication of them . surely , learned sir , you have great skill in judiciary astrology ; or else you deal with lilly , and booker ; or perhaps have an inchanted glass which discovers to you all i do in my study . for you know exactly all i do there ; nay which is yet more wonderfull , all i do not . you know better than my self i never use to read the fathers ; you can pronounce fearlesly that i never read euclid , and here you can tell to a hair where i borrow'd my chief properties of the rule of faith , and that it was dr. holden ' s analysis . what mephostophilus reveals these secrets to you ? but , sir , i beg your pardon ; i will not put this gift of yours upon such a score : you are a divine , and so no doubt know these things by the spirit of prophecy ; nor am i a little proud to know that so great a prophet is so near related to mee by his friendship and kindnesses . but , sir , take heed ; even holy men and prophets themselves have been deceiv'd sometimes . i need not quote scripture to you , how a certain person offer'd to bee a lying spirit in the mouth even of prophets ; and as for your present prophecy i do faithfully assure you that i never read a leaf in dr. holden's analysis in my life ; nor knew , till your book told mee it , hee treated at all of the properties of the rule of faith. the occasion of this neglect was that i was told hee went the way of rushworth's dialogues , which i made account i comprehended sufficiently , and so minded not to peruse it . you see , sir , what you gain by being persoually affrontive ; which you exceedingly affect in your book to mee and others ; and so studiously endeavour it that to find occasions for it , you stick not to say the most false and unjustifiable things rather than not humour that infirmity of your will. now your kindness in this partinular carriage consists in this , that you discover plainly a resolution to cavill though you engage your self by that means to assert things which may easily bee false , and which 't is impossible for you to prove or justify were they true ; which signifies you are neither too civill , over honest , nor endow'd with any exceeding proportion of prudence . but mr. stillingfleet likes you never the less for it , and perhaps will proclaim your praises the louder for your victory , however atchiev'd by stratagem . dolus an virtus . — . you are pleas'd p. . to cavill that the words absolutely ascertainable to us ( are as you who are master of language , and so may say any thing , deliver your self ) most contradictiously exprest . and why ? because they import , with respect to us , without respect to us : as if it were such an unheard of thing that the word absolutely should ofttimes signify perfectly , as when wee say absolutely good an absolute workman , scholar , &c. and then i beseech you inform mee what contradiction there is in saying the rule of faith is perfectly ascertainable to us . besides you should as well have plac't the contradictiō in the words absolutely ascertainable . for if it bee once sence that it is absolutely ascertainable , it cannot bee ill to adde to us ; for the word ascertainable implies a respect to some or other . on this occasion ( that i may not trouble my reader often with such nitty exceptions , with which your book abounds ) it were not amiss to reflect how industriously your friend mr. stillingfleet and you , who , as 't is most sit , eccho mutuall praises to one another , affect and pursue such empty cavills ; any misplac't word whether it happen through the compositors letting it in , in a wrong place , or printing it whennot sufficiently blotted out in the originall ; any less propriety in an expression , occasion'd by the hast i was in when i writ my appendix against him , which was sent to the press in loose quarters of sheets ; any metaphor which light unsutable to your cavilling genius , as that of perching , which makes your self verry jollyly merry ; any pretended degree of obscurity in a word , as that of regulate in stead of rule ; any expression that sounds not roundly and tersely rhetoricall , in a book in which i meant no rhetorick at all : these and divers others such wordish faults or no faults , ( 't is all one with you ) are judg'd mighty pieces of ignorance according to the genius of such aiery kind of schollarship ; and great triumphs made upon them . wheras i should rather wish to combat the inward meaning and sence of a discourse than it 's outward dress or manner of expression , provided the manner of expressing wrong not that sence . hence i except mainly against the titles of mr. stillingfleets and mr. tillotsons books : it being both highly improper and abusive of the signification of words to call that a rule which is confessedly possible to be false , that is which possibly has no power in it to rule at all ; and equally absurd to call that a rationall account of any thing which is built on no first , that is self-evident principle , without which no rationall discourse can subsist nor conclusion bee deduc't , as i showd lately § . unless perhaps mr. stillingfleet takes rationall as wee use the word reasonable when wee say a thing is reasonable strong , that is wee hope it will hold , but yet wee see not but it may break . this is my way of excepting ; but were mr. tillotson to work upon the word rationall 't is good luck hee is mr. stillingfleets dedicated and dedicating friend , for otherwise t is forty to one he would have about with him . and first he would have called the title of his book , his definition of it ; and then have fal'n foul with him for setting forth a book to englishmen and using the word rationall which was neerer the latin , instead of the word reasonable which was plain english , and so more intelligible to his readers . but enough of these fooleries ; 't is now high time i return to my friend and his kindnesses . your present one , sir , ( which i acknowledge common to you and your friend , and you ought to applaud one another for it ) consists in this : that by your magnifying and frequently insisting upon exceptions against my words , not upon a logical score , because they are equivocall or injure the sence wee are discussing , but upon a grammaticall , or rhetoricall , that is a superficiall account in which the point under debate is no way concern'd , is a very hearty acknowledgment to your reader that you value the aiery gingling of words more than the solid substance of sence ; which discovers you , how much soever you have read , noted and scribled , to bee very empty of true learning or science : this is a reall kindness , sir , and i humbly thank you both for it . your second section and some following ones for the main part of them speak nothing but pure reason ; i mean in your way , that is sophistically and knowingly deforming every passage you meet with . yet to do you right you speak a great truth in the beginning of your § . p. . when you say , and thus i might trace him through all the properties of the rule of faith ; for nothing is more certain than that . thus , that is , handling things as you do , one may do any thing , nay even write a book against the first principles themselves . the rule of faith being confessedly the means to arrive at the points of faith , and the sence or meaning of scripture being the points of faith , it follows unavoidably that the protestants must say ( if they will speak sence ) that the rule of faith must bee the means to bring them to the sence or meaning of scripture ; for which , according to them , the letter of scripture as significative , being sufficient , 't is consequent they can onely mean by rule of faith the letter of scripture as significative of god's sence or points faith. i beseech you , sir , what say you to this discourse ? do you answer it , or show that , if you take scripture in any other sence for rule of faith than as thus consider'd , you do not confound the rule of faith with the points of faith ? not a jot . nor is it your fashion to speak to my reasons , or consequences . thus you answer'd my first discourse , the most solid and most fundamentall part of my book ? deforming the plain sayings i built on for definitions , denying my conclusions in a following section , and saying something against them ; but not a word i can find any where against the proofs which inferr'd them , deduc't at large there for . § . § . together ; that is from § . to the end . your way of answering is generally when you are gravell'd with the reason , to bring some ridiculous parallell , then laugh heartily and mock at that , and so discountenance the other . but here to do you right , you bring two very good ones , but the comfort is you understood them not to bee such , else wee should not have had them ; which you put a little oddly and then triumph , and think your self victorious . pray sir , lend me your parallells a while to manage . the first of them is found p. . concerning which i thus discourse . taking the statute-book for the means to convey to us the sence of that book or the laws , i must still say you cannot mean by statute-book the sence of that book or the laws , that is that book as conjoyn'd with it's sence , for so it would signify that the same thing is a means to it self , that is , is before and after it self : you must onely mean then by statute-book , thus consider'd , the letter of that book as yet unsenc't , or contradistinguisht from the same book as conjoyn'd with its sence ; that is , the letter of that book as significative . thus i conceive it perfectly parallell to mine , and withall very rationall . but you make it amount to this p. . l. . that a book cannot convey to a man the knowledge of any matter , because if it did it would convey to him the thing to bee known . the later part of which is true though i percieve you know it not ; for these words [ knowledge of a matter ] involves in their signification [ the thing known ] as if you reflect on your own words , matter and thing , you will quickly discover . but the sophistry lies in this , that when you say , a book cannot convey , &c. you equivocate in the word book , which i contend must either be taken for the letter of it in conjunction with the sence which is the thing known , and then it cannot thus accepted , bee a means of arriving at the knowledge of the thing or the thing as known , for then it would signify as much as if one should say , the letter with the thing known is the means of arriving at the thing known ; or else , it must bee taken for the letter as significative onely , or without the sence , and so it may bee conceiv'd a way of arriving at that sence 't is judg'd apt to signify . but , sir , your contending here against a thing so evident has a great deal of reason for it ; you would have the outward letter of scripture confounded with the sense of it , that those who hear you quote the letter , may thee fool'd to imagine you have still the sense aoo ; whereas , should these bee known to bear distinction , it would bee very obvious to question whether you speak any thing of god's word , or no , how much soever you have the outward letter in your mouth and pen ; which reflexion alone if it were considerately weigh'd , would spoil all your writing and preaching too : for thus go your first principles ; the outward letter lying in a book must first bee call'd god's word , and held so plain that it cannot bee misunderstood ; and then the sence you give it must needs bee held god's sence ; which politick principles lay'd , i see not what you are inferiour to those whom the holy ghost inspir'd ; and your sayings are to have the same force , if the plot take , as the words of a prophet or evangelist . and who would not bee angry , fume and take on against a discourse which is likely to devest you of so considerable and beneficiall a prerogative ? your second parallell applies my distinction concerning scripture to orall tradition ; for you have a speciall faculty of your own in making men contradict themselves ; thus you us'd a whole cluster of our authours p. , . and as for poor mee , if you take mee underhand i can scarce speak a word consonantly . now , sir , wee are thus far agreed , and better friends than you took us to bee that i allow your parallell to a tittle , and stick not at all to grant what you would force upon mee p. . that , when i say orall tradition is the rule of faith , i can onely mean by orall tradition the living voice and practice of the church as apt to signify the sence of forefathers ; and not the sence , or those points of faith which they are apt to signify . also that those words and practices taken formally as the means to know points of faith are contradistinguish't from that sence , or those points , and oppos'd to it relatively as a means is oppos'd to an end ; and therefore taken as consider'd in this abstraction and contradistinction as a means to cause their actuall sence in us , i say those words and practises are without sence ; in the same manner as a means , taken formally for such , is without the end , and excludes it from it's notion . all this i voluntarily grant , and least you should conceit your strong reason has brought mee to it , i let you know i ever took them so formerly : see sure-footing p. . d . edition ( which i still intend to quote ) , by orall or practicall tradition wee mean a delivery down from hand to hand ( by words and a constant course of frequent and visible actions conformable to those words ) of the sence and faith of forefathers . where you see i make sence or faith the thing deliver'd ; and words and actions the way of delivering : which therefore must needs exclude one another formally . yet you think you have gotten a notable advantage against mee by this parallell discourse , telling your reader p. . when hee hath answer'd this argument hee will have answer'd his own . a shrewd opponent ! who confutes mee by putting mee to answer an argument , thinking it would puzzle me grievously , which is my own express , and avow'd doctrine . is not this a strange mistake ? but , sir , let me reflect on my obligations . first you write a book against tradition , and yet discover plainly in this last mistake , you understand not in what i put tradition to consist , that is you impugn , i thank you , you know not what . wee are like to find a wise confutation of it when wee come to examin it's rationall part , which still misses in what 's most substantiall and fundamentall . next , you revile mee all over as abusing scripture for unsenc't , or without sence when wee speak of it as your rule of faith ; and yet you see now wee speak the same of our own as to that point ; which i am sure you think mee too highly venerate ; and your mistake springs hence that ( which is a shame for a schollar , especialy for one mr. stillingfleet so highly praises ) you understand not the nature of abstraction , and imagine and represent mee to say 't is devoid of sence , senceles without sence &c. which i no where affirm of it absolutely butas ti 's abstractedly consider'd as a means to arrive at sence , and as so taken it must not bee conceiv'd as having that sence which ti 's a way to arrive at . once more for all ( that i may clear your mistakes to you ) know that wee make account there is the same reason for our rule 's being onely significative or a way to sence , that is , as such not-yet senc't , as for yours : but wee put the difference here that wee make account living voice and constant practice of the circumstant faithfull of the church essentiall is by our perpetuall comnverse with them and other conveniencies so perfectly significative of their sence in deliver'd points or points belonging to naturall christianity , that they leave to the generality no possible ambiguity or occasion of mistake ; the persons being alive to explain themselves in any such difficulty , if their carriage and expressions could possibly leave any ; wheras the letter of scripture as left to be interpreted by private heads , is given both by reason and experience to bee diversly interpretable ; and cannot by way of living voice apply it self pertinently to explain its own meaning when it 's sence is perverted by any ; but lies at the mercy of the interpreters pretending to draw it into different faces , by alluding one place to another , criticizing , and other fallible knacks . you make a great noise all over your book as if wee would make god unable to write intelligibly ; but you beg the question all the while , which is whether god intended the scripture for a rule of faith or no ; for if not , then why is it not as intelligible as it need bee ? again , the question is whether god intended it for every private man to interpret , or rather that they should hear the church in that as well as in all things else belonging to christianity : if he did , then they ( not god ) lead themselves into errour though their spirituall pride , which makes them usurp the churches prerogative . but tuetullian long ago has given you the best answer ( de praescrip . haer. c. . ) nec periclitor dicere ipfas quoque scripturas sic esse ex dei voluntate compositas ut haereticis , materias subministrarent ; cum legam oportere haereses esse quae sine scripturis esse non possunt . nor am i affraid to say that the scriptures themselves are so fram'd by the will of god that they should afford matter to hereticks ; for i read that there must bee heresies , which without the scriptures could not bee . i hope now you are satisfi'd that tertullian is as great a reviler of the letter of scripture as is your friend i. s. as for the point it self it needs no more to evince it to any except verball cavillers , but this ; that sence is no where formally but in intelligent things , that is , in our case onely in mens minds ; nor can it bee otherwise in words then as in signes that is significatively . since then i deny not but the protestants are to hold scriptures letter apt to signify gods sence , as is seen sure-footing p. . the very passage you cavil at , i wonder what you would have , or upon what grounds you can require more . you proceed as if you meant to overwhelm mee with your favours and tell the reader p. . it is pleasant to observe with what cross and untoward arguments hee goes about to proove dead characters not to have the properties of a rule of faith. may not one without danger of infidelity fear , sir , that as some vessels give every thing that comes into them a tincture of the ill sent with which they are imbu'd ; so every thing that passes into your fancy grows cross and untoward by a predominancy of those qualities there ? you will give the reader a tast or two you say , but the artificiall sawce you adde to it will bee found to alter quite the naturall one of the dish it self . the first tast is that i say it cannot bee evident those books were writ by men divinely inspir'd , till all the seeming contradictions bee solv'd . upon this your fluent wit works thus . how can this bee an argument against those , who by scriptures must mean unsenc't characters . i had thought contradictions had been in the sense of words not in the letters and characters ; but i perceive hee hath a peculiar opinion that the four and twenty letters contradict one another sir. i perceive you have been us'd formerly to bee humm'd at the university for breaking iests when you should dispute , and have taken such a liking to the grande 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of those applauses , you cannot for your heart yet wean your self of that merry pin of fancy . but though you bee pleasant as you say and follow your sport yet i must bee sober and regard the profit of our readers . i discourse then thus . contradictions are formally in mens minds , and significatively in words . since then in the very place you quarrell at i allow your tenet to bee necessarily this , that those characters are significative of god's sense , my discourse runs evidently thus . since god cannot tell a ly , or , ( which is all one , signify a contradiction ) if the letter of scripture cannot bee clear'd from being significative of contradictions it cannot bee held of god's enditing . see you any occasion , sir , in this plain discourse which can deserve such mirth and triumph . you might have pleased then after my words that the protestants must mean by scripture , unsenc't characters , have added what imediatly follows there p. with their aptnes to signify to them assuredly gods mind , which i repeat again in the same place , and then where 's the difficulty ? it being very good reason in my mind to say that gods spirit cannot order words to bee written which signify a ly . but this passage , dear sir , showes plainly you value honesty and fair dealing much less then your jest , dismembring a sentence which ought necessarily go all together , to gain a sorry occasion for your pastime and merriment . the next tast you give of mee is enough to give any reader who loves sincerity a whole belly full of your manner of confuting . 't is found p. . where you make mee say that the scripture cannot bee the rule of faith , because those who are to bee rul'd and guided by the scriptures letter to faith cannot bee certain of the true sence of it . upon this you descant thus . which is to say that unsenc't letters and characters cannot bee the rule of faith , because the rule of faith must have a certain sence , that is , must not bee unsenc't letters and characters ; which in plain english amounts to thus much , unsenc't letters and characters cannot bee the rule of faith , that they cannot . here is not much rumbling of rhetorick ( as you call it p. . ) but here is a strange jumbling of sence . let 's see if i can set right what you have taken such pains to disorder . i discourse then thus , points of faith are determinate sences , and faith is certain ; therefore the way or means to faith , that is the rule of faith , must bee a certain way of arriving at those determinate sences : these sences ( say you protestants ) are arriv'd at by the scripture's letter signifying it to you , therefore you must bee certain by it that those determinate sences were mean't by god. not that the rule of faith was those sences , but the way to them , and they the end of it , of which that rule must bee significative ( as i all over exprest ) & so it was properly related to those sences as the thing signify'd . whence in proper speech they are to bee called its sence ; in the same manner as 't is call'd my hand-writing which my hand writ , though neither my hand is the writing , nor involves writing in any part of it's definition , but is distinguisht from it as cause from effect ; nor yet does the letter taken as the way to faith , or god's sence , imply as any part of it self the sence 't is to cause in my knowing power . if by this time you bee awake you will see how you wilfully abuse mee , and how far i am from tautologizing , which for a blind to avoid a more pertinent answer you pretend . the pith of the cavill lies in those words in your descant ; the rule of faith must have a certain sence , that is ( as you put it upon mee ) it must not bee unsenc't letters and characters , or it must bee senc't letters , &c. observe the words have and bee : the former of which means no more than when wee say a cause must have an effect ; but wee do not therefore infer that the cause taken as a cause has in it self that very effect which it produces in another ; for example , the fire which causes or heats is not heated , not the cold that cools cooled ; nor for the same reason the letters which are the cause of sence in us are not , as such , senc't , that is have not that very effect in themselves which they produce in another , viz. in the understanding : for senc't means made to bee understood , and they cannot bee made to bee understood , taken as significative or as the way to bee understood . i hope by this you see how the rule of faith being the means , way or cause of arriving at faith or sence may have a certain sence , caus'd by it , as it's effect , and yet it self not bee or include the effect it causes in another , but for that very reason exclude it , and so bee unsenc't ; but yet significative , or apt to bee senc't . after this follows the triumph . and thus i might trace him through all his properties of the rule of faith. which i heartily yield too , and i beleeve my reader that examins these passages will bee verily perswaded not onely that you may do it , but that you will do it , 't is so naturall to you , and necessary to boot . now the greatest favour you have done mee herein is that by a few unselected passages you have so acquainted our readers with your manner of writing and what may bee expected from it , that it will render it needless for mee to spend time in laying you open any farther . besides i foresee your reason ( such as it is ) begins to come into play . yet some few favours scatter'd here and there , will , i fear , not cease to sollicit my gratitude . you drop some of them upon my friends . capt. everard you say ( p. . ) or his friend affirm there are plain contradictions in scripture , impossible to bee reconcil'd , and therefore protestants ought to submit to the infallibility of the church ; instancing in the third series of generations , mat. . said there to bee fourteen ; yet , counted , amount but to thirteen . and , has hee not good reason ? since neither can scripture alone recommend it self to an unbeleever to bee of god's enditing if it bee found by him to bee significative of irreconcileable contradictions , and so needs the churches authority to ascertain it to bee such ; nor can wee have any security such contradictions might not bee found in the main points of faith themselves , did not the churches faith writ in her heart keep the letter of it safe from such enormous corruptions . yet you must have your jest , and to bring it in you constantly mistake on set purpose ; asking ( p. . ) if the infallibility of the church can make thirteen fourteen : notwithstanding you say p. . this difficulty has been sufficiently satisfy'd by commentators : i suppose therefore you judge those commentators have sufficiently satisfy'd you that thirteen are fourteen : any body can sufficiently satisfy any difficulty with you , provided the church and her infallibility have no hand in it . on this occasion i beseech you , sir , give mee leave to ask you what commentator has reconcild that most evident contradiction in your translation of the scripture . look in your psalms put in the book of common-prayer , and there ps. , v. . wee have these words ; hee sent darkness and it was dark ; and they were not obedient unto his word but in the same psalm and verse put in the middle of the bible , these : hee sent darkness and made it dark ; and they rebelled not against his word the former place sayes they were not obedient the latter they were obedient . i suppose you conceit ( mistaking the whole thing ) your church without infallibility can reconcile those things , which ours even with infallibility is at a horrible puzzle with . mr. cressy's turn is next ; against whom you have many a fling , but one especially p. . because hee sayes schism is impossible in our church . which you call absurd and ludicrous ; you tell him hee cannot deny but 't is possible for men to break from our communion : but that the subtility of it lies here that therfore schism is impossible in our church , because so soon as a man is a schismatick hee is out of it . this done , you ask . and is it not as impossible in the church of england ? sir , i must tell you your whole book in a manner is compounded of putting tricks upon your adversaries ; that is putting their sayings upon such accounts they never intended , & then impugning your own fictions . 't is not on the impossibility of any going out of us , nor meerly because whenany one is out of our church , hee is not in it , wee ground the necessity of our churches unity ; but in this that her nature and constitution is so fram'd that shee can admit no division in her bowells , but keeps her self distinguisht from aliens . if any one recede from faith it must bee by not hearing the present churches living voice teaching him points which the knowledge practice and expressions of the teachers determins and make evident what they are ; whence his disbeleef , if exprest , is an evident matter of fact which is most apt to make a plain distinction between the disbeleever and the beleevers , and an evidence beyond cavill for the church governours to proceed upon . this done ( as likewise in the case of high disobedience against church-laws , or governours ) shee excommunicates , that is solemnly separates the schismaticall offender from the obedient faithfull ; hence those faithfull look upon him as a rebell or outlaw or ( as our saviour expresses ) as a heathen or , publican ; no church-officer admits him to sacraments but upon his pennance and satisfaction , nor any son of the church will communicate with him in sacred duties . pray you , sir , is this the temper of your church of england ? your rule is the letter of scripture as conceiv'd significative of gods word , and this to private understandings . again you say all necessary points of faith are plain in it , nay that nothing is fundamentally necessary but what is plain there . hence all that hold the letter to bee plainly expressive of gods sence and intend to hold to what they conceive plain there , whether socinians , anabaptists , independents or whatever other faction , all hold to your rule of faith , and so are all protestants . for , if you would ty any of these to any determinable points , you force them from the rule of faith , scripture as seeming plain to them , and would instead thereof bring them to a reliance on your judgement . and if you would punish them for not doing it , you cannot evidence their fault by way of matter of fact , that so you may proceed upon it ; for , as long as they profess their intention to hold to what seems plain to them in scripture , and that your text seems less plain to them there than their own , you ought not to proceed against them ecclesiastically without disannulling your avowed rule of faith. and your carriage executes accordingly neither using church-discipline against them for tenets , nor yet for denying or disobeying your goverment , episcopacy , though held by you divinely instituted : when did you put any distinction by any solemn ecclesiastical declaration between an anabaptist , presbyterian , socinian &c. and your selves ? when did you excommunicate them & warn the purer protestants by any publick ecclesiasticall act not to joyn with them in sacred offices , but to look upon them as aliens ? might not any of them come to receive the communion , if hee would ? or has any discipline past upon him to debar him from being admitted ? none that wee see . your party then in indeed no ecclesiasticall body , cohering by unity of tenets or government , but a medly rather consisting of men of any tenet almost , and so bears division , disunion and schism , that is , the formal cause of non-entity of a church , in it's very bowells . these two flams of yours , are , sir , the favours you have done my friends ; and i can onely tell you in a country complement , i thank you as much for them , as if you had done them to my self . seeing your reason begin to play it's part bravely in the following part of your book , i thought i had done my duty of thanking : but i percieve one main engin your reason made use of was to make mee perpetually contradict my self . and this you perform'd by singling a few words out of my book from their fellows , introducing them in other circumstances , and so almost in every citation falsifying my intentions ; and this purposely , as will bee seen by this that you practis'd designe and artifice in bringing it about . this obliges mee , in stead of making an end , to return back ; and to show how sincerly you have us'd mee in almost all your citations . i omit your false pretence that i mean't to define , contrary to my express words . you tell your reader p. . that if any presume to say this book , ( scripture ) depends not on tradition for it's sence , then the most scurrilous language is not bad enough ; then are those sacred writings but ink variously figur'd in a book , quoting for those words app. th . p. . but if wee look there , not a word is there found of it's depending or not depending on tradition for it's sence nor of making that the cause why i us'd those words you object , & cite for it ; but onely that whereas my lord of downs sayes his faith has for its object the scriptures , i tell him that since he means not by the word scripture any determinate sence ( which is the formall parts of words ) hee must mean the characters or ink thus figur'd in a book , as is evident ; there being nothing imaginable in them besides the matter and the form which , every schollar knows , compound the thing . this being then the plain tenour of my discourse there , and not the least word of tradition sencing scripture . whatever the truth of the thing is , 't is evident you have abus'd my words as found in the place you cite . my citation p. . which abstracts from what security wee can have of those parts of scripture which concern not faith , you will needs restrain to signifie no security at all either of letter or sence : which is neither found in my words nor meaning . how you have abus'd my words [ to avoid calumny with the vulgar ] cited by you p. . as also the former of those cited p. . i have already shown § . , and . p. . you quote my words , 't is certain the apostles taught the same doctrine they writ , whence you infer they writ the same doctrine they taught . which your introducing discourse would make to signifie an equality of extent in writing and tradition , by saying i grant this doctrine ( which signifies there the first deliver'd doctrine ) was afterwards by the apostles committed to writing . whereas , whoever reads my th . cor. will see i can onely mean by the word same doctrine , a not-different doctrine . whatever the truth of the point is , this shows you have an habituall imperfection not to let the words you cite signifie as the authour evidently meant them , but you must bee scruing them to serve your own turn . you quote mee p. . to say , that primitive antiquity learn'd their faith by another method a long time before many of those books were universally spread amongst the vulgar . the summe of your answer is , that when the apostles who did miracles were dead , writing then became needfull : but that in those circumstances orall tradition was a sufficient way of conveying a doctrine . what i note is that you ended your citation at the words [ before those books were universally spread amongst the vulgar ] but had you added what follow'd immediately to compleat that period , [ much less the catalogue collected and acknowledged ] you had been put to confess too that tradition was a sufficient way for diverse ages after the apostles were dead , which had been little favourable to your tenet . i complain then that by citing mee by halves , as you do frequently , you slip the answering better half of my arguments ; and , here particularly , as appears by the words [ much less ] that part in which i put the most force . p. . you put mee to say expresly that tradition is the best way imaginable to convey down such laws to us . now if by the word such , you onely meant such as it concerns every man to bee skilfull in , and had so exprest it , you had done well , for 't is my position ; but you had brought an ill-resembling instance of magna charta , and make mee seem to allow your instance , and to affirm tradition is the best way to bring down magna charta , as appears by your words . mr. s. saith expresly it is ; but how truly i appeal to the experience , and the wisedome of our law-givers who seem to think otherwise ; making my word such , mean such as magna charta , which is far from my meaning : in regard i judge not magna charta a thing in which 't is every man's particular concern to bee skilfull in , but lawyers onely whom others trust ; few in england , but they being thoroughly acquainted with the laws found there . take your own liberty , sir , in making parallells ( 't is my advantage you should , you pick out such aukward ones ) but when you have made them , do not disingenuously put them upon mee , and quote mee to say them expresly . thus you use my words , why may not hee mistrust his own eyes , which ( p. , and . ) were apply'd by mee to the business of mistaking or not mistaking in transcribing perfectly a whole book or correcting the press , in which , we daily experience miscarriage ; but you apply these words to your own senceless parallell of seeing the city of rome p. , and then by such an application endeavour to make them seem ridiculous , as they must needs for you had discourst ridiculously , and by making them part of your discourse , and not taking them as any part of mine , had made them so too . i could instance in many others of this nature , but i am too long already . p. . being to state the point , you alledge my words sure-footing p. . that the protestants cannot by [ scriptures ] mean the sence of them , but the book , that is , such or such characters not yet senc't or interpreted . and there you stop ; my immediately following words explaining my meaning are these : that is , such and such characters in a book with their aptness to signifie to them assuredly god's mind , or ascertain them of their faith. and this explication you omit ; which had been nothing had you not made an ill use of that omission ; but your cavills afterwards , and the loud out-cries in your book in many places , of a senceless book , my ignorance of your tenet , & what not , are all grounded upon your own fly omitting those words in which i exprest your tenet to bee , that those characters were significative of your faith ; & i wonder what else you would have a rule of faith to bee but a mean's to signifie to you god's sence , or the faith christ taught those inspir'd writers . it was one of my requests in my letter that wee might agree to acknowledge what was truth in one another's books ; but you use all the arts insincerity can suggest to deprave , wrest or diminish my words , rather than i should appear to speak reason in any thing . all must bee monstrous in your adversary when your pregnant fancy and dextrous pencil come to delineate it ; which shews indeed much crafty wit , but i doubt the reader will think it argues not too much honesty . i affirm'd sure-footing p. . that the numerous comments writ upon the scripture and the infinite disputes about the sence of it even in most concerning points , as in that of christ's divinity beat it out so plain to us that this ( to wit to find out a certain sence of scripture by their interpretation ) is not the task of the vulgar , that 't is perfect phrenzy to deny it , which you quote p. . and diverse other places , leaving out still my words and sence that [ this is not the task of the vulgar ; ] ( upon which that whole § proceeds ) and impugning it accordingly : see your own words p. . making mee say the protestants cannot bee certain of the true sence of it , as if protestants and vulgar were the same notion : also p. . hee tells us ( say you ) the numerous comments upon scripture are an evidence that no man can bee certain of the true sence of it . this improves it into a very ample falsification , for the word [ no man ] excludes all catholikes too , and indeed all the world , however proceeding to interpret it ; whereas i onely engage in the place cited against the vulgar . and , after you have ended you confute all built on your own omission of those important words , you single out ( after your old fashion ) two or three of my words [ 't is perfect phrenzy to deny it ] and call it , a hot phrase ; whereas 't is very luke-warm taken in the occasion i spoke it ; namely that the vulgar could not bee certain of the right interpretation of scripture , since even learned commentators so strangely differ'd about it . how you will clear your self of this kind insincerity without casting a mist before men's eyes , that they cannot read right , i cannot in your behalf imagin . p. , you quote mee twice as endeavouring to prove that men may safely rely on a generall and uncontroll'd tradition . which , though you pretend not my words , yet i count it an injury to impose upon mee such a sence . uncontroll'd joyn'd to tradition is such another epithet as sufficient joyn'd by you to certainty . i , who contend for the absolute certainty of faith , would say uncontrollable , not uncontroll'd ; for a thing may be uncontroll'd meerly because it had the good fortune that none had occasion to look into it , and so controll it : whereas nothing can bee uncontrollable but by virtue of it's grounds 't is built on , preserving it from a possibility of ever being controll'd . your intent in producing those two citations from mee is as you declare it p. . is to show the unhappiness of my demonstrations , that in order to demonstrate the uncertainty of books and writings must suppose all those principles to bee uncertain which ( i ) take to bee self-evident and unquestionable when i am to demonstrate the infallibility of orall tradition . a hard case ! yet it will bee harder to come of , for you never are more powerfull than when you use your wit to make authours fall out with one another , and unnaturall mee with my self . but to the point : in the first citation i say , that the common course of humane conversation makes it a madness not to beleeve great multitudes of knowers , — &c. but i add sure-footing p. . what you omit , that in the way of tradition all deliverers or immediate forefathers are knowers . — all the knowledge requisit being of what they were taught and practic 't accordingly all their lives . i beseech you , sir , are those great multitudes of immediate forefathers knowers when they deliver down a book for a right one ; that is , do they all know the translation is right made , the copy right printed or written , and all the perquisits which are needfull that they may bee truly said to know this book is rightly qualify'd . you see then how far i am from contradicting my self , unless you show that i hold all recommenders or accepters of a book to bee knowers , as they are of the practicall doctrine they were bred and brought up to , which i neither do , nor can with any sence profess . the reader also will see that the stratagem by virtue of which you made mee contradict my self , was your omitting those words of mine which made the contrary clear . the next place you cite p. . from mee to the same purpose , is this , that none but madmen can suspect deceit where such multitudes agree unanimously in a matter of fact. now the words such multitudes , mean all their immediate fore-fathers qualifi'd as knowers , as i exprest myself a little before , which will veryill sute your purpose , in regard the matters of fact employ'd about the delivering a right book , as in translating , transcribing , pointing right &c. of which their sences onely can make them knowers , are so inumerable , and minute , & yet such that very great miscarriages may ensue upon a very little over-sight , that to think all forefathers , can know no fault in any of these interven'd , is such an extravagant conceit , that onely a most obstinate passion could make a rationall soul entertain it . the point is at present that you affect to represent mee to the half part , and by that art you take mee up perpetually before i bee down ; for it is not an agreement in any matter of fact , but in such a one as may bee known by all , in which i place the force of being able to oblige others to assent to their proposalls . you treat mee far worse p. . making mee say that the providence of god is no security against those contingencies the scripture is liable to , because wee cannot bee certain of the divine providence or assistance to his church but by the letter of scripture ; which is to put upon mee a ridiculous argument , making mee infer there is no such assistance , from this , that wee cannot bee certain of it but such a way . whereas common sence tells every one that our certainty being an effect of the thing 's existence , must depend indeed on their existence , in regard we cannot bee certain of what is not ; but the things can exist whether wee bee certain of them or no ; i affirm then and charge upon you that i have no where either such words or sence in my whole book as you with a strange precipitancy ( to say no worse ) affirm p. . that i tell you sure-footing p. . where my discourse onely pretends to show that , who will argue orderly must first bee certain of that on which hee builds his conclusion ere hee asserts the conclusion it self ; this was the tenour of my discourse there which i conceive to bee evident beyond cavill . if i err'd any where 't was in supposing you onely took from scripture that god assisted his church in preserving a right copy of scripture and therefore argu'd preposterously if you inferr'd . god has a providence over his church in preserving right scripture , therefore 't is preserv'd right . but this i spoke onely with an if , and besides had good grounds for it : for i conceiv'd there being but two wayes to know this , by revelation which you profess to have onely by way of scripture ; and by naturall reason , whence you could not have it : for however meer nature might teach it's exact followers there was a god , and that hee had providence over his creatures , ( as it taught socrates , seneca and such like ) yet i remember not that wee have any ground to say meer nature inform'd any , god had a church , much less that there was no way to provide for her continuance in faith , or deriving his doctrine down in her , but by way of books . hence i concluded and conclude still it must bee either by scripture or no way you can know god has such a kind of providence over his church . you are pleased to tell your reader p. . that this principle [ that in matters of religion a man cannot bee reasonably satisfy'd with any thing less than that infallible assurance which is wrought by demonstration ] , is the main pillar of mr. s' s. book ; whereas i assure you , sir , the last part of the kind slur you put upon mee , [ which is wrought by demonstration ] was never either my words nor sence ; neither pillar nor the least part of sure-footing : wherefore , as you put those words in a different letter for mine , so you had done well to have put down the place too where those words were found ; which you wisely omitted . if i had affirm'd that that assurance which grounds faith must bee wrought by demonstration , how should i pretend the vulgar can bee sav'd who are manifestly incapable of demonstration , as i also frequently acknowledge . understand then my tenet at length , which you ought to have done e're you begun to write against it ; but that to use your own words you thought it an absurd and ridiculous study to bend your brains to read my book as you would do euclid p. . which yet is no more but to consider attentively my principles and my consequences . my tenet is that all the faithfull have , and those who seek after faith may have , and those who seek after faith may have assurance of their faith wrought in them by practicall self-evidence , in the same naturall manner , but with far better reason , than they beleeve there was a henry the th . and , that 't is onely schollars that go about to demonstrate what the faithfull know , but , for want of study or reflexion on their own thoughts and on the causes and manners with which they were so assur'd , are ignorant how to make it out . i beseech you , sir , repress this overflowing of kindness in giving mee so many advantages against you , and take a little pains to understand what i say , nor ( to borrow your elegant expression p. . ) suffer your self to bee so demurely discharged of a study so necessary and so honorable . i had affirm'd in my letter to my answerer p. th . that it was a civill piece of atheistry to say faith is possible to bee false for any thing wee know , or that wee have onely probability for our faith ; and you kindly tell us p. . that what m. s. calls a civill piece of atheistry is advanc't in most express terms by his best friends . sir , i account rushworths dialogues my best friend , and i perceive you abuse the preface of it notoriously , which was wholly design'd to evince the contrary positions ; citing the author of it p. . to say that such a certainty as makes the cause alwayes work the same effect though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherwise , ought absolutely to bee reckon'd in the degree of true certainty , whereas hee only tells us there p. . that by morall certainty [ some understood ] such a certainty as made your cause alwayes work the same effect ; whom a little after hee reprehends for undervaluing this for morall certainty , which is true ( or physicall ) certainty ; putting an instance of the certainty hee has that hee shall not repeat in order the same words hee spoke this last year ; and yet ( sayes hee ) these men will say , i am onely morally certain of it . your injury then lyes here , that by leaving out the words at the beginning of the citation by morall certainty [ some understood ] such a certainty &c. you make him say what hee evidently makes others say , and condemns them for so saying ; for hee is far from abetting their tenet tha a reall possibility to bee otherwise makes a true certainty ; but asserts that to bee truly certain which they mistook for possible to bee otherwise or morally certain ; which is the plain tenour of his discourse , as it is the whole scope of that preface to force the direct contrary position to what you would so disingenuously impose upon him . the two next citations are onely mistaken ; for , 't is one thing to say what men would doe , did they love heaven as they ought , or had they no interest in their souls , another to ask what means is most efficacious to beget a hearty love of heaven in their souls ; the prudentialness of their obligation , in case of a higher probability onely , joyn'd with their undervalue of heaven was enough to make them miscarry ; but 't is a question whether 't was enough to elevate them sufficiently amidst the temptations of our three spirituall enemies , to heavenly love so as to save them ; or if they bee very speculative , against the temptations of fancy and the seeming impossibility of the mysteries . also 't is another thing to ask what men should do if there were no infallibility , or ( which is all one to them ) if they hold none ; and , whether infallibility or an absolute impossibility faith should bee otherwise , bee not incomparably the best for mankind , and so , laid by god who ever does the best for his creatures . as i would not therefore have the protestants renounce all practice of religion because they have not an infallible means of knowing their faith to bee true ; so neither do i doubt , but had they such assurance , their faith would work through charity with far more liveleness and steadiness than either it now does or can do . you abuse what you cite from mee p. . by impugning half the sentence onely ; the other half would have discoverd i spoke not of mans nature according to his morall part , but according as 't is cognoscitive and this chiefly in naturall knowledges imprinted directly by his senses on his soul. represent things truely , and then dispute as much as you will , otherwise you but injure your self and abuse your reader , while you go about with a preposterus courtesy to oblige mee . p. . according to your usuall sincerity you quote rushworth's nephew to say that a few good words are to bee cast in concerning scripture for the satisfaction of indifferent men who have been brought up in this verball and apparent respect of the scripture ; to which you add , who it seems are not yet arriv'd to that degree of catholick piety and fortitude as to endeavour patiently the word of god should bee reviled and slighted . wheras in the place you cite hee onely expresses it would bee a satisfaction to indifferent men , to see the positions one would induce them to embrace , maintainable by scripture . which is so different from the invidious meaning your malice puts upon it , and so innocent and unoffensive in it self , that one who were not well acquainted with you and knew not your temper and over good nature to bee such that you car'd not to undo your self to do your friend a kindnes , would wonder with what conscience you could so wrest and pervert it . p. . you mention my explaining the notion of tradition , which you carp at as tedious ; and yet ( as wee have seen by frequent experience ) all was too little to make you understand it , though i endeavourd there according to my utmost to render it unmistakable . but you mistake it here again , objecting that i instance in set forms , the creed and ten commandments , whereas the apol. for tradition sayes that cannot bee a tradition which is deliver'd in set words . it had been better you had put down that authors own words apol. p. . which are , a tradition ( as wee have explicated it ) being a sence deliver'd &c. for why was it not possible hee and i should explicate it diversly ? but to the point . i speak of tradition or delivery , you and the apology of a tradition or the thing deliver'd , which you confound . now a tradition or point deliver'd being sence , and sence abstracting from my particular manner of expressing it , hee had good reason to say there , that a tradition is a sence settled in the auditor's hearts by hundreds of different expressions explicating the same meaning ; nor do you any where find mee say but that , though the creed and ten commandments bee the shortest expressions of the main points of speculative and practicall christianity , and so most sutable to the young memories i speak of , yet i no where say that forefathers exprest the sences contain'd in them no other way ; or , that they did not deliver them in hundreds of different expressions , according as the manifold variety of occasions and circumstances , accidentally lighting , prompted the fancies of the teachers after a naturall kind of manner to declare themselves . you see , sir , how unfortunate you are still when you would make us contradict our selves or one another ; and the civillest excuse for your perpetuall failings herein is to alledge that you are utterlyignorant of what you would impugn ; and i wish that were the worst . you put upon mee p. . that unless a person to bee converted can demonstrate one pretended rule certain and infallible , the other not , hee hath not found out the rule of faith. i wish you had told us where i say this , for i must disavow it as directly opposit to my doctrine which is that our rule of faith's certainty is practically-self-evident , and known by virtue of an obvious familiar conversation with the nature of things , and , therefore , that persons to bee converted may come to faith without demonstration at all . i may perhaps say that in an assent thus grounded there is found at the bottom what is demonstrable by a learned man , or apt to yeeld matter for a demonstration ; but that those who come to faith must demonstrate or frame demonstrations ( which 't is manifest onely schollers , and good ones too , can do ) is fa from my tenet , however 't is your kindness to put it upon mee , right or wrong . you shall take your choice whether the reader shall think you understand not the tenet you are confuting , or that understanding it you wilfully injure it . you proceed p. . that according to mr. s. reason can never demonstrate that the one is a certain and infallible rule , the other not . that never is a hard word ; and it will seem wonderfull to some readers i should say reason can never demonstrate this , and yet in that very book contend to demonstrate it by reason my self ; nay make that the main scope of my book . but , sir , those readers , know not yet the power of your wit and sincerity , which can make mee say any thing , nay say and unsay as it pleases . yet you quote my express words for it , sure-footing p. . where you say i [ tell you , tradition hath for it's basis man's nature , not according to his intellectualls , because they do but darkly grope in the pursuit of science , &c. ] i deny them , sir , to bee my words or sence ; you have alter'd the whole face and frame of them by putting in the word because , which makes mee discourse as if man's intellectualls could never arrive at evidence nor consequently certainty ; and you keep the reader from knowing the true sence of my words , by curtailing the sentence with an [ &c. ] my words are , not according to his intellectualls , darkly groping in the pursuit of science , by reflected thoughts or speculations , amidst the misty vapours exhal'd by his passion predominant over his rationall will ] which discovers i speak of our intellectualls plac't in such circumstances , or employ'd about such a matter , as our passion or affection is apt to blind and mislead us in it , which wee experience too too often . but do i therefore affirm our understanding can never arrive at science at all , or that our passion exhales vapours to hinder us from seeing the truth of the first proposition in euclid ; or was it ever heard that any man was transported so by his passion as to deny there was a henry the th ? or can any one out of passion bee ignorant of or forget what is inculcated into his sences almost every day , which naturall knowledge , i there make the basis of tradition ? pray , sir , reflect on my words once more and on the tenour of my discourse , and you shall see it onely says , that tradition has for it's basis man's nature , not according to his morall part , which is of it self pervertible , nor yet his intellectualls as subject to his moralls , but on naturall knowledges imprinted by direct sensations , not subject at all to his will , but necessary and inevitable : and when you have done this , you will easily see how you injure mee , though i expect not from you any acknowledgment of it . you commit those faults too often to concern your self in such a trifle as any handsome satisfaction . your next citation p. . layes on load . 't is taken out of my d . appendix p. . my whole discourse there is to show how reason behaves her self in finding out the authority shee is to rely on that this is god's sence or faith , and how in the points of faith themselves . concerning the former i discourse there § . . and have these expressions , that no authority deserves assent farther than true reason gives it to deserve ; that the church's authority is found by my reason to bee certain ; that 't is perfectly rationall to beleeve the church assuring mee the divine authority is engag'd for such and such points ; that gods and the church's authority as objects imprinting a conceit of themselves in my mind as they are in themselves , oblig'd my reason to conclude and my iudgment to hold them such as they were ; nor have i the least expression of diffidence of naturall reason's certifying mee perfectly of the ground of my faith , which can no wayes bee done by acts of reflected reason , ( which i there speak of ) but by demonstrating it . after this § . . i come to discourse how differently reason bears her self in order to the points of faith or the mysteries themselves . hereupon i have these words . p. . reason acts now much differently than formerly . before i came at faith shee acted about her own objects , motives or maxims by which shee scan'd the autho rities wee spoke of ; but in acts of faith shee hath nothing to do with the objects of those acts , or points of faith. then follow immediately the words you cite , shee is like a dim-sighted man ; who us'd his reason to find a trusty friend to lead him in the twy-light , and then rely'd on his guidance rationally without using his own reason at all about the way it self . which most plainly signifies , that , as a dim-sighted man cannot use his reason about the way , for that requir'd , it should well affect his senses , and imprint it's right notion there , ( which it did not , ) but yet could use his reason about chusing a trusty friend to guide him , for this depended not on his dim-sight , but the converse and negotiation with his neighbours and relations which hee had been inur'd to , and so was capable to wield and manage such a discourse : so our reason , dim-sighted in the mysteries of faith in which neither senses nor maxims of human science had given her light enough , could not employ her talent of discoursing evidently and scientifically to conclude the points of faith themselves ; but yet was by motives and maxims within her own sphere , enabled to scan the nature of authorities , and find out on which as on a trusty friend shee might safely rely . this , sir , is evidently my discourse , from whence you will needs force mee to say reason is dim-sighted about the authority wee come to faith by or the rule of faith. now my whole discourse in that very place aiming at the direct contrary , and you leaving out the immediately foregoing words which clearly discover'd it , i hope you will not take it ill , sir , if i tell you i fear any sincere examiner of it will judge , that though you hold plain-dealing a jewell , yet you would not bee willing to go to too much cost for it . especially when he reflects that you build better half your confutation in your book on such kind of willing mistakes , and hope to blind it and make it take by sophister-like quibbles , flouts and jeers with which you use to sound your own triumph . i expected , sweet sir , some first principles of your discourse , and i see now you intend those artifices for such ; none else have i met with , nor do you build on any thing so much as these ; but , one of these laid for a ground , you run on with such a carreer as if you would overthrow all the sence and reason that ever comes in your way . you tell mee p. . by a parallell discourse to mine against my lord of downs that my demonstrations are none unless i vouch some particularity in my method above what 's in others , which p. . you say you remember not i have done any where . it seems you read my transition not with any sober intent to understand it and speak solidly to it , but onely to carp at it , and break jests upon it . have you so soon forgot the pleasant mood it put you into p. , and . i contest then that the method i there declare my self to pursue is particular above what i ever observ'd in any of your controvertists ; not that they want better parts to lay it , but because they want a good cause to bear it , and give them leave to follow it . i declare also that i hold that method sufficient to demonstrate by , though i pretend it not the exactest than can bee made . as for those great men whom you alledge to differ in demonstrations , ( charles thynn i leave to bear you company , you are both such merry blades ) i doubt not but , were the business well examin'd , their differences spring from not attending heedfully to the method of concluding ; and that no miscarriage could ensue in any discourse , were the way of discoursing perfectly laid , agreed to , and exactly follow'd ; nay that those few differences amongst geometricians arise from the same defect ; as , were it seasonable , i could show particularly ( with the help of a friend , you must think ) in that famous one about angulus contingentiae . but to our present purpose ; meethinks , sir , you may remember , a thing call'd a letter to my answerer , where i endeavour'd at least at some means to settle some particularity in our method above what has been practic 't in other controversies formerly , begging you would agree to it that so wee might both follow it ; but you would have none you thank't mee : since then you would not accept it when offer'd , you should not ask for it again when your book is writ and the circumstances of using it past . but perhaps there lies the policy of it ! you end with a glance or two at my self-confidence ? but are you propheticall in this too , sir , that 't is some proud and vain humour in mee , and not rather my assuredness of the truth of my cause , and of the conclusiveness of my method , which makes mee deliver my self undauntedly ? see my letter to my answerer where i have these words p. . by this means it will bee quickly discover'd whether or no you have overthrown my discourse by showing it ill-coherent , and how far 't is faulty : that , if i cannot clear it to bee connected , i may confess my fault and endeavour to amend it . for , however i see my grounds evident , yet i am far from judging my self infallible in drawing my consequences : though i see withall the method i take , will not let me err much ; or , if i do , my errour will bee easily discoverable ; because i go not about to cloud my self in words , but to speak out , as plain as i can , from the nature of the thing . had you a desire to practice the due candour towards mee i should have done to you , you would not have sought occasions to put in upon a personall priding my self in my performances , which i so frequently disown and place all my advantage in my cause and my method . but you are angry i deliver my self so boldly in what i take to bee truth ; i beseech you , sir , is it not naturall for any one who judges hee speaks what 's evident , to express himself fear lesly when hee disputes against an adversary of the truth whose cause hee has espoused ; as , 't is on the contrary for one who judges hee has onely probability for what hee sayes , to speak dis-confidently , and condescendingly , and when hee indeed sneaks not daring to speak out , then to praise himself and his party for modest and moderate men ? you know by experience , sir , ' t is . has there in our late age come out a book more brisk than this of yours , not in asserting , but in scorn , and proud petulancy , and ( which is to bee pittied ) proud of an aiery jest or some gay conceit ? shall i bee bold to tell you , sir , what is self confidence ? to undertake to write a discourse about the ground of faith , without so much as one principle that deserves to bee call'd such to bless himself with ; to lay for grounds all along falsifications of his adversaries meaning and words , and then quibbling , taunting and vapouring as if all the world were his own . lastly , to tell his auditours soberly and sadly out the pulpit all is god's word hee preaches , and press they should beleeve him ; and yet when hee writes against us , confess all hee preaches concerning salvation and the way to it , may possibly bee false ; that is , for any thing hee absolutely knows , hee has not told them one true word all the while . this , sir , i must needs confess , is such a heroick strain of self-confidence that , however it bee familiar and naturall to others , yet i dispair for my part ever to attain it . to bear ones self as holding a thing a demonstration which he judges hee has evidence that 't is such , is a puling and trifling kind of self-conceit ; but to carry it out with the greatest formality in the world as if it were most certain , and yet hold at the same time and profess 't is possible to bee false , that is , may for any thing any man knows , bee shown false to morrow , is a noble and gallant self confidence , and such a one as fears not the face of any man living . p. . you come to examin my demonstrations à priori , and in order to it , my four grounds , which you affirm you will set down in my own words . which intimates you did not do so formerly , though it bee your duty to do it alwayes ; however 't is a kindness which i am bound to thank you for , and as far as i discern you have not faltred in it , of which i here make my hearty acknowledgment . but , sir , may i not fear this particular resolution of yours here to bee sincere springs hence , because in this sect. . where you put down my words , you do not yet go about to apply them to your discourse , and attempt to confute ; which in your next section p. . you endeavour ? i foresee you will bee shrew'dly tempted there , for want of other answer , to break your resolution ; till wee come there then i leave you with my hearty wishes of strength & constancy against that habituall infirmity which so often overcoms all your resolutions of that nature . and wee are now come to your third sect p. . ( the place of the triall of your perseverance ) where you begin your confute ; and contend first that my demonstration would conclude too much viz. as you tell us p. that if it were true , it would bee impossible any christian should turne apostate or heretick , or that any christian should live wickedly . i marry , this were a rare demonstration indeed ! but , how comes my demonstration to bee thus guilty of a plot to make all the world saints , or rather of drawing after it a conclusion so extravagant . by virtue of a direct falsification both of my words and sence , by cogging in a word little in show but very large in sence , namely the monosyllable [ all ] making my principle run thus that the greatest hopes and fear are apply'd to the minds of all christians ; which you put down here in the italick letter , the same you quoted my words in . i beseech you , sir , review my own words put down lately by your self p. . . at what time you made that good resolution , and see if any such word bee there ; but , what 's most materiall is this ; let the reader survey your following discourse which aims to confute mee , and hee will see'tis wholly and solely built on this word all , so that your own falsification is still the first principle , which gives the strength and life to your confutation . what use you make of it may bee seen p. l. . that any christian &c. ib. l. . that any christian should live wickedly l. . that any christian should turn apostate l. . but all christians have those arguments of hopes and fears strongly apply'd . l. ult . 't is necessary all christians . again p. . l. . ( which i desire the reader to note that hee may see how bold you are in your imposing things upon mee ) if these causes bee put in all the faithfull actually causing as ( say you ) mr. s. saith expresly in his grounds ; whereas i assure the reader mr. s. sayes expresly no such thing . but to proceed p. . l. . & . t is impossible there should bee any defection , &c. l. . t is impossible any single christian. p. . it concludes there can bee no hereticks or apostates &c. this , dear sir , you use mee : first you put upon mee other words and meaning , and then overthrow most powerfully not what i said or meant , but what you had counterfeited mee to do ; which victorious way of confuting runs thorough the better half your book . you affirm p. . that i liberally acknowledge in other places this ( to wit , that 't is impossible any single christian should either totally apostatize or fall into heresie ) is a genuine consequence from my principles . surely , sir , your great plot is to have mee thought a direct mad man or frantick ; for never did any man moderately in his wits advance a position and pretend to demonstrate it , which is contrary to the eye sight and frequent experience of the whole world ; nay write a whole chapter as i did sure-footing p. . how heresies come in , and yet maintain in the same book no man can turn heretick that is that no heresy could ever come in . well , but what are those other places which must prove mee a liberal acknowledger of such an unheard of paradox ? you assign four places p. , & . the first you introduce mee thus . hee tells us ( and then you quote my words from sure-footing p. . ) that it exceeds all the power of nature ( abstracting from the cases of madness and violent disease ) to blot the knowledges of this doctrine out of the soul of one single beleevor . i assure you , sir , i tell you no such thing , and that i have neither those words nor sense in my whole book , which makes mee doubt you did not so much as make a resolution here to set down my own words , as you did formerly ; and i wish for your own sake , you did not resolve the contrary . my doctrine is that the knowledges of this ( or christ's ) doctrin , may be blotted , not onely out of the soul of one single beleever , but all beleevers , in case it bee laid there onely opinionatively , or imprinted slightly by a fleeting sermon or wordish discourse , apt to go in at the one ear and out at the other . my words in that place cited are these ? it exceeds all the power of nature ( abstracting from madness and violent disease ) to blot knowledges thus fixt out of the soul of one single believer . and , what mean the words [ thus fixt ] 't is told you in the same p. . in sure-footing , that 't is by so oft repeated sensations ; which ( in the foregoing page , where that discourse begins ) is explained to bee , by impressions upon the senses , not made once but frequently , and in most , many times every day ; and that to make those more express and apt to bee taken notice of , their lives are to bee fram'd by the precepts they hear and conformable examples they see . all this is impli'd in the words [ thus fixt ] as found in that place ; which therefore being very prudent in your generation , you demurely omitted ; else it had seem'd no great paradox ( which 't is your constant endeavour to make mee still speak ) that no one man , unlesse mad or much diseased , can forget what hee daily experiences in others others and practices himself . but , grant all true you pretend to , and that every man must needs have or retain the knowledge of christs doctrin however imprinted ; yet , do i any where say that no man can act against knowledge , and so relinquish tradition , and by that means turn apostate or heretick ? when you find that position in mee , cite it , and let us see it , otherwise barely to alledge mee saying they cannot but know it , argues not i say they must necessarily follow it . the last of those four citations which you bring for this point p. . immediately follows this first ( now discust ) in sure footing p. . whence it concerns the same matter , namely the indelibleness of knowledges thus fixt out of the soul of one single man ; as is evident to him that reads the passage in it's proper place ; though false dealing bee so naturall to you , you assure the reader p. . that in the full career of my bumbast rhetorick i deliver it ( that is , as you express it a little before the impossibility that tradition should fail in any one single person ) roundly without fear or wit ; whereas neither there nor in that whole discourse is there one sylable concerning traditions being adher'd to or not adher'd to , ( this subject beginning the next discourse in these words , all this is well , may some say , in case tradition had been ever held to ) but onely of it's certainty or regulative virtue , founded on naturall knowledges imprinted by frequented sensations in such a manner as is impossible to bee blotted out in one single testifier or part of tradition . i am loath to think or say too hardly of you , sir , onely i say 't is strange a meer chance should produce so constant an effect of perverting my evident sense ( oft times words too ) in each passage . it may bee the reason of your mistaking mee here and in some other passages was this , i minded not rhetorick at all , but onely sense ; & you , ( as became a solid confuter ) minded not the sence at all but onely the rhetorick : which by mee was never aim'd at either there or in any other part of my book : if what i write bee truth , and my expression intelligible , i have my end ; and can without envy permit you to dress up your own falshoods in the gingle of periods and empty flourishes . the second place brought to make mee liberally acknowledge that it follows from my principles no man can possibly relinquish tradition is found in you p. , and . and thus ; since no man can hold contrary to his knowledge , nor doubt of what hee holds , nor change or innovate without knowing hee doth so , it is a manifest impossibility a whole age should fall into an absurdity so inconsistent with the nature of one single man. is here any liberall acknowledgment that no man can desert tradition ? or is there a word here to that purpose ? but onely , that no man can doubt of or hold the contrary ▪ to what hee knows , nor go about so visible an action as innovating without knowing hee does so ; with which yet may well consist that not onely one single man but all mankind may ( for any thing is there said ) knowingly and wilfully desert tradition and turn apostates . i wonder , learned sir , what you are akin to that philosopher who maintain'd snow was black ! you have so admirable a faculty of identifying the most disparate nay contrary notions ; and by a knack of placing things in false lights , make even propositions which signifie the self-same , become perfect contradictions . the third place of mine , which you say must make mee liberally acknowledge it a genuine consequence from my principles that 't is impossible one single man should relinquish tradition , is cited by you p. . from sure-footing p. . that it is perhaps impossible for one single man to attempt to deceive posterity , to which you add in another letter [ by renouncing tradition ] . it had been better in such nice points to put down my own words , especially when you put them in a different letter . mine are , 't is perhaps impossible that they should mislead posterity in what themselves conceit to bee true ; which is different from the words and sense you represent for mine ; for many weak persons by sophistry or fine words pretended from scripture and baptiz'd god's word , may bee inveigled to conceit that tradition is false ; in which case should they renounce tradition , yet they would not therefore mislead posterity from what they conceit true ; which is all i there say or undertake for . but , the main is , you represent mee to say , 't is perhaps impossible in one single man ; which reaches any man whether good or bad ; whereas my discourse there proceeds upon good and holy men onely . it begins thus p. . for , supposing sanctity in the church , that is , that multitudes in it make heaven their first love — had those fathers , ( that is those holy men ) misled posterity , &c. and then follow some of the words you cite , i mean all of them that are mine . this being so , bee judge your self , sir , whether ( bating you the perhaps , and speaking absolutely ) it bee not impossible for one good and holy man to mislead posterity in what he conceits to be true ; and whether it may not consist well enough with this branch of my discourse , that great multitudes may turn bad , that is , chuse some false good for their last end ; and then , out of affection to that , disregard what 's true , what 's false , and mislead their children contrary to their own knowledge . you say p. . that the onely thing i offer in that discourse to prevent this objection is this sure-footing . p. . 't is not to bee expected but some contingencies should have place where a whole species in a manner is to bee wrought upon , &c. and , had there been no more , mee thinks it might have made you wary to challenge mee with the direct contrary , had you not resolv'd to lay the necessity of my contradicting my self in every passage for one of your first principles to confute mee with . but i offer'd far more and more obvious preventions than that . see the immediate conclusion from my grounds put down by your self p. . which one would think should inform you best what is the most genuine consequence from the same principles ; this put , it follows as certainly that a great number or body of the first beleevers , and after-faithful in each age , would continue to hold themselves , and teach their children as themselves had been taught , that is , would follow and stick to tradition , &c. does a great number or body signifie all , not one excepted , which you falsly put upon mee ? how disingenuous a proceeding is this ; to perswade your reader those are not my consequences from my principles which i make my self , but those which you make for mee ? and how do you make them ? by perverting constantly my words and sense . again , you know i had writ a discourse , declaring how heresies came to bee introduc't , and therefore one would think any sober confuter that were not bent upon cavill , ere hee had challeng'd mee to hold that no one man could possibly turn heretick , that is , that no heresie could possibly come in , should have look't first in that place to see how and by what means i made heresies actually come in . but you were resolv'd before-hand what to do ; that is , to make mee speak contradictions , and so it was not your interest to see it or take notice of it . otherwise , there you had seen mee prevent all the imputations which you by virtue of your forg'd monosyllable [ all ] had put upon mee . see sure-footing , p. . we will reflect how an heresie is first bred . wee must look then on christs church not onely as on a congregation , having in their hearts those most powerful motives — able of their own nature to carry each single heart possest by them , — but as on the perfectest form of a common-wealth , having within her self government and officers to take care all those motives bee actually apply'd as much as may bee to the subject laity ; and that all the sons of the church , &c. — notwithstanding , it happens sometimes that , because 't is impossible the perfection of discipline should extend it self in so vast a multitude to every particular , some one or few persons by neglect of applying christian motives to their souls , fall into extravagancies , &c. — and — if governours bee not vigilant and prudent , draw other curious or passionate men into the same faction with themselves , which words would have clearly shown you that , for want of due application , ( which was one of the requisites my demonstrations went upon ) the cause fell short of producing its effect of adhering to tradition . and this you might have seen neerer hand , namely , in the foregoing discourse , the very same which pretended to demonstrate ; where , speaking of the application of the cause to the patient p. . . . i end thus : in a word , christianity urg'd to execution , gives its followers a new life , and a new nature ; than which a neerer application cannot bee imagin'd . so that you see i make account it's application depends upon it's being urg'd to execution ; and what is it that urges things to execution , but government and disciplin ? i wish , sir , when you are to confute a rational discourse , you would not stand running after butter-flies , and catching by the way childishly at this little word , and the other little word , to play upon them jestingly ; but have patience to read it thorough , and take the whole substance of it into your head , and so endeavour to speak to it solidly . this is the way to benefit your readers , ( to whom you owe this duty ) nay a far better to credit your self with understanding men , than all those petty tricks of impertinent wit , and ironical expressions , which you so passionately dote upon . i am heartily weary of so illiberal a task as to spend ink and paper , much less time , in discovering mens defects ; and i assure you , sir , i am very sorry your carriage made it necessary ; whereupon , though i see much rubbish of this nature behind , and have overslipt too very much , yet i should have ended , did not i find my self highly concern'd to defend one assertion of mine , than which you ( who use no hot phrases , but are all civility and sweetness ) say p. . nothing can be more impudent ; i humbly thank you , sir. this most impudent position is this , that sure-footing , p. . being to meet with the objection , that there have been many hereticks or deserters of tradition , i say , if wee look into histories for experience of what has past in the world since the first planting of christianity , wee shall find far more particulars fail in propagating their kind than their faith . now , sir , if this bee prov'd not at all impudent , which you judge most impudent , i hope the rest , which you judge less impudent , may easily pass for blameless . let 's to work then , and because 't is your business as well as mine , i beseech you lend mee your thoughts to go along with mine from one end of the th . discourse in sure-footing to the other , company may do much in making them attentive ; otherwise , i see plainly they will stand loitering and gazing by the way at this odd word , or the inelegancy of that phrase , or noting some passages that may bee prettily mistaken and make excellent good sport ; by which means you who as you say p. . are apt to unbend your brains without bidding , will hardly ever bee drawn to go forwards with a deliberate pace half the way . in the said discourse then p. . you see i design to clear an objection of my own which i conceiv'd obvious , namely that there have been actually many hereticks or deserters of tradition . i make my way to it p. . by asserting that the way of tradition is as efficaciously establisht in the very grain of mans nature as what seems most naturall , the propagation of their kind : hence i come at last to that most impudent assertion that more have faild in propagating their kind than their faith. proceeding to proove it , i show p. . how heresy , or a failing to propagate faith , happens ; and , i allow p. . that it must bee perform'd by deserting tradition , and chusing ( at least for a show ) another rule , that so they may have occasion to break from the former church . but i affirm withall p. . § . . that assoon as the breach is sufficienly made , and the novellists begin to bee shap't into a body , whatever for a show they still would seem to keep to , yet that they presently desert the new rule they had taken up , and the naturall way of tradition again recovers it self ; that , the reformers themselves make use of it to keep their company together ; that , children are taught they are to beleeve their pastors and fathers even in interpreting scripture ; that the first reformers punish them if they break from their body , and hold not to the sence of scripture they give them . and hence i conclude p. . that the number of the actuall deserters of the naturall way of tradition have been but few , to wit , the first revolters that the descendents of these revolters follow'd the way of tradition , however misplac't ; then i added some considerations for grounds to ballance the number of failers in propagation with the number of those who faild in tradition ; and as reasons why i concluded this number less : but you never use to speak to my reasons ; onely you mistake my discourse and my conclusion to mean not onely the first breakers , but their descendents too , which i make account return naturally to the traditionary way ; then you denie and impugn like a learned logician , the conclusion it self , amplify strangely upon your own mistake of it , instancing in all the countries almost east , west , north and south ; triumph mightily , and would have mee show you a whole nation that refus'd to marry : as if my conclusion could not bee true , unless such a rare sight were show'd you all at a clap . e're i come closer to the proof of my assertion i foresee i am to make good first that even the deserters of tradition , when they think themselves sufficiently enfranchiz'd from the disciplin of the former church and that their followers settle into a kind of body under them , bring in again the way of tradition , or rather indeed permit nature to work both in the new brood that grow up under those fathers who had lately deserted tradition , and in those deserters themselves : nothing being more naturall than both for the fathers , elders or governours , to desire and even expect the children , posterity and subjects should follow their judgments , and not to make themselves wiser than their betters ; nor for the descendents and young ones credulously to beleeve those whom they look't upon ever with an awe and respect , and to permit their lives to bee fram'd by their conduct . i affirm then that even in all those sects that have faln from the catholick church , whether protestants , lutherans , presbyterians , or whatever else they bee that pretend to hold to scripture , the generality if not all are continu'd to the former body or immediately foregoing generation by tradition , and not by virtue of scripture evidence uniting their understandings . for what a wild conceit it is to imagin that the children throughout a whole kingdom of lutherans for example , should still light to interpret scripture just as did their forefather lutherans and thence unanimously hold to the lutheran profession ? and the same in protestants , presbyterians , arians , pelagians . and the like may bee said in some sort even of turks and heathens , that 't is not the virtue of any motive that they go upon which keeps up a succession of men of the same tenet , but the naturall force of education at first and custome afterwards ; which wee experience daily to have so strange a power , that the most evident arguments are scarce able to wean persons , otherwise very rationall , from the most absurd and weakly grounded prejudices ; and that to root out judgments thus planted from their souls , seems as violently to shock and strain nature in them as if one went about to tear a limb from their body . if it bee acknowledged then , as it must , that education has such an incomparable force in preserving an unanimousness between foregoers and posterity , and education consists in making the descendents think & act as did their forefathers , wee shall discover that education hath in it the very nature of tradition ; and consequently , that 't is by virtue of tradition any sect continues the same ; which devolves into this , that , therefore , as soon as any sect is form'd it returns or slides back ( if it continues ) naturally into the way of tradition . i am afraid , sir , by this time you are ready to object ( for 't is your way , out of an over-zealous affection to find absurdities in your adversary , to catch at any thing that seems so at first sight without maturely weighing it ) that by this means i make all protestants , quakers , nay turks and heathens too of our religion , by making them follow our rule of faith , tradition ; and you have a little to that purpose p. . and elsewhere much more if i remember right . but , sir , i shall undeceive you easily , by distinguishing between tradition taken at large , or as i call it sure-footing p. . the natural way of tradition , and christian tradition . that has the abetment , and concern of many natural ties to make it follow'd , and in publick and universally-concerning matters of fact , it layes a kind of force upon man's nature , as in the existence of william the conquerour , mahomet , alexander , &c. this has , besides , supernatural assistances of the holy ghost , to strengthen the greatest force of nature . but to omit other differences , what concerns us most at present , is , that this pretends to bee an uninterrupted derivation from christ , whence 't is call'd christian tradition ; whereas any other , for example yours in following your fore-fathers , can pretend uninterruptedness no farther than your first reformer ; whose immediate ancestors being catholik , your chain is broke , or at an end ; whence , for the same reason , this short-lin'd tradition ought to be called his , ( for example the lutheran ) and not christian tradition . the more therefore you , or any other adhere to any other tradition , so much farther you recede from , and are more obstinate against christian tradition ; since , doing so , you hold more firmly to that which was a renouncing the other . these rubs remov'd , wee advance to our point , which is to examin whether , in likelihood , more particulars have fail'd propagating their kind than their faith. to do this the shorter and clearer wee will pitch upon one instance which your self mention , namely , of the vast multitudes which since luther , in germany , denmark , sueden , england , scotland , ireland , &c. have renounc't the roman-catholik faith. and , since by our former discourse and indeed common sense , none in any of those countries were actual deserters of tradition ( by which i mean catholik or christian tradition ) but those who once held it , which their descendents did not , but either follow'd tradition at large , or their tradition , that is the tradition of what these deserters educated them to , hence wee are to exclude all the innumerable descendents from those actuall deserters , as persons unconcern'd at all in my discourse , my express words ever excluding them . and , because those deserters began not all with luther , but some fell . some . years after him , i will put my self upon the disadvantage to put them all to be fal'n sooner , to wit , about . years after luther : it being all one to our case , for no more could fall but all those that actually then did fall ( in regard wee allow their descendents to continue their fathers steps ) though wee put them to fall all at once . imagin then that in the year . all were fall'n that did fall either then , before , ( i mean , before that year , since luther ) and after that time ; what proportion may wee conceive they might bear to all catholikes then living whether in the greek or roman church , whether in those parts of the world or america , whose conversion was then well begun ? i conjecture wee should be very liberall to grant they equall'd one third ( that is were the fourth ) part of those who were found living , in the year assign'd and adhering to tradition . this lai'd , let us consider next how many wee may conceive to have fail'd in that year and ever since that is for . years in propagating their kind . and first wee will take a view of those who die by naturall deaths or casualties , before they enter into the ordinary circumstance of propagation , marriage ; and yet conduc't , in their proportion , to the instilling faith into those they converst with . for , assoon as any arrive to that pitch of age as to express themselves christianly in their language and behaviour , 't is evident they connaturally insinuate into others of an inferiour pitch they converse with , to their slender degree , the same things they hold and practise ; and so are truly parts of the church essential as delivering , or parts of tradition ; and , though wee might begin much sooner to reckon them such , yet wee will to avoid dispute take them from the age of . to . before which time if any marry , there are as many that marry later , and if this be not enough to ballance it to an equality wee will allow all lay-people that live unmarry'd , and all that marry and yet die before they have children or never have any , into the bargain . those then between the age of . and . reckoning the whole time of man's life . years , are the th . part of mankind that were found living in our age. putting then all the present livers in that age to die in the year wee pitch't upon ( that so wee may for clearness reduce our discourse to the same determinate compass of time ) wee may well put the th . part of mankind living in that year to die between . and . that is , to die without conducing to propagate their kind , though they contribute to propagate their faith ; and , if this number bee thought too great , because of the healthfulness of that age , wee will account it but a tenth part , though in truth it deserves to bee held rather an th . or th . because of the numerousness of that decad in comparison of the persons found living in those decads , beginning from the th . th . and the th . year , which are very few . certain then 't is according to our best morall estimation a tenth part of mankind within that prefixt year die ( i mean a tenth part of those who do then die ) who have had a hand in propagating faith and not their kind . next , let us multiply that tenths part by the number of the years elaps't since , that is , from the year . that is for . years , and 't is plain that wee shall have . tenths , that is near . times as many as liv'd in that whole year . wherefore , the actuall deserters of tradition reaching but to one th . of the mankind that liv'd in that year as was shown above , it follows that the number of those since luther , who dy'd without propagating their kind amounts to . times thirteen times , that is , above . times more than those who actually deserted tradition since that time or those who fail'd to propagate their faith. again , let us weigh the multitudes found in any one year to belong to the whole ecclesiasticall body of the catholik church , whereever extended , with the innumerable companies of all the several religious orders of men and women with their lay-attendants , and consider what proportion they may be held to bear to the whole body of the church living in the same year , and so , to those that die in that year : that wee may not exceed , wee will allot them to take up but a four hundreth part of the church ; nay ( that wee may no more be troubled with mr. tillotsons uncharitable railery p. . . ) wee will allow them to amount but to a fivehundreth part of those who liv'd or dy'd in that year wee pitcht on ; that is there died that year onely a fivehundreth part of the church that propagated their faith and not their kind ; which low number is a most advantageous concession of ours , if wee take out as wee ought all those that dy'd from . to . formerly spoken of . but , bee it onely a fivehundreth part ; yet this multiply'd by . the number of the years since , there being four times . found in . rises to bee a full fourth part of the totall living in the year . that is full as many as were the actuall deserters of tradition since luther . add , that the persons now insisted on ( of whom wee might double the number , ) are all of them absolutely the most eminent parts of tradition that are , viz. the whole entire body of the church governours or ecclesiadocens ; a very few of whom experience has taught us to have been able to propagate our holy catholik faith to many nations in a few years ; the rest such whose exemplary devout lives exhibit the practice of christianity in so eminent a perfection , and with such influence over the hearts of the generality , that next to the sacred authority , and exalted sanctity of the others , nothing more fruitfully propagates christian life and doctrin than those who are thus barren to the world . thus much for the number of propagaters of their faith , and not their kind amongst those who were formerly catholikes ; but what a strange counterpoise does it add , if wee go about to compute those vast nations which since luther have of new accru'd to tradition , and who have been spiritually geniti in evangelio ; and this , ( which enhances our advantage ) not by lineall descendents in the same place , but a few externs , and in such places , to wit , heathenism , where there has been no deserters of tradition formerly , nor any since to diminish their number by their counterballance . whence i have title to add not onely the first adherers to catholik religion there , but also all their posterity since who have stuck to it , they being cleavers to tradition , and so counterdistinguish't to relinquishers of tradition . which if wee compute ever since the time about luther , who can averr ( considering the vastness of the territories they possess ) they equall not the totall of the deserters of tradition that have been from the beginning of the church . one consideration is yet more than all the rest ; but , i must not lay claim to it at present , lest i break bargain , having confin'd my self to the circumstance of time since luther ; yet 't is not unlawfull to mention it . 't is this ; that for diverse centuries before luther there had not been any considerable number of actuall deserters of tradition , ( as who is read in ecclesiasticall histories cannot but know ) but almost all followers of it , that is , propagaters of it practically to the immediately undergrowing faithfull . during which time if wee calculate how many , both in those lay-persons who dy'd from . to . and all those religious and sacred persons , the best propagaters of faith , fail'd in propagating their kind , it will bee very difficult ( i had almost said , most impudent ) to deny but they unproportionably almost exceed the number of the actuall deserters of tradition that have been since christ. for i see no reason to iudge by what i have read in ecclesiasticall history , that the number of the actuall relinquishers of the church have exceeded the number of the churches totall , taken in any determinate time , thrice repeated ; if you can show there were more , you may please to acquaint us with the sight . in the mean time i hope you understand by this time my position is so secure that i can allow you . times as many , and yet fear no danger of being most impudent . you may alledge perhaps this is but an evasion now , but was not my sense when i writ . to which i answer , i have shown it to have been my meaning already out of my plain words , and whoever reads sure-footing p. . and . shall see there expresly the grounds laid for each branch of this discourse : which , sir , had you been pleas'd to read over with a mind , to admit them into your understanding faculty , you might have sav'd mee this labour of dilating on them , and your self the blemish of ranting against a position as that than which nothing can bee more impudent , which onely your carelesness to read it , or resolution not to heed it , hinder'd from being most innocent . it were not unseasonable perhaps , if i should here amuse you with another paradox , namely that the deserting tradition strengthens it ; i mean , that , tradition , when a heresy arises , gains more of intensiveness and vigor , than it loses in it's extensiveness ; nay that the intensiveness which accrues to it by that means is the way to make it branch out afterwards into a far greater extent . i begin my explication of this from your words p. . if i should see a whole nation fail because no body would marry or contribute to propagate &c. by which i perceive you misunderstand the nature of the things in hand . in the business of marriage there is nothing to contrast with it on the other side , but being naturall and held withall a holy state , they that will ( that is , they who will not voluntarily oblige themselves to another holier ) may undertake it ; whence it has no universal opposit , and so takes it's free course , when convenient , and is liable onely to common contingencies . but in things of corrupt nature and grace , the matter is carry'd quite otherwise ; and , because either side has a great opposition against the other , and withall a very great , or rather a kind of universal sway and force , hence the course of such things consists in a kind of undulation : so that , now , corrupt nature when shee finds her self a little more free , follows her own tendency or propension , and bears downwards ; and now again supernatural and gracious assistances with which the wisdome of the eternal father had furnish't his church superabundantly , being shock't and excited even by this contrary motion of nature , begin to put themselves forwards into an opposit motion , and strive more vigorously to raise themselves upwards . for example ; disciplin , which is to apply christian motives , by tract of time grows remiss in the church ; hence decay of virtue , dissoluteness of life , addiction to material goods , and , consequently ignorance , creep in by insensible degrees into diverse parts , so that it happens there are multitudes of corrupt members in the church , and regardless of any duty ; who , therefore , want nothing but a fair occasion , and one to lead them to break all ties of virtue and obedience , and run into the utmost extravagancies . nor can wee think but in the course of such a vast variety as is found in a world , now and then there will bee found amongst those wicked men some notable fellow , of a subtle wit , a bold spirit , and a plausible tongue , so circumstanc't that hee can hope for impunity by the friendship of some great person , and so dares give way to his proud desire of having followers , or his private spleen , to renounce the church's faith , and shake of the yoak of her disciplin . hereupon , the rampires of government and disciplin being forc't and violently broken down , presently like a torrent or inundation all those whose hearts were corrupted with spiritual pride , or other vices , like brute beasts , leap after one another out of the fold of the church , and threaten to trample down all that 's sacred ; reviling the church , and laying to her charge all the faults found in particular persons , as if they were effects of her doctrin ; though their own knowledge tells them otherwise ; and make use of failings in particular governours to renounce and extirpate the government it self . on the contrary those good catholikes who by this trial are made manifest , stir up their zeal both in behalf of their faith and their governours , instituted by christ ; and detest the vicious lives and pride of those rebels , the parents of such a horrid revolt . the governours , alarm'd , begin to look into the cause of this distraction , and to provide wholesome remedies . they call councils ( generall ones if need bee ) to straiten afresh ecclesiasticall disciplin ; enjoyning the officers of the church to stand every one to his charge . they take order to promote worthy officers , and to advance ecclesiastical learning ; they recommend afresh by their grave authority the points of faith , to the ecclesia credens , as the depositum preserv'd uninterruptedly in the church from christ and his apostles , and establish them in a particular beleef of them ; nay make these more intelligible and rational by explicating them more at large ; or , if the heretical party involve and confound them in ambiguous words , they define and declare them in language most properly suting to the sence writ in the hearts of the faithfull ; and , lastly , anathematize the revolters , if they prudently judge their contumacy irreducible ; that , so , the remaining body may concieve a just horror and aversion against that rebellious party , and bee preserv'd uninfected with their contagious communion . all which advantages and much more are visibly found in the change made in the church by that neverenough-renowned synod the council of trent occasion'd by luthers fall . nor is this all ; for the faithfull not onely grow more virtuous by the reformation of church-disciplin , but even by the calumnies of their adversaries : again , the learned party in the church are excited to far greater industry , and consequently knowledge , by the insulting opposition of the churches enemies : whose disgracing points of faith for absurd and contradictions , stir up divines to show their conformity with acknowledg'd naturall truths , as does their calling into question the ground and certainty of faith , open the understandings of those who defend it , to look into the causes on which gods sweet and strong providence has founded it's infallible perpetuity , and so demonstrate it . a task no heretick durst ever attempt , finding principles failing him to begin with ; that is , causes laid by gods providence to build his congregation on ; whence all they can do is to talk gaily and plausibly about the conclusions themselves and laugh at principles . from which discourse is evident that by occasion of a heresy ( which purifies the church of all her ill humors , and rectifies and makes sound what remains ) tradition renews as it were it's youth and recovers it's vigor ; whence also it must needs propagate and extend it self still unto more and more subjects , as is also daily experienc't . 't is seen also that the abundance of corrupt humors begets heresy at first ; for multitudes fall away then , wheras afterwards scarce two or three in any age desert the catholick banner . it appears also that secular interest or desire of liberty and spirituall pride , not zeal of truth begun and continu'd the breach ; i mean in the leaders ; for afterwads they are content to remain where they are without troubling themselves to propagate the truth to other nations ; nay , they have let the large region of nubia run to wrack ( for as mr. t. to make us smile , tells us p. . alvarez sayes , it was for want of ministers ) and never sent so much as one single protestant parson to assist them . it shows also , how unconcern'd the catholik churches stability is in all the heresies that have or shall fall ; since they onely tend to confirm and radicate more deeply in the hearts of the faithfull the points of faith they renounc't ; to occasion reformation of disciplin and so to purify their virtue . lastly , it shows how tradition or the delivery of faith by the living voice and practice of the catholik church is so immovably planted by the hand of the almighty , that it loses nothing by all the actuall deserters of it that ever have been , but is by that means onely prun'd of it's saples branches to shoot out in due season livelier and farther . but , to return my friend . i hope sir you will pardon mee if i have rather taken pains to open your understanding a little in acquainting it more fully with that part of my doctrin is totally mistook , than to proceed with your faults ; in lieu of which i here pardon you all the injuries you have done my meaning or words in neer the other half your book , that is from p. . to p. . though i see them many , and some of them very gross ones . the testimony part i would not here neglect , because as you shall see shortly , they concern not my book as any proofs of the point , and so are improper to bee allow'd room in my future answer : which designes nothing but against your reasons . you are resolv'd to bee brief in them , and i hope to bee briefer ; in which , i thank you , you have helpt mee much by your manner of handling them . i will pass by divers of your little quirks upon my whether real or pretended mistakes in things unconcerning , and onely touch upon what is more pertinent . and first , i am sorry i must begin with the old complaint that you mistake quite ( whether purposely or no let others judge ) what was my intent in producing those testimonies . can you really and in your heart think they were intended against the protestants , that you set your selves so formally to answer them ? or can you judge mee so weak a disputant as to quote against you the d . council of nice or the council of trent so elaborately ; whereas i know you would laugh at their authority as heartily as you did at my first principles ? sure if i meant it i am the first catholick controvertist that ever fell into such an errour . my intent , manifest in the title and the whole course of my writing there was this , that having deduc't many particulars concerning the rule of faith which manner of explication might seem new to catholik controvertists , i would endeavour to show to them rather than to you that both others of old , and the catholik church at present favourd my explication . this was my main scope , however , as divers testimonies gave mee occasion , i apply'd them by the way against protestants . your second mistake is found p. . where you accuse mee to have committed as shamefull a circle , &c. and why , because according to mee scripture depends upon tradition for it's sense , and yet i bring scripture for tradition . sir , my tenet is , that nothing can sence scripture with the certainty requisit to build faith upon but tradition ; which yet well consists with this , that both you and i may use our private wits to discourse topically what sence the words seem most favourably to bear . and you may see i could mean no more by the many deductions i make thence alluding to my tenet , which yet i am far from your humour of thinking all to bee pure god's word or faith , nor yet demonstration , as you put it upon mee in other testimonies p. . though i make account i use never a citation thence , but to my judgment i durst venture to defend in the way of human skill , proceeding on such maxims as are us'd in word-skirmishes , to sound far more favourably for mee than for you . but let 's see what work you make with my authorities . after you have unworthily abus'd rushworth , in alledging him rawly to say scripture is no more fit to convince , than a beetle is to cut withall , whereas his discourse runs thus , that as hee who maintains a beetle can cut must cut with it , but cannot in reason oblige others to do so ; so they who hold scripture is the true iudge of controversies , and fit and able to decide all quarrells and dissentions against the christian faith , bind themselves , &c. after this prank ( i say ) of the old stamp , you put down p. . three of my testimonies from scripture , and immediately give a very full and ample answer to them all in these words . from which texts if mr. s. can prove tradition to bee the onely rule of faith , any more than the philosopher stone or the longitude may bee prov'd from the cap. of genesis , i am content they should pass for valid testimonies . to which my parallell answer is this . from which reply , and our constant experience of the like formerly , if it bee not evident that mr. t. will never with his good will deal sincerely with his adversary , but in stead of confuting him , impose on him still a false meaning , and impugn that in stead of him , i will yeeld all his frothy book to be solid reason . i beseech you , sir , where do you find mee say or make show of producing those testimonies to prove tradition the onely rule of faith. for truth 's sake use your eyes and read . do not i express my self sure-footing p. . to produce the first citation to show how scripture seconds or abets my foregoing discourse meerly as to the self-evidence of the rule of faith. does not the second contend for the orality of the rule of faith , it 's uninterruptedness , and perpetuall assistance of god's spirit , and the third of imprinting it by the way of living sense in men's hearts ? and , though i say those places speak not of books , but deliver themselves in words not competent to another rule , yet i contend not they exclude another rule , or say there is but one rule and no more . there was indeed p. . another testimony from st. paul , contradistinguishing the law of grace from moses his law , which sounded exclusively ; but you were pleas'd to omit it , and so i shall let it stand where it did . you advance to my testimonies from fathers and councils , and never was young gentleman so fond and glad that hee had found a hare sitting as you are to have discovered whence i had those citations : presently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , all is mirth and triumph and jubilee . you are a seer , sir , and will find out the truth by revelation , and so i had as good ingenuously confess it . 't was thus then . when my book was nere printed , some friends , who had read my discourses , dealt with mee to add some authorities ; alledging that , in regard i follow'd a way of explication which was unusuall , it would give it a greater currency to show it consonant , though not in the whole body of it , yet in the most concerning particulars to the sentiments both of the former and present church . i foresaw the disadvantage my little time would necessarily cause me ; yet , willing to defer to the judgment of my betters , i resolv'd it . casting about in what common-place-book i might best look , for i had not time to rummage libraries , nor am i so rich as to have a plentifull one of my own , it came into my mind there were diverse of that nature in that book where you made so fortunate a set , and caught such a covy of citations in one net together . i ask't first the authour's leave , who answer'd , that when a book was once made publick it was any one 's that would use it ; nor knew i , till you came to teach mee more manners , i ow'd any account to any man else ; neither do i think your self in your sermons stand quoting all the common-place-books or private authours where you meet a testimony or sentence transcrib'd you make use of . hereupon i took the book with mee to a friend's chamber near the press , where proofs already expected my correcting hand ; and there , having no other book by mee , fell to work . this hast made mee examin nothing , being very secure of the perfect sincerity of the authour i rely'd on , but put them down in his words and order . this , sir , is candidly the true history of that affair , which will spoil much of your discourteous vapour , showing a great deal of empty vanity in you , to magnifie so highly such petty trifles , and so totally unconcerning the main of the business you laugh p. . that i who confest my self a bad transcriber , transcrib'd him ; how childish a cavill is this ? as if every one who is to bring testimonies , whether hee like his task or no , must not transcribe them from some place or other ; yet you tell mee ironically , you will do mee the right to assure the reader ( that i ) do it very punctually and exactly . i wish , to requite you , sir , i could assure the reader you had as punctually and exactly transcrib'd mee ; you had sav'd a great deal of precious credit by it , and i a great deal of precious time and ungratefull pains in laying open your insincerity . but , to our testimonies . the first is from the synod of lateran . the force of which you say p. . lies in the word [ deliver'd ] which is indifferently us'd for conveyance by writings or word of mouth . but , sir , there are also in that testimony the words preaching and teaching , and i do not beleeve it is so indifferent to you whether you preach by word of mouth or no , that you should say the word preaching sounds not conveyance of a thing orally . the next testimony has the same exception , and the same answer . but you say this council particularly this part of the epistle were excepted against by some . what matter 's it , so they did not except against it for this passage or this doctrin ( which may serve for answer also to the mistaking exceptions against the th . generall councill which follows next ) thus origen and tertullian are both excepted against , yet are both commonly alledg'd and allow'd where the reasons of those exceptions have no place . next follow your answers to the fathers i alledg'd . but first p. . you must mistake rushworth , next mee . for rushworth speaks not ( i mean in the first citation ) of delivery , but of a point delivered ; nor do i here intend to convince thence the certainty of delivery or tradition which you proceed upon ; for , making fathers parts of tradition , it would make the same thing prove it self . understand then rightly , sir , what i am about , and then i shall accept your impugning it for a favour . the truth of the thing is one thing , and the iudgment of a person concerning it , is another ; and 't is not to evince the truth of the point i produce these testimonies , for in the order of discoursing the knowledge of traditions ( or first authority's ) certainty , antecedes and gives strength to all the other inferiour and dependent ones . what i only aim at then is only to show that thus they judg'd ( not to convince the truth of the thing from their judgment ) and thence to show my self not to be singular in thus judging . whence also 't is that i entitled this part consent of authority , &c. retract then , i beseech you , sir , any such thoughts or expressions as that i would hence convince tradition to be the whole truth of faith , demonstrate , prove it : for i intend to prove no more by the rest then by those from the council of trent , which onely aim to show that so and so that council said and held . the first testimony of a father is pope celestines ; the force of which you think quite spoild ( p. . ) by binnius his other reading of such a word . and why i pray ? unless he could make it out his reading were true , the other false ; which i see not attempted . but you let it pass , and answer that [ retain'd by succession from the apostles till this very time ] may mean by scripture , as well as by orall tradition . i conceive not , and i give you my reason ; because , who make scripture their rule , are unconcern'd whether their faith was retaind to this very time from the apostles by succession , or no : for , though all the world apostatiz'd , and so interrupted that succession , yet , as long as they have the letter of scripture , it being plain to all , their faith is retain'd still . what you quote this father afterwards to say of scripture , wee heartily say amen to , so you mean by scriptures that book sen'ct by its proper interpreter ( as to points of faith ) the church . and , you are to show he meant otherwise . you choke with an &c. better half of irenaeus his testimony p. . which spoils your answer to the first ; for it speaks of his present dayes when the scripture was not onely left by the apostles , but spread and to bee had , and yet that many nations of those barbarians who beleeve in christ , had ( even then ) salvation writ in their hearts without characters and ink , diligently keeping the ancient tradition . the substance of your answer to origen . is onely this , that unless i mean by churches tradition preserv'd by order of succession , mysticall interpretations of scripture so deliver'd down , you assure mee origen is not for my turn . and i assure you , sir , 't is so learned an answer that i dare not oppose it . tertullian is next , to whom by offering to wave him , you show your self . little a friend ; and no kindness is lost for hee is as little a friend to you driving such as you in his prescriptions from any title to dispute out of or even handle scripture , yet you say he saies no more but beleeve what is [ traditum ] deliverd ; though as alledg'd by mee sure-footing p. . hee sayes much more in a large intire testimony which you not so much as mention . you tell mee also hee meant deliver'd by the scriptures , but you strain hard to make it come in . and tertullian is the unlikeliest man in the world to provoke to the scriptures , who tells us ( de praescrip . c. . ) nihil proficit congressus scripturarum , nisi plane ut aut stomachi quis ineat eversionem , aut cerebri . scripture-disputes avail nothing but meerly either to make ones stomack or his head turn . but , alas , sir how are you gravell'd with the two first testimonies from athanasius and how slightly you pass them over p. . the protestants first maxim is beleeve no men , nor ancestors nor church , but search the scriptures , that is seek for your faith there : against which way his whole discourse is bent , as may bee seen surefoot : p. . . is faiths coming down by ancestours the same as coming down by a book ? or doe not the words , [ from christ by fathers ] mean [ by words expressing the sense in their hearts , ] but [ by a book not to bee senc't by them , but plain of it self ? ] the third testimony expresly saies . 't is to bee answer'd to those things [ which alone of it self suffices ] that those are not of the orthodox church , and that our ancestors never held so . you tell mee it is a gross errour that hee thought this alone ( or without scripture ) might bee sufficient ; i wonder what mean the words [ which alone of it self suffices : ] if they bee not exclusive of any thing else as necessary , words have lost their signification , and i my reason . i but , hee quotes scripture for it afterwards ! true ; and hee expresses himself to do it lest adversaries from his being wholly silent should take occasion to bee more impudent . that is , the reason of the thing requir'd it not , but the unresaonableness of the carping humour of adversaries . you alledge his words that faith which was profest by the fathers in the nicene council according to the scriptures . l. . . &c. is to mee sufficient , &c. whence your discourse makes his opinion to bee that scripture is the sufficient rule of faith. lord ? sir , where are your thoughts wandring ? or what 's the nominative case in that clause [ is to mee sufficient ] to the word is ? is it not that faith : to wit , the nicene , which you mistake for the rule of faith , and joyn the epithet , sufficient , to rule of faith , which in the testimony is joyned to faith ? your conceit that it seems hence the scripture was to him the rule to judge the creeds of generall councills is a very weak one : hee told you before his faith came to him by tradition of ancestours ; all that is here intimated is that hee judg'd the nicene creed to be according to the scriptures ; and what catholik judges not so of that and the council of trent too , and yet holds not scripture which is to bee interpreted by the church the rule and standard to judge the church by ? to use your own words p. . you use a wretched importunity to perswade testimonies to bee pertinent ; yet all will not do , and your too violent straining them makes them the more confess their naturall reluctancy . but now comes the testimony of clemens alexandrinus , charg'd to be taken ( not by mee , but by the authour i borrowed it of ) out of the middle of a long sentence , and both before it and after it scripture nam'd so as to make it quite opposit to our tenet . i have already given account of my action ; and my adversary , now become my judge , charges it not wholly upon mee . alas , i am not able to read the testimonies in the books and understand them there , 't is such a peece of mastery ; and therefore am fain to take them upon trust from others that can read them there . but my seducer , how hee will acquit himself of so foul an imputation is left to any ingenuous papist to judge &c , sir , let mee tell you , you should consider circumstances ere you come to lay on such heavy charges . i beseech you was the book in which this seducer ( forsooth ) us'd this testimony writ against protestants who hold scripture , the rule of faith , or against some catholik divines holding the opinion of personall infallibility ? clearly against the later . this being so what was hee concern'd to transcribe the whole large testimony , no wrong being done to them ? either position of ecclesiasticall tradition , which hee cites , or of scripture which hee cites not , equally making against that tenet ; or rather that passage of ecclesiasticall tradition , being far more efficacious upon them than that which concern'd scripture which they account not obligatory unless interpreted by the church . by this time the reader will discern there was a great deal of rashness in the accuser , but no insincerity at all in the alledger . nor is there the least danger of the testimonies following , upbraiding them who patch together abundance of false words and fictions that they may seem rationally not to admit the scriptures ; for what is this to us whose endeavours are to lay 〈◊〉 beginning from first principles why wee and every man may and ought rationally admit the scriptures ; and neither make our faith ridiculous by admitting into it what 's uncertain , nor leaving any excuse to atheisticall impiety in not admitting what 's certain ? this is the summe of my aim and endeavours , though nothing will content you , but that wee admit the letter to bee plain to all , and , by consequence , to you ; and then your fancy is to bee accepted for god's word , and your pride of understanding will bee well at ease . you pass over nine of my testimonies ; two from st. basil , and three from st. austin , alledg'd by mee sure-footing p. , , . one from ireneus , and two from tertullian , and another from st. peter chrysologus , sure-footing p. , . sleighting them as but a few ; whereas , speaking of testimonies from the fathers , as you do here , you had answer'd but eight in all ; which you seem by your words to judge such a great multitude in comparison of , and those , or those few which remain ( as you call them ) so inconsiderable for their number in respect of the other numerous or innumera le , that the paucity of their number made them less deserve speaking to . yet a careless generall kind of answer you give such as it is p. . telling the reader that there is nothing of argument in those few which remain , but from the ambiguity of this word tradition ; which wee will needs take for unwritten tradition . you add p. . that you need not show this of every one of them in particular ; for , whosoever shall read them with this key , will find that they are of no force to conclude what hee drives at . i was going , sir , to use your own words , and to ask with what face you could pretend this ? let 's bring the book ; i 'le undertake it shall not blush to tell you how careless you are of what you say . i omit that the word tradition doth by ecclesiasticall use signifie in the first place unwritten tradition . moreover , that wee may let mercy triumph over justice , wee will pardon the first testimony ; found p. . though st. basil by counterposing tradition of faith , to the conceits of the heretick eunomius seems to mean by tradition sense receiv'd from fathers attesting ; this being the most opposit to conceits or new-invented fancies that can bee ; for even an interpretation of scripture may bee a conceit or fancy newly invented , whereas what 's barely deliver'd cannot bee such . the d . is , the same st. basil's p. . let tradition bridle thee ; our lord taught thus , the apostles preach't it , the fathers conserv'd it , our ancestours confirm'd it , bee content to say as thou art taught . is not here enough to signifie unwritten tradition ? did christ teach it by reading it in a written book ? or the apostles preach it by book or is the perpetuating it by fathers and ancestours the keeping it by way of writing ▪ the third is st. austin's p. . i will rather beleeve those things which are celebrated now by the consent of learned and unlearned , and are confirm'd throughout all nations by most grave authority . is universall consent and most grave authority of all nations , the book of scripture or written tradition ? or rather is it not most evidently unwritten universall tradition or sense in the hearts of all beleevers learned and unlearned , or the church essentiall ? the th is from the same st. austin . 't is manifest that the authority of the catholik church is of force to cause faith and assurance . do these words [ authority of the catholick church ] mean the book of scriptures ? or can i desire more then this father offers mee in express terms ? or a greater testimony that you are to seek for an answer to it then the strange evasion you substitute instead of a reply ? especially if wee take the testimony immediatly following , which from the best establisht seats of the apostles even to this very day is strengthen'd by the series of bishops succeeding them ; and by the assertion of so many nations . is here the word tradition pretended indifferent and apt to bee taken ambiguously ? and not rather assertions of so many nations , or consent of nations , and authority of the catholik church , of force to cause faith and assu rance ? which to demonstrate is the whole endeavour of sure-fooring . the th is the same fathers cited p. . the faithfull do possess perseveringly a rule of faith common to little and great in the church . is the word church the same with the word tradition or in danger of being ambiguous , or ( as you say of the word tradition p. . ) commonly us'd by the fathers to signify to us the scriptures ? the th . is of st. irenaeus . all those who will hear truth may at present perfectly discern in the church the tradition of the apostles , manifest in the whole world . what means the world [ at present ] but that the tradition of the apostles is yet vigorous and fresh in the church ? which remark had very unfitly suted with scriptures . the th and th are tertullians . both say the same sence , that what is establisht as sacred or profest at this present day in the churches of the apostles is manifestly deliver'd by the apostles or a tradition of the apostles ; which is incompetent to scripture , it not being a tradition or point delivered , but the delivery . the last is of chrysologus , which has indeed the word tradition , but by the additionall words [ of the fathers ] not left ambiguous but determin'd to unwritten tradition : for the fathers according to you are not to give , or diliver down the sence of scriptures , it being plain of it self . this sir , is the upshot of your skill in notebook-learning ; the three first testimonies from scripture you answerd not , mistaking quite what they were brought for ; the th you omitted . you have given pittiful answers to eight from the fathers and shufled off nine more without answer , pleading you had given us a key to open them which was never made for those locks . by which i see you reserve your greatest kindnesses , like a right friendly man , till the last . you will not have the councill of trent make tradition the onely rule of faith ; you had oblig'd mee , had you answer'd my reason for it in my th note p. . . but this is not your way ; you still slip over my reasons all along as if none had been brought , and then say some sleight thing or other to the conclusion , as if it had never been inferrd by mee , but meerly gratis and rawly affirm'd . i have explicated our divines that seem to differ from mee herein , sure footing p. . . and the council it self takes my part in it , by defining and practising the taking the sence of scripture from that quod tenuit & tenet sanct a mater ecclesia , which , in this antecedency to scriptures sence , can no where bee had but from tradition . you cavill at mee for not putting down the words in which that councill declares it self to honour the holy scripture and tradition with equall pious affection and reverence . why should i ? you see i was very short in all my allegations thence and rather touch't at them for catholicks to read them more at large , than transcrib'd them fully . but how groundless your cavill is may bee understood hence that i took notice of a far more dangerous point to wit it's putting the holy scriptures constantly before tradition , and show'd good reason why ? but you approve not even of any honour done to the scriptures upon those terms ; and your interest makes you wish that rather it's letter and sence both should remain uncertain , than it should owe any thing to the catholick church . you ask how an apostle and evangelist should bee more present by the scripture ascertain'd as to words and sence then by or all tradition ? i answer , because that book is in that case evident to bee peculiarly and adequately his , whereas orall tradition was common to all ; and 't is doubtable what hand some of those apostles or evangelists might have had in the source of that which was lineally deriv'd to us . sir , i wonder how you hit so right once as not to answer likewise the testimony i brought p. . of the catholick clergy's adhering to tradition in the ●ick of the breach , you might as well have spoke to that as to the council of trent & divers others : but i perceive it had some peculiar difficulty , as had divers of the neglected nine , else your genius leads you naturally to flie at any thing that has but the semblance or even name of a testimony : whereas , unactive i stoop at no such game till i see certainly 't is worth my pains ; and i fear yours will scarce prove so they come in play p. . and because they are huddled together here something confusedly , it were not amiss to sort them under dr. pierce's heads found sure-footing , p. . to the first head , which comprises those which are onely brought to vapour with , belongs that of st. hierom. p. . to the second head , which consists of those which are raw , unapply'd , and onely say something in common which never comes home to the point , belong all those of eusebius . that of st. chrysostome and st. austin's p. . of iustin and theodoret p. . that of hilary p. . of st. basil. p. . of chrysostom . p. . and . and those of st. austin in the same place . of theoph. alexandr . p. . theodoret p. . . the d . and d. from gerson . p. . to the th . that of st. austin p. . to the th . head , which comprises those which are false , and signifie not the thing they are quoted for , appertain that of ireneus p. . of st. austin , st. hierome , and the d . of theoph. alexandrinus p. . to the th . consisting of those which labour of obscurity by an evidently ambiguous word , that of optatus p. . the first from gerson p. . and that from lyra p. . st. cyprian's testimony was writ by him to defend an errour , which both wee and the protestants hold for such , and therefore no wonder if ( as bellarmin sayes ) more errantium ratiocinaretur , hee discoursed after the rate of those that err ; that is , assumes false grounds to build his errour on . whence the inferring an acknowledg'd false conclusion from it , is an argument rather his principle was not sound . i know , sir , you will fume at this usage of your testimonies : but with what reason ? for first , you putting them down rawly , without particularizing their force or import , or driving them home to any point , my very sorting them under these heads , sounds a greater particularity in my exceptions and answer , than you show'd any in alledging them . next , you had refus'd to do mee the reason i begg'd in my letter to my answerer § . . in vouching you testimonies to bee conclusive or satisfactory ; which unless you did , i had already told you there it was my resolution to give them no other answer . and i shall candidly make known my intention why i do so , and shall ever do so , till you come to some good point in that particular . i had observ'd what multitudes of voluminous books had and might bee writ in the way of citation without any possibility of satisfying , that is , to the extream loss of time , and prejudice to rational souls , while any citation however qualify'd was admitted , and no principles laid to sort them , and show which were conclusive ; wherefore i judg'd it the best way to drive you from that insignificant , and endless way of writing , to tell in short my exceptions against each testimony , and to force you to vouch them conclusive . and i pray , why should i or any be put to show each of those citations , to our excessive pains , inefficacious , whereas your self , who is the alledger , will not take pains to show any one of them to bee efficacious ? but your way here is the weakest in that kind i ever read or heard of . you huddle together a clutter of citations , never apply them particularly as i constantly did mine : overleap all considerations of their qualifications , nakedly set them down , ( as you say p. ) and then tell us they are enough to satisfie any unpassionate reader that dare trust himself with the use of his own eyes and reason . which is plausible indeed to flatter fools that are passionately self-conceited , otherwise i conceive an unpassionate reader will require much more , if he ever knew what controversy meant . hee would know the variety of circumstances , antecedents , consequents , &c. besides , speaking equivocally or rhetorically , not distinctly and literally , may alter every testimony there ; above all hee would consider whether they were expressive onely of some persons opinions , and not rather of the solid and constant sense of the faithful in that age ; vvithout which they want the nature of testimonies . is it clear to every man's eyes and reason , none of these or other faults render all yours inefficacious ? is it clear that when they say scripture is plain , they mean plain to all , even heathens that never heard of faith , ( such must bee the plainness of the rule of faith ) or onely to those who have learn't christian doctrin already by the church ; that is , who bring their rule with them . i am sure st. austin de doctrinâ christianâ , your best testimony , speaks of such readers as are timentes deum ac pietate mansueti , those which fear god , and are meek with piety ; that is those which are not onely faithful or christians already , but pious and good christians ; which makes it nothing to your purpose . again , some one passage may bee so plain as a learned man may in the opinion of learned men plainly confound an adversary ; but will it bee clear and plain in all necessary points to the vulgar , who hear a great many hard words brought on both sides , and have no skill to judge who has the better in such contests ? yet the rule of faith must bee plain even to the vulgar , and able to give them satisfaction . again , when the fathers provoke to the scripture , is it not against those who deny the church , but accept the scripture , and so the necessity of disputing out of some commonly-acknowledg'd principle , may bee the onely reason they take that method ? 't is evidently so , in that you quote from st. austin against maximinus p. . and against the donatists , who deny'd the judgment of the catholik church quae ubique terrarum diffunditur ; and so hee was to prove his point ubi sit ecclesia , out of scripture or no way . again , is it clear out of the citations nakedly set down , what went before and after ? is it clear for example that when they speak highly of scripture , they mean not scripture unsenc't , but onely taken as significative of god's sence , as it must , to bee the rule of faith ; or , if of scripture senc't , they mean not senc't by the church , but by the human skill of private persons , which is the true point between us ? st. austin without doubt makes the church the interpreter of scripture , as is clearly seen by his discourse at the end of his . chap. of the profit of beleeving , which spoils your pretence to his authority . nay , do not they often mean by scripture the very sence of it , that is christs doctrine or the gospel ? as oft as you hear them speak of the things that are written , or call them principles , or the rule of truth and opinions , or speak of conforming other doctrines to them , and such like , so oft they speak of the doctrin it self contain'd in scripture , or the truths found there . such is that of clemens cited by you p. . . which speaks meerly of the sence of it , or the truths in it , which hee makes deservedly the rule to other truths ; and hence , now hee names scripture , then , the tradition of the church , then scripture again , it being indifferent to his purpose , the same sense ( which hee onely intends ) being included in both . such is also evidently your best testimony , to wit , that of irenaeus , which speaks of the gospell it self , preach't and writ ; that is , clearly of the sence indifferent to either way of expression . but what is this or indeed all that is said there to the letter of scripture taken as significative of god's sense , that is , not for that sense , nor as including it , but as the means and way to it ( as it must bee taken when 't is meant for a rule of faith ) and the plainness and certainty of that way , to all that are yet to come to faith , taking that letter as interpretable by private skill and maxims of language-learning , which is the true point between you and us ? bring testimonies for this , and you will do wonders . to use your own words p. . i need not shew what i have discours't here of every of his testimonies in particular ; for , whosoever shall read them with this key will find they are of no force to conclude what hee drives ( or ought to drive ) at . i am loath to suggest any jealousie of your insincerity in all these citations , though you have seldome fail'd in that point . present my service to your friend mr. stillingfleet , and assure him hee shall not bee neglected , though there were no other reason but your high commendations of him . your humble servant j. s. a postscript to the reader , reader , though i write to mr. t. yet i publish to thee , and so have a title to salute thee with a line or two . tell mee then , dost not find thy expectation deluded , which , sure-footing had rais'd , and our controversie begin to slide back into petty squabbles ? consider , i beseech thee how little i contributed to it , nay what care i took to prevent it ; hazarding some ill opinion of singularity in putting forth antecedently a letter to my answerer , requesting wee might hold to a conclusive method , rather than ( which i foresaw ) permit the clearing that most concerning point in hand relapse into wordish talk. if thou readest that letter , i hope thou wilt acquit mee , and think it rationall ; nay more , thou wilt easily see that mr. t. not onely waves speaking to it , or giving reason why , but goes point-blank opposit to it , using frequent ironies , quibbles and little squibs of university-wit ; and neither laying principles , nor admitting , or denying my consequences ( except very seldom ) nor distinguishing testimonies , or vouching any thing or way hee builds on to bee conclusive ; but catching mistakingly at this little word , and the other , putting upon mee twenty false meanings , with all the crafty arts that may bee to make mee relinquish pursuing the method i had begun , so disadvantageous to him , and fall to clear my self and accuse him , which is little to our cause and unsavoury to our readers , and so , not worth heeding or reading ; whence hee and his friends might hope the discourse would die and come to nothing . and , indeed , who expects better from him , who characters controversie ( which is the science or knowledge of the grounds of faith ) to bee nothing but a blessed art of eternall wrangling ? by which means hee gains himself indeed much credit for a great controvertist , who avoids all methods of concluding any thing , that is , labours to keep on foot and promote all the ways of wrangling ; and makes his adversary none , who pursues conclusiveness and wayes to avoid wrangling . but the plot shall not take ; i shall still go on my way in my answer ; and to this end that i might there onely attend thy benefit , i have voided out of the way this riff-raff with which this great controvertist in his way had so learnedly assaulted mee . in a word , i declare my resolution ( god giving life and health ) to bee this . i will never leave following on my blow , till either i bring them to lay principles that will bear the test ; or , it come to bee made evident to all the world they have none . what i attempt is , to settle the absolute immoveableness of faith against my adversary , whose avow'd position 't is p. , that 't is possible to bee false ; nay the certainty of scripture too , which hee puts in the same case as to it's firmness . pardon the sleightness in composing this , and perhaps some possible oversight , though my conscience knows of none . i am chid by my doctor for writing it while i was in a course of physick , my strength and health both much decay'd . which , if it pleases god of his goodness to restore , i promise thee amends . 〈◊〉 . . thy soul 's hearty well-wisher j. s. finis . errata . page . line . description . p. . l. . sections . p. . l. . in his . . l. . you proceed . p. . l. . particular . p. . l. ult . about . p. . l. . beefool'd . l. . too ; whereas l. . a distinction . d. . l. . wee too . p. . l. . tertullian . p. . l. . determin . p. . l. . determinate . p. . l. . your confute . p. . l. . the cause . p. . l. to from any . p. , l. , . knowledges . p. . l. . despair . l. . demonstration . p. . l. ult . thus. p. . l. . tenth . p. . l. . more forcible . p. . l. . self . p. . l. . to some . p. . l. . philosopher's . p. . l. . tradition's . p. . l. . binius . p. . l. . falshoods . p. . l. . deliver . a vindication of the doctrine contained in pope benedict xii, his bull and in the general council of florence, under eugenius the iii concerning the state of departed souls : in answer to a certain letter, printed and published against it, by an unknown author, under this title, a letter in answer to the late dispensers of pope benedict xii, his bull, &c., wherein the progress of master whites lately minted purgatory is laid open and its grounds examined ... / by s.w. sergeant, john, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing s ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a vindication of the doctrine contained in pope benedict xii, his bull and in the general council of florence, under eugenius the iii concerning the state of departed souls : in answer to a certain letter, printed and published against it, by an unknown author, under this title, a letter in answer to the late dispensers of pope benedict xii, his bull, &c., wherein the progress of master whites lately minted purgatory is laid open and its grounds examined ... / by s.w. sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. [s.n.], printed at paris : . attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . errata: p. . eng white, thomas, - . benedict -- xii, -- pope, d. . catholic church -- doctrines. catholic church. -- pope ( - : benedict xii). -- benedictus deus ( jan.) council of florence ( - ) letter in answer to the late dispensers of pope benedict xii his bull. a r (wing s ). civilwar no a vindication of the doctrine contained in pope benedict xii. his bull and in the general councill of florence, under eugenius the iiii. con sergeant, john c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a vindication of the doctrine contained in pope benedict xii . his bull , and in the general councill of florence , under eugenius the iiii . concerning the state of departed sovls . in answer to a certain letter , printed and published against it , by an unknown author , under this title a letter in answer to the late dispensers of pope benedict xii . his bull , &c , wherein , the progress of master whites lately minted purgatory is laid open , and its grounds examined ; and ( in order to a further discovery ) a prospect given to the reader , of this new school , it's method , it's design , to evacuate christian faith , and to establish a new philosophical , or a pretended demonstrative religion . psal. . . the unjust have told me fables , &c. coloss. . . beware lest any man seduce you by vain phylosophy , &c. by s. w. a roman catholick . printed at paris . . to the unknown author of this letter , in answer to the late dispensers of pope benedict his bull , &c. sir , sect. . i gratefully acknowledge my obligations , for the good will , you shew to instruct me . the perusal of this bull and council had long since setled a full belief in my soul : that the purgation of separated souls might be compleated before re-union with their bodies and the general day of iudgment . so that , in truth , i was not a little surprised by your book . it was my misfortune it fell into my hands , just then , when our expectations were at the height of those troubles , which afterwards succeeded in our nation , and which have ever since much diverted me from things of this nature , whilst in such nicities , as you now have brought the question too , our understandings ought to be perfectly calm . and this i hope will plead for the delay that i have not presented you sooner with these reflections on your book ( which i designed long agoe ) if my other occasions had not interposed themselves . i found not that satisfaction i earnestly wished for in your letter ; your objections seemed not manly , your answers not home ; you will pardon me then if i mind you of my exceptions against both : which i shall endeavour to do with that just moderation that befits brethren . i cannot altogether approove of harshness in writing , even against the professed adversaries of our holy faith . it was not unhappily said by one of them , as i remember , that writing of controversies ought to carry as much sweetness as love-letters , and that the other rudeness served but to chase away the game . and since you have administred to me a just occasion to reprehend this in your letter , i shall be wary not to be justly taxable my self , both to yours and your masters person , master white ( whom you have now introduced into the scene ) i bear as much respect , as any one whosoever , upon so sleight an acquaintance : it is not the doctor , but the doctrine , combat . i cannot digest their boldness , who usurp the authority of the supream tribunal , to brand any opinion with the title of heresie , whilst the church hath not done it to their hands : much less can i endure , that the author himself should be stigmatized with the infamous character of an heretick . and though in this present controversie , i am fully convinced , that this modern systeme of purgatory stands condemned , both by this bull of benedict the ● . and the florentin council , and that of trent , and by consequence is heretical : yet i am very willing to believe , those who sustain it , do not see its condemnation . and yet i think it will appear that the author of it , and those schollars who are now able pro●icients in his school are armed , even against the authority it self . this misfortune i regret , that i know not how to address my self to you , but in print : and since things which pass the press , are not confined to one or few mens view , but exposed to many eyes and censures , i am necessitated to satisfie even vulgar readers ; who certainly , though perhaps now acquainted with the controversie it self , never yet d●scovered the source and fountain of this new molded purgatory . and to the end i may do so , i shall in the very introduction to my discourse lay open to my readers eye , the first grounds and rise , and the afterwards continued progress , of this your new doctrin : nor could i otherwise acquit my self of it , with just satisfaction to other readers , whilst if i had spoken only in manuscript to you , ( who are now raised ( as you say ) above your pitch and inabled to give any one satisfaction that is not before hand resolved to receive none , by conferring with those solid men , who are acquainted with every resort of master whites doctrine ) my business had received a much quicker dispatch . for my method , i hope , you will pardon me , if leaving whatsoever you have urged either against the publishers ( whom you are pleased to style dispensers ) of this bull and council , or any thing else , not directly pertinent to our question , to the latter end of my discourse . after your doctrine laid open , and its grounds , and the question stated between us , i betake my self at first to our business in hand about the bull and council . and for my style , since we are now in a controversie much more proper for a divinity lecture then a rhetorical declamation , the strength of the sense , rather then the quaintness of the expression , will best befit the subject . this preface will claim your pardon , if you consider it gives some light to what i hereafter say . but i will neither detain you , nor my reader any longer , but fall to our work in hand . sect. . i have 〈◊〉 from a very learned and worthy friend of mine , that he himself being present at a conference between master white and another eminent scholar of our nation , divers years before master white appeared in print : among other things then discoursed of , master white advanced a phylosophical position which the other denied , as inconsistent with our holy faith of the blessed sacrament : to which master white replied , let us find out the truths in phylosophy , and the mysteries of our faith will square well enough with them : to which the other , nay , sir , by your favour , let us in the first place presuppose the establisht verities of faith , and then square our phylosophy to them . i have many times reflected , often conferred with others , of the different consequences , of those different methods , which these two great persons held in leading our understandings to truth . i have often entertained my self with these thoughts , what a dangerous method master white prescribed , and as now appears followed ? what a natural and new divinity it would prove , which should be squared to those phlyosophical truths , which our weak understandings should be able to establish , independent of divine revelation ? and at last master white hath brought forth this his issue , and made it publick to the world . sect. . it is not my design , in this our present discourse , to run through those many little books , which this author hath given us on several occasions : and the rather because the authority of our supream pastor , hath already taken notice of , and interposed his sharp , but justly deserved censures , against divers of them ; and doubtless will proceed against the rest , according to their demerits i shall then as to the present , concern my self only with this one controversie , of the state of those souls which leave this life in the state of grace ; but so that they are not as yet fully purged : and with those positions and grounds , on which this new molded fabrick of purgatory stands , unless some one doctrine or other , of the author of it , having a neer alliance with the business in hand , so offer it self , that our discourse , and the subject would be illustrated by it . sect. . and first as to the opinion it self , he thus delivers it of the middle state , ( acc. . ) i acknowledg ( sayes he ) in humane failings , a difference betwixt mortal , and venial ; nor do i deny an imperfect remission of mortal impurities , but i place not this imperfection , in that the sin is totally cancelled , the pain only remaining ; but in the change of an absolute , into a conditional affection , as it were instead of , i will , substituting , i will not ; but oh , that i lawfully might , &c. the affection or inclination he had to temporal good , is restrained , not extinguished , of mortal become venial , changed , not destroyed . being therefore by the operation of death ( as it were ) new molded , and minted into a purely spiritual substance ; he carries inseparably with him the matter of his torment ; in like manner as he also doth , who takes leave of his body , with his affections only venially disordered ; we do not then anywhere imagine a place filled with hellish dishes , by which the soul , as from an external tormentor , suffers a butchery ; but we are in horrour of the strife and fury of innate affections , which is therefore proportioned to the s●ns , because springing from them , nor ever otherwise possible to be defaced , unless the soul by a new conjunction to the body , become passive or susceptible of contrary affections , &c. these are his new apprehensions of the state of souls in their separation , perfectly squared to those phylosophical grounds , he had long before layed , in his peripatetick institutions . sect. . now as to the order in which this new fabrick of purgatory , and indeed a whole new system of philosophy and divinity was made publick ; it was ( as i take it ) this ; after the book of the immortality of of the soul , fathered on sir kenelm digby : master white appeared himself on the stage , under the name of thomas the englishman of the albi● of the east saxons , where , in a moderate volume intituled peripatetick institutions ; to the mind of that most eminent man , and most excellent philosopher , sir kenelm digby , &c. he discovers the great mine of this phylosophy ; here the suttleties of logick , the secrets of nature , the hidden properties of bodies , both heaven and earth , are layed open ; and not only that , but we are further led on by an undisolvable chain of unavoidable consequences ( as is pretended ) to the abstract notions of metaphysicks , to the clear understanding of separated souls , intelligences , even the existence and attributes of god himself . and all this ( if the reader hath faith enough to believe , for otherwise , i am confident , he will find but slender satisfaction , ) by most clear and evident demonstrations , by a long chain of consequences , or a series of patets , fits , sequiturs , clarum ests , consequens ests , confectum ests , and the like . the foundations thus laid , conformable to this incomparable ( and i think incomprehensible ) peece , for never daughter was liker her mother , issued out some time after his divinity , under this title , institutiones sacrae , built ( as he professes ) in , or on ( inaedificatae ) his former peripatetick institutions . this now containing a perfect sum or model of his divinity , as that had formerly done of his phylosophy . and certainly , happy it was , the author divided them to our hands , and gave us them in several volumes , and under several titles ; for else it hd been impossible to know , where the first ended , or the second began : this being so perfectly squared to that , that in the very entry to his divinity , he banisheth the a notion of supernaturality ( though not the word ) out of his school ; the whole design of his new theology being ( now in the third age of the church ) to evacuate christian faith , and out of his phylosophical grounds , to mould us up a new demonstrative religion , for nothing is upon any other grounds admitted into this new theological school , of which i give my reader a full account , sect. , . &c. sect. . in his peripatetick institutions then or philosophy , book , lesson . he lays the foundations of his future purgatory , or the state of souls in separation , and having in the first place laboured to evince , that rational souls , such as those of men are , may exist or be without their bodies . he delivers that notion ( which he desires to imprint in us ) of a separated soul , in these words , nu . , , . now he who desires to frame to himself , in some sort , a notion of a separated soul , let him ponder with himself that object which corresponds to the word , man or animal , as such : which when he shall see abstracts from place and time , and is a substance by the only necessity of the terms : let him conceive the like of a separated soul . then let him attentively consider some self evident and most natural proposition , in which , when he shall have contemplated , that the object is in the soul , with its proper existence , and , as it were , by it : let him think a separated soul is a substance , that is , all other things by the very connexion of existencies . lastly , when in bodies he shall observe , that motion proceeds from the quality of the mover , and a certain impulse , and that this impulse is derived again from another impulse , and so even up to that which is first moved and beyond . let him imagine the soul is a kind of principle , of such impulse , whatsoever thing that must be . and so he holds on , nu . . what is said of the substance of the soul , undoubtedly must be understood too , of its proper accidents : for since they depend onely on the soul , ( being something of it , nay even the very soul it self , ) and it would be more imperfect without them ; they must run the same fortune with it , unless some special reason interpose . out of which he deduces immediately num . . whatsoever things then were in the man according to his soul , at the instant of his death , remain inseparably in the state of separation . wherefore all his resolutions or judgments , whether speculative or practical , shall remain in it . out of which he deduces in the same book , less . . num . . and because the affections in the soul , are nothing else but judgements , upon which operation does , or is apt to follow , &c. it comes to pass , that our affections to acquaintance and friends , and the rest we cultivated in this life , shall remain in the future . and more fully in the same place , num . . the affections shall remain , and that in the same proportion they were during life . out of which he concludes there , num . . those who have given themselves up wholly to corporal pleasures , will be affected with a vast grief , through the impossibility of those pleasures there ; that is , because corporal pleasures cannot now be injoyed by the soul , in her state of separation . this is the essence , the substance of his purgatory ; this is his whole chain , or deduction of it , this is the grief he admits in separated souls , for accusing them of ignorance , who conceive fire , or any other material or external agent hath power to afflict them in that state ; he conceives them sufferers from these remaining affections to corporal pleasures , which therefore torment the souls , because they now are in a state , where these pleasures are impossible to be injoyed . sect. . now as to the measure or duraration of separated souls , and the continuation of that state , till the day of judgment ; the foundations are laid in the same book : less . . num . . again ( sayes he ) it is plain , that a separated soul in an other manner excels place and time , then in the body ; since in that it only abstracts from them , but out of that , it comprehends them . for this universal and actual knowledg , places all place , and all time within the soul , so that it can act in every place at once , and together ( as far as concerns this respect , ) and provide for all time , wherefore it is in a manner a maker and governour of time and place ; out of which he deduces fully of the middle state , acc. . in spiritual acts whether they bring happiness or misery ; there is no proportion to time , so as to make pain , which lasts longer , to be greater ; or that which ends sooner , to be less : for those are the properties of corporal things , &c. every act of a pure spirit reflected on it self , being of its own nature , out of the reach of time , is not subject thereto , but greater then the whole extension of time , &c. and in the next sect. more fully . if to a thing ( that is a separated soul ) which coexists to a longer part of time , nothing be thereby added ; or to a thing which coexists to a shorter part of time , nothing be thereby diminished , there can be no reason why duration should represent , either more or less grievous in these respective cases , &c. so that whatsoever grief of a separated soul is by the quality and force of its essence greater , the same , let its co-existence to time , be what it will , must be more vehement , and that which is less , less intense , nothing being gained o● lost by the perpetuating , or shortning of the motions of the sun , or other caelestial bodies , &c. and from this ground in the same book , account . . he concludes , whatsoever time intervenes betwixt it ( that is the prayer now powred out for a departed soul , or death ) and the restauration of the world , ( that is the day of general judgment ) is to departed souls , but as one moment . sect. . and further , as to the immutability of that state of separation , and the unchangeableness of the acts of souls now severed from their bodies , his grounds are laid down in the afore-cited perepatetick institutions , book . less . . num . , , . moreover ( says he ) out of what hath been said 't is deduced , that in the state of separation , no variety can happen to souls from any body , or the change of bodies : for since 〈◊〉 change passes not from any body into the soul , but through the identification of the soul with its own body ; and this identification ceaseth by the state of separation : it follows , that no action nor mutation can be derived from any body to the soul . nor has the soul , of it self , a principle of change in it self : not from hence only , because an indivisible cannot act on it self , but also , because since a mutation of the soul cannot be any other , then either according to the vnderstanding , or according to the will . but the vnderstanding is supposed to know all things together and for ever ; whence by the course of nature , there is no room left either for ignorance , or new science : and the will is either not distinct from the vnderstanding , or at least is adequately governed in the state of separation ; it follows , that naturally no mutation can happen to a separated soul from within , or caused by it self . nor yet from any other spirit without the interposition of the body : for since all spirits are indivisible , their operations too will be such ; but an indivisible effect , supposing all the causes of necessity exists in the same instant : wherefore if any thing be to be done between spirits ; t is all in one instant so done and perfected , that afterwards an other action cannot be begun : for if it begin , either the causes were before adequately , put ; or not ; if they were , the effect was put , if they were not , some of the causes is changed , that it may now begin to act , and not this , b●● the former is the first mutation ; whereof it is to be urged , whether the causes were put before ? these are the eternal truths ( as they would perswade us ) the unshakable foundations of phylosophy , on which this whole new fabrick of purgatory stands : and i have been the more careful to deliver them fully to my reader , ( even in this beginning of my discourse ) that he may with one cast of his eye see , on what firm foundations , this new school hath abandoned the hitherto received faith of our holy mother the church ; and now dares pronounce , that what she hath hitherto taught us , proceeded but out of ignorance of the nature of separated substances . of the mid. state . ( acc. . ) sect. . but because master white , the author of this new purgatory and our faithless demonstrative religion , was sufficiently conscious to himself , that these novelties would call upon the vigilancy and care of the shepheards of christs flock , he stood ready prepared to receive their incounter : and no sooner had the late bishop of calcedon , his then superior , admonished him of this , and other his new doctrines , in this new pretended demonstrative theology ; but in defence of his new molded purgatory , issued out his premeditated ( as it seems ) book , of the middle state of souls , directed to the same bishop ; which book , if it had remained in the authors obscure and mysterious dialect ( which he , above all modern writers , seems to affect ; and reason enough he hath to come mascaradoed into the world , and to involve himself ) had layed deservedly neglected : but it having been , by the indiscreet care of some one of his proselytes , put into an english dress , and exposed to the weak capacities even of vulgar readers , lest this new erroneous doctrine contained in it , might spread among those , whose infirmity betrayed them to be the easiliest misled ; for them was pub●ished this our bull of pope benedict the xii . and as much of the florentin council as seemed necessary and sufficient , to arm their souls against the attempts of this novelty ; by some pious and vigilant shepheards , to whom the care of their souls was committed . which bull and part of the council , because it may not have fallen into my readers hands , i give it him again at the ●atter end of my discourse , [ letter a. ] this , sir , was the true ground of putting forth that little volume , nor had the publishers any regard a● all ( as you tell us pag. . and . ) to the letter of vindication ; or as you now style it , challenge , of which certainly not master white himself , but some scholar of his ( and he but a slender proficient in his masters doctrine ) was author . and truly the likeness of its style , with that of this your letter , and the authors still fancying himself inspired with the genius of montalt , the fained writer of the late provincial letters ( as children by reading romances , fancy themselves to be knight errants , don hercioes ) would perswade me they both came out of the same shop . and besides that , the protestation contained in the beginning of that challenge ( as i heard well observed ) would be subscribed by all the protestant divines of the church of england : it is not consequent ( if master white remaine still himself ) that now he should proclaim , that if any thing expresly repugnant to any doctrine of his , be found in any decree of councils or popes , he is contented to be esteemed to have lost the cause : who had so lowdly , before the publication of this book , in his other writings , disclaimed and disowned the authority of both popes and councils , as we shall presently see , sect. . the publishers supposed , the sole evidencing , that this new minted purgatory stood condemned by that authority , to which he who resists , cannot remain a catholick , would proove a sufficient defence to well meaning souls , against the assaults of this new doctrine ; nor had they any design to enter the lists of disputation , against any persons whomsoever , as appears evidently in this , that they make no application of the doctrine , of this bull or council to any particular doctrine , of any particular writer ; but fairly and candioly deliver the words of both the pope and sacred council , in their original , and our vulgar language . and this indeed was abundantly sufficient for their design : there needed no application of the churches affirmative , to their negative , now sustained both in private discourses , and in print ; they needed not tell the reader , that where one part of the contradiction stands defined , the other undoubtedly stands condemned by the same sentence ; children know that already . sect. . who could justly suspect , that this innocent , this piously zealous proceeding , should beget an adversary in print ? who could imagine that the care of the flock of christ should now be accused of unreasonableness , of injustice , the publishers accused of weakness , of ignorance , even of school-boyes latine , of animosity , of an empty vanity to appear in print , in a little volume without any name , without any designed adversary , where there was nothing their own , but the pains to translate , and the charges to print ? but so it was , those , whose consciences were their self-accusers , who saw with what satisfaction , that little volume was received by pious persons , and how their new doctrine of purgatory stood pointed out to every mans eye , as condemned by that sacred authority , took fire , an o or an a shall be a sufficient subject to him , who watches an occasion to write . a puny scholar then of that school ( for such an one he was , as will be rendered evident hereafter , and none of the ablest proficients ) appears in the field , armed with a strong zeal to his masters doctrine , and with contempt enough against the innocent publishers ; whom in the entry to his discourse , he proceeds to vilifie and undervalue ; persons surely who never wronged him , probably never saw him , till now never heard of him , and at this howr do not know him . but it is not to vindicate their persons , however injured and undervalued , or to make use of that right which nature furnishes all men with , to repell an offered violence , by an equally violent resistance . for we have learnt a far other lesson in the school of grace , then my adversary hath in his new masters , master whites : to render good for evil , to pardon and pray for those that injure us . but in the defence of our holy and deer mother , the catholick church , and her never erring faith , in the defence of these decrees of the pope , and sacred council , that i undertake this quarrel ; and i desire my reader but to be unbyassed in this our present dispute , whether this position , that no souls are delivered out of purgatory , before the re-assumption of their bodies , and the general day of judgment , stands not condemned by this present bull of pope benedict . and the florentine council ? sect. , and first , that the contradictory of this position is the universally received doctrine of the catholick church , appears most evidently in this , that all orthodox writers who have treated this subject , of the state of separated souls , since the promulgation of the bull aforesaid and council , suppose it as a certain truth ; and therefore no one of them anywhere sustain the contrary : nor can the force of this evidence be weakned , by saying , that it is indeed the universally received opinion of divines only ; but not their faith ; for besides what i shall hereafter say , in refutation of this answer ; those who are acquainted with the prying curiosity of the schools , and with the strange variety of their apprehensions , know very well , that where any thing may lawfully be denyed , their restless curiosity ceases not to call it to the test , nor is it universally imbraced as truth ; and therefore it is authority only , and that irrefragable , which puts limits and bounds to their curious scrutiny , and the variety of their opinions . but because my adversary , having now ( as he tells us ) conferred with those solid persons , acquainted with every ressort of master whites doctrine ; and as cleer sighted in those ages which afford us these authorities , as in that they live in : with a strong youthful confidence proclaims : that it is incomparably false , that the question of purgatory was in the dayes of benedict , agitated and settled by this bull of his . or that the council of florence , ever intended or defined any such matter . and with a clutter of four or five pages settles us a quite : other question and controversie , as then disputed and determined , to wit : whether perfect charity be a sufficient disposition to beatifie a soul ? and appeals to cherubinus his compendium of this bull ; and tells us , that all learned writers agree . it will justly fall under our consideration : first , whether this our present question of purgatory were not then intended and defined ? and secondly , whether this his new question of charity , was there disputed and setled by this our bull and council ? sect. . and as to the first , if such an oversight could have hapned to a person whose business it was to answer this very bull , and of all those solid and cleer-sighted persons , by conferring with whom he was now raised above his own pitch : i should justly suspect , that neither he nor any one of them , had ever read this very bull , about which we now dispute . for was it possible that a few great letters , should so possess their eyes , and their great good affection to their new masters doctrine , so fill their hearts , that there was no room for any thing else of the whole context ? for the pope himself in this bull having in most plain and express words stated our very question to their hands : how was it possible they should all over-look it ? there arose ( saith he ) a matter of question , not long since , in the time of john the xxii . our predecessor of happy memory , between some doctors of divinity , concerning the vision of the souls of iust men after their death , in which nothing was to be purged , when they departed out of this world ; or if there were , it was now totally purged : whether they see the divine essence , before the re-assumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment ? and also concerning other matters , &c. and yet in truth . to do him right , he did see this , and cites it , page . and yet hath the confidence to impose his quite different question upon us . now , sir , if it were possible this should escape your consideration , yet since you appeal to cherubinus his compendium of this bull , you ought at least to have read and considered him : and yet in truth i cannot believe it . for was it possible , that after cherubinus too , agreeing perfectly with the pope had stated our question , you should have the boldness to deny it , and obtrude your new fancied controversie of charity upon us , and appeal to this very author , whose words do most clearly and evidently condemn you ? but having heard ▪ the pope , i will satisfie my reader , and let him hear flavius cherubinus in his own words . because ( sayes he ) there arose a question among the divines and others , whether the souls of iust men departed , in which there was nothing to be purged , or if there were , it was now purged , did see the divine essence before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment . § . . for the deciding of which question , john xxii . enjoyned the cardinals , pr●lates and divines , in a publick consistorie , that they should deliberately speak what they thought of it , when he should demand it ; but being prevented by death could not perfect it : now benedict the xii . after a diligent examination and deliberation with the cardinals of the sacred roman church , and by their counsel cleerly defines this question . § . . & seq. and another , concerning souls deparned in mortal sin . § . . and commands , that it be proceeded against such as pertinaciously hold , or assert the contrary , as against hereticks . § . . and hereunto he adds a penal sanction . this is the whole compendium of cherubinus , who directly with the pope states our present question , and delivers us , that it stands defined . and yet against this evidence to which you your self appeal , you have the confidence to tell us , the sole and only question was : whether perfect charity brings an immediate heaven ? sect. . now , sir , it is not possible for you to perswade an intelligen reader , as you endeavor page ) that there was one onely question disputed and defined in that time . the pope himself , and cherubinus to whom you appeal , have in terms made two . first , concerning the souls of iust men , in which nothing remains to be purged , when they pass out of this life ? and secondly , of those souls in which something is to be purged . and that there were more questions then one determined by this self-same bull , that very title which you say , page . belongs to it , and stands printed at rome , . a definition of certain articles concerning the blessed vision of god , and the beatitude and damnation of souls ; will clearly evince . let my reader consider the word articles , the several states of souls , of which our holy faith is here delivered ; and i think he will rest satisfied , it was not one only question , much less your only question of charity , which stands here defined to us . nor will that criticism , that the pope styles it quaestio , a question , and after him cherubinus , at all avail you ; for every one knows that where a question is stated of any subject , which suffers divisions , and subdivisions , it comprehends in it all those several questions , which of every one of those divisions , and subdivisions may justly be made ; and so it is in our very business , where the present question concerning the state of departed souls , extends to all the several conditions of souls , which departed this life . and that it was the popes design , and full purpose , to deliver us what of all these we stand bound to believe , will appear evidently by his exact division and enumeration of the several conditions , in which souls depart from this their earthly habitation : both of infants , who after baptism received , dye before the use of freewill : of those who coming to the use of reason , after baptism incur no blemish of sin : of those who in the same supposition , have incurred the blemish of sin , and yet depart this life , having fully satisfied , by worthy fruits of penance : of those who in the same supposition have incurred the blemish of sin , and have not made full satisfaction , but pass out of this life with a guilt of temporal punishment due in the next : and lastly , of those who depart this life in mortal sin , and enmity to god , of all which he here delivers our holy faith ; so unquestionable a truth it is , it was not one only , or your only single question of charity , which stands here defined : and truly sir , if your patience had held out , to read but to the end of the second ▪ scholion of this said cherubinus , to whom you appeal , you would have found not only this one question of the souls of just men , who depart this life without any need of being purged in the next , or this other , of those souls which so leave their bodies with a guilt of punishment in the next life ; but eight more questions answered and decided , even according to this cherubinus his judgment , by this self same bull of pope benedict the xii . for thus he concludes . i give you to understand . that by this determination of benedict the xii . t●n heresies are condemned , which eymericus in his directory examines and relates . in which cherubinus was not at all mistaken ; for so indeed it is : and since this eymericus is an author of that high esteem and deservedly , and his book hath received so signal an approbation by gregory the xiii . and is in deed , as well as in title , the directory of the inquisitors ; let us hear what pegna writes of him . eymericus ( sayes he ) [ a famous learned and holy man , who was appointed the general inquisitor of the kingdome of aragon , in the year . ( which is only . years after the promulgation of this bull ) from whence he was called to avignon by pope gregory . and there being his chaplain composed his excellent directory ] gathers ten heresies condemned by this extravagant ; and most truly admonishes , that so many catholick verities , contrary to those heresies , are thereby prooved and established : the place at length , out of this so authentick a writer ; i give my reader at the end of my discourse . [ letter b. ] not to interrupt the continued threed of it ; for by it my reader will easily observe , with what strong confidence the youthful scholars of this modern school appear in print . and if you had been pleased to peruse the continuation of baronius his ecclesiastical annals by spondanus , you would have rested satisfied in this our point ; for at the year . he thus delivers the opinion of pope iohn the . then disputed , which occasioned this bull of benedict his successour : for ( sayes he ) in that year . ( as villanius , rebdorfius , the continuator of nangius , and others witness ; ) iohn the . then pope , began publickly to treat of what before he had conceived , concerning the beatifical vision of souls : what not a few of the ancient , both greek and latine fathers , iustinus , ireneus , &c. did seem to hold ; that souls now severed from their bodies , and duely purged from all stain of sin , either in this present mortal life , or in the next ( in purgatory ) do not enjoy perfectly the beatifical vision of the divine essence , before the last day of iudgment : but do expect the resurrection of their bodies , that together with them they may attain perfect beatitude : and to this opinion not as yet altogether reproved ( or condemned ) by the holy church , this pope john himself seemed to incline , &c. for which reason he gained himself very many adversaries , both among the cardinals , and prelates , and also of other doctors of divinity every where , and religious men of all orders . and at the year the same sp●ndanus delivers , that this pope john the day before he died published a constitution , in which he condemned that opinion of which he stood suspected . now sir , when you have perused and weighed these things , which i am confident you never dreamt of before , for in truth you rested satisfied , with what your solid and cleer-sighted friends had told you , of their new devised question of charity as then disputed ▪ you will perhaps observe your error , you will see it is not a little heat of youth which presses men of your years to appear in print , or a little tickling vein which eggs young men forward to catch their adversary with an o or an a , and pass a witty jest upon him , till age and experience hath ripened their discretion , which can warrant a book in the publick view of discreet persons . you will be convinced that you were mistaken by your great good affection and esteem of your solid cleer-sighted friends , and that in truth you have ingaged your credit a little too farr upon their authority . sect. . but this is not all i have to say to you : the first fault of negligence and boldness , even in this kind , is perhaps pardonable in young men . but i beseech you sir , how could those solid , cleer-sighted persons , give you the confidence to impose so grosly upon us ? to state us here a question , of which the bull delivers not one word : of which cherubinus , to whom you appeal , makes not the least mention , and yet you confidently add , all learned writers agree . pag. . where if you had not named writers , i should have judged , you appeal'd to your solid clear-sighted friends : for in truth i cannot find any one learned writer who states , this your new question as then disputed or defined . and i cannot pardon this your so confident imposing on your reader ; you tell us , our present controversie , concerning the delivery of souls out of purgatory , stands not here defined , because the word purgatory , is not in the bull , ( however , it is sufficiently in the council , ) and the pope decrees of soul● now purged : and you require , pag. . the popes or councils positive is , or , is not : and unless i can shew this position in terms ▪ souls are purged before the day of judgment : i run a hazard to contradict both the pope and council . which how to excuse from nonsence , if compared with what you are pleased ou● of your kindness to allow , p. . that the pope was of the opinion that purgatory might be finished before the last day ( which could not be contradictory to his faith ) is past my skill . you know what it is to bring rods to whip himself . and can you have the confidence sir , to tell us , pag. . and elsewhere : the onely and sole controversie was : whether perfect charity brings an immediate heaven , and all that the pope intended to secure● by this present bull . whilst the word charity is not in the bull , whilst there is not the least mention of it , in the question even now related in spondanus , which occasioned this definition : whilst neither in the preface to the decree , nor in the decree it self , nor any thing that follows it , the pope pronounces of charity i , or no ; much less doth he declare either the affirmative or negative of this your new question , to secure it ; nor is there the least hint in cherurbinus of it , i gave my reader his whole compendium , that he might see , how far you were transported with the high esteem of your solid clear-sighted friends , when you appeal to him , who thus agreeing with the pope pronounces against you all . nor do your arguments drawn from holy desires , pag. . . or the future rewards and punishments which the pope so earnestly inculcates in his preface to this definition at all avail you . alas sir , the whole systeme of christian religion , every part and parcell of it , is directed , to plant , to kindle holy desires in our souls ; and yet i think you will not easily avow , there is nothing else defined , or recommended to us , in this whole fabrick , but purely and precisely , that perfect charity brings an immediate heaven ; nor will it be any plea for you , that this was then the question , because the pope ushers his definition with this exhortation to holy desires , ( which might very well and properly introduce any position of christian religion whatsoever , and peculiarly this , because by progress in vertue and holy desires , our endeavours are rendred more effectual for souls in that distressed condition ) as very neer allyed to his decrees , concerning the state of departed souls : for how neer a tye soever , the one hath to the other , though it were by an immediate , necessary , evident consequence , yet it is highly unlawful to change the state of the present question , and impose upon us , that not it , but some other , thus allyed to it , stands defined by the decree . when the church combated the eutychian heresie , which denyed two natures in christ , no christian dare affirm , it onely then defined the plurality of wills against the monothelites : because these two questions , have so necessary and immediate a connexion . and can you hope to perswade an ignorant reader , that when the pope defines : that after purgation , even before the re-assumption of their bodies , departed souls are received into heaven : he defines nothing at all about purgatory , but onely this , that perfect charity brings an immediate heaven ; though he hath not any thing like this position in his bull : and that this should be fixed on the pope , and cherubinus , and all learned authors to boote . i hope then sir , you will pardon my boldness , if i challenge you fairly with this : if you do not make it appear , by those unknown learned authors in terms , that yours was the question , and not that of purgatory , we shall judg you have wrong'd them as much , as now to our eyes , you have imposed on the pope , and cherubinus : and i justly challenge it of you , that you bring us it , in terms , and not by a consequence of a second or third remove , or else your sincerity in citing authors , will be highly questionable by your reader , or indeed now past question . and truly i wondred at the first perusal of this part of your book , why you should use this sleight to prepossess the unwary reader ; but afterwards by the rest of your discourse , i easily observed it was but made use of , to render , by this art of changing the question , a plawsible answer to this bull and council , otherwise unavoidable : and yet i discovered at last a further design , which no man but a prophet could have foreseen , to wit ; that you might fix upon your adversary , that he , not you , stands guilty of disowning these sacred authorities , and that forsooth , because he opposes the efficacy of holy charity , the queen of vertues , which you , and your master indeavour to sustain , of which your slye accusation i shall have occasion to speak hereafter , but i hope to render this your craft wholly unsuccessful . sect. . but how unfortunate a writer you are , will be rendred evident , and how unfit you are to catechise and instruct others , this grave and learned eymericus shall tell you , because you do not explicitely believe this doctrine of purgatory now in question . for having distinguished all the credibilia , or matters of faith , into three classes ( according to st. thomas ) and shewed what the vulgar and simple sort of christians , as also what superiours , prelates and doctours , are bound to believe both explicitely and implicit●ly he there concludes , concerning the middle sort of christians , under which name he comprehends , priests , cūrates , and all religious persons , who have undertaken to instruct the ignorant in faith , and good manners . the middle sorts ( sayes he ) who are to teach the simple people , are obliged to believe some of these points ( that is such as are determined , by the holy church in her councils and consistories ) explicitely : though not all these points singly , nor all these persons equally , but according to their several state and learning , whereby they are to instruct the ignorant : as for example , they are all bound to believe explicitely that the souls of just men departed without sin , as of little infants ; or if they have sinned , have here or in purgatory fully satisfied , are pass'd into heaven before the day of iudgment : according to the church's determination , making it a matter of faith , in the extravagant of pope benedict xii . beginning . blessed be god . sect. . and having said this as to the intention of the pope in our present bull , before i proceed further in your answer , let us take a short survey of the florentin council , of which i can not but blame you of neglect , in that you give your reader so slender an account : and if i must not flatter your sloth , i know not how otherwise to excuse it , then that you were not conversant at all in it ; and so you rested satisfied , with what your cleer-sighted friends told you , or cherubinus his , vbi hoc idem firmatum fuit : since ( if it were possible ) the council seems more full and home to our question . and first , in the third article which the publishers gave you it defines ; if truely penitent souls shall depart this life , before they have satisfied for their commissions and omissions , by worthy fruits of penance : that their souls are purged by the punishments of purgatory after their bodies death , &c. which doctrine can finde no admittance in your new modell ; for all the sufferings of souls , which you fancy by their irregular , and now unchangeable affections , avail nothing as to the purging or cleansing of souls in their state of separation : since that is wholly reserved , by you , to the change of those affections at the re-union . and secondly , when art . . upon this doctrine of the council so said down , it pursues to declare unto us : that souls which are purged either in their bodies , ar being uncloathed of their bodies ( as is above said ) are presently received into heaven . i would have you to observe , how this further doctrine of the delivery of them , and the compleating of this purging being uncloathed of their bodies , is by this parenthesis , as is above said , wholly built on the former doctrine , of the purging itself : and it will be unavoidable , since there is a purgation of souls by the punishments of purgatory against you ; that there also is as effectually concluded , a compleat purgation of them whilst uncloathed of their bodies , and an immediate delivery , perfectly condemning , and destructive of your doctrine in the very point in question . but that my reader may have a cleerer view of this unavoidable truth , let us set together , and compare this doctrine of the council with yours . the council defines , that truly penitent souls which depart this life before they have satisfied for their sins , are purged by the punishments of purgatory after death ; and being thus purged uncloathed of their bodies , are presently received into heaven . or as the pope more expresly pronounces : before the reassumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment . now how happily do you , and your new master agree with this doctrine , when you tell us , souls which depart this life with affections to corporal pleasures , suffer a vast grief , by reason those pleasures are now impossible to be enjoyed , but they are now in an unchangeable condition both as to the affections their torment , and the state it self . so that there is no hope they should ever be released before reunion with their bodies ; for though they suffer by their inordinate unchangeable affections , yet not possibly as to any purging or change of their state or sufferings , whilest uncloathed of their bodies ; and therefore can not presently , be received into heaven , or before the re-assumption of their said bodies , and the general day of iudgment . and i would have you further to observe and weigh the words ; sunt purgatae , are now purged , in the preterpersect tense , either in their bodies , ( which you do not deny compleatly perfected in some souls , in this life , ) or uncloathed of their bodies , which still irrationally , gratis , and wilfully you deny , though the council defines of both in the same form and style of words , sunt purgatae , they are now purged . which cleerly imports a purgation now past , and perfectly compleated . but we will take our rise a little higher , from the very process of both the greek and latin fathers in this business of purgatory , now assembled at ferrara , where this council ( though afterwards translated to florence and so is called the florentin council , ) began . for there in the very beginning of the council in order to this decree , this question of purgatory was handled . see tom . . concil. gen. oct. synod . quaestio de purgatorio . and both the latin and greek fathers lay down their several positions of purgatory . and first the latins thus begin . we do believe in this world , a purgatory fire : by which the souls guilty of lighter faults ( that is ) venial sins , are purged . for those who have confessed their sins , and have received the most sacred body of christ , and presently die before previous satisfaction : without doubt in the above-named fire , which is commonly called purgatory , are purged ; and together with the help of the church , the prayers of priests , masses , and alms , are expiated . after this the greeks lay down their perswasion of purgatory in this manner . we judge ( say they ) purgatory not to be a fire , but a darksome placee full of afflictions , in which souls now being , are deprived of divine light ; but that they are expiated and freed , from this darksome place and torments , by the help of the church , the prayers of priests , masses , alms , &c. now sir , it were beyond all the degrees of modesty to assert that the question of purgatory was not here disputed or defined : or that they talked onely of charity , as being an immediate disposition to bliss . and it is most cleer , that out of these several professions , in which both sides agreed against you , directly and home to our point in question , of an expiation and delivery from this purgatory ( either a fire , or a darksome place , ) issued out this definition ( being purged , uncloathed of this body , presently ) opposite to your errour . and i would have my reader to observe how positively , it was intended by the council , to deliver us the faith of the church conformable to the unanimous doctrine of both parties , both of the expiation or perfect purging of souls , when uncloathed of their bodies , and of their present delivery , whilest uncloated , for in all this , both the greek and latin fathers cleerly agreed , against this new school : which when he shall have considered , i doubt not but he will rest satisfied , it can not be an act of the vnderstanding , but of the will , which forces the word presently to signifie ( if it signifie any thing at all by these moderns ) at the day of iudgement , which was not the time , either the latin or greek fathers ever thought of , but of the intermediate time of separation , which is our business now in hand . but because this point is excellently well handled , by an eminently learned person of out nation , who with unavoidable strength pursues it more at large , in a paper which came lately to my hands , i will presume to give it my reader in his own words at the end of my discourse [ letter c. ] and further sir , for your more compleat and full satisfaction , since with confidence enough you strongly assert , that it is incomparably false , that either the pope or council ever intended to settle this point of the delivery of souls out of purgatory before reunion . i will add to the paper of this great divine , the answer of a school-fellow of yours , ( yet if i mistake not , a much better proficient , in your masters doctrine , certainly much more ingenuous ) who vanquished with the evidence of this truth , acknowledges , what indeed he could not with any modesty deny , that this your new doctrine of purgatory stands condemned by both the bull and council : and yet he was so captivated , that he endeavours to sustain it by other grounds , he had now learnt in your school . my reader shall find his letter at large , [ letter d. ] sect. . but before i pass any further , since i have already told you , that both master white , the author of this purgatory , and his abler scholars are armed against the authority both of popes and councils , it will not be out of my readers way , but very much conducing to my design of giving him a prospect of this school , if now by some short reflections on the doctrine delivered both by this ingenious gentleman , and master white himself , i make good that charge . for by them it will appear to what unavoidable exigencies , the defence of new fabricks in religion , drive those , who wedded to their preconceived phylosophical fancies , are resolved ro square their belief to them . this ingenuous scholar confesses , that truly according to the opinion that the holy ghosts assistance in councils and consistories it without restriction or limitation : the paper delivered [ letter c. ] seems to him to evidence a deliverance of souls out of purgatory , before the day of iudgment . but according to the opinion , that the assistance of the holy ghost , in councils and consistories , is no longer then there is a diligent search to find out what christ taught , and the apostles delivered as so taught ▪ there appears onely , that the council of florence and pope benedict , did think it to be so , which may raise opposition to a disobedience , but not to an heresie . &c. so that unless we shew that the council of florence and pope benedict determined conformably to tradition ; mr. blacklowes ( that is master whites ) calling the doctrine and practice new , will not savour the least of heresie , &c. but foreseeing the strange consequences of this doctrine , he therefore adds , this puts all to a loss ; for how shall it be known , that councils and consistories apply themselves aright ? easily ( says he ) by examining tradition of what you have seen and heard . this is the common light , and plain way promised , to keep even fools from straying from christs doctrine . thus he . now sir this exterminating doctrine was learnt in master whites school , where it is but too too frequent . and first , as to the infallibility of the pope , without which no submission , as to faith , can take place . master white * ( now being constituted by god a speculatour ) proclaims against it with sound of trumpet , and tells us , that to maintain the pope to be infallible , is heretical . son . bu● . and tabulae suffragiales , tab. . nay archiheretical , tab. . nay the most horrid of all sins , the sin of sins ; and for fear we should want examples , worse then violating sacred virgins on altars ; then treading the ever b. sacrament of christs body , under foot ; or bringing the turk or antichrist , into the christian dominions . son . buc. tract. . § . . tab. suff. tab. . and having thus rid his hands of the pope , he proceeds against the infallibility of the councils , in his tab. suff. tab. . this being his signal doctrine . non est impossibile , &c. it is not impossible that the pope or council should attempt to establish that , ( as now of faith , which was some time before not of faith ) and by that very attempt fall into an error , and even promulgate that error , &c. and further he tells us , as to a certain prophetick inspiration immediately and miraculously , enlightning the council or pope , if constantly and by the ordinary law of god it be asserted to be required ; it is altogether fabulous , and asserted without any solid ground . thus he . upon these grounds ( i say ) did this good proficient in this his masters school , endeavour to sustain your otherwaies ruinous fabrick of purgatory ; for in truth there is no other means left to support it , but by the destruction of all the authority of both popes and councils to deliver us our holy faith . and now i desire my reader to consider , ( for his just and full satisfaction of the design of this school ) that if these grounds be once admitted , christian faith , ( which they now combat , ) is a meer mockery . for if after all the canons of councils , all the anathmaes pronounced against any opinion , ( the very anathema it self carrying with it , and being an exercise of that power , invested in the church to oblige us to submission and beleef , ) it still remains to be showen , that the pope or council determined conformably to tradition , or else master whites styling the doctrine and profession new , will not savour the least of heresie ; or that it is not impossible , a council may err , and promulgate an errour , we are at an irrecoverable loss : for no catholick claims any other assurance of his faith , then upon this firm foundation , that our holy mother the church , is his infallible directress . that the councils her mouth are the unerring deliveres of truth . which if it stand no firm absolutely , but upon a supposition of a due application ( it being impossible we should have any higher or more authentique proof , of this supposition , then the council it self ) there is no security , no assurance left of any thing delivered by them . not so ( says he ) we may easily know , when councils and consistories apply themselves aright , by examining tradition , of what we have seen and heard . and shall i a private an illiterate christian ( not yet acquainted with these solid and cleer-sighted persons ) recall all the decrees of councils to a new examine ? is there still a higher court , to which i may and ought to appeal , from their sentence , as to a superiour iudg and umpire over them ? shall i take this liberty upon me , to censure their proceeds , to admit , to reject their definitions , as my weakness shall find them consonant to , or dissonant from , what i have seen and heard ? and if they were to receive their approbation from this court : how can i ( unless a senseless pride blind me ) hope , that my industry in the search , my ability to find , shall not only equallize , but even exceed that of five hundred , perhaps a thousand bishops and prelates , and the scrutiny of numberless divines , assisting them in this inquest ? and even to ease us of this sollicitude , you see what exact care is taken , in these proceeds . pope benedict here tells you of the holy church , that she teaches nothing rashly , brings in nothing unwarily , introduces nothing in faith unadvisedly . and hence it is that all such sacred decisions are still ushered in , with some such expressions as these . after an humble invocation of the holy ghost . after a careful examination of the matter . after a dilige●● deliberation with our brethren , &c. but if all this sollicitude in truth , signifie nothing , if we must not acquiesce here , but re-examine all in a higher tribunal ; i● not this the utter extermination of all that authority we hitherto have believed the church is furnished with , to deliver us our holy faith ? is not this to resolve finally ( en dernier resort , ) our creed into our own brests , to make every idle head competent judge of popes , councils , consistories , all ; and them judges of just nothing ? wherein do those loose bands of disagreeing protestants , all disagree from us , and all agree against us , but in this that we acquiesce and submit to the holy church , as the faithful keeper and dispenser of our faith , and tradition ; and so submit , that from her sentence we admit no appeal , against her decrees , we admit no contradiction , whilst they by a supereminent pride , assume to themselves a power to judg this pillar of truth , and resolve all into their own capriccioes , private reason , spirit , fancies , pride , and nothing . and yet i pray you consider whether by this appealing from the church to tradition ; what we have seen and heard : we are not sunk into a deeper sink of errour , of independancy , then they ? for they appeal to scripture , which ( though irrationally ) they accept as canonical ; they admit their translations as authentick , and contest the sense onely with the church , whilst this doctrine affoords us a far more full and ample reserve to evacuate all faith at our pleasures : since it is still in our power , and we competent judges , what is tradition ; what not : where the council proceeded with due application upon the depositum of faith , where upon the uncertain wavering opinions of schoolmen , or pretended assistance of the holy ghost : which extends to creeds , catechismes , definitions , yea , the very canon of scriptures , and indeed all that any way belongs to christian religion . nor will it avail , if this gentleman , should tell me , that i do him wrong to rank his doctrine with that of the protestants , or indeed hold it worse then theirs , for the protestants down right tell us the church hath erred de fact● in these & these points in particular . he and master white more modestly and shily mince the matter , and teach us that possibly onely , or not impossibly , the council may err , and promulgate an errour . and perhaps he will say that these inconveniencies are saved , by this his succeeding doctrine in the same place . tab. . for there having delivered this his doctrine against the infallibility of councils , he presently adds : but it is impossible that such an errour ( thus promulg'd by the council ) should pass into an establisht doctrine of the church , and be accepted as a doctrine delivered by the fathers , and preached by christ . for as to the first , it will presently appear even in this our question , that if their new model of purgatory be subsistent , not only possibly , or not impossibly , but de facto , the florentin council and church hath erred in this particular . and since to say , even not impossibly the council may err , the foundation of all assurance is now pulled up ; i know not but this doctrine is as high , and higher independancy then theirs : and as to those words of master whites . i answer , that they notwithstanding , it is still in his power by his former doctrine ( that it is not impossible the council may err , and promulgate an error ) to evacuate all the canons of all the councils at his pleasures ; for however the authority of the council now stands ingaged in the definition of any doctrine : however the decree is now published to the whole world , however the church accept of the decree , however all catholiques submit to the decree , yet it remains still in his power to say , it never passed into an established doctrine of the church , whilest he , or his cleer-sighted scholars intend to shake it . and how far this his reserve of an establisht doctrine , delivered by fathers , and preached by christ , extends , will sufficiently appear in his very attempt of the faith of the church in our question of purgatory . ( for i have reason to beleeve , he had a special regard to his beloved purgatory , when he renounced thus the authority of councils . ) the consciences of all the illiterate catholiques bear witness , that the delivery of souls from purgatory , is now their received faith , from their present pastors and teachers ; no divine but knows , that for three hundred years and upwards , ever since the promulgation of pope benedict his bull , no orthodox writer but submits to his decree as unquestionable : master white himself tells us , that st. gregory the great was the first founder of that faith ( we now fight for ) a thousand years ago , pursued and sustained by the numberless number of incomparably eminent doctors and saints . in sum , if there be any article of our faith witnessed , any establisht , it is this : not any one carrying after it a more ample continued practise , not any one testified by so many foundations , prayers , masses , almes , &c. as this . and yet this is no establisht doctrine of the church : it is not a truth delivered by fathers , as preacht by christ . and therefore he being overwhelmed with the consent of the whole church for a thousand years , appeals with the protestants to the primitive ages immediate to christ ; their plea and his being just the same , differing onely in this , that they say , the substance of purgatory is not the establisht doctrine of the church as delivered by fathers , preacht by christ : he , that the delivery of souls from thence , is not even yet established . sect. . this doctrine then is not the way ( as our ingenious scholar says ) to keep fools from straying , but the way to make fools stray , and supposes a high folly in him who accepts it ; who leaves the received doctrine of the holy church , to gadd after new models of a modern divine . but the way to keep both fools and wise men from straying , is that which all the wise men in the world have hitherto followed , to acquiesce , to submit , to the church , the pillar of truth , without further dispute or reserve , without further examination of her decrees , by what we have seen and heard . we know assuredly , that he shall never have god his father in heaven , who hath not the church his mother on earth . and how injurious would he shew himself ( sayes the pious emperour marcianus ) to the most reverend synod , who should attempt to question anew , and publickly dispute and controvert such points as are once judged and rightly determined . for who will grant ( says pegna ) more authority to the opinions of single persons disputing of faith , according to their own fancy , then to the definitions of councils lawfully called and congregated , where the fathers hearts are governed by the holy ghosts dictamen . t is already excellently well decreed , for many reasons , that things once defined should be no more called in question . for if such doctrines as are thus constituted and decreed , should be again brought under doubt and disputation ; surely no iudgment or sanction would remain firm and strong against any errours what soever : every establisht truth and definition of the church being troubled afresh with the same furies . thus gelasius the first related by gratian . by which my reader will observe , how far a different road , that ancient piety of christians , walkt in , to heaven , then what is now chalked out to us , by this school armed against the authority of popes and councils . sect. . but before i leave this point , i will mind my reader , that if it were ( as he supposes it ) lawfull , for every man to call the decrees of popes and councils to a new trial by this touchstone of tradition , by asking his very question , what we have seen and heard ? my adversary hath lost his cause . for to this question , being proposed in our present controversie of purgatory , what can we with truth answer ; but that we have seen innumerable masses , dirges , alms , & c ? and that we have constantly heard , that souls are delivered out of purgatory by these powerfull helps , before the day of iudgment ? and what can we with truth answer ; but that we have hitherto beleeved this ; and if we are still our selves , and are not so inconstant as to be carried away wi●h the wind of a new doctrine , we do beleeve it , and shall continue to believe it . and for the proof of this assertion , i appeal safely even to the consciences of those few proselytes this new master , master white , hath gained : whether till of late this new systeme of purgatory came to light , they ever entertained the least doubt of it ? whether it were not their full perswasion ? a doctrine which they beleeved to have been delivered with as firm and constant an authority , as any other whatsoever ? whether ever they divided this , from the rest of their faith , and allowed it a less degree of assurance onely , as of opinion ? nor will it avail my adversary to say , that it was indeed his full perswasion , bu● not his beleef ; he never understood it , ( though delivered to him from his present pastors ) as the faith of the church , but onely as the generally received opinion of divines : and that in truth he never ranked it among the articles of his creed , but in a lower form , of i know not what consent of schoolmen . for the experience of all mankind will refute this falshood . and confident i am , if a long perswasion of his now received doctrine hath not effaced the memory of his past disposition of soul , his own conscience bears witness against him . for as to the whole universality of catholiques , they still assert and sustain this faith ; they hear not of this novelty without horrour . and for that handfull of persons who are ( thanks be to god ) not one in a million , who have of late embraced the contrary : let them ( for it highly concerns them ) duely examine their consciences , whether the private esteem of their master , master white , the authour of this doctrine ; the comfortable new apprehensions he introduces , in lieu of that great terrour and fear they before were in , of the sufferings of that state : the easing their consciences from the incumbent care of assisting their departed friend● , ( for all this is immediately wrought by an acceptance of this position ) hath not wrought upon their inconstancy to abandon the tents of the church , and to list themselves in this new squadron , to impugn their pious mother : to forsake a formerly received beleef , now to adhere to a new doctrine , which certainly at the first proposal checkt their former perswasion , the holy faith planted in their souls . nor ▪ hath the contrary assertion any thing but a bold confidence to warrant it ; for we know , we feel , we experience in our selves this beleef . we do beleeve the councils can not misguide us . we do beleeve the delivery of souls , before the day of iudgment . this is our faith as firm as a rock , not to be shaken by all the sophistry of the world . if it were possible ( as certainly it is not possible ) that it could be evidenced that our faith of both these is erroneous : yet certainly it could never carry any f●ce of probability , that we have not hitherto , or even yet do not beleeve them ; every man being furnisht within his own brest , with an irrefragable witness , stronger then all the wit and logick of the world . the protestants face us down that we make idols of ●●ictures , against our own souls and knowledge : what impudence is this ? and shall this new school have the confidence , against all mens experience , thus to give the lye to the consciences of the whole christian world ? so that i hope my reader rests satisfied , that even this cour● ( to which he appeals ) hath given sentence against him , even by this question , what we have seen and heard . and how happily hath this our great master , master white arraigned himself ( as the first author of our new purgatory , or any other the first bro●cher of a new doctrine ) under the person of luther . sonus buccinae tract. . § . viii . before the tribunal of his bishop , or a nuntius of the apostolick see . that his own condemnation might be the more solemn , and the sentence pronounced against himself conceived in his own words : thus then he makes luthers , and his own process ; and let him be asked ( sayes he ) of the doctrine of which he stands suspected ( and much more if now he hath sustained in print ) whether he believes ( this his new doctrine of purgatory ) to be that doctrin which this present age he now lives in , received from their fathers , of the immediate foregoing age ? whether he received it in his childhood , when he was first instructed in christian belief , and which , till he now became a doctor , he followed ? and let him answer for himself ( for what other answer can he make ) then that ( this his new broached purgatory ) is not that doctrin he thus was taught , whilst he was yet a child : but that it is better doctrine then the former , which he himself hath now evinced out of sacred monuments : heathen poets , out of the bowels and principles of nature , by demonstration , and that the contrary doctrine to which he had been bred , took its rise onely from ignorance of the nature of separated substances . and let the faithfull people ( says he ) encompass the tribunal , now educated in this faith , that the authority of things which 〈◊〉 stand bound to beleeve , descends , handel down from christ our b. saviour , and is otherwise , even till this age : will they n● cry out upon him as an innovatour , a prophane person , an heretick : will they not proclaim and invoque to prisons , fire , with him ; to rid such a plague out of the world ? and he pursues . but let the people be silent , and let the iudge ●erge him . and do you not know , sir , this new doctrine fights against the known laws of your country ? that such an author as you are first thrust out of the sacred communion of the faithful , should expiate or pay for this his presumption with death ? do you not know that you now fight against the fathers and monuments of antiquity ? that you combate an immemorable custome ? that you now impugne that reverence due to our most dear parents ; by whom above all things else , the contrary doctrine ( of purgatory ) is recommended to us as most profitable both for soul and body ? and since it can not with any face be denyed , but that he knows he contends against all these : let the iudg further urge him . from whence sir can you hope to draw any argument of that evidence , which may inforce us and other prudent men to follow this noveltie with an obdurate soul ? and let him answer that out of the scriptures . and the iudg reply ; and do not you know , that wilfully you inhere to holy scriptures ? do you not know that words , do not signifie naturally , but by institution ? and therefore the construction of words is sub●ect to such variety , that it is impossible to pick out any sence demonstratively , at least any one expresly repugnant to the doctrine of so many wise men , who all of them indeavour the understanding of those sacred texts as well as you . or can you pretend christian faith is directed by the ●ables of heathen poets , or that you now can demonstratively shew out of the principles of reason , that to be false , which we all have with unavoidable authority , hitherto believed to be true ; or that you now have attained to such a cleer understanding of the nature of separated souls , that all the learning of mankind before you , could not reach that , which now you pretend to have demonstratively and scientifically proved ? is it not evident ( sayes he ) that this large-wide mouth'd gaping promiser will produce nothing worthy the hearing , but must needs b● esteemed as a meer frantick and mad person ? as he who vaunts , he will do that , which all learned men know is impossible , and the very unlearned see is improbable . and further he pursues ; let the same , or another writer , ( sayes he ) being now unmindful of his own weakness , imagin to himself , that either by his own reason , or explication of scriptures , he hath now found out that which all former ages were ignorant of ( to wit ; that now in the third age or mans estate of the church , we shall be directed by faith no longer 〈…〉 for the future by his demonstrations , which is the position of this our master , as we shall presently see . ) and that this truth was left by god to him , to be revealed and manifested to the church : of which position the vulgar christians , as a sluggish cattel not at all given to speculation know nothing , and so he contemns them ; he laughs at the doctours , he styles the saints lyars , because men : but that he himself is the first to whom god hath made known so great a mystery . but though he be a most arrogant person , let him weigh with him , and consider : though i have hitherto contemplated this sublime and happy truth : but when i come to propose this doctrine to others , they will presently object , and ask whether christian faith hath any other ground of its security then a continued succession through all ages to our present time ? do you sir promise this new light , of science , of demonstration ? if i deny it , will they not presently hiss me out ? will they not cry out to the faggot with me ? and shall we believe that in such a disposition of the faithful people , that ( such an innovatour ) will dare to print or publish his novelty ▪ or that he shall hope to find either buyers of his book , or followers of his doctrine , thus he . and thus sir , your great master pleads the cause , and arraigns himself , and all the proselytes of his new purgatory , thus he thunders and lightens , and i think home to our purpose , for the consciences of all the faithful bear witness against it , the unlearned know it is improbable , and the learned see it is impossible . having said this to the ingenuous gentleman , the author of that letter , who is a very able proficient in this new school . i hope he will pardon me , if i make his letter publick without his name : i hope these short reflections on his and his masters grounds , without which he acknowledges this purgatory can not be sustained , will prove an effectual admonition to him , both to see and repent , that he hath entred himself a scholar into this dangerous school , and therefore out of hand to withdraw his name . sect. . and now sir i hope this better proficients judgment will be of some weight , since he is your school-fellow . i think an unprejudiced understanding will be convinced , by that evidence i have already brought : the undoubted intention of the pope was , to deliver us our holy faith , in all the several conditions of souls , which depart this mortal life , either in the state of grace , or out of it ; either which need , or need not any purgation in the next life , and for the council , besides the strength of words of the decree , the very process of it , the several doctrines of the latine and greek churches in order to this decree , will evince that their intentions reach as home , to our purpose , as their words . but because the reverend esteem of ●●ur new master , and of those solid , and cleer-sighted persons stop your eares against the voice of the church : let us try that musick which certainly would cure you of this tarantula . what if we could obtain your new master to plead on the behalf of that faith we now maintain ? this certainly would prevail : let us attempt it then ; if you are not as yet so good a proficient in your new school , that you are ready to believe , the council erred in this particular question of purgatory : i doubt not to conclude you out of your masters own grounds . master white then layes you down this fundamental doctrine . the church ( sayes he ) in her definitions of faith proceeds onely on tradition : and declares to us , that depositum of faith , which was handed down from christ , and his apostles , by an innumerable number of fathers and pastors , to their numberless children and flock , through age to age , even to any one detèrminate moment . when then any controversie is to be decided , and a council is summoned to declare our faith ; what course is then taken ? surely no other then this . the fathers there gathered , lay down that faith thus handed down to them , which they received from their precedent teachers , and was commended to them to deliver to posteri●y , as a sacred treasure not to be violated , since it is their light , their guide in their way to heaven . this doctrine presupposed ; let it not be denyed , but the florentin council proceeded in that very way he hath chalked out for them , in our present question , and my work is done . let us take a view of the council . both the greek and latine fathers meet first at ferrara , afterwards at florence ; their business there is to declare the faith of the church , concerning the state of souls which depart this life ; and in particular , concerning the souls which are detained in purgatory : both sides lay down their hitherto received faith , in order to a decision . let us see how happily they agree with this new molded purgatory . and first as to the latins . they ●elieve a purgatory fire directly against master white , who pretends to demonstate , that no material agent can work upon the soul in its state of separation ; they believe that souls guilty of venial impurities , are purged by this fire , directly against master white who holds ; there is no purging of the soul in the state of separation , neither by fire , nor not by fire ; for this is reserved to the reunion , when her now torment , her irregular affections shall be changed . they believe that souls there detained , by this fire together with the help of the church , the prayers of the priests , masses , almes , &c. are expiated . directly against master white , in the point in question , both as to the indivisible duration of the state , he pretends to demonstrate , and the unchangeableness of it , and the continuation of it till the day of iudgment . being thus unfortunate with the latins , who must needs have thrust this new school out of their communion ; let us see what favour it would find with the greeks . these then profess this belief : that souls there , are detained in a darksome place . directly against master white , who holds that souls in the state of separation doe not only abstract from place , but comprehend , and are in some manner governours , of all place : they believe souls are expiated and freed , directly against master white , who holds there is no expiating and freeing of souls , but at re-union with their bodies ; they believe souls are freed by the prayers and sacrifices of priests , almes , &c. directly against master white , in all the wayes before mentioned , both as to his indivisible measure , or duration of souls , the unchangeableness of their state , and the continuation of it , till the day of iudgment . and most especially both sides unanimously agree against him , in asserting the efficacy of prayers , and sacrifices of the priests , for the dead ; for in his new systeme ( as shall be evidenced hereafter ) these endeavours advantage not the souls any thing at all . what wonder then , if out of both the greek and latin professions , thus directly opposite to him , should issue out a decree directly destructive of this his machin : or whilst neither part would admit him into their communion ; they should conspire to destroy his errour . the sacred council approving : we define ( say they ) that the souls of them , who after baptisme received , have contracted no blemish of sin , as also those souls , who after they have contracted the blemish of sin , are purged either in their bodies , or being uncloathed of their said bodies , are presently received into heaven . what wonders is it , we should have a purging of souls uncloathed of their bodies , and a p●esent translation into heaven , in which both sides agreed against him , destructive of all this new doctrine ? and truly what to answer to this evidence but by those other grounds , that the council did not proceed with due application , and so erred ; i cannot imagine . and now i think i have fulfilled my promise to my reader , that either this new model of purgatory cannot subsist , or else the council , in our very point in question , hath not only possibly , or not impossibly , but de facto proceeded to an erroneous definition ; de facto by this attempt hath fallen into an errour , and de facto publisht it to the world . and the church which hath constantly imbraced this faith , hath de facto erred as well as it . and now i hope your peremptory when , hath received its answer , your so many times reiterated question . when is this purgation perfected , comp●eated , ended ? take the popes answer ( since i hope you are not so good a proficient as to detest and abhominate his authority , to teach you faith , ) before the resumption of their bodies , and the general day of iudgment : let the council satisfie you , ( if you are not poysoned with that detestable doctrine that it may err too , as well as the pope ) being purged , even uncloathed of their bodies , presently . agree and reunite your self to the catholick church , and be refractory no longer upon the itch of novelties , of seeming wiser then all the christian world ever was before you . sect. . but still you bite the bridle ; these words so directly opposite to your errour , are in these sacred decisions : there they are , and there they must remain , maugre the gates of hell which shall never prevail against this faith ; and when you have turned your self into all your postures , you appear with this pitiful evasion ; these words are ●here indeed , but ( say you , pag. . &c. ) they reach not home to our point : the popes ante reassumptionem , &c. before the reunion , depends on the precedent words ; when after death they shall be purged , and after the aforesaid purgation , which words also should have stalked in great letters ; this purgation is indeed supposed , but no way defined : and for the councils , presently , it also depends on the foregoing words ; being purged , uncloathed , &c. which presupposes a purgation held by some divines , in the state of separation , but no way decrees it ; and since the question was not then of the truth of this supposition , ( as now it is , ) but that then it was admittted without more adoe ; you grant us , that in that supposition those words passed into the pope and councils decrees : the pope indeed was of the opinion , that the purgation ●f souls might be compleated in the state of separation ; but what does that concern you : you lawfully dissent from his opinion if you find reason , but not from his faith : where he opin●s , you follow him as far as his reason leads ; but where he defines you submit . now sir as to this , i wondered at your last word submit , for i understand not you , if you understand your master . we are here in a business of faith , and certainly you pass a very handsome complement upon the pope , when you tell him you submit to his definitions : if this be real , ( since your submission in faith can not be grounded but upon the supposition that he is infallible ; ) your master will instantly discard you out of the school : for an heretick an arch-heretick ; for an introducer of antichrist into christendome : this censure he hath fixt on this doctrine , as i have told you before . but as to your plea , though ( to use your own phrase ) it is incomparably false , as is before evinced ; nor can it according to your masters own grounds take place in the council , where they proceed upon the depositum of faith : yet to give you that satisfaction , we will joyn issue in this your subtility , as if your plea were allowable . and in truth , when you say that they proceeded on this as a supposition onely , yonr moderate reader will much blame the boldness of this attempt , because it will leave very ill consequences behind it ; and besides he will tell you , that you had a very great disesteem both for the pope● and council : and that you fancied them to be admirably ridiculous persons ▪ who should proceed to definitions of faith , to declar● us articles of our belief , which regulate so much practis● , on suppositions , not only false but impossible . the whole christian world was in labour about the state of souls in purgatory , the east and western churches meet , the diligent scru●iny of divines make a search into all libraries , papers , scrowls : and after all these throwes , the issue is , n●nsensical definitions upon not onely ridiculous and false , but impossible suppositions . if they had troubled their heads , to tell us that when the sky falls , we shall catch larks : it had been tollerable ; the supposition had been foolish , not impossible : but to tell us , and make ●uch a putther to tell us , when you remaining yet what you are , shall become an angel ? what then shall happen : when indeed nothing shall happen , or any thing may happen , is to render the supream pastor of the church , the sacred assemblies of ●h● shepheards of our souls a laughing stock to children . and yet this is our very case according to you ; for upon this bare and impossible supposition ; that the purgation of separated souls might be compleated before reu●ion , issued this impossible doctrine , that they were presently , and before the day of iudgment received into heaven . and if you had but weighed those very examples you use ( pag. . . ) you would have observed this . what sense will this bear ? a prisoner when acquitted by proclamation , becomes a free-man : or fire applyed to combustible matter presently burns ; if it be absolutely impossible the prisoner should ever be acquitted by proclamation , or that fire should ever be applyed to combustible matter ? what practise can we regulate by such positions ? and yet your self had a ●winkling light of it p. . for having asked your friend , when you should see him in the coantry ? you complain of his canting answer , when he tells you , as soon as he comes down , he will visit you , since ( as you say ) it was the confidence of this , which made you inquire the other we must be confident then of the supposition , or else what is drawn out of it , is nothing . if it were impossible , your time should ever be out , under this your new master , your setting up a new school for your self , would signifie nothing , if it be impossible that you should ever hav● performed your previous exercises , your presently proceeding doctour would be out of doors . so ●hat without being an oedipus , if the supposition ( as you will needs have it ) that souls may be purged uncloathed of their bodies , be impossible , the definitions both of the ●ope and councill are more silily ridiculous , then any fable in aesop or ovid , for in these there is still some morall or physicall mystery coucht for our instruction , in them nothing at all . but how do you parrallel pag , . your adversaries proceed , in obscuring some words in an obscure letter , or render it worse , then if he should set in cpaital letters , christ is not risen from the dead , and our preaching is vain , in lieu of these words of st. paul : if christ is not risen from the dead : then our preaching is vain , the cases being so far different : for here st. paul out of one absurdity which his adversary admitted , deduces an other absurdity , and presses it against him . and i pray you , when you write again , tell us , whether the councill and pope dispute here only , and define nothing , or whether they argue only as st. paul did : if souls be purged , uncloathed of their bodies , they presently are received into heaven before iudgment : both which according to you , are impossible . and yet , sir , i applaud your conceit as pretty , to possess your reader , that the pope and councill does not only not define against you , but indeed define nothing at all , and only dispute against your adversary , pressing out of one impossibility , which he admits , an other which follows it . but you tell us , p. . and that very truly , that among the divines in the schools , many times such impossible suppositions are sta●ed , to clear a point in question . and yet you are somewhat unfortunate in your examples ; for in this example you bring , if iudas had repented heartily , god had been merciful to him : this is so far from being a question , that no christian can hold the negative . and for your other , if there had been no trinity , there had been no incarnation . the supposition indeed is impossible : but i would willingly know , what divine disputes it : since it is impossible , we can have any light ; that in case there should be but one person in god , he would not have taken humane nature upon him . but though your questions be indisputable , others upon impossible suppo●itions are : where the question cleers a formality which depends not on the impossibility of the supposition , ( fo● so it would be nothing ) but might be proposed in possible terms , though not so justly home to our understandings . as for example , the divines dispute , whether if the holy ghost did not proceed from the son , he would be distinguisht from the son ? which question is no way impertinent : it bearing this sense in other words , whether the procession of the holy ghost from the son , be the precise reasen of the distinction between those two persons ? and so for our better comprehension of this nicity , is stated in that impossible supposition . but though this and the like nice subtilities may be●it metaphysicall schoolmen , yet with reasou you were shye , and therefore tell us , p. . however it may suit with the gravity of the supreme pastors decrees , to proceed on such metaphysicall nicityes : whilst in truth , without these mealy mouth'd excuses you should have plainly told us , that both the pope and councill proceeded on such quiddities , however it beseemed , or misbeseemed their gravities , or else you tell us nothing as to your purpose of building these definitions upon impossible suppositions : much less will it be to our purpose to tell us , that perfect charity brings an immediate heaven ; which is not ours ; nor the popes question , ●in which he was , as you would perswade us , to ennmerate all possible and imaginary cases : and yet you would possess your reader , as if those sacred assemblies , who are to deliver the world that faith which is to regulate the practice of all and every christian , should proceed onely on these niceties and formalities of school-men : for you insinuate , p. . that the pope spake onely to them : as if we were bound to beleeve in our metaphysical disputes in the schools , whatsoever our practise be out of them . and yet all our practise of devotions for the dead , stands on the firmness of this doctrine : which if built on an impossible supposition , these formalities can regulate just nothing . so that the objection you made to your self , still remains in full force : that this is but an evasion , which gratis , and without any ground you make use of , to evade an otherwise unavoidable authority . i can not then but lament the misfortune of that age , that this school was not then opened , or hearkened unto ; that you your self were not called to counsel in this business : it would have saved both the pope , and councils credit ; you had quickly taught them what suppositions to make ; what decisions to build on them , and much more effectually ; one thomas the englishman , appearing from the east of the trinobants , had put a stop to this torrent . my reader himself will easily observe , what a wide gate is laid open by this sphistry , to evacuate the rest of that bull , nay , the most of our holy faith , and doctrine of manners . wha● if another trinobant should rise and assert , that it is not possible any souls of just men can pass out of this life , without need to be purged in the next : what could this bull avail against him , though he should accept it ? what can this definition , that such souls passe immediately to heaven , be of force against him , whom my adversary hath furnisht with this ready answer : it depends on a false supposition● the opinion , not the faith , of the pope . what if an other should sustain , that it is not possible any soul should leave this life in mortal sin : what could he be concerned in this decree : that such descend immediately to hell : whilest to him this doctrine is built , on a false supposition , the opinion , not the faith of the pope . and in our other beleef , what if a new imp of hell should arise , and admit onely a metaphorical , and not a real son in divinis : how could this blasphemy be repressed by consubstantialem patri , in the sacred nicene creed , whilest he is ready furnisht with his answer ; this depends on this false supposition , that ●here is a real son , which i deny . and in our doctrine of manners , what if the same miscreant should say , that a moderate affection to a concubine , is a less crime then ●n immoderate love to a wife , as less intangling our souls and hindring their pursuit of the divine love : what could the contrary faith of all the christian world , or the doctrine of christ , saying , if thou wilt enter into life , keep the commandments , avail against him , who hath his answer ready , that this faith and doctrine depends on this supposition , that god hath forbidden the one , and not the other ; whilst in truth , god hath neither commanded , nor forbidden any thing at all . sect. . and now having answered this , i know not any thing else , thar carries any appearance of strength in your book : so that i might fairly take leave of this subject : but i will not be a niggard to my reader , i design to give him a cleerer view of your school , this will serve as an introduction to those further discoveries i design for the future . and as to our present business of purgatory ; my reader may perhaps have met this new model , sustained in english : he hath perhaps heard , that the faith we here fight for , is but a late device brought into the church by st. gregory the great , the glorious apostle of our now unhappy nation , pursued by venerable bede , odilo , and a long catalogue of eminent . saints and doctors , since that time , and so took its rise and continued support , by pi●us , but sillily credulous monks : for all those lights of the church are most severely whipt for their foolish credulity of dreams , fansies , melancholy apprehensions , and nothings . and besides , because it is provoked ( after the mode of our late cast-aways in faith ) to the primitive ages immediate to christ : i will ( for my readers just satisfaction ) give him two or three of the most eminently learned fathers of those ages , to which they appeal , and the rather because it will appear how far different their sentiments were , both as to the substance of those sufferings , as well as to the co●tinuation of them , from those of this modern school . let great st. augustine stand in the front . we may not doubt ( says he ) but that the dead are helped by the prayers of the holy church , and by the wholsome sacrifice , and by the almes , which are distributed for their souls , &c. for this is a doctrine delivered by the fathers , and observed by the whole church . and afterwards ; now when works of mercy are performed for their assistance ; who doubts but that they help them , for whom prayers are not in vain offered up , to the divine majesty ? &c. this place i choose to stand in the front , because it strongly asserts the essence of purgatory derived by tradition from the fore-fathers , and observed by the whole church , and because it is so home to the relief , those souls receive by our prayers and alms. and now this great father having told us , what he hath thus received as to the substance , let him also tell us what he hath received as to their sufferings there , and continuation of them . let no man say , i care not how long i must tarry in the way , if at last i come to aeternal life ; let no one say so , ( dear brethren ; ) for surely , that purgatory fire will be more severe then any punishment which can be felt or imagined in this world . and again : according to the greatness of the sin , shall be the length of the stay . and again : we must so long remain in that purgatory fire , until the aforesaid small sins ( as it were chips , hay , straw ) are consumed . let us add to him , learned origen , more ancient then st. augustine ; who though he afterwards erred , yet in all points stood cleer , when he writ those learned commentaries i here cite . the nature of the sin ( says he ) is like the matter which is consumed by the fire , which as the apostle affirms , is built by sinners : who upon the foundation of christ , build wood , hay , stubble : whereby is plainly declared , that some sins are so light , as they may be compared to stubble , to which if fire be applied , it can not stay long in it : other sins are like hay , which the fire also consumes without much difficulty ; though it stayes somewhat longer then in the stubble : and other sins are compared to wood , in which , according to the quality of the crimes , the fire finds a lasting and great substance to feed upon . thus therefore each sin , according to its quality or quantity , is punished ; but for how long time , or how many ages this purgation ( which is by the punishm●nt of fire ) shall endure ; he alone knows , to whom the father hath committed all iudgment . let 's hear pious and learned s. greg. nyss. in that excellent disputation he had with h●s sister macrina . as they who purge gold , ( saves he ) from its drossie mixture by the fire , do not onely melt that which is adulterate , but must of necessity melt that also , which is pure , together with the counterfeit , bad , and corrupted matter ; which corruption being consumed , the gold remains purified : in like sort , it is also necessary , that whilst the naughtiness and corruption is consuming in the fire of purgatory ; the soul , which is united to this naughtiness and corruption , must continue in the fire until that adulterate , gross , impure , and corrupt matter , be wholly abolisht and consumed , &c. wherefore the torment and sorrow there suffered , is measured by the quantity of the vitiosity ( as he terms it ) and naughtiness , which is found in each one of the sufferers . for it is not meet , that both of them , to wit , he who for a long time hath wallowed in forbidden evils , and he who hath faln into certain mean offences , should be equally tormented and afflicted , by the purgation of his vi●ious custome , and habitude : but proportionably to the measure and quantity of the matter , shall that pain-bringing flame be inkindled , to continue for a longer or shorter space of time , according as it shall find fewel to nourish it . the soul therefore that is clogg'd with a great inherent burthen of matter , must necessarily suffer a great and longer induring flame , which may waste that matter : but the soul to which that consuming fire is applied for a less space of time , the p●nishment doth remit , so much of its vehement and severe operation , by how much the subject hath a less measure of corruption , vitiosity , and naughtiness to be consumed . i hope , sir , when you have perused and duely weighed the how long which rendred st. augustine so sollicitous , his length of the stay , in propottion to the greatness of the sin : the whose analogy of wood , hay , stubble , ( in which st. paul had before delivered this doctrine of purgatory ) exactly answered by the time of their sufferings , in origen : his how long time , how many ages : the whole design of st. greg. nyssen in his discourse , his kindling the flame for a longer , or shorter time : his so many times repeated a great and longer induring flame : his apply'd for a less space of time , you will see those ages to which you appeal , had far other apprehensions of purgatory then are consistent with your new systeme ; and perhaps a modest christian divine would have blusht to pronounce , that all these apprehensions proceed but out of ignorance of the nature of separated souls . de med. stat. dimens . and if he had had the least respect for christian religion , he would have sunk with shame , to appeal from all the light of christianity , to the ancient fables and fictions of heathen poets . how could those shameless words pass from his pen ; much better then and more solidly then they , did the poet philosophyse in the sixth the aeneads , where he fansied to have found his purgatory , never admitted or thought of in christs school ? pardon me , sir , if a zeal hath transported me ; i can not endure the confidence of a christian writer , who should prefer a fable of virgil , before the consent of all christianity , and that now in point of faith , of purgatory . it is to give an approbation to an infamous slander i have read in a modern enemy of the catholick church : that she hath pickt her tenets out of the poets , and now their fables stand canonized in her creed . but to the consent of these great lights of the church , let us add the publique lyturgy , the great conveyer of tradition to us ; let it give testimony to this faith . we find the priest at the propitiatory sacrifice for the dead , powring forth his devotions in this manner . dread iudge ! whose iustice is severe , their long black score of sin make clear , ere the accounting day appear . what new construction shall we have of this ante diem rationis , ere the accounting day : and every where grant them rest eternall . receive , o lord , the sacrifices and prayers for those souls we make a memory of this day make them pass from death to life . and more expresly in the prayers and post-communions . grant , we beseech thee , o lord , that the soul of thy servant being purged and discharged from his sins , by these now offered sacrifices , may obtain mercy and rest. what senseless devotions are these whilst separated souls cannot be purged or discharged by any sacrifice whatsoever , since that is reserved to the state of reunion ? sect. . but to this clowd of witnesses , to all the authority we can imagin in the catholick church , to the consent of all the christian world , fathers , councils , popes , to the constant and universal practice of all the faithful , not any church , chappel , altar , oratory , but speaking it alowd , in their continual prayers , dirges , masses , almes , doales , &c. what is opposed ? but , thomas anglvs e generosa albiorvm in oriente trinobantvm prosapia orivndvs . thomas the englishman descended of the generous progeny of the albii ( i think he construes it whites ) in the east of the trinobants : a● which in good modest english is , thomas white of essex . together with the autority of the heathen poets . not so ( you willx say ) we have not this thomas the englishman , with this frightful title : but with his reason , with his demonstration : with that indisolvable chaine of necessary conclusions , pursued with irrefragable evidence ; through the most abstruse properties of bodies , to the clear discovery of separated substances , not onely of souls , now severed from that clay , which before inclosed them : but of angels , those clean , pure spirits , which never had any allay of drossy matter . dives promissis : to be rich in promises may accompany very poor men : would your performance were answerable , though much short of the full proportion . this , truly sir , is a very handsome invitation to your school . but is this the onely entertainment there ? o no , we have an incomparably higher and nobler feast prepared for us . all this is but his peripateticks : the atchievment of thomas the englishman of the albii of the east-saxons . what shall we hope for in his theology , now he hath gotten this much nobler title ? what is it for the now great trinobant to understand men and angels ? this towring soul flyes much a higher pitch ; by his adamantine chaine of demonstrations , he soars up to the a inaccessible light of the divinity , he leads us into the bosome of that incomprehensible essence , and there evidences by cleer light , the b eternal generation of the word , the procession of the holy-ghost : there he inlightens us cleerly to see , an eternal father , a co-eternal son , a substantial love , generation , processions , nature , persons , all : in sum whatever our astonisht humble faith , hath hitherto only accepted by revelation . c and yet which is more admirable then all this , and which never yet fell into any mans hopes or thoughts that it could be possible , even of those contingent verities , to which the divine will is free ; and where neither part of the contradiction determinately , can have any necessary tye to the cause ( as certainly , all created truths are , for god to any thing besides god , can have no necessary connexion ) he with his incomparable chain , fixes even in such contingencies , this determinat part of the contradiction . and all this after our great knight , his standard bearer , sir kenelm digby d had now held forth his new torch , to the hitherto darkned world . may sir , this your great master be happy in his glorious undertakings ; may success attend and wait on his endeavours . phaetont youthful attempt to drive the sun , was nothing to this enterprise ; and yet — magnis excidit ausis . happy we who are reserved to this third age of the church which is no more to walk by faith , but by science ! happy we that now live , when this new sun appears from the east of the trinobants , who gives the second wing of knowledg , to the woman , to the church ! but especially happy we to whom the acquaintance of this miracle ( for a man i dare not style him , nor an angel , since even to them , but by revelation , these mysteries are hidd , ) hath not been denyed i may all other doctrines be silenced , all other schools shut up ; they have hitherto led us in a clowd , in a submission of our understandings to obscure unseen verities , upon the authority of god the revealer : whilst he ( tearing this veile of ignorance , which incumbred our understandings , ) hath displayed with light and evidence , and plac't all in the mid-dayes sun , whatsoever we have groped for hitherto , in the dark obscurity of faith . let us no more envy the happiness of those who conversed with our b. saviour in flesh , who heard that heavenly voice , who beheld that ravishing countenance , beautiful above the sons of men , who were eye-witnesses of those stupendious miracles he wrought , in confirmation of that doctrine which he brought from the bosome of his father . let not an other bragg , he received his faith from the mouth of s. peter , the rock : of s. paul , the vessel of election : of s. iohn the beloved of iesus : but let all these worthily envy us , who now have a docto●r , as far excelling all them , as light excells darkness : as day , the night : as evidence , obscurity it self . for alas ! what did peter , paul , or iohn , or our b. saviour himself ? they layed down obscure positions , abstruse hidden mysteries , and in confirmation of the truth of what they delivered wrought miracles : which certainly inforce no assent , but leave us to our former liberty : leave the object it self , in the same obscurity it was before : for since they are neither its cause , nor effect , but purely extrinsecal to it , they enlighten not at all the object in it self . what then was begotten in the souls of those holy apostles and disciples , who followed our b. saviour by his preaching ? but a free , voluntary submission of their understandings , to those obscure truths he deliver'd upon the authority only , of their heavenly teacher . but our great master promises a far other proceed : not by an attestation extrinsecal to the object , will he confirm those truths which he delivers to us , but out of the cleare principles , and intime notions of the objects , out of the very bowels of the mysteries themselves , he will render all cleer , evident and perspicuous ; and ravish our souls ( even whether our selves will or no ) into an assent , not any more of an obscure , dark faith : but of a cleer , apparent science , even to the a full content and satiety of our truth-thirsty understandings . let him then possess the chair ; let him be inthroned ; let peter , paul and iohn : nay , let our master who came from heaven to teach us , give way ; let all other doctors whatsoever , attend upo● his triumph . let the astonisht captivated world , shutting henceforth their ears to all others , hear him alone . why should we trouble our heads any more with the gospels , with paul ? we find no satiety of our understanding , in their bare , naked assertions . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and god was the word : what if ten thousand miracles were wrought , in confirmation of this doctrine ? my soul ha●h not its full content : i still thirst after light , after evidence , which here is not to be found . let us then , shutting our ears to these drily proposed doctrines , hear great trinobant , and satiate and glut our understandings with this his evident , cleer demonstration . for thus what st. iohn obscurely had told us , he makes apparent : that there is vnity and plurality in god ▪ without repugnance . since that god knows himself , and the thing defined being put , the definition is also to be put in him , ( but to know is to be another thing , as another thing ; and to be known is to be an other thing , as an other thing ) the business is plainly ended : that god is in god as an other , in an other : and by consequence aliety is truly and really , and as a predicat of god , found in god , and not onely as a manner of predicating , or as it is in our vnderstanding . here is light , here is evidence able to ravish a soul ; nay , satiate and surfet her , in the height of all her thirst and longing after truth . sect. . in truth , sir , a sober reader , though he were in a melancholy mood , would be tempted to smile , at this demonstration , ( as you did pag. . at the word verbatim . ) and yet that passion would justly give way to his indignation against this presumption . no christian , but hath heard , that the faith our b. saviour taught mankind , was to continue in his holy spouse the church on earth , till the consummation of the world , and his second coming to judge . and can we cease to wonder , or indeed to conceive a just indignation , now to find a thomas the english-man , who after forty or fifty years study , should tell us , that in truth we have all been mistaken : there is no such matter : but that in the infancy and child-hood of the church , she was to walk indeed by faith , but now , in the third age , or mans estate , she is no more to be governed by faith , but by science , by demonstration . in this very third age or mans estate of the church , in which now we live , to begin undoubtedly from himself , ( since he admits of no one demonstration in any one former schoolman ; and himself promises thousands : ) and all this made out of the most prodigious explication of the apocalypse that ever saw light , as if it were a meer poem , and a stage-play : and peculiarly of that passage , that there were two wings of a great eagle , given to the woman , that she might fly into the desart : he understanding this woman to be the church , these two wings to be faith and science ; faith , which our b. saviour gave her in his oeconomy on earth , by which she was to steer her course in her nonage ; but now she being come to mans estate , he himself gives her the other wing of knowledg ; for henceforth she is onely to be directed by his demonstrations . and with this new wing , he now gives her , fairly she may walk , if she please , unless she be able to fly , as she hath hitherto done for sixteen hundred years , with one wing alone , since this wing quite destroys the other , evidence and science being perfectly destructive of obscurity and faith . but it is worth my readers pains to see this admirable conception of his fancied demonstrative third age of the church , described at large in the same book , sect. . and elsewhere . in the tenth chapter ( sayes he ) begins and is perfected , the enarration of the third age of the church , which because it is to be prosperous and blessed , and subject to few evils , therefore it is described onely in general , &c. the reason of this is , for since grace prefects nature , and since in rational nature there are three degrees , or species of knowledg , by which successively the soul receives increase , to wit faith , which governs children : opinion , which steers young men as yet unexperienced and unskilful : and lastly , science which directs men now perfect : it is necessary that in the church , nature ascend by the self same degrees . till constantins time ( the first christian emperour ) faith alone took place : from constantin till our age , hereticks , were combated by rhetorical and logical dissertations , which because by little and little , is fitted to conduct men to evidence , the immediat succeeding age of the church is to be expected , in which evidence succeeding , there will be no place for heresies , but the church shall flourish in most perfect peace and prosperity . and having thus adorned the scene , he brings himself down from heaven , with these happy demonstrations in this manner . as in this chapter ( sayes he ) s. john teaches , describing unto us , a strong angel ; as fitting for mans estate : descending from heaven , from whence all good things are derived to us . cloathed with a clowd : that is with a celestial garment , as who brings heavenly things to us : not keeping himself aloof from us , but even approaching and coming neer unto us : ●nd the rainbow , which is the symbol of divine peace , hung over his head and his face was like the sun : to wit , as he who came to communicate perfect light , to humane kind : and his leggs in strength and firmness , as pillars : and in activity , as fire : and he had in his hand , an open book , that is to be read and understood by all , and in which there was no obscurity or involution : and he put his right foot on the sea ; that is , he subjected turbulent spirits by force and power : and his left foot on the land ; that is , confirming and strengthening the humble and meeek : and he cried out with a lowd voice , even like the roaring of a lyon : which apertains to the latitude of the church , which is signified to be extended as farr as his voice might be heard , &c. and the effect of his voice was , that the seven thunders might speak their uoices ; that is , have their effects : which the apostle is forbidden , to write for the reasons above delivered ; nevertheless , he is commanded , to seal them in his memory , perhaps to be told to pious men in privat , not publickly to be promulgated to the church . but least this could not be so happily adapted to himself , and his long lasting third age of the church , steered by his demonstrative religion : since presently the text introduces this same angel swearing . that time should be no more , and s. iohn is presently described to have devoured this open book , which the angel brought from heaven . which might seem to regard the end of the world , when time shall be no more , but these circulations of the heavens shall receive their last end and period : he tells us , that this oath of the angel , and this devouring of the book , by s. iohn , belong to the preparation of the ensuing ruine of the world , and consummation of all things . and the book though sweet to the tast , and hearing , yet was bitter in his stomack : and could not be contained , but forced him to preach the doctrine of it , to others . thus he : but it is a good divertisement to see how after this sublime conception had fallen into his head , how he huggs it , and pleases himself with the fancied happiness , of that state of the church , which thus shall be steered by evidence , by his demonstrations : and how far he prefers it , before all whatsoever we have hitherto been acquainted with in christianity , and even prophesies of our future happiness by it . a all phylosophy shall be new molded , all theology shall be refined , by his and his knights demonstrations . b never were school-boyes so handled by an imperious master , as he ( besides the correction bestowed on all the fathers for a thousand years ) whips all the school-doctours , none excepted , and with most exquisite contempt , persecutes all their learning . and of the church he foretels , in this third age there shall be , no persecution , no heresies : but she shall flourish by his demonstrative religion in perfect tranquillity . she shall now be furnished with persons of most sublime and eminent sanctity ; and though there shall be no occasion of martyrdom : yet the supream saints , the first fruits to god and the lamb , shall adorn this mans estate or midday of the church ; persons of most sublime contemplation . and further as to the civil governments of magistrates , and happiness under them ; he prophesies . instit. sac. lib. . lec . . since this ( sayes he ) is the supream state of humane nature ; it will also bring with it the bettering of the manners of men , the governments , and commands of soveraigns , and supream magistrates , shall be more mild and moderate ; few warrs among christians , the commodities of life far greater : all excellent arts cultivated , and brought to the highest perfection . and since the supream governours shall find forraign warrs necessary for domestick security , they shall disburden the turbulent and ambitious spirits among christians , in wars upon barbarous nations , and infidels , the enemies of this demonstrative religion : whom since now they excell in arts , they will easily conquer by arms ; and contain them in their duty , by an even handed , equal government , and shall convert them to christianity , and so christ shall raign in the whole globe of the earth . nor is it to be doubted , but that this state , being the very flower and vigour of humane nature , shall be of a most long continuance . thus he rapt in an extasie prophesies ; such golden ages , melancholy men in love with their own long setled apprehensions , fancy , and dream of . and his scholars will easily believe , ( that he now having establisht an eternal peace in our nations , by that admirable doctrin , in his book of government and obedience : ground . . that a dispossest magistrate is worse then an infidel , if he doe not renounce all his title and claim : and that all his subjects are obliged to resist his attempts : ) their masters demonstrations marcht of late to the confines , with the two great ministers of state , and have now concluded a peace between france and spain . but this were tollerable , if this were all : why should not every man enjoy his own thoughts ? why should not this great master be as happy as his own imaginations , and the applause of his scholars can make him ? but thus to betray christian religion to atheists , to disbeleevers : to display his banner of evidence ; to open his school of demonstration , to reduce all those stupendious mysteries of religion , to the natural force of our too too weak understandings , ( and as i now exemplified in the aeternal generation of the son of god , a mystery naturally unknown to men and angels ; for even those celestial spirits in their now state of fruition , veil their faces with reverence , when they cry , sanctus , sanctus , sanctus , to the adorable and ineffable trinity ) to tell us , even in these sublime mysteries we shall be furnisht with evident demonstrations . and after this , the production is a discourse so frivolous , so unconcluding : assuming not onely what is false , but what is erroneous ; and inferring quite another thing in the conclusion , then was in the premisses ; so that no phylosopher of two years course , but sees the emptiness of it , no divine of one years standing , but has learnt the errour of it ; is to render our holy faith ridiculous , vain , and contemptible to naturalists , to disbeleevers . sect. . why should we then wonder , if we have a new purgatory ? alas , sir , we have a new systeme of a whole , intire , new religion : we have a doctour who with long melancholy thoughts , having fansied a world in the moon , perswades himself , that all the faith christ taught us , shall be evacuated : all other schools shall cease : and he , forsooth , for the future be the sole pole-star of the world . it is not unworthy of our observation , by what wary sters this new divinity ( which fitted to the genius of our times , i never read , but think i am in a romance ) walkt into the world . the first attempt was upon scripture , where by a long catalogue of its uncertainties , by the transcribers , translators , printers mistakes , or the wilfull corruptions of iews , hereticks , half-witted and bold readers : it would puzzle any mans arithmetick , to count how many to one it is , there is not one true word of scripture in scripture . upon the sole score of the transcribers mistakes , ( in that supposition , that there were two thousand copies writ of the bible in a hundred years ) he concludes it sixteen to one , against any determinate word , that it is not the true word of scripture , this onely saved , that the same errour might be in several copies . after this succeeded the infallibility of the pope , of which i have given my reader his sense already . then followed , that he should attaque the authority of the councils , which , in truth , with a better grace , and a complement of a non est impossibile , he sent packing out of his school : and yet all this while he bore us in hand , that he would save all , by manly sustaining tradition , the uninterrupted doctrine handed down and delivered , by the succession of fathers to children , from christ and his apostles to any determinate age : but because this tradition could not , with any appearance be sustained , but that it carried or supposed , the infallibility of councils : since there is nothing more universally and constantly beleeved : nor can we imagine any more authentique proof of any doctrine , that it is delivered by tradition , then the decree of a council : and yet he being resolved , by the ruine of that authority , to make way for his demonstrative religion : tradition faded and dwindled , into this mysterious expression : that the errour of a council , though promulgated , should not pass into an established doctrine of the church , as delivered by fathers , and preached by christ : by which he brought all into his own power again . and when he had thus ( as he thought ) cut all the sinews of christian-beleef ; the mystery of all the design is discovered : we must be governed by faith no longer : christ with his doctrine hath possessed the chair long enough : master white with his demonstrations , must now take place . and least my adversary should tell me ; i do him wrong , in asserting , that after the rest , he hath now laid tradition aside : i desire him and his solid cleer-sighted friends , to give me a catalogue of all those doctrines he admits into his new theology , or prooves in his institutiones sacrae ( which are to be our scriptures , fathers , councils , school-men , for the future ) by tradition , or on the score of authority . nor let him complain ; i impose a heavy task upon him : those who are acquainted with every ressort of his doctrine , will quickly answer it : the catalogue will proove so slender , so short , it will cost him no considerable pains : i could comprehend them all in this one word , nothing : for in truth , there is none at all : so safe a truth it is , that in lieu of faith and christian religion , we have nothing in this school , but under the title of peripatetick and sacred institutions , an epicurean , lucretian phylosophy ; or rather a medley of both theirs , and aristotles phylosophy , and pretended demonstrations : not of our faith , as catholiques have hitherto understood it , but as now changing quite the notions of the mysteries , he is pleased to understand it . of which we shall see more hereafter . sect. . why then should we wonder at the issues of this brain ? what should we wonder at these productions , which out of an absolutely erroneous method , were hatched , and brought to light ? it is no marvel , if a most exotick phylosophy being presupposed , an equally or more exotick divinity is built upon it . a little errour in the beginning , prooves a great one in the last end . the attempt to square theology , to ( i know nor what ) pretended demonstrations , hath wrought this destruction . nor need we the help of divinity : our own experience and reason sufficiently evince , and discover this method to be ruinous . there is no man who hath made even a moderate progress in sciences , but is sufficiently convinced how weak , how feeble our understandings are : they are but novices in sciences , who are puft into a vanity , as if they were even now become masters . the better proficients they grow , the more daily and howrly do they cleerly discover their own ignorance . let 's consider it in particular ; there is no knowledg so certain , so connatural to our undexrstandings , as that of quantity , the object of mathematiques : and yet all the wit of men , that ever yet have been in the world , come so far short of the discovery , that millions of problemes might yet be proposed , which no man can solve . and now as to our knowledge of natural bodies , it is far inferior to the former ; for of these we scarce understand any thing at all . who ever comprehended the composition , the properties , or even the essential notion of a fly ? what physitian ever understood fully the nature , the operations , the effects , of any one herb , any one simple ? who ever knew how rubarb works on the innumerable parts of our bodies : how it purges , how it refines , how it abates , how it heightens the several humours of it ? st. basill understood our weakness much better , who in his epist. to eunom , prosecuting this subject , proposes above twenty questions ( to which twenty and twenty more may be added ) of a contemptible emmet : in none of which , the wit of man can satisfie his curiosity . and if we are thus short in those things we daily converse with , which we touch , and tast , what will our knowledge amount to in separated substances , in souls , in angels , in god himself ? the true ground of this our ignorance being this : that our understandings in our present state of mortality , being onely naturally moveable from our phansies , which depend wholly on the weak reports drawn from our senses : we have not , in this state , without revelation , any other notions but such as are abstracted from sensible objects ; so that the peculiar properties of abstract substances ( since we are not now possest of the peculiar essential notions of them ) can not now by us , naturally , be known . and hence it is , that finding our selves so feeble , in things the most obvious even to our senses , all the wise men of the world , have ever been struck dumb , and ravisht in the consideration of that omnipotent hand , which built both us , to honour and love him , and them for our use to that end ; so that where his authority is ingaged , as certainly it is , in all things that apperrain to faith : we abase our prying proud curiosity , and square our weak apprehensions to them , and not these stupendious supernatural mysteries , to our creeping groveling apprehensions of nature . it was then upon this mistake , that this new purgatory came to light ; it is one , and but one of a thousand of those unheard of productions , this new phylosophical theology is stuft with . i could give my reader many instances of doctrines he never yet , not indeed the world was acquainted with : but i will conclude with that very doctrin ( because it offers it self as neer allyed to this our present subject ) with which he concluds his demonstrative divinity . it is concerning the damned souls ; for we have not onely a poetical purgatory , he hath also furnisht us with a most romancical hell : and who can but smile to think of those ridiculous mimick postures , he fancyes of horse-coursers , dancers , fencers , bowlers , and all other brutals attempting now in hell in all their several postures ; those very pleasures in which they constituted their final end in this life . thus then of those souls he concludes : their misery ( sayes he ) depends on their present perverseness , so that if they themselves would , they might even yet be happy . out of the force and series of nature , of which they are parts , nothing better ( to wit , then to be damned ) could happpen to them ; neither to all of them in general , nor to any one of them in particular . and least nature or god should escape this fatall doctrin , he adds : and even nature and god himself should have been worse , if they had been otherwise dealt with . pagan fatality ! out of the force and series of nature , nothing better , could happen to iudas then to be damn'd ; and if he had not been so , god had ceased to be god : as so , forsooth , wisdom is justified against her children . thus he concludes his prodigious theology . sect. . and now i hope my reader hath some light of the method and genius of this our great master and his new school . it will give him an introduction into the further discovery of their learning . but because his pretended demonstrations are now so cryed up by that little handful of his scholars , whose itch after novelties hath rendred proselites of his doctrin ; and since in the entry to my discourse , i have laid down those ( as they would have us believe ) unshakable grounds , of this new minted purgatory : my reader may justly challenge that we should take a survey of them . and though this might seem weakly to anticipate , what i heare far abler pens have undertaken at large , yet why should we not take a short view of them , and that even in the very order they lye . and first then , leaving his gibberish notion of a separated soul , how ridiculous is this position : that the proper accidents ( that is , those things that are in the soul according to the soul , its practical judgments , its affections to friends and acquaintance , even to corporal pleasures ) are the soul it self . since that they are so , is not onely indemonstrable , but incomparably false : for the soul is both created without them , remains in the body without them ( in such as by grace have subdued these inordinations ) and much more in heaven , both with , and without the body , before and after the resurrection : and even in his systeme of purgatory , the soul shall be divested of them at the re-union : and yet all the peripateticks or lucretian phylosophy in the world , can never evince , that the soul can be separated from it self : therefore nor from these affections if they be the soul it self . and how came these immediately insuing words , to escape his wary pen , that the soul without them were more imperfect ? are those very affections which constitute purgatory and hell too , perfections of the soul ? or when she comes to divest her self of them at the re-union , does she remain more imperfect in heaven , then when she was in the state of suffering by them ? or is she then not her selfe because she is without them ? or had she been less perfect if she had passed out of this life , by perfect mortification without them ? but because this doctrin , that the soul were more imperfect without these affectinos , is very neer allyed to an other excellent doctrin of our great master ( and which will much promote solid devotion ) of the corporal pleasures themselves ; let us compare them together , they agree very happily , and will illustrate one an other : since corporal life ( sayes he ) is made in order to the attaining of beatitude , and corporal pleasures are conformable to corporal life , and therefore of necessity that corporal life in its kinde , is the best , which hath the most , and greatest corporal pleasures : ( as elsewhere is shewn more at large ) and further , since the best corporal life , doth best serve to the attaining of beatitude , it is also necessary that the christian discipline ( which is the mistriss of beatitude ) should even fill our lives with the pleasures of the body , and those who live piously , should enjoy a hundred fold ( of those corporal pleasures ) more then those who live ill . might not this excellent sermon very well become a st. austen or a st. paul ? no truly , sir , they never were acquainted with this demonstration : they lived in the non-age of the church ; they were steered by faith not by this evidence and science . and so they walkt in austerities ; tenances , mortifications . they never fancyed , that that corporal life was best in its kind , which abounded with most and greatest corporal pleasures : much less , that such an one was best adapted to attain that beatitude they thirsted after . they looked on corporal pleasures as the bane of the soul : but our great master being still himself , might well teach us , that the soul without these affections were more imperfect , since he placed the perfection of a corporal life , best adapted to attain beatitude , in the injoyment of the pleasures themselves . in earnest , sir , i have a scruple to translate such doctrines as these are , which onely befit epicurus his school , and the life of hogs : ( though you would perswade us they are truths which promote solid devotion ) if i were not confident of my readers vertue , and that they will beget a just horror in his soul , both against the doctrines themselves , and those principles that lead to them . sect. . secondly , how frivolously he concludes , that the affections to corporal pleasures accompany the soul in her state of separation ? their rise , their origin is the body . the soul were untouchable by them , if it were not by reason of that union it hath , to that clay which now incloses her . how could the soul be concerned to see , to hear , to touch , if she had neither eyes , ears , hands , or any other corporeal organs , by which these pleasures could be conveyed to her ? especially if she enjoyed her fill of those far more noble and excellent satisfactions ( such as he puts of eminent compleat knowledge ) proportionable to that state of separation and what purgatory could a scholar indure , who should pass out of this life with all his affections regulated , save onely that to learning , since in that state , his soul should even be ravisht with the injoyment of all that knowledge which he inordinately long'd for in this mortal life ? how then is not the soul divested of those base affections , when she passes out of the body , which have their source from this earthly habitation ? but let us compare this doctrine , with an other admirable non-sence of our master . he tells us in his peripateticks , lib. . lec . , n. . that the separation of the soul from the body , is of that efficacy , that the soul even in substance is changed : and that a separated soul is in truth an other thing ( in substance ) then it was in the body . as if forsooth it were this thing , this soul , which now informs my body , that offends god in this life ; and an other thing , an other soul shall be punished for it in the next . and doth not this doctrine evacuate all the fear of purgatory , judgment and hell too ? and let not my adversary tell me he says it is an other thing , but says not , that it is an other soul : for i desire him to tell me , what other thing it is , if it be not an other soul ; for still it is a soul , and nothing but a soul . a thing is a notion more universal then a soul : and what are distinguished in a notion that is more universal , can not be the same in a notion that is less universal . no logician ever fancied , that those things which are distinguished in the notion of animal , can be the same in the notion of homo . if then the separation render the soul , an other thing , an other soul ; how should it not have other accidents and affections , which ( according to him ) are the soul it self ? or must it not of necessity have so ? but let this too be supposed . sect. . thirdly , whoever fancied , that a separated soul shall be tormented with a vast grief , by reason corporal pleasures are now impossible to be injoyed ? who ever was concerned or tormented , because he could not do that , which he knew to be impossible ? who ever was intollerably afflicted , because he could not fly ? or render his body as incorruptible as a diamond ? or become an angel ? stay , ( you 'l say ) i suppose an ardent ●●ffection to pleasures , not impossible absolutely , but onely by reason of the present state . and what then ? the soul is now mistress of perfect reason , euen of all knowledge , according to you : they are ●hreneticks onely , who torment themselves , because they can not do that , which they see is impossible in their present state , whilst they cannot transfer themselves into an other state , in which the pleasure they so much covet may be possible . how ardent a thirst soever you have to the knowledge of all truth ; yet since you see such knowledge is in this life impossible to be attained , ( and you hope for it in the next ) yet do i not beleeve you indure any vast grief , or even are much tempted to rid your self out of this world , that you may injoy it in the next . besides , your master tells us ; the will is either not distinct from the vnderstanding , or at least , is adequately governed in the state of separation : how then can the will be tormented with a vast grief , because of the impossibility of those pleasures , whilst the understanding , shall cleerly represent to it , the baseness , vileness , vnworthiness of such pleasures , and which at one blow , cuts off all the wills pursuit , shall represent them , as impossible ? but the truth is , this doctrine is grounded upon a pure mistake : for the absence , much less the impossibility of corporal pleasures , doth not torment with any vast or considerable grief , those souls , ( even in this life ) which are most of all immerst in the affections to them , ( and by consequence , not separated souls ; for ( he tell us , ) they remain in the state of separation , even in that same proportion they were in this life : ) but just then , when the body prompts or calls for an injoyment . let us consider the most luxurious , the most gluttonous person in the world , when the present capacity of his body is satiated with those pleasures , he indures no considerable torment , till the body again call for a reiterated enjoyment . it is not then rational to say , that a soul which passes out of this life by a long continued feaver , and therefore carries with it into the next world , a great affection to drink , shall be tormented in the next life with a vast grief , because she now can not injoy the pleasure of drinking , whilst in truth , she can never suffer any thirst . and how sordid and low a fancy he had of spiritual substances in their state of separation : to conceive them thus tortured , because corporal pleasures can not now be in●ayed ? which pleasures , pious christians abominate , even in this their pilgrimage ; which the pride and ambition of worldlings easily overcome ; which the wise● sort of pagans scorn ; which heathen phylosophers would not stoop to ; which avicen , though a turk , contemned , and his master mahomets heaven , built up and fancied for swine . it had been pious , and worthy a phylosopher , to conceive them ( as good christians do ) tormented with a vast grief , because they had so ungratefully offended almighty god , and delayed their beatitude , for such low , contemptible , transitory pleasures . but this satisfied not his design ; it reacht not home , to build us up a purgatory , out of which no delivery could be hoped for till the day of iudgment ; this grief was rather a disposition for heaven ; and therefore he must find us out some unworthy and unchangeable affection , which must detain souls there , till he please to release them . besides , it is frequent , that vicious men detest at their deaths those brutalities , the excess of which , hath ruined their bodies , fame , and fortunes ; and yet pass out of this life without true repentance , to be punisht for them in the next , for all eternity . but let us also compare this , with an other signal doctrine of this our ma●●er , de med. stat. dim . . he there disputing against those afflictions which he supposes his adversary asserts , that the souls suffers by some external agent ; delivers us this unexpected doctrine : thus arguing against him . from whence ( sayes he ) an unexpected truth breaks forth ; that all those pains ( inflicted by an external agent on the soul ) are purely pleasures . for since on the one side , the souls thus to be purged , are supposed to be perfect in charity , and extremely thirsting of the eternal good , which they are certain to attain ; and on the other side , cleerly understand , that corporeal punishments are the onely means by which they may attain beatitude ; it is evident they to these pains are , as a man of an invincible courage , in whom no weakness of mind can take place ; who being highly inflamed to attain some good , ventu●es on things of great difficulty , either in acting or suffering : in which , both experience and reason teach us , he would feel unspeakable pleasure . as if , forsooth , pains and torments , cease to be such , and become purely pleasures , whilst the soul now perfect in charity , faints not in suffering them . as if with perfect conformity to the divine will , and an absolute desire to satisfie the divine justice , an earnest longing after the ending of these griefs , and the enjoyment of beatitude , were inconsistent : which necessarily includes and carries with it a high affliction . but how by this sudden , and unexpected doctrin , all our apprehensions are changed in the sufferings of our b. saviour ? who by a most perfect charity , inflamed with the thirst of redeeming mankind , under went all , with an invincible courage : for in him no weakness of mind could take place . we must now change all our pious meditations , no more must we consider the scourges , whips , contempts , the nails , and cross to have been any other thing , but pure pleasures to him . an excellent doctrin to increase our love to our deer saviour , who to redeem mankind was patient , and resigned to suffer pure pleasures , and to incourage penance according to s. paul , si compatimur & conglorificabimur . this is an other truth to promote solid devotion . now then as to the souls in purgatory ( which certainly being perfect masters of reason , and now in charity , and see their own affections to be unchangeable , can not be conceived to faint in their sufferings ) let us now learn this unexpected sudden truth which now breaks out , that we have been hitherto quite mistaken : their sufferings are so far from being pains , that in truth they are nothing but purely pleasures . o happy model of purgatory ! but let this be supposed too . sec. . fourthly , to come to the other fundamental stone of this fabrick . it is incomparably false , that separated souls or angels , both as to their substance , and operations are measured , by this indivisible duration or moment : or that to co-exist to a greater or less part of time , adds or diminishes nothing to them . what if the omnipotent hand of god should create in this moment a new soul separated from any body : had the rest of souls departed their bodies many ages agoe , no greater duration , then this their even now created companion ? what if the same hand of god should now destroy one of those separated souls , shall the rest of them which shall co-exist to all future time , have therefore no longer duration then she ? what if there were no body , no motion , no time at all , could not god create a soul , and destroy it at his pleasure ? and yet not this in the same indivisible moment : for then it would follow , the soul is and is not in the same instant ; therefore in some other posteriour moment . what if god should again repair this thus annihilated soul ? we could not imagine , that this new second existence would be measured with the same duration that the first , for this would exclude the very supposition of an interruption . besides , sir , christian theology teaches us that angels ( whose duration is as indivisible as that of souls ) were not created in termino , but in viâ : the holy angels were not created in the state of fruition ; nor the devils in the state of damnation , but both in the way to these several states . and that first they were in the state of grace , in which the good by adhering to god were afterwards translated to glory , whilst the devils , by their pride and disobedience , were deservedly afterwards thrust out headlong into hell . who hath rendred it evident that all this could be effected in one indivisible moment ? and further , sir , as to this point , that my reader may be cleared more fundamentally in it : we must observe , that since eternity , which is devoid of all succession , is the measure of a perfectly permanent being , that is , of god himself : as far forth as any thing recedes from a permanent being , so far it recedes from eternity , and comes to succession . now though the being of angels does not consist in motion , and therefore is not measured by our time : yet since the essence of an angel is neither its vnderstanding , nor its will , much less is it the acts of these powers : the substance of an angel is not measured by eternity , since it hath transmutation adjoyned to it : and so hath a proper duration , or measure between it and time . and further , since the operations of angels , have a real and true succession , they are measured by a true succession and time , not that of bodies , or the motions of them , but by a time proper to the succession of those operations ; and if holy writ deliver us any other then metaphorical truths , of separated substances , it delivers this succession in them . your master himself takes notice in his med. stat. acc. . of the souls of the slain ( described in the apocalyps ) resting under the altar , and crying out to have the day of iudgement hastned ; which reaches home to our purpose , that they are concerned in the length of the stay , and that it is absolutely false , that there is no succession of acts , even in beatified souls ; or that , to coexist to a greater , or less part of time , adds , or diminishes nothing to them : though it fals much short of rendring our prayers onely available for the hastning of that day ( as we shall presently see ) for which end he there introduces it . and if you please to consider in the th chap. of daniel , where the angel appearing tels him , that the prince ( or angel ) of the kingdome of the persians resisted him one and twenty dayes : and behold michael one of the first princes ( he who stands for the children of the jewish nation ) came to his help : you will easily observe , there is not this comprehension of all time , your master fansied , in the workings , or beings , of separated substances . sect. . fifthly , as to his grounds of the immutability of that state , it is groundlesly assumed , that a soul can suffer no alteration from a body , but by identification ( or by being the same thing ) with that body . and indeed who ever fanfied that the soul could thus be identified , or become the very self-same thing , with the body ? who ever believed that now in this life , our souls are really and truly our bodies , and our bodies are our souls ? or if they were thus identified , or the same thing ; how were it possible they should ever be severed : since nothing can be imagined to be served from it self ? christian phylosophy never admitted this position , it is evidently destructive of the immortality of our souls , and of all religion : for if the soul be identified , ( or the same thing ) with the body , it must of necessity be resolved into dust with the body : for no man can conceive , how any thing should supervive it self ; so that this will put an end to purgatory , heaven , hell and all religion . we that walk by christian faith , and not by new lights , this ignis fatuus of demonstrations , alwayes believed , that the soul and body as two distinct parts , concurred to the building up of one man : who is one , not by simplicity , not by identification of the parts , or i know not what strange fancyed transubstantiation of the soul into the body , but by substantial vnion or composition . further , sir , it can never be evidenced , that not onely such an inimaginable identification should be necessary , to the end that a soul may be passive from the body : but that even a substantial union is requisite . we see that the soul , in the state of vnion , even naturally , suffers by the bodies indisposition , as in frensies , caused by feavours , or other distempers : and who shall render it evident , that in the state of separation , not naturally , but by the omnipotent hand of god , she may not be passive by fire , or some other external agent : by some way our vnderstandings now reach not to ? sect. . sixthly , it is a purely voluntary and false assertion , that a separated soul knows all things together and perpetually . the very holy angels do not thus know all things : our blessed guardians , of new know daily , and howrly , our actions ; and represent our sighs and devotions in the sight of god , and since in these we are free , and not tyed necessarily to any thing but our selves , it is impossible they should know them , till we our selves have determined our selves to them : nor even then immediately , ( for god alone is the searcher of hearts , ) till they have sallied out into some effect . and our b. saviour himself tells us , the holy angels themselves know not of that day and howr , ( to wit , of judgment ) but onely the father . matth. . and they rejoyce at the new conversion of a sinner . sect. . seventhly , who ever rendred it evident , that no alteration can befall a separated soul from any other spirit , without the interposition of the body ? for spirits can act on spirits immediately , without such interposition ; and the contrary doctrine is destructive of all the conversation of the holy angels for all aeternity ; is destructive of the doctrine holy writ delivers us of the fall of the devils , where the dragon is described , to have drawn after him the third part of the stars , or angels , into his rebellion . and if angels can thus act on angels , without this interposition of a body , why not on separated souls ? nor is that foundation of this his doctrine at all subsistent : for since ( says he ) all spirits are indivisible , their operations must be indivisible : and consequently , perfected all of them in one moment . for this consequence is perfectly null . nor will it ever be rendred evident , that an act of a spirit may not coexist to a great or less part of time ; much less will it ever be evinced ( as is already proved ) that there is not a true and real succession in their operations . so that his doctrine is absolutely false , when he tells us ; if any thing be to be done among spirits , it is so done and perfected in one moment , that afterwards an other action can not be begun and besides , when he assumes ; an indivisible effect , the causes being put , of necessity exists in the same moment : though he may say true for that one act ; but when he infers the same for all succeeding acts unto aeternity , he errs most grosly : imagining this , ( which is one of the most fundamental bases of all his phylosophy and divinity , ) that all causes are fixt and set , as to all effects whatsoever , from the very beginning , unto all future succession : by which doctrine , both god himself is necessitated so to do , that he can not do otherwise , then he doth do ; and each intelligence so to know ( by the connexion of existences ) that it can not know , otherwise then it does know ; which is most pure pagan fatality , destructive of the liberty of god , and all contingency in all created things whatsoever . sect. . lastly , that we may vindicate christianity and the church , from that ignorance of separated substances , he boldly and injuriously fixes upon her , and the angelical st. thomas , from a most gross abuse : let us take a survey of his accompt in his middlè state of souls . he there tells us , the delivery of souls before reunion , proceeded out of the ignorance , or not adhering to this doctrine , of the incomparable st. thomas and his school : that in abstracted spirits , there is neither discourse , nor any manner of composition ; but purely a simple apprehension : so that errour and falsity can have no place in them . for these ( sayes he ) depend on the body , so that it is impossible , indivisibles ( or spirits ) should be capable of succession . now that my reader may fully understand , both the truth here contained , and his most erroneous consequences drawn from it ; we must observe , that there is a double composition in vnderstandong : both of the praedicat to the subject , and of the conclusion to the premisses : both which take place in vs , by reason of the weakness of our vnderstandings , in this state of mortality . for neither do we at one single glance understand the praedicat , though we cenceive the subject ; nor do we attain to the conclusions included in the principles , but by a long indeavour and succession of reasoning or discourse : so that our u●derdandings arrive not to truth , but by compounding or dividing the terms one with the other , and the conclusion with the premisses . but it happens otherwise in angels ; for they , by a cleer strength of vnderstanding , apprehend both the composition and division of propositions with one simple sight , and the conclusions in the principles , without this succession of discourse . this is st. thomas his doctrine , par. quaest. . art . . & . now it imports not our present business , to consider , whether this knowledge of spirits is a true discourse , since a succession of time is not perhaps requisit to that , but onely of causality , which is here found . but it imports us to consider , that out of this doctrine of st. thomas it no ways follows , that errour or falsity can have no place in separated substances . for the same st. thomas disputes this , in the very next article ; and teaches us : that though in such things , as are thus naturally known , by the apprehensions of the terms or principles , spirits can not err ; yet in such things as depend on the supernatural ordination of god , as far forth as they are supernatural ; errour may take place in them . and this ( says he ) happens not to the good angels ; because they judge not of those things which supernaturally belong to the object , without due submission to the divine ordination ; but it does in the devils , who by their perverse will , withdrawing themselves from the divine wisdome , judge erroneously of supernatural things . but that we may further see how injuriously he would improove the doctrine of this great saint and doctour , both against him and the church : we must further observe , that his consequence , that indivisibles ( or spirits ) are not capable of succession : is both null , and against this holy doctour every where . for in the first article of this very question , he teaches , that angels are not alwayes in actual consideration of those very things , they know naturally . he tells us , that of those thinge which god reveals to them , of which they receive new revelations , by the occasions of affairs , they are in potentiality , or preceding ignorance . he tells us in the next article , those things whose knowledge depend on one onely species , angels know all together ; but not those which depend on divers . he tells us in fine everywhere , that there is a real and true succession in their acts , which is measured by a real and true succession of time . and i can not admonish my reader too of ten : of his fatal necessity and connexion of causes , which runs through all his doctrine , and grounds these his positions , when he tells us , that a separated soul is all other things by the connexion of existencies , and since she knows all things together , and for ever ; by the course of nature , there is no room left either for ignorance , or new science : which doctrine is the corner-stone of all his fabrick of purgatory , and is perfectly destructive of all religion , because destructive of all liberty in god and creatures : and peculiarly destructive of all the mysteries of grace and supernaturality ; for all these depend on the pure freedom and will of god who is not , nor can not be tyed to creatures : and therefore the same angelical doctor , in the precedent . quest . art. , , & . concludes , that angels neither know all future contingencies , nor the secrets of our hearts , nor the mysteries of grace , but as far forth as it pleases god to reveal these to them : which in their first creation he did in some measure : but more amply and fully afterwards , according as it did agree with their offices and imployments in this vniverse . this , sir , is true christian theology ( which reaches much more to souls in purgatory ) learnt by revelation from him , who neither can be deceived , nor deceive us : not out of epicurean , lucretian , pagan , principles of fatality in things , and of necessity in god , in order to his creatures . but if we should suppose all these vnchristian principles and consequences to be true ; that there is no error , no ignorance , no succession in separated substances , now in their present state of separation : how inconsequent is it ( as he there tels us ) that they are now just that , ( as to their affections , ) which this state of union with their bodies and mortality made them ? what a frivilous discourse he introduces , arguing in the same acc. as an embri● ( sayes he ) or seminal mushrom delineates a future man , so the thoughts and affections of this life , design by their impressions , the future condition of the soul : so that death produces such an entity , as from the man so disposed is naturally producible , thus to remain till resurrection . for this hath no connexion with the precedent doctrine of the immutability of souls in the state of separation . if we should suppose , that there is no variety in them , no succession in that single state of separation , how will it follow , there is no change of affections in these two , and those so different states of separation and vnion ? besides , sir , if the antecedent of this his argument reach home to his purpose , it is a position destructive of all christianity ; if this embrio , or seminal mushrom delineate the future man , if the soul be such as the quality of the matter exacts and determines it to be ( as he tells us ) it is , at the first infusion into the body , and remains so , or else he tels us nothing to his purpose : our liberty is destroyed . there remains no hopes , that these his determinations by the matter or body ; should be changed by education , by vertue ; should be corrected by grace : since then this his doctrin is absolutely false , and since souls , in truth , by the assistance of divine grace , do perfectly overcome ( even whilst in their bodies ) what they contract , or are determ●nod by their bodies , ( as our holy faith teaches ) how excellently is it concluded , that souls now in separation do not correct , what was in them by the commerce of that unworthy clay , which before inclosed them ? and how will it not be as well or more effectually concluded , that souls at their re-union too , passing now from separation to union , ( as well as before from union to separation , ) carry with them their unchangable affections ? and so never get out of his purgatory neither before nor at the day of iudgment . by these short reflections , my reader will easily observe , how far these adamantin , unshakeable grounds fall short of that so much boasted evidence , even of truth : some of them being most perfect falshoods , the rest groundless , uncertain , dreaming assertions : and yet they are such as shall serve the levity of some men , to abandon the authority of the whole catholick church , and upon these shall be errected a new modled purgatory , as upon other the like they have built us a whole , new , faithless religion , of which they are so fondly inamoured , and peremptory , that now they boldly pronounce , the hither to received faith of the church , proceeded out of ignorance of the nature of separated substances . sect. . but to conclude my adversary and our business ; if this his position be true , that no souls are delivered out of purgatory , before the day of iudgment : what serve for all our devotions , prayers , alms , offerings ? doth the holy sacrifice of the altar , which the church hath defined to be propitiatory even for the dead , avail those distressed souls nothing at all ? no , my adversary dares not , as yet , venture upon this . the councils are so cleer , so home to this point , his credit were ruined , if he should attempt to deny it . his new purgatory then , must be furnished with some new way , by which our endeavours may be beneficial to those poor souls , or else no catholiques ears could be open to his new divinity . is it perhaps , the intermitting at some times , or abating of the fury of their torments ? o no , this doctrin finds no admission in his school . his indivisible duration admits of no intermission : and where the soul , by her now unchangable affections , is her own executioner , no allay , or abatement of torment can be hoped for till reunior , what then perhaps shall our prayers be of force to obtain their release ? o no , this the least of all , it were against all their demonstrations , and therefore is reserved to his new changeable state at the resurrection . what then is the effect of all our tears and prayers ? what benefit doe separated souls receive by them ? this , and onely this , that the day of iudgment is hastned by them . and is this all ? yes , truly , this is all our new systeme of purgatory can admit of , as to the assisting of the souls detained in it . but what if this accelerating the day of iudgment prove no advantage , no help at all to those distressed souls ? would not all christians be justly charged with an intollerable folly ? would n●t the church be unavoidably guilty of a ●upereminent error , in a doctrin which draws so much practice after it ? whilst both the florentin council here , and that of trent pronounce , and all christians agree , that the souls detained in purgatory are assisted , delivered , by the prayers and suffrages of the faithful yet living . and yet certain it is , that the hastning of the day of iudgment is no advantage to them , in these their positions and grounds . let this great master himself plead the cause . let him fairly deliver us his sublime sense , in his own words : whether our devotions assist those souls or no ? whether the hastning of the day of iudgment be any way beneficial to them ? and that by his very ●bylosophical grounds , the basis and foundation of the duration of souls now detained in his new minted purgatory . in spiritual acts ( says he ) whether they bring happiness or misery , there is no proportion to time : so as to make pain which lasts longer , to be greater or that which ends sooner , to be less , for these are the properties of corporal things . every act of a pure spirit reflected on it self , being of its own nature out of the reach of time ; not subject thereto , but greater then the whole extension of time , &c , if then to a thing ( or separated soul ) which co-exists to a longer part of time , nothing be thereby added , or to a thing ( that is , a separated soul ) which coexists with a less part of time , nothing be diminished : there can be no reason , why duration should represent either more , or less grievous , in these respective cases : so that whatsoever grief of a separattd soul is by the quality and force of its essence greater , the same grief ( let its co-existence to time be what it will ) must be more vehement , and that which is less , ( by the force of its essence ) less : nothing being gained or lost by the perpetuating or contracting of the motions of the sun , or other celestial bodies : so that whatsoever time intervenes between death and the restauration of the world ( at the day of judgment ) is to separated souls as one moment . this doctrin presupposed , what can separated souls be concerned when the day of judgment shall come ? and hath not your admired master made a fair hand of it ? hath he not now compleately ended his work ? this , and only this remained in his new systeme : that the day of iudgment is hastned by our prayers , that so the souls may be assisted by them , and he himself escape that brand of heresie ( whilst the councils pronounce , they are assisted by us ) which even vulgar eyes would presently have fixt upon his opinion . and now he hath fairly delivered us of that empty pretence . it is not , it can not be ( according to him ) that the pepetuating of the motions of the heavens , or their even now ending their circulations , can give any addition or diminution , to the torments and sufferings of souls in the state of separation . for in them to co-exist to one hower , to one minute and a million of ages , is one and the same thing . let the angels trumpet summon them this moment , let it be deferred ten thousand , thousand years ; he tells us , and for fear we should not understand him , again and again , tells us , their duration is still the same , their moment one and the same , their pains , their sufferings one and the same . but how happily will he be surprized , if out of these grounds it be evinced , that those souls ( as to their present state of separation ) can not be concerned , whether ever the day of iudgment come or no ? let us suppose , that the providence of god had so ordered this machin of the world ; that these circulations of the heavens should never receive their last end and period : separated souls , most evidently , ( according to his positions , ) would not at all be concerned in this our supposition ; for where to coexist to one minute , howr , or a million of ages , is the same thing ; the soul , in that state , cannot be concerned whether time ever or never receive an end . he himself tells us , nothing is gained or lost by the perpetuating ( that is , never ending ) or even now contracting of these motions . and this will be rendred more evident , by the consideration of this our supposition . for since to suppose the world shall last for ever , is but to suppose it shall last longer , then any determinable number of ages ; and since his indivisible duration of souls , doth not onely comprehend this or that determinate number of years , but all time whatsoever : ( he himself teaches us , that every act of a pure spirit reflected on it self , is greater then the whole extension of time : ) it follows , that this duration of souls , it self remaining the very same , would comprehend all time in that supposition , that time should never have an end ; and by consequence , a separated soul , ( as to its state of separation ) is w●olly unconcerned , whether ever the world should have , or not have an end . and what influence this his doctrine will have , to evacuate our apprehensions of eternity , i leave to my readers consideration . away then with these idle winter-tales ; away with this ignorance of the nature of separated souls : a purgatory fire : a purging in the state of separation : a delivery from thence before re-union : an assistance given by our prayers to their sufferings . fables , dreams , and nothings . farewel to prayers , offrings , masses , alms , legacies , foundations : meer cheats and devices , utensils of a thriving devotion ; imposed by the church on the pious credulity of ignorant people . here is a period put by our thomas the english-man to that sensless devotion , which hath so long troubled the ignorant , silly world . and which then certainly shall have its period , when scriptures , fathers , popes , councils , and all other schools shall cease : when the faith christ our saviour taught us , shall be evacuated , and have an end ; and great trinobant be inthroned , to inlighten the hitherto darken'd world , by his and his knights demonstrations . sect. . but let us make an end . i have run through my adversaries defence of his purgatory against our present bull and council . i have given my reader some small light into this school , its method , its design : i have given some touches upon its doctrines , its demonstrations : and we have concluded with this devotion for the dead . there remains onely , that i make some short reflexions on what is added in this letter ; either as to the publishers persons , or other things , which did not directly pertain to our present question of purgatory . and first , as to his quarrel , pag. , &c. that the publishers printed this book without any application . a medium , by which mr. white might seem an heretick , to the good women ( as he tells us ) of which there are not a few ; and ignorant men , of which there are too many : nay , their own proselytes become such , by making private interpretations ; since this is to give themselves over to the private spirit . i answer : the faith of their flock being attempted , their pastoral care obliged them to this proceed : they published the condemnation of this doctrine , and pointed it out , which prooved effectual to their design . when creeds and catechisms are proposed to the vulgar , without further application to this or that opinion of a private doctour , or heresie : there is no fear children should become heretiques , but are instructed in faith . it is those , who with pride and pertinacy wrest these sacred texts to their own preconceived fancies , that run the hazard . to master whites person , neither they , nor i , have any quarrel : it 's an errour of judgment , to conceive him an heretique ; for those onely are such , who voluntarisy and pertinaciously adhere to some one or more doctrines , contrary to the received faith of the church : those who deny all faith , who pretend no knowledge is necessary , but such as is establisht by natural science and demonstrations , are not hereticks , but naturalists , and pagan phylosophers . in your third age of the church , which shall be directed by this new light , there will be no possibility of heresies . when st. pauls words , without faith it is impossible to please god , shall be evacuated ; his other doctrine , oportet haereses esse , will find no place . secondly , ●ow was this your quarrel , ushered in pag. . with tantoene animis coelestibus irae ? the publisher had not bewrayed the least impatience ; there was nothing in the book you pretend to answer , of his own : it was not he , but you , that pronounce your self guilty of anger . and yet this was as pertinent , as your — quid non mortalia pectora cogis ? is adapted to him , whom all good men ( better acquainted with him , ) have been more prone to censure , of the contrary disposition , to that , which you now slily would fix upon him . but yet not altogether unhappily was your defence of a poetical purgatory , ushered in with these poetical exclamations . thirdly , you tell us , pag. , & . that master white had long before appeal'd to these very authorities , and urged them so home , that he had rendred it evident , they speak his opinion , and against that faith i sustain . my reader may , if he please , for his satisfaction , peruse that mysterious place in his dimens de med. stat. and i answer , that it is not altogether unhappy , in an ill cause , to be able to say any thing without blushing . i have seen criminals deride the court , scorn the iudge ; but i never yet heard any of that eminent confidence , that he durst vaunt , the court had pronounced in his favour , when he stood condemned by the sentence . but because you have learnt to say so too , after your master , an ordinary reader will judge , that you verily beleeve you have no credit to lose , when you will venture your rest at this disadvantage . the pope defines souls being purged even before the re-assumption of their bodies , and before the general iudgment , were , are , and shall be in heaven . the council defines , souls being now purged uncloathed of their bodies , are presently received into heaven . i sustain this faith ; that souls may be purged uncloathed of their bodies , and that such are received presently into heaven , before the re-assumption of their bodies and general iudgment . you maintain the contradictory of this position ; and yet you have the confidence to tell your reader , and even hope he beleeves you ; that the sentence is pronounced in your favour , and that i stand condemned by it . fourthly , you quarrel , pag. . at the title of their book , which is : concerning the state of departed souls . you fancy a mystery which they never meant , and tell us , this is a false title ; the true one is , a definition of certain articles concerning the blessed vision of god , and the beatitude and damnation of souls . which yet is the very self-same with the other ; in this onely differing , that what they comprehended in the word , state ; is here declared by this division , of beatitude and damnution . sect. . fifthly , you tell us , pag. . the word verbatim made you smile . surely , sir , you do not smile without some special grace ; since you mind us so often of it . and presently you triumph about the gender of synodus , which you insinuate , the publisher was ignorant of , he having added to it an adjective in the masculine gender : and you pursue your sport amain , and tell us , the printer must take the fault upon him , or else the publisher will be suspected , to be better skilled in transcribin● three hundred lines of latin , then making three : and yet you safely pass this censure upon him , since the printer was exact enough in all the popes and councils latin . and further , you read us a grammar lesson , that some words in [ us ] are of the feminine , some in [ a ] of the masculine gender . now , sir , we will suppose that you were very carefull to examine the print ; and yet ( for all your care ) sacr●sanctum ecclesiam escaped your eye : for since you came so lately from grammar , i do not suspect you have forgot that ecclesia● and musa are of the feminine gender , though poeta indeed is ( as you tell us ) of the masculine . but these are meer seven-years-old-school-boys imployments , unworthy your reflections , now you write man , and would be tampering in divinity . but it unbeseems your youth , thus to attaque a person of merit and learning ; who long before your new minted purgatory appeared in the world , both read and sustained orthodox divinity , in a famous university , ( and i hope i may say it without vanity ) with dignity and honour to that chair : which was not every ones good fortune , even after their conclusions had passed the press , as i am informed out of portugal . sixthly , you laugh , pag. . at your adversaries , as if they were afraid to produce their reasons against master white ; and therefore you must guess at their whispering objections , by their stalking in great letters . and elsewhere you tell us , we can not weild reason , and therefore our weapons are authority . what goliath is this that exprobrates the hoast of the living god ? the church , sir , is both armed with authority against novelties , and is not unfurnished with reason to sustain her faith against all the pagan phylosophy of the world . if my indeavours receive your approbation , i shall proceed to further discoveries , in this your faithless pretended theology . and as to your complaint , that some words in their little book stalkt in great letters , 't is grounded on your little conversation with books ; where capital letters are frequent , especially in citing authorities : for there where the force of the proof lies in two or three words , they are pointed out thus to the readers eye and observation . you may , if you please , print in capital letters , monachi subditi episcopis , and notent monachi , and then , you will onely publish a little yet undigested choler , in a controversie again and again decided by that tribunal , from which there is no appeal . seventhly , you tell us , pag. . master whites opposers acknowledge , that this question of purgatory was not handled in pope benedict his dayes : since they accuse master white for the first starter of this doubt . your adversary the publisher of the bull , hath nothing at all of this : if his other opposers accuse him of it , i know not how they can justifie the accusation . new opinions are raked out of hell every day by the heterodox party , of which we yet finde obscure footsteps in antiquity . many opinions were choaked by the authority of the church even in their birth , and broached again . your self acknowledge pope benedict , and many doctors of the latin church , were of opinion , that purgation might be perfected before reunion , pag. . and it will not be improbable , if it was onely their opinion ( as you pretend ) that others with master white held the contrary . but how can you parallel pag. . master white ( according to your adversary ) with him , who brake a law before it was made ; if master white now breaks one , three hundred years after it was made ; unless you will suppose , that no one article of our faith was establisht , till some one or other impugned it , for otherwise , his now crime ( or erroneous doctrin ) might stand condemned long agoe . sect. . eightly , you would perswade your reader , pag. , . that not you , but we stand condemn'd by this bull and council : because the sole design of the pope was , to secure this sacred verity , that perfect charity brings an immediate heaven . and since your adversary holds , that every soul immediately upon her separation , converts her self perfectly to god , and yet he detains her still in purgatory , to suffer a dry and arbitrary punishment , which doth not redress the already rectified affections of the soul : it follows , he contradicts the popes design , and stands condemned by this his sentence . i answer , first , that i have already charged you with imposing on the pope , and if it were true , that the pope doth here define , that perfect charity brings an immediate heaven ( which when you shew we shall be thankful for the miracle ) yet does not your argument against us , at all conclude : for where does your adversary tell you , that immediately upon separation , all the affections of the soul are rectified and she in perfect charity ? much less that she hath satisfied the divine justice for her irregularites in this mortal life . the publisher hath not one word of this in his book you pretend to answer . ( you are like a romancical knight , you make gyants and kill them ) but if he truely did hold this doctrin which you impose upon him : yet will your argument be of no force against him . for this question being proposed , whether souls immediately upon separation , rectifie all their affections ? your adversary may take which side of the contradiction he pleases , and still sustain with the pope and council this their doctrin of purgatory against you . and first , let us suppose he should asser● with you , that inordinate affections do accompany the soul into the next life , yet he may sustain those affections are purged and rectified before re-union : and what crime should he be guilty of , but of opposing your pretended demonstrations ? and so your mock victory , and pageant triumph ( whilst you would perswade him , p. . to acknowledge with regret , that the pope and council pronounce against him ) is at an end : the strength of your proof depending on an imposition on the pope , an imposition on your adversary , and a non-concluding argument drawn out of them both . i had almost forgot , that in this case , he should withstand the authority of virgil , whose phylosophy your master magnifies above that of the church : though the poet describes both corporal punishments inflicted on the souls , ( which your master will needs understand after his too frequent metaphorical manner ) and admits their passing into elysium ( his feigned heaven ) before resurrection , of which the poet never dreamt . nor even as to the proof that affections to corporal pleasures do remain in separated souls ( for which end it is introduced ) doth this place of this poet reach home : — nec funditus omnes corporea excedunt pestes , penitusque necesse est , multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris . for these words doe not clearly carry this sense ; do all evils cease , all plagues all strifes contracted in the body , many a stain long time inured , needs must even then remain . but however ( to do him right ) if this place do not reach home , this doctrin is frequent with the heathen poets in their fables , as in that of narcissus . metamor . where he stands condemned to gaze upon himself in the next life , because he passed out of this , in a doting self-love . but if we should suppose the publisher to approve : that such souls immediately upon separation , rectifie all disordered affections : how will you justifie , that this or perfect charity is an immediate disposition to beatifical vision ? what do you think of lumen gloriae , the light of glory , which is farther required ? and if you fancy with your master , lib. . perip . lect. . that god is a sun , darting out existencies according to the several dispositions of creatures . what doctrin shall we have from you of the saints in this life ? will you pronounce , that never any saint had perfectly regulated his affections but just in that very moment he passed out of this life ? what do you conceive of the holy apostles ? of the baptist ? what in particular of st. paul , when he tels us , i live now not i , but christ lives in me ? what of the holy fathers ofx the old law ? what of the ever blessed virgin , even when she bore the saviour of the world in her sacred womb ? did all these injoy beatitude , or were they imperfect in charity ? or did this sun not dart forth his existencies as perfect charity the immediate disposition to heaven required ? but let us consider your argument , you tell us , that your adversary conceiving the souls now perfect in charity , delayes their beatitude and condems them to a dry and arbitrary punishment , pag. . this dry and arbitrary punishment you have out of your masters doctrin , for he prosecutes it at length in his middle state● acc. , , &c. and first , he tells us , god doth not punish sinners upon the score of revenge , nor for the satisfaction of iustice ; since he suffers no injury by our offences . nor can the punishments of souls be involuntary , or springing from an external , much less , from a material agent ; but from within . that such pains neither avail them , nor vs . lastly , that these sufferings have no connexion with the sins : and yet god being a perfect architect , hath so artificially framed his work ; that of it self it performs all operations without supplement , or future minute alterations , in any of its members or organs . and so he excepts against punishments which are supposed to remain due after the fault forgiven . acc. . all which is but to retrive what the heterodox party alledged long since , in their impugnations of purgatory and penance ; and which stands condemned by this the canon of the council of trent , sess. . de iustif. occasioned by this doctrine . if any one shall say , that to every penitent sinner , after the grace of iustification received , that so the fault is forgiven , and the guilt of eternal punishment , that there remains no guilt of temporal punishment to be payd , either in this life , or in the future in purgatory , before the passage to heaven may be opened ; let him be anathema . thus the council . where by the way you may observe a temporary punishment in purgatory , against your systeme : and after the remission of the fault , a punishment due . but because this truth is so fundamental in the sacred council , all its doctrine of satisfaction , the third part of penance , depending on it : let us compare its sacred oracles , with the doctrine of our new master . and first , sess. . cap. . of the necessity and fruit of satisfaction . the council declares this doctrine ( of satisfaction ) to have been the constantly received faith of the church by divine tradition , and is impugned now by those who have an outside of piety , but have denied the vertue of it . directly opposite to our new school , which teaches , that pains remain not due , after the fault forgiven : under pretence of promoting solid devotion . and the council pronounces , that it is altogether false , and against the word of god , that the fault is never remitted , but that all the punishment is also forgiven . for besides divine tradition , there are illustrious examples in holy writ , which most manifestly convince this errour . thus the council , directly against our new master , as will presently appear by his answer to this doctrine . further the council pursues . nay , the order of the divine iustice doth seem to require , that in an other manner sins should be pardoned in them who before baptism offended by ignorance ; then in those who after baptism violate the temple of god . and it becomes the divine clemency , that sins should not be pardoned ( in penance ) without any satisfaction . directly against our master , who tells us ; no punishments are inflicted upon the score of satisfying the divine iustice , since god suffers no injury by our offences . the council holds on . let the priests of god have before their eyes , that the satisfaction which they impose ( on penitents ) be not onely as to the guard of a new life , or as a medicine of infirmity ; but also as in revenge and chastisement of their past sins . and on this doctrine , the practice of the church is grounded in the sacrament of penance , where satisfaction is injoyned after absolution and forgiveness of the sin , and that in revenge and chastisement . directly against our master , who excepts against this doctrine , that after the sin forgiven , pains remain due . and the council concludes : which whilst our innovatours will not understand , they so teach the best repentance to be a new life , that they take away all the force and use of satisfaction . and again , the same council , sess. . cap. . declares ; that in the penance of those who fall into sin ( after baptism ) is not onely contained , ceasing from sins , and a detestation of them , or a contrite and humbled heart ; but a confession and absolution ; and also satisfaction by fastings , alms , prayers , &c. not for the eternal punishment , which together with the fault is remitted by the sacrament ; but for the temporal punishment , which ( as holy writ teaches ) is not all of it , alwayes remitted as in baptism . directly against him : for the fault is here remitted , together with the guilt of eternal punishment , by the sacrament , and yet temporal pains remain due in penance , but not in baptism . you see , sir , punishments due , after the sin remitted ; which doctrine you would disgrace with your epithetes of dry and arbitrary . where by the way i would have you observe , that sins are in an other manner remitted in baptism , then in penance ; for in this , a temporary punishment remains due , not in that . and i pray you tell us , when you write again , whether in baptism receiceived with your conditional affection to mortal sins , or an absolute one to venial sins , if the party should at that very moment depart this life ; your master would not condemn him to purgatorry , even till the day of iudgment ? though this countil here declare , that the fault , together with the punishment , is all of it remitted in baptism ; and the council of florence defines , that the souls of them who after baptism received , contract no blemish at all of sin , are presently received into heaven . i do very much suspect , this presently will signifie at the day of iudgment , in your doctrine . but because the council here mentions illustrious examples in scripture , where the sin was forgiven , and yet a punishment inflicted , which had no natural connexion to the sin it self , as all divines understand in the case of david ; where for his crime , now forgiven , god took away his son . it is not unworthy our observation , how our great master was pinched with this example , when he sustains , de med. stat. dimens . that punishments are not inflicted by god , which have no connexion with the crime . for there having ( most injuriously ) tied god to nature ; and told us , that god being the author of nature , which flows from him as from its proper cause , mu contradict himself , if he act any thing against it : and therefore cannot assign punishments bearing no connexion with the fault . yet presently ( in the same leaf ) to answer this case of david , he was forced to have recourse to a miracle , or work beyond the usual and connatural course of causes , and the usual connexion between the fault and penalty , that god might signalize a revenge : ( which according to his doctrine , is to make god contradicts himself . ) in which he contradicts all his former positions and grounds , both of gods proceeding on the score of revenge and justice ; and this his now delivered doctrine , that he punishes not , but by a penalty naturally connected , or flowing from the crime . but presently he tells us , that such examples are not to be drawn to the condition of ordinary punishments , which are usual in the common order of things . but why it may not be extended , that gods iustice may and doth require of separated souls , a punishment not now flowing from their inordinate affections , he doth not tell us : nor indeed could he give other reason then , that this doctrine would not square with his peripatetick theology . for if either the inordinate ●ffections of souls , in that state , might be redressed , or the divine iustice be satisfied by their sufferings , or our prayers before reunion ; the design he had in molding his new purgatory , ( which he himself sufficiently declares , de med. stat. dimens . ) had been ruined and overthrown . much better then , and more solidly did calvin phylosophyse , instit. li● . . cap. . § . . what is purgatory ( says he to catholicks ) but that satisfaction for sins which the souls of those who depart this life suffer ? so that if this opinion of satisfaction be destroyed , out of hand purgatory it self is quite pulled up by the very roots . and when you write again , sir , i expect your modesty should tell us ; that this council too , as well as that of florence , doth not decree any thing against your master , but against me . the bells will happily chyme your unchangeable brutish affections in separated souls : no punishments due after the sin forgiven : no temporary punishment in purgatory : no punishment in revenge and chastisement : no punishment inflicted by god , but such as naturally flow from the crimes . sect. . but what is all this , if master white ( as you tell us , pag. . ) say it is demonstrable , that souls being purged are immediately in heaven ? or if you can not beat it , with all this indeavour , into our heads , that charity is the immediate disposition to bliss : since this is the ground of his envied book , forsooth , of the middle state of souls ? ( as you say , pag. . ) for what can all the councils prevail against a demonstration ? and were it not worth my readers pains to see , and satiate his soul , with the excellent demonstration of this sacred verity ? the pope in our present bull declares , souls now purged see the divine essence . and we having , touched something of his new hell , why should we not see how his a ●amantine chain reaches to heaven too ? thus then , instit. sac. tom. . lib. . lect. . he with incomparable evidence , sufficient to destroy the hitherto onely faith of the world demonstrates , that souls perfect in charity , enjoy the beatifical vision . and first presupposing , that souls in the next life attain a plenary knowledge of all things . he thus pursues , nevertheless ( sayes he ) since god is one onely formality , which is so elevated above the reasons of all possible , and existent things , that it is superior to gender ( genus ) it self , and hath no common reason : it is evident that an intellect by force of the intellection of all possible things , much less of existents , can not be erected by consequence , and as it were virtual discourse , to the knowledg of such a formality , which is ( as we may say ) as it were , the diffinition of god : and therefore can not intuitively see god . again , it is evident , that those who have lived holily , that is , exercised themselves to have god for the last end , and s●le good , having now received this plentitude of knowledg , out of that , that they more strongly and evidently know this truth , do infinitely increase in the affection to see god : and since the will is a reflection of existence upon essence , by which the vertue of the entity is exercised and applyed to the desired effect : such a saint , not to be any other thing , then a man exercised according to the whole vertue and entity , in respect of the vision of god . since that then as to know himself , is to be himself to be , so to know god , is to be god : that is , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} to be ( of ) to be ( {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} esse esse ) but since the vertue of a thing to be , is nothing but a potentiality , especially in respect of to be subsistent , which is both essence and to be : it is concluded such a saint , by all which is in him , not to be any thing else , but an actual and exercised potentiality of being god . since therefore on the part of god , out of that that he is to be it self , ( or speaking more especially , it is to be understood in act it self , or to be in act understood , which is to be his own to understand passively : so that to be understood , is not in him a denomination , but a real quality ( that very quality which constitutes the father ) and this quality or property is subsistent , and by consequence proper to no power but to any one accommodated ) nothing can be wanting which appertains to the reason of act and actuality : it is concluded , that the saints and god are one by power and act , that is , that the saints cleerly see god . and now , truly sir , if my readers patience hath held out , as mine hath to translate this long demonstration , just as it lyes , for fear of spoiling the non-sense , i think he desires me to make it his humble request to that ingenious gentleman , who translated your masters middle state of souls , who hath so well delivered us virgils sense , to put this admirable demonstration in rhime , it will go rarely to a jewes trump . and i desire you to tel me when you write again , in what moode and figure this syllogisme concludes . but now having demnostratively understood , that the saints perfect in charity immediately see god . let us see how you pursue the way that separated souls attain to this perfection by re-union , and so ; sect. . ninethly , you tell us , pag. . master white endeavours to finde a state in which the soul may be changeable to more holy desires , and a connatural cause to give her those desires , to wit , the corporal and mental sight of her dearest saviour , &c. for what state more fit for changeableness , then a corporeal one ? and what more powerful to ravish the whole affections of a soul , then the divine face of her spouse ? my reader will not wonder at the inventions your master finds out , now he is a little acquainted with the head that finds them . yet this invention is worth our observation , which i suspect , you will hardly shew in any former writer , and so justly he may be proud of it . the souls then have been all the time of their separation , in a state of suffering only , by their irregular affections : which being wholly unchangeable in that state , they are as yet not purged , or cleansed at all , but perfectly the same they were at the moment of death : but now by reunion with the body they are put into a new state of changeableness . now , sir , christians that have hitherto walked by faith , do all conceive that the way or pilgrimage of men to the future life , is ended at death . they never heard that souls at the resurrection are returned to act again in order to eternity . if that state do render souls changeable and free , and their actions then , have such an influence on their future state , it will justly be feared , that many of them may drop out of purgatory into hell . nor will the sight of the divine face of their spouse , quite evacuate this apprehension : for if the soul be not necessarily , but freely and voluntarily ravisht , the doubt will remain , whether she will still continue her inordinate affections , or avert her self wholly from god , and so either remain in his purgatory still , or nowpass into hell ? and how happily , sir , doth this change of affections ( which is your sole and onely purging or cleansing of the soul , wrought by the sight of the divine face of christ , which sight is doubtless an incomparable pleasure , and such an one as ravishes the whole affections of the soul ) agree with the decrees of these councils : that of florence , when it defines ; the souls are purged by the pains of purgatory . that of trent , when it teaches ; after the sin remitted , temporary pains are due in purgatory . when now we are taught , that souls are purged by pure pleasures , the sight of their dear spouse . and in earnest , sir , i know not why the world is not more inamoured of your doctrine : you have now filled our lives with the pleasures of the body ; you have quite turned the pains and afflictions of souls in the state of separation , into pure pleasures : and now at the re-union , you fancy the souls affections changed ; ( that is her self purged ) by an incomparable pleasure , which even ravishes all her affections . and to compleat a most pleasant divinity , i could pursue it , even to your masters pleasant hell : who , instit. sac. lib. . lec . . describes the damned so pleased with their torments , that they are in love with them , and would not be without them . but i reserve that to an other discovery . onely i will for the present mind you , that since the inordinate affections of the damned are their torment , ( according to your master in that same place , ) and those affections remain in them , in the same proportion they were in this life ; and since doubtless where pleasures are possible , and easie to be attained , and we continually pressed by our bodies to the enjoyment ; the refraining from them is a far greater torment , then where the temptations are not so impetuous , or none at all ; and the injoyment represented as impossible , which at one blow outs off all the wills pursuit : it will follow , that those who restrain themselves from these pleasures , are in a greater hell in this life , then those who are damned in the next . and therefore it would not seem very rational , that any man should precipitate himself voluntarily now into a greater hell , where is duration and succession , to avoid a less in the future life , the duration of which , is but as one moment . and let me further beg of you , to render us a cleer account , how it should happen , that the souls of the damned at the re-union should not all of them rectifie their now disordered affections , and fly to heaven : for since your master hath already taught us , that the damned souls are now furnished with all knowledge , all erroneous judgments corrected in them : their grief depending on this , that their affections to corporal pleasures are greater then in proportion to other desires , which ought to be preferred : it would not be inconsequent to t●is doctrine , that those damned souls now seeing most evidently , that other desires ought to be preferred before these affections to corporal pleasures , ( since this errour is now rectified ) and they in a condition , by re-union with the body , of changeableness , they should also rectifie their affections , which are but these judgments , and by consequence become now denizons of heaven , which also might seem to become the mercies of god , and render the state of the blessed more happy there , by their company . sect. . tenthly , you entertain your reader , pag. , &c. with scoffing at hallowed grains , sanctified beads , the extending of indulgencies to the next world , which you style external devices , vtensils of a thriving devotion , deluding priviledges , &c. which perfectly befits a scholar trained up in luthers school ; thus he began . and you are not content with this , you retrive again , ( in the same place , ) and fix upon your adversary , that signal calumny long since fixt upon the church , ( for the use of such things , ) that she goes to heaven by such things , not by holy desires : nor even pretends , that such things promote souls in holy desires , or increase sanctity in them . in which you speak against your own soul and conscience : for you very well know , the church is not guilty of this ; nor your adversary , who will tell you , that he beleeves with st. paul , that if he had faith able to remove mountains , yet it would not avail him without charity ; and further tells you , that such things as you here enumerate , do increase sanctity and holy desires in us , and render our prayers more effectual for the souls in purgatory . eleventhly , you tell us , ( in your postscript , ) that private calumnies are whispered against master white , as holding strange opinions , which his own books contradict . i have also heard something of this , and i think our informations jump ; you may peradventure find it hinted at in this discourse : nor need that gentleman fear your title of a calumniatour , or that his authority will not carry it , nor indeed will it be engaged in the quarrel ; he is provided of a defence ; i have shewed him that very doctrine in terms , in your masters book , which he had told him in private ; it is ready for you , you shall have it when you please to call for it : and i wonder those solid persons , acquainted with every ressort of his learning , did not see it . lastly , you add , your master hath this comfort , that his carriage needs neither fear the exemplarity of his adversaries lives , nor his unparalled learning the force of their arguments . in which , your reader will be perswaded , that you were not a perfect scholar in galateus his school . the publisher against whom you write , is a person of eminent exemplarity ; and for my part , where your masters pen is not engaged , i have been edified by him , even in his writings i find some things most excellent ; but why comparisons should be made , i do not understand . you and i being private persons , hope still the best , and pray for all those whom we desire to better by our example : but because it is both laudable and lawfull to magnifie the good and pious lives of men , i joyn heartily with you in this encomium of your master : and if you now design to advance in order to his canonization , and can make good his faith , ( which is the first quaere of that court , ) i shall very willingly give testimony to the exemplarity of his life . i wish from my soul , his doctrine would appear intirely and fully catholick ; and for the rest , you have my vote ; he may be beleeved , as holy , as st. iohn baptist . sect. . and now , sir , i hope to have given you some satisfaction in our point in controversie . we as yet have proceeded upon this unshakeable ground , that the councils are unerrable in their decrees ; and upon this i have received a very ample and full ▪ one my self . i do beleeve , that souls are purged uncloathed of their bodies , and presently received into heaven before re-union with them . and that the council and pope deliver this position , i must see , if i have eyes ; and i hope you will , by what is said . and this hope is heightned in me , because my conscience tell me , i have proceeded with as even a hand as i could , in balancing what you have said against it , with that which i have said for it . if i am byassed naturally on either side , it is on yours : nature prompts me still to wish , the church and her faith were not engaged against you : your opinion would , at one blow , ease me of that incumbent care to assist my dead friends : but i have learnt this work of mercy from a child , to pray for the dead , which in your systeme ( as i have evinced ) is fruitless . but alas , sir , this business of purgatory is not that which so much troubles my head , though it be one : i have a deeper fear : i am pressed with the consideration of this new molded theology , i see this demonstrative doctrine , this pretence of reducing the mysteries of faith to our narrow brains , this hope of introducing science in lieu of faith into the world , strikes much deeper then yet you imagine . nor am i at all confident of your solid cleer-sighted friends , who are acquainted with every resort of master whites doctrine . i fear , and i think not without reason , the church and he have nothing common , but words ; for the notions and significations are quite different : but our faith lies not in the sound of words , but in the sense and meaning of them . when i am told , souls are not purged in the state of separation , but onely at re-union ; though the word purgatory yet remain , my faith remains not of this article . and so it will fare with the rest . i do beleeve faith , hope , and charity are infused by the holy ghost , into our souls in baptism . i do beleeve holy iustif●ing grace ( by which we are the sons of god ) is something inhaerent in our souls ; and my notion of these things which are supernatural , is , that they are of a different order and series then nature . but when i am now taught , god is the author of nature , but showrs not down into us an other series of things of an other or differing order ; reason is nature to us , and the perfection of reason is demonstration : though at the same time we are taught , that god perfects nature by supernatural things ; yet i suspect the word supernatural , being still the same , that now it is become aequivocal , and signifies an other thing with him then it does with me . i do believe the ever blessed trinity to be three real persons , father , son and holy ghost : yet where i find this most sublime mystery pretended to be demonstrated by what is essential in god ( to know and love himself , ) when i find it so brought down to our capacities , that it is pretended , the examples of logick and natural phylosophy equalize this mystery ; when i am taught , that the father and son ( in divinis ) are metaphors : i have a great apprehension that this doctrin and my hitherto received faith agree but in words , not in the things signified by them . i do believe , that god most freely , and of his own goodness built this vniverse : i believe , he is not necessarily tyed to the order or course of nature : and when i am now taught , that god must contradict himself if he act any thing against nature . that , out of the force and series of nature , nothing could happen better to iudas , then to be damned . in fine , god should cease to be god , if this flye should not now be in nature . i fear though we agree in this word god , our apprehensions jump not at all . christians apprehend and adore the liberal free hand of their maker ; but a god tyed to any thing besides himself , is not a christian god , but a pagan iupiter . i do believe upon christs words , that if i keep the commandments i shall enter into life : and this is the foundation of my doctrin of manners . and when i am now taught , that god neither commands nor forbids any thing . however we agree in these words , thou shalt not steal : thou shalt not commit adultery : my whole doctrin of morality is banished by this assertion . it will hereafter appear your master hath furnished us with a fa● other morality then ever escobar thought of . what do you think of this position of your master in his book of government and obedience , ground . speaking of himself , an other man ( says he ) is no otherwise to me , then a peece of cloath or wood , which i cut and shape after my own will , fittingly for my use : even though i do him harme , or seek his ruine ; it follows not i wrong him . how well doth this agree with that principle of nature , that we ought so to do to others , as we would have them do to us ? in summ , where i see a pretender to demonstrate all the mysteries of our holy faith , and that faith shall cease and evidence take place , i justly fear though the words are still retained , this is but to supplant christ and his doctrin ; our notions and significations of words must be changed , or else these stupendious mysteries can not be levelled to our weak capacities . but though these be my apprehensions , yet i wish i were mistaken : i wish these new doctrines may receive such explications , that they may appear no less catholick then those i profess , and shall be as happy to receive satisfaction , as you to give it me ; but , withal , i must frankly promise you , that i shall require your satisfaction both in these and many other doctrines . i do acknowledge with thankfulness , that one may be instructed by master white , whose excellent wit and pen , if duly applyed , is admirable ; but if i mistake not , he hath flown beyond the bounds fixed by an unerring hand : and therefore desire you to accept of this serious protestation , that i have an intire respect for his person , and if any harsh word hath escaped my pen , it is the doctrine not he that is concerned in the epithete : the same i speake and intend to your self . though if you consider the case aright ( where not only whatsoever is sacred to catholicks , but what the heterodox-party agree with them in , is thus attaqued ; where the foundations of christianity and of all religion , the liberty of god , and contingency of creatures , is thus attempted by a lucretian galamawfry phylosophy , to make way for a new demonstrative religion ) such an exotick design deserves not a more mild censure then what i have fixed upon it : and yet i hope you will nor find your too too frequent calumniating adversaries , or any thing like it in my whole booke . if you think there is any animosity in my discourse , i heartily beg your pardon : we daily say , sicut & nos dimittimus , where these heats are easily allayed ; and for our present controversie of purgatory , let us patiently expect the determination of our undoubted superior , the present soveraign pastor , who ( as the florentin council here tell us ) holds the primacy over the whole world : who is the successor of st. peter , the prince of the apostles : and the true vicar of christ , and the head of the whole church , and the father and teacher of all christians : and who finally had full power delivered unto him by our lord iesus christ in st. peter to feed , to rule , and to govern the vniversal church . to whom we will candidly , fairly and religiously , ( and not by any false suggestions or surprising friends , as you most strangely suspect , pag. . and thereby at once condemn both that supream court of weakness , if not of corruption , and your adversaries of dishonesty ) remit the whole controversie , and humbly submit to his judgment , both in this particular , and in all other disputable points whatsoever . finis . the publisher desires my adversary to take notice , that if there be any thing in this discourse which depends on matter of fact , in which he desires to be satisfied , he is ready to give him intire satisfaction before any person of honour , by undoubted witnesses . a the bull of pope benedict the eleventh , ( otherwise called the twelfth ) promulgated in the year , . concerning the state of departed souls . faithfully translated , as it is in the roman bullary , printed at rome , anno dom. . benedict , bishop , the servant of gods servants , to the perpetual memory of posterity . blessed be god in his gifts , and holy in all his works , who through his mercy forsakes not the sacred roman , catholique , and apostolical church , which his right hand hath planted as his vineyard , and which he hath raised up , as chief and conqueress , to be the head of all churches ; our lord saying to peter , thou art peter , and upon this rock i will build my church : but by his blessed apostles , especially peter and paul , the singular defenders of the same church , keeps her through his compassionate benignity and continual piety : that she being governed by these rulers , may remain stable in her self , as founded upon the firm rock , and that all the believers of the christian faith may obey her , may yield to her , may intend to her , may live under her authority , may be under her discipline and correction . that in her nothing may be taught rashly , nothing brought in unwarily , nothing in faith unadvisedly introduced : and that so men may decline from evil , and do good ; that they may walk in the right paths , and make progress to better things , by their holy desires ; that they may hopefully expect the neer approaching rewards of the eternal life of just men , and fearfully dread the not far off calamities of hell , appointed for the wicked . for it is written , behold i come quickly , and my reward is with me , to render unto every one according to his works . but if it shall be otherwise attempted by any one ; that she forthwith by her authority ( adding also punishments thereunto , as she shall judge it expedient ) totally root it out . for which church ( to the end that she subsisting in her self might inform others ) our saviour christ jesus prayed to his father in the time of his passion , saying , simon , behold satan hath desired to have you , that he may fift you as wheat : but i have prayed for thee , that thy faith may not fail , and when thou art converted strengthen thy brethren . § . . there arose indeed a matter of question not long since , in the time of iohn the our predecessor of happy memory , between some doctors of divinity , concerning the vision of the souls of just men after their death , in which there was nothing to be purged , when they departed out of this world , or if there were , it was now totally purged ; whether they see the divine essence before the assumption of their bodies , and the generall judgement , and also concerning other matters : some of them holding the negative , some the affirmative ; others according to their own imaginations , endeavouring to shew divers things , and in divers manners , concerning the vision of the divine essence by the souls aforesaid , as it is known apparently by their words and writings , and by their rejected disputations , which we here omit for brevities sake : because they so differed amongst themselves from our determinations . and whereas our aforesaid predecessor , to whom the determination of the above-mentioned questions did belong , had prepared himself in his publick consistory , as well before his brethren , the cardinals of the holy roman church , ( of whose members we our selves then were ) as before the prelates and doctors in divinity ( many of them being present ) strictly charging and commanding them , that each one should deliberately deliver his opinion , concerning the matter of the aforesaid vision , when he should require it from them : but being prevented by death ( as it pleased god ) he could not effect it . § . . we therefore , ( after the death of our aforesaid predecessor , being assumed to sit in the apostolical seat ; more seriously considering , how great dangers of souls might be incurr'd , and how many scandals might arise , if the aforesaid contentions were left unresolved : to the end that the diversity of opinions may perish , and the solidity of truth may plainly appear , having first made use of a careful examination of the matters aforesaid , and having diligently deliberated with our brethren , the cardinals of the said roman church : do , with the advice of those our brethren , by the apostolicall authoritie , define by this constitution to be valid for ever . § . . that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of all the saints , which departed out of this world before the passion of our lord jesus christ ; as also the souls of the holy apostles , martyrs , confessors , virgins , and of the other faithfull , departed after they had received christs sacred baptism ; in whom there was nothi●g to be purged when they departed , nor also shxall be when he●eafter they shall depart this life ; or if there then be , or shall be any thing to be purged in them , when after death they shall be purged . and , that the souls of infants , regenerated with the said christian baptism , and to be baptized ; when being baptized they shall depart this life , before they have the use of their free will . presently after their departure , and after the aforesaid purgation , in such as stood in need thereof ; even before the resumption of their bodies , and before the general judgement ; ( since the ascension of our lord and saviour jesus into heaven : ) were , are , and shall be in heaven , in the heavenly kingdome , in the celestial paradise with christ , aggregated to the fellowship of the holy angels ; and ( since the passion and death of our lord jesus christ , ) they have seen , and do see the divine essence by an intuitive vision , and even face to face , without the mediation of any creature interposing it self by way of a visible object ; but the divine essence shewing it self immediately unto them , nakedly , clearly , and openly : and , that they thus seeing the divine essence , do enjoy the same . moreover , that by such a vision and fruition , the souls of them who are already departed out of this life , are truly blessed , and have eternal life and rest ; and so shall their souls be , which shall hereafter depart this life , when they shall see the same divine essence , and enjoy it before the general judgment . and , that this vision and fruition of the divine essence , doth evacuate in them , and cause to cease the acts of faith and hope ; as faith and hope are properly theological vertues . and , that after such an intuitive and facial vision and fruition shall be begun in them ; the same vision and fruition , without any interruption , evacuation or cessation , hath remained , continued , and shall be continued , even to the final judgment , and afterwards , even to all eternity . § . . moreover we define , that according to gods common ordination , the souls of such as die in actual deadly sin , descend presently into hell after their death , where they are tormented with infernal punishments ; and , that nevertheless , in the day of judgment all men shall appear before the tribunal of christ with their bodies , to render an account of their own actions , that every one may bear the proper things of his body , according to what he hath done , whether good or evil , § . . decreeing , that our definitions or determinations aforesaid , and every of them , be held by all faithfull people : and that whosoever shall hereafter presume , wittingly and pertinaciously to hold , affirm , preach , teach , and defend , by word or by writing , contrary to these our aforesaid definitions , or determinations , and every of them ; it be proceeded against him in due manner , as against an heretick . § . . let it not therefore be lawfull for any man to violate this page of our constitution , or by a rash boldness to do against the same . but if any one shall presume to attempt it ; let him know , that he shall incur the wrath of the almighty god , and of the blessed peter and paul his apopostles . given at avinion , on the fourth of the calends of february , in the second year of our popedome . in like manner it was decreed in the eighth general synod , held at florence , under eugenius the fourth ; as appears in the letters of the holy union between the latin and greek church . in these terms . out of the eighth geneneral synod held at florence , under eugenius the fourth . in the letters of the holy union between the latin and greek churches . the sacred council aprooving , we define . artic. . if truly penitent souls shall depart this life before they have satisfied for their commissions and omissions , by the worthy fruits of penance : that their souls are purged by the punishment of purgatory , after their bodies death : and that to relieve them from such their punishments , the suffrages of the faithfull yet living do profit them , to wit , sacrifices of the mass , prayers , alms-deeds , and other offices of piety , which are used to be performed by the faithfull for other faithfull , according to the institute of the church . art. . and that the souls of them , who after baptism received , have contracted no blemish at all of any sin ; as also those souls , which after they have contracted the blemish of sin , are purged either in their bodies , or being uncloathed of their bodies , ( as is above-said , ) are presently received into heaven , and clearly behold god himself in trinity and unity , as he is ; yet according to the diversity of merits , one more perfect then another . art. . but that the souls of them who depart this life in actual deadly sin , or onely in original sin , do presently descend into hell , to be there punished , though with unequal punishments . we also define , that the holy apostolical sea , and the roman bishop , holds the primacy over the whole world ; and that he , ( the roman bishop , ) is the successor of st. peter the prince of the apostles , and the true vicar of christ , and the head of the whole church ; and the father and teacher of all christians ; and that full power was delivered unto him by our lord jesus christ in st. peter , to feed , to rule , and to govern the universal church : as it is also contained in the acts of general councils , and in the sacred canons . given at florence , in the publick synodical session . in the year . and subscribed by the emperour of constantinople , and the greek and latin fathers , there and then present : as it appears in the books of the councils . b the ten heresies condemned by this bull of pope benedict ; gathered by eymericus in his directory of the inquisitors , approved by gregory xiii . cited , pag. . in the extravagant of pope benedict xii . ( says eymericus ) which begins , blessed be god . these following heresies are condemned , and their contraries are proved to be catholick verities , and to be held as matters of faith . the first heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of just men departed before the passion of our lord jesus christ , in which nothing was to be purged ; presently after the said passion of our lord jesus christ , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment , did not see , nor do see , nor shall see cleerly and openly the divine essence , nor do enjoy it . no● after the ascension of our lord iesus christ , were , are , nor shall be in heaven , in the heavenly kingdome , and celestial paradise with christ , aggregated to the fellowship of the holy angels . the second heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of just men departed before the passion of our lord jesus christ , in which something remained to be purged , the purgation being totally compleated , presently after the said passion of our lord jesus christ , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment ; did not see , nor do see , nor shall see , the divine essence , clearly and openly , not do enjoy it : nor after the ascension of our lord jesus christ , were , are , nor shall be in heaven , &c. the third heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of just men departed , after they had received the sacred baptism , in which nothing is to be purged , when they depart , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment , do not see , nor shall see , the divine essence , clearly and openly , nor do enjoy it , nor are , nor shall be in heaven , in the heavenly kingdome , &c. the fourth heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of just men , departing after they have received the sacred baptism , in which there is somthing to be purged , when they depart , their purgation being also totally compleated , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment , do not see , nor shall see clearly and openly , the divine essence , nor do , nor shall enjoy it , nor are , nor shall be in heaven , &c. the fifth heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of infants regenerated by sacred baptism , departing before the use of their free-will , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment , do neither see , nor shall see , clearly and openly , the divine essence , nor do enjoy it , nor shall enjoy it , nor are , nor shall be in heaven , &c. the sixth heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls of all the aforesaid just men departed , before the resumption of their bodies , and the general iudgment , shall not be blessed with the divine vision and fruition , nor shall have eternal life and rest . the seventh heresie is , that the vision which the blessed souls have of the divine essence , is not an intuitive and facial vision . the eighth heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the intuitive and facial vision and fruition of the divine essence shall be evacuated in the blessed , nor shall be continued until the final judgment , nor from thence unto all eternity . the ninth heresie is , that according to the common ordination of god , the souls departed in mortal sin , presently after death do not descend into hell , nor are tormented with infernal punishments . the tenth heresie is , that in the day of judgmen● , all men shall not appear with their bodies before the tribunal of christ , to render an account of their actions , cor. . . that every one may receive the things done in his bodie according to that he hath done , whether it be good or bad . c. the discourse of an eminently learned divine of our nation , to prove the delivery of souls before the resurrection . cited pag. . the condemnation of blacklow ( or white ) by a pope and general council . the sense of the florentin council of the admission of some souls , even those that now are in purgatory , to eternal beatitude , before the day of general judgment . the definition of the council . in the name of the most holy trinity , father , son and holy ghost : this sacred and vniversal florentin council approving , we define , that the souls of those who after baptism received have contracted no blemish at all of sin ; as also the souls of those which after the blemish of sin contracted , are now purged either in their bodies , or uncloated of their said bodies ( as is above said ) presently are received into heaven , and do behold god himself in trinity and vnity as he is . thus the council . though the very text it self of the florentin council , seemes abundantly sufficient to evince what we here aime at and intend : yet that the stubborness of some persons ( who are not the most knowing in the ecclesiastical doctrin ) may more powerfully be repressed . it is to be noted , that when any doubt arises concerning the meaning of a council , we are diligently to seek out what occasioned such a decree , and find what was then chiefly agitated and debated . the matter here in dispute between the latins and the greeks , was this , what souls were admitted 〈…〉 to eternal beatitude before the day of general iudgement ? let us hear the latins in this question concerning the fire of purgatory ; presently in the beginning of the council . the latins acknowledge both in this world a fire , and a purgatory by fire ; and also in the future world they acknowledg a fire , yet not purging , but eternal . they confess also , that souls are cleansed and freed by that ( first named ) purgatory fire , and that he who hath committed many offences , is freed after a long time of purgation ; but he who hath committed a few , is sooner delivered . let us now heare the greeks . the greeks are of opinion , that the fire is in the future onely , and that in this world , the temporary punishment of sinful souls consists in their being imprisoned in a darksome place , where they remain for a time ; but that they are purged , that is , freed and delivered from that obscure and afflicting place , by the prayers and sacrifices of the priests , but not by fire . hitherto the council of the souls in purgatory . it proceeds to declare the opinions of both churches , concerning the souls of just men , which have no debt at all to be paid . the latins say , that the souls of holy and just men are in heaven ; and that ( without any medium ) they see and enjoy the sacred trinity . the greeks imagine that the souls of just men have indeed obtain'd beatitude , but not perfectly ; and that they shall perfectly enjoy it , when they shall be reunited to their bodies in the resurrection . and , that in the mean while , they remain in a separated place , where they interiorly rejoyce , entertaining their thoughts with the fore-seen and fore-known perfect beatiude and adoption which is prepared for them . you see the question cleerly and plainly propounded : you see wherein the eastern and western churches agree , wherein they disagree : what ( after their frequent disputations ) was at last concluded ? surely no other thing , then — the sacred councill approving , we define , that the souls of them , who after baptism received , have contracted no blemish at all of sin ; as also those souls , which after they have contracted the blemish of sin , are purged either in their bodies , or being vncloathed of their said bodies , are presently received into heaven , and cleerly behold god himself in trinity and vnity , as he is . behold a categorical definition , directly determining the proposed difficulty . the question was , how many sorts of souls were admitted to the intuitive vision of god before the general day of judgment ? the councill answers , three sorts : the first sort , such as after baptism , contracted no sin . the second such as although they contracted sin , yet fully satisfied for them before their death by worthy fruits of pennance . the third , such as contracted sin , and did not fully satisfie in this life , but were purged afterwards in purgatory . our aversary dares not deny an admittance of the first and second sort of souls to the fruition of god presently , before the day of general judgment . but he most inconsequently rejects the third sort now in question . for what an absurd exposition of the council would this be ? the souls of just men having no sin at all , are received presently befor the day of general judgment to the cleer vision of god . in like manner the souls which have fully satisfied for their sins before their departure , are admitted presently before the day of judgment to eternal beatitude : the souls cleansed in purgatory are admitted presently , that is , in the day of judgment ? when as this third sort of souls is contained in the same period , under the self same form of words . and ( which is to be taken special no●ice off ) the particle mox presently , wherein is the greatest force , is joyned onely to this third sort of souls , though it is also necessarily understood in the two former . surely none of the latins , none of the greeks , did either question or controvert , whether the souls of just men , or the souls in purgatory were admitted to eternal beatitude in the day of general iudgment : but the sole difficulty was of the time preceding ; as manifestly appears by the declaration of both churches : and as concerning purgatory , the difference between them was onely this ; that the latins admitted the operation of a material fire ; the greeks a darksome place , but not fire . now for that the adversary is pretended to be a catholick , and acknowledges that he ought to submit himself , not onely to general councils , but also to the judgment of the chief pastor : let him attentively read and consider the solemn decree of pope benedict the xii . ( above related ) where he shall find his assertion in most plain terms condemned : for by that constitution he may easily perceive in what sense this particle mox presently , inserted in the florentin council , is to be explicated , where the same matter , almost in the self-same words , is handled ; and where it most manifestly signifies immediately , and before the day of general judgme●t . this decree is extant in sanderus ( de visibili monarchia , ) and it is also mentioned in the th tome of the councils , in the life of the said benedict , in these terms . — he defined , that the souls of holy men , sufficiently expiated from their sins , were blessed , and enjoyed the cleer sight of god before the day of iudgment . and he is there highly praised , as a vertuous man , and one perseverantly constant till his death in pious actions . what ( think you ) may we now judge of him , who calls the definition of such a pope , and of so great a council , a new doctrine , supported by no foundation , and opposite to the churches practise ? d the answer to the precedent discourse , by one of master whites scholers , now a very able proficient in his school . sir , i have perused your papers , which truly , according to the opinion ▪ that the holy ghosts assistance in councils and consistories , is without restriction or limitation , seems to me to evidence a deliverance of souls out of purgatory before the day of iudgment : but according to the opinion , that the assistance of the holy ghost in councils and consistories , is no longer then there is a diligent search to find out what christ taught , and his apostles delivered as so taught , there appears onely , that the council of florence and pope benedict , did think or judge it to be so , which may raise opposition to a disobedience , but not to an heresie : for according to this later opinion , that opposition , and no other is to be termed heretical , that gain-says apparent tradition . so that unless you shew that the council of florence and pope benedict determined conformably to tradition , mr. a a that is , master whites . blacklowes calling the doctrine and practice new , will not savour the least of heresie ; for certainly that doctrine and practice must be new , that took beginning after christ and the apostles . o! but where is this restriction ? in christs own words , docebit vos omnia quaecunque dixero vob●s , not all truths , but such as i shall reveal to you . this restriction vincentius lirinensis understood , when he imputed the erring of the arim ▪ to their preferring their private reasonings before the proper rule and light , tradition , appointed by christ to steer by : and the concurrence of divines seems general , holding that there is no new revelation , that the church onely declares matters of faith , which supposes them delivered , not newly found out ; else she might make matters of faith , and bring all truths within the compass of christianity ; whereas indeed christianity can onely be a belief of those truths christ taught , whilest he was conversant amongst men . this puts all to a loss : for how shall it be known when councils and consistories apply themselves aright ? easily , by examining tradition of what you have seen and heard . this is the common light and plain way promised , to keep even fools from straying from christs doctrine . neither is mr. b b white . blacklow taxable in point of disobedience , he having submitted himself both to the pope and council . finis . the principal errours . pag. . line . leave very ill consequences behind it ▪ read , draw very ill consequences after it . p. . l. . i now draw , hopes , r. i now draw , is hoped . p. . l. . corporea , r. corporeae . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- introduction . this is not well 〈◊〉 by t. w. see consilium authoris . a see ratio operis . scito d●um naturae esse author●m . &c. know god is the author of nature , and that he perfects and el●vates it by supernatural things ; not that he showrs into our souls a series of things of a different or unlike order or nature : reason is nature to us , and the perf●ction of reason is demonstration . do not then despair of demonstration from god . page . page page . page , , , , . peg. com . . * sonus buccinae , the title of one of mr. whites books . in edic . consir . conc. c●lc . act . . g●l . pap. . ad ep. dar. miratisumus . grat. cau . . q. . c. majores . aug. ser. . de verb . apostoli . aug. ser. . de s. s. hom. . de . serm. . de s. s. hom. . in levit. lib. . in ep. ad rom. . master whites name in his instit. sac. a see institutiones sacrae , in the beginning ratio operis , where after a description of the theology he delivers , vide , &c. ( saith he to the reader ) see what an execrable thing it is in such matters as these , after a proposition and a hope of verity in them , to feed our hungry souls with vain and lying trifles . remember then thou art a man , born capable of truth , and that all these things are proposed to thee in a familiar language , that thou mightst understand and enjoy them . he who hopes this without demonstration , goes about to delude himself and thee . they object the obscurity of faith , and the inaccessible darkness of the divinity to our reason . but this hinders nothing ; for such demonstrations may be given of the mysteries , as is given of god himself , &c. courage then , and dare thou to expect in theology the full satiety of thy understanding : seek in it certainty , and the evidence of science and demonstration . and in the same institut . sac. volume . lib. . lect. . and since grace is so implanted in nature , that they draw each other with connected members , and interlaced links : it is not to be doubted , but most of the mysteries of faith , may be demonstratively known ; so that the church now proceeding to the midday , they are to be demonstrated . b see ibid : ratio operis . theology is planted in nature , faith is delivered to us , in humane language . what more sublime things are disputed in theology , then father , son , generation , spiration , nature , person ? &c. and yet we were taught all these things by nature and reason , even before christ . but if these things now be rendered evident , there will nothing at all remain obscure . see more fully in the same book , lib. . where all these things are pretended to be demonstrated , by the principles of natural reason . c see ibid. ratio operis . a libertatis cavo sibil●t alter anguis : the other snake hisses out of the denn of liberty . where of these contingent theological truths , he largely promises demonstrations , and attempts is every where in his new theology , where these mysteries are treated . d see ibid ratio operis , eadem labyrintho , &c. in the same labyrinth with divinity , phylosophy too , grew old . but digby hath held forth his torch : if now they dispair of it , is vanished : dare , now greater things ; his foot-steps will lead thee to the fortress of theology , &c. what then dost thou fear ? and trembling shunnest the digbaean attempts ? if the things thou learnest are false , reason it self will teach thee so , if they are true , the happy success will now provoke thee glad ; if they are uncertain , dost thou loose any thing by seeking ; set then the right foot forward , and gratefully hold on that path , trodden by other mens labours . exeg . on the apocalyps . sec. x● . a see instit. sac. ratio operis . expect that full satiety or surfet of thy vaderstanding in theology . inst. sac. lib. lect. . inst s. li . . lec . . & alibi . in the letter of vindication . exeg . on the apocalyps , sect. xi . a see instit. sac. ratio operis . sulcus quem duco , &c. the trench i now draw , hoped will serve to derive both truth , and certainty , in theological matters . b see ibid. neque tamen sustinet haec aetas , &c. nor does the present age sustain , that mention be made of demonstrations , or infallible decisions , ; that theology may be esteemed a science knit together , and woven with the connexion of consequences , or that it be believed to stand on other foundations , then a meer habnab medley of waxen words , or a certain juggling temerity of babling crackers , without any sence or meaning ; ( under the sir-name of phylosophy ) on either side of the contradiction . what further mischief can we expect ? or how long do we hinder fire and sword ? and adore this idol of desolation in the temple , &c. exeg . on the apacalyps . sec. . master whites prophesie of the happy state of the church , and civil governments guided by his demonstr●tive religion . in r●sh●orths dialogues , dialog. . instit. sac. . . lcct. xi . inst. sac. lib. lect. . inst. sac. lib. . lect. . concilium provinciale senonense decreta fidei , cap. . inst. peri● . lib. . lec . . of devotion by j. s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s a estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. 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[ ], p. s.n.], [london : printed in the year, . j.s. = john sergeant (attribution from wing). reproduction of the original in the bodleian library, oxford. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng prayer -- early works to . devotional literature -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - melanie sanders sampled and proofread - melanie sanders text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion of devotion . by j. s. printed in the year , . to the right honourable the countess of kinnovl . madam , it was the pressing desire of your pious heart , which inspir'd me with a will to satisfy your christian enquiry what true devotion was , and to write this piece . a laudable ambition to dress up your soul in such a manner , as it might look beautifully in the eye of heaven , made you strain towards th' attainment of it ; but your acute understanding did not so easily find out its certain idea , nor discover clearly what was it's proper nature . you were too wise , to think it consisted in light bigotteries ; and those affections which were built up from solid truths , were apt to seem too learned , and too rigid for that flexible and soul-melting disposition . manly thoughts appear'd too stiff , childish ones too weak to compound it ; and it bred in your ladyship no small difficulty , to hit the golden mean between flying fancies , and low dulness . nay , you scarce knew her when she was high in your self ; and were loath , out of a humble errour , to think the prompt flights of your spirit could consist with the heaviness or distractedness of imagination . your ladyship might have discover'd her nearer hand , and better exprest than i can do it here , in the exemplary life and conversation of the earl of kinnoul , your every-way most worthy husband . what virtue was there which , when occasion presented , he did not readily execute ? what duty , either to god or his neighbour , which through the whole course of his life he was known to neglect ? his piety was steady and fervent ; his deportment noble and affable ; his calm reason , fixt by christian principles , was never shaken or mov'd from it's just level , by the whirlwinds of passion , which toss the generality , and shipwrack such vast multitudes . his disregard of the world was admirable ; or rather , ( to speak more properly for one of his rank ) his just regard of it ; esteeming it , and behaving himself as if he esteem'd it , to be what truly it is , a stage so to act our respective parts on , as to please the great king of heaven , and his glorious court , our spectators . none of it's gay follies affected him ; no bribe , either of honour , profit , or pleasure , had ever the power to warp him . nor had dulness the least share in this unmoved temper of his mind : his wit was piercing , and wanted nothing but the rambling part of it , which shoots bolts at rovers . nor was his judgment less solid : though he had not the vanity to blaze either , or discover them without precise necessity ; and , i can speak by experience , not very many , even of those who make a profession of knowledge , understood better either the grounds of our faith , or the reasons why we ought to be virtuous ; i mean , the proportion the means has to the end , grace to glory , or a well-led life here , to the attainment of eternal bliss hereafter . no wonder then , he clos'd so pious a race with so happy an end , and look't upon death as the treshold to heaven . may we not say , madam , that the remembrance of his life and death , as from some luminary plac't in a higher sphere , sends down their influence upon your self ; prompting you powerfully with like steps , to follow such a leader . whoever considers the strictest severity of your widdow-state , the total application of your mind to devotion , and your earnest straining towards heaven with all the powers of your soul , will discern you proceed as if you made account the better half of your self were there already . but , i must remember madam , you are yet alive , and , in that circumstance , just praises are liable to be esteem'd flattery . the rest i ow'd to the memory of your dear lord ; and to my own duty , not to let so great an example of exactest virtue , in a person of so high a rank , especially clouded by his own sober modesty , and silent humility , be lost to us for want of proposing it to the world. to return then to my matter : your ladyship might , i say , have found a living character of devotion nearer hand , and have sav'd me all this labour ; and you already saw all was virtuous , all was saintly throughout the whole course of his life . but it was the exact knowledge of what devotion was , as distinguish 't from the common natures of virtue and goodness , which you aim'd at : for , you had observ'd , that many were held virtuous and good persons , who were not esteem'd devout ; and that this word devotion had something in it's notion particularly excellent , not found in the other . this excellency your ladyship aspir'd to ; and therefore , you wisely desir'd in the first place , to gain a clear discernment of what it was , and in what it consisted , as singled from other common considerations , belonging to goodness , which often run mixt with it . hence , i became oblig'd both to decypher devotion , and dissect her ; and not only so to delineate her nature that it might be particularly known , but , by dividing her into her several kinds , and treating at large of her chief act , prayer , to acquaint you more perfectly with her composition . in a word , you have here at once my obedience , and your own duty ; and that it may benefit your soul towards it's improvement in knowing virtue , shall be the daily prayer of , madam , your ladyship 's most devoted , and most obedient servant , i. s. the preface to the reader . though this treatise bears the title ( of devotion ) , yet i hope , it will not be expected , it should be either made up of set-forms of prayer , or be as easy as prayers use and ought to be : i have already declar'd , that the intention of writing it , was to settle exactly the nature and notion of devotion ; which kind of discourses , having for their subject the ground-work of the matter they treat of , cannot possibly ly so open to a common view , as those that concern the superstructures , built upon them . yet , i hope , there will be little found here , which may not be easily render'd intelligible to any attentive reader , who will think those knowledges which advance his soul , worth the pains of a serious endeavour to purchase them : i am sure , none of it is disproportion'd to the understanding of that noble personage , for whom , as a private paper , i first writ it : if all readers be not such , i heartily wish they were ; and endeavour , as well as i can , they should be so , by yeilding to the sollicitation of friends , to expose this treatise to be printed . no small kindness from me , considering the common apprehension , that a resolution is already taken and fixt by some , to find fault with all i have writ , or shall write : i beseech god , to send them more charity , and me patience ! it may be ask't , why such high subjects should be writ in english ? i answer , because very many who understand not latin , may be capable of comprehending good sense , and concern'd , too , to receive thorow-information in such subjects . nor do i think any thing here unintelligible by the generality , were there the same application of mind us'd to improve spirituality , as is employ'd in acquiring temporal things . i could also avail my self , of the example of a neighbouring nation , which puts even those authors that treat deepest points ( fathers amongst the rest ) into the common language of the country . as for the manner i observe in handling my matter , i guide my self much by the experience i have of what is needful for the tempers of divers spirits : i observe some exceeding scrupulous they are not devout ; and yet , they not only intend , but strain with all their powers to be so . lest such well-meaning souls , conscious to themselves they do their utmost ; and yet , fearing they fall short of the duty they aim at , should ( as there is danger ) lose their hope ; i endeavour to up-hold it , by showing them , that an intention firmly bent to god's service , cannot fail of rendering them truly devout . others , conceit they want knowledge requisit to attain it ; wherefore , to humble the pride of humane wit , and comfort their honest simplicity , i show how their frequent application to pious duties , joyn'd with a sincere well-meaning , goes beyond all the high knowledges of the acutest understandings , if the will be never so little less perfect . others , are to seek in the means to attain devotion ; which , therefore , i propose sutably to every ones respective pitch . lastly , i have observed many either neglecting totally , or less using prayer ; and that too , but faintly , out of an apprehension , grounded on an ill-principled humility , that they deserve not to be heard ; and so , all they do in that kind , is in vain ; as was once s. teresa's case , which she afterwards so feelingly bewail'd in her self , and of which she so charitably fore-warn'd others . such persons , therefore , i strive to encourage , by laying open the excellency and utility of prayer ; and how connaturally prayer for our true good , virtue , is the immediate disposition to attain it ; and so , is the very thing that renders us worthy to be heard . at once letting them see , that no address to our infinitly bountiful lord , can be put up in vain : and also , thence exhorting them to that devout importunity and struggling with heaven , so much recommended by our saviour ; which by the constant and ordinary course of supernatural causes , lay'd by providence , cannot fail of obtaining the blessing pray'd for . and is so far from injuring faith , or abating its efficacy , that it exceedingly comforts and strengthens it , by letting us see how certainly god , unchang'd in himself , performs his promises to those who use the means he has laid , and commanded to be us'd , to effect those happy changes in us. hence , 't is very easy to remark , that in this treatise , i meddle not with the efficaciousness of prayer for others , nor with other stranger effects of it , ( nay , somtimes , even miraculous ones ) which , by means of a firm faith , and relyance on god , are brought to pass . nor , lastly , do i treat of prayer ( or devotion ) as they depend on god ' s grace , or the secret workings of the holy-ghost , ( as i hint also in the treatise it self , p. . ) ; which i from my heart acknowledge to give us ability to begin , continue , and consummate both prayer , and every good act that is supernatural : though an imbitter'd adversary of mine , will needs throw that scandal upon me , to deny it . what i concern my self with , is that part of our christian actions , or that co-operation of ours with god's grace , that stands under our endeavours , which i strive through the whole , to encourage ; and particularly in discoursing of prayer , i meddle only with those effects of it , which are the ordinary and necessary consequents of a fervent and constant address to god for our soul 's true good , virtue . in a word , there are many and various tempers of spirits in gods church ; amongst which , my experience , as well as reason tells me , there are not a few so naturally speculative , and given to look into the reasons and grounds of things , that they find most comfort , and improvement in these discourses that go to the bottom , and give an account of them from their principles . to such persons as those , i hope , i may , when call'd upon , write , agreeably to their genius and pitch ; not blaming , but heartily applauding those pious men , who accommodate themselves to others . for , as it is a great weakness to imagin or expect that every manner of handling a subject , will sute with every capacity ; so , it is no less to conceit , that any kind of discoursing , so it be true , and agree with christian principles , can be such as sutes with none . chap. i. of devotion in common , its kinds , and the means to attain it . sect . i. of the nature of devotion in common . devotion is a word transplanted into our language from the latin , and derived from the primitive vovere , to vow . it imports , among the heathens , a steady and fixt resolution , or rather ty , obligatory , but yet voluntary ; and that of unusual strength ; such as carried them to the most difficult actions . it keeps the same notion among christians , the object only or motive of the resolution changed . for , whereas false glory was heretofore the most dazling , and most prized end of the actions of the heathens , and nothing was thought more glorious than to dy for their country ; they were said devoted who voluntarily , in circumstances particularly remarkable , threw themselves for its sake , upon a certain death . so codrus among the athenians , curtius and the decij among the romans , are remembred for devoted to the service of their several countries ; perhaps their resolutions having been confirm'd by some solemn vow to their idols . but , since we came to be instructed in the notion , and inclin'd to the pursuit of true glory and true good , devotion has got another object : and , keeping the same steadiness , and promptness and strength in its notion as heretofore , is apply'd only to the service of god. it signifies , then , a resolution or addiction to the service of god ; but strong and prompt : such as sets all the powers of man efficaciously a work in all occasions that occur . it is not confin'd to any one kind : for , we say , a man gives almes , fasts , visits the sick or afflicted , goes on pilgrimage , &c. out of devotion ; that is , exercises devotion in all these actions . but prayer being the most ordinary and most frequent act , by which men use to serve god , devotion is most ordinarily understood of prayer : and when we hear of a devout man , we generally apprehend a man who prayes frequently , and well . for , these two qualities enter too into the notion of devotion ; we not thinking him devout who prays but seldome , or carelesly . § . . by what has been said , the nature of devotion may be understood ; and we may perceive it is a quality , or disposition in man , strong and always efficacious ; which moves all his powers to act in the service of god , ac-according to their several natures , both with frequency and perfection . § . . hence may be gather'd , first , that devotion is a disposition of the will. for , since no power acts but as 't is apply'd , devotion , whose nature 't is to apply both the understanding and all other powers to christian action , must needs belong properly to that power which in man is the principle of action , that is to the will. § . . secondly , that this state of devotion , being a constant bent and readiness to perform the best actions on the best manner , is by consequence the best state the will can possibly have in this world ; and next to the necessary and continual conformity to the divine will , which the blessed have in heaven . § . . thirdly , that this promptness to put both the understanding in act as to prayer , and the other powers as to acts of virtue , as it is a disposition of the will , so it is to be lookt for in the will alone ; and not in the acts either of the understanding it self ( much less of the fancy ) or of any other of those powers which devotion is to set a work . whence follows cleerly that , though there happen never so much difficulty to elevate the mind actually , or rather sensibly , to god ; never so many impediments , nay even incapacity to act feelingly , or tenderly ; yet , as long as the will on her part preserves her self prompt to do all these , and can truly say with king david , paratum cor meum deus , paratum cor meum , my heart is ready , o my god , my heart is ready , there happens no loss , nor so much as diminution , of interiour solid devotion . the fancy ( without whose co-operation the understanding in this state cannot act ) may be restiff and backward ; the inferiour faculties lame and clogg'd , whether through impotency or ill circumstances : but , a pious soul ought not in the least be discouraged at these accidents ; ( to which , in the dependence the soul has now upon the body , we were not men if we were not subject ; ) nor think her self a jot worse : for , devotion ( as was said ) is only in the will ; and the will is not at all the worse dispos'd , because the faculties , with which she would work , are indispos'd , and cannot obey her ; no more than the hand is lame , because the pen is bad , and will not write . § . . fourthly , that a soul , which has a ready will to pray , can never fail ( though the fancy be never so dull , or out of order ) to please god by praying , or ( which is all one ) to have the merit of prayer . for , all merit , or actions that please god , proceed properly from the will ; whence a devout , that is , a hearty and ready intention , which is the best act of the will , must needs be , in a high and special manner , meritorious or rewardable . nay more , a devout soul , intending and endeavouring to pray , and standing bent that way ; that is , keeping that intention unalter'd , and prosecuting her endeavours as well as she can , actually is in prayer , or truly prays interiorly ; though , for want of the complyance of the fancy , or inferior part of the soul , ( which onely in acts of prayer is sensible ) she does not experience it even while she has it ; but , rather suspects the contrary ; unless reflex thoughts , and rais'd above matter , preserves her from being mistaken . yet , the thing is clear , both by reason , and ( when by reflexion we observe what passes ) experience too . for , prayer is nothing but an elevation or application of the understanding to god ; and , there can need no more to apply the understanding interiorly to objects already within her , but the will to do so . now supposing , as the case does , the will applying as far as she can the understanding , of necessity the understanding must be apply'd interiorly ; that is , prayer is actually exercis'd . again , however outward objects striking the senses , or inward fancies irregularly stirr'd up and fluttering in a perpetual motion , cause in a manner continual distractions ; yet , we may observe the soul , when by reflexion it comes to perceive them , rejects those distractions , and reapplies it self ( after that seeming dull manner , which the understanding , un-assisted with serviceable fancies , can practise ) to what it was employ'd about before . nay , there would be no such thing as distraction in prayer , nothing for those words to signifie , in case the understanding had not been acting about some other object before , and attending to it : the being diverted from which , and attending to a new object we call distraction : and this former object can be nothing , but the object of prayer , god. § . . a parallel instance to this case is that of saint paul , speaking of praying in an unknown tongue . nam si orem linguâ , spiritus meus orat , mens autem mea sine fructuest . for , if i pray with my tongue , my spirit prayeth , but my understanding is without fruit ; that is , he reaps not the benefit of stirring up the mind by new motives or discourses , which those prayers , distinctly and perfectly understood and penetrated , were apt to suggest : yet still his spirit , or superior part of the soul , is in common and confusedly elevated to god , still spiritus or at , the spirit truly prayes . so , in our case , in this dull state of praying , when the fancy playes not , nor co-operates as is fit , the understanding advances not in gaining those sights , which by extension of former knowledges into new conclusions , through attentive discoursing of its object , it might have attain'd : but still the superior part of the soul , is by the will fixt to something , which is not temporal : ( all such thoughts suggested by the dis-order of the fancy , being held distractions ) . she is then truly apply'd to her eternal good , and truly praying all the while ; till , intention altering all , she frankly and unconcernedly , relinquishes the circumstances proper for prayer , and applyes her self to new objects , without scruple or strugling any longer to keep out the thoughts of them ; which before she avoyded or repin'd at as distractions ; but , now admits and pursues voluntarily , as her business , duty , or end. sect . ii. of sloth . § . . i hope the nature of devotion in common may sufficiently be understood , by what has been already said : but yet , because contraries help exceedingly to illustrate one another , i will make some short reflexions upon its opposit , sloth . this vice is a certain lumpishness , and unweildiness in the soul , through which she yeilds her self to be sway'd down-wards by the weight of original sin , inclining her to temporal objects ; and so rendering her un-active and unable , without difficulty , to apply and raise her self to such thoughts and actions , as dispose her for heaven . i say , in the soul : for in her alone , vertue and vice , properly taken , and as they import merit and demerit , are lodged : the indisposition and disorder of the fancy , and other matterial powers , belong to the body ; and are not vice , though they dispose and incline to it ; and , if care be not taken , will cause it . again , by these words [ in the soul ] i mean , in that power which we call will , or in the soul , as she is will. for , philosophy , ( which indeed is nothing but true deliberate or reflecting reason ) teaches , that contraries belong still to the same subject ; and therefore , devotion being an affection of the will , sloth must needs be so too . and besides , 't is evident that all intellectual vices are defects of the understanding-power , that is , error or ignorance ; as , on the contrary , all its perfections are knowledges of truths . but , there is no kind of shew , that sloth should formally consist in ignorance or error , or devotion in knowledge ; since they who have much knowledge , may withall be very slothful ; and those who have very little , may be very devout , very ready , and very constant in the performance of all christian duties to their power . § . . hence follows , in confirmation of the former doctrine , that , as long as the intention to pray persevers sincere , there can be no sin of sloth , nor ground of scruple of not having pray'd as one ought : for , so long the will is not faulty , and so there is no moral defect nor sin at all in a prayer no better performed ; but all the imperfection in it springs either from nature , or circumstances indisposing the fancy ; or perhaps , from want of skill or information in the understanding - power , how to go about one's prayer ; which is so far a fault as there is negligence in the will to use due means to attain so requisit a knowledg . wherfore in case any one doubts , whether he have behav'd himself negligently , carelesly or distractedly in his prayer , he must consider well whether he intended that carelesness , or those distractions : for , if he did not , 't is evident it happen'd besides his intention ; and so was no moral fault . § . . but yet this word intention is equivoral , and may be mistaken . there are who think they do great matters , if , for example , they make , as they call it , an intention in the morning , of spending the following day in vertue and the service of god ; when perhaps they never think of god or vertue after . this is but deceipt : and 't would be no better , to use the formality of making an act , fancy'd to be an intention of praying , before prayer ; and then spend the time of prayer in a free and uncheckt entertainment of distractive suggestions . § . . to understand the business , we must remember that every action has a finall , as well as an efficient or material and formal cause ; and that a man can no more act without a why then a what. this end , when we know what we do , is foreseen , and the actor means or intends it : so that the intention is woven into the action , and a kind of part of it : as , if i go down , or up stairs , i intend to be at the bottom , or top ; nor can it happen otherwise , if the action be rational , and accompany'd with knowledg . and , if any action be done otherwise , ( as , when people walk , or do other things in their sleep or with a perfect inadvertence ) it is not counted a human action . in this sence , as no action can be without an intention , no more then without an end , so neither can the intention be without the action . for 't is , as i said before , a kind of part of it ; and we should laugh at him who would perswade us he had an actual intention of being at the bottom of the stairs , yet voluntarily stay'd at the top . but , as the understanding sees things to come , as well as past and present ; it may see what is like to follow from an action before the action it self , and from that sight resolve or reject it : and may resolve for the future , as well as present time , and so intend before she acts . and , in this sence , intention may be both before and without action , which , before it come to be executed , the intention may possibly change . intention is taken in this notion , by those who amuse themselves with making artificial intentions before hand . for plainly , they intend for the future ; and , when the time comes , do nothing often-times of what they intended , and remain deluded . now i understand intention in the former sence ; that is for such an intention as accompanies the action , and needs no formal endeavours on our part to make it : since nature will joyn it to the action , though we should endeavour never so much the contrary : for , it is altogether as idle to imagin he , who knows what he does , can have a not-intention to go down stairs , who actually goes down , as that he has one , ( i mean , for the present ) who stays above . wherfore , since this kind of intention cannot be sever'd from the action , 't is cleer that who thus intends to pray , truly prays , though never so many distractive thoughts interrupt and confound his action . neither are they , unless he voluntarily admit and mean to think of such things , properly actions of his , but rather passions or sufferings . for , as the eye cannot chuse but see what is represented to it , nor hinder it self from transmitting to the soul what it sees , nor the soul from perceiving what is transmitted : so neither can the soul hinder her self from receiving the impressions made by the inward stroaks of fluttering fancies , nor those impressions from having their effect , but is in both cases more passive than active ; and doth not so much do any thing , as hath somthing done upon her . sect . . remedies against sloth . § . . to return to the matter in hand , all that can be said of this dryness , and disgustfulness in prayer , caused by the not complying of the inferior part of the soul with the superior , is this , that 't is a disposition , and indeed temptation , to the sin of sloth . § . . by that tediousness , it first tires , then discourages , and after frights us ; till at last it gains so much upon us , as to make us yeild our selves over to a neglect , sometimes omission , of customary , decent , or ohligatory prayers : and the same may be said in some proportion , of our yeilding to those difficulties which oppose our exercising other devout acts. here then it is that a devout christian soul must faithfully fight gods battel ; and never consent , for want of gust , or for feeling disgust , to omit her devotitions . § . . one of the best weapons she has to defend her self is ( upon consideration of what has been , and , more , what will be said ) to settle a firm judgment , that this state of distraction is no ways faulty . this judgment would be made , not at the instant of prayer ( for then 't is to be put in practise and the prayer exercised by it , and so is needful to be had already , not then to be gotten ) ; but at some fit season before hand when the fancies are most calm ' and the soul can act with most cleernes and force . and , when 't is once made , let the soul be sure to act steadily according to it and pray on , how strongly soever disgust , or dryness , or whatever engin the devil chuses to imploy , may tempt her to the contrary . a little resolution will compass this , assisted with the reflexion how unreasonable it is to alter a course directed by our best and clearest reason , for the suggestions of disorderd fancies . but if once those temptations can deceive a soul into these erroneous conceits , first , that all her prayer is fruitless , and then harmful , as being in her apprehension a kind of perpetual fault , and such as she cannot mend ( for she finds by experience she can do no better with all endeavours she can use ) ; she is in danger to leave it quite off , and think it better not to pray at all , than to continue to do ill . and this i take to be one of the most dangerous temptions in the world : both because it comes mask't in the vizard of vertue , and so is apt to take with well-meaning souls , which are not aware of it : as also , because devotion being the best disposition of the soul to practise all christian duties , and particularly prayer , which includes in it self the exercise of faith , hope , and charity ; it follows , that a soul which thus abandons her self to sloth must needs languish away into a spiritual consumption , and piningly decay in those christian virtues , which give life to all the rest , and without which the outward practise of others are but false appearances , springing from material habits , and as it were the ghosts of true vertue . § . . another weapon , of great use in this kind of fight , is this consideration , that we may be certain we merit in the sight of god or serve and please him by continuing our prayer when we are seized with this dryness and dulness , and assaulted with distractions ; whereas we cannot be so certain of this when our prayer is accompany'd with satisfaction and delight . the content taken in sensible feeling is so inbred and , in a manner , essential to a soul , according to her inferior part , or as she is the form of the body ; and this natural propension to all manner of delights so heighten'd in us by original corruption , which still draws us from spirituality to sense ; that we are apt to adhere and cling to whatever is thus agreable : and this even in prayer it self . whence it comes to pass , that , because nature so subtly seeks its own satisfaction , 't is very hard , when this sensible pleasingness accompanies our prayer , to discern whether we are not serving our selves when we should be serving god : at least it often happens , in this case of sensible delight , that our easiness and promptness to apply our selves frequently to acts of prayer springs , in part , from our love of this pleasure ; which is a great alloy to the spirituality of devotion , and to some degree taints the purity of our intentions . whence , all spiritual masters use to take great care , that those souls who find sweetness in their prayer , be not attacht to it , lest they fall into spiritual gluttony , and depress the mind to sensible objects by those very means which should raise it above them . § . now all this danger is securely avoyded when our prayers are disgustful : for , however they seem to us sapless and dry , yet we are sure the desire of pleasing our inferior part , or complying with our corrupt inclinations , has not any the least share in what we do ; but that the prayer and intention ( which , as was said , necessarily goes along with it in the superiour part which only is spiritual , ) remains altogether pure and untainted . let then the soul , which finds litle gust in prayer , continue in the posture and circumstance of praying , especially if the prayer be obligatory ; and in the material exercise of it , at least vocally , if she can do no more . two comforts will ensue hence ; one , that the merit of such prayer is secure ; every act of bearing up against this dryness , and the sloth to which it tempts , being manifestly an adhesion or clinging to god with the superior part of the soul. the other is , that the gain made by such continuance , though it seem small , comes in clear ; there being nothing to be defalkt from its purity by the mixture of any motive sprung from matter or body ; wheras generally in good actions , perform'd by the middle sort of christians , there goes so much out to the inferior part , that is , to fancy and appetite , that when the chaff comes to be winnowed from the pure corn , there remains not so many grains of spirit as some apprehend . 't is very well if they escape with the abatement of half . and , after all , the harvest of the former sort does but only seem small , for in truth 't is otherwise : since of necessity the habit of adhering to god , must be got by a frequent repetition of acts ; so that the soul , which faithfully continues to struggle against the difficulties of prayer , cannot fail at last to come to a facility of it ; so much the more to be valued and endeavour'd , by how much it is free from all suspicion of alloy from the inferior part ; being manifestly wrought out by the strength and predominancy of the superior . § . . there is yet another comfort in this constancy and resolution , which is , that the not deserting our devotions for want of sensible content , but going steadily on whatever we feel , is an evident testimony or argument to the soul that she is as she ought to be . for , since she cannot act this to please nature , to whose grain it lies so cross , it must of necessity proceed from a motive above nature , that is , a firm will and hearty desire to please god. the knowledg of which must needs increase hope ; and , if it be well laid to heart , will , in despite of the dryness , and the scruples apt to ensue upon it , produce that fruit of the holy ghost , which is called spiritual ioy , and such a solid peace of mind as the world cannot give . § . . a soul which needs more helps in this kind , may make use of some preparation to prayer ; such as may be most efficacious to fix her attention , and keep her fancy from wandring , to which purpose she may a litle reflect upon the importance of it ; and remember , that happiness or misery , and this for all eternity , depends upon the disposition which she carries with her out of this life ; and that disposition on prayer , which is the means to procure it : that so much time is allotted to every one to work out his salvation , as every one lives , and no more ; and that this time mispent can never be recalled : that the rest of our life is only to fit us to pray well ; and , if the time of prayer be fruitless , our whole life is fruitless and irrecoverably lost : that we cannot be disposed for heaven without time , and the time of prayer is that wherein alone it can be expected this disposition should be wrought ; wherefore , if this time be lost , at what other time can we hope to do that , which if it be not done , we are miserable , and yet cannot be done but at some time , &c. these and the like reflexions , such as we find most apt to work upon us , may contribute much to the well performance of prayer . § . . freedome of spirit is another great help in this case ; distractedness for the most part proceeding from worldly matters , which our too great concern in them is perpetually suggesting to our thoughts . he that can contrive himself into circumstances , which free him from having any thing to do with the world , more then to make use of the means it affords him to gain heaven , is in the happiest condition , and likely to find least disturbance in prayer . he that cannot free himself from business , let him free himself from all unnecessary concerns for it ; and settle this judgment firmly in his soul , that reason permits him not to be farther concern'd cern'd for worldly affairs , let their importance be what it will , than as they depend on him . that success is out of his power , and depends not on him but providence , to which he should contentedly resign it , and must whether he be content or no : that his part , and all the share he has in any action , is to use his endeavours according to the best of his skill . that when he has allotted the time which is necessary for this , and imploy'd it as well as he can , he has done all he has to do or can do in these matters ; and ought to be concern'd no farther ; but is now at liberty to employ the time allotted for prayer in the best manner . likewise , that there is no business which takes up so much time as not to leave sufficient for prayer , if negligence , more than business , do not hinder , and the like . but , above all , let him still remember that whatever other business he have or can have ( and i do not except any ; not love to parents , care of children , the strongest and most rational tyes to the nearest and most dearest relations ; nay the pursuit of things most necessary , even of livelyhood , of cloths and meat ) is of no importance in comparison of this : if this succeed not he is undone , and that eternally , however he thrive in others ; and if this succeed , no miscarriage in any or all the rest can hinder him from being eternally happy . he that lives gloriously , and with full satisfaction of all his desires , is wretched , if he go at last into hell ; and , after his short dream of happiness , wake into a horrid and never ending real misery : and he who lives despised and scorn'd , and dyes starved with cold or hunger , is happy if he go to heaven , and find his short and now ended suffrings swallowed up in infinite bliss . so that , in truth , to amuse our selves with what happens in this life , to the prejudice of what is to come hereafter , is a folly infinitly more senceless , then what we can fancy most ridiculous . § . . this freedom of spirit is a disposition so highly conducive to devotion , that it ought to be preserv'd even in the immediate means to it , i mean in our prayers and reading devout books ; in case they be not obligagory , or that , after a deliberate consideration , with the assistance and advice of our spiritual director , it appears not that we have already made choice of the best , and see that others are improper or less beneficial . for there are many good souls so strangely fixt by a habituated custome of saying such and such prayers , that they fall into scruples if upon occasion they hap to omit or change them ; and yet let them examin their own thoughts to the bottom , they can discover no reason or ground of such a scruple , but the aukwardness of breaking a longinur'd custom . and to such persons it seems very advisable in my judgment , that they omit them in very good occasions or with good advice change them ; that so , freeing themselves thus from the tyrannous slavery of custome and the biggottery of irrational fears , they may inure themselves still to follow right reason in what they do , and no other motives of which they can give no account ; which is indeed to assert and preserve the just liberty of spirit , due by the laws of nature and grace , where no contrary duty or obligation does restrain it . § . . there are divers reasons why we should not always use the same prayers , and run still in one track . one is , because a perpetual custom hinders our attention to the sense and due penetration of the words , in which chiefly consists the fruit , or spiritual advance by prayer . another is the irrational scruple ( as was said ) of leaving off what meer custom has addicted one to , which is a fault or imperfection , and so ought to be amended . a third , because it is not to be expected , in this state , that our spirit should be always in one humour or disposition ; and 't is best that every thing be wrought upon according as it is dispos'd to have the effect produc't in it . a fourth , and principal reason is , because our soul every day grows or should grow in spirituality , at least at every competent distance , season or stage of our lifes race , she must needs , by the very practise of a vertuous christian life , have gain'd a considerable advance , though perhaps she discern it not , especially while 't is growing ; and 't is as irrational to think the same thoughts are apt to fit her in all states , as to think that our bodies ought always to be fed with milk , because we eat nothing else when we were infants . i for my part know no one devotion suting all sorts , all states , all times and every pitch , but that which was made by the wisdom of the eternal father , who fully comprehended them all ; i mean the lords prayer . § . . but , the best help of all , is a good director . for as , in the body , the same diseases proceed somtimes from different causes , and require different ways of cure ; so it is in the mind too . it may happen that the same indisposition , which in some proceed from the impersection of nature , may be caused by the perfection of nature in others . a soul fitted for higher operations than these in which she is imploy'd , and straining at them by a natural propension , and yet not reaching them for want of instruction may fall into the same unsatisfactory condition , which happens to other souls from other causes . a good director is as necessary in such cases , as a good doctor where diseases spring from not usual and not easily perceived causes . however , our conduct is sure to be so much the wiser , as he has more wisdom than our selves . in this particular , there are but two things to be observed : to chuse one who is truly fit , and then to treat freely with him . they are both of great importance , but need not be farther dilated . sect . iv. of the two chief kinds of devotion . § . . because devotion is a steady bent of the will to spiritual operations , and there be two ways by which the will may come to this disposition , those two different methods make two sorts or kinds of devotion . for the will may be wrought to this temper , either by a habit got , as other habits are , meerly by a frequent repetition of her own acts ; or by the interposition of the understanding ; which , clearly seeing that such or such things are to be done , presses and prevails upon the will to be always ready to do them . these ways are both efficacious , but the later the more natural and less changeable . for , the will according to the designe of nature , is to be led by the understanding , and indeed , in some sence , cannot be led otherwise ; there being some co-operation of the understanding to that first act of the will , the repetition of which , afterwards , produces the habit. for , unless the action had first been thought fit to be done , it would not have been done at all . but , if the understanding contributed but litle , 't is more chance and luck than reason , that the action haps to be good : which is not connatural , our nature requiring a rational proceeding in all things . again , it is also less lasting : for , as use produces , disuse will lose it ; and , should the understanding ( as , not being first settled it self , it well may , ) come to cross the operations of the will by contrary judgments or even doubts , the will would waver , and act faintly first , and after perhaps not at all . but , a will produced by the understanding , cleerly seeing , and conceiting practically what is to be done ; and out of that sight moving , and indeed becoming the will to do it , cannot be changed till the understanding change . and , if the understanding be determin'd by truth , and that truth clearly seen ; the understanding cannot change , because truth can never turn into not-truth : i say clearly seen ; for passion dims or blinds , and so comes in sin. § . . we shall find that , in one way , the soul works upon the body ; in the other , the body works upon the soul. where the habit is produced by repeated acts , it is caused in the soul by the influence of the body ; whose spirits and organs , being fitted by constant use , and readily concurring to such actions , carry the soul along with them . in the other way , the action begins from the soul ; by whose predominance over the body those spirits and organs are fitted , and concur with readiness and ease to her directions , yet both arrive at the same end a fitting disposition both of soul and body . § . . notwithstanding , since effects must needs partake the nature of their causes , though true devotion be an effect of both ways , yet this effect cannot but have consequences and operations , as different as the causes are which produce it . the devotion caus'd by knowledg is proper for more refined souls , such as are able to penetrate into , and judg of the nature of things , and guide their actions by their judgments : the other , for tempers less rational , and who , not able to go alone , require to be led : the former can only be lost by a wilful neglect of cultivating those principles which caus'd it ; and which are not soon nor easily pluckt up , where once they have taken deep root : the other perishes , both sooner and more easily , by bare dis-use of the material actions by which it was produc'd : and , indeed , they who have only custom from whence they can derive their devotion , generally run great hazard of a total decay in virtue , upon any considerable neglect of their customary exercises . § . . yet in some respects , this material way is less subject to involuntary distraction in prayer , than the other ; because this way of prayer , being , in a manner , confused , and an elevation of the mind to god in common , as it were , without distinct application of the soul to particular motives , which should advance her to new degrees of fervency ; it costs her , by consequence , little labour , and obliges her not , out of weariness , to divert to new objects . again , this kind of prayer , having little or no height of spirituality , but being sutable to fancy , finds in the brain proper species , agreeable to the thoughts he has who prays ; whereas the other , straining after objects purely spiritual , of which we have no proper species , has by consequence less ground in nature to fix the attention . § . . in some respects too , the spiritual way has the advantage in this point of distraction . for , the distinct considerations to which the soul applyes her self are apt , from their being distinct , to fix the attention ; because they afford her a particular entertainment to which she may attend . as for weariness , when she finds that prevail and render her unfit to continue her prayer longer , she leavs it off for the present , to resume it when she is better dispos'd : and , when some use has provided her of spirits fit for her purpose , she will seldom have cause to break off for weariness , but may pray with ease as long as is necessary or useful . § . . hitherto we have discourst of these two kinds of devotion as they are in their own nature . if we upon look them as they are in the subject , we shall find those of the material way generally great valuers of external acts : they place all spiritual goodness in frequenting them ; think them saints who are addicted to long prayers , and assiduously repairing to churches , and sacraments ; proceeding too often to censure those as little less than voyd of all goodness , whom they observe not to be still as their beads or the like . and this proceeds not from defect in devotion , ( on the contrary , it seldom happens but where it is strong and much valu'd ) , but from the weakness of the person who has it ; and who , being neither us'd ( nor able ) to judge of the nature of things , comprehends not how he can be devout , who does not do those actions continually , which by experience he finds useful and necessary to devotion in himself . those of the other way , place all their treasure in interiour dispositions ; and , for outward actions , chuse them by judgment ; and practice so many and such as they find useful to the inward affections . they think persons more or less saints , as their souls possess more or less of those true spiritual riches : and hence value and endeavour so to improve their minds in the knowledg of spiritual things , as being the connatural means to produce good affections ; which the others fancy not , but rather condemn as a hinderance to devotion , because they perceive no efficacy nor fruit of it in themselves . § . . the former , placing much of their devotion in performance of the external act , as going often to confession , communion , &c. are not generally altogether so solicitous of due preparation , or at least aim not by their preparation to work their souls into a disposition fit to advance in true vertue and perfection of the interior by a connatural efficacy of the action upon such a disposition ; but , following faith unexplicated by true theology , expect the fruit from a supernatural operation of grace , beyond their comprehension fixt to , and accompanying the action . the later , apprehending the benefit to be expected from those actions depends , after a connatural way , upon the disposition with which they are done , are as much solicitous about the disposition as the action ; and labour more to perform them well than often , ( unless their spiritual director judg them fit for both ) : but always with a preparation , suitable to the reverence due to institutes so sacred and divine . those , being altogether affected to many , and those the most customary prayers , often slubber them over ; sometimes with so litle application of the mind ; that there is not so much as a becoming reverence in the posture of the body . they litle heed the sence as they go along , and consider not how or how far it affects their souls ; and , wanting that which is the proper rule to direct their choice , if chance dispose not otherwise , generally make use of such as they see us'd by others : apprehending some great matter in the very words ; and , for that reason , chusing somtimes latin prayers , though they understand not one word of the language . and yet , by the proportion this way has to their pitch of soul , this conceit of some great thing in common , concurrs so well with their right-set intentions , that they pray very well , & better than where they understand more and conceipt less . the other sort , being knowingly devout , or spirituall , ( who , as st. paul says , omnia dijudicant , discern or distinguish all things ) and , holding themselves at liberty , where god or his church has layd no command , take for their rule the good of their souls , and believe this good to consist in a right disposition . they therfore chuse such prayers and books , as they find by experience most useful to this purpose , and contain such motives as are most efficacious to raise their souls to heaven . they are no ways affected to what they do not understand ; and comprehend not how ignorance , one of the chief curses of original sin , should ever be the mother of devotion . they are more for the few and well , than the many and often at a venture . they are always careful to accompany their prayers with a grave and reverent gesture , and an attention piercing into ( as far as they are able ) and distinctly penetrating the force of the words ; which they expect should contain such an affective sence , as is apt to wing their souls for heaven . § . . the former too are more addicted to corporal , the later to spiritual works of mercy : and , as those fancy no great matter in the advancing of truth , supposing we have once faith ; so these see no advantage to the world , in relieving any necessity incident to the body , comparable to that of bettering mens souls , which they see will follow from the advancing of truth : solid goodness being the genuin off-spring of solid knowledg . § . . lastly , the difference of these two spirits is great in relation to comportment and human conversation . they whose study it is to guide themselvs by right reason , the true nature which god has given us , apply it to all their actions ; whence their carriage is even , their friendship steady , their judgment stay'd and just , their thoughts charitable : they hearken to proposals with calmness and indifference , and believe , without good grounds , slowly : the others are more apt to be humorous ; stifly addicted to any opinion taken up of course ; inconstant in their purposes and friendships ; partial in their verdicts ; credulous even of toyes , and of which no solid ground appears , if they suit their fancy ; unwilling to hear any reason , son , which crosses the conceit they have once espous'd ; and , for want of duly weighing the nature and reason of things , rash concluders ; censorious of every thing that runs not just in the track of their thoughts ; and fierce reprehenders of what they think amiss . and yet these imperfections , when they happen , hinder not a good meaning , and right-set intention . all this while they may heartily wish and love what 's agreeable to gods will , and hate whatever is contrary ; only , by the shortness of their reason , or untoward circumstances , they are preoccupated with a wrong conceit of their own way , and see not what is agreeable and what contrary to the will of god ; and so afford those of the other sort a fair occasion of exercising a double charity , in bearing with their imperfections , and , by sweet ways , instructing their ignorance . § . . but , we must not think that these two sorts of devout people are found in the world , fixt in an indivisible point , as they seem here described . i fear there are not very many perfectly of the one kind , and hope there are not very many just of the other . i only intended to describe the standards of these two spirits : which are participated with a thousand unequal degrees , now of the one , now of the other sort , and interwoven with a variety almost infinit , according as natural genius , instruction , and other circumstances have allotted their proportions . § . . let be it our task oemulari charismata meliora , with a true christian ambition , to aim at what 's best and highest ; but yet remember too , that what 's best in it self is not always best for every particular : and resolve , upon better advise than our own , to pursue the unum necessarium , that way which is most expedient for our souls . the truth is , these methods , as different as they are , may both be needful almost for every one . few or no understandings are so sublime , as not to admit , and even need , the assistance of frequenting outward acts , which beget habits : and few so low , as may not be improv'd to contribute , and that considerably , to the benefit of the material way , if good instruction be not wanting . wherefore , neither should the intelligent devote neglect the constant use of outward acts of devotion ; nor the material one , to improve his outward exercises , by joyning as much understanding to them as he can . sect . v. of the means to attain devotion . the means of attaining both sorts of devotion are already toucht in common ; but the subject deserves to be treated more particularly . in the material way , because the effect is wrought in the soul by impressions first made on the body , that which imports is , that these impressions be as strong as may be , and as many ; for , a weak cause often apply'd , will produce the effect of a strong one . such exercises therefore are to be preferr'd , as strike the inward sense and fancy most strongly : but , what ever they are , they will become efficacious , if they be often enough repeated . those therefore for whom this way is proper should be exhorted to be assiduous in the outward exercises of devotion , whatever they be ; yet with this caution , that the frequency prejudice not their efficacy : for , if they become so customary as to be done meerly out of custome , they will loose much of their force . particular care is to be taken in this point , about those exercises which require an extraordinary reverence , and , by the design of the divine institutor , carry with them an awe and respect ; as the sacraments , &c. for if , according to the maxim , consueta vilescunt , customary things grow vile , our too frequent use of them , bring us to a careless indifference in performing them , and take off our conceit of them ; they will become little beneficial , and perhaps harmful . § . . but , these inconveniences avoyded , these devotes are to be advised to pray as often and as long as they can , and such prayers as they please ; to frequent the sacraments , the oftner the better , so it be with serious preparations , and such as may preserve the reverence due to them ; to be present at all solemnities of the church , and there where things are performed with most majesty and becomingness ; if any extraordinary occasion of devotion happen , as in jubilees and the like , by all means to lay hold of it ; often to read good books , of which the affective are more for their purpose than the instructive ; and , in a word , to omit nothing proper to strengthen and increase the habit of devotion . in general , the conceit they frame in common and confusedly , of the benefit of these things , should be kept up at the height , and increas'd if it may be : and , for particulars , because they penetrate not into the nature of things , nor consider which way they work , it matters not much what they be , so they be good , and apt to move them . for this reason , and because they are through their weakness easily scandaliz'd ; peo , ple should in charity be wary of maintaining and even discovering contrary sentiments before them : for , these ways , whatever they be in themselves , the best or no , are best for them , and will make them saints , if they pursue them sincerely and faithfully : and we must beware , nè pereat in scientiâ tuâ infirmus frater , lest a weak brother perish by thy knowledg . § . . the way of knowledg must needs be pursu'd by such means as improve knowledg ; and he advances in it best , who most deeply penetrates into christian duties , and most clearly sees their agreeableness to right reason . i do not mean with such a sight as is meerly speculative ; nor such a sight as can pierce into the mysteries themselves , and look upon them with that kind of evidence which we have of other truths , whose terms we see connected : for this would take away faith , and is impossible here ; and only to be hoped in the country of blissful light , where we shall see face to face . but i mean such a sight as presupposes faith , and renders it lively or operative ; which if once we can attain , it is impossible not to be devout : for , knowledg of any good , when 't is express and lively , becomes a principle of acting for it , or to obtain it ; that is , will : as by reflexion we may easily discover in the whole course of our lives , and experience of our daily actions . § . . now , this knowledge is renderd express , and faith by consequence lively , two manner of ways : by supernatural , and by natural means . supernatural means , are either apt to affect all mankind ; or some few chosen by god's providence , and design'd and fitted for great ends . of the first sort are miracles in general : for the common course of nature is practically evident to all ; and so , what ever evidently crosses it , must needs be conceiv'd to spring from the author of nature , who can control it as he pleases . wherefore , as , on the one side , this evidence makes it stick firmly in the soul , that god has a hand in it ; so , on the other side , the astonishment , by reason of the unusualness of the effect , makes it sink deep ; and both together render faith , as to the point it testifies , exceeding lively and prompt to action . of the other sort are the rushing wind , the fiery tongues , and other concomitant causes , which produc't that prodigious liveliness of faith and sublime height of ardent devotion in the first planters of the church : by which they were renderd so strongly and readily dispos'd for those duties which christ had order'd them , that they cheerfully embrac'd all inconveniencies , torments , nay death it self , to perform them . these causes were not apt to affect all mankind , as they did those few , particularly fitted by long conversation with christ himself , and expectation of the effects of the promise he made them at his departure ; which was still working in their minds , and raising them to look for some strange supernatural effect of it . these are the two manners of external and more ordinary supernatural means : for , of the inward workings of god's spirit , which blows where it lists ; and whose operation , and the circumstances of it , depend upon a series of causes unknowable by us , 't is not my intention to speak in this discourse . § . . natural and ordinary means , to make this knowledge express , and faith lively , are also two-fold , viz. penetrating well , either the grounds on which faith is built , that is , the certainty of the authority which recommends it ; or else , the agreeableness of the things to be believed and of the actions to be practis'd , to the maxims of true reason . it is the proper business of controversy to teach the one , and scholastick divinity the other ; and 't is by reading , and attentively considering the discourses made by masters in both kinds , that we may attain the knowledge we desire in these matmatters . only let us provide the author , we chuse , be truly solid ( for every one who writes is not so ) ; and that the point we chuse be to our purpose . it is neither necessary always , nor convenient , that every one who is capable of knowledge , should read all the controversies that concern each point of faith ; even though they be good and solid : much less amuse himself with solving all objections rais'd , and raisable without end , by adversaries . it will be sufficient to peruse and understand one or two good books , which solidly treat , and firmly establish the grounds of faith ; or , if leasure and opportunity serve , to hear some oral discourses of that subject : in fine , by any way we can , to weigh attentively the nature of the authority on which faith is built , and what perfect certainty the same , and less authority begets in us on other occasions . this done with that care and concern which the thing requires , it will naturally breed in a soul , these and the like reflexions . § . . i believe , and that with a most firm assurance , that there was a king henry th . a william the conqueror , a julius caesar ; and many actions perform'd by them , as altering religion in england , conquering this nation , gaining many victories , and the like . the same i believe of less men , and less universally-known actions ; provided they were sufficiently notorious to great multitudes , and by these multitudes openly and seriously attested , and without any imaginable ground of suspicion of fear or hope , or any interest which might move them to ly in the case . i find this writ in my heart in such characters , that i can as well doubt whither i am , as whither such things were . i find all mankind judge the same ; and i can no more think it possible , that humor or interest should beget this perswaon in them , than in my self ; which i am sure it does not . 't is evident then , that right nature , or true reason , obliges both them and me to assent that such things are true ; and therefore that such an authority , attesting such matters of fact , cannot deceive us . wherefore , by the same and far better reason , i am to believe this vast authority of the church attesting to me , that such and such doctrins were taught by christ and his apostles . § . . farther , considering the circumstances in which this universal perswasion of mankind that this doctrine is divine was introduc't , i find the effect absolutely impossible to nature . the men , who first began to work it , were inconsiderable in all respects of which the world takes notice : of mean birth , of mean callings , fisher-men , of no power , no extraordinary natural endowments ; and , where there was a primitive christian , as there were many , famous for parts or quality , he must first be wrought upon by men inferior to himself in all such kind of respects . this was at a time when the whole world was possest with idolatry , that is , utter enemies to christianity , excepting one poor corner of it , judea , where the change began ; and where those who remained unchanged were greater enemies to the business than the heathens themselves . the temper of the world at this time , was so far from simple or foolish , that wit was rather at the highest pitch ; all the learning of athens and greece being transfer'd to the romans , and there improv'd and heighten'd . yet this world , by these men , in such circumstances , was prevail'd with , to cast off all their long-settled perswasions in religion : and ; instead of them , to entertain , and that with a most unshakable firmness , the belief of mysteries inconceivable ; such at which nature could not chuse but boggle extreamly , and not admit without absolute conviction . for , no interest could move them ; all preferments of honour , or trust , or profit , were in the hands of those who opposed this new doctrine : and to embrace it , was to forfeit whatever they possest or hoped in this kind ; nay , to change it for poverty , and contempt , and torments , and death . force there neither was , nor could be : for , all power was in those who were against christianity ; and was employ'd and strain'd to suppress it . in learning and wit , and eloquence , and all natural parts , they had the advantage ; and the things proposed to their belief , a trinity , a god made man , and living in obscurity , and dying in torments and infamy , a virgin-mother , &c. were inconceivable , and to nature unsolvable riddles . § . . he that shall consider these things , and the rest of what may occur , as they deserve , will be convinc'd that the effect , viz. a perswasion of such multitudes of men , so qualify'd , to believe such strange things , so strongly that no hopes or fears could hinder them from standing firmly to them , even to death , could not be compast by natural causes ; and thence conclude with absolute certainty , the doctrine could be no other than divine , dictated by god the author of nature , and , by his power over it , introduc't and settled in the world. § . . again , amongst other supernatural means miracles being one , which the christian party unanimously pretend to have been done by christ and his apostles : 't is impossible had they been false they should not have been discover'd , and the pretenders and actors manifestly shown to be a company of cheats , unless there wanted wit , or power , or will in the opposit party to examin and detect them ; for , that which we know how to do , and can , aud will do , manifestly is done . wit to detect them there was in abundance , the world being then both acute , and withall sceptical ; a quality , too , which hindered them from believing rashly . will there wanted not : the honor and interest of all overseers of religion , or priests , both jews and gentiles , engaging them against it ; and the civill policy being highly concern'd to look to innovations , and doctrins contrary to the religion in vogue , and establisht among them . besides , 't is plain they had a will to do what they did , and they did make all the opposition they could . neither was there any want of power ; which , till constantin's time , three hundred years after christ , was all , ( whether secular or religious , ) in the hands of the enemies of christianity ; and often fruitlesly imploy'd to the uttermost , both by policy and persecution , to root it out . there was no possibility of over-bearing them by noise ( for that is one kind of power ) and silencing those who cry'd down the miracles , by the louder clamours of greater multitudes who cry'd them up . for , though christianity had made a considerable progress in the world during the times of persecution , yet , in comparison of heathens , christians were but few , and very unable to contend with them in noise . it remains then , that the pretended miracles were true miracles , and too evidently such for any wit or power of man to show them otherwise : and that those and the other means , used in the conversion of the world , were truly above nature ; since they overcame all human and natural means conspiring and bent to oppose them . and , had they not been such , the perswasion , nay steadfast belief , of such incomprehensible mysteries , and standing fast against such a violent torrent , nay turning the stream so strangely , and prevailing on such vast portions of the world to embrace christianity , would be an effect without a cause , or ( which is all one ) without a proportionable cause , or a cause able to produce it . wherefore , as certain as it is , that no effect can be produc't without a cause , and that a proportionable cause , or a cause able to produce it , ( and that is so certain , that to deny it , is to affirm manifest contradiction , viz. that a thing can do what it cannot do ; ) so sure it is , that this first-taught doctrin was both truly divine , and rightly deriv'd from the primitive times to us . therefore i am as sure as i live my faith is true , and the doctrin i believe , reveal'd to mankind by god himself . § . . hence a rationally-pious soul will discourse on this or the like manner : when i certainly know any thing that really and highly concerns me , for example , that such a precipice , if i leap into it , will certainly kill me , such an action will certainly ruin my estate , such another will secure it , and settle me in plenty , & content , and security ; 't is plain madness not to act according to this knowledg , and beware of that precipice , and avoyd one action , and do the other : but it is infinitly greater madness not to avoyd such things as my faith , with much greater certainty , assures me will bring upon me infinitly greater mischiefs ; and not lay hold of such things as it likewise assures me will put me into possession of infinitly greater goods , no less than true , and perfect , and never ending happiness : i will therfore endeavour by the best , and all means i possibly can , to avoyd sin , correct my passions and inordinate love of this world , strengthen and advance my reason , elevate my mind to god , and strain with the utmost force of my soul after this state of bliss , which is alone desirable , alone considerable , &c. and this with a steady and devout pursuit ; keeping ever awake in my mind , when it grows drowsy , the absolute certainty of what my faith , propos'd and attested to me by the church , delivers to me . thus we see how faith is the argument of things not yet seen , to wit , by the clearness of its principles or grounds ; likewise , how 't is the substance of things to be hoped , by the firmness of its own foundations ; lastly , how it is the ground-work of all devotion , because the consideration of its truth , render'd express to our thoughts , makes faith it self very lively and operative , that is , our judgments concerning the truth of it , very practical and ready for christian action ; in which , that disposition of the soul , which we call devotion , formally consists . to proceed thus far , and settle their judgments in these truths with the steadiest firmness and clearest sight they can , is advisable for those souls , whose pitch of reason makes them inquisitive into the grounds of things , and capable to comprehend them ; for such persons will receive much comfort and profit by such kind of satisfactions . it imports not which way they take to this end ; whether they work it out by their own meditations , or use the assistance of books , or publick or private and familiar discourses : so the business be done , it matters not how . § . . if any particular difficulty which strikes at the very ground of their beleef comes cross their thoughts , and hazards in the least to shock their judgment , it may be worth their pains somtimes to see through that too : but , to amuse themselves with every objection , and not to be quiet till they themselves can answer every thing which is or may be oppos'd , i take to be a very unprofitable , and very unsatisfiable curiosity . the difficulty may somtimes be such as cannot be solved , without a deep in-sight into many sciences , such as they neither have , nor can hope to have for want of leasure or parts . again , objections are endless , and should we not be satisfi'd of a truth , till all that can be said against it were answer'd , we should never be satisfy'd of any truth at all , but onely of the very first principles . should all the objections , yet ever thought of from the beginning of the world , be answer'd to day ; as many more might be invented to morrow . for wit and fancy have no bounds ; and 't is from the fertility of their inventions that objecting proceeds . and , after all , 't is not the proper business of devotes ; it belongs to controvertists to answer objections : the only thing which imports devout people of this pitch , is to understand well , that the grounds on which they proceed in the conduct of their lives , are firm and solid : and such as they ought securely , and without fear of deceit , rely on . which done , they must be true to themselves , and act with a vigour proportionable to that degree of cleerness with which their speculativeness discerns them to be true , joyn'd with such a concern as faith tells us the matter deserves . nor need they distrust gods providence in this , which has furnisht his church with means suitable to every capacity . § . . again , when upon certain grounds they have given admittance to a truth , they should stand to it , and trouble themselves no more : for nothing in the world is or can be more certain than that if this be true , what ever is or can be said against it is not true , whether i be able to make so much out or no. and upon this they may securely rest . in truth this wavering inconstancy , this quivering irresolution , which keeps us from owning heartily what we do see , for fear of what we do not see , is a blamable weakness ; loses the time , in which we should work out our salvation , upon doubts and scruples , and puts us into the condition , which st. paul reprehends in the women of his time , semper discentes , & nunquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes . always learning , & never coming to the knowledge of truth . § . . since then , a knowing devout soul seeks only , or only should seek , so much knowledg , as is necessary to the perfection of devotion ; let her if she be able , faithfully , and severely pursue her inquiry , till she arrive at such a certainty of those truths which concern her ; i mean such as will give solid ground for virtuous christian life : and , for the rest , remain satisfy'd with this , that there must of necessity be some deceit in whatever is said against truth . let her a god's name first discover that to be truth which she embraces , as truth ; to which 't is sufficient to judge upon good grounds , the church is infallible . but after this , it is lost time if she spend any in the discovery of the deceit . it is enough she knows it is deceit , and needs not know what kind of one it is . in our particular case , she may reflect , that the testimony of the church or tradition , being the ground on which we build the certainty of faith , as 't is christian ( which onely in a manner amongst us is called in question ) they who deny the force of tradition , must by consequence deny the certainty of any matter of fact done before our days : and , because nature assures us , that this is irrational , it assures us likewise , that who object on this manner go against nature , and so all they can say , is no other than witty talk , handsom flourishes , and plausible quibbling , without real force or solid ground . and , indeed , they plainly discover themselves irrational , and led by passion , who obstinately oppose tradition ; because they maintain an evident contradiction . for , on the one side they affirm that faith is truly certain ; and on the other , deny faith has any grounds truly certain : and this ( since nothing can be said certain , but in vertue of the proofs of grounds by which the certainty is made out ) is to say , that faith is and is not truly certain . to this they are forc't by the heat of opposition ; for they will not grant tradition has the vertue to make a thing truly certain , because they are aware it is against them : and , by denying it , they leave no truly certain grounds for faith at all . for , as all proof of matters of fact past long ago must at last depend on testimony , or tradition ; if tradition it self be not secure , nothing can be so which depends on it . and so there is no remedy , but they must speak out at last , and say plainly , as they do , that all grounds of faith , and consequently faith it self , may possibly be false . § . . i would not be mistaken here to advise any they should not beleeve till they have this evidence of the grounds of faith ; but i presuppose them already faithful and intend only to comfort their faith by looking into it's grounds : every one that is convinc't , whether upon solid or sleightest grounds , god has said a thing , is bound to beleeve it , else he sins mortally in disbelieving god who is essential truth . much less do i absolutely require this of them ; but , upon supposition that their own speculative and acute genius makes themselves require it , i exhort them to it as to that which is to such souls a means to increase their devotion , and can no way shock them if they be not passionate and precipitate . least of all do i tell them that in looking into their grounds they ought to go to work like doubters or seekers ; but , quite contrary , supposing them firm in faith by their relying on the sure rock of the church , and strengthen'd in that reliance by the practical evidence that the virtues she exhorts us to are agreeable to right practical reason or conscience , and that the means she proposes and enjoyns to attain them are effectuall towards that end , i bid them rest secure , that if god , together with an earnest desire to advance in devotion , have also given them a piercing eye to discern truth ( as he has to many many thousands in the vast extent of the church ) god's goodness has provided such grounds proportion'd , and penetrable by every capacity , and theirs amongst the rest , as will , if look't into , render their faith more lively , and their devotion more fervent and solid . but , who is of this pitch , and so to make use of this method , lest the over-weening of their own private and perhaps partial fancies should make them strain beyond their force , is left to the judgment of spiritual directers , whom we are to suppose fitted by education , as well as design'd by office to be the proper discerners of spirits , and knowing when to administer st. paul's milk and solid food according to the capacity of the souls they are to nourish us in devotion . for those perfecti were already faithful : the reason then of his discoursing wisely with them , was ( their pitch bearing it ) to make their faith lively , and their vertue more solid ; and to enable them also to convert others to faith , and advance them in vertue or devotion . § . . the bottom-ground of all devotion being thus layd in the establishment of faith , many other comfortable lights will break out , and cherish and strengthen the liveliness of it in such persons as we have spoken of , and to a great degree in others also . such are the considerations , what wise orders for a world the ten commandements are ; what universal mischiefs would succeed if any of them were omitted ; and how the well-being of mankind , both as to this life and the next , is pithily compriz'd in these few heads : which as it argues an infinitly-wise contriver , comprehending and providing for the necessities of human nature , so it likewise becomes an infinit goodness , commanding his poor and indigent creatures nothing but what is their own true good , and tends to bring them to compleat happiness . § . . next , the consideration how conformable the more elevaed points of faith are to right reason , exceedingly comforts an understanding captivating it self to the obedience of faith. for , as on the one side , nothing is more rational , than that those highest truths , which elevate us to heaven , should be placed above the pitch and endeavours of nature , and so not to be knowable by principles purely natural : so likewise truths , by being truths , and proceeding all from the author of truth , must needs be ally'd one to another , and bear some resemblance and proportion together ; those above nature and reason , to those discoverable this way ; although they cannot be proved by them , but depend on gods authority revealing and the churches proposing them . these things are found in the books of divines ; of which such would be chosen as serve best to perform the duty of divines , and shew the conformity of religion to reason most clearly . for , those which , with great shew of wit and learning , only dispute matters plausibly on both sides , are not proper for this purpose . who understands not latin , or , though he do , is perhaps to seek in those terms in which schoolmen usually express themselves , should make use of some good divine ; who may select such points as are most proper for the person with whom he deals , and deliver them in terms which may be intelligible to him . § . . besides these books & discourses , which increase dovotion in intelligent souls by enlightning their understanding , there are others which work immediately on the will , of them as well as of others , by the way of affections without the help of reason . and , though these are perhaps more proper for the other way of devotion , yet no assistance should be neglected ; and they are very compatible with this , and no less , if not more , efficacious . for , being made up of expressions coming from a mind full of , and overflowing with devout thoughts , they are apt to transsuse , as it were affections into the soul of the reader : and , if that reader be beforehand satisfi'd in the principles which ground those affections , he is excellently disposed to receive them . those principles then being habitually possest by the readers , they will experience their wills inflam'd by the ardent love , which those expressions breath ; in the same manner as lively expressions of any passion beget the same passion in another , especially if possest with the same concern which was to both the ground of those passions . hence they find such books full of spirit , and as it were of sap , connaturally nourishing and dilating their souls ; which others , not throughly satisfi'd of those principles , coucht underneath as their foundation , find sapless and disrelishing : though yet , sometimes it happens otherwise , and that without any fault or defect . § . . but generally such expressions are like meat already chaw'd , and needing nothing to become presently nutritive , but a heart disposed by affections of the same kind to receive it ; as new drops of water , without more ado cling together , and increase the bulk . of these , some are us'd for prayer directly , others for entertainment of the mind with devout reading ; but both work by the way of affective impressions . the best without all comparison are the psalms of david : which some find relish more , when they are taken asunder , and then peec't of verses taken one here , another there , as seems most proper ; and those obscure parts which darken the sence left out . divers devout persons have laboured in this kind ; and who would labour for himself perhaps would find it no unuseful employment . besides these , i would commend st. austins confessions , some piece of st. bernard , and s. bonaventure : the imitation of christ ; the love of god by st. francis sales ; st. teresa's works and ejaculatory prayers , the sermons of of st. thomas de villa nova , &c. but , the best books of devotion are those of prayer ; and prayer being an elevation of the mind to god ; and the mind consisting of understanding and will ; those prayers are the best which work on both , and at once instruct and enlighten the understanding and inflame the will. i would therefore advise to chuse such as contain solid christian doctrin , and express it both rationally and affectively . of this kind of prayers the number is not great ; few being fitly qualifi'd to compose them . for , there is requisit in the author , both skill in true divinity , to make the conformity of christian doctrin to reason appear , and ardent devotion ; he being very unlikely to warm another who is cold himself ; and besides a great mastery in language , to chuse expressions clear and affective , and both easy . i recommend for this purpose , the meditations of st. augustin ; and the devotions of our learned , pious and judicious county-man , mr. john austen in the way of offices . § . . the lives of saints also are of great efficacy to stir up devotion , by way of imitation and example . but they would be well writ , that is , with more care to relate their heroick vertues , which made them saints and estimable and imitable by us , then to huddle multitude of miraculous , and , if but flightly attested , incredible actions ; which neither were the causes of their sanctity , nor are imitable . they affect the vulgar indeed with admiration and esteem ; but work not so much upon the wiser sort , who only seek their own improvement , and how they may come to vertue themselves ; of which these things were no cause , though they may be signs . yet , when they are duly attested , and accompany'd with the saints vertuous life , they become a kind of testimony to the church , of god's particular favour to those who give themselves up to his service ; and an encouragement for others to serve so good a master , who thus honours those that honours him . but , as i said , they ought to be well attested , lest the credulity of the vulgar , embracing so many uncertain stories for assured truths , and the easiness of some pastors in permitting them without distinction to be printed , do not as much or more harm to those without the church , as good to those within her . the best way is to chuse such lives as were written by authors , who were also saints themselves ; and withal learned and prudent , and so less apt to be imposed upon by false relations , or byast by interest or affection . such as is the life of st. francis , by st. bonaventure ; of st. hilarion and st. paul the hermite , by st. hierom ; of st. anthony the great by st. athanasius , and the like . chap. ii. of the chief act of devotion , prayer . sect . i. of the nature of prayer , and its excellency , as it includes in it self the exercise of all virtues . the first or principal act of devotion being prayer , it seems proper , that , in a treatise of devotion , i should say something more particularly of it's nature , and excellencies than i have done hitherto ; and thence enkindle in the hearts of my readers a great desire to frequent it . all which i cannot do without hinting at the same time the best manner how to perform it : though it ought not to be expected , in so short a discourse as i intend , i should much enlarge my self , or descend to every particular manner of it . § . . prayer then , as was said , is defin'd an elevation or raising of the mind to god : which being a kind of action ; and every action , ( as philosophy tells us , ) having two terms or ends , the one that from which the action goes ; the other that to which it tends ; ( as for example , the action of heating , goes from coldness , and tends to heat ) it follows that the benefit of prayer must be rated from both these . it raises us to heaven , and therefore it lifts us from earth , its opposit or antartick : that is , it sets us above that from whence our misery springs , and approaches us to that where all our happiness is treasur'd up . § . . some ancient heathens , such as diogenes , seem'd to have attain'd the former , without the help of prayer ; and to be great contemners of the world. but , alas , they did but seem so , for all their mock-holy-day pretences : for , had they been indeed and truly rais'd above earth , they must of force have been rais'd towards heaven ; that is , they must have been addicted to address themselves by prayer to the true god ; of which kind of devotion their earth-clogg'd minds were utterly ignorant : they were not then rais'd above their affections to earth , but their whole pursuit was still the world , though under a different consideration : they were above it , as it was able to give them riches and honorable titles ; but still deeply plung'd in it , as it gave them esteem . nay , far more deeply , even for this regard , that for this esteem's sake , they contemn'd the other : for they thought it more honorable to seem to contemn riches and dignities , then to seek them ; and therefore aym'd at a greater worldly honour by refusing that which in their apprehensions was a less . so that , the progress of their vain and proud souls was not an advance from earthliness to heavenliness ; but a foolish leaving earthly riches and dignities , to acquire an aiery and perhaps a more empty earthly esteem and admiration . nay , they contemn'd the other comparatively onely , that is , would have lov'd it , and perhaps heartily too , but that they doted more upon this : as the forenam'd cynick trampled on plato's pride ( as he call'd his gay cloths ) with a greater pride perhaps than plato wore them . of which kind of contemners of the world , we have too many examples in england , amongst our deepest fanaticks : with this difference , that their pride is more spiritual , that is , worse ; nay being a corruption of right christianity , the worst of all that can be . § . . prayer then being the best means to elevate the mind from earth to heaven , or rather this very elevation it self ; and the best or readiest way to effect this , or raise our selves upwards , being flying ; it follows , that if we pursue the metaphor , we must say the soul has wings , by which she is enabl'd to take this flight , that is , her thoughts and affections : which how swift they are , and how far they reach at one view and effort of the soul , a litle reflexion will teach us . moreover , she must move and stir these wings , that is , meditate and consider ; whence we experience , that those who are given to run over their private prayers without considering what they say , are sluggishly indeed moving towards heaven ; for they cannot but think of it at times sleightly , and still intend well ; but they seldom advance by it to any high pitch . they climb a little upward , by the help of characters and sounds ; and the lame activity of fancy lifts them into the air ; where they see after a duskish manner far distant glances of heaven ; but scarce one constant ray of true light dawns , to allure and affect them strongly . lastly , there must be a calm and clear medium to fly thorow , ( such as is our air in material flights ) not disturb'd with ruffling passions , or clogg'd with clouds of sorrow and worldly cares . if such whirl-winds and tempests turmoil this medium , it will hazard to take the soul off the wing , and throw her head-long to the earth . wherefore , if we intend a progress towards heaven by prayer , we must first prepare a cheerful and unpassionate disposition of the mind ; ubi pax , ibi spiritus sanctus , where there is peace , the gift of the holy-ghost , the divine giver himself is not far absent . at least there must be a steadiness in the soul 's superior part , or a full intention to get rid of all these passions . for , this laid first , prayer it self will do the rest , as shall be seen hereafter . § . . another excellency of prayer , and consequently an encouragement to pursue it , is that it includes in it self at once all virtues ; not after a sluggish manner , as they ly dormant as it were habitually in the soul , but as they are consider'd in their most actuall and best state : which is as much as to say , that prayer is the actual exercise of all virtues at once : for , it is known that those virtues we call morall , are not at all meritorious , and consequently not at all virtues , but as they partake of that queen of virtues , charity . whosoever therfore has charity , ( and consequently the two other theologicall virtues , faith and hope ) has all the rest ; whence it is said in the scripture , that , love is the fullfilling of the law. § . . but , that we may come to particulars . while we pray , we make use of the virtue of faith in-many regards ; for we at once exercise our belief , that god is the soveraign giver of all good , and lord of all things ; that he is infinitly wise to see the bottom of our hearts laid open then before him ; infinitly powerfull to accomplish all we can possibly wish ; infinitly good , to admit us into his presence ; nay , to exhort and even command us to come to him ; as also to bestow on us all that our condition and disposition can render us capable of ; infinitly merciful to forgive all our sins as soon as ever we heartily repent , and humbly ask pardon . again , by our profound reverence , we acknowledge and exercise the belief of his incomparable greatness and majesty ; by our submission , and resignation , of his wise providence and conduct of the world : lastly , by our asking of him with due humility , that he is our great creatour , we his poor indigent creatures , and meer nothings of our selvs : also , that he is our most liberal and bounteous benefactor , infinitly rich to supply , and overflowingly communicative of himself , to relieve all our necessities , so we ask as we ought . § . . again , when we pray , we exercise our hope that he will hear our prayers , and grant all we ask , if we ask wisely and humbly ; that he will keep the promise he has made us to that purpose ; that he will mercifully pardon our sins , protect us from dangers ; and in a word , ( as we use to phrase it , ) that he will hear all our prayers , which according to his wise government of the world , ought to be seconded with performance . § . . lastly , while we pray , we exercise the virtue of charity , as it signifies love of god , by calling upon him and looking on him as a father and the fountain of all good ; as endow'd with all those ravishing qualities which amongst us use to beget love , such as are , bounty , kindness , mercy , tender compassion , fidelity of word , friendliness , pure intellectual light , infinit beautifulness to the eye of the mind : and , most of all , as he is our chief and final , our infinit and eternal good , and our onely bliss ; in whom our soul must either for ever repose after all the fond toyes of the world we so dote on leave us , or else remain eternally miserable . let us lay all this together , and then reflect how sublime an excellency is found in prayer , which at once exercises and interiourly executes in the sight of god , all virtues at once . sect . ii. of the excellency of prayer as t is the actual fulfilling all the commandments at once . when the young man in the gospel askt our blessed saviour , what he should do to have eternal life , his answer was , keep the commandments : now , if prayer be ( supposing it made as it ought ) the keeping all the commandments , nay , an actual exercising them all at once ; then we may be bold to vary the phrase of our saviour's words , without altering his sence , and to say , if thou wilt have eternal life , apply thy self to prayer . and this is another excellency of prayer , and a great one too , that every time we exercise it , we are exercising the fulfilling all the commandments at once . § . . to understand which we must consider , that no external act is meritorious or demeritorious before god , but as it springs from deliberate will or intention : and , though the execution of god's commands do exteriously increase merit too , yet it is because the intention it self is better'd or strengthen'd habitually to some degree by the outward exercise ; or because , there being some difficulty perhaps to be overcome in the performing the outward action : hence the intention to do this , pursu'd resolutely to an actuall execution , is better then else it would have been , by the very conquering the difficulty ; in the same sence a● we may say , an intention to do a thing notwithstanding any difficulty occurring , is better than an intention simply to do it . again , the outward action increases our merit , be-because it begets a greater satisfaction and hope in us , that our inward intention was not a counterfeit one ; for , the being conscious to our selves of having perform'd many such good deeds , ( especially if not done in the world's eye , and therefore not for its sake , but for god's ) will stand us in good stead at our last hour , and strengthen our souls with hope ( and consequently with love which always goes proportion'd to it ) when we are to appear before our great judg. but , abstracting from these cases , and speaking of outward actions , without any regard or rapport to the soul , they are purely local motions , or meerly natural not moral ones , and so have nothing to do with merit or demerit : wherefore , putting an intention to do any good , as resolutely bent to do it , and to overcome all difficulties that may occur , and to that degree of perfection as the other gains by extending it self to action ; lastly , such as by reason of its heartiness and honest sincerity , with other circumstances , gains the same comfort to the soul , as if it had been executed outwardly , 't is equally meritorious as the other . insomuch , that whosoever firmly and resolutely intends any good , so that nothing needs but an opportunity actually to put it in execution , does already execute it in his heart ; and t is the same before god , as if he had perform'd it exteriourly , as is evident from our b. saviours saying , that the poor widow , when she gave a mite , gave more than all the rich vaunters : for , though in the eye of the world it was not so much , yet is was full as much in the eye of god ; accepting it as such , because he saw her hearty good intention was such , that , could she have done it , she would have given more than they all did . § . . this being once settled , 't is easily seen , that prayer exercis'd as it ought , is in true theology a keeping at once all the commandments , and consequently the commandments of the church too , which are all involv'd in the fourth . for who sees not that the first commandment is nothing but an injunction to faith , hope , and charity ; as this last signifies love of god above all things : as also to soveraign honour and profoundest reverence , as they are peculiarly due to god. likewise , that the second is but an extension of the reverence due to himself , to his name ; or a conformity in words and conversation to the esteem we ought to bear him in our minds : and the third , a determination of a circumstance of prayer , to which he that is given to prayer must needs be easily conformable . and what cares he who is exercising actually the virtues , we show'd before were all found in rightly made prayer , and especially love of heaven above all things , what cares he , i say , for pretending to worldly power greater than others , for resenting injuries , or for gaining worldly pleasures or profit , in which consist all those of the second table ; whereas , if he be in prayer , that is , if his mind be elevated to god , and this frequently and fervently , he must needs despise in his heart , nay be habituated to despise all these sublunary trifles . in his heart i say , or superior part of his soul , or ( which is all one ) as soon as he recurs to his principles , which dwell and govern there ; however the inferiour , which feels some trouble , will have some natural grudgings and repinings . but these are little or nothing to god's commandements , but , rather , an advantage to virtue , or an occasion of merit ; so the superior part , by strength of christian principles , and supernatural considerations or motives , keeps them from growing moral ones , that is , keeps those natural considerations from settling into intentions : which is the true touch-stone , how far these or such motions belong to nature , and how far they relate to morality . § . . but you will say , we do not experience while we pray , that we practise distinctly any one of these virtues , now spoken of , nor so much as think of any of those commandments ; nay , many of them seem most exceedingly remote from our thoughts when we are in prayer , and a quite different kind of object . 't is answer'd , there are two ways by which divers things may be included in another . the one is call'd formally or being formally there , so that every one of these things retains it's own form and nature , as wood and stones are included in the fabrick of a house ; ink and paper are included in writing ; where each preserves it's own nature distinct from the other , notwithstanding their concurrence in a common subject . the other is call'd eminential , which happens , when all are there indeed , not singly as in themselves , or as remaining yet in their own different natures , but as contain'd in some third or common excellency , which has in it the virtue of all , and yet is singly no one . thus the sun-beams include light and heat ; thus reason includes in it self , ( though in an inferiour degree to prayer ) all imaginable acts of virtue . thus the force of each body in nature is included , as in a kind of center , in the indivisible being and operativeness of a spirit . thus , lastly , all perfections and virtues are compriz'd in the most simple and most uncompounded essence of the divinity ; in which , justice , mercy , power , and the rest are not found in their several distinct natures singled out a part , but in one most perfect formality call'd god's essence ; whose incomparable excellency comprehends eminently both all these and infinit others , which our low pitch of knowledge cannot reach or even think of without diffecting it piece-meal , as it were , by our understanding , and considering each little morsell a part . § . . now , this manner of containing others , is by far more excellent than the former ; and 't is thus that prayer comprehends all virtues , and the several distinct acts of fullfilling each of the commandments . § . . for , prayer being an elevation of the soul to god , and this not after a meer speculative way , as an heathen or an aristotle would think and discourse drily of the first being , without any farther concern than as it is a kind of curiosity beyond the ordinary reach ; but , after an affective way , endeavouring and aiming , by the affections ( which are the wings of the soul ) and by such thoughts as we are already possest of , to raise our selves to a higher degree of divine love , and , by it , of union with our dear god ; hence it comes to pass , that prayer is , in its best and most essential part , an actual exercise of the love of god , built up in us on the best foundations and principles that can possibly be imagin'd , viz. on those motives which faith proposes , and actually rais'd by the best and most immediate disposition imaginable , viz , hope : daily experience telling us , that nothing moves us so effectually to pursue any thing which we conceit to be an eminent good , as the hope we have to arrive at it ; as on the other side , that , let the thing be never so excellent and alluring an object in it self , unless we have hope it will , or at least may , be attain'd by us , we may perhaps gaze at it in our thoughts as a fine thing , but never desire it , or work for it , that is , never effectually love it . § . . prayer then being the best exercise of the love of god ; and this love including in it self eminentially all virtues , and being , ( as the scripture tells us ) the fulfilling of all the commandments ; it follows , first , that prayer is such likewise , as including in it self that soveraign quality , actually and in the best manner exercis'd , which comprehends eminentially all the rest . it follows next , that , this manner of including them eminently , being ( as appears by the instance , we brought before of god's essence , including all perfections , ) by far more sublime than the other , prayer is even in this regard , of a most incomparable excellency , and the best manner imaginable of keeping the commandments ; as indeed 't is fit that action should be , which is of it 's own nature , an approach to the divinity . sect . iii. a third excellency of prayer , in uniting us to god intellectually . but we have not yet taken so neer a view of prayer as we might : much of our former discourse , especially at the beginning , runs upon the metaphor , as our low dull pitch of knowledge oftentimes obliges us , when the thing we intend to explicate is very spiritual and very sublime . we now come to closer discoveries of its nature , by looking with a literal consideration into it's proper effects which immediately and necessarily spring from it . § . . that great man aristotle ( whom st. thomas of aquin follows both in this and most other points of his doctrin , as fittest by reason of their truth to explicate christian faith ) assures us , that the soul , when it knows any thing , has the very nature of the thing known in it self , and therefore , as knowing it , becomes that very thing intellectually . to comfort our assent to so strang a point , which looks at first sight like a kind of mystery of faith , we may reflect that , when we discourse or think of the nature of any thing , ( let it be fire , a stone , or what other thing you will , ) this discourse or thought passes wholly within our mind ; and , when 't is done , the effect of it remains there , and not in things that are without us , as it does in other kinds of actions ; as writing , cutting , or such like , which leave their impressions , out of our minds , in the things we work on : wherefore also the object , on which that inward thought or discourse , works , must as necessarily be in the soul , too , as objects of the other sorts of actions , fire , for example , or a stone , exist out of us , when we work upon them ; that is , when we blow the fire or hew the stone : but , this object of our discourse , or thought , is suppos'd to be the very nature of the thing , ( for 't is that we are discoursing about , and not about some lame resemblance of it ; ) wherefore the very nature of the thing is in our soul , or exists there , though after a different manner than it does out of the soul. § . . then , to clear how this can possibly be , that the very same thing can have two different manners of being , we may reflect how the frame of a house , or a new invented figure or draught , is in the mind of the artificer , while yet it has no being out of it : or , how the essences or natures of all things were in god from all eternity , when as yet they were not in themselves , or according to their own manner of being . if then , ( as 't was now made evident ) the soul can have the natures of things in its knowledg , it can be those things intellectually ; since what has the nature of any thing in it ; 't is ( as it has that nature in it ) that very thing : for , what is it to be that very thing , but onely to have the nature of that thing in it ? the soul then , as knowing any thing , becomes that very thing intellectually which it knows . § . . to apply this to our present purpose : as the blessed in heaven , seeing intellectually gods very essence , have the divine nature in their knowing power , and so are , god by participation and intellectually , which is the utmost pitch imaginable that a creature can possibly arrive to , similes ei erimus says st. john , quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est : so those who see god , and think on him as represented to us by faith , are , according to the inferior pitch of knowledge we have of god in this state , to some degree deify'd too . and , though these imperfect resemblances of god , which we borrow from creatures , do not reach the divine nature in it self ; yet in case those who pray be instructed ( as they ought ) that though the object of their conception does not properly correspond to god , yet , since the notion their judgment accepts to stand for him is not competible to any created nature , they truly have god in their thought , though after an imperfect manner , and so are him intellectually . prayer then being the proper exercise of thinking of god , or having him , as held out to us by faith , in us intellectually , that is of being him in some manner ; ( for the conceptions faith gives of god , though imperfect ones , yet are true ones , and peculiarly belong to him ; ) it follows , that we are truly him in some sort , when by the exercise of prayer , we attend to the thought of him , or address to him. and thus much is common to all christians that have faith : and , were there no more but thus much , 't is enough to ground this exhortation of st. leo. agnosce , o christiane , dignitatem tuam , et divinae consors factus naturae noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversatione redire : acknowledge , o christian , thy own dignity , and being made partaker of the divine nature , do not debase thy self by degenerate carriage into thy former vileness . but prayer adds an incomparable advance to the common advantage of faith. for , the same reason which proves that we partake the divine nature by thinking on it , or conceiving it , concludes also that the more perfect our conception of god is , the more perfectly we become him , & approach to glory ; which is the reason why some pure and elevated souls by cultivating faith through continual prayer , come to gain so sublime an idea of the divine nature , that they fall into transports of admiration ; and , when they return to their customary way of thinking , the memory of it is so precious to them , that they look upon that ravishing state as on a kind of glory or heaven , and seem to have been so happy that they could wish no more . now , 't is only prayer that gives the soul this high advantage : for , by often applying the mind to god , we discover more of the divine excellencies ; which gains to the soul a purer and nobler manner of understanding how and what he is in himself . and the like may be said of all the other mysteries of our faith , according to the prophet esay , as 't is render'd by the septuagint , c. . v. . nisi credideritis non intelligetis : unless you will beleeve , you will never understand . so that meer belief must go before to give us knowledge of the objects ; and then from a firm belief , cultivated as it ought , follows a more penetrative knowledge , call'd a lively faith , to which we are wrought up by prayer ; which is a studious addiction of the mind to those objects that depure the idea of god from all dross of imperfection , and render it far more chrystallin , empyreal , and ravishingly glorious . sect . iv. a fourth excellency of prayer , in uniting us to god affectively . from this more penetrative knowledge of the divine essence , immediately and necessarily follows that disposition of the will call'd divine love ; or rather indeed , love of god or creatures is nothing but a knowledge of their goodness render'd express in our thoughts ; either imprinted strongly by solid and well built-judgments of their agreeableness to us , or else by frequently-repeated thoughts , as by so many dints , beat out into an expresness . for we experience in our selves , both in loving creatures , and in loving heaven , that if we more fully and lively conceit the good in one ( creatures for example ) than the good in the other , ( that is , in heaven ) we still chuse and pursue creatures , even though we speculatively judg that heaven is incomparably more excellent . and the reason is , because a more lively conceit , hîc et nunc , or in these present circumstances , that the former is more agreeable to us , taking us as we are thus dispos'd , renders the soul more operative for it ; which active disposition of the mind to pursue any thing it judges agreeable or good , we use to call love. § . . whence again are seen two considerable advantages in prayer , in which also the sum of our christian life is contain'd ; viz. to beget a fervent and hearty love of god in our hearts , and to enable us to over-come all temptations ; both which are perform'd by rendering the idea's of the goods of the other life very lively , and , as it were , bright in our minds : for , this done , they will be sure to work love of heaven above all things in our hearts , if they be not that very love it self ; which will efface , or at least dim with their far more resplendent lustre , the gay appearances of false and transitory goods , and so preserve the soul from being deluded by her three spiritual enemies . for which reason they that are in temptations are as much bound in conscience to apply themselves to prayer , as a man in danger to lose his life by a distemper he feels growing upon him , is bound to make use of such helps as physick assists us with ; nay rather much more , according as the greater concern of the thing , and the greater certainty of the success and cure , are more powerful motives to make them act and endeavour to seek a remedy . § . . now the love of heaven being thus wrought in our minds by prayer , and love being unitive of the soul to the object belov'd , according to the common saying dictated by our natural thoughts , that , if two love one another , they are all one , 't is farther discover'd how incomparably prayer dignifies and ennobles the soul ; & this to a great degree beyond what meer knowledg , that is , knowledge staying in speculation , and not render'd efficacious by considerative prayer could have effected . if then every power receives a different degree of nobleness in proportion to the object it is employ'd about ; nay , if in our case it becomes it intellectually , and be in a more intimate manner united to it by love , and the object of the soul , while in prayer , is gods own infinite essence , it follows that , prayer , which being at once studious and affective , performs both these , advances a soul to so high a pitch of dignity , that not all the potentates of the earth , and learning of the wise , nor riches of both the indies conspiring together , no not the whole innumerable host of angelical natures joining all their force , can raise her to that heighth of dignity , that vicinity to the divine nature as prayer can do . who then that loves true nobility , and the solid perfection of his soul , but will apply himself to the means of gaining so high preferment ? and how strangely is the indevout part of the world frantick , who look upon prayer as an idle bigottery and fruitless entertainment of our mind in aiery conceits , without any farther effect or benefit ? § . . for the same reason a soul unimploy'd in prayer , and so unconcern'd to frame lively idea's of the goodness of heaven's blissful state , that is , how beautifying and ennobling an object gods essence is , but makes some creature the study of its affective thoughts , and first love of its will , becomes that creature , though never so base , and wretched , and never advances higher , she is married as it were , to that mean object by her giving it her love , and is debased or rais'd to that degree of vileness or dignity , as is found in the thing to which she is espous'd ; if it be earth , she is earthy ; if it be flesh , she is carnal ; if money , she is no more worth than shining dirt is ; if honour , she is empty and aiery . and justly too , since she had the means to advance her self by prayer , and rather chose to ly groveling on the ground , and wallow in the dirt , than raise her head by it to the glorious fountain of all true excellency . § . . from what is said , may be collected also , what advantage accrues to souls by their devotions to angels and saints in heaven . first , they that intend to benefit themselves by this way , ought to frame in their thoughts a most exact idea of the holy and happy state the blessed enjoy ; how full of conformity to gods will , and thence how not only inclinable , but unchangeably fixt to follow right reason , and act according to highest virtue in all things ; how boundlessly their souls are enlarg'd by charity to embrace all the world , and wish them from their hearts , and unenuiously all the goods they see they can possibly be capable of , even though they see it will be greater than their own ; how their understanding power is replenish'd , with a most incomparable glory , or surrounded with rays of most pure and most bright light of knowledge , and , their wills most indissolubly united with , and immerst most intimately in the boundless ocean of all goodness . by which means those happy persons become deify'd or rais'd to such a dignity that all the glories of the world put together are empty beggery and worthless trash in comparison of that noble and close relation to the divinity , or ( which is more ) union with it . § . . particularly of the saints , it is fit devout persons first chuse those whose state here was agreeable to their own , to some degree ; then , attentively read their lives , soberly writ ; regarding more their solid virtues proposed there to their imitation , than the esclat of their miracles , which are but the likely signes of true goodness , and need an eminent and constantly practised virtue , accompanying them , to make them such ; since the power of doing miracles , prophesying and the like , has been granted even to heathens , on some occasions , as st. hierom and the fathers inform us . having thus gain'd a lively character of the particular spirit that such a saint has , if we cultivate it in our minds with a high esteem of it , and of the saint as endow'd with such and such virtues , and so let it sink into our wills , and grow a desire to attain it , and all this be heighten'd and made more lively and more efficacious by applying to the saint himself by prayer , or invoking him to obtain of god's goodness that portion of his virtuous spirit , which he sees fitting for us , we shall at length be wrought up ( an endeavour to imitate him going along ) into the very genius of that saint , and as it were become him , and make his merits ours : not by extrinsecal imputation , as if because we daily ask't virtue for the saints sake , without any other disposition on our part , they are shar'd out to us , and as it were extrinsecally apply'd to our wills , and so better our interiour ; let none flatter themselves with such hopes , for catholick faith admits no extrinsecal imputation of christ's merits , much less of those of the saints : but , this is perform'd by proposing their virtuous example as an object , which by being penetrated lively , and thence desir'd heartily , makes us become like the saint himself , that is virtuous . and this , because 't is the very nature of the soul to become that thing by her understanding and will which it studiously knows and affectionately loves ; and in that very regard too , and to that degree in which we apply our selves considerately to know it and heartily to love it . but this will better be understood by what follows after . § . . hence also is seen the true use of pictures , keeping holidays of saints , and such other devotions : all which renewing in our minds the thoughts of such a virtuous person must needs be beneficial ; since they purify our mind by familiarizing it to such holy and elevated objects , and by helping it to make the character of the saints virtuous life , and of it's particular agreeableness to us , more express ; till at length , by will and affection as well as by meer understanding , we become in a manner it. but especially these helps are necessary to those who arrive not at the love of spiritual goods , by strength of judgment or clear evidence of reason , but by often reiterated impressions of objects upon the knowing power by means of the senses . i meddle not here with other more wonderful effects done by our application to saints and their intercession for us when the faith of him that prays requires it ; the principles of which are to be laid so deep , and are withal so remote from our present purpose , that it would be too long a digression to attempt here their explication . sect . v. of the excellency of prayer , as t is the infallible means to obtain all our best wishes . the impetrative part of prayer , or the virtue it has of obtaining from god infallibly what ever we ask for our selves , that we can be sure is our true good , is perhaps as great an incentive to exercise it as any of the rest . this seems to be a doctrine no less comfortable than strange . we ought then to unriddle it , and make it out . and , first , we must remark , that we can never be sure that any external thing is good for us ; be it riches , honour , pleasure , health , friends , &c. for , to many , all these have been the occasion of their damnation , as they have of salvation to others . nay , some are of that genius and so circumstanc't , that nothing but extream misery in this world can keep them from sinning ; others again are so temper'd , that they grow desperate by great and continual crosses , and fall into a stupidity or disregard of all duties , if prest heavily by afflictions : nay more , speaking of interiour perfections , which have a greater vicinity to virtue , even knowledge has made some solidly virtuous , others vainly proud. nothing therfore , but that perfection of the mind call'd virtue , is securely good for us . since then 't is directly against reason to wish pressingly and absolutely those things which we know not whether they will do us good or harm ; reason tells us we are not to beg of god absolutely any thing but virtue : the rest only conditionally , or with this reservation , in case our heavenly father judges we have need of them , or , in case he sees them convenient for us . and 't is of this i affirm , that if it be askt of god by prayer , it will be always granted , and that too to the very same degree as is our fervency in asking it . § . . to understand how this is effected , we must reflect that , to pray for any virtue , is earnestly to wish it ; as also that prayer , if perform'd attentively and as it ought , is the most serious action of our whole life , being a treaty or communication with god ; the seer of our hearts , with whom 't is the most irreverent folly that may be not to be in earnest , when we profess it outwardly . prayer therfore for virtue is the most serious and most effectual act of the will imaginable , strongly set and bent towards the attainment of that perfection we pray for ; that is , 't is a frequent and hearty wish of virtue . and what is virtue , but a confirm'd disposition of the will to do our duties to god and man ? or an habitual will to act according to right reason and christian principles ? and how are habits got , but by oft repeated or very effectuall acts ? since then , when ever we pray for virtue as we ought , both these are found in the exercise of that prayer ( for , we both repeat often our wishes , which are acts of our will , and withall they are the most serious , most solemn and most elevated acts that can be , and thence very efficacious ) : it follows , that the praying for virtue is the very gaining it ; in the same manner as warming continued and advanc't begetts heat ; and heat , a flame . § . . you will say , all this gives no great account of any particularity in prayer , towards the attainment of virtue ; since , according to this doctrin , the frequent considering with our selves , and pondering well the excellency of virtue may beget wishes of it , and consequently virtue in us ; and this in as high a manner , if well followed , as prayer does . i answer first , the case is impossible ; for , except , when we wish to get virtue , we aim at heaven by thus wishing it ; 't is not true virtue we wish , but some apish resemblance of it , to make us esteem'd by the world , or for some other temporal end : and , if , in setting our selvs to consider it's goodness and excellency ( which consists in this , that it disposes us for heaven ) and thence wishing it , we aim'd at the attainment of heaven , or the blissful sight of god by it , we were in prayer all the while we wisht it , after some manner ; though perhaps there went not along with it the addressive part to god by way of petition ; which yet , 't is very hard should be wanting in those who habitually know by faith , and by christian language and practice are inur'd to acknowledge , that all goods , especially supernatural ones , come from god. § . . next i answer , that there is no doubt , but a true sight of the excellency and utility of virtue , improv'd by our consideration , may cause some degrees of wishes or desires of it , and so beget virtue at first , or advance it something : but , that all those means are dry and inefficacious without prayer , will appear by the advantages found in prayer . as first , that while our thoughts are set upon him who is our last end , we take our aim more steadily at the means by which we are to attain him . ly . faith , which we suppose to go before prayer , telling us all comes from him , it heightens our soul , and consequently fancy , far above that pitch to which natural and unelevated thoughts could have rais'd them . ly . faith telling us also he is the fountain of all virtue , the very approach to him by prayer and begging it of him is the drawing it into our selvs , from his inexhaustible treasures of all good. ly . faith , telling us he has promis'd to hear our prayers which are made according to his own holy will , and that prayers for virtue are such , makes us firmly hope , out petition will be granted : and a hope thus rais'd , renders our wish of it far more efficacious ; as we experience passes in our selvs in other matters , when we are assur'd of getting them , and , as it were just upon the point of attaining them . this hope also fixes and comforts our thoughts in confidence of having already gain'd some , and of attaining yet more ; by which means they are kept up and continu'd in the pursuit of what we ask for , and relapse not into a stupid want of expectation . ly , while out minds are more rais'd by prayer to an ardent love of god , our will is proportionably rais'd to a more fervent wish of virtue , which is already known to be the proper means to attain him ; in the same manner as one , who knows certainly a treasure is hid in such a place , and is his if he will go for it , is very prompt to wish , nay resolute to get and use means to obtain it : whereas on the other side , that is , when our thoughts are not made lively by prayer , the thoughts of heaven being so distant and hard to be represented by fancy , it seems but a kind of dry speculation , and dull in comparison . ly , since , as was said , the nature of our soul is such , that , to know any thing what ever , is to have that very thing in our understanding ; and that , prayer improving this knowledg to a liveliness or expresness , it becomes active to obtain it , or which is all one , it becomes will ; it follows that , by much and lively thinking and conceiting the goodness of virtue , we arrive to have it in our will : i mean , we have in our will a disposition to act according to right reason inform'd by faith , that is indeed , we have attain'd virtue ; this being its very nature and definition . lastly , since , as was shown before , by prayer the soul is to some degree ( inferior indeed , but yet truly ) deify'd or made one with god , that is , with him who includes eminently all virtues , or rather is those very virtues essentially : it follows necessarily , that the soul addicted to prayer , especially when she prays knowingly , and thence raises her self to love , must have all virtues in her ; nay , be those very virtues , according as her pitch of love of god advances her , and her present state in this life will permit her . § . . from this doctrine we may draw these consequences : first , that , though we ought to pray for temporal goods always with resignation and conditionally , there is no need of adding either of these cautions when we pray for virtue , but we may wish it absolutely , without any measure or stint ; since we are sure 't is alwayes of it self agreeable to gods will , and our own true good ; in asking or desiring which god's goodness has limited no man. — you 'l say then , one may wish as high a pitch of virtue , as the greatest saints had ; nay , that of our blessed lady her self . 't is answer'd ; since the means to arrive at so high a degree of virtue as others , is to wish it with as pure an intention , and as fervently as they do ? none is to wish the end , without the proper means to it ; but to labour all they can to put the means ; that is , to gain a fervent desire of it from god ( by prayer , qualify'd according to all the particulars above-said ) as that of those saints was ; and then , they may be sure 't is absolutely god's will , both as author of nature and super-naturals , that effects should spring out of proper causes , and immediate dispositions . nay , we know this with a greater assurance , than that any effect of nature will succeed : for example , fire burn , or rain wet : for , it becomes god's goodness , sometimes , to alter the course of nature miraculously for higher ends , even when natural dispositions are ready , and require to produce natural effects ; but , it can never consist with his sweetest goodness , to hinder those from having virtue , who are immediately dispos'd for it . whether those that pray , shall attain an immediate disposition to so high a virtue as those had , is another question : but , it is certain , god has laid no commands upon any , to deterr him from doing his best to attain it ; but has propos'd saints to our imitation absolutely , and not to a degree only : for , as the saying is , he that aims at the sun , though he be sure he shall never his his mark , yet he will shoot higher than he that aims only at a bush. but , how high steps every particular soul ought to take at once , belongs to super-natural prudence , and discretion of spirits ; and therefore , 't is the proper office of a wise ghostly-father , to determin it : and his only care must be , to be sure the soul proceeds still by immediate dispositions ; for otherwise , the taking great leaps at once in a spiritual progress , generally strains the connaturality of devotion , and ends in indevotion or sloth . in a word , let him that prayes , be only attentive to ask virtue of god , with as much fervency as he will ; and then , leave the effect to him who is a faithful promiser , and a full rewarder . . secondly , since this assurance is so great , let him that prayes ask his true and certain good , virtue , without any wavering or doubting ; but with an absolute confidence in god's goodness or mercy : for , can we be surer of any thing , than that a miracle shall not hinder the effect , if we put the immediate dispositions to it by prayer ? and this security we have of attaining virtue , if we pray for it fervently , and as we ought . . thirdly , the same certainty is of the effect , if one prays for the forgiveness of his sins : for , prayer being a hearty wish of what we pray for , made fervent by those advantages we have above enumerated ; it follows , that it moulds ( as it were ) and frames the soul into an absolute and resolute will of forsaking sin , and warms it with affection to her true good. but , great care must be had of praying god to pardon our sins , while yet our wills are ty'd fast to the sinful objects ; for , that were to require of him to do more than miracle : love of god alone finally , or the holy-ghost in their hearts , being the only remission of sins ; and the love of any creature , otherwise than in order to that love , being the proper notion of sin : so that , as impossible as it is , that we should love god alone finally , and a creature above , or not in order to him , both at once , ( which is no less than a direct contradiction ) ; so impossible it is , that sin should be pardon'd , till the inordinate affection be taken from the objects of it . . but , what shall those poor sinners do , who have not a will to leave sin ; or at least , but a divided will ; as was st. augustin's case before his conversion , which he so complainingly descants upon in his confessions ? i answer , they must still take the same method ; that is , strive by continual prayer , ( made after that weak manner , at least , as they are able ) to improve those imperfect wills , into perfect ones ; and , groaning under the slavery they now fully experience , at once sigh and tremble before their justly offended god : which kind of exercise in this case , is more profitable and proper for them to use , than love of god ; of which their hearts , yet full of filth , are at present uncapable . yet , their utmost industry must be imploy'd , by faith and some degree of hope , ( which are here the only acters ) to promote and advance these good motions and graces of the holy-ghost , not yet within them , but only moving them to towards that grace , by which the same holy-ghost enters into their heart , and inhabits there . the hardest struggle is at first , till the scales begin to turn ; which done , all is easie to us , if we pursue our victory . but , for those who are in this state , it were very fit that mortification went along with prayer ; to wean , deterr , and divert the soul from the noxious gust she took in sinful objects . . lastly , we may hence admire the wise methods , and matchless bounty of our good god , in alluring us by so many motives to apply to him by prayer , that so we may arrive at true happiness ; and giving us , by the very asking , ( that is , as soon as ever we ask ) all that is our certain and true good , or all we can , according to right reason , heartily beg of him . you 'l say , it will follow hence , that if one immediately ask heaven , he shall have it . i answer , that this were the same manner of fond petition , but far more highly unreasonable , as to ask the virtue of our lady or the apostles , without thinking of putting first the immediate disposition to have it : which is to press god to do a miracle for our sakes ; a thing true humility & reverence , the requisites to a rightly made prayer , will scarce allow . and , so , still our general principle remains firm to us , that we shall be sure to obtain what we pray for , when we ask for our true good , so we ask as we ought . now , the immediate disposition to heaven being love of god , if we pray for the means , we shall be sure both to obtain this , and heaven too , which is our end , by it : which secures to us the effect of our prayer , or the accomplishment of our wishes ; though it come not to us after our own foolish manner , but according to the method our infinitly wise god has appointed ; that is , that all things even in super-naturals , ( except in some few cases ) be carryed forwards from connatural causes or dispositions to proper effects . which consequence of the effects out of their proper causes , is the true meaning of the word merit ( so misrepresented by our adversaries ) ; only superadding , that god has promis'd this certain effect shall follow , and that the generality of the faithful work out of that consideration , or out of a relyance on god's promises , without knowing ( perhaps ) how this promise is brought about , or perform'd to us : which , yet , when known by those who are capable of understanding it , must needs add a strange degree of comfort , and an exceeding courage to employ themselves in prayer . whence may be easily collected , that i only concern my self with that kind of impetrative virtue , by which rightly made prayer obtains certainly of god our true spiritual good ; that by shewing the connatural efficacy of it , and with how necessary a consequence the attainment of virtue springs from it : i may excite my readers , to pursue that best duty ; and withal , by the way , instruct them how to perform it . what other virtue prayer has , of obtaining many things of god for our selves , and our neighbour , by obliging his infinit goodness and wisdom in his government of the world , so to contrive and order things , that not one prayer of the just be left unavailable , as far as can possibly consist with the common good of the universe ; nay , even so far as , if the prayer be made with a perfect faith , confidence and firm relyance upon him , to alter the course of nature by miracle , for such a prayer's sake : of these , i say , it is not my purpose to treat at present ; it being out of my road , as depending on principles , which ly very remote from my present design ; as was said formerly , in a like case , concerning prayer to saints , at the end of the fourth section . i shall end this discourse with those most expressive words of st. james : if any one wants wisdom , let him ask of god , who gives to all abundantly , and without grudging ; and it shall be given him . but , let him ask in faith , nothing doubting : for , he that doubts is like a wave of the sea , which is mov'd and tost about by the wind. let not , then , such a man think , that he shall obtain any thing of our lord. where we are to note , first , that by wisdom is not meant speculative knowledge ; but that wisdom , which is our certain and true spiritual good ; and of which , the fear of god is the beginning , as the love of god is its accomplishment or perfection . next , he assures us , it shall be given , and that without grudging , or upbraiding any , that they have receiv'd enough already ; but abundantly , without stint , so they dispose themselves by prayer to receive it . thirdly , he puts the disposition to receive it , to be a firm hope , faith , or confidence in god's over-flowing goodness ; which is strengthen'd by knowing that what we ask , is agreeable to his holy will. lastly , he declares , that the want of this confidence in asking , renders our whole prayer ineffectual : for , the wish cannot be strong and efficacious , to work the soul into a hearty and habitual love of god , if it be held before-hand ( as it ought ) , that it cannot be had without god's giving it ; and the asker thinks that , let him ask virtue how he will , it is yet an obscure kind of mystery lying in god's breast , and depending on his meer will , whether he will please to give him any virtue or no ; and that , let him pray for it how he will , there are yet no determinate or certain causes laid in the course of his supernatural providence to attain it ; and thence comes to doubt , whether he shall ever obtain any virtue , or none at all , which is very uncomfortable . whereas , were it known , and well penetrated , that god's will is already , as to that point , determined by his wisdom , governing and promoting souls by prayer to virtue , and by virtue to heaven , as by proper dispositions to those effects ( according to that saying of the psalmist : they shall rise from virtue to virtue , till they see the god of gods in sion ) : also , were it known and consider'd , that an unwavering ( and , thence , efficacious ) prayer or wish , strengthen'd by directing it to god , is the proper disposition or means effectually , and necessarily ( as we may say ) to gain virtue : it will become impossible , to want courage to ask it heartily , and absolutely ; impossible , to waver or want assuredness in our asking it ; impossible , our wishes of it should not become an efficacious means to obtain it : lastly , impossible , we should not obtain what we ask . soli deo gloria . finis . the schism of the church of england &c. demonstrated in four arguments formerly propos'd to dr. gunning and dr. pearson, the late bishops of ely and chester / by two catholick disputants, in a celebrated conference upon that point. spencer, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the schism of the church of england &c. demonstrated in four arguments formerly propos'd to dr. gunning and dr. pearson, the late bishops of ely and chester / by two catholick disputants, in a celebrated conference upon that point. spencer, john, - . gunning, peter, - . pearson, john, - . lenthall, john, sir, - . sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. printed by henry cruttenden ..., oxon : . reproduction of original in huntington library. reprinted from spencer's schisme unmask't (p. - of the edition). also attributed to john sergeant by wing. wing lists title as "the schism of the church of england &c. remonstrated. the two catholic disputants are john spencer and john lenthall. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng church of england -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the schism of the church of england &c. demonstrated in four arguments . formerly propos'd to dr. gunning and dr. pearson , the late bishops of ely and chester , by two catholick disputants , in a celebrated conference upon that point . oxon . printed by henry cruttenden , one of his majesty's printers . mdclxxxviii . the schism of the church of england demonstrated in four arguments , &c. the definition of schism . schism is a voluntary separation of one part from the whole , true , visible , [ hierarchical ] church of christ . the first argument . whosoever make a voluntary separation of themselves from the whole , true , visible church of christ , are schismatiques ; but all those of the english protestant party , make a voluntary separation of themselves from the whole true visible church of christ : therefore all those of the english protestant party are schismatiques . the first proposition is evident , and granted by our adversaries when they allowed our definition to be a true proposition . we prove the second proposition . whosoever voluntarily separate themselves from all particular visible christian churches in the world of the same time with them , make a voluntary separation of themselves from the whole true visible church of christ ; but all those who are of the english protestant party , voluntarily , separate themselves from all the particular visible christian churches in the world of the same time with them : therefore all those of the english protestant party make a voluntary separation from the whole true visible church of christ. the first proposition is manifest : for in the extent of all the true visible christian churches in the world , must be contained the whole true visible church of christ. the second proposition we prove : whosoever voluntarily separate themselves from the present eastern and western churches , and all churches in their communion , voluntarily separate themselves from all the particular christian visible churches in the world , of the same time with them ; but all those of the english protestant party voluntarily separate themselves from the present eastern and western churches , and all churches in their communion : therefore all those of the english protestant party voluntarily separate themselves from all the particular visible christian churches in the world , of the same time with them . the first proposition is certainly true . for no assembly or congregation of christians can be named ( which is not manifestly heretical ) that is not contained in this proposition . we prove the second by enumeration : if they do not so separate themselves , let that church be nominated amongst the forementioned , from which they do not voluntarily separate themselves . it is not ( confessedly ) the roman ; for they all profess themselves not to be of her communion : nor the greek , under obedience to the patriarch of constantinople ; for they have as little dependance , or agreement with that , either in doctrine , subjection , discipline , rites , or communion , as they have with the roman ; our adversaries producing but four points wherein they seemed to agree with protestants against us ; and those either not of faith , or clearly mistaken , or not as they are controverted betwixt us . and the same reason proceeds of all churches in actual communion with them . ergo , the second proposition is true . it will avail nothing to alledge here , that english protestants communicate with many other reformed churches beyond sea ; for all those are comprehended under our terms the english protestant party ; and it is as evident , that each of those voluntarily separate themselves from all other churches , as it is that these of england separate . neither will it excuse them to say , that they only refined that church , which they found corrupted and defiled ; which notwithstanding remains still amongst them the very same in substance that it was before . for it is evident , that all of them , whether english or others , separated themselves from all those national churches and the pastors of them , who were in quiet possession of church-government immediately before they begun ; rejected in all countries respectively , where they entred , their authority , dispossessing them of their sees and cures , intruding themselves into their places , and gathering tumultuously among themselves particular congregations and conventicles , instituting new and unheard of rites and ceremonies , without dependance of any , who were in possession of church-government immediately before them through the whole world : and all this as notoriously , and undeniably , as any schismatiques ever did before their time : in all which particulars we appeal to the historians on both parts , who have writ the records of these two last ages . the second argument . whosoever adhere to schismatical pastors ( as schismatical is understood in our definition ) are schismatiques . but all english protestants adhere to schismatical pastors , as schismatical is understood in our definition : therefore all english protestants are schismatiques . the first proposition is evident . for those being only such as separate themselves from the whole true visible church of christ , all who adhere to them , must also separate with them , and thereby become schismatiques . the second proposition we prove . whosoever adhere to those , who are successively ordained by such schismatical pastors , maintaining the same cause which they begun , adhere to schismatical pastors , as schismatical is understood in our definition ; but all english protestants adhere to those , who were successively ordained by such schismatical pastors , maintaining the same cause which they begun : therefore all english protestants adhere to schismatical pastours , as schismatical , is understood in our definition . the first proposition needs no proof , as being clear ex terminis : the second , viz. that those , whom we say were so ordained , maintain the same cause , which was begun by those who ordained them , is also clear : it remains therefore only to prove , that they were ordained successively by schismatiques , understood in the sense of our definition : which we thus prove : whosoever adhere to those , who were successively ordained by matthew parker , and the other first protestant bishops of his time , adhere to those , who were successively ordained by such schismatical pastors ; but all english protestants adhere to such , as were successively ordained by matthew parker , and the first protestant bishops of his time : therefore all english protestants adhere to those , who were successively ordained by such schismatical pastors . the second proposition is clear , and confessed by all : we thus prove the first : if matthew parker , and the rest were such schismatical pastors , then whosoever adhere to those , who were ordained by them , adhere to those who were ordained successively by such schismatical pastors ; but matthew parker , and the rest were such schismatical pastors . therefore all those , who adhere to those , who were successively ordained by them , adhere to those who were ordained by such schismatical pastors . the first proposition is clear : we prove the second . whosoever either possess the sees and offices of lawful bishops , those lawful bishops yet living , or unite themselves to such as possess them , are such schismatical pastors ; but matthew parker , and other first protestant bishops of his time , either possest the sees and offices of lawful bishops , those lawful bishops yet living , or united themselves to such as possest them : therefore matthew parker , and all the first protestant bishops of his time , were such schismatical pastors . the first proposition is evident of it self . the first part of the second proposition , that the sees , &c. of living bishops were possest , and that others of these new bishops united themselves to such as possest them , is also clear , as matter of fact , out of stow , speed , cambden , mason , goodwin , fern , &c. the second part , viz. that those living bishops were lawful bishops , even when they were deprived , we prove thus : whosoever were once lawful bishops , and never did any thing after , whereby they became unlawful , remained still lawful bishops ; but those deprived bishops were once lawful bishops , and never did any thing after , whereby they became unlawful : therefore those bishops remained still lawful bishops . the first proposition is evident . the first part of the second proposition , viz. that they were once lawful bishops , we prove thus : no national church can be a true particular church of christ , unless those who have the place of bishops in it be lawful bishops ; but the national church of england in queen maries time was a true particular church of christ : therefore those , who had the place of bishops in it , were lawful bishops . now i subsume . but those , who had then the place of bishops in that national church , were those deprived bishops : ergo. the first proposition is clear . for no true church can unite it self to unlawful pastors . the second proposition is also clear from the confession of our adversaries , who grant , that the church of rome , and all those of her communion are true churches of christ. see bramhall and fern upon this subject . we prove now the second part of the second proposition , that those bishops did nothing , whereby they became unlawful bishops . if those lawful bishops did any thing , whereby they became unlawful bishops , it must be supposed to be that for which they were deprived ; but that for which they were deprived , did not make them unlawful bishops : therefore they did nothing , whereby they became unlawful bishops . the first proposition seems evident . for no prudent man can suppose , that they would deprive them for that which made them not unlawful bishops , if they had been convinced to have done any other thing which might make them unlawful bishops . the second we prove : all the reasons , for which they were deprived , was resisting the pretended reformation , and refusing the oath of supremacy ; but those could not make them unlawful bishops : therefore the causes , for which they were deprived , could not make them unlawful bishops . the first proposition being matter of fact , is witnessed by cambden , goodwin , and others . the second proposition we prove thus : no proceeding in practice , according to the common tenets , the holding whereof made them not unlawful bishops , can make them unlawful bishops ; but resisting the pretended reformation , and refusing the oath of supremacy , was only a proceeding according to the common tenets , the holding whereof made them not unlawful bishops : therefore resisting that reformation , and refusing that oath could not make them unlawful bishops . the first proposition is clear in it self : for no man can be thought to become an unlawful bishop , v. g. by praying for the souls in purgatory , if the holding that such prayers are lawful , make him not an unlawful bishop ; and so of the rest . the second proposition is also evident . for whilst they were lawful bishops in queen maries time , they held it a common necessary point of religion to resist that reformation , and refuse that oath of supremacy . if it should be replied , that as the queen had power to deprive lawful temporal officers at her pleasure , so might she also deprive at her pleasure lawful ecclesiastical officers and bishops , as being no less chief governour of the church then of the commonwealth ; we answer , even that admitted ( not granted ) yet this second she could not do : for the kings and queens of england pretended only to succeed into those prerogatives of church-government , which the pope had before them , as is clear in king henry the th . but the pope himself had no power to dispossess a lawful bishop remaining a lawful bishop at his pleasure . therefore neither had the queen any such power . the third argument . we prove in this argument , by another medium , that matthew parker and his associates , and consequently all who adhered to them , or adhere to their successors were and are schismatiques , separate from the whole true visible church of christ. matthew parker was a shismatique , voluntarily separate from the whole true visible church of christ : therefore all those , who were willingly consecrated by him , and all their successors and adherents , were such schismatiques . the consequence is clear , as appears in the former argument : the antecedent we prove . whosoever was willingly consecrated by schismatiques , voluntarily separate from the whole true visible church of christ , is himself a schismatique , voluntarily separate from the whole true visible church of christ ; but matthew parker was willingly consecrated by schismatiques , voluntarily separate from the whole true visible church of christ : therefore matthew parker was a schismatique , voluntarily separated from the whole true visible church of christ. the first proposition is already proved . for to be willingly consecrated by such schismatiques is schismatical , and therefore separating from the whole true visible church of christ. the second proposition we prove , as matter of fact . goodwin in the different lives of barlow , coverdale , scory , and hodgkins , who were the consecrators of parker , acknowledges , that the three first were possest of the sees and offices of other catholick bishops living . barlow was intruded into the place of christopherson , bishop of chicester , dec. . , and elect to it , before he consecrated parker , as appears by the queens letters , gulielmo barlow , nunc cicestriensi electo . scory was put by king edward the th into day 's place , then being bishop of chicester . coverdale into vecey's place , by king edward the th , aug. . , which b. vecey was forced to resign , as appears by his being willing to be restor'd ( as he was afterwards ) by queen mary . hodgkins was only a suffragan ; but communicated with these three in this consecration ; and thereby became schismatique . the fourth argument . whosoever subject themselves unto these , as to their lawful pastors , who have no true jurisdiction over them , are schismatiques ; but english protestants , ever since qu. elizebeth's time , have subjected themselves to those , as to their lawful pastors , who have no true jurisdiction over them : therefore english protestants , ever since qu. elizabeth's time , are schismatiques . the first proposition is clear , from tim. . . where describing heretiques , &c. s. paul says , ad sua desideria coacervabant sibi magistros , &c. according to their own fancies they shall heap up teachers , or masters , that is , confusedly and tumultuously , without power or authority . and from ro. . . quomodo praedicabunt , nisi mittantur ? how shall they preach , unless they be sent ? eor their adhering to such , supposes the rejection of all those who are legally authorized to govern them , which is formal schism . the second proposition we prove by enumeration . they could not have true jurisdiction over the particular bishopricks and cures of england ; neither by the force of orders which they receiv'd , ( if they had any such ) for one may have true order without any true jurisdiction , as appears in the act of k. henry th , concerning suffragans , who had true episcopal order , and yet had not episcopal jurisdiction , as the act expresly says ; and many are made ministers in the universities , before they have any jurisdiction over any particular parishes . neither could they have it from those who consecrated them ; for never a one of them had any themselves , as being either suffragans , or not design●d to any see , or elected , and not invested . neither was there then any primate in england to give it them . neither had they it by general consent of the bishops of england ; for they all resisted . neither would they have it from the pope , or patriarch of constantinople ; nor would either of them give it them : much less had they either from a general council ; for that was against them : nor from the general consent of catholick bishops , either of the eastern or western church ; for all oppos d them . neither did their fellowsuperintendents beyond sea , or could they confer jurisdiction upon them ; for they were all as void of jurisdiction as these themselves were . neither could they have it from the queen or parliament ; for that had been an heaping up of teachers to themselves , tim. . . now cited . and ecclesiastical jurisdiction being a spiritual government , is declared cor. . . to be a supernatural gift , and institution of god in his church ; and ver . . prophesying , that is , the power of preaching , is declared to be a gift of the holy ghost ; and therefore are above the politick power of magistrates of any commonwealth . and act. . . the holy ghost is said to appoint bishops to govern the church of god ; and so the giving jurisdiction to them must be supernatural , coming from the holy ghost , and above the reach of politick governors . and if kings , queens , or parliaments , who are under the number of scholars and subjects in matters of religion , could communicate ecclesiastical jurisdiction to their prelates , they would be governors of their governors , and masters of their masters , which is quite contrary to mat. . . non est discipulus supra magistrum , the disciple is not above his master , i. e. in those things wherein he is his master , which is here in church-government . as therefore our saviour joh. . and mat. . sent his apostles with power of governing and preaching , and the apostles gave that spiritual jurisdiction to others , whom they sent to divers particular provinces , and those ecclesiastical persons only amongst all orthodox christians , still communicated the like jurisdiction to others , both in the primitive and after ages ; and never did any catholick prince , or state , pretend to confer jurisdiction upon their own bishops , or pastors : it is most manifest , that neither qu. elizabeth , nor her parliament , had any such power : and consequently it follows from this enumeration of parts that those elizabeth bishops and pastors had no jurisdiction at all , or any of their successors ; and therefore , that all english protestants , attributing such jurisdiction to them and adhering to them as their lawful bishops and pastors are formal schismatiques . finis . raillery defeated by calm reason, or, the new cartesian method of arguing and answering expos'd in a letter to all lovers of science, candor and civility / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) raillery defeated by calm reason, or, the new cartesian method of arguing and answering expos'd in a letter to all lovers of science, candor and civility / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. printed for d. brown ... and a. roper ..., london : mdcxcix [ ] attributed by wing to sergeant. imperfect: pages stained and with some print show-through. reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- apologetic works. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion raillery defeated by calm reason : or , the new cartesian method of arguing and answering expos'd . in a letter to all lovers of science , candour and civility . by j. s. london , printed for d. brown , at the black swan and bible , without temple-bar ; and a. roper , at the black-boy , over against st. dunstan's church , in fleet-stteet , mdcxcix . to his adversaries . gentlemen , addresses of this nature did use , hitherto , to be made to great persons , for their protection ; or else , to special friends , to shew the author's respects : but , your way of managing this controversie , has been so preposterous , that it has oblig'd me to traverse those usual methods , and to present this defensive of mine to your selves , tho' my adversaries . and , because i fear that , coming from my hand , it will not please you , i will endeavour to make it as little unwelcome as i can . let me ask you then , what means all this railing , and libelling ? can any man of common sense think , this is the method to promote truth ? and , if not ; pray , what was your aim in taking this way , so ungrateful to sober men , so nauseous to the learned , and so unchristian in it self ? does it conduce to prove truth , or confute errour ? or , rather , does it not expose you to the censure of all lovers of learning , and civility ; as men , whose reasons are at a nonplus . i beseech you to consider , that reason is our true nature ; and , therefore , whatever subsists by reason , does naturally claim the assent and acceptation of mankind : whereas , passion , if excessive , is never wise ; and , especially , in philosophy , where evident arguments ought to be the only managers , 't is a meer folly. 't is scandalous to truth , as well as to modesty , that brawling should usurp the place of demonstrating . indeed , no credit being got by answering squabbles , you could not have invented any better way to make me lose mine : and , the best compurgator i can bring , to keep me fair in the opinion of the world , for answering books that abound in raillery , but are quite void of sense , is , that i saw it was a great good to the commonwealth of learning , to lay open , once for all , such ridiculous and unfair methods ; that their insignificancy being expos'd , they may , for ever hereafter , he held unworthy of any other answer , but that of scorn , and neglect . what i most fear , is , that my reader will think , that , while i am replying to mr. le grand's censura , i am rather framing an idea of the incredible weakness of perverted reason , than giving him a true account of his real and perpetual failings : but , my comfort is , his book is extant , to justifie me . philosophers use to say , that nature abhors a vacuum : i am sure , rational nature as much abhors an emptiness of sense ; yet , this is all he has allow'd me to work upon , or confute . now , since to talk incoherently , is , by all mankind , held to be folly ; and , to do this in a high degree , and constantly , is that which men call distractedness , or madness ; which is a total disabling of our rational faculty : 't is manifest , hence , that reason , which is our nature , consists in the conjoyning our thoughts rightly ; and , that 't is the perfection of our reason , to discourse coherently , or connectedly . wherefore , my only request to you , is , that , leaving off all those foppish and irrational ways of raillery , and buffoonery , you would do your selves the favour to pursue this way of connexion ; so natural to your souls , so honourable to your credits , and so beneficial to the learned part of mankind . this method , besides the doing a just duty to truth , will , over and above , make all uncivil language impracticable : no such stuff can find place , while we are laying principles , and deducing legitimate consequences ; which are all a philosopher has to do : nor , can impertinent babblers find opportunity to put in a word , while such serious business is in agitation . you have too much disoblig'd and scandaliz'd all good men , and no less mortify'd me , in forcing me from this solid method , by your bringing the controversie from evidence of arguing , to the worst sort of drollery ; since you neither brought against me any one argument , the terms of which you would undertake to be connected ; nor went about to solve the close connexion of mine ; but , only huddl'd together a medly of rambling cavils , tending only to blemish my reputation : which forced me ( it being expected i should say something , and you giving me no wiser employment ) to lose time in laying open your injuriousness , weaknesses , and falshoods ; whereas , i do assure you , i should , with much more joy and satisfaction , have commended your learning , and civility , if your carriage would have permitted me to do it with truth . i beg of you , that you would not ( as lawless assassinates and robbers use ) thus disgrace your selves , by assaulting me with your vizards on ; but , appear bare-fac'd . why should an honest man , in an honest cause , be asham'd to shew his face ? own your true nature , reason : state your cartesian thesis ; for , our controversie begun about that ; and , if you flinoh from it , and run to other subjects , you quit the field . then , lay determinate principles , and bring determinate arguments to prove your assertions ; and , i will promise you to do the same . but , i beseech you , let not the least disrespectful word pass between us , under penalty of being held to have lost our cause . if you please to take this way , so proper for settling truth , i shall honour and respect you , and civilly excuse whatever may hap to be defective . but , if you resolve still to continue these untoward methods , here laid open , i shall not think it worth my while to stand bartering angry repartees with you ; but , will let you rail on to your selves . resting confident , that all learned and sober men will both condemn your prevaricating incivility ; and , will also hold me excus'd , if i let you gratifie your own genius , and apply my self to better employments , more becoming a scholar , and a christian. your sincere , tho' undeservedly injur'd , friend , and servant , j. s. raillery defeated by calm reason : or , the new cartesian method of arguing and answering expos'd : in a letter to all lovers of science , candour and civility . gentlemen , . when pretenders to philosophy , instead of producing arguments of their own , or answering those that are brought by others , do break in upon all the rules of decency and civility , and betake themselves to railing and libelling , 't is the concern , not only of the learned , but of all mankind to declare their abhorrence of such an indirect and senseless prevarication . invectives cast such a shadow upon the clearest truths , and introduce so pernicious a precedent into disputation about points of philosophy , and those also of a more sacred nature , that , unless this absurd carriage be discountenanc'd , the best efforts of exact reason will be turn'd into buffoonery . that nothing but my opposing cartesianism , either by undeniable matter of fact , or by my arguments , did force mr. le grand and his complice to this hurry of passion , and ( as your selves will character it when you see their manner of writing ) madness of malice , will appear manifestly by a plain stating of the case ; which is this . . very many of my learned friends ( tho' it was my concern to name but one of them ) had blam'd my ignobile otium , and had press'd me to write . to speak candidly , i cannot perfectly remember , that they desir'd me , in express terms , to write philosophy ; but i am certain i understood them so , the circumstances seeming very improper to publish any thing else . being thus won , i cast about how i might make my productions as universally beneficial as i was able . at first sight i diseover'd , and had , ( with many others , who aim'd at true science , ) in my thoughts , bewail'd , that a kind of sceptitism , or despair of certain knowledge , had insensibly crept into the world ; and i had experienc'd how it had corrupted many excellent wits , and made them turn libertines . i saw that this dangerous distemper of the mind was grown very epidemical ; of which , in my preface to solid philosophy asserted , i so heartily and feelingly complain . i saw that this sceptical humour did hinder the progress of scientifical knowledge , and the improvement of rational nature ; nay , that it brought a vast prejudice to religion it self : for , those who had only wit enough to raise objections against christian faith , but wanted solidity of judgment , and true principles , enabling them to settle their volatil thoughts , were apt to think that the mysteries it propos'd were altogether repugnant to reason , and inexplicable . but , particularly , i had observ'd the increase of atheism , and ( which is next to it ) of deism here in england . which kind of men , making a scoff at scripture , and disregarding church , councils , fathers , and all authority , could no way be so properly and effectually combated , or confuted , as by reason ; to which , and which only , they appeal'd . hereupon , i resolv'd to bend my best endeavours to advance the way of exact reasoning ; and , thence , pitch'd upon the writing and publishing a method to science . . that the regard i had to christian faith was the chief motive that prevail'd with me to write philosophy , or that treatise , will appear hence : first , because it is manifest that i took there all occasions that could come in my way , to apply my discourses to the defence of faith ; and when i had establish'd any truth by way of reason , i did , upon the spot , make use of it to confute some heresie ; or else some tenet which seem'd not so well consistent with faith , but subcontrary to it . for example ; in my method , p. . i argue against the scepticks . pag. . against the pre-existence of souls . pag. . i prove that man is but one thing , and not two , as the cartesians hold ; of which more hereafter . pag. . i conclude against the epicurean hypothesis . i demonstrate , p. , . that the world had a beginning of motion ; and , consequently , that there is some spiritual nature , which , either by its own virtue , or by power deriv'd from some supreme and first cause of motion , did move unactive matter . i hint , p. . the grounds which shew the mystery of the blessed trinity conformable to right reason . i prove , p. . that angels are not properly in place . i explicate , p. , . in what god's attribute of eternity , and the aeviternity of angels , do consist . i take care , p. , . that weak men do not mis-interpret scripture , by taking metaphorical expressions literally , and dogmatically , as mr. le grand does frequently , and very rashly ; from which proceeded the heresie of the anthropomorphites , and divers others . i explicate , p. , . how , and in what sense , religious honour , or respect may be given to creatures , without shocking any well-meaning christian , or breeding disunion amongst them . i shew , p. . the incomparableness of god's divine word , the holy scriptnres , from its having or bearing many several sorts of senses , and yet all of them true. i attempt , p. , , &c. by a logical medium , to demonstrate the existence of a deity . i shew , p. . the way to perfect souls in solid vertue . i demonstrate , p. , , &c. god's providence in the whole course of nature , even to the very least effect : that he cannot be the author of sin : how senseless a sin irresignation is : how great our gratitude to god ought to be : and , how wise the doctrine of christianity is . i manifest , p. . how ignorant atheists are . pag. . that the world had a beginning ; and , that there are spiritual natures . i demonstrate at large , p. . that there is a self-existent being , or a deity . i prove , p. . against the origenists , how rational it is that there should be an eternal hell for the devils , and wicked souls . i i settle very largely , to the end of that lesson , the rational grounds , previous to humane and divine faith. and , p. . i shew , from a logical medium , the unreasonableness of opinionative faith , which grounds light credulity , and bigottery . i inform my reader , p. , , &c. how to arm himself against being surpriz'd by fallacies brought against christianity . and , lastly , p. . i demonstrate , that the practical judgment of a sinner , and , consequently , all sin , is clearly opposite to right reason ; and an evident fallacy , according to the commonest rules of true logick . . i pursue the same good end in my solid philosophy asserted ; and take all occasions ( even though not given me sometimes ) to apply my former grounds to higher subjects . i will only touch upon some instances . i explicate , p. , and . god's immensity , and set it above those low conceits fram'd by our fancy . as likewise , ( p. . ) his self-existence , and ( p. . ) his absolute infinity . i shew ( p. . ) the necessity of a supernatural doctrine , against the deists . pag. . how to conquer in our spiritual warfare . pag. . that man , pre-determin'd by god , determines himself , or is free. pag. . whence sin springs . i lay open ( p. , , &c. ) the nature of solid vertue . i shew ( p. , and . ) the clear distinction between corporeal and spiritual natures ; which is of vast concern , both to philosophy , divinity , and faith it self ; and , is the best rule of interpreting scripture in such passages as concern spirits , unless the known faith of the catholick church has already establish'd the doctrinal point to our hand . i distinguish ( p. , , ) what is due to reason , what to divine revelation . and , ( p. , . ) that reason is not to be rely'd upon in things above reason . lastly , ( p. . ) i give a certain rule how we can never come to be mis-led by authority , &c. . secondly , that i writ philosophy to maintain the interest of christian faith , and not out of the vain motive of being held a meer philosopher , does farther appear hence , that in the epistle dedicatory to solid philosophy asserted , i did civilly challenge the socinians , deists and atheists , that some learned men of those sects would please to send me those reasons which they , or their leaders , do judge to be of most weight why they cannot embrace the doctrine of the trinity , or christianity ; which they may send privately , and unnam'd , to the stationer who publishes this book : promising them , that i would give their arguments their full weight , and publish an answer to them . which manifestly shews , that my design was , to apply my books of philosophy to the explication and defence of reveal'd faith. from some of those sects i might have expected a rude opposition ; tho' i do not think any of them would have thought it prudent , or creditable to themselves , or their cause , to leave my arguments and my books unanswer'd , and let fly at me with personal reflexions ; but , that those who bear the name of christians , should , instead of answering my reasons , fall to decry , traduce and libel those very books , and their author , in the most vile and scurrilous manner , i could not have expected . this plainly convinces all sober men , that these angry gentlemen esteem nothing so sacred as the satisfaction of their private pique . but , nothing is so fiery , and furious , as men too fond of empty fame , when they fore-see their ignorance is in danger to be baffl'd . i dare presume , that whoever considers the several particulars lately mention'd , to demonstrate which , in those treatises , i have laid grounds ; ( not to speak of many others i have omitted , ) will acknowledge they are of no small weight ; and therefore , that the writer who advances positions which are so useful and serviceable to christianity , ought ( were it but out of respect to that best cause ) to be civilly treated , even tho' he had erred . nor could my adversaries have shewn a greater kindness to those sects above-mentioned , than to bend their whole endeavours to revile and blacken an author , who , as they already saw , had enter'd the lists against those men ; so to fore-stall ( as far as they were able ) the efficacy of all his future labours to defend christian faith ! poor men ! what service has either of them done for christianity ! they have spent their whole life , or the greatest part of it , in contemplating groundless fancies , coin'd by their own brain ; or , ( as they call it , ) in eliciting , or producing ideas ; and in talking voluntaries while they explicate them , without either principles or connexion ; and that 's the utmost of their empty performances . and then , when they should defend their cause by arguments , if we will not allow their explications for good proof , they fall to railing and libelling . but envy is of so froward an humour , that it will neither do good it self , nor let it be done by others . . i might add , as a third argument , to prove , that my chief aim in my writings , was , to do my duty to faith , that i have oppos'd all the whole way of ideas ; because i saw them very unfit to explicate or defend it . far be it from me to cast in a suspicion , that the authors who follow that way are unsound in faith. what i affirm , is , that i can neither conceive how the ideas of the cartesians can well sute with some points of faith , ( of which more hereafter ; ) nor that those of mr. locke , tho' his simple ideas being taken from the things in nature , his doctrine is in comparably better grounded than that of cartesius , do so clearly serve to explicate faith , but that they are obnoxious to some exceptions . i should be better satisfy'd with both those hypotheses , could i once see a body of speculative divinity ; or even an explication of two or three points of reveal'd faith , manifesting the agreement of faith with the principles of right reason ; so that we may see how the superstructure of that divine doctrine does accord with those grounds ; as it must with true science . for , i cannot but judge , that since [ verum vero non contradicit , ] philosophical truths , which are inferiour ones , and lie level to our reason , and therefore are clearer to our understanding than are those sublime mysteries , and are more maniable by it , ought to lend their assistance to our weak capacities in explicating and defending them from being contradictory to true reason : whence , i cannot think tha● philosophy to be true , which , like an officious hand-maid , is not thus subservient to her mistress , faith. and , if any writer , or sustainer of those sects above mention'd , shall think fit to attack any article of reveal'd faith , as contrary to true science , i doubt not but to make it evidently appear by the doctrine i have settl'd in my method , how far short their arguments are from any shew of concluding . . lastly , it was not in me any fondness of advancing paradoxes , but my zeal of pursuing the same good end , which made me attempt to demonstrate in my method divers points which shock the fancy of the vulgar , and , perhaps , of some learned readers , till they well weigh their grounds ; viz. those of the immutability of a pure spirit , and the impossibility of annihilation by god's ordinary power . i had observ'd , that the perfect distinction between body and spirit was ill understood by most , and their natures confounded by divers ingenious writers . also , that very few did penetrate thorowly the nature of their state , their kind of duration , or their manner of operating ; but conceited them to have a kind of commensuration to body , time and corporeal operation . which put , it was impossible to devest them totally of corporeal predicates ; or to evince clearly against atheists , that there were any beings of a nature truly and properly spiritual , or indivisible , unless we could prove they were contradictorily different from body , and all that belong'd to it , excepting only as to their genus , or common notion , ens , or thing . wherefore , reflecting of what importance it was to clear this main point , both for philosophy , the adequate object of which these two natures are ; neither of which could be clearly understood , unless they be thus perfectly , that is , contradictorily distinguish'd : as also , for theology , which treats mostly of spiritual things , and spiritual natures : and , lastly , for faith ; because , otherwise , atheists , who deny all spirituality , might take a conceit , that we meant nothing by a [ spirit , ] but only some more refin'd sort of matter ; and , thence , might come to deny also the immortality of the soul , ( which is one of the main grounds of all religion , ) if we ascrib'd to spirits any mode , or manner of operating , which appertains to body ; nay , would thence be apt to conclude , that there is nothing above meer matter : hence , i saw it fit to demonstrate the former of these theses , viz. their immutability , as the best , and most convincing proof of their immortality ; and , at the same time , quite defeat origenism , and the denial of an eternal hell , which ( tho' it be a known point of christian faith ) is now creeping again into fashion in england . and , it was for the same good reason , that i went about to demonstrate that point of the impossibility of annihilation ; because our modern socinians explicate the spiritual perdition of the soul , by annihilation . and , that the reason why i advanc'd and demonstrated those theses , was out of my respect to faith , appears yet more manifestly , because i apply them still to the confutation of those sects . . hitherto , then , it is not visible to the eye of any sober christian , how i , or those books of mine , could fall into the high displeasure of mr. le grand to that degree , as to revile my self , and degrade them to the lowest degree of contempt . if he had dis-lik'd my reasons which establish'd these particulars in my method , he might , in behalf of truth , have confuted them ; and he should not , in the least , have disoblig'd me ; nor had it broke any friendship between us . but , now comes my crime : it was my necessary duty , while i was writing my method to science , to confute those methods advanced by others , which i judg'd to be false ones : whence , i took notice of that of malbranche , who pretends that all science comes by divine revelation ; and of that of cartesius , who , ( as the writer of his life tells us , ) by endeavouring to bring himself to question all the certainty he had receiv'd from his senses , fell into fits of enthusiasm . i thought it a duty i ow'd to mankind , and to the subject i was writing of , to forewarn studious men of following such methods as might prejudice their wits ; and , withall , lead them into errour ; and to declare , that i could not think that god ever intended that for the only means ( as they pretend ) for men to get knowledge , which might make them lose their wits in looking after it . this highly offended those cartesians , and transported them into most tragical exclamations . but with what reason ? it lay directly in the road i had taken ; and , what obligation had i to either of those authors , that i should dissemblingly favour them , against the duty i ow'd to my readers , and the regard i had for truth ? it could not proceed from any private pique against their persons , for they had never injur'd me . again ; had i wrong'd either of them , it had been easie to confure me , by shewing that i either falsify'd the words i cited , or suppress'd their own interpretation of them . but , both these being impossible , and confutation by way of reason not being their talent , another way ( tho' nothing to the purpose ) was thought fit ; which was , to rail at me aloud , and bespatter my person . . i had brought also some arguments against divers positions of the cartesian doctrine , advanc'd by mr. le grand ; but i had not one unhandsom word against his person , but spoke respectfully of him : which , from a scholar , and a well-bred man , might have merited the like return . if the arguments against cartesianism gave him too much trouble to answer , it was too good a fault to be sorry for it . it seems , there was no other crime in them , nor me ; for , could they have been answer'd by calm reason , there had been no need to have recourse to passion and invective , which abounded in his reply . a hundred cavils , which were foreign to the matter in hand , were hal'd in by head and shoulders ; and fitted up by sinister constructions , and false representations , to lay an odium upon me . not one of those questions were stated , or fully treated of , to benefit the reader , by letting him see what was true , what not : but a few words were snatch'd out of my books , here and there ; and then distorted , and perverted , to make them fit to be descanted upon with raillery . my conclusions , against all laws of disputation , were stoutly deny'd : the proofs , by which they subsisted , were stifled in silence ; at least , the force of my arguments were scarce ever taken notice of : whereas , the most puny logician knows that a conclusion , for which a proof is brought , is to stand firm , and be allow'd , till the proof for it be invalidated . do they think i would have taken it ill from any man , if he shew'd me the weakness of my argument ? i do assure them , i am so far from that humour , that i should take it for a great favour : for , by this means , they would either satisfie me , by convincing me of my errour ; or else , by attempting to answer my reasons , and not performing it , truth would become more victorious ; which is all an honest man ought to aim at . on the contrary , how civilly did i invite mr. le grand , to take the manly way of arguing becoming a scholar , and to prove what he says ? ending with these words , id. cartes . p. , . nec peto à te , &c. nor do i require of you to perform this ; at least , endeavour it , and you shall see with what honour i will treat you , tho' you do sometimes , nay , often , fail . but i was not so fortunate , as to meet with such a candid adversary . the way of invective was resolv'd on , as more favourable to their cause ; and all overtures that were handsome , and becoming learned men , were rejected . . now , gentlemen , since i have , in my reply , shewn this carriage of theirs evident by matter of fact , judge how strangely imprudent ( not to say , worse ) these men are , who can persuade themselves , that this manner of writing , never taken by any sober man since the world stood when he is to answer another man's arguments , or to establish his own thesis , does not perfectly convince every intelligent person , that they are at an end of their reason when they fall into such a high salivation of passion ; and this without any other provocation , than what my arguments gave them ? can their pelting their adversary with such abominable slanders , ( even supposing him guilty of them all , ) either answer his proofs for his doctrine , or avail in the least to prove their own ? were the person they impugn a profess'd atheist , it could not justifie a writer who is to defend truth , to run away from the question , and fall to impertinent brabbling , and bring in twenty foreign exceptions , and personal defamations , which are nothing at all to the point . nay , it would , in that case , be far more requisite to take care to confute him with pregnant and solid reasons ; lest prudent readers , who are sagacious enough to see that ill language , bawling exclamations , and personal reflexions , are certain symptoms of non-pluss'd reason , should be inveigl'd by those passionate prevarications , and by such a wild management , to think that he has truth on his side , and so come to embrace his errours . but , will it not look like a jest , that he who was formerly , by all that know him , held a good christian , and had writ many books for christianity , should immediately , upon his opposing the cartesians , be guilty of so many impieties , blasphemies and heresies , and become as black as the devil ; and his books , which found such an universal acceptation among learned men , ( except two or three maligners , ) should , all on a sudden , become stark naught ? is it not prodigious , that men who are at age to have common sense in them , should so foolishly and childishly hood-wink themselves , and then think none sees them ? the world , whatever they think , is wiser , than to judge that any credit is to be given to them who , by their carriage , confess themselves to be piqu'd , and exasperated , even to an extasie of fury . their transport of passion too visibly discovers , that their souls are not acted by the spirit of sober reason , charity , and candid love of truth ; but agitated by a violent whirlwind of fury , envy , and resolute uncharitableness . their demeanour being such , that , even tho' they had truth on their side , they would disgrace their cause by their hot-headed managery of it . . these unoccasion'd contumelies being the most disgraceful that could be laid upon one of my quality , and rank , did a little transport me in my ideae cartesianae , where i was to reply to them ; and , made me use , now and then , some smart expressions , more than were precisely necessary for my defence ; for which i ask mr. le grand's , and my reader 's pardon ; tho' they were no more than such as every prudent man may discern that himself , as a writer , had given himself . but i carefully avoided all imputations of irreligion , either in his intentions , or his writings . and , if i saw that , in any circumstance , my words might occasion such a misconstruction , i charitably and carefully defended his credit in such points , and declar'd him innocent . all the reflexions i us'd , were on his manner of writing ; which it was impossible to avoid , if i would do a just right to my self . but he liberally requited me , in his censura ; and gave me pounds for my pence : for , he tells me , in the close of his epistle to the reader , that non quicquam per integrum responsum suum sine mendacio dixit ; that i have not spoken any thing ( that is , not one word ) throughout my whole answer , without a lye. so that my answer , which consists of two hundred seventy two pages , is nothing but one continu'd lye. upon my word , this was shrewd , and home ; and , if this libel of his , which usher'd in , and made way for the following one , be but capable of immortality , my name will be eterniz'd for a lyar , to the world's end. certainly , these men are the oddest sort of writers , that ever were guilty of ink-shed . other men , when they write , do entertain some hope they shall be believ'd ; but these men never think on , nor regard that obvious consideration . they press on furiously , to attain their beloved end ; which is , to disgrace that abominable j. s. and this so totally possesses and fills their whole fancy , that not the least prudential consideration can peep up there , to make them wisely pursue their own design . what man in his wits , do they think , will believe that a man of known credit , who never in his life was noted , or thought , to be a lyar , should , in the twinkling of a bed-staff , ( as their noble jack pudding , in his dialogue , p. . stiles it , ) tell a lye in every line , for two hundred seventy two pages together . logicians say , that an argument that proves too much is naught , and proves nothing at all . such will be the fate of their ranting fits of passion ; they so overstrain all belief , that no credit will be given to any one thing they say ; nor did i ever know that maxim of machiavell , [ calumniare fortiter , &c. ] more untowardly and aukwardly apply'd . yet , i must say this in their commendation , that they are men of a most magnanimous courage and confidence . should i talk at this swaggering rate , i should fear it would spoil my whole ensuing book ; and so utterly lose my credit , that not a word i said would be believ'd . . being heartily weary of this brawling way of theirs , so contrary to my genius , which , all who read my books may see , does aim at close and solid reasoning ; i publish'd a small treatise , settling the first truth , or first principle , fundamentally on the ideas in god's creative intellect ; for which reason , i intitl'd it non ultra , it being impossible to go higher . where also i demonstrated the shallowness of the first principlè of the cartesians . in it i begg'd of them but meerly to name , or put down categorically , any one principle of the cartesian doctrine , which they judge to be the strongest , or most evident ; and i would undertake to demonstrate , that , either it is no principle , or else , that it has no influence at all upon their hypothesis . i declar'd , that i did this , to put an end to this controversie , and to settle peace . i propos'd there , p. . that we should confine our selves to half a sheet of paper ; and , that all should be transacted by pure dint of reason ; and , that he who shall use the least uncivil vvord to his adversary , and falls into passion , shall be held to have lost his cause , and to be reduc'd to a non-plus . could any proposal , or any overture , be more civil , equal , or welcome to men who love truth and ingenuity ; or be more efficacious to decide the question , and stop the way to all possibility of vvrangling . but that 's the fault of it ; they have a great talent in brabbling , but they are not at all gifted for arguing conclusively , demonstrating , or laying principles . more than this , i offer'd , that , if they can shew their cause has any principles to support it , ( without which , by the way , none ought to hold it true , ) that i would make them satisfaction , by acknowledging publickly , that i had foolishly over-ween'd ; and take the shame to my self , for my rash presumption . by which candid and frank offer , i put my self upon the greatest disadvantage imaginable ; and gave them a greater advantage against me , than they could ever hope to gain any other way . lastly , i did all this needlesly , without either being forc'd , or desir'd , to do it ; but meerly out of my own voluntary motion , and out of my sincere desire that truth should be made appear . . but , what return , do you think , was made me , for this fair and candid proposal ? while i was expecting this half-sheet of paper , that was to consist of nothing but calm reason , and was likely to decide the whole controversie ; out comes a dialogue , in english , under the name of mr. merry-man , a-la-mode of our bartholomew fair jack-pudding ; stuffed with ignorance , impudence , falsification , foul-mouth'd railing , scornful jeers , and other scurrilous language : which , for any thing i see yet , are all the cartesian principles i am to expect . the reader will see how shrewdly he confutes me ; for , he tells me over and over , i am an ass , a rare fellow , and as proud as lucifer : that my writings smell rank of the fumes of an intoxicated brain : that i am a kind of devil incarnate ; for , he says , he begins to suspect i have a cloven foot ; and , that no body , but the devil , set me on vvriting : that i run down piety , religion , and god himself ; and forty such good morrows . certainly , by this description , i must have ten legions in me at least : yet , the jest is this ; this silly fop , who would pretend great zeal for faith , and god's honour , dares not appear bare-fac'd , to write against such a monster of wickedness ; but keeps a vizard on , and masks his name under that of merry-man ; which we must suppose he does , either because he is ashamed , and should blush if good christians knew he took god's part against lucifer and his imps , which is an odd piece of modesty ; or else , because under that disguize , he may lye , forge , and say or do any thing , and yet none challenge him with it , or call him to account . he falsifies the places where he does not quote my books ; and when he does , he picks out a few words , and concealing the tenour of the discourse , travesties them to any sense he pleases . he is so impudent , that , against matter of fact , known openly to great multitudes , particularly , to the right reverend the bishop of madaura , he objects very confidently , that some of my pieces of divinity were damn'd ( that word pleases him , and his friend mightily ) by the sorbon doctors ; of which , more anon . he has a fling at the bishops , for negligence in their duty ; or at me , for printing my books without their approbation : i beseech him to shew us , in in his huge wisdom , that 't is an episcopal duty to approve all philosophical books ; or for philosophy-writers to have episcopal approbations , ere they print them ! had le grand , had cartesius any such ? or , did this libeller ask any such approbation for his libel , which , by the antient canons of the church , renders him liable to excomunication ; nay , ( by conc. arelat . . canon . . ) he is forbidden to communicate till his death : and , lest he should think a provincial council's decree does not debar him from the sacrament , it is added there immediately ; sicut magna synodus , ( that is , a general council ) did formerly decree . his ignorance is so profound , that he understands not one of the questions he touches upon , and defiles . as , when i affirm that god is not the immediate cause of motion , he runs to creation , which is not perform'd by way of motion , but instantaneously : whence , since motion being successive quantity , and so proportionate parts may be taken of it , ( for example , half of it , ) and creation gives being , by this learned doctrine of his , a thing may half-be , half-not-be ; and so his miraculous stupidity has found out a medium between the two contradictions , est , and non-est . . who the author of this libel is , tho' he thinks he walks in a mist , is well enough known . he was formerly convicted of slandering a pious and virtuous ecclesiastick : and now , it seems , having the ambition to take the highest degree in that infamous art of calumny he took this occasion to commence doctor-libeller . but , too much of a pamphlet so silly and ridiculous , that 't is below contempt . . and now , gentlemen , is not this mighty learned ? are not these most profound principles ? does not every man , who has but half an eye , see plainly that mr. le grand , and his party , distrusting the way of laying principles , so unfriendly to their cause , which has none , are forc'd to have recourse to railing ; and endeavour all they can to bring our philosophical contest from the way of connected reason , to farce and drollery ? i discern , by his desire it should be told me what he says , he thinks i should set my self to answer his libel : but he is mistaken . 't is too much honour to him , that i take notice of it at all . nor does it spring from any desert of his , that i do even so much ; but out of regard to some weak persons , amongst whom , i am inform'd , they spread it in hugger-mugger ; and , to meet with the private cavils of the triumvirate : for , i hear , they have hook'd in a third man , to strengthen their thin party . . notwithstanding , i must confess , i owe satisfaction to every reader of my books , if in any place i speak obscurely ; and to themselves too , if their resolute malice would render them capable to receive it : for , i look upon them too as my brethren ; tho' , at present , being piqu'd , they are much out of humour ; taking it to be my duty to use all the effectual ways i can , lucrari fratres meos . i must confess , it is not fit that such high and abstruse points should be treated in english , in regard they transcend the fancies of the vulgar ; who are incompetent readers , much less judges , of such speculations ; but , since they have thus forc'd me to it , let the imprudence lie at their doors , if i treat somewhat largely , in our vulgar language ; of the main points which they strive to render so odious . . 't is to be noted , then , that the perfect distinction between corporeal and spiritual natures was formerly unknown to many , even of the antient fathers ; the doctrine of faith , ( only which was their concern , as fathers , ) abstracting from such particular questions , which belong to philosophical speculations : insomuch that joannes thessalonicensis , in the second nicene council , said , that the angels were , indeed , intelligibles , ( he means , intellectuales ; ) sed non omninò corporis expertes , verùm tenui corpore praediti , & aereo , sive igneo : that angels were not without a body , but had a thin body of air or fire . nay , this opinion of his was approv'd of by the council . and , which is yet more , he says , that catholica ecclesia sic sentit ; that is , 't is the sentiment of the catholick church : which shews , that this opinion was very universal . though it ought here to be observ'd , that he says not that the catholick church holds this as a doctrine of faith , or descended from christ and his apostles ; but only , that the church sic sentit ; that is , thinks or opines so . for , no wise man can doubt that the fathers , in council , being not only witnesses of the faith deliver'd from the fore-going church , which they propagate , and transmit to the following age , ( which gives them , properly , and formally , the denomination of fathers ; ) but , being also philosophers , and divines ; they do hence , sometimes , deliver themselves , ( tho' not in their decrees of faith ) as men endow'd with these later qualifications . . the reason which made so many holy men fall into that great errour , contradicted now by most of the divines of the christian church , was , because , the world not having yet arriv'd to that maturity of science as to get above fancy , and therefore not distinguishing perfectly those two sorts of substances , hence they were apt to take metaphorical texts of scripture , ( such as those generally are , where it speaks of spiritual natures , and their operations , ) to be meant dogmatically , and literally : nor , consequently , could they conceive otherwise , but that pure spirits were passive ; and therefore , of their own nature , mutable , by impressions on them , as bodies are ; and , consequently , matter being the only potential or passive principle , to have some materiality , or corporeity , in their natures . yet were not all the antient fathers thus weakly grounded : for , one of the antientest , tertullian , was more solid , and ( lib. de animâ , cap. . ) lays this for a kind of principle : [ incorporalitas nihil patitur , non habens per quod pati possit ; aut sihabet , hoc est corpus : in quantum enim omne corporale passibile est , in tantum omne quod passibile est , corporale est : an incorporeal ( that is , a spiritual ) thing cannot suffer ( from another agent , ) having nothing in it , by means of which it can suffer ; ( that is , having no matter in it , through which only those things , call'd bodies , are passive : ) or , if it have any such , it is a body ; since , for what reason every bodily thing is passive , for the same reason every thing that is passive , is corporeal . ] which principle , so perfectly consonant to the aristotelian doctrine , was , i believe , the reason why , speaking of those in the intermediate state , he says , non dimittetur nisi modico quoque delicto morâ resurrection is expenso : he shall not be pardon'd , till every little sin be paid for by the delay of the resurrection . nor is it hard to alledge many other antient fathers , of the same sentiment , whose works were never cenfured for it , nor their opinion condemn'd , but by such insignificant triflers as mer●y-man , and his fellow-banterer . . in process of time the christian schools embracing the categories of aristotle , which contain all our natural notions , reduc'd into heads ; which they also divided with more exactness than formerly ; men's thoughts grew to be more distinct , and clear , which , if well pursu'd , and held to , dispos'd their reason for demonstration . i dare affirm , the former words of tertullian do contain in them a metaphysical demonstration ; and i can as little doubt , but that ( their principles obliging them to it ) many others had held the same ; but that impressions from bodily substances , with which we perpetually converse , had so possess'd their fancies , that , tho' they might see it follow'd from their principles , yet they were startl'd at the conclusion ; and were afraid of the consequences which they fore-saw would ensue from such a position . as for my self , i shall content my self at present with producing one fingle demonstration , ( omitting many others ; ) which i the rather pitch upon , because i pretended it unanswerable ; and mr. le grand has undertaken to answer it . 't is this : . all created things are either divisible , or indivisible ; which two notions , as differences , divide the genus , or common head of ens , or thing , and constitute those two sorts or species of things , call'd body and spirit . therefore , these two kinds or species of things can agree only in the genus , or common notion of thing , and differ in every consideration else , and this contradictorily ; divisible and indivisible , which are their differences , being clearly contradictory to one another . wherefore , whatever is truly and properly affirm'd of the one , must be deny'd of the other : but , of that divisible thing , or substance , call'd body , it is truly affirm'd , that it is successive in its operations ; therefore , of an indivisible thing , or a pure spirit , ( such as an angel is , ) it must be deny'd that it is successive in its operations ; that is , it must be affirm'd of it , that it is unsuccessive , or instantaneous , in its operations ; and , consequently , all it can operate , is in an instant . whence follows , demonstratively , that it is immutable : for , since to be mutable , is , to have something in it , after another ; that is , to have part of what it is to have , after part ; and this belongs most manifestly to body ; the contradictory , or , to have all it is to have at once , must properly belong to a pure spirit , or an angel. again ; since an instant is an indivisible , and one indivisible added to another , cannot possibly make any greater quantity , length , or ( as we may say ) exporrection of duration ; or , ( which is the same , ) any duration corresponding to any least part of our time ; 't is manifest that angels can act as much in one instant , as , in two , or more ; their being more , not affording them longer leisure to consider , or resolve ; whence , they are never the worse accommodated to act thus in one instant , than in more . . the reason for this seemingly strange position is grounded ( as was now shewn ) on the essential differences of body and spirit ; and no less on the duration peculiar to angels , which divines call aeviternity ; which , being of a superiour nature to that of time , does comprehend and concentre in it self all the several differences of our fleeting time , and , after an eminent manner , includes , and is equivalent to them all : not by way of commensuration , ( which can onely be found among quantitative things , ) but by the excellency it has above them . so that , as when an angel operates upon any body of a vast extent , it is not diffus'd , or extended , according to the extent of the body it works upon ; but , by its own indivisible nature , produces that divisible effect : so neither are its indivisible operations , tho' they be equivalent to innumerable ones , which are done successively by us , perform'd by them successively , or one after another ; but , according as the nature of an angel requires , indivisibly , or instantaneously : yet , that instant , being equivalent to all our time here , contains in it thousands of priorities of nature ; nay , more , perhaps , than we can imagin ; by which , one of them may be conceiv'd by our reason to be originiz'd from another . for example ; we can truly conceive them to be , or to have their essence and existence ; and , consequently , to be naturally good , as they came from god's immediate hand , ere their own deprav'd will made them morally bad ; because , according to priority of nature or reason , being must antecede their operating , or making a wrong choice . also , for the same reason , we conceive them to know themselves , their own dignity , and man's inferiority ; that one of these men was to be set above them , be their head , and ador'd by them ; that they took thence , out of their selfish pride , an aeversion against god , as the orderer of it ; and envy against mankind , as their compepetitor ; and against our blessed saviour's humanity , as an usurper over them : that , hence , they inspir'd other angels to rebel ; that they contested with st. michael , and were foil'd by him , &c. as is explain'd more largely in my method to science , p. , , , &c. where i conclude thus : [ all these may be conceiv'd to have certain priorities of nature , as those causes have to their effects , which are in the same instant . so that this single instant of theirs , is , tho' not formally , yet virtually , and , in order to the many indivisible effects producible in it , as good as a long series of our time ; not by way of quantitative commensuration of one to the other , but by the eminency of the angelical duration , or their aeviternity , which is of a superiour nature to body , and , consequently , to bodily motion , or time ; and comprehends it all indivisibly , or instantaneously . ] . they who dislike this discourse of mine , ought , if they would confute me , to shew that i do not , in it , hold firmly to the nature of the thing , or subject , in dispute , and thence draw my argument ; but deviate from it : and , withall , they are to make it evident to the reader , that themselves do this , while they oppose me . but , i have the misfortune to have to do with such adversaries , who never in their lives dreamt of any such consideration ; or so much as thought of any such solid ground : they never attend to the nature of the subject we are discoursing of , nor heed the force of my arguments , or my premisses ; but manfully deny the conclusions ; deform them all they can ; and then , most learnedly oppose them with jests , jeers , and fulsome railing . but to return to the matter in hand : . lest any should think it impossible , so many several effects should be perform'd by an angel in one instant , and suspect it is some whimsie of my own head , i desire them to reflect on what st. thomas of aquin ( prima , q. . a. . ) positively asserts , or rather lays for a ground , viz. that the angels , by one act , and in the first instant , did merit . perhaps , i might here alledge , that , if in the first instant they could merit , or chuse god for their true last end , they might also , in the same instant , chuse a wrong last end , or demerit , and so be damn'd . but i need not press it so far here : i only desire we may consider how many distinct acts would pass in us , successively , ere we could be dispos'd for heaven ; which , in the old language of the church , is call'd meriting . several objects are propos'd to us , to chuse out of : then we consider , or compare them ; then we yield that this is more agreeable to us , ( thus affected , and circumstanc'd , ) than the other ; then we make choice of the one , and reject the other ; then we resolve to pursue it ; and , lastly , we set our selves to lay means to compass it , now , all these are , according to this great divine , perform'd by an angel , in one instant ; tho' there be evidently priority of nature or reason of the fore-going acts ; to the following ones : and , therefore , that the angels must necessarily , in the same instant , ( it being suppos'd by us the first , ) know their own nature , their existence , what is agreeable to that nature , and all the train of motives that conduce to the determination of their wills ; without which , there can be no merit . by which , mr. le grand ( who understands no more of those hard points , than a child does algebra ) may see they may have that which we call deliberation and determination in in the first instant , without needing succession of time to it , as he seems to imagine . nay , the same learned doctor affirms , that angels are happy by one only operation ; which includes , virtually , millions , nay , innumerable , of our knowledges . these are strange paradoxes to mr. le grand's merry man , and such men of fancy ; yet , we see this great and profound speculater asserts them for truths . . i know the same holy man holds the contrary opinion to that which , in this point , i think most reasonable ; nay , which , i see , follows out of the grounds lately mention'd , which himself had laid . for , if they may have so many operations in the first instant , ( subsequent to one another , in the order of nature , ) why not more ? what can stint them to such a precise number ? but , 't is to be noted , first , that in the place cited , ( q. . art. . corp . ) he affirms , with st. austin , that this opinion i follow does not induce the manichaean heresie , because it makes them not bad by their nature , but by the depravity of their own free-will : which evinces , there is nothing against faith in it ; nor would he have pass'd it over so unconcernedly , had it been so . next , speaking of the opinion i maintain , he says , quidam posuerunt , &c. some divines maintain'd , &c. which shews , that there have been divers learned men of that opinion formerly . thirdly , he confutes those who gave this for their reason why it was impossible , because two operations could not be terminated in the same instant ; and tells them , that this reason holds only in those agents which work by local motion ; but , that it may well be thus in operations which are instantaneous ; and , that in these , there may be , in one instant , the terminus of the first and second operations . lastly , the reason for which only that great man dissents from those who held our opinion , is grounded on that maxim of aristotle , that the generans , or he that gives being , gives also the first operation ; which , in the devils being sinful , cannot therefore be in the first instant ; lest it should make god the author of sin. which reason does not convince me , or seem to conclude . for , first , however this may hold in natural agents , for which only aristotle did certainly intend it as a maxim ; yet , i see not how the parity holds in those agents which have free-will ; for , the operations of such agents are not purely refunded into god , but partly into themselves , who are the producers of them ; nay , wholly , as far as they are defective . secondly , the first natural operation of an intellectual creature , is , to know her own essence , at least ( in souls ) their own existence ; and , by them , all other things which may be known by it , according as its nature and circumstances require ; and this is given her by the first cause , who gave them their natures . but , there are many other operations , subsequent to one another in posteriority of nature , ( as is explain'd above , ) which may be all perform'd in the first instant , as st. thomas himself , above-cited , has declar'd ; and , among them , the choice made by their free-will : nor does any reason appear , why all these thus subsequent operations should be ingenerated in them , by the giver of their being ; much less , why those defective operations , which have a natural dependence on others , should be refunded into god. . let us pass on now to souls separated , which die with some venial impurity in them , or ( as st. james calls it ) with sins not unto death , and therefore need purging ; nor can be sav'd , but by fire . mr. le grand puts it upon me , that i hold them immutable in their intermediate state , as angels are . i would ask him , how he knows i hold that opinion , since i have never declar'd in my writings that i hold it . wherefore , the putting it upon me , who no where assert it , is unfair , uncivil , captious , and invidious . i have shewn , indeed , ( id. cart. p. . ) that his arguments against it , do not conclude . so did st. thomas , in the place now cited , oppose the inconclusiveness of the reason brought against his own opinion ; and , yet , himself held that opinion of his notwithstanding . he will say , the same argument concludes equally for angels and them : but he will be hard put to it , to prove it . the soul had its being , by reason of the dispositions in the embryo , requiring such a form as nature could not give . it is the form of the body , and naturally requires , to act with it . it had its education ( as we may say ) in the body ; for it receiv'd its spiritual growth in knowledge , by means of bodily impressions on the senses . it is unactive when the body is out of order . it has naturally a dear love for it ; procures its good , grieves when it is hurt , and has a kind of horrour to part with it . nay , it retains a hankering after it , after it has parted with it ; insomuch , that even the greatest saints have not the perfect consummation of their bliss , till they get their bodies again at the resurrection ; and , magis est anima ubi amat quàm ubi animat . lastly , those imperfect souls carry some bodily affections along with them . hence , f. seraphinus caponi , in his elucidationes formales , q . art. . says , the soul is always united to the body , vel actu , vel inclinatione naturali ; either actually , or by its natural inclination : and he gives for his reason , aut ergo aptitudine saltem unitur tali materiae , aut non est anima ; sed semper est anima , ergo , &c. either the soul then is , by her aptitude at least , united to the body , or it is not a soul : but it remains always a soul , &c. the contrary to all which particulars is found in an angel. now , what connatural dispositions to mutability these considerations may give to a soul , rather than to an angel , i have not speculated so deep upon that point , as to determine ; which made me pitch upon an angel , rather than a soul , when i advanc'd that demonstration . and , had i spoke of a soul expresly , own'd its immutability as my tenet , and gone about to defend it , i do not doubt but so to explain my sentiment in that point , as will give no offence to any sober man , nor any who is not resolved to remain unsatisfy'd . . the next pretended bug-bear , is , the impossibility of annihilation ; which i prove thus : . . every cause acts according as it is , or according to its nature ; at least , it cannot act contradictorily to its own essence . but annihilation is the putting of nothing , or not-being ; which is diametrically opposite to god's nature , which is pure existence : therefore annihilation cannot be caus'd by god. . . every active power , ( as omnipotence is , ) even tho' infinite , is for some action : but annihilation is no action ; therefore it cannot proceed from god's omnipotence . that annihilation is no action , i prove thus : that which is no species , or no sort of action , is no action : but annihilation is no kind , or sort , of action ; for , every scholar knows that every action is of such a determinate kind , because its terminus , or effect , is such or such ; whereas , nothing is no effect at all , much less a determinate one ; but , in every imaginable respect , a defect , and indeterminate . therefore , annihilation is no action ; nor , consequently , can it be perform'd by an active power , as omnipotence is ; and , therefore , it argues no power at all ; and , which follows , 't is rather an impotency , or want of active power , than omnipotence ; because that active power which can have no such action proceeding from it ; or , ( which is the same , ) an active power which cannot vvork or act , is so far impotent ; which cannot be said of god's omnipotence . . . to be creator of all things , or giver of being , is ( as our creed teaches ) one of god's attributes : but it is unheard of , that to be uncreator , or destroyer , of things , was ever attributed to god ; or , that contradictory attributes could be peculiarly appropriated to him ; as my adversaries hold there can , while they deny both creating , and uncreating , or annihilating , to be possible to any , but to god ; that is , peculiar to him . . it will be said , that annihilation is perform'd by suspension of god's positive action of creating , or giving being . but this seems more unconsonant than the former : for , . . suspension ( if it have any sense ) means , the action of suspending ; especially , being put by them to be only performable by god's omnipotence , which is an active power ; and this action must have its effect upon that which is suspended , making it , of not-suspended , to become suspended ; that is , chang'd . but , that which is here suspended , is god's power of giving being . wherefore , this tenet of suspension puts a kind of passive power in god , receiving this action , or effect of suspension ; which makes him , who is essentially immutable , to be mutable ; neither of which themselves will say . . . that actuality is not infinite , which is not actually exercis'd , or produces not actually the effect peculiar to it , when the subject is dispos'd to receive its influence , and it self is intimately apply'd to it . but the ens , or thing , suppos'd to be annihilated , was equally dispos'd , or capable to be , in the instant it is suppos'd to be annihilated , as it was before ; and the cause , by god's omnipresence , was intimately apply'd , and yet the effect , or being , was not put ; therefore the cause it self was not infinitely actual , as it was before ; which is impossible to be thought . note , that to an infinite actuality , it is requisite , and necessary , that it be ( all other requisites being put ) actually exercis'd ; for , actual exercise being the most formal notion of pure actuality , it follows , that it is not infinite if it be stinted , or fails precisely on its part , of being exercis'd , when all other requisites are put . . . the same may be deduc'd from god's . infinite goodness ; which consists in his being ( as far as is of it self ) communicative of goodness and being when the subject is capable , and his wisdom sees it best ; by which only it is stinted . this is so certain a truth , that , in such cases , ( as divines shew , ) even in supernaturals , 't is the incapacity of wicked souls , putting an obstacle to the ever-ready influence of heavenly grace , that suspends it from working in such corrupt and indispos'd hearts : whence , as soon as , by their sincere repentance , that obstacle is taken off , they receive again the supernatural influence of the holy ghost , and the gift of divine love. and this is so constant a doctrine of the church , that never did the most sceptical divine question or fancy that it could become god's goodness to suspend the influence of grace to such penitents ; but rather , they oft-times receive it in a greater measure , according to that saying of our saviour , ( luke . . ) cui minus dimittitur , minùs diligit : he to whom less is forgiven , loves less . whence also , upon their hearty repentance , ( which includes a will to do what god and his church enjoin , ) the officers of the church are bound to absolve them , or admit them to the participation of the sacrament of love ; by which they are spiritually restor'd to the communion of christ's true members , vertuous souls . hence i argue : the creature suppos'd to be annihilated , was equally capable to receive being at the instant in which 't is suppos'd to be annihilated , as before ; and god's exuberant and infinite goodness cannot but be equally ready to communicate goodness , or being , to his poor , indigent creatures , as it was formerly ; therefore , the same effect , or continuation of being , must follow ; and , consequently , there can be no annihilation . . the same is deduc'd from that supreamly wise saying , grounded on god's infinite actuality , and goodness , [ dona dei sunt absque paenitentia : the gifts of god are without repentance . ] which signifies , that , let not the creature change , and god is still immutably the same ; and so , the same effect must still follow . nay , the diversity of the divine attributes that respect us , is wholly grounded on the various disposition of the creatures . so that the same ill accidents are mercies to good souls , and serve to try , purifie , and improve them in vertue , and thence , increase their reward in heaven ; which , to obstinately wicked souls , who are not dispos'd to make good use of them , is truly call'd an effect of his justice ; vexing them here by comfortless irresignation , and sinful repining at god's chastisement ; and , so , tending to increase their torments in the next world. wherefore , as was said , by parity , the disposition of the creature being the same , and god being unchangeably the same also , the same effect will follow : nor can it be , that any creature should be annihilated . . the same is evinc'd from god's attribute of vvisdom , or knowledge , by which he made the world. to understand the following discourse , we are to reflect upon that admirably profound saying of st. austin , ( conf. cap. ult . ) nos itaque quae fecisti videmus , quia sunt ; tu autem quia vides ea , sunt : vve see ( or know ) creatures , because they are ; but thy seeing ( or knowing ) them , is the cause , or reason , that they are . which amounts to this , that god gains not his knowledge of creatures from their being so as he sees them to be , as we do ; but his seeing , or knowing , them to be fit for the best order of the world , which his infinite wisdom had determin'd , gives , or makes , them to be . by which metaphysical , or rather divine maxim of this learned and holy father , it follows , that god leaves off to know a creature at the instant it is annihilated : and , consequently , since this knowledge of his is not taken from the existence of the creature , ( which is extrinsecal to him , ) nor depends on it , but on himself ; it should follow , that god , by annihilating a creature , becomes intrinsecally chang'd ; which is impossible . . the same is prov'd from god's attribute of justice . for , if any one creature can be annihilated , all of them may ; since 't is granted by both parties , that they do , all of them , entirely and equally depend on the divine goodness , for their existence . let us put then two souls to be annihilated ; the one of which , by loving god heartily , is , at the hour of death , perfectly dispos'd for its glorious reward in heaven : the other dies obstinately , and devilishly wicked : it is manifest , that neither that holy soul will ever be rewarded , nor the vvicked one punish'd , in case they be annihilated . but , this is against god's justice ; therefore it cannot be done . . in a word ; let them explicate suspension as they will , and assign it for the cause of annihilation , it makes god the cause of no effect ; that is , to be no cause , which destroys their own position : nay , it makes him the cause of the worst defect imaginable ; or rather , of pure defect ; for , nothing , or not-being , is such ; to put which upon god , who is pure actuality , and , therefore , a cause ( as far as concerns himself ) ever actually working , is ( to speak with the least ) a strange tenet . if they mean only to say , that creatures depend every moment on god , for their being ; or , that , if , per impossibile , he should suspend his acting , they would no longer be , i do heartily agree with them ; for this is agreeable both to the self-existence of god , and the nothingness of creatures , of themselves : but , if they contend it is an act of his power , or omnipotence , ( the notion of which is manifestly relative to its effects , that is active , or effective of something , ) actually to execute this , or , that it consists with his divine attributes ; they must bring very strong arguments to prove it , ere i shall think fit to yield it ; whereas , hitherto they have brought none at all , but merry-man's silly explication of a glass falling down , and breaking , if he takes away his hand ; which the weak fop thinks is a rare argument : whereas , it is demonstrable in physicks , that the glass would stand for eternity where his hand left it , if there were no positive action of a cause impelling it downwards , viz. ( the descent of the atmosphere ; ) which kind of positive action is here wanting . . they will object , that god is a free agent , and so may chuse whether he will sustain creatures in being , or no. but those weak divines take the notion of freedom from the folly of creatures ; which is this , that we can , out of humour , do , and undo things at our pleasure , whether it agrees with true reason , which is our nature , or no. whereas , true freedom does not consist in a foolish humoursomeness , or in the doing and undoing things , as the toy takes us ; but in this , that , unforc'd , and unconstrain'd , by any thing which is without us , we determin our selves according to the inclination of our true nature , reason ; and , when we do otherwise , we are less free ; or slaves to some passion which impels us , and makes us deviate from the propensions we have by our true nature , to do what is rational . wherefore , god's freedom consists in this , that he is essentially self-determin'd to act according to his own nature , and to his own attributes , which are essential to his nature . since , then , it has been shewn , that to give being is agreeable to god's essence , which is self-existence , and to his attributes , he is more free for his being thus self determin'd to give being to such creatures as his wisdom sees fittest for the best order of his world ; and , that , to do otherwise , or to annihilate , is to be less free , because it is less according to his essence , and attributes ; which is , not to be every way perfect , and infinitely such . . i must confess , it seems very indecent , and shocking , to pious ears , to say that god cannot do this , or cannot do the other : but the school-men , in their disputes , first brought that expression into custom ; and , tho' , following them , i have sometimes us'd it , yet i have endeavour'd to soften and explicate it so , as it may not breed any offence . hence , in my method , pag. . i have these words , [ it is generally more safe , more edifying , and more proper , to say , in such cases , [ it cannot be that god should will such a thing . ] than bluntly to say [ god cannot do it : ] for , this flatly limits omnipotence ; that only restrains its acting hîc & nunc , because of some attribute of the divine nature , to which it is disagreeable . ] hence , also , i affirm , ( id. cartes . p. . ) that it sounds the same among philosophers , to say , [ god cannot do it , ] as to say , [ the thing is a contradiction , or impossible : ] possibility being the object of all power , even tho' infinite . ] and , to render it still the more inoffensive , and to prevent all cavil against my doctrine , i added ; [ when philosophers affirm any thing is possible , or impossible , they regard only the present state of the world , and the order of second causes . ] so that this phrase , according to my doctrine , amounts to no more but this ; that it is beyond the power of second causes , as carry'd on by god's ordinary providence , to effect it ; as i have also explain'd my self , in my method , long ago , in the place lately cited . which innocent and common doctrine my maligners do character to be , the running down all piety , religion , and god himself : which shews , their dregs of common sense run very low , though their malice flies the highest pitch of slander , and calumny . to finish this discourse , let them bring solid arguments to prove annihilation agreeable to god's self-existence , his pure actuality , and the rest of his attributes ; and they shall see how readily i will embrace their otherwise-groundless opinion . but , alas poor triflers ! they never set themselves to bring any demonstrative or conclusive argument , either pro , or con , in their lives . they talk big , and , perhaps , sprinkle their assertion with some slight , insignificant explication , or untoward parallels ; and supply the defect of reasoning , with jeering , and railing against what either their short capacities do not reach to understand , or their resolute insincerity will not let them acknowledge , tho' they know it . . but , now comes an objection of weight : spondanus tells us , ( he says , ) that it was one of wickleff 's errours , condemn'd in the general council of constance , by a perpetual decree , that god could not annihilate . this looks great , and mighty . but , why does he not relate this perpetual decree of the council , in its own words , if there be any such ? is not the council it self extant ? or , is spondanus's relating it more authentick than the words of the council it self ? why does he not tell us then , out of the acts of the council , in what sense , and under what terms , wickleff propos'd it : in what words , and in what sense , that council condemn'd it ? or , whether it were more express than that of joannes thessalonicensis , in the second council of nice , that 't is the sentiment of the church , ( that is , the general opinion , ) that angels have thin bodies of air , or fire ? the contrary to which , for all that , the best catholick divines do now publickly teach . lastly , if this be a point of faith , ( as they would have it thought , ) why is not this press'd home against me ? this would knock me down at one blow ; and there would need no paltry jeers , flouts , or falsifications , to do that job , which is their only aim . the reader may be sure they are conscious there is some great flaw in this objection , that they are so favourable to me , in thus barely and crudely alledging it . but , what is all this to me ? it is a common doctrine , taught openly in the schools , that this is not performable by god's ordinary power ; and , i have already shewn , out of express words , both in my method ; and in my later books , that i speak of no other power . so that , either i am no wickleffist for maintaining it ; or , i have enow of very honest brother-hereticks ; who maintain publickly the same , and , yet , are not ill look'd upon for it by the church : which being manifestly so , it would be worth our consideration to find the reason , why our libelling merry-man , whose ironies are sarcasms ; and , who pretends mirth , to cloak his uneasie malice , does let all those divines alone who hold the same that i do , and fall upon me only . but those men had not challeng'd the cartesians to produce principles for their new-fangl'd doctrine ; in which consists my peculiar heresie , which blows their zeal for faith into such a flame . . i wish the cartesians , who make the soul and body two things , because they are two distinct natures , could as well clear themselves of speaking inconsequently in matters belonging to faith , as i have done : for , by making them two things , and , consequently , individual things , each of those things must have its peculiar determinations , modes , or complexion of accidents , constituting it an individual thing , which are sustained by those things , as their subject ; which is the very notion of a suppositum . there are therefore , and must be , two supposita in christ , as long as those two natures remain in his humanity ; that is , for ever . to which , add the divine suppositum , it must follow , that there are three supposita in christ ; which shocks christian faith. to those , mr. le grand has given no satisfactory answer ; nor can , unless he distinguishes the nature from the suppositum ; which , if he does , then the suppositum of every man may have two natures in it ; and so , the soul and body may compound one ens , or one thing : and , then , since 't is impossible , and contradictory , they can be one and two in the same respect , or under the same notion , it will follow , that man need be no more than one thing . they will , perhaps , say , they are one compound thing ; but two simple ones , or two parts of that compound : but i have taken off , and shewn , the weakness of that distinction , id. cart. from p. . to p. . and shewn , that an ens , or thing , is , that which is capable of existing : wherefore , each of those we call parts , if they be things , are capable of existing alone , when separated ; which cannot be be true of the body , which is a distinct thing when separated , ( viz. a dead carcass , ) and not the same thing , with the same nature , much less the same existence it had : nay , a compleat thing too ; because , that is compleatly a thing , which wants nothing to make it capable of existing ; and , if it wants that , it is not a thing at all . but , what enforces farther , this objection is , that 't is defin'd in the council of vienna , under pope clement v. that the rational or intellectual soul is the form of the body . the words are these ; [ doctrinam omnem seu positionem , temerè asserentem autvertentem in dubium quòd substantia animae rationalis seu intellectualis verè ac perfectè humani corporis non sit forma , velut erroneam , ac veritati christianae fidei inimicam , hoc sacro approbante consilio , reprobamus . definientes , ut cunctis not a sit sincerae fidei veritas , quòd quisquam deinceps asserere , defendere aut tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit , quòd anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se & essentialiter , tanquam haeretious sit censendus . here we see all those condemn'd for hereticks , who say , or hold , that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body ; and , that the opinion it self is stigmatiz'd with the brand of being an enemy ( that is , destructive , or pernicious ) to the truth of christian faith. now , if the soul be the form of the body , then the body is the matter of that form ; and then , let all the divines in god's church judge , whether the matter and form can be two things , since they all hold , that the matter and form make up one thing . did ever any solid man hold , that the matter or form either , singly consider'd , are things , or any thing else than parts of a thing ? or , can we think that those definers meant by the ward [ form. ] the same that is meant by the word [ thing ? ] whenas , all the learned world , before cartesius's time , held , that the form was no more but that actuating or determining part which , by informing the matter , constituted the thing . the cartesians will tell us , that it informs the matter , according to the notion of action : but the council has fore-stall'd that evasion , as if it had fore-seen it , by the word [ essentialiter ; ] by which signal and cautious expression , it declares it to be heresie , to say , it does not essentially inform the body , or according to the notion of ens , or thing , ( and not activè , or co-activè , only ; ) that is , it makes the matter become humanum corpus , and homo to be one ens , or thing , ( to use st. athanasius's words ) ex animâ rationali & humanâ carne subsistens . i do not here accuse the intention of the cartesians ; but i see plainly , that their new notions , or ideas , will never agree with the explications which former divines make of christian faith ; much less , help them with better ; or , indeed , with any . but , to return to our subject : . let us sum up this tenet of theirs , concerning annihilation , and see what work they have made of it , according to the lights nature and art , working upon our natural notions , have given us . first , they make it belong to god's omnipotency , for which attribute alone they seem zealous ; for , i do not see that , in discoursing this point , they even think of , or regard , his self-existence , which is his essence , or his goodness , his justice , or any other attribute of his ; or pretend , in the least , it is agreeable to them . now , omnipotency is a power of doing all things ; and they would make it a power of not-doing , or of doing nothing , as to the things annihilated , to which only it relates . . omnipotency is an infinite power , and withall , an active power , ( for , i do not think they will put a passive power in god : ) and , every active power is essentially such , because it can have such an action . yet , mr. le grand , in his preface , p. . seems to grant , that annihilation is not the action of any power ; nor , indeed , such a power ; they being , as i alledg'd , specify'd by their objects : to which he answers , rectissimè ! so that here we have an active power working , without an action answering to it ; or an omnipotent power , ( to which they ascribe that effect , ) which may be deny'd to be such a power ; or , ( which is the same , ) he makes that a power , which is no power . . they say , 't is done by suspension : well then ; this belonging , as they say , to god's omnipotency , which is an active power , this suspension must , for the reason given , be an action . no , say they ; 't is no action , but a cessation from action . now , that not acting should belong to omnipotency ; or , that the action of suspending his power , should be an action of that power , gives us a second bull of the largest size . . suspension must either have some effect , or no effect : if none , 't is to no purpose ; if any , it must be in god ; for , 't is his power that acted before , and is now suspended : but , this puts a passive power in god ; which is a higher strain of nonsense , than either of the former . no , say they ; the effect is upon the creature annihilated ; but this is as nonsensical as the former ; for , common sense tells us , that suspension has its proper effect upon that which is suspended , which is god's conservative action : nor is the existence of the creature , in good sense , suspended ; for , that which is only suspended , remains still , tho' in suspense ; whereas , the creature remains not at all , being annihilated . yet , grant the existence of the creature could be said to be suspended ; still , god's conservative action , which made it be , must , in priority of nature , be suspended it self , ere its existence could be suspended , or it self cease to be . but , waving this , let us see where this effect is , which terminates this action of suspension . in the creature , say they : and , what can we conceive to be in the creature when it is annihilated , which is the effect of this action , and terminates it ? why , to become nothing . now , nothing , or not-being , is a pure defect ; nay , infinitely , or in every imaginable regard , defective ; and so can be no effect , for this has something positive in its notion . the last thing , therefore , they can possibly alledge , is , that suspension is no action . for answer to which , we must turn them over to school boys , who can tell them , that suspendo is a verb active , has a transitive signification , and must have an accusative case after it . the question , then , is , what is this accusative case ? or ( which is the same , ) what is this thing which is suspended ? which we have already shewn , can with no sense either be god , or the creature ; that is , nothing is suspended ; and , therefore , this suspension is no suspension . so that , which way soever they turn and wind themselves , their own contradictions still meet them in the face , and confound them . and so much of this point , which is only therefore scandalous , because 't is unsutable to fancy ; that faculty , which , if solely attended to , leads all its followers into folly and nonsense . . another impiety of mine against god , is , that i will not allow that thesis of cartesius , ( for , we are to suppose , that all his conceits , tho' never so groundless , are gospel with these men , ) that god is the immediate cause of motion ; the denial of which does ravel the scheme of that hypothesis . hence mr. le grand infers , that i deny god to be the first mover : whereas , ( so short is his reasoning faculty , ) the direct contrary follows : for , he who only denies that god is the immediate cause of motion , does , even by doing this , imply that he is the mediate , remote and principal cause of it ; as giving angels , his ministring spirits , both the power to move matter ; and , withal , moving them to move it , by spiritual motives , or manifestations , of the wise decrees of his divine providence , how he would have it done . thus , all instrumental causes are the immediate causes of every effect in nature . will he say , that this is impiety against god ; or , that it debars him from being the principal cause ! does not fire immediately burn us ? water wet us ? or , will any but a mad-man say , that god is the immediate cause of that burning , or wetting ? or , that this hinders him from being the principal cause of all the effects in nature , who gives them power to produce those effects , and premoves or applies them to produce them ? does not the denial of this make all second causes useless ? how shallow , then , is this ridiculous objection ! wherefore , let them either shew that angels , which are of a superiour nature to matter , and are pure acts , have not power to act upon it , or move it ; or , that it becomes the sublimeness of the divine majesty , to put his immediate hand to such mean and low effects that his servants have a power to produce them ; or , that this power was given them by him , to remain useless , and unemploy'd about its proper objects : or , let them grant that angels , or ( which is the same ) god , by his angels , gives motion to matter . again , to omit many other arguments ; that which god does immediately by second causes , is according to nature ; but , what he does immediately by himself , is miraculous , and instantaneous , as coming from an activity , whose infinite power no indisposition on the creature 's side can check , and retard . did god move matter , when ( as they hold ) he divided it into greater lumps at first , instantaneously ; whenas , it is not motion , unless it have part after part ; or , unless it be successive ? would these men but please to leave guiding their thoughts by the hasty sallies of their fancy , and regard deliberately the natures of the things we are discoursing of , that is , the nature of god , who is pure self-existence ; the nature of an angel , and the nature of matter , and build their discourses from those grounds , we might hope , in time , for some sense from them : but that is too solid for them ; it will not give their fancy leave to range , and take vagaries in the air , but holds them in too strictly ; and , therefore , 't is not their way . yet , something must be said ; and , therefore , ill language must supply the place of sense and solidity . . but , gentlemen , to what end were all these objections huddl'd together , in their preface , and dialogue ? these theses are ( except this last ) altogether foreign to what i oppos'd , and prov'd against cartesius and mr. le grand . what is annihilation to cartesius's method to find out first principles , by denying the certainty of all his senses ? or , what is the immutability of a pure spirit , to the unaccountable constitution of cartesius's first matter , which grounds all his physicks ; which they put neither to be dense , nor rare ; hard , nor soft ; rough , nor smooth ; solid , nor fluid ; moist , nor dry ? &c. again ; if they would needs be meddling with impertinent questions , why were the reasons for them suppress'd , the conclusions themselves most learnedly deny'd ; and , this done , a black mark set upon them , at the pleasure of the painter ? who sees not that this odd prevarication , and untoward management of it , does evidently bewray a distrust of their cause , and a perfect despair of maintaining it ? who sees not , that , by their flinching thus from the question , and haling in impertinent points , which were odd to vulgar fancies , and were deny'd by other divines , they hop'd ( to save their own bacon ) to get those men on their side , to make use of their arguments , and of their ( miscalled ) authority , to decry me , because they wanted arguments of their own , to uphold the cartesian doctrine ? lastly , what is their scurrilous dialogue , to their producing , or so much as naming , any one principle of theirs ; to do which , i had challeng'd them ? or , why should this exasperate them to a raving extasie of railing ? let them take their own new method , unheard of amongst learned men , hitherto : who can hinder them ? but , if their passion have but left them one single grain of prudence , they cannot but see that all civil men will hate their abusiveness ; all good men , their malice ; and all learned men , their folly and ignorance . . but , to take off the edge , and blunt the teeth of all their reproachful calumnies , i have shewn , above § . . that what they object to me , if they will but truly represent my doctrine , can dissatisfie no sober man , even of their own party ; since , in the three first points , which their confus'd and undistinguishing anger strives to render so invidious , i speak of god's ordinary power , or , of the course of causes , and the nature of things , as they come to our knowledge by natural means , and are carry'd on by god's ordinary providence . what philosopher , but a mad-man , will say , he can fathom and comprehend all the supernatural methods and ways which god's infinite wisdom can contrive , or his almighty power execute , when he shall please to work miraculously ? he who is the original cause of those natures , cannot he order them as he pleases , when his wisdom , for reasons inscrutable to the greatest of his creatures , sees it fit , to bring about those hidden ends design'd by his divine decrees ? who can say , that , tho' angels have no means to acquire new knowledges , and so ought , by their nature , to have all the knowledge they are capable of , infus'd into them at first ; yet , that god , acting miraculously , cannot detain some light from an angel , and communicate it to him ( as we conceive ) afterwards ? who can say that god , if he pleases to alter the course and nature of things , or to order the circumstances of the next world , by ways unknowable by us , cannot , by his miraculous power , effect , that imperfect souls may be releas'd from the chains of their captive state , and be reciev'd into heaven before the last day ? or , who dares contend , that his divine goodness , that oft-times does stupendious miracles for the prayers of one single saint on earth , will not do miracles , and this frequently , for the prayers of his spouse , the church ! once more i do earnestly beg of mr. le grand , it may be consider'd , that all our science is built on the nature of things , as they are in themselves , and govern'd by god's ordinary power : 't is beyond the skill and sphere of philosophy , even to guess at how many miracles may be wrought upon the very least thing in nature : nor did any man , i know of , ever pretend to determine any such point ; and i cannot but think it some kind of neglect in them , not to declare as much . miracle is beyond all humane science ; ecce , devs vincens scientiam nostram ! ( job , ch . . . ) which being my present sentiment , and having ever been so ; and , that philosophers have nothing at all to do with the subjects they treat of , as standing under god's power working supernaturally , and miraculously ; 't is manifest , that all the expressions i have any where , do still relate to his ordinary power only ; nor can they be meant , or wrested by malice it self , to be meant , of any other : and , tho' i may seem , in some extravagant case , to doubt , because a power that never acted , seem'd useless , and , so , was not an attribute befitting god ; yet , i no where assert that annihilation is impossible to god's miraculous power . indeed , in case it be really against god's attributes , i should not stick at all to say , it is beyond miracle ; yet , i no where maintain , that infinite wisdom may not miraculously contrive it so , if it sees it fitting to be done , that it may not be against his attributes ; tho' things being left in their natural condition , it may truly be concluded to be opposite to god's attributes administring the world after the ordinary methods of providence : which being so ; and , that i , as a philosopher , speak of god's ordinary power only ; what is become of all their calumnies , of which they are so lavish ? why is my foot cloven ? why did none but his devil set me on writing ? why do i run down all piety , religion , and god himself ; as merry-andrew , their buffoon , in his hurry of calumny , would assure his reader , if any regarded him ? . convicted thus of rallying me so severely , and without the least occasion , or ground , since i say no more than other divines in the schools do , without any control , maintain publickly ; perhaps they may , for their excuse , pretend very charitably , that they are heartily glad they have prevail'd with me , at length , to be a good christian ; and exult , ( as their fellow-libeller , lominus , did , ) that they have brought me , with much ado , to retract my unwarrantable opinions . but , i am their humble servant , and beg their pardon ; i have not seen one argument of theirs , as yet , that could bring a man , endow'd with common reason , to retract ; no , nor hold any thing ; but to be a sceptick , and apprehend there is no certainty in the world , seeing men , who , as appears by their carriage , are mighty ambitious to be held men of knowledge , produce neither principles to ground their discourse , nor connexion , to make the parts of it hang together . what my sentiment was formerly , as to this point , i have told them often , ere this , ( in my d . cartes . p. . ) where i say , first , idem sonat apud philosophos , &c. it signifies the same among philosophers , ( especially scholasticks , ) to say , [ god cannot do such a thing ; ] as to say , [ it is impossible to be done . ] next , that , when philosophers pronounce any thing to be possible , or impossible , they have respect only to the present state of the world , and the order of second causes . thirdly , that , therefore , a thing may be contradictory , and impossible , according to the ordinary course of the world , or to the natures of things , by which god , according to his ordinary providence , governs the world ; which , yet , according to his supernatural and miraculous power , by which he subdues all things to himself , are possible . of which , i there brought divers instances . . perhaps too , they will say , that , by this doctrine i abandon and give up all my demonstrations ; and leave them to shift for themselves , or confess them to be false . i answer ; not one jot : for , all science regards its objects only as they stand in nature , and not under god's miraculous power , which orders or alters the natures of things as he sees fit . thus , one perfectly skilful in the science of physicks , might demonstrate , that it was impossible a virgin should conceive ; or , that clay , temper'd with spittle , should cure blindness ; yet , by god's miraculous power , both were done : thus , a speculative and learned metaphysician , before the incarnation was reveal'd to the world , might have brought most clear demonstrations from his altissimae causae , and the nature of god , that it was impossible god should be chang'd , suffer , or die ; ( which , amongst other things , made the greeks esteem christianity foolishness ; ) yet , god's infinite and miraculous wisdom and goodness could contrive a way , how all those propositions might be verify'd . which will make it less wonderful to us , that he can , if he sees fit , find ways enow , which surmount our guess , or imagination , how a pure spirit may change ; souls in the intermediate state be deliver'd , or a creature annihilated , if his incomprehensible wisdom sees it fit . whoever reflects seriously on those powerful and emphatical words , [ ecce , nova facio omnia , apoc. . . ] spoken by the great restorer of the world , and promoter of all creatures , and , amongst the rest , glorify'd bodies , to their utmost perfection , in their future and eternal state , will find in them matter enough of contemplation ; and easily apprehend that their condition will be so alter'd for the best , that , to our low conceits and notions we have of them now , it would seem impossible for them to be such as we shall find them then . indeed , i have not expresly put this distinction formerly , because it was not necessary , nothing of that kind being then objected to me ; yet , i had done this equivalently , and in other terms , by telling mr. le grand , ( id. cartes . p. . ) that , when philosophers affirm any thing to be possible , or impossible , they regard the present state of the world , and the order of second causes . and , he is aware of it ; for , in his censure , p. . he would wave that distinction , and seems willing to deny it ; yet , is forc'd to admit it , by his recurring to potentia obedientialis in creatures ; which is the same i express'd by quâ naturas rerum sibi subdit . but , to fix his cavil upon me , he tells us , that the question is not , quid philosophi pronuntiant ; sed , quid ille statuit : and , i do statuere , it cannot be done by god's ordinary power ; and , that all the notions we have of god , and his attributes , by natural means , and acquir'd learning , ( or philosophy , ) seem opposit to it : but , i hold , notwithstanding , that , if god's wisdom sees fit it should be done , the same wisdom can contrive ways how it may be done unknowable , nay , not possible to be gues'd at , by our unelevated , and infinitely short natural reason inform'd by the lights we have of him from creatures ; and that , what his infinite vvisdom sees fit , and his vvill ordains , his power can execute . which is what ( applying my words to this particular ) i call potentia miraculosa , or extraordinaria . nor do i any where say , that god's wisdom , if he sees it fit , cannot bring it about that it may be done , and yet , not be prejudicial , or contrary to any of those attributes , from which , as far as known to us by ordinary means , i , as a philosopher , ought to argue . and , it would be a madness in either of us , to maintain , that god's power is not beyond our foolish philosophy , or the reach of knowledge , which ordinary means can afford us . . i do not doubt , but it will be deny'd by my adversaries , that they have been so wanting to their cause , as to maintain it only by bantering , and railing : they will say , ( for , what will they not say , if saying would do their business ? ) that they have produc'd arguments to prove their doctrine , and have invalidated all mine . but , i deny that mr. le grand has , in his censura , even so much as given an answer to any one of my demonstrations ; unlese he thinks it is answer sufficient to call them ( as he does in his epistle to the reader ) cavils ; and to tell him , according tò his way of saying any thing , that he has , satis abundè , reply'd to them . i must , i say , absolutely contest against him , that he has not produc'd any one conclusive proof for any one tenet of his own , nor given any one solution to any one argument of mine , where i pretend to demonstrate , as i do frequently . i know he mentions some words pick'd out of them , and reflects on them with jeers , or jests ; but , when he should come seriously to a close discourse with them , and either admit or confute the connexion in which the force of them consists , he is in a hurry , and hast , to be gone to another business ; ( for , his whole method here , is a vvild and distracted leaping from one thing to another ; ) and so , he fairly takes a short leave of them , and away he is vanish'd . so that the frame of his discourse seems to be made up of little else but transitions . and , as for his proofs , he thinks it is enough to say a thing ; and , 't is a favòur to the reader , now , if he bestows so much as a slight explication of any point ; of which , formerly , he was more free . he sometimes cites my words at large , even a whole page together ; so that one would verily think he meant fully to confute me ; but the reader may easily see , it was only to make a shew , and swell his small performances to the just size of a treatise : for , if we set aside the sarcasms , ironies , sought phrases , quaint expressions , pretty curiosities and observations , ( to shew how profound a man he is at note-book-learning ; ) if we set aside these , with his angry words , and what he transcribes out of me , and others ; and his medly of little indifferent nothings , which do not signifie any thing , either pro , or con ; and , look for what only should be expected from a philosopher . viz. connected sense , grounded on principles ; and then go about to cast up the account of them , the total summ would amount to nothing but a long row of ciphers . mediums fit for demonstration , or any thing that , even , savours of true logick , are such strangers to his loose talk , that the solid sense in it might be compriz'd in a nut-shell ; as will more amply appear hereafter . . to give farther satisfaction , and , perhaps , some benefit to the reader , i will instance in one demonstration of mine ; and shew how empty mr. le grand's pretence is , that he has ( as he phrases it , ) abundè satis , answer'd my arguments ; and , how frivolous it would be in me , to lay open his incredible weakness in the rest of his imaginary solutions of my other demonstrations : for , since i challeng'd him , and the cartesians , to give an answer to this argument , we may be sure he will exert his utmost to perform it punctually , and satisfactorily . whence we may conclude , that if he most miserably falls flat in doing right to himself , and his cause , in this ; it cannot be expected , but he will much more fail in all the rest ; which is the only reason why i pitch'd upon this in particular , as a decisive index of all his atchievments of this kind . 't is mention'd above , § . . and i will repeat it in distinct propositions ; fetching it ( perhaps , something needlesly ) from remotest grounds ; and , then , reducing each piece of it to self-evidence , both that the force of it may the better appear to be irresistible ; as also , that mr. le grand may consider which of the identical propositions he will , in his great learning , think fit to deny . but , first ; to avoid the old cavil , let it be remember'd , that we speak here , as philosophers ought always to do , of the nature of an angel , as in it self , and not as it may be wrought upon by god's miraculous power , by which he disposes of all his creatures , as he sees to be wisest and best for supernatural reasons ; which , as they are beyond the science of philosophers to know , or even to guess at ; so , 't is evidently beyond their province to meddle with them . thesis : an angel , or pure spirit , is naturally immutable . prop. . body and spirit , which are suppos'd , by the question , to be the species , or kinds , of ens or thing , do agree , ( or do not differ , ) precisely , in the common notion of thing . this is as self-evident , as that [ every thing is a thing . ] which is an identical . prop. . therefore , they only disagree , or differ , by those notions , call'd , their differences : for , since , to have a difference in it from another , is the formal reason , why one is different , or differs , from another ; as , whiteness in a thing , is the formal reason which makes a thing be white ; it follows , that [ to have differences in them , is , to differ , ] is as self-evident , as 't is , that [ to differ , is , to differ . ] which is an identical . prop. . therefore , those things which have greater ( or more opposite ) differences in them , do more differ ; and those which have the greatest ( or most opposite ) differences in them , do most differ : for , since , to have a difference from another , is the same as to differ from it , by prop. . this proposition is as evident , as it is , that [ these which do more differ , do more differ ; ] or , [ those which do most differ , do most differ . ] which are identicals . prop. . divisible and indivisible do adequately divide the common notion of thing , as its differences . for , since [ divisible ] means [ not-divisible , ] which is contradictory , that is , most opposite to , or most different from the other ; and , between contradictories , ( or , is , or is not , ) there can be no third , or middle notion ; this proposition is as self-evident , ( by prop. . ) as 't is , that ( those which do most differ , do most differ . ] which is an identical . prop. . therefore , body being evidently divisible ; spirit , which differs from it , must be necessarily indivisible : for , since body and spirit differ ; and they are formally made to differ by their differences , by prop. . and those differences are most opposite , or do most differ , by prop. . and every thing is what it is constituted , or made to be ; this proposition is as self-evident , as , that [ a thing is what it is ; ] or , that [ what is divisible , is divisible ; and , what is indivisible , is indivisible . ] which are , all of them , identicals . prop. . therefore , whatever is affirm'd of body , except the generical , or common notion of thing , must be deny'd of spirit : for , since all predicates ( except that of the common notion ) must be taken from the difference ; and the difference is that which makes one of the species different , or distinct , from all others ; that is , constitutes , or makes it to be no other ; and , consequently , ( since it must be something , ) makes it to be it self only ; it follows , that body and spirit are so , or , in such a manner , distinct , as those differences make them , by prop. . that is , are most different , or most oppos'd ; that is , contradictorily distinct ; or , are of contradictory . natures to one another , by prop. . & . wherefore , that whatever ( besides the common notion of thing ) is affirm'd of the one , must be deny'd of the other , is as self-evident , as , that [ contradiction ( or , saying contradictorily , by is , and is not , ) is contradiction . ] which is identical . prop. . wherefore , since we do truly and properly affirm of body , that it is successive , or part after part , in its operations ; the contradictory , viz. that 't is unsuccessive , simultaneous , or instantaneous , in its operations , must , by prop. . be affirm'd of spirit . therefore , this proposition is as self-evident , as it is , that [ what is not part after part , is not part after part ; but all at once . ] which is evidently identical . prop. . whatever is mutable , is otherwise afterwards , than it was before ; and , consequently , 't is successive : for , if it has all it had before , ( neither more , nor less , ) 't is manifestly the same , or unchang'd ; and , where there is no successiveness , there can be no possible ground for before , or after : wherefore , this is as self-evident , as it is , that [ vvhat must remain the same , or can receive no change , is unchangeable . ] which is identical . prop. . wherefore , an angel ( being , by prop. . & . unsuccessive ) is naturally unchangeable . . ere i come to examine mr. le grand's solution of this demonstration , i desire all ingenuous readers to reflect what advantage it would bring to true knowledge , or science , were this connected way of discoursing from clear grounds brought into fashion , and candidly pursu'd . it would quickly make truth appear ; and discover , what productions are the genuine effects of right reason , and what is only loose talk. it would put an end to all controversies , and avoid all occasions of men's catching at , and availing themselves , by those insignificant methods of wrangling , ill language , and prevarication ; to which obstinate opposers of truth are forc'd to have recourse . whence , i must sincerely declare that ( as far as i am conscious to my self of my own intentions ) it was not any arrogancy , or vanity of preferring my labours , and thoughtful productions , before those of some writers , who took not this way of connexion but seem'd wholly to dis regard it ; but , that which caus'd me to take that way of expressing my self with that assuredness , was , an earnest desire to invite , and ( as far as i could possibly ) incite others , and breed an emulation in them to follow such a method , as might set truth in a clear light , advance science , and difcountenance and beat down scepticism , and all its inconclusive ways of talking ; which , in philosophy , where solid and vvell-grounded truth is aim'd at , ( let it be never so pretty , and witty , ) amounts to no more , nor deserves any better name , but that of idle tittle-tattle . nay , i express'd my self , in my preface to solid philosophy asserted , that i was aware this would be objected to me ; and , therefore , i did there ( from § . . to § . . ) alledge many reasons , to shew that this carriage was necessary for a writer who resolv'd , without fear or favour of any , to pursue those good ends ; and to put it to the test , what doctrine , or method , was true ; what sophisticate , and false . which reasons , till they answer , themselves must confess , that their objecting arrogancy can only be built on their seeing my heart , and penetrating my inward and invisible intentions . the plain truth is , mr. le grand would have had me speak well of his books , ( and other writers of the same strain and pitch ; ) for which reason he complains of me sadly , in his preface to his former treatise , that i had not so much as read his books , sive latinè , sive gallicè scriptos ; ( there is a quod not a benè for you , now ! ) my reasons why i neglected that expected duty were these : first , because ( except his volume which is a collection out of descartes his placita ) they were so very famous , and universally taken notice of , that i never so much as heard of them . next , i did not apprehend i had any such great obligation to read them . thirdly , i read as much of them as i had occasion to speak to ; which did not so hugely please me , as to think it worth my while to look after any more of them . lastly , those i had read were like whipp'd cream ; being so empty of solid sense and frothy , so void of principles or connexion , that is , without either head or tail , that i was weary of them . and , as for his last books , he has so doubly disfigur'd them with ill language , that the ground-work of them is insipid and unconnected talk ; and the embroidery of them is raillery : which are no such great philters , to make me in love with their brethren ; nor could any flattery be so fulsom from me , as to deck them with encomiums . but , words from an adversary are of no vveight ; let us , then , come to examine how pertinently and punctually he has answer'd this demonstration , which was so highly incumbent upon him . i earnestly beg of the reader , to take the pains to go along with me for this once , so that we may get a full view of the solution of it ; which , if he does , i am confident he will confess , that never did a weaker writer appear in print ; and , that he will both grant that my farther confuting him is needless ; and , withall , will admire i have had the patience to lose my time so long upon such an insignificant trifler . . he recites my demonstration in his censura , p. . and sets himself to answer it , p. . first , he says , this demonstration is none of those he brought formerly ; but , that this is the first time he has produc'd it . what is this to purpose ? let it be where it will , whose it will , or whensoever first produc'd , here it is ; and i have challeng'd him , and his cartesians , to answer it ; and therefore , we are to expect their performance . yet , he is much out , even when he talks frivolously ; for , i produc'd it formerly , at large , ( tho' not in the self-same manner , ) in my method to science , p. . as any one that can read , may see . next , he says , i durst not repeat here my former argument , drawn from the immutability of god. he says very right ; for , i dare not commit such a folly , as to repeat an argument which was brought to evince another point , to prove this thesis , which is so widely different from it . the immutability of god was my medium , to prove , that god could not be the immediate cause of that which is essentially mutable , as motion is ; his nature being contradictory to it . why must this argument be repeated here , where we are speaking of the manner of operating peculiar to angels ? tho' this be nothing to purpose , and sillily ridiculous ; yet , the words , [ he durst not bring it here , ] look great ; and would persuade his readers , if they were fools , that he has frighted me from my argument ; which , tho' he sets a good face on it , and looks and talks big , i dare say , poor man ! himself is far from hoping . thirdly , he talks ironically of its formidable and invincible strength . whether it be invincible , will be best seen by his answer to it : but , it seems , 't is formidable to him ; for he is loath to come up to it , but makes his approaches very backwardly ' , and cautiously . fourthly , he calls it garrulity , and ( afterwards ) verbosity . what reader will not smile at his humour of saying any thing , tho' never so manifestly false ? whoever reviews my argument , put down by himself , in the fore going page , and in my very words , will see there is not one superfluous word in it , but barely as many as suffic'd to shew the connexion of my discourse : and , of all the things in the world , verbosity and garrulity in a demonstration is the only way to blunt and spoil the force of the argument ; since this loosness of much talk , biinds the considerer from seeing the close coherence of its terms . but this acquaints us perfectly with his genius : the very grain of his thoughts is laid so cross to all kind of connexion , that he thinks all connected discourse is nothing : but idle babbling ; and , that only loose and rambling talk is true demonstration . . but , these avant-guards of his , are only vvhifflers before the show , to make way : now comes the answer it self . first , he excepts against the common notion of ens , or thing ; which i had said , consisted in this , that it had a power to be , or could be . upon which , he thus descants ; quasi verò essentia omnis entis . finiti , tam creati quàm creandi , non sit quid positivum , sed nihil aliud quàm potentia essendi , seu id quod quo possit esse . more folly , and shifting tricks , could not have been well crouded into five lines ! where did i speak in the abstract of essentia , potentia essendi , or quo potest esse ? does not he see , in my words , put down lately by himself , that i speak of ens , or the concrete ; and , that , in my id. cartes . p. . where i demonstrate to him , what the notion of ens creatum must be , ( of which he takes no notice here , but only talks against , that is , denies , my conclusion , ) i express'd what was meant by such an ens , p. . l. , , viz. illud quod potest existere ; and , all along , i name ens , corpus , spiritus , which are all concretes . and , surely , he will not say that the essence of created things includes actual existence ; for , if he does , he makes them so many gods ; for , 't is the prerogative of the deity only , essentially to exist . let him take any individual , created things , ( those being most properly things ; ) for example ; michael , peter , a horse , a stone , &c. and then examine his thoughts , whether he finds either actual being , or not-being , in their notions ; and , if he cannot , but finds ( as he must ) they abstract from both , that all that can be said of ens , as to what it has of it self , or its own nature and essence , in order to being , is , that it can be , or can receive existence , if the first cause pleases to give it . this being so , let us abstract the notion of ens from all individuals ; and we shall see that the notion of ens , or thing , in common , is that which is capable of being , and can be no other . . having thus chang'd my words , let us see what advantage he makes of this slippery dealing . he objects , that this would make the notion of ens not to be positive . what means he ? does he think that the notion of quo est res , or the form , or quo potest esse res , ( suppose i had said so , ) is not positive ; whereas , 't is impossible a negative nature can exist , or render a thing capable of existing ? indeed , aristotle's first matter is defin'd negatively , as having no kind of form at all in its notion , neither substantial , nor accidental ; but , that the form which is part of the essence , and constitutes the thing , should be negative too , would make the whole thing to be made up of negatives ; which is such a strange blunder in philosophy , as admits no parallel . the form determines the potentiality , or indifferency of the matter , and makes it become this , or an individual thing , and so fits it for existence ; because a thing in common , or that which is indeterminats , is not capable of existing . now , that the essence that makes an individual thing , which is the most positive notion we have , ( or rather , no notion is perfectly positive , but it , ) should not be positive it self , or be less positive , because it makes the matter capable of a farther , and best perfection , to wit , the last actuality of existence , is a paradox unheard of in metaphysicks . so that mr. le grand has alter'd my words , and yet gets no advantage by it , but blunders himself , while he went to blunder the demonstration . for , what is all this to the argument ? if he do but grant that body and spirit are species of thing in common , or ( which is the same ) that they are both of them things , ( which 't is a madness to deny , ) the demonstration , which consists in the connexion or agreement of the notions , will go on , and proceed , whether he will or no. and , this he fore-sees very well ; and therefore , by throwing these flim-flams , as rubs in the way , he endeavours to keep it off , and hinder it from going on . . next , he tells us , that de corpore & spiritu , rebus finitis actu existentibus , nunc sermo instituitur : this discourse treats of body and spirit , actually existent . i beseech him , who stated the question on this fashion , or pretended we spoke of this body , or this spirit , which only do actually exist ? he knows , that , when he put my demonstration , i acknowledg'd , that i spoke of body and spirit , which were the species of ens , in common ; and therefore , are themselves the most common notions next to it ; and , not particulars , which only do exist actually . yet , he tells us , nunc sermo instituitur : the speech now , is , of things actually existing . i beseech him , vvhose speech ? his , or mine ? not mine , as is now shewn : it must mean , then , that 't is his speech . and , by what rule must i needs speak as he would have me ? certainly , i have right to put my own demonstration as i please my self . it lies before him ; and , he is to answer it as it lies . what wriggling is here to pervert the sense of it , instead of representing it in my own vvords , and solving it ! again , this is a sign he knows little what belongs to science ; for this treats of the abstracted notions and natures of the subjects we handle ; which , as distinctly such , exist in our understanding , and no where else ; for , there they are concise , and exact , even to an indivisible ; whereas , if we treat of them as they actually exist in matter , or in re , they are jumbl'd confusedly with innumerable other modes ; so that there cannot possibly be any science , nor demonstration of them at all . i wish him to reflect upon all the particular sciences in the mathematicks , whether they are of circles , quadrates , triangles , &c. and he will see they do all of them treat of those formal notions , or natures , abstractedly , from their actual existence in re ; where , perhaps , no figures mathematically so exact as our mind frames of them , are to be found . the same is to be said , when we treat of the common notions of ens , corpus , spiritus , &c. which can no where exist , but in the understanding : nay , 't is evident , i speak of ens formally , as its notion is taken generically , or of ens in common ; and , sure , he will not say , the thing formally , as in common , can any where actually exist , but in our mind . . he proceeds after his old rate , and tells his reader , that all my verbosity , hoc solum vult , means only this , that body has parts , and spirit has none ; and , that therefore , body is successive , and thence mutable ; and spirit immutable . he puts my reason , after a fashion , indeed ; yet , only slightly , and slubberingly : he would have more oblig'd me to have us'd my own vvords , which were more ample , and full , viz. that the differences which constitute them being contradictory , it follows , that whatever we say of the one , ( except what belongs to the common notion of thing , ) the contradictory to it must be said of the other ; and , therefore , if body have succession in its operations , spirit must have none , but must have all its operations in an instant ; and , consequently , be immutable . however , i thank him he has put the substance of my demonstration on any fashion , tho' not forcibly , but rawly . here 't is the argument presses ; now let us expect his solution . first , he says the answer is easie ; and , 't is true ; for , in his way one may easily , without any trouble , answer all euclid : 't is but altering his words , and saying something , or raising some extravagant scruple against his conclusions , and the deed is done . next , he grants they may know some things at one view , but not all . this is said ; but , still the question is , why not all at once , if some ? his reason ? does the knowledge of those some burthen or fill the angel's intellect , so , that it can hold no more ? no , surely ; for , we experience , even in our souls here , that are very much inferiour to the intelligences , which are pure acts , that the having some knowledge , increases our capacity to take in more ; whence 't is demonstrable , that nothing can fill or satisfie them , but the sight of an infinite truth , or the beatifical vision of god. do angels require some time to have more knowledge , because slowly-moving corporeal phantasms , must bring things leisurely into their understanding ; or , impressions on their nerves occasion the producing ideas ? neither of these can be said . what hinders , then , their having at once all they naturally can have ? are not all truths , the objects of these knowledges , connected ; but some of them stand at variance with one another ? this would disgrace god's workmanship , the product of his wisdom , if we make truths incoherent , contradictory and chimorical . none of these rubs , then , being possible , which only could hinder or retard an angel from having all his intellectual operations in an instant , it had been but a piece of civility in mr. le grand to have bestow'd upon us some reason for his dissenting from us in this point ; and , not to have popt us off with a bare voluntary denial of the conclusion , which is the only thing in question . . for , we have much more right to expect his reason , because ( as was now said ) this denial of his , instead of answering the argument , is a plain denying the immediate conclusion which follow'd from that demonstration . yet , i must say , that ( however those foolish fellows , the logicians , would laugh at him , for such an unpardonable errour in disputation , yet ) he behaves himself here like a civil gentleman ; for , he compounds with us , and grants very kindly , that they do at once know some things , but denies they have all the operations belonging to them at once , or know all they ought to know in an instant . now , this being evidently the conclusion of my argument , ( as far as i there press'd it , ) 't is a double injury ; first , only to hint the argument , and then slide away from speaking to it , and deny our conclusion ; and , yet , give us no kind of reason why . yet , he pretends to give us something that he would have thought a reason , tho' 't is so slight , that he is shy to call it so : which we will hearken to ; only , let it be first remember'd , that he is arguing against the conclusion , which he had most learnedly deny'd ; and , not answering my argument , or shewing that the terms of it do not cohere ; or , that the conclusion does not follow out of my premisses . his reason ( if it be one ) is grounded on an explication of his own doctrine , that god moves matter immediately ; which , unless he first establishes , ( as he never did , nor can , ) his foundation shakes . however , that fuppos'd , he demonstrates it after his usual sort , by bringing a parallel . his discourse runs thus : bodies are stupid things ; nor could they stir at all , if god did not give and conserve their motion , and all the modes of it : and , in like manner , god gives and conserves cogitation , and the modes of cogitation , to angels . wherefore , as a body does not therefore lose its essence by moving more or less , so an angel does not lose his essence by thinking more or less . where are we now ? i am sure we are rambl'd quite out of the purlue of our question . my conclusion only says , and my argument only aims to prove , that if the ordinary laws of an angel's operating be observ'd , it would know all it is naturally to know at once , and not successively ; but , that it would , otherwise , lose its essence , i never said , nor thought ; nor that god , acting supernaturally , cannot devest them of some property they have , tho' naturally ally'd to its essence . so that , he first denies my conclusion , instead of answering my argument : next , brings a parallel for an argument ; and when he has brought it , he shoots it at rovers , and levels it at a wrong mark : so far he is from knowing what belongs to any one rule belonging to disputation . add that his pretended parallel is the most unparallel of any he could have invented ; divisible and indivisible are the essential , or intrinsecal differences of ens nor can there be any ens , but it must be either the one , or the other of them . are moving more , or moving less , essential differences of body ? or , cannot body be , without being either of them ? could not god's omnipotence have kept their first matter from moving , when he had first created it ? or , are [ moving more , and moving less , ] contradictories ; as are the differences i put , and argue from them ? or , could an angel , which is a pure act , have been created without knowing at all , as a body could without moving at all ? what a lame similitude then , or parallel , is this , which has never a leg to run on ! and , yet , he will needs make it run on a sleevless errand , and applies it to a point which is foreign to our question . add , farther , that our question is not here of an angel's simultaneous knowledge omnium rerum , of all things , as he puts it : 't is not the quantity or extension of the angelical knowledges , which i do here strive to evince ; but the unsuccessiveness of them ; or , that it has them all at once , ( whether they are many or fewer , large or narrow ; ) from whence is deduc'd immediately , that 't is naturally immutable . . yet , of this aukward answer he is so fond , that he crows over my demonstration most triumphantly , in these words , p. . [ quâ simplice solutione , &c. by which simple solution , all the herculean strength of his demonstration , as sampson 's did of old , by meerly cutting off his hairs , falls to the ground , to his great disgrace . ] and , i must confess , 't is ( as he says ) a simple solution indeed . were he but half as powerful in his arguments and solutions , as he is in his confident braggadochio talk , he would be invincible . poor man ! he thinks the tinkling a few fine latin phrases is far beyond all the strongest reasons in the world : and , can any man think i have nothing else to do , but to stand laying open the nonsense of such a perpetual trifler ? . this may serve for a sample of his solutions of my arguments , by which ( since this concerns him more than all the others ) we may judge of all the rest : for , i am forc'd to take the method of proceeding by instances , in regard it would require a volume to lay open all his follies of each kind . in the next place , i will produce an instance or two , of his great talent of aggravating and perverting my words to a sinister and invidious . sense ; which is an essential part of this new cartesian method , and takes up near a quarter of his book ; and , withall , gives it a thousand times à greater shew of being victorious , than all his arguments . an honourable and worthy gentleman hapt to say , that the parts of the cartesian doctrine did cum quodam lepôre sibi consentire , agree to one another with a certain grace , or prettiness ; than which , i know no expression more proper . i reply'd to mr. le grand , who seem'd fond of this commendation , in my id. cart. p. . and granted , it was not only lepida , graceful , or pretty ; but also , witty. which says the same that noble person said ; and i added a farther commendation to it . upon this , mr. le grand tells his reader , that , nobilissimum illum virum spiculis suis venenatis petit ; that i assault , or set upon that noble person with my poyson'd darts . his fancy is , certainly , very fearfuly hypochondriack : every thing is a spiculum , or dart , that he dis-likes . thus a silly asterisk * , casually left in the context , in my method , was interpreted as a design , transfigere ipsum quinque radiis tanquam tot spiculis ; to strike him thorow with those five points , as with so many darts . nay , he tells me , moreover , in that preface , § . . that i have petulans ingenium ac judicium pravum , for attempting to do him that mischief with those five darts of that asterisk ; and is so afraid of being transfix'd , or run thorow by them , that he complains of it sadly to the reader ( it being , as we are to conceive , a matter of much weight ) a second time there , in § . . of which , see id. cartes . p. . & . another instance of his ranting , and shameful exaggeration , shall be this : he had quoted bellarmin , to say , that a piece of wood was turn'd into stone . i reply'd , that it did not appear , but stony particles might be interwoven with the wooden ones , id. cartes . p. . for which i gave my reason . what harm , what incivility is in this reply ? none . yet , let mr. le grand come to represent it , ( who , as icterical men see all things yellow , dyes every word , tho' never so innocent , into the colour of his own furious choler , and renders it hideous , ) it amounts to this , in his language , ( cens. pag. . ) bellarmine rationis expers es , mentiris : bellarmin , thou hast no sense ( or reason ) in thee ; thou lyest . hundreds of such ingenuous representations of my words garnish his censure ; to which , what credit is to be given , these few instances may inform us : and the reader may observe , that whenever he is most transported and furious in amplifying , he may be sure there is always the least reason . and , so much for this exaggerating method , so useful and proper to our new cartesians . . another method of theirs , is , to impose upon me false tenets , to make me look like a monster of folly and impiety . these are great sticklers in his , and his friend merry-man's pamphlets ; and give the briskest vigour to their invectives . for example ; he tells the reader , ( p. . ) that i say , it is infinitely more impossible that god should change an angel , ( if it were changeable at all , ) after the first instant , than that it self , or another angel , should do it . now , what man , reading these words , thus industriousty singl'd out , would not verily think i made god infinitely less powerful than an angel , or any other creature ; and admire at my folly , and impiety , both ? but , read the whole discourse there , and it is evidently quite contrary ; nor could any man more highly magnifie god's attributes , than i do in that very place . my discourse is this : an indivisible effect must be put in an instant ; therefore , it will be put in the first instant , if all that is requisite to produce that effect be put : those requisites are , power in the cause , and disposition to exercise that power , and application of the agent to the patient ; and , that , in case the agent be not yet dispos'd to act , it must be chang'd , so to be made dispos'd . wherefore , since 't is infinitely more impossible god should not have power to do it in the first instant , being all-powerful , than that another spirit should not have such a power ; or , not be dispos'd of himself to act , he being pure and infinite actuality ; or , that he can be chang'd , thus to be made dispos'd , he being unchangeable ; or , not be apply'd , he being omnipresent ; than it is , that an angel should not have power to do this effect ; or , be chang'd , so to be fitted to act : or , not be apply'd most intimately to the patient ; therefore , 't is infinitely more impossible god should not do it in the first instant , ( that is , not after the first instant , ) if the effest were feisible , than that an angel , which falls infinitely short in every regard , should not do it in the first instant ; or , ( which is the same , ) should do it after the first instant . see my demonstration , in my method ; from p. . to p. . particularly , p. . now , 't is evident , that , in this discourse , i bear up to god's attributes , there mentioned ; and maintain them to be infinitely above those of the best created beings in every regard . what do these men ? they pick out a few words , and purposely conceal the whole tenour of my discourse ; and , by this false dealing , endeavour to impose upon me so wicked an impiety , as neither any christian , nor any heathen , who holds a first being , did ever assert . how he deforms this argument , by singling out a few other words , may be seen in his censure , p. . judge then , reader , whether those poor spiteful men have not renounc'd all shame and conscience , who dare thus wilfully defame their neighbour , and fraudulently abuse their reader . would not a lawyer that us'd such a dishonest trick , in altering the words which concern'd the title of an estate , be turn'd over the bar , and hated by all honest men ? something worse than this as containing the same malice , and in far worse circumstances , is this other instance . he had , in the preface of his former book , § . . made me to say , it was vile opus & laboriosum , for god to be the immediate cause of motion . he put it directly upon me , as my very words ; by introducing it with pergit , statimque addit ; and , by printing the word [ laboriosum ] in italick letter , and the same with the other words , which were truly mine . this makes me impious against god , with a witness ; for , it represents my opinion to be , that god makes use of the ministery of angels , to ease himself ( forsooth ! ) of the fatigue and weariness , which , otherwise , he would have felt , had he mov'd the first matter himself . hereupon , i challeng'd him to have flatly falsify'd my words , and , to have added [ laboriosum , ] to put upon me such an absurd doctrine , as never came into the head of any man acquainted with christianity , or common sense . i had happ'd to express it to be a drudgery mis-becoming god's essence , who is unchangeable , to be the immediate cause of motion , or change. where , 't is manifest , i put it upon the mis-becomingness , or unsutableness to god's nature , which is pure actuality of existence , to cause change immediately ; because , being only was the proper effect of him , whose nature was self-existence . yet , in despite of all the concomitant words , and the whole tenour of the discourse , instead of retracting , or excusing his fault , he stands to it stoutly , p. . and , why ? because drudges do use to toyl and moyl , and sweat and labour , and lead ( as we say ) a weary life : as if there were not meanness in drudgery , and indignity for the master of the family to perform , it being below his function ; and , as if the concomitant word , [ mis-becoming , ] and [ vile . ] join'd with it , did not restrain it manifestly to this sense , that it was indignum deo ; and , not such a toilsom business to move matter , which every angel can do . could it be possibly thought by any man in his wits , that he who holds that god created heaven and earth , of nothing , in an instant , should think he had not power to give motion to bodies , without over-straining himself ? who , but a mad man , could hold two such inconsistent tenets ? or , what man , well in his wits , could hope to obtain belief that i held such a piece of extravagant nonsense ? but , what cannot impotent passion feign , and pretend , when reason is nonpluss'd ? something was to be said when he was at a plunge ; and any thing is taken up , in that exigence , to serve a turn ; and , the more extravagant it is , the better it pleases his humour ; which never lets him consider whether it be credible , or no : it serves to bespatter , and vent his uneasie anger , which is still boiling in his breast ; and , that is enough for his purpose . . another piece of this new cartesian method , is , to cry aloud against me , and call me proud , self-conceited , and arrogant , if i will not allow such writers as himself to be most excellent philosophers : or , if i hap to dissent from other learned men , in some opinions , ( as , who does not ? ) then , presently , he complains pathetically , that i damn , contemn , and trample upon those authors : or , if i do but say , i demonstrate such a point ; or , that others do not demonstrate ; then , presently , i am as proud as lucifer ; and , the lord knows what . how sincere he is in alledging this , will appear by the examining three most signal places he makes choice of ; where he objects it , ( § . . ) in which he makes me say , [ providentiam divinam , ex aliis omnibus , me , ad rationem dominio suo restituendam selegisse : ] that divine providence had chosen out me , from all others , to restore reason to her dominion , or soveraignty , over fancy . this , certainly , thus worded , sounds proudly . but , may we not fear , after so many trials , that mr. le grand has falsify'd my words , tho' he puts them all for mine : and , that too , in a distinct character ? to say , i would attempt or endeavour this , is but to express , that my zeal for truth had put me upon such a bold undertaking , and , withall , to give an encouragement to the reader to weigh my argument : or , to say , that i apprehended god's providence had enabi'd me to perform this , was no more than to say , i had writ a method to science , which the title-page had profess'd openly ; for which too , i gave god the glory . but , to say god had chosen me , out of all others , can become no body but a proud and imprudent boaster . how proves he this ? that is , how shews he these words , thus put together , in my books ? why , he cites the very places ; which , if true , must shame me ; if false , must disgrace him , as a falsifyer . the first of the places he cites , is found in the preface to my method , p. . where i find , in the beginning of that § , these words ; i have not enumerated these particulars , to boast my performances ; but , to be-speak my reader 's pardon , if , travelling in an unbeaten road , i happen now and then to stumble . which have not the least shew of arrogancy , but the quite contrary . indeed , i say , p. . that it is impossible for any wit of man to invent any other vvay than what i have propos'd ; that is , solid and evident : which , i say there , is , to build on the nature of the thing , and frame my discourses by connexion of terms . but , do i pretend , that what i propos'd was my own invention , or that i am the author of it ; as the wondrously modest cartesius did ; who oppos'd all the present and past world , to set up his new-fangl'd doctrine ? do not all aristotelians pretend to it , as well as i ? and , did not all the learned world follow it , till cartesius's time ? with what ingenuity , then , does he tell his reader , in the margin , that this is arrogantia j. s. non aliàs audita ; the unheard of arrogance of j. s. to propose in his books , ( in opposition to the ideists , ) what ten thousand had propos'd before him ? the second place he cites , is , from the epistle dedicatory to solid philosophy asserted , § . . where i have these words , [ i must own , i have a high opinion of my principles , and of my method , which nature , and god's good providence , have laid , and establish'd . ] is it arrogance to have a high opinion of what god , and nature ( the work of his divine wisdom ) have done ? for , it is plain , that i do not pretend i have any hand in establishing either of them . my non ultra has told them why i have a high opinion of my principles , because they are built on the metaphysical verity of things , establish'd by the ideas in the divine understanding : and of my method , or way of discourse ; because nature , or ( which is the same ) god , as author of nature , has made our soul such an inferiour sort of spirit , that it works by abstract or inadequate notions , which we compound or connect into propositions , ( in which all truth formally consists ; ) and then connect those propositions into coherent discourses . these , then , being by me ascrib'd to god and nature , i assume nothing to my self , but my conclusions ; and , of these i deliver'd my self thus , in the words immediately following : [ but , as for my conclusions , and my deductions , as i will not justifie them with the same firmness as i did the others , so i should not think i ought to propose them to learned men , unless i judg'd them demonstrative . ] and , now , where is all this unheard of arrogancy ? where is my bragging that god had selected me so particularly , from all others , which he most expresly puts upon me ; and pretends to shew them , [ tribus ex locis , ] from three places ; of which , these are two , where not a word is found savouring of arrogancy , or any thing like it ; but , rather , the direct contrary ? would it be uncivil , on this occasion , to ask of mr. le grand , whether he has not forsworn all sincerity , and common honesty ? to stander is too great a crime for a good christian to be guilty of ; but , to falsisie his adversary's words , and slander him too ; or rather , to pretend falsly he says thus , or thus , in such determinate places , ( which particularizing makes it look credible , ) on purpose that he may slander him , is so voluntary and wilful a complicated crime , that the tenderest , and most indulgent charity is at a loss to invent an excuse for it . . the third place to which he refers his reader , is taken out of the dedicatory to solid philosophy asserted ; where there are , indeed , some of those words , but not one of those haughty ones he here expresly and distinctly fixes upon me . my discourse in the two fore-going pages , was , concerning the way of ideas made use of by cartesius , and others ; which , i made account , did delude their good reason ; and , by making them disregard the nature of the thing , led them into fancies , and imaginary conceits : i gave there for the reason why i writ philosophy , that i apprehended god's providence had fitted and enabl'd me to redress such great mischiefs , ( viz. that fancies should beat down reason and truth ; ) and therefore , i thought it became me to re-instate reason in her sovereignty over fancy ; and , to assert to her the rightful dominion nature had given her , over all our judgments . ] which amounts to this , that i thought my self able to confute his way of ideas , and to shew it to be opposite to true reason . is it such a piece of arrogancy to pretend to be able to confute a piece of novelry , so opposite to the way of all the former world , ( especially , ascribing , as i did , that ability to god ? ) or rather , ( if there be any arrogancy at all on either side , ) is it not more like arrogancy in them , to blame the methods of so many thousands of learned men , who writ before them ; and , by introducing new ways of philosophizing , to accuse , by consequence , all the former vvorld of ignorance ? is it not rather arrogance in him , to be so haughtily and rudely stiff in maintaining ideas ( as he says ) elicited , or produc'd by himself , without even attempting to bring any one demonstration , or conclusive proof for them ? can there be any self-conceit more enormous , than to be thus ravingly earnest to maintain that he has this invisible gift of producing ideas out of his own head , or ex se , ( as he expresses it ; ) which he holds to be the only ground of all true knowledge , without bringing any one argument that is able to evince it ; and , then , because we will not believe him without proof , to foam thus at the mouth with the foulest language the most transported rage could dictate ? see his words at the end of this § . [ quis a luciferi lapsu , superbiùs unquam de seipso senserit ! vvhat man , since the fall of lucifer , had ever such a proud conceit of himself ! ] then follows my never-heard-of arrogance , my intolerable arrogance , my nequissima , most vvicked arrogance . poor impotent railer ! whose passion will neither let him reflect how he dishonours his place , disgraces his friends , scandalizes good christians , or wrongs his own conscience . but , in the name of wonder ! how comes it that no body but himself ever thought me thus damnably arrogant ! i do confess , i write briskly , and smartly , when i think it evident i write for truth . it is my duty : and , i have given my reasons for it in my preface to solid philosophy ; which he , instead of answering , tells us here only , he cannot read them without horrour : no , nor my arguments neither ; for , he answers them both just alike . in what , then , consists this arrogancy of mine ? the plain truth is this ; and , his carriage confesses it : i had challeng'd him to bring one principle , or one conclusive proof , for his new vvay of philosophy : he has none ; and , therefore , i must be intolerably arrogant , because he is obstinate in his errours , and pitifully ignorant ; as also , because i follow the way , which builds truth on the nature of things , and on the connexion of terms ; which all the learned men in the vvorld had so long embrac'd , and unperverted nature teaches every man. . but , we have lost our third citation . i beseech my reader to re-view it , and then to consider whether there be one word there , that god had selected me from all others ; which he here , § . . puts upon me , as my express words ; and prints in a distinct character , as mine . that i have truly represented the three places he relates to , will appear by the preface to his former book , § . . where he puts them down at large . this , then , being evident to eye-sight , i charge him with three wilful falsifications here , in citing three places in my books for these haughty words ; viz. that i said , i was selected from all others , &c. whereas , i only said , that i apprehended my self able to confute his ideas . i demand of him , either to shew me the words in my books , or , to acknowledge his errour . but , i do not expect from him the candour to retract any of his slanders , whatsoever he professes here , pag. . for , this would oblige him to make satisfaction ; against which , as i have sufficiently experienc'd , he is ( i know not by what case of conscience ) church-canon-proof . this , then , is another branch of the new cartesian method of arguing , and answering ; viz. to falsifie , and impose on his adversary , whatever vvords he pleases : and , he is very constant , and diligent , in pursuing that useful method . . another branch of this new method , is , without so much as one vvord to abet his saying ; nay , in despite of many vvords , and , even , avow'd demonstrations to the contrary ; to impose upon me false , invidious , incredible , and unchristian tenets . thus , p. , . he makes me deny that the soul exists when it is separated from the body : nay , he is afraid i deny it is created , but is ex traduce ; and , that it is extinguish'd with the body , and rais'd again at the last day . nor is this all ; but , ( that we may see how his suspicions contradict one another , ) he calls into doubt , p. . whether i acknowledge a resurrection . i see , it is a great favour he will let me hold some few of the articles of my creed ; for , he has debarr'd me from holding most of them . his reasons , ( such as they are , ) as well as i can collect them , or make them look like aiming at any sense , are these . first , i made her incapable of pre-existing before the body , of which she is the form ; ( of which opinion he seems here an earnest asserter : ) whence he concludes , i deny she can exist when separate from the body afterwards : and , yet , p. . l. . himself uses my words ; which affirm , that , after she is separated , ex se existere apta est , she is able to exist of her self . next ; what says he to my discourse : ens is only that which is capable of existing : but , as the council of vienna has told him , the soul is forma hominis ; and , therefore , she cannot , of her self , exist here ; but the totum only , of which , she is a part. again , i argue thus ; that which is indeterminate in any kind , cannot exist ; but the soul , before she had knowledge in the body , was a meer potentia cognoscendi , or ( as some express it ) rasa tabula : therefore , she could not exist before the body . the major is evident . the minor must be granted by mr. le grand himself ; for , the soul can have no actual knowledge , without ideas ; and , he denies she has any innate ideas , but only an innate power of producing them ; that is , she has , according to him , none at all before she had elicited them out of her self : therefore , she was , according to some priority , before she did elicit them , or , before she had any knowledge ; and , consequently , she was , of her self , only a power to have them ; or , a meer power to have knowledge ; which is , to be utterly indeterminate , in ratione cognoscitivi : but , what is indeterminate in any kind , is neither this , nor that ; nor , consequently , can exist : therefore , there can be no pre-existence of souls . what answers he to these arguments ? we must excuse him ; 't is not his custom to do such trifling work , as to answer any argument at all : 't is enough for him to stand stiff to his cartesian tenet , that the soul and body are two things ; i , that they are , let arguments say what they will. however , he will do better than answering arguments : and , how is that ? why , he 'll make them all bad christians , and hereticks , that speak against cartesius ; which no sooner said , but , in his wise opinion , down they go to the pit of hell , like so many imps of lucifer , as they are : they deny the immortality of the soul , and the resurrection ; and there is an end of them . and , is not this confutation enough in all conscience ! . his follies here were tedious to enumerate . he yields , with much ado , what the council of vienna told him 't was heresie to deny ; but he yields it very faintly , in these words ; anima ( says he ) hominis forma aliquando dici potest : the soul may sometimes be call'd a form of man. the council is much bound to him for his civil complement ; and cartesius is their most humble servant , but not so obedient to its decrees of faith as he ought . but , what kind of form is the soul then ? the council said , it was such , verè & essentialiter ; and , if it were truly such , why may not a truth , that belongs to faith , be spoke at all times ? why , only , [ dici potest , it may be said ; ] as if it were some improper and unusual phrase , and not proper language , in which declarations of faith use to be worded ? why aliquando only ? may not truth be spoke always , as oft as there is occasion ? well , but , all this while , what kind of form is it ? he tells us here , p. . l. , , . is it neither an assistant , or extrinsecal form ; nor an informing , or intrinsecal one ? now , intrinsecal means not-extrinsecal : we should be glad , then , to see this monster of a form , that is neither extrinsecal , nor not-extrinsecal . what is this midling form then ? he gives us no account of it , but that 't is alterius generis , of another kind ; quo fit , ut hominis formam humanitatem esse strictiùs asseramus ; by which it comes to pass , that we more strictly call the form of man humanity . what gibberish is this ? is the soul a form at all , or no ? if not , then he must say the council errs : if it be , what is the matter to this form ? or , is it neither intrinsecal , nor not-intrinsecal to it ? a form that is not intrinsecal to the matter , or informs it , is a strange kind of form. again ; what sense is it , that humanity is , by the soul , more strictly made the form of . man ! one would think , that this being the abstract notion of man , its concrete , and that which expresses his total essence , should be so more strictly ally'd to it , by the very notion of it , ( as whiteness is to that which is white , ) that nothing could make a man more strictly call'd a man , than manhood , or humanity , can do of it self . so that , insignificant words and contradictions are obtruded upon us , instead of solid reasons ; and we must be content with them , when no better can be had . . as for his pretending i hold , the soul is ex traduce , and not created , he goes against the light of his own conscience : for , whoever reads my fourth preliminary to solid philosophy , § § . , . ( as 't is evident he has , since he cavils at that book , ) will see , i make the soul come immediately from god , and created ; tho , indeed , the whole man not being properly created , but , in part ( viz. according to its body ) generated , the infusion of the soul is call'd by the schools , not simply creation , but concreation ; meaning , that the soul is then created , when , by generation , the bodily part is brought to that perfection , as to be fit , in some degree , to work with it . this , then , is another piece of their new cartesian method ; and would serve for arguing and answering both , and do mighty execution in running down their adversary , if they happen to meet with ignorant and credulous readers , who are so weak , as not to consider that imputations of the largest size may as well proceed from confident calumny , as from honest ingenuity . . another new method of my cartesian adversary , is , to cite scripture , then interpret it by his own fancy , without giving us any rule of interpreting it ; or , of distinguishing metaphorical speeches , from literal ones ; but , taking every word that serves his purpose , or seems to chime to the cartesian novelty , in a dogmatical rigour ; ( which method , follow'd home , would make mad work with philosophy , and divinity too ; ) and then , if we will not allow his private and untoward interpretations , presently to exclaim aloud , and tell the reader very sadly , that i oppose not only cartesius , but moses , st. john , and st. paul ; nay , god himself , and ( which is a worse fault , it seems , than to oppose god ) the holy ghost too ; and , p. . st. jude also . certainly , this self conceited man makes account his private interpretation of scripture is the infallible rule of all our faith ; and , therefore , all mankind must be bad christians , and hereticks , that contradict such a supernaturally-gifted interpreter . what a clutter does he keep with the word [ stetisse ? ] and , that 't is against all arts and sciences , and common sense too , to say a thing did not stand before it fell ; as we both hold of the angels , that there was some terminus à quo , or some kind of state , whence they fell , is certain , and undeniable . the question is , vvhat this state was ? i took him to mean it was to see god ; ( and so did the learned merry-man too ; ) for , to say they were in heaven , is the same , in christian language , as to say they enjoy'd the beatifical vision . nor do i think any man living will deny , but that our saviour's words , in the house of my father are many mansions , ( one of which mansions he assign here , p. . l. . as a celestial habitation to the devils , before their fall , ) was meant of the stations , or degrees , of essential happiness , in the sight of god ; for , no man will deny , but that 't is there he told his disciples , he went to prepare a place for them . now , since mr. le grand calls the house which our saviour calls here his father's , [ heavenly , ] what i want to know , is , what he means by this house , if it be not the heaven of the blessed saints , who enjoy god. he makes it another thing ; and says , that they are thence promoted , and admitted more fully to the beatifical vision . what means [ promoted , and admitted more fully to see god , ] but , that they saw him before , tho' not so fully ? if so , and , that this was really his tenet formerly , as i suspected , then my argument proceeds against it thus : if they saw god , they were happy ; if happy , they had all they could wish ; if they had all they could wish , they could wish no more , nor love any created good inordinately ; nor , consequently , sin , nor be damn'd : therefore , they did not absolutely stare ; that is , they were not absolutely in termino , or in heaven . i am half afraid , that , from the words mansion , domicilium , and such like , which they left , he conceits there are certain kinds of upper-rooms , and lower-rooms , in heaven ; and , that lucifer , and his adherents , dwelt in some of the lowest ; and were there besieg'd , and driven thence by st. michael and his angels . some may think this is too much strain'd , and looks as if i spoke in jest : but i am very serious ; and , can see no reason in the world that is solid , or taken out of the nature of our subject , angels ; why he , who assigns to them , [ before and after , ] which are the proper differences of time , should not assign to them local habitations , and places too : and , i should be much oblig'd to that man , who would shew me , out of the nature of the thing , why angels , which are pure acts , should not have the one , as well as the other ; or , why they should not be contain'd in , or commensurate to place , which is permanent quantity ; as well as their operations , by being one after another , should be commensurate to time , which is successive quantity ; both of them being equally opposite , nay , contradictory to the nature of indivisible beings . . to clear this point , which is much blunder'd by metaphorical words , which are equivocal ; first , it is certain there was some condition , state , or terminus à quo , from which they fell . secondly , that words which signifie place , when apply'd to spirits , are , and can only be meant , of states , or conditions ; that is , of exalted knowledge ; ignorance of what they longingly wish to know ; of extreamly tormenting griefs , blissful joys , or suspended hope , which is also very penal . thirdly , that aquinas ( pr. q. . a. . ) maintains , that angels were created by god happy , beatitudine naturali ; or , in that happiness which they could have by the force of their nature , ( which is , in some sort , call'd happiness , or felicity ; ) in which sense , aristotle said , that the utmost happiness of man was , to contemplate the optimum intelligibile , god. this beatitude ( says he ) angels have by their creation , because they cannot acquire it by discourse , but 't is given them for the dignity of their nature . but there is another beatitude plac'd in the seeing god's essence , which is not within the limits of nature , but is the end of nature ; which , therefore , they had not by their creation .. besides , 't is probable they had some grace , and some gratuitous knowledge , beyond what their meer nature gave them ; which grace they resisted . these gifts made them candidates for heaven ; in which , the first act of their will would have invested them . this was their state , or condition , from which they fell : this hope and fair possibility , and ( as it were ) title to heaven , they lost by their first wicked choice : and , this , according to this learned saint , is all that is meant by the domicilium , ( which so much puzzles mr. le grand , ) which they forfeited by their deprav'd vvill , and unhappy wilfulness . . but , does mr. le grand imagine there goes no more to the interpretation of scripture , than a hasty fancy of our own ? i know he is resolv'd to like nothing that comes from me : however , i will acquaint the readers with my thoughts , hoping it make some of them more charitable , than to censure highly , and condemn one another , because they interpret scripture otherwise than themselves do . i conceive then , that in passages belonging to faith , scripture is to be interpreted , as mr. thorndike ( just vveights and measures , p. . ) also holds , by what the church , from the beginning , has receiv'd by their ( the pastors ) hands . in matters that belong to natural subjects , true science is the best means to interpret it ; because , vvords ( in a book intended only for faith and good works , and not for natural speculation ) may be ambiguous ; but a demonstration , if truly such , cannot deceive us . thus , when 't is said , that god made two great lights , the words would make us think that the moon is the greatest , next to the sun , in the firmament ; but the science of astronomy corrects that thought , and assures us , it is the least within our ken. particularly , true science of the natures of things enlightens us to know when words that relate to them are to be taken in a literal , when in a metaphorical sense ; but , most especially , when the speech is of spiritual natures ; which , if we should understand literally , it would make us entertain a thousand frantick conceits , unworthy god almighty , or angels either ; as every one knows . this determin'd , and that 't is once known the words are meant literally , then criticism , which acquaints us in what sense they us'd to be understood by those who liv'd about the same time and place , will give us great light. if metaphorically , then logick will assist us to know in what regard , and for what reason , the word is transferr'd from one thing to another ; and , to gather by the tenour or consequence of the discourse , the sense of the whole passage . nor is grammar useless in what concerns the congruity of the words which compound the sentence and context . this , and such other considerations , if mr. le grand would please to lay to heart , he would not immediately pronounce , and conclude , that every interpretation that sutes not with his fancy , or with the ideas of cartesius , ( the agreeableness or disagreeableness to which seem to be his rule of interpreting scripture , ) to be such heinous sins ( as he does , p. . ) against moses , st. john , st. paul , st. jude , nay , against god himself , and ( which is an odd addition ) against the holy ghost too . ( had i said so , he would have objected , that 't is a clear case i do not hold the holy ghost to be god. ) by which method , he assumes to himself a prerogative to make more decrees of eaith in a moment , than all the general councils , since the christian church stood , have made in sixteen hundred years , with all their disquisitio magna . but , i doubt , he will find few that will subscribe to his new symbolum fidei , or his new articles of faith , no better grounded ; nor believe ( however their science , according to malbranche , comes by divine revelation ) that their new faith hath such a supernatural and sacred original . . i had forgotten a very smart confutation of his , put down largely , p. . which is the more victorious , because my own words are brought to tell me to my face , that i eat them . the point was this : a syllogism being the most exact of discourses , out of which some determinate conclusion follows , from the placing of the terms ; hence , in my method , b. . l. . where i treated of the figure of a syllogism , which consists in the placing the two extremes with the middle , so that some determinate conclusion might ensue thence , i advanc'd this proposition , that therefore the two last figures were unnatural , and illogical . my reason given there , § § . , , . was , because the place of the predicate being that which belongs to superiour notions , and the place of the subject ( as the word imports ) being that which sutes best with inferiour ones ; and , it being natural , that that which conjoins two , should be placed in the middle , between them ; it was most unnatural , that the middle-term should be plac'd so as to be predicated , or above them both , as 't is in the second figure , where 't is twice predicated ; or below them both , as in the third , where 't is twice the subject : whence , the middle-term is , in neither of those figures , in the middle . hence , in my § . . i advance this farther consequence ; [ hence , no determinate conclusion can follow in either of the last figures , from the disposal of the parts in the syllogism : ] which i repeat again , and farther explicate , in the next page ; concluding thus , ( the indeterminate conclusion follows not from the artificial form of the syllogism , but meerly from the material identity of all the terms ; or from this , that their notions were found in the same ens. ] and , in conformity to this doctrine , i put two propositions only in each of those figures , ( which i did no where else when i came to make syllogisms , ) because no determinate conclusion follows thence ; as i declare my self , expresly , in the last line of that page . by which , any man of common sense may see clearly , that the state of the question is this , whether any determinate conclusion follows in the two last figures ; and this , from the disposal of the parts in the syllogism . whence , ( id. cart. p. . ) i challeng'd him , and all his cartesians , ( as i do now again , ) ut ostendant , &c. that they would shew , out of the nature of the subject we are treating of , ( as they ought ; ) that is , out os the artificial frame of a syllogism ; which would not be such as it ought to be , ( that is , artificial , ) unless all the three terms had a determinate place in it ; but , chiefly , out of the placing of the middle-term , and the laws of predicating ; why one of the extremes ought , in the conclusion , to be subject or predicate , rather than the other : or , ( which is the same , ) why any determinate conclusion follows from such a placing of the terms . this is the point truly stated from my words , over and over repeated : this , then , he is to answer to , and to shew , that out of such a placing of , the middle-term , any determinate conclusion , that is , one of them rather than the other , does follow . now , let us see his answer , and reflect upon his method . . 't is found in his censura , p. , . where we may observe , first , that there is not one vvord of either a determinate conclusion following thence , nor of following out of the placing the extremes with the middle-term in the premisses ; concerning which only the whole question proceeds , as i over and over repeated . whence follows that he has not spoke one vvord to the purpose , in his whole answer . . he says , turpiter lapsus est , he has fallen into a filthy errour . that is to be try'd , and determin'd , by the solidity of his answer . in the mean time , if my position was an errour , he has never so much as touch'd it , much less confuted it ; since , 't is evident , he has prevaricated from the whole question . . he says , i do calcare aristotelem , trample upon aristotle . poor spiteful trifler ! cannot i dissent from aristotle , or any other author , in any one thing , but i must presently calcare , spernere contemnere , damnare those very authors themselves ? did cartesius calcare , damnare , spernere , &c. all the former world , when he introduc'd this new doctrine of his , so different , and , in most things , so opposite to them all ? . he says , i do calcare porphyrium , trample upon porphyrius ; he means , in putting a sixth predicable , or manner of predicating : and , in case we allow identical propositions , without doing which , we must ( as non ultra has demonstrated ) renounce first principles , it is evident , that the predicating the vvhole , formally and expresly , of the vvhole , is another sort or manner of predicating , from his five . let him know then , once for all , that i am so far from standing corrected , as to my luciferian pride and arrogancy , notwithstanding his casvigations , ( as he calls them , ) that i value not a pin what either aristotle , porphyrius , or any other philosopher says , when i see an evident reason to the contrary ; since , 't is only the goodness of their reasons that gave them all their credit and authority . . i had alledg'd i had produced no syllogisms there at all ; since a syllogism consists of three propositions , whereas , i had manifestly put but two ; because no determinate conclusion follow'd ; and , i challeng'd him that himself had added a third . what says he to this ? does not eye-sight , and my express words in that place , put this out of all doubt , or cavil ? he reflects on it thus , quae haec hominis impudentis confidentia , &c. vvhat a strange confidence is this of this impudent man , whose mouth can by no other means be stopp'd , but by citing his own vvords in english ! and , immediately he puts down my very words , in which are only two propositions , and not three ; without which last , there can be no syllogism . his railing i pass over , and only desire the reader to find a word ( if he can ) to express fully the humour of this mad-man , who strives thus to cut-face men's eyes ; and puts down my very words here , which evidently confute himself . . he cites my words in his censure , p. . that the conclusion may either be this , or the other ; and , as far as i can guess , ( for i am loath to fix upon him absolutely such a prodigious piece of nonsense ) he thinks that , by these words , i signifie , some determinate conclusion follows . can any man be so weak , as not to know that [ either the one , or the other , ] means , [ neither the one , nor the other , determinatery ? ] i see a thing a far off , and i say , 't is either a man , or a horse : do i , in saying so , signifie that it is determinately a man , or determinately a horse ; when as my words expresly speak indifferency , or indetermination , to either ? every conclusion that is deduc'd , is some one ; and , what is one , is determinate ; and , if it be not determinate , or one , 't is none ; for , none signifies no one : whence , i told him , ( id. cart. p. . ) [ consultò abstinui ab ullâ conclusione inferendâ , eò quòd nullam determinatam ( seu quod tantundem est nullam ) inde deduci aut sequi tum ostendi , tum disertè professus sum . ] what replies he to this , in which the force of my answer consists ? not one vvord , nor so much as mentions it ; but rambles on , after his own fashion ; that is , concealing all that is to purpose , or else perverting it ; and , then , making a wide mouth over it , and railing against it . lastly , he will needs do feats , and put the syllogisms , [ clariùs & distinctiùs , ] more clearly and distinctly than i did : which is ridiculous bragging , and nonsense to boot ; for , ( as eye sight attests , ) i put no no syllogisms at all ; neither clearly , nor obscurely ; neither distinctly , nor confusedly . i know he will still be doing twenty things he should not do , to avoid the doing what he should do . if he will be doing . let him shew that any one or determinate conclusion follows out of terms no better placed in the premisses ; and this , from the disposal of the parts of the syllogism ; which are my very words , § . . but this he has not done , nor attempted to do , nor so much as mention'd , or taken notice of it , tho' it be the only point ; and , therefore , he has done nothing at all but prevaricate , fool and rail , and given no kind of answer . to make this clearer ; let the three terms be a b and c ; of which , a is the majus extremum ; b , the middle term ; and c , the minus extremum . if a be predicated of b , that is , be above it ; and b be predicated of , or above c ; then it follows , à fortieri , out of the very placing the terms , that a , being the supreme notion , must be above c , or the predicate in the conclusion ; and , so , a determinate conclusion follows , out of the situation of the terms : but , if a and c stand on the same level , and be both of them either above b , or both of them below it ; neither has any title , by virtue of their place , to be above , or below ; that is , to be predicate , or subject , in the conclusion ; and , therefore , the conclusion remains indeterminate , or no one ; that is , none . the rest is empty vapouring , [ turpissimè lapsus est , ] and such like stuff ; his constant assistant , when he is at a nonplus . if any one have a mind to have a list of his swaggering and ranting vapour upon this occasion , he may read them in my ideae cartesiauae , p. , . in these modest terms , deliver'd in his own words ; [ attend , you university men ; for , he would be your master too — this inventor of this new logick , or method to science — see here his syllogism — ( whereas , eye-sight tells every man , i put no syllogism at all : ) — he makes himself ridiculous — he errs against the most known rules of syllogisms — his judgment , or opinion , is foolish — he contemns every man ; nay , he blots out of the catalogue of philosophers , and makes a mockery of the most noble sir kenelm digby , and albius : ( which is most openly and ridiculously false , and groundless ; since the former never writ any logick , and the later maintain'd the same doctrine in this particular . ) — his syllogisms ( he means , his own ; for , i brought none at all ) are erroneous in more respects than one — these rules , not only sophisters , but almost fresh-men are well acquainted with — he errs filthily — he is a cobler , beyond his slipper — he is an ass , playing upon a harp — he bewrays his own ignorance — he is , in logick , more blind than a mole — he deserves to be hiss'd at — he will be eternally famous for a trifler . ] now , would any man imagin , that this vapourer is , all this while , so utterly out , that ( as has been now shewn ) he has not so much as spoke one syllable to the true question ; which is , whether a determinate conclusion follows in the second and third figures , out of the placing of the middle terms with the extremes . by the way , observe , gentlemen , with what meek and humble spirits these men are endow'd : they think , there is not the least shew of immodesty , or incivility , in their words ; not , tho' they call me impudent here , for saying what the very words they cite shew to the eye of every reader . this errour ( forsooth ! ) was shewn me long ago , by his friend , and tutor , mr. bisset , after my book was printed ; who , out of his own wondrous kindness to me , told me , he was sorry i had so strangely mistaken ; and , as i am inform'd , he has objected it since , to some of my friends ; as a great lapse : to rectifie whom , i have been something larger , in case he be not past rectifying . but , of him , and all that has pass'd between us , more hereafter , as occasion presents . . i cannot omit another method of solving my demonstrations , 't is so very pleasant . i had demonstrated in my method , that all intrinsecal differences were nothing but more or less of the generical notion ; for , if they be intrinsecal , or keep within the precincts of that common notion ; that is , if they be not fetch'd from another head , ( which is , to be extrinsecal , ) then , in case they did equally partake the genus , the one of the species ( they being , both of them , constituted by their differences ) would have in it nothing particular to it self ; or , have nothing in it , but just the same the other had ; and , so , they could not differ intrinsecally from one another : whence follows , that the intrinsecal differences , by which they formally differ , can be no other but an unequal participation of the common notion ; that is , more and less of it . what says he to this clear demonstration ? not a word . 't is his prerogative , never to regard the argument . he denies my conclusion , as he does almost always , quite thorow his whole answer ; and , he never fails of having something or other to say against that : and , to let the reader see here it cannot stand , he brings no less artillery than omnipotence against it : vvhat ! ( says he , ) is it impossible , then , for god , whose power he is not vvilling to obey , ( that unchristian slander must come in of course , ) to make two species , or individuums , that equally participate their superiour notion ? is it impossible for god to cause two things , or modes , or two eggs , not to be essentially unequal , since they all depend on god. now , there is not one word in my argument , that relates , in the least , to god's omnipotence , more than there is in any of euclid's demonstrations , or any other argument whatsoever , brought by any other philosopher : so that , this answer is equally applicable to them , as to this of mine . and , is not this a most formidable method , and , withall , very expedite , to answer all the arguments in the world ! viz. if they who alledge them , offer to say they conclude , he tells them , in short , that they deny god's omnipotence , that they are not willing to obey his power — on which all things depend ; and , therefore , are impious against god , if they will not grant , their argument may , possibly , not conclude , or be good for nothing ! what man living dares deal with such an adversary , who has omnipotence , in all exigencies , still at hand , to befriend him ? this is their constant topick ; and , tho' he uses it never so oft , it will never be worn thread-bare . certainly , that sacred attribute was never so prophan'd , as by these men , who make it perpetually an excuse for their ignorance , and a cloak for their malice . cartesius could dare omnipotence to do his worst , to deceive him , med. . nunquam ( says he ) efficiet deceptor ille summè potens ut nihil sim , quamdiù me aliquid esse cogitabo ; and , yet , is applauded for it : but others cannot bring a plain demonstration , but we are presently bobbed in the mouth with denying omnipotence . but , the question is not , whether omnipotence can solve it ; but , whether mr. le grand can . in the mean time , what answer does he himself give to my argument , which , in short , is this , if the species do not partake the generical notion unequally , one has nothing in it under that genus , but what the other has : if it has nothing in it , as under that genus , but what the other has , it does not differ from it , as under that genus : if it do not differ from it under that genus , then 't is one and the same with it under that consideration , and not two ; v. g. two yards being equal under the notion of quantity , they do not differ , that is , they are the self-same under the notion of quantity , precisely : which is as certain as this identical , into which it is refunded , viz. a yard is a yard . now , would i give something to be present when mr. le grand puts on his considering . cap , and bethinks him what to say to this demonstration : i expect he will laugh at it , as meer gibberish ; ( that we may be sure of , ) for , he has a perfect antipathy against all connected discourse ; and , if the connexion be close , he falls into a paroxysm of railing ; but , if the evidence of it be driven to identical propositions , then his reason falls into a swoon , and is perfectly entranc'd ; nor can any thing cure him , or furnish him with any kind of answer , but to have recourse to the divine omnipotence , for relief ; and then he is enchanted , and proof against all the demonstrations in the world ; and , will either pretend an identical proposition may be false ; or tell his adversary , that god's omnipotence can make his argument not conclude ; and , that he is unwilling to acknowledge and obey god's power , if he will needs stand to his argument , was ever man so nonpluss'd , and baffl'd . . another most remarkable instance of his exactness in solving my demonstrations , ( and 't is a very compendious and admirable one , ) shall be , his skipping over multitudes of them , very nimbly , at one leap. in my appendix , which confuted his false pretence of holding formal mutation , ( without which , all physicks and metaphysicks are meer nonsense , ) i had shewn how he spoke contradictions in every step he took ; v. g. how he made [ intrinsecal ] to be [ extrinsecal ; ] [ substantial , ] or [ esseutial , ] to be the same as [ accidental ; ] the producing a new substance , or ens , call'd [ generation , ] to be meerly [ location , ] or [ situation ] of many things orderly together , which belong to another head , or predicament ; and , consequently , is no generation . how he makes [ unum , or one , ] to be [ non-unum , or multa ; ] that is , not-one , but many ; and ens , or thing , to be entia , or things . how he so abus'd the notions of [ simplex ] and [ compositum , ] that he made them to be the same , under the same notion . how he made completum , and incompletum , to be the self-fame . how he confounds the commonest notions of actus and potentia , and destroys both their natures ; which contradicts all learned , and , even , all common discourse . how he makes what is ] divisible , ] to be no way divisible , or , [ not-divisible . ] how he puts that to be physical , ( which belongs to a distinct science from the mathematicks , ) to be mathematical ; that is , not-physical . how he makes [ meer matter , ] which , as such , is contradistinguish'd to form , ( as the principle of potentiality and indetermination is to that principle which is actuating , or determinative , ) to be [ inform'd ; ] and that too essentially . how he makes [ suppositions ] ( on which cartesius proceeds ) to be [ principles , ] and relies on them as such ; which are not only no principles , but contradictorily opposite to the whole nature and essence of principles . all which , and much more , i objected , and prov'd , against him , ( at least , all but this last ) by mediums , fetch'd from metaphysicks , which are next to self-evident , and border upon the very first principles of all ; or , on identical propositions , to which also i did , by the way , reduce some of them . what answers he to this large discourse , consisting of thirty five pages , which demonstrates how he had stumbl'd into flat nonsense , every step he took ? read , gentlemen ; and admire the profound learning of my adversary , and his dexterity in solving my arguments . he answers all those demonstrations ( o wonderful ! ) in less than a page and a half . but , how ? does he shew they proceed upon unevident principles , or false and unprov'd suppositions ; or , that the terms i use in my discourse , are unconnected ? no , no ; all these are meer fooleries with him : this is none of his methods . how , then , does he answer them ? why , first , ( censura , p. . ) he prefaces confidently , ( which is no small part of his method of answering , ) and says , expectandum erat , ut vires suas omnes in eâ ( he means his appendix ) confutanda eliceret : it was to be expected he would have exerted his whole force , in answering my appendix . well! but , does he reply to my answer , tho' never so negligently and carelesly written ? that is to be yet examin'd . secondly . he proceeds , at proh hominis ignavi imperitium ! hic , certè , si usquam , nugatur egregiè : oh , the unskilfulness of this slothful man ! here , if e-ever , he trifles egregiously . these are , hitherto , but bold sayings . what is his answer ? why , he says , that i bring a physical discourse to the ten predicaments ; to genus and species ; to ens and unum , abstractions , and logical trifles . indeed , in one page , ( . ) where i am stating the question , i make a small logical discourse , to shew under what a precise consideration we speak of our subject ; thus to beget a clear and distinct conception , what forms or modes are intrinsecal , what extrinsecal : but , my reader will see , that all my mediums are either taken from physicks , or from metaphysicks . and , 't is to these mediums , we would have an answer . does he shew that i deviate from the nature of the thing in hand ? do i not hold to the notions of ens , unum , matter , form ? &c. alas ! he never minds such frivolous considerations . thirdly , he says , i tell my reader , my peripatetical assertions are not suppos'd gratis , but demonstrated . does he go about to prove the contrary ? he not so much as attempts it . to what end , then , does he bring such stuff ? oh! 't is a necessary ingredient of his method , to tell us at large what i say ; for , that makes a shew , as if he were about to confute me ; and , when he has done , he lets it all alone , and slides away to another thing ; which is his general trick , all over . he is true to one part of his title , which is , censura ; for , he censures very notably : but , he never promis'd he would give a reason , why ; and , he will not go beyond his promise , or his bargain . fourthly , he says , i would have the readers believe that the words [ divisibility , physical , matter , &c. ] are abus'd by him . he mistakes ; i would not have any readers of mine believe any tittle , upon my word ; but , see with the eye of their own reason , that my arguments prove what i pretend , to be true. but , were it so ; does he even attempt to shew that my arguments do not conclude ; and , by doing so , to preserve my readers from the mischief of assenting to my impious doctrine ? methinks , his charity to his neighbour should oblige him to endeavour this , at least : but , he begs their excuse ; he must not run to new and troublesome methods , and leave his own , which never yet fail'd him , and is , withall , so easie. by which , every one will see , that his policy is much greater than his charity . after this , he surceases his impugnation of my arguments ; and ends with calling them cavils , which , he says , he has satisfy'd formerly ; but he neither tells his reader , nor can tell him , time , nor place , when or where , he thus satisfy'd the debt he ow'd him ; and , therefore , the obligation remains yet in force . then he says , i neglect his observations , ( the worthy transcriptions of his profound note-book-learning , ) which may sometimes ( if they be pertinent , and authentick ) be brought against a conclusion ; but can , with no sense , be pretended fit to solve arguments , or shew the terms unconnected . besides , i have laid open , how insignificant the way of observations or experiments are , ( when we are laying grounds of philosophy , ) at the end of my preface to my method . he brings up all , with sounding his noble triumph over my demonstrations , and then concludes it with a little pedantick foolery , which are great embelishments through his whole books ; and , tells his reader , like a right solid philosopher , as he is , that the mountains brought forth , and were deliver'd of a ridiculus mus. yet , tho' he has , with a wonderful agility , skipp'd over all those demonstrations against his appendix , at once , without either touching or mentioning any one of them ; yet , he tells us , for all that , ( p. . ) very briskly , and confidently , appendicem meam , ab omnibus ejus ictibus sartam tectam , tuebor : i will defend my appendix , safe and sound , against all his assaults . and , in one sense , he says very true ; for , certainly , never did man , in the world , make such a defence against so many demonstrations : one would think that , to avoid them all , and run away from them all , is a strange way of defending them all . but , these cartesian methods of theirs can do more than miracle . this prevarication of his from performing one jot of what he had so largely promis'd , would be enough to make any writer , but himself , lose his credit utterly ; and so it would his too , but that he is proof against it , having none to lose : for , he has us'd us to it so often , that none now expects it . by the same nimble method , he leaps over my whole th indication , without replying one word to those most important objections : see his censura , p. . where he gives them their quick dispatch , in ten lines , by virtue of the same method ; which deserves to be call'd , the new cartesian method of expedition . . in the self-same method he answers my demonstration , ( id. cart. p. , &c. ) which prov'd , the cartesians had no principles of knowing ; my five demonstrations , which shew'd their first principle of knowing ( consisting in this , that the soul had a power to elicit ideas out of her self ) was contradictory to the first principles of our understanding ; and three more against the insignificancy of the occasional impression upon the nerve , whence , as they say , those ideas come to be elicited ; and yet three more , against the pretence of annexing such and such ideas to such motions made upon the nerve , by god's meer will , as they pretended , but never yet prov'd . now , this expedite way of answering serves them as well for these , as it did for the former ; and is equally fit to solve all the demonstrations in the whole world : 't is but calling them trifles , cavils , and ridiculous mice ; and , immediately , all the connexion of terms in them , and all the consequences deduc'd from them , tho' never so strict , and close , will fly quite asunder , and they are all shatter'd into loose , incoherent talk , by the miraculous virtue of this all-answering , all-confuting method . yet , he tells his reader , in his ad lectorem , that omnibus adversarii objectionibus satis abundè factum inveniet ; that he will find all the objections of his adversary sufficiently and abundantly answer'd . whereas , whoever reads my ideae cartesianae , will discern , that he has not so much as mention'd the tenth part of what he ought to have reply'd to , and confuted . he tells him also , that nihil intactum reliquit , which was not futile ac ridiculum nimis ; he has left nothing untouched , but that which is very babbling , and ridiculous . and , this is another answer to all my demonstrations ; for , these are the things he has most carefully , and most exactly left untouch'd , ( tho' he handles wrangling trifles very largely : ) or , if , by accident , he happ'd to touch them , he first defiles and perverts them , as he thinks fit ; and then he musters , and brings up his little army of his new methods , to attack them . . but , what is become of these categorical propositions , all this while , into which i had reduc'd his loose ramble , as into the principles which , i saw , lay at the bottom of his respective discourses , and grounded the several parts of them . i had collected them with much exactness , and referr'd to the places where it would appear , that they were the foundations on which he built all his incoherent and inartificial superstructures . i did this , to oblige him to aim his random-talk at some certain and determinate mark ; and , that , by seeing what he was to prove , he might , at length , be forc'd to bring some determinate arguments , to make them good . i was so far from imposing them , that ( id. cartes . pag. , . ) i left it at his choice , either to grant or deny them : if he granted them , then he was to maintain them ; if he deny'd them to be his sense , then i undertook to shew that he would , by doing so , overthrow all his own doctrine which was grounded on them : but , he will not so much as take notice of any one of them ; only , he tells his reader , they are theses fictitiae , and fidelitate nullâ collectae : fictitious positions , and unfaithfully collected . if so , i had given him the greatest advantage against me , he could ever hope to gain . however , if none of his , and , that therefore he could not grant them , he might have deny'd them : but he fore-saw the consequence , and , that i could easily fix them upon him ; and , that those positions he had made use of for his principles , were such shameful nonsense , that nothing could be more opprobrious to him , than to be convicted to have built all his doctrine upon such chimerical grounds . he fore-saw too , that these scurvy categorical propositions use to have some kind of coherence in them , and so might hap to bring our dispute into that abominable way of connexion ; and , thence , might oblige him to bring arguments to prove them ; which would require much more trouble , and pains , than meer saying would do ; and , withall , would put him quite out of all his friendly methods , which had supported him hitherto , and were still his only refuge : and , therefore , he very fairly and and prudently let them all alone ; only , he tells us they are fictitious , and unfaithfully collected ; and there 's an end of them . for , he thinks , good man ! that whatever he says , is prov'd , as if he though he could create and uncreate arguments , ( and answers too , ) with only saying they were naught . and , 't is unconscionable to expect more from a man , who has no more to give us . . in the next rank of his new methods , march his follies ; and , first , for dignity sake , come forward his learned ones , as those that should aim at having some speculative truth in them ; viz. pag. . he puts upon me to hold , that creation is essential to god ; a tenet i ever abhorr'd , and have laid grounds to confute such a senseless opinion in my method , b. . l. . § . . and , for what reason does he impose it upon me , to hold such an impious tenet ? because i say there are no different points in eternity , or before the world was made ; by the distances from which , we may frame to our selves any notion of sooner , or later ; alledging , that these were differences of time , which could not be , till time it self was ; nor could time be , till the world was . which thesis has no more connexion with creation's being essential to god , than the tenet of the extension of body is to the first chapter in genesis ; or , that of the four elements is to algebra . whence , all his discourse , pag. . by which he would seem to oppose me , is wrong levelled . again ; since all common notions have their original from our observing many individuals agreeing in the same nature ; which , when all agree in it , we call it a summum genus ; if very many only , then a species ; and so we descend to inferiour kinds , or species ; which species are intrinsecally constituted by partaking unequally the superiour , or common notion ; as i have demonstrated , and shewn by instances , in my method , b. . l. . to § . . again ; since it is not every indeterminate , or very small degree of magis and minus , or of unequal participation of the genus , which constitutes or makes divers sorts of mankind , or denominates it to be another kind ; but , the distance between them must be conspicuous , and very notorious ; and , under the species of man , there are found great multitudes that do partake the notion of rational , ( which is essential to man , ) both in their intellectuals , and morals , and this from their natural constitution , or genius , above others ; so that they seem , in a manner , angelical , in respect of them ; and the other , comparatively , in a manner , brutal . hence , i advanc'd this paradox , that there may be such degrees of more and less rational found in mankind , so that some of them may seem to be another species , sort , or kind of men ( for those three words are equivalent ) from the other : nay , the nature-taught vulgar , following their genuin thoughts , use to call them so too : as , when they say , [ he is another kind of man than you imagine ; ] meaning thereby , more rational , or ( which is the same ) a man of better judgment , or more vertuous . what does mr. le grand ? instead of confuting my principle , or examining my reason , he falls to to talk of lunar-men , or men in the moon , and the other stars ; and tells me , lest ( as he says ) i should be ignorant of it , ( how infinitely am i bound to him for enlightning me ! ) what authors have thought there were men there . then he talks also of planetary-men , and tells us fine things of them too . which done , he says , if i am too dull to understand these astronomical observations , ( that is , which he had not made himself , but pick'd them out of books , which he thinks to be a work of great learning , ) he desires i would shew my self a divine , and answer to his question , whether i hold that there are any pre-adamites , or no ? why , this is pure bedlam ! what have i to do with the men in the moon , the planetary gentlemen , or the pre-adamites ? not a word to this purpose is found in any of my books . i spoke only of our honest neighbours here , in our earth ; where there are many , ex ipsâ naturâ , as dull as beetles ; and , naturally , as immoral as brutes : others , vel ex ipsa origine , ( that is , essentially , ) of a high pitch of knowledge , and inclin'd to vertue ; and both naturally dispos'd to see truth clearly , and to pursue it in their practice sincerely : whereas , others can scarce see ●s far as their nose ; and have such weak eyes , that they are blear'd , and be darken'd , if any evident or connected truth is propos'd to them ; which is the greatest depravation of rational nature , ( as far as 't is intellectual , ) that can be imagin'd , in regard all truth consists in connexion of our notions : which men do therefore seem to be another species , or ( as we say ) another kind of men , as to their rationality , than others are . you will say , these are only divers qualities in those men , which do not infer divers species . i reply , that , if they do concern their very power of reasoning , or their rationality , which is their essence ; and , that they have this from their primordial constitution , in the very instant they are made individually such ; ( which is always essential , because it distinguishes them from other individuals . ) also , if nobilitas animarum sequitur ex nobilitate corporum ; the nobility ( or excellency ) of souls follows out of the nobility ( or excellency ) of the body , ( as st. thomas of aquin says , prim. q. . q. . ) then this difference between such two men is not only a diversity in some quality , but essential ; and , therefore , in case there be many of each sort , and so visibly different , that we can abstract a notion from those of each sort , which is common to all those under it , 't will be a sub-species , or an inferiour kind of man. but , could he have more discover'd his own ignorance , than to call the knowledge of men in the moon , and planetary-men , astronomical observations ? what astronomy treats of , is , the motion of celestial bodies , their bigness , distance , the times of their appearances , their influences , and the respects they have to one another : but , that any astronomer did ever observe , ( as he says , ) men in the moon , or in the other planets , i confess my self too dull to conceive , or to apprehend ; nor , how any man , not better-half craz'd , could imagine they should . . well , but the question is , whether there can be abstracted a common notion of a very notable rationality from some sort , or kind of men , which agrees to all them , and does not to another sort , which are not , by their very intrinsecal or essential constitution , near so rational ! if so , is not this all that is requisite to make a sub-species ? this being so , what says mr. le grand to the reason of it ? not a word . yet , he is never out , in his way : for , as in the preface to his former book , he did , upon this occasion , instead of replying to the argument , give us a most learned discourse of all sorts of dogs ; of generous dogs , clownish dogs , degenerate dogs , hunting dogs , hawking dogs ; which he says , ( contrary to the notion of all mankind , ) that they differ only in some qualities , and not in kind ; so , he tells us here , of lunar men , planetary men , and men before adam . for which he had two reasons ; one is , to talk something , lest men should think he is nonplus'd , tho' it be not one tittle to the purpose , or , in the least concerns my argument . the other is , because he had laid up in lavender those pretty collections in his note-book ; and it was a thousand pities the world should die in ignorance of them , or himself lose the credit due to the great sweat of his brain , and most profound learning , in reading and transcribing them . . but , this premis'd , who can do less than admire at mr. le grand's assertion , p. ? three propositions were exibited to two sorbon doctors ; and so perverted , and untowardly propos'd , that they seem'd plainly to say , that we must see the connexion of terms in those propositions which express'd the articles of christian faith ; that is , that we must see the very mysteries themselves demonstrated , ere we ought to believe them ; and , in this sense they condemn'd them , as they clearly signify'd in their censure . now comes mr. le grand , and tells us , p. . error ab authore isto dicitur quicquid non exhibuit damnata illa olim parisiis terminorum connexio : j. s. calls every thing an errour , whatever that connexion of terms condemn'd formerly at paris , does not exhibit . is not this pleasant ? they condemn'd not the connexion of terms , even in the mysteries ; for , then they must condemn the truth of all the mysteries of christian faith : what they condemn'd , was , most expresly , the necessity of our seeing this connexion of the terms in the mysteries themselves , ere we ought to believe them ; for , this excludes , or evacuates , the divine authority , in which only , and by relying on which , we see such propositions to be true , or , their terms to be connected . again ; does he think there is no connexion of terms in other things , but only in these ? does not all the truth in all the sciences in the world ; nay , all the truth , even , in all our discourses , consist in this , that the terms of the propositions do cohere in sense , or are connected ? does he think that i account all these to be errours ? which if i do , i must deny all my own arguments , and all my thoughts , which are true. no , no ; that 's not the business . this would be a most prodigious piece of ignorance . but , his cruel feud against all connexion , and , particularly , that in my demonstrations , is so deadly , and implacable , that he would persuade the reader that those sorbon doctors did condemn all connexion of terms whatsoever ; nay , the very way of discoursing connectedly ; that is , all the deduced truths , writ by all scientifical men in the whole world. this , i must confess , would be ( tho' shameful to them , yet ) of vast advantage to himself ; for , then he need not stand solving my demonstrations , for , in that case , they would be solv'd to his hand ; or rather , they were never ty'd , knit , or connected . and , it would be a second advantage to him , that , in that happy case , his fancy might ramble at random , without any control , or without being fetter'd and shackl'd by this cruel tyrant connexion , and by the severe laws of logick ; which improve , and , by virtue of first principles , shew this connexion to be really such , and reducible to self-evidence . by which we see the reason why his friend merry-man and himself are so uneasie , and piqu't at my method to science , which advances and builds all along upon this enemy to all these cartesian methods , this most abominable proud and arrogant usurper over his ideas , connexion . . it were endless to reckon up all his loarned follies of this kind . my notes , which gather all his performances into several heads , reckon them to be about two and forty : all which spring from his abhorrence of connexion ; which neithe permits him ( or rather , render it impossible for him ) to bring any arguments of his own , or to answer mine . whereas , i am so arrogant , and proud , that i am ●o heartily contented , unless i see self-evidens connexion of the terms in my principles , and the terms of my conclusion to be connected , because the two extremes are clearly connected with the middle term , or medium , in the premisses . and , now we see too what is the reason why he does still slide over the premisses , and never looks my argument in the face , but comes cowardly behind it ; and first denies , and then ( after his fashion , or by some of his aukward methods ) sets upon their rear , my conclusions . . after his learned follies , march , in a long row , his plain fooleries : tho' those may not seem worthy to be rank'd among his new methods , yet we are mistaken ; for , they serve to set off the others , and to stop gaps when his reason is at a loss : and , first , come his profound criticisms . for example , p. . he takes much pains to tell us what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or impossible , means ; and spends above a whole page in declaring at large no less than four several senses , in which lawyers take that word . as if philosophers could not understand the meaning of the words themselves use , without having recourse to lawyers . however , this helps to shew he is an universal scholar , and informs the reader , he has peep'd into law-books too ; at least , into their indexes ; and , that he has glean'd thence some few notes , to enrich his common-place-book ; to do which , he thinks a high point of knowledge . which puts me in mind of the saying of a certain poet , concerning such collectors : — lord ! how they 'd look , should they but chance to lose their table-book ! . the next shall be that of sentire ; and of hearing also , both in primo gradu , and secundo gradu : the summ of which is , that the word is equivocal ; which is no wonder , most words being such : by which method , he might make reflexions on ten parts of twelve of the whole dictionary . now , in our way of doctrine , how easily are all these speeches reconcil'd ? for , man being one thing , all his operations are corporeo-spiritual ; whence , our direct knowledge of things coming in by our senses , it is natural to say when we hear , that we know ; since both are done at the same time , and by the same compound operation . thus , when we see a thing , we say , we know it ; all mankind , till cartesius's time , holding firmly , that we ought to trust our eye-sight , and the other senses , when the power is not disabl'd from perceiving , and the object and the medium are well propos'd , convenient , and well circumstanc'd . he has a worse criticism upon the word [ conceptus , ] conception ; and this , for two reasons ; one , because we rather apprehend , than comprehend ; as if we did not hold our conceptions to be inadequate ; and , by doing so , declare , that we do never , by any one conception , comprehend the whole thing . the other reason is , because a conception in the womb is , touch'd and comprehended by it : whence , he says , visio sutes better with our knowing a thing , than conceptio . i wish he would reflect on that known maxim , that the common use of words gives them their signification , whatever their radix , or derivation , grammatically imports ; and , that to be conceiv'd by our understanding , is the same as to be seen by it : so that visio and conceptio fall into the self-same notion . what a coil does he keep with his incoherent criticism upon lepidus and lepor . now , it signifies , elegancy of speech ; then , liberal arts ; then , trifling and ridiculous sports ; then , scurrility . then he wonders i do not take it for lepus , a hare , and make the second syllable short . and , why so ? that he might bring in his jest of corripuit fluvium , objected to an old poet , when he us'd the word euphrates so . certainly , this bewrays such an emptiness of sense , and such a nitty pedantick levity , that it is below ridiculousness . but , what is all this to me ? what is all this to philosophy ? lastly , what is all this to the duty incumbent on him , and owing to his readers , who desire to see truth ? does he think it becomes him to trifle away his time , in running thus a wooll-gathering after petty school-boy criticisms , and hunting after butter-flies ; and let so many demonstrations , which , if not solv'd , overthrow all cartesianism from the very foundation , lie unanswer'd , and untouch'd ? . the last criticism of which ( omitting others ) i shall take notice , is found in his censura , p. . which is such a famous one , that it deserves to be a pattern to all future generations , and to entitle him king of criticks . i had us'd the word [ directus , ] as a particle of the verb [ dirigo , ] in the plain obvious sense for [ directed ; ] as we use it , when we say , we direct our prayers to god , or a letter to a friend : but , mr. le grand , who is so little acquainted with any kind of principles , that he reflects not that the first principle , that governs the sense and meaning of all words , is the common and obvious use of them , which stamps the signification of them , and makes it current and proper , finds strange mysteries in this ordinary word ; and , as he formerly fear'd a silly asterisk , or star , left casually in the context , was a plot of mine , to run him thorow with those five darts ; so , now he apprehends i have some stratagem upon him , for taking [ directus ] in that plain sense : whereupon , he tells the reader here , that i am vir subdolus , a crafty , or subtile man ; and have some pernicious meaning ; but , let him alone , he will , in the end , turn it upon my self . now comes his most noble criticism : first , he brings in the phrase of plautus , the comedian ; abi directe ; go your ways , straight . thence , he carries it on still farther , i know not how , to [ dierectè ; ] which adverb comes not from dirigo , but from an odd obsolete word , [ dierectus , ] which his brother-criticks will tell him , comes from sub dio erectus ; that is , set up in the open air , or gibbeted . where are we now ? for , we are quite got out of the signification of the word [ directus , ] which signifies [ directed . ] but our critick is not got half way to his journey 's end : for , from [ dierectus , ] he carries it on to the adverb [ dierectà ; ] which signifies , in english , [ with a mischief : ] and , [ ito dierectà , ] is an old expression for [ go , and be hang'd . ] having brought it to dierectus , the next thing he does , is , to bring dierectus , by the alteration of a letter , and putting in another , to [ diarrectus : ] whereas , no such word is to be heard of in our common dictionaries , nor in the lexicon latino-barbarum : yet , he had a learned end in it , we may be sure ; and 't is this ; he remember'd there was a greek word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ] which signifies [ disruptus ; ] that is , burst , or broken asunder ; and , this bringing it to [ diarrectus , ] gives him occasion to take a leap from italy , into greece , that he might make the word [ directed , ] signifie [ broken in pieces , ] as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does . yet , this comes not fully home to his purpose ; and , therefore , he makes [ directus , ] i know not how , to signifie , amongst criticks , ( he means himself , ) [ disrumpi dignus , worthy to be broken in pieces . ] and , now the whole plot is come to light : for , when once he had , by often scruing the word , and shifting the signification of it , from one country , to another , got the plain word , [ directus , ] whither he would have it ; that is , to signifie , [ worthy to be broken in pieces ; [ immediately he applies his formidable engine he had been preparing , and down goes my preface , and my epilogue , directed to such and such ; they , all of them , deserve to be broken , or torn in pieces . then he brings [ broken in pieces , ] to perishing ; and , then , my poor self ( he says ) perishes with them too ; and , lastly , by virtue of a greek poet's saying , [ if i do perish , let the earth and fire be mingl'd ; ] let ( says he ) [ universus terrarum orbis , ] the whole world perish too . who could have imagin'd that such a dite and universal catastrophe should befall the whole world , from my using the word directus , when i expressed my self to design , send , intend or dedicate my books , or any piece of them , to such and such persons . gentlemen ; what can any sober men think of such a kind of writer ? this is neither levity , folly , or childishness ; but , plain downright . madness : this is something beyond prince butler himself . if any one can think this censure too harsh , let him but parallel such a distracted way of writing in any other author extant , who is well in his wits and , i promise him , i will re-call my censure . for my part , i can liken such a rambling career of criticism , to nothing but that of a merry sophister in cambridge-schools , who , jokingly ( as the fashion was then , at some certain times , ) would needs prove his adversary , whose name was cooper , to have been lineally descended from king pepin , by the like gradation of criticisms ; alledging , that he was call'd [ cooper , quasi hooper ; hooper , quasi haper ; haper , quasi naper ; naper , quasi diaper ; diaper , quasi napkin ; napkin , quasi pipkin ; pipkin , quasi king pepin . this , i say , is its only parallel ; only , this youth did not ramble from one language to another ; nor did this , but only when mirth and wit were expected : but , that a grave man ( as he would be thought ) should , in a treatise where philosophy and solidity were expected , let so many pretended demonstrations lie at his door , demanding , and calling-out to him for an answer ; and spend a considerable part of his reply so unseasonably , in such fooleries ; and , which is worse , ( as appears by his carriage , ) think himself very learned in criticism all the while , ( which shews he does it seriously , ) makes him not reachable by that sophister , or by any ; but , to be a phoenix , and only self parallell'd . by this worthy criticism , the reader will easily see what a rare interpreter of scripture this man would make , with his acute art of criticizing , which can wire-draw quidlibet è quodlibet . . so far concerning his criticisms : his other fooleries , which , i believe , take up the fourth part of his book , are innumerable : the best of them are so ridiculous , that it is a kind of foolery in me to take notice of them . however , since i am to lay open all the new cartesian methods , i am oblig'd to give my reader some few instances of them , by which he may guess at the rest . a friend of his told him , a terrible answer was coming out against him : this slight occasion serves him for an ironical expression all over his book ; and , terribilis author , terribile responsum , terribiles falsificationes , terribile argumentum , comes over and over , i believe , at least , a hundred times , in his censura : which i can liken to nothing so well as to some little , apish , wanton school-boy , blowing a feather up and down in the air , to make himself sport. yet , this does him more service than all his answers . but , give me leave to tell him , that the way of shewing it not terrible , is , boldly to come close up to my demonstrations , and solve them : but , he is so far from shewing any such honest courage , that whoever reflects how he avoids them all , or over-leaps them , will see , that , tho' my ideae cartesianae was not so terrible as to fright him quite out of his wits , yet , it has put him quite beside them ; and , has made him skip aside into twenty bogs and quagmires , and hiding-holes , to escape meeting with them . should a gentleman , challeng'd to the field , instead of meeting and grappling with his adversary , run about , into all companies , flouting at him for a terrible fighter , a terrible hector , a terrible swash-buckler ; i fear , every man would conclude , he was really , and indeed , terrible to him , however he call'd him so in mockery ; and , that this flouting him , without giving him the satisfaction due , and expected , would scarce serve his honour , or save him from the imputation of a coward . then , every errour in the printing is charg'd upon me , as if i knew not how to write true latin. upon which , i am told , i break priscian's head , am an ignoramus , and many such civil complements . did i think such toys worth noting , i could requite him with enow of such observations , in his late scabrous , and ( in some places ) unintelligible piece . then comes in horace , to prove all my writings are but ridiculous mice . then , artotrogus , an idle fellow in plautus , the merry comedian , is cited , to prove me perjur'd ; [ perjuriorem hoc homine , &c. if ever any one saw a more perjur'd man than this , or more full of vanity , let him take me to him , and i will be his bond slave if ever i eat a sallad with him , tho' i were like to starve . ] and , to clinch this undeniable testimony that i am perjur'd ; and , lest the reader should not believe it was artotrogus , who thus testity'd this unchristian immorality of mine , he assures him of it , by telling him , [ sunt ipsissima artotrogi verba apud plautum : ] they are the very and express vvords of artotrogus , in plautus . what an emphatical word is that same [ ipsissima ; ] and , how necessary to be particularly remark'd ! then comes in canis aesopicus , the dog in aesop , and admonishes him , by his example , not to follow my shadow : and , he is so heartily ready to follow the example aesop's dog had set him , that he not only not catches at my shadow , but he le ts pass what is most substantial too , by not replying to any of my demonstrations . then , he talks of a cos gyratilis , a vvhirling vvhet-stone , to put to my nose : which is a mystical jeer , taken from some of his pedantick observations . then comes in miles gloriosus , and his machaera quoe gestit fartum facere ex hostibus ; his sword that longs to make a pudding of his enemy : i beseech the reader to view the d and d pages , and then tell me , if ever he read a man more vainly proud of big vvords , than this empty man is . after that , he brings in his friend 's pyrgopolynices in campis gurgustidoniis is ubi bombomachides cluninstaridysarchides erat imperator summus , n●ptuni filius . what stuff is this ? can this man do himself a greater disparagement , than to tell his reader how fond he is of such trash ? yet , to talk idly when he has nothing else to do , is more excusable for an aery , light-headed man ; but , to talk at this rate , when he has such serious business lies upon his hands , as vindicating his cartesian doctrine from so many arguments ; and , then , instead of answering any one of them , to stand cutting capers in the air , and vapouring with such high-sounding bombast , tells every man he is at a scurvy loss ; and , too plainly detects , how insignificant he is in any thing belonging to sense and solidity . . yet , upon second thoughts , however mr. le grand makes me a lyar , and perjur'd ; yet , i will be so civil to him , as to declare he has not , for any thing i can say , told one single lye in any of his books ; perhaps , never since he follow'd cartesius's doctrine ; no , nor falsify'd neither . to understand which thorowly , and , that the reader may see i neither flatter him , nor injure my self , upon whom he has laid so many false aspersions ; i am to give him information of one main point of cartesius's doctrine ; which is , that ( no credit being to be given to our senses , but only to the ideas which the soul frames in her self ) our judgment is not therefore true , because 't is conformable to the things without us ; but , the things are then to be judg'd true , or to be really thus or thus , when they are conformable to our ideas : whereas , the aristotelians say , that we then judge true , when the things are such as we judge them to be ; and , that our senses , except in some odd circumstances , do not deceive us . wherefore , since to lye , is not barely to say a falshood ; for , a man may do so very innocently , and yet , since he spoke to the best of his judgment , be an innocent and good man : but , to lye , is to go against his own thoughts , or judgment : this being so , hence mr. le grand may think , and say , ( as he does in his preface to his reader , ) that i spoke false when i objected that he had said i was in deum impius , impious against god ; for , his ideas might inform him so : whereas , i , neglecting his way of ideas , and relying on this fallacious sense of mine , eye-sight , seem'd to read those words very plain in his former preface , p. . l. . thus he might read in my books , by the light of his ideas , that i deny'd god was primaria causa , or the first cause of motion ; whereas , i believing these false senses of mine do find that i only deny'd he is the immediate cause of it ; and , that he must therefore be the primary cause , because he moves matter by second causes , the angels . thus my ears informing my common reason , of the language amongst charitable and good people , told me , that to call one asinus ad lyram , talpa caecior , blasphemus , delirus , facie non satis honesta ; and , that i spit at heaven , and twenty such like contumelies , were virulent expressions ; notwithstanding which , his ideas might , for all that , tell him that they were ( as he calls them here ) modest. so , my eyes inform me , that i only put two propositions in that place lately cited , and said expresly , no determinate conclusion could follow , out of them , from the disposal of the terms in a syllogism : but , his ideas might tell him , i put three propositions in both places , and , that there are no such words as those now mention'd , which directly told him the true state of the question ; and , that therefore he had no reason to take notice of them . lastly , by the same means it may come about , that his ideas might tell him that i had said those very words , [ providentia divina me , ex aliis omnibus , selegit . ] and , the like may be said of all the other falsifications i had charg'd on him , and multitudes of others , which ( proceeding only by instances ) i had omitted ; whereas , these false and fallacious eyes of mine told me , there were no such words in the places he cited for them , but quite contrary . so that , he and i might both of us mean to speak truth ; but , either my senses , or his ideas , might delude , and deceive us : which we ought to believe , is left to the reader 's judgment to determin . besides , perhaps , he might think , as is malbranche's method , ( whom he so zealously defends , ) that he saw all these things i object , in the ideas which he sees in god , or fancies that he has a divine revelation of it ; and therefore , it had been impious against god , not to believe , and do , as he did . whence results this corollary , that 't is hard to fix any ill intention upon any high-flown , seraphick cartesian , lest we judge rashly of what he thinks he is assur'd of by divine inspiration . . but , leaving him to make out the certainty of his ideas , and passing over his most useful new method of saying any thing , tho' never so extravagant , and incredible , provided it but tends to disgrace or jeer his adversary ; now comes their last method of arguing and answering , which flies a higher pitch , and aims at blemishing all my endeavours , by an objection , which , tho' it be an extrinsecal one , and taken from the authority of learned men , of great repute , ( as the sorbonists are ; ) yet , he is well aware it will do greater execution , than any intrinsecal arguments they can hope to bring against me . their design ( as their managery of this contest shews ) is not to instruct the reader , or confute me ; but , meerly to despite , and disgrace me : and , a censure of my doctrine by the sorbon-doctors , especially , back'd with authority of the chief ecclesiastical governors in that place , will , ( as they hope ) lay such a load upon a single man's credit , that it must necessarily sink under it . and , tho' the pretended censure were in a matter quite different from that of cartesianism , ( which was at first , and still ought to have been , the only question , ) and therefore , is nothing at all to the right purpose ; it is , for all that , very much to their purpose ; which is , to defame me ; which blessed project atchiev'd , they hope , by this means , to raise such a hubbub , and noise , that the quiet force of my intrinsecal arguments will never be heard , or regarded ; but , put to silence , and shame , by their clamorous out-cry . besides ; they judg'd , nothing could make their calumny more authentick , than to relate it confidently , as plain matter of fact ; and , to represent it as such a matter of fact , as already transiit in rem judicatam : nor are they much concern'd whether it be true , or false ; that is indifferent to such resolute men ; so long as it serves a turn to beat down my credit , all is as well as may be . he tells the reader then , pag. . that i did audacter asserere tam fidem quàm scientiam non nisi per hoc principium , ( viz. terminorum connexionem , ) acquiri posse . also , ( ibid. ) authoritate publicâ duas propositiones , ( which he names there , ) anathematizare adactus est , neanon subscribere censurae diconti ; illas in sensu catholico non posse explicari ; that is , that i boldly affirm'd , that neither faith nor science could be attain'd , but by this principle , viz. seeing the connexion of the terms , or seeing faith , or , at least , the way to it , demonstrated : the first of which excludes all ; the later , almost all the christians in the world , from the means to salvation . also , that i was fore'd , by publick authority , to anathematize two propositions of mine ; and also , to subscribe to the censure , that they could not be explicated in a catholick sense . the sum of which is , that the sorbon-doctors censur'd some doctrines of mine ; and publick authority forced me to retract , or ( as his hot phrase runs ) to anathematize them , and subscribe to the censure that said , they could not be explicated in a catholick sense . and , pag. . he adds farther , that it is printed , or recorded , for eternity , by an egregious author , in a verissima historia ; ( meaning lominus his libel : ) and , lastly , that this puts me into a panick fear of the roman inquisition . and , hence , he tells his reader , p. . that i am abundè satis notus ; he means , abominably well known , both in france , germany , italy , nay , to the pope himself ; which , if not true , is a lye at large as all england , scotland , france and ireland . what will become of poor me ! or , where shall i hide my head ! i am , it seems , like old cain , vagus & profugus in terrâ : mr. le grand has , for my sins against cartesius , excommunicated me , and all-to-be heretick'd me , here in england : and , his lashing friend ( according to his obliging temper ) says , my book against the cartesians deserves to be burnt by the hand of the hang-man . so that here is no staying for me here , after such a disgrace : and , it will be hard to find any other country , where i can hope for shelter ; or , where my crying sins will not pursue , and proclaim me . and , which is worse , should i be put to death , or burnt , as such a complicated lump of all heresies deserves , i must never hope for the honour of a christian burial : and , what a lamentable case am in then ? . but , to be serious : if what mr. le grand says , in this long-winded calumny , be true , i am eternally disgrac'd : but , if i manifest , by undeniable testimony , that all this rabble of matters of fact he charges upon me be an arrant falshood , and calumny ; and , that i make it appear , that not one tittle of my doctrine was ever condemn'd by any sorbon doctor ; and , that i never retracted one tittle of it , nor was forc'd by publick authority to do so , much less to anathematize it . also , if i prove here , that i never held , nor said , ( what he here , in express terms , imposes upon me , viz. [ tam fidem quàm scientiam non nisi per terminorum connexionem acquiri posse ; ] but ever held the contrary doctrine , both as to that proposition , as also to the ill sense put by tricks upon some words taken out of my books , which ill and falsly-impos'd sense was the only sense that was condemn'd ; then mr. le grand must consult with his own conscience , whether he has not incurr'd the penalty of excommunication , for publishing in print such notoriously false slanders against his fellow-christian ; or , by what case he will excuse , or how he will acquit himself , when it comes to be prov'd upon him , that by his thus calumniating his neighbour so grievously , falsly and openly , he has render'd himself thus criminal , and obnoxious : especially , when the circumstances that highly aggravate this crime of his , shall come to be charg'd upon him . . to understand more fully how this business pass'd , we are to premise , that nothing is easier than to extract words out of any book , writ by a christian ; and then disguizing them , ( by concealing the scope and tendency of the whole book , the state of the question , and the immediate antecedents and consequents in those very places , ) to make those words , thus extracted , and exhibited , to speak perfect heresie , or worse . take an example : if , out of that verse in the psalmist , [ the fool hath said in his heart , there is no god , ] any one should extract those words , [ there is no god , ] and propose them in a paper , thus singl'd out , to any learned man , for his judgment , not telling him they were found in a book , where the concomitant words , or the circumstances , might , perhaps , give them quite another sense ; but , that it was in theses , where every single proposition stands alone , unassisted by its fellows , as to the declaring its sense : would any christian , thus surpriz'd , stick to declare , that such a proposition was flat atheism , and could not be explicated in a christian sense ? this was my very case . a certain great ecclesiastick , who was of good parts , but ( as we are not all of us of the same temper ) of a high spirit , turbulent , ( for which reason , 't is thought , he had been dismiss'd out of his order , ) and , withall , a great pretender to policy , hapt to be at paris , when i was also there . he pretended great friendship to me , and extoll'd my books highly ; ( as another gentleman , now my greatest adversary , has also done formerly , ) and this in print . but , it unfortunately happen'd , that a certain great person , on whose esteem he had set a high value , did , very imprudently , to his face , prefer my writings before his ; with some undeserv'd aggravations of the one , and reflexions on the other . this , tho' without my being accessary , in the least , to that affront , quite alienated his friendship from me ; and , he would needs make all those books of mine , tho' of late so highly prais'd by himself , to be heretical . at which time , some certain gentlemen , who love to fish in troubl'd waters , and were not over-friendly to me , ( one of whom , as i am told , had a hand in penning merry-man's libel , ) struck in with him ; knowing , that a more fitting instrument to make bustles could hardly be found . to carry on this project then , three propositions were pick'd out of my books ; and so politickly contriv'd , that , partly by stifling the knowledge that they were in any book at all , partly by adding to , and altering , my words , they plainly signify'd , that none was to believe , unless they saw the connexion of terms , or ( which is the same ) had a demonstration , or science , of the mysteries of faith themselves : and , in this sense , two sorbon doctors , thus cheated , condemn'd them ; as my self , had i been thus over-reach'd , should have done ; that sense being both manifestly heretical , and point-blank contrary to my constantly avow'd doctrine ; as i shew'd manifestly , out of many signal and most express places , cited in my vindiciae . this censure being , by stratagem , obtain'd , he flew about the town , shewing the censure , and amplifying mightily upon my imaginary heresies : but , no sollicitation could obtain of him a copy of the censure it self ; lest it might come to my hands , and so enable me to defend my self , and detect the falsity ; so , being incapacitated to say any thing in my own vindication , i never troubl'd my self at that which i could not help . about ten days after , during which time his envy took its full swing , the two very reverend persons , dr. godden , and mr. barklay , principal , or president , of the scotch college , came to my chamber , and thus , with some resentment , accosted me : sir , what do you mean ? are you stupid , that you sit studying here , unconcern'd , when you are proclaim'd a heretick all over the town ? i reply'd , when i can get the censure , and know what is objected , i am sure i can defend my self : in the mean time , 't is defence enough to let people know i cannot obtain the equity of him to know my fault . they reply'd , tho' you dis-regard your credit , we , that are known to be your friends , resolve to be more careful of ours . so mr. barklay , taking monsieur st. amour , a sorbon doctor , with him , to make his quality known , went to the chamber of monsieur de s. beuve , the chief of the censurers , and thus accosted him ; sir , you have condemn'd three propositions in the books of mr. s. which may make as great stirs in england , as the five propositions have done in france . he , all amaz'd , reply'd , that he had censur'd no proposition in any book , nor could in prudence , or honesty , unless he had perus'd the book it self ; to be satisfy'd , by comparing it with the scope of the discourse , and the adjoining vvords , what sense it must clearly and necessarily have . in the nick comes in my adversary , with the censure in his pocket : vvell met , mr. barklay , says he ; now your great friend , mr. s. is condemn'd of heresie , by this learned man. my lord , replies mr. de st. beuve , i neither censur'd his person , nor any proposition of his , unless he maintain'd those propositions thus singl'd out , and exhibited , as you propos'd them in your paper . then mr. barklay begg'd he might have a sight of the censure ; which was something unwillingly granted ; yet , it could not be deny'd in such a presence . having perus'd it ; now , my lord , says mr. barclay , to let you see , i am neither a heretick , nor a favourer of them , i will subscribe this censure : more than that , i dare swear , mr. s. will , at first sight , subscribe it too : for , the sense here condemn'd , is quite different from the whole scope of his books ; which treat only of demonstrating praevia ad fidem , and not at all of demonstrating the mysteries , or points of faith ; nay , 't is directly opposite to his doctrine , to say , they can be demonstrated . at these words , monsieur de st. beuve grew warmer with him ; telling him roundly , domine , callidè & artifieiosè mecum egisti , adeò ut suspicer ●●●um hoc ex ●ivore profectum : you have dealt craftily with me , and with artifiee ; so that i suspect that all this business springs from pique . mr. barclay astipulated , and told him , domine , rem acu tetigisti : sir , you are in the very right on 't . whereupon , my adversary rising up in a great heat , with a face engrain'd in anger , thunder'd out ; mentiris , barclaie ; mentiris impudentissime . ego novi quis sis ; nempe , haereticus ipse , & fautor haereticorum : ego tibi has vices rependam . you lye , barclay ; you lye most impudently . i know what you are ; that is , a heretick , and a favourer of hereticks : but , i shall be even with you . the grave sorbon doctors were astonish'd at this furious transport ; but , mr. barclay being a man of great prudence , and never in passion , nay , my lord , says he , i do not love to hear my self abus'd . so he takes a short leave , and brings away the original of the censure with him ; while the other , being in a high passion , had forgot to re-demand it : yet , he lingerd , unseen , not far off , till he saw my adversary gone by ; and return'd to the doctor . and told him , he had got the original of the censure ; desiring him to go to the archbishop of 〈◊〉 from me , and request of him , that i might keep the censure , and write my 〈◊〉 . he was heartily glad it was got from him , promising to go thither immediately , and to do me all the right i could desire ; and , affiaring him , the censure should never come into his hands again . so my request was granted , and i set to write my vindiciae . in the mean time , we sent divers to my adversary ; desiring to see the censure ; telling him , they would not believe such a sinister report concerning me , unless they saw it with their own eyes . which put him ( loath to say , his passion had made him lose it ) to a great nonplus how to answer , and gave us much divertisement . he apply'd to the archbishop , and complain'd to him , that mr. barklay had stole the censure from him . but his answer was , that he had order'd i should have it , to make my defence . which mortify'd him exceedingly . . my vindiciae , which were now finish'd , being in latin , and my books in english , eight divines of the greatest quality and worth , ( who understood english , ) were deputed to examine the sincerity of my vindiciae ; and all of them , except one , admitted by my adversary himself ; viz. mr. thomas godden , doctor of divinity , ex-president of lisbo-college , preacher to her majesty , and treasurer of her chapel : mr. francis gage , doctor of the faculty of paris , afterwards president of the college of doway : mr. robert barclay , principal , or president , of the scotch college at paris : mr. john betham , and mr. bonaventure gifford , then batchelors of divinity in the sorbon ; afterwards , parisian doctors ; and the latter of them now . bishop of madaura : mr. edward cary , and mr. george kempe , canons : and mr. edward lutton , confessor to the english religious : who did , first , each of them apart ; afterwards , met in a body , or conference , give their unanimous attestation , subscrib'd by their names , in these words , viz. first , that all the places , out of my books , alledg'd by me , were faithfully turn'd into latin. secondly , that from the whole context and scope of the author , in those placos brought by him , to prove that he does not maintain the sense condemn'd , it is manifest , that he does not require knowledge of the mysteries , in themselves , by evident reason ; but , professedly maintains , that they are incomprehensible , and above the reach of humane reason . thirdly , that the sense assign'd by him , to the three abovesaid propositions , is conformable to the scope and tenour of his discourse in those very places whence they are extracted ; and therefore , we judge this to be his true and genuine sense . also , we cannot but confess , that those omissions , and additions , which were the reasons why the propositions seem'd to bear another sense , were justly charg'd by him . ] after this , my adversary would needs give them some objections , ( which , we may be sure , were the best he could make , ) by way of instruction to their second thoughts , how they might make a right judgment of my doctrine . they met all again , consider'd them maturely , and made a second subscription , that they found nothing in them , which could , in the least , make them judge otherwise than they did witness formerly . this done , the archbishop of paris told me , that if i would subscribe to the censure , he would order the censurers to make me satisfaction under their hands , by declaring , no part of my doctrine was censur'd ; alledging , that , as they were ready to clear my credit , so it was but fitting i should clear them ; and acknowledge , those propositions , as they were exhibited to them , were justly condemnable ; as may be seen in my clypeus septemplex , pag. . i , at first , begg'd his pardon ; alledging , that my adversary was of that humour , that he would thence take occasion to vapour , he had made me retract . subscribe then , says he , in what form you will. hereupon , i gave in my subscription , in these very words ; non doctrinam meam retractans ; sed in eadem , utpōtè â censurâ immuni , atque ab illustrissimo olivero plunketto totius hiberniae primate , atque à superioribus meis approbatâ , persistens , contrariumque ubicunque repertum fuerit condemnans . this done , the censurers were commanded to make me satisfaction under their hands ; which they did , in a formal instrument , declaring , that they did not , vel minimam notam inurere , blemish with the least note , or censure , either me , or my books : adding , that if any should pretend it , they did , from their hearts , profess , that they made a sininister interpretation of their censure . and , there was an end of that politick jigg ; the issue of which was very honourable to me , and most shameful to my enemies . . by this relation , every tittle of which i can justifie by sufficient testimony , and authentick records , which i have now in my hands ; as also , by my vindiciae , and clypeus septemplex , publish'd immediately after the contest , where all these particulars , ( and many others , ) to my farther clearing , are printed ; which i durst not have publish'd , unless they had been true to a tittle , before the face of all those honourable and learned persons yet alive , who would have hated me for printing falshoods of them ; and my chief adversary himself , and his complices , yet living , who would have desir'd no more , but to have found me tripping in the least part of my narrative . these things , i say , being so , judge , i beseech you , gentlemen , what a prodigious folly , as well as malice , it is in mr. le grand , and his libeller , to pretend that any one tittle of my doctrine was condemn'd by sorbon doctors ; that i was cited before any tribunal ; that i was forc'd to anathematize any part of my doctrine , and subscribe to the censure of it , &c. whereas , it is manifestly attested , i only subscrib'd to my own ever-avow'd doctrine . nor was i forc'd : no tribunal meddl'd with me , or concern'd themselves about me ; and , if i would have wav'd my own satisfaction from the censurers , none oblig'd me to subscribe at all . lastly , how base and false a calumny is it , to say , that by subscribing , i retracted ; when i expresly subscrib'd , as not-retracting my doctrine ; or , that i was forc'd to anathematize it , whenas i subscrib'd it as persisting in it ! nor are any of those propositions , thus exhibited , and extracted , in reality , mine , ( nam malè dum recitat , incipit esse sua , ) any more than [ non est deus , ] thus singl'd out , is the scriptures : i have no propositions , but in books ; where many circumstances are found , determining the sense : and , he that pretends this , may , by the same reason , accuse the scripture of atheism . how rash a slander , then , is it in mr. le grand , to lay these things to my charge ! and , how lying a fellow is his libelling assistant , whose calumnies are so notorious , and some of them so criminal , that , were he known , he would be liable to lose his ears . . the next stratagem of our politicians , ( for , we expected new ones every day , ) was , to pick out of my books no less than propositions , ( with the same honesty , we may be sure , as they did the former , ) which they carry'd to the then . nuncio at paris , now cardinal spada ; pretending the same zeal for faith , as mr. le grand does ; and , as those two idle knaves did , who are said to have laid their heads together , to pen this libel : and therefore , pressing to have them sent to the highest tribunal , to be condemn'd with all speed , because my heresie ( forsooth ! ) spread far and near in england , and infected the whole country . the nuncio took them ; but , being a man of wisdom , apply'd to my lord abbot montague the next morning , to know what strange heresie this was , which , like a cancer , spread so fast in england . who , smiling , acquainted him at large with the undeserved feud of my adversary , and my innocency . the nuncio sends for me the next day , receiv'd me very kindly ; told me , he understood how i was persecuted by some adversaries of mine , and deliver'd me their objections ; desiring me to write an answer , and he would do m the equity to send up both together . both which are printed in the second part of my vindiciae . so this second plot was defeated ; and my maligners came off as shamefully as they did in the former : for , they could never gain the least advantage upon me , if they did not surprize great men with false pretences , and prevent my answering for my self . . but , envy is a restless vice. their third main plot , ( omitting many petty ones , ) was , to print a libel against me , under the name of lominus , ( which , some say , n. n. and t. w. have copy'd , and imitated , exactly ; ) making me guilty of near forty herefies . but , this book having neither author , printer , nor approvet's name put to it , ( which made it highly punishable by the laws of the kingdom , if any did spread it , ) it was glad to sneak in hugger-mugger : which concurring blemishes so disgrac'd it , that none regarded it ; for , what man of common sense will believe , that a writer for faith , against such a manifold heretick , should be afraid to own his name , if his accusations were not calumnies ? besides , the writer of it had counterfeited the subscriptions against me of two parisian doctors , by name , of mr. peter nugent , and mr. thaddaeus ô brien ; who , in their letters to the cardinal of norfolk , ( authentick copies of which i have in my hands , ) complain'd of such impostures , and requested they might not pass unpunished . so that , from many heads , it was convicted , and held to be a plain libet . lastly , i complain'd of it to the sacra congregatie ; laid it open , and confuted it , in my querimonia to superiour powers , and my antidoti ; as it is to be seen in my clypeus septemplex , and the large preface to my vindiciae . and , so , the third plot of my adversary , and of the gentlemen behind the curtain , his assistants , went out in a snuff , and lest an ill scent behind it . and , so much for mr. le grand's egregius author , and verissima historia , which does aeternitati pingere ( as he says ) my errours . which none regarded , but those who help'd to pen it ; with one of whom mr. le grand and his friend ( as i am informed ) have struck a holy league , to carry on their sensless and already baffl'd slanders and calumnies against me . . but , the fourth plot was so finely laid , they hop'd it would be prosperous , and make amends for all ; and , that , being so well levell'd , it could not but hit the mark. they sent up all my books to cardinal barberin ; and , with them , one of my lord chancellor hyde's , writ against mr. cressy , ( the title of which they had torn out ; ) pretending to him , they were all writ by one and the same author , my self . their friends there press'd the condemnation of them with such a hurry , as if the whole church had totter'd if it were not done quickly . to expedite the business , they earnestly sollicited him , that only that one book ( viz. chancellor hyde's ) should be read ; and then , to determin whether all the books writ by such a pernicious author , ought not to be condemn'd . the cardinal , without naming me , delivers them to a worthy divine , who understood english ; bidding him keep the rest , till call'd for , and read only this one ; ( pointing to that of the chancellors , which they had signally particulariz'd to him , ) and give him an account of it as speedily as was possible ; for , by that one , they could judge of the rest . what remedy now ? would not any man swear now that all was cock-sure ? but , there is no policy against god's providence ; which directed thither an english divine , who had lately come out of england , and attended the now earl of derwent-water , and his brother , in their travels . he being of acquaintance with this divine , came to visit him in the very nick of opportunity , and finding him very busie in reading that decretory-book , went to his table , and took up some books that he saw lie there together : finding , to his astonishment , they were mine , he ask'd him how they came by all mr. s's books ? the other told him , he was much mistaken ; and said , they could not be mine ; telling him , they had a far other character of me ; whereas , the book he was reading , which was ( said he ) writ by the same author ; could not possibly be writ by a man of mr. s's principles . mr. midford ( for , that was my friend's name ) knew the book , and avow'd it was writ by another author , whom he nam'd to him . at which , the roman divine held held up his hands with admiration , at such a knavish contrivance . so , they agreed that mr. midford should go with him the next morning , to cardinal barberin , to inform him what a cheat was put upon him , to hasten him to judge of all my books , by the book of another , who was of another judgment , and went upon different principles . this was so shameful , and horrid , that , after this , not an enemy of mine durst appear . besides my clypeus septemplex , and vindiciae , i had sent divers apologeticks thither , explaining my doctrine ; which the roman divines examining , desir'd mr. midford to know of me , if my occasions would let me come thither , to teach the same doctrine there , i had printed in england . if i would , they would petition for a good pension to maintain me . but , i was a greater lover of my studies in my privacy , than i was of courts . however , mr. le grand , and my then opposers , may see by this , how i am notus in gallia , and in italia . the malice of my enemies ( as god had order'd it ) having done me more kindness , and gain'd me more honour , than all my friends could ever have done . all this was writ by mr. midford , to my friends , and my self , then at paris ; divers of whom are yet alive , to witness it . . i am heartily sorry to lay open such fraudulent and unconscionable carriages in any christians much more in those of my own persuasion it being so perfectly contrary to common honesty , than a turk would blush at it , and a good moral heathen detest it . but , when my christian credit is thus assaulted , i am oblig'd in conscience to vindicate my self : nor , can any man blame me , for doing that just and necessary duty to my own reputation . perhaps , to revive this quarrel , which the chief church governors have examined , determin'd , and compos'd , mr. ● . grand exerts himself in this consure of his , to gratifie the contrivers of it then , hoping it would oblige them to put them in a capacity to play a book-game . and , for the same reason , he goes about to gratifie some protestants too , by hazarding his credit , to do them a kindness . but , as i believe , the former are too prudent to begin squabbles with one , who meddles not with them ; so , i am very confident , the later have too much honour and candour in them , to be offended at a man who writes for his conscience ; and in such a cause , as is the settling christian faith upon such grounds as are absolutely certain ; which is the interest of all christians : and , that they will never be favourable to a writer , that wrongs the common cause , and , consequently , his own conscience , to please his passion ; much less , to such a man , who , in his censura , as appears by the words , [ ut sint , ] calls the protestants in england , infidels . . that the world may know of how different a temper i was , from that of mr. le grand , ( whether natural to him , or inspir'd by another , i wave at present , ) after his censura injustissima came out , notwithstanding his unoccasion'd provocations at first , which was the origin of all his warmth of opposition , so little edifying to sober christians , or beneficial to learned readers ; tho' i saw also , there was a pound of gall in that book , for a grain of reason ; yet , i did charitably resolve to try if i could calm his passion , and sweeten his bitter humour . to compass this , i put my self upon some great disadvantages ; and blam'd my self as much as i could with any degree of truth ; that so i might invite him , by my example , to some civil acknowledgment of his peevish errours , i had resolv'd to pass over all his unsavouly taunts , his railing , falsifications , and untrue imputations , under the name of mistakes ; nor to take notice of his manifold omissions ; but , to put down barely , and clearly , my yet unanswer'd arguments ; tho' it was tedious to me , without any occasion , to repeat them . nay , i fully purpos'd to give his pretended answers a fairer character than they could deserve ; and , while i rectify'd his errours , to excuse , as well as i could , what was amiss , or defective . i had fram'd my thoughts to pen my book in a gay , familiar style , to put him in a good humour . and , in a word , i was resolv'd to omit nothing that could become a kind friend , and a charitable christian. whence , i had begun my reply on this manner ; by which , the reader may make an estimate , how condescending and obliging the whole had been , had they let it go forward . veritas & pax . responsio mollis frangit iram , sermo durus suscitat furorem , inquit sapiens , ( prov. . v. . ) hortatur etiam propheta , dei nomine loquens , ( zach. . v. . ) ut , veritatem ac pacem diligamus . utrumque hoc dictum , vir eximie , nobismetipsis applicare debemus ; saltem , ego utrumque mihimet applico . quare iterum ad te redeo , iterum te adorior : non animo infenso , sed verè amico : non , prae famae meae tuendae studio , forsan ultra modum effervescens ; sed , ad amicitiam charitatémque ( heu nimis laesas ! ) redintegrandas paratissimus . perculit me , fateor , ( idque non immeritó , ) quòd nunquam à me laesus , sed uti existimabam , mihi amicus , cartesianae tamen doctrinae , quam impugnabam , zelantior , & , forsan , suasionibus aliorum eodem zelo nimis flagrantium , obsequentior , in contumelias contra personam ac famam meam , effusiùs quam par erat , scripto publico , proruperis . venit mihi in mentem davidicum illud ( ps. . , , . ) si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi , sustinuissem utique — tu verò homo unanimus & notus meus — in domo dei ambulavimus eum consensu , &c. hinc , commotior factus , ad defensionem me accinxi . atque utinam intra justae defensionis fines me continuissem . perdifficile siquidem est , ut quisquam , acerbè , idque ( quantum sibi conscius erat ) sine causâ tractatus , modum ubique servet . reposuisti tu , & altioribus adhuc convitiis fraena laxâsti . quid hîc faciendum ? num in jurgiis ac rixis , sine fine reciprocatis , ac nemini profuturis , prodigendum tempus , conspurcanda charta ? ridiculum ! tandem , sapiamus , & redeamus ad cor . scilicet homines uterque sumus , originali labe infecti , indéque lapsu faciles ; at supernâ ( uti spero ) praemuniti gratiâ , quò minùs malevolentiae venenum in animae viscera se effundat . nec rideant nos lectores nostri . eâdem pice inquinati sunt & ipfi , eâdémque farinâ subacti . et , forsan , pauci sunt , qui hoc idem non factitâssent , si in iisdem circumstantiis fuissent constituti , atque easdem cogitationes eosdémque affectus habuissent . solus , idque meritò , ridebit nos humani generis hostis ( & quos habet sequaces ; ) qui homines invicem committere , rixas serere , ac seminatas usque fovere gestit . quin rideamus & nos , vice nostrà , incendiarium illum ; & delusum se sentiat qui foveam aliis struxit . quicquid crepat metaphysica de primù suis principiis atque altissimis causis , certè nos à certioribus longè principiis & causis altioribus , divina lege sancitis ac commendatis , edocti sumus charitatem fraternam dissertationibus philosophicis , & magistri ( quisquis ille fuerit ) placitis longè anteferendam . homines , inquam , sumus ; indéque nonnihil humani passi ; at videant omnes , nos tales nihilominus esse homines , qui nôrunt corrigere in sese quodcunque denum illud fuerit , quò minùs homines , seu minùs rationis compotes sumus . vides , mi amice multùm colende , quòd etiam dum de pace loquor , impugnationem aggrediar ac contentionem tecum denuò instaurem ? quare , cave s● tibi ; nam novum bellum tibi indîco , provocationem novam ad te mitto . spiculis non umbratilibus , sed verè igneis ( cl●ritatis scilicet ) te adoriri decretum mihi est ; in quo profectò praeliandi genere usque ad mortem terum decertabo . quicquid nonnulli ex amicis tuis de east● meo existiment , audacter jact●●●● quòd priores mihi partes , tibi posteriores in hâc lite christianâ cessurae sint . quod amplius est , palam pronuntio me lauream in isthoc certamine reportaturum ; imò aliqualiter ( quantum mihi liquet ) jam reportâsse . praeripui siquidem tibi honoris ( non aer●i , sed solidi ) florem , dum prior ad concordiam gradum promoveo . nisi forsan & tu●e hoc idem fecisses , nisi quòd existimâris me , ( obsirmato utique , ut opinatus es , ad bellum animo , ) pacem de●rectaturum , id si prositearis , tunc enimverò fatendum est quod inter otramque partem — dubiis volitet victoria pennis . aliter , totum atque integrum triumplum jure optimo mihi vendicabo . si rationem exposeas , habeto notissimum atque sapientissimum estatum illud , — fortior est qui se , qu●m qui fortissima vincit m●ni● — in quo quidem sensu , vel à te , vel à quovisalio , p●●gopolynices vocari non recus●bo , im● honori mihi ducam . ] &c. truth and peace . a soft answer breaks anger ; harsh speech stirs up fury , says the wise-man . the prophet also , speaking in god's name , exhorts us to love truth and peace . both these sayings , honoured sir , we ought to apply to our selves ; at least , i account it my duty to do so . again , then , i return to you ; again , i set upon you ; not with a mind full of resentments , but , of real friendship : not out of an earnest desire , and , perhaps , too sensible a concern , to defend my own fame ; but , most ready to renew and repair charity and friendship a-fresh , already ( alas ! ) too much violated . i must confess , it struck me , and shock'd me exceedingly , ( and , no wonder , ) that you should , without the least offence done to your person , who ( as i thought ) was still my friend ; but , out of a too fervent zeal for the cartesian doctrine , which i impugn'd , and , perhaps , too easily persuaded by others transported with the same zeal , break out , in print , into contumelious words , more than was decent , against my person , and my christian reputation . that saying of king david , ( psal. . ) came into my mind ; [ if my enemy had revil'd me , i could have born it — but , thou , my friend and acquaintance — who didst walk with me unanimously , in the house of god. ] thus , causlesly provok'd , i set to write my defence : and , i wish i had contain'd my self within the bounds of a meer defence , or vindication : for , 't is very hard for any man who is roughly handl'd , and ( as far as he was conscious to himself ) without cause , to keep himself within an exact mean. you reply'd ; and , in your censura , out-did your former self , in affrontive language . what is now to be done ? must we still throw away our precious time , and blur paper with angry repartees , reciprocated endlesly ? 't were most ridiculous ! at length , then , let us grow wiser , and return to our right temper . we are , both of us , men ; that is , frail , and tainted with original sin ; but , yet , ( as i hope , ) so pre-establish'd by christian principles that the poyson will be thrown out before it infects the vitals of our soul. nor , let our readers laugh at us ; themselves too have some of the same pitch sticking to them , and are made up of the same mass of corruption . and , perhaps , there are few , who had not done the same we did , had they been in the same circumstances , and had had the same thoughts and affections . none but the enemy of mankind ( and his imps ) can have just occasion to laugh at us ; who hates peace , and delights to sow and foment dissension . let us , in our turn , laugh too at that wicked incendiary ; that he who digg'd a pit for for others , may fall into it himself . whatever metaphysicians talk of their first principles , and highest causes or reasons , i am sure we are taught by far more certain principles , and higher reasons , establish'd , and commended to us by the divine law , that brotherly charity is infinitely to be preferr'd before philosophical contests , or the tenets of any master , let him be who he will. we are men , i say ; and , thence , have suffer'd some humane imperfection : but we will let the world see , that we are such men , as can correct in themselves whatever makes them less men , or less governable by reason . you see then , my much-honoured friend , that even while i speak of peace , i impugn you a-fresh , and renew my contest with you . wherefore , look to your self ; for , i denounce a new war to you , and send you a new challenge ; in which i will never yield the victory . i am fully resolv'd to attack you , not with imaginary darts , but with fiery ones ; to wit , with those of charity ; with which i will maintain the combat , to my last breath : whatever your friends talk of my pride and arrogancy , i boldly proclaim , and boast , that i will have the advantage in this christian contention . nay , i do openly brag , that ( as far as yet appears to me ) i have already won the victory ; by getting the start of you in this war , ( the guerdon of which is a crown , not of aiery , but of solid honour , ) by making thus the first step to a reconciliation : unless , perhaps , your self also had intended the same , had you not thought me to be refractory . if you profess you had the same thoughts , then i must , indeed , confess , the victory hovers doubtfully between us : but , if not , the whole and entire triumph will be justly due to me . if you ask me the reason of this forward condescension ; take for answer , that most famous , and most wise saying , [ 't is a greater victory to conquer one's self , than to subdue the strongest forts . ] in which sense , i shall not be asham'd ; but , shall think it a high honour to be call'd by your self , or any other , a pyrgopolynices . ] . i do not believe there is any man in the world , who reads this charitable overture of mine , and considers all the circumstances , but will both commend , and admire at , such an unexpected , and extravagant condescension , and moderation , on my part . mr. le grand had been the unprovok'd aggressor ; for , i had not given him one unhandsome word , but only oppos'd some cartesian tenets , by way of argument ; when he , in requital of my civility , fell upon me with the the most virulent language that ever was heard given by ( i will not say any christian , but ) even by any one heathen , to another tho' my defence was smart , yet i confin'd my resentments , to oppose him only as an injurious and weak writer ; without imitating him , by blackening him as impious against god , or unsound in faith ; but still excus'd him in such occasions . he had printed infamous slanders against my books , writ for the absolute certainty of faith ; making my doctrine in them condemn'd by scrbonists , retracted and anathematiz'd by my self ; and , what not ? he abetted a known libel , as a most true history ; which makes me guilty of twenty heresies at least . lastly , he had given me more advantages against him , as a scholar , in his censura , than even my self could have wish'd . yet , i was willing to pass by all these highest provocations , and lose all these advantages , and ( unconstrain'd ) to make the first charitable step to a friendly accommodation ; requiring only , that he would make some publick satisfaction , not for any reviling words , or slanders , against my particular person , ( all which i was ready to pardon ; ) but , to wipe off the false aspersions he had laid upon my books writ for faith , which reflected upon the common cause of religion ; to do which is the precise duty of every good man : to promise which , notwithstanding , ( by the way , ) i could never learn he was willing , or inclin'd ; nor could i ever get any certain light what he would do , or how far he would comply on his part . i had now finish'd about a third part of this healing reply , and had communicated this exordium of it to some friends of his ; who , i dare say , had acquainted him with my peaceful and friendly intentions ; when , as if done on purpose to prevent it , out comes merry-man's libel , contriv'd and fram'd by some achitophel , ( i leave it to the reader to guess whom , ) to render all reconciliation impossible ; and , tim'd so , as to be publish'd just in the nick , when i was expecting that half-sheet , which ( as i had requested in my non ultra ) was to decide the whole controversie , by way of principles . this made me see , that my charity was requited with such a rude affront , that all the malice in the world , put together , could scarce have invented any thing more rancorous ; and , that i was to content my self with my own good intentions , and prepare for a vigorous defence . which , also , was the reason why ( putting a stop to my latin treatise ) i became oblig'd to reply in english , into which their slanders were now brought ; that so my answer might be as universally read , and understood , as order had been taken their calumnies should be : and , indeed , both mr. le grand , and the libeller , very brotherly conspire to slander my doctrine , as condemn'd ; or , which is the word they do both of them affect , [ damn'd ; ] whence , i saw plainly , that this writing in english was absolutely necessary , and most proper to spread my vindication , and make it more taken notice of . . i am to expect , that mr. le grand , and his inspirer , will stoutly deny that they are accessary to this libel , or knew of it : 't is their interest , as well as their credit , to do so . that they did not pen it , i am apt to believe : nor , is it prudence to charge them positively with their knowing it , liking it , or ( in their way ) abetting it ; unless i had positive testimony for it . but , yet , i must beg the favour of them , to leave thought free : 't is best , in such cases , to give my reasons , and remit the decision to the judgment of prudent readers : for , first , i could never learn , that any one man in england spoke the least word against those two books of mine , till mr. le grand and his governor did so ; and , this libel visibly abets them , and carries on the same cause , viz. the defaming of me : and , 't is very hard to conceive , that one who assists another , should not let him know what kindness he is doing him ; or , that the assisted person should not contribute to his power , and help those who were so kindly helping him ; or , that a journey-man should go to work without the knowledge of his principal ; especially , when he uses his tools all the while , as merry-man does mr. le grand's censura ; out of which , the whole libel is extracted . secondly , i was inform'd , ere the libel came out , by a worthy gentleman ( mr. f. h. ) that mr. le grand had struck in with a certain ecclesiastick , who would joyn with him , in opposing me ; which , all things consider'd , especially , their sympathizing in their being , both of them , of a light , inconsiderate genius , and , in their aversion against me ; makes it very wonderful , and unheard of , that confederates should not communicate their designs , or confer their notes , how to carry on their common cause . thirdly , that ecclesiastick spoke of , as siding with mr. le grand , is the very person who is universally said to be , at least , the parcel-author ( if not the only one ) of that libel . now , that a concurrence in affections ( that is , in disaffection to the same person ) should not produce a concurrence in action , when that person is upon the anvil , when they are both striking at him , and when the resolution to run him down is already evidently , taken by both ; let any man believe that can . fourthly , 't is evident , that they do mutuas operas tradere , or friendly assist one another . mr. le grand ( i fear , in this , made foot-of-whelp ) hazards his credit , in defaming my books , as condemn'd ; and crying up lominus's libel ; so , to retrieve the credit which was lost by a former defeat : and , the libeller , by taking his matter out of his censura , and ecchoing aloud all those slanders in english , manifestly abets him , and requites his kindness ; and yet , we must believe ( to the forfeiture of common sense ) that all this lights by chance , and not by design , or agreement . sure , they think all men are fools , but themselves ; or else , they childishly imagin , that while they hood-wink themselves , none can see them . fifthly , the opposing cartesius would not bear the weight of an accusation in the high court ; whereas , the magnifying albius , who had given disgust to them above , would easily , as they hop'd , if well improv'd , and manag'd , be made criminal , if they could but catch me in that snare : but , it light unluckily to their project , that ( resolving to live quietly with my neighbours , if i could ; and , to carry on truth , without giving offence to any ) i had not , so much as once , nam'd mr. white in either of those two books the libeller is is so angry at ; nor have i any position there , peculiar to him alone ; as i can easily shew , when put to it . wherefore , it was plotted to bring me , by stratagem , to name mr. white , with some handsome character . to this end , mr. le-grand , in his railing preface , p. . ( by which we may see 't is an old project , ) challeng'd me , that i did [ eradere albium-ex albo philosophorum , & in ludibria vertere ; ] that is , that i did blot mr. white out of the roll of philosophers , and make a mockery of him : and , i was blam'd by them , as proudly dis-regarding all others , and assuming all to my self . i might have smelt a design in it , it being such nonsense , that i should make a mockery of a man i had not so much as spoke of : but , i was too candid , to give easie way to suspicions . upon which , hating to be held guilty of such an ungentileness , i made mention of him in my following books , tho' under no other character , but only that of a great philosopher , which his worst enemies cannot refuse him . no sooner had i done so , and that he had drawn me into the noose , but the cloak was immediately pull'd off ; and , the same man who had lately seem'd so zealous for the honour of albius , presently profess'd himself his greatest enemy : he sets up , and abets lominu's libel , which makes him guilty of half the heresies that have pester'd the world , from the beginning of the church ; and , a mark is set on every man who has any esteem for him , as a scholar : and , i was told by a right reverend bishop , that i had done my self a greater injury , by speaking well of albius , than i could imagin ; as fore-seeing the malicious use they intended to make of this fraudulent trappan . all which , laid together , shews the intimate correspondence between mr. le grand , and the libeller ; and , to think that his old friend , who began all this stir , would not joyn with him in this , and gather a few twigs to help to lash me , were , to break the sacred bond of friendship between them , and disoblige them both . add , that mr. le grand , according to his small politicks , to gratifie his new friend , picks quarrels with me , in his behalf , by making me say of bellarmin , ( an author he much esteems , ) bellarmine , rationis experis , mentiris . which , and divers such passages , are too plain evidences of their strict confederacy ; and , consequently , that he could not be ignorant of this prop of his cause , this libel . his hopes were , that the libeller would bring in divers . friends of his , to increase the cry , and assist him with their interest : but , i will not think them to have so little charity , or so little regard to religion ; or , to be so imprudent , as to oppose a veteran writer for faith , who meddles not with them ; against whom they have nothing to say , justly ; and , who has already given good proof , that , in case he be attack'd unjustly , he is able to defend himself ; nay , who is before-hand with them too , should they attempt it . . against all these strong proofs of their being conscious of , and ( in what they could ) abetting to this libel , what can they bring for themselves ? oh! they deny it : as if , either affirming , or denying , were such most valid arguments for persons speaking in their own cause ! or , as if i ( who was the person concern'd ) ought , in prudence , to give any credit to to the words of those men ; one of which smil'd in my face , and pretended great friendship , when he was doing me all the mischief he could : the other so falsifies my words , and publishes such false and and scandalous slanders against my doctrine . whence , that objection is groundless , which ( for want of something else to say ) is lately given about , that things were about composing , and i , upon occasion unjustly taken at this libel , flew off ; and , so continu'd the difference , when it might have been heal'd . these gentlemen are either ill-inform'd , or very partial ; for , . he never offer'd peace at all : . i offer'd it ( as a judicious friend , meeting with my thoughts , had advis'd me ) on these terms ; viz. heartily to pardon and pass over all his causless revilings against my particular ; only desiring , that the injury done to the common cause should be repair'd ; to which i could never hear he would yield . some cry [ pax , pax ; ubi non est pax. ] i had never observ'd the least ingenuity on their side ; and , i had been false to my self , to print my condescending treatise , and be laughed at for my foolish charity ; and , advantages be made of it , against my self . nay , i ever reply'd , to those good men who desir'd it of me , that i would do any thing that could be thought reasonable ; but , that i much fear'd , all our charity would be lost , thro' mr. le grand's being ty'd up by this new engagement , and govern'd by a man who was an enemy to all moderation . . i expect , gentlemen , you will complain you have lost your time in reading this treatise ; and ask , what benefit accrues to the reader , by seeing the faults of others laid open ? but , i must beg your pardon ; and maintain , that this procedure , tho' most unpleasant to me , is , notwithstanding , most beneficial to the world. [ virtus est vitium fugare , & sapientia prima stultitià caruisse — ] and , these idle methods of railing , flouting , prevaricating , bantering , fooling , slandering , falsifying and libelling , ( to which nonplus'd writers are forc'd to have recourse , ) being thus expos'd ; and , by your declaring against them , disgrac'd ; they must either be driven to take the way of discoursing connectedly , or leave of writing at all . to return then to my adversaries : i request , or ( it being my right ) demand of them , that they would make choice of some one principle for the cartesian doctrine , which they will maintain to be such ; or , some one argument of theirs , which they will undertake to be demonstrative ; or , pitch upon some one solution of theirs , to any one argument of mine , where i pretend to demonstrate ; and , that principle shall be examin'd , by looking into the self-conexion of its terms , or the reducibleness of them to self-connexion , or self-evidence ; that argument shall be try'd by the necessary connexion of its terms , with the medium ; and , lastly , that solution shall be judg'd of , by putting my argument home , shewing on what the connexion of the two terms with a third , was built ; and , then , considering upon what grounds it it is pretended they are unconnected , the consequence of it slack , and the reason of it solv'd . and , let him who uses the least disrespectful word to his adversary , be held nonplus'd , and to deserve no answer . by this means , in a reply or two , truth will be made appear , much precious time sav'd , all wrangling avoided , the rules of decency and civility preserv'd inviolate , and the controversie decided . . only , this condition i would request , that if any principle , axiom , postulatum , or argument , be produc'd , which has been solidly refuted already ; that , then , to save unnecessary labour , it may be sufficient to relate to it , unless it has been reply'd to formerly : which i desire , because i have very lately seen and perus'd a book , written by a professor of philosophy in paris , and dedicated to the dean and faculty of sorbon ; in which , many of the principal positions of the cartesians are solidly confuted . it bears for title , [ de existentiâ dei , & humanae mentis immortalitate , secundum cartesii & aristotelis doctrinam , disputatio . ] this acute and learned author is thorowly versed in cartesius ; and has so perfectly digested aristotle ; that he seems to have turned him in succum & sanguinem . he tells us , cartesius attempted to demonstrate these two points , because he was ( i believe , unjustly ) suspected to hold neither of them . he refutes his definitions of [ cogitatio , idea , sustantia , & mens : ] as also , his notion of [ corpus , materia , extensio , physica , &c. ] he shews his definition of god , to be faulty ; and , his notion of real distinction , to be groundless . he sifts all his seven postulatums , his ten axioms , and all his pretended demonstrations of those two most important theses ; and , shews them to be shallow , and spurious . lastly , in his second part , he domonstrates those main points , by the principles of aristotle . tho' a school-man , ( indeed , the best of our modern ones , i have seen , ) and , for being such , ought to have some grains of allowance granted him ; yet , he avoids school-terms as much as is possible . his style is concise , and yet clear. his oppositions and solutions ( generally ) forcible , and full. he lights , frequently , into the same arguments i do ; and , very often falls into my abominable sin , ( which so mads my two cartesians , ) of telling his reader , and shewing , that the cartesian doctrine is strangely fanatical . i thought fit to acquaint our country-men with the just character of that learned book ; than which , i know none more proper for those of our universities , after they have pass'd their first studies ; as well for the excellency of the two noble truths it demonstrates , as for giving them great light to look into the nature of true demonstration , and and into the right understanding of aristotle's genuin doctrine ; so much mistaken by most of our unskilful modern commentators . . i hear , my adversaries contend , that ( id. cart. p. . ) i deny annihilation to be possible , even to god's extraordinary or miraculous power . i answer , . that i speak there , ( § . . ) not of annihilation it self , but of a particular way i was inventing , how it might be done ; which way , whether it holds , or no , i neither know , nor care . . i did not seem to deny even this , but upon supposition that it would put an attribute in god , which was unworthy of him. . that , in my whole discourse there , 't is most evident that i only spoke tentativè , not assertivè . i will not recount how many authors have held the same , as to this point , which my self ( if truly represented ) have done : one will suffice , ad hominem , against my cartesian adversaries ; viz. du hamel ; the best philosopher of the cartesian school , tho' he be none of the fierce , or furious ones ; who , in tom . p. . says , substantiae annibilatio aliquid inconstantiae in ipso rei conditore testari videtur : the annibilation of a substance ( or thing ) seems to testifie some inconstancy in the maker of the thing , himself : which , certainly , is a dishonour , and imperfection ; and , cannot be attributed to god. the sense of that position , as far as concerns the generality of christians , who are no speculators , is , that creatures should not be held , to subsist of themselves ; but , to depend entirely , every moment , on god , for their being . now , let us consider how i had exceeded all other writers , in asserting that substantial truth . others use to say , that the nature of creatures is indifferont to being , and not-being : whereas , ( method to science , p. . ) i maintain , that , [ were there any inclination in creatures , rather to one , than the other , it seems to be , rather to not-being , than to being ; ] and , that [ the nothingness of creatures is so radicated in their natures , and sticks to them , that it inclines them to not-being , even while they are . ] . whether this doctrine of mine be more for the honour of our great creator , and for our continual dependence on him ; or mr. le grand's , in his censura , p. . who denies that creatures would , out of their own defectiveness , or indigent condition , fall to nothing , or be annihilated ; and says , that every thing , as far as is of it self , would remain in the same state ; let indifferent divines judge . nay , he says this , in opposition to me , when i affirm , that all creatures depend on god , for their continuance in being . certainly , there needs many grains of salt , to make such doctrine as this sound well to a christian's ear : for , this destroys the doctrine of suspension's being the cause of annihilation ; in regard he makes the creature still , of its own nature , able to exist alone , after it is once put to be ; which , i am sure , takes away its continual dependence on god , for its being ; which is both against the language and sense of christianity . yet , i doubt not , but his intention is very orthodox , whatever his ideas are . by this time , gentlemen , i fear i have over-weary'd you ; i am sure i have my self , with replying , by snatches , to unconnected talk. i hope , my next present will be more worthy of your perusal . in the mean time , i am , with all respect , your most humble servant , j. s. finis . the method to science by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the method to science by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. printed by w. redmayne ... and are be sold by thomas metcalf ..., london : . attributed to john sergeant. cf. errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng science -- methodology -- early works to . science -- philosophy -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the method to science . by i. s. london , printed by w. redmayne for the author , and are to be sold by thomas metcalf , bookseller , over against earl's-court in drury-lane , . book i. of the first operation of our understanding . less . . of notions , or the very first ground on which all science is built . less . . of the distinction of natural notions , and of the reducing them under ten common heads . p. less . . how these common heads of notions are to be divided , and of the common head of substance . p. ●ess . . some considerations belonging to those heads of notions , or to the ten predicaments in common . p. ●ess . . of the common head call'd quantity . p. ●ess . . of the common head of quality . p. ●ess . . of the common head of relation . p. less . . of the common heads of action and passion . p. less . . of the common head of ubi , or where . p. less . . of the common head o● quando , or when . p. ● less . . of the expressions of ou● notions by words . p. book ii. of the second operation o● our understanding , or judg●ments . less . . of the nature of judg●ments , or propositions , common ; of their parts ; of 〈◊〉 ground of their verification , 〈◊〉 of the several manners of predic●ting . p. ● less . . of self-evident propositions first principles . p. ●● less . . that first principles are ide●●tical propositions , prov'd by insta●●ces . the use that is to be made of them . also , of some other propositions , either in whole or in part , formally identical ; and of the reducing of inferiour truths to self-evident propositions . p. ● less . . of the generating of knowledge in us ; and of the method how this is perform'd . p. book iii. of the third operation of our understanding , discourse ; and of the effects and defects of it . less . . of artificial discourse , the force of consequence , and of the only right figure of a syllogism . p. less . . of the several manners or moods of a syllogism , and of the laws of concluding . p. less . . of the matter of a conclusive syllogism ; or , what middle term is proper for demonstration . p. less . . how every truth is to be reduced to an identical proposition ; and , consequently , every errour to a contradiction : what consequences follow thence of one truth being in another ; and of the science of pure spirits . p. less . . of other mediums for demonstration from the four causes . p. less . . several instances of demonstration . p. less . . other instances of demonstration . p. advertisement . p. less . . of opinion and faith. p. less . . of assent , suspense , certainty and uncertainty . p. less . . of disputation and paralogisms . p. appendix . p. the errata's in the preface . pref . p. . l. . out of . p. . l. . cast about . p. . l. . the cartesian . corrections of the errata . page . line . onely which . p. . l. . as is . p. . l. . that motion . p. . l. . most nearly . p. . l. . but their . p. . l. . become . p. . l. . has besides . p. . l. . false . p. . l. . proposition . p. . l. . a whole . p. . l. . sophroniscus . p. . l. . make . p. . l. . proposition is identical . p. . l. . & nunc . p. . l. . that can . p. . l. . sensitivum . p. . l. . 't is evidently . p. . l. ult . basis. p. . l. . at one . p. . l. . est of . p. . l. . be a kind . p. . l. . cause of . p. . l. . exercise it 's . p. . l. . there . p. . l. . frailty which . p. . l. . all own . p. . l. . main . p. . l. . what is , is . p. . l. . erroneous . p. . l. . he is not . p. . l. . grammatical . p. . l. . the sixth . p. . l. . a proud . p. . l. . with no. p. . l. . to be . p. . l. . gives : p. . l. . very small . p. . l. . slender , flexible and. l. . contiguous . p. . l. . art. p. . l. . is it . p. . l. . so they . l. . do . p. . l. . lock . p. . l. . and seeing . p. . l. . that is , ' t is . preface dedicatory to the learned students of both our universities . reason being man's nature , and the proper act of reason , the deducing evidently new knowledges out of antecedent ones , it may seem wonderful that mankind , after the using their reason and disputing so long time , should still disagree in their sentiments , and contradict one another in inferring their conclusions : so that those who are sam'd for the greatest philosophers , do still remain in perpetual , and ( as far as it can be discern'd ) endless and irreconcileable variance and dissension about their tenets . it seems to shock the very definition of man , and to lay in some sort a scandal upon creative wisdom it self , that , whereas all other creatures do arrive at the natural end for which they were made , mankind alone , nay the noblest portion of that kind , who cultivate their thoughts with the most exact care that may be , should still miss of reasoning rightly , and so fall short of true knowledge , which is their natural perfection . what tree but bears the fruit proper to its kind ? or , what cause in the world but produces such effects as are sutable to its nature ? and tho' , by the interfering of cross-agents , there happens now and then a deficiency in some very few particulars , yet that defect is never found in a considerable part of the species ; for chance would not be chance if it did come near the reaching an universality : whereas mankind , in its whole latitude , seems to fall short of improving it self in truth ; at least , in gaining certainty of it ; or , if some have attain'd it , yet the number of those right reasoners is so very inconsiderable , that they are lost amongst the croud of those who stray into errour . nor can those happy few who have light on it , obtain quiet possession of what they have acquir'd ; but their title to it is perpetually disputed by great multitudes of pretenders ; who put in their claim , and set up their pleas for their opposit tenets . whence , our first enquiry ought to be , how man's nature comes to be so disabled from performing its primary operation , or from reasoning rightly ; that so we may bethink our selves by what means it may ( if possible ) recover the true use of its natural faculty ; how it may be cur'd of the impotency it labours under ; and be freed from those impediments which hinder it from acting as it ought . . divines will tell us that this mischief happens thro' original sin. nor can it be doubted but there is some truth in what they alledge . for , questionless , passion distorts the understanding by the ascendent which the depraved will has over it in such concerns as the will is addicted to , and has espous'd an interest in . but , this comes not up fully to our difficulty . for , granting that , when the soul is thus originally tainted , the will influences and byasses the understanding , so as it cannot discern clearly the just value of spiritual goods , and , by addicting it to such false goods for which it self has a passionate concern , it makes it over-value vile pleasures , aiery honour or sordid profit ; whence , it becomes blinded and makes wrong iudgments both of the one and the other ; yet , i see no reason why original sin , which works only by giving us corrupt inclinations , should hinder us from concluding right in points meerly speculative , to which our discourse confines us ; nor why an archimedes , an euclid , an aristotle , or an hippocrates , tho' heathens , may not arrive a● truth in mathematicks , and other sciences to which they apply'd themselves ; nor why a man of a wicked life , whose soul is corrupted with actual sin added to original , may not cast up an accompt right , as well as he might have done had adam never fallen . to deduce consequences right out of other knowledges , which we call the premisses , is so nearly ally'd to our very essence and rational nature , that quite to lose that faculty seems the same as to lose our manhood ; which we cannot be thought to have forfeited by the fault of our first parents . nor has the depravation of our will any interest or inclination tempting it to be accessary to such a miscarriage : rather the acquisition of science is so agreeable to our innate vanity and desire of esteem , that it runs along with the grain of that primigenial imperfection . the honour that accrues to an eminent scholar prints him in such a character , and is so grateful to pride and self-love , that it excites in●ustry , whets the wit , and , thence conduces to clear the understanding . so that t● exercise our natural faculty as we ought 〈◊〉 such kind of studies , and so arrive at an e●cellency in reasoning , does sooth and not thwart those vicious inclinations . besides , there have been without doubt , many persons of eminent virtue among the schoolmen both of the present and former ages ; who by a long practic'd habit of virtue have rectify'd those sinister propensions of the will inherited from their parents ; and yet , by their contradicting one another , we may 〈◊〉 ●ssured that one side does still miss of truth . whence we may conclude that neither virtuous inclinations do avail the good , nor do vicious ones considerably or discernibly hinder the bad in order to their attainment of science : wherefore , we must look for another reason for these constant miscarriages , and this unaccountable disagreement among philosophers and speculaters ; and how it comes that the truth or falshood of very few conclusions have , in so many ages , been decisively determined ; or , which is the same , why truth , in things subject to reason , cannot , in so long time , be made clearly ap●ear . reflecting then that mathematicians do very rarely disagree in their conclusions ; or , if any differ from the rest , as in the quadrature of the circle , or such like , either thro' surprize , or unattentiveness to the long train of consequences which are prae-requisit to those conclusions ; and that by this means a mistake happens , the errour is evidently discover'd , so that even the mistaker himself is convinced of his failing , when it comes to be thorowly examined by others , learned in the same art , who like by-standers see more than did the gamester ; this leads us naturally to consider whether the same clear way has been taken in other parts of philosophy , as has been in that science . and , at first sight it appears manifestly it has not . for 't is evident that geometricians do lay for their axioms self-evident propositions and clear definitions ; and their postulatums are not such as are meerly begg'd or supposed , and so need our favour to let them pass for truths ; but they claim our assent to them as their due ; and the consequenees they draw are all of them immediate ; which makes the contexture of the whole work close and compacted . whereas i have not observ'd that any other sort of philosophers have taken that clear method . whence we have good reason to suspect that the want of observing this method , or something equivalent to it , has been the sole oecasion of all those deviations from truth and disagreements among philosophers in their conclusions and tenets , which we find in the world. i say , [ or something equivalent to it . ] for , i do not expect that every demonstrater should be ty'd to observe that severe method in rigour . this were to condemn aristotle , and all the philosophers that ever writ hitherto . 't is too laborious to the authour to cast his thoughts perpetually into that nice and exact frame ; and very uneasie for the readers also , and would too much strain their brains to keep them still bent to such a solicitous attention . besides , a discourse that proceeds endways by immediate connexion , does comprehend as much in one page , as in euclid's method could be contain'd in many . 't is enough then that such discourses be so perfectly consequential , that they can , if need be , bear that most rigorous test. and such they must be ; or , otherwise , they will scarce pass muster with acute wits , who candidly and unbyassedly pursue truth . nor does this precise mathematical method sute , in all regards , with the other parts of philosophy . for the notions that science is employ'd in are , for the most part , extension and figure ; which being perceptible to our sight , they show the thing , in some sort , to our eye , as well as demonstrate it by reason to our understanding ; whereas , scarce any other science affords us this advantage ; which forces us to have recourse only to our notions , and to strive to make them clear by definitions . in which , having no assistance from our fancy or material representations , they are hence less easily imprinted and reflected on ; which makes our attainment of science more laborious . yet , notwithstanding this accidental disadvantage , their productions are not at all less evident or less certain to the judgment . for , it is not the noting them with a , b , c , that either makes them true , or shows them to be so ; but the connexion of the notions we have of those lines , angles , or other quantities , and of their proportions to one another , which we voluntarily agree to signifie by such letters . whence results this evident and comfortable corollary that clear demonstrations may be had , and , consequently , science attain'd , in other parts of philosophy , and in all other subjects , as well ( tho' not so easily ) as in those of the mathematicks ; so the notions belonging to those subjects be but clear'd and rightly connected ; sinee 't is the connexion of notions , or ( as logicians phrase it ) the connexion of terms , which does beget science , and not the formality of lines and letters us'd by mathematicians . by this time we may seem to have discover'd the true reason of the general miscarriages of most philosophers in the pursuit of truth . for , since 't is impossible that he who intends to travel to london , tho' he have both clear eyes , and strong legs , and employs both of them to his utmost , should ever arrive at his iourney 's end if he does not take the right way to it ; so it is equally impossible any man should arrive at science , if he takes not the right method or way to attain it , tho' he have never so clear a natural wit , and a strong brain , and labours never so industriously to make use of both to his best advantage . providence therefore is justify'd , and the ability of our natural faculty asserted ; and the blame lies wholly at the doors of the persons who do not first apply their thoughts to know the way to truth , e'er they set forwards in quest of it : but chiefly in those who pretend to be guides to others , and yet are themselves ignorant of the method that can bring men to it . mathematicians take the way , and so arrive at it . others ( a very few exeepted ) do not take it , and therefore miss of it . whence we may establish this fundamental and most useful maxim , that the first and chief study of those who pursue true knowledge in philosophy , is to apply their industry to comprehend the method or way to it : that , if they find not that , their most earnest study is lost labour ; but that , having once found it , they cannot doubt of compassing their end by using such proper means . but is not the knowledge of this method insuperably hard to be attain'd ? for , if it be , we are never the nearer , but still at the same loss . to give a stop to such an apprehension , i must avow that no part of mathematicks is more demonstrable than is the way to demonstrate , or the method to science . nature ( as we experience ) gives us our notions ; on which , as on its elements , all science is grounded . to make these clear and distinct , we can distribute them under common heads , and divide those heads by intrinsecal differences , or such as are proper to each of them , till we come to the notion we are to discourse of . while we thus divide them , we at the same time , and with the same labour , frame denitions of each notion comprehended under those respective heads ; by doing which we gain a distinct and clear conception of them ; which does , to a fair degree , facilitate our judging whether such or such of them may be with truth connected in propositions , ( or in such speeches as affirm or deny , ) in which truth does formally consist . to do this more exactly , we consider that those propositions must either be such as show of themselves that the two notions ( call'd it terms ) must be connected ; and then they are self-connected or self-evident : or else they need to be shown connected by means of some other notion which is connected with them both ; to show which we call proving . those of the former sort , if perfectly such , are fit to be first principles ; whose nature , as common sense tells us , is not to need or admit of proof . the connexion of the later sort is made known by proof , or by their joint connexion with a third , which we call the middle term , medium or argument ; to do which is the proper work of discourse or ratiocination : these three terms rightly placed or put together , compound that most close and exact discourse call'd a syllogism . certain and most evident rules may be assign'd how to place those three terms in the two first propositions , so as that discourse may be most clear and perspicuous ; as also , how to find out such a middle term as is proper to connect the other two , whose connexion or truth is under dispute ; and to show the force of the consequence , and why a new proposition call'd the conclusion , must most necessarily follow out of the former ones . all which being demonstrated , ( as i have reason to presume is done in this following treatise ) and the equivocation of the words that express our notions being avoided , i see not what more can be substantially necessary to the method to science . for , our notions being clear'd , first principles establish'd , the true form of a syllogism manifested , proper middle terms found , and the necessity of the consequence evidenced ; all those conclusions may be deduced with demonstrative evidence , which ly within our ken , or which we can have occasion to enquire after ; that is , all that we have notions of : provided those notions be not meerly accidental , or very remote from one another , and therefore incapable of being connected . yet still there is one difficulty that sticks , and lies in our way ; and which is more , seems hard to be remov'd . for logick , or the art of reasoning rightly , being the skill which is to teach us this method to science ; and so many logicks being written by learned men , and studied by such multitudes ; how comes it that , notwithstanding such helps , men do still differ in their tenets , that is , many or most of them do still err , as much as if they had never had such proper assistances . for , if logick shows them the way to science , and they take that way , and have a natural ability to follow it or walk in it , they must all arrive at science ; and their thoughts center in the same truths without any disagreement ; the contrary to which we do notwithstanding experience . to give an answer to this , i shall be hard put to it how to bear my self between the two extremes of modesty , dissimulation and boasting . for , if i grant those logicks are as they ought to be , that is , full and evident , and follow'd by men of divers sentiments , i must confess i know not how to reply , or solve the objection . on the other side , to condemn all the logicks since aristotle's time , or all logicks which are not according to his grounds , is to set up our selves , and savours of arrogancy . in this porplexity i have no way to secure my self but to speak the plain truth , and to hope it will bear me out . i must then , in behalf of truth , declare , that the pretended logicks themselves are in the greatest fault . for , 't is easie to observe , that they do indeed give many dry and unprov'd rules and maxims ; they afford many definitions , some right , some wrong , being oftentimes illogical and fram'd out of fancy ; they pester their books with many unnecessary divisions and subdivisions ; they treat very largely of the predicaments , of single , opposit and aequipollent propositions ; they are prolix and superfluous in their doctrine about syllogisms , their moods , figures , several sorts of idle fallacies , &c. all which look very learned to new beginners ; who do , therefore , take much pains to lay them up in their memory ; i say in their memory , for none of those passages being demonstrated , they never sunk into or settled in their reason . and therefore , notwithstanding all this , when they have as it were got without book all these particulars , the readers are no wiser how to demonstrate any point practically , or how to set himself about it , than he was before he read those treatises . i have studied many of those logicks my self when i was young , and all of any note i had seen then , and consider'd them very attentively , till i had almost lost my natural reason by dwelling upon them ; yet notwithstanding ( and i believe the same passes with other young students ) i knew no more how to go to work to demonstrate any thing , than if i had never seen them . they started now and then some curious , amusing ( but jejune and useless ) questions about ens rationis , unions , &c. and set many confused ideas of the several parts of logick in my memory ; but still my reason was not enlighten'd , nor enabled to perform those fine things they had told me of . nor was it any wonder ; for they spoke not to my reason , nor endeavour'd to ground their discourse on the nature of the things in hand ; nor to show demonstratively why every step they led me , or lesson they taught me , must be true ; nor how it did influence true knowledge , or advance directly towards the acquisition of science ; so that it look'd more like a kind of history of what those authours had said or writ , than like a method to find out truth ; insomuch that i came at length to suspect that the intention of those kind of logicians , was not to pursue the knowledge of truth , which is only to be had by clear demonstration ; but that they meant to furnish young wits with certain modes of talking with a show of learning , and of signalizing themselves for being able to argue pro or con indifferently in scholastick dissertations . it resembled the tiring of a hawk , serving only to exercise its nibbling faculty , and whet the appetite , but had nothing of nutritive in it to satisfie it . for , reflexion will teach us very evidently , that only that which is made clear to our reason , can settle in it , nourish and dilate it , as being proper and connatural food to a rational soul ; and that whatever we take in or carelesly swallow , that is not such , but meerly wordish only fills us full of wind and ayr , which breaks out in insipid talk. the fault then lies evidently in the logicks which have been us'd in the schools hitherto , none of which have attempted to show demonstratively the way how to demonstrate , or given us a connected discourse of the method to science . 't is noted that the practice of the preacher going along with his doctrine , makes the doctrine it self more edifying : and , by parity , had the teachers of logick practised demonstration all the while they had taught how to demonstrate , those rules , so rationally imprinted , sinking deep into their soul , and thence becoming as it were a limb or faculty of their judgment , would have truly enabled them how to act accordingly ; whereas , while they swim only in their memory , they serve for nothing but to pour out indigestedly what they had rawly taken in . but now , where is that authour who has hitherto made such an useful and necessary attempt ? none that i know of . the treatise call'd ars cogitandi has divers excellent things in it , and in some places has made many good steps towards true logick ; and the examples it brings are very illustrating . but yet , in the main , it amounts to no more but the schools reform'd into method and elegancy . it abounds with many useless particulars : it does not bottom it self upon nature , only which can give solidity to our reasons : it has many unprov'd suppositions , and bare sayings without offering any proof . and , yet i do verily believe that , had not the authours calculated it for that particular sort of philosophy they had espous'd , which could bear no evidence , but had follow'd the guidance of their own natural genius ( which , doubtless , was very extraordinary ) it would have much excell'd its present self . * mr. le grand's method says much , but proves little ; and i believe , both cartesius , and himself , did first consider and survey the whole scheme of their doctrine , and then fitted their logick to it . which is preposterous and praeter-natural ; for the certain way to the end of our iourney should be foreknown , ere we set the first step towards it . mr. lushington has with much pains gone about to demonstrate some particulars of the summulist part of logick , and chiefly that about predication . but , there is nothing at all of nature in his grounds . he regards not the common notions of mankind , nor in what they consist ; and therefore his discourses are so perfectly artificial , that they have nothing to say to nature , nor nature to them . he imposes imprudently new language and new terms upon his readers , which he might have assur'd himself they would never take pains to learn. he affects the way of a , b , c , which makes a show of science ; but the product of his discourse is , oftentimes , no more but the bare proposition he is to prove , onely drest up in a mathematical garb. his whole book , in my judgment , might have been more clearly compriz'd in one sheet of paper : and , lastly , as for want of nature to ground his conceptions , his several proofs can never enter into the reason , so 't is almost impossible they should ever stay long in the memory . yet his attempt to demonstrate in such a sceptical age , and his industry , deserve a fair commendation , and may provoke others to make the same attempt with better success . burgersdicius is clearly contriv'd for the memory onely , and not for the reason ; and he confounds and over-burthens it too , with the multitude of his canons , rules , and divisions ; for which he seldome or never gives any reason , but puts them to be believ'd by his reader if he pleases ; and , so leaves him still in the dark . yet he might be made useful to new beginners ; were something of every thing , that is to purpose , pick'd out ; unnecessary things ( in which he super-abounds ) cut off ; his errours , which are not a few , corrected by some learned hand ; and his shatter'd thrums-ends woven into some kind of connexion , and dependence on one another ; to do which , little transitions from one passage to another are insufficient . but , as he is , he informs not the understanding of any one thing groundedly or solidly . he falls exceedingly short of ars cogitandi in many regards : how , he may please climates of a duller genius i know not ; but i should much wonder if any learned englishman should consider or esteem him . mr. clark , far exceeds him in good sense , and in giving some reasons for what he says in many particular passages . but , by his framing the contexture of his book out of authours of different principles , his discourses do sometimes appear desultory , and like a kind of elaborate rhapsody , laid well together by his own good wit. he mistakes aristotle now and then , by taking his sentiments as represented by his adversaries ; whose interest and principles conspire to make them misconceive him . he abounds with many reflexions not all conducing to science . a fault , from which aristotle himself was not altogether free ; which makes it more pardonable . for instance ; to what purpose are his many distinctions of his propositions , especially those he calls exponibiles ? let but the learner know certainly and liquidly , what are the subject and predicate in any proposition , which is easie to be discover'd by the copula that is to come between them , and unite them ; and have a care that the words that express them are univocal ; he will be furnish'd with means to see the form of connexion , which is essential to a proposition , and is onely conducive to science , which wholly consists in the connexion of terms . his chief misfortune is , that he does not seem either at the beginning , or in the process of his book , to know , at least to build upon this truth and stand to it , that our notions , or ( as the moderns have taken a toy to call them ) ideas , are the very natures of the things in our understanding imprinted by outward objects ; without which no stability of those notions or ideas can be , with evidence , asserted ; nor any solid knowledge possibly be had of our predications ; nor the true ground of truth or falshood be understood ; nor , consequently , ean there be any firmness in our judgments or discourses . whence , i could wish that every beginner were at first well instructed and settled in this point ; for , without this , all will be but loose , and ungrounded talk in the air. and , tho' i lose credit with our late wits , i must avow that aristotle's dry assertion , that [ anima intelligendo fit omnia , ] tho' it may seem to some a wild paradox , has more solid sense in it , were it rightly understood , and is more useful to true philosophy , than all the other maxims that do not proceed upon it , and suppose it ; which yet i see the goodness of nature intimates to many , and forces them to ground their discourses on it practically ; even tho' , while they speculate , they deny it , or , at least , seem to doubt of it , or disregard it . observing therefore this great want under which philosophy ( which is the study of truth ) labours , i have , out of my true zeal of improving science , and beating down scepticism , ( the profest patron of ignorance , and covert parent of all irreligion ) hazarded the opinion of singularity in endeavouring to write and publish a demonstrative logick ; at least i have given such reasons , quite thorough it , as i judg'd to be clear and conclusive , in every piece of it that has any influence upon scientifical knowledge . what my reader may expect from me is this . i begin with our natural notions , the bottom-ground of all our knowledge . i show them to be the very natures of the things ; whose metaphysical verity being establish'd by creative wisdom , does , consequently , give stability , and solidity to all our discourses that are built on them . i distribute those natural notions under those several common heads , and manifest why there must be so many and no 〈◊〉 show how their definitions are to be fram'd , which make our conceptions of the● 〈◊〉 and distinct. i lay rules to escape 〈◊〉 snares , which equivocal words lay 〈…〉 way while we are discoursing . i show ●he reason of all truth and falshood in connected notions , or propositions : which , if self-evident and identical , have title to be first principles , as from many heads i demonstrate . i trace nature in all those nice and immediate steps she takes to generate knowledge in us at first . coming to those propositions that need proof , and the way of proving them , i lay open the fundamental ground of the force of consequence , which gives the nerves to every act of true reasoning , and of the certainty and evidence of every conclusion which we rightly inferr . to perform which , i manifest that there can be but one necessary or natural figure of a syllogism , and but four moods of that figure . i lay down and fix the fundamental laws of concluding . i evidence the nature of that third notion or middle term ; by the connexion of which with the two terms of the thesis to be proved , they must inevitably be joyn'd with one another , and so the thesis it self must be rightly concluded ; and , therefore , infallibly true. i show how to find out a middle term fit for our purpose , and thence prepare the way for demonstration . i lay open how every truth must have at the bottom an identical proposition , and every errour a contradiction as their first principles , and how they may be reduced to those principles of theirs : to do which ( tho' more laborious ) is the best way of demonstrating . i manifest thence how one truth is in another , and what strange consequences follow thence . also , how middle terms , proper for demonstration , may be taken from all the four causes . to clear better the notion of science , i treat of the natures of opinion , and ( human ) faith ; their grounds , and how the former of these two last deviates from right reason ; and when the later does , or does not . then i consider the effects issuing from all sorts of proof ; viz. assent , suspense , certainty , and uncertainty . and , to put in practise my self what i do persuade , and recommend to others , i add seven demonstrations of the most considerable theses in divers sciences . and , lastly , i lay open the ways and methods of disputation ; and detect the weak stratagems , and inefficacious attacques of fallacies , or paralogisms . this is the summ of my endeavours in common . but , besides these , many particular knowledges light in on the by , ( and , as i hope , very useful ones ) which it would be tedious to enumerate . the manner i use to carry on the scheme of my doctrin , is , not to propose my conceptions magisterially , or to expect any one should assent to the least tittle of what i say upon my word : but , i offer my reasons for every paragraph i advance , if it can be conceiv'd to need any ; by doing which i speak to the reason of my readers , and withall i expose my self to the severe examination of the most acute and iudicious wits ; of which , i doubt not , there are multitudes in those seminaries of learning , our two famous universities ; to whom i humbly dedicate this small present . i neither strive to ingratiate my self by my style , nor to surprize any by plausible discourses ; much less to impose upon their understandings by voluntary suppositions . i draw now and then divers useful corollaries , and some that will seem , i doubt not , paradoxical ; that so i may carry on my doctrine to farther consequences , and show withall to what unthought-of conclusions reason will lead us if we follow her close and home . nor am i asham'd to declare openly , that i hold , that the chief end of science is to beget virtue ; and not onely to raise us to higher contemplation , but also to comfort , and strengthen divine faith in us , and to make it more lively and operative . whence i have taken occasion to excite my reader 's devotion out of the reflexions on divers points , that seem'd of themselves to be but dry speculations : making account that good thoughts arising , upon the spot , but of truths newly clear'd to our reason , do affect the will most connaturally , raise devotion , heighten contemplation , and make it solid ; and , consequently , keep the soul clear from idle fancies , and set her above light bigotteries . i have not enumerated these particulars to boast my performances , ( for these are yet to be decided , by examining whether the reasons i have all along produced will bear the test ) but to bespeak my reader 's pardon , if , travelling in an unbeaten road , i happen now and then to stumble . which as i am not conscious to my self to have done at all , so i shall hope i no where do in any passage that substantially concerns the method to science : rather , i must positively avow that it is impossible for any wit of man to invent any other way , than what i have propos'd , that is solid and evident . for , 't is granted by all mankind hitherto ( unless , perhaps , the cartesians ) that truth is fundamentally the conformity of our judgment to the nature of the thing , and that it consists formally in the connexion of the terms ; both which i have follow'd most exactly ; and , as some readers ( i doubt not ) will think , too superstitiously . now , since rectum est mensura sui & obliqui , my design engages me to show ( as far as the brevity of a preface will allow ) that the different methods taken by others do not lead us to true science . and , indeed , there is a kind of necessity laid upon me to make this charge good : for , since we take different methods , if theirs be a right one , mine must be a wrong ; and my publishing it no advantage , but an injury to truth , and to my greatest neighbour , the world. the methods which i pitch upon to examine , shall be of two sorts , viz. that of speculative , and that of experimental philosophers ; the former of which pretend to proceed by reason and principles ; the later by induction ; and both of them aim at advancing science . looking about for an instance if the former sort , i did not think epicurus , and his school worth my taking notice of ; for he who supposes all his principles , bids defiance to all methods of concluding any thing . and , as for our modern school-philosophers , they have so disputed themselves quite out of breath for want of any certain method , that they have brought all science to an indifferency of opinions , or maintaining any thing with equal evidence ( or rather no-evidence ) a thing absolutely impossible for those who lay any right method to science . and this deficiency of theirs , losing their credit with our late wits , have given them occasion to east about how to model philosophy a-new , and frame it wholly in another mould : for the schoolmen on the one side represented aristotle wrong , and on the other side his ( perhaps affected ) obscurity , won them rather to believe the schools concerning his doctrine , than to be at the expence of pains and patience to understand him right , speaking by himself , or by his first interpreters . the inconsiderableness then of other pretenders to a method to science , and the weakness of their pleas , throws me forcibly upon examining the method of that great man , cartesius : it must be confess'd his method is vastly different from mine . he pretends to a first principle , and the self-evidence of that principle ; which therefore i must either disprove , or give up my cause , and condemn what i have written ; since it is impossible that two methods , contrary to one another , can both of them be the right one ; or lay just claim to self-evidence in their principles . but , with how potent an adversary has my unlucky audaciousness , in attempting to lay a demonstrative method to science oblig'd me to grapple ! it must be acknowledg'd that he was a a man of that prodigious wit , that scarce any age has produced his equal . his school has dilated it self into divers nations ; and his scholars and followers are of such eminent rank and name , that it would terrifie any man to encounter his doctrine , especially his principles ( which must be the solidest , strongest , and clearest parts of it ) who had not an unshaken confidence in the invincible strength of truth , under whose ●anner he fights . he dazles the understanding of his reader with his most ingenious and clear way of discoursing ; a talent peculiar to himself ; and he lays his thoughts together with such an artificial and smoothly-flowing currency , in proper and unaffected language , that he captivates it at unawares into a complaisant assent ; and his greatest adversary must be forced to confess that , if his doctrine be not true , at least truth was never so exactly and handsomely counterfeited . he postures his thoughts so dextrously , that nothing but perfect evidence can break their ranks , or make a hostile impression upon them ; so that , if his hypothesis be false , and hap to be overthrown , it will certainly be the most glorious victory truth ever gain'd . but all those bug-bears cannot deter me from the defence of truth ; in such a cause , non divûm parcimus ulli and the more his doctrine resembles truth and has greater patrons to abet and carry i● on , the higher obligation it lays upon me t● detect its falshood , if i sincerely judge i● fallacious , and think i can show it to be so i would not be misunderstood to intend her● a confutation of his doctrine ; 't is neithe● a work for a preface , nor for a man of m● small leasure ; but only to take minutes o● some few , ( but main ) hinges of his do●ctrine in order to confute his method ; leaving it to others who have better parts and less employments , to carry on my slight animadversions , if they may be found of weight , to farther reflexions . to begin then with his six meditations . in the first place , i cannot conceive why they should be styl'd his metaphysicks . for 't is proper for that noblest and highest science to treat of ens , as ens , or of sueh notions as concern being ; which i cannot discern to have been the direct scope of those treatises . he sets himself to investigate some first principle , to fix upon , by a laborious divesting himself of all those knowledges he is seemingly possess'd of ; and , after much tossing his thoughts to and fro● a long time , with doubting or pretending to doubt , of all he had hitherto known , he arrives at length at that odd first principle of his [ cogito , ergo sum ] and triumphs mightily with a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at his having found it . against which procedure ( waving here what i have said of it , book . less . . ) i have divers exceptions , as irrational in many respects . for , first he might as well have made that inference , or have found that first principle at the very beginning , when he made his first doubt ; since [ dubito ergo sum ] is full as conclusive of his own existence as [ cogito ergo sum ] can be pretended to be . nor can any reason be given why [ ego sum dubitans ] does not include in it [ ego sum ] as well as [ ego sum cogitans ] does . and cartesius himself ( medit . d. ) confesses the same expresly . to what end then did he run on in a long ramble of doubting , when as the very first act of doubting , would have done his whole business , and have prov'd that he is ? if it be pretended that [ ego cogito ] was more comprehensive than [ ego dubito ] because doubting is one head , or sort of thinking , then his argument should have been put thus [ dubito ergo cogito ] as we argue from [ est homo ] ( which is one kind of animal ) to ergo est animal ; whereas he takes and pursues a quite different method . dly . he infers his first principle , [ ego sum ] and so makes it a kind of conclusion ; which is clearly against the nature of first principles , they being self-evident , and , therefore incapable of being inferr'd or prov'd ; because there is nothing more evident than themselves to inferr or prove them by . i know spinoza , and some others of his school , deny he meant an inference , but intended by these words one positive proposition , viz. ego sum cogitans , or p●es cogitans . but , what means then the illative particle [ ergo ] or what sense bears it ? or , why did himself in his third meditation say expresly , [ ex eo quod dubito sequitur me esse ? ] again , his first principle is deny'd by himself to be [ ego sum res cogitans ] but meerly [ ego sum , ] at which he arrives by the means of ego cogito : for , in the d . meditation he has these words . nunquam efficiet deceptor ille summè potens , &c. ut nihil sim , quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo ; adeò ut — denique statuendum sit hoc pronunciatum , [ ego sum , ] [ ego existo ] — necessariò esse verum . but , not to hold him too severely to his own words , tho' no man uses to express himself more clearly , let his first principle be [ ego sum cogitans ; ] i object then farther against it . dly , that , notwîthstanding all that can be alledg'd , it must be granted , he has inferr'd and prov'd that whole first principle . for was not all that anteceded to the finding it so many discourses or reasonings ? and did he not evidently inferr this to be true , because all else might be doubted of ? if not , to what purpose did he pretend he might doubt of all else ? for , if this was evident of it self , and not needed to be prov'd , he might have propos'd it at first , without making all that a-do . thly , since he must necessarily grant that something or other is inferr'd or prov'd by him , that is , follows from his antecedent discourses ; and , it is evident that , in his opinion , something did follow thence , because he discours'd or argu'd all the while , and us'd more than once the word [ sequitur ; ] and no such discourse can be , but something must still follow out of what went before ; he ought , in the first place , and ere he began his discourse , or went about to speak consequentially , to have been perfectly satisfy'd himself , and have shown his readers , so as to put it past all doubt , what the force of a right consequence is , and in what it consists ; and that himself , while he discours'd , did make use of such right consequences . and , he should the rather have done this , because men do more frequently err in drawing consequences , than in judging that they have a body , that they see , feel , hear , or use their other senses ; all which he represents as possible to be doubted of . whereas , he never starts or makes the least doubt of his consequences , which are to bind the parts of his discourse together all along , and so bring him orderly to his first principle ; nor gives any reason why they may not be doubted of as well as the rest ; nor takes care to settle that doubt . which shows that he is not true to his own extravagant method of settling his first principle , by doubting of every thing till he comes at it ; but leaves it , and consequently his first principle , which depends on it , uncertain . thly , and lastly , no man can have a clear and distinct idea , ( in which , according to him , all knowledge consists ) of any thing following out of a first principle , unless he have a clear and distinct knowledge of that principle it self : but cartesius , when , in the progress of his thoughts , he came to the settling ego cogito ( or ego sum ) for his first principle , had no clear and distinct idea of that principle it self ; therefore he could have no clear and distinct idea of any thing which follow'd out of that principle ; and , consequently , all that method to science laid by him is useless to that end , and fruitless . the minor ( which onely can need proof ) is thus manifested . for , he had not , as soon as he had arriv'd at that principle , as yet any clear and distinct knowledge of the subject of that principle ( or proposition ) [ ego ] and therefore he had no such knowledge of the proposition or principle it self . the antecedent is confess'd by himself in the words immediately following the place lately cited , viz. [ nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim ego ille qui jam necessariò sum ] and thence he proceeds to find , after he had found his first principle , what ego means , and at length conciudes that he was praecisè res cogitans , mens , ratio , &c. which clear and distinct conception of himself he had not before , tho' he pretended he knew his first principle . again , when he was newly come to the knowledge of that first principle , he is put to know nothing but barely that ; nor could he gather this clear knowledge of himself from that principle alone , while it was yet unknown . it were worth our enquiry then , how , and whence he had this clear and distinct knowledge of himself . he concludes the soul to be a distinct thing from the body , because the idea he has of it , and of its properties and affections are clearly different from the idea , he has of the body , and its modifications . by which 't is most evident that , for want of logick , he reflects not on the difference between the nature , and the suppositum which has the nature in it ; that is , between the essence or nature , and the ens or thing . for , if he did , he would have seen that from the having different , nay contradictory ideas of two distinct natures , it does not necessarily follow that they must be two things , meaning by thing the suppositum . surely he has a vastly different idea of the divine and human natures , and yet will grant that they were both in one suppositum , or ( which is the same in an intelligent being ) in the same person , and , i am sure , if he holds the incarnation , he must renounce this principle of his , that whenever he has distinct ideas of two natures , there must be two individual things or suppositums . it being one of the most chief and most fundamental articles of our christian faith , that there is in christ our saviour but one hypostasis or suppositum ; tho' the essences and properties of the divine and humane nature , and the ideas ( as he calls it ) of them , do still keep their exact distinction , and remain unconfounded ; and that , whoever holds otherwise , and makes them two suppositums , does ( in the christian phrase ) solvere christum , io. . . i have not time to reckon up , even hintingly , the many absurdities that spring from this ill-coherent position of theirs . but , i will keep to this very maxim of his , and demonstrate that , even according to that , man , which must be meant by the pronoun [ ego ] is truly one thing consisting of soul and body , and not a mere mens . to show this , i deny that he has a c●●ar and distinct idea of himself , unless he conceives himself to be a rational thing ; or , as he calls himself , ratio ; nor can he clearly conceive himself to be a rational thing , but he must conceive himself to be a thing that infers new knowledges out of foregoing ones , leasurely , or with succession of time , which belongs properly to bodies and bodily motion . wherefore , something of corporeal , extended , or divisible is found in the clear and distinct idea of ego , or himself , if he be a ratio or rational thing ; for , were he meerly a mens or spirit , his operations would be indivisible , simultaneous and unsuccessive , as is abundantly demonstrated in divers places of the following treatise ; particularly in my seventh demonstration , book . lesson . among the other points , he brings as possible to be yet doubted of , he puts this for one , that a four-squar'd thing has in it four sides and no more ; of which he pretends he may yet doubt , because some most powerful agent may possibly make that appear to him to be so , tho' it be not true in reality . now , 't is the very notion or essence of a quadratum , to have but four sides ; and , therefore , the proposition affirming that it has just four sides , is perfectly identical , and the same as to say , what has but four sides , has but four sides . it being then impossible any thing can be more certain , or more evident than an identical proposition ; i would ask why he might not as well be deceivable in his first principle [ cogito ergo sum ] as in that self-evident proposition ! or , if he pretends that proposition , [ ego sum cogitans ] is more evident than the other ; then , since all evidence of the truth of any proposition , consists in the close and clear connexion of its terms , i would demand of him or his scholars , whether there be any connexion of terms more close and more clear , than there is of those found in an identical proposition , which affirms the same is the same with it self ? or , if they say there is , then to know of them in what that evidence consists , or how it comes to be more evident ? to make way towards the settling his beloved and self-pleasing ideas ; he falls to doubt of the certainty of all our senses in order to knowledge ; and that not onely as a supposition for discourse sake , as he pretended to doubt of other things , but really and seriously ; and his scholar malbranche † assures us , the eyes ( and the same he says of the other senses ) are not given us to judge of the truth of things , but onely to discern those things which may either profit , or injure us ; and all over , he makes them improper means to attain knowledge by . which tenet of theirs lies open to many exceptions . for , first , the reason cartesius assigns , viz. [ prudentiae est nunquam illis planè confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt . 't is a part of prudence not to trust them at all , who have so much as once deceiv'd us ] is utterly unworthy so great a man : for , it discredits all nature , for some few men's morality ; which is a strange argument for a philosopher . he that has but once deceiv'd us designedly , is presum'd to have done it out of knavery ; and consequently , may not deserve to be trusted the second time , because 't is to be fear'd he is still dispos'd to do the same again : but , what is this to corporeal nature , in which ( taking in all circumstances ) things are carry'd on from proper causes to proper effects . weak men are sometimes deceiv'd by their senses ; but speculative or learned men , who penetrate the reasons how the senses came to misinform them , are aware of those undue circumstances , and by that means easily prevent the being led by them into errour . dly , no wise man builds his judgments barely on the impressions made on his senses , being taught by their reason , as well as by the senses themselves better circumstanced ( that is , by experience ) that they do sometime , deceive us . whence , they reserve in their minds certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in what circumstances we may truly give credit to their testimony , in what , not . now , since exceptio firmat regulam , to say their information is to be excepted against in such circumstances , is to acknowledge that in all others they are to be trusted . dly , as art does preserve the learned from being deceiv'd by the shortness of the senses in some cases , so ( as was said lately ) the senses themselves do generally correct the false iudgments they may have occasion'd in weak people . for example , ( to use some of the instances they object , ) a brand whirled round represents a circle of fire ; a stick in the water looks crooked ; a square tower seen a far off appears round , and great bodies little. but when the seer comes near the brand , the tower and those great bodies , or beholds the stick out of the water , he having now a more exact view of them in better circumstances , is inform'd certainly by the same sense , ( and , if need be , by others conspiring with it , ) that the former representations were not sincere ; whence he easily corrects his former mistakes . why then must the senses be quite discarded as useless servants for knowledge , and be branded for constant lyers and deceivers ? since , if we apply them as we ought , they are the proper means to make us correct these too forward iudgments , which in improper circumstances they may have occasion'd . nay , they advance our knowledge accidentally even when they happen to misinform us ; by stirring us up to enquire whence it came , that the right impressions on them , from the objects , which were customary , was thus perverted ; which , doubtless has been the cause of very many new knowledges in nature . thly , what is all this to science , or to our purpose ? for in the method to science , we neither need , nor do build our judgments on the senses alone . all we require is , that they convey into our knowing power right a●prehensions or notions of the things in nature : and , this 't is evident they must do ; for tho' , as they object , a large square steeple seen a far off seems round and little ; and therefore who judges it such is deceiv'd ; yet it imprints truly in my mind the notion of little and round ; and , 't is on these unmistakable notions all our science is built ; and our judging right in our speculations is chiefly grounded on other principles , as will be seen hereafter . lastly , themselves must either grant the certainty of those impressions on the senses , or they must confess all their ideas are nothing worth . for , since they hold that the objects imprint motions on the fibres of the senses , which , making such a report ( as it were ) to the soul , the proper and ‖ ingenit ideas of such a body are either excited in the soul , or else are , as cartesius elsewhere expresses it , elicited , that is produced by it , upon the hint given it by such a motion ; in case the impressions causing such motions be not sincere , and do not truly inform her , a wrong idea may come to be made use of , and so they can never have any certain knowledge of any thing . having thus got rid of the senses giving us notice of outward things , by imprinting notions in them , which experience teaches us is the ordinary way of knowing any thing ; it follows of course , that they must recurr to extraordinary ways by inward means , or to inward light ; which is the method of fanaticks in religion , when they have rejected the ordinary ways of believing their proper teachers . and , hence , the cartesians tell us , they know there is a god , by the divine idea of himself which he has imprinted in them ; which is in other terms , to say , that they have it ky divine revelation ; for knowledge , according to them , being caus'd in them by those ideas , nay , consisting formally in thoir having the ideas of things in them ; and god giving them those ideas without the help of second causes , it follows that god is the immediate cause of all our knowledge ; and , so , no thanks at all to the things in nature , or to natural agents . these ideas i can observe by cartesius's discourse , are either of propositions , or else simple ideas . of the former they say , that whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive to be , is true . by which if they mean no more but that whatever we know to be , is ; or that we cannot truly know that to be which is not , nothing is more certain or more evident by common sense ; onely they run counter in their discourse , and make not the understanding to be true , because the outward thing is so , but they argue that the thing is therefore thus or thus , because the idea in the understanding is such or such ; and , so , they seem to make truth consist , not in the conformity of the understanding to the thing , but in the thing 's being conformable to the idea in my understanding ; as cartesius himself affirms in his answer to the instances of gassendus . how solidly he argues from simple ideas may be seen by his demonstration of a deity , which he concludes to be , because he has an idea of a being that has all perfections in it , amongst which existence is one ; which idea he contends he could never have had from the things without us , and therefore it must have been imprinted by god himself immediately . in making which proof passable , tho' cartesius exerts the utmost of his great wit , yet this plain discourse will manifest how untoward and inconclusive it is . i can have a notien or idea of finis , of non , and of perfection , and thing , and all , and lastly of existence ; and had i not such distinct ideas of all these , i could not understand the meaning of those words ; for an idea can be nothing but what 's meant by those words . having distinct ideas of all these , i can compound an idea pf all these , or frame an idea of a thing that has all perfections in it , and existence among the rest : and this idea is in my mind , and the effect purely of my mind , already imbu'd with those simple ideas , and compounding them ; for i had it not from any one thing directly , nor did i gather it by discourse from the natures of things i was pre-acquainted with . but how comes it , or how can he argue that because i have such an idea fram'd by my mind , it must exist without my mind , or have a reality there : unless my mind could coyn or create beings at her pleasure , as oft as i have a desire to compound such ideas together ? he plays wittily upon the word [ existence . ] but we may consider the notion of existence , or ( which is all one ) know the meaning of that word , and yet abstract whether it does actually put its formal effect , that is , whether that existence is exercis'd or not exercis'd in the thing : which consideration alone spoils his whole argument : let us put a parallel . i have a complex idea of these words , my debtor will pay me a hundred pounds to morrow , at ten a clock , at his goldsmiths ; that is , i have in my mind the meaning of all these words ; and existence is necessarily involv'd in the meaning of those words , for they signifie determinate persons , time , place , and action , all which involve existence ; will it therefore follow , that that action of paying me money will be , because my idea includes the existence of that action , so determinately circumstanc'd ? yet upon his knowledge of a deity by this demonstration , depends , by his discourse , all the knowledge he has of any truth , except perhaps of ego cogito . what need was there to run after whimseys coyn'd in the mint of our own mind , to demonstrate a deity , when there are so many clear demonstrations of it from solid grounds in nature ? it may seem harsh that i should resemble , tho' cartesian method to fanaticism , or pretend they bring a kind of enthusiasm into philosophy . let the so much applauded malbranche be my compurgator . that very ingenious and eloquent person , who has a peculiar talent of talking nonsence as prettily and plausibly as any man i ever read , in his preface to the first volume of his search after truth , acquaints us with many extraordinary things , which would no doubt ( as bayes says ) very much elevate and surprize an ordinary reader . in common , he confounds all our moral and christian knowledges , which are immediately ordain'd to raise us towards heaven , and advance virtue and sanctity , with the speculative knowledges belonging to meer philosophy ; and most untowardly misapplies the sayings of the scriptures and fathers , which were never meant for his purpose , but in order to devotion , or mystical theology , ( nay to the beatifical state of god's manifesting his divine essence to the saints in heaven ) to the maxims and methods by which we are to attain human science . in particular , speaking his own sense , according to the cartesian doctrine ; he tells us , we must judge of things by the pure ideas of the mind ; whereas , i should rather have thought , that we ought to guide our thoughts , and judge of them , by the conformity they have to the things in nature : since we are sure creative wisdom made them , and implanted truth in them ; whereas , 't is uncertain whether god or our whimsical fancies gave us our ideas ; and , 't is certain they are the off-spring of the later , if they be not conformable to the things without us . he tells us farther that , all sciences are learned by the attention of the mind , which is nothing but its return and conversion towards god , who onely can teach us truth by the manifestation of his substance . i am heartily glad to know , that euclid and archimedes were converted to god , and that they were so infinitely happy as to see god's substance ( which is his essence ) so manifestly . he proceeds , men must look within themselves , and draw near unto the light that shines there continually , that their reason may be the more illuminated . — the mind ought to examin all human sciences by the pure light of truth which guides it , without hearkening to the false , and confused testimonies of the senses . — those that hear us do not learn the truths we speak to their ears , unless he that discover'd them to us , ( he means god the giver of ideas ) do reveal them at the same time to the mind . so that all science it seems , comes by divine revelation . to what end then are teachers , professours , schools and universities , if , when we have done what we can by all our teaching and learning , nothing but divine revelation must do the business , or gain us any science . but now he advances to a higher point . the mind ( says he ) is immediately , and after a very strict manner united to god ; nay , after a stricter and more essential manner than with the body . now , if this be true , i dare affirm that the mind is more united to god naturally , than our saviour's humanity was supernaturally and miraculously . for , this was but united hypostatically , or according to the suppositum or person of the eternal word ; whereas , by this new philosophy , every human mind is united essentially to god , that is to the godhead it self . for , to be united essentially is for one essence to be united to another essence , that is , to be one or the same essence with the divine essence . was ever such quakerism heard of among philosophers ! or , plain honest human reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into mystick theology , by spiritual alchymy ! yet , to say true , this is very consonant to the doctrine of ideas . they slight the instruction of nature , they scorn to be beholding to their senses , and outwards objects ; which forces them upon introversion , and to observe ( as the same authour says ) what eternal truth tells us in the recesses of our reason ; that is , in their darling ideas . now common reason ever taught me , and every man who did but reflect upon what passes within his understanding , that the proper and effectual way to gain a clear and distinct knowledge of our simple notions , is to make definitions of them ; and there are most certain rules of art , how those definitions may be fram'd . but , this was too ordinary a way to please minds so extraordinarily elevated as these gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with . the highest flights of nature do flag , it seems , too low for their supernatural pitch , nor can reach the degrees of their elevation above our dull horizon . they are inspir'd with heaven implanted ideas ; and , so , they have no more to do but retire their thoughts into the inward recesses of their mind , embellish'd and guilded with these shining innate ideas , and their work is done without any need of definitions made by sublunary art. sometimes i am apt to think , that they had recourse to those spiritual pourtraitures , out of despair of explicating any other way the essences of things , or in what they consisted ; and , i fear two of our learned men lately mention'd , apprehend them to be inscrutable and in-explicable . whereas , speaking of essences in common , i do assure them , that nothing can be plainer ; and that every clown were he interrogated orderly , could give us the true essences , or ( which is the same ) the true natures of the things he is conversant with . for , whatever makes mankind call and esteem any bodies , such or such things in distinction from all others , is truly their essence ; or , ( to speak in the language of a philosopher ) let but matter be determin'd by such a complexion of accidents , with that harmony or proportion of parts , connected with that constancy , that it is fit to act a distinct part upon nature's stage , or perform its primary operation ; that complexion of accidents , ( i say ) is truly the essence of that body , or the form that constitutes it such an ens , or such a part of , or in , nature . perhaps the cartesians will say , they allow definitions to make their ideas clear and distinct. but how can this cohere ? definitions are the effects of art , whereas these ideas are imprinted by god's hand who gave them their nature , and * cartesius says expresly , they are ingenitae . this being so , and god's immediate works being perfect , and those ideas being intended to give them knowledge , they can need nothing to make them more clear and distinct ; nor consequently can the users of them have any occasion for definitions , unless perhaps to explain their ideas to us ; who think we have a firmer basis to build them on , than those ideas of theirs . nature gives the ground , and art , the rules to make them : and they are such necessary instruments to true and solid science , that i could wish for the improvement of knowledge , that our universities would appoint a committee of learned men to compile a dictionary of definitions for the notions we use in all parts of philosophy whatever . monsieur de furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever , in three volumes ; out of which may be collected those that make for our purpose ; which being , by the ioynt-labour and concurrence of the persons deputed , examined ; if faulty , amended , and propos'd to the world ; it could not fail of advancing science highly . in carrying forward such a noble work , and so beneficial to mandkind , i should willingly contribute my quota of endeavours , nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing i know of . for definitions explicating or unfolding the nature of the thing , and all proper causes and effects being so nearly ally'd to the nature of the thing , it follows that there lies involv'd in the definitions , all essential and proper middle terms , to demonstrate whatever belongs to the notion defin'd , if right logick and studious industry be not wanting . he blames st. austin , and wishes he had not attributed to external bodies all the sensible qualities we perceive by their means . and why ? because ( says he ) they are not clearly contain'd in the idea he had of matter . what idea st. austin had of matter is little to purpose ; but , if he proceeded consequently to his thoughts , he could not conceive the first matter to be such as they put theirs to be . for , what man of common sense can frame any idea of a thing that has onely extension in it ; but is not to any degree either dense or rare , easie or hard to be divided , fluid nor solid , soft nor hard ? &c. and , if their quaint ideas and clear and distinct conceptions , which seem to be the ground of all their witty discourses , or divine revelations ( as malbranche calls them ) of science , be no wiser or solider than this , which is , or should be the chief subject of their physicks , i shall dare to affirm , that they are in plain terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible fopperies ; as i have shown at large in my appendix . and , indeed , how should we make any clear idea of their matter when themselves speak contradictions concerning it ; as may be seen hereafter , p. . where i shall hope i have demonstrated that their forc'd silence , open prevarications , and perfect inconsistency in telling us the intrinsecal nature of that first matter of theirs , has render'd them utterly incapable of explicating any body in nature . nor can we need any greater confirmation , that their natural philosophy is utterly unprincipled and unaccountable in the most essential part of it , than to observe that neither cartesius himself , nor regius , rohault , regis , le grand , nor any of that school i have met with , have ( as i must think ) been able to give us any light of it ; since they neither attempt , nor mention it ; which shows they are at an utter loss about the primordial constitution of their first matter ; of which , notwithstanding , they acknowledge all their three elements , and , consequently , all nature was made . these few particulars ( omitting innumerable others ) i have thought fit to hint , to show that the method to science , which the great cartesius follows is utterly incompetent to attain it , and that the scheme of his doctrine is merely a piece of wit. that which gives it most credit is , that , his suppositions granted , he proceeds consequently , in the subsequent parts of it , which are purely mathematical . but , what signifies that , if he neither observes true logick in laying his principles ; nor nature in his physicks , which he cannot pretend to do , unless he gives us a particular account of the intrinsecal constitution of his first matter , upon which all depends . a task , i say again , his followers neither will ever attempt , nor can possibly perform by his principles , as is shown at large in my appendix . yet it must be confess'd , that those kind of discourses are very plausible and taking with the middling sort of readers ; and with such who are much pleas'd with a melodious gingle of words , prettily laid together with neat eloquence , quaint wit , and unusual remarks . for those kind of embellishments do divert the reader , make the authours pass for curious men , and bear a fine appearance of truth ; till they come to be scann'd exactly , and grasp'd close by severe reason reducing them to principles and connexion of terms . which done , it will be found that they afford to the learner who sincerely seeks for truth , nothing but certain bright flashes or coruscations ; which do indeed for a time dazle the fancy , but they settle in the iudgment no constant steady light to direct them in their way to true science . farther , i must declare , for the honour of our english genius , that , tho' we do not match the french in the finery , gayity , and neatness of their delivering their conceptions ( a talent in which they are very excellent ) any more than we do in our outward garb , and dress ; yet , that there are more solid productions , well built truths , and more iudicious and ingenious thoughts of his own in our learned countryman mr. locke's treatise , entituled , an essay concerning human understanding , than ( as far as i have observ'd ) is found in great multitudes of such slight discoursers put together . we are come now to consider the other pretended method to science , which is the way of experiments or induction . concerning which , ( not to repeat what i have occasionally , by way of reason , alledg'd against it in my following book ) i need say no more , but that matter of fact shows evidently , that this method , alone , and unassisted by principles , is utterly incompetent or unable to beget science . for , what one universal conclusion in natural philosophy , ( in knowing which kind of truths science consists ) has been demonstrated by experiments , since the the time that great man , sir francis bacon , writ his natural history ? the very title of which laborious work shows , that himself did not think science was attainable by that method . for , if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ , we shall find that it is , ( as he calls it ) meerly historical , and narrative of particular observations ; from which to deduce universal conclusions is against plain logick , and common sense . to aim at science by such a method , may be resembled to the study of finding out the philosopher's stone . the chymist lights on many useful and promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes , and decoy him farther ; but he still falls short of his end. what man of any past , or of our present curious age , did ever so excell in those industrious and ingenious researches , as that honour of our nation , the incomparable mr. boyle ? yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden recesses of nature , as far as that way could carry him , he was still a sceptick in his principles of natural philosophy ; nor could , with the utmost inquisitiveness , practic'd by so great a wit , arrive at any certain knowledge whether there was a vacuum or no : and certainly , we can expect no science from such a method that can give us no certain knowledge , whether in such a space there be something , or nothing : which , of all others , should be the most easily distinguishable and knowable . lastly , we may observe , that when an experiment , or ( which is the same ) a matter of fact in nature is discover'd , we are never the nearer knowing what is the proper cause of such an effect , into which we may certainly refu●d it ; which , and onely which , is the work of science . for , gassendus will explicate it according to his principles , cartesius , according to his ; the noble sir kenelin digby , and his most learned master . albius , ( whom i iudge to have follow'd the true aristotelian principles ) according to theirs ; so that , after all , the assigning the true natural cause for that effect , and explicating it right , must be decided by way of reason ; that is , by demonstrating first whose principles of natural philosophy are true and solid ; and onely he or they , who can approve their principles to be such , can pretend to explicate that natural production right by resolving it into its proper causes , or to have science how 't is done ; and , however the experimental men may be highly commendable in other respects , yet onely those who can lay just claim to true principles , and make out their title to them , can be truly held natural philosophers . which sufficiently shows that the way of experiments cannot be a true method to science . but to leave other men's failings , and return home to my self . to obviate the superficial ways of reason , so magnify'd by other speculaters , i have endeavour'd to take the quite contrary method ; and have laid my discourses as deep as i could possibly ; and , perhaps , it will be thought i have over-done in those about identical propositions ; for which yet i shall hope , the reasons i have given there for that procedure , will bear me out and justifie me . for the same inducement i have very frequently drawn my arguments from metaphysicks ; being well assured that such mediums do make the dicourses , built on them , approach nearest to self-evidence . nor do i fear it should be objected , that , in a logical treatise , i bring such instances and corollaries as entrench upon , and make an in-road into divers other sciences . rather , i must profess that i held it a precise duty in my circumstances ; because logick , or the art of reasoning , being a common instrument to attain all science , i was to show how it was , upon occasion , to be apply'd to as many of them as i could ; so i do not make unreasonable excursions to hunt for them in foreign subjects , but that they light naturally in my way . lastly , i thought it became a lover of peace and union among christians to endeavour they should not wrangle about equivocal words , so their meanings be justifiable . in a word , 't is connexion of terms which i onely esteem as proper to advance science . where i find not such connexion , and the discourse grounded on self-evident principles , or ( which is the same ) on the metaphysical verity of the subject , which engages the nature of the thing , i neither expect science can be gain'd , nor the method to science establish'd . but , this done , i make account both the one and the other may be hoped for . how well i have behav'd my self in attempting this , is left to the iudgment of those who are the proper umpires in such matters , i mean your selves . your true honourer and humble servant , i. s. the method to science . book i. lesson i. of notions , or the very first ground on which all science is built . . we experience , that impressions are made upon our senses , and that those impressions are different , according to the different nature of the objects that imprint them . . we experience also , that those impressions do not stay in the outward senses , but reach the soul , and affect it . . every thing being received according to the nature of the subject that receives it , and the nature of the soul being a capacity of knowledge ; hence , those impressions must so affect the soul , as to cause some kind of knowledge in her , how rude and imperfect soever it may yet be . . the impressions from objects that affect the senses , and by them the soul , do carry the very nature of those objects along with them , and imprint them in the soul : which prints , or , as it were , stamps , as received in the understanding , we call notions . . wherefore notions are the first and rudest draughts of knowledge ; being most simple , and naturally wrought in the soul by the strokes of occurring objects , without any industry or active concurrence on our part . . that these notions are the very natures of the thing , or the thing it self existing in us intellectually , and not a bare idea or similitude of it , appears hence evidently , that when we say interiourly , or judge a stone is hard , we do not intend to affirm , that the likeness or idea of a stone is hard , but the very stone it self . and were it not so , the proposition would be false ; ( for the similitude of a stone in our mind is not hard : ) whereas yet we are well assur'd that proposition is true. . again , we experience , that we consider , judge , and dis●ourse of the very thing it self , and of its very nature ; which ( these being interiour or immanent acts , bred and perfected within our soul ) we could not do , unless the objects of those acts , or the very things themselves were there . . lastly , it cannot be deny'd , but that we have in our soul the full and compleat sense of this proposition , and notions of every distinct part of it , viz. [ there is in me the idea or likeness of a stone . ] therefore there is in me something signified by the word [ stone ] not only distinct from idea and likeness , but moreover relatively opposite to it , as the thing represented is to that which represents it ; which can be nothing but the very stone it self . . nor need it cause any wonder , that the same ens or thing may have diverse manners of existing ; one corporeal , the other intellectual or spiritual ; since the thing ( v. g. peter ) * abstracts even from existence it self ; for 't is not found in the notion or meaning of that word , that the thing signified by it exists , or not exists ; much more then does the notion of thing abstract from ( that is , is indifferent to ) all manners of existing . . the words notion , simple apprehension , conception , and meaning , are all synonymous terms . they are called notions , because they are the parts or elements of knowledge ; which , put and consider'd together , make cognition , w●ich is proper and compleat knowledge . they are call'd simple apprehensi●ns , to distinguish them ●rom judgments , which are compounded of more notions , and belong to the second operation of our understanding . or rather , because by them we simply or barely apprehend , that is , say hold of , or take into us the thing , about which we a●terwards judge or discourse . they are call'd meanings , because they affect the mind , which only can mean or intend ; or else , in relation to the words whose meanings they are . they are called conceptions , in order to the power , which , impregnated by the object , conceives or ( as it were ) breeds them as the embryo's of knowledge . lastly , they are said to be the natures of the things , because ( as was shewn ) they are such essentially and formally ; in nothing differing from them , but only that they connotate a new manner of existing , which * is extrinsecal to the thing , and to the nature or essence of it . the word [ idea ] is the least proper , because it seems to signifie a bare similitude ; unless the users of it would express themselves to take it in that sence in which we take the word [ notion ] here ; or , as we use to understand it when we say , that the idea's of all things were in the divine intellect before they were created ; that is , their very essences . . notions are called simple apprehensions , not from the fewness of the words that express them , nor from their not having any grammatical composition or syntax in them : but , from the nature or manner of this operation of our understanding . for , since ( as was said ) they are called simple apprehensions , because by them we simply or barely apprehend or lay hold of the nature of the thing intellectually ; it matters not how many or how few the words are , so we do no more than meerly apprehend or take the meaning of the words , or the notions , into our minds , without judging or discoursing of them . whence , we may have a simple apprehension of a long sentence , nay , of a whole sermon or a great book ; as long as we do not set our selves to judge or discourse of the truth or falshood of what 's said or writ ; but purely to apprehend the sence or meaning of the speaker or writer . . notions being the natures of the things in us , have neither truth nor falshood in them formally ; since they do neither affirm or deny ( only with speeches are capable of formal verity or falsity ) any more than does the thing it self as it stands in nature , or out of the understanding . . all the verity they have is their metaphysical verity , or their being truly what they are . and they partake this from the idea's in the divine understanding , from which they unerringly flow , and which are essentially unchangeable . by which we see how the god of truth is the sole author of all the truth that is in us , and how he does ( ordinarily ) communicate it to us , viz. by fixing unalterably the natures or essences of things ; from which , being thus establish'd and imprinted on our minds by our senses , all science and truth in us have their certainty originally . . all true science being thus built on the immovable stability of the essences or natures of created beings , it follows necessarily , that all discourses that are not agreeable to the natures of things , and grounded on them , are frothy , incoherent , and false , and , if pursued home , must be found to have a contradiction for their first principle , in regard they make the natures of things to be what they are not . . wherefore notions being the natures of the things in our understanding , the method to pursue true science is , to attend and hold heedfully and steadily to those notions which the things without us have imprinted or stamp'd in our minds ; and to be very careful lest imaginations ( which are the offsprings of fancy , and do oft misrepresent the thing ) do delude us , or the equivocation of words draw us aside , and make us deviate from those genuine and nature instill'd notions . corolaries . corol. i. hence is seen how unreasonable the scepticks are who endeavour to undermine all science , by pretending that all our notions are uncertain . for they being caus'd by natural impressions on our senses , those men may as well pretend , that water does not wet , or fire burn , as that the objects work not their several effects upon our senses . if they contend , that , every man 's individual temper being different , our notions must therefore differ to some degree in every man , they oppose not us , who say the same ; nor will this break any square , in our discoursing and our understanding one another ; for few men ( perhaps none ) can reach these individual differences , nor consequently mean them or intend to speak of them when they discourse . but , if they say they are not the same in all men ( whose senses o● imagination are not disordered by some accidental disease ) substantially and in the main ; then , besides what has been now alledged , they are confuted by this , that mankind has now for some thousands of years held conversation with one another , yet it was never observ'd that they could not understand one anothers meaning in discourse about natural objects ; or if any hap'd to occurr which was ambiguous , that they could not make their notions known by explications ; or if there had been some notable variation in their notions , ( as when to icterical persons , all things seem yellow , or sweet things bitter to depraved tasts ) the mistake can easily be made manifest and corrected by the standard of the generality of mankind , who assure them of their misapprehension ; and of learned men particularly , who find the cause of their mistake to proceed from some disease perverting nature , or some circumstances of the unduly-proposed object , or of the medium ; or from our inability to reach to some minute considerations belonging to its composition , figure . &c. which hinder not our having science of it in other cases . corol. ii. hence also is shewn the vanity of that tenet that maintains the pre-existence of souls , as far as it depends on this ground , that knowledges are only excited or awaken'd ( as it were ) by the objects working on the senses , and not imprinted there by them . for , this ground shakes , by manifesting the ways and means laid by nature to beget those knowledges in the soul , and convey them thither from the objects . besides , ( which overthrows all their hypothesis ) the knowledge that i am hic & nunc thus affected , cannot with any sence be pretended to have been pre-existent to the time and place in which that particular knowledge was made ; since neither ehat time nor ( perhaps ) place was then in being . whence it follows , that the soul can gain some new knowledges , and this by the senses ; and if any or some , why not , with equal reason , all that the same senses can receive from objects imprinted in her ; which ( as far as it depends on this way of instilling knowledge ) may reach in a manner ad n●tu●● , and by the assistance of reflexion , discourse and art improving it , may stretch it self much farther . corol. iii. from this whole discourse it appears , that whatever other method of attaining science some may propose , however it may seem witty , and one piece of their doctrine be consonant to the other , and all of them consequent to the principles they lay ▪ yet it will , i say , evide●tly appear , that the way they take can never be that which god and nature have laid to ingraft knowledge in us . whence , tho' such discoursers may shew much art , yet , in reality , and if it be examin'd to the bottom , all their plausible contexture and explication of their own scheme , will be found no better than the running pretty strains of division upon no ground ; since their pretended knowledges do not begin with , nor grow up orderly from the natures of the things themselves , or from our natural notions , which are the seeds of science . corol. iv. our discourse here abstracts from that question , whether sensible qualities are inherent in the object or in the 〈◊〉 ? it is enough for my purpose that the objects work upon the senses , so as to imprint by their means several notions in the mind . yet , i do not see how mr. hobbs proves ( for he does not so much as attempt it ) that light coming from the object does not carry away with it some particles of it ; since we experience , that the sun beams dry up great ponds , which they could not do , unless they did , when reflected , dip their dry wings in that moist element , and return with some particles of water into the air ; which , when multiply'd , are condensed afterwards into clouds : and i believe it will be granted , that the sun-beams reflected from the moon bring along with them moist vapours . much less is it conceivable ▪ that in smells and tasts nothing at all of the nature of those objects should be convey'd by the nerves to the brain , but only a certain kind of moti●n . 't is not my task to defend the opinions of schoolmen , nor those of vulgar philosophers , which he impugns , but to mind my own business . tho' had i a mind to lose a little time , it were easie to shew , that he seems to mistake all-along our p●●●eptions for what is perceiv'd of the object : and i might as easily deny , that colour ( for example ) is n●thing but light ; and affirm that 't is such a disposition in the surface of a body , figur'd thus or thus with parts and pores , as is apt to reflect more or less of the light , and then to assert , that that disposition of the surface is truly and really inherent in the object or body it self , — sed haec obiter . lesson ii. of the distinction of natural notions , and of the reducing them under ten common heads . . every individual thing not only ( as was said ) imprints a notion of it self in our minds , but many diverse notions , according to the various impressions it makes upon the same or diverse senses . this is manifest by experience ; for we find that an orange ( for example ) causes in us the several notions of yellow , heavy , round , juicy , hard , &c. . we can consider one of those notions , without considering the others . for we experience , that we can abstract the notion of round from the notion of heavy , ( or any of the rest ) and consider it apart , and discourse of it accordingly . ( . ) note , that since the object or thing in our understanding is capable of being consider'd diversly , hence [ notion ] gets the name of [ considerability ] and diverse notions are said to be diverse considerabilities of the thing ; which yet is no more but the same thing as diversly consider'd . . whether or no there be any knower of a superiour order , that can at one intuitive view comprehend the whole thing , yet 't is certain that our soul , in this state , can have no science of any thing , otherwise than by these abstracted notions . for since * our notions are the ground of all our knowledge or science , and ( as will be seen shortly ) we have no notion of any object , but by impressions on the senses , and those impressions do differently affect us , and so breed different or abstracted notions ; 't is manifest that we can no otherwise know any thing here , but by different , that is , abstracted , partial or inadequate notions . . 't is necessary to science , that it be distinct and clear , and not gross and confus●d . this is evident from the very terms ; for science signifies a distinct and clear knowledge . . our soul cannot in this state wield more notions at once , nor consider them , or discourse clearly of them together ; or rather , indeed , not at all . this will appear evidently , by an easie reflexion on our interiour : for , we shall find , that we can discourse of each single abstracted notion in an orange viz. on its bigness , roundness , colour , tast , &c. but if we would go about to consider or discourse of us roundness and tast both together , ( and the same may be said of any other two that are disparate , or not included one in the other ) we shall find our selves at a loss , and in confusion , not knowing how to begin , nor how to proceed . . we cannot in this state know , even singly , every particular considerability found in the thing : for , tho' ( for example ) we can by our common sight discern the colour or figure of a thing , or of its grosser parts , yet a microscope will discover to us innumerable particularities which escap'd our common view ; and had we a glass that magnified more , there would be found still more and more particularities than did appear when we observ'd it formerly . wherefore , since every new observation we can possibly make begets a new notion in us , * and all our knowledge is grounded on our notions , we can no more know the last considerability , which is in the thing , than we can know the least part that is to be found in quantity , or in the differences of figure , colour , and other respects which each of those very least parts may have ; and therefore they are not all knowable by us in this state . . much less can we , in this state , know perfectly , or discourse scientifically of any whole individual thing , or ( as the schools call it ) the suppositum , taken in bulk . for , * since all the considerabilities that integrate it , and consequently the notions it begets in us , are blended confusedly in the entire notion of the suppositum or thing . again , since these are † innumerable , and many of them unknowable by us ; it follows , that no one of them ( that is , nothing in that whole suppositum ) can be distinctly or clearly known , while we discourse of that which has them all in bulk ; that is , while we discourse of them all at once ; and consequently , the notion of the suppositum , which contains them all , cannot be clearly or perfectly known by us , nor discoursed of scientifically . . wherefore we cannot know in this state any one entire thing perfectly , since we can never have any perfect science of it , * either taking it in bulk , † or by detail . . wherefore all we can do in this state , is to glean from the objects by our senses so many notions of them as may suffice to distinguish them from one another ; and may serve for our common use , needful speculation ; or , lastly , for our contemplation . . notwithstanding this , the science attainable in this state may arrive to be in a manner infinit . for , since our notions * are the very natures of the things , and the † natures of the things are the seeds of all science , and diverse truths spring from them , and other truths do still follow by connexion with the former ; and , ‖ since no stint is assignable of the connexion of truths , or of our deduction of one truth from another ; it follows that there is no bound or limit of our science attainable here , but that ( if art and industry be used ) it may be in a manner infinit . . 't is a most fundamental errour to fancy that there are many kinds of little things in the object , corresponding to all the different notions or considerations which we make of it . for , since the least pa●ticle that is in it does ground diverse notions of it , and every various consideration of each particle , either according to what is intrinsecal or extrinsecal to it , does still beget more : again , since no particle can be so small , but we can conceive or have distinct notions of two halves , and many other proportionate parts in it , and the particles that are or may be conceiv'd to be in quantitative things are numberless ; it follows , that , were all the distinct considerabilities in the object distinct things , we could never pitch upon any of those things ( they still including others in them ) which we could say is one or vndivided in its self ; nor consequently could we know what ens or thing meant in corporeal or quantitative things , with which we converse ; which would fundamentally destroy and pervert all human speech and discourse about any thing , and make all science impossible . . from what 's said 't is deduced , that it is one necessary and main part of the method to science , to distinguish our notions clearly , and to keep them distinct carefully . for , * since all science is grounded on our notions , and science must be clear , and this cannot be † if any two of them be confounded , or taken together at once ; it is manifest , that 't is one necessary and main part of the method to science , to distinguish our notions clearly , and to keep them distinct carefully . . the best way to do this , is to rank all our notions under distinct common heads . for , this done , it will be easie to know , to which of those common heads they belong ; and those common heads being easily distinguish't from one another , because they differ most vastly , or ( as the schools phrase it ) toto genere , it will follow that the several notions comprized under each of those heads , must likewise , to a fair degree , be clearly known to be distinct also . . there is but one onely notion that is perfectly absolute , viz. that of existence , and all the rest are in some manner or other , respective : for , since all notions that are , must be either of the thing it self , or of what relates or belongs to it , and the thing it self relates to existence , of which ( since only a thing can be ) it is a capacity ; and existence , as being the last actuality conceivable in the line of being , relates to no other or farther notion ; it follows that only the notion of existence is perfectly absolute , and all the rest are some way or other respective . . whence it follows , that the notion of existence is imprinted in the soul before any other in priority of nature . for , since * all other notions are respective , and so consist in some ( at least confused or rude ) comparisons , as it were , of that notion to what it respects ; to have which is much harder than to have that which is perfectly absolute , more simple and not comparative at all ; hence the notion of existence is the most easie , and therefore the first in priority of nature . again , since ( as ‖ will be shewn hereafter ) the substance of all operation is nothing but the existence of the object imprinted on the patient , and the soul must have a notion of the operation made upon her , that is , a notion of the existence of the thing imprinting it ; it follows necessarily , that the notion of the existence of that thing is first in her . . from this last reason it is evinced , that the notion of the man 's own existence is wrought in the soul before the notion of things without him , and this by the man himself as his own object , and is not imprinted by outward ones . for * since the soul has notions of objects , not by emission of its virtue to them , but by their being receiv'd in it , and existing in it intellectually ; nor could it have a notion of them , that is , they could not exist in the soul , without its having a notion first ( in priority of nature ) of its own or the man's existence ; it follows , that the notion of the man's existence comes into the soul before the notion of other things , and consequently that it is imprinted by the man himself , as his own object , and is not caused by outward ones . again , since the existence of the man is naturally in him , and consequently in the soul , ( when she has a notion of him ) after its manner , that is , intellectually ; it follows , that it has ( as it were ) naturally a notion of the man's existence , and consequently , before it has the notion of any other thing . note . to explicate how this is done , and why it must be so , anatomists tell us , that the embryo lies in a manner round in the womb ; whence some parts of it do continually and necessarily touch some others . wherefore as soon as the soul is infus'd , and it is now from a meer animal become a man , and has got an understanding power capable to receive notions of objects ; those touches or impressions of some parts of himself upon others , do naturally affect the sense , and by it the soul , and beget a blind notion there of the man ; and by a natural kind of consciousness or experience , that he operates thus upon himself , * of his own existence . note d. hence follows , against the cartesians , that there is no kind of necessity of innate idea's : for , having once got , by this means , the notion of existence , and all other notions being respective or comparative to it ; and the soul being of its own nature a comparative power , since ( as will be seen hereafter ) both our acts of judging and of discoursing are comparative acts ; hence the soul becomes provided with means to have all other natural notions whatever , by what it has from the object , and by it self . but of this point more towards the end of this lesson . only it is to be remark'd , that it is not here intended that the soul has only the notion of existence alone , and afterwards others ; for at the same time it has the notion of the man existing , and existing thus by his operating thus . we only discourse which of those notions is first in priority of nature , that is , of its own nature most knowable or perceptible . . all other notions of the thing besides existence , being respective , are either of something intrinsecally belonging to it , or else of something extrinsecally refer'd to it by our understanding . this is evident ; for we can have no notion of non-ens , or nothing , nor consequently of what belongs to it . . intrinsecal notions are but four. for , since existence is the only absolute notion , and can be refer'd to no other , all other notions must either immediately or mediately refer to it ; wherefore all intrinsecal notions must either refer the thing it self immediately to its existence , by considering the ens to be of such an essence , as it is capable to recieve it ; and then essence being the immediate power to existence , they are essential notions , and belong to that common head we call ens or substance . or else they refer the thing to some common manner or modification ( that is , consideration ) of it , in which all things we converse with do agree ; that is , to its bigness or quantity . or else they refer the thing to some modification or consideration belonging to its own peculiar nature , denoting how it is well or ill dispos'd in that respect ; which common head is called quality . or , lastly , they refer some one individuum , according to something intrinsecal to it , to another individuum ; which constitutes the common head of relation . and more common heads of intrinsecal respects cannot be invented ; therefore there are only four common heads of intrinsecal notions . . those notions that refer not something that is intrinsecal to the thing , but what 's extrinsecal to it , are conceiv'd to apply that extrinsecal to it either by way of motion , or in rest. if by way of motion , then , since motion has two terms , it may be consider'd either as coming from the mover , and 't is the notion of action ; or as affecting the thing moved , and then 't is called passion . and , because the most regular and most equable , motion , to our apprehension is that of the sun , call'd time , and therefore all sublunary motions must bear a proportion to it , and be measur'd by it , being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was flowing ; and mankind is forced to need and make use of such a measure to adjust , proportion , and design all their motions or actions by , and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious periods ; hence there must be a common head of the time when those motions were perform'd , which we call quando . if the extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the subject or thing in rest , then , either that extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole , that is , to be immediate to it , or meerly to contain it , which grounds the notion , and answers to the question where , or ubi : or , it denotes some certain determinate manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it ; and then either the whole , or at least some parts of the subject or thing , must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the extrinsecal thing , and 't is call'd its site or situation ; or else the extrinsecal thing , or its parts , are conceiv'd to be fitted , ply'd , or accommodated to the subject or thing , and then 't is call'd habit. . these ten common heads are call'd predicaments , that is , common receptacles , which contain , and whence we may draw , all our predicates for the common subject , thing : which we may briefly exemplifie thus : peter , tho' but a yard and half high , yet a ualiant subject , fought and was wounded yesterday , in the field , standing upon his guard , armed . . all these notions , under whatever head , if they be corporeal ones , are natural and common to all mankind . for , since they are made by impressions on the senses , which are common to all mankind , it follows , that the notions which are the effects of those impressions , must be such also ; since the same causes upon the same-natur'd subjects , must work the same effects . . our soul has in it a power of compounding those several notions together , of considering them diverse ways , of reflecting on its own thoughts and affections ; and , lastly , of joyning a negative to its natural notions if there be occasion ; such as are the notions of indivisible , immaterial , incorruptible , unactive , insignificant , &c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame notions of spiritual things . all which is manifest by plain experience , if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own interiour . . no notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these heads : for corporeal notions are imprinted direct●y ; spiritual notions by reflexion on our mind , and on its operations or affections ; or else by joyning a negative to our positive natural notions . and mix'd or compound notions are framed by joyning our former simple notions . wherefore , since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either corporeal , spiritual , or mix'd , or compounded of former notions , 't is manifest , that all the notions we have or can have , do arise from one of those heads . . wherefore 't is hence farther shewn , that there is no necessity at all of making some notions to be innate ; and consequently that conceit of the cartesians is groundless , who affirm , that by a motion made on the senses , the soul , by an unknown vertue peculiar to its self , excites or awakens such and such an innate idea , which till then lay dormant in it , because they find that that notion is nothing like to the idea it excites : for , first , how do they prove that only motion is communicated to the brain from the object , or , that that motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd particles or effluviums of these several bodies , which are ( as it were ) little models of their nature ? it is certain this passes thus in the grosser senses , and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler , but that the particles emitted be more subtil ; which cannot shock the fancy or reason of a natural philosopher , who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness body is divisible : and , of all men in the world , the cartesians should not be startled at it : whose principles do allow lesser particles than those effluviums , and to pass thro' far lesser pores than those within the nerves , or even than such as are in the substance of the nerves themselves . now , this being granted , the whole contexture of this doctrine of ours has a clear coherence . for , such particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them , are apt , when they are carried to the seat of knowledge , to breed in the mind , or convey into it the nature , ( or an intellectual notion ) of the thing it self . to do which , there can need no more , than that every thing ( according to the maxim ) be receiv'd according to the nature or manner of the receiver ; viz. that those effluviums , by affecting the body corporeally , do affect the soul intellectually . secondly , how is it conceivable , or any way explicable , that a motion , which they confess is utterly unlike the idea in the mind , should be the proper exciter of such an idea ? indeed , were those motions of the nature of our signs , that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the users of them , they might have a power to make such a peculiar excitation of those ideas , as our words do now ; or as any odd and disagreeing things are made use of by us when we practise the art of memory . but here things are quite otherwise ; for we have no fore-knowledge either by agreement , nor by our voluntary designation , that such motions shall excite such idea's or notions ; nor , as is confess'd , are they naturally alike ; wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular idea's . add , that this hidden virtue in the soul , to make such a particular idea start up as soon as that motion is made in the nerve , is both said gratis , and is as obscure as an occult quality ; and so far from explicable , that even themselves ( as far as i can learn ) have not so much as attempted to explain it : but it seems to be in part taken up gratis , to make good their doctrine of innate idea's , as the tenet of such idea's is to prove the soul is a distinct thing from the body . lastly , their argument drawn from experience , that the idea in the mind is quite different from that impression in the senses or any bodily faculty , is shewn to be inconclusive , by alledging , ( as was said lately ) that the nature of the object found in those emitted particles , and the nature of it found in the soul intellectually ( or as standing under notion ) are the self-same , and not so vnlike as they imagin . add , that their argument faulters in this too , that the makers of it did not duly reflect , when they advanced it , on that ' foresaid axiom , quicquid recipitur , recipitur ad modum recipientis : for , had they done this , they could not have wonder'd that an affection of the body ( which is imprinted directly ) and an affection of the soul which is spiritual ( and known only by reflexion ) should have a different appearance : the two manners of existing , with which the same nature is vested , differing toto genere , that is as far as body and spirit ( their subjects ) can distance them . to explicate this more fully , and to shew the difference between corporeal and spiritual idea's , i offer to their thoughts this reflexion concerning the distinct nature of a phantasm , which is a corporeal resemblance , and the nature of the thing in the mind ( that is its n●tion ) express'd by a d●finition , which is intellectual and spiritual . the phantasm or corporeal resemblance of a man is a kind of picture of a thing with two legs , two arms , such a face , with a head placed uprightly , that grows , moves itself , &c. let us regard next the definition of a man , or rather ( which is , abating the expression , the same ) the notion of him ; which is , that he is a rational creature ; and we shall easily discern of how different a shape it is from the other ; how it abstracts from many corporeal qualities , figures of the parts , and other considerations , which were essential ingredients to the picture or phantasm , and not at all essential to it , nor found in the definition ; and how some considerations too are added in the definition , or imply'd in it ( as to apprehend , iudge , discourse , &c. ) which no more belong to the phantasm , than it did to zeuxis's grapes , to have the definition of the fruit of such a vegetable predicated of them . in a word , one of them is a kind of portraicture , outwardly resembling ; the other speaks the most intrinsecal essence of the thing defin'd . the one signifies bodily parts belonging to such an animal , and therefore is corporeal : the other does not signifie , but is the nature signified ; and this too by words which denote to us the mind or meaning ( that is , the notion ) of the speaker ; which is therefore spiritual , at least in part . whence the compleat essence of man could not be understood , nor a definition of it fram'd , without making use of some of these notions or idea's , which are made by our understanding , reflecting upon its own spiritual operations . lesson iii. how these common heads of notions are to be divided . . the differences that divide each common head must be intrinsecal to it . for , since * we cannot discourse of two disparate notions at once ; and since were those heads divided by differences that are extrinsecal to the common genus , ( or taken from another head ) each species of it would consist of two disparate notions ; hence it is absolutely necessary to science that the differences which divide these common heads be such as belong to no other common head , but be within the limits of that head , or intrinsecal to it . again , since the difference is most formal in constituting the species , and the genus only material ; were the differences extrinsecal or borrow'd from another head , it would follow , that all the species of the head divided by such differences would belong to another head , viz. to that head whence those differences are taken : which would put all our notions into confusion , and involve a direct contradiction , as making substances to be quantities , qualities , &c. . intrinsecal differences can be no other but more and less of the common notion : for since , being intrinsecal , † they cannot be taken from any other head , it follows , that they must partake of the common notion of their own respective heads . again , since , if they did partake of the common notion equally , they would not differ in that notion , and so would not be differences of it ; it follows , that they must partake of it vnequally ; that is , they must be more and less of the common notion . . hence the common notion of ens , thing or substence being that which is capable of existence , is immediately , intrinsecally , or essentially divided into what 's more and less capable of existence . wherefore , . divisible and indivisible , which constitute body and spirit , are the proper and intrinsecal differences of the common head of substance : for , since actual division of the entity makes the thing to be no longer indivisum in se ; that is , to be unum ; that is , to be ens ; that is , to be capable of existence ; it follows , that that ens which is divisible ( or body ) is less capable of existence , that is , has less of the nature of ens or substance ; and the ens that is indivisible ( or spirit ) has more . again , since things divisible , or bodies , can only have their own being or existence , whereas things indivisible , or spirits , are capable of being other things also , or of having in them the natures and existences of all the things they know ; hence they have a greater capacity of existence than bodies have ; since they have enough for themselves , and can impart it to millions of other things besides ; and , consequently , body and spirit are constituted by divisible and indivisible , as by the proper , immediate , and intrinsecal differences that divide substance or ens. . the divisibility and indivisibility that are the intrinsecal differences of ens , are not those of being quantitative and not quantitative . for , were it so , it would follow , that some intrinsecal differences of ens in common would be taken from some other head , viz. that of quantity , and * so , the differences being what 's most formal in the species , hence those species of ens would rather be under that head than its own . again , that divisibility , which is of quantity , may oftentimes be put into act , and yet the same ens remain ; v. g. a man may lose the quantity of an arm ; a tree , of a branch , &c. and yet remain still the same things ; whereas , if quantitative divisibility were the intrinsecal difference which constituted it such an ens , quantitative division must by consequence make it cease to be that ens. moreover , since quantity ( as will be † shortly seen ) is divisibility , and divisibility in vnity , in case quantity did intrinsecally divide ens , and constitute body , where-ever there were quantity there would be vnity under that notion ; and so all quantitative things would be but one ens or one body ; which is the highest absurdity . therefore the divisibility and indivisibility which are the intrinsecal differences of ens , are not those of being quantitative and not quantitative . . therefore the divisibility and indivisibility which divide ens intrinsecally , must be the divisibility and indivisibility of the constituents of ens , as such ; that is , the divisibility of it into matter and form , and indivisibility of it into such constituent parts : which differences do essentially divide the genus of ens , and constitute the species of body and spirit . for , since we see bodies chang'd into one another , and therefore , the former body had really somewhat in it determining it to be actually what it was , which we call the form ; and somewhat by which it could be another , which we call the power to be another , or matter : again , since we see that the form , which made the former thing be what it was , is gone when 't is made another thing , and a new form succeeds into the same matter ; hence we can frame diverse conceptions of body , which belong to it as such an ens , viz. matter and form ; and have a ground in nature to say there is a real divisibility between them . wherefore since that ens call'd body , by being divisible into matter and form , becomes liable to have the form , that constituted it such an ens , separated from the matter , and so to lose its being the same ens it was , and incapable of existing any longer ; and , for the same reason , a spirit , by it s not being divisible into matter and form , has not in its essence any principle giving it a capacity not to exist , as had the other ; but has in its self , or rather is of its self a more simple and more perfect kind of vnity , and consequently a more noble kind of entity or capacity of existing , than is the other ; therefore the divisibility and indivisibility which divide ens intrinsecally , must be the divisibility and indivisibility of it into matter and form ; which we call metaphysical divisibility , because it is the divisibility of the parts of ens as such ; that is , of ens under the notion of ens. . for the same reason given above , ( sect. , . ) mixt and simple are the intrinsecal differences of body : for , since simple bodies , which we call elements , have in them but the nature or essence of one kind of body only , and mixt bodies have both the nature of that kind , and of other elements besides ; it is manifest that they divide the common notion of body by more and less , which are intrinsecal differences . . for the same reason mixt body is divided into living bodies , and not living by intrinsecal differences ; because those are more mixt , these less . , for the same reason , a living body , being that which has a principle of motion in it self , is divided , as by intrinsecal differences into animal , which is more living , or more moving it self ( viz. by every slight impression on the senses ) and plant , or vegetable , which is less-moving it self . . for the same reason , animal , which is a body moving it self by impression on the senses , is intrinsecally divided into brutes , which do thus move themselves onely to a set determinate number of actions , which is to be less moving it self by impressions on the senses ; and man , who by his reason and knowledge is apt to move himself to a kind of vniversality of action , which is to be more moving himself by means of such impressions . . for the same reason , man , or rational animal , is divided intrinsecally and essentially into those who have more and less the faculty or power of reasoning ; who are , therefore , properly and essentially more and less men. note , that common logicians , because we cannot descend or reach to those particular intrinsecal differences which constitute individuals , do therefore make [ man ] the lowest species : but 't is one thing what may serve for logical speculation ; another , what the nature of the thing bears , and the right division of the commoner notion by intrinsecal differences requires : wherefore , tho' not able to discern the intermediate species , and ( as far as i have observ'd ) not reflecting that more and less of the common notion do make the intrinsecal and essential differences that constitute its species , common logicians do content themselves to put individuums immediately under man , and thence mistake man to have no essential differences at all , but accidental ones only ; yet 't is manifest , that , since all individuums are diverse entia or things , and essence does formally constitute an ens , the differences that constitute diverse entia must necessarily be essential . so that amongst men there may be many degrees of more or less rational , constituting diverse under - species of man , could we have light to distinguish them ; as well as there are diverse species of dogs , horses , trees , and flowers . . particular or singular things are properly call'd individuums , because they cannot be divided into more of the same notion , as all others in the same line could . for socrates cannot be divided into more that have the particular nature of socrates in them , as man could into more that have the common nature of man. . individuals only are properly and compleatly entia or things , and capable of existing . for , since the notion of thing is [ capable of existing ] and all notions that are superiour to the individuum are inadequate or partial notions of it , as is manifest ; and the individuum is the whole , as comprizing all those parts ; and no part can exist by its own virtue , or out of the whole ; in regard it would then be of it self a whole ens and not a part onely ; it follows , that onely individuals are properly and compleatly entia or capable of existing . . individuals are the proper subject or suppositum of all other notions or natures both of its own line , and of all the rest . for , * since individuals onely are properly things , or capable of existing ; it follows , that both all in its own line , and much more in all the other lines ( which have not at all in their peculiar notions any order or title to existence ) must exist and subsist in individuals , as in their suppositum or subject ; which lends them to be , and sustains them in being . corolaries . . hence , 't is logically demonstrated that every individual man is but one ens or thing ; since he descends lineally from that common head by intrinsecal differences of more and less , which constitute him truly one in that line ; that is , one ens , or one thing . whence the contrary position ravels all the well-order'd frame of human notions , and the division of them by intrinsecal differences ; which ( as * has been shewn ) must needs put all our thoughts into confusion , and wholly obstruct the way to science . nor matters it that there are two contrary natures in him , corporeal and spiritual ; since the notion of ens is not the notion of the nature , * but of the suppositum which has the nature in it . add , that the notion of ens is indifferent to both natures ; and therefore , if they may be co-ordinate to one end , and that it wrong no other principle , they may both club into one thing , and compound one ens : as appears in the incarnation , in which the second person of the trinity assum'd human nature , and joyn'd it to it self in the same suppositum . . the notion of rational ( which is in some sort truly spiritual ) may be co-ordinate to the notion of some kind of body . for , since animal is directly subsum'd under the notion of body , and the notion of animal ( or of a thing moving it self by impressions on the senses ) is intrinsecally divided by less-moving it self thus , which constitutes brutes ; and more-moving it self thus , which is manifestly done by its being rational , that is in part spiritual ; it follows , that the notion of rational or spiritual may be co-ordinate to some body , ( viz. to animal ) as one of the proper and intrinsecal differences of that genus , as is shewn above . . notwithstanding man cannot be both body and spirit formally . for , then he must necessarily be two entities in distinct lines of substance ; the one under the genus of body , the other of spirit . whence , he would be vnum and non-vnum , in the same regard , or according to the same formal notion ; that is , he would be ens and non ens ; and consist formally of two things as perfectly distinct as an angel and an ape ; and even be more monstrous than a hircocervus or chimaera ; because he would be formally , that is essentially , made up of two more-generically-opposit things than these are conceiv'd to be . wherefore , the notion of man being deduced by intrinsecal differences from the genus of body , he is formally a body , tho' his soul be of a spiritual nature , which makes him virtually a spirit . whence also , the manner of existence following from what 's formal in the thing , he has , in this state , a corporeal manner of existence ; as appears by his gleaning knowledge by the senses ; his being measurable by quantity , alterable by corporeal qualities ; nay , even his peculiar and proper action of discourse attends the slow pace of fancy and bodily motion ; none of which could be competent to a pure spirit that exists after a spiritual and indivisible manner . nor does this more prejudice the spiritual nature of a soul that it exists and works in some regards after the manner of a body , than it does prejudice the nature of a body , ( a stone , for example ) that it exists in us spiritually ; as it does when we know it , or have the notion or nature of it in our understanding . . hence is seen what notions do formally belong to the line of substance , or to ens as ens , viz. the several species of it descending downwards from the common head , till we come to the i●dividuum ; which therefore is a compleat ens , as including all those superiour or partial notions ; and * therefore it only is in proper speech , an ens or thing ; in regard it onely being ultimately determin'd to be this or that , only it is , by consequence , capable of existing , which is the definition of ens. whence all potential or indeterminate notions of ens , such as are ens , corpus , vivens , or animal in common , are , for the same reason , incapable of existing , otherwise than as they are parts of the compleat ens or individuum ; and therefore they are phras'd by the schools , substantiae secundae , and the individuum substantia prima . lower than the individuum in the line of ens we cannot go , nor can any notion be superadded to it that belong properly to ens , but that of existence , of which ens is a capacity . whence we do not call existence a form ( or act , ) for this joyn'd with the matter ( or power ) does constitute that compound ens call'd body , and , therefore , are both presuppos'd to existence ; but we call it the last formality of every created ens , because it has no potentiality at all in that line , but is pure actuality ; and therefore most resembles god , our creator and the sole giver of it , whose very essence is self-existence . . all those notions before said , taking them precisely as determining the common notion of ens , and belonging to it ( even to the last actuality of it [ existence ] inclusively ) are metaphysical notions : the proper object of which science is ens ; not taken as it abstracts from existence , but as it abstracts from all the other predicaments or common heads of notions ; that is , from all matter and motion , and all modes or manners of them . for which reason existence , which more perfectly abstracts from both , does more formally belong to the object of metaphysicks . lesson iv. some considerations belonging to those ten heads of notions , or to the ten predicaments in common . . the last nine predicaments , call'd accidents , are not truly things , nor ( of themselves ) capable of existence ; and therefore they are onely capable of being by their identity with substance . for , since * we cannot clearly know any thing but by framing diverse notions or considerations of it , † and all the notions we have are divided into ten common heads , ‖ and it hinders the way to science , if we keep not the distinction of those heads unmingled : wherefore , it being manifest and undeniable , that among those heads there is one which is truly the notion of ens or thing , that is , of [ apable of existing ] viz. that of substance . hence , in case we should conceive , or put all the rest to be also entities or things , or of themselves capable of existence , we should confound and jumble all the common heads of our notions together ; which would fundamentally destroy all possibility of science , even while we are laying it . . notwithstanding this , the notions or natures of those nine heads are not fictitious , or fram'd gratis by our understanding , but real affections or modifications of the thing . for , since * we cannot comprehend all that is in the thing at once , but are forced to make diverse considerations of it ; nor could we do this unless the thing were diversly considerable ; it follows , that these nine heads ( as well as the first ) are diverse considerabilities of the same thing ; that is , the real thing it self as diversly consider'd or conceiv'd by us ; and therefore , since they are not things by virtue of their distinct notions , and yet are really the thing diversly consider'd ( which takes nothing from their re●lity ) it is left that they must be real affections , modifications , respects or determinations of it , and not meer nothings or fictitious ; but , ( as we may say ) somewhat of the thing , or belonging to it ; which logicians phrase to be a thing in an analogical or secondary sense . . the distinction of these considerabilities is partly taken from the vnderstanding , partly from nature it self . for , since the diverse considerabilities of the thing * are not so many little entities found in it , but the same thin● diversly conceiv'd ; the distinction of them cannot be taken from the thing it self , singly consi●●red . on the other side , * since our understanding is naturally apt to make diverse abstract notions of the thing ; nay , is forced to do it because it cannot discourse clearly of more of them to●ether , much less of the whole suppositum ; and , that the impressions on the senses which cause those notions are naturally diverse ; and , that the causes in nature do often work upon the suppositum or thing , according to some one notion or considerability of it , and not according to another : for example , on its figure , and not on its colour ; on its locality or situation , and not on its substance ; hence ample occasion is ministred to the understanding to consider it diversly ; that is , to make diverse conceptions or notions of it . wherefore the distinction of these considerabilities is partly taken from the vnderstanding , partly from nature it self ; nature affording ground and occasion for the understanding to make this distinction , and the understanding making it formally . . hence follows , that the only way to acquire solid knowledge of the nature of things , or ( which is the same ) of those nature-imprinted notions , is , not to frame high-flying speculations of them , beaten out of our own brain , or coin'd by our own wit : but , to gain by attentive reflexion , the true and genuine meaning of those words , which the generality of mankind , or the vulgar , make use of to signifie those notions : for , this known , * the meaning of the word being the meaning or notion of those that use it , and their † notion being the nature of the thing , it follows , that the nature of the thing will be known likewise . wherefore , this is the best test to know which speculations are aiery , which solid and grounded on nature . for instance . to know what is properly meant by the word [ thing ] , ask an honest country fellow ( as my self did once to satisfie a sceptick ) how many things lye upon the table ; and we shall see that he will readily reckon up all the individual substances , and be ready to swear there are no more : which shews , that nature teaches him that only an individual substance is truly and properly a thing . this done , tell him he has not reckon'd all the things there , but has omitted bigness , whiteness , roundness , &c. which are not nothings , but things , and really there . which done , you will find you have blunder'd him , by putting him to distinguish , which he is not good at : yet , for all that , he will stand to his former answer , and tell you , these are not such things as we call things ; and that in reckoning up the other things , he reckon'd up those into the bargain . which rude answer contains the sum of this present discourse ; viz. that only individual substances are truly things ; the others somewhat of the thing , or belonging to it ; and that they are no otherwise ●hings , but as they are it , or somewhat of it ; and consequently are not , or have no existence of their own , but its . . artificial things are in no one of these heads . for , since artificial things are either more things join'd together , or some one natural body , not as it stands in nature , but as vested with a new ●rtificial form , introduced by a●t ; it cannot have one notion ; nor , consequently , can it be comprized under any one head. nor are these notions common to all mankind ; nor , lastly , are they constituted by essential or in●rinsecal differences in the line of ens , but such as are accidental or extrinsecal , and generally by their figures or situation of their parts . . what 's infinit can be in none of these heads . for , since an infinit ens ( for example ) involves in its self all that is or can belong to the notion of ens , and can be but one , in regard , were there more , one of them would have something of entity in it which the other has not , and so they would limit one another , and both of them would be finite ; it follows , that what 's infinite can neither be a common head it self , because it can have no particular infinites under it ; nor can it be a particular under that common head , because it could have no genus to it , nor intrinsecal differences to divide that genus , and to constitute a distinct infinit from the other . . ens , diversly conceiv'd , is the adequate object of our understanding , working naturally . this is evident from the whole scheme of our discourse concerning the ten common heads of all our notions , shewing they are nothing but diverse conceptions of ens. . hence we can have no proper notion of a pure non-entity ; not only for the reason now given , but also , because a non-ens could never make any impression on our senses , and thence convey it● ●otion into our minds . . for the same reason we can have no proper and direct notions of indivisibles or points , or of what 's purely negative of ens , or of any real affection of ens , taking them as purely negative , without connotating the subject , or the thing ; whose notion only is truly positive . for ( as has been shown ) all our conceptions are notions of the things as conceiv'd by us ; which when , by a reflex act , we consider to be limited , and to reach no farther under such or such a notion , we abstract limitedness from the real notion ; and because we can have no conception but under the notion of ens , we are forced to use an improper notion , and conceive it as a kind of ens ; even tho' at the same time wise reflecters judge and say , 't is none of it self , or , as totally abstracted from the thing . in which case no harm is done by our barely apprehending it so , for 't is natural , and we cannot help it ; but if , not distinguishing our manner of conceiving from what is found in the thing , we come to judge that to be an entity which , by the thing 's reaching no farther , is evident that of it self 't is none ; or to be diverse entities because our conceptions are different , it will certainly pervert all our discourses , and make them aiery , fantastical , and contradictory . . hence it is a most intolerable error , to make imaginary space , or an immense vacuum beyond the world to exist ; and , by consequence to belong to some one of those common heads . for , the word vacuum must either be taken as a concrete , and then it must signifie a subject or ens which has an accident in it call'd vacuity ; in which case , since none says that that ens is a spirit ; nor can it be a body , being put to be beyond the world , that is , beyond the whole mass of bodies ; it follows , that it is no ens at all , but a meer nothing ; and so , to put a nothing to be , is against common sence , the light of nature , and the very first principle of our understanding ; for it puts that to be , which , being no ens , is not capable to be ; that is , it puts a perfect impossibility or contradiction . or else it is a meer abstract term , and means a vacuity ; and then the asserters of it must put a form to bee without any matter or subject inform'd by it ; which wanting , it can be no form ; or an accident to subsist without any subject , which makes it no accident ; since an accident is that which does accidere substantiae , or is adventitious to it . again , the name they give it , viz. imaginary space , by which they distinguish it from real space , confesses it not to be in re , but only in our imagination : which words can have no sence , unless they mean , that the imagination is the only subject in which it subsists . wherefore , to speak consequently , they ought to say , that our imagination , in which only it has any being , is some infinitely-extended thing beyond the world ; for there they put this imaginary space to bee ; but this is so notorious a banger , that they dare not say this neither ; and , therefore , they can make no piece of their tenet cohere , nor make any sence of their own words . but let them wriggle what way they will , their putting it to be without the world , and yet not to exist in re , but in our imagination only , which is within the world , is so full fraught with variety of contradictions , that they cannot even name it or talk of it , without speaking palpable nonsence at every step of their discourse . moreover , they deny it to be a thing , and yet they attribute to it the properties of a real thing , by making it have assignable parts in it ; as also to be extended , measurable , &c. which is the highest strain of contradiction imaginable . for , since ens and non-ens do differ more than toto genere , and as far as contradiction can distance them ; whatever is affirm'd of an ens must necessarily be deny'd of non-ens ; so that , if a thing ( a body for example ) can be extended , measur'd , pass'd through , or mov'd in ; it must necessarily be affirm'd , that a non-ens cannot be mov'd in , extended , measur'd , or have parts . lastly , imaginary space or vacuum never affected our senses ; and therefore , since we can have no distinct notion of it from outward objects , neither can it , consequently , belong to any of those common heads of notions ; whence follows that one of these heads , which gives being to all the other , being ens , imaginary space and vacuum are meer nothings . note . that this discourse equally concludes against vacuum within the world. for that imagin'd space would neither be body nor spirit , subject nor accident ; and therefore it must be meerly nothing . nor , consequently , could it be measur'd , extended , mov'd in , &c. note . that these two tenets being overthrown , the whole epicurean hypothesis , built on them , falls to the ground , and needs no farther confutation . . hence 't is logically demonstrated , that there can be no protuberancy in the outmost superficies of the world ; for , were this so , there would be some distance between the extream surface and that protuberancy ; and that distance could be measurable , divisible , &c. which would make non-ens to be ens. . this humour of fancy , or of ill-govern'd reason , making entities of non-entities ; and conceiting every negative , purely as such , to be a thing , because we cannot conceive nothings but as thin●s , destroys all science , and makes it chimerical . for , every species in nature includes a negation of all other species , and every individuum in the world of all other individuums : at which rate we should have far more nothings in the world than things , if we come to put all those negations to bee . it were very proper , but withal very pleasant , if such men of fancy would , in pursuance of their tenet , frame us a new no-logick of their own , and put non-ens in common to be the first head of their negative notions ; and then divide it by more of non-ens that is , no-body , and less of it , or no spirit ; and then descend to its proper individuums . as non-petrus , non-ioannes , non-bucephalus , &c. this would be consequent to their fantastick tenet . but , even then they must be forc'd to contradict themselves , and confess , that as non-ens means not capable of existing ; so , by the same reason , they ought to make non-corpus to be non-quantum , non-quale , non-passivum , non-locabile , &c. which would spoil all their positions of vacuum and imaginary space . so certain it is that all errors , pursu'd home to their bad principles , will still confute themselves . hence the distinction some make of ens into ens-positivum , privativum , and negativum , is no wiser than was the saying of the fanatick preacher in ben's play. viz. that he had three lights in him ; a great light , a little light , and no light at all . . we have no natural notion , nor ground , from nature , of an union , as they call it . for , the asserters of it , neither make it the action that unites two things or parts , nor the effect of that action wrought upon the subject , that is , their being united , ( which hinders it from belonging to the common heads of action or passion ) but an intervening little entity , whose nature it is to tye them together . and , since such a notion was never imprinted by our senses , 't is plain it can be no natural notion as those in the predicaments are , nor belong to any of those common heads . nor can it be collected by reason ; for since the matter , before the union be made , is ultimately dispos'd by nature to receive the form , and the form is proper , and by the course of causes , necessary to be received into the matter thus disposed , there can need nothing to unite them ( as they call it ) but the efficient , making the form result from such matter as was fitted for it and requir'd it , which is to be in it ; any more than , if fire be apt to burn what 's combustible , and what 's combustible be perfectly fit to be burnt by fire , there can need any thing but application , to burn it , or ( which in their phrase is the same ) to unite the form of fire to the matter of the wood. this conceit therefore of those little entities , call'd 〈◊〉 , to tack things together at every turn , is a meer chimera coin'd by fancy ; and seems to be borrow'd from those mens observing that two things , unapt otherwise to cohere , ( diverse pieces of wood , for example ) do need glew , or pitch , or some such tenacious stuff , to fix them together ; whence , by an unsuitable and ill-grounded metaphor , they translate it to the uniting the parts of natural entities ; which , by the wise conduct of the author of nature , are always ready for an union e're they come to be made one , and can need nothing at all to unite them or make them one entitatively . vnion therefore is the effect of the action of uniting , or the same with their being united or their vnity , and not an intermediating entity ; since whatever things or parts are naturally vnited do cling together into one entity by a kind of spontaneous inclination ; and by means of the antecedent dispositions requiring the form , are such good friends of themselves beforehand , that there can need nothing to reconcile them . besides , this conceit is ill-grounded in another respect ; for , the inventers of it make account that those vnible parts were , before they were united , two things ; whereas , in reality , there was but one thing , dispos'd to be chang'd into another , by sitting the matter to receive a new form. which discourse may be apply'd to those who ask , how , or by what means , the soul and body were united or made one thing ? to which the proper answer is , they were never two things . . we can have no one notion of a transcendent ; for , since transcendents are those that run through all or many of the predicaments , and the predicaments are so many heads of notions generically distinct ; it is impossible to have any one notion of transcendents ; again , there is no more common genus , which can be divided into those ten heads , as its species , by intrinsecal differences ; but those several summa genera are distinguish'd from one another by their own common notions . whence the words that signifie them , whether vnum , verum , bonum , idem , diversum , or what ever they be , are the most equivocal of any that can be imagin'd , and have a vastly different signification as apply'd to the notions in each of those heads . . no part of an ens ▪ can belong to any predicament : for a part of an ens is no more an ens , than a part of an apple is an apple : nor , can parts have intrinsecal differences in the line of substance ; for such differences would with the genus make the part to be a totum in that line . corollary . hence by the way , we may frame a logical demonstration against actual parts in a compound . for , were they actually distinct , they must have each of them matter and form of its own ; which being the proper constituents of such an ens , each of them would be such an ens or a body ; and so they would have each of them , a title to existence , which is the proper notion of a compleat ens ; and by consequence each part would be a whole . . the notions of genus , speci●s , and the terms of art , fram'd by the reflexion of our understanding , are not things distinct from the notions of ens , corpus , vivens , &c. which logicians call by those names ; nor are they in any of those common heads . for , first , ( * as wil● appear ) these notions are but parts of the individuum , which is the whole ens. next terms of art are made by men of art , who are reflecters , and not directly imprinted by nature , or common to all mankind : for which reason we must learn the meaning of those words , and , consequently , those notions themselves , from learned men , and not from the generality . . notwithstanding , it must be granted , that nature gives our understanding hints or ground to frame such artificial conceptions ; without which they would be fictitious and chimerical : for example , by observing that all the men we ever knew , do proceed to action upon some reason or other ; hence , we frame a common notion of a species or kind , call'd a rational thing ; and , observing farther , that beasts as well as men have senses , and are excited and mov'd by means of them ; hence we frame a higher notion , common to both the kinds of man and beast , and call it a genus ; and so still upwards . nature all along affording us some ground of framing universal notions , and the understanding making and framing them actually . and , where these notions were bred , there they dwell or exist ; for , out of the understanding , and in nature , there is nothing but individuals . . note , that the notions of genus , species , &c. as abstracted and rais'd to a common pitch by men of art , or logicians , reflecting on the agreement of more under that one notion , are ( as such ) wholes ; but , as consider'd in the ens or individuum , and as causing our natural notions of them , they are but parts , and the individuum is the whole , in respect of them : for , since the whole is that which is larger than some parts are , or rather which comprehends all the parts ; it follows , that those notions , thus abstractedly consider'd , being ( according to the condition they have in our understanding ) larger than the inferiour notions , and comprehending all under them , are therefore certain kinds of wholes , as thus consider'd . on the other side , since only individuums are truly the compleat and whole entia , as being only capable of existing ; and the notions of ens , corpus , vivens , animal , homo , are but partial and inadequate notions of the individuum ; it follows , that the individuum does , in reality , comprehend what answers to the notions of each or all of them : wherefore , thus consider'd , ( that is , as they stand in nature ) they are but parts , and the individuum is the whole . lesson v. of the common head called quantity . . quantity may either be consider'd mathematically , as abstracted from motion , and meerly extending the body , as it were , in rest ; or physically , as affecting body , its subject , in order to motion ; that is , as to natural action and passion . this needs no proof , since it is evident that quantity may be consider'd both these ways , and we experience that we can both these ways consider it . . the essential notion of quantity is divisibility into parts ; and , such a divisibility as that each of its parts , after division , becomes a whole . for , since the essential notion of it cannot consist in its having matter and form , which make it an ens , and so fit it for existence ( as it was in a divisible substance or * body ) the essence of it ( such as it is ) must be taken from some consideration belonging to its own single abstracted notion , and from that in the first place that best expresses its metaphysical vnity . and , since nothing can be said to be divisible , or capable to be made more , but it must be said eo ipso to be actually and truly one ; therefore divisibility , or a capacity to be made more , is the very notion of its vnity , only connotating that 't is such an unity as makes its subject capable to be made more , or dissolved by division into parts . again , † as was said above , and will more evidently be shown hereafter , that is the true notion of any nature to which the sayings of mankind do agree : but divisibility is thus shown to be the notion of quantity . for example , ask what a mile is , it will be answer'd , that it has so many furlongs , paces , or yards in it . ask what a yard is , it will be answer'd , it consists of so many feet ; and so of the rest . and when we come to so small a quantity , that we can no more give an account of it , or assign the parts into which it is divisible , we find our selves at a plunge , and know not how to define it , but seem to have lost the notion of it . therefore , however extension , measurability , and such others , may truly belong to quantity as its properties , yet only divisibility is its primary and essential notion , because 't is this only denotes its vnity . and , since it is not a divisibility into such parts as could not remain wholes after their separation , such as were matter and form , which are the essential parts of substance ; hence the divisibility which quantity gives to its subject must be such as makes it remain so many wholes after the division is made ; as experience also shews us . . quantity is adequately divided into continu'd , or coherent ; and discrete , or number . for , since 't is impossible to ask any question concerning the quantity of things , but either how many they are , if more things ; or , how great it is , ( that is how much there is of it ) if it be but one thing ; 't is evident that mankind has no notion of any other kind of quantity but of discrete and continu'd ; and , therefore , the division of quantity into these two species is adequate . note , that discrete quantity is less quantity than continu'd , because 't is less divisible ; or rather 't is not so properly quantity as is the other , because it has no vnity to distinguish it from a mere confused multitude of ones but by means of the understanding , conceiving it to be so many units terminated by the last ; yet , because plurality and paucity are more and less of any one determinate number , and that there is a ground in nature for our understanding to consider many scatter'd ones and comprehend or bind them together into one notion , and that such notions are useful or necessary to mankind ; therefore this order'd multitude of discrete or shatter'd ones , call'd number , is rightly placed in the predicament of quantity . for , t is to be noted , that when 't is said quantity is divisibilis in semper divisibilia , it was not meant of quantity in common , or all quantity , but only of that species of quantity call'd continued . . the unity proper to extended quantity is continuity of its parts ; for , if the parts of this sort of quantity be discontinu'd , either nothing ( or vacuum ) comes between them , and then they are still continu'd against the supposition ; for nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the parts of quantity . or else some body comes between them and discontinues them ; and then , since all bodies bring their own quantities along with them , however the bodies , a. and b. are distanced by c's coming between them , because every body has its determinate bounds and limits ; yet , the quantity of those three bodies , precisely consider'd , has none , but goes on smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole mass of body , whether those bodies be different or the same ; without notches or nicks butting and bounding it here and there , or in the least diversifying it ; what ever variety is found in the figure , colour , hardness , softness or in any other consideration belonging to those bodies . again , since this species of quantity has its peculiar notion , nature , or essence , it must have some kind of vnity too peculiar to it self : but , none is imaginable except continuity , nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of quantity , which is divisibility or vnity of its potential parts , or sute so exactly with it . nay , were the parts of quantity discontinu'd quantitatively , they would be divided quantitatively , that is , not divisible or one ; that is none , or not-quantity , against the supposition . therefore the vnity proper to this species of quantity is continuity of its parts . cor. i. therefore the quantity of the whole world is one vninterrupted continuity , and the world it self ( speaking of quantitative unity ) one great continuum . . quantity , according to its precise notion , cannot be essential to body , because it can neither be the genus of it , nor the intrinsecal difference that constitutes it ; as is prov'd * above . . yet quantity , materially consider'd , and not according to its precise and formal notion of divisibility , may ( as it were ) per accidens contribute to the essence of individual bodies . for , since nothing is truly and perfectly ens , or capable of existence , but individuals ; nor ( since thing in common cannot exist ) can any thing be capable of existing , but by being ultimately determinated , and thence compleatly fitted to be this or that ; and this determination , distinguishing one individuum from all others , is perform'd by means of such a particular complexion of accidents as fits them for their primary operation for which nature ordain'd them ; and this complexion of accidents is either of quantity , or else ( as is shewn in physicks ) of different modifications of quantity ; it follows , that quantity , materially consider'd , and not according to its formal notion of divisibility , may ( as it were ) by accident contribute to the essence of individual bodies . . the intrinsecal differences of quantity are more and less of the notion of quantity . this is prov'd * formerly , when we treated of the division of substance ; and the reason given there holds equally here . . the proper species of quantity , mathematically consider'd , or as it abstracts from motion , are longitude , latitude , and profundity ; otherwise call'd linea , superficies , and corpus . for , it is evident that latitude is another sort of quantity , and has more of that notion in it than longitude has ; and that profundity is a different sort of quantity , and has in it more of quantity , thus consider'd , than either of the other , as containing in it self all the three dimensions . . therefore , the intrinsecal differences of each of these continued quantities ( consider'd mathematically , as abstracted from all order to motion ) are divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts : for , since the notion of quantity is divisibility , and divisibility respects the parts into which it may be divided ; and this respect cannot be to indeterminate parts into which it may be divided , they being ( as euclid has demonstrated ) infinit , as well in the greatest as the least quantities , so that they cannot have any differences , thus considered ; wherefore divisibility into greater and lesser parts , being the intrinsecal differences of all such quantities , in regard that the greater have more of the immediate generical notion , or of that kind of quantity , in them ; the smaller , less of it ; and divisibility into parts which are determinate , may bear the notion of greater or lesser divisibility , which divisibility into potential parts ( as was said ) cannot ; it follows that divisibility into greater and lesser determinate parts are the intrinsecal differences of this kind of quantity , mathematically consider'd . besides , greater and lesser bear in their notions some proportion between those parts ; which cannot be conceiv'd unless those parts be determinate . . the proper and intrinsecal differences of continued quantity consider'd physically , or in order to motion ; that is , affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by natural causes , are more or less divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those causes . this is evident from the very same reason , supposing intrinsecal differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common notion , or of the genus they are to divide . . the more and less divisibility of continu'd quantity thus consider'd , is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by natural agents . for , since quantity , thus consider'd , does not respect the parts it contains or may be divided into , but the causes in nature , and their operation upon its subject , body ; it follows , that the notion of its being more or less divisible , as thus consider'd , can only mean more or less susceptive of the efficiency of natural causes ; that is , more easily or less easily divisible by the said causes ; which is to be rare and dense . . the division of continu'd quantity into permanent and successive , is made by accidental differences , and not by essential ones , as were the former divisions of it : for , since to move and to stand still are accidental to quantity , and have no respect to that generical notion , as more and less of it , as had the other differences above mentioned ; it follows , that these differences are accidental to their generical notion , and not essential or intrinsecal to it . again , more and less , which are intrinsecal differences , signifie some proportion or comparison of one to the other , which can have no place in permanent and successive quantities ; for , what sense bears it to say , that a yard is as long as an hour ? wherefore , since it is a most certain maxim , that comparisons are made of things which are of the same genus or kind ( which by the way shews , that intrinsecal differences of any genus or kind are comparative notions , or more and less of it ) 't is evident that continu'd quantity is not a proper genus to them , as such ; nor they proper species of it , or constituted such under it by intrinsecal differences ; but each of them is the very genus it self of continu'd quantity , consider'd under diverse states altogether disparate ; and one of them , viz. successive , connotating the predicament of action , the other seeming rather to hold on the side of meer quantity ; tho' that common head does , in rigour , abstract from both those states . . the division of permanent continu'd quantity into extensive , containing the three species * above mentioned ; and intensive or weight , is yet more defective than the other : for , first , part of the genus it self ( viz. permanent ) is accidental to quantity . next , ( there being no natural propension one way or other inherent in bodies while in rest , ( as is shown in physicks ) weight must be taken for an actual tendency downwards ; and so it belongs to the predicament of action or passion , according as the body that weighs is consider'd either as prest upon by the superiour body , or pressing that below it . whence , whatever else we can conceive of the notion of weight in any body is nothing else but its density ; for this makes it apt to receive the full impression of the descending ayr , and better and more swiftly cut the medium , when its motion is once determin'd ; whereas rare bodies suffer the descending particles to slip thro' them , and do but dully and slowly divide the medium thro' which they are to pass in their descent . but of this more in physicks . . infinit discrete quantity , that is infinit number cannot belong to the predicament of quantity ; for then , it must either have the place there of a genus , or of a species ; whereas it can be neither , because the generical notion would in that case be common to more infinit numbers as its species , which is a contradiction : for , since each of these species , being infinit in such a line , or under such a notion , must comprehend all that can be in that line , they would each of them contain the whole line of number ; and so each of them would be of as large a notion as their genus ; nor would they , in that case , be different from one another in that line , because one of them can have nothing which the other has not ; nor consequently can they be diverse species , nor can infinit quantity be their genus . besides , two infinits , under what notion soever , limit , and so destroy one another : nor can it be solv'd by saying , that quantity may be divided into finit and infinit , and that species that is infinit be but one , or have no more of its kind but its single self ; for , since infinit in any notion includes all that can belong to that notion , nothing of the genus would be left for its fellow - species to partake of ; which makes finite number to be no species . lastly , as the differences of continu'd quantity were greater or lesser determinate parts , so the differences of number must be more or fewer determinate parts ; which can bear no sense if one of the species have all , or be endless or indeterminate . . hence 't is logically demonstrated that infinit number is impossible and contradictory ; since it contradicts the methods and maxims of all our natural notions . for , were it put , it ought to belong to the common head of quantity , which we see is in many regards implicatory . add , that as no ens is capable of existence unless it be first ultimately determin'd to be this or that ; so no affection of ens , v. g. number , can possibly exist in things , unless it be determin'd in its own line to be this or that number ; which is here forbidden it by the very notion of infinit , which signifies indeterminate . · therefore continu'd quantity , for the same reason , cannot be infinit ; that is , there cannot be an infinit extent or expansion of body ; for , then the subject would verifie it , that there must be in it an infinit number of yards , which is now prov'd impossible . . for the same reason there cannot have been infinit time ; for then , again , there must have been an infinit number , viz. of hours . again , let us put time to have been infinit , that is , never to have begun ; then there must have succeeded an infinit number of hours ; wherefore in that whole collection of hours there must either have been some one hour distant from this present hour by infinit intermediate ones , or no one hour thus distant . if no one , then the whole collection of hours ( consisting of ones ) is finite : if some one hour be distant from this present one by infinit intermediate ones , then we are forc'd to put an infinit which has two ends , viz. that hour said to be infinitely long ago , and this present hour that now passes ; that is , we must put an infinit to be finite . corol. hence is demonstrated , that the course of nature , consisting in motion , had a beginning or first motion ; therefore a first-mover , therefore some spiritual nature ; as * will be demonstrated hereafter . lesson vi. of the common head of quality . . the notion of substance being what a thing is ; and that of quantity , how great it is , or how much there is of it ; the common notion of quality , ( as was said above , and indeed as the very word imports ) is how a thing is in respect to its own peculiar nature ; that is , whether it be so as it should be or no. this will be farther evident from the whole following discourse . . wherefore there must be so many common kinds or species of quality as there may be common considerations of how a thing is in regard to its own peculiar nature . . wherefore , seeing the subject may be thus consider'd , either according to its intrinsecals , or according to extrinsecals , to which it may be refer'd : and , if to intrinsecals , then , either according to some perfection or imperfection of its intrinsecal temperature or constitution , which we call habit , if permanent ; or disposition , if transitory ; or to its outward shape conceiv'd to inhere in it , call'd figure . if it be consider'd according to extrinsecals , then , either according to the causes from which it may suffer or be variable , which we call passible quality , if steddy ; or passion , if sudden and fleeting ; or to the effects or operations it may or may not produce ; which we name its power or impotency : hence quality in common is divided into four kinds and no more ; nor can more sorts of answers to the question , how a thing is , be invented or imagin'd . examples of the questions proper to quality are such as these : how do you ? to which is answer'd , sick or in health , well or ill dispos'd . how is he as to his understanding ? learned or ignorant ; which answers we call habits or dispositions . how is he as to his walking , or using his natural faculties ? to which we answer , well able to walk , or lame , &c. which signifie his power or impotency . how is the milk that 's over the fire , or the bread in the oven ? to which is answer'd , hot or cold ; dough-bak'd or enough : which are passible qualities . how is he affected to me ? to which is answer'd , angry , which is passion . lastly , it may be ask'd , how he is as to his outward shape ? to which is answer'd , well or ill shap'd , handsome or vgly , which quality is call'd figure . . the intrinsecal differences of more or less in this common head of quality , are more properly to be call'd better and worse qualified , since they fall into the same as more and less ; only the latter expressions sute better , having a qualifying sense . . wherefore power and impotency are the first species of quality , because they spring immediately out of the essence as it's properties , and most meerly concern it as to making it better or worse ; as also , because they most dispose or indispose the subject to the substance ( as it were ) of it's natural operations . habit and disposition are the second ; because they supervene to the power , and only give it a better or worse facility or difficulty to operate . passible quality and passion , taken as such , are the third ; because , taken as such , they meerly qualify the subject to be passive or alterable by another . i say , taken as such , that is , as passible ; for , if they be consider'd as active , as heat in fire is conceiv'd to be apt to effect heat in another thing , then 't is a calefactive virtue , and has the notion of power . lastly , figure has the least share of the notion of quality , because it onely regards the outward lineaments and appearance , which are the sleightest of all other qualities . though it may sometimes , ( especially in organical bodies and their several parts , ) contribute to their power or impotency ; as an acute figure in dense bodies makes them better divide the ayre , and other bodies , adding thus an accidental perfection to their power of dividing ; and splay-footedness hinders the power of walking , whereas straightness helps it . accidental , i say , for the , essential notion of figure is onely to terminate thus , or thus the quantity of bodies , as will be shewn hereafter . . wherefore , the intrinsecal differences of quality being to make the subject of them better or worse , hence most qualities may admit of several degrees in each of it's species , or , as the schools phrase it , may be intended or remitted ; whereas neither substance nor quantity can . not substance ; because , as we no sooner step out of the notion of ens in common but we plunge into non-ens , so we cannot depart from the essential notion of hoc ens , but we must fall into non-hoc-ens or another ens. not quantity ; for , let us design any particular or determinate species of quantity ( a yard for example ) and but in the least increase or diminish it quantitatively , and immediately it becomes no yard but of an other species really , tho' perhaps so little may be added or detracted that we may want a name for it . . power differs from habit also in this that powers are natural , and spring out of the essences of things as their properties ; as the power of walking , seeing , hearing , fancying , understanding , willing , heating , dividing , &c. whereas habits are generally , acquir'd by frequent acts. in things inanimate , and vegetables , and in some sort of animals they are properly call'd virtues ; thus we say such a mineral or herb has the virtue of drying , cooling , healing , cauterizing , poisoning . in animals , they are call'd natural faculties ; as those of seeing walking , flying , &c. where the word faculty is not taken in the same sense in which we use it , when we tell one he has got a faculty of doing this or that , meaning thereby a facility or habit of doing it , but for the power it self which is to be facilitated by that habit. the privations or want of those powers due to nature we call impotences ; as deafness , blindness , doltishness , &c. which signify inabilities to perform such operations as we ought , were the subjects qualify'd as they should be . . habits are generally acquir'd by acts : yet some may seem to be had by nature : as healthfulness and sickliness . of the former we use to say such a one has got a habit of dancing , drinking , brawling , swearing , praying , &c. of which sort are all kind of skill's in moving the body , and all arts and sciences qualifying the mind , and their opposites : all which we shall find to be perfections or imperfections , belonging either to the particular nature of the body , as dancing , pronouncing , &c. or else suitable or disagreeable to the peculiar temper of the mind , which is reason ; such as are sciences , virtues , vices , ignorance , &c. but those that are innate , and have withal some constant ground of stability by the steady or fixt course of causes , are rather call'd states or conditions than habits ; such as are original justice , original sin , impeccableness in the saints in heaven , obdurateness in sin in the divels ; and , healthfulness or sickliness , if it comes out of a man's natural constitution . all which , tho' less properly habits than those that are acquir'd , yet habit having in it's notion a kind of constancy , we do therefore from their steady manner of working , denominate habitual propensions , dispositions , affections , or determinations of the subjects , and reduce them to the species of habit . . those natural affections of body , consider'd as apt to render the subject , not to be determinately this or that in the line of ens ; nor bigger or lesser , but only alterable thus or thus , without changing the entity , are for the most part passible qualities . this is manifest ; for considering them thus , there is no predicament but that of quality , nor any species of quality but this , under which they can be rank't . under the genus of passible quality are particularly the four first qualities , heat , coldness , moisture , dryness ; and the second , ( and perhaps third ) qualities compounded of these , with a variety almost infinit , of which more in physicks . all passible qualities are objects of the senses , otherwise they would not be natural notions , nor belong to any common head ; and , consequently , we could not discourse or think of them , which yet we experience we do . . yet 't is not the consideration of them as the objects of our senses which constitutes them , nor essentially distinguishes them ▪ this is evident , for their essence , as qualities , must be taken from their manner of affecting their own subject , and thence giving us ground of denominating it diversly , or framing distinct notions of it . besides , to be an object of any power , can , as such , be essential to nothing ; because it is perfectly extrinsecal to the thing or it's power to which 't is an object ; as will be farther seen when we come to treat of the predicament of * relation . wherefore , the division of this species of of quality into visible , audible , tangible , &c. is accidental to quality and far from intrinsecal or essential . . notwithstanding what is said above , some qualities may contribute to the essence of a thing , and so be in part essential . for , since ( as is shewn in metaphysicks ) the complexion of accidents , and of some qualities , among the rest , do determine a thing to be this and distinct from all others , and withal fit it for its primary operation ; and consequently do help to constitute the essence of an individual body as part of it's form ; passible qualities , in particular , may contribute to the essence of a thing ; or be in part , and , as joyn'd with quantity , essential to it . yet so , that each of these consider'd alone is an accident : but all of them taken together and as clubbing to determin the matter ultimately to be this , they are to be consider'd not as meerly quantitative , nor as qualificative , but as belonging to the substantial form. . no other species of quality but passible qualities has this prerogative , not power : for powers are properties ; and , so , are conceiv'd to follow the essence constituted , and presuppose it ; much less habits , for they supervene to the natural powers . and least of all figure , for this is extrinsecal to the constitution of the body ; however in organical bodies they may help to determine the species or individuum . . figure is nothing but the termination of the quantity of a body , or ( which is the same ) body thus terminated . for , since figure is nothing but such a superficies , and the superficies is the termination of profundity which is the proper quantity of body ; it follows that figure is nothing else but the termination of the quantity of body . again , if we look narrowly into particular figures , we shall find them nothing but that the quantity goes no further , or ends , here and there . whence the figure of it must necessarily be thus and thus . and this is all can be made of it as it is distinguisht from the body it self or its quantity ; however we are prone to conceit it , as 't is distinct from body , to be a kind of ens. . figure alone is incapable of more or less in the same species . for , since figure is the termination of the quantity of body , and quantity being divisibility , the termination or no-fartherness of quantity must be no quantity , and therefore indivisible , and there can be no degrees in indivisibles ; it follows that figure is not capable of more and less within the same species , but every alteration of the figure is a new species of it . . hence the termination of the self-same quantity ( tho' being oft-times imperceptible , it happens to be nameless , ) after several manners make so many particular figures . for example , the self same quantity , ( viz. a pint of water , ) may be put into a round viol and a square or oval one ; which being terminated after a particular manner , do make so many particular kinds of figures . corol. i. hence is seen that there is a real divisibility ( that is such a notional one as is grounded in nature ) between quantity and figure ; since the subject may be chang'd according to figure and not according to quantity , of which we can have no better nor more familiar instance than a pastry-cook's forming the same quantity of dow into a pye , and a lid for it , or into pyes of several figures . . the termination of the quantity of body , being the outside , that circumscribes and comprehends all the body enclos'd in it , which is the containing it ; the species of figure , simply speaking , must be more or less a capacity to contain body ; that is , to contain more or less of it . hence a round figure is the best , a quadrate worse , and a parallelogram still worse than the former : i say , simply speaking ; or regarding body in common ; for otherwise , if the nature of some sorts of bodies ( organical ones for example ) requires such a determinate figure , then that figure is better or worse , which approaches more or less to such a figure as best sutes with that nature , fits it best for its operations , and makes the symmetry with its other parts most perfect . things endow'd with this quality we use to call well shaped or handsome ; which , with fit colours rightly placed in the respective parts , make up that amiable quality we call beauty . . all corporeal qualities are in reality the very particles or parts of body . this has been prov'd * above , where it was shewn , that accidents are not entities , nor can exist of themselves , but meerly by their identity with their subject . . wherefore corporeal powers are nothing but several mixt parts , so contriv'd and organiz'd , as enable the compounds to perform such and such operations . corporeal habits are nothing but the same parts by vse and bending to and fro made plyable , and , so , apt to perform them more easily . the passible qualities are the same parts as rendring the subject either perfectly or imperfectly divisible or capable to be alter'd by natural causes . figure can the least be thought to have any being of its own , since it is onely the termination of quantity which is it self but a determination of body . corol. ii. hence is evident that all the qualities that affect our senses are nothing but the minute and subtil particles or effluviums of bodies ; sent out from them , and lighting on those most tender and sensible receivers , and affecting them agreeably or disagreebly to the nature of the subjects . and the same may be said of the ideas lodg'd in the fancy or imaginative power it self . nor will this be hard to conceive if we reflect attentively , how quantitative particles may be still less and less , almost infinitely . corol. iii. nor will it hence follow , that cartesians and aristotelians agree in the main about the explication of nature , in regard they do both of them hold , that there is nothing but the matter or substance thus or thus modify'd . for , the aristotelians give an account of there minima naturalia ; they make them mixt bodies ; they reduce them to their first or original mixture ; and shew the intrinsecal temperature or constitution of their subject , or the inform'd matter of which they consist , from the conjunction of the highest and most known notions in nature , viz. of that matter and quantity diversly proportion'd ; whence arise the natures of rarity and density in the first species of bodies . none of which the cartesians do ; nor can they by their principles reach the explication of their first matter , or render any tolerable account of it ; whether it is dense or rare , hard or soft , &c. as will be more amply demonstrated in the appendix . . nothing more obstructs the way to natural science than the doctrin of vulgar philosophers , that qualities are certain kinds of little entities , which of themselves have a diminutive sort of being , and are able to produce such and such effects . for example , ask them how a bell works that effect upon my ear which we call sound ; they 'll tell you there is a quality in the bell call'd sonoreity , whose nature it is to make a sound . ask how a green thing makes such a pleasing impression on my eye ; they 'll answer , there is a certain quality in it call'd greenness , whose nature 't is to work such an effect ; and so of the rest . which ridiculous method explicates nothing , but makes the silliest old wife as good a philosopher as the most learned naturalist , if she can but name the word that signifies that quality . next , it makes learners rest easily contented , and well appay'd with a meer word ; whence they will grow negligent and careless to take pains to look into the natures of the things ; or else ( if they have any wit in them , ) to despair of all knowledge of nature , by seeing their masters so profoundly ignorant , and so superficially learned . and lastly , it hinders learners from seeing , or even endeavouring to see , the natural proportion and alliance between proper causes and their effects ; and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole administration of nature , and all consequence of one thing from another , which renders all natural science precarious . for , 't is not science , unless we use our own eyes , and see the point demonstrated . jurare in verba — is ( in such cases ) the fool 's oath ; and is , in plain terms , to swear the devoting or giving up our reason to a slothful contentedness never to grow wiser . lesson vii . of the common head of relation . . the notion of relation being what one individual thing is , if compar'd to another , there must be some real ground of it in the thing referr'd , which is the reason of our referring it , and by which formally we do thus refer it : for otherwise relation would be a chimerical and fictitious notion ; and not a real or natural one , common to all mankind , and held by them to be such ; which yet we experience , by our daily converse with them , it is . . this ground cannot be their having disparate or disagreeing notions in them , or their being of disparate orders , which have nothing to do with one another : for , we find that we cannot refer or compare green and hard , youthful and transparent , hot and triangular , nor any other disparate notions ; nor yet a writer and a plough-share , a father and a mill-stone , a brother and a handsaw , &c. because they are in disparate orders , and have no respect to one another , grounding our referring them or comparing them together , as have a writer and a writing , a father and a son , a baker and bread , &c. . wherefore the ground of relation must either be some notion agreeing to both the things related , that is , found to belong to both , either intrinsecally or extrinsecally , or else their having communication with one another by way of natural action and passion . this is prov'd by the former section , and is evident , because there can be no other considerations by which they can be order'd to one another , or be of the same order , but their having some intrinsecal notion common to both , or else their acting and suffering upon and from one another , which is an extrinsecal consideration . . relations of the first sort , which have one and the same notion in them , are of as many kinds as there are heads of notions , since all these have a kind of nature or notion in them , and so some kind of transcendent unity . thus , if they have the same nature or essence in them which belongs to the common head of substance , the relation between them is call'd identity , which is their being of one and the same kind of entity . if of one and the same notion of quantity , 't is call'd equality , which is their being of one and the same quantity : if of quality , 't is call'd likeness : if of action , ( singly consider'd ) they are call'd co-actors , as fellow-souldiers , fellow-servants , &c. if of passion ( singly consider'd ) fellow-sufferers , fellow-martyrs , &c. if of place , ( or vbi ) bed-fellows , chamber-fellows , townsmen , country-men , &c. if of time , contemporaries , co-eve , or born at the same time . if of habit , fellow-mourners , fellow-curassiers , fellow-souldiers of the blew or grey regiment . if of situation , fellow-assessors or sitters ; tho' such as this seldom occur . nay there may be a relation grounded on having the same notion even of relation in them ; as parents or fellow-begetters . . of the second sort grounded on action and passion , not singly consider'd , but with an order to one another , or as inferring one another , are such as these , viz. father and son , master and servant , prince and subject , tutor and pupil ; which are grounded on the actions and passions of begetting and being begotten , commanding and being commanded , governing and being governed , teaching and being taught , &c. . in both these sorts of relations the things referr'd must have their correlates ; that is , there must be a mutual relation on both sides . in the former of them , because there is the selfsame ground or reason of referring in one as in the other , viz. that one same notion , common or belonging to both , to wit , the same essence , same quantity , same quality , same relation , same place , same time , same sort of action and passion , same situation , and the same habit. . this agreeing and corresponding of the two things thus related in those of the former kind of relation , must be meant to be their agreeing in the same abstracted and common or specifical notion , and not in the same individual one . for , otherwise two men could not have identity in their individual essence , since then they would be the same and not the same , that is , vnum and non-unum : and , for the same reason , intrinsecal accidents being identify'd with the subjects in which they inhere , and having no entity but theirs , they can have no individuality but by them , and so the same individual intrinsecal accident cannot be common to two subjects or substances , but must be individually two , as they are . whence the relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in species or kind , and not individually . which reason holds equally for those relations that are grounded on action , passion , and situation , and the rest : for , two things cannot be in one individual place ( that is , in a place capable to hold but one individual thing ) without penetration of bodies : nor is it possible , in the course of natural causes , that two should be born or dye at the same precise time , that is , in such a portion of time as is terminated by the same instants : nor can two wear the same individual arms , &c. at once . wherefore it must be meant , that the notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical notion , and not the individual . . the relations of the later sort became mutual upon another score , viz. because action and its proper passion corresponding to it , do infer one another ; for , nothing can act , but it must act upon something that receives that action , or suffers by it ; nor suffer or be acted upon , but by something that acts on it . . there is a third mix'd sort of relation , call'd , of the thing measured to the measure ; that is , when the thing related depends for its essence or its perfection , on another , and that other does not at all depend for either on it . for example , when a picture is drawn from the prototype , it depends on the prototype for its perfection , and is , as it were , measur'd by it , in regard 't is only so far good or bad as it resembles the man it was drawn for ; but the prototype or the man , gets nothing , nor is in the least better or worse , by having a picture drawn from him . again , there is a common notion of lineaments and colour found in both , which makes it seem to partake of the first sort of relation ; also the prototype , by imprinting an idea of it self in the painter , enables him in some sort to draw him , and so contributes something to that action which gives it to partake of the second kind : so that this kind of relation seems to be mixt of the other two , and yet ( as will be shown ) is perfectly of neither . . this kind of relation is not mutual , but is found only on the side of the thing measured : for , since the measure ( v. g. the prototype ) has no natural order of agency or patiency by which it respects the picture , because the man is not a thing naturally ordain'd to work upon the fancy of the painter so to render him , a perfect efficient cause of the picture , as fire is ordain'd to heat , a master to command , &c. nor is there a true vnity of form , to wit , of colour and figure , in both , but only some counterfeit resemblance of them ; whence we cannot , without speaking nonsense , say , the man is like his picture , as we can that the picture is like the man , or that two white walls are like one another ; nor ( as was said ) does the man receive any degree of perfection or imperfection by being pictur'd ; it follows , that there is no ground or reason on the man's side to make him related to his picture ; wherefore he has no real relation to it at all , but only a verbal one , consisting in the grammatical chiming of the word pictured to ●●●ure . . of this sort are the relations between all our powers , whether corporeal or intellectual , to their objects ; for the very essence and nature of those powers is to see , hear , or understand the objects : and the perfections of the powers in their several kinds , are measured and rated by their doing this better or worse ; whereas the objects are never the better by being seen , heard , or known . wherefore there wants on those objects side a real ground , and therefore a real relation to our powers ; however , the words seer and seen , knower and known , do answer one another , as if they were proper agents and patients , and order'd mutually to each other . . of this sort too is the relation between god , as creator , and his creatures . for , seeing the creature has received all it has , or can have , from its creator ; that is , has to be an ens , and not a meer nothing from the essential ideas it had from all eternity in the divine understanding ; and was put afterwards into actual being or existence , and is conserv'd in the same by his continual influence ; and has , besides all its accidental perfections and conveniences , by the course of causes , laid by his divine providence ( all which is demonstrated in metaphysicks ) : hence there is all the ground imaginable of a real relation on the creature 's part towards god. on the other side , since god gains no kind of perfection by making creatures , nor is intrinsecally better in the least by his creating them , there can be no ground at all of a real relation on god's side to the creature , but only a verbal sound of [ creator ] answering grammatically to creature , as creature does to creator . so important a thing it is in philosophy not to be deluded by articulate ayr , or meer characters , but to look deeply and attentively into the thing it self , and to guide our thoughts by what we find there , lest we come to frame mock-notions out of our fancy which nature never gave us . corol. i. hence follows , that all the expressions of the holy scripture of a pact or covenant between god and creatures , that , upon their behaving themselves thus and thus , he enters an obligation of doing thus or thus towards them ; the which do , consequently , put god and the creature upon the same rank of agency and patiency : it follows , i say , that such expressions are purely metaphorical , and far from proper or literally true ; but are spoken humano more , or in accommodation to our human actions and manners of proceeding . for , on god's side there is nothing but his infinit wisdom and goodness , carrying on supernatural good dispositions to conformable effects , as he does natural dispositions to effects suitable to the nature of such things . which rectitude of his will being essential to him , and consequently independent on creatures or their actions , had produc'd the same effects whether he had made any such covenant or no. and the same may be said proportionably of god's promising , threatening , commanding , requiring satisfaction , accepting the payment of it , and such-like ; which tho' metaphorical , are notwithstanding true , amount to the same , and induce the same effects , tho' in a more soveraign way , and more becoming god's infinit majesty , than the gross capacity of the generality of mankind ( for whose sake those low conceptions and expressions were us'd ) can apprehend . . there is yet another sort of mutual relations , which are partly artificial , partly natural ; such as are those of genus and species , antecedent and consequent , subject and predicate , premisses and conclusion , &c. these are partly natural , in regard our vnderstanding has its distinct nature or notion , as well as whiteness , action or any other ground of relation hitherto spoken of ; and these are grounded on the manner of the objects existing in our vnderstanding ; where they are as truly vniversal and particular , subject and predicate , &c. as the wall is white , or the quantity a yard , &c. and they are also partly artificial , because artists in logick , who reflect on the things as they are in our minds , do make use of such to clear their notions , predicate them of one another , and discourse of them exactly . . wherefore those logicians who call them relationes rationis , meaning to oppose them by that expression to real relations , seem to forget that the * understanding and its manner of working are real ; whereas they have more of entity , and consequently of reality , in them than bodies , and their powers or manners of working have ; and , consequently , those relations are far more real than those which are grounded on corporeal powers and their operations . . the substance ( as it were ) of relation consists in that immediate ground which is the reason of our referring one thing to another . for , 't is evident , that 't is the thing it self in my mind which is referr'd , and not the act of the mind referring it . for example ; two white things have vnity of form , or the same notion in them , which makes them really alike of themselves , were they in a comparing power , that could actually referr them and denominate them relatively as their nature requires ; so that it is not the act of my understanding which made the white walls really alike , but their own natures which are the object of my act ; by means notwithstanding of the comparative act of my understanding , which they inform'd , as a necessary condition to relate them actually , and without which they had each of them had but the absolute notion of white , and not the relative one of being alike . corol. ii. hence we have some light given us how there may be true and real relations in god , knowing and loving himself ; and , how they depend and not depend on our understanding . . the intrinsecal differences of relation being more and less , and our act adding nothing to the substance of the relation , they must be taken from the greater or lesser ground or reason why the thing is referr'd to another . hence our greatest relation is to god , because all the good we have or can have does entirely referr us to him . upon which therefore is founded all our religious respects , and our duties of serving , obeying and adoring him . next follows the relation of a husband to a wife , who is ( in some manner ) the same individual with himself . after them comes our relation to our parents , who concurr'd to our being , gave us education , and provided for our subsistence . then to mankind , to whom we are related by identity of nature ; to our country , our king , and other superiours , according to their several ranks ; to our kinsfolks , neighbours , &c. from which relations arise several duties in proportion to the more or less important reason or ground that makes them more or less nearer or remotely related to us . lesson viii . of the common heads of action and passion . . there are two , and but two , common heads of extrinsecals conceiv'd to be apply'd to one another by way of motion . for , since motion has two terms , viz. that thing from whence it comes , and that to which it reaches , and these are distinct considerations ; hence we have two common heads of one extrinsecal thing conceiv'd to be apply'd to another by way of motion . nor can there be more ; for motion , consider'd ( as it were ) in the midway between those terms , has no notion but that of meer motion ; whence it is the very notion of successive quantity , and belongs clearly to that common head , and therefore cannot belong to another , or constitute a new one . . the notion of motion is the most imperfect of all our notions , and most approaching to non-entity . for , since motion , as it superadds to the extensive quantity of its subject , is wholly made up of not being in this place , or that ; or , of not being still here and not being yet there ; nor has any thing of permanency , which is in a manner the same notion with actual being ; it follows , that , besides the common disadvantage other accidents are liable to , of having no entity of their own but what 's borrow'd of their subjects , it has moreover this , that neither it self , nor any part of it self , exists so much as for one moment . wherefore ens being a capacity of existence , motion seems to be ( in a manner ) incapable of existence , or a non-entity ; and this out of its own peculiar nature or notion . again , since in every part of motion the thing moved is in a space bigger than it self , and place ( as will be shewn * hereafter ) properly such , is but equal to the thing it contains , and not bigger than it , hence motion hinders its subject to be , properly speaking , in any place , that is any where , which amongst bodies seems next akin to not being at all . lastly , motion is destructive of actual being in those things that are arriv'd to their full state of perfection ; which shews its nature to be in some sense directly opposit to the notion of being , which has some kind of constancy and stability in it . nor can it be said that it gives actual being or existence to the new entities it helps to produce , for existence † is the proper effect of self-existence or the first cause . wherefore the notion of motion is the most imperfect of all our notions , and most approaching to non-entity . corol. i. hence is demonstrated that , since every agent produces an effect suitable to its own nature , and therefore an agent infinitely perfect cannot be the immediate cause of what 's most imperfect ; therefore motion , being both most imperfect , and withal most disagreeable , nay , directly contrary , to god's nature , which is pure self-existence and essentially immovable and vnchangable , was not immediately caus'd by god , but by * some imperfect agent , or some creature , that is , by such a cause as of it self is a non-entity . . the notion of action , as it superadds to meer motion is , the exercise of a power , which is effective of something . for , since to act is to do , and to do nothing is not to do , it follows , that to act is to do something ; but to do something presupposes a power to do it ; and this so as not to stay in the notion of meer power ; for , if it stays there , it only denominates the thing able to do , which ( again ) is not to do ; wherefore action is not the notion of a sluggish power , but of a power exerted and exercis'd , that is , effecting something ; whence the power is call'd effective , the action efficiency , and the something it does is term'd an effect . all which superadd to the notion of meer motion . . the primary and chief natural action is division . for , since substance is the subject of all accidents ; and , which being changed , all the accidents do suffer a change with it ; hence that action that works upon a body according to the substantial notion of it , has more of action in it , as working a greater effect : but division makes two things of one , and so destroys the former vnum or ens , and makes two new ones , therefore division is the primary and chief of all other natural actions . note , that this is to be understood of perfect division , which makes the thing divided , and is therefore only properly to be call'd division ; for , imperfect division only alters the figure . it may be objected , that rarefaction and condensation , if they be in a great degree , change the substance as well as division does . answ. this arises out of the nature of some particular sort of bodies , and not out of the precise notion of those actions : for , 't is evident that rarefaction and condensation import no more in their notion but the altering the subject according to some quality ; whereas division imports directly the taking away the vnity of the thing , and consequently its entity . again , meer rarefaction does not change the substance , but the degree of it , when it comes to great height ; and every body admits rarefaction a long time without losing its former essence ; whereas division consists in an indivisible , so that the divisum esse is esse aliud , or esse duo ex uno ; whereas the rarefactum esse may be without any such effect following it . . rarefaction and condensation are the next actions in dignity : for , since ( as was proved above ) rarity and density are the first intrinsecal differences of quantity , as it affects body ( in order to natural action and passion , it follows , that those natural actions that cause rarity or density , are the next in dignity to division , which works more upon divisibility their genus . . these three sorts of action take up the whole head of natural action . for , since the genus and its two differences must needs comprehend all under any common head , as being adequate to it , and division answers to divisibility , the genus , and rarefaction , and condensation to the intrinsecal differences of more or less thus divisible ; it follows , that these three sorts of action do take up all that head , so that there cannot be any kind of natural action , which is not reducible to some of these , or not comprehended under them . besides , all the first and second passible qualities , which generally are the immediate objects of natural actions , are comprehended in , or spring out of , rarity and density ; as will be seen in physicks . . the formal virtue of acting , or working any effect , which we call its causality , is the agent 's being what it is , or its very existence apply'd by motion to the patient , and communicated to it , or ( as it were ) imprinted on it . for , since no particular agent in nature can do every thing whatever , the reason why such particular causes work such particular effects must spring hence , that the effect has something in its nature that is like the cause , comes from it , and is communicated to the patient , or partak'd by it . whence come those vulgar axioms , operari sequitur esse , every thing acts as it is ; an effect is a participation of the immediate ca●se , &c. thus the cause or reason why water moistens , is because it is moist in it self , and imparts that quality to another thing . the reason why a seal makes such an impression , is ; because it self is of such a stamp . the reason why god creates , or is the cause of being , is , because being is essential to him . corol. ii. hence motion is only requisit to apply the virtue or existence of the agent to the matter or patient ; but the substance of the effect springs from the cause's being what it is : whence it happens , that the effect from the same causes is more or less perfect , according as the existence of a cause which is of such a nature or essence , or more or fewer parts of it , are apply'd better or worse to the patient , or to more or fewer parts of it , by a feebler or smarter motion . . it follows from this discourse that there must be four sorts of causes necessarily belonging to every effect in nature , viz. there must be an acter which we call the efficient cause ; a subject for the acter to work upon , called the material cause . the effect wrought in that matter or receiv'd in it , which makes it otherwise than it was before , and therefore has the notion of some form newly accruing to it ; which constitutes the formal cause . and , since corporeal action is motion , and no body can move it self , and therefore all motion in nature must be caus'd ( either mediately or immediately ) by something that is not a body , that is , by a spiritual or intelligent being : and such agents do design or act for an end ; therefore , there must also be a final cause to make those agents to move bodies , and make them act as they do in every particular action tho' never so minute ; which grounds our notion of providence adequately governing the world even as to the least circumstance of it . wherefore , there are to every action in nature four causes necessarily requisit ; which will afford reflecters ample occasion for speculation and contemplation . for example , when i write a letter , the efficient cause is my self ; the material cause , paper , which receives the effect of my writing ; the formal cause , the characters received in the paper ; the final cause , to gratify my friend , treat of business , or acquaint him with news . . there is no fifth cause call'd an idea , as plato affirms . for , either that idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and receiv'd there , and then 't is clearly a formal cause : or , as 't is in the mind of the artificer ; and then it concurrs to make him an efficient cause ; for without such an idea he could not produce such an artificial effect . . operation has not the same notion with action , but is indifferent to action and passion , or rather a kind of neutral notion made up of both . for example , notions or simple apprehensions are said to be the first operation of our understanding , tho' the soul in having them is purely passive . so also my acts of discoursing , willing &c. are call'd operations , tho' they be both perform'd by my soul and receiv'd in it ; whence they have a kind of neutral notion , such as have curro , ardeo , and such-like , taking such words not in a grammatical , but in a philosophical and natural sense . of which kind are all immanent actions or acts ; and , therefore , these are not so properly call'd actions , as operations , in order to what they have of effective in them ; or else acts , because they actuate or inform the subject in which they are as well received , as they are produced by it . whence action , in the proper and obvious sense , signifies the efficience of a natural cause ; which has a transitive notion , and inferrs passion ; and , consequently , some effect in the extrinsecal subject it lights on . note , that since action inferrs passion , and referrs to it , hence whatever is discoursed here of action , may , by turning the tables ( as it were ) or considering motion in order to its other term , be understood likewise of passion ; for which reason we treat of both those heads in the same discourse . lesson ix . of the common head of ubi or where . . ubi or where signifying [ in what place ] the notion of place , must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right notion of the common head call'd ubi . and the word [ place ] being no artificial term but a natural one , and us'd by all mankind , we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the users of it ; that is , we must take the notion of place , not from men of art or speculaters , but from the vulgar ; and the surest way to do this , is to gather their sense by reflecting on their sayings and known intentions . . since then the vulgar agree naturally to say a thing is in a place ; the notion of place is to be a container of the thing that is in it ; and , withal , such a container as is not intrinsecal to the thing of which 't is enquir'd where it is , but extrinsecal to it ; for it would be very odd and dissatisfactory , and look like a jest , if when we are ask'd , where such a man is ? we should answer , he is in his skin . whence , pursuing these natural apprehensions of theirs exactly , we shall find , that the proper place of any body must be another body that is immediate and equal to it ; for were it distant from it , and so , vnequal to it , or too wide for it , then ( since there is no vacuum ) that too-large container would be a common place to other bodies as well as it , and so would not be its proper place , ( which was the question that was ask'd ) since it would be no more its place than that others , but a common place to both ; which , therefore , would be no competent answer to the question where it was ? whence , by reflexion , we shall discover , that place , in proper and exact speech , is the ambient superficies of the next body ; for , this is immediate , and therefore equal to it , because an indivisible ( such as the superficies is in respect to body ) can add no quantity to it or make the container vnequal to the thing contained . but 't is to be observed , that the vulgar , whose only aym it is to find a thing by asking for its place , do not reflect oftentimes upon their own notion , or as it were refine it to an exactness , but content themselves to know near what visible thing that which they look for is placed ; as on the cup-board , behind the door , under the beds-feet , &c. which is a slubberd or imperfect notion of place , even according to their own sayings ; for these do put the thing sought for to be in that place , whereas perhaps many other things are on the cup-board , or near the bed's feet , as well as the thing sought for . . again , since the intention of mankind in asking where a thing is ? can be no other but to know how to find it , it follows that place must be certainly knowable , that is , such as does not it self need seeking for . nor could it be such if it were still subject to be remov'd ; for then we should be at a loss both to find it and other things by it : and our selves would be at the same plunge as are those that practise the art of memory ; who , being to range the things they would remember in ●et places their fancy had design'd , do affix them to stools , chairs , brooms , and such like ; which being taken away and remov'd , they have lost the memory of the thing their fancy had placed there ; wherefore place must have as much immobility as may serve for our finding a thing , so that our enquiry where , or in what place the thing is , be not defeated ; and no more is requisit . all farther immobility being nothing to the purpose mankind intended , and therefore was no part of their notion of place . . wherefore , there is no necessity of having recourse to imaginary space or subsistent dimensions , to find something which is immoveable absolutely , which some do upon this account , because all things in nature are subject to motion . for , we experience , that we can find any thing that we can have necessity to use or know well enough without recurring thither . besides , place must be more knowable then the thing we look for ; whereas , these imaginary vbies are not distinguishable or knowable at all . so that such wild conceits as these are extravagant even to madness . we have prov'd vacuum to be purely nothing , and consequently vnknowable ; and , therefore , to be in a vacuum is to be in no place or no where . and , as for subsistent dimensions , 't is a plain contradiction upon another score ; because it puts quantity to be substance , and capable of subsisting alone or without a subject . . 't is not much less ridiculous to invent little entities call'd vbies for bodies , or for spirits ( which are incapable of being in place ) of which we can give no account . for , since the surface of the containing body , in a determinate distance from some parts of the house , the town , the country , or the world , which to our apprehension are fixt , answers all questions that can be proposed about the place of a thing , and we can be furnisht with this by our natural notions ; it follows , that all other far-fetcht conceits , invented to explicate place , are needless and sensless . such strange extravagancies capering wits are apt to fall into , when they relinquish nature and the solid notions she imprints in them , to follow meer fancy , the mint of a thousand ungrounded capricio's and chimera's . . examples of vbi may be such as this . quest. where , or in what place , lives dr. h. ? answ. in kings-street . q. where is that kings-street ? a. in high holborn . q. where is holborn ? a. at the west end of london . q. where is london ? a. about the middle of england . q. where is england ? a. in such a part of europe . q. where is europe ? a. in the northwest part of the earth . and , farther than this ( or rather not so far ) none of the generality of mankind can have occasion to enquire ; tho' perhaps artists , or geographers and astronomers , may ; nor needs there any more immobility to be ascertain'd , to find out where that skilful doctor lives , since this may serve our purpose of finding him . and we may do this easily , ( let the whole earth move round never so swiftly ) by getting an answer to some of these questions , without the help of imaginary space , subsistent dimensions , or those little entities call'd vbies , which no mortal man's eyes ever saw , or any man of sense could ever understand . corol. i. hence it is a contradiction to say the world is in place , since it contains all space , and , consequently , all place in its self , and therefore is contain'd by none ; which ( as was shewn ) is requisit to the notion of being in place ; nor is there any necessity or sense it should ; unless we should fancy that some ultra-mundane traveller bewilder'd in imaginary space , should be put to it to ask some of the chimera's there , which is the way to the world ? corol. ii. hence is seen , that the concave superficies of a body , consider'd as affecting its own subject , is in the head of quantity ; but , as containing another body , and connotating a respect to some other things , so fixt and known , that by knowing them and it , we may know where the thing contain'd is ; it constitutes the common head of vbi , and consequently of place . corol. iii. 't is seen also that angels are not properly in place , nor consequently have properly any vbi ; since they have nothing in them which can have any commensuration to a superficies , or be contain'd within it . wherefore their being in place can only be understood of their working upon bodies which are in place . . from what is said it will appear , that the true and proper notion of ubi is not place it self , but the being in such or such a place ; that is , it consists formally in the application of one extrinsecal thing to another , in rest ; viz. of the body contain'd to the superficies of the body containing , with a connotation of the respects above-mentioned . yet , because to be in a place includes place in its notion , it was proper and necessary to treat of it under this head , seeing it belong'd to it formally , and to quantity only materially . lesson x. of the common head of quando or when. . there is some motion that is even and regular , at least to our apprehension ; and withal knowable to all mankind . for , every man sees that the sun moves ( at least it appears so to us ) and if there be any irregularity or unevenness in its motion , yet it is to us undiscernable . . therefore this regular and known motion is fit to be a measure to all our other motions . for , since there are but three things requisit to compleat the notion of a measure , viz. that it be apt to bear a proportion to the thing measured , and to be compar'd to it , which all motions have from being quantities of the same kind , viz. being successive quantity ; and that its quantity be more known than the quantity of the thing measured ; and , lastly , that it be fix'd or constantly the same , that so it may be a standard to the others ; and , since the motion of the sun has both these last properties , as well as it has the first from its being of the same kind of quantity with other motions , therefore this proportionable , known , and even motion of the sun is every way fit to be a measure to all our less known and less regular motions ; which kind of measure we call time. . hence motion may be consider'd three several ways , and thence ground three several notions : one , as it respects the parts into which it is divisible , and its peculiar manner of having no two parts at once ; the former of which gives it the notion of quantity , the latter to be of that species of quantity call'd successive . next , it may be consider'd as it respects the two terms or things , viz. that from which it begins , and that on which it lights and where it ends its career ; which considerations of motion ground action and passion : and , lastly , it may be consider'd as bearing a proportion to other motions , and as having such other properties as fit it to measure them ; and motion , as conceiv'd to be furnish'd with these requisites to measure all others , is that which we properly call time. . the notion of time is a natural notion , and common to all mankind . this is evident ; for all mankind , the rudest as well as the most learned , ( as we find by their expressions ) has that notion , must need it , and does use it . . tho' the notion of time be clearly grounded in nature , yet it needs some help of the understanding to make it compleatly and actually a measure : for , when i write an hour ( for example ) that motion of writing was really perform'd while the sun did run the four and twentieth part of his diurnal course ; and so , that motion of my pen was in reality proportion'd to such a part of time. on the other side , since every particular measure bears in its notion to be determinately thus much , and there is no determination in nature of any part of the sun's motion , nor any part of it at once , and only my understanding divides its annual and diurnal motion into so many proportionate and determinate parts ; and ( tho' the motion it self be perpetually fleeting ) yet it resumes so much of it into one determinate and constant notion ( viz. of an hour ) without which determination it could not actually be a measure ; therefore , tho' the notion of time be clearly grounded in nature , yet it needs some help of the understanding to make it compleatly and actually a measure . . the notion of time depends on our understanding in the same manner that relati●n did : for , the ground , reason , and substance of times being a measure , is found in nature ; and yet the otherwise-indeterminate parts of the sun's motion must be made determinate by our comprizing so much of them at once into one notion , and then considering them as proportion'd , that is , by our referring or comparing them to other motions , e're they can be actually a measure . . hence may be collected , that the true and genuin notion of the common head of quando or when , is not the meer precise notion of time it self , but of being in such a determinate part of time ; that is , its notion consists in the application of the extrinsecal motion of the sun to sublunary ( or perhaps in artists who reach further ) to subsolary or supersolary motions ; and the answer to quando tells us to what part of time they belong , or are conceiv'd to be apply'd . for example , these expressions ; i writ yesterday , i will come to morrow , i will speak with you within an hour , and such-like , do apply our past , present , or future actions to some different part of time. yet , because their being perform'd in such a time includes time in its notion ; and that time , tho' it be materially successive quantity , yet taking it formally , 't is not consider'd in order to its own subject , of which it is an intrinsecal accident , but in order to another ; it was necessary to treat of it under this head ; since taken thus formally it can belong to this , and cannot to any other . corol. i. hence 't is a meer chimera , and as sensless as that of imaginary space to fancy time before or after the world. for , it is in direct terms to put motion and time to be when they are not , which is , to put it to be and not be at once . corol. ii. for the same reason meer being , without order to motion , has nothing to do with time , nor can be said to be in it , or subject to it , or measurable by it . for being , precisely as such , has no parts by which it may be proportion'd to the sun's motion , or commensurable to it : wherefore , to fancy god's eternity ( which consists in the most absolute impossibility of his not-being ) to be commensurate to an infinit flux of time , is a groundless and sensless imagination . tho' his never-altering being does , even for its being such , eminently include all possible time and all differences of time , past , present , and future , and this concenter'd in it all at once . corol. iii. for the like reason the internal operations of spirits being indivisible and instantaneous , can have no commensuration to the motion of the sun , or to time ; tho' their external operation upon bodies may ; correspondently to what is said before of their being in place . . the questions of quando , and their proper answers , are such as these ; when was christ born ? ans. years ago . when will there be a leap-year ? ans. this year . when did mustapha the turkish emperor begin his reign ? ans. the last year . . the differences of quando are past , present and future . tho' the present is not in reality , it being an instant and indivisible ; yet , since our understanding can comprise such a portion of time into one notion , and consider it , and conceive it , and thence speak of it by a participle of the present tense , and as one entire part of time , and say 't is running , till as much as we had fram'd a notion of were run out or ended ; hence we can truly say , something is doing this present age , year , month , day and hour , nay , this very moment , taking moment for some short indeterminate part of time. . the differences of past and future are more and less distant from the present prefix'd time ; for past signifies before it , future , after it . inferiour differences also must be taken from some determinate point , ( as it were ) as , from the creation , the first olympiad , the birth of our saviour , &c. note , that it is very nicely to be remark'd , that when questions are ask'd , by how much or how little of time ? the answer belongs to the predicament of successive quantity ; whence an age , a year , a month , &c. are quantitative notions , divided by more and less of successive quantity or motion , and constituted by them ; and only what answers precisely to when , belongs to this predicament of quando . thus , if we ask how long time it is since the invasion of william the conqueror ; the answer is , six hundred and thirty years ; which is a quantitative notion consisting of both continu'd and discrete quantity . but if you ask , when was the first olympiad ? the answer will be , in the three thousandth two hundredth twenty eighth year from the creation ; and so it will belong to this head ; for then it formally signifies , that the motion or action of the games in the first olympiad were celebrated while such a part of the sun's motion was passing . the predicaments of situation and habit are of little use , therefore not worth the dilating on them . lesson xi . of the expression of our notions by words . . notions being ( as was said ) the meanings of words , it comes next to be examin'd , what advantage or disadvantage may accrue to science , by the expressing our notions by words , either distinctly or confusedly . if the word have but one sense or signification , either taken alone or as apply'd to other notions , 't is said to be vnivocal , or to be spoken vnivocally of them ; because vex or word differing from meer sound in this , that a voice is apt to express our inward sense , mind , or notion , so that sense seems to be the form or soul of a word , and sound only the material part or ( as it were ) the body of it : hence a word is said to be vnivocal , when it has but one sence or meaning , and equivocal when it has or may have more . . since , as * was prov'd above , notions are the natures of the things in our understanding , and so can have no falsity , in regard they have their metaphysical verity ; that is , they are what they are , and cannot be other than they are ; nor can they have formal falsity , for this consists in the compounding two notions together by affirming or denying , neither of which is found in notions or simple apprehensions , which are not thus compounded ; hence no error can possibly proceed from the notions , but all truth ; wherefore , were all words vnivocal , and had but one notion or meaning , there could be no more possibility of error from words than there could be from the notions themselves , which are signified by those words . wherefore , on the contrary , if words be equivocal , that is , ambiguous , or liable to be taken in a double meaning , or ( which is the same ) to signifie diverse notions , and it happen that some of the persons that use them do take them in one sense , others in another , they must necessarily speak and discourse of different things , and , so fall into different sentiments , and contradict one another . . hence , supposing the persons be sincere , and that there be no fault in their will , most of the contests and wranglings in the world do arise from the equivocal meaning of words : for , since the use of words is common to all mankind , and most single words are equivocal , and the contexture of them , or the whole clause , may also be oftentimes taken in a different sense ; hence , unless the double sense of the words be clear'd and distinguish'd , innumerable and endless contests must necessarily happen from the equivocal meaning of those words . . written words are far more liable to those inconveniencies than words spoken , especially if the authors of those written words be dead , and no certain way of interpreting them be agreed on by all parties . for , if an equivocation happen in words spoken , the speaker , if alive , may easily come to see he is misunderstood , and by a pertinent distinction shewing the double sense of the word , and in which of the senses he means it , may come to a right understanding with his opposit ; which is impossible in written words , when the author is dead , and there is no certain way of interpreting those words agreed on ; as it happens in the followers of aristotle or any other dead authors . corol. i. this method or way of interpreting such words must either be evident of it self , or made evident by proof ; and it must , besides , be agreed by both the contending parties . evident , because it is a kind of principle to find out the true sence of the author . and it must be agreed on ; for otherwise the principle not been yielded to , all contests which depend upon that principle must remain vndecided , and end ( if they ever do so ) in a meer logomachy or word-skirmish . . for the same reason , even the same person , if he be deluded by the ambiguous sound of a word , and , thro' inadvertence or want of skill to keep his thoughts steady , happen to take it now in one sense , now in another , must necessarily blunder in his discourse , and speak incoherently . for , since the true notion of the thing does ground all our knowledge of it , and all our discourses concerning it ; it follows , that he who proceeds now upon one notion , then upon another , must needs vary and hobble in his discourse , and talk incoherently ; having no certain and fixt notion affording him light to guide his steps to the same end , or take the right way to it . . the meaning of those words that express natural notions is to be taken from the vulgar ; and the sense of artificial words from men who are learned in those respective arts : for , the signification of words can only be taken from the authors and users of them ; which in the former sort of words is the vulgar ; in the later , men of art. . hence criticisms , generally speaking , are incompetent to give us the certain sense of words . for , criticks do very frequently ground the sense of words upon etymologies , or the derivation of them from other words : or else , on the sense in which some few learned writers do take them ; both which are fallacious rules to know their sense certainly . the former , because the reason why the word was impos'd , and the sense it self of those words are many times different notions : for example , a stone ( as some of them tell us ) is in latin nam'd lapis , a laedend● pedes ; but the notion or signification of that word is the very substance it self of such a body . nor is the latter rule competent to give us the true meanings of those words that express natural notions ; first , because those learned men use to speak learnedly or rhetorically with tropes and figures , and affect to deliver their thoughts neatly and finely , with quaint phrases , allusions , metaphors , and other knacks of language ; all which are so many deviations from the natural manner of expression common to all mankind , and , consequently , unsuitable to our natural conceptions . besides that , a few authors suffice the criticks to build their observations upon ; all which falls infinitely short of that certainty and plainness which the common and constant vse of the generality of mankind , or the vulgar , affords us . . equivocal words are either simply and absolutely such , which we call equivocal by chance ; or relatively , which we call equivocal by design . absolutely , when there is no kind of reason or ground why the same word should have two different senses ; as when [ far ] in english signifies a great way ; in latin , bread-corn ; or any word in one language happens meerly casually to have a different signification in another . in which sort of equivocation there can be no danger to science , those two senses of the word being so vastly disparate : relatively , when there is some kind of ground why the same word should be transferr'd from one notion to another . and this may be done for two different reasons . one , when it is referr'd to another for some connexion with them as cause and effect ; as , when the word [ healthful ] which properly belongs to an animal , is ; transferr'd to meat , because it is the cause of health in the animal ; and to vrine , because it is an effect of its health , and therefore a natural sign of it . or , as when we say there is much art in such a picture or poem , it means the effect of art ; for art in proper speech is to be found only in the understanding of the artificer . the other reason of the words being transferr'd from one to another , and consequently , referr'd back to it again , is , when this is done for some proportion or resemblance between them : as , when we say of a good governour , that he is the pilot of the common-wealth , to steer it into a safe harbour , and preserve it from splitting upon the rocks of division . where the word [ pilot ] which in the first and proper meaning signifies a director of a ship , is transferr'd to a governor , because he does the same in proportion in a common-wealth which the other does in a ship. thus tranquility , which is properly said of the sea in a calm , is transferr'd to a state or kingdom , because its peaceable condition resembles or bears a kind of proportion to the undisturb'd quiet found in a calm sea. . words transferr'd to another for some proportion or resemblance between them are call'd metaphors , or metaphorical ; and the best metaphors are , when the thing , from which 't is transferr'd , is eminent under that notion we intend to express . as when we call a valiant man a lyon , and a meek man a lamb ; because courage and mildness are eminent in those animals . a continu'd metaphor is call'd an allegory . as , in the example lately given , the word pilot , steer , harbour , splitting and rocks , are all metaphors , and therefore the whole speech is allegorical . . there is no danger nor detriment to science that such words are us'd in common speech , or loose rhetorical discourses ; but they are exceedingly pernicious to it when we are treating of dogmatical tenets , and searching for truth out of the words of written authors . for , since those metaphors , however they be true while understood to be meant in proportion and resemblance onely , yet are literally tals ; and in delivering doctrines or dogmatical tenets only litteral truth is aim'd at ; and , if the reader happen to take a metaphorical expression for a literal one , he will most certainly embrace an errour for a truth ; or , if he takes a word literally meant for a metaphor , he will take a truth for an errour ; hence , it must needs be most pernicious to science not to distinguish between the metaphorical and literal sense of the words , but mistake one for the other . and , therefore , unless some certain rule be establisht , by which we may be ascertain'd when written words are to be taken literally , when metaphorically , 't is impossible to be certain of any truth meerly by those written words . . those words which are transferr'd from corporeal to spiritual natures are , by far , more highly metaphorical than can be any transferr'd from one body to another ; and therefore , the misunderstanding them must needs be very destructive to science : for , since corporeal and spiritual are the first species of ens , and the division of that genus into those species is made by the contradictory differences of divisible and indivisible ; it follows demonstratively , that whatever , except the precise notion of ens , is properly affirm'd of body must be properly deny'd of spirit : and therefore the words transferr'd from bodies to spirits which are in different lines are far more improper than those which are tranferr'd from one body to another ; they being in the same line , and so less disparate . corol. ii. hence is confirm'd the former doc●rine that spirits are not in place ; nor are them●elves , or their spiritual actions , subject to time ●r commensurable to it , &c. since all these may ●roperly be said of bodies ; and therefore must ●roperly be deny'd of spirits . corol. iii. from the two last sections it fol●ows evidently that no dogmatical tenet can be ●rov'd from books that treat of spiritual natures , ●r of such considerations as belong to them , unless ●ome certain rule be first establisht by which the reader may know when the words are to be taken ●iterally , when metaphorically in this or that place ; ●nce a mistake in this may make the reader em●race a falshood for a truth , or a truth for a fals●ood in matters of greatest importance . for ex●mple , this proportion , [ god is mov'd by our pray●rs ] is literally false ; for to be moved is to be chang'd , and god is esse●tially unchangeable . wherefore , it is only true in a metaphorical ●ence ; and the word [ moved ] is a metaphor of the last sort , viz. of words transferr'd to ano●her for some proportion or resemblance between them ; and , so , the true sense is this ; god , tho' unmov'd in himself , yet acts in the same manner towards him that prays to him , as a good man here ( who is properly mov'd ) would act towards one that petitions him . corol. iv. hence also is demonstrated that all the names and words we can use when we speak of the divine nature and its attributes , are in the highest manner metaphorical and improper . for , since we can no other wise name or speak of a thing but as we conceive it , and all our conceptions are notions taken from natural objects , and onely said of them with propriety ; and no otherwise said of created spirits but onely metaphorically ; and that god's infinite perfections do far more excel created spirits , than those spirits do bodies ; it follows that all the names and words we can make use of to speak of the divine nature and its attributes , are in the highest manner metaphorical and improper : as may be farther shewn in metaphysicks . . the word ens , as apply'd to substantial and accidental notions is of the former sort of equivocal words , and analogically spoken of them ; that is , first and properly , of substance ; and secondarily or improperly of accidents . for , since ( as was shewn above ) ens signifies capable of being , and none of the accidents is of itself capable of being , but onely comes to have some title to existence by the substance , from whose being they have entirely all the being they have , and that its being : it follows that the word ens must be analogically said of them ; that is , properly of substance , and improperly of accidents . . since it appears , from what is said hitherto , that the equivocation of words is most highly prejudicial to science , it is one necessary part of of the method to science to detect the snares it lays in the way of our discourse , that we may avoid them . and this may be done . . first , by observing the explication we make of the word that is apply'd to different notions , that so we may know which is the proper signification of it . for , by doing this we shall certainly find that the less proper notion , when the word is explicated , will still include the notion of the proper one , and bear up to it . as if we would explicate the word strong as 't is spoken of ale or wine , we shall be forced to say ( if we be put to express our selves literally , and tell what it means ) that as he is call'd a strong man , who is able to overthrow his enemy , so we call wine or beer strong when it is able to overpower our brain . or , if we call a man hard-hearted , it would be explicated thus , that his humour is as hard and inflexible , considering the temper of a rational creature which ought to be mov'd by reason , as hard things , which are very difficult to bend , are among natural bodies ; for which reason they sometimes call such men [ stony-hearted ] or [ iron-hearted ] ; in both which we see that [ strength ] is properly in man , and hardness in such bodies as stone or iron , and improperly in wine or the heart . and the same may be observ'd in the word [ pilot ] apply'd to a governour ; in [ moved ] apply'd to god ; in [ healthful ] to meat or urine . thus the word [ religious honour , worship or respect ] is first and properly apprehended as belonging or due to god , the sole end and author of all religion , and analogically or improperly to holy persons , either on earth or in heaven , as his servants ; and to sacred books , pictures , and churches , as either causing , exciting , increasing or belonging to the religious honour due properly to him alone . whence religious honour given to any other things cannot be explicated , but in reference to god , the only proper object of religion ; which therefore will be found included in the explication of that religious honour which is given to any thing else . and yet what endless squabbles , contests and animosities has this one equivocation produced , while passionate or ignorant men will needs take the word [ religious ] when spoken of those different things , to be vnivocal , which is most clearly analogical . . the next way is , to observe the notions any way connected in our common speech with that word whose equivocalness we doubt of ; that is , to consider the causes , effects , antecedents , consequents , contraries , its superiour and inferiour notions , its circumstances , &c. for , if some or any of these do not agree to the meaning of any word when spoken of more things , or found in diverse contexts , then we may be sure 't is spoken in diverse senses , and is equivocal ; and then , by the foregoing rule we may certainly come to know its proper signification . so , in the notion of religious honour apply'd to god as properly due to him , and adoration of him , the chief part of which is an humble acknowledgment of him to be our creator , redeemer , sanctifier , the supreme lord of heaven and earth , the searcher of hearts , and judge of all our actions , &c. none of these are possible to be connected , or agree to any of the other improperly called objects of religious worship : so , when we stile any eminent person for learning [ a great man ] we shall easily find it is equivocal and improper , because greatness means , in proper speech , much of quantity , and has that common head for its genus ; whereas a very little man in quantity may be great in the sence in which we meant it . . the third way is , to attend to what true science or faith teach us . for , since one truth cannot contradict another , therefore we may be assur'd , that , in case we be certain that what the writer meant is true , his words must be taken in that sence which is agreeable to true science , or faith. hence , when it is said that god made two great lights , the sun and the moon , it being evident by science , that other stars are incomparably greater than the moon , hence the words [ great lights ] in that place , cannot be meant of great in it self , but as to their appearance to us . but , care is to be taken that we have true science of the thing exprest by such words , and that the subject be not such as exceeds our pitch of knowledge . . the context may help much to give us the right notion of the words ; especially when the literal truth is aim'd at , axioms and evident principles are laid , and the discourse is perfectly connected or coherent . for , in that case the symmetry found in the parts of the whole discourse forbids any word to be taken in a wrong signification ; as we experience in mathematicks and other close discourses . . the intention of the author , and the argument and scope of the book , avail much to direct us to the right sense of those words in it which are most material and significant . for , the notions meant by such words are as it were the steps which lye level all the way , and lead to the end at which the author aim'd them ; and , therefore , cannot easily permit a deviation from their true sence , or suffer their meaning to be mistaken . . the words in which laws are conceiv'd are best interpreted by the common practice of those who are subject to those laws . for , since those laws are the causes of the common practice , and the common practice is the effect of those laws , hence the sence of the laws is demonstrated by the common practice a posteriori . . but the very best and most assured way to detect and avoid equivocation in all words whatever , is to observe and examin , whether the same definition agrees to the word as found in diverse places : for , since the definition consists of a determinate genus , and its intrinsecal or proper differences , it must needs give us the precise notion or meaning of the word ; since , if it be either under any other genus , or constituted by any other differences , the essence which they constitute must needs be a different essence ; and , therefore , the word which signifies it , must necessarily have another meaning or notion . corol. v. words being invented to express sense or meaning , it follows , that those words that have many senses , and all of them true and coherent to one another , have the highest perfection that words can possibly have . wherefore those passages in holy scripture that bear both a literal , tropological ( or moral ) analogical and anagogical sence ( or several of them ) are of a more sublime nature than other words are , and argue , that they were endited by a divine author . book ii. of the second operation of our understanding , or judgments . lesson i. of the nature of judgments , or propositions in common ; of their parts ; of the ground of their verification ; and of the several manners of predicating . . having treated of notions , and of their clear distinction and expression , to that degree as may be sufficient for science , it follows of course that we treat next of cognition , or the putting together of notions ; and this not joyning them together on any fashion , by rote as it were , in our memory , as a school-boy gets a latin sentence without book , the meaning of whose words he understands and revolves in his mind , but regards not whether it be true or no ; nor yet , the putting them together according to grammatical congruity , as is this sentence , [ virtue and vice are both equally laudable ] in which the words do cohere indeed according to grammar rules , but the sence is false , and incoherent : but ( as the word [ cognition ] imports ) it must be the connecting or joyning them together , in order to knowledge ; that is , with an application of our knowing power to see whether they ought to be thus put together or no ; or , ( which is the same ) whether the proposition be true. . wherefore , since we cannot know any thing to be so , but what is truly so , it follows , that all knowledge must be of some verity or truth ; and this not of a truth which is materially such , or repeated in our mind , ( for this amounts to no more but a complex notion or apprehension ) but to make up the notion of knowledge , we must see the notions of which that truth does formally consist , to be truly and indeed connected . as , when we say [ a stone is hard ] we must see that what 's meant by [ stone ] and by [ hard ] are some way or other connected in the thing ; or , otherwise ( all truths being taken from the things ) we cannot be said to know it to be true. . judging , in proper speech is not meerly and precisely the seeing or knowing that the notions are connected , but the saying interiourly or assenting heartily that they are so . otherwise , since nothing can be known to be so , but what is so , it would follow that there would be no false iudgments . wherefore , judging adds to the meer notion of knowledge , that it is the subduing of all hesitation , or the fixure of our intellective faculty about the verity or falsity of any thing . whence judging is the effect immediately and necessarily resulting from our knowledge that the notions are really connected , when 't is a true iudgment ; or else from our only conceiting them to be connected , when the judgment is false . whence , this is a right consequence , i see or know the notions cohere , therefore i judge the saying or sentence that signifies they are connected to be true ; which is the method that all rational or judicious men take : whereas passionate or ignorant men , who are blindly addicted to their own sentiment , take the contrary way ; and will have the notions to cohere , and the proposition to be true , because they had prejudg'd it so upon some other motive than the seeing that the terms themselves were indeed connected . it will be objected , that knowledge also fixes our understanding ; and , therefore , knowing is judging . i answer , that to fix the understanding so as to acquiesce to what it sees , is to make it judge ; but the notion of knowing is compleated in the bare seeing the terms connected , and is terminated in regarding the object or the proposition that is known : but judging superadds to it , that it is moreover the yielding to reject all farther disquisition , and adhering firmly to that knowledge ; which ( tho' the distinction between them be nice and delicate ) is another consideration superadded to meer knowing , and sinks and rivets the object more deeply and unremovably in the soul. lastly , the intuitive knowledge of pure spirits is true knowledge ; but it is not made by our way of judging , in regard they neither abstract , nor compound or divide notions . . hence is seen that to make judgments of things out of true knowledge , is the greatest natural perfection our soul is capable of . for , since nothing can be known to be so but what is so , or true ▪ all judgments resulting from true knowledge not onely fill our mind with truths , but are , moreoever , a firm adhesion to truths and the secure possession of those incomparable endowments , which are the best perfections of our understanding , and make us like the god of truth . nor ends the advantage we gain by truth in meer speculation ; but , truth excluding from its notion all possible errour , it makes it impossible we should ever embrace any errour while we thus judge . which , since omnis peccans ignorat , and that every sinner ( as the proverb is ) has his blind side ; must therefore , if truth be express in our understanding , and kept awake there , preserve such a mind from sin ; and by making right and lively judgments of our present and future state , and of our several duties here , most certainly bring us to eternal happiness hereafter . . that speech that connects notions in order to knowledge , or expresses a judgment , is call'd a proposition ; that is , such a speech as proposes the notions , and puts them into such a frame or posture of connexion , as best serves for us to judge whether they are really connected or no. whence it must consist of three parts , viz. that which is affirm'd or deny'd of another , which in an artificial term we call predicated , and that notion the predicate . that of which 't is affirm'd or deny'd , call'd the subject : and that notion which signifies their connexion , call'd the copula . the two first are also call'd the terms or extremes of a proposition ; whence all truth is said to consist in the connexion of the terms ; and , if the terms be not found to cohere , the proposition is justly held to be false . . since propositions may be both in the mind and in words , and the meanings of the words are the same with our notions ; it follows hence ( so the words be not equivocal ) that mental and verbal propositions are the same thing ; so that it is , in reality , all one to treat them under either of these considerations . therefore , in regard we must use words in our discourses concerning propositions , and many times artificial ones , we shall treat of them indifferently as taken in either condition ; and sometimes use the word [ judgments ] sometimes [ propositions ] as it lights . only let it be remember'd , that judgments are onely in the mind formally and truly : and in verbal propositions , only as in signs of the mental ones . tho' even taking them as in our understanding , they have , even there , their subject , copula and predicate , as well as when they are pronounced , or writ in words . corol. i. hence is deduc't , that the rude vulgar , nay , even children who cannot speak or discourse , may have mental propositions , and consequently what answers to subject , copula and predicate in their understandings ; tho' they cannot reflect or distinguish them , and ( as it were ) dissect and anatomize their own thoughts and inward acts , as do men of art. for example , when a clown knows or judges that there is such a place as london , or a child that what it sees is milk ; they have in their minds the true , tho rough , draught of these two propositions , [ london is existent ] and [ this is milk ] and , consequently , of what corresponded to the several parts of those propositions , after a natural manner ; tho they cannot yet lick their rude embryo judgments into form , or bring them to a perfect shape , by distinguishing in them these several parts . corol. ii. hence also , tho' we cannot know the precise time in which children begin to judge , yet we may be assured it must be as soon as they have cognition or knowledge of common and familiar objects , and of their agreeableness to their own nature . and , first of all , of that which is next to them and most knowable , viz. that themselves exist ; as will be seen hereafter . the reason is , because judgments are the immediate effects resulting out of knowledge ; and , therefore , as soon as they know any object is agreeable or disagreeable to them , or that it exists , they cannot but judge so after their dull fashion . . to proceed . as the metaphysical verity ( of which onely our notions are capable ) is taken from the things , and consists in their being truly what they are : so the formal verity of our judgments must be also taken from the thing 's being such as we iudge it to be ; whence truth is by some defin'd to the conformity of the understanding to the thing , wherefore , when we affirm the thing to be this or that , or to be such or such , the true meaning of that affirmation is , that what corresponds to both those notions of the subject and predicate is found or exists in the same thing or being ; and , were not this so , it would be false to affirm that one of them is the other . . wherefore the meaning of the word [ is ] which is the copula , is this , that those words are fundamentally connected in the same thing and identify'd with it materially ; however those notions themselves be formally different , provided they be not incompossible ; for then the proposition must , for the reason now given , be necessarily false . as when we say [ a stone is hard ] the truth of that proposition consists in this , that the nature of [ hard ] is found in that thing or suppositum call'd a stone , and is in part identify'd with it ; however the notions of stone and hard be formally distinct. or , ( which is the same ) it is as much as to say , that that thing which is stone is the same thing that is hard. . the copula [ is ] has alwayes the sense now given , except when we are to speak of nothings which ( the adequate object of our understanding being ens ) we are forc'd to apprehend as things , even when at the same time we judge them to be otherwise . as when we say [ imaginary species a chimera ] and yet , even then , it expresses a kind of identity of the two nothings , and affirms them to be the same nonsense , and that to put a space or quantity to be no quantity : or to put a non-ens to be ens is contradictory and ridiculous . and , indeed , these kind of propositions are in effect no more than to say , that non-ens , non est ens , or , what is not capable of being cannot be . . the copula [ is ] is the most proper to give us a clear intellectual light ; and , by consequence to fix our judgment . first , because the notion of is , or actual being , is impossible to admit any explication ( and therefore 't is self-known ) as any one may evidently experience , if he goes about to explain it ; for he will find that he must be forc'd to put is , or some word that imports actual being in its explication ; which makes the explication to be none , but leaves it as obscure as it was before ; nay , more obscure than formerly by adding other notions more obscure than it self was . for example , ask what it is to be or exist , all that can be said of it is , that 't is esse extra causas ; where ( esse being the same with existere ) we vainly endeavour to explicate the same thing by its self ; and to make it look like an explication , we add extra causas , which two notions are less clear than esse it self was . dly , the notion of [ is ] is most determinate of its own nature , and so most fixt of it's self ; and , therefore , most proper to fix the judgment . dly , because all other notions having some potentiality and indifferency in them , are ( as it were ) wavering between two or more notions ; call'd differences . whereas the notion of [ is ] having none , is only absolutely steady , immoveable or undeterminable to any other notion . lastly , because hence , in literal , and not figurative , speeches , the word that expresses this notion , can never be equivocal , since 't is impossible to distnguish it into this or that sence ; all distnguishing or differencing notions being evidently more formal , actual and determinate than the notion to be distinguisht : which is in this case , impossible . . to proceed : there being ( as was said ) a real relation between those notions which are the subject and predicate , the later being really in the understanding as that which is said of the former , and the former that of which 't is said ; and relation being necessarily compleated and actually such , by the act of a comparing power ; it follows , that every judgment is a referring or comparing one of those notions to the other , and ( by means of the copula ) of both of them to the same stock of being on which they are engrafted , or the same ens ; where they are entitatively connected ( or the same materially ) before they are seen or judg'd to be so by our understanding . . it is sufficient that the two terms be materially the same , or identify'd with the same ens , when the subject is a concrete ; whether it be substantially a concrete , that is , consisting of the nature and the suppositum , as when we say petrus or homo is animal . or accidentally ; as when we say album est dulce . but in abstract notions , they must , besides this , be moreover the same essentially or formally ; that is , they must not onely be found in the same material ens or thing , but those very notions themselves must have the same formality , either in part , or in whole , in our understanding . in whole , as when we say petreitas est petreitas , quantitas est divisibilitas ; in part , as , when we say , petreitas est humanitas or animalitas ; for then humanitas and animalitas are as essential to petreitas , and petreitas as much includes and is the subject of their notions and of its own differnces besides , as petrus does or is of the notions of homo or animal . . an abstract and a concrete term can never be subject and predicate in the same proposition ; tho' never so essential to one another ; for an abstract notion , out of the very nature of its abstraction , is formally a part ; and a concrete notion in respect to it a whole ; and a part , tho' taken materially , it may belong to the same ens which is a whole , and be the same thing with it ; yet taken formally , it cannot ; for then a whole would be formally a part , and a part formally a whole . hence we cannot say petreitas est petrus , or petrus est petreitas , &c. hence also this proposition quantitas est quanta ( and such like ) is false ; for quanta being a concrete , signifies the subject which has quantity in it ; and it is false to say that quantity alone is quantity and its subject too . . from what 's said above we may gather , that there may be diverse manners of predicating or referring one notion to another , and they are reckon'd by porphyrius to be five , called by the schools predicables ; that is , several manners how one notion may be predicated of another . whose pardon we must beg , if following the dictates of reason , which we judge evident , and not the track beaten by others , we dissent from them , and assign six . the first is , when the whole notion is predicated of the whole , as when we say [ quantity is divisibility . ] [ a. whole consists of all its parts ; or , when we predicate the definition of ●he notion defi●'d , as , [ man is a rational animal ] ; or , all the dividing members of the notion divided . and this manner we call entirely identical ; that is , the predicating of the same whole notion wholly of it self . in the rest ● part only is predicated of the whole ; and then ●he predicate is either essential to the subject , or ●ot . if essential , then it either predicates that part of his nature which ( in the common acce●tation of mankind not reaching to inferiour differences ) is immediately superiour to it , and is thought to denote the whole essence of the thing , and then 't is call'd a species ; as , petrus est homo . or , but some lesser part of its essence ; as , petrus ●st animal , vivens or substantia , which are call'd the genus or generical notion . and both these ( as also the first ) are said to be predicated in quid , because they are essential predicates and answer differently , tho' imperfectly and but in part to the question made by quid. as ask , quid est petrus , we answer appositely , homo , animal , vivens , &c. or else the predicate is that compart which distinguishes the genus essentially from others of the same common kind , and constitutes it in an inferiour class under the common notion ; and is therefore referr'd to what it thus constituted , as its essential difference ; as , homo est rationalis . and , this supposes the question made by quid , or what thing , and answers to a further question , what kind of thing . and therefore , 't is said to be predicated not meerly in quale , for then it might have been a meer quality , and not essential ; but in quale quid , as both giving account of the particular nature of the thing , as also of its belonging to the essence of it . if the predicate be not essential , then either one notion is referr'd to another , and predicated of it ( not as any part of its essence , but yet ) as more or less connected with it , as an effect or sign of it ; as , capable of admiring , or the being affected with musick , proportion , or beauty , are connected with rational nature or man , and referr'd to him accordingly , that is predicated of him as a property . thus combustive or rarefactive are connected with fire ; opacous with earth ; and referr'd to those subjects , or predicated of them as properties . or , lastly , the predicate is com●par'd or referr'd to the subject , as having no kind of ( at least known ) connexion with the essence , but meerly casually belonging to it ; or , as indifferent to the essence whether it belong to it or no. as armed , placed , situated , &c. belongs to ma● or body : and then 't is said to be predicated as an accident , that is , as affecting him only casually and accidentally . note . that in this last predicable only the manner how it is predicated or compar'd to the subject is consider'd , and not the nature of that which is predicated ; nor , whether it be a substantial notion , or , whether it does belong to some one of the other 〈◊〉 accidents , so it be but casually or accidentally belonging to the subject , or referr'd to it ; for wooden , golden , and earthen are all predicated as accidents , or accidentally , of cup ( for 't is still equally a cup , whether it be made of any of those , or of any other matter tho' wood , gold , and earth be substantial notions . whence the word ( accident ) does not here signifie what inheres in the substance , as it does in those predicamental accidents which are intrinsecal ones ; but that which belongs to a subject by chance or casuality ; so that the notion of the subject is preserved entire , whether it has it , or has it not . note . that since it was clearly the intention of him who invented these predicables , and of those who follow'd him and us'd them , to comprehend all the different manners how notions could be predicated of their subjects ; and , the being predicated as a whole of the whole , is most evidently one manner of predicating , and distinct from the five they assign'd ; it is manifest , that their account of the predicables was defective , and our supplying it rational and necessary . add , that they omitted that predicable , or manner of predicating , which , if it were not the most vseful , at least it was the chief and first in dignity , all the first principles having ( as will be shewn hereafter ) this manner of predication , and consequently having title to belong to this predicable . besides that , scarce any thing can be so useful to science as are those first principles , and the definition's being predicated of the thing defin'd ; these being the propositions which give us chiefly all our certainty , and all the ground , to scientifical knowledge . . when the notions of the two terms are of an vnequal extent , the subject of the proposition ought to be the inferiour or more particular notion , and the predicate that which is the superiour or more common one . for , since , when the notions are not entirely the same , and the whole predicated of the whole , they can belong to one another , but in part , and the predicate is conceived ( even as to its whole notion ) to be something belonging to the subject to which 't is attributed , and as it were receiv'd in it ; and , that this hinders not the subject from having many other notions belonging to it as well as that ; hence , the subject is conceiv'd to be a kind of a whole , in respect of the predicate , and the predicate but a part , in respect of it . again , since ( as was shewn formerly ) all the superiour and larger notions are but parts of the inferiour ones , the lowest ( v. g. peter ) comprizing in it self actually all the superiour ones ( v. g. man , animal , vivens , corpus , and ens ) and adding , over and above , other notions to them which particularize or individuate it : it follows , that when two notions are of an unequal size , the superior , which is the partial notion , ought to have the place of the predicate ; and the inferior , which contains in it self both what corresponds to it , and also to other superior and partial notions , and therefore is a kind of whole in respect of them , ought to have the place of the subject ; since a whole cannot be properly said to belong to a part , ( or to be receiv'd in it ) but a part in the whole . and , nature it self seems to abet the reason now given ; for it sounds naturally to say , peter is a man ; but most absurdly and unnaturally to say , a man is peter . nor matters it that the superior notion is a whole in the way of abstraction , and the inferior but a part of it as thus consider'd ; for the copula [ is ] by which all predication is made , does not necessarily express what or how the notions are in their abstracted state , where they are only potential , and ( as such ) only found in the mind , and made meer●y by our manner of understanding ; but what passes actually in the thing in which the notions of the predicate and subject are to be the same ens or actually identify'd . and , 't is evident , ( as was now shewn ) that in the thing , whether it be without or within our understanding , there goes more to make up the nature or notion of the inferior than there does to make up that of the superior notion . . however , the predicate has of it self a large sense , taken alone and abstractedly ; yet , when attributed to the subject , it is restrain'd by ●t to mean only such a proportional part of its notion as befits the subject to receive . thus , when we say , petrus est homo or animal , it cannot be meant that he is homo or animal at large or in common ; ( for , were it so , peter might as well be a brute as a man ) but one determinat● man or animal . and the same passes in the thing , as it does in our vnderstanding . for , tho' albedo taken alone may reach all the whiteness in the world , yet apply it to a subject , by saying paries est albus , 't is restrain'd to signifie only some part of albedo in common , or as much of it as affects the wall : whence , thus consider'd , it means only haec albedo , or albedo parietis ; that is , so much of whiteness as is in the wall , and no more . . thus much of the nature or essence of s●●gle propositions ; their quantity and quality come next to be consider'd . as for the former , eithe● the predicate is referr'd to more particulars , as the● agree in one common notion ; as , every man 〈◊〉 an animal , and then 't is call'd an vniversal proposition . or to some one only ; and this either indeterminately ; as , some man is wise ; and then 't is call'd a particular proposition : or determinately ▪ as , socrates was the son of sophronisens ; and the● 't is called a singular proposition . these need no reflexions on them , it suffices to name them ( they being artificial words ) and to explicat● what we mean by them : only we may note , tha● in regard the subject is as it were the matter , and matter is properly determinable by quantity , the words expressing the quantity of the proposition can only be apply'd to the subject ; as nature also will inform us . . the quality of a proposition , is either its being affirmative or negative , which can need no farther remarks . or lastly , its being evident or inevident : and evidence is two fold ; self-evidence and evidence by deduction or proof ; of both which hereafter . note that the negative particle [ non ] must affect the copula , and not either of the terms ; otherwise it is no proposition , or a speech predicating one notion of another ; in regard such a speech wants one of the three notions ; as , petrus est non-brutum ; or , non-homo est bucephalus : for , the particle [ non ] destroys the positive notions of brutum and homo , and puts no other in their stead . . if propositions be compar'd to one-another , they are either equivalent in sence , or opposit . equivalents have no difficulty in them . opposits are either contradictories which affirm and deny the same in all respects ; as , petrus hic & nunc currit , petrus hic & nunc non currit ; or contraries , which are the extremes in any kind , having middle notions between them ; as white and black are in colours . whence these propositions , all men are wise , no man is wise , are said to be contraries , because they are extremely distant , and have middle propositions between them , viz. some man is wise , some man is not wise ; which differ or are oppos'd only according to their quality ; the one being affirmative , the other negative ; for , the quantity in both is the same ; whence they are call'd particularly opposit . but , if one proposition be an vniversal affirmative , and be oppos'd to a middle proposition that is negative , as omnis homo est sapiens , aliquis homo non est sapiens ; or , if it be an universal negative , and be oppos'd to a particular affirmative , as nullus homo est sapiens , aliquis homo est sapiens ; then they are said to be subcontraries , because the one of them opposes the other not fully , as do omnis homo est sapiens , nullus homo est sapiens , but in part only . singular propositions have no opposition but that of contradiction , which happens when one affirms what the other denies of the same subject in all respects , as was said above . lesson ii. of self-evident propositions , or first principles . . since , as was said , judgments or propositions may be true or false , and in laying the method to science we can have no occasion to speak of false judgments , but in order to the avoiding them , which is easily done , if we settle the knowledge of the true ones ; hence that which concerns us , is , to treat of true judgments or truths ; and , in the first place , of those propositions or judgments that are the first truths which we call first principles . again , since al● propositions are either evident or inevident , and inevident or obscure ones cannot avail us in our quest of science , it follows , that only evident propositions are to be treated of , or made use of by those who aim at scientifical knowledge . wherefore , since all propositions or judgments that are evident must either be self-evident , or made evident , which is done by way of proof , and these latter must depend on the former for their evi●dence , we are therefore to begin with the former which are self-evident . . all first principles , as being the first truths must be self-evident propositions . this is manifest from the very terms . for , being the first they can have no other before them , out of whic● they may be deduc'd or made evident ; or , into which their evidence , if lesser , may be resolv'd . wherefore they must either not be evident at all , which would destroy all possibility of any evidence , or they must be self-evident . . our knowledges may either be consider'd according to the order by which they are generated in us at first , or according to the dependance of one truth on another , and the resolving them finally into first and self-evident principles . the former of these is the way that nature takes to instill useful knowledges into us , when as yet we know nothing ; the later is the method which art makes use of to polish and promote those rude and short knowledges had from nature ; then to link many of those knowledges together ; and lastly , to render them exact and evident by resolving them into first or self-evident principles ; to do which , we call to beget science , or to frame a science of them . the former comes by experience unreflectingly ; the later is attain'd by study and reflexion . and 't is of this later sort of knowledge , and its first principles , we intend to treat in this and the next lesson ; reserving the former consideration of how and in what manner knowledge is first generated , till lesson iv. . the self-evidence belonging to first principles consists in this , that the two terms must be formally identical . for , since ( as was shewn above ) the terms in every ordinary and inferior proposition , nay , in every conclusion that is true , must be materially the same , and so the proposition it self materially identical , it follows , that the terms of the first principles , which ought to be more evident than they , as being self-evident , must be formally identical . . the terms of the first principles must no● only be formally identical in sense , or be the same formal notion ; but it is , moreover , most convenient that they be such in the expression also ; th●● is , 't is fit that the subject and predicate in those propositions should be the same word taken in the same sence . for , since first principles must be the most evident , and the most clearly expressive o● truth that can be imagin'd , and not liable to the least mistake ; and words are subject to equivocation , which is apt to breed mistake , obscurity and error ; hence , first principles should not only be formally identical in sense ; as when we say , ho●● est animal rationale ; but it is most convenient they should be such in expression too ; as , hom● est homo , idem est idem sibi ipsi , quod est est , &c. for then , whatever distinction ( in case of ambiguity ) affects the predicate , must also affect the subject ; and so the proposition will not only remain still most formally , but also most evidently , i● every regard , identical . note , that tho' this be most convenient , yet it may suffice that the terms , when explicated are reducible to the same formal expression by the same word ; as when we say [ a whole is greater than a part ] for , a whole being that which consists of parts , and a thing being that of which it consists ; hence , a whole is all its parts : that is , is one part and more than one part , whence , the proportion is reducible to this , [ what 's more than a part is more than a part ] which is not onely most formally , but besides most evidently identical . . this proposition [ self-existence is self-existence ] is , of it self , most supremely self-evident , ●or if the meaning of the word [ self ] which is ●oyn'd with existence be but understood , and that the addition of this word to existence be not meant ●o signify any the least composition in it but the most ●imple and most uncompounded actuality that can ●e imagin'd ; then the same formality in every respect is predicated intirely of the same , and so 't is also most perfectly self-evident . and 't is most su●remely such , because it expresses the existence of ●he deity , which is infinitely more simple , and more necessarily it self than any created exi●tence can be . again , since every thing , the more potential it is , is more confused ; that is , less distinct and less intelligible ; and , the more actual it is , the more intelligible ; and the divine nature , which ●s meant by self-existence , is a most infinitely pure actuality ; it follows , that this proposition [ self-existence is self-existence ] is , of its self , the most supremely self-evident proposition that can be imagin'd . . this proposition [ what is is ] or [ existence is existence ] is the most self-evident proposition that can be imagin'd to be taken from created things . for , since existence is the most evident notion that can be found amongst all our notions that can be had from creatures , that proposition must needs be the most evident , ( and consequently , amongst self-evident ones , the most self-evident ) in which not only the notion of the copula , but of the subject and predicate too , is existence . again , since the clearness of all truths whatever depends on the connexion of the terms by the word [ is ] it follows , that unless the nature or notion of existence be first immovably fix'd or establish'd , to be coherent with its self , that is , unless this proposition what is is , or existence is existence , be self-evident , no proposition whatever could be absolutely certain , clear , or coherent ; and so , there would be no possibility of any truth , certainty , or evidence in the world. lastly , since both the essences of things , and the existence they have are in the divine understanding , and the essences which are only capacities of being , belong to things as they are limited , or apt to be created , that is , belong to them according to the notion of creatures ; which being only potential as to being , they can have no claim thence to actual being or existence , but meerly by the free gift of him who is essential being ; hence the nature of the existence of creatures , and their being such is taken purely from god's side , and holds entirely of him . whence it is most actual , and most like him ; that is , most defecated from all alloy of potentiality , most pure , most intelligibly clear , and most establish'd , above whatever else we can conceive in creatures ; and therefore , it alone is able to give certainty , clear light , and establishment to all other truths . . equivalent to the former , or perfectly identified with it , ( abating the putting it in a diverse logical frame ) is this proposition , [ existence is not non-existence ] or which is in effect the same , [ 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once . ] for , if the notion of existence and non-existence could at once belong to the same subject , then , since the notion of existence , as being most simple and most actual , can admit of no distinction of being in part existence , and in part non-existence ; that is , of being in part such , in part not-such , as potential notions can ; it would follow , that the entire and most simple notion of existence is non-existence ; which is directly contradictory to this principle now mentioned , and consequently , to the equivalent proposition [ what is is ] ; whence it would be unavoidably consequent , that all we could say must necessarily be false , because the notion of existence , by which only we can affirm or say , would involve a contradiction in its own bowels , as being indifferent to being and not being , or rather as being both of them . note , that the same may be said , in some proportion , ( that is , as to the extent of their own notion ) of all propositions that are equivalent to first principles in any particular subjects ; as of homo est homo , aequale est aequale sibi , &c. to which are equivalent homo non est non homo , aequale non est non aequale sibi , &c. for , the same inconveniences would follow in all discourses upon those particular subjects , as did in all discourses whatever , by wronging the former self-evident and universal propositions ; that is , all that could be said of such subjects would be incoherent , contradictory and false . . the next self-evident proposition is that of ( ens is ens. ) for , since the notion of ens is most nearly ally'd to existence , being wholly order'd to it , and a capacity of it , it follows , that that proposition which predicates ens of ens , is the next , in self-evidence , to those which predicate existence of existence . . hence all propositions consisting of particular notions that subsume under ens , that is , such propositions which affirm that particular notion or nature to be what it is , are likewise self-evident : for , since ens , taken as undistinguish'd , or in its whole latitude , has the force of an vniversal , and is equivalent to all ; and an vniversal engages every particular under it , of which it consists ; so that if the terms expressing those particulars be not self-coherent and self-evident , it would follow , that neither would the terms of this proposition [ ens is ens ] be such : hence all propositions consisting of particular notions , that subsume directly under ens , must be likewise self-evident . again , since the proposition ( ens is ens ) is for no other reason self-evident , but because the notions of the two terms are every way formally identical ; and this reason is found in those propositions , the notions of whose terms subsume under ens ; it follows , that these also must , for the same reason , be likewise self-evident . corol. i. hence homo est homo , quantitas est quantitas , &c. being self-evident , are the first principles to all discourses treating about the nature of man or quantity ; that is , they are the last and most clear propositions in that matter or subject , into which all that can be said of man or quantity is finally resolv'd ; and , moreover , the test of the truth or falshood of all that can be said of them . so that if any part of those discourses do hap to violate those principles , that is , if it deviates from those natures , or does , by consequence , make man not to be man , or quantity not to be quantity , 't is most evidently convicted of falsity : as , on the other side , if those discourses do proceed agreeably to these principles , it must most certainly and evidently be true. corol. ii. it is not meant here , that these last-mentioned self-evident propositions do follow the former by way of proof or deduction ; but we are only enquiring what propositions in the resolving of truths into their principles are most self-evident ; and therefore , in priority of nature , presupposed to the other , and imply'd in them , as those without the certainty and evidence of which no certainty or evidence at all could be had of any of the others which are thus imply'd , or contain'd in the former , and engage their verity ( as it were ) a posteriori . as if homo , which is a particular ens , be not that particular ens or homo ; then , neither is ens ens , nor existentia existentia , because there is the same reason for the former to be self-evident as for these later , tho' not altogether in the same degree . corol. iii. from the self-evidence and truth of that proposition self-existence is self-existence , and from the ground of verity in all propositions whatever that are true , we may demonstrate the existence of a deity . for , since not only our simple notions or apprehensions are taken from the things , but also all connexions of those notions or propositions are therefore true , because what 's meant by the two terms exists in the same thing ; so that neither this proposition [ a stone is hard ] could be true , unless what 's meant by stone and hard were found in the same entity ; nor even could this self-evident proposition ( homo est homo ) be true , unless there were something , or such a thing as , by being fix'd in its determinate nature , or by being the same with it self , had thence a power to verifie it ; it follows , that neither could this self-evident proposition [ self-existence is self-existence ] be true , unless there were some most actual being , which , by being most perfectly the same with it self , did verifie that proposition . but such an actual being can only be the deity , there is therefore a deity . it may be reply'd , that we can compound notions , and joyn self to existence ; which done , this compound notion , having such a nature in our understanding , has , consequently , a determinate nature or actual being in our mind only , and thence a kind of metaphysical unity or verity there , which gives it to be predicated of it self ; so that there is no necessity that such a thing should be put to be in re to verifie it . 't is answer'd , that our argument is not grounded meerly upon our having such a notion ; for we do not argue as cartesius does , upon the notion or idea of such a subject ; but we grant , that we may compound such a one , and yet remain vncertain whether that nature be or not ; but our argument proceeds also , and chiefly , upon our verifying that proposition , which is done formally by the copula ; and i affirm , that the copula [ is ] could not verifie it , unless there were something out of the vnderstanding that oblig'd us to do so ; which i explain thus : this copula sometimes meerly puts together fictitious notions , or non-entities , which ( all truth being grounded on ens or the thing ) have consequently direct opposition to being , and therefore falsity in their very natures , or rather no-natures ; as , when we say [ imaginary space is a chimaera ] , for then , indeed , the connexion is meerly in our vnderstanding , there being no thing , nor any terms , which have an entitative notion to be connected or verify'd : or rather indeed there was no connexion at all ; but , as the terms were mock-things , so they could only have a mock-connexion . in all other cases , since the copula [ is ] cannot signifie nothing at all , ( for this would make it a meer sound and no word ) it can only signifie the actual existence or co-existence of what 's meant by the terms , in the same thing ; and this ( as was * said ) whether that co-existence be only material or formal . and , should it be deny'd that the copula [ is ] has this signification , we can never know any thing which we say , or can say , is true ; because we can never know , nor see , that the notions are agreeable or conformable to the thing . since then the notion of self-existence is so far from having non-existence in its notion ( as the others had non-ens ) that it is the most perfect in that kind that can be imagin'd ; the ' foresaid proposition could not be true , unless there were actually something that has , in that supreme manner , metaphysical verity and vnity in it self , to verifie it . in the same manner as [ homo est homo ] could never have been true , had there not been something which had such a metaphysical unity and verity in its self , as grounded that proposition . so that the objecter must either find more significations and uses of the word [ is ] than we have assign'd ( which is impossible ) or alledge , that the notion of self-existence is chimerical , or destructive of existence , as non-ens is of ens , which is as absurd as the other ; or , he must be forced to grant our conclusion , and acknowledge our argument to be a true logical demonstration . i know it will run in the objecter's fancy , that we can connect notions which our selves have coin'd ; but he may easily correct these misconceits , by reflecting , that this proposition is true ; and that truth must not be grounded on our aiery fancies , but on the solid nature of the thing to which it is a conformity . i know too he will fancy that the copula [ is ] has an office of meerly connecting without any reference to the existence of the thing which is its proper signification ; but he may see the folly of such a conceit , if he but consider that we cannot with truth conjoyn notions in our minds that are not conjoyn'd before-hand in the thing ; and that when the notions are of some positive being , or such as are not chimerical and contradictory , the copula [ is ] must signifie exists , and does but say in our mind what is in the thing , if the saying be true . also , that that copula cannot divest it self of all sence while it conjoyns such terms ; and he will do more than miracle to invent any other for it but that of exists . it may yet be further objected , that these propositions ( rosa est rosa , animal est animal ) and such-like , are still true , tho' their subjects do not actually exist when we thus predicate of them ; and that therefore it is not necessary the copula ( est ) should always signifie existence , even tho' the notions of the terms be positive entities . 't is answer'd , that either the subjects ( rosa ) and ( animal ) mean the individuals of those natures ; and then , if once they are perish'd , the propositions are false ; for haec rosa is no longer rosa , nor is hoc animal animal , when they are corrupted or turn'd into another thing . or else these words mean the abstracted notions of rosa and animal ; and then , since abstracted natures , or vniversals , do ( as such ) no where exist but in the vnderstanding , they have their actual existence where they ought to have it ; and the copula [ est ] signifies they have their existence there ; and so the proposition is true. and it is to be farther noted , that they could not have been even there , unless there had actually been diverse individuals from which they might be abstracted . but now , in our case , it is quite otherwise ; for self-existence being the simplest notion that can be conceiv'd , nay , more actual than any notion of existence found in creatures , it is impossible there should be any abstracted notion of it ; both because that abstracted notion would have potentiality in it , which would destroy that notion , and make it chimerical and self-contradictory ; as also , because ( as metaphysicks demonstrate ) self-existence is unlimited or infinit in existence , and so , can be but one. wherefore the copula ( est ) does not meerly conjoyn such positive notions , but always signifies existence , when the notions it connects are not chimerical or opposit to existence , as non-ens is to ens ; and consequently , if this proposition [ self-existence is self-existence ] be true , there must actually be , and this out of our vnderstanding , some being that verifies it , which can be nothing but the deity . it may be ask'd , what is to be said of these propositions , such a thing is possible or future . 't is answer'd , the word [ possible ] signifies possible to be , or capable of being , which is the very notion of ens ; and so , it means that such a possible thing is an ens ; and then it might be true , could we frame such a proposition of a thing meerly possible , which is impossible ; for , if the thing be only [ possible to be ] it never was ; and so ( all our notions being taken from the thing ) we could have no notion of it ; and therefore the proposition would be none , since we want that notion that makes the subject . the proposition [ such a thing is future ] is in rigor false , ( for that which is not at all , can have nothing predicated of it ) and it can only be true , as it signifies that there are determinate causes laid to produce it : which is to say , those causes are , and so the copula [ est ] still signifies existence . . to settle this main point , that first principles must be such propositions as are most formally identical , in the manner declared above , many other proofs may be alledged ; as , that contradictions are the first of falshoods ; therefore those propositions that are directly opposit to them must be the first truths or first principles : but only propositions thus perfectly identical are directly opposit to contradictions ; therefore these only are the first truths or first principles . to prove the minor , we shall find by reflexion , that the two contradictory propositions are comprizable into one which is equivalent to both ; as to ( peter here and now runs , peter here and now runs not ) is equivalent ( what here and now runs , does not here and now run ) . whence is seen clearly , that only such identical propositions are directly opposit to contradictions ; since man's wit cannot invent a proposition directly opposit to ( what runs runs not ) but ( what runs runs ) which is perfectly identical . add , that all fault consisting in this , that 't is a privation of the opposit good , contradictions would not be at all faulty , but that they violate the truth of identical propositions , ( as has been now proved ) since there are no other truths which they directly and formally oppose or destroy . . again , as will be seen hereafter , to conclude is to shew the terms of the conclusion to be connected , by their being connected with a third or middle term in the premisses . but , how can we shew that middle term is really connected with those two other terms in the premisses ? by finding still another middle term to be connected with the terms of the proposition to be proved . and , how far must this go on ? endlesly ! or no ? if endlesly , it is impossible any thing should ever come to be prov'd ; if not , then we must come to some proposition whose terms are so connected that no middle term can come between them ; that is , such as cannot be connected by means of another ; that is , which cannot be prov'd or made evident ; that is , which are self-connected or self-evident ; that is , which are formally identical . to enforce this , we may observe that the more remot● the terms of a proposition are from formal identity , the less evident they are , and the more proo● they require ; as also , that they grow still nearer to evidence , according to the degree of their approaching to be formally the same . wherefore , since all approach of distant things ends in their conjoyning and centering in the same ; 't is manifest that all approach of distant notions ends in their being the same in notion , or in a proposition formally identical , as in a first and self-evident principle . . besides , all causality , or the whole course of nature , is finally refunded into this self-evident principle , that things are such as they are , that is , are what they are . for , since an effect is a participation of something that is in the cause ; and the cause , as such , is that which imparts or communicates something it has to the matter on which it works its effect . again , since the effect is such as the cause is , as to that which is imparted to it ; and if the cause be of another sort , the effect still varies accordingly ; there can be no doubt but that causality is the imprinting the existence of that essence or thing which is the cause , upon the matter . whence follows evidently , that the very notion of natural causality , and the whole efficacy of it , consists in the causes existing ( that is being what it is . only motion is added as a common requisit to apply that existing cause better or worse ; which is refunded into a nature superiour to body ; as will be shewn * hereafter . . lastly , god himself has exprest his own supreme essence by this identical proposition ego sum qui sum ; that is , i exist ( or am ) existence . which is the same , in a manner , with ( self existence is self-existence ) which , therefore , is the first increated truth ; as 't is the first created one that ( what is is ) or a thing is what it is ; which is therefore true , because god is what he is ; or , because self-existence is self-existence . from which divine and soveraign verity all our created first principles derive their truth . for , were not this true , all our identical proposition and first principles would all be false : in regard they have their verity from the natures of the things , and of our vnderstanding ; neither of which could have their metaphysical verity , nor , consequently , could they ground or be capable of any truth at all , if self-existence , their cause , were not self-existence , and thence unlimited in power , wisdome and goodness to create and conserve those beings which are the foundation of all the truth we have or can have . the reader is desired to referr this section , to the third corollary , and to consider them well together , because they mutually give light to one another . and , if we rightly consider it , as the proposition ( homo est homo ) is onely the reducing the metaphysical verity of homo into a formal truth ; so ( self existence is self-existence ) is the same in respect of the soveraign metaphysical verity of the divine nature . corol. iv. hence is seen that an atheist can have no perfectly certain knowledge or evidence of any thing ; but that , by denying his maker , he deservedly comes to lose the best perfection of his own nature . for , if a sceptick should put him to prove that things have any metaphysical verity in them grounding our first principles , and ▪ consequently , all our knowledge ; and object , that for any thing he knows , things are chimerical , and so contriv'd as to beget in us false judgments ; he is utterly at a loss through his denying a first cause : whose unchangeable and essential truth and goodness has establisht their natures to bee unalterably what they are : whence onely any certain and evident knowledge of them is possible to be attain'd . . definitions , tho' very useful to science , are not self evident ; nor are those propositions that predicate the definition of the notion defin'd , first principles . for , self-evident principles , by force of their very terms , do oblige the understanding to assent , which such propositions do not . again , art is requisit to make such definitions as are proper and adjusted to the thing defin'd ; whereas first principles must antecede all art , and be known by the natural light of our understanding . besides , the possibility of being defind , goes before the definition ; which possibility the thing has from its metaphysical verity , determining it to be this and no other . for , if the thing were not truly what it is , it could not be exexplaind to be what it is ; were it not one , that is , undivided in its self and divided from all others ; it could not be compriz'd in one definition ; and , if it were not determinately of this or that nature , it 's certain , bounds and limits could not be drawn , which is done by the definition . whence 't is manifest , that that proposition which affirms , that a thing is what it is , is the first principle and ground to all definitions : and therefore definitions themselves are not first principles . . this is further evinc'd , because , words being liable to equivocalness , where there are more words ( as there are in definitions ) there is more room for equivocation ; which inconvenience appears no where more than in the known definition of man : for , there wants not many witty , ( or rather half-witted ) discoursers , who distinguish , that is makes ambiguous , the word [ rational ] and do not stick to maintain that man is rational , or ( concluding being the proper act of reason ) can conclude evidently in lines and numbers , but not in logick , physicks , ethicks or metaphysicks , much less in theology ; and , by this means they cramp the definition to less than half the sense the words contain . there are others too , who make brutes rational in many things ( and they make men to be rational but in some ) and so quite destroy the said definition by enlarging and ampliating it , and making it common and indifferent to man and beast ; and not apply'd to either of them adequately , but only in some degree onely : and yet the same men , even tho' perfect scepticks , would not dispute the truth of this proposition , a man is a man. wherefore , since 't is directly against the nature of first principles to be disputable , definitions cannot be first principles ; and , consequently , only propositions most perfectly identical can be such . . there is another kind of self-evidence call'd practical , which is inferiour to this we have hitherto spoken of , and proper to the vulgar . this is call'd self-evidence , not because its evidence is seen in the very notion of the terms , as was the other , but because it is bred or instill'd from the things themselves without speculation or study , by a practical converse with those things . thus the vulgar know evidently what is moist , dry , hard , &c. as well as the best philosophers , tho' they cannot define them as the others can . nay , the best philosophers ( as will be seen hereafter ) must learn from their sayings how to make their definitions of all such natural notions . thus they know evidently ( tho' naturally ) the force of witnessing authority , when 't is vniversal , and of sensible matters of fact : for example , they know there was such a one as queen elizabeth , or the long civil war in england , for , they know men could not be deceiv'd themselves in knowing such things , and that they could not all universally conspire to deceive their children in attesting such a falshood ; or , if they had had a mind to it , they know that the cheat must needs have been discover'd by some among so many thousands . note , that this is call'd evidence , because , tho' it be a rude knowledge , yet it is a true one ; and 't is the work of learned men to polish by art those rough draughts of evidence which the vulgar have by a natural way ; as will be farther seen hereafter . . those speculations only being well grounded which are according to nature , it will add a great confirmation to this new piece of doctrine , that first principles are identical propositions ( and help withal to satisfie some superficial readers , who perhaps may think such speculations a●ery ) to shew that the nature-instructed vulgar do abet this doctrine , and make use of propositions exactly identical , when they would express themselves to stand finally to some truth which they judge to be most evident . for example , if you would force a clown to deny a thing which he is sure of , or knows to be true ; he will tell you soberly , and ( if you press him much ) angrily , that truth is truth , or that he is sure a spade is a spade , or that he knows what he knows ; or , if it be in a point belonging to justice , that right is right , and he brings these as evidences from whence he can never be driven . which signifies clearly , that such truths as these are judg'd by him self-evident , and to be the principles which naturally determin and fix him in an immovable adherence to the point , as the vltimate ressort and reason of his perswasion ; that is , nature teaches him to have recourse to these , as to his first principles . . the other test , by which to examin the truth of this discourse of ours about first principles , is to desire the objecter to settle some first principles of his own , after his fashion ; which done , it will manifestly appear , that , if he takes any other way , either his first principles will not be self-evident at all , which yet first principles must be ; or , in case he pretends them such , he will not be able to tell you or explicate in what that self-evidence of theirs consists ; or else , he will produce such as he will tell you he will undertake to prove to be evident , which ( since what 's prov'd is concluded ) will be the same as to offer to obtrude upon us conclusions instead of first principles . or , lastly , they will be meer fancies of his own , put together prettily , and exprest wittily and plausibly ; which , when they are divested of their gay dress , and their naked sence is laid open , will be either meer voluntary talk or plain nonsence in cuerpo . into which fault of groundless and boldly and magisterially pronounced ( tho' wittily exprest ) assertions , and the imposing them upon us for principles , the author of the leviathan does fall very frequently ; and i could wish all his followers would please to examin all his principles by this test , and they would quickly discover how strangely they fall short of self-evidence , that is , of the nature of first principles . or , in case they judge i have stated 〈◊〉 the nature of first principles , i should take it for a favour , if they would vouchsafe me an answer to my several reasons for my doctrin , as to this point , in this lesson and the next ; and , in a full discourse , settle their own first principles , and shew me my error ; which , i am very confident , they will never think fit to attempt . lesson iii. that first principles are identical propositions prov'd by instances . the use that is to be made of them . also of some other propositions , either in whole or in part , formally identical ; and of the reducing of inferiour truths to self-evident propositions . . that the first principles in metaphysicks are identical propositions , has already * been clear'd . it remains to shew they are such in other sciences also . we will begin with physicks . the first principle that grounds that whole science , according to some modern philosophers , is , [ corpus est quantum ] , in which tho' the subject and predicate do indeed differ grammatically , the one of them being substantively the other adjectively express'd , yet if we rifle the words to get out the inward sense , ( as philosophers ought ) we shall find that , since all the essential differences they allow between a body and a spirit , is this only , that that is divisible , this indivisible , as also , that quantity and divisibility into integral parts are ( with them ) the same notion ; it will appear eyidently , that , according to them , this proposition [ body is quantitative ] is perfectly equivalent to this [ what 's divisible is divisible ] which is every way identical . i say , with them , for they deny all metaphysical divisibility of body into matter and form * by denying all formal mutation . the same discourse holds , if they put for their first principle [ corpus est extensum ] ; for , in that supposition , they hold that extension is the notion that intrinsecally constitutes body or matter , and differences it essentially from spirit . whence the proposition [ corpus est extensum ] is the same as [ ens extensum est ens extensum , or corpus est corpus ] which are most formally identical . . that the first principle which grounds all ratiocination in logick is an identical proposition , will be shewn hereafter , sect. . when we come to shew the vse of first principles . . the first principle that grounds all ethicks , or morality , is , [ a will is a will ] . for , since all morality ( at least in its practice ) consists in acting for an end , and no man acts for an end but because it appears to him a good , and therefore an appearing good is the proper object of that active power call'd the will ; and powers are specified by their proper objects , and have their essences from them ; it is as certain the will cannot act when there appears to the man no good , and that it will act for what appears to him , taking him as thus dispos'd , hic & nunc a good , as it is that a will is a will. object . this takes away the freedom of the will , to tye it up to first principles , or pretend that its actions can be reduc'd to rules of science or demonstration ; for , this seems to hamper it , and lay a necessity upon it , which destroys its free nature . i answer , that the will has a nature of its own , which it can no more forgo than homo can not be homo . whenever then there is but one appearing good , the will is not free in that circumstance , because in such a case its essence is engag'd ; and 't is not in the power of the will to chuse whether it will be its self or no. in all other cases where its essence is not engag'd the will is free , provided there be on the object 's side variety enough for choice : yet , in the former case , those acts of the will , tho' not free , are voluntary , because they are more according to what 's essential to it , or to its very nature ; and would , if the will did not bear it self accordingly , make the will to be no will. corol. i. hence is seen , that the only solid way to perfect our souls in christian morality or true virtue , is by wise judgments or frequentation of devout thoughts and actions , to gain a lively and hearty conceit of the transcendent excellency of heavenly goods , and of the vileness of all temporary goods in comparison , since 't is the very nature of our will to pursue that with her interiour acts which appears lively to be the greater good ; that is , to be hic & nunc , a good to him that wills . . lastly , to omit others , the first principles in mathematicks are identical . for example ; at our first entrance into euclid , we are met with those famous and useful principles : those things that are equal to the same , are equal to one another . if equals be added to equals , the wholes are equal . if equals be taken away from equals , the remainders are equal . those which are twice as big as the same , are equals . those which are halfs of the same are equals . all which are in effect but this identical proposition [ aequale est aequale sibi ] ; or else diverse inferiour identicals , subsuming under that common one , as homo est homo does under ens est ens . for example , this proposition [ if equals be added to equals , the wholes are equal ] is that common identical proposition thrice ( as it were ) repeated ; and is plainly as much as to say , the two supposed equals are equal to one another : the two equals added are equal to one another ; and so the two equal wholes , made up of both those equal parts , are equal to one another . there are many other such identical propositions on which that great mathematician builds as on his principles ; and among the rest [ a whole is greater than a part of it self ] which i have shewn above to be , in sence . formally identical . . as for the vse that may be made of first principles ; first , they cannot be the conclusion , for that is the thing to be proved , and first principles are above proof , as not being to be made evident , because they are self-evident . nor can they be either of the premisses ; for ( as will be more clearly shewn hereafter ) the middle term must be connected with one of the terms of the conclusion in one of the premisses , and with the other term in the other ; which could not be , if the self same notion were us'd twice in one of those premisses ; for then the syllogism must either be fram'd thus , [ omnis homo est homo , aliquod animal est rationale , ergo aliquod rationale est homo ] ; or thus , [ nullus homo est irrationalis ; ted aliquis homo est homo , ergo aliquod irrationale non est homo : ] where we see ( to omit other faults ) that the notion of homo is taken thrice , whereas in a legitimate syllogism no term ought to be taken more than twice ; and , so the whole discourse is preternatural and absurd . . hence follows , that since the vse of first principles cannot be the bringing down or deducing truths , which are yet unknown , from them ; therefore the use of them must consist in the bringing up or reducing truths to them ; which is done by resolving less-clear truths into others still clearer , till we arise to those which are the clearest of all , that is , to self-evident principles ; to shew which by instances , or lay open the way how this is done , is not proper for this place , but belongs to the next book , where we shall treat of rigorous discourse or demonstration . . to make this use of first principles is no more , in effect , but to attend heedfully to the nature of the thing , and not to deviate from it . this is evident ; for , to deviate in a discourse about homo or corpus , from their natures , is , by consequence , to make homo not to be homo , and corpus not to be corpus ; which propositions are contradictory to homo est homo and corpus est corpus , which are the first principles in those discourses . . quaere . it may be ask'd , if there be no more in the business but to attend to the metaphysical verity or nature of the thing , why we keep such a pother about putting it into such nice , and dry , and seemingly insignificant identical propositions , since we may attend to our notion , or the nature of the thing , without framing formal propositions about it , or saying it is what it is ? 't is answer'd , because all our discourses are made up of propositions , without which we cannot say or affirm any thing ; and therefore those sayings into which we do finally resolve their evidence and truth , as into what 's most true and evident , must be propositions also . besides , self-evident propositions , which advance the metaphysical verity of the thing into formal verity , do reflect and redouble ( as it were ) the notion of it upon it self by expressing its being what it is ; and thence gives an advantage to our bare single notion , by not only having had ( as had the single notion ) its metaphysical verity in it , but by expressing that metaphysical verity , so as to make it more fit to be discours'd of . . tho' first principles cannot be any proposition in a legitimate or regular syllogism , yet this hinders not but that those particular identical propositions which subsume under ens est ens * , may in some sort and improperly be deducible from that common one . for , since a common notion , taken without restriction , is equivalent to an vniversal , and includes all that have that notion , and all includes and signifies every particular one , as a whole does its parts ; hence follows , that if ens be ens , then homo is homo , lapis is lapis ; and the same may be said of every particular thing that is comprehended under that universal . note , that this is not perform'd by virtue of those terms orderly plac'd and connected , as 't is done in a syllogism ; but by vertue of some logical maxims applying or referring the common propositions to those particular identical ones , as appears in the proof of this last section . corol. ii. hence is seen how metaphysicks give the principles to all inferiour sciences that treat of particular subjects ; and how they establish both the truth , certainty and evidence of those respective principles . . the other main use of first principles is to establish all our ratiocination or deduction of new truths out of others formerly known : this is evident , because all inference , concluding or proving is perform'd by identifying the two terms of the proposition to be concluded with a middle term in the premisses ; and if it be found that they are both of them the same with it , it is thence inferr'd that they are the same with one another , and that the conclusion is true . but , what if that middle term be not the same with its own self , but divided within it self ? why then it must certainly follow , that we could inferr or prove nothing : for if that middle term were divided in it self , as hirco-cervus , chimera , and all non-entities are , then one of the terms of the proposition to be prov'd might be identify'd with it according to one of those considerations , and the other term identify'd with it according to the other ; and so , it would not follow that the terms of the propositions to be proved are at all identified or connected in the conclusion by being both of them identified with it in the premisses ; but rather it will follow , that they would be diversify'd or unconnected , because that middle term had diversity and not identity in it self . wherefore all the force of inference , nay , all possibility of concluding or proving any thing is entirely grounded on this self-evident proposition , idem est idem sibi ipsi , or , a thing is the same with it self . which shews how useful first principles are , and how they are both the first truths in themselves ; and , besides , the bottom-ground to all others which are not evident in themselves , but need proof to make them so ; how dry and insignificant soever they may appear at first sight , or seem ridiculous to superficial talkers , or some men of more witt and fancy than of exact speculation . corol. iii. hence is seen that the light of reason or the light by which we draw new knowledges out of foregoing ones , is the light that shines in this self-evident proposition : a thing is the same with it's self . corol. iv. hence also , if the terms be univocally understood , and do agree to the middle term in the premisses , we may be as infallibly certain our conclusion is true as we are that the same is the same with it self . which will give a great encouragement , to the laborious pursuers of true science , and comfort the pains they take in seeking after truth . corol. v. hence , lastly , if any discourse be so fram'd as to thwart this first principle or clash with it : 't is self-evidently absur'd , false and contradictory ; as will be particularly seen when we come to treat of discourse or ratiocination . . there are other propositions which are , either in the whole or in part , formally identical , ●ho ' not most formally : that is , such as have the ●ame formal notion in whole , or in part ; and ●herefore are , upon a sleight reflexion , evident , ●ho ' not self-evident from the very terms , as were first principles . of the first sort are those whose predicates belong to the first predicable , in which ●he whole notion is predicated of the whole . and ●hese are either definitions ( of which we have spo●en above ) as when we say homo est animal ratio●ale ; or the members of such divisions as are made ●y contradictory differences . for since there ●an be no middle or third between two contra●ictory notions , and therefore the dividing parts , ●f contradictory , do take up all the parts of the whole , and consequently ( abating the manner of expression ) are perfectly and intirely the whole it self ; it follows , that such parts , taken divisively , ●re predicated of the notion divided as the whole ●f the whole . for example , animal is divided into rational and irrational ( that is , not-rational ) and number into even and odd , ( that is , not-even ) . whence in those propositions , [ animal is either rational or irrational ] and ( number is either even or odd ) all the parts or the whole is predicated of the whole , and the propositions are formally identical and evident in the manner explicated in our former note . note . that these are call'd formally identical , because they are evident by their own terms when they are once explaind ; without needing any formal proof for the learned to discern the connexion of those terms ; onely there is requir'd some sleight reflexion on certain common maxims , known by the light of nature : such as is that a thing either is or is not , and that therefore there can be no middle between them ; and that all the parts are the whole . they are also self-evident practically ( that is evident without study ) to the vulgar , because they cannot but know those maxims by their mother-wit . in like manner as they know also the substance of the definition of those notions they are conversant with , if plainly and fully exprest ; tho they cannot compile or frame it artificially : whence they will heartily acknowledge it to be true when 't is thus propos'd to them , finding the notion or sense of it in their own understanding . . propositions whose terms are formal in part are those whose predicates belong to the second , third and fourth predicables ; that is , such as are predicated as the genus species and diffedifference ; for all these do in part belong essentially to the thing or individuum ; as petrus est animal , homo , rationalis . they belong to it essentially ; because they are deduc'd by intrinsecal differences in the same line : in part , because the thing or individuum ( v. g. peter ) comprehends both them , and more than them , viz. his individual essence . . those propositions whose predicates belong to the fifth predicable ( viz. properties ) are neither in part nor in whole formally identical , and therefore not evident ; tho' they are oftentimes easily reducible to evidence . for , since such predicates are not of the same line as the thing is , but in another , they cannot be at all essential to it , or any direct part of its formal notion or definition ; and , so , not at all evident from the terms , but must be made so by proof . yet , since all deduction or proof is made by connexion of notions , and those notions ( or what corresponds to them ) must be connected in the thing e're they can be so in our understanding ; and properties are more nearly ally'd to the essence than other accidents , as resulting necessarily from it , or being immediately connected with it ; hence they are , by consequence , most easily proveable to belong truly to the thing ; and therefore very fit to be made use of in demonstrations . . of this sort are all propositions whose predicates are proper causes and effects ; and , more immediately , the powers or virtues by which they act on others , or suffer from others ; as will be seen when we come to treat of demonstration . . propositions whose predicates belong to the last predicable are utterly inevident , and , as such , not easily evidenceable . for , since ( as was shewn * above ) such predicates do belong to the subject but by chance , or as their very name imports , by accident ; and chance signifies a cause which we do not see or know ; it follows , that the connexion of such predicates with the subject can never be known by reason , or prov'd that they must belong to it , because we can never know al● the causes that concur'd to make them belong to it . wherefore such propositions are utterly inevident , nor ( as they are accidents or unconnected with the essence ) easily evidenceable by way of reason , that they must belong to them ; however they may be known to belong actually to them hic & nunc by sense or experience . such predicates are mostly those of the six last predicaments , and many quantities , qualities , and relations . . notwithstanding , those propositions which have such accidental predicates , were all the causes by which they hap to belong to the subject perfectly known , might be perfectly evident and demonstrable . for , as we can demonstrate one effect that needs but one cause to put it , from that single cause ; so , did we know all the causes that concur'd to any effect which is brought about by many causes , we could certainly conclude and know such an effect would follow ; in which case the predicate would be no longer an accident , but the proper effect of that complex of causes ; nor would the proposition it self be any longer meerly accidental . corol. vi. hence there is nothing contingent or accidental to god , but all events , tho' never so minute or so odd , are equally certain to him , as the most immediate effect of the most proper and most necessary causes ; because he lays and comprehends the whole series of causes that concur to bring about every least effect . lesson iv. of the generating of knowledge in us , and of the method how this is perform'd . hitherto of knowledges or judgments , according to their dependence on one another , and their being resolv'd artificially into first principles . our next task is , to consider them according to the order they are instill'd into us naturally . . the soul , or the understanding , is at first void of all kind of knowledge , or rasa tabula . for , since the author of nature does nothing in vain , nor acts needlesly , he puts no effects immediately , or without second causes , when there are causes laid by him to produce them ; and , since we experience that causes are laid by him , apt to imprint notions in us ; and that the nature of our soul being evidently comparative , we can compare those notions , and can see how they agree or disagree , which is to know : hence , in case the soul had any notions or knowledges infus'd into her otherwis● than by those causes , it would frustrate and make void that course of natural agents which is apt to beget knowledge in us , and make nature contradict her self . again , since we experience that we know no more than we have notions of , and that we can compare those notions , and can know all things we have notions of and do thus rightly compare ; and , that both those effects do follow naturally from the impressions of objects , and from the nature of the soul ; it falls into the same absurdity , to affirm , that those causes do only excite , and not beget knowledge in us . lastly , the contrary opinion supposes the soul to be an ens before the body , or at least distinct from it ; and then 't is both unconceivable and inexplicable how they can ever come to be vnited so as to compound one ens. for , this cannot be done quantitatively , as is evident , nor by their acting together , as the cartesians hold ; both because all action presupposes the being of a thing ; whence they must be one ens before they can act as one ens ; as also , because the line or predicament of action is * distinct from that of ens , and extrinsecal to it , and so cannot † intrinsecally constitute those joynt-acters one ens or thing . nor can it be conceiv'd that the body , if it be not one ens with the soul , can act with it otherwise than as its instrument ; and it would be most absurd , to say that my hand and pen are o●e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways , to the action of writing . wherefore the soul has no antecedent knowledge , but is a rasa tabula , capable to receive such impressions as beget knowledge in her . . the first judgment in order of nature the soul has , is . that its self or the man exists . for , since ( as * was shewn ) the first notions the soul has are of the man himself , and of his existence , and † all judgmen●s are made by compounding or comparing of notions ; it follows , that the most obvious , most easie , most natural , and consequently the first judgment , in priority of nature , that a man has when he is ripe to judge , is , that himsel● is , or [ i am ] . . the next judgment is , that [ he is struck ] or affected by some object without him ; for , since the course of nature is motion , and therefore objects are continually moving where the man is , and , so , do light and act on his senses , that is , do work experimental knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them , it follows , that he must , after he comes to frame judgments , necessarily and frequently know , and , consequently , judge he is struck . nor can this be the first judgment , both for the reason lately given sect. . as also because in this proposition [ i am struck ] the proposition [ i am ] is most simple , and manifestly antecedes [ i am struck ] ; the notion of [ struck ] being clearly superadded to it . . the next knowledge or next judgment to the former , in order of nature , is , [ i am struck thus ] or affected after such a manner . for , the notion of [ i am struck ] is more simple , and so , antecedes [ i am struck thus ] which superadds to it : whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third section . . these judgments had , we are furnish'd by nature with means of knowing in some measure the distinct natures of all things that affect us . for , since we get all our notions or the natures of things into us by impressions from objects ; and by such impressions , or by their affecting us thus or thus , their different natures ; that is , knowledge how those things differ from one another ; and differences do constitute the nature of the thing by distinguishing it from all others ; 't is manifest that from the judgment or knowledge that we are struck thus and thus by these and these objects , we are furnish'd with means of knowing , in some measure , the distinct natures of all things that affect us , and of our own bodies in the first place . and our soul having the power of comparing them to themselves , and to other natures that are also in her , we hence become capable of framing innumerable judgments concerning them , or knowledges of them . . these knowledges of all things that affect our senses being gain'd , to a fair degree , by the different impressions of objects , are made more express , and improv'd very much by study and reflexion . for , since study and reflexion are not the inventing new or counterfeit notions or natures of our own coyning , but the receiving frequently , and minding heedfully the true and solid notions of the things which nature had imprinted there before ; it follows , that , as in corporeal sight , by our regarding the object frequently , wistly and attentively , we come to observe more and more in it ; so , by often reflecting on and revolving intellectual objects , or the natures of things in us , the eye of our mind must needs look deeper into them , make new discoveries of diverse considerations in them which escap'd a single cursory view , and gain more exact and more penetrative knowledge of them . . by methods of discoursing or ratiocination made evident by maxims of art , this improvement of knowledge ( were not vita brevis ) might come to be in a manner infinit . for , all this is perform'd by evident connexion of terms , both in some propositions which are truths , and the deducing others by necessary consequence from them , and so forwards . since then there is no stint assignable of the connexion of truths , and ( as will be shewn hereafter ) there are rules or maxims of art to teach us how to connect terms aptly and evidently ; it follows , that there can be no bounds of the improvement of knowledge . . from what 's said above , 't is manifest that this proposition [ ego cogito ] cannot be the first-known truth whence all our science is generated ; for , since this proposition ( ego cogito ) if put entirely or explicitly as it ought , is ( ego sum cogitans ) and in the order of nature the proposition ( ego sum ) is antecedent to ( ego sum cogitans ) and more simple than it ; so that if it be not suppos'd to be known , the other cannot possibly be known ; 't is most evident that ( cogito ) or ( ego cogito ) or , which is the same ( ego sum cogitans ) cannot be the first-known proposition or first truth that can be laid in the method of generating science . . the proposition ( ego sum cogitans ) is less clear and evident than many other propositions that have for their predicate notions directly imprinted on our senses such as are ; i am heated , hurt , extended , moving , &c. for , since all our first-known notions ( the soul being rasa tabula ) come by impressions of objects on our senses , those propositions are most clear whose predicates are the immediate effects of those impressions , and , joyn'd with ego sum ( which is the first judgment ) do compound those propositions . but such are the predicates abovesaid , and not the predicate ( cogitans ) . therefore the proposition ( ego sum cogitans ) is less clear than are the propositions which have those directly imprinted notions for their predicates . that the other predicates are notions more known than is cogitans , i prove thus . the notion of cogitans is spiritual , and therefore could not be imprinted in the soul by a direct stroke of the object on the senses , as are the others , but must be known by reflexion ; but what is known by reflexion is less easily and less early known , that is less evident to us , taking us as not yet imbued with other knowledges , than that which is known by experience or directly ; therefore the notion of ( cogitans ) is less known than are those other predicates ; and consequently this proposition ( ego sum cogitans ) is less clear than the propositions ( ego sum extensus , vulneratus , movens , &c. again , were the predicate ( cogitans ) known experimentally , or by impressions on the sense , which it is not at all but as it is joyn'd with the imagination ( the most fallacious faculty we have ) co-operating with the understanding ; nay , were it an affection of the man , and its notion directly imprinted in him , and , so , as easily and early known as any of the rest ; yet the proposition ( ego sum cogitans ) could not be the first or second in the order of knowable : for , since ( as was shewn ) [ i am struck or affected ] antecedes [ i am affected thus ] or have such an affection in me , and cogitans is not barely to be affected by objects , but to have such a manner of affection ; hence the proposition ( i am affected by objects ) is more simple , and therefore , in priority of nature , precedes ( i am affected thus ) or ( i am thinking ) and is more clear than it . . hence the proposition ( ego cogito ) is also less certain than multitudes of other propositions , whose predicates are experimentally known by direct impressions on the senses . for certainty follows evidence as its proper cause , as judging does knowing . wherefore , if that proposition be less evident , it is also less certain . . if it be alledg'd , that it is certain by way of evident proof that this proposition ( ego cogito ) is the most absolutely firm ground we can relye on to generate and principiate all our other knowledges , because tho' we would voluntarily divest our selves of all other knowledges , and call them into doubt ; that is , were all the rest vncertain , and my self insecure whether i think true or false in holding them ; yet it is unquestionably certain , and impossible to be doubted of , but that , whether i think right or wrong , still i think ; whence follows , that the proposition ( ego cogito ) seems to be a firm basis to ground all the rest upon . i answer , that the whole discourse seems to me to be a paralogism , and a kind of fallacy of non causa pro causa ; for , the question is not whether it be not more certain that i think than that i think wrong or right ; for , 't is granted that this proposition [ i think ] is more simple , and therefore antecedes , and is presuppos'd to the propositions [ i think right or wrong , or thus and thus ] and , consequently , it is more evident and more certain than these are . but the true point is , whether i am more certain that i think at all , than that i am certain that i am ; since if it be not presuppos'd that i am , 't is most certain that it is impossible that i should be certain that i am thinking , or any thing like it . the objecter then slides over the certainty of this proposition ( i think ) as compar'd with the proposition ( i am ) and other judgments experimentally known ; and compares it with other propositions subsequent to ( i think ) . wherefore he first supposes it to be most certain , that is , more certain than they are , and prefers it before all others , without comparing it with those others ; which is to suppose it so gratis , and ( which is yet more strange ) he grounds all knowledge whatever upon it . . 't is yet a worse error , that whereas ens or being is the basis of all other notions , so that if no thing be , they cannot be ; the alledger , by arguing thus [ cogito ergo sum ] does by a strange hysteron proteron , put an operation to be antecedent to being it self ; and that [ to be thinking ] is a more simple , clear , and distinct notion than [ to be ] . and then , from an operation found out or suppos'd , he concludes the very notion of being it self to be in the thing . nay , which is yet more odd , he supposes the notion of knowledge of himself , imported by the word ( ego ) and supposes that ens ( or ego ) to be , as is signified by the copula ( sum ) ; nay more , he supposes that ens , or ( himself ) not onely to be , ●ut moreover to be such , viz. operating or thinking , which most evidently speak or imply existence ; and when he has done all this , he infers thence , ( contrary to our d. & th . sect. ) the simple being of that which he had not onely put to be and be known ; but , which he had over and above put to be ( or be known ) to be such : that is to be operating or thinking . . hence , this method of generating science is unnatural , preposterous and self-contradictory . t is vnnatural , first because the way nature takes to beget knowledge in us is not by divesting our selves of all other knowledges to find out what 's most certain : but , she at first instils knowledge into us by a natural way of imprinting notions in our mind , and our conparing them ; and thence letting us see whether they agree or disagree : ly , because it strains nature to fancy our selves ignorant of many clear truths which the goodness of the same nature forces us to assent to as evident . and , ly , because [ i am ] is according to the order of nature antecedent to [ i am thinking ] . t is preposterous , because it argues from compound judgments which are less known , to in●er what 's more simple , and , so , more known . and lastly , t is self contradictory , because it supposes that to bee or to be known ; which , as yet according to that doctrine is not , or is not known : but is to be concluded , that is , made known ; as is shewn section th . . hypothetical philosophy , which is grounded on suppositions ; and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate al● nature , is built on meer fancy , and is unworthy the name of philosophy . for , since it belongs to a philosopher to resolve all truths into their principles , and all natural effects into their proper causes ; and , finally , ( if need be ) into their first principles or first causes : and a hypothetical philosopher can never perform this duty which is most essential to a philosopher ; in regard the first grounds he layes are barely begg'd or supposed ; that is neither self-evident nor made evident by way of proof : hence , hypothetical philosophy is utterly unworthy the name of philosophy ; since all its assertions and conclusions , if driven home , are resolved finally into precarious suppositions . again ▪ since all speculation is aiery and fantastical that is not grounded on the things as they are found in nature , and such discoursers do not finally build their discourses on the natures of the things as they find them to be , but on their being such as they suppose them or would have them to be ; it follows , that the whole scheme of their doctrine and all the speculations they advance , how ingenious so ever they may appear , are far from solid , and , in reality groundless , aiery and fantastical . . hence follows , that who ever supposes any principle or proposition that influences his explication of nature , or of natural effects which ar● apt to be produced by natural causes , and demonstrated by them : whether that principle be that matter is divided into such or such parts , or that it is moved in such a manner ; that it continues its motion without a natural motive cause continually acting on it , notwithstanding that it still meets with rubbs from other parts of matter which it ●reaks asunder ; that there are such figures of it's parts ; or such qualities affecting the subject and giving it a virtue of operating thus or thus ; that ●here are multitudes of little entities , brought in ●o serve a present turn when the discourser is at 〈◊〉 plunge ; or atomes , pursuing and over taking ●heir fellows , and clinging together conveniently ●or his purpose : without giving a reason why and 〈◊〉 they must do so , ( as is the manner of the epi●ureans ) or , what ever other useful expedient he ●upposes to carry on the clockwork of his scheme ; such a man is no true philosopher . . likewise , who ever layes for his ground ●hat neither is nor can be : viz. vacuum , imaginary space , subsistent dimensions , infinit expansion of continu'd quantity . infinit number of atomes and suchlike , can be no true philosopher ; since they ( as do the former ) resolve things finally into their own unprov'd and ridi●ulous suppositions : and would have us accept their groundless fancies for first principles ; when as many ●imes the contrary to these is clearly demonstrable . . whoever proceeds meerly upon experiments and induction , and cannot assign proper causes for the effects or matters of fact they see ●one ; how ever their inquisitiveness into nature may merit commendation , and oblige artificers and practical men by many useful observations ; and , in some measure ▪ help speculative men also , who do make use of principles , to find out more easily the proper causes of many effects : from which industrious researches into nature , such men may deserve the name of virtuosi , or curious and ingenious persons ; yet since ( as will be shewn hereafter ) they cannot , by that method alone , without making use of principles , refund effects into their proper causes , nor give the true reason of the effects they experience ; nor deduce so much as one scientifical conclusion ; they cannot , in true speech , be call'd men of science or philosophers . . those of the vulgar who have good mother-witts , and addict themselves to think much and attentively of some certain natural objects , may , by practical self-evidence , well improv'd , arrive to such a true knowledge of the causes of things , as may rank them in the next class of knowers to scientifical men , or true philosophers . for , such men , by an innate or casual addiction of their thoughts to some particular sorts of natures ; and by industrious and frequent consideration of them , joyn'd with a natural sagacity to penetrate them , and natural logick to discourse them in their thoughts ; are furnish'd with all the materials ( as it were ) that are requisite to science : nor , while they attend to the natures of the things , can they want first principles by which to guide their thoughts ; so that , they onely want maxims of art to put their thoughts into the posture of science , to make them more firm , distinct and express , and to improve them by drawing new consequences from them : wherefore such acute men ( some of which are found in every country and every age , ) by having their knowledge grounded on solid nature , may far exceed hypothetical philosophers , or any of the others before-mentioned , in true knowledge ; and , so , come nearer the being true philosophers than any of them ; nay , than great artists and reputed scholars ; though they caper in the ayr never so nimbly and quaintly with school-terms , distinctions , and witty and congruous explications of their own schemes ; if they do not begin with , and build upon , good honest solid nature . book iii. of the third operation of our vnderstanding , discourse ; and of the effects and defects of it . lesson i. of artificial discourse , the force of consequence , and of the only right figure of a syllogism . . discourse may either mean common reasoning us'd by all mankind in their ordinary conversation , or by some in rhetorical speeches ; which may fitly be call'd loose discourse : or , it may mean that artificial way of reasoning , which consists in such a connexion of terms in two propositions , call'd the major and minor ( or the premisses ) as that a third proposition , call'd the conclusion , must naturally and necessarily follow from them ; which may be properly nam'd contracted or strict discourse , and by logicians is call'd a syllogism . . this following or consequence of such a proposition out of two others , is call'd inference , deduction , concluding , argumentation and proving . so that the essence of a syllogism consists as formally in the consequence of that proposition , which is concluded from the premisses , ( exprest by the illative particle [ ergo ] as the essence of a proposition does in the copula that connects its terms , and predicates or says something of another . . wherefore , since , if the consequence , in which consists the essence and all the force and nerves of discourse , be not clear and evident , there could be no certainty or evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded ; and , so , our faculty of exact reasoning would have been given us to no purpose : hence 't is manifest that , however one proposition may be made known by others that are connected and consequential to one another ; yet , the consequence it self cannot be prov'd or made clear by another consequence ; for the question would still return how , and in virtue of what , that consequence which made the other evident is evident it self ; and so in infinitum . whence it follows , that the evidence of all consequences whatever , must be built on something in a higher manner evident than any consequence or proof can make it ; that is , on a self-evident or identical proposition , as will be shown hereafter . . hence we may gather manifestly , that a syllogism can have but three terms in it ; two of which are given us in the proposition to be concluded ; and the third is that middle term , by finding which to be identify'd with the other two in the premisses , we come to be assur'd , by virtue of the self-evident proposition hinted above , that they are identify●d in the conclusion ; or , which is the same , that the conclusion is true. . from what 's said it appears that a syllogism is the t●st of all other discourses ; by reducing them to which their truth is to be try'd . for , since whatever is most perfect in its kind , ought to be the standard or test by which to measure and try the perfection of all others of the same kind ; and a syllogism is the best and most firmly grounded act of our natural reason , made exact by art which is to perfect nature ; and therefore absolutely the very best that can be in its kind , or the best discourse ; it follows that 't is to be the true test and standard of all other discourses ; to which the verity , sense or coherence of all the rest are to be reduc'd , and to be try'd by it . corol. i. hence , 't is of very excellent use for young wits to exercise themselves in reducing loose discourses to strict ones , or syllogisms ; for , by endeavouring this , they will , to their admiration , find how shallow and far from evident the grounds ; how precarious ▪ unprov'd , and oft-times contradictious the particular assertions ; and how open and incoherent the contexture and consequences are in many rhetorical discourses and speeches ; which , drest up in fine language and embell●sht with little tropes and figures , and other pretty tricks of wit and fancy , did before look very plausible , and made a gay appearance of most excellent sense . perhaps scarce any one expedient can be invented that is more useful to advance truth , beat down error , and keep the generality of mankind from being deluded , than thus to divest such empty discourses of their glossy out-side ; and to let them see how deformed a hag errour will appear to the eye of reason , when expos'd stark-naked . whereas , on the other side , 't is the glory of truth to be stript of these ornamental tri●●es ; for by this means her native beauty and the symmetry of all her parts will appear more amiable in the eye of those who do sincerely affect her . . from the third § . it manifestly follows , that , the consequence of a syllogism having a self-evident proposition for its basis , if upon severe examination , we find that any discourse does indeed bear that test , and can be reduc'd to a rigorous syllogism ; and the premisses ( which the consequence supposes to be true ) be really so , or can be by this method prov'd true ; it follows , i say , that we may be as perfectly assur'd as that we are that the conclusion is consequent , and true ; and , that sooner , may all the material world crumble into incoherent atoms , or relapse into the abyss of nothingness , than that any conclusion , thus deduced , can be false ; since , if it could , then that identical proposition , on which the consequence is grounded , would be false ; and , so a contradiction would be true ; which falsifies the metaphysical verity of creatures , and of the ideas of them in the divine understanding ; which would consequently shock the wisdom , and even the essence of the godhead it self : for self-existence might not be self-existence if a contradiction might be true. corol. ii. were that which is said here , and some other main hinges of science , which occur in this treatise , duely consider'd and well penetrated , it might be hoped , that they would to a fair degree cure the disease of scepticism , so epidemical among our late wits . for , even the worst of scepticks will grant that an identical proposition must be true ; and he may see here , that by this doctrin both first principles must be such , and that all force of consequence also ( which two are the main pillars of science ) must be grounded on such . this last § . requires and supposes that none of the words which are to signifie any of the three terms be taken there equivocally . for , if any of them be taken now in one sense , now in another , that is , if any of these words have , in the same syllogism , two meanings or notions ; then , however the sound or character o● that word may seem the same in a verbal syllogism , and make a show of its having only three terms ; yet , in a mental syllogism , ( which only is formally and essentially such ) there are four notions of the extremes , that is , four terms . wherefore such a discourse ( if it be indeed at all such , and not a meer blunder ) is a paralogism , or a fal●e and deceitful argumentation , and not a syllogism ; because a syllogism ought to be apt to prove the connexion of two terms by their joint-connexion with a third , and therefore can consist but of three terms . . it is most requisite also that a syllogism be fram'd after the best manner ; which is done by disposing all its parts in such a figure as may make the connexion of the middle term with the other two most clear ; for , we experience that the placing the words aptly , renders every common discourse clearer ; much more is it requisite in so nice and exact a discourse as a syllogism is , where there are but three terms to be placed . . to place the parts of a syllogism right , no more is requisit but to place rightly the middle term in the premisses . for , the proposition that is to be concluded or prov'd , and consequently the order of its terms , is given us to our hands , and already determin●d ; and the c●pula must of necessity still keep its own place . so that nothing more can be requir'd but to place rightly the middle term in the premisses ; for , that done , the place of the other two terms , conjoyn'd with it there , must ( as will appear presently ) be likewise necessarily determin'd ; and , so , all the parts of the syllogism will be placed and ordered as they ought to be . . the middle term is then placed rightly , when 't is placed in the middle , or between those other two terms which it is to conjoyn with one another . this is evident by the light of nature ; for , were it not joyn'd to both , it could not be the means of conjoyning them ; nor could it be joyn'd to both , unless its notion were in the middle or between both : . hence the middle term must be inferiour in notion to one of those terms , and superiour to the other . for , since ( as has been shown above ) notions do arise orderly from the inferiour to the superiour ones ; it follows , that that notion is in the middle between other two which is inferiour to one of those notions and superiour to the other . . wherefore the middle term must , in the two propositions which are the premisses , be the subject to one of the terms , and the predicate to the other . for , since the middle term must be inferiour in notion to one of those terms , and superiour to the other ; and the inferiour or narrower notion , by virtue of its place , † is to be the subject , and the superiour and larger notion the predicate ; it follows that the middle term must be the subject in one of the premisses , and the predicate in the other . for example , in this syllogism . virtue is laudable , courtesy is a virtue , therefore courtesy is laudable . the proposition ( courtesy is laudable ) is the conclusion , and to be proved ; and so , the placing of it's terms is already determin'd : the middle term [ virtue ] is plac'd in the middle , being subject to , or under laudable in the major , and above or superiour to courtesy in the minor. . tho' the place of the terms of the conclusion were not determin'd , yet the reason lately given would determin it . for if laudble be above virtue , and virtue above courtesy , it must follow à fortiori tht laudable must be above courtesie , which is the lowest of the three ; or , that laudable must be the predicate in the conclusion . . wherefore the other two figures are unnatural and monstrous ; for , since nature has shown us that what conjoyns two notions ought to be placed in the middle between them , it is against nature and reason to place it either above them both , as is done in that they call the second figure , or under them both , as is done in that figure they call the third . . hence no determinate conclusion can follow in either of the last figures from the disposal of the parts in the syllogism : for , since as appears § . the extreme which is predicated of the middle term in the major , has thence a title to be the predicate in the conclusion , because it is above the middle term , which is the predicate or above the other extreme in the minor ; it follows that , if the middle term be twice above or twice below the other two terms in the premisses , that reason ceases ; and , so , it is left indifferent which of the other two terms is to be the subject or predicate in the conclusion ; and the indeterminate conclusion follows not from the artificial form of the syllogism , but meerly from the material identity of all the three terms ; or from this , that their notions are found in the same ens. wherefore from these premisses , some laudable thing is virtue , courtesy is a virtue , or from these , virtue is laudable , some virtue is courtesy , the conclusion might either be , therefore courtesy is laudable , or some laudable thing is courtesy . so that to argue on that fashion , or to make use of these aukward figures , is not to know certainly the end or conclusion we aim at , but to shoot our bolt at no determinate mark , since no determinate conclusion can in that case follow . . from these eight last §§ . it is manifest that nothing can be more unnatural and more inartificial , than to invent two other figures , and then to study how to lay many elaborate rules how to reduce them again to the first . for , it will appear by our last discourse , that this is no better than to use our wits to contrive how to erre and goe out of the way ▪ and , when that 's done , to take twice as much pains in shewing how we may get into it again ; whenas we might easily have stay'd in the right way when we were in it , and have sav'd all that mis-spent labour . . wherefore , if an adversary puts a syllogism in baroco or bocardo , or in any mood of the two last mishapen figures , the respondent ought , by the reason here given , to shew him plainly , and then tell him roundly , that his syllogism is illogical and inartificial , and require of him to mend it . and , if the opponent , to justifie his proceeding , alledges universal custom of the schools , then to tell him smartly that no authority , custome or prescription ought to be allow'd as a iust plea against reason in matters subject to reason ; and that art ought to perfect , and not to pervert nature . nor can the arguer have any just reason to make use of those two last figures , since ( as will shortly be shown ) all questions what ever may be prov'd in the first figure . nay , he will be convicted of seeking to blunder and obscure truth , and not to clear it ; since he leaves a plain and easie path of reasoning for an intricate and perplext one . lesson ii. of the several manners or moods of a syllogism ; and of the laws of concluding . . the right figure or position of the lesser parts of a syllogism , ( viz. it's terms ) being shown to be but one , and the force of it's consequence , in which consists it's essence , being still the same ; the variety of syllogisms , or the several sorts or moods of them can only be taken from its greater parts , the propositions , or from something belonging to them . this is manifest , because there is nothing , besides these , from which the distinction of those moods can be taken . . the moods of syllogisms may be in part taken from the quantity of the several propositions . for , since the essence of a syllogism , or the force of consequence does consist in the connexion or identification of two terms with a third ; and , to be universally or particularly identify'd , are evidently divers manners of being identify'd ; 't is manifest that the variety of syllogisms may be in part taken from the quantity of the propositions . . the moods , or several manners of syllogisms must be taken also in part from the propositions being affirmative or negative : for , since affirmative propositions do express the agreement of the two extremes with the middle term , and those which are negative their disagreement with it ; and this agreement or disagreement with it have equal influence upon the consequence , and diversifie it , or make it follow after a diverse manner ; it follows that the moods or manners of a syllogism must also be taken from those propositions being affirmative or negative . . as it is self-evident that the same is the same with it self ; so it is equally self-evident that what is different or diverse from another is not the same with it , or different from it . this is evident both by the rule of contraries , as also because this proposition is identical as well as the other . . the quantity and quality which ought to be in the several propositions of the syllogisms of each mood , are by a kind of art of memory , signifi'd by these four words , barbara , celarent , darii , fe●i● in which the three syllables correspond to the three propositions found in a syllogism ; and the vowels in each syllable tell us the quantity and quality of each proposition . a and e signifying an universal affirmative and negative ; i and o a particular affirmative and negative . . we are also to reflect on what was shown above , that , in the way of predication , an universal is consider'd as a kind of whole in respect of the particulars contain'd under it , and the particulars are conceiv'd to be parts of that whole ; whence an universal proposition expresses the identity of its terms in the whole or totally , and a particular one but in part . . the distinction of moods may also in some part be taken from the conclusions in the several syllogisms . for , since those conclusions are all of them propositions , and all propositions ( singular ones excepted , as not belonging to science ) must be either universal affirmatives or universal negatives , particular affirmatives , or particular negatives ; and the vowels in the last syllable of those four words do answer to all these several conclusions , and the two vowels in the two former syllables of each word do tell us of what nature the premisses must be , if we would conclude such propositions : it follows that the number of those several moods , or several manners of concluding , may , in some sort , be taken from the propositions that are to be prov'd or concluded , as from the end we aim at , and by which we are to contrive or cast our premisses . . hence , as we shew'd before there ought to be but one figure , so 't is shown here , that there can be no more moods of that figure necessary but these four now mentioned ; because these do fully direct us ( as far as concerns the form of a syllogism ) how to conclude or prove all the several questions or theses that can be ask'd , or propos●d to be prov'd . and , since all these moods do belong to that which they call the first figure , hence also , by the way , is farther confirmed what we prov'd above , that there cannot need , and therefore ought not to be , any more than that one figure . . but , because in treating of the method to science , we ought not to deviate from that method our selves while we are shewing it to others ; hence , we become oblig'd not barely to tell the reader , as it were by rote , how the syllogisms in each mood do conclude , or by pretty inventions to help their memory how to do this ; but we are bound to inform their understanding , and to shew them why such premisses must necessarily inferr such conclusions as those four words do hint to us ; or , which is in a manner the same , why or for what reason such conclusions must follow from such premisses . . as the substance of the connexion of the terms in the conclusion depends wholly on the connexion of them with the middle term in the premisses , so the degree of their connexion in the conclusion must depend on the degree of their connexion with it in the said premisses . this is evident , because all the connexions those extremes have , is from their connexion with the medium ; wherefore , if they be more connected with the middle term in the premisses , they must be more connected with one another in the conclusion ; if less , less connected . . hence , from two premisses which are both of them universal affirmatives must follow a conclusion vniversally affirmative ; because the middle term in the premisses was totally or universally the same with one of the extremes , and the other extreme totally or vniversally the same with it ; whence follows , that those extremes must be totally or vniversally the same with one another in the conclusion . for example . bar-every body is divisible , ba-every atome is a body , therefore ra-every atome is divisible . . when one of the extremes is universally deny'd of the medium in the major , and the medium universally affirm'd of the other in the minor , the conclusion must be an vniversal negative . for , were the extremes to any degree the same in the conclusion , when one of them is totally the same with the medium in the minor , and totally not the same with it in the major , it would follow that the middle term would be ( in part at least ) not the same with it's self , as being in part identify'd with two extremes , which are not identify'd at all . for example . ce — no indivisible thing is corruptible , la — every spirit is an indivisible thing , therefore rent — no spirit is corruptible . when one of the premisses affirms universally , the other particularly , the conclusion must be a particular affirmative . for tho' one of the extremes be universally or totally connected with the medium , yet the other extreme is but particularly or in part connected with it : and so , it can never infer the total connexion of them , nor can the conclusion be an universal affirmative * because they were not to that degree connected with the medium in the premisses . for example , da — every good man is charitable , ri — some rich man is a good man ; therefore i — some rich man is charitable . . when one of the extremes is universally deny'd of the medium , and the medium particularly affirm'd of the other extreme , the conclusion must be a particular negative . for , were the terms totally the same in the minor , as it was in celarent , then the terms of the conclusion had been not at all the same , but vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there ; wherefore , being but in part the same in the minor , they can only be in part not the same in the conclusion . for example , fe-no harmful thing is to be used , ri — some mirth is a harmful thing , therefore o — some mirth is not to be used . from these grounds , the reason may be given for diverse maxims or axioms , commonly used by logicians , concerning this present matter ; telling us when and how the conclusions follow or not follow ; such as are , . from two vniversal negatives nothing follows . because neither extreme is connected with the medium , either in whole or in part ; nor , from this that two notions are different from a third , is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another . wherefore , a syllogism being such an artificial and perfectly order'd discourse , that , putting the premisses to be true , the conclusion must be true also , such as this ( and the same may be said in part of those other that follow ) wanting that due connexion of the terms which is essential to a syllogism ; are not syllogisms , but paralogisms , v. g. no brute is rational no man is a brute ; therefore no man is rational . from two particular propositions nothing follows . for a particular proposition expressing but some part of the whole notion of the middle term with which it is joyn'd , and there being more parts in that whole notion , one of the extremes may be united with it according to one part or consideration of it , and the other according to another part ; in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the conclusion : v. g. some man is a fool. some wise man is a man , therefore some wise man is a fool where some man , the medium , is taken for a diverse part as it were , of man in common ; and so the medium , as considered according to it's parts which are diverse , is not one it self : nor , consequently , can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self , which is the fundamental ground of all consequence . corol. hence follows immediatly that one of the premisses must be an vniversal , else nothing is concluded . which deserves remarking , this being useful to confute some wrong methods to science . . a negative conclusion cannot be deduced from affirmative premisses . because , if the extremes were the same with the medium in the premisses , and not the same with one another in the conclusion , it would follow that the middle term is the same and not the same with it self ; or else , that the connexion or inconnexion of the terms in the conclusion is not to be taken from the connexion or inconnexion with the middle term in the premisses , which utterly subverts all ground of discoursing . . the conclusion cannot be vniversal , unless the medium be once taken vniversally in the premisses . because , otherwise , both the premisses would be particulars ; from which ( as was proved § . . ) no conclusion can follow . . the conclusion always follows the worser part ; that is , it must be negative or particular , if either of the premisses be such . the reason of the former is , because , if either of the premisses be negative , then the medium is not the same with one of the terms of the conclusion ; and , therefore , it can never be the cause of identifying them both , which is done by inferring an affirmative conclusion . the reason of the latter is , because if it be only in part the same with one of the extremes , it cannot prove those extremes to be wholly the same , which can only be done by their being united with it universally ; for it can give no greater degree of connexion to the two extremes than it self has with them , as was shown § . . these maxims or positions being shown to be rational , and necessarily consequent to the grounds of rigorous or syllogistical discoursing , we proceed in our intended method . . a singular proposition may supply the place of a particular one in the minor of darii and ferio . for a singular or individual notion is , in reality , some part of the common notion ; and the words [ some man ] or [ some men ] do signify some individual man , or men ; wherefore , abating the manner of the indeterminate expression , the sense is the same in both . hence these are right syllogisms and conclusive . da-every philosopher resolves effects into their proper causes , ri — aristotle is a philosopher ; therefore i — aristotle resolves effects into their proper causes . fe-no man who supposes his grounds gratis is a philosopher , ri — epicurus supposes his grounds gratis ; therefore , o — epicurus is not a philosopher . . expository syllogisms , that consist of singular propositions are true and perfect syllogisms . for , since a syllogism is such a discourse as from the clear connexion of a middle notion with the two extremes inferrs the connexion of those extremes with one another , and singulars have their notions as well as universals , and may be connected with one another ; it follows that ( in case these discourses be not faulty in other respects ) they cannot , from the regard of their consisting wholly of singulars , be degraded from being true and perfect syllogisms . v. g. tom long brought me a letter this man is tom long ; therefore this man brought me a letter . . such syllogisms do not advance science . for , since we experience that our soul is not only capable of having universal notions , but that 't is her peculiar nature to abstract , that is , to draw singular notions to universal ones ; and , since notions are the ground of all knowledge , and , consequently , universal notions of universal knowledges ; and science is a perfection of our mind according to her nature ; and , therefore , does dilate and enlarge her natural capacity by extending it to the knowledge of vniversal truths : wherefore , since , on the other side , an expository syllogism , as consisting of singulars ; can conclude , or gain the soul knowledge of no more but some one singular , it cramps , contracts or makes narrow her natural capacity ; whence it follows , that such syllogisms are far from perfecting the soul , or from generating science , which is her natural perfection . . hence follows , that such syllogisms are good for vse and practise , and only for that : for , since such syllogisms are true discourses , and , therefore , are not wholly in vain , but must be good for something ; wherefore , since they conduce not at all to speculation or generating science ; it follows that they must be good for vse or practise , and for that only . again , since all outward action , use and practise is wholly employ'd about such subjects as exist , and nothing exists but suppositums , individuums , or singulars ; it follows , that singulars are the proper subjects of artificers , or such as work outwardly upon determinate matters ; and the knowledge of the nature of those singulars is useful and necessary for such men ; for , by this , they know how to work upon those subjects and manage them accordingly . for example , an architect by knowing the certain quantities and proportions of his materials ( wood , brick , or stone , ) may build a house ; but he cannot , without the science of mathematicks , have a clear knowledge ( out of the natures of those quantities ) why it must be so always , though it hit to do so once , or hic est nunc . note that practical self evidence may oftentimes ( as was shown formerly ) in a great measure supply here the place of science , and operate like it ; though it can never arrive to that clear and grounded penetration into the reasons of such , actions as is found in scientifical men. . hence , the way of arguing by induction can never breed science . first , because out of pure particulars nothing follows . next , because to argue from some part or parts to the whole , is inconsequent . wherefore , we cannot thence inferr an vniversal proposition or gain science of any nature , unless we could enumerate all the singulars in the world , that is , all the parts so to make up an equivalent to the whole , which is impossible . . hence follows immediatly that some vniversal proposition must be taken in if we would conclude any thing from a singular one . this has been amply show'd above ; and , accordingly , in mathematicks vniversal maxims and axioms use to be first laid , without which nothing in any subject can be known scientifically . . further , 't is collected from our former discourse that hypotheticall or conditional syllogisms are , in proper speech , no legitimate syllogisms ; nor , consequently , can they generate science , but by seeing , in common and confusedly , they are the same in sense with categorical ones . for , since we cannot see evidently the truth of any conclusion or have science of it , but by seeing evidently the connexion of the two extremes with the middle term ; and , this cannot be seen evidently unless all the terms be posturd in their right place , as is done in the first figure ; therefore , since neither this clear position of the terms , nor any thing like it , is found in hypothetical syllogisms , they are not in proper speech , syllogisms ; any more than are some sort of more concise rhetorical discourses , which have oftentimes virtually the sense of a categorical syllogism in them , though the parts of it be disjoynted and out of that due order that ought to be in a syllogism . . wherefore all hypothetical syllogisms ought in disputes to be reduced to categorical ones . for , the major neither absolutely affirms nor denies ; and therefore cannot be absolutely either affirm'd or deny'd . next , the same major proposition has a kind of consequence in its single self ; and so is a kind of imperfect syllogism even taken alone . ly . it does not identifie it's terms ; and , lastly , unless they be reduced to categorical ones , the figure of its parts cannot clearly appear . . the way to reduce them is to vary the phrase or tenour of the words , still keeping the same sense . for example this hypothetical , ( if science be a perfection of the mind it ought to sought after . but science is a perfection of the mind ; therefore science ought to be sought after . ) may easily be reduced to a categorical syllogism in barbara thus . what ever is a perfection of the mind ought to be look'd after . but all science is a perfection of the mind , therefore all science ought to be look'd after . . for some of the same reasons disjunctive syllogisms ought to be reduced to categorical ones , as it is either day or night . but it is not day ; therefore 't is night . which may be reduced to a categorical in darii thus . da-what ever time is not day is night ri — this present time is not day , therefore i — this present time is night . lesson iii. of the matter of a conclusive syllogism ; or , what middle ▪ term is proper for demonstration . the right manner of framing a conclusive syllogism , or of drawing a consequence right , which is the form of it , being thus laid open from its grounds ; there remains no more to be done as to the attainment of science , but to shew what is the proper matter of such a rigorous discourse : for , since the matter and form do constitute the whole essence or nature of every thing ; if both these be made known , there can nothing more be wanting for us to conclude or prove evidently ; which is the sole end and aim of the whole art of logick . wherefore , all the elaborate rules that occurr in common logicians , which conduce not to this end , are frivolous , and meerly invented for vain show and ostentation ; and are so far from advancing science , that they pester the way to it by making in more perplext and intricate , which obstructs the attainment of it . . such a middle term as is proper to conjoyn the other two is the only matter of a conclusive syllogism . for ; since there can be in a lawful syllogism but three terms , and two of them are given to our hands in the thesis to be proved , and the right placing of those terms belongs to the form of it ; there is no consideration left that can be conceiv'd to be the matter of it , or which , joyn'd with the former , makes it evidently conclude , but such a middle term which is apt to conjoyn the other two in the conclusion . . wherefore , such a term being found and order'd in the right form , nothing more can be requir'd to gain science of any proposition whatever . for , this done , the conclusion so necessarily follows , that it is as impossible it should not be true as it is that an identical proposition should be false ; or ( which is the same ) that a contradiction should be true , which are the highest impossibilities . wherefore , since to have science of any thing , is to know evidently the thing is so and cannot but be so , and this is known by the means now mentioned ; it follows that no thing more can be requir'd to gain science of any proposition whatever . . hence such a syllogism is demonstrative , and to produce or frame such a syllogism is to demonstrate : for , since a demonstration bears in its notion that it must be the most certain and most evident proof than can be ; and no proof can be more certain than that which renders it absolutely impossible the conclusion should not be true ; nor more evident than that which engages immediately the highest evidence of an identical proposition ; and all this ( as has been prov'd ) is found in a syllogism consisting of such a matter and such a form , it follows that such a syllogism is a demonstrative one , and that to prove by such a syllogism is to demonstrate . . all middle terms that are proper for demonstration must be taken originally from the nature of the thlng or from it's metaphysical verity , for , since all inferiour truths are therefore such because they are finally resolvable into identical propositions which are the first truths ; that is , because those first truths are virtually in them ; and identical propositions are therefore true ( because the thing is what it is , in which consists its metaphysical verity ; it follows that the verity of all inferiour truths ( such as are the premisses ) on whose truth all demonstration and truth of the conclusion necessarily depends , is taken originally from the metaphysical verity of the subject and predicate . again , since ( as has been shown ) the force of all consequence is grounded on this that the middle term is the same with it's self , or what it is ; it follows that the force of all middle terms that any way conduce to demonstration must be taken originally from the nature of the thing , or from it's metaphysical verity . . we can have no demonstration of the whole thing taken in gross . for , the whole thing , as was said , may be consider'd diverse wayes , and so ground many notions , and contains in it confusedly what corresponds to all those notions we can frame of it ; since then we cannot have at once a distinct and clear knowledg of what corresponds formally to any two notions , it follows that we can have no demonstration ( or distinct and clear knowledg ) of the whole thing taken in gross . . wherefore , if we would demonstrate the nature of the thing according to what 's essential to it , we must take in pieces , unfold , explicate , and , as it were , detail the thing into it's essential parts , that so we may look more clearly thro' it's nature or essence ; which is done by definitions of the whole first , and then of it's several essential parts , till we come to those parts of it which are most known , or to the common head. for , we experience that we have but a confused notion of a thing while it is exprest but in one word ; but , when many words are used to tell the nature of it , our knowledg of it grows clearer , and still more clear and distinct after each of those words also has it's meaning told , or is defind . for example , ask what such a thing is , it is answer'd a man ; which gives us , indeed , a true but a confused knowledg of it . whence we may have occasion to ask farther what is a man ? and the answer is a rational animal ; which clears the notion of man to a fair degree . but , the word animal is also confused , tho' less than homo was ; wherefore , to gain a more distinct knowledg of it , we set our selves to define it , and we find it to be a living or self-moving thing that is sensitive , or which is mov'd by impression on the senses . and thus still to gain clearer light of more and more essential notions or considerations of man , we may drive on farther the definitions of the ascending genus till we come to ens or substantia , which is the supreme in that line , ( and the clearest of any except existence ) which stints our quest . by which way of defining still upwards , we gain many distinct notions of man's essence , which were before confusedly blended in the single word [ man ] . and , were the collateral differences , which constitute the inferiour notions to ens , defin'd too as well as each genus , descending in a right line from it , we should gain a most distinct and clear essential notion of man. . it remains to define the difference [ rational ] which is the other essential notion that compounds the entire notion of man. if we ask then what reason is , it will be answer'd that it is a faculty of deducing some new knowledg out of foregoing ones ; or ( to express it in the language of art ) to draw a proposition call'd the conclusion from two other true ones call'd the premisses . to know more distinctly what this definition means , we may ask what a proposition is , and what true means , and it will be answered that a proposition is defin'd , a speech by which one notion is affirm'd ( or deny'd ) of another . next , ask what a notion is and we are answer'd by the definition of it , that a notion is the very thing as conceiv'd by us , or , the thing as existing in our understanding . ask what true is , it is answer'd , it is the conformity of what is in our mind to the thing without us . ask what affirming is , it is answered , it is the comparing one of the terms of ●he proposition to the other , or seeing they both ●gree in the same ens. ask what deducing is , ●nd 't is answer'd 't is a comparing two terms ●o a third , and seeing them to be the same with it , and thence the same with one another ; all which being known , we shall have gain'd ●he distinct and clear notion of reasoning or exact discoursing , and consequently of rationa●ity , the power which produces that act. . hence proper middle terms may be taken from the line of ens ( and the same may be said of any other common head ) for demonstrations of any truth that belongs essen●ially to any notion or nature in those ●espective lines . for they are taken from the definitions , afforded us by the genus and dif●erence in each line , both parts of which de●initions are essential . . tho' when it happens otherwise it wrongs not the demonstration , yet this is best done when the superiour notion is predicated of that which is the immediate inferiour , and that inferiour of the notion immediately under it . for then the middle term is not by our choice or ordering , but ex naturâ rei placed in the middle between them . as every animal is a living thing , every man is an animal , therefore every man is a living thing . every man is an animal . peter is a man , therefore peter is an animal . . the same may be said when any of the intrinsecal differences is used for the middle term ; even tho' it be remote , in the same line , from one of the extremes ; as every sensitive thing is an animal , every worm is a sensitive thing ; therefore every worm is an animal . the same holds in all the rest , whether they be generical or differential notions ; whether immediate or mediate . for , the same reason concludes for one as for the other . viz. because all such are essential predicates ; and , being found in the same essence , are not only identify'd in the same thing materially , as is done when in a true proposition the subjects and predicates are in distinct lines as aethiops est niger ; but being , either expresly , or by consequence , included in some part of the definition , the formality of one is , in some part , the formality of the others ; as the notions of ens , corpus , mixtum , vivens , sensituum , are found in part to be formally in the entire notion of homo . the art of dividing right is requisit to make exact definitions . because the genus and one of the proper differences that divide that common notion do constitute and integrate the definition . note that the genus must be immediate ; because , otherwise , it confounds the intermemediate notions with the species ; and , so , gives a less-distinct conception of the notion to be defin'd . hence , ens or vivens rationale is not a good definition of homo ; because ens and vivens do but confusedly , or in part , speak the notion or nature of animal . nor is rationale the proper and immediate difference of ens and vivens . . hence dichotomy , or a division made by two members , is the best . for , in such a division , the parts , if rightly exprest , may be most easily seen to be equivalent to the whole . that dichotomy in which the members are contradictory is the very best division that can be imagin'd . as that of ens into divisible and indivisible ; ( that is not-divisible ) of animal into rational and irrational ; ( that is not-rational ) of number , into odd and even ( or not-odd ) for , since there can be no middle between contradictories , it is evident there can be no more members than two ; and , consequently , that those two parts are equivalent to the whole . . the whole definition , and all the members of a division that is rightly made , ( if taken together , ) may be a proper medium for a demonstration . for both of these , taken together , are equivalent to the whole notion defin'd and divided ; and may as well be a middle term as that whole notion exprest by one word , as by man. animal , &c. v. g. every rational animal is capable of science , every clown is a rational animal , therefore every clown is capable of science . what-ever is either even or odd is capable of proportion , all number is either even or odd , therefore all number is capable of proportion . . out of what has been proved 't is seen that definitions are one of the best instruments or best means to attain science . for , since all knowledg is taken from the nature of the thing ; and , therefore all distinct and clear knowledg ( such as science ought to be ) from the nature of the thing distinctly and clearly represented ; and this ( as has been shown ) is done by definitions ; it follows that definitions are one of the best instruments or best means to attain to science . . another use to be made of definitions in order to demonstration is this ; when two notions , by being remote , seem in a manner disparate , and , so , the proposition is obscure ; we are to pursue home the definitions of each of the terms till something that is formally identical appears in both of them , which done , all farther disquisition ceases , and the point is demonstrated . for example ; if we would prove that virtue is laudable , we shall find that the word [ laudable ] signifies [ deserving to be spoke well of ] and practical self-evidence , as well as reason , telling us , that , our speech being nothing but signes agreed on by mankind to express their thoughts , that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of ; and that what 's according to the true nature of him that speaks or thinks , or to true reason , deserves to be judg'd by him right and good , that is , thought well of , to which add that virtue is nothing but a disposition to act according to true reason , it comes to appear that [ virtuo ] and [ laudable ] have something couch't in their notions that is formally identical ; and that this proposition , [ virtue is laudable ] is full as certain as that what 's according to right reason is according to right reason , or what 's laudable is laudable ; which seen , perfect knowledg is had of the truth of [ virtue is laudable ] that is , 't is the proposition ; evidently concluded or demonstrated . note hence that , in resolving truths thus into first principles , rigorous definitions do not alwayes need , but explications of the two notions ( or of the meaning of the words that express the two terms ) may serve , so they be true and solid ; since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the inferiour truths , and the notions that compound them , into superiour ones . for which reason also practical self-evidence , or a knowledg agreed on by all mankind in their natural thoughts , through converse with those natural objects , is sufficient : for this is a solid knowledg , tho' it be not lick't into artificial shape . whence it may suffice oftentimes without framing the demonstration , coucht in these discourses , into a syllogistick method ; unless the form of the discourse be deny'd . . hence follows , that all truths have at the bottom identical propositions , and are grounded on them . for , since all truths are therefore such , because they are conformable to the nature of the thing , or to its being what it is , which is express'd by an identical proposition ; it follows that all truths have at the bottom identical propositions and are grounded on them . . hence every errour has at the bottom a fect contradiction , and is grounded on it . for , since all truths , as being conformable to the nature of the thing , are grounded on the things being what it is , and so have an identical proposition for their bases ; therefore , for the same reason , every error , being a dis-conformity to the thing , or a deviation from its being what it is , must be grounded on this , as its first principle , that the thing is not what it is , which is a perfect contradiction . . hence follows necessarily , that , if art and industry be not wanting , every truth is reducible to a self evid●nt or an identical proposition , and every errour to a contradiction . for , since these ( as has been prov'd ) are the bas●s or bottom-principles of all truths and falshoods ; and all inferiour propositions derìve all their truth or falshood from the first truths or falshoods , that is , from identical propositions or contradictions ; it follows that , either no truth or falshood can be finally known , or be knowable or provable to be such ; or else they must be reducible either to identical propositions or to contradictions , as the tests of their truth or falsity . corol. i. hence follows that , all learning being knowledge , those men only ought to be accounted , absolutely speaking , true schollars or perfectly learned , who can thus settle truth and confute errour ; that is , thus demonstrate the conformity of the position he maintains to the nature of the thing , or the disconformity of his adversaries thesis to the essence of the subject under dispute . by which it will appear how unjustly many men are esteem'd learned , by the generality , meerly for their having read a multitude of authors : since the former know the truth of the things , or of the subjects discours'd of ; these only know it to be true , that such and such authors , say thus or thus . those are such schollars as have god and nature for their masters . these are only the schollars of meer men ; who , if they take not this way , speak out of fancy , which is ungrounded , and therefore various and inconstant : whence , such men of reading use to fill their heads with a gallimowfry of thrums ends of sayings glean'd from diverse logicians or philosophers discoursing thus or thus ; but if you put them to demonstrate any point , or to reduce it to its first principles , they are utterly at a loss . a certain sign they do not , in true speech , know any thing . corol. ii. were the method of reducing truths , as is abovesaid , well settled , probability in speculatives ( which is the bane of science ) would be quite dash'd out of countenance , and sham'd out of the schools . to do which , how highly it conduces to the advancement of science , is ●●sily discernible by the dimmest eye . lesson iv. how every truth is to be reduced to an identical proposition ; and consequently , every errour to a contradiction ; what consequences follow thence of one truth being in another ; and of the science of pure spirits . . to reduce any truth to an identical proposition is nothing but to show clearly that , if you deny such a truth , you must , by consequence , deny the identical one which is proper to that subject , and expresses its being what it is . for , since the reducing inferiour truths in any subject to those which are supreme or identical is perform'd by way of discourse or drawing consequences ; and , it is evident that those propositions which are inferiour truths , and the supreme ones cannot be the same formally and expresly ; it follows that they can only be the same virtually , or as one truth is included in another . wherefore as deducing is nothing but deriving downwards the verity which was in some higher truths to the inferiour ones ; so reducing is the carrying upwards or resolving those inferiour truths into those higher ones on which they depend , and the showing them to be by consequence the same ; or that the inferiour thesis must needs be true , if the identical or supreme one be so ; and that the supreme one cannot be true , unless the inferiour one be such also : so that the verity of the supreme truth does by consequence stand engag'd in the patronage of the inferiour one . l●mma . all essences consist in an indivisible . for , since essence is the form of the ens , and ens that which is capable of existing , and nothing can exist but that which is ultimately determin'd in the line of ens , and distinguisht from all others in that line ; and , any essential predicate taken away , it wants part of its essence , that is , part of that which was to constitute it such an ens , and distinguish it from all others , that is , which determin it to be this ; it follows that the notion of ens or essence requires a totality of all its essential parts : but a totality ( since the least part defalkt from it makes it to be no totum ) consists in an indivisibility ; therefore all essences consist in an indivisible . . hence an easie way is chalkt out how to reduce any truth to an identical proposition or any errour to a contradiction . for , let but the subject of the discourse ( homo for example ) be defin'd , and the two parts of its definition be defind likewise , and so forwards ; we shall have gain'd a clear and distinct notion of the subject , and of all its essential parts . if , then , the discourse be about the nature or essence of homo ; all the divisions of the parts of that essence , which are common notions , being ( as they ought ) made by contradictory differences , and this from the notion of ens to the very notion discours'd of ; consequently , that discourse must either evidently clash with and contradict some one of those essential parts , or agree to them all. if it contradicts any one of them , then , since essences consist in an indivisible , it does , by consequence , destroy the whole essence of the subject , and make homo not to be homo ; and , if it agrees with all its parts , then , since , all the parts are evidently the whole , 't is by consequence as certain as it is that homo is homo ; since to say that homo is an ens , and such an ens as is corpus , and such a corpus as is compounded , and such a compound body as is vivens , and such a vivens , as is sensitive or an animal , and such an animal as can have notions in it , and can compare one notion to another , and two to a third , is evidently to say in equivalent terms homo est homo : . another method of resolving all truths into identical propositions is to define both the subject and predicate , and to pursue their definitions till some notion that is perfectly identical appears in both ; as is instanced in this proposition [ virtue is laudable ] in the last lesson § . . . moreover , all conclusions formally as such , that is , considering them as inferr'd or concluded , are resolv'd finally into this identical proposition , [ the same is the same with its self ] as has been demonstrated above b. . l. . § . . . wherefore , the method being settled of reducing to identical propositions both inferiour truths , which are the premisses ; and , also the necessity of the following of the conclusions from their respective premisses , which is the consequence ; it is hard to conceive what can be farther wanting to the method to science ; so these rules be thorowly penetrated , and industriously put in practice . . all truths whatever that concern the essences of things , if we have but notions of the terms of the propositions which express them , do come within the compass of this method , and are demonstrable . for , since all truths , whose terms we understand , do consist of notions ; and , it s not hard to know to what common head those notions do belong , nor insuperably hard to divide by proper differences that common head ; nor the less general notions under that head , till we come to the very notions whose connexion is in question ; it follows , that all propositions belonging to any head , are , for the same reason , equally reducible to their proper identicals ; since all the predicates in the nine last common heads , which are analogically entia , have also their analogical essences ; of which we can have as clear and distinct notions as we have of the first common head which is properly ens ; and , so we can as easily define their abstract notions as we can the other , ( or rather much more easily ) and consequently reduce them to their identicals . . hence we can discourse scientifically , or have true science , not only of quantities , which are the subject of mathematicks ; but , with equal reason , of virtues and vices , which are the subject of ethicks . for , we can equally abstract the notions of the several virtues , have a distinct conception of them , equally define them , and by that means equally reduce them to their identicals . and the same may be said of other qualities that affect our senses very distinctly , as heat , cold , moist , dry : &c. note , that in such as these , if it be too laborious to arrive at their definitions by dividing the common genus , as it often happens when the dividing members are more than two , and are not contradictory to one another ; then we may frame our definitions of them by observing the carriage of the vulgar towards them , or their sayings concerning them , for such qualities , being sensible ones , are the objects of the senses of mankind , and do imprint lively and distinct notions of themselves in all men . wherefore their sayings being the effect of the true notions they have of them , they ( if enow of them be collected ) must give us the true notion of them ; or which is all one , of what they mean by the word that expresses them , which is equivalent in sense to a perfect definition . for example , when they speak of those qualities we call dry and moist , we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest moist things should squander and run about , and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some receptacle or vessel that may keep them from doing so ; or they bid their servants do it . on the contrary , they bid them set dry things on the cupboard , or on a shelf ; and never put them in a vessel , or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a pot or tub , out of fear they should squander about . which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the definitions of both those qualities ; viz. that moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or figure , and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing ; and dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or figure , and is difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another ; which are the very definitions , which that great observer of nature , aristotle , gives us of those two qualities . note ii. whence we may , with a humble acknowledgment and thanks , reflect on the infinite goodness of the god of truth , who unenviously bestows knowledge on all , who will dispose themselves to receive it ; that , where-ever art , by reason of our shortness , is at a plunge , he supplies it by practical self-evidence , or the naturally instill'd knowledge of the vulgar : whence it is a high pride in the greatest men of art , to conceit that they are above being still the children of nature ; whereas 't is the best title they have to true and solid learning . — sus minervam — . all conclusions are virtually in the premisses ; for , since the premisses , by means of the middle term and the right placing of it , have in them the whole force of the consequence ; and the consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some determinate proposition , which can be nothing but the conclusion ; it follows that all conclusions are virtually in the premisses . again , since , before we conclude determinately and expresly we must know what to conclude , and we know what to conclude by knowing the premisses , and the conclusion is that proposition which is to be concluded ; it follows evidently that , since we know the conclusion , e'er we actually inferr and express it , to be in the premisses , it is there virtually . . all deduced truths are virtually in one another . for , since all deduced truths are conclusions , and the conclusions are virtually in the premisses ; and the same reason holds for all the following conclusions as for the first , or for one single one ; it follows that , let there be never so many orderly-succeeding syllogisms necessary to prove any point , the conclusions are still in the premisses and the following ones in those that went before them . . all truths are virtually in the identical propositions ; and , consequently , in the definitions . for since all truths are taken from the nature of the things , and from their metaphysical verity , and consequently are in the nature of the thing fundamentally ; and this is contain'd and exprest in the whole by identical propositions , and in all its parts by the definitions ; it follows that all truths are virtually contain'd in identical propositions , and , consequently , in the definitions . . from what 's lately said , 't is evinced that , if a middle term be taken which is a proper cause or proper effect , the conclusion is seen to be in the premisses . for , though the proper causes and effects be not the very essence of the thing ; yet , since an effect is a participation of the cause , and so is apt to manifest the nature of the proper cause that produced it ; and , the operation of a proper cause is nothing but the * existence of such a cause ( which is sutable to its essence ) imprinted upon the patient ; hence , such mediums do demonstrably and mutually inferr one another ; and therefore nothing hinders , but that the conclusions may be seen to be in the premisses as well in such syllogisms as in those which have an essential notion for their middle term. . hence all natural truths , and this throughout the whole course of nature , from the very creation , are virtually in one another , for , since , as will be more clearly seen hereafter , all those natural effects were demonstrative of their proper causes , and those causes demonstrative of their proper effects ; and this from the first starting of nature into motion ; and so were apt to inferr one another all along ; that is , new conclusions were still apt to spring from such middle terms connected with the two extremes in the premisses ; and , consequently , the truth of those conclusions were all along virtually in those several premisses ; it follows that all natural truths are in one another , and this throughout the whole series or course of nature from the very creation . . hence , had we liv'd in every place , and in every part of time , where and when those several causes wrought those several effects , and had been endowed with capacity sufficient for such a performance , and not been diverted with other thoughts from application to that work ; we might have actually demonstrated those effects by their proper causes or those causes by their proper effects , through the whole series or course of the world , from the beginning to the end ; except miracle had alter'd that natural course . for , in that case , all those subjects had afforded us matter or fit mediums for demonstration , as well as any single subject does now ; wherefore , if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid , and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance , it had been done . . hence every soul separated from the body that knows any one natural truth knows all nature , and this all at once , at the first instant of her separation . for , since all nature is carry'd on by proper causes , and proper effects , and those mutually inferr one another ; that is , the truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the truth grounded on the other , as being virtually in one another , and we experience that the capacity of the soul to know truths is not fill'd by knowing many truths , but is enlarged and enabled to know still more ; and , being clear of the body , she is not distracted by objects working upon the senses and the fancy , but intimately and necessarily present to her self , and , consequently , to what is in her self ; and so is addicted , apply'd and naturally necessitated to know the nature of her body , and , consequently of her self , as being the form of that body , and fitted for it ; and , by her self to know all the truths connected with the knowledge of her self , that is ( as was shown ) all nature ; and this , not successively , one truth after another , as she did when she was in the body and needed the fancy , and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace , but , being now a pure spirit and indivisible ▪ and so not commensurable to time , or to before and after , which are the differences of time , she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a pure spirit , that is , at the instant of her separation . these things being evidently so , it follows that every soul separated from the body , that knew any one natural truth , knows all nature , and this , all at once , in the first instant of her separation . but of this more hereafter . corol. i. hence we may frame some imperfect conception how our science differs from that of angels , and how angels must know things intuitively . for , since they have no senses , they can have no abstracted notions by different impressions from the objects on the senses ; nor , consequently , can they compound any two notions to frame a proposition ; much less can they discourse , or compare two notions to a third , and so deduce thence new knowledges , call'd conclusions : it is left therefore , that they must a tone view , comprehend entirely the metaphysical verity of the whole thing , and all that is in it , which we express by an identical proposition . whence this knowledge or intuition of theirs , abating the composition found in an identical proposition ( which too is the least that is imaginable ) is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these identicals . by which we see that the supremum infimi , in respect of an angel's and man's manner of knowledge , is ( as the order of entities requires ) contiguous as it were , to that which is superiour to it . corol. ii. hence also is seen how a separated soul knows all things after a different manner than angels do . for , though the substance of a separated soul's operation be intuitive , as is the angels ; yet , because her natural genius led and forced her here to d●scourse and gather one truth by another , that is , to see one truth in another ; hence , she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the discoursiveness she had here , though she cannot in that state exercise it ; and that , though she cannot then actually deduce new truths , yet she sees all truths as deducible from one another , or following one another by consequence . we may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course similitude . when we look upon a picture call'd a prospective , all the parts of it are equally near our eye in themselves , and we see them too all at once ; yet , they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another , even to a vast distance ; observing still a perfect order and decorum in their greater propinquity or remoteness , according as those parts are more or less shadowed or luminous . so the soul knows all at once whatever is knowable by her , and they are equally near the eye of her understanding ; yet , because of her acquiring them here by way of discourse , that is , by proceeding from more-clear to less clear truths , she sees them as following one another , or , as it were , beyond one another ; because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves , but depending on the others for their evidence . lesson v. of other mediums for demonstration taken from the four causes . . there must necessarily be † four causes concurring to every effect in nature . for , since nothing can do nothing , it follows that nothing can be done , unless there be something that does or acts , that is unless there be an efficient cause . which efficient must act upon something or some patient , which is the matter on which it works , or the material cause . and it must work something in that matter , which , being received in it , must be some form ( either substantial or accidental ) which must consequently concurr to that action formally , or be the formal cause of it . and , since the orderer of all nature , or the first cause , is an intelligent being and not blind chance , ( for whàt's blind can order nothing ) and this first cause is the adequate governour of the world , and , being an intelligent being acts seeingly or with design , that is , with prospect of some end in every thing that is done , how great or minute soever ; and e●ery intelligent creature that administers the world , in their several stations , under him ▪ ( wh●●her they be angels or men ) do , for the same reason , act designingly too ; that is , do propose to themselves some end , good , reason or mo●ive for which they act , and without ●hich 't is against their nature to act ; and since metaphysicks do clearly demonstrate that the immediate action of the first cause is only to give being , and * the oeconomy of the world is administred immediately by other intelligent beings under him ; hence , there must be a final cause too for every effect that is done in the world , how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem . wherefore , there must necessarily be four causes concurring to ev●ry effect in nature , viz. the efficient , ma●●rial , formal , and final . for example , in my action of writing a letter , the efficient cause is my self : the material cause , is the paper ; the formal , the characters drawn in the paper ; and the final , to gratify my friend , acquaint him with news , &c. . hence we can demonstrate the an est of those four causes in the whole mass of corporeal nature , how remote soever it is from us ; and that they must concur to every effect , tho' we do not know the quid est of them . the first part of our thesis is proved ; for , since the an est of all those causes , or that there must be such four causes necessarily concurring to every effect , follows out of the nature of action , from the subject●s being quantitative and consequently variable substantially or accidentally , and from the supreme agent 's being intelligent ; and these are equally found in all parts of the universe , how remote soever they be , or in the whole mass of bodies ; it follows that the same causes do concur to every effect all over the world , as they do in those bodies near us , and with whose operations we are acquainted . the second part is evident , since the knowledg of the an est or [ that there is something ] may it be known by experience , tho' we know not what that thing is ; as we experience when we hit casually upon something in the dark , or run against it , tho' we neither see or know what that thing is ; or , when we see a thing a far off , we know that that thing is , tho' as yet we know not what it is . the course of nature is carry'd on by efficient cau●es and effects ; for since a first cause being suppos'd who is infinitely wise , he administ●rs his workmanship , the world , after the wisest and best manner ; which is , that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack , but perfectly coherent ; nor can this be done , among an infinit variety of bodies , by any other means ( so as to make up the course of nature ) but by making effects necessarily follow from their causes ; since , if that were not , the course of nature would be at a stand , and need the artificers hand at every turn to make it go on , which argues an imperfection in the workmanship it self : it follows , that the course of nature must be carry'd on by efficient causes and effects . . the course of nature must be c●●ry'd on by such efficient causes and effects as 〈◊〉 ●roper to one another . for , were ●ot ●●ese ●auses and effects proper to one anothe● ▪ any 〈◊〉 might do any thing , or suff●r from any thing : v. g. fire might both heat , and cool , and m●i●ten ; and water might be as combustible as dry wood , and so of all the rest . in whi●h case no man could tell how to order his actions , or what efficient cause , or what matter , rather than another , he is to make use of to produce any effect ; nor , consequentl● , sin●e ●uch essences are ordain'd for such and such ends , could the essences or natures of things be known or distinguisht more than in outward appearance . . hence follows immediately that every such proper efficient cause put to be actually causing , must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 proper effect . for since to caus● is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do , what 〈◊〉 actually causing must cause something or pro●uce some effect . an● this effect must be a proper one as has been prov'd . § . . . all the efficient causes in nature are actually causing . for , since the virtue or power of working is in the efficient cause it self , as being nothing but it's existence , and the matter to be wrought upon is quantitative , that is , of it 's own nature either perfectly or imperfectly divisible , and variable innumerable manners of ways according to it's qualities ; nor can it have an infinite power of resisting the efficiency of the least cause , hence , it is apt to have an impression made upon it to some degree by any quantitative agent , provided there be but immediate application of the agent to the patient , and that it is pr●st upon it : but , there being no vacuum , immediate application of one natural body to another must needs be throughout all nature ; and the course of nature consisting in mo●ion , one body must necessarily press upon that which is next it . from all which it follows evidently that all the efficient causes in nature are actually causing . . from these discourses 't is evident that we can demonstrate proper effects from proper efficient causes , which we call demonstrating â priori ; and proper efficient causes from proper effects , which is call'd demonstrating à posteriori . for , since a cause and a reason do onely differ in this , that the word [ cause ] speaks the thing as it is in nature , and [ reason ] the same thing as 't is in our understanding ; and proper causes and effects in nature are necessarily connected to one another , and , consequently , do infer one another naturally ; it follows , that those causes ( and , for the same reason effects ) as they are in our vnderstanding must be the reason why one infers the other in our understanding : whence follows , that tho●e causes and effects can be u●'d as proper middle terms to infer or conclude one another . and , that proofs made by such mediums are demonstrative is clear ; for no proof can be more clear than that which is grounded on those notions or natures being connected naturally and , so connected that it is impossible it should be otherwise ; as 't is shown these are § . § . . and . . this is farther confirm'd , because , two bodies that are immediate , do act and re-act , or are ( in some respect ) mutually causes and effects to one another : for since their existences ( which is their power of acting ) are immediately apply'd ; and by the course of nature , consisting in motion , prest upon one another ; and no natural agent is of infinite power , nor consequently can it subdue all the resistence of the patient in an instant ; it follows that , till one of them be , by degrees , totally subdu'd , the resisting body must necessarily , for the reason given , re-act upon it ; whence they will be , to some degree or in some respect , mutual causes and effects in regard of each other . corol. i. the carrying on this connected course of natural causes is called providence ; and , as joyn'd with a course of supernatural ones ( interiour and exteriour ) perfecting and stre●gthening the will all along to the very end , and ripening souls for bliss ( which we call grace ) is that which is truly meant by predestinatio● ; which sounds so terribly and is such ●●ugbea● to those that mis-understand it . cor●● . ●i . every step of this order of causes has entity or goodness in it . for it is manifestly the causing of something by something . corol. ●●i . therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of ●●e first cause to cause , or lay any 〈◊〉 , for sin. for , sin ( formally as such ) has no kind of entity or goodness in it , either ●etaphysical , physical or moral ; but is formally a meer privation of some entity or goodness which ought to be in an intelligent creature ; whence it comes that , by falling-short here in using the means , that creature falls short hereafter of attaining the end , which is only attainable by such means . to explicate which high points fully is left to solid divines . i mean such as do not guide themselves by meer words , but by reason and good sense . corol. iv. hence follows also that , were all the efficient causes that produce any effect , known to us , we could have no accidental predications , nor consequently any opinions ; but the effect would still be equally demonst●able from the complexion of those causes , as it is now from some one single efficient , as was hinted formerly . corol. v. hence , to one that comprehends the complexion of all causes , there could be no chance ; nor could such a man have any ground for such a notion ; for , chance ( as the common use of the word tells us ) signifies an vnseen or vnforeseen cause ; whereas no cause is vnseen to him who sees demonstratively how all natural effects follow all along from the causes , and that they cannot but follow from such causes . corol. vi. hence , tho' we know not particularly the quid est of this exact order of the world , or the course of nature , because we comprehend not all causes , nor know what cause or causes did all a long produce such effects ; yet , since we know and can demonstrate the an est of this order , or that the course of nature is still carry'd on by proper causes and effects ; hence , we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that chimerical cause , call'd chance , governing the world ; which fantastick whimsy is imputed to the epicureans . corol. . hence we can demonstrate that every the least motion of a fly or an insect , the figure of every leaf of a tree , or grain of sand on the sea shore , do come within the compass of this course of nature , or gods providence ; which neglects not the least of his creatures , but has a superintendency over all . which considerations , tho' they may at first sight seem incredible and paradoxical , and stun our reason ; yet , after that , by recourse to our principles , we have recover'd our dazled sight , and clearly see they must be true , will exceedingly conduce to raise our souls connaturally to deep contemplations of gods infinit wisdom , goodness and providence and ground in us a perfect resignation to his will in all occurrences ; and let us see and be asham'd of our froward , proud , peevish and selfish humour , which nothing will content but the having the whole course of nature alter'd for our sakes ; as if the world were made meerly for us , or that causes should not have their proper effects . which being a contradiction , is therefore , as unreasonable and foolish as it is in a man , that wants money , to be angry that two and three shillings do not make forty . corol. viii . hence , none can have just occasion to grumble at god's providence for ill successes . for , since we know à priori that god , he being infinitely wise , casts the whole frame of the world , or the course of causes , in the most perfect and best order ; to wish we should be otherwise , after we see that no causes can bring our endeavouring it to effect , is to wish the whole world should be worse for the interest of one inconsiderable piece of it : which is against common sense and the light of nature to expect from a common governour , who is to provide in the first place for the common good ; and is even against the judgment and generous practice of diverse heathens , who for the common good of a small part of the world , ( their own country ) have not car'd to ruine their private concerns , nay to sacrifice their lives . corol. ix . on this doctrine is grounded the duty of gratitude we owe to god for all the good we have , of what nature soever . for , it is hence seen demonstratively , that god is as much the giver of that good , by laying such a steady course of innumerable causes to convey it to us , as if he had given it by his own hand immediately ; nay , it ought more to increase our gratitude , to see that he has ordered such an infinity of causes , from the beginning of the world , to be instrumental to our good. corol. x. hence , lastly , is shewn the wisdome of christianity ; which instructs all its followers to express in their common language , and to put in practise all the substance of those truths , which we have , with so much labour , speculatively demonstrated . as when they say that , every thing that happens is gods will ; pray his will may be done ; resign to it ; acknowledg that all the good they have comes from god , thank him for it , free him from all imputation of injustice when any harm lights to them , and bear it with a humble patience , &c. . there is a certain order , or priority of nature , in our notions taken from the same subject , by which one of them ( or which is the same , the subject as grounding one of those notions ) is conceiv'd to be kind of efficient cause of another of them . for it is evident that the first efficiency of fire is the making that smart impression on our feeling sense which we call heating ; out of which , if continu'd , it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt body on which it works . to which 't is consequent , that it disgregates the heterogeneous parts of it , and congregates the homogeneous ones ; from which latter effects of heating , as being most obvious and discernible to mankind , aristotle takes his definition of hot things . thus , out of rationality springs a solid and serious content in discovering new truths , which are the natural perfection of a soul ; and , from this content a greater degree of the love of seeing still more truths . thus risibility springs from rationality ; the object of which is not a solid food , nourishing and dilating the soul as is this later , which causes some increase of science in her ; but as it were a kind of light repast and recreation to her , sprung from the observing some trifling particulars which were odd , aukward , and sudden or unexpected , and withal not harmful or contristating . . in those subjects which have many accidents in them , we must separate those accidents from the subject , and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an effect ; which found , we shall discover a proper cause and its proper effect . for example , put case we experience aloes purges choler , we must separate its colour , smell , hardness , bitter tast , and the rest of its accidents , and endeavour to find out , according to which of them it produces that effect ; and if we can find it does this precisely as bitter , we shall discover that bitterness is the proper medicine against choler ; and thence we can gain this certain knowledge , and establish this universal conclusion , that every bitter thing is good against choler ; according to that solid maxim in logick , a quatenus ad omne valet consequentia . note , that induction in such cases gives great light to a man already well vers'd in natural principles . but , this former maxim must be understood with this provis● that it be meant to hold per se loquendo , as the schools phrase it ; that is , if nothing hinders ; as it does often in the practise of physick . for , in mixt bodies there is a strange variety and medly of accidents or qualities ; divers of which are of a disparate and sometimes of a sub-contrary or contrary nature to one another ; so that it requires a great sagacity to add to them such other mixts as may obviate their interfering , and make the intended effect follow . thus much of demonstration from the thing as it is active , or from the efficient ; which is the first of the four causes . . demonstrations may be taken also from the matter or material cause , that is from the thing or subject , as it is passive . for , from the divisibility of a thing ( whether that divisibility be metaphysical , or physical ) we may demonstrate the corruptibility of it ; which , necessarily following out of the thing as 't is divisible , is therefore a property of it . thus , capable of admiring is a property necessarily inferring rationality in it's subject : admiration being nothing but a suspension of the rational faculty at a stand , or non-plust , to find a reason for the thing it admires ; whence it inferrs demonstratively a power of reasoning , capable to act or exercise it self in other things . of this kind are all passive properties , which are quarto modo ( as the schools phrase is ) or properly such : for , these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the essence , are , by consequence , naturally connected with it , and the essence with them ; whence they are proper mediums to inferr demonstratively such an essence à posteriori , and the essence a fit medium to demonstrate them à priori . . that demonstrations may be taken from the formal cause or from the subject as 't is formally and essentially such , has been shewn above lesson . . §§ . . and . where it was manifested that the middle notions in the gradual line , giving us the parts that were included in the definition , are proper middle terms to connect demonstratively the inferiour and superiour notions . . the causality of the final cause consiststing in this , that it moves the efficient to act , this cause can have no place but in intelligent beings . this is evident , because only such can know an end or consequently aim at it , or work for it . corol. ii. wherefore , when 't is said that such an effect ( v. g. the following of water in a pump ) happens in nature ne detur vacuum , that nature flies from or abhors vacuum ; that ( as aristotle acutely speculated ) entia nolunt malè gubernari ; and such like ; the true meaning of those sayings can only be this , that 't is highly against the nature of the first intelligent being who created the world , and of the inferior ones ( angels ) who manage it under him , that ground should be laid in nature for a contradiction to be true , or that the course of nature should be contriv'd in a bad method or carry'd on after an absurd manner . corol. xii . hence , these sayings , thus rightly understood , have in them the force of a nobler and more solid demonstration from the final cause , than can be taken from any corporeal efficients and effects , though they be never so proper to one another . for , these sayings engage the nature of the supreme cause , and of the noblest causes under him ; and which , had they not rectitude in their understandings , wills and operations , all nature would be wrong , and ground or beget in us nothing but error . the demonstration stands thus . the immediate end of those causes is that the world should be order'd wisely , that is , so as that th● things should be a ground for truth ; therefore 't is most highly impossible there can be any ground for a contradiction , in things which the first cause did make , and the others do manage : but , were there a vacuum there would be ground for a contradiction . ergo , &c. corol. xiii . hence , we may with pity remark the ignorance , folly or rather phrenzy of those gross speculators , who , by allowing nothing but the course of nature , are forc●d by their impious and foolish tenet to speak of insensible things , as if they were intelligent . 't is something pardonable in lovers , when they speak to trees , rivers , and mountains to vent the passion that be-mads them ; but 't is shameful in pretenders to philosophy , who are to reduce natural effects to their causes , and to speak of both literally as they are . yet , such and so apply'd , must be the common language of meer naturalists , who look no higher than matter , and talk of great nature , or the soul of the world , and such windy whimsies , ordering things thus and thus , that is designing an end ; hating and abhorring this thing , affecting another . which yet , all the while , they deny to be intelligent things , lest they should grant a first being making nature , and spiritual second causes carrying on the course of it , and moving it regularly . nor matters it that we had now and than to use the same language ; for we do acknowledge it to be improper , and can reduce it to a litteral sense agreeing to the natures of those things manag'd by such governors , which these men cannot . . there can be no final cause in respect to god. for end and good being the same , and god being infinitely perfect and infinitely happy in himself , there can no good accrue to him from any thing out of himself , or from creatures , and so they cannot have the notion of an end in respect to him . wherefore , when it is said that god aims at the good of his creatures , or that to govern the world wisely is his end ; the meaning of these words is only this , that he acts as becomes his wisdom , or ( his wisdom being his essence ) he acts as he is . . speaking of mankind , we can demonstrate some acts of his will from the final cause supposed , and a final cause from the supposed acts of his will. for , since the will is a power , and all powers are specify'd or have their particular essence from the respect they have to such or such objects ; and the object of the will is an appearing good , it follows that it is essential to the will to act for an appearing good , wherefore , if we can demonstrate ( as we may often ) that such a particular object must ( all things consider'd ) appear a good to a man in such circumstances ; it will both follow â priori that , if his will acts , it is for an appearing good ; and also â posteriori , that , if there be an appearing good , there will follow an act of his will. the proof of both is plain , for , since the will is a power to act for an appearing good , if it did not ( in due circumstance ) act for it , it would follow that the will is not a will ; or else it must follow , that an appearing good is not the object of the will. whence , since it can have no other object imaginable , it would follow again that the will is no power ; and consequently , no will. nor does this take away the liberty of the will , which is exercis'd in chusing one out of many , but establisheth the essence of it . corol. . hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with mankind , is , to make that , which you would bring them to do , appear to be their good ; for then they will be sure to obey . and if , either thro' perversness or delusion by others , they will not be brought to see that which is for the common good to be their own , there is no way left but to over-awe them with fear ; that so , at least , it may appear to them a good to avoid punishment . lesson vi. several instances of demonstration . . the method of demonstrating is two-fold ; the one is perform'd by exact syllogisms in right mood and figure . the other by laying first certain maxims , axioms , or pestulatums . and then proving the theses by the concatenation of many propositions orderly succeeding one another , which is the way euclid takes . for this later way may be full as solid as the other , tho' it looks not so artificially ; provided it's several consequences be immediate , and nothing be assum'd which is not some way evident . this way also is shorter , and more fit to comprize much truth , or many syllogisms , in a little room . the other way is clearer at first sight . this is more fit for writers , whose productions may be scann'd leasurely by multitudes of readers and examiners . that , is proper for disputants in the schools , who are to argue or answer upon the spot : and ought to be so well verst in the rules of art as to be ready to act the part of opponent or respondent ex tempore , and without studying . amongst the other differences between them this is one , that if an obstinate adversary denies any link , in the demonstration of the second kind , to be connected to the other part of the chain , recourse must be forcibly had to the syllogistick method , to convince him by plain self-evident principles of our understanding , on which all force of consequence is built , we shall give here some few examples , of either method . the first of which is purely logical ; the second , arithmetical : the third and fourth , physical : the fifth , sixth , and seventh , metaphysical . thesis i. infinit number is impossible . demonstration first . bar-whatever involves a contradiction is impossible ; but ba-all infinit number involves a contradiction ; therefore ra-all infinit number is impossible . the minor is thus prov'd . bar-whatever notion compriz'd under any of the common heads is neither the genus of it's particular kind , nor any species under that genus , involves a contradiction , but ba-all infinit number ( it being discrete quantity ) is compriz'd under one of the common heads , and yet is neither the generical notion of discrete quantity , nor any species of it ; therefore ra-all infinit number involves a contradiction . . the major is evident . for all the notions of any common head , till we come to the bottom of that scale , are either generical or specifical . whence , such a notion as infinit number would be under that common head ( as 't is evident discrete quantity is under quantity ) and yet it would not be under it , because infinit number is neither the genus of discrete quantity , nor any species of it . the minor likewise as to it 's first part is most evident , because infinit number is a number ; nor is it less a number for it's being infinit , but more . the same minor , as to it's second part , viz. that infinit number cannot be the genus , or the whole notion of discrete quantity , is thus prov'd . ce-no notion that is not comprehended in each of it's species can be a generical notion or a genus ; but la-every infinit number is a notion that is not comprehended in each of the species of discrete quantity therefore rent-no infinit number can be the generical notion of discrete quantity . . the major is evident . for the genus or superiour notion is but a part of the inferiour or the species , and a part must necessarily be comprehended in the whole . and , accordingly , we find the whole notion and definition of animal to be in homo , of corpus in vivens , and of ens in all under it . . this last minor is likewise most evident : for ten and twenty are species of discrete quantity , being both of them numbers ; and yet 't is impossible that the notion of infinit discrete quantity or infinit number , should be found in each of these ; which yet it must be , if infinite quantity be their genus . . the former minor , according to it's third part , viz. that infinit number can be no species of number or discrete quantity , is thus prov'd . ce-no species comprehends all that is in it's fellow-species , but leaves it somewhat which it self has not ; but la-every infinit number comprehends all that is in it's fellow-species , and does not leave it somewhat which it self had not ; therefore rent . no infinit number can be a species of discrete quantity . . the minor is prov'd : for , essential differences that constitute the species , are more and less of the genus , and not all and none . and , as for the formal part of the several species of number , they are constituted formally by some one unity shutting up the rest ; otherwise those species had had no distinct notion , being indeterminate : v. g. ten and twenty are formally such species of number , because there is a tenth unity and a twentieth in them , shutting up or determining ( that is terminating ) those unities which were presupposed . wherefore , for the same reason , if infinit number be a distinct species , it must have , besides it 's other material constituents , something belonging to it's own intrinsical and particular nature , constituting it formally of such a species ; which can be nothing but an infinitth one , determining or terminating it in the line of number ; which is a clear contradiction and makes an infinit to be finite . the same thesis infinit number is impossible . demonstration second . axiom . units are the elements of which all number consists , v. g. the number of twenty is twenty ones , the number of a hundred is a hundred ones ; and for the same reason , an infinit number consists of infinit ones . da-whatever tenet puts some one to be infinitely distant in the line of number from another one assignable , or puts an infinitth one , puts a contradiction ; but ri-the tenet of an infinit number puts some one to be infinitly distant in the line of number from another one assignable , or an infinitth one ; therefore i-the tenet of an infinit number puts a contradiction . . the major is self-evident , for it clearly puts àn infinit or endless number , to have two ends ; viz. this one assignable , and that other one suppos'd infinitely distant from it , or the infinitth one. . the minor is also evident . for , since , by the axiom , all number , even tho' infinit , consists of one's as it 's constituent parts , if no one be an infinitth , then every one is a finitth ; and so ( all the parts being the whole ) that whole , or the infinit number it self , must be finite which is a contradiction . thesis ii. all continu'd quantity is one whole consisting of potential , or still divisible , parts . demonstration iii. axiom i. quantity is divisible without end , this is suppos'd prov'd by euclid , element . lib. . prop. th . axiom ii. what is actually distinct in any line , is determinate in that line . all act coming from the form ; which being determinate it self , makes those subjects in which it is determinate likewise . axiom iii. a quatenus ad omne valet consequentia . proposition i. quantity cannot be compounded of a finite number of indivisibles . co-nothing that is infinitly divisible can consist of a finite number of indivibles ; but la-all quantity is infinitly divisible , therefore rent-no quantity can consist of a finite number of indivisibles . . the major is evident , for , putting it to consist of a finite number of indivisibles , ( ten for example , ) when 't is divided into those ten , it can be no longer divisible , and so no quantity , by the ax. i. proposition ii. quantity cannot be compounded of an infinit number of indivisibles . ce-no one indivisible added to another can make quantity ; but la - all infinit number of indivisibles consists of , or is one indivisible added to another : therefore rent-no infinit number of indivisibles can make quantity . . the minor is evident ; for all number ( tho' infinit ) consists of ones ; that is , of one added to another . add that 't is demonstrated above that all infinit number is impossible . proposition iii. if any two parts of quantity be actually distinct , all the parts must be actually distinct also . bar-what ever springs out of the precise nature of quantity must be equally found where ever there is quantity , or throughout all the parts of quantity , by axiom d. but ba-all actual distinction of the parts of quantity ( if put in any two ) springs out of the precise notion of quantity , therefore ra-all actual distinction of the parts of quantity ( if put in any two ) must be equally found wherever there is quantity , or throughout all the parts of quantity . . the minor is proved ; for , all unity and distinction in any line follows out of the entity to which it is peculiar , that is , in our case , out of the entity or essence of quantity . again , this actual distinction of quantitative parts cannot spring from substance ; for this has no distinction of parts , but that of matter and form. nor out of any other line ; for all those do presuppose quantity , and spring from it as the primary affection of body ; therefore , if any two parts of quantity be actually distinct , that distinction must proceed from the nature of quantity it self . . now , that all the parts of quantity should be actually distinct , destroys the nature of quantity , and is contradictory ; is thus proved . da-whatever makes quantity consist of infinit indivisibles contradicts the nature of quantity . but ri-that position which makes all the parts of quantity actually distinct , makes quantity consist of infinit indivisibles , therefore i-that position which makes all the parts of quantity , actually distinct , contradicts the nature of quantity . . the minor is evident ; for , those things which are actually distinct quantitatively may be divided quantitatively ; or rather are already so ; as those which are actually distinct in the line of substance , are distinct substances or distinct things in that line , wherefore , since the nature of such a subject , as they put quantity to be , does bear it , let us suppose quantity divided into all it's actual parts it can be divided into ; that is , into all , they being all of them suppos'd actually distinct ; it is manifest there could remain only infinit indivisibles . they must be indivisible , because it is supposed to be divided into all it could be divided into ; and they must be infinit , for divisibility that is but finite , would contradict euclid's clear and most approved demonstration . besides , it would follow hence , that if all the parts of quantity were actually distinct , each of them must be determinate in the line of quantity ; wherefore , they being also infinit in number ( for a finite number of parts makes quantity not to be divisible infinitly against euclid's demonstration ) it would follow that each least quantity would be of infinit extension ; for the least determinate quantity , infinit times repeated , makes an infinit extension . . hence is evinced our main demonstration , that , since continu'd quantity is neither compounded of a finit , nor of an infinit number of indivisibles , nor of actual parts , it is made up of potential parts : that is , there is but one actual whole in the line of quantity ; and this whole is divisible without end . corol. i. hence is farther demonstrated the unity of the whole world as to it's quantity ; or which is the same , the continuity of the whole imaginable mass of body . corol. ii. hence is demonstrated likewise that all vacuum , and epicurus's scheme of plenum and vacuum are contradictory : as likewise that there cannot possibly be more worlds than one ; the very nature of quantity being but one whole , divisible still into its potential parts , or parts still farther divisible . thesis iii. . successive quantity or motion , and , consequently , the course of nature , could not have been ab aeterno , but must have had a beginning . demonstration iv. bar-all infinit motion or time is impossible , but ba-all duration of motion ab aeterno must have been for an infinit time , therefore ra-all duration of motion ab aeterno is impossible . the minor is self-evident ; the major is thus prov'd . bar-all infinit time must be an infinit number of determinate parts of time , v. g. infinit hours ; but ba-all infinit number of the determinate parts of time is impossible ; therefore ra-all infinit time is impossible . . the major is clearly evident ; for , were the number of the determinate parts of time finite , then all the parts ( which are equivalent to the whole ) being finite , the whole must likewise be finite , the minor is prov'd above demonstration . and . where it was demonstrated that all infinit number is impossible . . whence is demonstrated our main thesis , that time , motion , or the course of nature had a beginning . whence many useful conclusions may be drawn against heathens and atheists . note , that 't is the same as to our argument , whether there be an infinit number of parts of time , which are actually determin'd and measur'd , or no ; 't is sufficient the subject [ infinit motion , or infinit time ] bears the having such a determination made , by having that in it which corresponds to all those infinit determinate parts ; for this necessarily induces and enforces a contradiction . thesis iv. there are spiritual beings , which we call angels . demonstration v. axiom . . what acts , is . . every thing acts as it is ; and , à fortiori , cannot act directly contrary to what it is , especially as an immediate agent . . motion is change . there are no created beings , but either divisible or indivisible ones , that is body or spirit . . the first being is essentially vnchangeable . da-whatever must be the immediate cause of some effect acts , and , consequently , is : but ri-an angel must be the immediate cause of some effect ; viz. of the first motion in nature , therefore i-an angel acts ; and , consequently is , the minor is thus prov'd . da-every effect that can neither be caused immediat●ly by the first cause no● by a body : must have been caus'd immediatly by a created spirit or an angel ; but ri-the first motion in nature is an effect which could not have been caus'd immediatly by the first cause nor by a body ; therefore i-the first motion in nature must have been caus'd immediatly by an angel ; and , consequently , an angel acts & is . the former part of th● minor , viz. that the first motion could not be caus'd immediately by the first cause , is thus demonstrated . . fe-no * being that is essentially vnchangeable , and whose nature is directly contrary to the nature of change , can be the immediate cause o † change or motion ; nor , consequently , of the first motion in nature , but ri-the first being is * essentially vnchangeable , and his nature is directly contrary to the nature of change or motion ; therefore i-the first being cannot be the immediate cause of motion or change ; nor , consequently , of the first motion in nature . . the latter part of the former minor , viz. that a body could not have been the immediate cause of the first motion in nature , is thus prov'd . ce-nothing that , antecedently to the first motion , was not-moving , or in rest , † could have been the immediate cause of the first motion in nature , but la-every body antecedently to the first motion in nature was not-moving , or in rest ; therefore rent-no body could have been the immediate cause of the first motion in nature . note that this demonstration supposes a first motion in nature , which was prov'd . demonstration . lesson vii . other instances of demonstration . thesis v. there is a first self-existent being ; or a deity . demonstration vi. proposition i. the notion or nature of ens and of existent in creatures , ( and consequently of essence and existence ) are distinct. da-every notion of which [ existent ] and [ not-existent ] may be truly predicated is different from the notion of existent ; but ri-the notion of ens ( in its first and proper signification , taken for an individual substance ) is a notion of which existent and not-existent may be predicated ; therefore i — the notion of ens ( thus understood ) is d●fferent from the notion of existent ; and , consequently , the notions of essence and existence are also distinct. . the minor is evident . for we can truly say that [ petrus est ] while he is living ; and as truly say of the same peter , that [ fuit ] or [ non-est ] when he is dead . . the major is no less evident ; for , when we say [ petrus est ] or [ peter is existent ] were the notion of the predicate [ existent ] the same with [ peter ] the subject , the proposition would be ( in sense ) formally identical , and the same as 't is to say , [ what 's existent is existent ] wherefore , when we say [ petrus non est ] or peter is not-existent , peter signifying the same as existent , it would be the same as if we said , what 's existent is not existent , which is a contradiction . proposition ii. . the notion of ens abstracts from existence , or is indifferent to it and to non-existence . this needs no farther proof ? for , in the two propositions lately mention'd , existent and not existent are truly predicated of the same ens viz. peter ; which could not be , unless the subject [ peter ] did abstract from both , or were indifferent to both . besides , all the words which we use to express the notions or natures of any created ens whatever , do so perfectly abstract from existence , that it is neither exprest , imply'd , nor in the least hinted in them ; as appears in the words , lapis , quercus , bucephalus , petrus , raphael ; which give us not the least light or intimation that they are existent or not-existent . proposition iii. . were there any inclination in created entities to one more than to the other , it seems to be rather to not-being ; than to being . for , since peter , even tho' possest of actual being , is still no less capable of not-being ; it seems as if he had a particular natural tendency to not-being ; because , tho' supported formally ( as it were ) by it's opposit [ actual existence ] he is notwithstanding , no less a capacity of not-existing ; his original nothingness being so radicated in his nature as he is a creature , that it sticks to it , and inclines him to it , even while he is . proposition iv. . existence is no ways intrinsical to any created ens ; either essentially , or as an affection springing out of it's essence . this has been demonstrated prop. d. and d. because every nature requires all it's intrinsicals , and what follows out of them , or is connected with them ; and is not indifferent to have them or not have them , as ens is to have or not have existence . proposition v. . all created things have their existence from something that is extrinsical to them . for , whatever has any thing and not from it's self , or from it's own intrinsical nature , must have it from another , or from something that is extrinsical to it ; there being no third sort of cause imaginable , which is neither intrinsical nor extrinsical ; that is , which is neither it's self nor another . proposition vi. . no created ens can give existence to another , for tho' ( as was shown formerly ) the virtue by which the ens operates be the existence of that ens ; yet it can work no otherwise than as the thing it self is , or according to the nature of the thing , which has that existence ; whose nature it actually imprints ( as it were ) on the subject , as we find in fire heating , in water moistning , and in the whole line of universal causality . again , since the whole line of causality also bears that no cause can act unless it be first determin'd , and , as it were appropriated to work such an effect , ( whence come those establisht maxims that the course of nature is carry'd on by proper causes to proper effects , and ex indifferente nihil sequitur . ) therefore , seeing ( prop. . ) the created ens to which such an existence belongs , and , consequently , the nature or essence of that ens , abstracts from all existence ; and is perfectly indifferent even to it 's own , and much more to the existence of any other ens ; it follows demonstratively that no created ens can give existence to another , or be the proper cause of it . therefore proposition vii . . there must be some vncreated cause that gives existence to all created entities . this is already † evident ; since no created entity can have it's existence either from it's own intrinsical nature , or from any other creature . proposition viii . . this vncreated cause of all existence must be self-existent ; that is , his essence must be his existence . for , were his essence indifferent to existence , or existence accidental to him and not essential , he would need another cause to give him existence , for the same reason creatures do , and , so he would not be vncreated . therefore there is a first self-existent being or a deity . corol. iii. hence it is seen that all that created causes operate upon entities , grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon ; by altering the matter so that , out of those alterations brought to such a point , the body ceases to be any longer of such a nature or kind ; and consequently loses it's existence . at which instant the providence of the first being so orders his world , that those determinations of matter , which were inconsistent with the former ens , should be proper for the new ens that is to succeed ; to which in the very first instant the other ceases to be , and this new one is ultimately determin'd to be this , he , by his bountiful and steady emanation of being , gives it such a peculiar existence as is commensurated and proper to it's essence . thesis vi. an angel cannot undergo any change after the first instant of it's being . demonstration vii . axiom . if agent and patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of agent and patient , there needs no more to begin the effect , actually but application . . if agent and patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of agent and patient , and the effect be indivisible , there needs no more to begin and end , that is to compleat the effect at once , but application . . an indivisible effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts . . every thing operates as it is . . no change can be made without the operation of some cause . . a pure spirit is not quantitative , a body is . proposition i. no corporeal operation is without local motion . for , since ax. . every thing operates as it is , what is quantitative operates quantitatively ; but , nothing can operate quantitatively , or exercise 't is quantity , when it perfectly rests according to it's quantity , that is , moves not according to it's quantity : it follows , then , that to operate quantitatively is to move according to quantity . wherefore , since nothing can move according to it's quantity , but either intrinsically , by having it's quantity made greater or less ; or extrinsically , that is , by having it's quantity ( unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self ) mov'd towards another ; and both these do evidently require some kind of local motion ; 't is evident likewise , that no c●●poreal operation is without local motion . proposition ii. . that an angel is not susceptible of local motion . for , since motion is mutation ; and , consequently , local motion , mutation or change according to place ; and change of place does necessarily require some space , and space is quantity ; it follows , that local motion cannot be made in a subject which has no quantity . but angels ( they being pure spirits ) * are not quantitative ; therefore they are not susceptible of local motion , or capable of having local motion made in them . proposition iii. . that no body can cause a change in an angel. for , since no † operation of body is without local motion ; and † an angel ( it being a pure spirit ) is not susceptible of local motion ; it follows , that neither is it susceptible of the operation of body . but † no cause can change any thing unless that cause operates upon it ; therefore no body can cause any change in an angel. proposition iv. . that an angel cannot change it self after the first instant . for , since a cause , the self same in all respects , if the patient be likewise the self same , and the application also the self same , produces the self-same effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an effect ; and an angel , put to act upon it self or change it self after the first instant , is put to be the self-same , as to its being a cause in every instant before it acts ; as likewise to be the self-same patient in all respects , and the application of it self to its self cannot but be equal ; it follows that in any time sufficient for the same effect it will produce the same effect , that is , act upon it self or change it self . wherefore , since an effect in an indivisible subject is indivisible , that is , impossible not to be all at once , or in one instant ; and an angel , being a pure spirit , is * * an indivisible subject ; t is evident that this effect , or the action of that spirit upon it self , would be equally made in every instant in case it were not already made ; that is , can only be made in the first instant . wherefore an angel cannot change it self after the first instant . proposition v. . if there were only two angels existent , one of them could not act upon the other after the very first instant of their being . let there be only two angels , the one whereof can work upon the other ; and let the agent be a : the patient b : and , because they are suppos'd not to act in the first instant , but after some duration , let the duration assign'd be c ; the instant at the end of that duration in which they first work d. since neither a. nor b. are able to work upon themselves except in the first instant , † and ( as is suppos'd ) one works not upon the other till the instant d : they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the first instant till the instant d ; that is , for the whole intermediat duration c : therefore they are equally fitted in point of agent and patient in each ( nay in the very first ) instant of the duration c : as they are in the instant d ; but in the instant d , in which they acted , they were in all points fitted to act ; therefore , they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first instant of the duration c : wherefore † the effect begun , and , the subject being indivisible , * ended in the very first instant , in case their wanted not application of the perfectly-ready agent to the perfectly-dispos'd patient . but there wanted not application in the very first instant ; for , since quantitative application , or propinquity , is not competent to pure spirits ; all the application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by knowledg and will. but they had the same knowledg and will for the whole duration antecedent , because they are suppos'd vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole duration . and , tho' they had not had it formerly , the argument returns with the same force ; that they could not have had this new knowledg and will from themselves in any part of that duration , nor from a body , and therefore they must have had it from an●ther spirit ; and this in the first instant , because * that other was then perfectly apt to give it , this perfectly apt to receive it . and , consequently , if there were only two angels existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very first instant of their being . proposition vi. . put any multitude of angels , how great soever , all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the first instant of their being . for , since , where there are only two , † one must therefore act upon the other in the first instant or not at all , because all the imaginable concurrents to that action were then adequately put ; the rest also , where there are more , will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same instant , in case the causes of that action be then adequately put . but they are all adequately put in the same first instant ; for the second angel that acts either is a perfect agent , and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self , or by what it has from another ; wherefore , since it can never want what it has of it self , or by it's self , it cannot want any thing to work upon the third , unless it be to be wrought upon by the first , and so be fitted to work upon the third , but this is done in the very † first instant , wherefore also the third will , for the same reason , be wrought upon in the self-same instant . again , since the third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work upon the fourth , but to be chang'd by the second , and this was done as was now shown , in the first instant ; the causes of changing the fourth were adequately put in the same instant too , and † consequently the effect . and , since how far soever we proceed , the same reason holds , viz. that the effects are still indivisible , and all the causes of each immediately succeeding effect , still adequately put in the first instant , it will follow , that the effects will still be put in the same instant , by the same necessity that the effect of the first up on the second was put in the first instant of their being ; therefore , all whatever any multitude of angels , how great soever , can work upon one another is perform'd in the first instant of their being . proposition vii . . that 't is infinitly more impossible an angel should be chang'd by god after the first instant , than by any other spirit . for , since the angel is in the same manner capable of change , as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed , whether god or any other spirit be to change it , on that side precisely there is a perfect equality . wherefore seeing , on the other side , 't is infinitly more impossible that god should not have power to change her in the first instant , than that any other spirit should not have such a power ; and infinitly more impossible that god should not , of himself , be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it , his nature being pure actuality . also , since 't is infinitly more impossible that god should , after some duration , receive any change in himself , fitting him to produce that effect , than that any other spirit should ; and , lastly , since 't is infinitly more impossible his active power should not be apply'd to the patient ; both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it , and most intimately , by himself , conserves it in being . wherefore , since from these considerations or reasons , however infinitly short in creatures , it is concluded to be impossible that even any other spirit , if it should change an angel at all , should not change it in the first instant , and these considerations or reasons are found to be in god with infinitly greater advantage ; it is evident that 't is infinitly more impossible that god , if he change an angel at all , should not change it in the first instant , that is , should change it in the intermediate duration ; than that any other spirit should . proposition ix . . that 't is absolutely impossible an angel should be changed after the first instant of it's being . for , since * no change can be made without ●he working of some cause ; and no † body can work upon an angel , and all that it self or any other created spirit can work upon it , must necessarily be in the very first instant of it's being ; † and * 't is much more impossible god should work upon it , unless in the first instant , than that any created spirit should ; and there can be no cause possible or imaginable besides god , created spirits , or bodies ; it follows that there can be no cause at all to work upon an angel , or to change it after the first instant of it's being ; and , therefore , it can undergo no change after that first instant . advertisement . . this last conclusion may seem a strange paradox to some readers , whose reason and principles have not rais'd them above fancy . but not to insist farther on the evidence of our consequences from undeniable principles , which have forced the necessity of our conclusion , such men are desir●d to reflect that [ ens ] being divided as by it's proper differences , by [ divisible ] and [ indivisible ] and these differences being contradictory to one another ; it follows that [ body ] and [ spirit ] which are the species constituted by those differences , do agree in nothing at all but in the common and generical notion of ens ; or in this that they are , both of them , capable of being . whence , 't is logically demonstrated that they must differ , nay contradictorily disagree , in every thing else ; so that whatever else is affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other . wherefore , since we can truly and literally affirm that body is quantitative , corruptible , in place mov'd locally , chang'd by time or subject to it , capable of succession , or of before and after which are the differences of time &c. we must be forced with equal truth literally to deny all these of pure spirits or angels , because none of these do belong to the common generical notion of ens , but to that difference which constitutes that species call'd body ; and , therefore , the contradictory to all these , and amongst them to be vnsuccessive in it's operations , must be predicated of the other species , call'd spirit . it will , i doubt not , be much wonder'd at too , that the devils should be damn'd in the first instant of their being ; which looks as if they were created in the state of damnation ; a thing certainly , most unworthy god , who is essentially and infinitly good. but , their wonder will cease if they reflect that those bad angels had far more knowledg , and consequently more perfect deliberation ( such as they can have ) in that one single instant than we could have had tho' we have been a thousand years considering and deliberating e'er we had made our choice of our last end , and fix our resolution to adhere to it finally . so that it never lay in the power of any man to have so clear a knowledg of his duty , and so perfect and full sight of all the motives to continue in that duty , as the devil and his angels had in that one instant . whence , the crime of lucifer , and his adherents , was a sin of pure malice , and not mere frailty , or mixt with frailty ; much less of inadvertence , speculative ignorance , or suggested by the soul 's deprav'd companion , the body ; as are the sins of the generality of mankind , some inconsiderable number of them excepted , whose souls are thorowly poison'd with spiritual sin 's peculiar to the devil ; such as are spiritual pride , malice , envy or such like ; which wicked sinners are therefore , even while here , so many limbs ( as it were ) of the devil , and very difficult to be brought to any repentance . and this is the reason why god's wisdom , goodness and justice laid so many miracles of mercy to save poor weak mankind ; and left the faln angels in the sad condition , in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves . wisely and justly placing it in the order of causes , that that sin , which was so perfectly , and ( in despite of all motives to the contrary ) so wilfully resolute , should be irretractable ; whereas , on the other side , sins of mere frailty are not hard to be repented of , when the alluring circumstance is past and gone ; the same faculty which permitted them to fall , leaving them likewise in a pliableness to reform and retract what their reason , abus'd by passion , had ; perhaps either by surprize or after much struggling , ( that is half unwillingly ) yielded to . corol. i. hence , abstracting from faith and theology ) 't is demonstrated against the originists , by reason reflecting on the nature of things , that the devils are to be eternally damn'd ; and how , and why 't is impossible their hell should have an end. for , they cannot be saved without repentance , nor repent without having some new motive which they either knew not of before , or did not well consider of it . neither of which can have place here ; for , since they acquire no new knowledg either by the senses , or by discourse , it follows that they have all in the first instant that is due to their natures ; that is they know all they could possibly know , and out of that knowledg made their full and final choice . nor can there be consideration in a knower that sees all things by simple intuition . for , consideration is the comparing one motive with another , and therefore 't is an operation proper to that knower that works by abstracted notions or considerations of the thing . whence it is most improper and incompetent to such an intelligent being as knows all as once by way of simple intuition . corol. ii. tho' all that can concern the internal operations of angels was finished in an instant , yet we may , for all that , conceive certain priorities of nature , in the course or process ( as it were ) of what belongs to them in that first instant . v. g. we can conceive them to be ; and to be good according to th●ir essence and existence , as coming immediately out of god's hand , ere we conceive their own depraved will made them bad. we can conceive them to know themselves ere they knew in and by themselves the whole angelical order , and the whole course of nature . we can conceive them to know themselves as most fit ( under god ) to preside over humane nature , ere they knew that a man , by the incarnation of the word was to be their head , and ( as it were ) take their office out of their hands , and be lord of themselves too ; we can conceive them to know this ( which was the cause of their aversion from god ) ere we can conceive them to have had that aversion from him , for his thus ordering things . we can conceive lucifer , their ring-leader , to have had that aversion ere he propos'd his seditious thoughts to other angels , to debauch them from their allegiance . we can conceive him to have debaucht them , ere we conceive the contrast and battle was between michael and his loyal angels , and lucifer with his rebellious troops . lastly , we can conceive this battel fought , ere the latter black squadrons were cast down from their sublime height into hell. all these , i say , may be conceiv'd to have had certain priorities of nature to one another , such as those causes and effects use to have which are in the same instant : so that this single instant of theirs is , ( tho not formally , yet ) virtually , and in order to the many indivisible effects producible in it , equivalent or ( as we use to say ) as good as a long series of our time : not by way of quantitative commensuration of one to the other , but by the eminency of the angelical duration or aeviternity , which is of a superiour nature to body , and consequently bodily motion or time ; and comprehending it all indivisibly and instantaneously . corol. iii. hence it follows , that the several instants which divines put in angelical actions , and particularly in lucifer and his fiends , before their fall , can be no way solidly explicated and conformably to the nature of pure spirits , but by those priorities of nature : for since comparisons can only be made of those natures which are ejusdem generis we cannot compare , or commensurate those actions which are spiritual to the succession found in the actions of bodies , which are measurable by time , any more than we can their essence to the nature of a body ; and it would be an odd comparison to say , an angel is as knowing as a horse is strong , or as a wall is hard : wherefore , [ before ] and [ after ] which are differences of time or successive motion , can never be with good sense apply'd to the operations of pure spirits . again , should we allow such instants succeeding one another , it would avail nothing : † for , since one indivisible added to another cannot make a thing greater , nor , consequently , a duration longer ; the putting many of them advances no farther than the first indivisible or the first instant . add , that even those divines who put diverse instants , do all owe our principles , that angels are indivisible substances ( for did they hold them corporeal , as some of the fathers did , i should not wonder at their inconsistency ) but they are frightned from the conclusions that naturally and necessarily follow thence ; either because they vainly fear scripture-texts , expressing things humano more , or in accomodation to our low conceptions , cannot otherwise be verified ; or else , because those conclusions too much shock their fancy by their seeming extravagancy ; or lastly , because they are willing to gratifie and please the fancy of the vulgar which is startled at such uncouth propositions : and this is one mane hindrance to the advancement of science , when men are afraid of their own conclusions ; because the herd of vulgar philosophers will dislike and decry them : a fault which , i hope , i have not been guilty of in this former treatise ; but have both avoided it my self , and have indeavour'd to prevent it in others ; by holding firmly , and directing others to hold to the right notions or natures of the things , and to pursue steadily the consequences that do naturally issue from them ; how aukward soever the conclusions may seem , to those who take their measures from fancy how to frame their rules of logick , which are to direct their reason . lesson viii . of opinion and faith. . science being grounded on intrinsical mediums , and on such as are proper or immediately connected with the extrems , whence it has to be evident ; it follows , that those mediums which are either extrinsical to the thing , or common ones cannot beget science , but some inevident or obscure kinds of light , call'd faith and opinion : the former of which is grounded on an extrinsical medium call'd witnessing authority or testimony ; the later , on remote or common mediums ; which seem to bend or lean towards the conclusion , but do not by any maxim of true logick reach it , or inferr it ; examples of both may be these . . that which is attested unanimously by such a multitude of witnesses , and so circumstanc'd , that they can neither be mistaken in it themselves , nor conspire to deceive others is true ; but that there is such a city as rome is attested by such a multitude of witnesses , and so circumstanc'd , that they can neither be mistaken in it themselves , nor conspire to deceive others ; therefore that there is such a city as rome is true. what 's promis'd will be ; but that my debtor will pay me money to morrow is what 's promis'd ; therefore that my debtor will pay me money to morrow will be ; where omitting the former at present , the medium [ what 's promis'd ] is a common notion in respect of paying ; whence we use to say , all promises are either broken or kept : besides , 't is far from being proper or immediate to the effect of paying ; in regard that multitudes of cross-causes may intervene , hindering that effect from following , tho' never so really intended ; whereas taking a proper effect [ viz. my chambers being enlightn'd ] prov'd by it's proper cause [ the suns darting it's rayes in through my window ] at which rate all the course of nature , and all the demonstrations that might be fram'd of it all along , do hang together , nothing can intervene to hinder it ; the efficiency of the cause being still the putting the effect . . common mediums not being immediate but remote , are not in true speech mediums apt to connect the extremes . for , since what connects two others must it self be connected with them both ; and what is connected to two things must be immediate to them both ; it follows , that a common notion , not being immediate to the two extremes , cannot connect them ; and , so , cannot be in proper speech , or univocally , a middle term with that which is immediate . . wherefore , all assent to a conclusion from a common medium is a deviation from humane nature ; and , consequently , opprobrious . whence comes the proverb turpe est opinari , 't is shameful to assent upon uncertain and inconclusive mediums , such as are common ones . to which agrees that saying of holy writ , qui credit citò levis est corde ; he that assents hastily is light of heart ; that is inconstant or unsteady in his thoughts and actions . whence also he that adheres stiffly upon opinionative grounds incurrs the note of being an opiniatre . the reason is , becau●e , reason being man's nature , so that as brutes are led by sense so he is led by some reason ( good or bad ) in all his actions , and true reason being a power to draw true conclusions out of true premisses ; hence , every assent involves ( as it were practically ) that the thing is true for such a reason ; which proposition is false if that reason , for which he assents , does not conclude it true , as common mediums do not . wherefore , reason being the true nature given us by god ; and truth the perfection of that nature , all assents upon incompetent or inconclusive grounds do doubly injure our nature ; first , as to its essence , by concluding unduely ; next , as to it's perfection , in making it embrace a falsho●d ; and , such a falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others , by imbuing the understanding with a wrong method of reasoning ; whence he lies expos'd , by leaving the paths of right reason , to the disrepute of being either passionate or ignorant . . they who do assent upon such an inconclusive medium , notwithstanding that they see it is inconclusive , are convinc'd to be deserters of humane nature , and led blindly by passion . for , since all reasoning is built upon first principles , they who come nearest the deny●ng first principles , do radically ( as it were ) put off and abdicate their whole nature ; but such assenters come as near as is possible to the denying first principles ; for they assent , that is , they judge or say interiourly , the conclusion is true , or that the thing is ; and yet they see at the same time , that the reason , on which only they relie for that assent , does not con●lude it to be ; that is , they see it may not be , notwithstanding that reason : which is to assent or judge that to be , which yet , at the same time , they judge may not be : which is in substance , though not in direct terms , ( nature not permitting such a palpable contradiction to settle in a subject made to see truth ) as 't is to deny the first principle [ what it is ] or , it is impossible a thing should be and not be at once . corol. i. hence , such men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge , to be false to themselves , self-condemn'd , highly passionate , prejudic'd and govern'd by meer will ; that is , to be blindly willful ; which is the greatest and most unnatural depravation , that a spiritual or knowing nature is capable of . wherefore , they are justly held to be disposed for any ill that a depraved soul can desire . which ought to make every prudent man wary in his conversing or negotiating with them , if he cannot well avoid them totally ; since , having renounced the conduct of evident reason , no reason can manage them , nor the wisest man give any guess at what they will do , or whether the blind impulse of ungovernable passion will hurry them . . whatever allowance may be made for weak or ignorant people , there can be no excuse for a learned man if he assents upon a common or inconclusive medium . because there can be no necessity imaginable that can compel him to interiour assent , as ( perhaps ) there may be to force him to outward actions ; in regard god has given us a faculty of suspending our assent till we see evidence ; lest our weakness or carelessness should at every turn precipitate us into error . . from what has been said , 't is seen that common mediums can , at most , but prove a thing probable or likely to be ; which may consist with it's not-being or being false . the former part is prov'd , because proper mediums only make the conclusion certain ; and therefore such as these can only render it probable or likely . the second part is prov'd by every days experience , which shows us how often we are deceiv'd in likelihoods or probabilities , even though great ones ; and that the contrary frequently happens to what such slight grounds made us expect . . when those who are invincibly ignorant do assent upon such common mediums , it leaves no note upon them more than that of weakness and ignorance ; for , since such men do , as is suppos'd , use the best of their understanding , their erring does not spring from the obliquity or byass of their wills perverting their light of reason , which secures their morality untainted . . tho' we ought not to act thus interiourly , or assent , upon inconclusive mediums ; yet probability is very often enough to make us act exteriourly when those actions are necessary to be done ; even though they be subject to great hazard . thus merchants venture their effects to sea , even in the time of war , because their state of life requires it ; yet , even then , they must have evidence that 't is best to venture ; otherwise their reason is some way defective . so that humane nature still obliges all men to act upon some evidence . . in cases of conscience , and law-suits , which are only probable , and in which interest is concern'd ; the safest way is first to purge our affections from coveting that which is perhaps our neighbours ; next , not to trust to casuists whom we apprehend to have large cases favourable to our interest ; nor to make choice of a lawyer who is a crafty knave ; but rather one who is reputed honest , so he be intelligent . for , while we proceed thus , the will and conscience is kept clear ; however the decision of the matter may hap to be vnjust . . thus far of opinion : faith or belief ( speaking of human faith to which our circumstances determin our discourse ) is built on human testimony or witnessing authority . to which ere we ought to yield assent , two things are prerequisit , viz. that we be certain it could certainly know the things it attests , and that it speaks truly when it does attest them : that is , there are requisit knowlèdg and veracity in the attesters . . if we certainly know that the attesters knew the thing , and did not only fancy they knew it , it is most certain the thing is so as they knew it to be ; for , since to know a thing is to have the thing in our understanding as it is in it self , and none can know what is not knowable , or is not : it follows , that all knowledg of the thing 's being , or of it's being thus or thus , does most certainly infer that thing to be as the asserters knew it to be . . care is to be had that the attesters did truly know the thing and not only fancy they knew it when they knew it not . for , since mankind is often deceiv'd in thinking they know , and only true knowledg in the attesters can ground our second-hand knowledg that it is , grounded on their knowing it to be ; it follows , that we must be sure those attesters could not err in knowing that thing , ere we can rationally beleive them . . wherefore no testimony built on their knowing speculative points can have any force upon our understanding or oblige it to belief . for , since we experience that even learned men do often err in their speculations , either thro' inadvertency , the obscurity or perplexedness of the object , ambiguity of words , dread of some authority which over-aws their reason , or , lastly , thro' want of logick or a right method how to manage their thoughts : it follows , that we cannot be sure that they do not err , or that they do truly know speculative points ; nor , consequently , can we be certain that the thing is truly so as they pretend to know it is . all the power they have over us is , to make us prudently wary not to oppose such speculaters , but upon evident reason : especially if they be many and of repute ; but much more if they pretend to go upon intrinsical mediums ; in which the mistake is both seldom , and quickly discover'd if brought to the test. corol. ii. hence no credit at all is to be given to such reasoners who do not so much as pretend to demonstrate , tho never so many . for such men do not so much as affirm themselves to be knowers , or that the thing is certainly so as they deem it to be ; and , so , they can have no kind of authority , even tho' their speculative thoughts were a thing attestable . whence we may establish this maxim , viz. that no reasoner ( precisely as such ) has any kind of authority but by virtue of the reason he produces ; that is , the reason , which he alledges , and not his saying or word ought to have any force at all upon our understanding . . wherefore testimony has for it's object either particular things , or matters of fact necessarily knowable by mankind , using their common and frequent sensations , or relying on vnerrable experience . for since vniversal notions are the object of speculation , and men † may err in their speculations ; vniversals cannot be the objects of witnessing authority or testimony , but particulars only . again , since every particular is not obvious to sense , but many of them are so circumstanc'd , insensible , or remote , that we can have no certain experience of them ; it follows that only su●h particular objects or matters of fact , as make a lively and certain impression on the senses , are those which can be attested or be the object of testimony . . experience may be so circumstanced , that it is impossible the thing experienced should be otherwise . for , since the senses of mankind , in due circumstances , are as apt to convey sincere impressions of sensible objects into our minds , as other natural causes to produce their effects , they being design'd and fitted by god and nature for that end : it follows , that ( if other circumstances be agreeaable ) it is impossible but they should give us such experiential knowledg of sensible matters of fact , or particulars , as may assure us of the things being as we experience it . the circumstances requir'd to this absolute assurance is , that the object propos'd be of a thing subject to sense ; that it be within a convenient distance ; and , that the i●pression be not hindred or perverted by an inconvenient medium . hence , we can be absolutely certain what house or street we live in , of our acquaintance , or employment , who reigns in such a year ; and of notable actions , universally knowable , that happen'd in such or such a time ; lastly , of multitudes of private actions , familiarly known to our selves only . . besides knowledg in the attester , there is also requisit veracity in him to ground human faith. for , let the attester know the object never so well , if we cannot be certain he tells us true when he sayes he knows it , his original knowledg cannot have any effect on us , or beget a second-hand knowledg in us , derivable from his pretended knowledg of that object . . no authority deserves assent farther then reason gives it to deserve . for , let us take two authorities , one that of a whole town , the other of a knight of the post ; and ( since our nature allows us that privilege ) let it be ask'd why the latter is not to be credited as much as the former ? and the answer will be , for such a reason . so that reason , in common , is the ground of our believing at all , as well as of our believing one authority rather than another . and , this because reason is our nature given us by god ; and , therefore , every act of our soul that is not for some reason and according to reason , is totally without reason ; that is unnatural , that is irrational , that is brutal or unbecoming a man. . wherefore no man can be oblig'd to believe beyond the motive he has to believe . for , that degree of belief that is beyond the motive or the reason , as far as it is beyond the reason is evidently without reason , or irrational . whence follows that our reason is to give us our grounds of belief , both as to the knowledg and the veracity of the attesters . for otherwise our belief would have no reason at all for the grounds it is to rely upon , and so would be perfectly irrational . corol. iii. wherefore , since god governs his creatures according to the nature he has given them ; he does not command us to assent absolutely upon any authority which may either be deceiv'd or deceive us . for , otherwise , men may be led into errour by obeying god's command ; that is , since god laid that command , by god himself . . wherefore both the knowledg and veracity of the attesters must be knowable by intrinsical mediums taken from the nature of the thing ; and those must be also conclusive ones . for , their knowledg and veracity must either be made known by intrinsical mediums , or by extrinsical ones ; that is by another authority ; and the same question recurrs , how we are certain of the knowledg and veracity of that other authority , and so in infinitum . whence we must come to be certain of the knowledg and veracity of authority by intrinsical mediums , or we can have no ground at all to believe any authority . moreover , the proper work of reason is to demonstrate , which is done by intrinsical mediums ; and , unless they be conclusive , they prove nothing , and so are good for nothing . . the knowledg of the first attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd . § . § . . . their veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no apparent good to move their wills to deceive us ; and the best proof ( omitting the impossibility of joyning in such an universal conspiracy to deceive , the certain loss of their credit to tell a lie against notorious matters of fact &c. ) is the seen impossibility of compassing their immediate end , which was to deceive . which reason is grounded on this , that no one man , who is not perfectly frantick , acts for an end that he plainly sees impossible to be compassed . for example , to fly to the moon , or to swim over thames upon a pig of lead . thus it is demonstrable that all england could not conspire to deceive those born since , in asserting to them that there was a king charles the first , or a long parliament which rais'd a civil war here ; because they must see it is impossible to gain belief of it , which was their immediate end ; ( whatever farther end they might propose to themselves ) so many records , practices , laws , and other consequences issuing thence , giving them the lie ; besides the histories of our own and other countries ; and the concatenation of causes and effects in the political part of our neighbouring nations , all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the cheat. wherefore , the end being evidently impossible to be atchiev'd ; it could never be an apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an end , or to attempt to deceive us by attesting it ; and , therefore , they could not tell such a lie in such a case ; therefore they were veracious while they attested it . . tho' both the knowledg and veracity of the attesters be demonstrated , and , consequently , the thing attested by them be most certainly and necessarily true ; yet our assent to the truth of that thing is neither science no● opinion . it cannot be opinion , because the medium that begets opinion is not necessarily connected with the extremes , as is found here . nor can it be science , because our knowledg of the thing is not taken from the thing it self that is attested , causing such a notion or impression in us directly by it's self , or by reflex knowledges upon those direct ones ( on which kind of impressions all science is built ) but it is a knowledg reflected to us from anothers knowledg of it , or a kind of second-hand knowledg . nor is the knowledg which even the attesters had of the object at first-hand , a proper effect of the ens or thing which is the object of that knowledg . nor is the thing , as an object , the proper cause of that knowledg ; only which can beget science . for , a proper cause has a real order or relation , to it 's proper effect ; whereas the objects have no real relation at all to the senses or our knowing power , as was shown above where we treated of relation ; by which we may farther more clearly discover the essential differences between science , faith , and opinion . it may be objected that intelligibility is a property of ens ; therefore every ens is a proper cause of knowledg . 't is answer'd that it is only a property of ens negatively ( as it were ) in regard nothing can be understood but ens ; non ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us . or , it may mean that 't is only a property of ens in order to an extrinsical thing , not a true property , perfecting it intrinsically ; as properties due to a thing by nature , and springing from their essences , do . it may be objected farther that all natural powers are true properties tho' they respect extrinsical things on which they are to work . 't is answer'd , that they perfect those entities intrinsically , or give them some perfection in their intrinsical nature , which , intelligibility does not ; for nothing is intrinsically better , or otherwise than it would be , for being known or vnderstood . to explicate this better , we may consider that every entity , being a part of the world , has some office or place there , and some part which it is to act on the stage of nature . and , accordingly , metaphysicks teach us that every body is constituted such by it's having some primary operation , which 't is fitted to produce ; as fire to heat , water to cool , &c. whence , what ever fits it for such an operation is either essential to it , or a property immediately connected with it's essence ; such as are those natural powers objected . now 't is evident that those powers do perfect each nature intrinsically ; since without them it would be imperfect and impotent to perform that which it was essentially ordain'd for ; and so the whole course of nature , carry'd on by such proper causes to proper effects , would be quite out of frame and order ; whereas , 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self , whether those proper causes or effects were vnderstood or no. which shows that their being known by the first attesters , or made known to us by their knowing them , is not a proper effect of those causes , nor intrinsical to them as they are parts of corporeal nature , but accidental to them as such ; but yet so accidental that it is inseparable from them ; and , so , does necessarily infer the conclusion . . testimony on which human faith relies , is adequately divided into living and dead ; that is into such attesters as speak vivâ voce , and those that speak by writing . because there is no common or ordinary way but speech and written or printed characters by which men can relate matters of fact to others , or testify to them their knowledg of such things . . matters of fact done long a go , if very concerning to have the knowledg of them continu'd , and that they were known at first by the experience of a great portion of mankind , may be made known to us who live now , by a delivery of them down from the foregoing age to the succeeding one. which continued testimony or delivery of them is call'd tradition . for , since the generality of first attesters , who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd , could not but know them ; and the continual concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke foregoers to speak of them to their descendents ; it follows , that the continuance of those causes may still continue the same effect , and bring the knowledge of them down to our times . . practise , if frequent , and obligatory to be continu'd , will most certainly bring down the tradition of former matters of fact. this is evident ; for it is impossible that the martyrdom of king charles the first , or the horrid powder treason should ever be forgotten , if the anniversary of them have a continu'd obligation of celebrating such matters of fact but once a year ; much more , were such practises often repeated . . such a tradition of such matters of fact is equally certain tho' the thing attested had happen'd some thousands of years ago , as if it had happen'd but an hundred years since . for , since it is equally easie for the succeeding age to understand the attesters , witnessing still all along that they had been told it , as it was to understand the first attesters relating they had seen it ; their testimony , as far as concerns their knowledge of what was transmitted , has equal force as had the first attestation : and , since the wills of the intermediate attesters had the same object ( viz. an apparent good ) which they could not desert or go against , or act without it , and an evident impossibility could not be an apparent good ; and it was equally acting for an evident impossibility , to conspire to say they had such a thing universally testify'd to them by their fore-fathers , or to hope to gain belief of it , if it had not been so attested ; their veracity , in attesting they thus received it , was no less assur'd . wherefore , the same causes being put all along in each succeeding age as were at the first , the same effect of delivering it down with the same certainty , must still be continu'd , though for some thousands of years . . no dead testimony or history has any authority , but by virtue of living testimony or tradition . for , since falshoods may be written or printed as well as truths , it follows that nothing is therefore of any authority , because 't is written or printed . wherefore , no book or history can authenticate another book ; whence follows that , if it have any authority , it must have it from living authority or tradition , continuing down to us the consent of the world , from the time that author writ , or the matters of fact it relates were done , that the things it relates are true in the main ; and , consequently , that the book that relates them deserves credit , or is ( as we use to say ) an authentick history . for example , had a romance , ( soberly penn'd , ) and curtius's history been found in a trunk for many hundreds of years after they were writ ; and the tradition of the former ages had been perfectly silent concerning them both , and the matters they relate ; we must either have taken both of them for a romance , or both for a true history ; being destitute of any light to make the least difference between them . . tradition not only authenticates books in the bulk , but it gives moreover the d●stinct degrees of credibility to divers passages in the same book already authenticated in gross . for no wise man can give the same degree of credibility to alexander's cutting the gordian knot , or to his speaking such and such words to hephaestion or parmenio , as he is forc'd to give to his conquest of asia : and why ? all of them being equally in the books ? certainly , because the latter being visible , remarkable , and of great concern to innumerable attesters of it at first , so vast a source of original attesters did , consequently , carry down a matter of fact so hugely notorious with a vast sway ; whereas the others , being particulars , of small concern or note , and seen or heard but by a few at first , wanted a strong tradition to recommend them for certain truths . whence , ( for ought we know , ) they were grounded and writ upon hear-say , as our news and many particular actions and sayings of great men are now adays , which oftentimes prove false . . hence appears , that historical faith , meerly as historical , that is , in passages vnabetted by tradition , is not absolutely certain , but is liable to be false or erroneous , and so is not without some degree of levity to be absolutely assented to ; tho' we cannot generally with prudence contradict them , but let them pass as if they were truths , till some good occasion awakens our doubt of them : the reason is given , in our last paragraph , from this , that all particulars are of slight credit that were not abetted by a large and well-grounded tradition . . tradition thus qualify'd as is above-said , viz. so that the matters of fact were certainly experienced by very great multitudes of the first attesters ; that they were of great or universal concern , and so prompting them still to relate them to the next age ; that they were abetted by some obligatory practise ; and , lastly impossible to gain a belief , if they had not been ; and thence , obliging the attesters to veracity : such a tradition , i say , is more than morally , that is , absolutely certain . to omit the foregoing reasons , which have evinc'd the force of each of these particulars . this will be evidently seen , or rather experientially felt ; by reflecting on our own interiour ; and by observing how nature works in mankind and forces them to assent firmly to the points which such a tradition recommends , and to suspend as to the other . for instance ; let us take some particular that is only morally certain ; as , that i shall not dye this night ; or , that when i walk abroad a tile shall not fall from a house , and kill me ; or , that the house i live in shall not fall down and crush me ; or such like . i find at first sight , that these are highly vnlikely , because it very seldom happens ; and many reasons may occurr why i think it will not be ; yet if i severely call to account my most serious and deliberate thoughts to find any absolutely certain reason , why that may not happen to me which has happen'd to others ; i shall perceive that i can find none such . whence , i can entertain some degree of suspence , whether it may not possibly happen to me or no ; which restrains me from assenting absolutely that it will not . this duely reflected on , let us propose to our selves another particular , to be scann'd likewise by our most strictly-examining thoughts : viz. whether there was a henry the th . a julius caesar , or that alexander conquer'd asia . which being propos'd to our examination , let us again consult our thoughts , and put on the most sceptical disquisitiveness we are able , to find out some reason , why these may not possibly be false , as well as the others might . and , in despight of all our most exact search , and our utmost endeavours to put our selves upon doubting of these said particulars , we shall still find the affirmative of each of them writ in our breast in such indelible characters , and so solidly imprinted there by nature ( i say , by nature , for that certainty was not acquir'd by study and speculation ) that we can never be able to invent any kind of reason that can breed in us the least degree of suspense , as to the verity of these , and such like matters of fact ; or unfix us from our most stedfast adherence to them as most certain truths . which shows evidently that the former were only morally certain , that is , had some contingency in them , and so , might possibly be otherwise than we , till we came to reflect , deem'd them ; whereas those latter were more than morally , that is absolutely certain ; because , after the most accurate reflexion , we could not invent , and heartily embrace , any ground or reason to admit the least suspence as to their truth ; nor how or why they might possibly be false , or ( which is the same ) that the testimony or tradition for them could be fallacious . corol. iv. hence we may make a farther discovery of the force of practical self-evidence instill'd by nature without study : and , that it is a solid knowledge of the an est of the thing attested , and , consequently , of the conclusive force of tradition , as also of many other truths ; the quid est of which ( or the grounds on which our rational nature unreflectingly , and as it were , at unawares proceeded , ) is to be demonstrated by learned men , looking exactly into intrinsecal mediums ; and thence discovering how this effect , viz. such a firm adhesion , was wrought in us connaturally ; or why such an authority could not deceive us in attesting such particulars . note , that some of these matters of fact now mention'd , do fall short as to some of the best qualifications found in diverse other traditions ; viz. as to that of their being practical . which gives us farther light to discern the incomparable strength of tradition , and how every way impossible it is it should deceive us , were it furnisht with all the advantages it might have . . hence is seen that opinionative faith is as much irrational as opinion was shown to be , taking it as oppos'd to science ; for example . what an old wife said is true that she saw a spright is what an old wife said ; therefore that she saw a spright is true. lesson ix . of assent , suspence , certainty and uncertainty . . the notion of potentiality , indifferency , indetermination , and uncertainty , as conceiv'd to be in the thing , are one and the same ; for , if the thing be consider'd meerly as a power to be this or that , or to be thus or thus , 't is evident from the terms that it is not ( as thus conceiv'd , ) actually , particularly , determinately or certainly this , or thus ; since all difference , determination , and , consequently , certainty in the thing ( which , if well reflected on , are no more but it's being what it is ) do spring from the act or form ; as all potentiality , indifferency , indetermination and uncertainty of being this , or being thus , does from the matter . . existence , as being the last actuality , takes away all potentiality , indifferency , and uncertainty of being this , or thus that can possibly be in the thing . this is as evident as 't is that perfect light takes away darkness , or , that any opposit is inconsistent with the other opposit in the same kind ; or , to come nearer our point , that what is , has , while it is , lost all potentiality or power of not being while it is . . wherefore , considering the thing as it is in our vnderstanding , it remains indeterminate and vncertain to us ; that is , our understanding , which is inform'd by it , is potential or indeterminate it self ; and consequently , we are vncertain intellectually till we see it is . the reason is , because all our knowledg is intirely and adequately taken from the thing , which makes the understanding conformable to it according to the degree of clearness or obscurity whereby it is represented to us , or affects us : whence follows , that , when we see the existence of the thing , or that it is , our understanding is ultimately determinate , that is , we are absolutely certain . . wherefore , on the contrary , while we see the thing may not be for ought we know , our understanding is indeterminate as to it 's being ; that is , we must remain vncertain that it is . for , 't is against a first principle of our understanding , that the thing may not be and be at once . . wherefore , [ assent ] being the judging that a thing is , all that passes in us ( if we act rationally ) is suspence till we come to a proof that concludes it is . this is manifest from the terms ; for the words [ suspending of assent ] do show that , take away all suspence , assent succeeds : and , consequently , that ( unless it so happens that we see a thing to be clearly false ) all is suspence till we come at assent . . wherefore all common and remote mediums , which are only apt to ground opinion , being unable to conclude the thing is ; they are , consequently , unable to determin the understanding that the thing is , and , therefore , they must leave it ( if it works rationally ) in some degree of suspence ; indetermination or ( which is 〈◊〉 same ) in vncertainty . this is evident ; because such proofs do reach only to show the thing likely to be , which falls short of it's being really and indeed ; for likelihood to be is not the notion of being , since [ what is , most certainly is ] which goes beyond all likelihoods , how great soever they may be imagin'd to be . . suspence may be consider'd as indifferently hovering between the things being or not being , or without inclining to either of them . for , sometimes we have no kind of reason inclining us to the likelihood of the one more than of the other . as we experience it happens to us as to our determining whether the number of the stars be even or odd. . hence assent consists in an indivisible ( as does also dissent , or a judgment that the thing is not ) but all suspense is divisible or capable of different degrees . the former part is evident , because it 's proper object , [ is ] or [ being ] is indivisible , as is also the object of dissent [ is not , ] whereas the objects of suspence are seeming distances from the things being so actually , or approaches towards it ; or in dissent , approaches towards it's seeming not to be so ; that is , removes from it's being so . . the differences of this perfectly indifferent suspense are more and less seemingly distant from , or approaching to , the actual being of the thing . for this indifferent suspense , by it's being indifferent , is a kind of genus to the others , and abstracts from them both ; and therefore , the differences of it must be more and less in that kind . corol. i. the disinclining towards assent or inclining towards dissent that the thing is , is call'd doubt ; and , if the being of that thing is our good , it grounds that passion call'd fear of loosing it . and , the inclining towards assent in such a case , or disinclining to dissent , causes a disposition in the understanding opposit to doubt ; which , ( tho we want a name for it ) is a certain chearing glimpse in the understanding , which was in perfect darkness before , and grounds that passion which we call hope . both which passions are rational or irrational , according as the likelihoods on which they are built are great or slight . . those different inclinations or propensions of the understanding towards the things being or not being may be taken from innumerable heads : viz. from the meer frequency or seldomness of the things happening ; from historical relations unabetted by tradition ; from rumour and common talk ; from writers of uncertain authority , or proceeding upon speculation or opinion ; from the multitude of such authors as do not so much as pretend to know , yet are of great name or authority ; from the bare sentiments of antiquity ; from relying on our nurses , parents or tutors ; from medals , monuments , inscriptions , fables , &c. from misconceits deluding our fancy ; from equivocation of words ; from interest and prejudice ; from ill-agreeing observations made by our selves of the same happening in a like case ; from mistakes of proper causes , &c. all which agree in this that they are common or remote mediums . . some degrees of suspense are so small and indiscernable , that they are not easie to be discover'd , so that they counterfeit an assent even in the wisest , and cause a real assent in weak people . such as are the instances of moral certainty mention'd * above . . the way to discover whether they be assents or suspences is to reflect on our own interiour , and to study better our careless thoughts , by asking our selves what certain ground we had for them . for , 't is evident that we have many effects wrought in us by nature , which , for want of reflexion , we are not aware of ; in regard our thoughts , and the several natures of them , cannot possibly be known but by reflexion . for , to use our former example , we seem to assent absolutely that we shall not dye this night ; and even the wisest men , if they be now in perfect health , do seem to take it to be altogether certain , or ( to speak more properly ) that themselves are absolutely certain of it ; yet , upon recourse to their grounds , finding themselves unable to fathom the series of hidden causes and the multitude of casualties that may occur , which they habitually knew before-hand that they did not certainly know ; we shall find that , notwithstanding this seeming assent of theirs , they yet retain'd some small degree of suspence whether it might happen or no , which hinder'd them from truly assenting . . from what 's said it appears that certainty is a qualification of assent , giving it it 's best perfection by securing it from errour ; and making it , at the same time , incapable of ever admitting the least degree of suspence . for , since our assent may hap to be , and oft-times is , upon irrational and inconclusive grounds ; which expose it , when discover'd , to the shame of a future retractation ; but certain assent , cannot be liable to that hazard and inconvenience , because what 's certain to us , is true beyond all peradventure ; it is evident that certainty superadds to assent the highest perfection that can be . . certainty may either be consider'd as it is in the object or the thing ; or else , as it is in the subject or person who is ascertain'd by by that object . . certainty on the objects side is nothing but the things being determinately what it is , or as it is . this is in a manner self-evident ; for every thing that is , is determinate ; and it 's being fixt to be such , is to be certainly such of it 's own nature ; independently on any thing but on the first cause establishing that nature to be what it is ; or ordering it , by second causes , to be as it is . . certainty on the subject's side is the conformity of our understanding to this objective certainty . for , we can neither be certain nor uncertain without reasons or motives ; and those must either be taken from the establish'd or certain nature of the things , or they can be no reasons . . wherefore , when we discourse or dispute about the certainty of any point , it can only be meant of certainty in the subject , or of certainty to us : for , of certainty on the object 's side , or that the thing is certainly or determinately what it is , there can be no dispute . corol. ii. hence , certainty being the determination of the vnderstanding , which is to be led by reason ; all determination of our understanding which springs from the will , and not from reason , is not to be call'd certainty , but resolvedness or wiliful adhesion . . wherefore 't is most irrational , and a most senseless abuse of the word [ certainty ] to ground it on the subjects or the person 's own perswasion that the thing is so , and not on the thing it self . for , since our soul is of her self tabula rasa , all our knowledg , and the firmness or solidity of our knowledg , that is our certainty , must either be taken from the things that are without us , or ( since nature can have no other method but tha● ; ) it must be inspir'd supernaturally . wherefore , such a fantastick and catachrestical certainty , is convinc'd to be nothing in those men that are capable of weighing reasons , but a self-conceited resolution to hold or think thus , and to stick to it , out of meer wilfulness ( its true and only ground ) in defiance of all reason , and of the natures of things which do ground all our reason . . hence follows , that that certainty they nick-name [ moral ] is in reality , vncertainty . for , since all certainty has for it's object or cause the existence of the thing on which all true assent is grounded ; and this , consisting in an indivisible has no degrees ; it follows that as when you step never so little out of the notion of [ is ] which is its object , you plunge into [ is not ] so you no sooner relinguish ( tho' never so little ) the true notion of certainty but you fall into vncertainty , in regard the object of it permits no degrees of passing from one to the other , or approaching to it nearer by little and little . wherefore , since moral certainty imports some diminution of true certainty , it must necessarily be some kind , or some degree of uncertainty , whence to say [ i am morally certain of a thing ] is , in rigour , the same nonsense as it is to say i am vncertainly certain , or ( which is consequent to it ) i ignorantly know , i suspendingly or hoveringly assent , i diffidently believe or can probably demonstrate . wherefore , when in common speech men use to say they are morally certain , 't is a catachrestical phrase , and signifies only that the thing is highly likely , or that they incline strongly to think 't is true. . hence follows , that certainty and infallibility are all one , or the self-same notion . for , since nothing sounds more contrary to the common sense of mankind than to say , we are certain of any thing peradventure , certainty must be such a fixure of the mind , as to the existence of the thing , as is beyond all peradventures of being deceiv'd in that thing , or beyond all contingency that it may happen to be otherwise than we are certain it is . again , since certainty is the immediate effect of our knowledge of the thing , and the thing is infallibly , what it self is ; and our knowledg of a thing ( it being essentially a conformity to that thing ) is infallibly as the thing is : it follows demonstratively that certainty , which determins and fixes our understanding by such a knowledg , or a knowledg so grounded , must be likewise infallible . lastly , ( to omit many other conclusive proofs ) if infallibility and certainty be not the same notion , then they are different notions ; that is , [ infallible ] is one of the differences of certainty , distinguishing it from other sorts or species of certainty ; wherefore there must ( in that supposition ) be another species of certainty which is not infallible ; that is , ( since what is not infallible must be fallible ) there must be another species of certainty which is fallible certainty ; but this is against the common sense and language of mankind ; nor can there be greater nonsense than to say , i am fallibly certain of such a thing ; nor , ( though there could not want occasions to use such words ) was it ever heard or read since the creation that any man did ever joyn these two words [ fallibly and certain ] together in their discourses and writings . therefore , [ infallible ] is not a difference of certainty as its genus or ( which the same ) a notion different from it ; whence 't is logically demonstrated that it is the same notion with it , or that certainty and infallibility are all one . quaere . why is [ infallible ] then added to [ certainty ] if it have no different signification from it , or do not add some degree of certainty to it ? or why does mankind use such a needless tautology ? 't is answer'd ; we may observe that though to say i am infallibly certain of such a thing , sutes very well with the notions and the sense and language of mankind , yet men never use it but when some circumstance requires it to put others out of all possible doubt of the thing in question : and then nature puts them upon redoubling , as it were , their words or expressions to assure them of their certainty of that thing . thus in such cases , they use to say , i know it , i tell you once again , i know it to be so ; or , they think it not enough to say barely i saw it , or i heard it , but they express themselves thus , i saw it with my own eyes ; or i heard it with my own ears ; which , were it not on such an occasion , would seem foolish and tautological ; since no man can see but with his own eyes , nor hear but with his own ears : or , it may be answer'd that some men use in such occasions to joyn [ infallible ] to [ certainty ] to signifie true certainty , and to distinguish it from that mock-certainty call'd moral ; which must be a fallible certainty if it be any certainty at all , that is , an vncertain certainty . whence , since mankind never us'd such a phrase as fallibly certain , though they might have had many occasions to do so , had it not been chimerical and nonsense , and against their natural notion of certainty ; we may hence farther demonstrate ( in confirmation of our th . sect. ) that moral certainty , being ( if any ) a fallible certainty , is no kind of certainty at all ; and that 't is as great non-sense to say morally certain ( meaning by those words such a certainty as we may be deceiv'd in ) as to say fallibly certain ; and it would be as much abhorr'd by mankind , were not the phrase cloak'd , and the sense of it clouded by the unintelligible notion of the word [ moral ] which , as they use it , has no determinate bounds ; and so it cannot be defin'd , nor consequently distinctly vnderstood . nor ( as far as i have observ'd ) do we read such an expression in the antient latin authors , either heathens or christians , but the word verisimilitude or likelihood only ; which is not so apt to impose upon learners or readers ; till some late speculaters being most of them sceptical , and blundering between certainty and uncertainty , invented this odd mixture call'd moral certainty , which should be partly the one , partly the other . to which they were forced by their bad speculation , and the care of their credit : for , it was highly opprobrious to say they had no certainty at all in their writings ; and it was impossible for such superficial discoursers to show any thing truly certain , because they durst not undertake to demonstrate any thing ; and , therefore , to uphold their repute on some fashion , they were oblig'd to advance this ambidextrous notion of moral certainty , which might be either certain or vncertain as occasion serv'd . whereas , ( as has been shown above ) they might with full as much reason have invented a compound of [ is ] and [ is not ] which would have done a great kindness to scepticism , and have been a most excellent ground to verifie contradictions . nor is this spoken in the air ; diverse of them have made many great steps towards this heroick exploit to un-man mankind by their putting vacuum , imaginary space , subsistent dimensions , negative entities and such chimaeras to have a being ; tho' , either directly or by consequence , they have been manifested to be pure nothings . and as they dealt with the notion of ens by confounding it with non entities , so they labour hard to do the same with the notion of existence too , as is seen above . for they are utterly destroying the notion of [ is ] and the truth of this proposition [ what is , is ] while all their sceptical discourses would have those best perfections of our understanding ( i mean certainties ) that are immediately grounded on , and correspond to , the being of the thing , to be possible not to be as the thing is , or possible to be false ; which they must be , if the notion of certainty may be compounded with moral . . no testimony that is fallible in what it attests , can prove the thing attested by it to be true. for , since knowledge in the attester is necessary to ground all attestation , and give it any weight ; and a testimony that is fallible in what it attests , may be deceiv'd in what it attests ; it cannot be said to know that thing it attests , because all knowledge consists in this that the understanding be formally , that is infallibly , as the thing is . whence follows that , how firmly soever such attesters may deem or opine that the thing is highly likely to be true ; yet they cannot be said to know , really and indeed , that the thing is true. whence 't is concluded that such attesters can never prove the truth of that thing : truth , fundamentally consider'd , consisting in an indivisible , as being the existence of the thing known ; and formal truth ( or truth in us ) being the conformity of our understanding to the thing thus existing ; and , therefore , consisting likewise in an indivisible . which sets it above all gradual approaches of likelihood , or probability of being so ; nay , above all possibility of no● being so , that is , of being false . again , they who are fallible in the thing they attest may be deceiv'd in that thing ; that is , may be in an error ; and so what is built on their testimony may be erronious or false : but what 's true cannot be false ; therefore a fallible testimony cannot be a ground or reason to prove a thing , no better attested , to be true. note that this proposition [ what is true cannot be false ] does hold in all truths , but those which are in materia contingenti ; as , when we say to day [ it rains ] this proposition may be false to morrow , when it is fair ; because the matter or subject , viz. the temper of the air on which it is built , is alter'd . but , this exception has no place in speculative truths ; which abstract from such contingency , and are grounded on our natural notions , or the natures of things and their metaphysical verity , which cannot alter . . therefore no fallible testimony can deserve assent to what it attests or says . for , since a fallible testimony may attest a falshood , and falshoods do deprave the understanding , and to assent to a falshood is a certain and actual depravation of it ; and , therefore , to assent to a thing that may be false is to hazard to deprave it ; and none ought to hazard such an injury to his soul , especially when there is no necessity of doing himself that harm , or of assenting in such a case ; both because god and nature have furnish'd us with a faculty of suspending till we have evidence ; as also , because no outward force can impel us to assent ; nor any interiour force , but that of clear evidence ; and a motive that may be false ( as fallible testimony may ) cannot lay claim to clear evidence , either of it's self , or of its grounds . it follows that such a testimony cannot deserve our hazarding to embrace an error ; nor , consequently , to make us assent upon its attestation . lesson x. of disputation , and paralogisms . disputation must be fitted to the occasions , and to the ends , we aim at ; which may be either to clear truth by combating our adversary with down-right reason ; or only to gain a victory over the defendant by stratagem . the manners of disputing may be shown by putting four cases or circumstances which vary the method of it . . when the defendent holds a false thesis , the way to convince him will not be difficult , if the doctrin deliver'd above be well consider'd and dexterously made use of . for , if a fit middle term be taken and rightly placed , the conclusion will necessarily follow against him ; so that he will be certainly overthrown , and his cause lost . but , if the disputant be so skilful as to reduce his discourse to identical propositions , he will not have the face to own his position any longer ; the first lights of nature standing so evidently against him . . to know in what mood we are to frame our syllogism , we must take the proposition which is contradictory to the defendents tenet ; and , by the certain rules given as * above , it will be easie to know in which of the four moods such a conclusion is to be prov'd . for example , suppose the defendent holds that [ some body is unchangeable ] you must take and prove the contradictory to it , viz. [ no body is unchangeable ] which being an universal negative , and withal the proposition which is to be the conclusion , it can only be prov'd in celarent ; as ce-no divisible thing is unchangeable ; but la-every body is a divisible thing ; therefore rent-no body is unchangeable . . the same method must be taken if the defendent absolutely denies any of the premisses of the first syllogism , or any of the succeeding ones ; or , if , by distinguishing , he alters the more universal or ambiguous proposition , to a more determinate one ; only you must not now take the contradictory to it , as you did at first , for then it was your adversary's proposition which you were to disprove , now 't is your own which you are to prove ; and , therefore , you must take your measures now from it self . for example ; if he denies the minor , which was an universal affirmative , you must prove it in barbara , thus . every quantitative thing is divisible , but every body is a quantitative thing ; therefore every body is divisible . . besides the having a middle term , and knowing in what form to argue , some other rules must be observ'd . . get an exact notion of the terms of the proposition under debate ; that is , consider well in what common head they are , and how defin'd ; which is the same as to look attentively into the nature of the thing . for this will best furnish you with proper mediums . . agree before-hand with the defendent about the meaning of the words which express those terms ; which is the most solid way of stating the question , and of avoiding wordish distinctions . . see the mediums be proper or immediate ; otherwise , not being well connected , they cannot conclude certainly , although the form be right . . take heed of equivocation of words ; for , otherwise , you will hazard to be carry'd aside from the true state of the question , and lose sight of the true nature of the thing by mistaking one notion for another ; and , so , you will be certainly non-plust . and , the longer you dispute , the farther still you will err . . observe well the doctrin of dividing right , and be sure that each member of the distinction he brings , has in it the true notion of the term divided or distinguisht . otherwise he will baffle and confound you with impertinent distinctions , introduce a new question , and put you besides your argument . for example , if he distinguishes space into real and imaginary , and obtains of you to admit imaginary space for one kind of space ( which is in reality nothing ) he will defeat your argument , and put you to fight against the air ; while , by getting you to admit non ens for ens , he may answer or say any thing . you have lost all your strength when you forego nature , and suffer your natural notions to be perverted . the same may be said of the distinction of ens into positivum and negativum which is plainly to distinguish ens , into ens and non ens. . when the defendent grants any thing , then to lay up in careful memory his own concessions , and make use of them against him to force him to admit truth or retract . for , otherwise , he may perhaps in the beginning of the dispute yield candidly to diverse things ; which , afterwards , when he finds himself pincht and reduced to streights , he will flatly deny . . to be true to your cause , and to seek the victory of truth over error , rather than your own over your adversary ; that is , to hold him still to the point , and to pursue the eviction of that ; and not , leaving that pursuit , to catch the adversary at advantages , and follow on that game to show him weak and self-contradictory ; ( tho' it is not amiss to hint , and then wave it ) as is the less-laudable way of those who fall to argue ad hominem . yet , if the repute of the person happens to weigh more with his followers than the strength of his reasons , and that he is held obstinate and to want candour ; it may be a duty to truth , and to the cause , to expose him to contempt by baffling him . . to reflect that , tho' the words in common have the same sence ; yet , as standing in the context , it may have diverse constructions , and so cause that fallacy we call amphibology . . that not only single words and sentences may be ambiguous , but there may lurk an equivocation even in the connexion it self ; as when the middle term is accidentally joyn'd to one extreme by [ is ] and essentially to another . thus far of disputation when the defendent holds a false tenet ; which is the only method an honest man , whose sole end is to evince truth and beat down error , ought to take . the following ways are more becoming vain sophisters , whose aim it is to combat truth on any fashion . yet , 't is fit that honest men should know them , that they may know how to avoid the ambushes and snares of truth 's enemy . . the second case then is when the defendent holds a true point . v. g. [ that there are angels ] and yet holds a false one inconsistent with it . v. g. that [ that which is no where ( or in no place ) is not . ] the disputant , if crafty , may make use of this false thesis to overthrow the true one , thus nothing that is in no where ( or in no place ) is ; but all angels are no where ; therefore no angels are . . the third case is , when the defendent does not hold an inconsistent thesis , yet he is ignorant of the antecedents and consequents of his tenet . in which case , if the defendent can be brought to deny some truth necessarily connected with his thesis , he will be forc'd to deny the thesis it self . as , put case the defendent holds that god , our creator , is infinitly perfect in himself ; yet , through want of logick , is ignorant that god has no real relation to creatures ; and therefore that the word [ creator ] apply'd to him is meerly an extrinsecal denomination , and no ways intrinsecally perfecting him or affecting him ; such a man may be in danger of foregoing his christian tenet by this argument . fe-nothing that depends on another for some perfection is infinitly perfect in it self : but ri-god depends on creatures for his being a creator , which is some perfection in him ; therefore a-god is not infinitly perfect in himself . . the fourth is , when the defendent understands only his own thesis , and is in a manner ignorant of all others . for example ; let us suppose that some defendent by the language of christianity , with which he is imbu'd , or by some solid discourse he has accidently heard , and ( though not learned yet ) having a good mother-wit is made well understand , does hold that god is vnchangeable ; but yet , being not us'd to disputes or speculative reflexions , he is little verst in other points ; as in the nature of christian language in spiritual points , of which , consequently , we have no natural notions ; and therefore is not aware that all our words we use when we speak of them are equivocal and improper ; and , especially , when we speak of god , highly metaphorical : such a man , no better qualify'd , may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that evident and true tenet by a contentious alledging things very forrein which he not skilful in , and then backing them with authority , on this manner . what is not god pleas'd when we do well , and when we sin becomes displeas'd ; that is , changes from being pleas'd to be angry ; and , when we repent , is he not pleas'd again ? will or dare you deny that which scripture , fathers , catechisms , prayer-books , and sermons do so often inculcate , and the consent of all good christians does unanimously and constantly avow ? why are we afraid of sinning , but for fear of losing god's favour , and of a friend making him become our enemy ? will any but a heretick deny this ? again ; is not god omnipotent ? cannot he do all things ? 't is an article of our creed he both is and can ; since then to change himself is to do something ; will you stint god's omnipotence , and say there is something he cannot do ? such insulting talk as this , tho' there be never a wise word in it , working upon the weakness of half-witted people , may hap to make them forego their true tenet ; and even fright them to renounce their faith out of fear of renouncing it . corol. i. these three last cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be truth 's champion , and to undertake her cause , unless he be thorow-pac'd in logick , and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her ; lest truth it self suffer for the confident weakness of the unable undertaker . corol. ii. this last case belongs to such disputants , who , to maintain absurd and impossible things , do use to argue from divine omnipotence ; by alledging and magnifying which , they hope to fright the piety of a well-meaning , but weak , defendent to admit any thing though never so senseless or ridiculous . the way to answer these men , is to show the effect to be contrary to our natural notions , and , consequently , to the wise conduct of the world , which was the cause of those notions ; and , therefore , what god can do , or cannot do , is nothing to the purpose , unless the thing in question be agreeable to his wisdom and goodness , which determin his power to act ; and without which it cannot be that he should act . whence it is generally more safe , more edifying , and more proper , to say in such cases ; that it cannot be that god should will to do such a thing , than bluntly to say god cannot do it . for , this flatly limits omnipotency ; that only restrains its exerting it self hic & nunc because of some attribute of the divine nature to which 't is disagreeable . i say generally ; for oft times such discourses would hav● god's power to do perfect contradictions ; that is , to undo the natures of things establisht by himself ; which is not to do . as in the instance of his changing himself ; which is the same in effect as not being himself . or , when they say , god has a power to annihilate ; for , since powers are specify'd by their objects , and non-ens ( which can do nothing in any kind , nor consequently specify a power ) is the object of annihilation ; a power to annihilate is to be no power . and 't is as ill to say god can suspend his action of conserving ; for this takes away from god his goodness , or the redundancy , exuberancy or communicativeness of being ; which is essential to him , and was the sole cause of the creation . thus far of disputation it self or true syllogisms . the faults of it come next to be consider'd , which are call'd fallacies , or paralogisms . . fallacies are of two sorts . those which arise out of words ; which happens when the ambiguity of some single word , or of some words put together , do lead us into a mistake of the thing . and those which are not in the words , but arise out of the thing or the sense ; and thence , make us mistake the thing and the words too . . those of the former sort are , almost all , little gramarical quibbles ; and it would do too much honour to them , to spend labour to name them , being too open of themselves to need exposing . those which are less discernable and worth remark are such as this . he that says you are an animal says true , but he that says you are an ass says you are an animal : therefore he that says you are an ass says true . where , as has been particularly shown above , the word [ animal ] is taken in diverse senses ; for in this proposition [ peter is an animal ] it is restrain'd by the subject to signify one individual animal and of such a kind , viz. rational ; but , in the proposition [ an ass is an animal ] it is restrain'd to signify an animal of another kind , viz. irrational . whence 't is no syllogism , because it has four terms . . of these fallacies which are not grounded on the ambiguity of the words , but are built on the thing or the sense ; the first worth remarking is that call'd the fallacy ex accidente ; which happens when the middle term is only accidentally connected with the extremes , and not per se , or out of its own nature , as , bar-whatever breeds stirs in a common-wealth is bad ; but ba-all religion breeds stirs in a common-wealth ; therefore ra-all religion is bad . the common answer is to distinguish the major and minor both ; and to say , that what breeds stirs out of its own nature , is bad ; but not that which breeds them accidentally ; for , otherwise a sword and wine must be bad , because the one sometimes helps to commit murther , and the other causes drunkenness . but , the more solid way , and which bears up best to logical grounds ; is to deny it to be a syllogism ; because , though the form of it be legitimate , yet the matter or the middle term , is not so . for , a syllogism being a speech contriv'd by true logicians to conclude a third proposition out of the premises , so as by connexion of the medium with the extremes , we may know it to be certainly true ( for that which leaves us vncertain leaves us ignorant ) it follows , that the middle term must be either a notion essentially connected with the extremes , or else as a proper cause or effect of it ; neither of which it can be if it be but accidentally belonging to them . we may note here how accidental mediums are common and remote ones , or such as beget opinion : for , between religion and commotions , intervene perversity of will , disregard of virtue , irrational assents upon opinionative ground , pride , and faction against church governours , who would bind them to good principles and religious duties , interest &c. all which , or some ( if not most ) of them , are the proper and immediate causes of dissention ; at least , nearer and more proper causes of it than religion it self ; the principles of which do oblige men to the preservation of peace and unity . . the second is called ignoratio elenchi , which , in easier language , is the attempting to prove what 's not in question ; or , putting upon our adversary to hold a tenet he never own'd nor held ; as it usually passes among passionate discourses and scolds , when they object to others what they neither held nor thought , that they may the more easily confute them or render them odious . this is avoided in disputes by stating the question right , and by agreeing before-hand in the signification of the words in which the question is conceiv'd ; as was recommended in the second and third rule . or , if this be not done before the dispute begins , it is answer'd by saying transeat totum , and forcing the adversary , weary with aiming his blows amiss , to recur to the true point , and to conclude the contradictory to the defendents tenet ; which was his only duty , and ought to have been done at first . . the third is , begging the question , or supposing that which should have been prov'd . which is manifestly faulty : for the premisses must be clearer than the conclusion ; which they cannot be if the proof , in whole or in part , is as unknown and obscure as is the conclusion it self ; as it must be if it is barely suppos'd ; and begg'd gratis . of which fallacy therefore all the whole body of hypothetical philosophy is guilty , as also that fallacy call'd an ill enumeration of the parts , as follows here . . the fourth is that of an imperfect or incomplete division , which happens w●en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in question must be one of those which are nominated ; or , that it must be perform'd one of the ways assign'd ; when , perhaps , there is another way how that thing may be done , which was never assign'd , but either unthought of or neglected . as , if it should be asserted that motion must either happen by atoms descending in an immense vacuum , or by the impression of so much motion in the mass of matter at first by god , and his continuing it ever since ; when as a third way may be assign'd , viz. that a created intelligent being causes , and all along , continues , the motion of the first-moved bodies , which move the rest . this fallacy is defeated by denying the proposition , which contains the enumeration of all those causes or manners of action ; and , by obliging the disputant to show his division to be adequate . . the fifth is called non causa pro causa . that is , in plain terms , the bringing a medium that does not conclude ; or the pretending the conclusion follows from a medium that cannot necessarily inferr it . this fallacy , if it must be call'd so , happens chiefly to experimental philosophers ; who , going by meer induction , and laying no evident or certain principles of nature , a priori , to guide their thoughts by , but hypothetical ones only ; do , hence , refund all the effects of nature into false-pretended causes ; whence every man who sets up a new scheme , does still assign new reasons or causes , according to which he strives to explicate nature , and into which he endeavours to resolve all the several productions and effects of it . but , why this should be call'd a fallacy , i cannot comprehend . at this rate every argument that does not conclude may be call'd a fallacy . for , since the premisses in a demonstrative syllogism are the cause of the conclusion ; whoever argues ill , argues fallaciously ; and assigns a wrong cause , by producing an incompetent medium . but , in case the disputant puts it upon the defendent to have made use of such a ground as he never meant , it is then enough to deny it ; and put him to prove that that was indeed his ground , as was pretended . . the fifth is the arguing from what 's taken in a divided sense , as if it were taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly ; or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a divided sense ; example of the former is this , he that is actually sitting may walk , peter is actually sitting ; therefore peter actually sitting ( or while he sits ) may walk . where the major is false , unless sitting and walking be taken divisively ; and mean that he who sits now , may walk hereafter . an example of the later may be this . two and three are even and odd. five is two and three : therefore five is even and odd. where the major is false , unless two and three be taken divisively , whereas in the minor they are taken conjoyntly . or , it may be said that five are † not two and three formally , but only materially : in which sense aristotle said that bis tria non sunt sex . . the seventh fallacy is when the opponent argues à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter . which kind of fallacy is the erroneous principle that begets the vice of pride , and therefore is peculiar to all proud people . for the sin of pride does not consist in knowing what endowments any one truly has , or esteeming himself as having such endowments ; for this is a truth ; and did he not know it , and what degree of perfection it adds to him , he would neither strive to perfect himself , nor know how much he is particularly bound to love and thank god , who bestow'd on him those accomplishments or advantages above others . but pride , ( as all other vices have ) has a lye for it's principle ; and consists in this , that a proud person over values himself , and preferrs himself absolutely before all others ; that is , concludes himself to be the very best , or better than others , and to deserve more esteem than they , because he is good or estimable secundum quid , or in some particular which is far short of rendring him so highly estimable . thus , some self-conceited lady esteems or concludes her self to be the best woman in all the country , because she has a new-fashion'd gown , or is finer , handsomer , or richer than others . thus a king or lord preferrs himself absolutely before all others , because he has more power , or can reckon up more titles than others can . thus a great scholar who is proud , values himself absolutely to be better than those who are unlearned . whereas a poor , ignorant , ragged beggar , who has more virtue or love of god in him , has more intrinsick worth in him , and is , absolutely speaking , more valuable than any or all of them ; notwithstanding their gayness , beauty , riches , knowledge , honour and power . all the rest are but only good secundum quid , and he is for his sanctity , good and valuable simpliciter . . thus much concerning those fallacies that are worth noting ; if , indeed , any of them do much deserve it . for , i cannot discern but that , if the rules for distinguishing our notions , of predicating one of them of another , and lastly the right methods of arguing , both as to the matter and form of syllogisms , were observ'd exactly ; there is nothing in them that can require the treating of them so elaborately , or making such a pother about them as authors do . the agreeing with our adversary about the meaning of the words in which the question is conceiv'd , forestalls those fallacies of ignoratio elenchi , and that of begging the question . * the doctrin given above how to detect the equivocation of single words , will prevent any advantage that can be taken from the ambiguity of the terms ; and the rules of predicating , by shewing how a word that is univocal , taken single , may become equivocal by being joyn'd to different subjects , will defeat all stratagems that lurk secretly in such propositions , * as is seen in the first fallacy § . . the doctrin of using only such middle terms as are either essential , or proper causes and effects , renders ineffectual the fallacy ex accidenti ; as also those of non causa pro causâ , and à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter . the common doctrin concerning division , viz. that it's members be adequate to the notion divided , makes void and insignificant , that fallacy call'd mala enumeratio partium . in a word , let but the rules given here be warily observ'd , and it will scarce be possible the defender of truth should be circumvented by any fallacious manner of arguing ; but it will either be seen that the terms are ambiguous , or ( which generally happens ) it will be found that the syllogism has four terms ; and , so , is no legitimate syllogism . the subtlest of them seems to be the first . for the single word [ animal ] seems to be taken in the same sense , both in the major and minor , and has the same definition in both places ; and yet , by reason of the different subjects , it is not predicated in the same sense , but according to different parts of it's intire notion or signification ; whence the syllogism has four terms in sense ; that is , in reality , or in our mind , where syllogisms are only properly and formally ; however the word [ animal ] be the same materially . . the syllogism which is imply'd in every practical judgment of a sinner , has four terms , or else one of the premisses which he grants to himself is false ; and therefore both it and the action that proceeds from it , is a deviation from right reason , and a perversion of human nature . v. g. justice is to be done , that satisfaction be taken of my enemy who injur'd me , is justice ; therefore that satisfaction is to be taken by my self of my enemy , is to be done , or i may revenge my self . where the major is true , so is the minor ; but when the injur'd person comes to conclude , instead of the true conclusion [ therefore that satisfaction be taken of him that injur'd me is to be done ] which abstracts from who is to take that satisfaction or revenge , whether himself or the magistrate , who is the overseer of the laws and the proper revenger of injuries , his passion , and not right reason , coggs in a fourth term , not found in the premisses , viz. satisfaction is to be taken [ by my self . ] and the same may be observ'd in the practical judgment of any other sinner , whether their sin be theft , incontinency , rebellion , &c. corol. iii. hence , all right reasoning , which causes science and truth , is also , of its own nature , the parent of virtue ; and can dictate nothing but what tends to true morality . as , on the contrary , all false reasoning , does naturally and necessarily beget error ; and , by means of error , leads to vice. appendix . the grand controversy concerning formal mutation decided in favour of the peripatetick school . . the main hinge on which the greatest contests between the peripateticks and anti-peripateticks turn , is , whether or no there be that composition and division in natural bodies , call'd formal ; and , consequently , formal mutation . the corpuscularian philosophers and atomists deny there is any mutation in the thing it self , either in the whole or any part of it ; and they affirm that there is only an extrinsecal application of particles figur'd , mov'd and plac'd in various manners ; and , consequently , that the whole contexture of natural bodies is a meer mechanism . on the contrary , the peripateticks ( by which word i do not mean the common school-men , but those who take pains to understand aristotle , either by his own books , or by his first interpreters ) do grant some kind of particles and minima naturalia ; that is , some least size of bodies , which are ( generally ) no farther divisible because there want natural causes little enough to pass between their parts and divide them ; but they say , moreover , that there is not only local or situal ( which are extrinsecal ) but also intrinsecal or formal composition and division , and , consequently formal mutation in them , either in whole or in part ; that is , a change in them according to the form , and not according to the matter or subject ; and they deny that any solid discourse or explication either of nature or transnaturals ( which we call metaphysicks ) can possibly be made , unless this be admitted . . the parts of which they affirm all the essences or natures , of all those entities we converse with , are compounded , they call act and power , or form and matter ; whether those be essential or accidental . and , they put the matter and essential form to be necessarily found in every body , and in each of the most minute and insensible atomes and particles that can be imagin'd . the reason they give for this assertion is , because each of them is a distinct ens from the others , in regard it can subsist alone , and so , is capable of a distinct being : whence they conceive there must be somewhat in every body and every atome , by which it is distinguisht from all others , and somewhat in which it agrees with them . that which distinguishes them they call the form , and that in which they agree , the matter . and they think that , however their adversaries may quarrel the words , yet they must allow the sense : nature and daily experience teaching us that one thing is made of another ; which cannot be , unless somewhat of it remains , and somewhat be lost . for , otherwise , one thing could not truly be said to be made of another ; but the former ens , of which nothing remains , would be annihilated ; and the ens or body , newly produced , would be made of nothing ; that is , created . . now , when the peripateticks speak of matter and form , and that each thing is compounded of these ; and consequently , that there is some kind of divisibility or difference between them ; the corpuscularians , who fancy nothing but particles commodiously laid together , are presently apt to conceit that those parts ( as it were ) that compound a body , are meant to be two certain kinds of things joyn'd together into one ; and , if this be deny'd , they are ready to conclude , that they are either two nothings , or at least that they leave us in the dark , and at a loss how to distinguish things from nothings : and thence object that this doctrin of matter and form cannot explicate any thing , or make a man one jot the wiser . and , indeed , in case the asserters of them did stay in these common expressions , and not draw many clear consequences from them , giving a farther account of them , the bare saying there are such part● so named , would be as insignificant as to talk of occult qualities . . to rectify this misconceit of theirs , sprung from a just prejudice against meer school-terms , the aristotelians defend themselves , by declaring their meaning to be that one and the same thing does ground those diverse notion● of it self in us . that the faecundity ( as it were ) of the thing , not being comprehensible at one view by our short sighted understanding , which knows nothing here but by impressions on our senses , which are distinct and of many sorts , forces us to frame inadequate or partial conceptions of it . and , because we cannot speak of a thing otherwise than as we conceive it , hence we can truly say , one of those notions or conceptions of the thing is not the other ; which yet means no more , but that that thing as thus conceiv'd , is not the same thing as otherwise conceiv'd ; or that the thing , as working by my sense upon my understanding thus , is not the thing as working by the same or another sense upon my understanding otherwise . whence , because what corresponds to both these conceptions or notions is found in the same thing , hence they affirm that there is a certain kind of composition of them both , in the thing it self ; which is no more , in reality , but that there is found in that thing what corresponds to , and grounds , both these conceptions . . farther , they declare , that , since nature shows us that the thing may be changed according to somewhat in it that answers to one of these conceptions , notions , or natures , and not chang'd according to what answers to the other ; hence , we must be forced to grant that there is a kind of divisibility between them in the thing , answering to the foresaid composition ; and consequently , a capacity of formal mutation , by which the thing may be chang'd accord●ng to one of them , viz. the form , and not chang'd according to the matter . whether that form remains or no after such a change is another point , and extrinsical to our present business . . for instance ; we experience that that thing we call ( wood ) is chang'd into another thing call'd ( fire ; ) and , therefore , unless we will say that wood is annihilated and fire created in its room ( which we are forbid to do by the very notion of its being chang'd into another ) there must have been somewhat in wood by which it was actually such a thing before the change was made , and which is lost by its being chang'd into fire ; and also somewhat in it which remains in the fire into which 't is chang'd . the former they call the form , the later the matter ; and thence conclude there must have been a composition of matter and form in the wood. and , since all mankind agrees that wood is one thing and fire another thing ; hence , ( essence being the form that constitutes an ens , or makes it formally a thing ) they do farther affirm , that that which was in fire , and made us denominate it such a thing or ens , is an essential form. and , because the matter of the wood had , ( or rather was ) a power to have such a form as made it now to be wood , ( and also a power to be afterwards fire ) hence they say that that thing , ens or substance we call'd wood , did consist of matter and form , or was compounded of them ; that is , wood had truly in it what corresponded to both these natures or notions . lastly , because wood was chang'd according to one of them only , viz. the form , hence they conclude there was formal mutation made in the wood ; which , therefore , was a change according to somewhat that was most intrinsecal to it ; because it chang'd it's essence by making it become another thing ; and , consequently , that change was an essential one . thus much of the doctrin of the peripateticks concerning formal composition and mutation which is essential . . but , besides this formal composition , and the divisibility of that essential part call'd the form from the matter , which we have now spoken of , there is moreover , ( say the peripateticks ) another sort of formal composition and mutation , which is accidental . for even the intire thing , consisting of matt●r and the essential form , has many ac●idental forms or modifications in it , which are also truly intrinsecal to the thing , tho' not essential to it . which forms are compounded with the intire thing as with the matter or subject of them . for example ; we say a piece of wood is round , hard , long , green , and such like ; and , therefore , since wood has in it , besides it 's essential form , these accidental forms of hardness , length , &c. there is therefore a real composition of wood ( which is a complete ens , and their subject ) with these supervening forms ; because the thing has really in it what grounds and answers to all these several conceptions . farther ( say they ) there is , consequently , a real divisibility between the wood and these additional forms ; in regard the causes in nature can work upon and change the wood according to it's length , roundness , hardness , &c. and yet not change the nature or essence of wood. therefore ( say the peripateticks ) the wood , which is the subject , can be chang'd according to these accidental forms ; that is , there may be formal mutation in it according to those accidental notions or natures , tho' it remains substantially and essentially the same . and , since the form , of what nature soever it be , is conceiv'd to be in the subject , hence ( say they ) both these sorts of formal mutation are also intrinsecal ; or a change of the thing according to somewhat that is truly conceiv'd to be in it . . i expect that all this discourse will look like gibberish to the corpuscularians , whose thoughts beat upon nothing but upon particles thus figur'd , moved and situated ; and all the while they read this , they will be conceiting how dextrously all this may be explicated to be perform'd by their hypothesis ; and therefore how needless it is to have recourse to such abstruse speculations as are those about matter and essential forms that are intrinsecal ; and , especially , to such unintelligible points as formal composition and mutation . but i must beg their patience to suspend their thoughts till we come to the proof of formal mutation , which we are not yet got to . what we are now about , is barely to declare and lay open the scheme of the aristotelian doctrin ; resting confident that in the sequel of this discourse , the main point we have undertaken will be forced upon them with such evidence , that it will be unavoidably necessary to admit it . in the mean time the aristotelians , with so less assurance than they use confidence , do peremptorily challenge their thoughts , and bring them as witnesses against themselves , if ever they reflected on the common rudiments of true logick , and they set upon them thus . . it must be granted that we cannot have science of any thing but by means of discourse ; that the most exact , and most evident discourses are those we call syllogisms : that syllogisms are resolved into propositions ; and propositions into two terms , and a copula that connects them : that all that we can say of those parts of a proposition is , that they are notions , or meanings of the words that express them : that , therefore , all discourse is built on the right putting together of these notions , and can be built on nothing else , nor made on any other fashion : that no discourse can be solid but what is grounded on the natures of the things themselves : without which they must necessarily be aiery and chimerical , and impossible to beget knowledge : that , for this reason , our notions , which ground all our discourse and knowledge , are the very natures of the things without us , existing spiritually in our understanding ; that our operations of apprehending , iudging , and discoursing of the natures of things being immanent , or perform'd and perfected within us , the objects of those operations , or the very natures of the things , must be likewise within us : that 't is evident by experience that we do make diverse conceptions or notions of the same thing ; that is , all the operations of our mind are built on those partial and inadequate notions of the thing about which we are to discourse : that we can frame a great number of these abstracted or partial notions of the same thing , and many of them intrinsecal ones : that , therefore , that thing must have in it what corresponds to all those several notions ; which we call formal composition : that , hence , there is a divisibility in the thing as grounding one of those notions from the same thing as grounding another of them , by reason that natural causes are apt to work upon the thing according to that in it ( or that part of it , as it were ) which is thus conceiv'd , and yet not work upon it according to what in it is otherwise conceiv'd , or , to what grounds a different notion . whence they make account is inferr●d this grand conclusion , that therefore there is formal mutation , in regard it can be wrought upon according to that in it which corresponds to the notion of form , and not to that in it which answers to the notion of matter : whence follows unavoidably that there is formal composition , divisibility and mutation in it , as is above explained . which conclusion must necessarily follow , if they allow ( as they must ) this method of discoursing ; each part of which has been made good in the foregoing treatise . and the aristotelians presume it is altogether impossible for them to assign any other that can bear the least show of sense or coherence . . the peripatetick school has yet another great exception against the corpuscularians ; which is , that , because their schemes do not take their rise from our solid natural notions , made by impressions of the things upon our senses , and thence convey'd to the mind ; they come by this means to have little regard to the nature of the things , or to their metaphysical verity , the only firm and deep-laid ground of all knowledge . through which neglect having render'd themselves incapable of laying any first on self-evident principles , ( taken from our most firm and most radical conceptions of the thing , and predicated of it accordingly ) to which they may finally reduce their discou●ses ; hence , they are forced to coin to themselves principles from their own wit and fancy : out of which they contrive certain hypotheses ; which granted , they hope they can make some congruous explication of nature . by which manner of proceeding , their systems of natural philosophy , being grounded on such supposed principles , is meerly conditional or hypothetical . whence , they not only disable themselves from concluding any thing , or advancing science ; but , instead of doing this , which is the duty of a philosopher , they breed an utter despair of it , and introduce meer scepticism . to pursue the truth of which is not our task at present , nor sutes it with our intended brevity . . yet to show the justice of this objection , it may suffice to remark at present , that neither does epicurus regard the intrinsecal nature of his plenum or atomes , or go about to show why they must be so infractil , nor in what their more than adamantin hardness consists ; nor how the potential parts of these atomes do come to have such an insuperably-firm coherence . nor yet does cartesius explicate to us of what nature his first mass of matter is ; what degree of consistency or density it has ; and , if any ( as it must have some or o●her ) why it was to be of that density , or in what that density consists . which shows that neither of them regarded or minded the intrinsecal nature of their first matter ; tho' this must needs have had great influence on the oeconomy of the world , and have afforded us much light to know the constitution and temper of natural bodies , and consequently of their proper causes and effects ; as also of many intrinsecal modifications of them , highly conducing to give account of , and explicate the operations of natural agents . the only thing they seem to have regarded was the extension of their first matter , and the motion , figure and situation of it's parts ; which are extrinsical or common considerations ; but to give any account of what intrinsecal or essential nature that matter was , they are perfectly silent . they suppose it to be , but they do not so much as suppose it to be of such or such an intrinsical nature ; which yet they must be bound to do , since all extrinsical respects came by motion , which was not yet begun . or , if epicurus does , by making his atomes infractil , 't is both said gratis ; and , besides , he gives us no account in what that quality of indissoluble hardness consists , or how it is to be explicated . . hence the peripateticks alledge that , however the authors of those sects are men of great wits and strong brains , ( for 't is not a task for ordinary capacities to undertake a design that fathoms and comprehends all nature ) yet they can never begin with evident categorical propositions and first principles , or carry on their discourses so as to bear the test of true logick ; but , either their principles must be far from self-evident , and must need proof , which is against the nature of first principles ; or else their consequences must be loose and slack . and the only way to refute this objection is , for some of their school to put it to the trial by laying their principles , and , proceeding forwards , to draw all along evident conclusions without intermingling their own suppositions . but the peripateticks are very confident they neither can do this , nor will ever attempt it . i mean so as to carry it along with connexion and evidence ; in which spinoza , tho' perhaps the best writer of the cartesian school falls , very short , and pieces out his discourse with many unprov'd suppositions ; as is hinted above in my preface . . and hence it is that the corpuscularians , being forced by their cause to decline such a severe method , strive to avail themselves and uphold their cause by witty discourses , smooth language , clear expressions , apt similitudes , ingenious experiments that bear a semblance of agreeing with their doctrin , and such like stratagems , to make a plausible show of science . but their chief reliance is on the facil and familiar appearances to fancy ; with which they court that delusive and easily deluded faculty : and , to this end , they gratifie it with such proposals as are apt to sink into it most pleasingly ; such as are particles of matter , whose variety of imaginary figures , and the diverse positions of them , they , without study , quickly apprehend . and conceiting that all is done when they have thus fancy'd or apprehended them , they argue thus ; if these pores and parts will do the business , what need is there of those abstruse and metaphysical speculations of formal composition and mutation , and those many intrinsical changes , of which fancy , can frame no idea's or shapes . and , indeed , such high points seem to that superficial faculty mysterious whimsies ; they disgust it with the laboriousness of comprehending them ; and persuade men of fancy 't is impossible to explicate nature by such principles , because they are rais'd beyond it's reach . and , indeed , if nature could be solidly explicated by a kind of contessellation of particles , fancy would have ( as it never has ) some reason : but , if , upon examination , we come to find that such schemes go no deeper than the surface of the essences of things , that they can never reach to the bottom-principles of nature , nor give solid satisfaction of the true intrinsical natures of any thing , to the judgment attending to maxims of evident reason , and to true logick ; then we must be forc'd to follow the aristotelian doctrin , and have recourse to intrinsical and formal mutation ; especially , if the necessi●y of allowing it shall happen to be demonstated . . to do which being our present work , we will begin with epicurus , a scholar of the first class in the school of democritus . this philosopher ( if we may call him so ) puts innumerable atomes , or rather ( contrary to a clear demonstration ) an actually infinit number of them , and of an infinit number of figures , descending in an infinit imaginary space or vacuity ; some of them downwards , some of them overthwart ( according as his hypothesis had occasion ) that so they might overtake their fellow-atomes . with which , clinging together by virtue of their meer figures , they compound several worlds , and every particular body in each of those worlds . that natural bodies become rare or dense , according as they have in them more or fewer of those atomes , or ( as they call it ) plenum , in proportion to the vacuum . thus much in common of his hypothesis ; which , were the circumstance proper , it were easie to show , ( besides it being vnprov'd ) be a hotch-potch of the most refined nonsense , in every particular sentence , and almost in every word ; notwithstanding the explications and patronage which gassendus , lucretius , and our dr. charleton have lent him . while i am speaking of his tenet , i note here by the way , that by the indivisibility of his atomes , he means insuperable hardness or absolute infractilness ; and not that they consist in a point , or want extension ; as he is understood by mr. le grand in his entire body of phylosophy , part . c. . § . . for , to think that , since he makes them of several figures , there should want room or space to admit division , could not be meant by such men as epicurus or gassendus . but , to return to our business , what concerns us at present is this , that let him contrive his scheme as he pleases ( for , in such fantastick philosophy , all is as pleases fancy , the painter ) yet he must be forced to grant intrinsecal and formal mutation , even while he most industriously strives to avoid it . at least , tho' , perhaps , his followers will not own the conclusion , yet they must allow the grounds of it , or the principles that ought to inferr it . . to show which we ask , are all his atomes of the same matter ? he must grant it ; for he allows no difference between them , but that of figure . again , each of those atomes must be granted to be an ens or thing , because it can and does exist alone ; and , to be a distinct ens from all the other atomes ; for , otherwise , all his several atomes might be but one ens or one atome ; which is both a flat contradiction , and , besides , quite destroys his own hypothesis . wherefore , each atome must have something in it , that makes it a distinct ens , or distinguishes it from all the rest ; which cannot be the matter of the atome ; for that is common to them all ; and what is common to all , cannot distinguish one from another . and , if there be somewhat in each atome that makes it a distinct ens , then ( essence being that which formally constitutes an ens , ) it gives it a distinct essence , or distinguishes it essentially ; which is what the aristotelians mean by an essential form. so that they are at unawares , in despite of their own doctrine , become ( thus far ) aristotelians . . to proceed ; therefore it is not impossible but each atome may be chang'd according to the form , and not according to the matter ; that is , each atome is capable of formal mutation . which i thus demonstrate , whatever does not imply a contradiction is not impossible ; but the putting each atome to be chang'd another to the form , and not according to the matter , does not imply a contradiction ; therefore the putting each atome to be thus chang'd is not impossible . the minor , only which can need proof , is thus evidenc'd . for , since a contradiction is no where but in our vnderstanding , there can be no contradiction unless the same be affirm'd and deny'd secundum idem , or according to the same notion or respect , in our understanding . but , this cannot be in our case : for the notions of the matter and form of each atome ( as has been in the last § . metaphysically demonstrated from the natures of idem and diversum ) are distinct notions that is , distinct considerations , regards or respects of the same thing ; and therefore , to affirm that the atome is chang'd according to one of those different regards or notions , viz. the form , and not-chang'd according to the other , viz. the matter , has not the least show of affirming and denying secundum idem ; nor , consequently , the least show of a contradiction . wherefore it is evidently demonstrable from plain logick , acknowledg'd by all mankind , that it is possible each atom should be chang'd according to the form or formally chang'd ; whence , if there be causes in nature sufficient to change it , it will be actually chang'd or broken ; that is , it will undergo such a mutation as is not only formal , but essential ; because the former ens is no more when two entities are made of it . it remains then only to examin whether there be sufficient causes in nature to work this change , supposing each atom of it's own nature changeable , as has been demonstrated . . in order to which we are to reflect that epicurus puts those atomes of his to be of all imaginable figures : wherefore , there must be some of them like needles , ending in the smallest point that can be conceiv'd . others full of pores or very small holes , into which some of these sharpest points will light ; and the more bulky part of the atome not being able to enter it , that point will remain wedg'd in that pore or cavity . now this point of the atome may be so almost infinitely slender , that the least impulse of other atomes , crouding and pressing upon it , may be able to break it ; much more , when it happens ( as it needs must ) that the vast weight of mountains or a great part of the body of the earth do press with a transverse or side-motion upon that atome . in which case , it will be impossible to conceive how that smallest point , perhaps a million of times less than a hair can be able to resist such a stupendious pressure . the same may be said of those atomes made like our hooks , clasping with another hooked one , when a very strong divulsive force , able to rend rocks asunder , tears the compound several ways ; as when mines of gun-powder blow up castles or mountains . wherefore , since ( as has been shown ) the atome is capable of being broken , that is , capable to be intrinsecally or formally chang'd , and there are causes sufficient to break it ; it follows that ( whatever epicurus does extravagantly , and against the sense of mankind , suppose ) his atomes would be de facto broken ; that is two entities would be made anew , and the vnity ( that is the entity ) of the former ens or atome would be destroy'd ; and , consequently , there must be not only intrinsecal , but essential , that is , the greatest of formal mutations , made in his atomes . . the same is demonstrated from the notion of mutation it self , and the effects it causes in our understanding . i discourse thus , our words express our notions , and our notions ( unless they be fictitious ) are taken from the thing . wherefore , unless there be some change or other in the thing , our notions , and , consequently , our expressions and denominations , must still be the same . but , when local motion of the atom is made in the vacuum , we must be forced to speak of it or denominate it diversly , and to say it is now here , now there , or in another place than it was before ; for , otherwise , it could not be said truly to be mov'd locally if it did not change place . there must then be some novelty or some change in some thing or other to ground this new notion , which causes this new denomination . themselves will not say 't is in the vacuum ; and , should they say so , it would be perfect nonsense ; for the vacuum , being nothing , cannot be capable of change ; therefore this novelty or change must be in the atome . otherwise , did all the causes whatever remain the same , the same effect , viz. the same notion and the same denomination , and not a different one , must ensue ; or else there would be an effect ( viz. this new notion and denomination ) without any cause , which is impossible . wherefore 't is logically demonstrated that there must be formal mutation made in the atome . . perhaps they will say ( for such discoursers think they have given a sufficient answer if they can but give us a new word ) there is only an extrinsical change made by the application of the parts in the atom to different parts of the vacuum . but first a vacuum can have no parts , much less any difference of parts . next , an extrinsical change is a most improper expression , and signifies a thing may be chang'd , and yet no change in it . but , suppose we should admit those words , yet themselves must say an extrinsical change means or implies a change in some extrinsical thing which is realy and intrinsically changed : and which , by being thus changed , give an extrinsical denomination to another thing ; which is all they can mean by these words [ extrinsical change ] as when the wall is extrinsically denominated [ seen ] from the act of my seeing power , my eye is intrinsically chang'd by having that act , and thence gives that extrinsical denomination to the wall : and if the words [ extrinsically chang'd ] have not this meaning , they can have no sense , but are altogether inexplicable . to be cloath'd , is an extrinsical denomination to the man on whom cloaths are put : but then the cloaths suffer an intrinsical change of their figure , and perhaps their quantity , by being fitted and acomodated to the body of that man , and the air suffers the same while the action or motion of cloathing is perform'd . to be mov'd locally is an extrinsical denomination to the body that is moved : but then , local motion being a division of the medium through which that motion is made , there is an intrinsical change in the medium divided , and a new continuity of the parts of the thing moved , to new parts of the medium , is acquir'd ; which is a quantitative , and therefore an intrinsical mutation ; whence the extrinsical denomination of [ moved ] accrues to the moved body . besides , it is scarce possible in nature , where there can be no action without some degree of reaction , but the body it self that is moved must undergo some small change. but now , in the scheme of epicurus his philosophy , all things are quite otherwise ; since neither the vacuum , nor the atoms ( and he puts nothing else ) even according to his own doctrin , are in the least degree capable of change : wherefore he is convinced to deny this self-evident maxim [ idem , manens idem , semper facit idem , ] while he must affirm that there can be a new effect , ( viz. that new notion and denomination ) without any novelty or change in the cause , or the thing ; that is , he must put a new effect without any new cause ; or ( which is the same ) an effect without a cause . . but , leaving him , and turning our discourse to our modern corpuscularians , the cartesians : these philosophers tell us the particles of their ma●ter are crumbled or shattered by rubbing against one another . wherefore their matter , and each part of it was one thing before it was moved , and now is by motion become many things . nor can it be deny'd , but that all of them were entities before their motion ; since both that whole mass of matter , and each of the first divided parts , were ( antecedently to the division ) capable of existing apart , and pre-suppos'd to the division as the subject of it . wherefore , both that whole bulk of matter , and each of those parts , by losing their vnity did eo ipso lose their entity too ; and , consequently , the respective forms that constituted them such entities ; which is the greatest formal and intrinsical mutation that can be ; and far greater , even by their own doctrin , than could be made afterwards , according to any accident or modification of those foresaid entities . . again , since motion cannot be made in an instant , that mass of matter must be granted to have been created , that is , to have had being , antecedently , in priority of nature , to motion . wherefore , it had in that instant some kind of intrinsecal nature ; and somewhat in it which made it to be of that nature : hence i argue thus ; that nature and the form that constituted it , is either lost when it came to be divided , and then it was intrinsecally and formally chang'd : or else it retain'd that nature after it was divided ; and then 't is manifest that that mass was diminisht , that is chang'd according to its extension ( in regard the greater extension of that original mass was now made less ) and yet was vnchang'd according to its nature . let them take which of these they please , they must unavoidably yield there was formal mutation ; in the former case , of its essence ; in the later of its extension ; and a formal divisibil●ty in it , either of its form from its matter ; or of its extension from its nature or essence ; in regard it was by motion , chang'd according to the one , and not according to the other . but , now , in case they make ( as they do ) extension to be the essential form of that matter , formal mutation is made more unavoidable , and must be granted even by themselves . . to understand the force of this demonstration more clearly , it is to be noted that the cartesians do not make their first matter to be only an abstracted conception of an ens or body , as it has in it a power to have a form and so to be a thing , as the aristotelians do ; for which reason they rightly , and acutely define , or rather describe it , as thus abstracted by our consideration , to be neque quid , neque quantum , neque quale , neque aliquod aliud eorum quibus ens determinatur ; in regard that , as thus consider'd , 't is a meer power to be any of them , or all of them , that is , none of them actually . but they put their first matter to be inform'd ; otherwise they could not put it to have extension in it , which must necessarily be granted to be a form either essentially constituting it , or some accident or modification of some thing that has a substantial form. whence , they must hold that their first matter is an ens or compleat thing , that is , compleatly capable of existing ; which appears farther by its terminating the action of creation ; the peculiar effect of which is to give actual being ; which concludes it to have been compleat under the notion of ens ; since it is self-evident that that cannot actually be , which is not capable to be ; that is , which is not an ens. this note reflected on , it is manifest it must have a nature of its own , and somewhat in it to constitute that nature , or some essential form ; and so is formally mutable ( whether extension be that form or no ) as is deduced by our argument . § . . . to come up closer to them , and enforce the evidence of our argument to a nonplusage of their cause , we ask ▪ of what kind of consistency was that original matter , into which god ( according to them ) did infuse the first motion , and so divided it . the very terms tells us that it must have been of it's own nature either easie or hard to be divided , nor do we ask the precise degree ; let them say 't is either one or the other , or a middle degree between both , we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn . it being then indifferent to our question , in this perfect silence of theirs we will g●ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their doctrin ; and so we will suppose it to be dense . we enquire next in what consists this modification or affection of it call'd density ? or how they will explicate it ? motion had not yet begun in that instant in which it first was , by the means of which they put all qualities ( and this amongst the rest ) to be produced . if they should say ) which yet i do not read they do , nor so much as speak of it as 't is found in their first matter ) that it consists in the rest of it's parts . 't is reply'd first that that matter has as yet no parts , for these are made by motion , which was not in that instant begun . or , if they mean only it's potential parts , or ( which is the same ) that one actual whole ; not to pose them by what virtue those potential parts do formally cohere , which without making divisibility ( which is quantitative vnity or continuity ) the essence of quantity is impossible to explicate ; the question returns and we demand how firmly those parts do cling together ; that is , how dense that whole was , and in what it's density consisted ! which we affirm must have been either in it's intrinsical nature or such a degree of consistency ( which is in it's being to such a degree more or less divisible by natural causes ) or in nothing . again , if density consisted in the rest of it's parts , and there was most perfect rest before there was any motion , then the density of it must have surpassed all degrees ; and , therefore it must have been of the nature of epicurus his atomes ; that is , insuperably and essentially incapable of being divided ; which they must not say who make their elements made by the rubbing of some parts of the matter against the others . besides , in tha● supposition god , as the author of nature , had offer'd violence to his own creation , by dividing it immediately at first . lastly , that matter was of it's own nature indifferent to be mov'd or not-mov'd , that is , indifferent to rest or motion ; for being and extension abstract from both ; whereas in our case , density ( and the same may be said had it been rare ) being natural to it , and not adventitious or accidental by the operation of external causes ; it could not have been indifferent to it ; since every thing necessarily requires what is natural to it self . nor is a thing , meerly by it's being in rest , of another nature . to understand this more clearly , let us consider this proposition [ that thing call'd the first matter is in rest ] 't is about the essence or nature or intrinsecal quality of the subject of this proposition we are enquiring ; to which supervenes that accidental predicate of being in rest. wherefore , to be in rest does not alter the intrinsecals of their first matter , but presupposes them ; and , therefore , all it's intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature , whether it had happen'd to be in rest , or in motion . . density then in their first matter cannot be explicated by rest , nor , consequently , rarity by motion . let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist , or how it may be explicated . now , we are to note , that all particular natures or notions , are to be explicated by more common and general ones , if we go to work like philosophers ; for all grounds and principles are made up of such notions as are common or vniversal ones ; and , to explicate particulars by other particulars , is the way of proceeding by similitudes ; which may serve sometimes to elucidate , but never to prove or to resolve any thing or notion into its formal cause , which belongs properly to philosophers . we find then , abstracting f●om rest and motion , which are accidental to that matter , no notion or nature in it that can be superiour to density and rarity , but the essence of it , that is , that thing it self call'd the first matter , and its quantity : and quantity may be consider'd two ways ; either as affecting the body meerly in order to its self ; or else in order to the causes that may work upon it ; the former we call extension , the latter , divisibility ( physically consider'd . ) now , density cannot any way be explicated by extension as that in which it consists , as is most evident ; in regard a body may be equally extended , whether it be rare or dense ; nor is any thing therefore rarer or denser because it is longer or shorter . let us apply then our consideration to divisibility , taken in the sense spoken off lately , viz. as making its subject apt to be wrought upon or divided by natural causes ; and the proper and intrinsecal differences of every common notion being more and less , and it being also evident from the very notions , and from the consent of mankind , that we call those bodies [ dense ] which are less easy to be divided , or less d●visible ; and those [ rare ] which are more divisible or more easy to be divided , we are in a fair way to find out clearly what rarity and density do consist in ; viz. rarity in an excess or greater proportion of quantity ( thus consider'd ) to the matter or subject of it ; and density in a lesser proportion of the same quantity to the matter ; that is , to the subject of it according to the notion of it as matter . nor , does this more strain our reason to conceive this various participation of the same accident [ quantity ] than it does to conceive a thing to partake the quality of whiteness vnequally , and be more or less white . for that maxim of [ quantitas non suscipit magis & minus ] is meant evidently of extension ; in regard that the least imaginable extension being added or abstracted from the former , must necessarily vary the species . . that we may bear up more directly to our main thesis : since rarity , or else density must necessarily be in their first matter , ( for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all divisible by natural causes but it must be either easily or hardly divisible by them ) if we joyn to this that contraria ( according to the maxim ) sunt circa idem subjectum , it will and must follow that the same matter ( whether theirs or ours ) that had a power in it to be less divisible or dense , had also a power in it to be more divisible or rare ; and this not only in the first matter it self , but also in every particular body in nature made of it , and which has the nature of that matter in it : whence results this conclusion , that rare bodies are transmutable into dense , and dense into rare ; and that , therefore , there is formal mutation in bodies according to these two primary qualities ; and , consequently , according to all secondary qualities too ; which ( as will be demonstrated in physicks ) are made up of those primary ones . so that most of the effects in nature are carry'd on by formal mutation ; nor consequently , can nature be ever rightly explicated by the deniers of such a formal change. . let it be well noted that i speak not in this last discourse of contradictories , which have no middle between them , and therefore cannot have the same matter or subject , or make it changeable from one to the other ; as , because body is divisible , it does not follow that the same subject can be chang'd to indivisible . what i discourse of , and from whence , in part , i drew my argument was , from the nature of contraries , which are two extremes under the same kind of quality , and therefore have middling qualities between both ; by passing through which , as by degrees or steps , the body is transmutable from one of them into the other . and the reason is , because neither extreme is infinitely such , and therefore has necessarily some mixture of the opposit quality an● is ( as it were ) allay'd by it ; so that it comes to be finite under that notion . whence the subject which has one of those extreme qualities , becomes a capacity of admitting the other extreme . and therefore epicurus seems to go to work more like a philosopher , in this point , than the cartesians , by supposing his atoms essentially that is infinitely dense or incapable to be broken or divided ; tho' in most other things he falls very much short of cartesius his clear wit , by his building in a manner wholly on suppositions ; and , those too , the most extravagant ones an ill-grounded judgment could stumble into . . they will ask how or by what means can a dense body be chang'd into a rare one , or a rare into a dense ; or , what causes do we find in nature proper to produce such an effect ? and , it must be confest the question is very pertinent . for to put the operations of rarefaction and condensation without any proper agents to cause those operations , is a thing unbecoming a philosopher . we answer then , that all compressive and divulsive agents , which we experience are frequent and almost continually working in nature , are as proper to work upon quantity as such , and to make the subject of it rarer or denser , as dealbation is to work upon a subject as 't is colourable , or combustion upon a thing as 't is combustible , or any other action to produce or inferr it's proper effects , or , to cause the passions that correspond to it . nor can there be any notion or consideration found in a body on which those two actions of compression and divulsion , can be conceiv'd to work properly and precisely but on it's quantity or divisibility , in order to make the same matter have more or less quantity in it ; or to make a body that is compressed or drawn several wayes to be formally chang'd in those respects . so that we must either say that those two common words , importing natural actions , and us'd by all mankind , to have no sense in them , or they must allow them their proper effects , which are to shrink or dilate the quantity of the thing , which is to make it rarer or denser . granting them that sometimes and even very often those effects are perform'd by the intromission and extrusion of subtil particles of other bodies , ( which as the very terms show , are improperly call'd rarefaction and condensation ; ) whenever any natural body is prest or stretched on all sides by other bodies closely besieging it , if quantity be capable of those effects as is demonstrated above § . . it is , the proper effects of such kinds of operations must ensue , and the body enclos'd , will be to some degree condens'd or rarefy'd . . now , had cartesius put these two first qualities in the matter created by god in the beginning , so that some parts of it had been created dense , some rare , nature had been furnisht with immediate causes to made division or motion connaturally , ( supposing them set on work , or mov'd first by some superiour agent ) in regard dense bodies are naturally apt to divide rare ones , and rare ones naturally apt to be divided by those which are dense . nor had he then needed to assign to essential being whose nature is unchangeable , and in which there is no transmutatio aut vicissitudinis obumbratio , that is , neither change nor shadow of change , a drudgery so mis-becoming his essence , as to be the immediate cause of motion or change. hence i argue : since neither to be easily nor hardly divisible , is the essence of that first matter , in regard it was compleat in the line of ens , and terminated the action of creation , and so could have subsisted whether it had been rare or dense , or , tho' it had not been divided at all , there is manifestly a divisibility between the essence of that matter and its rarity or density ; and therefore , by the same argument we brought formerly against epicurus , that matter might have been chang'd according to either of those qualities , and not according to its essence , and yet no contradiction ensue ; which demonstrates it to be possible . again , that matter being indifferent to either rarity or density , had god created some part of it rare , some dense , the course of nature ( as was lately shown ) had gone on more connaturally : wherefore , since god , as the author of nature , and abstracting from miracle , does always act most connaturally or agreeably to the nature of things ; it follows that he did actually order that some parts of the first matter , of which the world was to be form'd , should be rarer , and some denser than others , and not of an uniform or homogeneous nature . and , accordingly , we are taught by holy writt , that in the beginning there was earth , water , and air. and , if the cartesians will needs make their first matter uniform , and that god must move it immediately , 't is justly requir'd of them to show this tenet of theirs , most agreeable to the natures of the things : i mean to the nature of god whom they put to be the immediate cause of the first motition ; and to the nature of matter , the patient ; and not overleap and slide over the proof of both these main points and suppose them ; and this , not because they can even pretend that those suppositions do suit best with the natures of the things themselves ; but , meerly , because it best serves to introduce and carry on the scheme of doctrin they had resolv'd on . . from essential mutation of things in nature , or their losing their substantial form , we come now to demonstrate that there is moreover mutation in them according to those forms which are accid●nt●l . in order to which we will premise this consideration taught us by daily experience , that no body becomes another thing in an instant , but is alter'd or dispos'd before hand ere it comes to suffer an essential change. for example ; a piece of wood ere it comes , by perfect division , to be made two things of one , is first alter'd according to its figure , that is , cleft or nick'd . before the same wood is turn'd into fire , it is first heated ; that is , it has that accidental form call'd the quality of heat first introduced into it ; and so in all the rest respectively . which changes not being essential ones , in regard they antecede the change of the e●tity as dispositions to it , they must be accidental ones ; and this , according to quantity , quality or relation , which are all the accidental notions we have of the thing that are intrinsecal to it . now , if we admit those previous alterations and dispositions , we cannot avoid the admitting mutation of the subject according to those forms . wax , by melting is rarifi'd , that is , chang'd as to its former density . a man or horse loses a limb , and consequently their former quantity and figure too ; and yet they are the same individual man and horse . a husband loses that relation when his wife dies , and yet is the same man he was . so that here is most manifestly a divisibility between the natures of essences of those things , and these intrinsecal accidents or accidental forms ; and the subjects are evidently chang'd by natural causes according to these , and not according to its essence or nature ; that is , the subject undergoes so many formal mutations that are accidental . and , let them explicate these terms as they please after their own odd manner , they shall never avoid the conclusion , if they do put the subject or body to be truly an ens , and that it may be otherwise than it was , and yet not immediately cease to be that ens ; either of which to deny were to bid defiance to mankind and to common sense . . i know it will be repli'd , that all natural bodies are compound entities , or made up of many little particles ; which , put together , mov'd and plac'd commodiously , do enable them to perform those several operations peculiar to each ; and that these do occasion our saying in our common speech , it is such an ens. and that , therefore , all our discourse concerning formal mutation falls to the ground ; since all may be explicated by the taking away , adding . ordering and moving those particles after such or such a manner . but , this comes not up to the point , nor can serve them to escape our argument , but rather plunges them into a more manifest and direct contradiction . for , admit that each compound ens ( as they are pleas'd to call those many entities ) or at least a great part of it , be made up of those little particles ; i am still to ask them whether those particles do really conspire to make it one thing or no , after the composition ? that is , whether after the composition there remains only one actual thing , or many actual things or entities ? if the first , then our discourse proceeds with the same force ; for then , since this one ens or body is dissolvable or corruptible , it must ( as was prov'd above ) have somewhat in it that remains in the compound w ch is to be made out of it , which we call matter , and somewhat which formally constituted the former body to be what it was , and consequently , which does not remain in the new one ; which is what we call the form. and , because it did not cease to be or was corrupted in an instant , the former subject or body admitted of alterations first ; and , consequently , there was mutation in it , both according to those substantial and those accidental forms . but , if they say , ( as i fear they will , because they must ) that after composition there is no ens which is truly one but many ; or , if they say that , after composition , there is one and many which are properly and formally entities ; then they must say that the same thing is both one according to the notion of ens , and yet not one according to the notion of ens , which is a plain contradiction ; for it affirms and denies contradictories of the thing acording to the same respect . whereas in the aristotelian doctrin , there is but one ens actually , tho' made up of potential parts which have a formal divisibility between them ; or ( which is the same ) one thing apt to verify different conceptions and notions ; which ( as was said above ) partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once , partly because natural causes do change it according to one respect and not according to another , we are naturally forced to make of it . now , to make the subject consist of potential parts , destroys not the vnity of the compounded ens but establishes it ; for , to say it is potentially many , is the same as to say it is actually one ; and , to compound an ens of potential parts proper to the notion of ens , neither of which were one actual part before , is to make that ens truly one tho' it had no other titl● to be one of its own nature : for , to compound an ens of entitatine parts neither of which is of its self an ens , is as plainly to make one ens as words can express . . but , to put them past this evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our discourse by alledging that natural bodies are compounds , i have purposely drawn my chief arguments from the atomes or molicellae ( as gassendus calls them ) of epicurus , and from that original mass of matter , of which the cartesians affirm their elements were made , which the antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly vncompounded . and , i farther alledge , that as many quantums cannot compound one quantum unless they be vnited quantitatively ; so neither can many entities ( such those distinct atomes and particles must be ) compound one ens , unless they be united entitavely . wherefore those parts can be only potentially in the compound ( as our matter and its essential and accidental forms are ) for , were they actually there , they would be entitatively many . whence the ens , made up of those many actual entities , could not be entitatively vnum or one ens ; but it would be an vnum which is divisum in se ; and which is worst , ( to compleat the nonsence and make it a perfect contradiction ) it would be in the same respect divisum in se in which it is vnum or indivisum in se , viz. in ratione entis ; which is to be perfectly chimerical . . thus they come off , and so must every one , who guides himself by the sound of words without looking attentively into their sense . for , the word [ compounded ] is in reality a kind of transcendent , and therefore in the highest manner equivocal ; whence , while out of slightness of reasoning and not heeding where the question pinches , they take the word in an vnivocal signification , they come to apprehend that the compounding many entities together according to some extrinsecal respects ( such as are situation , motion , joynt-action and such like , ) is the same as to compound them according to that most intrinsecal respect call'd substance ; and is sufficient to make them one entitatively , or one ens. . and let it be noted that this discourse equally confutes their position of the soul 's being a distinct thing from the body , which leads them into innumerable errours . and , the absurdity in making these two to be one compound thing , is far greater than to make one body compounded of those particles ; in regard the ranging of particles may at least , make one artificial compound , ( v. g. a house ) tho' not a natural one ; whereas a spirit and a body are forbid by their natures to have any such artificial or mechanical contexture ; but must unavoidably , when the asserters of this tenet have shifted and explicated all they can , remain two actual things ; and , moreover , such two , as are toto genere distinct ; nor , consequently , can they , either by the natural or artificial names us'd by mankind , be signify'd by one word ; or be called a man ; as the former compounds could be called a house , or a clock . and i defy all the wit of man to invent any way how two such actual things can have any coalition into one natural thing , or have an entitative union , but by being join'd together as act and power , that is , as matter and form ; which are the potential parts of an ens , and therefore are apt to compound one ens , in regard neither of them is a thing actually . . and indeed if we look more narrowly into the doctrin of the deniers of formal mutation ( the antiperipateticks ) we shall find that they have perplex't and render'd obscure the most common , easie , obvious , useful and necessary notion which mankind has or can have , viz. the notion of a thing . for i cannot discern that they make their first mass of matter to be one natural thing , unless they fancy it to be a kind of idea platonica of body , existing indeterminately or in common : for they put the form of it to be extension , and they make this extension to be indeterminate , that is not-particular ; that is , to be extension in common . nor can we learn of them what kind of thing it is , more than that it is barely thus extended : which tells us , indeed that it has quantity , but gives us no light of it's intrinsecal nature or entity ; that is , they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is extended . and what man living can conceive a body which has neither figure , or colour , density or rarity , heat or cold , hardness or softness in it , but meerly extension ? again , i cannot see that they put those little particles , made by motion out of that matter , to be natural things , tho' they do actually and distinctly exist in nature ; because they make them principia or elementa rerum naturalium ; and the elements of which things are made can no more , with good sense , be called things , than letters , which are the elements of words , can be said to be words . the compound , made up of those particles , they do , indeed , expresly own to be a thing ; but , by making it consist of many things , ( i mean those particles ) each of which has a peculiar actual existence of its own , and which are not united or made one according to the notion of ens , but only according to the notion of some accident which is extrinsecal to the notion of ens and differs from it toto genere , they cannot with any show of reason , call such a compound a thing , or one thing . whence , according to their hypothesis ; we can have no clear light what is to be called a thing , or what the word [ thing ] means . as for our four elements ( which perhaps they will object ) they either are found pure , and out of the compound ; and then having an actual existence of their own , they are truly things . or they do not , and then they are potential parts of the compound in which they are ; which , and only which , exists by one actual existence , which shows it to be one thing ; and not by many , as their compound does , which makes it many things ; at least such things as they will allow those elements or particles to be . . but to give them what satisfaction we may without injury to truth , and withal to clear the true aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those school-men , who make accidents so many little entities distinct from substances , we will confess that many of those forms we call qualities , are effluiums or particles sent out from other bodies ; which , while they transiently affect that body on which they light , they retain their own distinct entities , and are call'd the particles or vertue of the emittent body affecting another body that is passive from them . but , when they gain a permanency there , and , by continuity of quantity , or similitude of nature , or any other cause , they come to be naturally vnited to it , and assist it in its proper operation , they lose their actual entity and unity which they had formerly , and become a potential part of the subject that was passive from them , and exist and subsist in it . and ; because the notion of [ form ] is to be receiv'd in the subject or matter , and those particles advene to it already existing , they are hence call'd accidental forms of it ; and either give it such an alterableness as is agreeable to their nature , as is seen in passible qualities ; or , sometimes , if they suit with the primogenial constitution of that body , they strengthen and belong to some habit , disposition , power or property of it ; and piece out ( as it were ) those qualities , and , in some degree or other denominate the subject thus or thus qualify'd . . but to make it yet more manifest how industriously the cartesians do wave the giving any account of their first matter , of which notwithstanding they hold all their three elements , and consequently all nature , was made , we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more ; which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it ; by omitting that consideration , which , even by their own doctrin , was the chiefest and most necessary . they affirm that matter of theirs to have been divided first by god into greater parts , which again being moved or jumbled one against another , did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their first element was made : division then was the first and principal physical action , and that which most conduced to frame all nature : nay , in case there be no vacuum , ( as they grant there is not ) it is manifest that the first motion , and which was exercis'd immediately upon their matter , as also all the following motions exercis'd upon the said matter , was division . now , divisibility of the matter being the proper power that answers to the act of division , or ( which is the same ) to motion , and withal directly speaking the nature of their matter as apt to be wrought upon by those causes : how was it possible they should slip over that , and regard only the extension of it ? divisibility is a natural notion , and imports an order to natural action ; whereas extension is a dull sluggish notion , and meerly mathematical ; that is , it does abstract from action and motion both ; for an extended thing is never the more or less extended whether it moves or stands still ; but its whole nature and notion is taken up in affecting its own subject , or extending it , equally and all one whether it acts or not acts . but , the reason of this willful neglect is this , that , tho' they grant it to have been divided , yet , should they tell us it was thus divisible , common reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were easily or hardly divisible , that is rare or dense ; of which qualities in their matter , antecedently to motion , and the contexture of the particles made by that motion , their principles can give no kind of account , nor possibly explicate them . . i am apt to think that they foresaw this rub in their way , which hindred the currency of all their doctrin of physicks ; and , seeing they could not remove it , they very fairly let it alone ; yet , for a show they take notice of the word , but they turn it to a quite different sense : for mr. le graud * coming to give us account of the divisibility of this matter , where it was the proper place to acquaint us to what degree it was divisible into particles by natural causes , he starts aside to tell us that , being quantitative , 't is divisible in infinitum ; which is quite besides our purpose . this is a mathematical divisibility ; whereas a physical divisibility , or a disposition to be divided by the motion of the first-made parts , is only that which can concern his scheme or do it any service . for had it been insuperably dense or hard ( as epicurus fancies his atomes ) they could not have been divided at all , nor consequently , his three elements have been made . or , had it been rare or soft , one part would have stuck to another , and could not have been shatter'd and crumbled into those most subtil parts which make his first element . to declare then how and of what nature it was , in this respect , should have been one of the first principles in his physicks , his whole hypothesis depending on it ; whereas it was not a straw's matter whether it were divisible in infinitum or no , so it were but divisible into parts little enough to make their first element and the rest . i must then , in behalf of truth , declare that their avoiding this point , so necessary to their own scheme , and to the explication of nature , is a most manifest prevarication , arising hence that they cannot , notwithstanding they are men of great wit , make any sense of it according to their principles . . but tho' they do not treat of the divisibility of their matter de professo and purposely , as they ought , yet it is scarce possible but they must , against their wills , be forc'd to say something at unawares of the intrinsecal nature of their matter as either easily or hardly divisible , while they go about to explicate themselves . errour then being the best confuter of it self , let us see what they say of it . the ingenious gentleman , now mention'd , * tells us that their first element is made of particles , which , like shavings ▪ are rubb●d off by motion from bodies . now , since their matter is held by them to be homogeneous or uniform , a man would verily think by those expressions , that the nature of their matter is dense , hard or ( in a manner ) friable or crumbling . for what is rare , soft and tenacious , cannot be conceiv'd proper or fit to be crumbl'd or shatter'd into such very small dust by rubbing . yet the same author * tells us the particles of their first elements are slender and flexible accomodate themselves to the figures of the bodies they are contiguous to . by which expressions one would verily imagine them to be fluid , soft , moist or yielding , rather than of a solid or hard nature , for only such can accomodate themselves to other bodies on all occasions . so that he makes it at once to be both hard and soft ; as being very apt to break , and yet at the same time very apt to ply and bow too ; that is , he puts contrary qualities in the same uniform matter : which shews manifestly that they know not what to make of it , nor how to speak coherently concerning it ; and , withal , that , ( which is the true genius of hypothetical philosophers ) they blow and sup at once ; and say any thing that suites with their present occasion . it was for their turn to make them very flexible , for otherwise it had been impossible to avoid vacuum , whenas millions of those atomes were jumbled together ; which , had they been solid , had retain'd their figure , and then vacuum must have fill'd the little interstices : and , it was very fitting too they should be hard and friable ; otherwise they could never have been shatter'd by rubbing into such minute dust , as they had design'd to make their first element of . so that they play fast and loose with their reader ; and , no wonder we know not where to have them , when they do not know where they are themselves . . the same untoward way they take in expressing themselves , sometimes as if they and we did perfectly agree in our sentiments . and because the goodness of our common reason teaches us that the nature of a thing is in it , they do therefore allow our well-meant words , and talk of intrinsecal forms both essential and accidental ; which granted they cannot deny formal mutation . mr. le grand part . cap. . § , , . gives us all these good words , tho' he chuses sometimes rather to use the word [ modification ] than [ form ] and in his § , . he discourses altogether as if he were an aristotelian . but , alas ! what trust is to be given to meer words ! for , coming to the § . he tells us plainly his true meaning , which is as opposit to ours ( tho' using the same words ) as the two poles are to one another , viz. that in the generation of plants and beasts a new substance is no more produced , than in the framing a statue , or building a house : which he there exemplifies in some particulars , and then concludes that generation is nothing but the translation or new ranging of the parts of the matter , and that this is alike in natural and artifieial compositions . but , by his leave , if he that builds a house does not know the intrinsecal temperament or consistency of his materials , viz. that stones are dense or hard , and therefore most fit to be the foundation ; that wood is dense , and lighter , and so more fit for the superstructures : lastly , that mortar is soft at first , but hard when it comes to be dry , and so is most fit to bind the stones together ; i am afraid that if he be ignorant of these and such like particulars , he will make but a ruinous and bungling piece of work of it , tho' he be never so well verst in the act of ranging the parts of the several materials artificially or mathematically . and , as has been shown , no man living , no not themselves , can give any account of the consistency of their matter , which is the only material of which they build ( pardon the bull they force us to ) their natural-artificial structures . . this then being his true sense , and , consequently , the true doctrin ( if we may believe him ) of the cartesian school ; and the word [ form ] bearing in its notion that it is in the matter , and therefore is intrinsecal to the thing , and makes it either another if it be an essential form ; or intrinsecally otherwise or alter'd , if it be an accidental one ; and , it being likewise evident that the ranging the parts of matter , is only an outward application of them to one another , which is meerly an extrinsecal notion ; we may hence clearly discover , that they do not use the words [ form ] and [ intrinsecal ] in a proper and natural sense , but utterly pervert and abuse them . . by these expressions of his lately mention'd , and their putting nothing but extension in their matter , which abstracts from motion and natural action , one would think they intended , in stead of physicks to give us a piece of meer mathematicks , for bare extension fits it for no other science . nor are we mistaken in thinking so ; for he tells us expresly * that natural philosophy is one part of the mathematicks . tho' the abstraction which , in the place now mention'd , he assigns to quantity as a genus , is very odd and illogical ; for the abstraction of quantity from the thing or from motion , is an abstraction of the accident from the subject , or from another accident ; and therefore is quite another kind of abstraction than that of the genus from the species ; and it looks as if they hanker'd after plato's exploded conceit of a subsistent vniversal ; and that they would have their first matter , contrary to all logick and good sense , to be a body in common ; and therefore the genus to all particular bodies : nor can any thing sound more awkwardly then to make a mathematical treatise of physicks . but cartesius was a greater master of mathematicks than he was of physicks ; and therefore had a vast design to reduce all nature and all philosophy within the purlew of his own art ; in which it must be confest he was very excellent . . but , to lay yet a greater force upon their backwardness to admit a formal change in bodies , we come now to more palpable and plain instances , not fetch'd from metaphysicks but from obvious effects in nature ; which every man sees , and themselves cannot but acknowledg . let us then take into our consideration a young lately-planted oak growing in a nursery ; which in the space of a hundred years , spreads it self into a vast tree ; dilating it's large and massy branches on all sides , and over-shadowing a spacious extent of ground . can any man deny but that this is the same thing , or the same tree it was at first ? and yet 't is most evidently not the same in quantity , it being now a thousand times greater than it was formerly . 't is manifest then that here is a real divisibility between it's quantity and it's entity or substance ; and a real mutation according to the form of the quantity , and not according to the notions of ens or thing . the same may be said of an infant grown up to be a man ; which , when 't is now bigger in quantity , should they deny to be the same thing or the same man , it would make mad work in the world by taking away titles of inheritances , and altering the right of succession . the infant might , perhaps , retain his title for some very small time ; but the identity of it being lost by the accruing of new matter and new quantity , he has forfeited his estate , e'er he comes at age to understand or manage it , by losing his essenee . . i know that our late philosophers will hope to evade this last instance by alledging that the numerical identity of a man springs from his having the same soul. which tenet , ( were it proper to confute it here ) would prove as unreasonable and ill-grounded as any of the rest . i only note , on the by , that , as it becomes god's wisdom , as he is author of nature , to carry on the course of causes by fitting dispositions to the production of farther and more noble effects ; and consequently , to sute and proportion what supervenes to what prae-exists ; and the embryo in our case praeexists , and , by having such dispositions in it as made it fit to concur ( on it's part ) to work rationally to such a degree , made it require to have for it's form such a rational soul joyn'd with it , and , thence , determin'd the author of nature to infuse it ; it follows that the thing is quite contrary to what they imagin ; viz. that the soul was to be adjusted and proportion'd to the exigency of the bodily part ; and that , therefore the soul is determinately such , or of such a determinate degree of rationality ( which essentially and numerically distinguishes souls , and men , from one another ) as was fit to be infus'd into and work with such a body . and were not this so , it would be impossible to explicate how original sin is connaturally transfus'd from adam , or how the soul becomes tainted by being united to a body made * ex immundo semine . but , this is not the only ill consequence that springs from this extravagant tenet of the soul 's being a distinct thing from the body , or that man is in reality compounded of two actual things , and therefore not to be placed in any one line of the predicament of ens or substance . for , that odd opinion does , besides , very much favour ( at least , very well consist with ) the praeexistence of souls : because , if the soul be not proportion'd to the disposition of the corporeal part of man , and so , be truly the form of it , but a kind of assistant spirit , only apt to joyn with it , and promote it in it's operations , it might as well exist before the body as after it . whence it will be very hard for them to assign any solid reason from the nature of such a spirit , ( since it might indifferently fit other bodies or assist more of them ) why there might not be also a transmigration of souls from one man to another ; for it would be , in that case , no more but shifting their office and assisting now one of them then another . not to mention how this doctrin ( as is discourst in the preface ) tends to introduce a kind of fanaticism into the philosophy schools , by making all their thoughts run upon nothing but spiritual conceits and innate ideas , and having a spiritual communication with god , when they know any natural truth , after an unintelligible manner . not considering that man , in this mortal state here , is truly one part or piece of nature ; and subject to the impressions of natural causes affecting him , both as to his corporeal and spiritual capacity , according to the different natures of those different recipients . . but , to return whence we diverted ; letting man and his individuality alone , what can they say to the former instance of a young oak ( or of any other vegetable or animal ) increast to it's full growth , which all mankind agrees to be still the same thing , and yet not the same in quantity ? it is not hence unanswerably evident , that there is a formal mutation according to it's quantity and not according to it's entity , and therefore a formal composition and divisibility in it according to those two respects ? they cannot say they are the same physically , or the same physical compound : for , since all natural bodies , according to their doctrin , are made solely of their first matter , or of the particles made of it ; where there is incomparably more matter , there must be a new-compound or a new body ; in regard more and less must be the differences of every notion in the same line , as has been demonstrated : wherefore more or less of the matter ( it being inform'd , and , so truly an ens or a body ) ought to outweigh , in constituting particular bodies or entities , all consideration of accidental notions or modifications of it , which are not properly entities but only modes of ens. 't is a folly to alledg the figure or extension of those particles ; for , if the subjects , ( i mean the particles ) be not the same , all the accidents which belong to those numerically different subjects , must be numerically different likewise ; and , so , cannot constitute a thing to be numerically one , but only add more numerical things to it to make it numerically many extension is held by them to be the only essential form of their matter ; they so , ought , if they go to work logically and consequentially , to say that particular extensions of that matter which come along with those particles , does give a particular essence to each of those compounds which are made of that matter ; and so make the generical notion hold in every species and individuum of that common body ; as entity which is the form of ens is found in every individual thing in the whole world ; and not to make the essential difference of those bodies consist in such respects as are not essential . they will tell us of many modifications of each compound : but they should consider that modifications of the thing or subject do supervene to it ; and therefore the thing must first be supposed to be , e'er it can be capable to be modify'd ; and it looks odd to talk of modifying what is not , or of modifying a nothing . yet tho' it strains good sense , they tell us of other essential modifications of the matter in each compound ; as if res were not , by all mankind and by the light of nature , presuppos'd to modus rei . but this catachesis they are forced to by their pique against essential forms ; the sense of which the goodness of rational nature forces them to admit ; tho' out of aversion to the word , they generally change it into a worse . . their last evasion then is to say that those vegetables and animals are the same morally . and , indeed , they cannot in all humane language pick out a blinder word , and of a more ambiguous signification ; and therefore , 't is most proper to make use of for a subterfuge against clear reason . i never yet could hear of any man that could define it ; and it is as easy for the taylor in the fable to fit the moon with a coat , as to fit it with a definition . but , we will do what we can to show the different senses it may have in our circumstances ; and that none of them can serve their purpose . either then [ to be morally the same ] signifies that the thing does seem to us to be the same , tho' it it be not so really . but , this comes over to us instead of opposing us ; for , our question is what is , and not what seems ; nor is such an expression to be tolerated amongst philosophers , whose duty 't is to consider what passes really in nature , and not what only appears so . or else , these words must mean that the thing is not considerably chang'd ; and therefore , 't is , morally speaking , the same . but , this is most evidently false ; for , the over-grown oak has a thousand times more quantity in it , and , consequently , according to them , more matter added to it than it had while it was but a s●yon - wherefore , it must be more than morally , that is , considerably chang'd according to its quantity , and yet , not at all chang'd as it is an ens or thing . and this is all i can imagin the antiperipateticks can any way plead to escape the force of our argument for formal mutation . * our ingenious country-man , mr. locke , goes more solidly to work , by making it to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life , in a like continuing organization , conformable to that sort of plants . for , life speaks something intrinsecal and essential , ( which the meer ranging of particles thus or thus , does not ) unless we will say that a watch or clock lives ; and therefore it argues some formal mutation of the matter , while it is disposed , fitted and ( as it were ) digested so as to continue that life by nourishing the vegetable . for , it will seem incredible to any considerer , that particles of all sorts should be found , in such vast quantities , in every little spot of ground where so many several plants and trees do grow , as are proper to each , and sufficient to nourish them up , t●ll they increase to such a prodigious bigness . yet , this must be asserted , if formal mutation be deny'd . but , i can by no means allow what he sayes there that the principium individuationis is existence . for , since created entities have not existence from their being entia or things , or ( which is the same ) individuums : all we can say of them is that they are capable of existing ; and this they must have antecedently , in priority of nature , to their actual existence . wherefore their individuation must be presuppos'd to existence ; and , so , cannot depend on it as on its principle . again , since plato's flash of ideas existing in common , is now hist out of all schools ( if indeed that excellent man meant them as his opposers apprehend him , ) and that neither man nor horse in common can exist , but it must be determinately , and particularly this or that man , horse , &c. it must be suppos'd to be constituted determinately this or that individuum ere it can be capable of existing . wherefore existence is an accidental formality , supervening to the individuum already determin'd and made fit to exist , that is , to the individuum already constituted ; and therefore existence cannot cause nor constitute it . had i leasure , and were the place proper , i would show my respects to the learned author by giving him my thoughts of his chapter concerding identity and diversity ; for it is an important subject , and i see it is treated by him more elaborately than are some other parts of that worthy book . . lastly , to say no more of formal mutation in bodies , let us cast a short view upon what passes in spiritual natures . when a soul that before was ignorant becomes knowing , or a wicked soul virtuous , can it be deny'd that those souls are chang'd according to that form call'd quality , and yet remain the same according to their essence ? surely , they cannot say that this is done by new atomes aggregated to that soul , or by any other of those odd requisites they put to induce a new accidental form. and , if not , they must see and confess that formal mutation is , beyond all dispute , found in spiritual natures . much more then may it have place in bodies ; which , being subject to motion , which is essentially change , are , consequently , of a nature far more changeable than spiritual beings are . what can be answer'd to those pressing arguments i cannot in their behalf imagine ; nor , i am confident , can themselves give any reply that is solid , or taken from the known and acknowledg'd natures of things ; however they may shuffle it off wittily , by throwing in some unprov'd supposition , plainly exprest ; and endeavouring to make that pass upon their readers . but 't is impossible they should even attempt to perform this by bearing up to any evident principles , or by deductions connected by such principles , or reducible to them : only which can satisfy the judgments of learned considerers and true philosophers . from what is said hitherto is establisht this grand conclusion , that formal mutation must unavoidably be granted . which evinc't , all the corpuscularian and atomical hypotheses fall to the ground , and can need no farther confutation . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e † b. . ch . . ‖ medit. . * medit . notes for div a -e * see 〈◊〉 . 〈…〉 * b. . l. s. , . less . . . * less . . sect. , , . * l. s. , , . † sect. . * s. . † s. . * l. . s. , , . † l. . s. , . ‖ see b. . l. . s. , , . * l. . s. , . † s. . * sect. ‖ less . . sect. . * less . . sect. , , . * l. . s. * less . . sect. . † s. . * s. . † less . . sect. , . * sect. * l. . sect. , . * sect. . * l. . s. , , . † l. . s. , , , . ‖ l. . s. , . * l. . s. . . * l. . s. . * l. . s. , . . * less . . s. . † less . . s. . , · * s. . * l. . sect. . † l. . s. . * l. . s. , , . * less . . sect. , . * sect. . * b. . l. . s. . * l. . s. , . * l. . s. . * l. . s. . * less . . sect. . † book . l. . s. . prop , . * see b. . l . s. . * b. . l. notes for div a -e * l. . s. , & . * b. . l. * less . . sect. , , , . * see appendix . * see b. . l. . corol. . * b. . s. . * book . l. . s. . † book . l. . s. . * b . l . s. . † b. l. . s . notes for div a -e † b. . l. ● . ● . . * see §. * b. . l. . §. . † see b. . l. . § ▪ . axl . prop. . prop. ▪ ax. . ax. . * ax. . † ax. . * ax. . † ax. . † prop. . . * ax. . † prop. . † prop. . † ax. . * ax. . * ax. . † prop. . † ax. . * ax . * ax. . . † prop. . † prop. . † ax. . * ax. . † prop. . . † prop. · * prop. . . . . † b. . l. . §§ . . . . † ● . . * l. . §. . * b. . l. . b. l. . § ● † see b. . l. . §. . * b. . lesson last . * see b. . l. . §. . notes for div a -e the question be●ween the peri●●●eticks and antiperipatetick● , stated in common . the grounds of the peripatetick doctrin concerning matter and form. the mistake of the antiperipateticks concerning matter and form. the true doctrin of the peripateticks concerning formal composition the true doctrine of the peripateticks concerning formal divisibility and formal mutation , which are essential . the same doctrin declar'd by an instance . of that other formal composition and mutation which is accidental . that all formal mutations are intrinsecal . the peripatetical doctrin prov'd from logick and the known method of discoursing . the doctrin of the ant●●peripatetick● is unprincipled . this last charge made good . the indirect methods us'd by the antiperipateticks . the summ of epicurus his doctrin . that the ep●curean atomes are ●ormally changeable that those atoms de facto are formally 〈◊〉 . the same demonstrated from this infallible ma●xim , that all our notions are taken from the things . the alledging extrinsecal mutation is both nonsense , and incompetent . the cartesians are forced by their own doctrine to admit formal mutation . the cartesians can give no account of their first matter . th●t 't is impossible the car●esians should explicate density in their first ma●ter , because they deny formal mutat●on . formal mutation demonstrated from th● transmutation of rare and dense things into one another . that there are proper agents in nature to condense and 〈◊〉 . the cartesians hypothesis is praeternatural . james c. . v. . that th●re is also mu●ation a●c●rding to 〈…〉 . * entire body of philosophy part . ch . §. . * ib. ch . . §. . * ib. § , . * part . chap. . §. . * job . . * an essay concerning humane understanding . b. . ch. . a letter from a trooper in flanders to his comrade shewing that luxemburg is a witch, and deals with the devil. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter from a trooper in flanders to his comrade shewing that luxemburg is a witch, and deals with the devil. sergeant, john, - . p. 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or how come these things about ? i have been often musing what the matter should be ; and at last i have found it out . in plain english , tom , we have been bewitch'd . this damn'd rogue luxemburg , this crooked urchinly rogue , and the devil together , have bewitch'd us all this while . as for the dauphin , who commanded the french last summer , or at least had the name of it , i suspect him not : for we all know that the dauphin is no conjurer . but we have been bewitch'd as sure as i am here ; and none but luxemburg could thus bewitch us . thou knowest , tom , that at the beginning , we talk'd of nothing less than marching into france , and carrying the war into france . and we had forces sufficient for that purpose , both then , and many times since ; the french not daring to fight us . if they had , we should have beaten them to clouts . by our carrying the war thus forward , we should have lived upon the enemy ; and should have tumbled in free quarter , and contributions , and plunder . but instead of this , we have kept still in flanders ; lying heavy upon it , and plainly devouring it . nor have we ever had our foot upon french ground . so that i conclude we have been bewitch'd ; and that a spell hath been laid before us , which we had not the power to pass over . i meant , by french ground , not only their own country of france , but their conquests also ; or generally , the french quarters . and i say again , that we have not been in the french quarters ever since this war ; that is , not with our main army . for i confess duke wirtenburg with a detachment , and count thian with a party , have been in those quarters ; though their stay and their reign were very short . marry your gazette did publish . that our main army ( upon our late march to rouselaer , where we encamp'd so long to so little purpose ) was in the enemies country . but that 's a damn'd lye. for the enemies country ( we all know ) is that which is beyond , and within their frontier garisons : whereas this place is on this side their frontier , and between their frontier and ours ; and pays contribution to us , as well as to them . so , i remember , three years ago , when our army had passed the sambre , and was got as far as beaumont , fools gave out that we were in the enemies quarters . but we were but nine or ten miles from charleroy , which was then ours , and within the contribution of that garison . and the like may be said of walcourt , where we had been before that time . thou seest now , that we can come near the enemies country ; though even that doth seldom happen : but we can't get into it , for the heart-blood of us . though we desire it above all things ; and though we want neither strength , nor courage , nor conduct . and therefore thou may'st be satisfied , as well as i , that the devil has hinder'd us , and that we have been bewitch'd . the french run every foot into our country , and why should not ▪ we do the like into theirs ? are we affraid of an action of trespass ? we had once namur , charleroy , and mons , all abreast ; and it was a noble frontier . but the french made nothing to pass through this frontier , and to lie in the heart of our country , between those places and brussels ; where they were as safe as a thief in a mill. not a quarter ever beaten up , or so much as attempted . and this they would do , even when they were forced to avoid fighting , our army being stronger than theirs . tom , we have been invaded year after year , by an enemy that durst not fight us : but whether this could be done without witchcraft , i leave thee to judge . and i know thou art a great judg in these matters : we have many great officers , that cannot judge half so well . prethee tom give me leave , for otherwise i must take it , to add one word more . i say then , that by these doings poor flanders hath been sadly burden'd , being made the perpetual seat of war : when in the mean time the french quarters lie fresh and untoucht . and this hath made them so rampant as they are . but if we had lain upon their country as long as they have done upon ours , they would have been in a very bare and low condition . ay but , thou'lt say , we cannot fall into the french quarters , because of their lines . very good . and these lines shew yet more : plainly , that there is witchcraft in the case : for they could never be defended without the help of the devil . they reach from dunkirk upon the sea , to pont espiers upon the river scheld ; which is near forty english miles . from whence to conde ( along that river , which here serves for a line ) is near twenty miles more . and from conde to namur , it is almost fifty miles . now i leave thee to consider , whether lines of this length could be defended without witchery . and herein lies the witchery , that we have not the power to attempt them . for when we did attempt them , ( which we have done but twice , and that was under wirtemberg and thian , ) we broak through them with ease . thou seest , by what i have written , that i am very fond of getting into the enemies country . others are rather for besieging and taking their frontier towns. and so am i , when we are able to do it . but this requires a great odds in power : one army for the sieges , and another to confront the enemy . whereas we may march into their country , when ever we dare fight . what , go beyond their frontier garisons ? ay , beyond them . why should not we do it as well as the french ? and garisons signify nothing against a commanding army ; no more than so many crows nests . an army that dares fight , and yet dares not march into the enemies country , are the veriest buzzards and owls that ever were hatch'd . unless they are bewitch'd , as we plainly have been . for i would have thee , and all men to know , and thou dost know , that we are neither owls nor buzzards . i will now tell thee in particular of some of luxemburg's tricks : that thou may'st see what a rogue he is , and that he is the rogue that has bewitch'd us . one of his first pranks , after he came in play , was at fleury : where i saw plainly , who he dealt with . he lay with his army beyond the sambre ; and prince waldeck was advancing towards him in fair order . what does luxemburg now , but get boufflers to him ( by the help of the devil ) with his army from a far country : and prince waldeck knew no more on 't than the pope of rome . in the twinkling of an eye , abundance of bridges were thrown over the river , by the same help i warrant : and they catch'd poor waldeck in fleury plains , just as the devil had contriv'd it . would'st know what came on 't ? they gave us a damnable ruffle , to say no worse . i come now to mons ; which place we had never lost by a winter siege , but that we were bewitch'd there twice over . first , the devil was in it , that when we saw vast preparations for a siege , and that in all likelihood mons was aim'd at ; we did not put into it one man the more , though thousands lay quartered in flanders . so that the place was lost for want of men. for the garison was not five thousand strong , when the place required ten thousand . secondly , the town being yet in condition to hold out several days , by luxemburg's means the devil possessed the priests , and set them in a mutiny ; and they forced the governour to surrender . when at the same time we were just marching to their relief . mons being lost , we fell to fortifying of hell ; which thou knowest is within seven miles of brussels . and we had laboured several weeks upon it . but luxemburg coming across the country , we were fain to out run our new fortress . for , as the devil would have it , there were but two thousand men in it , and no cannon . we thought the loss not so great , as the disgrace and the baffle . if luxemburg could have kept this town , it had been a sharp thorn in our sides , lying so near brussels . but our army grew soon so strong , that he durst not do it . and now he declined fighting , and mainly fortified his camp. whereupon we fairly left him , and marched away directly for france ; to the great joy of the whole army , who long'd to be there . and luxemburg soon followed ; marching along beside us , and coasting us at a distance . we , in our march , were joyn'd by several thousands ; so that our army was increased to ninety thousand men , the french being not near so many . and now we were full of hopes , and resolution , and courage ; and we hugg'd our selves with the thoughts of a brave invasion . but in the nick , this cursed rogue luxemburg , fell to his charms and spells , and confounded all . methinks i see the devil sitting upon his crump shoulder , and beckning to us , and saying ; come this way , come this way , turn your noses this way . and as sure as thou art alive , tom , we stop'd our march into france , and turned our noses upon luxemburg . and we encamp'd by him with our mighty army a good part of the summer ; doing no kind of thing but eat up our own country . didst thou not read news in the gazette , week after week , from his majesties camp at gemblours , and from the royal camp at gemblours ? there it was that we lay , just behind charleroy and namur , which then were ours ; while the french army lay advanced before mons. they said , we staid for our heavy cannon to come by water from mastricht ; which were long a coming . for the devil dryed up the maese river , and laid sands in our way , so that the boats could not pass ; and we were bewitch'd all over . at last our cannon came up , and we did nothing with them . however we afterwards marched on , and passed the sambre . but we never got ten miles beyond it , nor out of our own contribution : nor could we ever reach the french quarters ; though they lay as open to us , as hartfordshire does to middlesex . for then they had no lines thereabouts . but our stay was not long in these parts : for within a while we marched back into flanders , and luxemburg after us ; where we passed the rest of the campaigne . all this while our noble king was with us ; who is the bravest general in christendom . he spares for no pains , and he wants no brains , and he is metal to the back . tom , it would do thee good to serve under such a general . but , at the end of the year , his majesty left us , and prince waldeck commanded . and then it was that luxemburg play'd us another trick , near a town called leuze , in a damn'd thick fogg , which the devil had raised for him ; he was with us , and upon us , before we were in the least aware of him . i tell thee , tom , we dreamed not on him , till he was almost within pistol shot . and if we had not fought like devils , luxemburg's devil had beaten us to pieces . but fighting as we did , it proved but a brush , or a basting . here the devil did as much for luxemburg , as could be expected at his hands . for he raised one mist in the air , and cast another over some-body's brains : or else we should have had our scouts abroad , knowing that the enemy was not far from us . the siege of namur follows next in order : where we were bewitch'd most confoundedly . it was a brave town , and of mighty importance ; and we brought a brave army to relieve it ; and our men were in high courage , and would have sought blood up to the ears , and were mad to be at it ; making no question but to beat the french to dirt . then , as to conduct , i say it again , we have as good as any in the world : but yet we suffered this town to be taken before our faces , without striking a stroke ; or so much as firing a musquet . and some think , that we lost more men by lying still , and by the diseases it occasioned , than we should have done if we had fought every day . now can any man imagine that these things could be , if the devil had not bewitch'd us ? if the relief was possible , why did we not attempt it ? if it was impossible , why did we not march away , and make a diversion ? but we could neither fall on , nor march off ; but were perfectly inchanted . and who should do it , but that crooked urchin , whom i have so often mentioned ? the french king was here himself ; who is likewise much suspected to deal in the black art. but , for my part , i am fully satisfied , that 't was luxemburg , and his devils , that brought these things about . it must be confessed , that the french did something out-number us ; but we feared them not . and their army lay round a great city ; their inner line being without cannon shot , as it must be : so that their quarters extended very wide , and took up a mighty compass : nor had they any circumvallation , as they called it ; only their quarters were barricadoed , and some works thrown up here and there . also the maes and the sambre meeting at namur , those two rivers run through and divided their quarters . so that part of their men lay on one side the sambre , and part on the other , and part lay beyond the maes . and we having huy upon the maes , and charleroy upon the sambre , we might have marched upon them on either side of either river . and it had been hard , if some where or other we could not beat them up . however we might have tryed what we could do : but the devil was in it , we never made a tryal . whereas though we had failed in the attempt , and been soundly banged with the loss of ten or twenty thousand men ; no body would have blamed us , and our very loss had been glorious . but to be lookers on , was such a thing ; it makes me mad to think on it . though an observator says , that we got more honour by our mighty attempts to relieve the town , than the french did by taking it . but after namur was lost , we fell to fighting like mad ; though it would have been better , one would have thought , to have done so before . had we ventured half so freely before , as we did after , namur might have been ours at this day . but as to the fight we had after , ( it is called the battel of steenkirk , and thou hast heard much of it ) i 'll tell thee how it was . the french king , after he had taken namur , was gone to paris ; and a good part of his army was sent towards germany ; and our army was much increased . so that the french army , left in flanders with luxemburg , was now clearly the weaker . yet , for all that , he had the impudence to march into our country , and there continue . but , for fear of the worst , he encamped in a ground of great advantage , which he also strongly fortified . whereupon we took a resolution to fall upon him in his camp. and we begun most bravely . ten battalions of ours , who had the van , beat thirty french battalions out of their ground ; and chased them from hedg to hedg , and from one work to another ; and we made them out-run their cannon . we shewed what rogues we could make of the french , if we had them fairly before us . and now was luxemburg hard put to it : he scarce had time to say a short prayer to the devil . good devil , quoth he , help me out at this dead lift , or i am undone for ever . and the devil did help him to some purpose . for he so brought it about , that our men were not seconded : by which means we were beaten off with great loss , ( still fighting stoutly ) and luxemburg scaped a scouring . for had our main body secon●ed our van , he had certainly been quite routed . some said , that our main body could not come up , because of the bad ground . but why could they not march the same way , and upon the same ground , that the van had done ? and why did they not follow closer , but lay lagging some miles behind ? in short , the devil was in it , and we were bewitch'd . when this bloody bout was over ; and our army recruited and reinforced , we marched to attaque the french lines . but luxemburg , by the help of his old friend the devil , got thither before us . for we , on our part , saunter'd a great way about , and out of our way , as if puck had led us ; which i believe he did . however , we then learned , as we had done at hall before , that the true way to draw the french out of flanders , is to march into france , or towards it . for they are very tender in this matter : and though they love to be in an enemies country , yet they cannot endure that an enemy should be in theirs . being bob'd at the lines , we went with our commanding army and encampt at at a place called grammen ; which is a good snug place , within our own country , and but five or six miles from gaunt . and here we were tyed by the leg ( no doubt by sorcery and witchcraft , it could be nothing else ) for a great many weeks ; being not able to move one way or other . but our army increased to a hundred thousand men , while luxemburg had not half the number ; a great part of his army being gon to the maes under boufflers , to stave off an invasion there . nevertheless we still kept close in our camp at grammen : nor did we budg from it till we went into winter quarters . during all which time you had news in the gazette , from the royal camp at grammen . but what could we have done , had we been disposed to be active ? i answer , that in the first place we might still have attempted their lines . not their line between the scheld and the lys , where luxemburg lay with his army ; but their long line between the lys and dunkirk . for this had but an ordinary guard : and if the french should have drawn their main army to have defended it , their new and unfinished fortifications at courtray , and likewise their camp near it , would have been in great danger . we found afterward , by experience , that in all likelihood it would have been no hard matter to have sorced these lines . but if it had prov'd hard , and we had been repulsed , we might have marched up the scheld ; and have endeavoured , by throwing bridges over it , to have gotten that way into the french conquests . tom , i think in my conscience this river scheld is enchanted . it is like styx , the river of hell ; which none could pass without the help of old charon . thou knowest it is but a paltry river , in comparison of other rivers . a man ( i had almost said ) may leap over it with a pike staff : i am sure that with five or six boats , we might lay a bridge over it any where . and yet we stand in as much awe of it , as if it were the rhine , or the danube ; we dare not so much as attempt to pass it . though the french conquests lie entire and untoucht behind it ; at which we might have our wills , if we durst pass this river . if we must encamp , why might we not have encampt upon this river ( getting likewise a passage over it ) any where above their lines ? and then the french must quit their lines , we being behind them . or if we had made a new garison , methinks there were the place . a lusty garison here , ( i would not have it less than ten thousand men ) would maintain it self bravely , by contributions out of the french conquests . in such a garison i should desire to be ; there were some cut in such a garison . but suppose we could not get over this river ; must we then lie in our own country with our commanding army ? there was no such necessity . for we might have gone higher up the scheld ; and have forced those lines , ( if they had then any lines there ) which afterwards count thian forced so easily , with a party of twelve hundred men. which being done , nothing could have hinder'd us from marching into france , we having such a mighty power as we had . and if luxemburg had come in our way , we should have beaten him , with all his devils . but let us go on . thou hast heard , i know , that dixmude and furnes , which we had fortified at the end of the campagne , were most famously lost this winter . we out-run the one , and the other was delivered up after a siege of some hours . when these things were done , luxemburg was at paris : but i warrant he had laid his spells before he went ; for i am very sure he did bewitch us . was it not a bewitched thing , that we should fortily these places for the french ? when base things are done , and no body in fault , i conclude there is witchcraft in the case : and when no body is punish'd , i conclude that no body was in fault . we were much troubled at the loss of these places : but some think , that we were more bewitch'd in fortifying them , than we were in losing them . furnes is about five miles forward from newport , ( which is ours ; ) and dixmude about seven sideward . and must we have a garison at every seven miles end ? why , a small country , thus garison'd , would drink up a great army . and thou knowest , tom , ( for thou art a cunning dog , and hast guts i' thy brains , ) that when we fortify places near our own garisons , they do us little good if we keep them , and great mischief if the enemy take them . if we had kept these two places , they would not have commanded a contribution ( more than we had before ) to maintain a thousand men ; when at least five or six thousand must be in them . i 'll not give a pin for a garison , that has not a good contribution . for the great end of garisons , let them say what they will , is to command contributions . therefore our new garisons should have been made twenty or thirty miles forward , towards the enemies country ; and then they would have contribution in abundance . now follows the campagne of . in the beginning of which the french monarch was soundly baffled . at that season , it seems , the devil was turn'd against him , or at least forsook him . he came upon us with a greater force than ever ; and we were to be run down forthwith , and all flanders to be swallowed up . in good earnest , tom , we were in great danger . but our king encamp'd so commodiously , and so strongly , and took such order for the defence of all places , that the monarch was quite gravell'd . yet if he had not been an arrant buzzard , or the devil had not owed him a shame , he might have left us in our camp , and have marched up to brussels , and beyond it , and whither he pleas'd ; and have grazed up the country as he went , and have put all brabant under contribution . which had put us in a bad condition to maintain the war : and some places or other would have fallen into his hands . but instead of doing this , or any thing else , he sneak'd back to paris , ( or to versailles , i care not which ) and all his court ladies with him : whom he had brought to be spectators of his famous victories ; and by report they were no better than they should be . soon after the dauphin marched towards germany , with part of the french army : luxemburg being left with the remaining part , which was still a force superiour to ours . and not long after that , the duke of wirtemberg was detach'd from our army to attaque the french lines . which design was carried so secretly , that the devil himself could not discover it to luxemburg . the lines were master'd with little ado , and we got into brave quarters , and we raised contributions amain . but then came the battel of landen , ( another bloody bout , ) which hurried us back to our main army that wanted us . 'till then we had been free from witchcraft during that campaigne : but then luxemburg bestir'd himself , and conjur'd up all his devils ; and we were bewitch'd over and over . first , the devil bewitch'd us to let huy be so miserably unprovided for defence , the enemy being so near it . and if we could not defend it , why did we not blow it up ? but it was yielded in two or three days . secondly , we were bewitch'd to lie in the enemies reach , who so much over-power'd us . and thirdly , we were catch'd in a bewitched ground ; having a river and morass behind us , which should have been before us . the french came up with us over night ; and we expected to retreat that night , which the gallants thought dishonourable . but some of our troop have read sir walter rawleigh , and they tell us that he has a saying , that 't is more honourable to retreat by night , than to be beaten by day . but we fought it stoutly ; and the king did bravely above the rest . however it was a bad business : and it would have been much worse , if luxemburg ( to our great good fortune ) had not play'd the beast , in not pursuing his advantage . we are come at last to ninety four , or the campaigne of last summer : and thou wilt find by the story , that the devil doth still haunt us , and bewitch us . this year the dauphin did again command the french in chief ; and the old magician ( thou knowest who i mean ) commanded again under him . and they presently fell to their old trade : for the first thing they did , was to come boring into our country , where they lay at rack and manger . and we suffered this as tamely as we used to do : wherein thou may'st perceive a spice of the old witchery . i confess that the french at first were something too strong for us : but in a short time we were grown stronger than they ; and our fingers itched to be upon their jackets . however we were content to forbear , till the arrival of all our forces : which forces being come , and we being all together , the sun never shined upon a braver army . and then we out-number'd the enemy , by many thousands , both in horse and foot ; and we had better horses , and better men , and were every way superiour : so that we made no more of the french army , than of so many jack-daws . we being in this glorious condition , the french , who had lain beside us , then marched in quite beyond us ; and were got between liege and mastricht . but we thought them besotted , to give us such an advantage ; making account that we had them then in a bag ( if we had but the grace to shut it , ) and that they could not escape us . for our army interposing between them and home , ( as we expected we should ) and they having with them all their baggage and heavy cannon , they could not get off without fighting ; and then we made no doubt but we should beat them to fitters . for my part , i thought the war was near an end ; a happy and glorious end : there being but two things to do ; that is , to beat the french army , and then to march to paris . thou knowest , tom , that namur , and huy , and liege , and mastricht , lie all on a row upon the maese . of which mastricht and liege were ours , and the french had huy and namur : huy being advanced into our quarters , beyond all the rest of their frontier . these places lying thus , and the french army ( as i told thee ) being between liege and mastricht , we had orders given us to get ready to march. and i cannot express , nor thou imagine , how joyfully we received these orders . and then our business was , either to march straight upon the enemy , or to cut off their retreat , by interposing between them and home ; that is , between them and huy : for if they got to huy , they got home . but now see and wonder how we were enchanted : tom , as i hope to be saved , we turn'd our noses the wrong way again . for with mighty diligence we marched clear fromward the enemy , and likewise beside and beyond huy : leaving the french a free passage to it . and they marched thither the very next day . never talk now of bungling , or fumbling , or making blunders ; for we scorn those words . 't was witchcraft , dear tom , 't was witchcraft , that made us do as we did ; the devil and luxemburg did bewitch us : and that damn'd magician may brag of this , as one of his bravest-feats . thou wilt say , that we were still between the french and namur . ay , and so we were . but the french had a bridge at huy over the river , and they made divers other bridges : whereas we had none , nor did we offer to make any . so that they could march to namur on the far side the river , when they pleas'd , without the least danger or disturbance . but they chose rather to lie by it , that they might give us a baffle by making us rise first : wherein they succeeded , as well they might . for they commanded the one side of the river as much as we ; and the other side they had wholy to themselves . yet here we staid and encamp'd , as long as we could get any forage , waiting upon the french-mens back sides ; ( when thou and i are together , we use another word . ) but , for my part , i did not think we had owed them that duty ; nor did i know why , or wherefore we staid here so long , in the high condition we were in . the french , being the weaker , might with reason be willing that the time should be spent in idle encampments : but we , who were the stronger , if we had not been still bewitch'd , methinks should rather have chosen to be doing . well , at last we marched away for flanders , as hard as we could drive , to have another bout at those lines . and the french durst not follow us the way we went , ( which was the next way , ) for fear we should turn back upon them , and fall upon their bones ; but they were fain to go round by namur , and beyond the sambre . yet , by the devil's help , ( for no power of man could do it ) they got before us to the lines : by which means we were prevented and baffled . what had we then to do , with our glorious army , but to march presently up the scheld ; and either force a passage over that river , or march on directly for france it self ? we had then led the french such a dance , who were damnably jaded by their late long march , and hardly able to crawl , ) that all the devils in hell could not have enabled them to follow us . but the devil turn'd our noses once more the wrong way : for we marched down the river , and into our own country ; first to oudenard , then almost to gaunt , and at last to a place called rousselaer , which now bears the name of a royal camp. for here was another encampment , and enchantment : and here we lay with our glorious army all the rest of the summer , as it were bound hand and foot ; and without doing any thing , or any prospect of it . for we were coop'd up by the enemies lines , which we had no thoughts of attempting . and was not this a bewitched place , for such an army to lie in ? we exceeded the enemy by thirty or forty thousand : and though after a while we sent a detachment to the siege of huy , yet still we far exceeded them . if we had encamp'd all this while in the enemies country , it would never have anger'd me , though we had been never so idle : for then , if we had done nothing else , we had eaten up the enemies country . i have told thee already , and i tell thee again , that we were not then in the enemies country . in the country between both , i confess , we were : but in these parts , the enemies country is that within their lines ; whereas our camp was without these lines , and eight or nine miles short of them . i said before , that we had never attempted scheld river , but i lyed ; we attempted it then , that is , we look'd upon it and no more . first , one great man view'd the p●ace , and then another great man view'd it , and then we came away . it was as we came down to oudenard , in ou● way to ou● camp : and the attempt was made by a detachment of about six thousand men. but if we had ●een in earnest , we might have made , out of our vast numbers , many such detachments for that service : and we might have attempted several places at once ; or tryed one place , and then another ; both by day and by night . how did prince lewis of baden pass the rhine this summer ? i am sure i saw it in the paris gazette , ( for tom i can now read french a little , ) that he made a false attaque or attempt in one place , and then passed in another ; the french having drawn their forces to the first place . but this attempt of ours ( such as it was ) was made in one place only ; and in a place more likely to be provided for defence , than any other on the river . for it was at pont esperies , where the french line ends , which is between the lys and the scheld , and where they always had forts and guards . our retaking of huy was a very good business , as things go : but i expected that the army that took it , would have enter'd the dutchy of lutzenburg , which the french now have , and which lies hard by ; and so have broken that charm that keeps us hitherto from entring the enemies country . thou wilt say , they did enter that dutchy , for all the news-books said so . why then all the news-books lyed ; for we never were in that dutchy , nor out of the diocese of liege : for , by their own story , we lay all the while between navaigne and franchimont , both which places are in this diocese . and navaigne is upon the maes , almost as low as mastricht . and therefore i am the more confirmed that some witchcraft lies upon us ; so that we cannot find the way into the enemies country . in the close of the last campaigne ( for at last i draw to a conclusion ) we new fortified several places : that is , dixmude again , ( which the french had slighted and abandon'd , ) deynse , ninove , and tillemont ; and we talk of hall likewise . of these , dixmude ( as i said before ) is seven miles from newport ; deynse is within five miles of gaunt ; ninove lies behind oudenard and aeth ; tillemont is between lovain and leeuwe , and very near the later ; and hall is within six or seven miles of brussels . and the places to which they ●ie thus near , were our standing garisons before . let us now examine between thee and me , and according to our rules , ( and i think we troopers should understand these matters as well as some of them do ) whether these new garisons be good ones , and will do us any service . i say then , that if each of these new garisons can command contribution to maintain three or four thousand , or even two or three thousand men , we must allow these garisons to be good ones . but if all these garisons put together , will not command any contribution worth the speaking of , more than we might have without them ; then , according to our rules , all of them together are not worth a dog-turd . and we were bewitch'd , by luxemburg and the devil , to be at so much charge , in fortifying and keeping such useless things . a little time will shew what they can do . but if we had made a new garison upon the scheld , any where between tournay and conde , and another upon the sambre near charleroy , either above or below it ; i 'd have eaten hay with a horse , and been hang'd for a fool , if either of these two garisons would not have maintain'd ten thousand men : if they were made big enough ( as they ought ) to contain so many . and all this by contributions out of the enemies countries , which otherwise we cannot reach . out of these two garisons we should have scour'd the french quarters i'faith . i could write more now to thee , but i won't ; for i know thou art a man of business . only i shall say this , that if this cursed witchcraft which has so plagu'd us were removed , we 'd beat the french to iericho : but if it continue upon us , though you send us never so many millions from england , we shall do nothing here in flanders that is worth one farthing . and so , dear tom , fare thee well . london , printed in the year mdcxcv . solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, the method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, the method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], [i.e. ], [ ] p. printed for roger clavil ... abel roper ... and thomas metcalf ..., london : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. errata: p. [ ] at end. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. philosophy, modern -- th century. enlightenment. knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jennifer kietzman sampled and proofread - jennifer kietzman text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion solid philosophy asserted , against the fancies of the ideists : or , the method to science farther illustrated . with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding . by j. s. london , printed for roger clavil at the peacock , abel roper at the black boy , both in fleetstreet , and thomas metcalf , over against earl's - court in drury-lane , . to the right honourable robert , lord viscount dunbar . my lord , had i thought that this piece i here dedicate to your lordship , was not above your , or any man's , patronage , i had shewn less respects to you in making you so mean a present . were you monarch of the universe , truth ( which it defends ) could receive no protection from your grandeur . her genius is so sublime , and her self so nobly-born , that , like him from whom she descends , she is beneficial to all , and incapable of receiving advantage from any . all extrinsecal supports , in stead of honouring her , debase her . her well-compacted and indissoluble fabrick is altogether divine : contrary to our material structures , it is built from the top ; and , its foundation laid as high as heaven it self . the god of truth has imprinted all natural truths in created beings , as in the footsteps of his infinite wisdom ; from whence , by the vehicles of our senses , they are copy'd and transcrib'd into our mind ; where , without our labour , they beget all our natural notions ; and , as speculation , and even experience , assures us , they do also , at the same time , give us some knowledge of the things themselves ; which steadily and distinctly reflected on , breed in us that best natural perfection of our understanding , science ; of which those notions are , as it were , the seeds . thus was mankind put into a plain road-way of gaining clear intellectual light , by the common providence of our good creatour . to improve in which , and to keep our thoughts from wandring into errour , the same goodness of our maker endowed us with a faculty of reflecting on the operations of our own minds ; and , on all the guilded train of our spiritual conceptions , and of the several natures and manners of them ; by which means those who were addicted to attentive reflexion , or speculation , invented a way , and setled artificial rules , how to manage their notions , judgments and discourses . which rules laid orderly together , and found by reason to be agreeable to the natures of things according to the being they had in the mind , and , therefore , solid ; did , in time , compose that excellent and most useful science call'd logick . but , my lord , the crooked byass of men's wills perverted their reason , and made them disregard this well-grounded and regular method , given them so freely by the author of nature . the heathen philosophers of old , whose god was vanity , affected to set up several sects , to pride themselves with the empty honour of being esteemed their heads . the christian schools succeeded ; who , at first , discours'd gravely on those subjects which were of a higher nature ; but , whether the circumstances did not bend their thoughts that way , or from what other reason , they settled no scientifical method to attain philosophical knowledges . yet , those who follow'd aristotle's principles , ( as the great aquinas constantly endeavoured ) did generally discourse even in such subjects , when they had occasion , very solidly . but , afterwards , when school-disputes grew to be the only fashionable learning , the multitudes of combatants increas'd , and the contests were maintain'd by several great bodies ; each of which thought it creditable to their party to set up and follow some eminent man of their own . hence this nature-taught method came to be much neglected ; and he was thought to win the prize who was the subtilest and acutest disputant , and not he who could most solidly demonstrate truth . hence , no exact and rational logick being settled and agreed on , they were apt to take up oftentimes wrong principles ; and the several conceptions of our mind were mistaken to be so many several things . demonstration was rather talk'd of for form's sake , than pursu'd and practis'd ; and , the the use of general maxims , which should establish our discourses , was scarce once thought on ; without which , demonstration was impossible . new questions in philosophy , of little or no use , were started ; and bandy'd to and fro by terms and words not well understood ; nor their sense agreed on , by the contending parties . the heat of opposition fix'd men in their own opinions . innumerable quaint and nice , and sometimes impertinent , distinctions were invented , to escape their being entangled by the arguments of their adversary . every man affected to be a proteus , and took more care to elude opposition , than to settle and establish truth on immovable grounds . the true sense of aristotle's doctrine , not being taken from himself or his first interpreters , but from some modern mis-understanders , was lost ; and his text drawn into several meanings , to abet contradictory tenets . in a word , nothing was decisively concl●●ed , nor likely to be so , by this way of school-term-learning , as things were manag'd by unmethodiz'd disputation . thus stood the affair of philosophy at the beginning of this present century ; which having been fertile of many excellent wits , two of the chiefest of them , cartesius in france , and our ingenious countryman mr. locke , having taken scandal at these miscarriages , and an aversion against that miracle of nature , aristotle , whose doctrine schoolmen had ill represented ; and being withal men of strong brains , enabling them to carry their conceptions through , and to make them coherent ; they did , out of their zeal for truth , undertake to set up new systems of philosophy ; tho' cartesius in some sort , furbish'd up , improv'd , and refin'd upon the old corpuscularian way of democritus and epicurus ; which i have fully confuted in the appendix to my method ; and , i hope , beyond all possibility of reply . but , these two gentlemen , being better vers'd in the mathematicks than in metaphysicks ; and , thence , not apprehending how corporeal natures could get into the mind , or be there ; nor , reflecting that a spiritual nature , being incomparably superiour in the rank of beings to that of corporeal things , must , consequently , have naturally and ncessarily a power to comprehend , after its manner , ( or by way of knowledge ) that inferiour one ; they were forc'd , thro' their want of higher principles , to build all knowledge , not upon the things themselves in their knowing power , but upon ideas or similitudes of them ; tho' neither of them set themselves to make out or demonstrate how we could possibly have our notions , or first notices of the things by them . now , these spiritual ideas being , most evidently , neither the things known , nor any mode or accident of those objects ; and , consequently , nothing at all of the thing in any sort , were manifestly convinced not to be the productions of creative wisdom , in which he had imprinted all natural truths , but meer fancies , coin'd by their imagination . these ideas or fancies then , and only these , they contemplated , and grounded all natural truths , ( which could have no foundation but only in the things which the first truth had made ) upon these fantastick resemblances : and , thence , they put all formal truths to consist in the agreement of those empty similitudes ; till at length ( as fancy let loose to fly at its full random , and driven forward with a quick wit , does naturally and genuinly lead ) they had introduced a kind of fanaticism into philosophy ; built , in the main , or in great part , on a pretended inward light by means of those imaginary and visionary ideas . from this introversion upon these unsolid aiery bubbles , and thence their neglecting the things themselves , and our solid natural notions , mr. locke was brought to confound corporeal and spiritual natures ; and consequently , ( these two being the adequate object of all philosophy ) all philosophical knowledge was rendred impossible . and cartesius left us no means to know whether man is one thing made up of soul and body , or two things , tack'd together by virtue of some accident ; which well consisted with their substantial distinction . hence also it came , that god was brought in at every hard pinch , to act contrary to what the natures of things requir'd ; without which , they could not lay their principles , or make their scheme cohere ; that is , they would needs make god , as he is the author and orderer of nature , to work either preternaturally or else supernaturally ; which is a plain contradiction . nay , mr. locke finding no fancy in his imaginative power that suits with our notion of [ thing , ] would perswade the world that no man living knows what a thing or substance is ; that is , that none knows what the word thing means ; which is so evident to our natural thoughts , that it is impossible for the rudest person in the world to be ignorant of it . in a word , their fancy so inveigled their reason , that they came to deny self-evident truths ; and held many other propositions , which were absolutely impossible and contradictory . wherefore , seeing philosophy reduced to this lamentable condition ; and , that solid rationality , and all truth in natural objects , were thus in imminent danger to be over-run and born down by imaginary conceits ; and apprehending that god's providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great mischiefs ; i thought it became me to re-instate reason in her soveraignty over fancy ; and , to assert to her the rightful dominion nature had given her over all our judgments and discourses . i resolved therefore to disintricate truth , ( which lay too deep for superficial fancy to fathom ) from all those labyrinths of errour . i observ'd that philosophy labour'd and languish'd under many complicated distempers , ( all springing from this way of ideas ) and that they were grown epidemical ; nor could they be cur'd by the application of remedies to this or that particular part , or by confuting this or that particular errour . hereupon , having found out the true cause of all these maladies of human understanding , i saw it was necessary to stub up by the roots that way it self ; and , by clos● and solid reasons , ( the most decisive weapons in tru●●● armory , ) to break in pieces the brittle glassy essences of those fantastick apparitions ; which , if a right way of reasoning be settled , and understood , will disappear , and vanish out of the world , as their elder sisters , the fairies , have done in this last half century . i know , my lord , reformation made by a single man , tho' but in philosophy , seldom gains credit to him who attempts it . and , it must be confess'd , that , to pretend to reform where there is no necessity , has an ill name ; and is justly held to spring from policy , interest , pride , or some such other sinister motive . but i am very confident , that whoever peruses this treatise , nay , but even the preface , will see , that the occasion of this undertaking was not only expedient , but cogent . nor can any man justly tax him of arrogance , or of usurping a dictature over other men's judgments , tho' he opposes great multitudes of speculaters , who offers his reasons to convince theirs . to this necessity , now laid open , of reforming philosophy , i shall add another , of a much more weighty concern ; and which may also rectifie some zealons well-meaning friends ; who , judging of things by their own short reach , think that the advancing truth in philosophy is little better than time and labour lost ; whereas , i , on the contrary , do really think , that the supplying what the world most wants , is the greatest , and most universal good i can possibly do . this other necessity then , of my rectifying our modern philosophy , ( which will make others see , how great a good it is , ) is this : those truths which are of a higher , and more sacred nature , can never be rightly explicated , nor consequently ( such men not valuing authority ) be duly recommended to those who dissent from them , unless true principles of philosophy be settled , and unsound ones confuted . for , since no explication of faith can be made by faith it self ; all of them must necessarily be made by our reason , shewing the conformity they have to our natural notions , or to such knowledges as we had from the things in nature ; especially , since dissenters draw their chief objections from the repugnancy of those points to our natural principles . 't is a known truth , that as every definition must be the self-same notion with what is defin'd , so must every right explication too ; it being , in reality , nothing but the unfolding what was before wrapt up closer . whence follows , that , when he who has the ill luck to have taken up false principles , comes to explicate the trinity , the incarnation , the resurrection , or any high point of reveal'd faith ; his explication must always be contrary to true principles of nature , and perhaps may have twenty real contradictions in it ; and , so , common reason ( as was said ) telling all sensible men , that the explication must be the same sense with the point which it explicates ; the tenet of faith will suffer in the opinion of witty men , by such an untoward and senseless explication ; be ridiculous to adversaries ; and be held perfect nonsense and contradiction . whereas , if the philosophy , by which those tenets are explicated , be true and solid ; then , since both natural and reveal'd truths are children of the same father , ( the god and author of all truth , ) who cannot contradict himself , and therefore those two sorts of truths cannot but agree ; it will follow , that the explication of all reveal'd points , made according to true philosophy , must needs appear to intelligent men to be most rational ; and most consonant , and not contradictory , to true natural principles : which will comfort faith in those who believe already ; recommend it to all ingenuous and indifferent seekers ; help to convert to christianity those , whose reason was formerly dissatisfy'd upon such sinister misconceits ; and , lastly , confound adversaries , by putting them past opposing it by any principles of true philosophy , and leave nothing for them to object against it , but idle and ill-grounded fancies , whose weak attempts are easily defeated . whence , i could heartily wish , that , were true philosophy in fashion , all sects ( so the state thought fit ) might have free liberty to print the best reasons they can muster up against christianity ; resting confident , that ( in that happy state of science , or true learning ) nothing in the world could gain to truth a greater advantage . till that desirable time comes , all i can do , is , to declare here publickly , that i shall take it for a great favour , if any learned socinian , deist , or atheist , would please to send me those reasons they , or their leaders , judge of most weight , why they cannot embrace the doctrine of the trinity , or christianity ; which they may do privately , and unnam'd , to the stationer who publishes this treatise ; and i do hereby promise them , i will give their objections their full force , and publish an answer to them : onely , i will expect , that their arguments shall be intrinsecal ones , or drawn from the opposition such reveal'd articles , as they mislike , are conceiv'd by them to have to some principles of logick , physicks , or metaphysicks , which are either self-evident , or which they will undertake to reduce to evidence : these onely being such objections as becomes a christian philosopher to speak to . for , if they be extrinsecal ones , and built on histories , or on groundless fancies ; or , if they consist in glossing words , in whose sense we are not agreed ; it belongs to a critick , or a historian , and is not the proper employment of a philosopher . i would not be thought , by what is said lately , to cast any reflexions on cartesius or mr. locke , ( whom i join here equally , and indifferently , ) as intending any diskindness to christianity by their new methods of philosophy : it appears both by their writings , and by their particular manner of handling their subjects , that they meant ingenuously and sincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be true. onely i must say of both of them , that , if their way of philosophizing , and , therefore , their philosophy it self , be shewn to be far from true and solid ; then , in case any chief christian tenet should come to be explicated by their ways , those sacred points themselves must necessarily , for the reason now given , receive some taint and blemish by such ill-grounded explications : and the same , for the same reason , i must say of school-philosophy too , if it proceeds upon principles that are not well-grounded , or solid . it remains , my lord , to give my reasons why this common duty i here perform to the learned part of mankind who are candidates of science , comes to be particularly address'd to your self : which , in short , are these . i was much in debt ; and it was an honest man's part to endeavour to discharge it . i ow'd much to your lordship's father , of honourable and pious memory , who both encourag'd my first endeavours , and favour'd me with a particular friendship and correspondence to his dying-day : and , i make account , such kind obligements , writ in a grateful heart , ought to be as lasting , and as binding , as those obligations drawn on paper ; and , withal , ought to devolve , by a hereditary right , to his immediate descendent , your self . i ow'd very much to your lordship 's own person , for the kind respect with which you have been pleas'd to honour me . i ow'd much to all your lordship 's nearest and noblest relations , both in the direct , and in all the collateral lines . and , lastly , since every man who writes for truth , naturally loves to be understood , i ow'd it to my self , to present this treatise particularly to your lordship ; than whom , i know none of our english nobility more acutely intelligent . it is of such a nature , by its laying the foundation of philosophy from the deepest bottom-principles , that , to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly , there was requir'd a judgment both solid , and pointed ; both which perfections meet in your lordship's great genius , in a high perfection . the diligent printer has overtaken my lazy pen , and stays for this hasty scribble ; which forces me , with an unmannerly abruptness , to write my self , my lord , your lordship 's most sincere honourer , and most humbly devoted servant , j. s. the preface , directed to those learned men of both our universities who have a due regard for truth , and a sincere desire of knowledge . gentlemen , . after i had publish'd my method to science , which i dedicated to your selves , i came to receive certain information that very many students in both the universities , and not a few of those also who were to instruct others , did apply themselves to the way of ideas , in hopes to arrive by that means at philosophical knowledge . my best judgment , grounded on very evident reasons , assur'd me , that that method was far from solid , and utterly unable to give you the true knowledge of any thing in nature ; being it self altogether groundless , and meerly superficial . i saw clearly , that to addict your thoughts to study similitudes and resemblances , ( which , as will be most evidently demonstrated , could not possibly give you any true or certain light to know the things themselves , ) was no better than ( as it is in the fable ) vitreum vas lambere , pultem non attingere . it struck me with a very sensible trouble , that the precious time and pains of such great numbers of men , who were the flower of our nation , who were hereafter to be guides to others , and whose very profession , and state of life , had addicted them wholly to the pursuit of knowledge , should be imbued with such principles as render'd the attainment of it absosolutely impossible . i look'd upon my self as one who , having spent near half a century in speculative studies , was capable to avert and redress so great a harm ; and , thence , i esteem'd my self bound in duty to make you aware of the way you have either chosen , or light into for want of a better ; that you might consider seriously whether you ought not to retrieve your steps ere you had wander'd too far in a path which could never bring you to the end you aim'd at . this consideration oblig'd me to strike at the root , and to overthrow the whole way of proceeding upon ideas , by whomsoever advanced ; and to demonstrate by many clear , and , i hope , unanswerable arguments , and multitudes of instances , that it was superficial , fruitless , insignificant , and meerly phantastical . . when i had near finish'd my method , i gave a cursory look over mr. locke's essay concerning humane understanding ; and i hap'd to light on some places , which gave me a high esteem for it ; insomuch that i began to conceive some hopes that his ingenious thoughts might , with some few alterations , be reconcil'd to true philosophy : for , i was at that time far from intending to make any reflexions upon it , but highly extoll'd it where-ever i came : judging of the whole , by the scantlings i had seen of it ( as it were ) accidentally . but , the last september , setting my self to take a nearer and fuller view of the whole book , i quite lost the hopes , i had gladly entertain'd formerly , of according it with philosophical principles ; and became much concern'd , that so excellent a wit should be half lost to the commonwealth of learning , by lighting unfortunately into such an unaccountable method . for , i saw evidently , that ( besides the oddness of the way he took ) his fancy , the vivacity of which was very extraordinary , had , in very many particulars , got such an ascendent over his reason , that , as he was sceptical in divers things which were clearest truths ; so he seem'd in very many others to be positive , the contrary to which was plainly demonstrable , and in a manner self-evident . i was heartily sorry , i say , to see so considerable a writer , whose comprehensive genius , and clear expression , would have made truth irresistible , had he taken her part , mis-led so strangely as to take fancies for realities ; and to think that philosophy , which is the knowledge of things , consisted in a perpetual contemplation of empty ideas , or resemblances . . this wrought up my thoughts higher , and made me conceive a greater indignation against this new way of philosophizing ; and that , very particularly , for his sake ; tho' i saw the cartesians as much wanted rectifying in their grounds , as he , or rather more . wherefore , to gain such a powerful assistant over to truth 's side , ( of which , his sincere professions of ingenuity would not let me despair , ) i resolv'd to lay open those blemishes of errours i had observ'd in his essay , retaining still a due esteem for the many beauties it contain'd : for , i do assure him , my nature leads me , as willingly to acknowledge and give their just elogiums to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as to discover the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he may have fallen into at unawares , as i doubt not but my readers will see ; and , that ( tho' i declare open war against the way it self ) i rather incline to excuse , than to aggravate his faults or mistakes . indeed , the duty i ow'd to truth oblig'd me to note those latter with such a distinction , as i conceiv'd they did more or less injure that sacred concern . and , i was the more willing to enter the lists against such a champion ; because , if i hop'd to gain any advantage over him , ( i had rather say , if i had the good fortune to win him , ) 't is impossible truth should ever obtain a more clear victory ; for , no man , who takes the just dimensions of mr. locke 's great wit , can think , that any thing but the invincible force of truth can soil him . . i have good reason to fear , that this declaring against whole bodies of ideists , at once , will be interpreted by some to savour of singularity : it will be deem'd by others , a high imprudence to make such a bold breach with a world of acute speculaters ; with whole sects of modern philosophers , both in two neighbouring nations , and in our own universities ; and , in many things , with most of the school-men too . others will think , that i do very unwisely provoke opposition ; and , by such a brisk attack , in a manner challenge all those great men who are of a contrary sentiment . but , what is all this to his purpose , who has devoted himself wholly to promote and defend truth ; and , is sure he does , upon solid reasons , judge that to be true which he maintains ? this objection seems grounded on this false maxim , which some men have set up very politickly , to establish their own reputation with the vulgar , as sacred and inviolable ; viz. that [ the opinion of a multitude has the force of a kind of authority , to bridle the understandings of private men from setting up a contrary doctrine . ] now , whatever some men may think of this position , i must declare my sentiment of it , that it is the most pernicious maxim that could be invented , to hinder the progress of rational nature in that which should most perfect it ; that it puts a stop to the farther use of their reason in all future mankind ; that it makes all improvement in knowledge impossible , and utterly obstructs the advancement of science . no reasoners , how many , or of how great name soever they be , have any authority at all but by virtue of the reasons they produce ; whence , that single man , whoever he be , that brings better reasons , for the tenet he advances , than all the former world has done for theirs , ought to have more of this ( miscall'd ) authority , than that whole world of opposers . . but , this postponing the consideration of the multitude of dissenting speculaters to evident reason , is ten times more justifiable , in case that opposing party does not so much as pretend to , much less produce self-evident principles , nor demonstration , to ground , or conclude their tenets ; but builds on voluntary suppositions , and makes use of wit , good language , and other meerly plausible ways , to recommend their conclusions to the approbation of their readers . those who do not so much as pretend to demonstration and clear principles , being unable to offer any thing that is certain , ought not ( in my opinion ) meddle at all with philosophy ; nor appear before learned men with an expectation their doctrine should be embraced ; nor can they , in reason , assert any thing , but only propose . . but the main consideration which takes off all invidiousness from my carriage in this particular , is , that in this whole contest between the ideists and me , there is nothing at all that is personal . 't is not the parts or abilities of the contenders , but their method which is in dispute . the slowest and lamest traveller , who can but creep forward in a right path , shall sooner arrive at his journey 's end , than another whose legs are nimble , and his pace swift , if he takes a wrong way at his first setting out . rather his greater strength and agility do , in such a ease , enable him only to run more widely astray ; as the strongest bow shoots farthest from the mark , if the shast be wrong levell'd . let the talent of wit in the ideists be incomparable , ( as doubtless that of cartesius was , to whom i may , with justice , join mr. locke ) if the methods they take be not proper to attain true science , their errours , when they mistake , ( as i am sure they do in their principles , and , consequently , in most of their conclusions ) must be to the same degree more enormous , as their fancies are more ingenious . 't is their method then , or their way of proceeding and building upon ideas , which i most blame and oppose . or rather i deplore the detriment accruing hence to the learned part of the world , that men , endowed with such an excellent genius , did unluckily light into such an indirect and perplex'd path ; seeing what vast advances science might have made , had such men taken up right principles , hit upon the right way at first , and apply'd their strong brains to pursue it . 't is not then their endowments which come into competition , to which i deferr as much as is possible : for , i much more admire the skill of such architects as can build a castle in the air , and make it hang there by geometry ( as it were ) than all those common sort of artists , who can raise such a structure upon firm ground . . what our several methods are , the title of my book tells my reader in short , viz. that , ( as i have hinted in my dedicatory ) theirs is to ground all their discourses on ideas ; that is , ( as themselves express it , and as the word [ idea ] declares , ) on similitudes or resemblances ; which similitudes , ( as is abundantly demonstrated in my three first preliminaries , ) are meer fancies : mine is to build them solely and entirely on the things themselves , in which , as the footsteps or effects of his essential verity , the creative wisdom of the god of truth , has planted and imprinted all created truths whatever . this method i observe so exactly throughout my whole method , and this present treatise , that i disown and renounce any discourse in either of these books , which is not built either upon the things as they are in nature , or according to the being they naturally have in the understanding : and , i shall owe much to that man , who will show me that i do any where decline from this solid and well-grounded method . as for formal truths , found in our judgments or discourses , i build them on most evident principles , or strive to reduce them thither ; and on the connexion of the terms found in propositions , by which only truth can be express'd ; keeping still an attentive regard to the things themselves . and i desire that the differences between the ideists and me may be decided by the impartial umpirage of rigorous logick . a test , which , as i am sure their cause cannot bear , so i am confident they will never accept of or stand to . for , it may easily be discern'd by any serious reflecter , that their procedure and manner of discoursing is not by way of laying principles , and drawing a close and well-knit train of consequences , as i do in all the main points of my method , and in this present treatise on occasion ; but , by unproved suppositions , and loose discourses made up of well-express'd wit , ingenious remarks , quaint novelties , plausible explications , and such other superficial ways ; which , tho' they take with vulgar readers , are ( to speak plainly ) more fit for flashy rhetorical declamation , than for manly and solid philosophy . nor do i think it did ever so much as once enter into the thoughts of the ideists , much less their hope , that their discourse could be reduced to self-evidence , or to that artificial form of close discourse call'd a demonstrative syllogism ; which is the touchstone to distinguish what ratiocinations are truly conclusive , what inconclusive or fallacious . without which , what do we know ? . i am very well aware what prejudice i bring upon my self , by addressing you in this confident manner at the very first dash of my pen ; and some well-meaning friends have advertis'd me , that this carriage of mine has been reflected on , especially by some meer school-men ; who , tho' they in reality know nothing , are more proud of their probabilities , than the most scientifical man living is of his demonstrations ; tho' their utmost performances amount to no more than that of the ridiculous fortune-tellers of old , — aut erit , aut non ; divinare etenim magnus mihi donat apollo . whence i do fully expect , that the humour of our modern speculaters will judge this assuredness of mine to be a high presumption of my own performances ; nay , some will think it a proud disregard of others even to talk of demonstration . indeed , i must own i have a high opinion of my principles and my method , which nature and god's good providence have laid and establish'd . but , as for my conclusions and deductions , as i will not justifie them all with the same firmness as i did the others ; so , i must declare , that did i not really judge them demonstrative when i call them so , i should not think i ought to propose them as such ; nor at all to the learned . the world has been sufficiently pester'd already with books of philosophy , nay , volumes , blown up to a vast bulk with windy and frathy probabilities , and petty inconclusive topicks ; which , like rank weeds , have over-run that rich soil where science ought to have been sown ; and i esteem it too poor and mean a vanity to plant briar-fields to enlarge a wilderness . if i overween in calling my proofs , demonstrations , i am willing to take the shame to my self , if it deserves shame ; tho' perhaps i had been more blame-worthy , if , really judging them demonstrative , i had minced the truth , and out of an affected modesty , or a diffidence for which i saw no ground , i had diminish'd their force in the esteem of my readers ; and so hinder'd the profit , which , startled at the uncouth sound of demonstration , they might otherwise have reap'd by looking into them . for , demonstrations are strange rarities in this sceptical age ; and when those who are to show them do proclame to the world where they are to be seen , curious people will run in flocks to view the monster . . he that knows what demonstration is , and verily judges his argument is such , and yet , out of niaiserie and shamefastness says at every turn , [ i think , or , perhaps this is true , or may be true ] should , if i might advise him , wear a mask ; for he does as good as tell his readers , [ gentlemen , i offer you an argument , but i fear 't is not worth your acceptance . ] a strange complement from one philosopher to another ! it was not out of my natural humour and inclination , but perfectly out of deliberate design to win my readers to attentive examination , and invite those who were dissatisfy'd to opposition , ( which is the best means to clear truth ) that i deliver'd my self with that bold assurance . and i did really intend that sceptical men should ask , — quid profert dignum tanto promissor hiatu ? that , setting themselves thence to sift the nature of my method , and the force of my arguments more narrowly , they might better sink into their understandings ; as i am confident they will , if ever they have perused my method to science ; and , by that or any other means , do solidly know what is requisite to a true demonstration . . another reason why i put on this vizard of confidence , so little suting with my natural complexion , was this . the want of true science , and the despair of finding any , had brought such a luke-warm and indifferent humour into the world , ( and i wish it were not too common ) that , tho' all men affect to talk of truth , and seem in ordinary discourse to value and magnifie her ; yet , when it comes to the point , scarce one man dares heartily profess himself her champion , and declare he will defend her cause with evident reason , against all opposers . for , alas ! how few men are there , who will profess to demonstrate in philosophy , or to reduce their discourses to evidence ? without doing which , and abiding by the tryal , perhaps there is not one word of truth in all philosophy , nor any thing but learned romance in all the universities of europe . many men , indeed , do make a profession of knowledge , because 't is honourable ; and every scholar is engag'd to do so , or he will quite lose his credit . but , when it should come to performance , not one man in ten thousand shews that zeal for the advancement of truth as answers to the profession he made to love and esteem it ; but , tho' he sees errour and ignorance , and probable talking overspread the face of philosophy , and stifle truth and knowledge both , he sits still unconcern'd . now and then indeed there is a writer who attempts to confute this or that particular errour ; some casual circumstance addicting him to that employment : but , what man sets himself to lay the ax at the root , or writes against uncertain methods and groundless babbling ? what man goes about to make mankind aware of the mischief that comes to rational nature by the sophisticate ways of talking prettily , neatly , and wittily ; tho' , perhaps , not a word groundedly and solidly ? nay , what man is not well-appay'd and pleased with a well-penn'd piece ; tho' , were the reason in it sifted to the bottom , perhaps there is not one evident ttuth in it to build that discourse on ; that is , not one word of sense in it ; but only such a way of plausible discourse or language-learning , as may serve equally and indifferently to maintain either side of the contradiction ? . lastly , ( which is the chief point , ) who is there that applies himself to find out a certain method to arrive at truth , and attain knowledge , without which all our studies are to no purpose ? logick is the proper art to give us this method ; and i see students do generally make use of any logician , so he but talks d●yly of the operations of the understanding ; of propositions , syllogisms , and demonstration ; tho' , perhaps , he gives not one word of reason for his unprov'd sayings , to enlighten the understanding of the learner , or inform him , ( ex natura rei , ) whence and why this and the other rudiment , or rule , must be so : such an author may indeed enable a learner to say as he says , and talk after him in imitation , as it were ; but he can never instruct him to understand what 's true , and why it is true , or to demonstrate himself ; which was the main design of my method . . but my greatest complaint against others , and my best excuse for putting my self forwards with such a confident ayr , is , that i see not that any learned men do endeavour to make head against scepticism ; which , thro' this universal connivence , or rather civil and kind toleration , and ( in some sort ) encouragement , creeps by insensible degrees into even the most learned societies , infects the best wits of our nation , threatens to bear down all true philosophy , to extinguish the natural light of men's understandings , and drown their best faculty [ reason ] in a deluge of profound ignorance . for , if this vogue should obtain still in the world to look upon any loose discourse for brave sense , so it be but sprucely dress'd up in neat language , and sauc'd with a little piquancy of brisk wit ; and let it pass current for true learning and knowledge ; scepticism will not only insinuate it self slily into all sorts of men , but be recommended to the world by such an universal approbation of well-clad gentile ignorance . nor does this mischievous inundation stop its career in bereaving us of natural truths ; but , having once darken'd in us the knowledge of nature , it disposes men to doubt of , and too often to deny the existence of the author of nature himself ; who is best made known to mankind by science , or the exact knowledge of his creatures ; from which we glean all the notions , and , consequently , all the knowledge , we , by ordinary means , have , or ought to have . all these mischiefs , ( i may add , and all immorality too , ) are owing to the insensible growth of this lethargy of our understanding , scepticism ; which benums and chills our intellectual faculties with a cold despair of ever attaining evident knowledge of any thing ; for which , as its natural perfection , our soul was fitted and ordain'd . i saw this gloomy evening overcasting the clear sky of science , and drawing on the cimmerian night of dark ignorance , and black infidelity ; and thence it was , that , to awaken men's souls out of this drowzy sleep and torpor of their mind , i did so often , boldly and fearlessly ( tho' as i judg'd , truly , ) declare and proclaim aloud , that demonstration in philosophy might be had , and that i had actually demonstrated in such and such particulars . . lastly , 't is for this reason , and to rescue all sincere lovers of truth from this spreading contagion of scepticism , that with an unusual boldness , i did ( as was said before ) attempt to write a demonstrative logick ; to comprehend which , whoever shall bestow half that pains as men usually do who study the mathematicks , ( for such connected discourses are not to be perused , with hopes of profiting by them , with a cursory application , ) will , i am sure , be able to set all his natural notions in a right and distinct order ; know how to connect two of them with one another in a solid judgment ; and both of them with a third to frame a conclusive discourse ; and not only have the true nature of demonstration knowingly fix'd in his mind , by comprehending the reason of it ; but , by having it there , he himself will be enabled to work according to that nature , or to demonstrate himself ; without ability to know or do which , none ought to pretend to be a philosopher . lastly , to carry this good work forward as far as was possible , i have here , as a supplement to my method , and an introduction to my reflexions , added five preliminary discourses ; shewing the true and solid bottom-ground on which all exact knowledge , or philosophy , is built ; and , that the things themselves , and not ideas , resemblances , or fancies , ( which can never make us know the things , ) are and must be the only firm foundation of truth , and of our knowledge of all truths whatsoever . . i must not pass over another complaint made of me by some of the cartesian school ; viz. that in the preface to my method , i so deeply censure malbranche as a phanatick in philosophy ; nay , the whole way it self as disposing to enthusiasm . to the first part of my charge , i reply , that i cited that author 's own words ; which are such strong proofs of a fanatick genius , that i cannot believe any arguments of mine can add weight to the full evidence and force they carry'd with them , to manifest that his philosophy is built upon inspiration ; or , as himself expresses it , comes to him by revelation . and , for my pretending that the whole cartesian way of philosophizing is of the same leven , i can need no other compurgatour than that french author , who with much exactness wrote the life of cartesius , and was his good friend and follower . the book is now made english ; where in the th page he tells us , that to get rid of all his prejudices , ( that is , to unlearn , amongst other things , all that the clear light of nature had taught him ) cartesius did undergo no less than to unman himself . a pretty self-denying beginning ! and pag. , . that he wearied out his mind to that degree in his enquiry after this happy means , ( viz. that his imagination should represent to him his understanding quite naked ) that his brain took fire , and he fell into a spice of enthusiasm ; which dispos'd his mind , already quite spent , in such a manner , that it was fit to receive impressions of dreams and visions . where we see it confess'd , that his method of unknowing all that nature had taught him , brought him to enthusiasm , and enthusiasm to visions and revelations ; so that malbranche did but follow his masters example , and copy'd his method . the author proceeds . he ( cartesius ) acquaints us , that on the th of november , . laying himself down brimful of enthusiasm , ( which is little better than stark mad ) and wholly possess'd with the thoughts of having found that day the foundation of that wonderful science , he had three dreams presently one after another ; yet , so extraordinary , as to make him fancy they were sent him from above . he supposed he discern'd thro' their shadows , the tracks of the paths god had chalk'd out to him , in his enquiry after truth . and is it not a powerful motive to make all wits , ( especially , if they be of a melancholy temper ) who are enclin'd to embrace his doctrine , which was first sent from heaven , to gape after revelations too , as well as malbranche did ? he goes on . but the divine spiritual air which he took a pride to give to those dreams , was so near a-kin to that enthusiasm wherewith he believ'd himself to be warmed , that a man would have believ'd he had been a little crack'd-brain'd . and , lest any should wrong the original of his doctrine , or degrade it from the honour of being given him by divine inspiration , this author takes off any unfavourable conjecture of ours , that might make it spring from any sublunary cause , in these words : one would have believ'd he had drunk a cup too much that evening before he went to bed ; but he assur'd us he had been very sober all that day , and that evening too , and had not drunk a drop of wine three weeks together . this looks as if cartesius himself , who so cautiously inform'd him of this afterwards , was fond to have it thought that his doctrine , and especially his method , ( which was the minerva of which his brain was then in labour , ) had been given him from above , by supernatural means . . now , gentlemen , i beseech you , tell me , in good sober sadness ; can you think god ever intended that the onely method for men to get knowledge , should be to lose their wits first in looking after it ? that , to unman our selves , so as to seem crack'd-brain'd , or drunk , is the way to become soberly rational ? that , to reduce our selves to perfect ignorance of all that the goodness of nature has taught us , ( which is , in plain terms , to make an ass of one's self , ) is the onely certain way to become a philosopher ? certainly , unless we be all infatuated with enthusiastick dreams and visions , made up of ideas , we should rather think that it is a far more solid , and more natural way , to begin our quest of truth from those knowledges which are evident , and such grounds as are magis nota , and thence proceed by our reason to minùs nota , than it is to take our rise from affected ignorance , and unknowing again all those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or common notions , which right nature had given us to ground all other knowledges on . no wonder then , this freakish method , taken up by whimsical fancy , had for its genuin effect , fantastick dreams , visionary madness , and enthusiastick folly ; which this writer of his life ( who , doubtless , was himself a zealous cartesian ) calls here a happy means , the foundation of that wonderful science , the path chalk'd out by god ; and the descanting on them , to be done by a divine spiritual air ; tho' he confesses , at the same time , they were dreams , visions , and fits of enthusiasm : and that they made him that had them seem crack'd-brain'd , or drunk . all these wild caprichio's of cartesius , sprung naturally from a lively and heighten'd fancy , screw'd up by frequent sollicitous and melancholy thoughtfulness ; and were the effects of his introversion upon his ideas ; which is quite opposite to his regarding the things in nature , that are without us . nor do i doubt , but that all his followers , did they ( as they ought ) imitate their master , and follow his example , in laying aside first all their former natural knowledges , would also ( as any man must who takes that unnatural method ) fall into fits of enthusiasm , dreams , and visions , and run mad for company . for , ideas , which , being similitudes , are no more but fancies , appearances , and representations , are , consequently , far more proper materials for dreams and visions , and such roving flights , than they are for science , or solid philosophy . . tho' i forestall what comes hereafter , i am tempted to annex here , to this character of the cartesian manner of spirit in philosophy , a short passage mention'd by mr. locke , book . chap. . § . . viz. that he has discours'd with very rational men , who have actually deny'd they were men. now , certainly , this is something beyond enthusiasm , and extravagant even to madness , that any man should deny himself to be what he is : but , 't is prodigious , that mr. locke should give such men the elogium of being very rational . whence , since he cannot but sincerely judge , that the way he proposes and maintains in his essay , is the most rational of any other ; we are to conclude , that those very rational men did follow this way of his , and were great ideists ; or else , that mr. locke judges that those men who actually deny'd themselves to be men , might , for all that , according to his way of ideas , be very rational notwithstanding . 't is worth our while to observe the consonant effect of the ideal way , in the followers of cartesius and mr. locke , and ( in some sort ) in both the authors of those philosophical sects themselves : the one unmans himself ; and the others deny themselves to be men , and yet are character'd by mr. l. to be , notwithstanding , very rational : which are so perfectly parallel , that i am at a great loss which to prefer . and , now , do you think , gentlemen , that , ( besides the regard we owe to truth , ) out of the common love we ought to bear to mankind , and to rational nature , that it is not high time to look to our wits , and to make head against this way of ideas ; when we find two such great men as cartesius , and mr. locke , thro' this fantastick method they had chosen , fall into such incredible extravagancies , as either ( in a manner ) to abdicate , by unmanning one's self ; or , to commend the abdication of their own natures ; at least , to think them very rational that do so ? . far be it from me to judge , that all , or most of the performances of those two admirably-ingenious men , are of this extravagant nature . 't is my sincere judgment , that few men write like them ; and , none , better , where their ill-grounded methods do not intermingle , and pervert their reason . and , i freely acknowledge , that mr. locke 's essay , on which i make so many reflexions , contains many excellent and uncommon truths in it : tho' i do not think he owes any of them to his way of ideas ; but , that he proceeded in such occasions , upon his natural notions , in the same manner the aristotelians do ; and , thence , made right judgments and reflexions upon them by his own acute wit. this unfortunate choice of their method did , as i conceive , proceed hence , that such active and quick fancies do not patiently brook the rains of logick and metaphysicks ; the former of which ( much against the grain ) restrains them from taking their wild carreer , by the discipline of its artificial rules ; the other keeps them from roving , by the self-evident maxims it sorces their understanding to accept of . whence , if these two do not bridle and keep them in , it is not to be expected in nature that such high-mettl'd fancies should be held within strict bounds , or kept to the slow and sober pace of solid reason ; but , that they will take their vagaries , and run over hedge and ditch , whithersoever the swift career of that nimble faculty hurries them . this discourse i make the more willingly , that those students who read this , may clearly discern , that all their application to gain knowledge will be purely lost labour , and time thrown away , if their first and chief care be not to take a wise and solid method at the beginning . having thus finish'd my long address , for which i beg your pardon , i shall now apply my self to make some few discourses , relating to my following book . . man being one thing , compounded of a corporeal and a spiritual nature , and every thing acting as it is , it follows , that both those natures must concurr to every operation that flows from him , as he is man ; and , consequently , be produced by some faculty belonging properly to each of those respective natures : nor can it be doubted , but that , as those faculties , or powers , which are peculiar to both those natures , are as different as are the natures themselves ; so the immediate objects peculiar to those different faculties , must likewise be as widely different from one another , as are those powers to which they belong ; and , consequently , be as vastly opposite , as the natures of body and spirit can distance them . it being then agreed to by all parties , that the faculties or powers which join in our production of knowledge , are those we call the imagination and the mind , or the fancy and the understanding , i cannot doubt but it may be demonstratively concluded , from the known nature and constitution of this thing called man , that , to every thought or act of knowledge we have , ( those being such operations as properly and formally belong to us as we are men , ) there must two sorts of interiour objects concurr ; whereof , the one is of a corporeal , the other of a spiritual nature ; and that , otherwise , those acts could not be said to be humane acts , or the acts of that suppositum , or compound thing , called man ; but of one of those natures onely , a-parted from the other as to its operation , and consequently , as to its being . which supposition is directly contradictory to the natural constitution of man ; as he is distinguish'd , on one side , from a brute , who has nothing but material phantasms , or ideas ; on the other , from an angel , or intelligence ; in whom there is nothing of matter or fancy , but all in it is purely spiritual . . the distinction of these two objects of the fancy and of the understanding being granted , in some manner , by all sides , i cannot but wonder how it hapt to escape the thoughts of all the philosophers both ancient and modern , to explicate fully and clearly the exact difference between those two objects of the fancy and of the understanding ; there being scarcely any one point in philosophy of half that importance for the attaining of truth , and avoiding of errour : for both these being truly in us , whenever we have an act of knowledge ; and withall , being as far removed from one another in their natures as body and spirit are ; if speculative men , either thro' mistake , or thro' inadvertence of this vast difference between them , or out of loathness to take pains to look deep into the intrinsecal natures of things , imprinted in their minds when they have notions of them , shall happen to mistake what they find uppermost or most superficial , and therefore is easiest to their fancy , ( as phantasms or material representations are ) for notions ; which , being of a spiritual nature , do not make so obvious and familiar an appearance as those gay florid pictures did , but are to be gather'd by reason , or made understood by reflexion and study ; such speculaters , i say , will be at the same loss , and not much wiser than those birds were that peck'd at xeuxis 's grapes to seed themselves ; mistaking the outward pourtraiture or idea for the inward nature of the thing : for , no knowledge of the things could ever be expected from ideas , taken ( as themselves take them ) for similitudes ; since those terms or words , which we use , and must use , when we speak or discourse of any thing whatever , were intended , by the agreement of mankind , to signifie the things themselves about which we are discoursing , and not to signifie meer likenesses or similitudes of them . however this has been neglected by others , i see 't is my duty to say something of this distinction of phantasms from notions . i have in my th reflexion , § § , and . endeavour'd to show it . to which i have here thought fit to annex some few 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or distinguishing marks to know one from the other . . my first criterion shall be the sensibleness of the former , and insensibleness of the other . when we shut our eyes , or walk in the dark , we experience we have ideas or images of our way , or of other things we have seen , in our fancy ; and this , without the least labour of ours , or any reflexion : and there is also beyond that , something else in the mind , which tells us of what nature , or what things those are , which appear'd superficially to our fancy ; which costs us labour and reflexion to bring it into the view of the understanding , so that we cannot get perfect acquaintance with it , unless we define it . nor is this sensible , as the other was , but only intelligible : not superficial or uppermost ; but hidden , retruse , and ( as we may say ) stands behind the curtain of the fancy : nor easie to comprehend at the first direct sight of our inward eye , but costs us some reflexion , or some pains , to know it expressly and distinctly . which latter sort , in each of these regards , are those we call simple apprehensions , conceptions , or notions . . the next criterion shall be this : we find we have in us meanings ; now the meanings of words , or ( which is the same , taking that word objectively , what 's meant by those words , ) are most evidently the same spiritual objects as are our notions , and 't is impossible those meanings should be the same with ideas or similitudes , but of a quite different nature . let it be as like the thing as 't is possible , 't is not the likeness of it which we aim at in our language : for we do not intend or mean when we speak of any thing , to talk or discourse of what 's like that thing , but of what 's the same with it , or rather what that thing it self is ; which the meer similitude of a thing cannot possibly be . for a similitude being related to the thing , is so far from being that thing , or the same as it is , that it is relatively opposite to it ; that is , quite distinct from it . now , that what 's essentially and formally distinct from a thing , nay opposite to it , should of it self , and by it self alone , give us the first knowledge of it , ( as they put their ideas to do ; ) or that the meaning of the one should be the meaning of the other , is utterly unintelligible , and against common sense . wherefore the meaning , which is the immediate and proper object of the mind , and which gives us , or rather is the first notice of the thing , must be of a quite different nature from an idea or likeness of it ; and since there can be no middle between like and the same ; nor any nearer approach or step , proceeding from likeness , towards unity with the thing , but it falls into identity , it must necessarily be more than like it ; that is , the same with it ; which an idea or likeness cannot possibly be , as was proved lately . . the third criterion which confirms the other , shall be this : none denies but brutes have ideas or similitudes in their fancy ; but they can have no meanings , because they have no spiritual part or mind , only which can mean. hence , all the sounds or noises they make , express only passion , or some corporeal easiness or uneasiness which they feel , and not their thoughts or meaning : as appears by this ; that they can never come to know what the words we use do mean or signifie ; nor can those of them that can speak , adapt the words they pronunce to our meaning , nor answer us pertinently ; which reflexion serves to shew us farther the vast difference between ideas and meanings , or between phantasms and notions . . my third criterion is taken from the evident difference between an idea or similitude of a thing , and its definition ; of which see method to science , book . less . . § . towards the end. . my fourth criterion is , that we are as certain we have general notions , as that we have particular ones ; nay , we can conceive them as general ; that is , we can conceive their generality . if then we have an idea or likeness of universality , or generality , what is it like ? it must either be like the thing , or must be like nothing , and so is no idea or likeness at all . but it cannot be like the thing in any respect , because in the thing there is nothing that is general or universal ; but all that is there is particular and determin'd ; which is quite unlike , nay , opposite to universality or generality . 't is evident then , that we have no idea or likeness of an universal in our meaning or notion , when we use or hear the words that signifie it . on the other side , we have a notion of homo , animal , and ens ; and still a clearer one according as they are more general . wherefore , 't is likewise evident , that our notions are of a quite different nature from ideas or similitudes . . i shall leave the pursuing this point any farther , and give the reader some taste before-hand of what ( perhaps ) he will be cloy'd with in the following book ; especially it will be proper to season his understanding with some few notions concerning the main question between the ideists and me , viz. whether our knowledge is made by the things being in our mind when we know it , or an idea or similitude of it only . in order to which i ask the ideists , whether the modes or accidents are distinct entities from the substance or thing ? to which i am sure mr. locke will say , they are not . hence i argue , therefore , if the modes or accidents be not distinct really from the substance , the substance or thing is not really , ( or in re , ) distinguish'd from the modes or accidents : therefore they are ( as they are in nature , or in re ) the same thing , or identify'd . therefore they are only distinguish'd by the understanding conceiving the same thing diversly ; therefore 't is onely the conceptions of our understandings which are distinct. therefore taking the word [ conception ] objectively ; that is , for the thing conceiv'd ; all we conceive is still the thing . therefore all our notions , both of the substance and of its accidents or modes , that is , all the notions we can have , ( they being the same with our conceptions , ) are nothing but the thing conceiv'd diversly . therefore , if that thing be a body , all our notions of it are meerly that thing call'd body diversly conceiv'd . therefore the putting space , succession , &c. where there neither is nor can be any body , is to put body where there is no body ; and , is a meer fancy , and contradictory . therefore those philosophers who proceed upon our grounds , do still conceive , judge and discourse of the thing . therefore the knowledge they gain by such notions is the knowledge of the thing ; the judgments they make by connecting those notions , are connexions of the thusdistinguish'd parts ( as it were ) of the thing ; and the discourses they make , discourses concerning the very thing . therefore the philosophy of such men is truly and entirely the knowledge of the things , or true philosophy . wherefore those who have only in their minds similitudes or ideas , and do only connect or discourse of them , which ideas are not the thing , nor conceiv'd to be it either in whole , or in part , are convinced to build their discourses ( thus grounded ) upon nothing . therefore they have no solid knowledge of any thing . therefore , in proper speech , they know nothing . therefore all their philosophy ( thus built ) is purely fantastick . i infer farther , that , since this distinction of the thing into substance ( precisely consider'd ) and its modes or accidents , is perform'd only by the understanding ; therefore it is made within the understanding . therefore since this act , that thus distinguishes them , is not transitive to the thing which is out of it , the thing must be in the understanding to be there distinguish'd ; otherwise we should distinguish we know not what ; which ( it being done by a knowing power ) is impossible , and a perfect contradiction . therefore the thing it self must forcibly be intellectually in the mind : therefore , there can need no ideas or similitudes to make us know it ; for to be in a knowing power is to be known , without more ado . 't is incredibly strange , and even monstrous , that mr. locke 's thoughts and mine , like antipodes , should move diametrically opposit to one another in this point . he tells us , b. . ch. . in his margin , that there is no abstract idea of substance ; nor can we ( as he there says ) by the sensible qualities have any idea of the substance of body , more than if we knew nothing at all . and , the essences or entities of particular substances ( as clearest reason demonstrates , ) are incomparably harder to be known , than substance in the abstract ; whence we must , consequently , know less than nothing of them , if we know nothing at all of the other : it being impossible to know what this thing or this man is , if we be ignorant what thing or man is . nor have we any innate ideas ( as he confesses ) to make [ substance ] known . if , then neither innate nor acquir'd ideas can make us know any thing at all of it , and we can know nothing but by ideas ; 't is plain , we cannot know thing or substance at all , and so we must rest contented with knowing nothing . for , substance being unknown , 't is impossible to know any mode or accident ; they being essentially certain manners how a thing is ; and , so , including substance and thing in their definition . again , mr. l. holds we can frame no idea of substance , or at most but a most blindly obscure one ; and i hold that the notion of it is most clear , nay , the clearest of any but that of existence , exprest by the word [ is . ] he thinks that the nature of accidents is known by themselves , tho' the substance ly in the dark from us : and i judge it demonstrable that , as they have no entity of their own , but by means of the thing , ens or substance , so they can have no intelligibility ( which is a property of ens ) of their own , but meerly by virtue of the substance or thing with which they are identify'd . in a word , he thinks substance is most unknown , and i say , 't is self-evidently known . he says it cannot be known clearly ; and i say it not only can , but must be known clearly ; nay , that nothing else can be known but it , or by being it. by this discourse it appears , that this point being ( of its own nature ) of universal concern ; and , therefore , drawing great and most important consequences after it , which , acting here as a philosopher , i do not mention ; either he or i must be in a most dangerous errour . wherefore , being perfectly assured that the method i take will not permit me to erre enormously ; and , very certain that i follow very faithfully that method ; i humbly beg of mr. locke , by that candour and ingenuity , of which ( i doubt not , sincerely too ) he has made so frequent professions , that he would please to apply his thoughts anew ( for if second thoughts be better , the last may be best of all ) to review his way of ideas ; and , comparing it with what i have propos'd and prov'd in my method to science , my preliminaries , and my several reflexions on his essay , he would unbyassedly consider , whether ( since he cannot suspect his own excellent parts ) this new way of philosophizing be not the sole cause of all his mistakes , and misleads him into all these great errours ; to entertain which this phantastick method has inveigled his good reason . i have no more to preface , but to beg pardon for oftentimes repeating the same thing over and over in the ensuing book , mr. locke civilly apologizes for doing the same ; and my chief excuse is , that , being to trace and follow his discourses , i could not well avoid it ; hoping withall , at the same time , to clear the point better ; either by some new thought , which then occurr'd , or by giving a better turn to my former arguments . besides , i must confess , that i did now and then affect these repetitions , to make some particulars which were of most weight sink better into the judgment of my readers , by re-minding them often of such important truths . i am forced to use the word [ idea ] often , because mr. locke ( with whom i am discoursing ) does so always ; tho' generally i join notions to it . but , this one note will keep my true sentiment from being misunderstood ; that i allow ideas or resemblances in the fancy or imagination ; but , i absolutely deny there are any spiritual ideas or similitudes in the mind on which we ground any truth , or which are the materials of knowledge ; but notions only , or the things abstractedly or inadequately conceiv'd by the understanding . your well-wishing friend and faithful servant , j. s. solid philosophy asserted . preliminary discourses . preliminary first . of the impropriety and equivocalness of of the word [ idea . ] . the author of the essay concerning human understanding , having sincerely levelled the aim of his endeavours at the attainment of truth in philosophy , which can only be had by clearing the way to science ; hence , this being the sole end we have , both of us , prefixt to our selves , the best method ( in common ) which i can take in my reflexions on that learned treatise is , to keep my eye still directed to that end , and to take my measures from the order and rapport which our respective positions , or discourses , may be conceived to bear to that best design . . this premis'd , my first preliminary reflexion shall be upon his making use , throughout his whole work , of the word ( ideas ) as the chief , or rather only materials , of which , according to him , we are to frame immediately all our knowledges . which being so , it follows that , if the sense of that word be not it self clear , but equivocal ; and if , as taken in one sense , it be manifestly nothing at all to science , nor can be any material of it ; and , as taken in the other , it may and must conduce to it , nay , be the sole imediate ground and origin of all science ; i cannot but think , that the promiscuous usage of that word in such disparate senses , ( it being of so general concern , and running through that whole book ) must necessarily encumber and perplex in a high measure the way to scientifical knowledge . . one of his secondary designes was ( as he expresses himself in his epistle to the reader ) to remove the rubbish in order to the building up science , and to beat down the vanity and ignorance of those who have reduced philosophy , which is nothing but the knowledge of things , to insignificant school-terms . this is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable design ; it being evident to all ingenuous lovers of truth , that never was there more need of a reformation , than there has been of philosophy in these last centuries ; to second him in which i have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours . yet , notwithstanding i do not think we ought , without great and necessary occasion , alter those words which have been accepted and used by the learned world ( such as it was ) hitherto : especially such words as are proper and univocal , such i take the word [ notion ] to be ; much less to substitute another , which i must think is less proper , and withall highly equivocal , or ambiguous , i mean the word ( idea . ) i know this ingenuous author apologizes for his frequent using it ; and i am apt to think he did this out of civility towards our modern philosophers , who have brought it into fashion : for , he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word ( notion ; ) which , importing a part of cognition , does most certainly better suit with a treatise about human understanding . . as for the sense in which he takes the word ( idea ) he professes that he uses it to express whatever is meant by phantasm , notion , species , or whatever it is that the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . which manifests that he uses that word very equivocally : for a phantasm , and a notion , differ as widely , as body and spirit ; the one being a corporeal , the other a spiritual resemblance ; or rather , the one being a resemblance , or a kind of image , or picture ; the other the thing resembled , as will be seen hereafter . again , 't is agreed to by all the world , that brutes have phantasms , but they can have no notions ; for these are the elements , or materialls , whose agreeable connexion furnishes our mind with science ; of which beasts , which have no mind , are incapable ; and therefore it were both unnatural , and to no purpose , to put notions ( which are the primary affections of the mind ) in those meer animals . i am more at a loss to find , that , in the last page but one in his epistle to the reader , he seems to contradistinguish notions to ideas ; which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word ( idea ) here to signify notions , i cannot at all comprehend . . i must confess , it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a word , which is nothing but a sound , or a character , were but the determinate meaning of it told us by the user of it : let it be a , or b , or what he pleases , provided the distinct sense of it be clearly manifested by the writer , or speaker , it were , in that case , logomachy , and impertinent cavil , to except against it . but , when the author 's own explication of it does , ( contrary to the nature of explications ) declare it is used ambiguously , it laies a force on me to remark it ; lest it may lead the reader , ( as it infallibly must ) into great errors , unless it 's double sense be warily distinguisht in the ensuing discourse ; which i have not observed to be done any where by this otherwise accurate author . . from this undistinguish'd ambiguity of the word ( idea ) it follows naturally , that even his own excellent judgment , and consequently , his reader 's , must necessarily sometimes deviate ; and , tho' his general intention was only to pursue the knowledge of things , yet he must needs be sometimes mis●ed at unawares to entertain fancies for real knowledges ; as will occasionally be shown hereafter . for the present i cannot omit one particular , it being of such main importance . . the author believes all sorts of animals to have , in some degree , perception . now perception ( as i conceive ) signifies knowledge ; for , under what sort of material action to rank it , i confess my self at a loss : but , let it be only the first step and degree towards knowledge , and the in-let of all the materials of it , still he says , the dulness of the faculties of some brutes , makes them remote from that knowledge which is to be found in some men : so that it seems in other men there may possibly be no more knowledge ( at least in some things ) than in brutes ; nor does he any more than probably conjecture , that beasts have not the power of comparing , which may be observed in m●n , belonging to general ideas , and useful to abstract reasonings . now , this so jumbles together spiritual natures with those which are meerly corporeal , that , if this be so , we shall be at some loss to know our own kind , to define what man is , or to distinguish our selves from our younger brothers in knowledge , brutes , or our souls from theirs : for , if by ideas there be meant notions , ( as his expressions leave it indifferent ) and that a man's knowledge consists in having these ideas in him , and brutes have also such ideas ; and , that , moreover , they may possibly have also , in some sort , a power to compare those notions , and both * judging and discoursing most evidently consist in comparing our notions , i see no operations peculiar to a man , but what brutes may perform in a lower degree ; and since degrees do not vary the species ( for otherwise dull men would be of another species from those who have more wit ) we could , consequently , never know what mankind meant ; or who is a man , who not , unless in outward appearance ; nor , lastly , how our souls , or minds , do differ from their fancies , or imaginations . again , m. l. affirms , b. . ch. . § . . that it seems as evident to him that beasts do reason , as that they have sense ; than which , certainly , nothing in the world can be more evident , or undeniable . now , if this be so , all those who hold that ( a rational animal ) is a proper and adequate definition of ( man ) ought to hold brutes to be men. mr. l. will say , that brutes can only reason in particulars , having no general ideas , because they cannot abstract ; nor do we see they make use of any general signes to express universal ideas : indeed , they have no such signes as words , to notify they have any such ideas ; but , if we may conclude from their outward actions ( on which only mr. l. seems to ground his good opinion of them that they have reason , ) we may as well gather from the same ground that they have general ideas too . for example , when a horse sees a man a far off , he can only have an idea that it is something ; for the object cannot , at that distance , imprint a more particular idea of it self , but that most general one , and therefore 't is evident the horse must either have a general idea of it , or none at all ; whereas yet he must have some idea of it , because he sees it , though confusedly . coming nearer , the object imprints a more distinct idea of a man ; yet not so distinct , as to represent this man in particular . at length coming very near , the same object is apt to imprint an idea of this particular man ; which shews plainly , that all those ideas the object gave him before were general ones : to proceed , we may observe , that while it appear'd only to be something , which was a very abstract idea , the horse carry'd it abstractedly too , and remain'd unconcern'd . when it appear'd to be a man , it began to be a little concern'd , having to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either good or harm ; and therefore it stares at it ( a common carriage in sheep especially ) as if it study'd , or consider'd , what to make of it , in order to its own interest , or self-preservation . but , when the object imprints an idea of this particular man , who either us'd to bring him provender , or come to catch him to make him work , he either comes towards him , or runs away ; which different behaviour of theirs ( if outward actions were , in this case , worth building on ) is as good a sign that brutes have general ideas , as we can expect from dumb animals . besides , when a cat , or dog is hungry , and hunts about for meat , how can mr. l. imagin they long only for one particular sort of meat , and not any sort of meat in common that is agreeable to their nature ? i am sure their indifferency to any such food ( in case they know at all ) gives us as good ground to think they have a general idea of such a sort , kind , or species of food , as it does for any knowledge they have of particulars . hence is shown , that mr. l's criterion , or distinctive mark to know them from men , ( viz. the having general idea's ) quite failing , we ought to esteem horses , and other cattle , to be four-footed men , or else men must be two-legg'd beasts . moreover , since he grants here § . . they can compare those ideas they have , tho' imperfectly , and but in some circumstances ; and all judging , and discoursing must , by his doctrine , consist in the comparing ideas ; he must think there are some of them who are very judicious gentlemen , and use natural logick , and , tho' not very artificially , make syllogisms too . in a word , if we have no pecular faculties intrinsecal to our nature , nor any primary operation belonging to it , and it only , to distinguish us from brutes but extrinsecal shape only , all beasts might be men , and men beasts : and then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our carriage towards our dear brethren in nature , brutes ; which will bring in the turkish charity to dogs , and twenty other fooleries : and , 't is an excellent argument to prove the identity of our natures , that mr. l. brings of some gentlemen he was acquainted with , who deny'd themselves to be men ; and i wonder he would civilly give them the lye , by passing upon them the complement that they were notwithstanding very rational men ; for , were it possible any man could be a beast , 't is most certain these men were such . but i wonder not all at such extravagant conceits ; for as reason , grounded on our natural notions of the thing , is reduced , if pursued home , to first and self-evident principles ; so fancy , if follow'd close , advances at length to pure folly , and ends finally in perfect madness . . as for us men , we can certainly affirm , that we do truly perceive , or know , because we know certainly , by experience , or rather by reflexion , that we do know ; but we do not thus know that brutes know ; and whoever thinks he can gather it by reason , ought , i conceive , er'e he goes about it , to study exactly two previous points . first , he ought to consider very attentively , how , or upon what grounds he can imagin particles of matter , tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together , can be capable of perception , or knowledge , or how this suits with the nature of meer body . we can only gather this from local motions proceeding from brutes , with some kind of regularity : now an exact watch ( in proportion to its few parts ) does , by vertue of a spring within , which is part of its self , afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance . for , it shews us , and regularly too , the minutes , quarters , half-hours , hours , days of the month , and tells us the time aloud by striking the bell : nay , a repeating-clock does , without missing , or mistake , answer the question ( as it were ) which by pulling the string you ask it ; and , tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often , yet it still answers truth , with more steady exactness than banks his horse could , by seeing the motion of his masters eye . yet , if any man had drawn thence a conclusion that those engins had perciev'd , or known , we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken . an italian here had an engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise , and also strike fire , and light his candle for him ; which i believe is more than the most docil brute could ever be taught to perform . the case had been still more difficult , had this watch , or engine , which seemed self moving , been put into all these motions by subtil and indiscernable agents ; as iron is by the effluuiums of a loadstone , or as memnons musical statue was by the rayes of the sun ; for in that case the vulgar , discerning no material cause that set it on work , would presently have had recourse to some knowing power in the engine ; in the same manner as when they hear noises in a house , and cannot find out what caused them , they imediately conclude 't is a spright . whence results this plain rule , that er'e we can with reason conclude , or think any thing , except our selves , has perception , or knowledge , by our seeing it perform any outward action , we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the operations of bodies , and all the several combinations and contrivances of them ; and that we see that those actions are impossible to be performed by bodily parts , laid together by an infinitely wise artificer ; before we fall to imagin that any meerly animal body is more than a natural engin ; or that it does any more perceive , think , or know , than does a watch or clock . . the second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think brutes have any knowledge , is , to consider exactly the incredible variety of the several organical parts , found in the bodies of animals ; which , with the peculiar uses of each , and the contexture of them with the other parts , do swell so many books of anatomy already , without any hopes or prospect of reaching them all : and , besides , it is necessary also to weigh attentively the chymical parts ( if i may be allowed to call them so ) of an animal , consisting of blood , the humours in it , and especially the spirits ; which last are apt to be moved , upon every occasion , by the least touch of all the bodies about it , nay , by the most minute particles of them , lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh ; and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient vehicles throughout the whole , to set on motion those parts which are more solid : when he has done this , let him consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the all-wise contriver of nature , in order to the animal's pursuing what 's agreeable to its nature , and avoiding what 's disagreeable to it : when , i say , all these particulars are well weigh'd , and duely reflected on , i believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward notion with such wise contextures , and the complexion of such innumerable material causes may not naturally produce . . to give some ease to our fancy , startled at the strangeness of many actions we see done by brutes , let us reflect on what happens to men , walking in their sleep , when the passages to our knowing power are intercepted ; and our wonderment will to a great degree , cease . how regularly do the phantasms at that time , move our brutal part , the body : many authentick examples of which i could recount worthy our highest admiration ; they being such as , were we awake , and had our rational fears about us , we neither durst attempt , nor could possibly perform , without extream hazard . but , not to insist on these , let us reflect on our selves , even when perfectly awake , and we shall discover that , however we are set on work by motives , or reasons , yet we know not at all how the outward parts of our body ( only which we experience in brutes , and ground the conceit of their having knowledge upon them ) do perform any of their operations . what man living , though supposed the wisest ( much less the generality ) knows how , or by what passages he is to send animal spirits into the muscles ( whence all our motion proceeds ) or into what muscles , or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an outward action ? what feats of activity does a rope-dancer show us ? how many ways does he distort , wind , turn , poize , stretch , and ply the parts of his body ? to do which , the animal spirits are to be sent now into this , now into that muscle , to move this or this or that limb , or joint ; sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement , or quick motion ; sometimes fewer , to move them more moderately ; sometimes none at all into any of them , when he has a mind to surcease all motion , and sit still . yet he knows , no more than a brute , or a stone does , how he is to do any of this , nor can give the least account how it is done . all this is transacted by the wise contrivance of the body ; which is so framed as to be subservient to the design the man , as he is knowing and rational , had projected . and the same is done in brutes , when either actual impressions are made upon them from the objects ; or those former impressions are again excited in the brain ; which done , all the frisking motions of pursuance and avoidance which they perform , do follow by a course of natural or material causes ; and , withal , according to those measures and degrees as are proportioned to the efficacy of the first impellent cause , the object in their imagination ; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of which , to the nature of the animal is that which sets all the engine on work at first . . nor can the objection bear any force that some actions of brutes resemble reason , even though it seems more then is found in men ; since we experience that a watch , which is the work of an artificer , performs the operations proper to it , and tells us the time of the day with more exactness , than the best reason we have can do without such helps . so that the watches acting according to reason , demonstrates indeed there was reason in the framer of it , but argues none at all in the engine it self : wherefore , however the actions of some brutes may bear a show of reason , this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a rational , or wise maker ; but , not that themselves acted knowingly , or rationally , while they did these actions : for my self , i must declare , that i have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the action of a young vine , exerting and twisting its little fingers about other things near it , to support it self as it grew up , as ( all the forementioned circumstances weighed and abated ) at any operation of a brute ; and i doubt not but a campanella ( who maintained that every thing in nature had perception ) or some such other man of fancy , would discourse , and descant on it thus : " the poor week limber vine knew , and was well aware , that , not being able to support it self , it would , when it increast in length , fall down flat on the ground , and so be exposed to be trampled under foot , and hurt ; and , therefore , did very prudently cling about other vegetables , or poles near it , to sustain it self , and avoid that inconvenience . " and , i dare affirm that we lose the best part of our natural contemplation , by putting brutes to have knowledge ; for , what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing power in them should know , or , who admires it in a man ? whereas , it justly raises our mind to high admiration and adoration of the divine artificer , to see things which are made of meer matter , act with as much wisdom and prudence for their own preservation , as the wisest knower can by his best wit , of which he is so proud , and sometimes with much more . no doubt but the growth and operations of dull vegetables , do administer to devout reflecters occasions of very high contemplation ; and shall the operations of sensitive beings , which are incomparably more excellent , and more admirable , as being the top and master-piece of this material world , afford little , or none at all ? now , if their nature be to have knowledge in them , and it be a thing common to all creatures , and expected that god should give to every thing what is its nature , there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment . god has given brutes a knowing power , and that power makes them know , and there 's an end of our admiration , and consequently of our contemplation , and of that devout admiration , to which our astonishment at the several actions of those natural automata would otherwise raise us . . i beg pardon for this long digression ; i thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point ; both because it is a very concerning and useful preliminary ; as also to manifest how the using the word ( idea ) hand over head ( as we may say ) and taking it equivocally and indifferently for phantasms and notions , leads this great man ( as it must needs have done every man ) into great mistakes . for phantasms beasts may indeed have , they being no more but effluuiums emitted from other bodies , and received by the portalls of the senses into the brain ; where the animal spirits stand readily waiting to move the brute , according as those tinctures are agreeable , or disagreeable , to the compound : but notions , or ( which is the same ) meanings , or apprehensions , they cannot have ; for these being made by direct impressions upon our spiritual part , the mind , ( only which can mean , or apprehend ) to judge they have any such , would conclude they had a spiritual , and consequently an immortal part in them , which i am sure we shall both of us deny . besides , had they meanings , or were capable of any , they would be capable of the meanings of our words ; at least those amongst them which are most docil , and could speak , would not fail , if well taught , and educated , to know much of our language , and answer , in some few occasions , pertinently ; which none of them ever did designedly , and , if they hap to do so by accident , none thinks they meant as they spoke , but all mankind laughs at the odd chance , as at a pleasant jest. those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their names , as nurses do to little infants ; and why might not beasts learn them , as well as children ; at least learn as much in many years , as they do in two , or three ? indeed , some words and sounds , which are very often used to come into their brain , accompanied with some pleasing or harmful phantasm , do , by vertue of that concomitant phantasm , affect them , and make them act ; not from their knowing what these words , or interjections mean , but by vertue of the phantasms , or effluviums , that came along with them , and moves them ; or , because they being lodged together in the brain , that word or sound , or some other vehement motion of ours , excites again the same phantasm which puts them upon acting . nor can we draw any parallel from some wild and savage men , seeming as rude as brutes ; the question is of their nature , not of their circumstances . could it be well proved that those brutish savages , tho' instructed afterwards , could never be brought to perfom any actions more rationally than brutes do , nor could ever be taught any language to a tolerable degree , so as to answer at all pertinently or intelligently , the difficulty would be greater ? but this i never heard , or read , asserted by any . or , conld it be well attested , that brutes could fancy , or make choise of a female for being more beautiful , or were taken with the harmony of musick , or did comport themselves accordingly , i must confess i should much wonder . i remember that about the year . visiting my noble friend sir kenelm digby , he told me he was much surprized , and uneasy at a relation made him by a gentleman , whom he could not suspect guilty of that vanity , as to tell an untruth to make his story admired ; which was , that he saw apes dance the ropes at southwark fair ( which was then held ) and that they framed their gestures and motions exactly according to the musick . for ( says he ) this , if true , shows they know proportion , which argues reason , and will oblige us to seek for new principles . at his earnest intreaty i went to examine the business , and found it thus . a fellow stood below on the ground with a string ( which was put about the ape 's neck ) in one hand , and a switch in the other ; who , understanding the musick , made a little twitch with the string , or a menace with the switch , when he would have the ape retire , or advance , to keep time with the fiddles : nay , far were those mock-men , the poor apes , from being guilty of any thing that resembled reason , that , when they made them dance with a lighted wax-candle in their hand , neither their tutor's instructions , nor their own docility could teach them to hold the lighted end of the candle upwards , though they often felt the inconvenience : for , the melted wax scalded their legs , and made them , in the middle of their dance , steal now and then a little scratch where it burnt them ▪ which they did with such a serious and innocent grace , that it gave much divertisement to the spectators . this story i relate the more willingly , to warn others not to give easy credit to particular men's narrations , whether travellers , or others ; much less to suspect their own principles upon such sleight advertisements . i returned to my friend , and eased him of his quandary ; for which he was very thankful ; and blamed himself much for giving credit to a tale , to the prejudice of evident reason . . to proceed , and pursue my theme more closely , i would be glad to know , at least in common , what kind of things , in this author's opinion , those [ ideas ] are . are they corporeal , or are they spiritual , or under what head shall we rank them ? if corporeal , they cannot be in the mind ; as accidents , or modes of it ; the mind being of a spiritual nature . if they be spiritual , brutes , which have not a spiritual nature , can have no ideas . perhaps it will be answer'd they are not things , but certain modes of things : but this satisfies not ; for modes are affections of the thing , or certain manners how it is ; wherefore they must be sutable to the nature of the thing of which they are modes ; for a thing cannot be such as it cannot bee : and so the question returns , what that thing is of which those ideas are the modes : is it corporeal , or is it spiritual ? if it be spiritual , then again brutes can have no ideas , because they have no spiritual natures in them , and so they can have no spiritual modes : if corporeal , then our mind , which is spiritual , can have no ideas in it ; corporeal ideas being improper modes for a spiritual nature . i do chiefly insist upon this objection , to shew more manifestly that the word idea , should have been distinguish'd at first , and counterposed to phantasm , and not confounded with it : besides , my genius leads me when i discourse about any thing , even tho' i oppose it , to know distinctly what that thing is , least i oppose i know not what ; and i must declare that i can make no conception of the word idea by what our moderns , and particularly this learned author , has given me concerning it . for , he abstracts from affording his reader a distinct and clear view of it ; without which his book , which runs wholly upon that word , cannot be perfectly intelligible ; nor , oftentimes , his main discourses inferr any determinate conclusions . . it may perhaps be replied , that every man experiences he has those ideas ; as also that he comes to know , by having them in his mind ; and therefore it is a folly to enquire so scrupulously about such things as are , in some sort , self-known ; and that it is enough to say they are resemblances of things , made in us by the object without us . to which i reply , that we indeed experience the an est of something in our mind ( and , by the way , of something of another nature in our fancy too ) by which we know things ; but , whether it ought to be called an [ idea ] or suits with the proper meaning of this word ; or , after it is called so , the quid est of that [ idea ] or what it is ( at least as to the common notion or genus of it ) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this author , or any other i have had the good fortune to see , i must profess i am not able to discern . all the knowledge i have of it from him , besides that given above which confounds me , is this , that he calls it frequently a resemblance , portraiture , image , appearanc , and such like ; which still leave me more dissatisfied than ever : for , who can have the first knowledge of a thing by a picture , or resemblance of it ? let any man see the picture of a tree , or an apple , who had never seen those things themselves , nor ever should see them any other ways ; and what knowledge could it give him , but only of things of a far different nature from a tree , or apple , viz. a cloth , board , or paper , thus figured and colour'd ? or , how can any man know that such things are , or have any being in nature , by a bare similitude of them . i may see the picture of such a shap'd man , but whether that man is , or ever was , the picture cannot inform me ; so that it might be some fancy of the painter , for ought i know by the picture . indeed , had i known such things formerly , then a resemblance of them might , in that case , revive , and call into my mind the knowledge of them ; but , how it should beget the first knowledge of them , as our late philosophers put those resemblances to do , is altogether impossible and inexplicable . . again , since mr. l. affirms that we know nothing , either by direct or reflex knowledges , but by having ideas of it ; it must follow , that when by a reflex act i know my first idea got by a direct impression , i must have an idea of that direct idea , and another idea when i know that reflex one , of it ; and still another of that ; and so still on , all the time while i go on reflecting upon my former knowledges . now , what sense can we make of an idea of an idea , or what means a similitude of a similitude , or an image of an image ? each succeeding knowledge must be different from the former , because it has still a different object to represent , and that object cannot be known without its proper idea ; and , it is not only the immediately preceeding act which must be thus different , but the immediately-preceding idea too , which is the object of each succeeding act ; and , in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive ideas to consist ? it may perhaps be said , that plain reason tells us it must be so , though we know not the particular manner how it is done . i answer , the same reason tells us far more plainly , that it looks very untowardly , and aukwardly , it should be so ; or that there should be a resemblance of a resemblance : and my advancing this objection does oblige me to show , in due place , how both our direct and reflex knowledges may be performed after a connatural manner , without straining either good sense , or the nature of things . were it a material resemblance , it might , by rebounding from one place to another , cause a resemblance of its self ; but here 't is quite otherwise ; for the first ( idea ) it coming by a direct impression from the corporeal object without me , must resemble it ; and the idea of that idea ( or else of my first direct act ) which is the object of my first reflex act , must be a similitude of an idea that came from the object in nature , and is like it ; and the second reflex idea must resemble an idea , which was like an idea that represented a thing of a quite different , or of a corporeal nature ; and so endwayes ; which would put all our reflex ideas into confusion , as involving still others in them . . 't is yet as great a difficulty , if not greater , how the soul should have a power in its self ( as mr. l. conceives ) to reflect upon its own actions , that is , to form ideas of its former ideas ; it being ( as i verily judge ) metaphysically demonstrable , that an indivisible nature cannot work upon it self , or produce in its self a new act , or a new idea by its own single power ; or , by it self , move the body at pleasure , as we seem to experience in those motions we call voluntary ; or so much as have any succession of acts , but by means of the body ; only which ( and not the soul ) is quantitative , and , consequently , of it self , capable of succession . the farther explicating and elucidating which points , are reserved to their proper places . . many other arguments against these ideas , will , i believe , occurr hereafter , which i at present omit , because i would not fore-stall . but , e're i leave this point , i must do the right to this ingenuous author to d●clare , that it was besides his intention in his treatise to discourse particularly about the nature of his ideas , and therefore i cannot be said properly to confute , or over-throw , what he never went about to advance , or establish : though i cannot but judge , that it had been far more satisfactory to his acute readers , and most highly important to science , to have done so ; and most necessary for his book , since without distinguishing his ideas from phantasms , and letting us know distinctly what his ideas are , his whole essay is unintelligible , and all his discourses built on the ambiguous word [ idea ] are inconclusive . and , had his penetrating wit set it self to that study , i doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his own thoughts , and to have enlightned others . i desire then it may be understood , that it is not in order to him only i have enlarged on this point , but to meet with the mistakes of others also , who do customarily use the word [ idea , ] and yet , as i have good reason to fear , do not perfectly understand their own meanings . lastly , i thought it fit to dilate first on this point , that i might prepare the way to my next discourse , to which it naturally leads . corollary . from this whole discourse collected into a summary , i deduce this corollary , that , since the word idea , according to this author , signifies a resemblance , similitude , or image , and , consequently is indifferent to corporeal and spiritual resemblances , that is , to what 's in the mind , and what 's only in the fancy ; and that , only that which is in the mind can be the proper material of all our knowledges ; hence that word is most improper to be used in philosophy , which is the study of knowledge . also , that as taken thus undistinguisht , it does in another regard highly prejudice all true knowledge of things , or science ; in regard it confounds corporeal and spiritual natures , which contain the two general objects of all our knowledges ; and are , besides , most vastly disparate . preliminary second . that the elements , or materials , of all our knowledges are properly to be called . notinos ; and what those notions are . . but , if the word [ idea ] be equivocal and improper to be used in philosophy , as being unfit to signify the first conceptions of our mind , ( which are , as mr. l. says well , the materials of science ) and consequently , are apt to make us entertain erroneous fancies for real knowledges ; it will be be ask'd what other word we can invent which is univocal , proper , and not liable to signify a superficial resemblance , nor dangerous to seduce us by taking fantastical appearances for the true knowledge of the things ; but is , of its own nature , fit to express distinctly those solid materials , by the composition of which the structure of science is to be raised ? i reply , the word [ notions ] is such , and answers all these intentions ; and therefore this is the only word to be made use of by philosophers , who seriously and sincerely pursue the knowledge of things , and not their own witty conceits , or imaginations . 't is univocal and unambiguous , because men of art , or philosophers , who are the best reflecters on the operations of our mind , and have the truest right to express those thoughts their art has given them , have constantly used it hitherto to signify our simple apprehensions , or the first operation of our understanding ; and never to signify material resemblances , or phantasms : whence also it claims to be proper . and , indeed , it has title to be such even from its very origin and derivation : for , none can doubt , or ever question'd , but that the compound word [ cognition ] does properly signify true [ knowledge , ] and therefore the simple word [ notion ] must most properly signify those simple parts , elements , or materials ; the orderly putting together of which in a knowing power does compound , or make ( cognition , ) whereas the particular sense or meaning of the word [ idea ] which denotes a resemblance , or similitude , does not , in its immediate and proper sense , in the least intimate any order to knowledge at all ; nor any material , part , or peculiar object of it . nor , lastly , does the word [ notion ] signify a bare similitude , or resemblance , which can be , and usually is , in the fancy ; but ( as will be seen shortly ) the very thing it self existing in our mind ; which is most undoubtedly a solid material , or firm ground to build the knowledge of things , or science upon it . . i hope i shall have candid readers , and therefore i am not apprehensive that any will be so captious as to object , that i do here use an equivocal word , as well as others , by taking [ cognition ] which signifies an act of knowledge , for the object of that act. 't is a fate , to which all words are obnoxious , to have some ambiguity , or double sense one way or other . thus we call in our common speech a parchment by which we hold our estates [ a writing , ] and a sentence of seneca , his , [ saying ] ; and so take those words for the thing written , or said ; tho' they may also signifiy the acts of writing , or saying . but , this is not such an equivocalness as breaks squares between me and the ideists , or that on which my exception proceeds . the univocalness which i assert to the word [ cognition ] and [ notion ] is such a one as is taken from their radix , [ nosco ] which , notwithstanding little gramatical variations , does still import some knowledge , or an order to it ; and the genuin signification of those words , thus varied or declined , is still kept within that same line . quite otherwise than is found in the word [ idea ] which is indeterminate to those vastly different lines of corporeal and spiritual , ( which makes it highly equivocal ; ) besides that it has no rapport at all to the line of knowledge from its radix , or original sense . to clear then the meaning of the word [ notion , ] as 't is used here from this sleight , and ( in our case ) unconcerning ambiguity , i declare , that , there being two considerations in knowledge , viz. the act of my knowing power , and the object of that act , which , as a kind of form , actuates and determins the indifferency of my power , and thence specifies my act ; i do not here take the word [ notion ] for my act of simply apprehending ; but for that object in my mind which informs my understanding power , and about which that power is employed ; in which objective meaning i perceive mr. locke does also generally take the word [ idea . ] . since i have formerly blamed the ambiguous explication of the word [ idea , ] 't is but just it should be required of me to give a more determinate and distinct one of the word [ notion , ] which i shall do in blunt terms thus ; [ a notion is the very thing it self existing in my understanding . ] i expect at the first hearing such a monstrous position , which seems to the antiperipateticks something above paradox , and as mysterious as a supernatural point of revealed faith , it will be entertained by some of them with a kind of amazement , by others with a smile . on the other side , i am so little concerned how any receive it , that i must resolutely declare that , unless this thesis be as true as it is strange , it is impossible any man living should know any thing at all . by which the reader will see that the credits of the aristotelians , and their adversaries , as to their being held solid philosophers , does entirely lie at stake upon the decision of this main point . which therefore must crave the attention , and soberest consideration of those persons , who take themselves to be concerned in the affair of science , or in the search after truth . . er'e i address my self to prove my position , i must bespeak my reader 's consideration , that , in a question of this nature , which depends upon our reflexion on what is , or is not in our spiritual part , the the soul , he must lay aside his pleasing phantasms , and all the imagery , which with such a fine raree-show uses to entertain and delight his fancy . the point is of a higher nature than to managed by such familiar appearances . the ideas of figure , colour , nay , of quantity it self must sit out as bunglers , when such a game is to be played , in which they have no skill . this contest must be carried on by means as spiritual , as is the subject of it ; that is , by exact reason , or severe connexion of terms . and , to think to draw intrinsecal arguments ; or to frame pertinent answers to them , from what we find in material imaginations , when the question belongs to that part of metaphysicks which treats of spiritual natures , and their operations , is as absurd , as 't is to contend that the knowledge of a man is great , or little , because his body is bigg , or dwarfish ; or to fancy that science is to be measured by yards , or inches . and , tho' i cannot fear any such rational kind of attacque as close connexion of terms , for the negative , yet i grant my self obliged to produce no less than clearest evidence for the affirmative ; provided we rate evidence , not from what seems easiest to fancy , but from the said connexion of terms ; only which can establish our judgments . . i am to note first , that , as the moderns grant we know nothing without having [ ideas ] of them within our minds ; so i willingly acknowledge , that we cannot know any thing that is without us , but by having in our understanding notions of those things . now , say i , those notions must be the very things themselves ( as far as they are known ) in our soul ; which they deny , as incredible and monstrous . i note , secondly , that in my thesis , i take the word [ thing ] in the largest signification , as it comprehends not only substances , which only are properly things ; but also all the modes , or accidents of substance , which are improperly such . these notes premised , i come to my proof : . first argument . when i simply apprehend the thing , or any mode or accident of it , this operation of my understanding is within my mind , and compleated there ; therefore the thing apprehended , which is the object of that operation , must be there likewife : for , otherwise , this operation of my mind , it being immanent , and not transient , or passing out of my mind to the thing without me , cannot be employed about that thing , contrary to the supposition . nor could the thing be truly said to be apprehended , unless this operation , called my apprehension , had the thing for its object ; and this within my understanding , it being an internal operation . but , that which is within me when i know it , is the notion of it : therefore the notion of it ( taken , as is declar'd above , objectively ) is the thing it self in my understanding . . second argument . i know the very thing ; therefore the very thing is in my act of knowledge : but my act of knowledge is in my understanding ; therefore the thing which is in my knowledge , is also in my understanding . . tho' i will not allow it to be any way an an answer to these arguments , to alledge , that 't is sufficient that the [ idea ] or resemblance of the thing be in my mind , because it does not in the least shock the connexion of its terms , or shew them incoherent ; but is a mere shuffling pretence , thrown in to avoid their force : yet i shall condescend to shew it impertinent , and i argue against it thus . . third argument . that only is known , which i have in my knowledge , or in my understanding ; for , to know what i have not in my knowledge , is a contradiction : therefore , if i have only the idea , and not the thing , in my knowledge or understanding , i can only know the idea , and not the thing ; and , by consequence , i know nothing without me , or nothing in nature . again , . fourth argument . philosophy is the knowledge of things : but if i have nothing but the ideas of things in my mind , i can have knowledge of nothing but of those ideas . wherefore , either those ideas are the things themselves , as i put notions to be , and then i have gain'd my point ; or else they are not the things , and then we do not know the things at all ; and so adieu to the knowledge of things , or to philosophy . . i expect not any direct answer to these reasons , yet i doubt not but wit and fancy will furnish a prejudiced person with evasions ; and the next will , possibly , be this , that we know the things that are without us , by means of the ideas or resemblances of them which are within us . to overthrow which pretence , i argue thus : . fifth argument . we cannot have the first knowledge of any thing by a picture , or resemblance , as was shewn , preliminary . § . . wherefore , notions , or simple apprehensions being the first notifications of the things to our mind , we cannot know the thing by their means , as is pretended , were they not more than resemblances ; that is , were they not the very thing . to overthrow this pretence utterly , and withall , to uphold and fortifie this last argument , i advance this : . sixth argument . we cannot possibly know at all the things themselves by the ideas , unless we know certainly those ideas are right resemblances of them . but we can never know ( by the principles of the ideists ) that their ideas are right resemblances of the things ; therefore we cannot possibly know at all the things by their ideas . the minor is proved thus ; we cannot know any idea to be a right resemblance of a thing , ( nor , indeed , that any thing whatever resembles another rightly , ) unless they be both of them in our comparing power ; that is , in our understanding or reason , and there view'd and compar'd together , that we may see whether the one does rightly resemble the other , or no. but , this necessitates that the thing it self , as well as the idea , must be in the understanding , which is directly contrary to their principles ; therefore by the principles of the ideists , we cannot possibly know that their ideas are right resemblances of the thing . now , if the thing it self be in the understanding , there needs no idea of it ; for to be there , or to be in a knowing power , is to be known . again , . seventh argument . no relation can be known without knowing both the correlates : therefore no idea , which being a resemblance of the thing must necessarily be related to it , can be known without knowing also the thing to which 't is related as that which is resembled by it . therefore the thing resembled must be known , not only besides the idea , but by other means than by it ; which can be no way but by the thing it self existing , in the understanding . which argument is enforced by this consideration , that when the one of the two things that are related , or alike , is the prototype , the other taken from it , or ( as it were ) drawn by it ; the prototype must be first known ere we can judge that the other is like it . but the prototype in our case is the thing without us , therefore the thing without us must first be in our mind er'e we can judge of the other 's resembling it . . ninth argument . notions are the meanings , or ( to speak more properly ) what is meant by the words we use : but what 's meant by the words is the thing it self ; therefore the thing it self is in the meaning ; and consequently in the mind ; only which can mean. . it may be perhaps replied , that the ideas are only meant by the words ; because when we speak , we intend to signify our thoughts . i answer , that , however it may be pretended that what is meant immediately by the words , is our thoughts , when our own thoughts or judgments about any matter , are the things desir'd to be known ; yet , when the things are the objects enquired after , as , when a master teaches a scholler natural philosophy , or any other truth , the intention of the speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify the things or truths themselves ; and not our thoughts concerning them ; and , therefore , the things themselves are in the intention and mind , or are the meanings of the speakers , or discoursers . and this passes generally in all other occasions , except only when the knowledge of our interiour thoughts is ultimately aymed at . thus , when a gentleman bids his servant fetch him a pint of wine ; he does not mean to bid him fetch the idea of wine in his own head , but the wine it self which is in the cellar ; and the same holds in all our commerce and conversation about things without us . . eleventh argument . our words are ad placitum , and have no natural connexion with the things they signifie , but are order'd to express them by the agreement of mankind : therefore what 's signified by them , must be fore-known to that agreement . but the ideas , or resemblances we have , cannot be foreknown to this agreement , since they could not be at all known , ( being in the mind , ) but by the words ; which , not being yet agreed on , can make known , or signifie nothing . therefore the things which we had naturally fore-knowledge of , and not the ideas , are that which is signified by words . on the other side , since 't is no less certain that the words do signifie what 's in the mind of the speaker , or his notions , they must signifie the thing in the mind ; and , consequently , also the very things which are without us , and which were known to us before the agreement about the words , were in our mind , when we went about to name them : and , were not this so , words could signifie nothing , which is a contradiction . corollary i. hence that great contest in the schools , whether our words do immediately signifie our conceptions , or the things in re , ( as they phrase it , ) is put past all dispute . for , if the objective part of our conceptions , which are our notions of the thing , be the self-same with the thing in re , neither the one , nor the other , is immediately signified ; because there is no one , and other , but the same . and if the question be put of the thing as in re , and as in the understanding ; 't is answer'd , this question takes in those several manners of existing , which enters not into the objective notion , nor prejudices the identity of the thing under either state ; and so the question is again frivolous . . twelfth argument . the same is evinced from the verification of our words ; as , when i say [ the glass is in the window , ] the word [ the glass ] must mean the very substance of that glass existent without us , and not the idea of that glass ; for it would be false to say , the idea of the glass is in the window . therefore the very glass it self which is in the window , must be also in my mind . . thirteenth argument . but , because resemblances and likenesses please them so well , we will try what proofs may be drawn from those very words which themselves do most affect . they hold , the idea , or likeness of the thing is in the mind . let us consider then the likeness of a man in the understanding ; or rather , because we both agree that we have no compleat ideas or notions of any suppositum , let us take one of mr. locke's simple ideas , v. g. extension . i ask , is the idea of extension , as to its representation , in all respects like that mode as it is in the thing ; or is it not ? if not , then we can never know that mode ( at least , not clearly and fully ) by that idea ; which yet we must do , ere we can discourse of it as a simple idea . and , if it is perfectly , or in all respects , like it ; then 't is in no respect unlike it ; and , by consequence , in no respect different from it , ( for that difference would be an unlikeness ; ) and , if it be in no respect different , it follows , out of the very terms , that it is the very same , in the mind , and out of the mind , which is so much boggled at in our notions : so that , at unawares , the explicaters of ideas by resemblances , must be forced to come over to our position , even while they would avoid it . . fourteenth argument . to make this yet clearer , and to set it above all possible confute , let us take the word , [ existence , ] or actual being . they know what that word means , and consequently , they they have an idea of it in their understanding ; for 't is this which they say words signifie . this idea then must either be in all respects like to existence , or in some respects ; that is , in part only : not in part ; for existence has no imaginable parts in it , nor any divers respects or considerations ; no , not even those parts made by the nicest metaphysical abstraction of our mind , called act and power ; but 't is one , most simple , indivisible , and most absolute act ; and thence 't is called by the schools an actuality , as if it were the very nature of act it self , without the least alloy of the more imperfect notion of potentiality , or power . wherefore the idea of existence must either be in all respects like existence , or not at all like it ; if not at all like it , then , having no idea or resemblance of it , we can never know what the word existence means : if it be in all respects like it , then , by our former discourse , 't is in no respect unlike it ; and therefore , in no respect different from it ; and therefore 't is the very same with it . . fifteenth argument . it may , perhaps , look like an amusement , or surprize , to pretend the thing is the same , when 't is perfectly like ; for i do not expect that every reader will speculate so deep , as to see that all likeness is unity of form as far as the likeness reaches . wherefore , to put them out of this mis-conceit , we will endeavour to convince them that this position is not a trick of art , but plain honest nature : it has been still my usual method to shew , that the highest speculations i advance , are abetted by the natural notions , sentiments , and sayings of mankind ; nor will i decline to bring my present position to be tried by the same test. let us take then two quantities , ( yards for example ; ) in case we find them perfectly alike under the notion or respect of quantity , we make account we can in true speech say they are the same quantity . or , take two pieces of cloth , of such a colour ; and , if they be exactly alike in that respect , unprejudiced nature obliges us to say they are of the same colour ; and the same holds in all substances and modes whatever . since then the ideists must grant that their ideas are perfectly like that which they know by them , ( as they must be , as far as the thing is known by them , because the thing is known only by their resembling , or being like it , ) it follows from the consent of mankind , that those ideas must , consequently , be the same with the things out of the mind which are known by them ; which is what we put our notions to be . wherefore , the notion we have of the thing , must be the self-same with the thing known . . it may be replied , that the notion of a thing ( a stone , for example ) has a spiritual manner of being in the mind ; whereas the thing , or stone , out of the mind has a corporeal manner of being , and therefore 't is in some respect different from the thing ; and , consequently , not perfectly the same with it ; and so can only be barely like it , or resemble it . i answer , 't is granted that it is unlike it , and so different from it , and therefore not the same with it , as to the manner of existing ; but i deny that either its existing , or manner of existing do enter into the notion , ( except in the notion of god , to whom existence is essential , ) or do at all belong to it , or the thing either ; but that the notion is the thing , precisely according to what is common to it both in the understanding , and out of it , abstractedly from both those manners of existing . to explicate which , we may consider , . that no created thing , nor consequently , mode or accident of it , has , of its own nature , any title to be at all , ( much less to be after such or such a manner ; ) for then being would be essential to them , and not the gift of their creator ; whose prerogative of self-being , or essential being , is incommunicable to his creatures . . hence the things , and consequently their modes , do perfectly abstract from being , and not being , much more from all manners of being . . this appears evidently by those words which signifie them , the meaning of which words is the same with our notions . for example , take gabriel , peter , bucephalus , an oak , a stone , a yard , whiteness , or what other thing , or mode of thing we please ; 't is evident that the sense of them ( which is the same with our notion of them ) does not at all include , hint , or intimate existence , or non-existence . wherefore , 't is set above all farther dispute , and ( as far as i can fore-see ) beyond all imaginable objection , that our notion of the thing is the self-same with the thing in nature which is conceived by us . q. e. d. . now , if our soul , when it knows any thing has the very nature of that thing in it , and therefore is intellectually that thing ( for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the nature of such a thing in it ) it follows that , considering her precisely as knowing a stone , a tree , fire , &c. she is that stone , tree and fire intellectually , whence we may discover how rational , and how necessary and important a truth that saying of aristotle is , that anima intelligendo fit omnia . in a word , 't is due to the nature of our soul , as it is spiritual , and to the eminency of her essence , to comprehend after her manner the whole inferiour nature of bodies , ( and much more ) or to be an intellectual world , as soon as she is her self , and depur'd from her dull material compart , as is shown in my * method . nor can this making the soul to know so much ( nay , much more ) be deemed an extravagant conceit , or too high a privilege for her , by any well instructed christian , who reflects , ( as is also clearly demonstrable in metaphysicks ) that she is made for , or is capable of a knowledge infinitely higher , viz. the beatifying sight of god ; in comparison of which the knowing the whole universality of creatures is but a meer trifle . . i much fear that such readers , who are not raised above fancy , and have not well reflected how all truths , and all our judgments and discourses that are rightly made , do consist in the connexion of terms , will look upon all efforts of close reason , as chimerical , and think them to be only a kind of chiquaning , and little tricks of logick . wherefore , to comfort the uneasy fancies of such weak speculaters , i desire them to consider how all things were in the divine understanding before they were created , and are still there ; and how their ideas , that is , their essences , had there another , ( and that a more incomparable manner of being ) then they had in themselves afterwards . from which divine archetypes they were copied into nature , and thence transcribed , by impressions on our senses , into human understandings . this reflexion will ( i hope ) let them see how it is not impossible , but consonant to reason , that the self-same thing may have both a natural , and an intellectual manner of existing . i note by the way , that , whereas i have insisted so much on the impropriety and novelty of the word [ idea , ] our modern ideists will alledge that plato did make use of that word before them , and that they do but eccho him , while they use it after him . but , i believe they will find upon examination , that plato meant by that word the essences , or natures of things ; and , in likelihood , those very essences in the divine understanding ; however some thought he misapplied it to universal ideas , or essences , subsisting alone , and not in the individuals . now , did our moderns take it in the same sense he did , that is , for essences , and not for resemblances only , i should not except against them as to that particular ; but , to use his word , and affix another sense to it , is , as i conceive , to abuse it . . corollary ii. from this whole discourse , and the many several arguments in it , it appears evidently , that unless the word [ idea ] be taken as we take the word [ notion , ] that is , unless ideas , or notions , or whatever else we please to call them , be the very things in our understanding , and not meer resemblances of them , they can never reach or engage the thing it self , or give us knowledge of it ; that is , they can never make us know any thing ; any more than a picture can make us know a man we never saw , nor ever shall or can see but by means of that picture ; that is , not at all . and therefore , as i cannot but judge what i here advance to be true , and withall most necessary to be told , so i am obliged , without asking leave of any , to do that right to truth as to declare that those many schems of doctrine , woven upon such ideas as their groundwork , tho' they be never so ingenious and coherent within themselves , and may be of some use in logick to distinguish our notions , are both meerly superficial , and perfectly useless in philosophy , which is the knowledge of things ; and can only serve to please the daedalean fancies of the ingenious contrivers and witty descanters upon them ; but can never bring us to the solid knowledge of any one thing in nature , nor verify any one predication , or judgment we make ; nor enable us in our speculative , or even common , discourses about any thing , to speak one word of good sense . not that i think that mr. locke does still take the word [ idea ] in that unaccountable meaning ; but , that the acuteness of his natural genius does generally carry him ( perhaps unreflectingly ) to mean by that word the same i mean by notion ; tho' , to say the truth , he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point . . corollary iii. hence also we may gain some light what knowledge is . for , it has been demonstrated that our notions , on which all our knowledges are grounded , and of which they are compounded , are the very natures of the thing known ; and , consequently , that our soul , considered precisely as knowing those natures , or having them in her , as in their subject , is , as such , those very things which are constituted by those natures . wherefore , our knowing that those things are , or are such or such ( which is compleat knowledge ) is the having those things and their predicates of existent , or of their being affected with such or such accidents , so in the judging power as they are in the things without ; that is , the things within her must be as the things in nature are . wherefore , when the soul knows any thing in nature she must be that thing as it is another thing distinct from her ; so that in a word , to know is esse aliud ut aliud ; to be another thing , as it is another . for example ; to know the bell is in the steeple , she must not only have the bell existent in the steeple within her , but also that the bell in the steeple is without her ; or is in her as another thing , which is neither her , nor any thing or mode belonging to her . to explicate which hard point we may reflect , that all the essential notions of a thing ( were it possible to comprehend them all ) of a body for example , are intrinsecal to it ; as also all those modes or accidents of it , the complexion of which does constitute the essence of that body ; and even taking them singly , as meer accidents , they depend for their being on that body as on their substance ; but it is not so with the natures of those bodies , or their modes or accidents , as they are in the soul. for , they are no determinations or modes suitable or belonging to her nature as 't is spiritual , nor depend solely on her as on their subject for their existence , as all modes in their natural subjects do . whence follows , that when she knows them , they are purely in her as extrinsecall to her , or as other things ; and as having their genuin existence elsewhere , or out of the mind . and , in this consists the excellency of a spiritual nature , ( from which we may demonstrate her immateriality , and , by consequence , her immortality ) that by reason of the superlative nobleness of her essence she can comprehend the whole nature of bodies ( tho' she may know other higher natures also ) all its accidents , its existence without us , and whatever can belong to it ; and yet so as to stand a-loof from it , and preserve her distance and height above it ; and is withall through the amplitude of her nature , able to engraft on her infinitely capacious stock of being all other things ; and give them , besides their own , ( if they be inferiour natures or bodies ) a far nobler existence in her self . this definition of knowing will , i doubt not , look like gibberish to short-sighted speculaters , who have not reflected steadily on the souls spiritual operations , and on what manner things are in the mind : but , if each step to it be ( as i cannot doubt but it is ) demonstrable , the evidence of the premisses , and the necessity of the consequence ought to obtain of every learned man not be startled at the strangeness of the conclusion , because fancy is dissatisfyed . that inferiour faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow sphere ; and forbid to meddle with spiritual subjects which are beyond its reach and skill ; and are only manageable by reason grounding it self on such notions as are above matter . and , if it appears by this rigorous test that our notions are the very things as distinct from us , all the rest of it will follow of course by a natural and necessary consequence . preliminary third . that all our science is grounded on the things themselves ; and how this is performed . . but how can the things be in our understanding ? since the [ thing , ] in its first and proper signification , being an individual substance , is the subject of innumerable modes , or accidents , which we can never reach , or comprehend ; and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly , as mr. locke has very elaborately demonstrated at large ; and , as my self have also proved in my * method . this being so clear and confess'd a truth , it seems to follow hence against us both , that neither the ideists have any idea of it resembling it fully , nor we any notion of it , which is truly and entirely the same with it intellectually ; and so neither of us can , properly speaking , pretend to know any thing as we ought . . to clear this important difficulty , on which the whole affair of science , and the confutation of scepticism , seems mainly to depend , it is to be noted . . first , that the notion of the individuum , thing or suppositum , can never , for the reason now given , be distinct and compleat , but confused and imperfect . for , let us take any individual thing , v. g. a stone , we shall find that it has in it what answers to the notion of a thing , ( or what has being ) as also of extended , dense , hard , opacous , dinted , &c. it is divisible into innumerable particles ; its peculiar mixture consists of many diverse-natured parts , with such an order or position amongst them , &c. of all which our senses , with their best assistances , can not afford us clear knowledge ; nor , consequently , imprint any clear notion of that whole thing in our mind . . secondly , that , since to know a thing , is to have the notion of it in our mind , our knowledge must be such as the notion is : if the notion be clear , intire and distinct , our knowledge too is such ; and , if the notion be obscure , partial and confused , our knowledge must be obscure , partial , and confused likewise . . thirdly , we can have such a notion of every individual thing , if it be not ( as the smallest atoms are ) too little to be perceptible by our sense , as ( tho' it be confused as to it self ) may serve to distinguish it from all other things , and to make us know it exists separately from all others , and independently on them ; moreover , that it is the suppositum , or subject , which has its own nature or essence in it , and also all the modes or accidents belonging to it . thus , when we see a bag of sand , or wheat , poured out , our senses acquaint our mind , pre-imbued by some common notions , that each grain can exist separate ; and has , sustains , or gives being to its own accidents , without the assistance of any of its fellow-grains . . fourthly , this confused knowledge of the thing , in gross , is sufficient for such a degree of science of it , as we can have in this state. for tho' we cannot have a distinct knowledge of it all , taken in the lump , and therefore do not pretend to have science of it thus considered , nor of each considerability in it taken by detail ; yet , we know that confusedly it contains in it self what answers to all the many distinct conceptions we make of it , which are the ground of all the science we have ; they being all stored up and amassed in the thing , and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our abstractive considerations of it . . lastly , that our distinct knowledge ( or science ) is built on our distinct notions of the thing fram'd in our minds by impressions on the senses , which are many , and the manners of their affecting us also manifold . hence our soul , in this state , can have no distinct or clear knowledge of the thing , but by piece-meal , or by distinct , different , partial , inadequate , or ( as they are generally and properly called ) abstract notions ; as mr. locke has frequently and judiciously exemplify'd in the several conceptions or notions we have of gold ; which we may consider , as yellow , heavy , solid , malleable , dissolvable in aqua regia , &c. whence , tho' it be , perhaps , impossible for us to reach all the considerabilities that may be found in it , which ground our different notions ; yet each notion we have of it , being distinct from all the rest , and being truly the thing , as far as 't is thus consider'd ; hence we can have science of the thing , tho' confusedly of the whole , yet distinctly of it in part , by such a notion , as far as it is conceived by that notion ; notwithstanding our ignorance of other considerations of it ; those abstract notions being in our mind , ( unless they hap to be subordinate , as general and particular ones are , ) perfectly distinct from , and exclusive of one another . thus we can have abstract notions of length , breadth and thickness in bodies ; or ( which is the same ) we can conceive bodies precisely as they are long , broad and thick ; and mathematicians can frame many sciences of bodies , as thus conceived ; and discourse orderly and clearly of each of those distinct notions , that is , of the thing , as precisely such ; without meddling with rarity , density , solidity , fluidity , heat , cold , moisture , dryness , or any other physical consideration found in the same body : tho' each of these last also may , for the same reason , ( viz. their clear distinction from all the rest , ) be discours'd of with equally clear evidence ; and ground as many several subordinate sciences in physick , as the other did in mathematicks . . by what 's said , it appears , that all science , or all philosophy , being grounded on these abstract or distinct notions of the thing , it can be truly said to be the knowledge of things ; and that unless this be so , there can be no philosophy . this position mr. locke has ingenuously asserted : whether he holds to it exactly , or no , will be seen shortly . tho' , in case he should be found to deviate from it , 't is not peculiar to him , but a far more common errour in our modern school-philosophers ; and , i fear , in all the ideists : for these gentlemen , as soon as they have got such ideas into their heads , and express'd them by abstract words , as rationality , extension , roundness , length , &c. they , finding this abstract conception in their minds , and experiencing that they can discourse about it scientifically , do presently begin to imagine that those ideas have got rid of the thing , and hover in the air ( as it were ) a-loof from it , as a little sort of shining entities ; and thence have of themselves a title to be a competent ground-work to build science on . they character them to be resemblances , which is a conceit easie to fancy ; and so they set themselves to contemplate them , and employ their wits to descant on them . they discourse of them , and them only ; for they do not endeavour to shew clearly how those ideas do engage the solid nature of the thing . whence it must needs happen , that in case those ideas chance to be meer material resemblances , or phantasms , the knowledge built on them is purely superficial and imaginary ; nor can have any more truth in it , than a looking-glass , which represents to us a well-proportioned edifice ; or a dream , which ( as it sometimes lights ) is composed of fancies pretty well coherent with one another . lastly , which is worst of all , they make truth , which can have no foundation , but in the things which creative wisdom or essential truth has made and establish'd , to consist in the meer agreement of those ideas . whereas they ought to make it consist in this , that those abstracted conceptions , or notions of ours , are the thing it self thus partially consider'd ; and also , that our judgments or discourses of them , and all truths whatever , do wholly consist in this , that those partial conceptions of ours are found to be identify'd in the thing we judge or discourse of . 't is the thing we divide , ( as it were , ) or take in pieces by those abstract or partial notions of it ; and , therefore , 't is the parts ( as it were ) of the same thing we put together again , and identify when we compound propositions or judgments . . in a word , they make the abstractedness of those ideas to be exclusive of the subject or thing ; whereas i make it only exclusive of other notions , but to include and signifie the thing or subject , according to some consideration , or ( as it were ) part of it ; in the same manner ( to use a grosser example ) as the hand or foot signifie the man or thing to which they belong , according to his power of handling , or walking . hence i hold , that whiteness , breadth or hardness in the wall , do signifie and import the wall it self , precisely quatenus , or as it is white , broad and hard. whence i affirm , that all science , which consists of those abstract and mutually-distinct notions , as of its materials , is truly a solid ( tho' inadequate ) knowledge of those very things ; and not of notions , or ideas , aparted from them really , or as distinct kinds of beings existing separately from it : which if they were , we should be never a jot the wiser for knowing all the ideas in the world , nor ever arrive at true philosophy , it being the knowledge of things , and not of resemblances : especially , since ( as was demonstrated in my former section ) those resemblances can never give us knowledge of the things themselves . we may draw farther arguments to prove our position , that all our most abstract notions do include or connotate the thing or subject , from all our abstract notions or ideas , whether they be essential , or accidental . to begin with the former . . arg. . 't is impossible to conceive humanity , for example , without connotating homo its suppositum ; therefore that abstract idea , [ humanity , ] must signifie the thing , or [ homo , ] according to what 's his essential constitutive . the antecedent is prov'd . the notion or idea of the definition is the very notion or idea of the thing defined ; but the definition of humanity , viz. the compleat essence of a man , includes man in its notion ; therefore [ humanity , ] which is the thing defined , does also include the thing , or [ man , ] in its notion . wherefore [ humanity , ] tho' express'd abstractedly , because 't is but one part , as it were , of the entire suppositum , ( though it be the principal part of it , ) does signifie the thing , or man , according to his compleat essential form or constitutive . the same argument may be made of any other essential idea . let us examine next the ideas or notions of the modes or accidents of things , and try whether they exclude the thing , or include it . . arg. . the idea or notion of [ modes , ] is , that they are the manners how a thing is ; and of [ accidents , ] that they are those which do advene to the thing , or ( if i may be permitted to strain a word , to express properly and fully my meaning ) accidents are unessential conceptions of the thing . wherefore , the idea of both of them do include the thing in their explications , and consequently in their notions , and not exclude it . or thus , there can be no modes of a nothing ; therefore the notion or idea of a mode involves essentially the thing of which it is a mode , and to which , as such , it relates . wherefore , the material part of it is the thing , the formal part [ as thus modify'd ] or [ as existing thus ] or ( which is the same ) as thus conceiv'd . . arg. . this is confirm'd , because modes are justly conceiv'd to have no being of their own , but to exist by the existence of their subject : but , when we have a notion of any mode in nature , we conceive it as some way or other existing ; therefore their notion must connotate the subject or thing by whose existence only they do exist . . it would not be hard to multiply arguments to prove this nice point , fetch'd both from metaphysicks , and also from logick , and the verification of all propositions , did i conceive it to be needful . but , i see plainly , that all the arguments in my former preliminary do conspire with their united force , to make good this fundamental position . for , if this truth be once firmly establish'd , that our notions are the things themselves , as far as they are conceiv'd by us , it must follow , that all our science being built on those notions , has for its solid basis the very thing it self , and not any other things or nothings , distinct from the thing known ; such as are their pretty spiritual looking-glasses , those unaccountable , inexplicable , unnecessary , and useless things , called ideas . and , i hope i may rest confident that those proofs of mine will abide the shock of the most strenous opposition ; since , unless that grand leading truth be certain , 't is demonstrable that no man living can know any thing at all . for , 't is confess'd , that nothing can be known , but by the means of those ideas or representations of it : and those arguments evince , that unless the thing it self be in our mind first , those ideas , or resemblances cannot possibly give us any notice , or knowledge of it . . note first . on this occasion we may reflect on the sagacity of that great speculater and observer of nature , aristotle ; and may gather , at the same time , his true sentiments in this particular ; that , when he came to range all our natural notions into his ten common heads , he did not express the modes or accidents by abstract words , but concrete ones ; lest his scholars should hap to think they were certain kinds of entities distinct from the subject : whereas they were nothing but the subject or substance it self , considered as thus affected , or thus modify'd : for , he does not call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quantitas , qualitas , as we do ; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quantum , quale ; nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relatic , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relata ; or more simply , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ad aliquid : which last is abetted by our common language ; as , when we ask , [ what is he to me ? ] the answer is , [ your friend , ] your father , &c. where the words [ to me , ] express formally what we call relation ; and the words [ is he , ] both signifie that the relation is a mode or accident intrinsecal to the subject , however it be consider'd in order to another ; and withall , that it has no being , but that of the thing or subject signify'd by the pronoun [ he : ] which amounts to this , that what we call in an abstract word [ relation , ] is nothing in reality , but the thing considered thus , or in order to another individuum , which we call to be thus modified , or conceived to be according to such a manner related . the same is observable in the rest , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , agere , pati , habere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quando , ubi , which have the force of concretes ; for 't is only the subject that can be conceived or said to act , suffer , be in such a place or time , or have such a kind of habiliment : whereas , were it not for that reason , he could have express'd them in abstract terms , ( perhaps more handsomly ; ) as , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tempus , lecus , actio , habitus , had it not been his intention to avoid abstract terms , lest the manner of expression should represent it as a kind of thing , distinct really from the subject , and so lead men to take a fancy for a reality , as it happens in the mis-acception of the word [ space , ] which breeds the conceit of vacuum . and , he was less sollicitous to do this in the first predicament , call'd by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because there was no danger men should take the essence of the thing to be a distinct thing from the thing it self , as there might be in the others ▪ so that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd , as a most certain and most fundamental maxim by all who pretend to true philosophy , that whatever conception of ours has not the thing , or res , ( either consider'd in part , or in whole , ) in its notion , has no reality in it , and is a meer fancy . note second , hence we may gather the proper manner of signifying , found in abstract and concrete words , as such , viz. that the concrete word ( album for example ) signifies directly the subject , and indirectly the form or mode conceived to be in it : and the abstract word albedo signifies directly the form or mode , and indirectly the subject ; which indirect manner of signifying is properly called connotating . . this uncommon doctrine might , perhaps , sink better into the reader 's consideration , if it were illustrated by an instance . we will take then mr. locke's position of an infinite imaginary space , or vacuum . to make good which tenent , he imagins that vacuum signifies a space without body : which , to my judgment , is as much as to say , it signifies a contradiction , or chimera . for , i positively deny we can have any notion of space , without including body , however we may have a fancy of it : and i as positively affirm , that space can signifie nothing but body , according to such a mode called space , or quantity . for ( to wave my former proofs ) i ask him whence he had first the notion or idea of space ? he is too acute to hold innate ideas : it was acquir'd then , or wrought in him ; and by what , but by the thing , that is , by the body ? it was the body then which he saw ; it was the body thus modify'd , that imprinted it self thus on his senses , and caused such a manner of idea in his mind . wherefore , to conceit that we can have an idea of space without body , whereas he never had an impression or idea of space , but what was in body , and a mode of it ; and so identify'd with it , is to relinquish our solid natural conceptions , and run to fancies ; to abandon the firm ground of all our knowledge , the thing , and to pursue instead of it an aiery nothing ; ( for modes or manners , without the thing of which they are modes , signifie a meer nothing , and can be nothing else ; ) or , ( which is the same ) 't is to discard our well-grounded notions , and to entertain in their room meer phantastick resemblances . the notion of space then being an impression of and from the thing , is the thing or the body conceived according to that abstracted respect or mode , called space ? wherefore , to put space beyond all bodies , or where there is no body , is a plain trucking our natural notions , for appearances that are groundless , and coined by our imagination . perhaps he will say , we can clearly abstract the idea of space from that of body ; which is so far true , that our precise and formal notion of the body , as it is precisely a thing , or capable of existing , is not the notion of space , which is a mode of the thing . but , why must it therefore be nothing of body , when 't is evidently one kind of conception or consideration of it ; that is , when 't is nothing but body , as grounding the notion of space ? in a word , since space is not of it self a thing , or res , it must and can only be modus rei ; and therefore , to fancy an idea of it , which excludes body , is to make it a mode of nothing , and consequently no mode ; which is to destroy the notion of space , while he goes about to refine it . this for the present , till we come to reflect farther upon that tenet in its proper place . preliminary fourth . of the particular manner how all sorts of notions are bred in us ; and by what way those elements of knowledge do first come into the soul. . the former grounds being laid , shewing what knowledge is , and in what it consists ; the next thing that comes to be consider'd is , to shew , in particular , the manner how we come to know at first ; or , by what connatural steps , the things , or ( which is the same ) our notions of them , which are the materials of knowledge , are introduced into our minds . and , let it be noted , that it is not my intention here to shew , what compleat knowledges , or judgments , are in our soul before others in priority of nature ; which i have already done in my method , book . lesson . what i aim at here is , to acquaint the reader very particularly with my thoughts how our mind comes first to be imbu'd with both direct and reflex notions , which are the elements or materials , of which our compleat knowledges or judgments are compounded . . the difficulty of conceiving how corporeal things that are without us , could get into our soul which is spiritual , and affect it , was so puzzling to the greatest philosophers hitherto , that it has made them rack their best wits to invent some congruous way how this could be performed . aristotle , who ought to have done this , since he advanced that position above-mentioned which required it should be done , gives us no particular account of it ; but being resolved , it seems , to follow the sullen principle he had taken up , viz. acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editae , left it to posterity to find it out . which affected humour of his , whether it proceeded from envy of knowledge to the world ( an unpardonable fault in a professor of knowledge ) or from vanity , or out of policy to bring more scholars to his walking school , has certainly brought much disparagement to his doctrine , hindred its currency , and help'd forward by the schools , ( who undertook to explicate him , and did it untowardly ) has pester'd the world with diverse schemes of philosophy , either newly invented or furbish'd up afresh . whether he did explain after what manner we come to know , to his scholars , i know not ; only it may seem wonderful , if he had done it , that none of them should have deliver'd it down to us . but , letting aristotle alone with his faults , which blemish'd his other great vertues , and come to the other philosophers since his time . . these learned men saw clearly , that all corporeal agents work by local motion , and that no operation of theirs could be transacted without such motion , at least accompanying all their actions , they being all of them successive or quantitative ; and they could not conceive how local motion should be received or wrought in a soul , whose nature , ( it being spiritual ) is incapable of it . for , it must ( as the very notion of it imports ) be made first in one part of the subject , afterwards in another ; which can with no sense be apply'd to the soul , which ( it being indivisible ) has no parts at all . they were not so well skill'd in metaphysicks , as to reflect , that it was very congruous to reason to affirm , that the notion or nature of things ( speaking of created beings ) did abstract from all existence ; and therefore , that the same thing might have different manners of existing , and be in our soul spiritually , tho' out of it corporeally : and , those few who did apprehend the thing might thus exist in the soul when in it , were still at a nonplus how it could get into it . perhaps the difficulty of explaining this , might be one reason , why cartesius , not knowing how to give an account of this , thought fit rather to study , how he might avoid giving any account at all of it , and thence recurr'd to the position of innate ideas . at least , this is the best excuse i can make in his behalf , for embracing a tenet so totally praeternatural ; in case ( as his words give us just occasion to think ) it were really his doctrine . . the schoolmen , whose way it is , when they are at a plunge how to find out a reason for any difficult point , to create some entity which god and nature never made , and then to alledge 't was that entity which did the business ; invented their species intentionales ; which , if they were not the same with our notions , or the things in our knowledge , were meer resemblances coined by fancy , as our modern ideas generally are . but this raised a new difficulty , instead of laying the old one : for , besides that those species were such unaccountable things , that none knew what to make of them , or under what head to rank them , they could do the question no service at all : for , if they were corporeal , they could only affect the soul by way of local motion ; of which , being spiritual , she is not capable . and , if they were spiritual , it will be ask'd , how they came to be such , being caused by a corporeal agent ; as also , how , being sent from a body , they could get into the soul , or by what vehicle ? being thus at a loss , they invented another entity , called intellectus agens ; whose office it was to depure the phantasms from their dross of materiality , that they might become fit , thus refined , to be receiv'd in the soul. but this still multiply'd more difficulties , and solv'd none . for , first , what other reason had they from nature to put such a power in the soul ? or what other thing was it good for , but to purifie the species ? if it had no other office , nor served for any thing but to do this job , 't is manifest 't was invented gratis , to get rid of the difficulty that stunn'd them , and taken up for an asylum ignorantiae , when they were hard put to it , and wanted something else to say . secondly , were those phantasms , before they were spiritualiz'd , in the soul , or intellectus , or out of it ? if in it , the old question returns , how got they thither ? if out of it , how could the soul's acts of understanding , which are immanent acts , become transitive , and affect a thing which is without her ? thirdly , since the understanding , or this intellectus agens , can only work by knowledge , how could it have this power to alter the natures of things , or turn them from corporeal into spiritual , when as yet it had no knowledge at all in it , as before those species were refined and fitted to be received in it , it had none ? lastly , are those species they put , when purify'd , perfectly like the thing , or imperfectly ? if perfectly like , then they are the same with it , as our notions are ; and so , the thing it self is in the soul , and then those species of theirs are to no purpose ; for the thing being there in person ( as it were , ) there can need no proxy of species to stand for it ; nor can it bear any sense to call the thing a species of it self . if they be imperfectly like the thing , they are no more but resemblances of it ; and then , 't is already abundantly demonstrated , that the thing can never be known by them : so that they could make nothing cohere how our first rudiments or materials of knowledge could get into the soul , or how the thing could come to be known by them . . the ideists , on this occasion ; have taken two ways , and both of them very short ones ; which is to skip over all those difficulties at one leap. the cartesians tell us in one word , that god gave the soul her ideas ( or , as some of them say , some of them ) at the same time he gave her her being ; and that , by having those ideas in her , she comes to know ; and , so , by making this quick work , the question is at an end. this is soon said , but not so easily proved . some rubs i have put in the way of this pretence , to hinder its currency , in the preface to my method , and in the book it self , as occasion presented ; and shall add many more , in case their opposition shall invite me to it . but ; what needs any more , since mr. locke has already confuted that position beyond possibility of any rational reply ? other ideists there are , who think it their best play to abstract totally from that hard question ; and , finding , by experience , that they have ideas and resemblances in their head when they know , they content themselves with that , without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are , or how they bring us to the knowledge of the things in nature . these men do certainly act more prudently than the former ; for , 't is much more wise and safe , in order to the common good of learning , to wave an obscure point totally ; than , by advancing false positions , in a matter of universal concern in philosophy , to affirm what cannot be maintain'd . tho' i must declare , that i cannot see but that such a fundamental point , which influences the whole body of science , ought not to be pretermitted . for which reason i have thought fit to lay the grounds for it in the two first lessons of my method , reserving a more particular account of it till further occasion should be presented ; which seems to offer it self at present . . yet i do not judge this opportunity so pressing or proper , as to oblige me to treat such a large point fully , or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every step i take in this untrodden and rugged way . this of right belongs to that part of metaphysicks that treats of the nature of the soul ; and , particularly , as it is the form of such an animal body ; which may not improperly be called physicks ; or animasticks . besides , it were too great a boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse point quite thorough with evident demonstration . yet i think i may promise my readers , that the positions i shall lay down orderly to clear it , will have that coherence amongst themselves , and be so agreeable to the natures of things , and to the maxims of divers other sciences ; that it will be hard , in just reason , to find any considerable flaw in it . i take my rise from the remotest principles that can concern that point , and these are my thoughts . . it belongs to the divine wisdom to carry on the ordinary course of his world by causes and effects ; and , on the matter 's side , by dispositions to further productions . thus wood is heated by degrees , e're it becomes fire , and breaks out into a flame ; and , in the generation of every thing in nature , there are are many previous alterations of the matter , ere it acquires another form , or becomes another thing . . wherefore it belongs also to the same wisdom and goodness of god , as he is the first cause , that if , in the ordinary course of the world , the subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the power of second causes , to step in to nature's assistance , and help her immediately by his own hand . thus , when the individuality is compleated , that is , when the potentiality of the matter is ultimately determin'd and particulariz'd by second causes , so that it is become distinct from all other entities , or apt to be this , and so fitted for existence ; which existence , second causes cannot give : god , whose generous bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his creatures all the good they are capable of , does give them existence immediately by himself . . therefore , if there can be such a disposition in the brain of an embryo , that ( grown riper ) it is apt , as far as is on the matters side , to act comparatively , which is the disposition for rationality : and that this cannot be done , but by having a form in it of a superior or spiritual nature , which second causes cannot produce ; it is certain , god will , by himself , assist it , by infusing such a form. . there can be such a disposition in the brain of an embryo to work comparatively , that is , to judge and discourse ; since we experience that we do this actually now , in part , by the means of the brain , or something that 's near it , or belongs to it . . wherefore , since this cannot be done without having those materials in us , of which , compounded or compared , we are to judge and discourse , which we call simple apprehensions , or notions ; it follows that there must be such a disposition in some bodily part , as to convey into the soul such notions . . wherefore , since bodies , in their whole quantity , or bulk , cannot be convey'd by the senses into the brain , the author of nature has order'd that all bodies , upon the least motion of natural causes , internal or external , ( which is never wanting ) should send out effluviums , or most minute and imperceptible particles ; which may pass through the pores of those peruious organs , called the senses ; and so , be carried to the brain . . this natural compound , called [ man , ] is truly one thing , and not aggregated of more things actually distinct ; since the form , called the soul , did ( tho' not so naturally , yet ) as necessarily follow out of the disposition of the matter , ( taking it as seconded , and its exigency and deficiency supply'd by the first cause , ) as the form of fire , or of any other body in nature , does out of the dispositions properly previous to that form : and , therefore , does as truly ( by informing that matter ) make or constitute the man one thing , as any other corporeal form does any body in nature . . therefore there must be some chief corporeal part in man , which is immediately united with the soul , as the matter with its form , and , therefore , is primarily corporeo-spiritual , and includes both natures . whence , when that part is affected , after its peculiar nature , corporeally ; the soul is affected after its nature , that is , spiritually , or knowingly ; which part cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or glandula pinealis . . therefore the manner how , and the reason why those corporeal effluviums do come to affect the soul , and cause in her spiritual notions of the thing , is because of the immediate identification of the matter and form , in that part ; whence follows , that the one cannot be affected , but the other must be affected too after its different manner , proper to its distinct nature . in the same manner ( abating the diversity peculiar to each of those natures ) as , when the matter of wood is wrought upon , the form of it , or the complexion of accidents , ( making up one thing with it , ) does also suffer change. whence , by the way , is seen the reason of that received maxim , that actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum : so that 't is the whole thing which acts or suffers , tho' according to this or that part of it ; and hence it is that the whole thing is conceiv'd , tho' by an inadequate notion we conceive but but one part of it ( as it were ) distinctly . . this part immediately inform'd by the soul as 't is spiritual , ( which we will call the seat of knowledge , ) must , whatever it is , be of a temper the most indifferent to all bodies , and to their several modes as can be conceived ; and ( as far as matter can bear ) abstract from them all ; both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the different effluviums by which their several natures are to be understood ; as also more fit to beget in the soul universal notions , such as are those of ens , or being ; by which all the negotiation of our interiour acts of judging and discoursing is managed . tho' i am apt to judge that those general notions are also caus'd when the impression is confused or indistinct , as those of ens or being are ; and the same is to be said of the rest in proportion . thus , when we see a thing a-far off , and have but a confused view of it , it only appears to us to be something , we know not , particularly what , or a thing ; without making us know in the least , what kind of thing or body it is . afterwards , coming nearer , we discern it moves it self ; whence we gain the notion of a living thing : then , approaching still nearer , we , by a more distinct impression , know 't is a horse . and , lastly , when it is within convenient distance to give us a perfectly distinct view of it , we know 't is such a particular horse of our own . . that part , called the seat of knowledge , must , moreover , be the most sensible , and the most tender that can be imagin'd , that ( as was said ) the least effluviums may affect it : and yet it must not be of a glutinous nature , so as to entangle them , and make them stick there ; but that , reverberated thence , they may light in some near adjacent place , to serve , by their renewed impulses afterwards , for the use of memory , and to excite again former knowledges ; as also , ( as will be shewn , ) to cause reflex acts. that it must not be in the least glutinous , appears hence evidently , that , did the effluviums stick there , we should , whether we would or no , perpetually contemplate or think of those objects ; which would also hinder our perception of others , by mingling the former effluviums with those which supervene . . the orderly disposure of the world , by gradual steps arising from less perfect natures to those which are more noble , and more perfect , does evince that this part call'd the seat of knowledge , is the most supremely noble production of material things , and nearest ally'd ( as it were ) to spiritual nature that can be imagin'd ; so that all the best perfections that are to be found in corporeal things , are center'd in it . whence , tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned physician , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is a baser part of man's body than the intestinum rectum ; yet i cannot approve of cartesius his conceit , that it is a glandule ; which is one of the ignoblest parts we have ; but judge it has a peculiar temperature of its own ; not only specifically distinct from other parts , but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it . . whether amongst its other special qualities it partakes of the nature of those bodies which in the dark do reflect light ; and that the glossy and lively appearances and resemblances , which we call fancies , or phantasms , do spring thence , i leave to others to determin . i think it is the interest of those who make the septum lucidum to be the seat of knowledge , to embrace that opinion . . those effluviums sent out from bodies , have the very natures of those bodies in them , or rather are themselves lesser bodies of the self-same nature , ( as the smallest imperceptible parts of bread and flesh , are truly bread and flesh ) which are cut off by natural agents from the great lump ; and , therefore , by application of themselves , they imprint the very body it self , or a body of that nature , on that material part which is the seat of knowledge . whence the soul being , at the same time , affected after her manner ( or knowingly ) as that part was affected , she has also the very nature of that body ( as far as the sense exhibits it ) put in her by that conformable impression , when she has a notion of it . . therefore those effluviums striking the seat of knowledge , and immediately ( as has been said ) falling off from it , do affect it as a thing distinct from the m●n . for they are not there as belonging at all to the intrinsecal constitution of the body , but as meer strangers to it : whence the soul has the nature of that body in her ( and consequently is that body ) as 't is another thing from her , which illustrates the explication of knowing given formerly ; and that 't is to be another thing as it is another . . the reason why those effluviums , containing the essence or nature of the bodies whence they flow , do not breed a notion in the soul of their whole essences is , because they are convey'd to that part by many different conduits the senses ; which being diverse , and each of them ( according to their circumstances ) apt to be affected diversely , do therefore receive and imprint them after a different manner . for example , those which , by the smart motion of the ayr , do come in thro' the drum of the ear ; and consequently by the auditory nerve which is joined to it , and immediately conveys them to the seat of knowledge ; do affect it with a kind of vibration , or ( as we may say ) soundingly . those which come in by the eye , affect it luminously , or as accompany'd with light , and so of all the rest ; whence are caused in our soul all our distinct , or abstracted notions of the thing , or ( which is the same ) of the nature of the thing , in part , or according to such a consideration of it ; on which , because of the distinctness , and consequently clearness of those impressions , all the science we have of the thing is grounded . . there is , moreover on the soul's side , which is the subject that receives those impressions , another thing highly conducing to make our notions yet more clear and perfectly distinct , which deserves our best reflexion . 't is this , that , the nature of our soul being indivisible , it gives an indivisibility to all those notions , or natures in her ; which , as they existed without her , and were convey'd into her by effluviums , being corporeal , were divisible , and therefore something indistinct and confus'd : this appears clearly in most of the objects about which the soul is conversant , perhaps , in all ; viz. in figures , points , lines , superficies , instants , measures , comparisons , predications , respects , negations , denominations , relations , &c. for example , there is not , perhaps , in all nature any body perfectly , or mathematically , flat , sphaerical or triangular ; or just a yard , nor any duration mark't out to be just an hour ; but , by reason that bodies are affected with quantity , which is perpetually variable by a world of agents of diverse figures assaulting it ; as also because of the divisibility of quantity in infinitum , it is warpt from those exact figures , or deviates from those just measures : whereas , on the contrary , those things , as they exist in the soul , are adjusted and stinted even to an indivisible ; so that the very least imaginable consideration , added or detracted , quite alters the notion to another species , now , nothing can be so concisely distinct from another , or more impossible to be confounded with it , than what is so comprized within its own bounds , as to be this and no other , or so much and no more , even to an indivisible . whence 't is demonstrable that the thing , as in our soul , or as standing under our notion , or conception , is a most proper ground for that distinct and clear knowledge called science . this is evidently seen throughout the whole body of the mathematicks ; and the same will be found by reflexion in all other sciences whatever . i note here on the by , that this power or faculty of the soul , which is so proper and so natural to her , of reducing all things in her from the indistinctness found in them , as they stand in nature , or from divisibility to indivisibility , does ground most evident demonstrations of her immateriality , and consequently , of her immortality , were it pursu'd home .. but this is not my business at present . . that part , called the seat of knowledge , can be affected with many coherent impressions at once , which cause in the soul complex , or compounded notions . this is too evident to need any dilating on it , i call those impressions coherent , which are caused by effluviums making singly different impressions either from the same thing , or the same sort of thing . but , it is on this occasion to be well noted , that , lest our knowledges or discourses be lost in a croud , or run astray in a pathless wood of notions disorderly aggregated , the art of logick is absolutely necessary , to range and distinguish our notions into common heads , and to descend from those general heads all along by intrinsecal differences * ; that is , to divide them by more and less of the common notion , so to keep them still within that line or head ; without which they must needs interfere and breed confusion . this method of distinguishing and keeping distinct our notions , is as necessary for scientifical discourses , as 't is for an army to be marshalled in rank or file ; without which 't is but a medly or confused multitude . whence , those who slight this methodizing their notions , must necessarily , in rigorous reason , talk ramblingly ; tho' perhaps ingeniously , according to such a sort of wit as men use when they would maintain paradoxes ; or , as erasmus us'd to praise folly. . it being demonstrable in metaphysicks , that whatever is only in power to have a new act , cannot of it self produce that act in it self , unless it be wrought upon first by some other agent which is in act ; and much less can such a power do this , as is of an indivisible or spiritual nature , in regard it has no parts , one whereof being in act it self , may produce an act in the rest ; as it happens in the wheels of a watch , or in our bodies , when one part of them moves another : it follows hence , that our soul can produce no new act , either of memory , or of reflexion upon her own former acts , nor of thinking or willing , &c. without being first affected by some object without her , or anew by some part or particle within the man ; which , being in act it self , may cause those new acts of knowledge in her . . the effluviums , which , by affecting the seat of knowledge , gave her to know at first , are the properest agents to produce connaturally these new acts of reflexion or memory ; in case it can be found that they are duely qualify'd for such an efficiency . . those effluviums ( as was prov'd above ) not sticking on that part which is the seat of knowledge , do consequently fall off from it , and are lodged near it ; whence 't is consonant , that that part also having its effluviums when thus sollicited by the impulse of those atomes sent from without ; and therefore ( all natural action causing reaction ; ) when they rebound thence , they carry away some minute particles of the said part. wherefore these outward effluviums , thus imbu'd , and qualify'd with some tang of the seat of knowledge , when they come to be excited again by some exteriour or interiour causes , must affect it afterwards accordingly ; and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a notion of it as fore-known , which we call , to reflect upon it , or remember it . by which we see how reflexion and reminiscence are caused by the new impulse of those former atoms to the seat of knowledge , tinctur'd with some particles of that part it self . for which reason , the oftner this is done , the memory of it is more easie and lively . whence is seen , that there is no need of multiplying succeeding ideas , to know the preceding ones , when we have acts of reflexion ; a new impression of the effluviums or phantasms , thus qualify'd , repeating still the same former notion with the connotate of foreknown . . memory and remembrance are inexplicable , without putting those first-imprinted atoms to reside still in the brain , and to be excited there anew . for , were this put to be perform'd by a meer motion upon the nerve ( as most of our modern philosophers think , ) the object being gone , that motion would quickly cease . nor could the same motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same object , which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember , as experience shows us . much less could the remembrance of sounds or tunes , in man or birds , be possibly explicated , unless those repell'd atoms , lying in order , and striking afresh the auditory organ , did repeat the same impression they had formerly . for , to put millions of motions to continue perpetually playing in the fancy , and ( as they needs must ) interfering with one another , would destroy all harmony , and breed a strange jarring confusion . note , that reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our reason , gathering or recollecting former notions by others that orderly succeeded them ; in the same manner as we investigate causes from their effects : whereas in brutes it is performed meerly by a new appulse of the former atoms to that part in which the imagination consists ; which being the most supreme in the animal , has a power to agitate the animal spirits , and move the body agreeably to those impressions ; as is found also in man. . the same excitation of those particles thus imbu'd , causes also reflex knowledge of our former operations . and indeed reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as remembrance of them ; for we can neither reflect on a thing without remembring it , nor remember it without reflecting on it . but this reflexion , for the reason lately given , must proceed from some object or cause extraneous to the soul ; that is from effluviums in the memory thus reexcited . for it is to be noted that as divines ( or rather christian faith ) tell us , that christ having two distinct natures in the same suppositum , all his operations proper to him as such , were therefore theanthropicae , or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the divine and humane natures : so man , consisting of both a corporeal and spiritual nature , and thence being a corporeo-spiritual thing , all his operations , for the same reason , must be corporeo-spiritual . whence he has no act purely spiritual , or uncompounded with the co-operation of that corporeal part , which receives those effluviums ( call'd by us fancy ) or without it's concurrence . which gives us farther light , to see how our soul cannot reflect on her own operations , but the fancy must go along ; and , by what 's said , it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the operation must begin anew , viz. from that part from which it did begin at first . hence came that saying of the schools , that the soul has notions , or knows , speculando phantasmata : which are pretty fanciful words ; and , tho' they may perhaps have a good meaning , yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd : for it makes the soul to speculate , which ( if it have any sense at all ) signifies to know the phantasms or ideas in the imagination , when as yet she has no knowledge in her at all . all her notions , which are the first elements of knowledge , being caus'd in her by those effluviums , previously to her knowing either them , or any thing else . . from what 's said above , 't is seen that those direct notions , which are thus naturally imprinted , are common to all mankind in the main , ( however they may in each man differ in some degree ) and consequently , the words we agree on to express those natural notions are , for the same reason , proper words ; whereas those notions made by meer reflexion , as are those of spiritual natures , are therefore improper , as having no proper phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the mind : whence also the words that express them , are such as are taken or translated from natural objects ; and therefore they are improper or metaphorical . . from this exact distinctness of our notions , even to an indivisible , or from this , that one of them is not another , our mind has an appendage of a negation tack'd to every notion , so that it becomes very familiar to her : whence she can have a negative notion of every thing she conceives , while the considers it as limited , or reaching thus far , and no farther ; or being this , and no other . of which nature are all the modes of ens , they being limited conceptions of it ; no notion being perfectly positive but that of ens or being . . hence the soul can have also the notions of indivisibility , immortality , immensity , and innumerable such like . but , it is very specially to be remark'd , that we can have no notions of those negatives as taken abstractedly from the thing or subject ; for , otherwise , non entities ( formally as such ) might be the object of the understanding ; which is impossible ; for [ nothing ] formally as such ( i add , nor vacuum ) can have no effluviums sent from it to the brain , nor consequently any intelligibility ; nor can any possible notion be fram'd of it . wherefore baldness signifies the head , quatenus having no hair on it ; blindness , the eye , quatenus having no sight ; immensity , the thing , quatenus not capable to be measured , &c. hence . the notion we have of [ nothing ] or non ens , is only that of ens in it's whole latitude , with a negation annexed to it ; in the same manner as in particular entities , [ incorporeal ] signifies [ non corpus ] or as [ indivisible ] signifies [ non-quantum ] &c. . hence it is that we come to conceive , and sometimes express non ens as an ens ; as grammarians do when they define a noun to be the name of a thing , and yet make nihil ( which signifies nothing ) a noun subjective , and put adjectives to it . whence philosophers must take very great care , lest , seduced by our manner of conceiving non-ens as a thing , they come to fancy , or judge it to be formally something ; as do the asserters of vacuum , and too many others in like occasions . for then ( i beg their pardon for my plainness ) their discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those ingenious verses , made to shew how rare a thing nothing is ; nor , indeed , so wise : for those poets did this ludicrously , to shew their wit ; but these do it seriously , and make account , that , in doing so , they shew their skill and wisdom ; which i must think is meer folly. . the notions of genus , species , subject , predicate , and generally of all terms of art which are not fantastick , but wisely conducing to clear and range our notions in order , to gain science , are nothing but several abstract notions of the thing , precisely considered according to some manner of being it has in our understanding . for animal and homo are evidently abstract or inadequate notions of peter , taking him as he exists in nature : but , when we call animal a genus , or , homo a species ; or , when , in this proposition , [ petrus est homo , ] we say petrus is the subject , and homo the predicate , we speak of them precisely , as they exist in the understanding ; for , in nature , or out of the understanding , there can be no universals , but only individuals , none else being determin'd to be this or that ens , or capable of existing : nor can propositions be any where , but in the mind . whereas , in the understanding , the notion of [ animal ] is really larger , and that of [ homo ] narrower ; which artists call genus and species . and , in the foresaid proposition , petrus and homo , which are its parts , are as truly in our mind the subject and predicate , as that proposition it self is there ; or as the thing , as existing in nature , is white or black. . this then is the test to try all the speculations made by logicians , and other reflecters or artists , viz. to examin whether they suit with , and are built on the natures of the things themselves , as they exist in our mind ; that they conduce to order our notions so , as may clear the way to science ; and that they be not meerly impertinent and shallow grounded fancies , as they too frequently are ; particularly , the * entia rationis , which make such a noise in the schools . corollary ii. whence , upon the main , is clearly discovered , how all true philosophy is nothing but the knowledge of things ; either as they have their being in nature , which is done by direct acts ; or else in the understanding only , which are known by reflex ones . . besides those impressions which cause our direct and reflex acts , there are others which breed meer whimsies coin'd by the fancy , and are purely chimerical . for our fancy having innumerable effluviums , or atomes in it , of many sorts , which are oft-times agitated disorderly ; hence it comes , that it conjoins and imprints incoherent phantasms on the seat of knowledge , and so makes apprehensions of them in our minds ; such as are those of a golden earth , a hircoceruus , an elephant supporting the world , a chimera , and such like . this most commonly happens in dreams , conceited prophesies , and enthusiastick revelations ; especially those caused by the spleen . nor is groundless speculation , exempt from this enormity . generally this happens when our thoughts are unattentive to the things in nature , whose direct impressions keep our fancy orderly , and firm. now , there is little harm in our apprehending those extravagant connexions ; the danger is , lest speculaters , seduced by imagination , do come to judge that the things are so in nature as they fancy them ; which must necessarily fill their minds with caprichio's , and frantick conceits . the ways to avoid these inconveniences , are , first , to attend heedfully to the direct impressions from the things without us ; and to examine whether the connexion of those fancies be agreeable to their natures , or no. secondly , to make right and strong judgments concerning those common notions we had from nature , which keep our thoughts and discourses steady and solid ; especially , to keep an attentive consideration , that , as all these notions came from the thing , so they are still the thing , conceiv'd according to somewhat that is in it ; and to take care we do not make them forget their original , nor disown the thing , from whence only , as being modes meerly depending on it , they had any kind of being at all ; nor , consequently , intelligibility . thirdly , to observe the methodical rules and maxims of true logick , which teach us how to distinguish our notions exactly , and to keep them distinct , lest we blunder in our discourses ; and which do withall shew us what are the ways how to frame true connexions , or right judgments and discourses . but , the last and best means to keep us from being mis-led by fancy , or following its vagaries , is , the study of metaphysicks ; which , being built on the highest , steadiest and clearest principles , abstract from all fancy , and will scarce ever permit those who who are well vers'd in it , to fall into errour . and , let it be observ'd , that nothing in the world more perverts all true science , than does the admitting those disorder'd fancies because , being cleanly express'd , they have sometimes a lively appearance , for solid truths ; nay , laying them often for grounds , and self-evident principles . this , this , i say , is the main source of all hypothetical philosophy , and of all erroneous schemes of doctrine , not grounded on the natures of the things ; which , therefore , must needs be , at best , shallow , and superficial ; and , if pursu'd home to their principles , plain nonsence , the usual and proper effect of ungovern'd fancy . . of those things that do not come in by our senses , as bodies do , but are of a different or opposite nature ; of which therefore we can have no notion but by joining a negation to the notion of body , ( such as are indivisible , incorporeal , immaterial , immortal , and , in general , all spiritual things , and their proper modes , ) we can have no proper effluviums , or phantasms , as is evident . wherefore also , the notions we have of them , and , consequently , the words by which we express them , are all improper , or metaphorical ; which , if not reflected on , will breed innumerable errours . the best notion we can frame of them , is that of thing , with a negation of body , and of all the modes of body joined to it ; which does not so much tell us what it is , as what it is not ; or rather , it gives us a blind , but certain knowledge of what kind of nature it must be , because it tells us of what kind of nature it cannot be ; the differences which constitute that nature , and its opposite , being contradictory , which forces it to be either of the one or of the other . yet this hinders not , but we may discourse consequently , or scientifically , of those things that connotate the negation of body , full as well as of the bodies themselves : for , as we can conclude evidently from the notion of body , that it is divisible , changeable , placeable , moveable , thus or thus qualify'd , &c. so we may conclude , with equal evidence , from the notion of a thing which is not a body , that it is not divisible , not extended , not moveable , not placeable , not affected with any physical qualities , &c. . lastly , as for the notion we have of god , however the an est of such a supreme being be many ways evident and demonstrable ; yet the notion of the quid est of such a being is the most obscure that can be imagin'd . for , first , since he must have innumerable perfections in his nature , and the notion we have of every ordinary suppositum in nature is therefore confused , and obscure , because it grounds many notions which we cannot clearly conceive at once , or have a distinct apprehension of them ; it follows , that much less can the divine nature be clearly conceived by us in this state , which comprehends all the best perfections found in the whole universality of creatures , and infinitely more . secondly , 't is yet harder to frame a notion of a being , in which those innumerable perfections are not found single , but are all of them center'd in one most simple , and most uncompounded formality ; which contains in it self eminently all the excellencies that can possibly be conceived in creatures , and millions of times greater , and more . thirdly , as we can have no notion of a created spiritual nature , but by a negation of what 's proper to body ; so we can have no notion of the divine nature , but by denying of him all that belongs properly to the natures of such a body and spirit both ; and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling , or even shadowing him . lastly , we have no notion , or expression , that can sute with him ; no , not even the most metaphysical ones . ens includes potentiality to existence ; and , all potentiality signifying imperfection , must be utterly denied of him . existence seems to come nearer ; yet , because it signifies a formality supervening to ens , as 't is existent ; and so is , as it were , a kind of compart , it cannot be proper for his infinitely - simple being . and even self-existence signifies a kind of form or mode of the subject that self-exists . so that we have no kind of notion or expression , that can perfectly agree to god's infinite essence ; but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes one attribute , sometimes another , that signifies some perfection , with [ infinite ] annex'd to it , which is not found in creatures , or which is denied of them , or is incommunicable to them . whence comes that maxim of the mysticks , that god is better known by negations , or by affirming he is none of those positive perfections we find in creatures , than by applying any of our positive notions to him . and this is all we can do in this state , till grace raising us up to glory , we come to know his divine essence , as it is in its self ; ( or , as we phrase it , see him face to face ; ) in contemplating which , consists our eternal happiness . . thus much of our notions , which we call the first operations of our understanding , and how they are caused in our soul. how our judging and discoursing ( which are the other two ) are made in it , is shewn at large in the second and third books of my method to science . . if any learned man is dis-satisfied with this discourse , or has a mind to oppose it , i think i have right to require of him two things : first , that he would not object his own fancies or dis-like of it , or think that this is sufficient to invalidate it ; but , that he would go to work like a man of reason , and shew that this or that part of it does contradict such and such a principle in logick , physicks , or metaphysicks . this is the only solid way of objecting , all other being but empty talk , and idle cavil . next , i think i have right to demand , ( since it is fundamentally necessary to philosophy that this point be clear'd , ) that he would set himself to frame some orderly and coherent discourse of his own , built upon evident principles , how , or by what particular means , the first knowledge of the things without us , comes into our soul. in doing which , he will oblige the world very highly , and my self very particularly : and , unless he does this , he will be convinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend : which will manifest that he either wants true knowledge , or ( which is a far greater defect ) ingenuity . preliminary fifth . of the proper and genuine signification of those words which are of most use in philosophy . . the main hindrance of science , viz. the mistake of fancies for realities , or of meer similitudes for notions , being provided against ; the other grand impediment to true knowledge , which is the taking words , us'd in philosophy , in an ambiguous or wrong sense , is to be our next care. the inconveniences which arise hence , and the ways how to detect and avoid equivocation , are in my * method discours'd of in common ; and i have here in my second preliminary clear'd also in common the signification of all abstract words , and shewn , that they mean the thing it self , quatenus such or such ; or , according to such or such a consideration of it as is express'd by that word . my present business , to which my circumstances oblige me , is to clear , in particular , the notion or meaning of those most important words , which being made use of by learned men , and taken by them often-times in different senses , do so distract them in their sentiments ; and , by drawing their intellectual eye , now to one side , now to the other , make them so frequently miss the mark while they aim at true science . not that my intention in this preliminary is , to pursue the mistakes of others , but only to settle the true and genuine sense of such words , to be applied afterwards to the mis-accepters of them , as occasion requires ; tho' i may hint now and then some abuses of them , that so i may the better clear their proper signification . . i begin with [ existence ] express'd by the word [ is ] which is the notion of the thing , precisely consider'd as it is actually being . this is the most simple of all our notions , or rather indeed the * only simple notion we have , all the rest being but respects to it . for , it has no kind of composition in it , not even that metaphysical one , of grounding divers conceptions or considerations of it , as all others have . whence all notions being , by their abstraction , distinct and clear ; this most abstracted notion is so perfectly clear and self-evident , that , as it cannot need , so it cannot admit any explication . they who go about to explain it , show themselves bunglers , while they strive to approve themselves artists . for , by telling us , that 't is esse contra causas , they put [ esse , ] which is the notion defin'd , in the definition ; which is most absurd , and against all art and common sense : nay , they make it more obscure than it was before , by adding [ extra causas ] to it , which are less clear than it self was . by the word [ causes , ] i suppose , they mean natural ones ; and so , tho' it gives no clearness to the signification of the word [ esse , ] yet it may at least consist with good sense ; and may mean , that the thing was , before , or while it was not yet produced , within the power of those causes , or in the state of potentiality ; and that existence is that formality , or most formal conception , by which the thing is put out of that imperfect state , of having only a power to be , and is reduced to the perfecter state of actuality , or actual being . . as it is impossible to misconceive this self-evident notion , so 't is equally impossible to mistake the meaning of the word [ existence ] which properly expresses that notion ; for , if they take the word [ is ] to have any meaning , relating any way to the line of [ ens , ] or any signification at all that is , of its nature , purely potential , they quite destroy it's notion : and , if they take it , in any sense , for an actuality not belonging to the line of ens , they must necessarily take it to mean [ is not , ] there being no third or other such notion to take it for ; in the same manner , as if one takes not ens to mean a thing , he must take it to mean nothing . now , tho' the goodness of humane nature , which abhors contradiction , reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural depravation of common sense , as to take [ is , ] while thus express'd , for [ is not ; ] yet , taking the meaning of the word [ existence ] as it is disguised by another word , which is , by consequence , equivalent to it ; those deserters of humane nature , the scepticks , do take occasion from the altering the expression , to misapprehend even what is self-evident . for 't is the same sense , ( when we speak affirmatively ) to say a thing is true or certain , as to say it is ; since nothing can be true or certain that is not ; and , therefore , when these men talk of moral and probable truth , and probable or moral certainty , which mincing expressions mean [ possible not to be so ] they in effect say , that [ what is , may , whilst it is , possibly not be ; ] which manners of expression , tho' they may seem to some but a meer unconcerning school-speculation ; and unreflecting men may think it deserves no other note , but that of being ridiculous ; yet , i judge my self obliged to declare , that it is moreover most enormously mischievous ; and that it quite perverts and destroys ( by a very immediate consequence ) the nature and notion of all certainty and truth whatsoever , and of being too ; and quite overthrows all possibility of knowing any thing at all . had they said [ i think it true or certain ] none would blame them ; rather 't is a credit for such men even to think heartily there is any truth or certainty at all in philosophy ; but to joyn ( as they do ) moral or probable , to truth and certainty , as a kind of mode affecting them , is to clap these most unconsociable things , light and darkness , into one dusky compound , to abet nonsense , and palliate ignorance . . the notion immediately next in order to existence , as that which has the very least potentiality that can be in the line of being , is that of ens , or thing . wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [ capable to be ] for , no created thing has actual being , or existence , in its essential-notion , but of its own nature may be or not be ; as , besides what 's proved in my * method , is seen in the very notion of creature ; which signifies that which has its being from another ; which , therefore , can , of its self , be only capable of being . that the notion of ens is distinct from that of existence is demonstrated * elsewhere , and is farther evident hence , that the notion of what has existence must be different from what 's had by it , or from existence it self . all mankind has this notion of thing in them ; for they experience that every thing can exist , by seeing it does so ; and they know also they are not of themselves , whether they hold a first being , or no ; because they do generally see that causes produced them . wherefore all that can be said , or thought of the word [ ens ] is , that it signifies the thing precisely , as 't is capable of being . . whence follows , that the abstract terms , [ entity ] or [ essence ] do properly signify [ a capacity of being , ] which is the abstract term of [ capable of being . ] tho' entity is often us'd as a concrete for the thing it self . moreover , essence is the total form of ens its suppositum , or subject , which adequately and intirely constitutes it such ; as humanitas is the total form of homo . i call it the total form , to distinguish it from the partial form of body ; which , with the matter , its compart , do compound the entire notion , or total form of corporeity . . to understand which more clearly we are to note that the notion and signification of the word [ matter ] signifies the thing , or body precisely , as it is a power to be a thing ; and form signifies the same thing , according to that in it which determins it to be a thing actually . we are to reflect too , that power and act , considered in the line of being , are the same as matter and form ; only the former words are purely metaphysical , because they express the parts of ens as ens ; in regard no other conceptions in the line of being can possibly be framed of a body , but as it is determinable , or determinative , which are the very notions of power and act ; whereas matter and form , tho' in bodies they signify the same as the former , seem rather to incline to the parts of such an ens , or body , physically consider'd . . to show literally what 's meant by this saying , that matter and form constitute the compleat ens , or make the subject capable of existing , i discourse thus . nothing as 't is indeterminate or common to more can be ultimately capable to be : v. g , neither a man in common , nor a horse in common , can possibly exist , but this man , or this horse : whatever therefore does determin the potentiality , or indifferency of the subject as it is matter , or , which is the same , a power to be of such or such a nature , ( which is what we call to have such a form in it ) does make it this or that , and , consequently , disposes it for existence . wherefore since the particular complexion of the several modes and accidents do determin the power or matter , so as to make it distinct from all others , it does by consequence determin it to be this , and , so , makes it capable of existing ; that is , an ens or thing . i enlarge not upon this point , because i have treated it so amply in the appendix to my method to science . . hence is seen what is , or can , with good sense , be meant by that metaphysical , or entitative part called by the schools , the substantial or essential form ; which they say , does , with the matter , make up that compound ens , call'd body ; and that , in literal truth , it can be nothing else but that complexion of the modes , or accidents , which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial constitution of every body , at the first instant of its being thus ultimately determin'd to be this. for , this original temperature of the mixt or animal , being once settled by the steady concurrence of its causes ; whatever particles or effluviums , or how many soever , which are agreeable to it , do afterwards accrue to it , are so digested into , or assimilated , to its nature , that they conserve , nourish and dilate , and not destroy it . whereas , if they be of an opposit nature , they alter it from its own temperature , and in time quite destroy and corrupt it . to explicate which more fully , let us consider how the causes in nature , which are many times of a different , sometimes of a contrary temper to the compound , do work upon a body ; and how they make ( as they needs must ) preternatural dispositions in it ; till , when those disagreeable alterations arrive to such a pitch , as quite to pervert the former complexion of accidents , which we call its form ; a new form , or new complexion succeeds , determining the matter to be another thing ; till it self also , wrought upon in the same manner , comes to be corrupted , and so makes way for a new off-spring . to which , in the very instant it is ultimately determined to be this , the first being , whose overflowing goodness stands ever ready to give his creatures all that they are disposed or capable to have , does , with a steady emanation of being , give his peculiar effect , existence . corollary . the reason why our moderns do so oppose substantial or essential forms , are reduced to two heads : first , because they conceited the form was a kind of distinct thing , or at least a part of a thing supervening to the marter , its compart , and compounding the ens , after that gross manner as two things in nature do compound a third : whereas , in reality , they are nothing but divers notions or considerations of the thing , formally , as it is a thing . wherefore , to say , a body is compounded of matter and form , is no more , in literal truth , than to say that there can be no more considerations of a body , taken formally , as it is a thing ; or taking it in the line of ens precisely , but of a power to become such a thing ; and of the act or form , determining that power : however the thing may have in it what grounds the notions of many modes or accidents ; which are also the thing materially , tho' not formally according to the notion of ens. nor let any object , that this is to maintain that things are compounded of notions , as some may mis-understand us ; for , let it be remember'd ( as is demonstrated above , ) that the notion is the very thing , as it is in our understanding , according , or as far as it is conceiv'd by us ; that is , 't is the very thing , partially consider'd . the other reason which the moderns had for this mis-conceit , was , because the schools generally explain'd themselves very ill , by making a new entity of every different conception ; not comprehending well the difference between metaphysical composition and divisibility , and physical , or rather artificial ones ; such as apothecaries use when they put many ingredients into a pill ; or carpenters , when of many divers materials they compound a house ; which is the applying , outwardly or inwardly , more things ( properly so called ) together : whereas metaphysical divisibility is never reduced to act , but by our understanding framing distinct or abstract notions of one and the same thing . and metaphysical composition is no more , but that there is found in the thing ( though physically and entitatively one , and uncompounded ) what grounds those distinct notions ; which being but divers respects or considerations , it follows , that the thing in nature may , without any contradiction , ( or possibly , ) be chang'd according to one of them , and not according to another . . hence , lastly , is clearly seen what is the principle of individuation , about which there have been such warm disputes , viz. that 't is nothing but that comploxion of modes or accidents , which make up the peculiar constitution of a body at the first instant of its being such an ens or this , as is explicated at large , § . by which 't is , consequently , fitted for such a particular operation in nature . . ens or thing has many other names , tho' all of them less proper . as , first , [ substance , ] which , coming from the verb [ substare , ] respects only its modes and accidents , and not what concerns its self , or its own order or capacity to existence . wherefore , 't is very improper ; and , unless the common usage of it make some amends for the impropriety of the expression , certainly it is most highly unfit . aristotle calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which coming from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , keeps it within the line of being . as i remember boetius was the first who render'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by substantia . the schools either us'd it in imitation of him , or else they took it up when they were to treat of the ten predicaments ; and , nature instructing them that the last nine had no order to being in their signification ; and so , as taken in their peculiar notions , could not exist alone , without needing a kind of support ( as it were : ) hence they call'd this support , by a name suitable enough to their thoughts , substance ; and the others , that had not being in their notion , and so had no title to being by their own merits , or to uphold themselves in being , accidents ; of the impropriety of which word more hereafter . i wish there were no worse in it ; and that , they did not fancy all those abstract notions , which are only the thing in part , to have in them the notion of things too , or to be so many intire things ; tho' they were feebler and the other stronger . however it were , they went to work illogically : for , they should have considered , that all of them ( taking them as they were distinct from the notion of thing ) could be nothing but several conceptions of ours , or ( which is the same ) the thing as diversly considered ; and then they might have easily reflected , that we could not ( in general ) have more conceptions than those of res and modus rei ; that is , of the thing , and of the several manners how a thing is ; which would have clear'd this truth to them , that the manner or the how a thing is , is nothing without the thing , as is deduced formerly . however , the word [ substantia ] with a sound explication , may pass , since use will have it so ; and will do little harm , so it be but rightly understood to mean what we properly call ens , res , or thing . . on this occasion , 't is my opinion , that both mr. locke and my self should not be too severe against the modern school-men , for using the words [ substantia ] and [ inhaerentia ; ] or , as he ingeniously ridicules it , [ sticking-on and underpropping . ] the manner how the thing and its modes do relate to one another ; being only found in our mind , and according to the being they have there ( for out of it there is no distinction at all of the thing from its modes ) is spiritual ; and so , can no other way be express'd , but metaphorically ; and our selves do and must , in such a case , frequently use such metaphors to express our conceptions ; which a critick might banter sufficiently , by taking them literally . indeed , if those school-men did understand them in that crude literal sense , ( as i fear many of them did ) from which apprehension , i believe , his zeal against them proceeded , they deserve to be the sport and laughter of all men of sense ; for i know nothing else they are good for . now the truth is , there is a kind of natural order in our notions , tho' taken from the same thing ; so that we have the notion of res or thing antecedently ( in priority of nature ) to modus rei , or the accidents ; and we conceive the mode or manner to presuppose the notion of the thing , and to have no being but as it is in it and affects it . whence , being conceiv'd to be in it , and to have no being by any other means , we may , by a metaphor not much strain'd , say it does , as it were , inhere in it ; and that the thing supports its modes in their being . nor will it do us any harm loqui cum vulgo , to speak as vulgar philosophers use ; provided we do sentire cum doctis , or make wiser judgments of the literal sense of those words , than they perhaps ever meant . . the word [ suppositum ] is another name of ens or thing , in a manner , ( tho' not altogether ) the same with substance . for [ substance ] is , i conceive , meant for the essential notion of the thing , as it is contradistinguisht from accidental , or unessential ones ; and suppositum does , over and above , relate also to the very nature of the thing , ( or to the complexion of accidents which constitutes its essence ) and not only to the modes , as each of them singly is a meer accident , and had being by it or in it . whence the notion of suppositum is the most confused of any other ; and signifies that which has all the forms in it whatever , whether they be essential ones or accidental ; and not only those modes ( or accidents ) which naturally belong'd to it at first as properties , ( or inseparable accidents ) but those also which accru'd to it since , and are meerly accidental to it . . hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word [ suppositality ] which is the abstract of the suppositum : for , it signifies manifestly the thing according to the precise notion of the suppositum , or of what has all the aforesaid forms in it : how agreeable this discourse is to christian language and principles , will easily appear to solid divines . . the word [ individuum ] which is another name of ens , us'd by the learned , and , as is seen in those usual words [ the same individual thing , ] is got into our vulgar language , is a logical expression ; distinguishing the notion of a particular , ( only which is properly a thing ) from the generical and specifical notions ; in regard both these latter do bear a division of their notions into more inferiour ones ; and so , that each of the inferior ones contains the whole superiour natures in it which the others do signify ; as the whole definiton , notion or nature of an [ animal ] or of [ a sensitive living thing ] is found in man , and also in brutes ; and the whole definition or notion of man , is found in socrates and plato . but , the particular natures of socrates and plato ( which are signify'd by those words ) and their definitions , could they bear any , cannot be divided into more which have the particular natures of socrates and plato in them : and , therefore they are called individuums ; that is , such as cannot be divided into more , which have the natures signified by those words in them , as could the generical and specifical notions of animal and homo ; whence individuums are the lowest and narrowest notion that can possibly be in the line of ens. . the individuum , is call'd by the latin schools [ substantia prima ] and the superiour notions in the line of ens. [ substantiae secundae ] which signifies that only individuums are in propriety of speech entia or capable of existing ; for , since , ( as was shown above ) nothing that is common or undetermined can exist , none of the others can have any actual being at all but in the individuum , as a kind of metaphysical part of its intire notion ; and a part ( in what sense soever that word be taken ) can not possibly be but in the whole . if this then be their meaning , as i believe it is , nothing can be more true and solid . only i must note that it is less properly and less logically exprest ; and that aristotle speaks more exactly when he calls the former 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or primò substantia , and the latter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or secundò substantia ; which words denote , that the former is ens in its primary and proper signification of that word , and the latter only analogically , that is in a secondary and improper sense ; which prima and secunda substantia do not express : for , both these may be properly entia still , for any thing those words tell us , tho' one of them may have an order of priority to the other as prima and secunda ; in some such sense as we call god the primum ens , considering him in order to creatures . . from words used by philosophers which belong to the line of ens , we come to those which are made use of to express the modes or manners how a thing is ; which , in a generall appellation , the schools have call'd accidents . this word is , certainly , very improper : for , who can think that quantity or ( as they will needs call it ) extension , is accidental to body , or ( as some may take that equivocal word ) that 't is but by chance , or by accident , that bodies have any bigness in them at all ? the best sense i can give it , in pursuance to my own grounds , is this , that [ accidental , ] which is the denominative from [ accident , ] may mean such notions as are not essential ; or ( which is the same ) they may mean the thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any order to being , nor expresses any such order by the word which signifies its notion . and , were this sense universally accepted , and attributed to the word [ accidents , ] it would be a true and solid one : for , 't is evident , that none of the words that signifie any of those accidents , does in the least import in its signification either being , or any respect or order to it , as does ens , and all those words which do formally and properly express it , or belong to it . whence the notions signify'd by such words , are not essential ones , or relating properly and precisely to the essence ; but modish , ( as we may term it , ) or expressing some manner [ how ] the thing is ; which is a quite different notion from that of ens , or thing , or of what formally is found in that line . i do believe that divers of the wisest , and most learned school-men did take the word [ accidents ] in this sense , tho' the propriety of that word , fetch'd from its radix , did not invite , much less oblige them to do so . i doubt also , that the usage of that word in that warrantable sense i have now assign'd , was not so common , and universally current , even among the school-men , as to force it to bear that sense ; as appears by their thinking that accidents were certain kinds of little adventitious entities ; much less among the modern ideists ; who ( through their shortness in logick and metaphysicks ) do make quantity , or extension , the essential form of body ; which is , to put bigness in the line of being ; or , to make bigness and being , or the mode and the thing , to be in the same line of notions , and intrinsecal to one another : whereas , a thing must first be conceiv'd to be , e'er it can be after such a mode , or manner . . for the reason lately given , i cannot but judge , that the word [ mode , ] or ( as some call it ) [ modification , ] is far more proper than the word [ accidents , ] to signifie those last nine common heads of our natural notions , which impartiality of mine , on this , and other occasions , giving some advantage to the cartesians , and other moderns , over other philosophers , who call themselves aristotelians , will , i hope , obtain their good opinion of me , that i do sincerely follow my best reason , and not pique or prejudice , while i oppose them in other things : and i am sure , 't is my own reason i ought to follow , till clearer reasons of theirs shew mine to be none ; which i have no reason to fear ; for , i hope , it will appear to every acute and ingenuous examiner , that no writer ever distinguish'd his notions more exactly and clearly , or connected them more closely and immediately . . the primary mode of all those things we converse with , or bodies , is call'd quantity . this word is very proper , and fully significant ; for , all the bodies in nature have some quantity or bigness in them , more or less : nay , even the least atome , or effluvium , that can be conceiv'd , has bigness in it , as well as the greatest body , nay , as the whole world ; tho' not so much , or so great a degree of it . wherefore , this word [ quantity ] is comprehensive ; and so , fit to signifie the commonest affection of body : but , this is not enough ; 't is withal , very simple , or uncompounded : moreover , the word it self has , on its side , no kind of equivocalness , taking it as it is applied to body in common ; which requisites are not found in any other word used by us , to express that mode . only we are to note , that bigness , or bulk , is only proper to body , as it has in it all the three dimensions ; whereas , quantity reaches to how long , or how broad , as well as how thick : and therefore quantity is absolutely the properest word to express this primary mode : however , it is much neglected by our moderns , who are grown strangely fond of extension . . the word [ extension ] is very improper to signifie it : for , extension properly denotes the action of extending ; to which is directly opposit , in our usual speech , that action , call'd contraction . or , if it be taken for the being extended , still its proper signification must be a passion caus'd by the action of extending ; which cannot sute with that simple and primary mode we call quantity ; which is naturally antecedent to , and independent of those subsequent modes called action , and passion . again , all intrinsecal modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of forms affecting body , as their subject ; and forms are very ill express'd by a substantive deriv'd from a verb ; and by such an one especially , as must necessarily ( at least ) connotate action or passion , if it does not rather directly , or most properly signifie them . moreover , let them take extension , stretching out , or exporrection how they will , still common sense teaches us , that we may take contraction or straitning in the same manner as they do it : whence follows , that if extension means or implies impenetrability of parts , contraction must mean penetrability of parts ▪ which notion none of us will admit to have any ground in nature , tho' the maxim tells us , that [ contraries are employ'd about the same subject . ] now , the word [ quantity ] is not entangled with any of these inconveniences , but freed from them all , as will appear to any sober reflecter . and , on this occasion , i beg leve of our ideists , to tell them , that it is not safe , nor prudent , to leave off an old and us'd word , till they are sure they have found another which is better , or more proper . cartesius made choice of [ extension ] wittily , that he might thus more cleaverly bring all physicks to mathematicks ; and others ( perhaps , ut est natura hominis , fond of a novelty ) follow'd him unadvisedly ; tho' they were not guilty of any such design of their own , or aware of his . and i am sorry mr. l. affects only the improper word [ extension , ] and quite neglects that more proper word [ quantity . ] . many other names , at least attributes , are given to quantity ; such as are divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability ; the former of which signifies it in order to natural action and passion , and respects properly the parts into which it may be divided ; or , which is the same , its potential parts ; in which , perhaps , the nature of quantity would be found to consist , were i here to treat of the nature of those modes , and not only of the names us'd in philosophy . impenetrability properly signifies such an order or ( as it were ) situation of those parts , as that one of them is without , and not within another ; which grounds that secondary notion , which some do improperly call extension ; and extension or quantity , if of any considerable largeness in respect of the body it contains , is call'd space ; which differs from the notion of place in this , that place ( if properly such ) is just as much quantity as contains the thing placed , and has a respect to some determinate and known points : whereas space has not in its notion to be adjusted to the body that is in it , not restrain'd to any set distance . so that space is place at large , and place is space restrain'd . measurability grounds the reckoning or computing how many of such a standard of quantity as we had design'd in our thoughts , would , if repeated , equal the whole of which we intend to take a survey . . now , quantity being the most common of all corporeal modes , and which antecedes and grounds all the others , it cannot , for that very reason , be properly defin'd ; so that ( as mr. locke acutely observ'd ) we know such things before we are ask'd , better than we do after ; for the asking puzzles our natural thoughts , which were clear enough before of themselves ; and reflexion , which , when there is occasion , is wise , and enlightens us , does but serve to blunder us when there is no need or occasion for it . notwithstanding , i have , in my method , endeavour'd to give it some kind of explication , by differencing it from all other intrinsecal modes , ( which are its genus , as it were , or rather , a transcendent notion to all such accidents , ) in this , that it tells how the thing is , according to some common consideration , in which all things we converse with do agree . by which 't is distinguish'd from quality , which acquaints us how a thing is as to what respects its own peculiar nature ; and from relation , which expresses how one individuum respects another individuum . but this ( as was said ) is out of my present business in this preliminary , which is only to shew what names are proper , or improper ; and not to treat of the particular nature of each mode , of which i have , in their due places , sufficiently discours'd in my method . . these , as far as occurrs to my memory , are the chiefest words used by philosophers , whose proper or improper acception has most influence upon the advancement or hindrance of science . notwithstanding , there are others far more equivocal than any of the rest , called transcendents , or words applicable to all , or many of the common heads of our natural notions ; which are hardest of all to explicate , as wanting any common genus , or any thing like it , to explicate them by . i intended once to dilate upon them in this preliminary , as being a subject very worthy of our reflexion , and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve : but , seeing , upon review , how prolix i have been already in my preliminaries , i am forced to content my self with noting them in short ; leaving it to others to enlarge upon them . they are these , distributed into their several ranks . . first , ens , taken , in its whole latitude , for the thing , and its modes . secondly , the properties of ens , taken in that large signification ; such as are unum , verum , bonum , and their opposites , non-unum , or divisum , falsum , and malum . for , the notions of all the modes being improperly entia , have , by consequence , only improper essences , or entities of their own ; and , consequently , properties of those improper essences . thirdly , idem , diversum , and , in general , relatum ; taking this last word in the largest sense , for all kinds of respects whatsoever . in which signification , all things , or properly called entia , do relate to existence ; and all their modes or accidents do respect them diversly , as certain manners how they are . of which nature also are the aforesaid common words , [ mode , ] and [ accident , ] which are transcendents in respect of the nine last predicaments . fourthly , completum , incompletum , partial and total , generical and specifical , superior and inferior , simple and compound , and such like . most of which kind of transcendents seem rather to respect the manner of being which things have in our understanding , than the manner of being they have out of it . of the last sort are , which , what , that which , something , somewhat , &c. which are the most confused words imaginable , and signifie any notion , but that of meer nothing . by these we make a bastard or illegitimate definition of ens ; and say , that a thing is [ that which is capable of existing , &c. ] i call it an illegitimate or improper definition , because the notion of the genus ( which is one part of a proper one ) has a determinate sense : whereas [ that which , ] which , for want of a better , supplies the place of the genus , has none . for , 't is to be noted , that in all transcendents , ( unless ▪ perhaps , some of those of the fifth sort , which have a kind of blind , confused sense , ) the name only is common or applicable to more , and not the notion ; for , having no one notion that is common to all those common heads , they have none till it be determin'd ; since no notion can exist in the mind , unless it be this , or that , or one , any more than a thing can exist in nature , unless it be determin'd to be such a particular or individual thing . much less has any of them proper differences , dividing them by more and less of the common notion , as every notion that is truly common to more , may , and must have . . whence extreme care must be taken , how students in philosophy do use these transcendent words ; and that they do distinguish their sense most exactly , when they have occasion to make use of them . for , they having an indifferency to many senses , and those as vastly disparate as the common heads themselves are ; that is , ( as the schools properly phrase it ) senses differing toto genere , ( i may add , generalissimo ) it must follow , that every time they do use them confusedly , or with a conceit that they are univocal , their discourse must needs straggle widely , now one way , now another , and thence confound all our commonest notions , which , of all others , ought to be kept distinct ; the want of doing which , hinders all coherence or connexion of terms , in which only science consists , and breeds innumerable , and most enormous errours . it would be tedious , i doubt , to my readers , tho' perhaps not hard for me , to show what prodigious inconveniences do arise from the mis-acceptions of one of those many different senses such words may bear , for another , i will only bring one instance ; hoping that by this , as by a sea-mark , my readers may avoid the shoals and rocks of errors in other like occasions . . the word [ compounded ] may either mean the composition of matter with its essential form ; or , that of the essence with its suppositum , which is conceived to have the essence in it : or , of the superiour notions of ens with the individuum ; all which are compositions belonging to the line of ens. coming next to the modes or accidents , the whole ens or suppositum may be considered as compounded with its primary mode called quantity ; or with some quality , or relation . or , with some action or passion , time , place , situation , or habit. whence accrues to the subject the denominations of agent , patient , living , or being at such a time , or in such a place , sitting , armed , &c. all which nine last compositions are modifying or accidental ones , and not essential , or such as concern directly and precisely the notion of thing or being , as did those of the first sort . now come cartesius and his followers , who , loath to say the body and soul are two suppositums ; and , wanting skill in metaphysicks to comprehend what the union of entitative parts is , or how made , ( which are points too hard for mathematicians , and of which de la forge , tho' he talks prettily , can make nothing at all ) they would have the soul and body compound one thing , because they act together , or assist one another mutually to produce some sorts of actions . whereas action being only a mode , and so presupposing the res , or thing , which it modifies , can only determin and denominate its subject to be acting ; and therefore joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the soul and body co-acters ; which is a vastly disparate notion from the constituting and denominating them one thing , as common sense informs us . we will put an instance : my hand and my pen do both of them concur to the action of writing , and so compound one joint-acter ; nay , they depend mutually on one another as to the producing this action : for the hand cannot write without the pen , nor the pen without the hand : besides , they are in some sort fitted to one another , in order to perform this action ; for , the fingers are so fram'd , as to hold and guide the pen very commodiously ; and the pen ( taking in its handle and the nib-end too ) is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my hand , so as to draw the letters such as they ought to be . lastly , which is much more , and a parallel very agreeable to the co-action of soul and body , they both of them do modifie each other's action . for , the best scrivener writes but scurvily with a bad pen , and the best pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful hand . and yet the hand and the pen are not one jot the nearer being one thing , notwithstanding their concurrence to this joint-action ; tho' it be qualify'd with mutuality , fitness of the co-agents , and the modification which the action receives from both of them jointly , and each of them severally . besides , they put the cart before the horse , while they pretend that the acting as one thing is to make them one-thing . for since the res is , in priority of nature and reason , before modus rei ; and being before acting ; and that nothing can act otherwise than it is ; 't is evident from plainest principles , and even from the very terms , that they must first be one thing , e'er they can act as one thing , or be such a compound , before they can act as such a compound . and so , the point sticks where it was , viz. how the soul and body come to be thus compounded into one ens ; of which i have given some account , preliminary . § , , , . . on this occasion i cannot but reflect , that the cartesians were very unadvised to meddle with such a point , as puts them quite past their mathematicks ; as likewise , that tho' they have fram'd a logick or method suitable to explicate their mathematical philosophy , yet they are but very bad distinguishers of our natural notions into common heads , which is one principal part of true logick ; as appears by their rambling so irregularly from one to the other , as has been shewn elsewhere , in their making extension or quantity , which is a mode , the form which is essential to their first matter ; and here , in putting composition according to the notion of action , to be composition according to the notion of ens. and whoever impartially examins the distribution of their notions into heads , will find it not to be such as reason naturally forced , ( as ours is , ) but such as design voluntarily and ingeniously invented . reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning humane understanding . reflexion first , on the first book . . this book gives me little occasion to make any reflexions , but such as i must be forced to make through his whole essay ; which is , on the penetrative and clear wit , and happy expression of its author , in his pursuing the design which he had prefix'd to himself . i could wish , indeed , that he had thought fit to take his rise higher , or ( to speak more properly ) had laid his grounds deeper . but , it is to be expected , that every author should write according to those thoughts or principles with which the casual circumstances of his fore-past life had imbu'd him , or as his natural genius leads him . his steering such an impartial mean between scepticism and dogmatizing , does certainly argue a very even temper of judgment , and a sincere love of truth . and , i shall hope , that , whoever peruses attentively my method , ( b. . less . . from § . . to § . . ) will discern that i have so exactly measur'd out the pitch of knowledge attainable by us in this state , that i am as little a friend to over-weening , as i profess my self a declar'd enemy to scepticism . . i am a little apprehensive , from some words in his introduction , expressing his dis-like that men let loose their thoughts into the vast ocean of being ; and his conceit that this brings men to doubts and scepticism , that he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks ; whose proper object is , those notions of the thing which abstract from matter and motion , and concern being only . were i assur'd that i did not mistake him , i would , for his sake , enlarge on that point , and display fully the excellency of that most solid , most clear , and most incomparable science ; which i shall only touch upon at present , by giving my reader a summary of its principal objects . . it treats of the formal or essential parts of physical entities , or bodies , in common , and in specie ; of the essential unity and distinction of them , and whence 't is taken ; particularly , of the essential constituents of elements , mixts , vegetables and animals ; and when , and how , they come to be essentially , or individually chang'd : thence , advancing to the chief animal , man , he treats of his form , the soul , and of its proper action : of the superior part of it , the mind ; and , of its progress towards its last end , or its declension from it . thus far demonstrated , it proceeds to treat of the separation of the soul from the body ; and , to shew evidently its immateriality , and , consequently , its immortality . of the science of a soul separated , and the eminency of her acts in that state , above what she had in the body ; and , lastly , of the felicity and infelicity connaturally following out of her actions here , and the good or bad dispositions found in her at her separation ; as also , of the immutability of her condition afterwards . it treats of the notion or nature of existence , and how 't is accidental or unessential to the natures of every created being ; and thence demonstrates a first being , or a god , to whom 't is essential to be ; that is , whose nature is self-existence . whence follows , by necessary consequence , that his nature is infinitely pure or simple , eternal , infinitely perfect and immutable , all-knowing , willing ever what 's most wise , and therefore most free in all his actions ; and that the divine essence is unconceivable by any notion we can frame or have of it ; and unexpressible by any name we can give it which is proper , and not most highly metaphorical . lastly , it demonstrates , there are pure spiritual beings , which have no matter or potentiality in them , call'd intelligences , or angels ; and likewise , ( in common , ) of their number , distinction , and subordination ; as also , of their proper operations , both internal and external . . these , and such as these , are the objects proper to that supream science , metaphysicks ; which any man of sense would think ought to make it deserve the esteem of the best , and most elevated portion of mankind ; and not to be ridicul'd by drollish fops , who turn all they understand not into buffoonery . all these high subjects it treats of , i say , if possible , ( as i believe it is , ) with more close , more necessary , and more immediate connexion , than the mathematicks can pretend to ; since the evidence and certainty of the principles of this science ( as also of logick ) do depend on , are subordinate to , and are borrow'd from the principles of the other ; which is the sovereign and mistress of all other sciences whatever . . it will , i doubt not , be apprehended , that such high knowledges are above our reach , and impossible to be attain'd by us , in this state. they are , indeed , above fancy ; and , i believe , this objection is made by fancy , or by men attending to the resemblances of fancy , which fall short of representing to us such sublime objects . but , why they should be above our reason , i cannot imagin ; or , why they should be deem'd so mysterious , as not to be knowable without a divine revelation . it is manifest , that we can have abstract notions of existence , thing , immaterial , incorporeal , knowledge , will , operation , &c. that is , we can consider the common subject [ thing ] as existent , capable of being , and ( if it be a spirit ) as immaterial , incorporeal , knowing , willing , and operating , &c. as well as mathematicians can a body , as extended , round , or triangular , &c. and , then , i would know why we cannot , by attentive consideration , and due reflexion on those things , as thus conceiv'd by us , frame a science grounded on the things thus apprehended , as well as mathematicians can upon a body consider'd as grounding their proper objects ; or , as grounding their notions of such and such modes of quantity ; such as are the degrees , proportions , or figures of it . let us not blaspheme in our thoughts the bounty of infinite goodness . it was the devil's first calumny against god , that he envy'd manking knowledge : let not us carry it on , by entertaining such an unworthy conceit of essential goodness ; but , dispose our selves by seeking a right method to knowledge , and pursuing it with industrious study , and we may be certain of success . while i was writing my method to science , the attempt to shew the reason all along , for such notions as were taken from the thing , according to the manner of being it had in my understanding , and , therefore , was to be carried through with perpetual reflexion on the things there , did appear so discouraging , that i was sometimes half sorry i had undertaken it : but i saw the world needed it , and knew all truths were connected , and therefore was confident of god's assistance in such a necessary and useful occasion . indeed , providence has left us no means to know what is done in the moon , or other stars , ( tho' , perhaps , they are as busie there , as we are in this sublunary planet , the earth , ) because it is not to our purpose to know such things . but , whoever considers those metaphysical objects , will , at first sight , discover how useful the knowledge of them is , both in regard of their influence upon all inferior sciences , and to raise us to contemplation ; as also , to explicate , establish , defend and comfort christian faith. for , there is a gradation of truths , as well as a connexion of one truth with another . the natural are foundation-stones , to bear the supernatural ones ; which , tho' they to heaven's top aspire , 't is the same ground , rais'd stories higher . bless'd soul ! which , to the throne divine , winds it self up by its own line ! all these high encomiums of metaphysicks , if it shall please god to protract my span of life some few inches longer , i doubt not but to shew , are no more but its just due ; and , amongst the rest , its clearest demonstrative evidence and certainty : particularly , that the study of that science is so far from increasing doubts , or leading to scepticism , ( as , perhaps , mr. l. may apprehend , ) that , on the contrary , the knowledge of it is the most effectual means imaginable to settle all doubtfulness , and to convert or confound the greatest scepticks . . mr. locke's tenet of no innate notions , nor , consequently , innate principles , does perfectly agree with my sentiments ; both as to the thesis it self , and the reason for it ; which is , that god has laid connatural causes , to give us our notions ; and , therefore , it did not become his sovereign wisdom to do such a needless action , as to ingraft them by his own hand immediately . besides which , that judicious author accumulates so many other pregnant and solid reasons , to fix that position of ours in an immoveable certainty , that i see not but it may , for the future , deserve the repute of an establish'd and leading maxim in philosophy . reflexions on the second book . reflexion second , on the first chapter . . i agree perfectly with this learned author , that our observation employ'd either about external sensible objects , or about the internal operations of our minds , perceived and reflected on by our selves , is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking . as also , that a man first thinks when he begins to have any sensations . that the impressions made on the senses are the originals of all knowledge . that the mind is of its own nature fitted to receive those impressions . that in receiving ideas or notions at first the mind is passive . that 't is all one to say , the soul and the man thinks . and , lastly , that men do not always think ; which last thesis he confutes here very elaborately : but , i cannot at all agree to some positions he makes use of to oppose this last tenet , and , indeed , needlesly ; for he produces good store of solid arguments sufficient to confute it . . for first , he makes the having ideas and perception to be the same thing . i apprehend he means , that when we have ideas , we must perceive we have them ; because he says afterwards , that the soul must necessarily be conscious of its own perception . indeed had he said the having ideas , when he is awake , and attentively reflects on those ideas , it had been a certain and evident truth : otherwise , 't is manifest that we retain or have our ideas or notions in our mind when we are soundly asleep , ( it being a strange and extravagant paradox to say , that we get them all again as soon as ever our eyes are open ; ) and yet we do not then know them ; and , to say we do , is to come over to his adversary , and grant the thesis he is impugning : for , if a man does think when he is sound asleep , 't is without question that he may think always . . next , i must utterly deny his position , that we cannot think without being sensible or conscious of it . to disprove which i alledge , that when a man is quite absorpt in a serious thought , or ( as we say ) in a brown study , his mind is so totally taken up with the object of his present contemplation ( which perhaps is something without him ) that he can have no thought , at that very instant , of his own internal operation , or that he is thinking , or any thing like it . i have been call'd sometimes from my study to dinner , and answered , i am coming . upon my delay , they call'd me again , and ask'd , why i came not , having promis'd it ? i deny'd i heard , or saw , or answered them ; yet , upon recollection , i remember'd afterwards that i did . i knew then that they call'd me , since i understood their words , and answered pertinently ; yet , it is most manifest , that i did not at the time of the first call understand that i understood it , or know that i knew it , since it came only into my mind afterwards by reminiscence or reflexion ; which argues i had the knowledge of it before by a direct impression , otherwise i could not have remember'd it . . tho' this thesis of mr. locke's is mention'd hereafter , it were not amiss to speak my sense of it where i first meet it . he judges , that we know our own thoughts , ( which are spiritual ) by experience ; and i deny we have any experience but by direct impressions from sensible objects , either coming from them at first , or re-excited . he thinks it impossible to know , but we must at the same time be conscious , or ( which is the same ) know we know : and , i judge it impossible we should know we know at the same time we have that act only , till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a new act ; which is to know it , not by experience , but by reflexion . my reason why i am so positive in my assertion , is this : nothing can be known by any act of knowledge but the object of that act : for the object of knowing , and the thing known , are the same almost in the very terms , and perfectly the same in sense . put case then i know by a direct impression what we call extension ; in this case extension is the sole object of that act of knowledge , and not my act of knowledge it self ; therefore i am not conscious i know ; that is , i do not know i know when i have the act of knowing extension : for , were it so , extension would not be the sole object of that act , but the complex made up of extension , and the act it self by which i know extension : which objects being of disparate natures , ought to be the objects of different acts. besides , this would hinder any external object , or corporeal mode to be known distinctly ; for the idea of it would be confounded and mingled with a kind of spiritual compart , viz. my very act it self ; for this act being known ( according to him ) at the same time with extension , must needs make up part of the object of this act. lastly , if we know our own act experientially , we should confound direct knowledges with keflex ones . for ( if i understand mr. locke rightly ) he with good reason makes the internal operations of the mind to be the proper objects of the reflex acts ; and , that the genuin difference of those two sorts of acts does consist in this ; that by direct ones , we know the objects which are in nature , or without us ; and by reflex ones , what 's in the soul , or her operations ; and not the things in nature , otherwise than as they are in that act : but if i be conscious , or know that i know when i know the object without me , i must by the same act know what 's within me and what 's without me both at once ; and so my act of direct knowledge would be reflex ; or rather , that one act would be both direct and reflex , which makes it chimerical . . the same argument demonstrates , that we cannot be conscious of our reflex acts at the very time we produce them . for , my first reflex act has for its sole object that operation of the mind , which i had immediately before by a direct one ; and my second reflex act has for its object the first ; and in the same manner , each succeeding reflexion has for its object that act which immediately preceded . wherefore , if the first reflex act had for its object , at the same time , both the direct and it self too ; that is , did we , when we first reflected , know by that very act it self that we did thus reflect , then the second reflex act would be forestall'd , and have no proper object left for it . to clear this better , let us assign one reflexion to be the last : it were not the last reflexion , unless the object of it were that reflexion which was the last but one . wherefore , unless that reflexion that went last before was known by that act , and the last of all remain'd unknown , the last would have two objects , viz. the preceding reflexion and its self too . this seems to me as plain reason as plain can be ; and , i believe , mr. locke's different thoughts proceeded , from not adverting with what incredible celerity our reflex thoughts do generally succeed the direct ones , and one another . whence it comes , that , not aware of the imperceptible time between them , we are apt to conceit , that the reflex act is experientially known by the very act it self . since then , nothing can be known by any act but the object of that act , and , ( as might easily be shown ) it would confound our natural notions strangely , to say , the act is its own object ; it follows , that it cannot be known by its self , but must be known ( if at all ) by the next reflexion . whence results this certain and evident corollary , that , it is impossible we should ever come to know our last reflexion . . these are my reasons why i recede from mr. locke in his opinion , that a man cannot think without being conscious of it . but , the consequence he seems to draw thence , that therefore consciousness is that which causes individuation , i must absolutely deny ; and cannot but judge , that it draws after it a train of farther consequences , which are altogether extravagant . of which more , when we come to examin his principle of individuation . as for the position , [ that men do always think ] which he impugns , and , in my judgment , quite overthrows , i cannot but wonder what the asserters of it mean. they grant the soul has modes and affections peculiar to her own nature ; and , consequently , of which she is properly the subject : why she may not therefore retain them in her habitually ( as it were ) without exerting or exercising them , as well as the body may those proper to its nature , is altogether unconceivable . indeed , were the soul , in this condition she has here , a pure act , as angels are , it would consist with good reason ; but being here in a potential state , ( as appears by her being capable still of new knowledges , and her being but a part of that one actual thing call'd man , and depending on the material compart in her operations ) i cannot see on what principle , either physical or metaphysical , they can pretend to ground such a paradox . this makes me fear , that this tenet savours strongly of that odd opinion , that the soul here is a pure act as the angels are , or a distinct thing from the body ; that is , a forma assistens , and not informans ; tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly , but shift it off with witty explications of their own doctrine ; which , when brought to the test of close reason , vanish into air ; at which ingenious ways of evasion it must be confess'd they are very great artists . reflexion third . on the second , third , and fourth , chapters . . i must except against his making , or naming the objects of our senses , simple ideas , having already prov'd that the only absolutely simple idea or notion , is that of existence : to which are respective ( which argues some complexion or composition ) one way or other , all our other notions of the thing which we have , or can have ; as is shown in my method , b. . less . d . from § . to § . i could wish he had taken the distinction and order of his notions from nature ; which teaches us that the notion of [ res ] is before [ modus rei ; ] and that the consideration or notion of [ thing ] is more knowable than that of any mode ; and the mode of quantity is that which naturally antecedes , and grounds , all the other modes that can be conceiv'd belonging to body . nor will it excuse this deviation from nature , that we have no exact notions of individuals ; since we can abstract the notion of entity or capacity of being from the thing , as well as we can its solidity , or any of the rest . and certainly , that notion which expresses reality , or an order to being , should claim a right to be consider'd in the first place : i cannot but judge that the methodizing of his ideas on this manner , would certainly have made his ensuing discourses more orderly , and consequently more clear. but , every man is master of his own thoughts , and of his own method . nor did mr. locke intend to write an exact logick , which is what i aym'd at ; and therefore took that way that best suted with his own ingenious conception ; which was , that , as all our notions ( as we both of us hold ) come into our mind by our senses , so he apprehended it the properest way to treat of them as they are the objects of this or that , or many different sensations . . his th . chapter of solidity gives me occasion of making some few reflexions ; which i shall touch on slightly , or omit , because they recurr hereafter . first , his using the word [ solidity ] in his new sense seems very improper . for , all our words do either signify our natural notions , which are common to all mankind , whose meaning therefore is to be taken from the usage of the vulgar ; or else artificial ones , invented by artists to express the notions they are conversant about : whereas the word [ solidity ] taken as it is here , seems to agree to neither . i do not remember it is ever us'd in an artificial sense but by mathematicians , who signify by it the triple dimension of quantity ; which is quite different from his sense of it : and the vulgar understand and use the word [ solid ] as opposit to [ fluid ; ] and say that the earth is solid , or firm , and the water fluid , or apt to be diffus'd ; both which senses are vastly different from impenetrability of the potential parts of quantity ; which is the meaning he gives it : so that , as far as i have read , no man ever used the word [ solidity ] in his sense but himself ; and it is not at all allowable to him , me , or any man , to give a new sense to any word not given it before . for , this discourse of mine shows it can have no proper sense at all ; and on the other side he does not take it in a metaphorical sense , as we use to do when we transferr it to spiritual things , and call a notion or a discourse solid . all words are indeed ad placitum ; but 't is mankind that must please to agree in their signification ; nor must they be at the beneplacitum of particular men , or private authors . . he declines , with some reason , the word [ impenetrability ] because it is negative : but why might not then extension have serv'd , which bears the same sense ? for that , whose notion or nature it is to have its parts without one another , cannot bear the having them within one another , or their being penetrated within themselves ; which is his notion of the word [ solidity . ] he conceives his solidity to be most intimately connected with , and essential to body , and no where to be found or imagin'd but only in matter , but why his solidity should be deem'd essential to body at all , he gives no reason , and i am well assur'd no man living can give any ; for it confounds the line of substance or ens , with that of quality ; which jumbles all our commonest notions together , by making the thing and its mode to be the same essential notion . nor is it solidity only that is necessarily found in matter ; for neither can extension , divisibility , measurability , space , impenetrability , &c. be found any where but in things made of matter , but , what i most wonder at , is , why [ quantity ] should be totally wav'd and neglected , that word having been used by all the learned world , till of late , is ( as has been shown , preliminary th . § . . ) most proper ; and , either directly , or by immediate consequence , involves all the rest in its signification . for , if a body have bigness or quantity in it , it must be extended , and cannot be contracted into a point , line or surface . it must be divisible , or one in the notion of quantity . and , if it must be extended and cannot be crampt into an indivisible , its parts cannot be penetrated within one another ; however it may be pierced or divided by another body , by shoving its potential parts towards either side . lastly , it must be measurable , or proportionable to a body of the same quantity . so that i see not what imaginable priviledge can accrue to solidity above the rest : and , it seems to me a new and groundless assertion , that impenetrability ( tho' we abate the negative manner of expression ) is essential at all to body , more than any of the rest ; that is , not at all . . this acute writer , in pursuance of his doctrine about solidity , proceeds to prove there may be pure space , or vacuum ; because we can have an idea of space left by a body without the idea of another solid thing , or a body , coming in its room . i answer , we may indeed have a fancy of such a thing , as we may of many other contradictions , so they be not exprest in directly opposit terms , v. g. of a golden animal , or a chimera , &c. but , i utterly deny that we can have a true and solid notion of it , taken from the thing it self ; as all ideas must be , that are not phantastick . he thinks there is no necessity , one body should follow another that is moved from such a space ; and that the maintainers of it do build their assertion on the supposition that the world is full . what other men hold of the world 's being full , i know not , nor what they mean by it ; but i will candidly deliver my sentiment , and the demonstration for it a priori , which is this : i take my notion of quantity from the thing , or body ; and , i have shewn above , that that notion is the nature of the thing , as 't is quantitative , or affected with such a mode . here is my firm ground , and here i fix my foot. . proceeding hence , and reflecting on this nature of quantity in my mind ; i discourse it thus : i am to find out in what its ( analogical ) essence or entity consists ; and i discover , it must be in that which expresses its proper unity : seeing then divisibility best expresses its unity , ( for , what is divisible , or capable to be more , is , eo ipso , one , ) i have found out the essential notion or nature of quantity ; and , since what is divisible , or not yet divided , is continued ; and what is continued as to its quantity , is not discontinued or divided according to its quantity ; therefore continuity is its proper unity ; which consists in being indivisum in se , or within its own notion , and formally constitutes its subject such . wherefore , since the essence of quantity is the commonest affection of body , taken in its whole latitude , as including all bodies , it follows , that continuity , which is its unity , must be found in them all likewise ; that is , all bodies , or the whole nature of body , that is , the entire bulk of body , must be continued . and therefore , 't is as great a contradiction , that some bodies , or some parts of body , should not be continued , ( or , which is the same , that there should be a vacuum , ) as that triangularity should be in some one body , and yet it should not be triangular ; that whiteness should be in a wall , and yet it should not be white ; or unity in a thing , and yet it self should not be unum . this is my way of demonstrating against vacuum within the world , to prove , and not suppose , the world full , or continued ; which i draw out of the abstract notion of quantity , or of body consider'd as quantitative ; and out of those notions , most intimately and essentially connected with it . which , why it should not be as evident as any demonstration in mathematicks ; or why we cannot draw as clear a demonstration from the nature of quantity in common , as we can from the nature of such a quantity , i desire any man , who is so wise as to know that all science and demonstration do consist in the connexion of terms , to inform me . i say , any such man ; for , if he knows not this , it is impossible he should know any thing at all in philosophy , or even in logick ; and so he is not worth discoursing with . . hence is seen , that it is impossible that a sucker in a pump may draw up water , and yet the next body not follow . we may fancy it if we please ; but our fancy cannot change the natures of things : it cannot make continuity not to be continuity ; quantitative unity , not to be such an unity ; nor quantity , not to be quantity ; any more than his solidity can be non-solidity , or the parts of body penetrate one another . had mr. locke had a notion of space , taken indifferently from body , and something that 's not body , as we have of sensitiveness from man and brute ; he might , in that case , have fram'd an abstract notion of it , common and indifferent to body and vacuum ; for , then , it had been grounded on the thing , and had been a solid and true notion ; but , since he had the idea , or notion of space from body only , and therefore ( as was largely prov'd above ) it could be of nothing else , but of body thus modified , it must be confin'd to body , with which ( as all modes are ) it is identified ; and therefore , the idea , or notion of it , can never be applicable to what is not a body . reflexion fourth , on the seventh and eighth chapters . . having * already shewn , that our only simple notion is that of existence , i have no occasion to make any remarks on his th chapter , but that 't is highly commendable in the author , to reduce his speculations to piety and contemplation : this being not only our duty , but that best end , to which all solid speculation naturally leads us . . as for his th chapter , i grant , that all the ideas , or notions , we have , are positive in the understanding , ( at least , in part ; ) but the reason of it is , because they do , all of them , include the thing , as 't is thus consider'd ; without which , we could have no ideas of privations or negations at all : for , non-ens , formally as such , or as totally excluding ens , can have no intelligibility , nor , consequently , any notion , by which we can understand it : and privations differ from negations only in this , that they include in their notion a capacity of the subjects having such or such a mode , annex'd to its not having it ; which capacity clearly connotates the thing , since there cannot be a capacity , without some thing that is capable , or has that capacity . add , that i see not how , ideas being resemblances , an idea , consider'd by us as a positive real being , can ever resemble or represent privations , they being of ( at least ) subcontrary natures . what i hold , is , that , when we conceive a thing , as having some privation in it , the idea of it is partly positive , partly privative ; and the material part of it is the thing ; the formal , as privative , or , as thus modify'd . for , ideas , i mean , notions of privations , without including the thing , are unconceivable , and impossible ; as whoever looks into their * definition , will discern clearly . of this nature ( in common ) are all the notions we have of the modes , or accidents ; no notion being truly or perfectly positive , but that of ens , or thing . i cannot grant that our ideas , or notions , ( or even phantasms , ) are caus'd in us by meer motions , continued from our senses , to the brain , or the seat of sensation ; but must judge , for the reasons alledg'd * above , that this is perform'd by those imperceptible bodies there spoken of , or by the effluviums themselves convey'd thither , and afterwards lodged there . in embracing which opinion , of our knowledge being wrought by meer motions made by the objects , his excellent wit suffers it self to be led astray by our moderns . his reason ( which i conceive is also theirs ) is , because it is not more impossible to conceive , that god should annex such ideas to such motions , than pain to a piece of steel dividing the body , with which that idea has no resemblance . how unlike a reason this is , appears at first fight ; and , i am sure this parallel has no resemblance at all with the thing it is brought for . i know of no annexing the idea of pain to a piece of steel ; but , must think 't is a most highly extravagant conceit . the business passes thus in nature . a piece of steel being denser , and withall sharp , is a proper cause of dividing the body ; the dividing of it , is a proper cause of its being disorder'd , and render'd unable to assist the soul , or the man , in his necessary operations : this breeds naturally a conception in the soul , or the man , that he is hurt ; which naturally produces in the knower , who is highly concern'd in it , grief or pain : so that all is here carry'd on by a train of proper causes , to proper effects ; and needs no annexing by god , more than to conserve the order of second causes which himself has establish'd . on the other side , there is no natural resemblance of such a motion to such an idea , as is confess'd ; nor is the former a proper cause of the other ; which puts them to have recourse to this voluntary annexion to them by god. add , that it is an odd kind of argument , to alledge , that it is not impossible to conceive that god may do this , or that , without proving he has done it : nor is it at all allowable in philosophy , to bring in a deus è machinâ at every turn , when our selves are at a loss to give a reason for our thesis . nor is it to be expected , that god will alter the nature of things , for the interest of any man's tenet ; but , since his wisdom , in his ordinary government of the world , carries on the course of it according to the nature of second causes , it must first be prov'd , that what we maintain , is agreeable to the course of natural causes , e'er we ought to think or imagin that god will have any hand in it : and , if we can prove this , we need no immediate or particular recourse to god's favouring us , by doing this , or that , to make good our argument . . i must deny too , consequently to my former doctrine , that sensible qualities are nothing in the objects , but powers to produce various sensations in us ; unless it be meant , that they have powers to send out such effluviums into the brain , by the senses , as imprint their very natures in our mind ; and not barely to produce motions in our nerves . nor can i conceive why the ideas of the secondary qualities should have nothing like them , existing in the bodies themselves ; nor be resemblances of them . if this be true , why are they call'd [ ideas , ] which either signifies resemblances , or nothing ? again , since the bodies are put to cause them , how can we think they are nothing like them ? can any man think the effect is nothing like the cause , when every effect can be nothing but a participation of the cause , or something coming into the subject from the efficient , which was in it some way or other before ? lastly , if these secondary qualities be compounded of the primary ones , ( viz. of solidity , extension , figure and mobility ) in our understanding , why should not those primary qualities in re , as well compound those secondary ones in the thing , or out of our understanding ? and , if they do , ( as 't is evident they must , since they are all there , ) then , why are not those secondary ideas full as like those secondary or compounded qualities found in the thing , as the primary ideas were like the primary qualities in the same thing ; and , consequently , resemble them , as well as the others did their proper originals ? i much doubt , that the author rather consulted his fancy in this particular , than his good reason : and , because those effluviums , or the figures of parts , which cause our sensations , are too subtile and indiscernable to cause distinct phantasms of themselves , as the primary ones did , but are of a confus'd uniformness in appearance , he judges hence , they are nothing like the others : whereas , reason will inform reflecters , that , since colour is nothing but the surface of a body , as 't is apt to reflect light ; the manner of reflexion found in the surface of a white thing , which is apt to reflect much light , is , to our reason , and in our notion , such as it was in the thing imprinting it ; and , consequently , ( every thing acting as it is , ) such as came from it . whence , those who , by reflex thoughts , and using their reason , do go about to explain or define the nature or notion of whiteness , do make it consist in such a reflexion of light , bringing effluviums with it from a surface so advantagiously figur'd : and so , the notion of whiteness is the same in the thing , and in the understanding ; viz. those effluviums thus figur'd , or modified , however , the appearance of it in the fancy reaches not the true nature of the thing , as 't is white ; which , indeed , fancy never does . . the reason why the pain , which we feel , is not in the thing that caus'd it , and sensible qualities are so , is , because these last are proper , univocal , and immediate effects of bodies sending out effluviums of their own natures ; but pain , being an affection of the soul , springing from a perception that its dear compart is hurt , and disorder'd , is an improper , remoter , and equivocal production . the altering , disordering , or spoiling the temperature or continuity of the bodily parts due to their nature , is , ( as was shewn , ) the immediate and proper effect of those offensive agents ; but 't is accidental to their manner of operating , that they cause pain , or pleasure , even remotely ; and , it lights only , that sometimes they do this , because the subject , or the body , in which they produce these their proper effects , haps to be identified with a knowing nature , only which is properly capable to grieve , or be delighted when a harmful or pleasing impression is made on the body , which is part of the man , and , in some sort , himself . the like is to be said of manna , and other such instances . the alterations or disorder made in the guts and stomach , are natural , proper , and immediate effects of it ; but the pain ensuing thence , which is a spiritual disposition of the mind , is a remote , accidental , and improper effect of it . . by this time mr. locke sees that i agree with him , that the bodies in nature have a power in them to cause our several sensations ; and , that this power is that which we call such a quality of it . but i disagree with him , that they are only powers to cause such a motion ; and affirm , it is a power , when duly circumstanced with other requisites , ( as , with light , to convey visible qualities ; moisture , gustable ones , &c. ) to send out effluviums , of their own nature , to the brain ; ( which , therefore , are inherent in , and proper parts of those objects , ) whether they cause actual sensation , or no. the sun sends out his beams , which , scatter'd thinly , at this remote distance from the fountain , are therefore one of mr. locke's secondary qualities , which we call light ; yet , contracted by a burning-glass , they perform the proper effect of fire , burning ; whence we ought to conclude , they are of the nature of fire . can we then deny , or doubt , but that the body of the sun , which communicates , or sends them out , is it self fire ; or , that , being such , those rays , and the sun , have no similitude with one another ? or , that , when they strike the eye , they stop there , and are not carry'd into the brain ? hippocrates tells us , that omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles ; meaning , that they are pervious to the humours ; which are gross things , in comparison of the sun-beams . how can it then be doubted , but that they reach the fancy ; and thence , the soul ; and imprint their notions or natures there : and , tho' some may deny they are the same in the mind , as they are in nature ; yet can it , with any shew of reason , be deny'd they are at all like the cause that produced them ? the like discourse holds in all other sensible qualities , to what sense soever they belong . . to close this discourse , i am apt to think , that mr. locke intended to oppose those who hold , that the sensible qualities are a little kind of distinct entities . next , i declare , that , tho' the thing has accidentally a power in it , to make it self perceiv'd ; yet , taking the thing as an object , ( as he does , ) it is but improperly called a power ; and not properly , as are our powers , or faculties , of seeing , hearing , knowing , &c. are : for , the act being the end for which the power was given , the faculties , or powers , are better'd , and perfected , by being reduced to act ; and so there is a real ground for their being related to the object : whereas , neither the object , or thing , nor any sensible quality in it , is a jot the better , or any way alter'd , by being perceiv'd , or known ; any more than a cart rolling through the street , is the better , or otherwise than it had been , because the effluviums it sends out do make a representation of it in a shop full of looking-glasses , as it passes by . whence logicians say , that there is no real relation of the object to the sense , or intellect ; because there is no real ground for such a relation , nor any dependence of the object on those powers , in any kind ; * as is shewn in my method . reflexion fifth , on the tenth chapter . passing over this ninth chapter about perception , i confess my self at a great loss how to understand divers passages in his tenth , which treats of retention , or how to make him coherent with himself . for , first , he tells us our ideas are nothing but actual perceptions of the mind . by which words he seems to make no kind of distinction between the act of perception and the object of it ; whereas the act is the exercise of our power of perceiving , actuated by the object about which it is then employ'd ; which object determins the indifferency of the power to this or that act in particular ; which the schools call specifying the act : but the object is the thing known by the act ; and 't is a strange paradox to say , that the act of knowledge and the object or thing known are the same ; especially , if the thing known be something without us : next , i cannot reconcile his making our ideas to be nothing but actual perceptions , with his making our ideas , quite through his book , to be the object of our thoughts , and expresly stating them to be such in the beginning of it , chap. . § . secondly , he says , that those ideas cease to be any thing , when there is no perception of them . if so , why does he put us to have memory or retention , if , after the act is past , there be nothing to keep in memory or retain . thirdly , in consequence of this his ground , he affirms , that this laying up ideas in the repository of his memory , signifies no more , but that the mind has in many cases a power to revive perceptions , with a connotate annext , of having had them before . certainly , this signification of the word [ memory ] is peculiar to himself , and contrary to the sentiments of all mankind ; who , were they examined by the poll , would , i believe , unanimously declare , that by laying up a thing in memory , they meant , ( as the words naturally import ) the retaining something which has its being yet within us , and may be brought into play again upon occasion . can the memory be said to retain what is not ? or can there be a repository of nothing ? is reviving the notion of retaining , they being rather of a contrary sense to one another ? or can remembring be conceived to be the same notion with reproduction ? these seem to me such monstrous abuses of words , that i would willingly think my self mistaken , rather than to father them on so learned an author , did not my eyes assure me i do not dream or oversee . nor can the same individual act ever be reviv'd ; it depending on many circumstances , determinable to such a time or place ; the former of which can never recur , or be reproduced . lastly , what means this power in the mind to revive perceptions ? the man , indeed , has a power , when re-excited by outward objects like the former , or by passion , disease , or by some other casual circumstances , to rummage the ideas lodged in the brain ; and , so , by their new impression on the seat of knowledge , to cause such an act , as by it to know the same thing again ; as also to know it was foreknown , as was explicated * above : but to put the soul to revive ideas , or even to act , so that the action shall begin from her peculiar nature , is praeternatural to her condition , to her manner of existing , and consequently , to her manner of operating here ; which , as it must be ever with the bodily part or the fancy , so it must begin still from it , as it did at first ; with this only difference , that in the first impressions made on the sense , and thence on the seat of knowledge , the man ( and particularly as to his soul ) is perfectly passive ; whereas afterwards by vertue of those phantasms , and their former impression , which have already affected the said seat of knowledge , ( which is part of himself ) and have been re-affected by it , the man is partly passive , partly active in remembring ; as mr. locke does , i think , also acknowledge ; tho' he explicates it otherwise than i do , viz. by the mind's setting it self on work , which i judge , and have shewn to be impossible , prelimin . . § , , . . i must not omit here to remark , that when mr. locke says , that ideas fade in the memory ; or , ( as he ingeniously expresses it ) that [ the pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours ] he most evidently discovers , that by ideas here he means material representations or phantasms , and not those spiritual objects of our understandings , notions . for , there is no doubt but that phantasms , they being only imperceptible particles , of the same nature with the corporeal agents whence they are sent , do follow , ( and that very easily ) the fate of their originals ; and are liable to be defaced , alter'd or corrupted , as these are : whereas it is impossible , that ideas or notions , which have a spiritual being in our mind , should be liable to any such decay , corruption or mutation . if any thing could prejudice , destroy or efface them , it must in all reason be thought that their contraries would do it : whereas clear reflexion tells us , that contraries in the mind are so far from expelling , blurring , or altering one another there , that they not only very friendly dwell together , but moreover that , by their co-habitation there , they make one another magis elucescere , and establish one anothers natures . hot and cold , moist and dry , which are perpetually fighting , and make such bustles and turmoils in the material world , are very consistent , and agree amicably in the soul. the corporeal instruments which brought our notions thither may perish ; but when they are once in her , they are as immutable and immortal as her self . so that the pictures in our minds are so far from being drawn in fading colours , that they should rather be said ( if we would use a metaphor to express their durableness ) to be engraved in brass , marble , or adamant ; being as lasting as eternity . which tenet , were i writing metaphysicks , i should not doubt but to demonstrate ; and withal to show how useful it is to explicate christian faith : particularly those points of laying open the book of conscience at the last day ; when , as the sybil sings , [ cunctaque cunctorum cunctis arcana patebunt . ] and how infants are connaturally saved by virtue of baptism . reflexion sixth . on the eleventh and twelfth chapters . . the th . chapter gives me no occasion to make any reflexions , but only on his attributing knowledge to brutes ; about which i have been too large already . he denies indeed that they have the power of abstracting , or of having general ideas . but , if they have true knowledge , or any more than king david meant , when he says , the sun knows his going down , i see no reason why they may not have general notions , and abstract , and compare too . for , if they have any degree of reason , as he grants they have , they may do all this ; and i am sure , and have already shown , their outward actions do as much countenance their having reason , as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot abstract , or have general ideas ; since general ideas ( as every good reflecter may observe ) are nothing but imperfect ideas of the thing ; and in a thousand occasions , the object or thing affords them no more , but imperfect or general ideas , and therefore they must have them . i am much pleased with his distinction between wit and judgment ; and i could wish that our men of fancy , who affect to bring religion , and all they understand not , to drollery , would apply it to themselves . . the author discourses very acutely , how our reason and judgment are misguided by our not distinguishing our notions exactly ; whence we may inferr , that that part of logick which teaches us how to distinguish them accurately , and to keep them distinct , is of exceeding great use ; and that the study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all pretenders to science ; especially by new beginners : of which , i hope , i have elaborately treated in the first book of my method . . in order to the th . chapter ; there is no doubt but that we can unite several simpler ideas or notions into one , and signify them by one name ; but i deny that , if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are , or may be , united in external objects , or in the thing , we can have any complex notions , tho' we may have a fancy , of them , or a kind of imitation of some thing which once affected our senses . for , since i cannot but think i have demonstrated that our notion is the thing as conceiv'd by us , or the thing existing in the understanding ; if i have any complexion of more simple notions in my mind , not found to be united in the thing ; the idea in my mind is not conformable to the thing it self , nor is it , as i have prov'd it to be , that thing ; and then to what end should i have such an idea , as if i come to predicate it of the thing , the proposition would be false , which consequently would fill our mind with falshoods . next , as has been often prov'd formerly , i deny the soul can unite or act of her self , or by her peculiar power ( tho' the man may ) but is oblig'd to take what 's given her by impressions on the seat of knowledge . in which case , what the thing or object , by a genuin impression , gives her , is orderly , solid , and a seed of true knowledge or science ; but that which the fancy gives her , otherwise than as the thing did directly imprint it , is disorderly , superficial , and a ground of errour . indeed , she is forc'd to apprehend , whenever the phantasms strike the seat of knowledge , tho' their motions and complexions be never so disorderly , or even monstrous . now , whenever this is done , judicious men direct their eye to the thing , and examine whether the conjunction of such or such ideas , is truly found in re ; or is agreeable to those direct impressions it had received thence ; which if it be , the soul entertains it , after examination , and lets it sink into her ; it being the true nature of the thing , and so a ground to truth , to see which her essence was made ; if it be not , she rejects it ; for it grounds a contradiction to the nature of the thing , which is the only ground of truth ; and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is not ; and it is directly against her nature to admit contradictory judgments . now , what judicious men , by their recourse to the thing , thus reject , those unskilful thinkers , who are led by fancy , do admit ; and by this means their souls become full of phantastick conceits which never can be brought to any coherence or connexion of terms . for no terms can cohere , unless the notions meant by each of them be really in the thing it self ; and those coherences made in the mind by any other way , or of any other materials , are far from solid or true , as we experience in people that are splenetick or enthusiaistck . . wherefore , whenever the ideas are connected otherwise than they are or may be in re , the object of that act can have no metaphysical verity , unity , nor consequently entity in it ; the two former of which , being properties of ens , cannot be where ens or thing is not . whence the objects of those fantastick acts is some non-ens taken for an ens ; which , if pursu'd home by a good logician , must end in a contradiction . for example , i can have notions of hircus and ceruus aparted from one another ; but , if i will unite them in my mind otherwise than nature exhibited them , and take them conjoyntly , ( as fancy may ) and frame a a complex idea of a hirco-ceruus , or goat-stag , it must needs be perfectly fantastical and chimerical . this will farther appear , if we take one of mr. l's complex ideas , viz. beauty , consisting of a certain composition of figure and colour . now , if such figure and colour had not been found , or might not be found united by nature in the same thing , the idea of it could not have been conformable to what 's in nature , or the idea of any reality , but purely fantastical and counterfeit . the same may be said of his idea of lead , with its proper qualities ; or of the ordinary idea of a man , describ'd here to be a substance or thing with motion , thought and reasoning join'd to it : which qualities , were they not join'd in the thing they belong to , or identify'd with it , the complex ideas of them would be nothing but meer groundless fancies . this point is so important , that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible : i shall therefore allow it a more elaborate explanation , tho' i spend less pains and time in my other reflexions . when i consider an individual thing in nature , ( v. g. a man ) according to the notion of being , i have two notions of him , viz. that he is capable of existing , and that he actually exists ; the former of which he has by means of second causes , which , by determining the matter , gives him his determinate nature or essence . the other he has immediately from the first being ; and i have a complex notion of him accordingly . next , considering the same thing precisely as a body , or such an ens as we call by that name ; i find in it somewhat by which it is corruptible , or changeable into another , and somewhat by which it is determin'd to be this sort of thing , or body , or to be what it is : and , i conceive and call body according to the former of these considerations power or matter ; and , according to the later , act or form ; and i frame a complex idea of it , as 't is a body accordingly . hitherto i treat of the thing as a metaphysician , and regard it only according to some order it has to being . proceeding further on , and dividing still the common line of ens , or ( what i am now arriv'd at ) [ body ] by intrinsecal differences , or by more and less of the generical notion , of which quantity or divisibility is the primary affection , or that of which all the other modes are made ; i find that some bodies must be more divisible or rare , other less divisible or dense ; and by this means we approach something nearer to natural or physical considerations of that thing as 't is call'd body ; and the science that treats of it , as being immediately under metaphysicks , and immediately above physicks , may not unfitly be called archi-physical ; as giving the immediate principles to physicks ! this way of considering body grounds the notions of simple bodies , called elements ; which differ in nothing but rarity and density ; and also , the notions of compound bodies made up of those simple ones . so that now my former complex notions of capable to be and actual being ; and , of having determinate and indeterminate respects to that ens as it is body , call'd form and matter , has annext to it in the thing many secondary qualities , made up of those primary ones ; such as are , heat and cold , moisture and driness , &c. and so we are come to that science call'd physicks or natural philosophy ; and my former complex notion of such an individuum , takes in these second qualities , over and above what it contain'd before . advancing farther , we come to consider this thing or body with its parts so diversify'd by those first and second qualities , or so organiz'd , that one part ( the common causes of the world suppos'd ) is able to work on another ; which kind of thing we call self-moving or living . and , still proceeding on by a f●rther complexion of such parts , we come to a thing that is sensitive , or moving it self by the least effluviums affecting those tender organs call'd the senses . all which give so many new additions to my former notion of that individuum , and make it more complex . moreover , we can find in this sensitive thing , or this animal now spoken of , both as to its peculiar matter and form , a disposition to work comparatively ; that is to judge , and reason or discourse ; and , consequently , to have in it a knowing power , which is to be a man : and , lastly , such a peculiar degree of this power of comparing , which restrains the specifick notion of man to be this individual man. so that , by this time , such a vast assembly of modes or accidents ( the croud of which make that most complex notion , call'd the suppositum , so blindly confused ) do meet in my complex idea of this individual man , that , tho' i see he is a thing ; and a distinct thing , because i see he exists and operates independently of all other things ; yet , i can have no distinct and clear notion of his essence , but by taking it in pieces , ( as it were , ) both as to those several considerations belonging to him , according to the line of being , as was now explain'd ; and also , as to those conceptions i make of him , according to all the physical modes or accidents which are in him : which modes , so to gain an exacter knowledge of him , as affected with those modes , ( and the same may be said of all other things , ) we divide , and sub-divide , as we see agreeable to their distinct natures or notions . this discourse may , if well weigh'd , be , perhaps useful for many ends. but , to apply it to our present purpose : all this multitude of less complex , or more simple ideas , belonging to the line of substance , are found connected in this individuum ; and , did we add the least of them by our mind , which was not found conjoin'd in the thing , my notion or idea of him would , so far , be fantastick , and false ; because there was nothing found in the thing that answers to such a complexion , ( only which can make it real , ) but only in my fancy , counterfeiting such a complexion , and mis-informing my understanding ; as it happens in the illusive representations , made in those who are troubled with the spleen , melancholy , or phrenzy ; as likewise , in timerous people , when they think they see sprights ; or in horses , when they boggle . add , that the mind cannot , of its self , begin to act , ( as was proved formerly : ) but all new acts , or excitation of former notions in her , are the acts of the whole man , and must naturally arise first from the bodily part , or the fancy ; either imprinting phantasms , which it receives from the objects , orderly and genuinly , on the seat of knowledge ; or disorderly , as its irregular and extravagant motions happen to conjoyn them . whence we say that a man who does not correct such incoherent connexions by judgment , is led by fancy , or caprichious . . while we are discoursing about the manner how we come by all our ideas whether simple or complex , it would not perhaps be improper to set before the reader 's view , what is my tenet , the cartesians and mr. lockes , and how we differ . the cartesians do not own themselves at all beholding to outward objects for their ideas ( as least , as some of them say , for the chiefest ones ) but they say they are innate , or imprinted on the soul by gods immediate hand ; tho' some of them ( which makes the matter much worse ) chose rather to say they are elicited or produced by the soul it self , upon such a motion from without ; as also , that they are re-excited by such motions ; in which last tenet mr. locke seems to agree with them . but this learned author denies all innate ideas ; and holds that the simple ones ( at least ) are caused by the objects , whether they be internal or external ; but , that the complex ideas are framed by the mind , which he conceives to have a virtue of compounding them as she pleases . whereas , my principles force me to oppose them both , and to hold that all ideas , whether simple , or complex ( provided that by ideas be meant notions , and not imaginations ) are to be taken intirely from the objects or things in nature ; as also that , when we excite them a new , something that is in act it self must cause that action ; because a meer power to do any thing , ( whether in the soul or out of it ) cannot determin it self to any action in particular . and , if i may freely and impartially pass my verdict between them , i should frankly declare , that mr. locke's way has far more of nature in it , and consequently is more solid than the cartesian ; in regard he holds all our ideas are originally taken from the outward objects , either emmediately , as to his simple ideas ; or mediately , as to those which are compounded of them by the soul : whereas the cartesians cannot pretend to know any thing in nature , unless they can solidly prove these three previous points : first , that their ideas are innate , or else produced by the soul ; neither of which i am certain they can ever prove . secondly , what those ideas are , or that they are not meer fancies . thirdly , if they put them to be meer representations , and not the thing , or object it self , how we can be certain that we must by them know the things without vs , notwithstanding all that i have alledg'd to demonstrate the contrary in my second and third preliminaries . if these points , which are the main hinges that open us the way into philosophy , or the knowledge of things , be not first firmly establish'd , all their discourses , tho' they be never so ingenious , must be hollow and superficial for want of solid ground . these three points , i say , they must either show to be self-evident , or they must make them evident by demonstrating them ; or else , i am sure , 't is most evident , that all their superstructures are ruinous for want of a firm foundation . i would not misunderstand them , when they explain to us what their ideas are ; and yet they have such a peculiar talent of speaking ambiguous sense in seemingly plain words , that i cannot for my heart comprehend their meaning . they tell us sometimes they hold the idea , consider'd objectively , to be the res or thing itself ; but when they add , that it is the res or thing [ quatenus representata ] they seem to deny it again ; for the words [ quatenus representata ] signifie , in true logick , the bare representation of the thing ; as [ paries quatenus albus , ] means [ albedo ; ] the restrictive word [ quatenus ] cutting off the precise notion to which it is annex'd , from all others . and how odd a piece of chiquanery it is to say , that the picture or resemblance of caesar , is caesar himself , quatenus representatus , i leave it to others to judge . besides , if the thing it self be really there , or in the knowing power , it may be known without more ado , or without needing those little spiritual epicycles , ( if i may so call them ) those useless ideas . mr. locke , i must confess , began at first to build solidly on the things ; but , he is so very acutely and speculatively attentive to the ideas in his own thoughts , and so wholly taken up with contemplation of them , that he seems sometimes to over-run his own principles , ( which only at first he intended to pursue ) and quite to lose sight of the things . whereas i bend my whole endeavour to keep my eye steadily upon them through the whole course of my doctrine , without intermingling any gratuitous suppositions , or suffering my self to be led astray from the natures of the things by any ill-grounded fancies of my own , which would court and debauch my reason , tho' they seem never so ingenious . reflexion seventh . on the thirteenth chapter . . if , as mr. locke says , we get the simple idea of space by our sight and touch , then nature gives us no idea of a space , which is not visible and tangible ; whence follows , that the idea of such a space as vacuum , which is neither the object of one of those senses , nor of the other , is unnatural and fantastical . the notion of distance is well explain'd ; but i cannot discern why length , breadth and thickness should be called capacity : for , these three modes ( as all modes do ) express the manner how they intrinsecally affect their subject , body ; whereas , capacity signifies the respect to something extrinsecal to the body thus affected , or a power to contain another thing . much less can extension be character'd a capacity of space , with something between the extremities , which is solid , moveable and tangible ; for , tho' matter were suppos'd to have no extremities at all , but to be infinite , it would not be less extended , but more : and were the air supposed to be neither solid , moveable or tangible , yet still it might be conceiv'd to be extended . again , what means it , that extension is a capacity of space , whereas space is rather a capacity of what is extended . i wish i knew from what rule or ground mr. locke takes the proper meaning of the words he uses ; for it seems evident to me , that this explication of extension is meerly voluntary and preternatural ; and seems ( tho' perfectly groundless it self ) to be laid as a ground for vacuum ; and , therefore , his consequences drawn thence , want premisses . nor need we take such pains by repeating our ideas , to gain the notion of immensity ; it is but putting a negative to the plain notion of [ measurable , ] and the deed is done . rather , 't is perfectly demonstrable , that the adding or repeating our ideas , cannot possibly give us the notion of immensity ; for , we have no ideas , but of finite quantities ; and the number of the times we can repeat them , can be but finite ; which the very terms tell us , can never give us a notion of an infinite quantity , or of immensity . when he says , the mind can repeat , double , or join ideas , i must deny it , as impossible , unless , by the word [ mind , ] he means the man. the mind has no distinct shop of her own , to work in a-part ; nor can she work without her tools , or her conjoin'd instrument , the body , as is prov'd above . . nothing can be more solid , ingenious , or better express'd , than are his discourses here about place : in which , he , in great part , observes the sayings , and common language of the vulgar ; which is the most natural way to explain those notions which are vulgar ones , and common to all mankind . whence , when we will needs affix significations , to the words which are generally used to express those notions , by our own conceits , it will most certainly lead us into very great errours . he only seems not to reflect upon the common saying of the vulgar , that [ things are in such or such a place ; ] which shews , that their notion of place is to be a container , and consequently , extended ; the body contain'd , to which it is adjusted , being such . . he argues well ad hominem , against those who make body and extension the same thing : i suppose , he and they both mean , the same idea ; for , the latter is not a thing distinct from the substance in which it is ; and the ideas do most evidently differ , toto genere . those men's way of arguing from ideas including one another , is purely fantastical , unless those ideas be notions , or the thing , as thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , like a kind of parts , are in the whole ens , and so may be said to be in it , or predicated of it . . i have already prov'd , that space is ( materially ) nothing else but body , consider'd according to its quantity ; and those preliminary discourses , which pretend to demonstrate it , must either be confuted , or else it must follow , that ( whatever we may fancy ) the parts of space are both separable , moveable , and do resist motion . farther , to imagine space , that is not extended , is a perfect contradiction , tho' not in the very terms , yet by an easie and immediate consequence . for , putting a body to be in such a space , it must be commensurate to such a part of it ; otherwise , that body might take up all space ; and must do so , were it not commensurate to some part of it only : and to fancy a thing commensurate to the parts of what is extended , and it self not to be extended likewise , is a most extravagant conceit , and a plain contradiction . again , if a body take up but one part of space , and not another part of it , ( v. g. that part which is next it , or in which it is , ) space must not only have parts , but also one part without another ; which is the very notion of extension . lastly , since imaginary space is put to be vast , and even infinite , it cannot consist in an indivisible ; wherefore , it must necessarily be divisible and diffused , that is , extended : whence follows , that , to fancy body to be put in such a space , or place , ( for he grants here , § . . that these two ideas differ but in a certain respect , ) and yet not shove aside or remove those extended parts out of that space , is to make the extended parts of that space , and of the body in it , to be within one another , or penetrated ; which implies a contradiction . now , if they be not penetrated , one of them must necessarily drive the other out of the space it occupates ; and therefore , the parts of that space must be separable , moveable , and resistent , as those of body are ; they being , in very deed , the self-same . . hence is seen , that in all this discourse about pure space , or vacuum , mr. locke consulted his fancy , and not his good reason attending to the things as they are in nature . that which mis-led him seems to be this , because he finds not in his idea of space , formally consider'd , the notion of divisibility , separability , nor resistance ; but that it abstracts from them all , as to the formal part of its conception , by which 't is distinguish'd from those others . but , this is not peculiar to space ; nor bears it any shew of being a solid ground for the existence of space separately from body . for , figure has not , in its formal notion , quantity ; and yet 't is nothing but quantity thus terminated . how many notions have we of quantity , and several other modes , formally distinct , which yet are nothing else , really and materially , but quantity it self . take divisibility , extension , measurability , proportionability , impenetrability , space , place , &c. they have , all of them , some nice formality , or different respect , which distinguishes them ; and makes the ideas or notions of them , as such , to be formally exclusive of one another . divisibility speaks the unity of the potential parts of quantity : measurability , the respect they have to some determinate quantity stated by our mind : proportionability , such a degree of equality or inequality to another thing , or to their own parts : impenetrability and extension , the order or situation of the same potential parts : space , the same quantity , precisely and formally , as it is a capacity or power to contain a multitude of things , without any determination or adjustment of the space , to the things contain'd in it ; so that the notion of space is the self-same as that of room : and place signifies the same quantity , as having a power to contain them limitedly , and determinately : yet , notwithstanding , none ever conceited , that , because they were apprehended as formally distinct , they could therefore exist separately , without quantity , or without one another , ( as he puts space to exist without body and extension , ) tho' all their ideas are thus formally distinct : nor , consequently , can space , for the same reason , exist without extension and body ; which seems to be his ground , built on the distinct formal idea he has of space , why he thinks there may be a vacuum : or else , his ground is only a roving imagination of a vast nothing beyond the universality of things , fancy'd by him to be a thing he knows not what , nor of what sort or kind . but , enough of this formerly . . the notion of extension stands in his way , and therefore he endeavours to make it unintelligible , and inexplicable . he objects , that , to say that to be extended is to have partes extra partes , is the same as to say extension is extension . first , if it were the same in sense , where 's the harm ? so it be only meant , that it is the same in re ; or in the formal notion , as long as the expression is different , and not formally identical . at this rate we may ridicule all definitions : for , to say , [ homo est animal rationale , ] is the same in reality , as to say , homo est homo . next , i deny they are formally the same : divisibility , which is the notion of quantity , expresses only , that the body it affects , has potential parts ; and extension expresses the manner how it has those parts ; viz. not penetrated , or one within another , but without one another ; which adds a new formality to the bare notion of quantity : and this is a fair explication for such a most common and general notion ; which having no proper genus , but a transcendent , can bear no exact definition . . to our objection , that if pure space or vacuum be not really a body , it not being pretended to be a spirit , it must be a meer nothing , and so cannot exist ; he replies , ( if i understand him , ) that there may be a thing that is neither spirit , nor body ; and he asks who told us there may not be such a third thing ? i answer , our evident reason told it us , by dividing ens into divisible and indivisible ; which dividing members , being contradictory , allow no third thing which is neither the one , nor the other . since then he must not say , that such a vast expansion as vacuum beyond all bodies is indivisible , either mathematically , as a point is , or physically , as those things are which are insuparably hard ; it must be divisible , and consequently extended , separable , &c. as a body is . but this also he denies it to be ; and therefore 't is evidently concluded , that 't is a meer nothing . . nor will he acquaint us with his thoughts , whether vacuum be a substance , or accident , till we shew him a distinct idea of substance : which seems to me a witty avoiding the question , rather than a pertinent answer . indeed , we have no distinct and compleat notion of a suppositum , or individual substance , because it involves many distinct notions or considerabilities in it , as their ground . but , of substance it self , or , which is the same , of what is meant by the word [ thing , ] 't is scarce possible to be ignorant , or to want a distinct idea of it : for , there is nothing from which we need or can distinguish the notion of substance , or ens , and so to gain a distinct conception of it , but either non-ens , or modus entis ; from both which , honest nature , if we attend to it , and not to preter-natural fancies , teaches us to distinguish it . i should put the argument thus : vacuum , if any thing , must be either res , or modus rei ; for we have no other notions : but vacuum is neither ; therefore it is pure nothing . i believe mr. locke had the worst of the late school-men in his eye , when he gave this answer ; who , talking metaphorically of standing under , and inhering , left their readers in the dark , as to what they meant literally . how god is metaphorically called a substance ; and how all our notions and words fall infinitely short of conceiving him as he is in himself , or of expressing him literally , i have discoursed * above . . 't is almost insuperably hard for those who are more vers'd in mathematicks than in metaphysicks , to get above fancy , especially in this particular of vacuum , or imaginary space ; because , tho' plain reason tells them that all created things are limited , both in their own natures , and consequently in their modes or accidents ; yet , because they can fancy something beyond bodies , they will needs conceit there is some ultra-mundane kind of thing existent out of the world , tho' it costs them that highest absurdity of putting non-ens to be ens , or nothing to be something . and the same fancy furnishes them with plausible apprehensions , which serve them for arguments . so , mr. locke asks , if god should place a man at the extremity of corporeal beings , whether he could not stretch out his hand beyond his body ? i answer , that , in all probability , he could neither stretch out his hand , nor so much as live in a region so remote from the habitation of mortals : nor , did he live , how knows he but the outmost surface of the world is insuperably solid and hard ; as 't is likely it is , so to keep the world compacted , close and tight ? next , to put god ; at every turn , ( with all reverence to his divine majesty be it spoken , ) to shew tricks , meerly for the interest of their tenet , ( as our moderns use , ) is very unphilosophical . he will say , it is only a supposition ; which , even , tho' impossible , is sometimes allowable to put , that we may clear a farther point . nor do i look upon it to be any other but a supposition ; only , i judge it to be a very extravagant one , and contrary to the natures of things . god's infinite wisdom has so contriv'd the world , ( * omnia in sapientia fecisti domine , ) that created things should be the ground of truth ; therefore , whatever supposition or position draws after it a contradiction , is as impossible , as that two and three should not make five ; or that a thing can be and not be at once . and , as it has been demonstrated , that when the sucker in a pump is drawn up , the water must needs follow ; because , otherwise , it would violate the natures or essences of things : and therefore , vacuum , within the world , is impossible ; so no force in nature can make any protuberancy in the world's surface , because it would induce a formal effect , viz. distance , and yet nothing to make that distance formally . a position as contradictory , as 't is to say a thing is round , and yet no mode or accident of roundness is in it , which is the formal cause of it as 't is round . 't is his opinion , that they who deny vacuum , must hold body to be infinite : whereas , i hold it demonstrable that there is no vacuum , nor infinity of the world neither ; nor can i see any dependence one of those tenets has upon the other . . he conceives , that no man can , in his thoughts , set any bounds to space , more than to duration . i ask , whether , by his thought , he means his judgment ? for , 't is evident , that he that can demonstrate , that the mode or accident cannot exist , where the body or thing , of which it is a mode , is not ; or , that both the extent of the world has , and its duration will have an end ; can , and must , in his judgment , set bounds to both of them ; however his fancy rambles and roves beyond his judgment . or , if he means , he cannot have a notion of any thing so great , but a greater may be still conceiv'd ; then i answer , first , that our conception cannot make or prove that to be , which is not . secondly , that none can , indeed , possibly have such a notion ( by his way ) of either of them ; but by our way very easily ; for , by adding a negation to finite , as 't is manifest we may , we may have a notion of infinite , which sets bounds to all imaginable quantities , since none can pretend to imagine any thing beyond infinity . the same way gives us the plain notion of immensity , by joining a negation to measurableness . indeed , the notion of eternity can be explicated neither way ; neither by repeating or adding ideas , nor by a negation of finite time , compounding an infinite time , to which it may be conceiv'd commensurable : for , to endure , is to be ; and , tho' our duration , which is accompany'd with perpetual alterations and changes , is therefore subject to time , and commensurable to such and such portions of it ; yet god's duration is of a far more sovereign nature . let us reflect , when we say , god was from all eternity , what those words can mean. infinite time neither was , nor can be ; and therefore , to explicate eternity by what neither was , nor can be , is to explicate it by an impossibility , which is to make it inexplicable . time was not before the world , in re ; nor in our understanding , for we were not yet ; nor in god's , for he , being truth it self , cannot know any thing to be actually , when as yet it was not . wherefore , since eternity cannot be explicated by any regard to possible time , it is left that it must be explicated by what the word [ duration ] imports , viz. by being ; and so it must consist in the highest impossibility of not being , which naturally follows from the notion of self-existence . tho' i doubt not but those who are not got above fancy , are as hard put to it , not to imagine a long flux of time before the world ; as they are , not to imagine a vast expansion of empty space beyond the world. and so it must happen , till connexion of terms ( in which only , and not in the fancy , truth is to be found ) comes to govern men's thoughts , and establish their judgments . . but , to leave these little sallies and inroads into metaphysicks , and return to to our business : the next argument is drawn from god's power to annihilate a part of matter , and keep the next bodies from closing ; in which case , a vacuum between them is unavoidable . in answer ; first , i ask how he knows god would keep the next bodies , in that case , from closing ? if it be against the nature of things , he will not do it : and if it be a plain contradiction , as we contend it is , mr. l. himself will not say he can do it . secondly , i fear it would look like a wild paradox , and little less than blasphemy , if i should deny that god can annihilate ; and yet , out of the profound and dutiful reverence i bear to his wisdom , goodness and power , i must declare , it is my tenet , that he cannot ; any more than he can witness a falshood , or be liable to any other imperfection . it will be thought this limits , and consequently takes away his omnipotency : and i , on the contrary , think i have far more reason to judge , that the other opinion argues impotency , and ours settles his omnipotency . common sense seems to tell us , that omnipotency is a power of doing all things , and not of doing nothing . to act , is to do something ; and therefore , to do nothing , or make a nothing , ( which the sense of annihilation , ) is , not to do : and , 't is a strange notion of omnipotency , which puts it to consist ( in such an occasion ) in not doing . i wonder what conceit such discoursers make of the divinity . what i am forc'd to conceive of him , as essential to him , is , that he is a pure actuality of being , ( as far as is on his part , ) actually , and ever exercised ; that he has no power in him undetermin'd to act , as we have ; which argues some potentiality , or imperfection in us . that , actual existence being essential to him , his peculiar effect is , to give existence , or to create things ; and to conserve them in being , which is a perpetual creation , or creation continued ; and , therefore , that 't is more diametrically opposite to his nature , to cause not being , than it is for light to cause darkness . whence follows , that whatever his creatures are naturally disposed for , he is actually bestowing it upon them . since then the essences of all creatures are capacities of being , the same goodness that makes the sun shine on the just and unjust , must give them continually to be actually . the place is not proper to prove this point at large ; but , were i writing metaphysicks , and were oblig'd to handle it throughly , i should not doubt , but to demonstrate from the natures of action , effect , causality , the specification of action , from the natures of creatures , and almost each of god's infinite attributes , that annihilation is both impossible , and also most unworthy the divine nature . some witty men think that annihilation does best sute with god's justice ; and thence conceit , that eternal damnation is nothing else but to be annihilated . whereas , indeed , this tenet violates that attribute in the highest degree : for , to punish a sinner without inflicting something upon him that is penal , is nonsense : and , what pain can a sinner feel when he is nothing , or is not ? . indeed , mr. locke , § . . argues strongly , and ( as far as i can judge ) unanswerably , against the cartesians ; who make the innumerable particles of their aether , tho' jumbled together confusedly , still light so exactly , as to fill every little interstice . did they put them to be fluid , and of a very rare nature , and so , easily pliable , they might make some sense of it : but they make them solid , dry , and of a firm consistency ; for , otherwise , the particles of their elements could not be made by attrition of other parts of their matter ; of which , one of them is ( as it were ) the dust. nor can it avail them to say , those particles are less and less indeterminately ; for , every thing ( and mode too ) in nature ( especially if consistent ) is determin'd to be particularly what it is , and as it is . nor can there be any thing of an indeterminate quantity , any more than there can be a man in common , who is indeterminate and indifferent to be this or that man. . as for his alledging that men have an idea , of vacuum , distinct from the idea of plenum , 't is true , indeed ; and it means the same as non corpus , and consequently non quantum , non quale , &c. and is of the same nature as is chimaera , which means non ens. but , how does it follow hence , that it does or can exist , or that ( as he phrases it ) there is an incomprehensible inane ; unless , with the vulgar schools , we will make every distinct nice conception of ours to be a particular entity , and capable of existing a-part ; which i do not think mr. locke's good judgment will allow of . reflexion eighth , on the fourteenth chapter . this chapter affords much matter for reflexion , which to do as briefly as i can , i will put my respective negatives to mr. locke's affirmatives , giving my reasons for them , and invalidating his . i deny , that the notion of time is so abstruse as he conceives it . the word is used commonly by the vulgar to express what they mean by it , and their usual meaning is the notion or nature of it . no clown can be ignorant of it , if he ever read an almanack , or saw a sun-dial ; unless some witty man comes to puzzle him with doubts and questions ; which he may even in things the vulgar , and all men living , know very perfectly . he knows , tho' not to a mathematical exactness , ( which is not requisite to our time , or our use of it ) that the year begins on new-years day , and that the sun 's diurnal motion , till he returns to the same line or point , makes what we call a day , and that a day is divided into hours . he knows how many days make a month , how many months a year , &c. he esteems all these , however he divides them into lesser , or by addition augments them into greater , to be parts of time ; and , consequently , parts of the sun's motion , as well as he knew that a day was such . if then they know that all particular parts of the sun's motion are particular parts of time , let us abstract from all these particulars , and the motion of the sun , in common , is the common notion of time it self in reality ; however the formal notion of time consists in this , that it be known and regular , ( as the sun's motion is , as far as they can discern , ) so that they can measure and adjust all their actions by it , which 't is evident they may . and this formality of time they do know too ; as appears by using or applying hours , days , months , &c. to measure and adjust all their motions or actions by them . so that this whole discourse of mine , answering the niceties objected , which escap'd the observation of the vulgar , seems to be built on that solid maxim , that the true signification or sense of the words is to be taken from the common usage of them . if mr. locke pleases ( as i think he will not ) to coin another idea of it , and call it time , he may if he pleases ; but it will not be the notion of time which men have had hitherto ; nor will his new notion sute with the sense of mankind ; nor is it possible the signification he imposes upon that word can ever obtain acceptation in the world , unless some supreme authority , which commands all the world , should enjoin , under great penalties , that such a word be taken in that new sense , and no other ; and even that will never be ; for all mankind will never be under any such authority . . i deny that duration ought to be call'd succession , unless restrain'd to corporeal duration , which is the least worthy that name . for to endure is to be , which has steadiness and permanency in its notion ; whereas succession is essentially change , and so rather opposit to duration or being . nor is any thing said to endure because it succeeds , but because it is all the while other things succeed ; or rather , while it self undergoes some accidental change. whence our being is not commensurate to succession as it is being , but as it is changeable one way or other ; which changes being accompany'd with motion , must consequently be successive as it is . angels and pure spirits have duration , tho' they are unchangeable , and therefore unsuccessive ; having no parts or vicissitudes in their natures or operations , as material and quantitative things , or bodies , have . moreover , the notion of meer being is indivisible , whereas the notion of suceession is essentially divisible ; whence they can have no commensuration to one another . for which reason , before ( as we apprehend it ) motion or succession begun , or after it is ended , the things afford us no ground to conceive any thing like before or after , but only one ever-standing or unchangeable and indivisible instant ; which better expresses our eternity , or constantly being ever , than any correspondence to succession or motion can ; whose natures are finite in duration , and so can never reach infinite duration , or that ever-constant being call'd eternity . . i deny absolutely , that the notion of succession ought to be taken from the train of ideas running in our heads , but from the things in nature ; and mr. locke , ( chap. . ) makes motion , which is the same with succession , one of his simple ideas which comes into the mind by divers senses from outward objects . which how to reconcile with his doctrine here , i am at a loss : nor can i see why the rowling of a cart-wheel in the street , or the flying of a bird in the air , should not more naturally and more solidly give us the idea of succession , than our observing the gliding of ideas in our fancy , or mind . . i deny that his argument , drawn from our not perceiving duration when we sleep , does conclude that this successive train of ideas gives us , or is the notion of our duration . for , none can think he endures not , whether he perceives it or no ; or that our duration ceases , or is interrupted , tho' he thinks not of it ; or that its being longer or shorter depends on our having attention to those ideas , but on its correspondence to more or less of the sun's motion : nor , had we endur'd more or less , or been a jot more or less old , whether we had wak'd or slept all our life-time . nor , is this peculiar to the idea of duration , that we have no perception of it in our sleep ; but common to extension , and all other modes whatever ; which , nevertheless , are , or continue in being , after their manner , whether we perceive them or not . wherefore his notion of duration taken from our co-existence to such a train of ideas , is ill-grounded , as not having any the least foundation in solid nature , but in witty fancy . . i deny also , that the idea or notion of succession comes by reflexion on our train of ideas : because experience tells us it comes naturally by a direct impression from outward objects , which we see move or succeed . . i deny absolutely , that , tho' all that 's said be wav'd , a train of our ideas can either be a proper cause of the notion of succession , or represent it : for succession or motion has , of it self , no distinguishable , much less actually distinct parts , any more than permanent quantity , or extension has any nicks or notches to butt , bound , determin or distinguish it here and there ; but they both proceed in one even , confus'd and undistinguishable tenour ; whereas in the train of ideas , each idea is actually distinct from the other . whence the notion of such a succession ought to be one continued idea , or the idea of a continuance , or else it resembles not the thing as it is in nature ; nor consequently , is it a similitude or idea of the thing , or outward object ; that is , 't is no idea at all , nor so much as a good phantasm ; much less is it a notion , or the thing so in the understanding , as it is out of it . whence i must utterly deny what he says here , § . . that motion produces in the mind an idea of succession , any otherwise , than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas . for , distinction can never represent that which is essentially indistinct , as succession is : or , if he means the interval's between the appearances of one idea , and another are indistinct and confused , it will be ask't by what idea this indistinct interval is made known to us ; and why the same idea may not as connaturally be imprinted by the motion of bodies in nature ; the succession of which our eyes , ears , and touch , do testify ? . i must deny too that duration ( as he takes it ) and succession cannot one of them be a measure to the other . for , all that can be conceiv'd of the notion of duration ( besides being ) fitting it to be a measure , is some designed part of motion or succession : and , when two things move , that which moves more regularly ( provided it be evidently knowable , and its quantity some way or other determin'd ) is in all points fitted to be the measure of the others motion . nor is it more difficult to measure the less regular motion by the more regular one , if the other requisites be not wanting , than 't is to measure the extended quantity of a permanent body , v. g. a yard of cloth ( which as found in the piece is undetermin'd ) by a yard-wand , whose quantity is stated and determin'd . for example , when i write or walk an hour , the motion of sand in an hour-glass , which is more known and determinate , measures the motions of my pen or legs , whose successive quantity or motion is less certainly known or determinate than the other is . and , as that determinate motion measures the other , so the motion of the sun , which is knowable to all mankind ( which the glass was not ) and , to their apprehension , regular , brought to proportionate and determinate parts by help of our understanding , is apt to measure all our motions whatever ; which measure we call time , as i think , mr. l. grants . whence i deny that time is measur'd by the motion of the sun ( as mr. l. objects , and justly wonders at ) for it is that very motion , fitted , as is now said , to be a common measure to all others . he mentions many other signes or marks of periods supposed equidistant , as the returning of birds at such seasons , the ripening of fruit , or fire lighted up at the same distance of time , increast in heat , &c. but what must measure the distance between those periods ? or , what 's this to our time as it is now . st. austin was puzzled to know , whether , if rota figuli moveretur , and all things else stood still , there would in that case be time or no. but all these extravagant suppositions are frivolous . mankind takes their notions from things as they are , and as they work upon their senses ; which , in our case , is the regular and known motion of the sun ; and they take the notions of its parts , from the designation , division and multiplication , made by our understanding ; and not from wild suppositions , which neither come home to the point , nor are , ever were , or shall be ; nor are , or could be so regular and knowable to all mankind , as this motion of the sun is . . i must absolutely deny , and moreover think it a most extraordinary position , to affirm that we must not judge that the periods of duration are equal , by the motion of the sun , but by the train of ideas that passed in men's minds in the intervals ; which , i conceive , is the sense of his § . . and § . . and of the tenour of his discourse in divers places . for , first , how does it appear that the motion of the train of those ideas is it self equal , or near equal , in any one or the same man at all times ; without which we cannot know by their equal succession that the periods which they are to measure are equal , when a man is in a stupid humour , his thoughts play very little and slowly ; when he is sound a-sleep , not at all ; when awake and brisk , or agitated by some great passion , they move very swiftly ; when sedate and compos'd , more moderately ; so that 't is impossible to fix the succession of those ideas in any regularity . next , how can we know that those ideas move regularly , and not rather very differently , in diverse men ? contemplative , melancholly and dull men use to fix their mind long upon one thought ; and , consequently , upon one object of their thought , or one idea : whereas those who are endow'd with gayity of wit , ( which is defin'd c●ler motus intellectûs ) and those who are possest with phrenzy or madness have their ideas succeeding one another very swiftly : when we judge , we fix our thought ; when we invent , we muster up whole armies of them on a sudden . ly , let any man consult his own interiour , and examin with the most exact reflexion , whether his ideas have mov'd swiftly , or slowly , the last hour , he will find himself at a loss to give any good account of them ; much more to assure himself , or ascertain others that they moved regularly : wherefore the train of ideas ( and the same may be said of his other imaginary measures , § . . ) are quite destitute of that chief property of a measure , viz. that it self be regular ; and , if it concerns all mankind , most notorious to all who need it . for want of which , and for the reasons lately given , perhaps no two men in the world could agree , or come to a right understanding with one another , about the time of their actions , which would put all the world in confusion about their common affairs . lastly , mr. l. assignes no reason to evince the regular succession of his ideas in his § . . which seems the proper place to assert that principal point upon which all his discourse depends ; and he only says , that he guesses that the appearance of the ideas vary not very much in a waking man ; and that they seem to have certain bounds in their quickness and slowness . and the reason he gives afterwards , § . . for this ( as he calls it ) odd conjecture , is easy to be solv'd by our principles : for , there is no doubt but that some short time must be allow'd for the coming of impressions from without , for the ferrying them over the medium , and the re-exciting them in the fancy , by which notions are bred in our mind ; which a very quick motion of the outward object may prevent , as in a brand whirl'd round , &c. and there must be also some marks to make us observe too slow motions ; yet , between those two extremes , there are so many degrees , and such variety intervene , that the succession of those ideas may nevertheless be very uneven and irregular . rather , i may with better reason , affirm that it is impossible it should be any way regular at all ; since their succession depends on the fancy ( the most irregular and unconstant faculty we have ) applying the material ideas or phantasms a-new to the seat of knowledge ; which application thousands of causes may retard , or accelerate . his objections against the regularity of the sun's motion not being mathematically such , is of no force . 't is sufficient that it be so regular as serves our use to measure , and adjust our actions by it ; and the same may be objected against one measuring cloth by a yard-wand , whose length is never mathematically exact . . wherefore , notwithstanding the respect i have for mr. l. i cannot but think that such quivering grounds as these can never support his most unaccountable opinion , § . . that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man , are , as it were , the measure and standard of all other successions . his own good judgment saw well the weakness of his grounds ; wherefore his clear sincerity , and usual modesty would not suffer him to deliver assertively , and assuredly , what he saw was uncertain ; and therefore he propos'd it rather as a paradox , or ( he calls it ) an odd conjecture , than maintain'd it as a position ; however , the conception being so new , he was tempted not to pretermit it wholly : in doing which too , i believe , he not so much gratify'd himself , as the humor of most late philosophers ; who are far more addicted to value what 's quaint than what 's solid . reflexion ninth , on the fifteenth chapter , of duration and expansion consider'd together . . i have already said enough of imaginary space , imaginary time , and of the true notion of eternity . philosophers must speak of things as they are , if they mean to speak truth ; and , therefore , the applying our idea of duration , which is a mode of ens , to imaginary time before the creation , when as yet there was no such ens as was capable of such a mode , is evidently against the first principles of our understanding ; and the same illusion of fancy that induced mr. l. to put space ( which is a mode of that ens called body , and neither has , or ever had any being but its , nor power to beget any idea at all in the mind , but by being it ) beyond the world , that is , beyond the universality of things ; where there can only be pure nothing . when we relinquish the things on which only truths are grounded , all the ideas we pursue and substitute in their rooms must necessarily be meer fancies , and inevitably plunge us into contradictions and absurdities . wherefore , i have no occasion to make any further reflexions upon the grounds of this present discourse , the foundation of it being , i hope , overthrown in my preliminaries , and divers other places ; yet , upon his manner of his carrying it on , i must a little reflect . as , . first , that they who endeavour to introduce opinions inconsistent with our natural notions , must be forced to change the common signification of words , lest they cross them in their discourses , and in the explication of their tenet . hence ( as i have noted above ) mr. l. alter'd the signification of the word [ solidity , ] to make way for an unsolid being , or an empty space , as also , the meaning of the word [ extension , ] which he would confine to material beings ; and chose to make use of the word [ space , ] because it seem'd less to connotate the notion of body , than extension did . and , here , he rather chuses to make use of the word [ expansion , ] as if it were better , that is , different from extension . the word is proper enough , for which i do not much blame him : only , i must affirm , that no wit , nor even fancy of man , can conceive or imagine any thing , existing any where but in the imagination , ( or , even scarcely there , ) to be expanded , but it must also be really extended ; nor to be extended , but it must be divisible ; and , therefore , its parts separable by the intervening body , ( which he denies of his inane , ) unless we put them to be insuperably hard , solid , or infractil , as epicurus did his atoms ; or that , if they be thus extended , and yet the parts of the inane do not separate , and give way to a new-come body , there must not inevitably follow a penetration of extended parts ; that is , those parts that must be without one another , must be at the same time within one another ; which is a direct contradiction . . secondly , i cannot but specially remark , to what incredible extravagancies fancy , if not check'd by reason , transports men , tho' otherwise of the greatest parts ; even so far as to conceit that god's immensity consists in a kind of quantitative diffusion of his essence , or in the commensuration of it to an infinite expansion . for , what else can his argument here , § . . for his infinitely expanded inane mean , couch'd in these words , [ unless he ( viz. the denier of such a vacuity ) will confine god within the limits of matter . ] what , i say , can this mean , but that he apprehends god's unconfin'd or infinite being , would be confin'd , finite , and consequently lost , unless there were an infinite quantity of imaginary space answerable to it in extent or expansion . a conceit certainly most unworthy the divinity , whose essence was equally immense ere any creatures were made : nor can any of his essential attributes be taken in order to them ; for , this would give his essence some kind of dependence on his creatures . this is something like ( but much worse than ) the opinion of those ancients , who thought god to be the soul of the world. — penitúsque infusa per artus mens agitat molem , & magno se corpore miscet . which whimsy making god a kind of compart with matter , is long since exploded out of the schools by the solid principles of christian faith. god is not in his creatures by any co-extension to them , or any other way than by giving them being ; and his immensity , which is essential to him , consists in this , that , did an infinity of creatures exist , he would be intrinsecally , and of himself , able to give , or rather , actually giving being to them all . or else , [ existence ] being the least improper notion we can attribute to god , he is said to be immense , because his existence is illimited , or infinite . . thirdly , i much wonder what those words should mean , [ and he , i think , very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding , who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts farther than god exists , or imagine any expansion where he is not . ] for , first , i deny any understanding can conceive or have any notion of a vacuum , tho' he may have a fancy of it ; the notion being the thing it self in our understanding , imprinted by outward objects , by means of the senses ; whereas , his inane never made , nor can make any impression upon the senses at all . next , for the same reason , i deny our thoughts are extended to imaginary space , if by thoughts he means notions , or judgments built on them . lastly , i see not why our fancy may not extend it self farther than god exists ; that is , ( as is lately explicated , ) gives being to creatures ; as well as fancy can extend it self farther than god's omnipotency can act . splenetick or maniacal men can fancy they are made of glass ; that , if they make water , they shall drown all the world ; that , tho' standing on the ground , they touch the moon ; that their nose , tho' but an inch and an half long , touches and feels the opposite wall , tho' perhaps a furlong distant : the quaker fancy'd he was a grain of wheat ; and , when any pidgeons flew over his head ; fell down in a marvellous fright , lest they should peck him up , and fly away with him , &c. now , none of these are a possible object of the divine omnipotence , which is employ'd in making things , which are the ground of truth ; and not in making nothings , or undoing the natures of things , ( as fancy does , ) and so laying a ground for falshood and contradiction . . fourthly , i remark , that the texts of holy writ , which speak humano more , or in accommodation to our low fancies and conceptions , are the worst sort of arguments imaginable , and most unfit to be alledg'd for such by a philosopher ; being apt to lead us into a thousand enormous errours . for , if they be taken in a literal rigour , ( as philosophical arguments ought , ) they would make god no better than his poor changeable creatures . they would make him , at every turn , angry , sorry , repentant , subject to all , or most passions ; moving from this place to that ; and liable to innumerable imperfections . all which are opposite to the unchangeable nature of the divinity ; and therefore ought to be remov'd from him , as far as our thoughts can distance them . . the divine nature is essentially actual being ; and he goes below his soveraign excellency who conceives any thing of it by any other notion , or speaks of it by any word that is in the least potential , or comes not up to actual and essential existence . all his attributes , as metaphysicks demonstrate , do flow or follow from that infinit source of all perfection , self-existence ; or rather , are nothing but it diversly conceived by us ; and , therefore , cannot , according to literal truth , be any other way rightly explicated but by being . much more then are all the modes of ens , founded in creatures , especially those belonging to the basest of all other entities , corporeal things , ( such as are diffusion , or commensuration to space or quantity ) most highly derogatory to that most simple and all-comprehending mind , which eminently and actually contains them all , and concenters in its self all possible being . creatures are no more but [ rags of being , torn into thin formalities ; ] whereas the divinity is the inexhausted source of existence or being it self in the most full , compleat , and intire latitude its vast notion can bear . . i should think my self very happy , if i could correct this influence of fancy over men's thoughts , when they speak of spiritual natures , without making long excursions into metaphysicks ; and , perhaps , this plain discourse may help much towards it ; it being fetch'd from our most natural notions , and known to us ( as it were ) by a kind of experience . let us take then any spiritual mode or accident , a virtue for example , and let it be that of temperance ; which done , let us ask our natural thoughts , how long , broad , or thick that virtue is ? is it as little as a barly-corn , or as big as a house ? is it a yard in length , or but an inch ? is it as thick as a wall , or as thin as a wafer ? &c. and , honest nature would answer for us , that 't is nonsense to ask such a question ; its nature being perfectly of another kind , and utterly disagreeable to any of these accidents . again , let us ask what colour or figure it is of ? is it blew , green , or yellow ? is it round , four-square , or triangular ? is it rare or dense , hot , cold , moist , or dry ? and we shall discover that the asker , if serious , would be look'd upon by all mankind as a fool or a mad-man ; such qualities as these being as much disparate from the subject we are enquiring about , as knowledge is to a beetle , or science to a mushrom . and yet , it would not be wonder'd at , that such questions as these should be ask'd of any body whatever . and what does this amount to , but that nature assures us , by her free and sober acknowledgment of it , that this spiritual mode , call'd virtue or temperance , is quite different from the whole nature of body , and from any corporeal thing that by our senses ever enter'd into our fancy . since then this spiritual mode or accident has nothing at all to do with body or its modes , it is clearly evinced by the ingenuous confession of unprejudiced nature , that the subject of it , which we call a spirit , is so vastly removed from all we can say of body ( being only excepted ) that 't is perfect nonsense to attribute any thing to it which we find in corporeal natures . since then we can truly say of corporeal natures , that they are long , short , diffus'd , extended , commensurate to one another in their bulk , motion , duration , &c. we must be forced to deny all those of spirits ; and to judge that they have nothing to do with any of these , nor can bear the having such modes apply'd to them , or said of them , under penalty of forfeiting our plainest reason , and contradicting common sense . and , if it be such an absurdity to apply them to created spirits , how much more absurd must it be to explicate god's eternity , infinity , or immensity by such gross resemblances , or an imaginary order to the short and fleeting natures of corporeal creatures ? . lastly , to sum up all , i deny that the notion of motion is taken from the continu'd train of distinguishable ideas ; and i affirm that it is imprinted by the object without me , and is one continually successive and undistinguish'd mode there as it is in the thing . i deny too , that duration is motion or succession , but only being ; tho' our being ( it being unconstant and fleeting ) is accompany'd with succession , and subject to motion and time ; and commensurate to them , only ( not as 't is being , but ) as 't is fleeting , or perpetually changing some way or other . i deny it also , as the most prodigious enormity a rational soul could be liable to , thro' its giving up the reins of reason to wild fancy , to say , that our measure of time is applicable to duration before time. for mr. locke makes duration inconceivable without succession , and there could be no succession before the world , when there was only one unchangeable god , in whom is no shadow of vicissitude or succession . does not the plainest sense tell us , that we cannot apply one thing to another , but there must be one and another ; and where 's that other duration or succession before time , or before the world , whenas 't is confess'd there was none . can any man apply a mode of thing to nothing , which yet must be avowed by this author ; for before the world there was nothing but god ; to whom it could not be apply'd , and therefore there was nothing for mr. l. to apply it to . but this is parallel to that seducing fancy that inveigled his reason to hold a vacuum ; he took the notion of space from body , and then apply'd it to what was neither spirit nor body , but meer nothing ; and , here , he took his notion of duration , or succession from bodies moving ; and when he has done , he would apply it to what 's not body ( nor spirit neither ) nor motion , nor like it , but contrary to it ; that is , he would apply it to meer nothing . i desire he would please to consider , that the thing to which another is apply'd must exist as well as that which is apply'd to it ; and this antecedently to his application of one to the other . wherefore both space and duration being both modes or accidents , he must first prove , there is something beyond the world to which he can apply the mode of space ; or something before the world , to which he can apply the mode of successive duration , or it is perfect nonsense even to talk of applying one to the other . but this he has not done , and his way of attempting to do it seems to be this ; first , he fancies he can apply those modes to something there , and then ; and thence concludes , there must be things there to which they may be apply'd ; as if his fancy could create entities at pleasure , or to please her humour . nor matters it that we can apply stated measures of duration , and thence imagin duration where nothing does really endure or exist , or by this means imagin to morrow , next year , or seven years hence ; for we cannot apply them by our reason , but only upon supposition that they will exist , and then there will be also some thing or subject supposed fit for them to be apply'd to ; whereas an imaginary space beyond the world , or imaginary time or succession before or after the world , neither is now , nor can there ever be any possible subject to which they can be apply'd ; and so the application of them can bear no manner of sense . i must confess the word [ imagin ] which mr. l. uses , cap. . § . is very fit for his purpose , and gives the greatest semblance of truth to his discourse . but , by his leave , our imagination cannot create entities , nor make things , to which he is to apply his ideas , to exist when they do not , nor ever will exist ; and , unless it can do this , his application is no application ; for to apply a thing , or mode of thing , to nothing , is no application at all . both space and successive duration are modes proper to body , whence only we had them ; and , a mode without the thing of which 't is a mode ( modes having no entity of their own ) is a meer nothing . let him prove then first , that there are beyond or before the world any thing to which they can be apply'd ; otherwise he will be convinced to ground all his discourse on this principle , [ whatever we can imagin , is . ] which maxim being utterly deny'd , he must make it evident by proof . which if he does , it will do his book more service , than any principles taken from all the sciences in the world ; for all these are as much opposite to him , as he is to them. reflexion tenth , on the th and th chapters . . i have little to except against his th chapter , of number . nothing , certainly , could have been deliver'd more solidly , or more ingeniously . i only reflect on the last words in it ; viz. that the endless addition of numbers , so apparent to the mind , is that , i think , which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity . for , since it is granted that all we do actually conceive , how much soever it be , is finite ; and all our ideas are of what we do actually conceive ; i cannot comprehend how that which is finite can give us the idea of infinite . it may be said , that our reflecting that we can still add more endlesly , is that which gives us the notion of infinity . i reply , that , were this addition of numbers taken from the objects side , so that we saw that by such an addition , number might at length arrive to be truly or actually infinite ; then , indeed , that object ( viz. number ) thus consider'd , or reflected on , might beget in us the idea or notion of infinite : but , 't is taken only from our side , who are the adders , or multipliers ; and so , means only that we can never come to take so much of it , but more may by us be still taken ; whence , since all we can possibly take of it ( our term of life , and consequently , our additions being stinted and limited ) must still be finite ; this may , indeed , furnish us with an idea or notion of a very great number , and by us incomputable ; which notwithstanding , for any thing we can thence gather , may be of it self finite , tho' our additions can never de facto reach its by-us-innumerable total . now , how a finite number , a finite number of times repeated , tho' we called in algebraical multiplication to our assistance , can give us the notion of infinite , which is contradictory to it , surpasses all imagination . and , instead of shewing how it does so , mr. locke tells us here , that we must suppose an inexaustible remainder beyond the finite idea , and that infinity consists in a supposed endless progression ; which is , in a manner , to suppose or beg the whole question : for , if this inexhaustible remainder be still actually finite , ( especially , if held by us to be such , ) it can never give us the idea of infinite actually , which only is the true idea of infinite ; a potential infinity , or a meer power to be infinite , rather signifying not to be infinite ; for , nothing is , what it is only a power to be , especially such a power as is never reducible to act : wherefore , this inexhaustible remainder must be supposed more than potentially , that is , actually infinite ; which is the thing in question . or , if he says , this remainder is only a power to be still greater , but is impossible ever to be actually infinite , then how can it ever , possibly , beget in us an idea of true or actual infinity ? . i have explicated above , by how plain and easie a method we come to have our notion of infinity ; which is , * by joining the sense of the adverb [ non ] to that of [ finis : ] and mr. locke , ch. . § . . seems to come over to my thoughts ; where he says , that the idea of infinity seems to be pretty clear , when we consider nothing in it but the negation of an end. whereas , on the other side , he grants , that the idea of an infinite space or duration is very obscure and confused . now , if the clearness of an idea be the greatest perfection it can have , it follows , even from his own concession , that the idea of infinity ought rather to be taken from the negation of finiteness , than from this confus'd way of adding and repeating more and more of space or duration . add , that ( as was said ) this way can only give us the idea of a potential infinity ; nor that neither well , unless that power to be infinite could ever be reduc'd to act , which is impossible it should : now , the negation of finiteness fully reaches an actual and absolute infinity ; and is applicable , and truly to be predicated of god himself , and all his intrinsecal attributes , as being , duration , power , wisdom , &c. without needing any recourse to the transitory and limited natures or modes of creatures to explicate it . whereas , mr. locke's idea of infinite cannot be predicated of god , or his attributes , at all : nor can we say that god is infinite , in his sense of that word ; in regard he says , that our idea of infinity is ( as he thinks ) an endless growing idea ; for , the infinity of god , and of all that can be conceiv'd to belong to him , is incapable of growth , degrees , or additions ; but is one indivisible being , without any possibility of our conceiving more or less in it , if we conceive it as we ought . . on the other side ; how facil and natural is my way of our gaining an idea or notion of infinite ? we see most things we converse with to be limited , or finite ; wherefore , the notion of the thing as 't is limited , or ( which is the same ) the notion of limitation or end , is very familiar and obvious to our thoughts . since then experience teaches us that we can very easily join a negation to finiteness or end when-ever we please , as well as we can to any other notion ; and , thence , have a kind of complex notion of infinite , as well as we can of immortal , immense , immaterial , incorporeal , indivisible , &c. we have the notion of infinity given to our hands , without more ado ; or without perplexing our selves with making use of those ●ame helps of adding or repeating those stinted measures of corporeal modes or accidents , whose very natures ( besides the finite number of times we can only repeat them ) do make them utterly incapable ever to reach actual , that is , true infinity . . as for the question he introduces here , viz. whether the idea of infinite be positive , or negative , or includes something of both ; my firm opinion is , that , however the gramatical way of expressing that conception seems to be negative , yet the notion it self meant by that word , is altogether positive . my reason is , because the idea or notion of finis or limit ( in what kind soever it be ) does formally signifie [ no farther in that kind , ] which is perfectly negative : wherefore , the negation added to finite , in the word [ infinite , ] quite taking off that negative sense which did before belong to the word [ finite , ] gives the word [ infinite ] a sense purely positive . again , we can have no direct impression from the thing ; nor , consequently , direct notion of [ infinite , ] nor , consequently , any reflex notion of it ; for , all reflex notions have for their proper object , the direct ones which are already in our minds : wherefore , if the notion of [ infinity ] can be had any other way than by adding [ non ] to [ finite , ] it must come from our reason finding out by discourse , that there is a first and self-existent being , whose essence and attributes are beyond all limits , or actually infinite . whence follows , that , since clear reason demonstrates , that all created entities , and consequently , all the modes belonging to them , are finite , and only god is infinite in his essence , and in all his intrinsecal attributes : and reason also tells us , that all which is in god , ( to whom only the notion of infinite can belong , ) is most highly positive ; the same reason teaches us to correct in our thoughts the grammatical negativeness of the word [ infinite , ] which can only be apply'd to him ; and to look upon it , and esteem it , as most perfectly positive . . i cannot pass by , unreflected on , a passage , § . . in which mr. locke's fancy imposes strangely upon his reason : he says , that nothing is more unconceivable to him , than duration , without succession . what thinks he of the duration of god , in * whom is no vicissitude , or shadow of change ; ( which text , i believe , no man , at least , no christian , but holds to be plain , and literally true ; ) whereas , succession is essentially perpetual change ? let him please to reflect , that [ to endure so long , ] is nothing else but [ to be so long ; ] which done , by cutting off [ so long ] in both those sayings , he will sind , that [ to endure , ] is neither more , nor less , but simply [ to be . ] whence his conceit is so far from being true , that nothing more wrongs duration , or being , than does succession , or motion . and , therefore , our duration here , which is unsteady , unconstant , and transitory , is justly reputed to be the worst sort of duration , or being ; and the next to not-being , or not-enduring at all . again , common sense tells us , that nothing moves meerly for motion's sake ; and , therefore , that all motion is , to attain something which is not-motion , but the end of it , that is , rest. wherefore , eternal rest , or that duration called eternity , is the end of all the motion of the whole world ; conformably to what the holy scripture , speaking of the state of eternity , tells us , that , * tempus non erit amplius ; time ( nor , consequently , succession ) shall be no more . wherefore , since , taking away motion and succession , 't is impossible to imagin any thing in duration , but only being ; and eternity is an infinitely better duration , or state of being , than this transitory one , which is successive ; it follows , that eternal rest , in which we have all we can have , or could acquire by motion , at once , is the only true duration , and our duration here only the way to it . so far is duration from being unconceivable without succession , if we guide our thoughts by principles , and not by meer fancy . reflexion eleventh . on the eighteenth , nineteenth , and twentieth chapters . . the three next chapters of simple modes , are very suitable to mr. locke's doctrine delivered formerly , and almost all of them agreeable to nature ; particularly the th , which gives us more genuin definitions of the several passions ; and more aptly , in my judgment , expresses them than mr. hobbes has done ; tho' he is justly held to have a great talent in delivering his conceptions . but , i must deny that the perception or thought , made by impressions on the body , by outward objects , is to be called sensation . for if thoughts be sensations , then the sense can think ; which being the proper act of the mind , i believe none will say if he reflects that our soul is of a spiritual nature . nor are the modes of thinking at all proper to the senses . the truth is , that man having two natures in one suppositum , all the impressions upon him as he is an animal , do also at the same time ( i may say the same instant ) affect him also as he is spiritual ; whence they are to be called sensations , as they are receiv'd in that material part called the seat of knowledge ; and the same direct impressions , as they proceed farther , and affect his soul , are call'd notions , or simple apprehensions . wherefore , as the two natures in man are distinct , and have their distinct properties and modes ; so the words , that are to express what 's peculiar to each of those natures , are to be distinguish'd too , and kept to their proper signification ; which cannot be , if thought , which is peculiar to the mind , be confounded with sensation , which properly belongs to the corporeal part . but i suspect the printer may be here in the fault , and not the author ; the sense in this place being something imperfect . . to the question proposed , ( cap. . § . ) whether it be not probable , that thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul ? i answer , that 't is more than probable ; for 't is demonstrable , that 't is only the action , and not the essence of it . for , in such natures as are potential , or apt to receive impressions from other things , ( as the soul is in this state ; ) and therefore their essence does not consist in being pure acts ( as angels are , ) being must necessarily be presuppos'd to operating ; especially , when their first operation ( as thinking is to the soul ) is a meer passion , caus'd by impressions from another thing ; which are therefore purely accidental to the subject that receives them . and i wonder mr. locke would even propose this as a question to be yet decided , or think it but probable ; since he has formerly maintain'd assertively , that men do not always think : for if it be not certain that thinking is not the essence of the soul , it follows necessarily , that men must always think ; since the soul can never be without her essence , or what 's essential to her . . his position , that things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain , however it may hap to be misunderstood by some well-meaning bigots , is a most solid truth ; and is exceedingly useful to explicate christian principles , and to shew god's wisdom and goodness in governing mankind connaturally . he proposes to him fulness of joy , and pleasures for evermore ; and such as , being spiritual and most agreeable to the nature of the soul , are pure , durable , and filling the whole capacity of its boundless desire ; not transitory , mean , and base ; which , tho' they cloy , never satisfie . heaven would not be heaven , if it were not infinitely pleasant and delightful ; nor would hell be hell , if it were not penal . and in case that explication of epicurus his tenet , which is given it by some of his followers , be truly his , which makes man's summum bonum consist in pleasure at large , and chiefly in the best pleasures of the mind , it would not misbecome a christian philosopher . whence results this corollary , that the whole body of christian morality depends , as on its practical principle , upon our making a wise choice of the pleasures we pursue here . for , the object of our will , and consequently , of its acts of love , is an appearing good , and the lively appearance of that good is that which makes the will prompt to act effectually ; whence , since that which breeds pleasure in us , must needs appear lively to be a good to us , there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most pleasant , or most agreeable to our true nature , reason ; ( such as the best spiritual goods are ; ) and we may be sure by such a well-made choice to arrive at that best , greatest , and purest pleasure , eternal glory . reflexion twelfth . on the th . chapter . . in this chapter of power , i find more to admire than confute . the author always ingenious , even when he errs , has here much out done his former self . particularly , his explication of freewill , is ( generally speaking ) both solid and acute ; and his doctrine that liberty is consistent with a perfect determination to goodness , and virtue is both learned and pious . yet i am forced to disagree with him in some particulars : in giving my thoughts of which i will imitate mr. locke's laudable method ; in making my discourses subservient , and in shewing them to be agreeable , to christian principles . . 't is an excellent thought , that the clearest idea of active power is had from spirit . for bodies can act no otherwise , than as they are acted on themselves ; nor can the first mov'd body that moves the rest , push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not body , or by some spiritual agent ; which therefore has the truest notion of agency in it , without any mixture of patiency ; because the body mov'd cannot react upon it . tho' therefore we may have by our senses the idea of action and passion , from the effects we see daily wrought by natural causes on fit subjects ; yet the clearest idea of action , is given us by our reason , finding out that the beginner of corporeal action is a separated spirit , or pure act ; and therefore not at all passive from any other creature , nor from the body it operates on , by reaction , as is found in corporeal agents . and , our reason gives us this idea , ( as it does many other reflex ones ) by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be processus in infinitum amongst corporeal agents ; nor can they , of themselves alone , begin to move themselves , nor move one another circularly ; and therefore the first corporeal motion must necessarily be originiz'd from some pure spirit or angel. now , mr. locke conceives that the soul , according to her faculty call'd [ will ] moving the body , gives him this clearest idea of active power ; which tenet i have in diverse places disprov'd * formerly ; and shown that the soul , by reason of her potential state here , cannot principiate any bodily action ; nor the man neither , unless wrought upon by some external or internal agent , which is in act it self . . he judges with good reason , that the vulgar mistake of philosophers , in making every faculty or power a distinct entity , has caus'd much obscurity and uncertainty in philosophy ; which humour of multiplying entities , i am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand , in making the understanding and will to be one and the same power , and affirming that they only differ , formally , in degree . he shows clearly how , in proper speech , the will is not free but the man ; unless it be signified with a reduplication , that by the word [ will ] is meant man , according to that power in him call'd the will. for powers ( as he discourses well ) belong only to agents , and are attributes only of substances , and not of the powers themselves . perhaps this reason of his will abet my position , that the understanding and will are the same power . those who make them two , do this because they find in the notion of [ will ] only a power of acting , and not of knowing ; and in the notion of [ understanding ] only a power of knowing , and not of acting : but the same men make the understanding direct the will , which they call a blind power ; by which they make one of those powers , formally as such , to work upon the other , as if the former were an agent , and the latter a patient . i add , moreover , that they do this with the worst grace that is possible ; for what avails it the will , to be directed by the understanding , if it does not know how the understanding directs it ? and to make the will to know , is to make it a knowing power , which is to make the will ( tho' they never meant it ) to be the understanding . not reflecting in the mean time when our understanding is full of any apparent good , the man pursues it , and so becomes , or has in him a principle or power of acting ; which is what we call will. . perhaps a philosophical discourse , beginning from the principles in this affair , if exprest literally , and pursu'd home by immediate consequences , may set this whole business in a clearer light ; and show us very evidently how man determins himself to action ; and therefore is free ; as also how he is predetermin'd to determin himself , than any particular reflexions on our own interiour : which , tho' they may oftentimes have some truth in them , yet , not beginning from the bottom-truths that concern the point in hand , they can never be steady , but are now and then liable to some errours . . beginning then with the animal part in man , and considering him barely as an animal , and wrought upon as other animals are , i discourse thus . particles , agreeable to the nature of the animal , being by the senses convey'd into the brain , do , if they be but few , lightly affect it ; and work no other effect but a kind of small liking of it ; if more , they make it ( as we say ) begin to fancy it : but , if they be very many , and sent from an object very agreeable or good to such a nature ; they will in proportion to their multitude and strength , cause naturally a tendency towards it , and powerfully excite the spirits , so as to make the animal pursue it ; that is , they will become such a principle of action ; which in meer animals we call appetite . to which action that meer animal is not carry'd thro' choice , or freely , but is naturally and necessarily determin'd to act for the attainment of that good , in the same manner as iron follows the load-stone . but , if we consider this animal , as having now a rational and knowing compart join'd to it , things will be order'd after another manner : for , those impressions are carry'd farther than the region of the brain , even into the soul it self , which is endow'd with a faculty of reflecting upon those her notions , whence she gains exacter knowledge of those bodies that imprinted them . nor only so , but she can reflect upon her own operations too , and know that she knows them ; by which means she comes acquainted with her own nature , and comes to see that knowledge and reason is that nature of hers ; which she finds is a nobler part of the man , than is the body ; because by it she excels and governs beasts ; and , in great part , under god , manages corporeal nature . moreover , she can discourse her thoughts , compare the objects , or the goods they propose , and gather the preference some ought to have above others . . things standing thus with the man , it is evident that he has now not only that nature called the body , to provide for ; but another , and that a spiritual , and much better nature , to look to , and to procure for it all the good he can , and such goods as are agreeable to it . he finds evidently , that no corporeal things can be its proper good , taking it as 't is distinct from the body . he may easily discern , that its distinct nature being knowing , or rational , nothing can perfect it but what is according to reason , or improves knowledge ; and that the acquisition of science does perfect it in the latter regard , and virtue in the former ; virtue being nothing but a disposition to act according to right reason in such and such matters , or in such and such occasions . reason therefore is the ground of all true morality ; and , to act according to reason , is to act virtuously : wherefore , to act virtuously would be most natural to man , if his true nature be not depraved ; which it cannot , without impiety , be thought to be , if we consider it as it came immediately from god's hand . wherefore , if it be not so now , but be blinded and mis-led from reason and virtue , by passion and vice , ( as we experience it is , ) it is demonstrable hence , a posteriori , that it has been some way or other perverted since its creation ; which christianity tells us , has happen'd thro' original sin , transfus'd from adam . moreover , as the sense of corporeal or sensible pleasure or pain invites the man to pursue what is for the good of the body , and makes him tend towards what 's agreeable , and eschew what 's harmful to it ; so , in man , as he is rational , there is , or ought to be , answerable to those , a spiritual pleasure and pain , viz. the satisfaction and dis-satisfaction of mind , which we call conscience , or the law of nature , annex'd to all our actions ; our thoughts ( as st. paul says ) accusing or excusing one another ; so to keep us from unreasonableness , or vice , and make us more pliable to follow reason or virtue . for , as grief or pain is caus'd in us by our knowing that our bodies , for which we have a great concern , is disorder'd ; so the stings of conscience ( as far as they proceed from nature ) come from our knowing that our better part , our soul , for which we ought to have an incomparably higher concern , is wounded or disorder'd in her rationality , which is her essence . . hence is seen , that man is apt to be wrought upon by two several sorts of motives , viz. those which are sutable to the good of the body , and those which are agreeable to the good of the soul. now , were not humane nature ( as was said ) perverted , these two could not clash ; nor would there be any inclination in the man to do any thing which could prejudice his superior part , reason ; to which the inferior , the body , is naturally subservient . but , man's nature being poison'd in the spring-head , the motives of the first kind did hazard quite to over-bear the motives of the second sort ; and so mankind became liable to act , in a manner , perpetually against reason , or , ( to express it in christian language , ) all his actions might have been sinful , and himself a slave to sin. wherefore , to obviate the violent impulses of passion , and to strengthen our reason against its assaults , god's wisdom , goodness and mercy took care to give us a doctrine full of supernatural motives , and those the most powerful ones that could be conceiv'd ; taught us by a divine master , and ascertain'd after the best manner ; so to make the appearance of the eternal goods it proposed ( if reflected on ) lively ; which might keep us upright , and move us effectually to follow our true nature , reason ; and so pursue our true last end , by the practice of virtue . . now , there can be no question but that , both in the state of pure and uncorrupted nature , as also in the corrupted state of it , thus powerfully assisted , the innate propension of the will tending strongly to good or happiness ; and [ good ] and [ motive ] being in our case the same , eternal goods would most strongly carry the will , and prevail over temporal ones ; as certainly as heat ut octo would prevail over heat ut duo , were there the same application of one as of the other to the same object equally well dispos'd ; in case the proposal or appearance of both these goods were but equal . . both these motives , natural and supernatural , have their several species or phantasms beating upon the seat of knowledge ; with this difference , that the natural phantasms , being directly imprinted , are proper ones ; but those reflex ones , being of spiritual natures ( as the words and language they are express'd in do testifie ) are metaphorical and improper . as then , when in a meer animal a sensation is made by a small number of agreeable effluviums they make only a slight fancy , imagination or representation of it ; but when an impression is made by a great multitude of them , the animal is naturally ripe for action , and is enabled , or has a power to act , which power , thus prompt to act , we call appetite : so ( as was said above ) in a rational or knowing animal , a small quantity of reflex notions may serve to give it a speculative knowledge of the object proposed : but , when those reflex impressions are many , and of such objects as , being very agreeable or good to our true nature , are therefore highly concerning us to have them ; the appearance of them is so lively , and the strength of their motive force is so great , that the man becomes fit to act for them ; which principle of action we call will. so that knowledge and will differ but in degree , as did fancy and appetite in a meer animal . by which explication are avoided all the incoherent positions about this subject ; such as are , that the understanding directs the will ; that the will knows ; that one power works upon another , &c. whence is seen , . first , that the way to conquer in our spiritual warfare , is , to strive to multiply and strengthen those reflex thoughts , especially those given us by supernatural motives ; and to make their appearance lively in the soul ; that so it may be able to beat down and overcome the opposite band of impressions from corporeal objects which assault it : which i conceive to be what is literally meant by a lively faith working in us that best virtue , charity . next , in order to the same end , we must endeavour , by a cautious and prudent avoidance , to lessen and weaken the impressions from corporeal objects ; which is done by that virtue which we call temperance , or ( when 't is to some high degree ) mortification ; and , by that means to dim the appearance those objects would otherwise make ; lest , if it be too lively , they should overcome the motive force of those objects which are spiritual . but , it is to be noted , that the multiplying , or frequently repeating those reflex impressions , are not so necessary to every person , nor always the best . for , a wise , judicious christian , who , out of a clear sight of spiritual motives , has ( by a thorow-penetration of their excellency and preferribleness ) his speculative thoughts so lively , that they fix his interior practical judgment to work steadily for the attainment of eternal happiness , is a far more manly and strong christian , than those who arrive at a high pitch by the frequent dints of praying , or other good exercises , almost hourly continued : for , those well-knit thoughts , and rational judgments , are ( as it were ) an impenetrable phalanx ; and being connatural to our reason , no assault can shock or break their ranks . yet , even in those firmest souls , christian discipline and vigilance must be observ'd ; lest , not having those strong thoughts or judgments still in readiness , they be surprized by their ghostly enemy ; which i take to have been king david's case , when he first sinn'd . . secondly , it is seen hence , that man determines himself to action , or is free. for , 't is evident , both to reason and experience , that all those thoughts , discourses , judgments and affections , he had in him before , naturally , or supernaturally , are the causes of the determination of his will. wherefore , all these being modes or accidents belonging to him , and modes not being distinct entities from the thing to which they belong , but the thing it self , ( or , the man thus modify'd ; ) it follows , that man determines himself to action ; or , is a free agent . . thirdly , since man has neither his being , his powers , his actions , nor consequently , the circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good thoughts ( from whence he has the proposals of his true good , and of those incomparable motives to pursue it ) from himself ; but had all these from the maker and orderer of the world : and , since this series of internal and external causes ( called , in christian language , god's grace ) did produce this determination of himself , 't is manifest , that he was predetermin'd by god , the first cause , thus to determine himself , as far as there was entity or goodness in his action . . fourthly , since all our powers are , by the intent of nature , ordain'd to perfect us , and that power , called freedom , does not perfect any man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to eternal misery ; it follows , that the more he is determin'd to virtue and true goodness , the more free he is . again , since a man is free when he acts according to the true inclination of his nature ; and the true natural inclination of a man is to act according to right reason , that is , virtuously ; it follows , that freedom is then most truly such , and the man most truly free , when he is determin'd to virtuous actions . whence irrationality , or sin , is by the holy ghost called slavery , which is opposite to freedom . from which slavery , the mercy of god , meerly and solely through the merits of his son , our redeemer , has freed us . . fifthly , we experience , that the lively proposal of temporal and eternal goods , when it arrives to that pitch , that there is hic & nunc , such a plenitude ( ex parte subjecti ) of such objects or motives , that it hinders the co-appearance , co-existence , and much more the competition of the contrary motives , does always carry the will , or the man , along with it . for , the object of the will being an appearing good , and no other good , in that juncture , ( at least , considerably , ) appearing , because the mind is full of the other ; it follows , that the inclination of the will to good in common , which man is naturally determin'd to , must needs carry the soul ; no other ( as was said ) then appearing . whence , mr. locke's position , that uneasiness alone is present ; and his deduction thence , that therefore nothing but uneasiness determines the will to act , is shewn to be groundless : for , an appearing good cannot but be always present to the soul ; otherwise , it could not appear , or be an appearing good. . sixthly , hence wrong judgments arise , either thro' want of information , as , when men are not imbu'd with sufficient knowledge of eternal goods ; or else , thro' want of consideration ; whence , by not perfectly weighing and comparing both , they come to prefer temporal goods before eternal ones . . lastly , 't is to be noted , that sin does not always spring from false speculative judgments , but from their being disproportionate . for , 't is a truth that temporal goods are in some sort agreeable to us ; nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd , provided we did but love eternal goods as much as they deserve to be loved too . sin therefore is hence occasion'd , that thro' too close and frequent a converse with them , we too much conceit , and make vast judgments of these temporal goods in proportion of what we make of eternal ones . and , were not this so , no sin would remain in a bad soul when separate , or in a devil ; nor , consequently , the proper punishment of sin , damnation , because they know all truths speculatively . wherefore , their inordinate practical judgments ( in which sin consists ) springs hence , that they do not conceit , or ( as we say ) lay to heart the goodness of true felicity , because they over-conceit or make too-great judgments of the goodness found in some false last end , which they had chosen . yet these disproportionate judgments , tho' speculatively true , are apt to beget wrong practical judgments , and wrong discourses or paralogisms in the soul of a sinner , to the prejudice of his reason ; as has been shown in my method , book , less . . § . . . mr. locke's discourse about uneasiness , lies so cross to some part of this doctrine , that it obliges me to examin it . he endeavours to shew that uneasiness alone and not good or the greater good , determines the will to act. his position , tho' new , and paradoxical , is very plausible ; and , taking it in one sense , ( viz. that there is always some uneasiness when the will is alter'd in order to action , ) has much truth in it ; and it seems to have much weight also , by his pursuing it so ingeniously : yet there is something wanting to render his discourse conclusive . for , . first , if we look into grounds and principles , they will tell us , that 't is the object of any power , which actuates , or determines it ; and the object of the will cannot be uneasiness : all uneasiness being evidently a consequence , following either from the not yet attaining the good we desire , and hope for ; or from the fear of losing it . and , if we should ask whether uneasiness does affect the will , otherwise than sub ratione mali , or , because it is a harm to the man ; and ease otherwise affect it , than sub ratione boni , ( that is , because it is good to him ; ) i believe it is impossible , with any shew of reason , to deny it . now , if this be so , it will follow , that 't is good only which is the formal motive of the will ; and ease , no otherwise than as it is good. . secondly , all that we naturally affect being only to be happy , or to be well ; it follows , that good only is that which our rational appetite , the will , strives to attain ; or pursues , and acts for . . thirdly , appearing good being held by all , to be the object of the will , ( for none hold , that good will move it , unless it appears such ; ) and the greater appearance of it having a greater , and sometimes the greatest power to move it , i observe , that tho' mr. locke does now and then touch slightly at the appearance of the good proposed to the understanding ; yet , he no where gives the full weight to the influence the several degrees of this appearance have over the understanding , to make the man will it ; but only denies that good , or the greater good , in it self , determines the will. whereas , even the greatest good , ●dimly appearing such , may not , perhaps , out-weigh the least good , if it be very lively represented , or apply'd close to our view , by a full appearance of it . hence , his argument , that [ everlasting unspeakable goods do not hold the will ; whereas , very great uneasiness does , ] has not the least force ; because he still leaves out the degree of their appearing such to us . for , since ( especially in our case ) eadem est ratio non entium , & non apparentium ; and no cause works its effect , but as it is apply'd ; he should either have put an equal appearance of the two contesting motives , or nothing will follow . . fourthly , this equal appearance put , his argument is not conclusive , but opposes himself . for , the prodigious torments inflicted by the heathen persecuters , upon the primitive martyrs , were , doubtlesly , the greatest present uneasiness flesh and blood could undergo ; yet the lively appearance of their eternal happiness , ( tho' distant , and absent , ) which their well-grounded faith , and erected hope assur'd them of , after those short , tho' most penal sufferings ; overcame all that inconceivable uneasiness they suffer'd at present . . lastly , how can it be thought , that the getting rid of uneasiness , or ( which is the same ) the obtaining of ease , can be the formal and proper object of the will. powers are ordain'd to perfect the subject to which they belong ; and , the better the object is which they are employ'd about , so much , in proportion , the man is the perfecter , who applies that power to attain it . it cannot then be doubted , but true happiness being the ultimate perfection man can aim or arrive at , which is only attainable by acts of his will ; that power was naturally ordain'd to bring man to his highest state of perfection by such an acquisition ; or , by loving above all things , and pursuing that object ; and , consequently , since this consists in obtaining his summum bonum , 't is the goodness of the object , apprehended and conceited such , which determines the will ; and , therefore , the straining after greater , and even the greatest goods , and being determin'd to them , is what , by the design of nature , his will was given him for . now , who can think , that meerly to be at ease , is this greatest good ; or the motive , object , end , or determiner of the will ? ease , without any farther prospect , seems rather to be the object of an idle drone , who cares not for perfecting himself at all ; but sits still , satisfy'd with his dull and stupid indolency . it seems to destroy the acquisition of all virtue ; which is arduous , and not perform'd but by contrasting with ease , and present satisfactions . it quite takes away the very notion of the heroick virtue of fortitude ; whose very object is the overcoming ease , and attempting such things as are difficult , and inconsistent with it . i expect , mr. locke will say , that all these candidates of virtue had not acted , had they not , according to their present thoughts , found it uneasie not to act as they did . but i reply , that uneasiness was not their sole motive of acting , nor the only , or formal determiner of their will : for , in that case , if meerly to be rid of uneasiness had mov'd them to act , meer ease had satisfy'd them . whereas , 't is evident , they aim'd at a greater good than meerly to be at ease . in a word ; ease bears in its notion , a sluggish , unactive , and most imperfect disposition : it seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or insensibility of a stoick . pleasure and joy have some briskness in their signification : desire is active , and implies a tendency to some good we affect : but the meer being at ease denotes no more but a stupid indisturbance ; which noble souls hate , as mean , and are weary of it : and , if ease be the proper motive and determiner of the will ; and the greatest good the will can have , or wish , is eternal glory ; it would follow , that the glory of the saints and angels in heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at ease ; which is far from elevating the soul to the highest degree of perfection , as glory , or the beatifying sight of god does ; and only signifies , she is , when in heaven , securely out of harm's way , or free from being disturb'd ever after : by which , no great good accrues to her , but only a kind of neutral state , in which she shall receive no hurt . . the true point then seems to me to stand thus ; the object of the will , an appearing good , works many effects immediately consequent to one another . first , when the appearance is but slight , it begets a liking of it ; when lively , a love of it , which determines the will to it ; to which , if great , follows an effectual tendency towards it , called desire of it . desire not satisfy'd , troubles us , or makes us uneasie : uneasiness makes us strive to change our condition , to get ease . this makes us to cast about , and consider how to find means to do it : means found , we make use of them , and actually go about to rid our selves of what was uneasie to us . now , tho' some of these are nearer to our outward action than others , yet the appearing good in the object is the common cause which produces all those orderly dispositions ; in virtue of which , as the first motive , they do all act , assist and concurr to determine our will to go about the outward action with vigour . . ere i part with this chapter of power , i am to observe , that mr. locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the power to be a thing ; tho' nature gives us as clear a notion of it , as of any other power whatever . for , as oft as we see one thing made of another , which we know is not created anew , so often our natural reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former thing could be made another thing ; and this , as evidently as when we see a thing act , which did not act before , we must acknowledge it had antecedently a power to act ; and thence we frame an idea or notion of such a power accordingly . but of this power , called matter , and of its metaphysical compart , the form or act , i have treated largely already in my appendix to my method , to which i refer my reader ; as also here , preliminary . § . , . i note , by this omission of the notion of metaphysical power , or matter , that mr. l. holds so rigorously to his first ground , that all our notions are got by sensation and reflexion , that he seems to make account , that , by working upon these , we do not gain other notions by using our reason ; in which sense , i must deny that ground of his . or else , he omits this , and other notions , ( especially metaphysical ones , ) because he finds no proper or formal similitudes for them in his fancy ; which makes it still more evident that he too much consults his imaginative faculty , to the prejudice of his reason ; and , too frequently , means by his ideas , meer fancies . which also is the reason why he blunders so about the notion of substance . reflexion thirteenth , on the twenty second and twenty third chapters . . i find nothing in chap. th , [ of mixed modes ] to reflect on , but what has been spoke to already . the author pursues with much accuracy his own method of shewing how his ideas of mixt modes are made up of simple ones . which , in a manner , falls into the same , as does our way of ranging all our notions into the common head of substance and its . modes , and then compounding them as use and occasion invites us , or rather as nature forces us . nor do i see how the name ties ( as mr. locke fancies ) the several ideas together , more than barely by signifying the combination of them made before-hand in our minds . the different method in this point , taken by mr. locke and us , seems to be this . that we , by distributing our ideas or notions into ten common heads , do know at first view in which box to look for them ; and , this discover'd , we find also all our particular notions , that are within the precincts of each head , by dividing the head it self by intrinsecal differences , or more and less of it ; which done , the mixture of that compounded notion is close and compacted ; each part of it , if in the same branch of that division , being essential to the other . and , if some part of the compound notion be taken from other heads , we , by looking into their notions , and comparing them by our reason , know how much , and what share of that notion is borrow'd from others , and belongs or not belongs to it ; and in what manner it belongs to it : which teaches us how to predicate diversly ; and instructs us how the terms of our propositions are connected , and whether they be connected at all . which exceedingly conduces to science , and ( as we conceive ) is hardly performable by his way , but rather is inconsistent with it . again , while we divide those common heads , in case our division be rightly made , we , with the same labour , frame genuin and proper definitions of each notion under each respective head. whereas , we conceive , his way of mixing his ideas wants the beauty of placing their parts orderly , which the process from superiour to inferiour notions has ; and his mixt ideas , if he goes about to explain and compound them , have so ragged , shatter'd , and dishevell'd an appearance , that 't is hard to determin which of his simple ideas that makes this mixture , ( much more which of his compounded ones ) is to be the first , second , third , &c. so that the definitions of his ideas do more resemble a confused heap than a regular building ; as will be observ'd by any man who reflects on those definitions and explications of his ideas he now and then gives us . in which , however it may be pretended , that his materials are oft-times proper , and the same with ours , yet it will be impossible to shew , that his way of laying those materials together is regular , artificial , or handsome . he speaks of the combinations , compositions , and mixtures of his ideas ; but i do not remember he ever tells us , much less maintains , their regularity , or the order in which his several ideas , or the words which express them , are to be placed ; which must necessarily leave his reader 's thoughts in much confusion . indeed , it seems not to have been his intention in this treatise to observe the rules of art , but only to give us our materials ; wherefore , as i do not object , or much impute this deficiency , so i thought it not amiss to note it . . while i perused mr. locke's th chapter , of the idea of substance , i was heartily grieved to see the greatest wits , for want of true logick , and thro' their not lighting on the right way of philosophizing , lay grounds for scepticism , to the utter subversion of all science ; and this , not designedly , but with a good intention , and out of their sincerity and care not to affirm more than they know . he fancies that the knowledge of substance and extension are absolutely unattainable . now , if we be altogether ignorant what substance or thing means , we must bid adieu to all philosophy , which is the knowledge of things , and confess that we talk all the while of we know not what : and , if we be invincibly ignorant of what extension is , farewell to all the mathematical sciences ; which , ( those that treat of number , or arithmetick , excepted ) do all of them presuppose our knowledge of extension , and are wholly grounded on that knowledge . wherefore , that i may perform the duty i owe to science and truth , i judge my self obliged first to establish the literal truth in this point ; and , next , to satisfie his scruples and difficulties . in order to which i discourse thus . . we can have no knowledge of a nothing , formally as such ; therefore all our knowledge must be of things one way or other ; that is , all our knowledge must either be of the res or the modus rei ; or , ( as the schools express it ) of substance or accidents ; for , other notions we cannot have . again , since mr. locke grants the accidents or modes are not distinct entities from the thing ; they can only differ from it notionally ; or , as divers notions , considerations , respects , or abstracted conceptions , which our limited understanding ( not able to comprehend at once the whole thing , and all that belongs to it , in the bulk ) has of the thing , which grounds them all . hence all our knowledge of quantity , ( under what name , or in whatever formality we take it ) is of the thing as 't is big , divisible , or extended : our knowledge of quality , is of the thing consider'd according to what renders its particular nature perfect or imperfect . relation is still the thing , according to that in it which grounds our comparing it to others . now , as we can consider the thing according to its modes or accidents , so we can have another notion or consideration of the thing as to its own self ▪ abstracting from all these former considerations ; or a notion of the thing , ( not according to any mode it has , but ) precisely according to its thingship ( as we may say ) or reality ; that is , in order to being ; or ( which is the same ) we can consider it precisely and formally as an ens , res , substance or thing ; and all we can say of it , thus consider'd , is , that 't is capable to be actually . for , since we see created things have actual being , yet so that they can cease to be ; all that we can say of them , ( thus consider'd ) is , that they are capable to be . besides , since we see they have being , were this actual being or existence essential to them , they would be of themselves , and so could not but be ; and , consequently , must always be ; which our common reason and experience contradicts ; in regard we know them to have been made ; and we see many of them daily produced , and others corrupted . this discourse is built on this principle , that all our ideas or notions ( and amongst them the notion of substance or thing ) are but so many conceptions of the thing ; or which ( taking the word [ conception ] objectively ) is the same , the thing thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , besides what 's said here , is prov'd at large in my second and third preliminaries . . now , according to this explication , which when we are distinguishing the notion of thing or substance from its modes ( as both of us are here ) is evidently true ; it is so far from being impossible to know , even distinctly , what the word [ substance ] or , which is the same [ thing ] means , or what substance is , that it is impossible to be ignorant of it . for , every one must needs know what it is to be ; since without knowing this , we could not understand any thing another says , nor what our selves think ; for all this is perform'd by affirming or denying , express'd by [ is ] or [ is not , ] which speak actual being , or not being . and 't is in a manner equally impossible not to know what [ capacity ] or [ power ] means ; which are the only ingredients of [ capable to be , ] which is the very formal conception of ens , as 't is precisely ens ; or , of the thing according to the meer notion of substance , taking that word in a logical sense , as 't is distinguish'd from accidents ; and not in a grammatical one ( as it were ) for a supporter of the accidents ; for , this is a secondary sense of [ thing , ] and does not signifie what it is in it self , or according to its primary and precise notion , as is noted above ; but , according to what respect or consideration it bears to others , or other notions . . thus far concerning the idea or notion of substance in common , or taken as abstracted from its modes or accidents . descending thence to such and such sorts of substances , and keeping still in that line , 't is plain that there goes more to their composition , than there did to constitute the bare notion of substance it self ; and therefore the modes or accidents must be taken in ( for there is nothing else in nature imaginable ) to constitute them such and such : wherefore , the complexion of those accidents which constitutes them of such or such a nature , and nothing else , is ( as the schools phrase it ) their substantial or essential form. and , if we go yet lower , there will need still a greater complexion , or a decomposition of accidents for the same reason ; and so still more , till we come to an individual thing ; or , as they call it , the substanstantia prima ; which , only , is in proper speech , a thing , because it only is capable of existing . but , when we are got to this lowest step in the climax of substance , i mean to the individuum or suppositum , which includes in it all the modes that constituted the superiour and inferiour natures above it , and those innumerable accidents over and above , which distinguish it from all other individuums of its own kind , and by which it is perfectly determin'd to be this in particular , and no other ; then , 't is no wonder our bewilder'd thoughts are lost in a wood ; it being impossible for us to conceive , find out , much less to know distinctly the confused medley of those numberless accidents or modifications found in the suppositum , which do compleatly constitute its individual essence . . and hence arises mr. locke's first difficulty , and his apprehension that we can make nothing of the idea of substance . but , he may please to reflect , that we ought to distinguish between the notion of a thing or substance taken as involving all the modes aforesaid ; and the notion of thing , as excluding , abstracting from , and contradistinguish'd to to them all ; in which later sense i take it here , and himself too , as appears by his considering it as a supporter to the accidents . which done , i am confident his difficulty will be at an end : for this is as easie to be done , as 't is to see the difference between the meer notion of thing , ( or what 's capable to be ) and such a thing , or capable to be of such or such a nature . next , he thinks that all we can make of the idea of substance is , that it is a substratum , or supporter of the accidents . to whch i answer , that if we consider substance in reference to its modes , we do indeed make such a metaphorical conception of it ; but not , if we do ( as we ought when we consider it singly ) conceive it as 't is in its self , or as to its own precise notion , or idea . 't is partly the impropriety and unfitness of the word [ substance ] ( as i have noted preliminary . § , . ) and partly the blundering explication of the common school-men , which breeds all this perplexity . and , indeed , 't is no wonder , if , when we take metaphorical words literally , we find our selves at a loss , and that our thoughts ramble into extravagancies . the literal truth of the whole business is this in short , which who ever does not well reflect on , and carry along with him , ( the distinction of our notions depending on it , ) i dare confidently affirm must necessarily discourse confusedly , and incoherently . . the thing , or individuum , as it stands in nature , does ( as was said ) contain in its self what grounds , corresponds to , and verifies thousands of different notions or conceptions which we may make of it . we cannot , as experience teaches us , weild or manage all or more of those notions at once ; and , therefore , our knowledge of it ( taken as it is in nature , or in the bulk ) is so confused , that we know not distinctly what it is , more than to see and experience that it is , and is distinguish'd from all others . the only way then to gain a clear and distinct knowledge of it , is to take it in pices ( as it were ) by our various considerations of it , and frame many partial , inadequate or abstracted notions of it . all these notions , how many soever they be , are either of res , or of modus rei ; that is , either they must be the notions or natures of thing , or of such a thing ; and both the first of them , and also all the rest , are nothing but the thing diversly consider'd . the conceptions , or notions of the modes or accidents are innumerable ; but there is only one which is the conception of thing it self , which we find to be this , that 't is capable to be or exist ; and , this notion , or ( which is the same ) the object thus consider'd , we call ens , res , substance or thing . the other notions we have of it , such as are big , qualify'd , related , &c. have neither being , nor any order to being in their signification , or peculiar notion , as had the other . wherefore , since nature tells us that we must first conceive the thing to be , ere we can conceive it to be after such and such a manner ; nor can the mode or manner be apprehended to be of its single self capable to be , otherwise than as it is annext to what 's capable to be by its self , or by its own peculiar nature , that is , as it is identify'd with it ; therefore no mode or accident can exist by virtue of its own idea or notion , but in virtue of the notion of thing or substance ; with which , therefore , tho' formally different , they are all materially identify'd . or thus , more briefly : had not the thing somewhat in it which grounds this true conception of it , that 't is capable to be ; none of the accidents ( they all wanting in their notion any order to being ) could be conceiv'd to be at all . and this , in literal truth , is the great mystery of those positions , about which disputants in the schools , blinded with their own ill-understood metaphors , have so long , like andabatae , fought in the dark about such questions as these , viz. whether the essence of the accidents is their inexistence , or inherence in the substance ; whether the substance supports them in being : is their substratum , or the subject , in which , those accidental forms , do inhere ? then , in pursuance of their fanciful metaphor , some of them begin to cast about how those forms are united to the subject or substance , or come to be received in it ; in order to which , and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly , they coyn a new connecting little entity , call'd an union , to soder them together , and so , instead of making it one entity , they very wisely make three . all which conceits , if we look narrowly into them , have at the bottom this mistake , that all our several conceptions have so many distinct entities in the thing corresponding to them . which vast errour both perverts all true philosophy , and is against a first principle in metaphysicks , by making unum to be divisum in se , or one entity to be many . now , if these modes be things , or ( to speak more properly ) if the notion of every manner of a thing be the formal notion of the thing it self , or of what 's capable of existing ; first , the nature of modes is destroy'd ; for they will be no longer the [ how , ] but the [ what ; ] and the nature or notion of substance , or ens , is lost too ; for , if all the modes are distinct entities , or capable of existing , they must all be substances ; which blends all the notions mankind has , or can have , ( on the perfect distinction of which , all science is grounded , ) in a perfect confusion ; and , consequently , reduces all our knowledge to a chaos of ignorance . but i wonder most , how this learned man can think none knows what extension is . we cannot open our eyes , but they inform us , that the air , and other bodies which which we see , are not cramp'd into an indivisible , but are vastly expanded , or ( which is the same ) extended . may we not as well say we may see light , and yet have no notion of it ? and , does not himself make extension to be one of his simple ideas , the knowledge of which goes along with all the knowledges we have of bodies ; and , withall , resembles the thing ; for what , thinks he , serves an idea , but to make men know by it what it represents ; or , consequently , an idea of extension , but to make us know extension ? perhaps he may think we cannot know it , because we cannot define or explicate it , but in words equivalent to it . but , first , this objection has no ground ; because all definitions and explications in the world are the same sense with the notion they define and explicate ; and , were it not so , they would be no definitions nor explications of that notion ; for they do no more but give us all the parts of the entire notion , and all the parts are the same as the whole . next , how does it follow , that , because we cannot explicate it , we do not know it ? whereas , the direct contrary follows in our present case : for , the commonest notions can the worst be defin'd . because they least need it , being self-known , or self-evident . not all the wit of man can define and explicate what it is to be ; and , yet , all mankind knows it perfectly , or else it is impossible they , not knowing what the copula means , should know the truth or falshood of any proposition whatever . thirdly , he seems to think that ( as some of the school-men do imagin ) contradictory positions may follow out of the notion of extension ; else , why should he imagin the difficulties concerning it are inextricable : which i must declare against , as the the worst piece of scepticism , next to the denying all first principles . for , if contradictory positions may follow out of any notion taken from the thing , then that notion , and consequently the thing it self , would not have any metaphysical verity in it , but be purely chimerical . add , that the learned thomas albius , in his excellent preface before the latin edition of sir kenelm digby's treatise of bodies , has clearly solv'd those imaginary contradictions . . to shew the difficulty of knowing extension , he objects , that no reason can be given for the cohesion of the parts of extended matter . if he means , that we can give no. physical reason for it , or such an one as fetch'd from the qualities or operations of bodies , i grant it ; for all those qualities and operations are subsequent to the notion of extension , and grounded on it : but , if he thinks there cannot be a far better and clearer reason given from the supream science , metaphysicks , i deny it . i explain my self ; all positions that concern the essences of things , or modes either , do belong to the object of metaphysicks ; so that , whoever makes the natures or essences of any of these [ not to be what they are , ] is most clearly convinced , by his violating that metaphysical first principle , [ a thing is what it is , ] to maintain a clear contradiction . if then divisibility be the essence of quantity , and divisibility signifies unity of the potential parts of quantity ; and continuity ( as making those parts formally indivisas in se ) be evidently the unity proper to those parts ; it follows , that quantity being the common affection of body , does formally , and as necessarily , make its whole subject , that is , all its parts , continued , or coherent ; as duality does make a stone and a tree formally two ; or rotundity in a body makes it round ; or any other formal cause is engag'd by its very essence to put its formal effect , which would induce a clear contradiction if it should not . . 't is not in this occasion only , but in many others too , that great scholars puzzle their wits to find out natural causes for divers effects , the true reason for which is only owing to trans-natural ones , or from these altissimae causae , which only metaphysicks give us ; and it happens also , not seldom , that men beat their brains to find out efficients for that which depends only on formal causes ; whose most certain causality depends on no second causes , but only on the first cause , god's creative wisdom , which establish'd their essences to be what they are . let any one ask a naturalist , why rotundity does formally make a thing round , and you will see what a plunge he will be put to , not finding in all nature a proper reason for it . the same , in other terms , is the ground of mr. locke's perplexity how extended parts do cohere ; to which , the properest and most satisfactory answer is , because there is quantity in them , which is essentially continued ; and , so does formally give coherence of parts to body , its subject . by the same means we have a clear reason afforded us , why bodies impell one another ; which mr. locke thinks is inexplicable . for , putting one body to be thrust against another , the body that is passive must either be shov'd forwards , or there must necessarily be penetration of parts ; unless , perhaps , at first , the impulsive force be so slight and leisurely , that it is able to cause only some degree of condensation . every thing therefore acting as it is , if the body , or the quantity of it , be extended , or have one part without the other , and , therefore it be impossible its parts should be penetrated , or be one within the other , the motion of the passive body must necessarily ensue . . to proceed : mr. locke makes account we have as clear a knowledge of spirits , as we have of bodies ; and then argues , that we ought no more to deny the existence of those , than of these . which i should like well , did he maintain and prove first , that the nature of bodily substances is clearly intelligible : but , to make those notions which are most essential and proper to bodies , and most obvious of all others , viz. their entity or substance , and their extension , to be unintelligible , and then to tell us , that the idea of spiritual natures are as clear as that of bodily substance , which he takes such pains to shew is not clear at all , is , as i conceive , no great argument for their clearness , nor their existence neither ; but rather , a strong argument against both : the parallel amounting to this , that we know not what to make either of the one , or of the other . . as for the knowledge we have of spiritual natures , my principles oblige me to discourse it thus : we can have no proper or direct notions of spiritual natures , because they can make no impressions on our senses ; yet , ( as was shewn * above , ) our reflexion on the operations , and modes which are in our soul , make us acknowledge those modes are not corporeal ; and therefore , that the immediate subject of those modes ( our soul ) is not a body , but of another nature , vastly different , which we call spiritual . our reason assures us also , * by demonstrating that the first motion of bodies could neither proceed immediately from god , nor from our soul , ( which presupposes both that , and many other motions , to her being , ) that there must be another sort of spiritual nature , distinct from our soul , from which that motion proceeds ; which therefore being active , and so in act it self , is not a compart , but a whole , and subsistent alone ; which we call angels : their operations prove they have actual being , and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be , or things . whence we must correct our negative expressions of them by our reason ; and hold , they are positive things ; all notions of thing being positive . farther , we can as evidently discourse of those beings , or things , tho' negatively express'd , as we can of any body : v. g. if an angel be non-quantus , we can demonstrate it is non-extensus , non-locabilis , &c. and , from its having no matter , or power , which is the ground of all potentiality and change , 't is hence collected , that 't is a pure act ; and , therefore , that once determin'd , it is immutable , at least naturally . lastly , i affirm , that , this presupposed , we can discourse far more clearly of spirit , than of bodies : for , there are thousands of accidents belonging , intrinsecally or extrinsecally , to every individual body , whence all our confusion , and ignorance of it comes ; whereas , in a pure spirit , there are only three or four notions , viz. being , knowledge , will and operation , for us to reflect on , and manage ; and , therefore , the knowledge of them is ( as far as this consideration carries ) more clearly attainable , than is the knowledge of bodies . reflexion fourteenth , on the th , th , th , and th chapters . . the th chapter [ of the collective ideas of substance ] gives me no occasion to reflect . only when he lays ( as it were ) for his ground , that the mind has a power to compare , or collect many ideas into one , i am to suppose he means , that the mind does not this of her self alone , without the joint-acting of the body , as has been often prov'd above ; for , otherwise , the whole , or the man , cannot be said to be the author of that action . . the th chapter gives us the true notion of relation , and very clearly express'd ; which he seconds with divers other solid truths , viz. that some terms which seem absolute are relatives ; that relation can be only betwixt two things ; and that all things are capable of relation . what i reflect on is , that he gives us not the true difference between real and meerly verbal relations ; nor the true reason why some relative terms have , and others have not correlates he thinks the reasons why we call some of them extrinsecaldenominations ( which is the same with verbal relations ) proceed from defect in our language , or because we want a word to signifie them : whereas , this matters not a jot ; since we can have the idea or notion of relation in our minds , if we have good ground for it , whether we have a word to signifie it or no ; or rather , if we have a real ground for it , we shall quickly invent either some one word , or else some circumlocution to express it . let us see then what our principles in this affair say to us . . relation is not here taken for our act of relating , ( for then it would belong to another common head of notions , call'd action ) but for the thing as it is referred by our comparative power to another ; wherefore , there must be some ground in the thing for our thus referring in ; and , consequently , if the relation be new , or such a one as before was not , there must be some novelty in the thing it self to ground it . whence follows that , if there be such a real ground on the one side only , and no real ground on the other , there will be a real relation on the one side , and no real relation on the other , but only a verbal one , or an extrinsecal denominatien ; answering , or ( as it were ) chiming grammatically to the term which is really relative , v. g. our powers of seeing or understanding any thing , have a real relation to their proper objects ; both because such objects specifie the power , or make it such a power , that is , give it its peculiar or distinct essence ; as also , because the power is by the object actuated and determin'd to act ; that is , the power is intrinsecally chang'd , or otherwise than it was , by means of the object ; but the object suffers no kind of change , nor is it at all alter'd , or otherwise than it was by being known or seen . whence the intellective or visive powers are really related to the object ; but the objects , for want of a real ground , are not really related back to the powers ; however the words [ understood ] or [ seen , ] do verbally answer to the acts of understanding and seeing ; which is , therefore , call'd by the schools in their barbarous language [ relatio dedici ] or an extrinsecal denomination . for farther light in this very necessary particular , i refer my reader to my method , book . less . . where , if i flatter not my self , he will find the notion of relation treated of very fully and clearly . especially i recommend to his perusal the th , th , th , and th section , where i discourse of that unmutual relation of the measure to the thing measured ; the exact knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this subject ; however it lay out of mr. locke's road to take notice of such speculations as regard , or not regard , the thing as their ground . . reviewing his th chapter , ( of cause and effect , &c. ) i found that he acquaints us very exactly , how we gain the ideas of them by our senses ; but he proceeds not to show us , ( which yet he often does in other occasions ) in what the nature of causality consists , which is of the chiefest use in philosophy . for , what is the learned part of the world the better , for having those rudest draughts , or ( as mr. l. well calls them ) materials of knowledge , ideas or notions , or for knowing how we come by them , ( in which he very frequently terminates his enquiries , ) if we do not by reflexion and reason , polish and refine them , and thence attain to true knowledge of the things , from which we glean'd them ; or by what virtue they come to be causes of such effects ? what i conceive of causality is , that 't is the power of participating or communicating some thing , or some mode of thing , to the patient , which was before some way or other , in the thing that caus'd it : on which point i have no occasion to to dilate here particularly . only , which concerns our present purpose , i am to note , that that which is thus communicated is the real ground on which the real relation of the effect to its cause is founded . whence follows , that the cause also , when it has some real change , by being reduced from the imperfecter state of meer power , to the perfecter one of act , or ( as we say ) gets something by producing such an effect , will have a real ground , and consequently a real relation to the effect , and not otherwise . and hence it is that god , our creatour , has no real relation to his creatures , tho' they have many to him ; because he is no otherwise , nor better , in the least , by creating them , than he had been in case he had not created any thing at all ; and therefore there is no ground in him of a real correlation to them . . the th chapter ( of identity and diversity ) requires a deeper consideration . in order to which , i know no more compendious way to clear the point in dispute between us , than to fetch my discourse from those principles that concern it . the subject does , indeed , properly belong to metaphysicks ; but i will endeavour to do what i can , to avoid those abstracted mediums , which are made use of in that supreme science . and , first , as the ground work of my discourse , i am to settle the principle of individuation , or how a particular thing or substance , comes to be what it is ; for , this done , it will be easily seen whence we are to take our measures , to judge when it continues the same , and when it is to be another , or a different thing from its former self . i discourse thus ; nor will it be tedious i hope to repeat often , what is so useful to be remember'd , as being the sure ground of all our knowledge . . all our conceptions , by which only we can discourse of things , are either of res or modus rei ; that is , they are either the notions of substance or thing precisely ; or else , the notions of accidents . of these the word [ thing ] has a very abstracted notion , and is perfectly indifferent and indeterminate to all particulars : wherefore the notion of such a species or sort of thing , being ( as was said above ) more determinate , must have something superadded to it to determin it , and compound or constitute it of such a species ; which can be nothing but such a complexion of accidents or modes ; there being ( as was said ) nothing else imaginable that can be added to the notion of thing . now , philosophers agreeing to call that which determins the common notion of thing ; and so , constitutes such and such species or kinds of things [ a substantial or essential form ; ] hence , the substantial form of all the sorts , kinds , or species of natural bodies can be nothing else but such a complexion of accidents , as fit the thing for such a kind of operation in nature . and , hitherto , if i mistake not , mr. locke and i may agree in the main , however we may differ in the manner of explicating our selves . . descending then to the individuals , it is evident , that a greater complexion of accidents is necessary to determine and constitute the several individuums , than would serve to constitute the species ; for , the species or kinds of things are but few , but the individuums under those kinds are innumerable ; and , therefore , more goes to distinguish these from one another , than was needful to distinguish or determine the other : whence it comes , that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the suppositum , or individuum . wherefore , it being a certain maxim , that [ what distinguishes , does constitute , ] this medly of innumerable accidents , which differences or distinguishes each individuum from all the rest , does also intrinsecally constitute those individuums ; or , is the intrinsecal or formal principle of individuation . moreover , since nothing in common , or not ultimately determin'd to be this or that , is capable of existing ; nor , consequently , in proper speech , a thing ; it follows again , that that complexion of acccidents , which gave the thing its primigenial constitution in the very first instant it was thus ultimately determin'd to be this , ( or different from all others of the same kind , ) did truly and properly individuate it . note , that this discourse holds equally in elementary , mix'd , living , vegetable and animal individuums ; allowing only for the smaller or greater number of accidents , which goes to the constituting each of them respectively . why mr. locke , who allows the complexion of accidents to constitute the specifick nature , should not follow the same principle , in making a greater complexion of the modes intrinsecally distinguish the individuum from all others , and so constitute it , i cannot imagin ; it being so perfectly consonant , and necessarily consequent to his own doctrine , and agreeable to evident principles . . applying then this discourse to man : since it is the constant method of god's wisdom , as he is the author of nature , to carry on the course of it by dispositions on the matter 's side ; and , therefore , to adjust and fit that which supervenes to what pre-exists ; and , especially , to sute the form to the matter ; and , since 't is evident that the embrio pre-exists to the infusion of the soul , as the peculiar matter to its form ; it follows , that the soul is adjusted to the bodily or animal part ; and , according to the degree , that part of it , call'd the fancy , is better or worse fitted ( as far as is on its side ) to perform such actions , when it is ripe ; or , more or less fit to work comparatively , ( in which all judging and discoursing * consists , ) there will be infused a soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly , or less perfectly , according as the matter requires . and , were it otherwise , so that the soul were apt to work more perfectly than the body were able to go along with it ; first , that greater degree of rationality in the soul would be lost , and in vain ; and next , the man , god's workmanship , would be disproportion'd , and , in a manner , monstrous in his most essential parts . putting then those parts orderly fitted to one another , which can only be done ( as was shewn ) by suting the supervening part to that which pre-existed , it follows necessarily , that as the bodily or ( meerly ) animal matter of man , the embryo , was , in the instant before the soul was infused , ( and the man made , ) individually different from all of the same kind , or from all other embryo's ; and so , was , consequently , just to such a degree , fit , by the peculiar disposition of its brain , ( as it s conjoin'd instrument , ) to act with the soul comparatively ; so , it is impossible ( the soul being proportion'd to that matter , as its form ) that any two souls should be perfectly alike , or equal in rationality ; or rather , that any two men should have a capacity of knowing , or reasoning , to the self-same degree : for , were they equally rational , those two men would be but one and the same man essentially , or under the notion of such a species ; in regard that , tho' they might have many accidental differences , yet they would have nothing in the line of such a rational ens , or man , to distinguish them essentially , or make and constitute them formally two such entities , or things , as we call men , or rational animals . . this premis'd , i come to examin mr. l's discourses upon this subject . he imagins existence is the principle of individuation ; which can consist with no show of reason . for , since thing in common cannot exist , and therefore what 's ultimately determin'd to be this thing , or an individuum , can only be capable of actual being ; 't is evident that the individual thing must , ( in priority of nature or reason ) be first constituted such , ere it can be capable of existence . wherefore 't is impossible that existence , consider it how we will , can be in any manner the principle of individuation , the constitution of the individuum being presupposed to it . again , since , as has been shown above , the notion of a thing , or an individuum , ( speaking of creatures ) is [ capable to be ] 't is impossible that actual being , or existence , should constitute the potentiality or capacity of being , any more then the meer power of walking can constitute or denominate a man actually walking . besides , both logick and metaphysicks demonstrate that , existence , it being the immediate effect of the first cause , who is essentially an infinitly-pure actuality of being , is therefore the most actual of any notion we have , or can have . wherefore , since whatever does difference or distinguish another , must necessarily be more actual than the notion distinguish'd ; it follows , that existence is of its own nature a most perfectly uniform and undistinguishable effect , that is one and the same in all creatures whatsoever , as far as concerns its own precise nature or notion : for reflexion will inform us clearly , that whatever notion is distinguishable is potential ; and that the distinguishing notion is more actual than it . since then no notion can be more actual than is that of existence ; it follows , it cannot possibly be distinguish'd at all . whence follows this unexpected , tho' clear , consequence , that , if existence does constitute the individuality , all the individuums in the world , as having one and the self-same constituter , would be but one individuum . . next , mr. l. fancies , that the existing of a thing in the same time and place , constitutes the identity of a thing ; and the being in several times and places constitutes its diversity . by which 't is easy to discern , that he distinguishes not between the extrinsecal marks and signes by which we may know the distinction of individuals , and what intrinsecally and essentially constitutes or makes them differeut things . who sees not that time and place are meerly extrinsecal to the notion of substance , or rather toto genere different from it , as belonging to other common heads ? and therefore they are too superficial considerations for their identity and diversity ( which are relations grounded on their essence ) to consist in them . besides time and place are evidently no more , but circumstances of the thing ; wherefore , that very word ( circumstance ) shows plainly that they cannot be intrinsecal , much less essential to it ; and it evidences moreover that they suppose the thing already constituted , to which they are annext . tho' then practical men may have light thence to distinguish individuums ; yet , it is very improper for philosophers , or speculative reflecters , to make the entity of things , which grounds the relations of identity and diversity , to consist in these outward signes and circumstantial tokens . . this learned gentleman conceives there must be a different reason for the individual identity of man. to make way to which he premises , and would perswade us gratis , that it is one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third to be the same person . but , i must forestall all his subsequent discourses by denying this preliminary to them . for , speaking of one and the same individual man , as he does , i must affirm that 't is all one , nay , the same formal conception of him , to be the same substance , man and person , for example , 't is evident that socrates is one thing under the common head of substance , or ens , descending by the genus of animal , and species of homo ; whence this one thing or substance is not only necessarily , but formally one man , because he is formally a a thing , or substance , under the kind or species of man ; and 't is impossible he can be under any other . again [ man ] bearing in its essential notion that he is an intelligent being , he is essentially and formally one person too . nor can we separate , even by our thought , one of those considerations from another , unless we take the word [ substance ] or [ man ] in a generical , or specifical meaning for substance , and man in common ; which we are forbid to do by our very subject in hand , which is about the principle of individuation ; or else , unless he takes substance for parts of matter , with their quantity and figure acceding and deceding to the individuum ; which things are not essential to man , nor fit him for his primary operation ; which position follow'd home , would , perhaps , make the individuality of man , and of all things else , alter every moment . so that mr. locke , led by the different sound of words , makes three notions of one ; and then racks his wits to shew how this one notion , made into three , is distinguish'd ; which we may easily foretell must render his discourse very extravagant , as will be seen shortly . . perusing his th section , i much fear that his tenet , that brutes are knowing and rational , does influence his thoughts strangely on this occasion , and makes him dislike the definition of man , [ viz. a rational animal ; ] and he seems here not only to take the idea of individuation , but of his very nature and kind too from his make and shape ; and then he discants on what people would think of a thing in the shape of a man , which never used reason any more than a cat or parrot ; or , of a cat or parrot that could discourse or philosophize ? i answer , i will tell him my mind when it shall please god to do miracles to help out our want of principles ; and , in the mean time , that i think such extravagant suppositions , perverting the course of nature , should not be heard amongst philosophers ; much less be brought instead of , or to abett , arguments . it would be more to purpose , if he could convince men of sense by conclusive reasons , that it is possible that knowledge should be made by artificial laying together particles of matter ; or else , if it cannot , to prove that srutes have spiritual natures in them : for , one of these two must necessarily be first made good , ere we can with reason affirm , that ●●●●●s have , or can have knowledge . 't is principles and not fancies which must guide our thoughts in such concerning points . what i conceive sober men , and even the generality , would think of such irrational men and rational brutes is this : they would think the former , if they could never be made to understand , or answer pertinently in their whole lives , ( notwithstanding their make , ) to be no men ; and the later , i mean those philosophizing brutes to be either devils , or engins acted and animated by them : so far are such wild suppositions from giving us the notions of things . but the main point ( in which mr. locke frequently mistakes ) is , that it matters not at all what people think or judge . we are indeed to take the meanings of words which express our natural notions , or simple apprehensions , from the users of them , the populace ; but , the applying , or joining those words or notions to one another , in order to the framing thoughts or judgments of such connexions , we are to take only from the learned , or from the principles belonging to the sciences that treat of such subjects , and not at all from the vulgar ; which if we did , we must judge , as many of them doubtlesly do , that the moon is no bigger than a great cheshire cheese ; nor one of the fixed stars so big as a brands-end , or a beacon on fire . . the former distinction forelaid , he proceeds to make personal identity in man to consist in the consciousness that we are the same thinking thing in different times and places . he proves it , because consciousness is inseparable from thinking , and as it seems to him , essential to it . perhaps he may have had second thoughts since he writ his th chapter , where , § . he thought it probable that thinking is but the action and not the essence of the soul. his reason here is , because 't is impossible for any to perceive , without perceiving that he does perceive . which i have shewn * above to be so far from impossible , that the contrary is such . but , to speak to the point : consciousness of any action or other accident we have now , or have had , is nothing but our knowldge that it belong'd to us ; and , since we both agree that we have no innate knowledges , it follows , that all both actual and habitual knowledges which we have , are acquir'd or accidental to the subject or knower . wherefore the man , or that thing which is to be the knower , must have had individuality or personality from other principles , antecedently to this knowledge call'd consciousness ; and consequently , he will retain his identity , or continue the same man , or ( which is equivalent ) the same person , as long as he has those individuating principles . what those principles are which constituted this man , or this knowing individuum , i have shewn above , § § , . it being then most evident , that a man must be the same , ere he can know or be conscious that he is the same ; all his laborious descants , and extravagant consequences , which are built upon this suppositions , that consciousness individuates the person , can need no farther reflexion . . yet it is a great truth , that consciousness of its own actions is inseparable from a knowing individual substance , or person , and remains with it eternally ; and ( which will justifie the forensick consideration he mentions ) will acquit or condemn him when he appears before god's dread tribunal ; not because it constitutes its personality , but because nothing we once knew , or knowing , did , is possible to be ever blotted out of the soul. whence it comes , that a soul not only knows her self as soon as separated , ( or rather , is then her own first , and most immediate , and ever-most-present object , ) but also , because , she then knowing all the course of the world , and , consequently , all the actions of her past life , both good and bad , is disposed , by the knowledge of the former , and by the consequences of them , laid by god's mercy or justice , to erect her self by hope to an ardent and over-powering love of her true last end , which will save her ; or , by her knowledge , or the consciousness of the latter , to sink into despair , which will plunge her into a hell of endless misery . it is also true , that we are conscious here of any perceptible good or harm that happens to our person ; because we cannot but reflect on what concerns any part of our individuum , which is our self ; which , yet , is so far from proving that our personality consists in this consciousness , that it proves the direct contrary : for , it shews that our person , or individual self , affected thus agreeably , or disagreeably , is the object of that consciousness ; and objects must be antecedent and pre-supposed to the acts which are employ'd about them , because the objects are the cause of those acts. nor is there any farther mystery in the word [ self ; ] for it means no more but our own same intelligent individuum , with which we are well acquainted , partly by direct , partly by reflex knowledges . . it looks so very odly to say , that one of our own acts should constitute our own particular essence , ( which it must do , if our personal identity consists in our consciousness , ) that i am apt to think that mr. locke's great wit aim'd at some other truth , tho' he hap'd to mis-apply it . i can but guess at it ; and perhaps 't is this : 't is , without doubt , true , that the essence of subsistent spiritual natures , which ( as having no manner of potentiality in them ) are pure acts , ( i mean angels , ) consists in actual knowledge ; which act is first of themselves . and , if so , why may not this act of the soul , call'd consciousness , employ'd about her self , or her own actions constitute the soul , or the man's personality . but , the difference lies here , that those pure spirits having no matter or potentiality in them , annex'd to , much less identify'd with their natures , their essence is formally constituted by their being in act according to their natures ; that is , by being actually knowing : whereas , the soul , in this state , being immers'd in matter , and identify'd , or making one thing with her bodily compart , and needing to use it as her conjoin'd instrument ( as it were ) to attain knowledge , is therefore in a state of potentiality ; whence she has no innate notions , ( much less principles , ) but is meerly passive in acquiring those first rudiments of knowledge : however , after she is thus pre-inform'd , she ( or rather , the man , according to his spiritual part ) is , in part , active , when he improves those knowledges , or ripens them to perfection , by his reflexion and reason , as both of us hold . . i see no necessity of making any farther remarks upon this chapter , after i have noted some other ill-laid , and wrongly supposed grounds , which occasion'd his mistakes . as , first , that the soul of a man is indifferently alike to all matter . whereas , each soul not being an assistant , but an informing form ; and , withall , being but the form of one particular , and therefore fitted ( as was lately proved ) to the disposition of the particular pre-existent embryo ; it can be receiv'd in no matter , but that which is individually determin'd in it self , as to its animality ; and therefore it requires a form distinct from all others , or as the individual constitution of the embryo was . secondly , § . . he makes account , the specifick idea , if held to , will make clear the distinction of any thing into the same , and diverse : whereas , our subject ( as i suppose ) being about individual identity , and diversity ; how the holding to the specifical idea , in which all the individuums under it do agree , and which makes them one in nature , should clear the distinction of individuals , is altogether inexplicable . it must then be only the individual idea , or notion , as far as we can reach it , ( to which there go more modes , than to the specifical , ) and its intrinsecal composition , which can diversifie things really , or make them to be really the same , or divers : however , some outward circumstances can do it , quoad nos . i am not much surpriz'd , that mr. locke , led by the common doctrine , does think there are no essential notions under that which logicians call the species : whereas , all individuals being most properly distinct things , must have also ( essence being the formal constitutive of ens ) distinct essences , and so be essentially distinct. but of this , enough in my method , book . less . . § . . &c. his proof of it is very plausible : but the reader may observe , that while , § . . he uses the word [ that rational spirit , that vital union , ] he supposes it that ; that is , individually the same ; instead of telling us what makes it that . besides , that he throughout supposes existence to individuate ; which is already confuted . lastly , i observe , that , to make good his distinction of [ person , ] from the individual substance , and individual man , he alledges , that a hand cut off , the substance is vanish'd . by which 't is manifest , that he takes [ substance , ] not for the thing , called man , constituted by a soul , as its form ; but , for the quantity of the matter , or the figuration of some organiz'd part : whereas , taking the word [ substance , ] as he ought , for ens , or thing , no alteration or defalcation of matter , quantity , or figure , &c. makes it another substance , or another thing ; but such a complexion of accidents , or such a new form , as makes it unfit for its primary operation , to which it is ordain'd , as it is a distinct part in nature . nor can this argue in the least , that consciousness constitutes personality ; because this happens not only in men , or persons , but also in trees and dogs ; which , if they lose a branch , or a leg , are still the same substance , or thing ; that is , the same tree , and the same dog , as all the world acknowledges . reflexion fifteenth , on the th , th , th , th , and th chapters . . the th chapter [ of other relations ] is very ingenious , and consonant to his his own principles . it might ; indeed , shock a less attentive reader to see virtue and vice rated , or even so much as named so , from the respect they have to the lesbian rule of reputation or fashion , call'd in scripture consuetudo saeculi , which the more libertine part of the world would set up and establish as a kind of law. and this , i suppose , was the occasion that made that very learned and worthy person , mr. lowde , except against it . but the author has clear'd that point so perfectly in his preface , that none can now remain dissatisfy'd : for who can hinder men from fancying and naming things as they list . . i take leave to discourse it thus : the word [ virtue ] both from its etymology and true use , signifies manly , or becoming a man , taking him according to his genuin and undeprav'd nature given him by god ; that is , right reason . this reason , if we use it and attend to it , will give us the knowledge of a deity : in speculative men , by way of demonstration ; in others , by a kind of practical evidence , from their observing the regular and constant order of the world , especially of the celestial bodies ; as likewise by their scanning , according to their different pitch , the solid grounds of the christian religion reveal'd to us by god , viz. the certain testimony of the miracles , and other supernatural ways by which it was introduced and recommended . this right reason convinces us we are to adore this supreme being and great governour of the world , and to obey him in those things he has manifested to us to be his will. this assures us that he governs his creatures according to the natures he has given him ; and , therefore , that he governs mankind according to his true nature , right reason ; and consequently , that the rule of living , or the law he has given us , is absolutely the best for the universal good of the world , which right reason teaches us is be observ'd ahd preferr'd before the satisfaction of our own private humour or appetite ; and therefore this rule , call'd the decalogue , or ten commandments , is most rational . whence , from its being most agreeable to man's true nature , reason , 't is hence styled jus divinum naturale , or the law writ in men's hearts . this shews how compleat a summary of our comportment with all others of our own kind , that incomparable precept is , [ do the same to others as you would they should do to you ] and that a rule so short and plain in words , and so comprehensive and universally beneficial in sense , could only be dictated by a divine master . this assures us that , if this infinitely great and good governour does , to elevate and perfect souls , oblige them to believe any other and higher points , especially such as are uncouth to the course of the world , or to natural reason , he will , out of his wisdom and goodness , give us such convincing grounds for our belief of them , as shall overpower the repugnance of our fancies , and oblige us according to principles of right reason to assent to them as truths . this tells us also , thro' our reflexion on the goodness , piety and peaceableness of christian doctrine , that the principles of it ( that is , the doctrine it self ) are true and sacred ; and lets us see how infinitely we are bound to his favour , and merciful kindness , for enlightning us with so sacred a law , and so every way conformable to right reason . and , if any company or sort of men have , out of the depravedness of their nature , fram'd to themselves , and introduced any other rules of manners , grounded upon vain-glory , false reputation , or any other new-fangl'd conceits of their own invention ; v. g. if they would strive to legitimate , and make pass for current and unblameable morality , duelling , excessive drinking , swearing , whoring , cheating , &c. this tells us how unmanly , and far from right reason , those actions are ; and how the world could not long subsist , did men take their private revenge , besot their brains continually with excess ; blaspheme , or needlesly and carelesly ( that is , irrevently ) slubber over god's holy name , which alone gives majesty and authority to all those sacred laws ; or , did they live promiscuously with women , or take away all they could get from other men. this right reason , abetted by costly experience , shews us what pernicious consequences , and inconveniencies of many kinds , do attend the breach of those laws , instituted for the universal good of the world ; and , how all the course of our life is dis-jointed , and out of frame , when we once yield the conduct of it to passion and vice. lastly , 't is this light of true reason , which makes those who are conscious to themselves that they have deviated enormously from this rule , look upon themselves as debauchers and deserters of their reason , which is their nature ; as breakers and contemners of the law ( not of the land , but ) of the world , and disregarders of the law-giver himself ; as base , mean , corrupted , and rotten at the heart , degenerate from their own true nature ; and , therefore , ( unless they reform themselves , ) utterly uncapable of being promoted to that perfection and happiness , to which the ever ready generosity of their infinitely-bountiful god and maker , would otherwise advance them ; and , moreover , as liable to all those most dreadful punishments , which the anger of so great a majesty , justly provok'd , will certainly inflict on them . whence ensues interior heart-gnawing sorrow , and stings of conscience ; and , if they persist , despair and damnation . these things consider'd , and virtue being nothing but right reason ( man's true nature ) employ'd about fitting objects , in fitting occasions , i do not think we are to attend to what irrational men , libertines , or humourists call virtue or vice , and esteem laudable or blameable ; but to what right reason , the only establish'd and impartial standard in this case , teaches us to be truly such : and , i think it had been better , and more unexceptionable , to have called such good and bad dispositions [ reputed virtues and vices , ] than to join those qualities in an univocal appellation with those rational or irrational habits , which only , in proper speech , are truly such . . as to the th chapter , [ of distinct and confused ideas , ] i cannot think that the confusion of ideas , is in reference to their names ; but springs mostly from the reasons assign'd by himself , § . . for , what are names , but the words which signifie those ideas ? the idea , then , is in my mind , what it is , and such as it is , independently of those names ; as being there before i named it . and the same reason holds , for keeping up the distinction of those ideas ; for the notions will be still what they were , whether one name or another be imposed on them : and , i think mr. locke agrees with me , that they are like figures , which , the least detracted , or added , makes the idea be quite another . if one talks to me of a mufti , and i take that word to signifie a rat-catcher , my idea of a rat-catcher is the same as if the word [ rat-catcher ] had been used , tho' the reference of the idea to that name be as wrong as may be . or , if i speak of an individuum , called longinus , and another takes that word to signifie a yard ; my idea is confused , being of an individuum ; and his distinct , tho' the word be the same . so if the same person , rectify'd as to the meaning of any word , takes it now in a different sense than he did formerly , then he has another idea by it than he had ; but yet , both his former , and his new-got idea are still unalterably and perfectly distinct . but , i observe , that mr. locke attributes many things to words and names ; which , whether it be his over-acuteness , or my dulness , i can make nothing of . what i conceive of confus'd ideas , is this : in two cases chiefly they are confus'd , viz. when there is a confusion in the things themselves from which they are taken , and to which they correspond ; as , when too many considerabilities are blended together ( as it were ) in the same suppositum , or individuum ; or , that the object it self consists of many things ; as , a heap , an army , a sack of wheat , &c. or else , when the object is not well represented , either by defect of the organ , the distance of the object , or the ill disposition of the medium . to this latter sort belongs the imperfection of our understanding ; which , not able to comprehend the whole thing , is forced to make many inadequate ideas or notions of it ; which , not reaching to particularize the thing , must therefore be common , or general , as containing more under them indeterminately , that is , confusedly . in two cases also , names seem to cause in us confused ideas : one , when the word is perfectly equivocal , and signifies neither sense determinately . the other , when a multitude of words are huddled together inartificially , or stammer'd out unintelligibly ; to which we may add , our not understanding the language thorowly . in which cases , we have either no notion at all , or , if any , a very confused one . and these seem to me the only solid ways to breed confused ideas , as being taken from the nature of the things , and of their circumstances ; and from the nature of the words , as words ; that is , from their significativeness . as for the secret and unobserved references , the author speaks of , which the mind makes of its ideas to such names , i must confess , i know not what it means , more than that the understanding knows perfectly , or imperfectly , what the word stands for , or ( which is the same ) what is its true and proper meaning . concerning infinity , of all sorts whatever , i have said enough formerly , on divers occasions . . the th chapter needs no new reflexion . the th , [ of adequate and inadequate ideas , ] has in it much of true philosophy ; especially , where he makes the essences of things consist in the complexion of the modes or accidents . i grant , that whole complexion is not knowable by us in this state : but , why have not we as much knowledge of them as is necessary for us ? or , why must we think we know nothing of them , unless we have ( over and above our use ) all those superfiuous degrees of the knowledge of things , as may satisfie also our curiosity , or humour ? by those accidents of gold , which we know , we can discern gold , ordinarily , from other metals : or , if any cunning fellow would impose upon nature and us , and undermine that slighter knowledge of the generality , to cheat them ; god has furnish'd us ( especially those whose peculiar concern it is ) with means to countermine their sophisticating arts. i grant too , that our idea of individual substances is not adequate ; but , if an imperfect notion of them be sufficient for our purpose , and withall , most sutable to our imperfect understanding , why should we desire more . . moreover , there is another reason , of a higher nature , and most supreamly wise , grounded on what the metaphysicians term altissimae causae , which we call first principles , why this complexion of accidents should be so numerous , and millions of ways variable . it becomes the god of truth , so to order his world , that things should be a ground for truth . now , had there not been almost as infinite variety of those modes which constitute , and , consequently , distinguish , every individuum ; it might happen , there being such an innumerable multitude of those individual things , that some two of them , which , by being two , must be different , would yet differ in nothing , or in no respect , or mode ; and so , they would be one , and not one ; which is a contradiction . nay , not only divers things , but each discernable and divisible part of the same thing , however seemingly uniform , must have a various complexion of those modes , to distinguish them . for example ; let a s . piece of gold be divided into forty parts ; each part , after division , being now a whole , and a distinct thing from all the rest , must either have some distinct modes in it , to distinguish it from all the others , or it would be distinct , and yet not distinct , ( having nothing to distinguish it ; ) that is , it would be one thing , and yet not one thing ; or rather , the same part , and yet not the same part ; and this in the same respect , ( viz. under the notion of substance , thing , or part ; ) which is a perfect contradiction . wherefore , the god of nature , who is always essential truth , has so order'd it , that things , and each part of things , how minute soever , should have a ground in them of differing from one another , as whoever is used to microscopes , will easily discover . as for what concerns us , this inconceivable variety tasks our industry , employs our speculation , and raises our contemplation , by making us see that god's wisdom is infinitely exalted in the least of his creatures ; and by obliging us to break out into transports of admiration , * ecce , deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram . . since then we see and experience that things do exist , and therefore ( nothing being able to do what 't is not capable to do ) are capable of being actually , or existing ; since we know they existed not of themselves , or by virtue of their own essence ; and therefore , that to be meerly or purely capable of existing , is the very nature or notion of created things , considering them precisely according to the notion of thing or substance . since we know the last distinction , or individuation , of things thus consider'd , consists intrinsecally in the complexions of modes or accidents , which ultimately determins them to be this ; and since , withall , we have such outward marks and signs of their individuality , from their existing in the same time and place , and other such like circumstances , ( in which sense , and not in making them intrinsecally constitute the individuum , mr. locke's doctrin in this point is admitted . ) lastly , since there are the highest reasons imaginable , that this individual complexion of accidents should be impossible to be comprehended by us in this state ; let us content our selves with this sufficient knowledge which we have of them , without grasping foolishly at more than we are able to fathom . . in my judgment this acute author might have excused this th chapter , [ of true and false ideas . ] he grants they cannot properly be true or false in themselves ; and ideas or notions , being nothing but the nature of the thing ( as thus or thus conceiv'd ) in our minds , can have no consideration belonging to them , but what they are in themselves , or that they are what they are , which is called their metaphysical verity ; and therefore ( as he says well ) they can no more be true or false , than a single name can be said to be such . the improper truth or falshood which he seems willing to attribute to them , belongs ( as he also intimates ) to judgments ; that is , to the connexions of his ideas , and not to the ideas or notions themselves , which are the parts that are capable to be connected . but , if this truth or falshood ( which mr. locke would force his reason to shew , ) can any way belong to them , it will not be improperly but properly such ; for truth and falshood are most properly found in judgments , and only in them . wherefore , either no formal truth or falshood at all can belong to ideas , or it must be proper truth or falshood ; which is what the author denies , as contrary to his intention . reflexions on the third book . reflexion sixteenth , on the subject of this whole book . . in the th section of the first chapter , the grounds are well laid to shew how metaphorical and improper conceptions and names come ; and how they are translated from those notions which arise from impression on the senses . for , to have senses being common to all mankind ; and , withall , they being , ( with a very small difference ) apt to be affected by objects after the same manner , the notions thus imprinted are natural and common ; and , therefore , the words that men agree on , or by use establish , to signifie such notions , are proper ; the universal use of them , and the general consent that they should signifie those natural notions , making them current , and giving them this propriety . whereas , the notions we have of spiritual natures , and of the operations of our mind produced by it , not being imprinted naturally , but got by reflexion , have no words or names which mankind agrees to call them by . whence we are forced to make use of our natural notions and expressions , ( with some additions annex'd , to shew their difference ) to signifie our reflex ideas ; and , therefore , the conceptions we have of such natures , and consequently the names by which we signifie them , being transferr'd from the natural ones to them , are called metaphorical . . as for rules to know the right sense of words , as far as relates to philosophy , there can be but two in general , viz. that the sense of those words or names which express our natural notions , which are common to all mankind , is to be taken from the vulgar ; and , the sense of artificial words from the masters in those respective arts ; these two sorts of men being the framers and authors , as it were , of those two sorts of language ; and who , by their imposing , accepting , or using of them in such a sense , have stamp'd upon them their proper signification , and given it to be sterling and current ; in which , and not in etymologies or criticisms only , consists the propriety of words . nor can i see ( care being taken to avoid equivocalness ) what further inspection into the nature of words can be needful for a philosopher . i say , in this designation , agreement , and usage of the word , and only in this , consists all the connexion or tying the ideas to the words , and those secret references of the former to the other , of which mr. locke speaks so often in his second chapter , and other places ; nor can it consist in any thing else . . indeed those words which express artificial notions are most liable to be mistaken ; because artists have the prerogative of coining their own words , and of affixing to them what signification they please . whence , if their thoughts differ , the words that express them must needs be equivocal or double-sensed . for all art being nothing but reflexion on nature , polishing and perfecting those rude draughts given us by our mother-wit to an exactness , and reflexions being various in divers men , according to their degree of skill , and their talent of penetrating the nature of the object they are employ'd about ; the same univocalness of signification is not to be expected in those words that express our reflex thoughts , as in those by which we notifie our direct ones , in which all mankind ( as was shewn ) do agree . this chiefly happens in many logical words ; for the notions that art makes use of , being wholly built on the manner of existing the thing has in our understanding , which none but steady , solid and acute reflectcters can perfectly discern ; hence , those reflex notions , and consequently the names which are to signifie them , become liable to ambiguity ; which has , doubtless , been the occasion of many fruitless contests ; which end ( if they ever end at all ) in word-skirmishes . . yet , it will not be hard to prevent , or avoid , all mistake even in these , if we do but attend heedfully to the manners by which those things exist in our minds , and take the sense of those words from the ablest artists , or best reflecters . for nature ( if we do not relinquish it ) and familiar explications , will make them easy to be understood . for example , let it be told us by a logician , that the species is the lowest and narrowest sort of common notions , that have none under them but individuals ; and it will be presently seen that the conception we call [ man ] ( thus apprehended and exprest ) is a specifical notion . let it be told us again , that a genus is a larger notion which has divers species or sorts under it ; and , it will quickly appear that [ animal ] is a generical notion ; or , if a logician acquaints us , that a proposition is a speech which affirms or denies ; and that that part of it which is affirm'd ( or deny'd ) is call'd by men of art the predicate , and that part of which 't is affirm'd or deny'd , is the subject ; and that which expresses the affirmation or negation is the copula ; and there can be no difficulty to know that this speech ( a stone is hard ) is a proposition ; that [ stone ] is the subject , [ hard ] the predicate , and [ is ] the copula ; and so in all the rest , if a right reflecter have the management of them . but , care is to be taken that we do not pin our belief upon authors , who frame artificial notions out of their imagination , without regard to the thing as 't is conceived by our understanding , or according to the manner it is there ; for , then , we shall quite lose the solid grounds of nature , and let our wits loose to follow their butterfly fancies ; for , that thing call'd [ man , ] as thus conceived , is as truly a species , and [ animal ] a genus , considering it as it is in our understanding with such a degree of abstraction , as an individual man , as existing in re , or out of the understanding , is two-legg'd , or a horse four-footed . and , for the same reason , 't is as evident to true logicians , or right reflecters , that in the proposition now mentioned , there are as truly , really , necessarily and essentially those three parts lately spoken of , as 't is to a mathematician , that there are three corners in a triangle : the same reason , i say , holds for both ; for the soul is as really a thing , as the bodies in nature ; and her modes , or accidents , and their manners of existing , are as real , as those of any bodies are , or can be , perhaps more . whence 't is evident also that , in the proposition now mentioned , the thing diversly conceiv'd , or its modes , are truly and really subject , predicate and copula in the mind ; and that , tho' they be exprest in logical terms , they do not put off their natures , or notions , which were directly and naturally imprinted on the understanding ; but are only super-vested with an artificial dress , thrown over them by our reflexion : for , otherwise , we could not say the thing call'd [ a stone ] is hard , but we must withal mean and say [ the subject is the predicate ] in case not the natural notion of the thing , but only the logical notion were predicated ; nor could the former of these two propositions be true , the later , false , if the thing it self , or its modes were not the materials that compounded it . . wherefore , this is to be establisht as a certain maxim , and a necessary preliminary to all philosophy whatever , that 't is the thing in our mind that gives solidity and steadiness to all our judgments and discourses ; for all these are made up of notions , that is , of the very thing it self in our mind , inadequately and diversly conceiv'd : wherefore that is still the ground-work , however it be wrought upon , order'd and postur'd by reflexion and art. from default of this consideration springs all the wordishness , and empty disputes among trivial philosophers ; of which mr. l. does , with good reason , so often complain . i wish he could as well give us an account , that the ideas he and others speak of are the thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd by us , and not meer representations of it ; for , this done , we might hope for true philosophy from the principles of the ideists . which they cannot pretend to show , or to give us this hope , till a solid answer be given to what 's alledg'd against them in my second and third preliminaries ; where i undertake to demonstrate that 't is impossible . . i am not of mr. l's mind , that metaphysical words ( however logical ones may be ambiguous ) are so unintelligible , or in fault . for those words that signify being , or what nearly relates to it ( which are the chief objects of that queen of sciences ) are absolutely the clearest that mankind ever uses , or can use ; so that , whoever abuses or misaccepts them , must needs be a deserter of common sense . notwithstanding , in regard some pretended schollers have on divers occasions us'd philosophical , and even common words variously , i have thought fit to add a fifth preliminary , to show what sense the chief words us'd in philosophy must have ; and that they can signify no other . lastly , i have shown at large in my method , b. . less . th . how equivocalness springs , and how it may be detected and avoided . . this learned authour having most elaborately , largely and acutely prosecuted in his former book the distinction of his ideas , and the whole duty of words being to signify our thoughts to others , i cannot discern what need there could be to take such pains about those outward signes . many curious remarks do indeed embellish his discourses , which show that his exuberant wit , can make good work of the dryest subject , and raise elegant structures out of the sleightest materials : yet , notwithstanding , i see not how they conduce to promote the solid knowledge of things . the very essence , i say , and the nature of words being to signify our notions , or to impart the knowledge of the things in our mind to others ; their sense must either be suppos'd to be agreed on , and foreknown to the speakers and hearers , or they will scarce be allow'd worthy to be call'd words but rather empty and insignificant articulate sounds . wherefore , if the idea or notion of the speakers be clear , or obscure ; distinct , or confus'd ; adequate or inadequate , &c. the word must either express it accordingly , or it is not the name of such an idea or notion , nor a word ▪ sit for it , and much less for any thing else ; and therefore 't is good for nothing at all . this makes me wish mr. l. had rather thought fit to take particular notice of those words , which have been abus'd or misaccepted by trivial philosophers ; and had clear'd their ambiguity , rectify'd their impropriety , and substituted ( if need were ) others more proper in their stead ; which must certainly have had great influence upon the advancement of science . nor need he much wonder that dull or hasty men , who either are not capable of much sense , or will not take pains to reflect on their natural notions , or ( which is the same ) on the meanings of their words , do make use of them , and yet talk by rote all the while ; following the track of others whom they have heard speak them , or the jargon of their masters ; who breed their schollers to stick to their words , as unalterably as if they were principles ; tho' perhaps neither of them were so wise as to know , or so prudent as to regard much their determinate meaning . . things standing thus , and my intention , in this whole treatise , being only to carry on my method to science , and to reduce to solidity , those discourses which i conceive have too much of fancy in them , i have no more to do , as to this third book , but to note by the way some particulars that occurr , and which , as i judge , do by ass from true philosophy . . the author seems to dislike our way of defining by a genus and its difference , and to think it may be better perform'd by enumerating some certain ideas , which , put together , do make up the sense of the notion defin'd . to abett which doctrine , he gives us this definition of a man , viz. a solid extended substance , having life , sense , spontaneous motion , and the faculties of reasoning . i discourse thus : what best sutes with the vulgar is one thing , what becomes men of art , another . it will serve the common people well enough to declare their thoughts by huddling together many particular considerations ; nay , they will define even individuums ( if such as these may be call'd definitions ) by this method , as homer did thersites . but the point is , how art , which is to perfect and polish the rudeness of raw undisciplin'd nature , ought to behave it self . reflexion , the parent of all arts , teaches even housewives and lawyers , that 't is very convenient for the one to put such and such linnen into distinct drawers ; and , for the other to distribute all those writings that concern different businesses into distinct boxes : and the same faculty teaches logicians also to range all their notions ( the materials they are employ'd about ) into distinct common heads , so to gain a distinct knowledge of each ; which , they being innumerable , would otherwise lie mingled confusedly . this perform'd , what are they to do next ? must they hover still in these few common heads of notions ? no , certainly ; for , then , they would not have enow of such more-particular notions as are needful for discourse . they must descend therefore from those common notions to more-particular ones under each of them ; and this , as plain reason tells us , gradually : that is , they must divide those common heads by immediate distinctive notions , call'd differences : for , were they not different , the product of that division could not be more notions ; whereas division must ( at least ) make two of one. and , whence must we take those differences ? from other common heads ? no surely ; for this would confound all our notions again , which we had taken such care to distinguish into those heads , in case the more particular ones , or the respective species , were made up of one notion found in one line , and of another found in another . those differences then that divide each common head , must be found within the same head , or ( as we use to call them ) must be intrinsecal ; which ( * as is demonstrated in my method ) can be no other but more and less of the immediate superiour notions . the first two differences ( of ens , for example ) join'd with the common head it self , gives us the definitions of the two first subaltern genera ; and each of those two ( and of the inferiour ) genus's being for the same reason divided after the same manner , do still give us naturally ( as it were ) the definitions of the next two members immediately under them ; and so still endways , till we come at the individuums ; each of which being constituted by an innumerable multitude of accidents , we are , when we come there , lost in a pathless wood ; and can no longer define or give a clear and entire account of the intrinsecal dictinction of those particulars , but are forced to content our selves with some few notions belonging to them , which distinguish them from others ; or to describe them by outward signs and circumstances for our use and practice ; our speculation being here nonplust . . when mr. locke shall have leisurely consider'd each step of this short discourse , he will find that nature forces us upon this method of defining by a genus and a difference ; that art , ( which is nothing but nature well reflected on ) shews us it must be so ; and that his own definition of man will oblige him , even while he opposes this method , to have recourse to it for refuge . for , when he puts man to be a solid extended substance , should it be deny'd , because there is but one part of man ( his body ) that is solid and extended , and not his spiritual part , the soul ; his only defence can be this , that those words were meant only for the general notion , or what was common to man and all other bodies , ( for which reason , substance there is the highest genus ; ) and that which follows is meant to difference or distinguish him from them . next , it will be unanswerably objected , that man being a thing , or ( which is the same ) a substance , which signifies meerly what 's capable to be , and a definition telling us the essence of the notion defin'd , he deviates manifestly from the fundamental laws of art , by taking in such differences to distinguish substance , viz. solidity and extension , which are foreign to this common head of being or thing , and belong to other common heads , which are only modes of thing , viz. those of quantity and quality . add , that this seems also to contradict his own doctrin , ( b. . chap. . § , . and b. . chap . § . ) where he makes extension and body not to be the same . i suppose he means in part ; which , were extension a proper and intrinsecal difference of substance , constituting the essence of body , could not be said . now , as was lately shewn , all these rubs are avoided if we separate our notions into common heads ; and , by dividing those heads by intrinsecal differences , at the same time make our definitions of each inferior notion . nor can it be objected , that we also use extrinsecal differences , while we divide substance by divisible and indivisible , and yet make divisibility the notion of quantity ; for , all such exceptions are fore-stall'd in my method , b. . less . . and particularly , §§ . . and . . the like errour , and no less fundamental , is his assertion , chap. . l. . that generals and universals belong not to the real existence of things , but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding , made by it , for its own use , and concern only signs , whether words , or ideas . had he said , that universals belong not to the existence of things , as they are in nature ; or , that universals , as such , are not capable of existing there , i could understand him : but , if he means , they do not belong to the existence of things in the understanding , or , that they are designedly invented , or fram'd , or made use of by it , for its own convenience , i must utterly deny it . for , it is as evident that nature makes them in our mind , as it is that because we cannot here comprehend individuals , therefore nature , by imprinting objects diversly in us , and by different senses , forces the mind to have partial or inadequate notions of it . now , every inadequate notion , in what line soever , is an universal notion ; as will appear to any man who reflects upon the ideas or notions of ens , corpus , vivens , animal , homo ; all which are inadequate ( and withall , universal ) notions , in respect of the individuum . when i see a thing a-far off , so that i can yet make nothing of it , but that 't is something , or some body , 't is evident that i have only an universal notion of it , since i know not yet what it is in particular ; and , that this general notion is not invented or created by my mind , but given me by nature . the like happens when i hear one knock at the door , without knowing who it is in particular ; and in a hundred such like occasions . so that the mind , and it only , is indeed capable of universal notions ; but , 't is only nature , and not her self , which begets in her those notions . her only work is , to compare , or discern the identity or diversity of those notions ; but nature gives her those objects , or materials , on which she thus works . thus , when we see two or many things agree , 't is those natural objects , that have in them something agreeing to both , which causes in me a common notion , called animal , or homo ; and the mind lends nothing but her comparing nature , to make those common notions ; which artificial reflecters , designedly re-viewing , call them genus and species . let us hold to the things in nature . our mind ( as was often said ) is not here in an actual state , but in a potential one ; and , therefore , when we ascribe to her singly any activity , we make her do what she cannot do ; and , so , missing the true causes of such effects , we fall into great errours . . as for that catachresis of nominal essences , which answer to those few abstract notions we have actually of the things , when we name them , making a complex idea , i deny we have any such intention as he speaks of , in naming any thing : for , tho' at that time we do actually know but few of those accidents , whose complexion does , indeed , go to the whole essence ; yet , being pre-assur'd the thing has more modes in it than we know or think of , we do not nominate them precisely according to what we do then actually know , exclusively of all others , but including them confusedly . rather , otherwise , we cannot know the thing at all , because it involves confusedly all the modes that are in it , known or unknown , as their subject : for , tho' we should afterwards discover more particular accidents in gold than we did formerly , yet , we should not alter the name which signifies its substance , or essence ; nor would call it any thing but gold still ; however the newly discover'd mode gave us a new idea of it self , annex'd to that of substance . the essences are no otherwise ingenerable , but as they are from eternity in the divine ideas ; nor incorruptible , but as they are either there , or else in some humane or angelical understanding , out of which they can never be effaced . lastly , what have names or words , which are nothing but articulate air , or figur'd ink , ( excepting what is annexed to them by our minds , ) to do with the intrinsecal natures of things , that they should be one sort or kind of essences . . this learned author justly complains that we have so few definitions ; and my self have both resented it in my preface to my method , and have also excited and encourag'd learned men to make good that defect . but , till the best , and only proper way ( which i mention'd lately ) to make definitions be allow'd and taken , i am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that name ; and those few that are already made , will still be exposed to the baffling attacks of fancy . aristotle was , certainly , the best definer of any philosopher yet extant ; yet , his definitions are excepted against by witty men ; and ( which is worse ) for no other reason , but because they are too learned , that is , too good. mr. locke expresses here great dis-satisfaction at two of them ; which , to my best judgment , not all the wit of man can mend . the first is . of motion ; which aristotle defines to be actus entis in potentia , quatenus in potentia . now , i wonder not that mr. locke , who , in his large chapter of power , never so much as mention'd the idea of power to be a thing , nor the power to have such an accident , or mode ; nor , consequently , the idea of an act answering to such a power , should conceit this definition to be gibberish . however he came to pretermit them , it is most manifest that we have natural ideas or notions of both these . we cannot see a thing made actually of another , or alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was ; but nature obliges us to see , and say , that that thing , of which the new one was made , could , or had a power to be , it , or have another made of it . or , when we see 't is anew made hot , cold , round , white , moved , placed , &c. but that it could , or had a power to become such , ere it was actually such . these ideas then of act and power are so natural , that common sense forces us to acknowledge them , and common language must use them : and 't is a strange fastidiousness , not to allow those transcendent ( that is , most common , and most clear ) words in definitions , whose notions or meanings nature gives us ; and which words , or equivalent expressions , common discourse forces us to use . yet , in the uncouthness of these words to some men's fancies , consists all the difficulty which they so boggle at in this definition . the ens , or body , was only capable , or had a power to be moved ere motion came ; and , now , by motion it is actually moved . it is evident then that motion is the act , or ( which is the same ) the formal cause , which reduced that power into act , or formally denominated it moved actually . act then , was a proper genus , as far as those most common notions can have one . now comes the difference [ in potentia , ] which is , to determine what kind of act motion is . to understand which , we may reflect , that a body has many other acts or ( as we conceive and call them ) forms in it , such as are quantity , figure , and all qualities whatever ; as , roundness , length , breadth , health , &c. but they are not acts of that body , as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is , but as 't is actually such or such : for , they truly denominate it to be actually round , long , healthful , &c. whereas , motion , being formally a meer tendency to an effect not yet produced , constitutes and denominates a body to be only in power to be what by that motion it is to be afterwards . for , reflecting on all motions whatever , v. g. generation , alteration , augmentation , sanation , &c. none of them affect the subject , or body , in order to what it has already fixedly ; but in order to a newly generated , or rather , producible thing , quality , quantity , disposition , health , &c. which the matter or subject has only a power to have or acquire by means of those respective motions . the last words , [ quatenus in potentia , ] signifie , that the thing , as affected with motion , is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such , and not at all as actually so . matter has the notion of power to be another thing ; but in regard it is a kind of compart , constituting actually the stable and entire ens , the thing , or body , which has matter in it , cannot be said to be meerly in power to have matter which it has already . whereas , by having motion in it , which is only the way or means to attain what nature aims to produce , it must be thus meerly and formally in power to that to which it is tending . wherefore , this definition most appositely fits the notion of motion , by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other sorts of acts whatever ; without a tittle conceivable in it that is defective , superfluous , or disparate . yet , this is here character'd to be exquisite jargon , and a famous absurdity . i should be glad to see how one of our new philosophers would define motion : i doubt he would find it a puzzling task to explicate its formal and proper nature ; in regard that , besides its being very general , it is the blindest and * most imperfect notion we have , and most approaching to non-entity ; being neither the thing as it is in it self , nor as it is yet another , but hovering ( as it were ) between both . and i am certain , it is impossible to perform it , without varying the words used by aristotle , to others of the same sense ; or , even to give some tolerable explication of it , which can sute with its formal notion . . the other definition which mr. locke mislikes , is , that of light ; which he says aristotle defines , the act of a perspicuous thing , as it is perspicuous . now , tho' light be fire , were the particles of it contracted into one closer body , as it is by a burning-glass ; yet , the rays of it , thinly scatter'd , have , like all other effluviums , the notion of a quality or mode of the body they are receiv'd in ; and modes or accidents have their analogical essences from the manner they affect their subjects . the question then is , what is the proper subject of light ? mr. locke's principles deny the sun is the subject ; and put it to be onely the cause of it : nor can an opacous body be the subject of it ; for it affects not that body it self , but the surface which reflects it ; and then it has the notion of colour . 't is left then , that the proper subject of light must be a medium , which is perspicuous , or which has a power in it to let it pass through it , to our eyes ; and , therefore , onely light is , properly and formally , the act which informs or actuates that power ; which cannot possibly be express'd better than by these words , the act of a perspicuous body , as it is perspicuous . for , putting the air , or the water , to be that medium , those bodies may have many other acts or accidental forms in them ; as , rarity , fluidity , humidity , coldness , &c. yet , according to none of these , is light the proper act of either of them ; but as they are pellucid , or perspicuous ; because , whatever other qualities or powers they may have , if they had not that called perspicuousness , it could not affect those bodies at all . i observe by mr. locke's discourse here , that he makes account definitions are made for the vulgar : whereas , they are only fram'd by art , for men of art , or philosophers . but , surely he is pleasant , and cannot mean seriously , when he finds fault with this definition , as useless , and insignificant , because it will not make a blind man understand what the word [ light ] means . the meaning of the word , is the notion of it in our mind ; and our notions , or ideas , ( as both of us hold , ) come in by impressions from the object upon our senses . if , then , blind men could have no sensible impression of light , 't is impossible they should have any idea or notion of it , let the definition be never so good . definitions are the work of reflexion , and are to suppose our natural notions , which are the rough draughts of knowledge , common to us , and to the vulgar : art is to polish our notions , and bring them to exactness and concinnity , by defining them ; and not to imbue us with them , when nature never gave them : and 't is a hard case , if aristotle's definitions must be useless and insignificant , unless they work miracles . . i agree with him that the definition of motion , which he says is that of the cartesians , [ viz. that 't is the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another ] is faulty . whether it be theirs or no i know not , i think they give another : yet , i doubt not but mr. locke has his reasons why he dislikes it . mine is this ; because successive quantity and motion are the self-same formal notion ; and , so , the definitum is as plain as the definition which should explain it . besides that , [ application ] is one sort of motion , and therefore is harder to be understood than motion it self , which is the genus to it . all which absurdities , and others such , aristotle wisely avoids , by using the transcendent , or more common notions of act and power . . i pardon mr. locke's opinion , that nothing is essential to individuums ; because this error is common , or rather epidemical , amongst the modern schools ; and springs hence , that those authors do not distinguish between what serves for logical speculations , and what is the real constitution of things in nature : for , what can the word [ essentia ] of which essential is the denominative , possibly mean , but that formal notion quâ ens est ens. since then the notion of ens or thing is only proper to the individual substance , as being its first analogate ; it follows that , if they be divers entia or things , they must have divers formal constituents , or divers essences . nay more , it follows that [ ens ] being only properly spoken of substantia prima or the individuums , and improperly of substantiae secundae , and much more of the modes or accidents ; therefore , essence ( the formal constituent of ens ) can only be properly said of the essences of individuals , and improperly of any other essences : so that only divers individuals , in proper speech , do differ essentially , or have essential differences belonging to them . but , of this enough in my * method . i only remark how odd it is to say , that two men are two things , and yet do not differ under the notion of thing , but only accidentally ; or , according to the notion of some mode or accident ; which is perhaps as much as my self now do differ from my self a year ago , and yet i am the same thing now i was then . but , i have said enough above of what intrinsecally constitutes divers entities or individuums ; and how we sufficiently know them , tho' we comprehend not the whole complexion of accidents that constitutes their individual essences , on which a good part of this th chapter proceeds . . the two last chapters contain many various observations in them ; and such as may both delight , and in some sort profit inquisitive wits : yet they touch upon some difficult points , which are contrary to my sentiments , and cannot well be solv'd without first laying my grounds ; especially that about the unknowableness of real essences . to clear which farther , and withall to meet with other difficulties that may occur , it will be necessary to lay , or repeat , for the foundation of my future discourses , some few principles . i have , i hope , demonstrated in my preliminaries , that all our ideas , or notions , which are solid , and not fantastick , are nothing but several conceptions of the thing ; or , which is the same ( taking the word [ conception ] for the object , and not for the act of conceiving ) the thing diversly conceiv'd . hence all our conceptions , or notions , are inadequate , especially if they be distinct , and not confused . hence the most abstracted notion we have , or can have , let it be figure , colour , existence , or what other we please , even tho' signify'd by the most abstract term , is still the thing consider'd precisely as having those modes in it ; in regard that , as those modes , or accidents , have no entity of their own , but meerly that of the thing which they affect , so they can have no intelligibility , or knowableness , ( which is the property of entity ) but as they are conceiv'd to belong to the thing , or to be it : so that , ( hardness being that by which a thing is formally hard ) neither would hardness be hardness , nor would existence be existence , if they were the hardness or existence , of nothing ; for nothing can neither be hard , nor exist , nor have any other affections belonging to it . again , 't is evident we can have no distinct notion of the whole ens , or individuum ; nor consequently of the essence , ( properly such ) which is the form that constitutes the whole ens : for this contains in it what grounds or corresponds to great multitudes of inadequate , or partial notions , and contains them blended ( as it were ) in the thing as in their root ; and this so confusedly and inseparably , that only that most acute divider , call'd acies intellectus , can take them a sunder , or separate them . moreover , there are not only confus'd and distinct ideas , as mr. l. acknowledges , but also ( which i remember not he takes notice of , ) notions or ideas which are more and less confused or distinct ; or partly one , partly the other , and this with very great variety ; as is seen in his example of gold , of which ( and the same may be said of all other bodies , ) some men gain by degrees more distinct knowledges than others do . to proceed , 't is evident that , of all other notions , that of existence has the least composition in it that can be . whence all clearness of our notions coming from their distinctness , and their distinctness springing from their simplicity , the formal notion of existence is the most clear ; that is , self-evident , and therefore inexplicable ; all explications being of those notions that can need it . the notion of ens , which signifies capable to exist , has but a very little composition , and consequently , confusion in it , as consisting of actual being , and the power to it , for the same reason corpus has more of composition or confusion in it , than ens ; vivens than corpus ; animal than vivens ; homo than animal ; and socrates , or the individuum , most of all ; there going still ( as was shown above ) more notions to constitute and compound each inferiour notion than there does to constitute those above it ; whence , still as they are more compounded , they are proportionably more confus'd , that is , less distinct , or less clear. the ideas , or notions , of individuals therefore , or of particular things , are for the reason now given the most unintelligible ; meaning by that word , the most impossible to be comprehended all at once . this reflected on , and it being shown above , that both nature and art instruct us to divide our notions into common heads , and to proceed thus gradually to inferiour ones ; 't is most evident that the only proper and natural way of distinguishing our notions into simple and compounded , is to be taken ( not from our fancy , what ideas seem most clear to us ) but from this gradual progression from superiour to inferiour notions ; in regard there goes still more to compound the inferiour notions , than there does to compound the superiour . whence follows out of the very terms that those must be more compounded , or less clear , these more simple , and more clear. . the same rule holds , and for the same reason , in all the common heads of the modes or accidents . the notion or idea of the supreme genus has no composition but that noted above , which is common to them all , of connotating the subject . whence , it is the simplest or least compounded , as involving both that of the common head and that of the difference , superadded to it . hence neither the ideas of motion nor extension , if by this latter be meant ( as by distinguishing it from motion it should seem ) permanent quantity , are simple ideas ; but the idea of quantity is the simple one ; and they , being evidently such kinds of quantity , viz. permanent , and successive , are clearly compounded of quantity and of the two different ideas which make them those two several sorts of it . much less is the idea or notion of number or figure simple ones ; for the former is compounded of the idea of meer quantity and of [ discrete ; ] and the later of the idea of quantity , and of such or such a manner of terminating it . and , the same may be easily shown of all the rest of his simple ideas whatever , excepting only that of existence . from these principles i make the following reflexions . . first , that the ideas can never be in fault when we name things wrong , but our own heedlesness or disagreement about the meanings , for which such words stand . for , our common notions are wrought by natural causes upon the same-natur'd patients , the senses , and thence upon the soul. whence notions are what they are invariably , without their meddling or being concern'd with our signifying them , or applying them to these or these words . we have them from nature ; the signifying them by such and such words , comes from our voluntary designation ; and that is all can be said of them ; as mr. l. has shown b. . ch. . § . . secondly , confused ideas , they being all compounded , may have fewer or more distinct ideas annext to their subject , according as we gain a farther distinct knowledge of the object , as is exemplified in mr. l's frequent instance of gold. in which case , it is not a new specifical notion , nor so much as a new nominal essence , as mr. l. calls it : ( for , let us discover never so many new qualities in gold , every man will call that thing gold still ) but the additions or appendages of new distinct notions , tack't as it were to the confused one ; or new inadequate notions , approaching so many little steps nearer to the making it an adequate one . . thirdly , since we know before-hand , that every thing has a distinct nature or real essence peculiar to its self , we take those most remarkable accidents intrinsecally belonging to it , to be that essence ; especially if they do sufficiently distinguish it from all other natures ; and , when we find they do not , we acknowledge our judgment may be false , we strive to correct it , and suspend till we gain better light ; yet still our notions are inerrably what they are , and faultless , however it fares with our judgment . nor does our judgment exclude the yet-undiscover'd modes from the notion of the thing ; but , we include them all in the lump or confusedly . whence 't is the real essence of the thing which is known , tho' imperfectly and inadequately . thus we know a man and a horse to be two things of different species by divers manifest qualities which never agree to both of them , and therefore distinguish them ; and , tho' 't is the whole , or rather a greater complexion of accidents which does constitute the specifick difference ; yet even that is known truly , ( tho' imperfectly ) when we know it but in part , especially ( as was said ) when it is sufficient to distinguish one from the other : in the same manner as when i see but a man's hand or face , i am truly said to see the man , tho' [ man ] signifies the whole , which i see but in part . the solid reason of which is this great truth , that [ there are no actual parts in any compound whatever . ] whence follows , that every part is the whole in part , or according to such a part ; which is one of the chiefest principles that gives grounds to the science of physicks , and therefore is demonstrable by the superiour science , metaphysicks . . fourthly , our former discourse being well reflected on , which shews that the most solid and certain way of knowing which notions are simple , which compounded or complex , is not to be taken from the easie appearances to our fancy , or from seeming experience , but from their being more general or more particular ; we may farther learn what notions are clear and which obscure , and how or why they are so . for , 't is manifest that all confusion and obscurity springs from composition , or the involving many notions , as is evidently seen in particular or individual bodies ; and all distinctness or clearness in our notions from their involving few or none , as is found in the most general notions . add , that , if this rule be observ'd , the order in our complex notions will be more regular . whereas the other unmethodical way of making so many simple ideas , places those ideas at random , or hap-hazard . lastly , if our method be observ'd , complex ideas cannot be taken for simple ones , as has been shewn mr. locke does in most of his . . fifthly , that the distinction of simple and complex , clear and obscure notions , is not to be taken from appearances to our fancy , but from the solid grounds now spoken of , is seen farther by this instance , that many men are much distasted at the notions belonging to metaphysicks , such as are being , ens , essence , act , power , and such like . the reason of which is , that we do customarily reflect upon our notions , and endeavour to define or explain them . whence , in metaphysical ones , finding this to be very difficult , and in many of them impossible , hence men fancy them to be inconceivable and incomprehensible ; and thence they take a toy at metaphysicks , and pretend it insuperably hard and mysterious . now it passes with these reflecters , as it does with those that would look stedfastly on the sun at noon-day ; they find a kind of cloud hovering before their eyes , and seem bedarken'd with too much light. the test to stick to in such cases is , to set themselves to define or explicate their notions ; which done , if they find they can invent no notions more clear than those notions themselves are , they may be sure they are self-evident , and may safely look upon them as such ; and , if they find they can be defin'd or explain'd , they may be sure there will be found in their definition or explication more notions equivalent to that one ; and thence they may be assur'd also that the notion defin'd or explicated , has more parts , or composition in it ; and , therefore , is not simple nor perfectly clear , since it needs to be made clear by others , which therefore must be more simple and clearer than it. . sixthly , it appears from what is said , that 't is not to avoid different significations of words , that men suppose a real essence belonging to each species ; but because 't is impossible there should be any individual thing , but it must have superior notions , or ( which is the same ) it must be of some sort or other in nature ; and , the notion of this sort , or species , must be an essential and main part of the individual essence . for , 't is evident , that nature forces us to have both the one , and the other notion , without any form'd design of ours ; and words have nothing to do but to signifie them . . lastly , hence it appears , that words do not therefore become ambiguous , because they have no settled standards in nature ; as mr. locke apprehends in mix'd modes , especially in moral ones . for , all virtues and vices being nothing but dispositions to act according to right reason , or contrary to it , have as fixed standards in nature , as reason it self has ; taking [ nature ] for the reflexions we naturally have upon the operations of our soul , and for what is agreeable or disagreeable to its true nature ; as also , on the subjects and circumstances , about which , and in which it is employ'd . hence , the words which he instances in , viz. sham , wheedle , banter , are evidently deviations from right reason in our just and civil comportments with other men ; and all the notions that go to their definitions , are as much connected as any other genus and difference are in any other definition whatever . so likewise , his mixed modes , murther and sacrilege , are defin'd ; the killing a man lawlesly , and the taking to our selves lawlesly , or abusing holy things ; and have the same solid connexion , as any other notions ; which consists in this , that the one of them is common or determinable properly by the other , and the other is particular or determinative of it , which makes them cohere together in good sense . as for our soul 's connecting them at pleasure , it is quite otherwise : she has notions of each common head naturally ; and nature and art do both of them conspire to oblige us to divide those heads by intrinsecal notions , called differences ; and , it is not at her pleasure and choice , what differences shall be proper , what disparate . nature has settled the agreeableness of one of these notions to the other ; so that , should we put a difference to a generical notion , which is inconsistent with it , the notion thus defin'd would be nonsence , and chimerical ; and no wiser than green scarlet , or a four-square triangle . . let the obscurity and ambiguity of words spring from what causes mr. l. pleases , concerning which he is very acute in his th chapter , it is to me very evident , that the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of words , and , that this abuse of them must spring from one of these three heads , viz. ambiguity of single words , the ill contexture of them , and their mis-application . artificial words are , indeed , ( as was said , ) more liable to obscurity ; and , perhaps , logical ones most of all . but , since the users of those words do pretend to learning , let them define their terms of art , and it will quickly appear whether they agree in the notion of those terms , or no ; and , by declaring what the notion meant by that term is useful for , it will appear which of the definitions agrees truly to that notion , and which does not . . tho' then some men have the knowledge of more accidents in the same thing , or in the same essence , than another man has , yet it does not follow they agree in nothing but the name , or that they substitute the name for the thing ; for they do both of them acknowledge and agree that they speak of the same thing , or of the same essence , notwithstanding this more particular knowledge which one of them has of it above the other . in the same manner as divers persons may know , or discourse of the same individual man , socrates , ( tho' the complexion of accidents which constitute the individuum be far greater than that which constitutes the specifick notion ; ) notwithstanding that , one of them better knows his humour , temper , constitution , science , virtue , and his degree of rationality , ( which is most essential to him , as he is this man , ) than the other does . whence this position does not only make all philosophy , or knowledge of things ( which are not such , but by their real essence which formally makes them such ) to be impossible ; but , it makes even our ordinary communication amongst men unintelligible , because we should still speak of divers things , and not of the same : for , divers they must be , if they have divers essences , which formally constitutes them such . yet , i must declare , that i verily judge this learned author delivers this doctrine out of his sincerity , without intending to do any favour to the scepticks ; and that he is not aware how much this leans to that maxim of the pyrrhonians , viz. that [ nothing can be known , unless it be known perfectly ; ] which is sufficiently confuted by this evident reflexion , that our soul works by inadequate notions , and builds her knowledge on those partial notions ; that is , we can truly know that thing , though we know it but imperfectly , or in part . . and , where 's the harm to this acquir'd knowledge , called science , tho' we know the thing , or its essence , only imperfectly , by those partial notions ; since science has not for its object the whole thing in the bulk , nor its whole essence neither , but only abstracted conceptions of it ? cannot a mathematician discourse scientifically of wood , as 't is long , broad , or solid ; or a carpenter or carver know it to be wood really , or to have the real essence of wood , and such a sort of wood , by its colour , its degree of hardness , its aptness to be cut , or its being more easie to do so if one goes according to the grain , and such like ; unless he knows all those innumerable accidents found in its entire and exact composition ? or , cannot ( i may say , do not ) we all agree to call its real essence [ lignea , or woodish , ] without abusing the word ; because one of us penetrates the nature , or real essence of it , more than the other does ? i suppose , mr. locke's laudable zeal against some pretended philosophers , did , on this occasion , something byass his good reason , that he might better oppose them . and , certainly , it must be acknowledg'd , that , never were words more abusively used , to the prejudice of good sense , than those by which they express their essences , and their specifick and essential forms ; so that , for want of some determinate and literal intelligible meaning , which could give a philosopher any light what to make of them , they seem'd nothing but meer words , obtruded upon us for the only truths ; and so tended to reduce science to mysterious nonsence , and unintelligible cant. but , i could wish , notwithstanding , that mr. locke had not over-strain'd some points , to baffle their insignificant talk. i hope his discerning judgment will distinguish me , and all true aristotelians , from the abetters of their folly ; and let them answer , if they can , for themselves . . his last chapter is , about remedying the abuses of words . wherefore , since divers of those abuses are conceiv'd by him to spring from our names given to real essences , and 't is impossible , he says , to know fully what those real essences are ; i should be glad he would put us into a way to do an impossibility , and comprehend them fully ; otherwise , since name them we must , we shall , according to his discourse , be necessarily inforc'd to the abuses of words , without any possible remedy ; which is something too hard a case . . i am a little apprehensive , that i do not perfectly hit mr. locke's true meaning in some passages here , and elsewhere ; finding his discourse in other places sub-contrary to what i took to be his thoughts . for example ; speaking here , § . . of shewing and defining substances ; all which being entities , must have real essences in them ; he has these words : [ for , there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities , to which we suppose the other , which make up the complex idea of that species , annex'd ; we give the name to that quality or idea which is the most observable , and we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species . ] where , if , instead of the words [ to that quality , ] be put [ the subject of that quality , ] to which subject we suppose the rest of its proper complexion of accidents annex'd ; it will be perfectly co-incident with my thoughts as to this point . only , i wonder why he pitches upon some one quality ; as also , why he says not a word of the matter , which , ( in all bodily substances , ) determin'd by this complexion of accidents , makes up the thing . this manner of expression makes him seem to discourse all along as if this complexion of accidents , abstractedly consider'd , without any regard to the matter , did make the essence ; whereas , they cannot do this at all , unless by their determining the potentiality of the matter to be this , and as including that determination of it ; that is , as including the matter thus determin'd . of the equivocalness in words , the several sorts of it , how it comes , and of the way how to detect it ; as also , of the means how we may arrive at their true and proper signification in several subjects , i have treated in my method to science , book . less . . reflexions on the fourth book . reflexion seventeenth , on the first three chapters . . this learned author having , with much exactness , treated of all that can belong to his ideas , the being affected with which is called the first operation of our understanding , or simple apprehension ; he advances to the second [ judgment , ] which is express'd by a proposition . 't is by this that we have compleat knowledge or cognition ; which ( as the word it self imports ) is the putting together of notions in the understanding after its manner ; that is , in order to the seeing them connected , or knowing they are so . the first chapter is both comprehensive of his subject , and has much truth in it . whether it goes to the bottom , and does not require some deeper truths to explicate the point fully , is now to be examined . . he defines knowledge to be the perception of the connexion and agreement , or of the disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas . my exceptions against this definition are : . that [ perception ] being the act of a knowing power , can mean nothing but knowledge ; and , therefore , to define knowledge by knowledge seems inartificial and preternatural : for , it will still be ask'd , what this knowledge he calls perception is ? . mr. locke granting perception to brutes , he must necessarily allow them ideas , and that they can connect them too . wherefore his book being entituled , an essay concerning humane understanding , it is needful we know what kind of ideas we have , what brutes have ; and , ( not to speak of our or their perception ) whether they do connect them as we men do . for , this concession makes perception to be the genus in this definition ; and , therefore , to appropriate it to humane knowledge , the large signification of it ought to be restrain'd to such a perception as is peculiar to man. but , what i most dislike is the word [ ideas , ] in our perceiving the agreement or disagreement of which he puts knowledge to consist . philosophy is the knowledge of things ; wherefore , unless those ideas be the thing it self in our understanding ; or , if they be not , but similitudes only ( as the word imports ) unless it be well made out that those similitudes do give us the knowledge of the thing it self , ( which i have demonstrated in my preliminaries they cannot ) 't is impossible we should ever arrive at true philosophy , tho' we did perceive the connexion of all the ideas in the world. nay , unless they be the thing it self ( in part , ) no predication we make can be true. . to shew this more fully , i intreat mr. locke to consider , that this connexion of ideas he speaks as necessary to knowledge , is that which is signify'd by the word [ est ; ] which being so , in this proposition , [ sugar is sweet , ] the word [ est ] must according to him , if only ideas must be connected , naturally and genuinly affirm , that one of those ideas is the other idea , or that the idea of sugar is the idea of sweet ; which is evidently false . for those ideas differ toto genere ; the former belonging to the common head of substance , the other of quality ; and besides , 't is perfectly contradictory to mr. locke's avowed doctrine , that each idea has its peculiar metaphysical verity , or is what it self is , and is distinct from any other idea , and therefore is to be deny'd of it . whence follows , that it is not in seeing the connexion or disagreement of the ideas themselves that knowledge can consist ; for they are , as to themselves , always distinct , and therefore unconnected ; so that we can never say one of them is the other , which yet we do in all our affirmative propositions ; whence follows , that all our affirmative propositions would be false . it follows then , that it is the subject or thing inadequately conceiv'd by our understanding , which is said by the copula [ est ] to be identity'd really and materially with it self as conceiv'd by another inadequate notion ; and , that [ est ] speaks their being united in the same ens , or ingrafted on the same stock of being . and , certainly , it appears , at first sight , to be an odd explication of knowledge and philosophy , to maintain , that they consist in seeing the connexion or disagreement of similitudes . . wherefore , i should rather think , that , as notions are defin'd , the thing in the understanding inadequately conceiving it , ( which has been abundantly prov'd , ) so knowledge ought to be defin'd , the inadequate notions of the thing , existing in the understanding , so connected there , as they are in the thing in nature . to make good my definition , i discourse thus : first , it has been prov'd by many arguments , that all our notions are partial conceptions of the thing ; or , which is the same , ( if we take the word [ conception ] for the object , and not for the act of conceiving , ) they are the thing inadequately conceived . and , i dare be confident , those arguments are unanswerable ; and that no true reason , or connexion of terms , can ever shock them : however , i may expect much repugnance of fancy , ere that point be admitted . secondly , all our distinct notions being inadequate , and consequently , ( as it were , ) parts of the thing , as 't is knowable by us ; it follows , that ( according to our doctrine ) the immediate object of all our knowledge , being somewhat of the thing , is wholly built on the thing it self , and therefore solid . thirdly , those several notions , however inadequate taking them abstractedly , yet they do connotate the whole thing ; since no part can be conceiv'd , but in reference to the whole , or as in it , it being impossible the former can be apprehended to be a distinct thing from the latter ; because , if it were of it self a distinct thing , it would be of it self a whole , and not a part. fourthly , the copula [ est ] speaks the identity of those parts with the whole ; for , they can onely be identify'd , as they are one with the whole thing materially ; since formally , as parts , they are contradistinguish'd from one another . and , were it not so , few propositions ( as was lately prov'd ) could be true. whence , let us take any proposition , v. g. [ socrates is wise ; ] the true sense of it is , that the individual substance , called socrates , is the same thing , materially , or really , with that which is wise ; or , that , what answers to socrates , and to wise , are found in the same thing . fifthly , in regard parts , as such , are distinguish'd formally from one another ; therefore , we cannot say that any partial notion , express'd formally as a part , is another . whence we cannot say [ petreitas est sapientia , ] tho' we can say [ petrus est sapiens ; ] in regard those abstract words do formally signifie such a partial notion of the whole thing , or a kind of part of it . and , tho' each of them does connotate the whole thing , yet , with a quatenus , ( to which that abstract manner of expression is equivalent , ) they cut off such a precise considerability , or notion of it , from all others ; and therefore , such words can onely signifie that precise notion , or ( as it were ) part , and no other . lastly , hence it is , that we cannot predicate a concrete of an abstract , nor an abstract of a concrete ; because the abstract signifies , distinctly and formally , only a part , and the concrete the whole , ( tho' confusedly , ) and not any distinct part of it . but i expatiate too much into the subject of predication , and shall pursue it no farther at present . . to come closer to the business in hand ; it appears by what is here said , that it is not enough for knowledge , nor answers the true notion of philosophy , that ideas be predicated of other ideas , or similitudes of similitudes ; nor ( which is the same ) that we see they agree or disagree with one another ; but it is necessary , that the ground of our knowledge , and of our predications , be taken from the thing it self , as is express'd in our definition . i produce not here the definition of knowing which i gave in my preliminaries , because it is not yet granted by those with whom i am discoursing , that our notions are the things in our understanding ; tho' ( one consideration , which is brought there , being added ) these two definitions are co-incident : but i accommodate my self to mr. locke's words , as far as they will bear , that the difference between us may be made more apparent . . hence , whereas mr. locke makes four sorts of connexions of our ideas , in which knowledge is found , viz. . of identity , or diversity : . of relation : . co-existence : . real existence ; i must , in pursuance to the grounds now laid , affirm , and maintain , that there is but one sort of intellectual connexion of our notions , viz. that of the co-existence of what is meant by the two terms in the same thing ; and , that ( there being but one copula [ est , ] all the other sorts of connexion are co-incident with this one . for , the first consisting in this , that each idea , or notion , is its self , and not another , signifies no more but what we express by this identical proposition , [ the thing as thus conceiv'd , is the thing as thus conceiv'd ; or , not as otherwise conceiv'd . ] whence it is self-evident , because the terms being every way the self-same notion , are as closely connected as perfect identity can express them ; whence they can admit no middle term to come between them , and make the proposition evident , or prove it : but their evidence is entirely grounded on this first metaphysical principle , [ every thing ( whether substance or accident ) is what it is ; or , is indivisum in se , and divisum a quolibet alio ; ] that is , in plain terms , one. the second , [ relation ; ] taking it not for the act of our mind , comparing or connecting it to another ; but for the ground of it in the thing , which obliges our comparing power , when it is in it , to refer it actually ; is still the thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd to be connected with , or agreeing to the same thing in part , as is explicated above . v. g. master and scholar are grounded on the actions and passions of teaching , and being taught , which are inadequate conceptions , co-existing in those two persons , and identify'd materially with those subjects : and the same is found in all others , which are thus connected . and the last , of real existence ; as , when we say , [ peter is , ] clearly imports , that what is meant by peter , the subject ; and by existent , which is the predicate , ( imply'd there in the word [ is , ] ) are co-existent ; or , are found in the same thing . but , more of this when we come to consider his th chapter , of the reality of our knowledge . . his second chapter , of the degrees of our knowledge , distinguishing it into intuitive , demonstrative , and sensitive , is admirably solid , clear , and rational throughout . the first of these is proper to principles , the second to proofs , the last to the knowledge of particular things or modes by the way of experiments . indeed , intuitive knowledge is proper to pure spirits , call'd intelligences or angels ; which , because they do not glean their knowledge from various impressions on the senses , consequently they do not divide the thing into parts , by inadequate notions , when they come to know it ; nor compound those notions again into propositions , as we do ; but , at one direct and full view , call'd intuition , they comprehend the whole thing , and all that belongs to it , at once . whence it seems not so proper to attribute intuition to us mortals , who are but poor retailers of our imperfect and short notions ; which we spell ( as it were ) and put together as children do letters , when they are , otherwise , not able to read whole words currently . but this is very pardonable in mr. locke ; for , to say true , 't is very hard to find another word which fits our knowledge of first principles much better ; tho' i think [ self-evidence ] might serve . my self have long ago had such a thought , tho' i express'd it warily in these words : " there is nothing in all our knowledges , that , in the manner of it , comes so near the angelical intuition as does our knowledge of self-evident principles , express'd by identical propositions . it divides as little as is possible for us in this state ; for it predicates the same of the same ; nay , the whole of the whole ; and , for the same reason , it as little compounds again . whence , it resembles it not a little in its absolute evidence and immovable firmness ; and is the nearest approach possible to simple intuition . that so , as the order of the world requires , the supremum infimi may immediately confine upon the infimum supremi . " . i was much pleased to see mr. locke declare , that upon this intuition depends all the certainty and evidence we have of our knowledge , and particularly , that , in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge , ( that is , in every consequence we deduce ) there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the next intermediate idea . i add , upon which agreement all the force of consequenee , that is , all our reasonings are grounded . the evident proof he gives for it here , is worthy the attentive consideration of his learned readers . 't is not in this occasion only , but in divers others , tho' i have not always noted them , that mr. locke and my self have , without design'd confederacy , agreed in positions of great moment ; which , i know not how , have escap'd the thoughts of all other authors i have seen . the reader may please to review my method to science , b. . less . . § . . where i discourse thus : " wherefore , since , if the consequence , in which consists the essence , and all the force and nerves of discourse , be not clear and evident , there could be no certainty or evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded ; and so our faculty of exact reasoning would have been given us to no purpose ; hence , 't is manifest , that however one proposition may be made known by other propositions that are connected and consequential to one another ; yet the consequence it self cannot be proved by another consequence . for , the question would still return how , and in virtue of what , that consequence which made the other evident , is evident it self , and so in infinitum . whence it follows , that the evidence of all consequences whatever , must be built on something in a higher manner evident than any consequence or proof can otherwise make it ; that is , on a self-evident proposition . ] " the certain knowledge of which kind of propositions , as mr. locke holds , is to be had by intuition . . i have been larger upon this point , and do most especially recommend it to the best reflexion of our readers ; because it is not only the deepest and firmest ground , but also the very best test of all argumentation ; and therefore the main hinge on which all science turns . i must confess , for all that , i cannot see why , since all self-evident truths can only be express'd by identical propositions , this learned gentleman is so shy to use those words , since the sense he brings on this occasion , is clearly equivalent to those identical forms of speech ; nor , if put into propositions , can be express'd by any other . i think we should not be asham'd of them , or think them trifling , because some men of fancy , who never set their thoughts to trace evidence and truth to their originals , are pleased to make themselves sport with them ; nor because their terms are too closely connected ; for , they must be so ; and , were they not so , they would be unworthy the name of first principles , nor do us any good when we come to reduce other truths into them ; which is the best way of demonstrating . . the extent of humane knowledge , of which he treats in his d chapter , is a very excellent subject . science has two capital enemies , scepticism , and dogmatism : the one will allow very little , or nothing at all , to be known ; the other pretends to know too much . the former , by breeding a perfect despair of knowledge , discourages the industry of the best wits ; and makes them , since truth cannot be found , to addict themselves only to wordish talk and declamation : to which contributes not a little , that many who have incomparable fancies , have oftentimes the worst judgments ; especially , if they have let their wits loose to raillery , and drollery : for , such persons , proud of their joking talent , do think they answer a demonstration , if they can but break a jest upon it . and , besides , they have the faculty of cutting capers beyond the moon , and raising objections at random . the latter does , perhaps , as much harm , by presuming to demonstrate every thing : and the over-weening of these men is the more pernicious , because they make a shew of a great friendship and zeal for science ; and yet , by falling short of their extravagant pretensions , they throw a scandal upon her ; and make weak distinguishers apprehend there is no science at all . the one deviates from zeal for truth , in excess ; the other , in defect : and the judicious decision of this point , [ of the extent of our knowledge , ] settles the golden mean between both . i have endeavour'd , in my method , b. . less . . to § . . to establish from clear grounds , the just pitch of our knowledge in this state : mr. locke does , with his usual candour , attempt to do the same in his way ; concerning which , i am to give him my thoughts ; which are these . . there is no doubt but we have less knowledge than we might have had , through our want of some notions ; as also , for want of discerning the agreement or disagreement of them in the same thing . no doubt too , but intuitive knowledge , which is only of self-evident truths , cannot reach to all that belongs to our notions , or ideas ; and , that we too often want proper mediums to connect those notions , in order to demonstration : as also , that our sensitive knowledge ( i suppose he means that which is had by experiments ) does not reach very far ; otherwise , our senses giving us ( as we do both of us hold ) all the first natural notions we have , i believe it cannot be deny'd , but that they give us withall the ground of all our knowledge . whence i cannot see , why he limits sensitive knowledge to the notion of existence onely ; or , that our senses do make us know onely that a thing is : for , certainly , our senses do as well tell us the wall is white , as that the wall is ; tho' , in proper speech , it does neither , but by means of our mind , comparing the notions of the two terms , given us by the object , in order to the seeing their co-existence in the thing . all they do , is , to give us our notions ; which the soul ( that is , the man , according to his spiritual part ) compounds into a proposition ; and so frames a judgment of the said co-existence ( or inconsistency ) of those terms , or ( which is the same ) of what is signify'd by them , in the same thing . nor do i think mr. locke will much deny any of this , however we may express our selves diversly . . 't is very true that our experience gives us some light to know what qualities do belong to such substances ; yet , i cannot think it impossible to know this very often a priori , by demonstrative reason , tho' we do not know the constitution of the minute parts , on which those qualities do depend ; much less do i judge , that , tho' we did not know them , yet we could not discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities ; he means , those qualities which are the objects of our senses . nor do i wonder mr. locke thinks thus , because he does , all along , pitch his thoughts on the corpuscularian hypothesis , as on that which , in some men's opinion , goes farthest in an intelligible explication of the qualities of body . now , my judgment is , that 't is demonstrable , that the principles of the corpuscularians cannot possibly give account of the constitution either of the minute parts , or of the least atom , nor , consequently , of any body in nature ; or ( which is the proper work of a philosopher ) refund any quality into its proper causes ; i mean , such causes as they can prove to be such , or must be such ; however , they may fancy them to be such , by allowing to themselves voluntary suppositions for principles . i have shewn in my appendix to my method , that the most celebrated of the corpuscularian philosophers , the cartesians , cannot know the constitution of the most minute part of any of their elements , since they can never tell us by their grounds , the primary qualities of their first matter , of which their three elements , and , consequently , all natural bodies are made . to shew we can , i will give a short summary of the aristotelian doctrine in this particular , truly represented , and cleared from the mis-conceits of some late school-men . . 't is confess'd , and evident , that quantity is the primary affection of body ; of which , re-modify'd , ( as i may say , ) all qualities are made . we can shew , that by it body is divisible ; and , therefore , quantity ( for that , and and many other reasons ) is divisibility , especially , taking it as consider'd physically : however , taking it as capable to be measur'd , proportion'd , and figur'd , ( as mathematicians do , ) it may not very unfitly be called extension . but , take it , ( as i said , ) as affecting bodies , in order to natural action and passion , in which the course of nature consists , ( as a natural philosopher ought to consider it , ) and 't is divisibility , or a capacity to be divided by those causes . nor can the greatest cartesian deny this , since he grants , that the first operation in nature , is , the making their three elements , by grinding ( as it were ) or dividing their first matter . proceeding by immediate steps , we are to seek out the first sorts of this divisibility ; and this must be done by finding the most simple intrinsecal differences of that , or any other notion , which can only be more and less of the common notion . now , more and less of divisibility consider'd , in order to natural agents , is the same as to be * more easily , and less easily divisible by by those agents , which we call to be rare , and dense . rarity therefore , and density do constitute the simplest sorts or kinds of bodies . and , since it is inconceivable that matter should be divided at all by second causes , but the divider must be more dense , or more able to divide , than the matter that is to be divided by it ; it follows , that rare and dense bodies were originally such ; or , that there were created at first some sorts of bodies that are more , and others that were less divisible ; as is clearly express'd in the two first verses of genesis . and reason abets it ; for , otherwise , the course of nature , consisting in motion , could never have been connaturally made ; because , had all the parts of matter been equally divisible , there could be no reason why one part of the matter should be the divider , rather than the other ; and so there could have been no motion , nor , consequently , any course of nature at all . . by the division of rare bodies by dense ones , and the division of their first compounds , the number of parts increasing , there naturally follow'd the various size , and the grossness and minuteness of those parts ; as also , their various figures , situations , &c. all which contribute to compound the species and individuums . of these , variously mingled and remingled , all the rest are made . from simple division , two things are made of one ; whence follows the individual diversity of bodies , according to the notion of substance , or ens. more accidents are ( as was said before ) still taken in , to make the subaltern genera and species , even to the lowest sort , or kind ; and innumerably more of them , to distinguish and constitute individual bodies . . to come a little nearer our main point : unless those qualities , rarity and density , which are the primary ones , be admitted , the world could never have been form'd connaturally ; nor the course of nature carried on ; because , ( as was now shewn , ) in that supposition , there would have been no motion . for , motion of material entities is perform'd by the intervening of the parts of the one between the parts of the other , and , so , dividing it ; which is impossible , unless the one had been rarer , or more yielding ; the other denser , or less yielding . but , this once settled , 't is evident from the very terms , that there are proper causes , both on the agent 's and patient's side , for the one's dividing , and the other's being divided . for , the rare being more divisible than the dense , 't is demonstrable , that the dense being impell'd against the rare by motion , ( which comes from a superior agent , ) the rare being more divisible , will give way , and be divided by the dense ; which is clearly impossible in the corpuscularian hypothesis ; which puts all parts of their matter to be equally rare , or dense ; or rather , ( as the cartesians do , ) neither rare , nor dense ; all qualities , according to them , being made by mingling their three elements ; which elements are themselves made by , and presuppose , the motion of their first matter . whereas , yet , it is impossible to conceive , but those parts of that matter must be either rare , or else dense , at least to some degree . and , as denying the rarity and density in the first bodies does , by making motion impossible , put the course of nature out of frame , both in its beginning and progress ; so it utterly destroys all demonstration in physicks , which is grounded on mediums from proper causes , and proper effects . . passing over many immediate steps , which shew how those four principal qualities , heat , cold , moisture , and driness , are made of rarity and density , acted upon by the common causes in nature ; we come to shew how these two primary qualities do constitute many secondary ones ; and how these last are refunded into the other , as their proper causes ; and , therefore , are demonstrable by them , as by their proper mediums . a few instances may serve , as hints , to explicate others . that great pellucidity in the air is necessarily , and properly refunded into its extream divisibility , or rarity ; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its parts , by those spicula ignea , the rays of the sun ; and opacity , for the same reason , is the proper effect of density ; which hinders its subject from being penetrated , or divided by them ; whence also it is a proper cause of repelling , or reflecting them . again ; who sees not that liquidity , which makes its subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly , as we see in ponds ; or driven to run into cavities , by the common motion of gravitation , is a proper effect of rarity , as consistency is of density ? spissitude is a constipation of dense parts , or the want of pores to admit the ingress of other bodies . grossitude is clearly nothing but density , in a bigger quantity of its parts . friability is refunded into great dense parts , and very large rare ones : whence , those rare parts , which , were they less , would better cement those parts together , being now very large , and , withal , very divisible , are easily divided ; and , consequently , the body is soon shatter'd : as we find in dry clods , out of which , ( while they were yet wet dirt , ) those parts which were watry , being drawn by heat , large cavities are left , which the air now possesses . on the other side , ductility and malleability are the effects of the very smallest rare parts , finely compacted with the minutest dense ones . those small dense parts , so closely woven , and , in a manner , contiguous , keep the rare from evaporating ; and the rare , by being such , and interwoven with the dense all over , make the compound yield to expansion , without breaking ; being very small , are not easily separable ; and yet , tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest agent , fire , they render it fusible . . were these principles which i rawly and briefly touch on here , pursu'd by learned men with immediate consequences , which , true logick assisting , is far from impossible ; the nature of those first-mixt qualities , and by their means of many others , would not be very hard to explicate . but , if men are resolv'd to neglect all natural principles , and the intrinsecal constitution of the first bodies in nature , and will needs run upon nothing but mathematical notions , which pre-suppose those principles ; nor could be found in nature , unless the other be first admitted , or division made possible ; ( for neither parts , nor consequently figures of parts , could be made without division , nor division unless some bodies were naturally apt to divide , others to be divided , that is , unless some were rare , others dense ) or , if , instead of demonstrating their natural principles by the superiour science , they will needs have recourse to voluntary suppositions ; and violate the nature of causality , and of the deity it self , by making him whose proper effect ( he being essentially self-existence ) is to give existence , or create , to be the proper and immediate cause of motion ; and go about to prove ignotum per ignotissimum , by supposing ( as they sometimes do ) that god wills this or that , which is for the interest of their tenet , and too hard to prove : if , i say , men are resolv'd to follow such untoward methods , 't is no wonder science does not advance , but the world is detain'd in ignorance of many things , which otherwise it might know . did learned men set themselves to carry forwards the grounds of nature in euclides physicus ( where they will find demonstrations enow ) to farther conclusions , with the same zeal as they do the mathematicks ; i doubt not but the evident truths , which would by degrees disclose themselves , would both encourage , and enable them , to make a farther progress in knowledge ; nor would the science of second qualities , ( about which physical demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd ) be held so desperate . but to leave these discourses , and apply my self to mr. l. i cannot but wonder , that amongst all his ideas of qualities , he not so much as once mentions ( as far as i remember ) those two chiefest ones of rarity and density ; tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole course of nature than these are . which , with many other reasons , makes me think he had not seen , or at least well weigh'd the true aristotelian system , ( which he might have seen in sir kenelm digby's treatise of bodies , and its latin preface ; as also in institutiones peripateticae ; ) but took it as represented by the modern schools . for my self , i must declare i verily judge , that the grounds i here insist on , are the only true ones that a natural philosopher can have ; that they are demonstrable ; and i do offer my self to maintain them to be such , if it shall please any learned objector to attempt to show these principles faulty ; or that we build on any supposition at all , and not on what 's either self-evident , or easily and immediately reducible to self-evidence . which , i believe , no other sect of philosophers did ever so much as pretend to . . to come to those qualities , which are the formal object of our senses , called by mr. locke secondary qualities , i have shewn already that divers of them are intelligible and explicable by rarity and density ; only certain little respects are added to them , which too lie in our ken : nor do i doubt but most of the others may be clearly and distinctly known by the same grounds . indeed , divers of them depend on the figure and texture of parts ; which , tho' we can never know with a mathematical exactness , yet i see not why we may not demonstrate the natures or kinds of each quality , so far as to distinguish them from others , and refund them into their proper causes ; which is enough for our purpose , and most proportionable to our state. for example , light brings from the wall into the eye , and so into our knowing power , the notion of whiteness , and of other colours from other objects . it cannot be doubted then , ( since light of its self is uniform ) but that there is some disposition in the surface of the object , or the figure of its outmost parts , which reflects light after a different manner , and affects the seer accordingly . nor is it hard to conceive , but very evident , that a very smooth surface , as having fewest pores in it , will reflect more light , and so make it more visible ; especially if those outmost parts be roundish , which reflect light every way , or towards all sides . it is manifest then that , that quality which is most visible of all others being that which we call whiteness , the proper causes of that quality may be found out . which will further appear hence , that if , on the contrary , the surface have small-pointed parts and large pores , much of the light will be lost in those shady grotts , and scarce any beam of it reflected ; which therefore is the proper cause of that lightless appearance call'd blackness ; which is the reason why , when there is no light at all to be reflected , all things seem black. if we hold a thousand needles points towards our eye , they appear black , because of the vastness of the interstices or cavities in proportion to the extant parts which should have reflected the light : whereas , were the object a polish'd plate of steel , the interstices or pores being less , it appears more luminous and whitish ; which may give us some faint , but sure , light , how this colour is made . the intermediate colours are made by the mixture and demixture of those extreams ; whence , out of the degrees of their partaking those , contrary or subcontrary qualities are framed , as blue , green , yellow , and all other colours . nor is this degree , constituting each of those species , unknowable . a picture-drawer can tell us what proportion of his paint of such a colour he adds to that of another colour , to make what third colour he pleases . we see then , that the secondary quality of colour , may come within the compass of our knowledge . nor do i see why the rest of them may not become equally intelligible , did we seriously set our reflex thoughts on work to study them ; especially experimental knowledge assisting , by hinting to us such matters of fact as give light to our reason , ( when furnish'd with , and attentive to , true natural principles ) how it may reduce those qualities unto their proper causes , which is the only work of science . reflexion eighteenth , on the th and th chapters . . i come now to a nearer view of the th chapter , of the reality of knowledge , the main point in which the whole doctrine of the ideists is concern'd . to state it rightly , i do not doubt ( as i have exprest my self formerly ) but that the ideists have many true notions of the things ; that is , the things themselves in their minds , after a natural manner , as well as their opposers have , notwithstanding their ill speculation ; and thence oftentimes discourse right ; for the same reason that , tho' some philosophers held that the eye sees per emissionem , others per receptionem radiorum , yet they naturally saw both a like , however their speculative thoughts , disfer'd about the manner how seeing was made . wherefore the true state of the question is , whether they can have any real knowledge of the things in nature , according to the principles of the ideists ; or , by their puting our notions , which are the ground and materials of our knowledge , to be onely likenesses , appearances , similitudes , resemblances , pourtraitures , or pictures of the things , ( which are the names they give them ) and not the things themselves in our minds : for , if they can have no real knowledge , or knowledge of the thing , by such meerly representing ideas , then it must be said that those ideas , being confessedly the first and onely materials of their knowledge , the ideists will become oftentimes liable to deviate from nature , and fall into errour by adhering to such groundless principles , as is the substituting very often empty resemblances , or fancies , for the things themselves ; nor can they ever be able to give a solid account by their principles , that they know any thing . . now , it seems to me ( tho' i should wave those many pregnant arguments brought against them , in my three first preliminaries ) that the very position of the ideists , does decide the question , and confute themselves . for , if we may trust their words , they agree that we know the things as well as the ideas , and onely differ in the manner how : of which mr. l. tell us here § . 't is evident the mind knows not things immediately , but onely by the intervention of the ideas it has of them . whence i much fear that by ideas he means phantasms , or material pictures in the imagination ; by whose intervention 't is indeed confest we know . for , otherwise , it is far from evident , that we know them by means of those spiritual conceptions , we call notions ; since we bring many close arguments , fetcht from the nature of the thing , to prove that there is perfect evidence of the contrary : for , those ideas or notions being held and shown by us , to be the things in our mind , their very being there , or in a knowing power , is to be known : nor can they be held by us to be the means to know themselves ; for , so the same would be the means and end both , which is a contradiction . but , let us consider his words . the mind , he says , knows the things by the intervention of ideas . the question then is what the idea does , and what the word [ intervention ] means . does the mind see the thing without , by sending out her rayes of knowledge to it ? this cannot be said , in regard all the acts of knowledge which the mind has , are immanent ones , and are receiv'd in that which produced them , as in their onely subject . does then the thing that is without , send its beams by the ideas , as by a kind of spiritual optick-glass , to which the mind lays her intellectual eye ? neither can this be said , for the mind could see or know the thing it self were it in it , else how could it know the ideas ? rather , were the thing in the understanding , it could not but be known , whether there were any similitude , besides , in it , or no. it may be said that the mind knows the thing by the idea because it is a picture or similitude that represents it . but i way walk in a gallery , and see a hundred pictures in it of men , and many other things in nature ; and yet not know one jot the better , any one of the things represented , unless i had know them formerly , tho' apelles himself had drawn them . i may remember them again , indeed , if i had known them before ; which cannot be said in our case , because those ideas of theirs are to give them the first knowledge of the thing . . being thus at a loss to explicate [ intervention ] or to know what it , or the idea or representation serves for , we will reflect next upon the word [ know ] which mr. locke applies ( tho' not so immediately , yet ) indifferently , to the thing and to the idea . now , if this be so , and that to to be known agrees to them both ; then , as the idea is in the mind when it is known , so the thing , when known , should be in the mind too , which is our very position , thought by the ideists so paradoxical , and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves . and , if neither the idea brings the thing into the knowing power , or ( which is the same ) into the mind ; nor the mind , or knowing power goes out of the soul to it , i know not how they can pretend to show how the knowing power , and the thing known , can ever come to meet , as they must when ever an act of knowledge is made . 't is to no purpose then , to alledge that the thing comes into the mind , or is brought thither by means of the idea ; for , if it comes or is brought thither , let it be by what means it will , 't is most incontestably evident that , after it is come or brought thither , it is there . nor can all the wit of man avoid this consequence , unless plain words must lose their signification . wherefore mr. l. in pursuance of his own principles should not have said that the mind does not know things immediately , but by means of the ideas ; but , that it does not know them at all , neither mediately nor immediately ; for if the thing be in the knowledge at all , they must be in the mind , where onely the knowledge is ; which comes over ( thus far ) to our position . . it must be confess'd , that mr. locke has here , § . . put the objection against the ideists as strongly , and home , as it is possible : but i must still persist , and avow , that neither his own excellent wit , ( which , had he light on right principles , could reach to any thing that is within the compass of possibility , ) nor all the world joining in his assistance , can clear that objection , so as to satisfie any intelligent man , who is true to his reason guiding it self ( as it ought ) by connexion of terms , and not by fancy ; nor shew , that by his ideas any knowledge at all of the thing can be possibly had . first , he alledges the agreement or conformity of the things with his simple ideas . and i reply , that he cannot , by the principles of the ideists , sh●w that the things do agree or disagree with his simple ideas at all . to demonstrate which , i argue thus : ere he can know that the representation and the thing represented do agree , common sense tells us , he must have both the idea and the thing in his comparing power , that is , in his mind ; that so he may take a view of both of them , and consider them in order to one another ; and , by doing this , see whether the one does truly resemble the other , or no. but , this is directly against the principles of the ideists , who do not allow that the thing can be in the mind , but the idea only . next , he alledges , that his complex ideas are archetypes ; and not conformable to the things , as the others were , but to themselves only ; and , therefore , he says , they cannot lead us into errour , because they cannot but represent themselves . i pass by the oddness of the position , that the idea , which is a picture , should be a picture of it self , or represent it self : i only note , that this allegation which should clear the point , quite loses it , and gives it up . for , the question is , whether his ideas do give us the knowledge of the things in nature ; and 't is evident , and confess'd they cannot give us this knowledge of them , but by representing them : now , he tells us , that his complex ideas are not copies of the things , nor represent them , but themselves only . whence is evidently concluded , that we are never the nearer to the knowing of things by them ; no , not obliquely , and at second hand , or by the intervention of those ideas , or similitudes representing them , as was pretended formerly . whence , for any thing he has produced , we may justly doubt whether such ideas are not whimsical fancies , without any reality at all ; since he will not allow them even that slightest relation to the things , of so much as representing them . but , which is much worse , he affirms , § . . that those ideas themselves are consider'd as the archetypes ; and the things no otherwise regarded , but as they are conformable to them . now , this seems to me a strange way of proving the reality of our knowledge , by ideas , to affirm , that we are not to regard the things , but as conformable to our ideas . is not this to make philosophy not the knowledge of things , but of ideas only ; and to pretend , that the thing must only be held true , if it be conformable to our ideas ? he might as well have said fancies ; for , he expresly says , these complex ideas are made by the mind , and not taken from the thing , nor like it : and , whatever is neither the res , nor so much as like it , can neither have reality , nor shew of reality ; and therefore , must be a meer fancy . now , these complex ideas reach much farther than all the others do ; viz. to modes , substances and relations ; as is seen , book . chap. . so that this discourse of his destroys the reality of our knowledge in almost all the things we are to know . he will , perhaps , say , those complex ideas are the effects of certain powers to cause them , found in the thing ; and , by this means they bring the things , as being their causes , into their mind . but the argument returns still with the same force ; for , if they bring the thing into the mind , then the thing is in the mind when it is brought thither . add , that this makes them resemblances of the thing , which he denies ; for , the effect , being a participation of the cause , must necessarily resemble it ; especially , if it be a natural effect . nor can he say they make us know the thing , because they are made up of simple ones : for , as the simple ideas only made us know the thing by representing it , so these other not representing it , have lost the power of making us know it at all . so that , let them turn which way they will , either the thing is never brought into the knowledge , or the mind ; and then it can never be known : or , it is brought thither , and then it must be there ; which is our position , and deny'd by the ideists . . i have shewn above , that all mathematical knowledges , tho' they are never so abstractedly express'd , are grounded on the thing , or on body ; and moral ones , ( which two he here mentions , ) on the nature of man , or reason ; which , i suppose , none will say are nothings ; and , therefore , they are , both of them , true knowledge of the thing , consider'd in part , or inadequately . . in his th section , he defends himself for having so little regard ( as it may seem ) to the real existence of things . i discourse thus : we have more real notions of the thing , than barely existence ; for , every notion that belongs to the line of thing or substance , whether inferior or superior ; nay , every mode or accident that does belong , or ever did belong to the thing , either intrinsecally or extrinsecally , are all of them real ; so that he needs not be sollicitous any should object , that his ideas have no reality in them , because he regards not their existence onely . and , were such an objection made , or had it any force , he might also reply , that in every part of his discourse , he does regard existence , and cannot do otherwise ; unless any objecter should be so weak as to alledge , that what exists in the mind , does not exist at all . for , if he had once his notions from the thing , they would be still the thing in the mind , and real , tho' the individual objects , whence they were taken , be perish'd . nay , more ; those things would have a better , a more durable , and more noble existence in the mind , than they had in nature . i say , [ those things ; ] not fearing that any should object , that thing signifies the whole ; which may seem contrary to my former doctrine , that the thing is only in the mind by inadequate notions , or in part . for , tho' the formal conception be onely of some quality of it , expresly and distinctly , yet it implies or connotates the knowledge of the whole thing confusedly ; it being most clearly demonstrable in metaphysicks , that there are no actual parts in any compound whatever : so that 't is still the whole thing that is known , tho' onely a part ( as it were ) of it be known distinctly . upon this evident principle , that there are no actual parts , is grounded that solid and most approved maxim , that actions and passions are of the suppositum , or individual thing . thus , when the hand strikes or wounds a man , 't is truly said , that the man ( which signifies the whole thing ) did it , and is answerable for it ; and , if he kills the person he struck , the whole man will be hang'd for it , tho' the hand onely , and not the legs , head , neck , &c. gave the blow . now , this could neither be said with truth , nor that punishment be inflicted by justice , if the word [ hand ] did not signifie , and truly were the whole man , according to his faculty of handling or striking , or according to that part which immediately did that action . the self-same is to be said , and for the self-same reason , of our inadequate notions ; and , that each of them implies , or connotates ( that is , materially and entitatively is ) the whole thing , tho' formally or precisely but a part of it , as it were ; or the thing according to such a particular considerability , found in it , or identify'd with it . whoever shall weigh attentively the force and coherence of this discourse , will clearly discern how entirely all our philosophy is built on the things , and is the knowledge of them ; and how far the ideists fall short of having that solid ground for the basis of their discourses : but , especially , this tenet , which puts their complex ideas not onely not to be the thing , ( which it must be some way , or to some degree or other , if it be not a meer fancy , ) but , not to be so much as a copy or resemblance of it , which ( as was said ) is the slightest and least relation it can possibly have to it . . i would have none think , that , by this discourse i deny complex notions , or ideas . the ten common heads are the simpler ones ; which when we divide by differences , each inferior genus and species , ( they being made up of the superior notions , and those differences , ) are complex notions , as their very definitions tell us . whence mr. locke's complex idea of murther , sacrilege , or whatever else they be , are given us by the same method . and , the difference between him and me in this point , is this ; that we complicate our ideas regularly , and according to the exact rules of art ; and he seems to make his voluntarily , or else by reflexion on his own interiour , and what he experiences in himself ; which i take to be a very fallacious way , because very few can distinguish well between a phantasm in the imagination , which is a material faculty in us ; and a notion , which is spiritual , tho' they be both of them interiour , or within us . to shew the difference between which , i have given a short hint in my method , book . less . . § . . and much more here , in my preface . . it is very hard , when two writers go upon different principles , not to mistake now and then one the others meaning ; and i would be loath to wrong so ingenuous an author . sometimes he seems to mean no more by his complex ideas , but either those compound notions which are made up of the simpler notions of the genus and difference , as we descend downwards in the same line ; or else , of those in divers lines ; and , i am sure , let him discourse them as he will , they can be compounded of nothing else ; those common heads comprizing all the natural notions we can have . it is no less certain too , that we can put together ( as he says ) simple notions as we please , which we have not observ'd thus put together in things that actually exist . but then we must be wary , while we do this , that our reason joins them by seeing them consistent and compossible : for , our fancy will put together ideas which are utterly repugnant to one another , and are altogether chimerical . now , if the notions , thus join'd by us , be consistent , the nature or thing suppos'd to be the ground of those notions is possible to be ; which being the notion of ens , hence they are conceiv'd as a kind of intellectual entity , created ( as it were ) by the mind , and thence have an intelligibility , which is a property of ens ( non-entities and chimaeras being unintelligible ) and we can have a kind of counterfeit , or artificial , notion of them as entities , tho' such a thing never existed in the world that we know of ; tho' , i believe , ' tit hard to conceive , that we can frame a complex notion of a nature that is capable to be , but it exists somewhere in the universality of creatures , here , or elsewhere . how the mind , using the fancy , can do this , cannot , i think , be better elucidated , than by reflecting on what those , who write of the excellency of poesie and poets , use to say in commendation of those daedalean artists . they tell us that a poet has that name from the greek noun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a maker . the reason they give for this appellation is , that whereas other artists have their materials given to their hands to work upon , by shaping it into an artificial form ; the poet alone is the maker as well of his matter , as the contriver of its form. so that the ideas he has in his head of his heroes , his lovers , his ladies , and of virtuous persons , are indeed ( as mr. locke calls his ) archetypes , and regard not whether such incomparable patterns he has invented did ever exist in nature , or no ; nor is it to his purpose . yet still ( as mr. locke says well ) that his complex ideas are made of simple ones , so ( by the leave of those self-magnifiers ) the poet could never have had those excellent ideas of his heroes , or their great actions , had he not been pre-imbu'd with natural notions ; which he joins together ingeniously , and exalts them to a high pitch , so to make them exemplars for others to imitate . rather , he only adds superlative or extraordinary degrees to what he finds in nature . whence 't is manifest , he regards not what is , but what should be ; quite contrary to the duty of a philosopher , who is to take his complex notions from things , just as he finds them complicated in nature , and then discourse upon them by his reason ; and not to stand coining new complex ideas which nature never gave him . what therefore i most dislike here in mr. locke is , that he seems not to reflect on what it is which makes some ideas or notions more simple than others , viz. their being more abstracted or universal ; for this frees them from the partnership of more-compounded differences , and the complexion of multitudes of accidents ; ( which , still , as they descend lower , are requisit to distinguish the kinds of things ; ) by which means they become more simple or less compounded ; whence , the supreme heads of the ten predicaments are the simplest notions of all others , except that of existence . did mr. locke rate the simplicity and complexion of his ideas from this certain and well-grounded rule , there might an easie accomodation be made between his doctrin and mine as to this particular . but his zeal against the cobweb schemes some modern school-men had woven , transported him to ravel that excellent frame of notions , which both nature and art had given us ; and , ( as cartesius and others have done ) to model all philosophy upon a new , tho' less solid , or rather far from solid , foundation . . that i may say as much as i can in behalf of the ideists , it may be alledg'd , that they find by experience things are as their ideas do represent them , and that they succeed as we by means of our ideas do forecast them : therefore real knowledge may be had by means of ideas . i answer , first , that this agreement they have between what 's in the mind and out of it , would equally , nay better , be explicated , were the things themselves in the mind , and not the ideas ; and , therefore , it can be no argument for the reality of their knowledge by ideas only . besides , i deny that when their ideas are not true natural notions but fancies , they experience them , or any effect of them ; as in vacuum , or duration before or after the world. secondly , i answer , that experience only helps them by giving them knowledge ; and knowledge , according to them , can only be had by means of ideas ; wherefore they must either prove , by other grounds , that similitudes can give us knowledge of the things , or they do petere principium , beg the question , and prove idem per idem . for , if meer representations can give us no true knowledge , experience , which only assists us by giving us ideas , is quite thrown out of doors , and may all be fantastical . all is wrong and falls short , if the first ground of our knowledge be incompetent and insignificant . besides , experience gives us both phantasms , which are material representations ; and our notions too , which are spiritual ; but experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the one , and which is the other ; tho' this be of the highest concern in our case : all it can do is to inform us , that we are affected by some agent working on our senses . nay , of the two , it more inclines us to embrace phantasms for notions ; for those do make upon us the more sensible impression , and cause a more lively representation . to distinguish perfectly between this false and true ground of knowledge , is of the most weighty importance of all other points of philosophy whatsoever ; and yet i must complain , that not the least care ( as far as i have observ'd ) is taken any where in this treatise to distinguish them ; and particularly , not in this chapter , which had been the proper place to treat of that subject : but , on the contrary , ( as i have shewn above ) they are carelesly confounded . and i must declare , that without settling this point well , we can never have any certainty what knowledge is real , what fantastick : or , when we do truly know , when onely seem to know : but , there is not a word here to that purpose . . as for the monsters and changelings here spoken of , i think philosophers should have nothing to do with lusus naturae , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which are besides the ordinary course of nature ; but with the common course of causes , or nature it self . my judgment is , too , that people should be very wary in killing any monsters that approach to humane shape ; and , that it were fitter there should be hospitalls to breed them , till perfect observations were made concerning them . the novelty of the sight , would invite spectators , and bear their charges : unless perhaps there may be danger , lest the imaginations of the apprehensive sex , who see such uncouth shapes , or hear frequent talk of them , should , by that occasion , breed more of them . what concerns us is to look to our principles , and not to be misled from them , by reflecting on such odd preternatural productions ; as i must think mr. locke is , when he thinks changelings to be something between a man and a beast . the division of animal into rational and irrational is made by such differences as are perfectly contradictory to one another ; between which there can no more be any third or middle , than there can be a medium between is and is not . if then that odd birth be rational , let the shape be as distorted as it will , it is truly a man ; if it be not , let it look never so like a man , 't is a brute . when 't is the one , when the other , may hap in some odd cases to be doubtful ; and then it belongs to the prudence of intelligent men to decide it ; or , if they cannot , it becomes us in christian prudence to act warily . indeed , if the definition of man , viz. rational animal , be questionable , we shall ( as i said above ) be at a great loss to know our own kind ; which would be but a melancholy business . and , if we forego our principles , distinguishing between corporeal and spiritual natures , we may perhaps grow in time no wiser than the common people amongst the portugueses in brazil , who conceit the apes and monkies there have as much wit as themselves have , and could speak well enough too if they would ; but that , out of a deep reach of policy , they counterfeit themselves dumb , and not to understand the language , lest they should be forced to work . corollary i. from this discourse , and the evident grounds of it , all possibility of vacuum is clearly confuted . for , if the idea or notion of space be only an inadequate conception of body , whence 't is evidently taken , or body conceived according to such a mode of it ; then to put space without body , or where there is no body , is a perfect contradiction . corallery ii. hence also , tho' the cartesians could demonstrate there are innate ideas , ( which i judge impossible ) yet , unless they declare and prove , by their principles , that those ideas are the things themselves in our understanding , and not resemblances onely , the same arguments i have used against others will have equal , or rather a far greater force against them ; and conclude , that they cannot , by their principles , have knowledge of any thing , but that they know nothing . and , how they should pretend they are the things themselves , if they do not so much as allow them to be taken from the things , is altogether inconceivable . . concerning truth in general , of which mr. locke treats in his th chapter , no more can be said ( speaking of natural truths ) but that it is , the things existing such in our minds as they exist in themselves . for , this put , our minds will be conformable to the things , whose metaphysical verity fixes them to be what they are , or ( if we speak of them as affected with any mode ) as they are : whence our judgments concerning them , being thus grounded , cannot but be true. what mr. l.'s joining or separating of signs , &c. has to do with truth , is beyond my skill to comprehend ; for signs are no more truth , than the bush at the door is the wine in the cellar . i have demonstrated over and over , that ideas , which he makes here one sort of signs , and are meer similitudes , can never give us knowledge of things ; much less can truth , which is the object of knowledge , consist in conjoining or separating them ; and , least of all , can truth consist in the joining or separating the other sorts of signs , viz. of words without the ideas or notions ; for , thus consider'd , they are no more but sounds or characters . to discourse this point from its fundamental ground , and declare it literally : the metaphysical verity of the thing , which , put into a proposition , predicates the whole thing ( or mode ) of it self , and affirms that the thing is what it is , gives us our first truths , or first principles . and all other truths consists in this , that inadequate , or partial notions or conceptions of the thing , either as to what is intrinsecal or extrinsecal to it , are predicated either of the thing as in it self , that is , according to the line of substance , which are call'd essential predicates ; as , when we say , petrus est animal ; or , as it is affected with some mode consistent in the same subject ; as when we say , petrus est albus , pater , locatus , galeatus , album est dulce , &c. and it is impossible there can be any more sorts of formal truths but these two : for all predication is made by some kind of identification , as is plainly signify'd by the copula [ is , ] and there cannot possibly be any other sorts of identification , but either in the whole , or not in the whole ; that is , in part , or according to partial conceptions of the same thing ; nor can there be any identification at all of ideas ; mr. locke confessing , that each of them is what it self is , and no other . . i take it to be a strange kind of catechresis to make two sorts of truth , montal and verbal , and we may with as good sense say , that a tavern has two sorts of wine ; one in the cellar , the other in the bush at the door ; for words are good for nothing in the world but meerly and purely to signifie : so that when we say a man speaks true , the sense of those words can be only this , that the proposition he speaks does signifie such a thought or judgment in his mind as is really conformable to the thing he thought or spoke of : and i wonder this great man can imagin that , in our more complex ideas , we put the name for the idea it self ; for then that name would signifie nothing at all , if neither the thing nor the idea be signified by it , as he seems to hold . again , words differ from meer sounds in this , that they have some sense or meaning in them , and meanings are the very notions we have in our minds : wherefore the parts of this distinction of his would be coincident , because all verbal truths ( were the expression proper ) would necessarily be mental ones ; and mr. locke seems to say the same , § . where he makes those truths which are barely nominal to be chimerical . i grant too , that truths may be distinguish'd , according to their several subjects , into moral , physical , metaphysical , &c. but i must severely reflect on his describing moral truths , § . to be the speaking things according to the perswasion of our own minds , tho' the proposition we speak does not agree to the reality of things : for , since it is most evidently known , that the perswasions of men's minds not onely may , but do frequently contradict one another ; by this definition of moral truth both sides of the contradiction may be true ; which destroys truth by confounding it with falshood ; and makes the art of distinguishing ridiculous , by making truth a genus to some sort of falshood , or not-truth to be one kind of truth . 't is a very dangerous thing in philosophy to bring distinctions , unless each member of the notion divided includes the notion of the genus . they were invented for clearing truth ; but , if ill made , or ill-manag'd , nothing in the world breeds greater error and confusion . corruptio optimi pessima . reflexion nineteenth , on the th , th , and th chapters . . by what has been deliver'd in my foregoing reflexion , my notes upon his th chapter [ of universal propositions , their truth and certainty ] will be easily understood . but , i am to premise , first , that the question is not here , what proves the truth of such propositions , which is the work of logick ; but , whether there can be any truth in them , or certainty of them at all , or no. secondly , that the formal truth of propositions can onely be in the mind ; or , that mental propositions onely are capable of truth or falslhood ; tho' words be needful to signify them : and , therefore , i must deny that the consideration of words is a necessary part of the treatise of knowledge ; meaning by that word , philosophical knowledge , as our circumstance determin us . let logicians but take care that the words be univocal , and not equivocal , or double sensed , and all else that can be consider'd to belong to truth , is to be look'd for in the mind , and can be no where else . hence , i cannot admit his distinction of certainty of truth , and certainty of knowledge in any other sense than that knowledge is the act , and truth the onely object of that act ; since nothing can be known to be what is not ; nor known to be true , which is not true. the generical notion [ certainty , ] should first have been explicated , ere those two sorts of it had been defin'd ; otherwise both those definitions must necessarily remain unintelligible . i shall presume that i have in my method shown from its grounds what certainty is , viz. the determination of our understanding , or judging power by the object 's actuating it , or being actually in it as it is in its self . with which , what his putting together of words in verbal propositions has to do , surpasses my understanding . and , 't is as hard to conceive , that general truths can never be well made known , and are very seldom apprehended , but as conceiv'd and express'd in words . that general truths cannot be made known to others without words , is in a manner , as evident as 't is that we cannot see one anothers thoughts ; nor is this peculiar to general truths , for scarcely can particular ones be made known any other way : but , that they cannot be known or apprehended by our selves ( which seems here to be his meaning ) but as conceiv'd and express'd in words , is so far from evident , that the contrary is such ; for , it is impossible to express them in words , unless we do first apprehend and conceive them in our thoughts ; and were not this so , all the while we use words in speaking of general truths , we should do nothing but talk of we know not what : for , our thoughts and apprehensions are ex natura rei , presupposed to the words by which we express them ; and , to do otherwise is to let our tongue run before our wit. whence we account them silly and senseless people , and perverters of nature , who make use of words before they know their meaning . . i have shown above , that it is not necessary to our being certain of any proposition that we know the precise bounds and extent of the species it stands for ; but that 't is sufficient to know it in part distinctly ; and the rest of it , or the whole , confusedly ; provided that part of it , which we know is sufficient to distinguish it from all other species : and , were not this so , it would follow that we never could know the truth of any universal proposition whatever ; especially when we discourse of the species infima , which requires a complexion of very many accidents , whose precise number and bounds are utterly unknowable by us . a position which makes logick useless ; scarce any conclusion being deducible from premisses , unless one of them be an universal ; and quite destroyes all science which is employ'd about universal or general truths . he instances in man and gold , and judges that , for want of knowing the extent of their species , it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational , or all gold yellow . we cannot indeed know this by considering every individual man by the poll : but , if by the word [ man ] we mean no more but a rational animal , it is so far from impossible to know , and affirm that all men are rational , that 't is impossible not to know it . and , were it a proper place to make good that definition here , i could demonstrate that it does agree to man , and can agree to nothing else ; and therefore that definition is true and adequate : nor can the contrary be sustaind any other way , but by unacquainting us with our selves and our own kind ; and by jumbling together these species , which are distinguisht by contradictory differences , and confounding the vastly-distinct natures and properties , of corporeal and spiritual beings . as for the species of gold , yellowness ( which he instances in ) is not essential to it , as rationality is to man ; as being but one of those accidents , by which we distinguish it from other species of minerals ; and i have hinted some other formerly , which are more intrinsecal and essential to it than its colour . again , we are moreover certain by manifest and daily experience , and by the constant and common practise of the world , that mankind is acquainted with enow of those accidents to distinguish it . one bespeaks a golden cup , and the goldsmith makes it for him : nor was it ever heard that any of this trade , did hope to cozen a sensible man , by obtruding upon the buyer brass , or any other mettal , for gold ; or , if he did , that goldsmith's-hall could not distinguish it : nay , if it be but a little alloyd , there are ways to find it out ; which shows that mankind is furnisht with means enow , to distinguish gold from other mettals , and for the same reason other things also ; tho' the extent of all the species , and their precise bounds , be not exactly known to those speculaters , who will needs forgo their natural knowledge of things to pursue scrupulous fancies : which , let loose to fly at rovers , are too hard for their reason unestablish'd by principles . . hence an answer is given to mr. locke's acute difficulty , viz. that 't is impossible for us to know that this or that quality , or idea , has a necessary connexion with a real essence , of which we have no idea at all ; that is , ( according to his principles , ) no knowledge . for , since a real essence is that which constitutes such a kind of ens , or species ; and what distinguishes an entity or species from all others , does also make it this , or that species ; that is , does constitute it ; it follows , that , since , by my discourse here , we have such a degree of knowledge of that kind of ens called gold , as to distinguish it from all others , we have a sufficient and true ( tho' not an adequate and distinct ) knowledge of its essence too , that constitutes it such a kind of ens. indeed , if nothing will content us but superfluous knowledge , for curiosity sake , of each particular mode that belongs to that essence , 't is no wonder if we labour in vain ; and , by over-straining to go beyond our selves in this state , fall short of our aim . i must confess , that it would concern us much , as we are , to know whether there be any quality , which we do not yet know in the thing , inconsistent with those we do know ; for , this would blunder our notion of it , and make it chimerical . but , as it is impossible creative wisdom should lay grounds for contradiction ; so , in case those qualities be all consistent , where is the harm not to know them ? and , since consistency implies some kind of agreement or connectedness of the one with the others , who knows how far their connexion and dependence may be known in time , if right principles were taken , and pursu'd ? 't is a strange dis-satisfy'd humour in us , to complain we know not all , when we know enough : i know no man is more free from this fault than mr. locke , or declares more against it formerly . what i dislike in him in this point is , that , by his too much introversion , he forsakes nature ; and , by his too nice speculation of his ideas , hazards to breed a conceit in his readers , that they know less than they really do ; and , that we are not able to attain half that knowledge we , in reality , may arrive to ; which , tho' contrary to his intention , must needs incline men to be scepticks as to essences and substances . . the th chapter , [ of maxims , ] is admirably clear , and , in the greatest part of it , very solid ; abating his proceeding upon ideas , and applying his discourses to his former hypothesis ; to which mr. locke was oblig'd , that all the parts of his work might be woven of the same piece , and consonant to one another . he explicates very well , how they are self-evident : yet , tho' they be such , he has three exceptions against them ; . as not being first known ; . as , in a manner , useless ; and . dangerous . he proves the first , because particulars are known before universals . i understand him not . knowledge may be either consider'd , as instill'd by insensible degrees , into infants , or the ruder sort ; or , as reducible to the clearest grounds , by men of art. now , i cannot think that mr. locke imagins , that we , or any man , hold that maxims were meant for infants , or the vulgar ; or , that either of them ought to be taught general principles at first , and by them attain to particular knowledges ; or , that the users of maxims ever intended them for that end . wherefore , all his discourses to prove them not to be first-known , may be allow'd to have their full force , and yet hurt no body , being wronglevell'd . the point then is , how they may avail artists , or speculators : and this leads to his second exception , their pretended uselesness ; which he endeavours to shew , by alledging , that 't is as evident as any maxim whatever , that the same idea , is the same idea , and no other ; v. g. that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow , and not of blue ; and , therefore , that maxims serve to little purpose , and are also innumerable . now , i grant , indeed , that all such particular propositions may be self-evident , and truths ; as also , that truths of this kind , which express the metaphysical verity and unity of every thing , and of every mode of thing , are innumerable . but , i do not think that any man living thought those to have the usefulness of maxims or principles , which are always general , or universal : for , the notion of [ principles ] super-adds to their being truths , and self-evident , that they influence many other truths that are ( as it were ) under them ; which cannot be said , or thought , of those particular propositions . for example ; should any one go about to refund the verity of this truth , yellow is yellow , and not blue , into this , because white is white , and not black , it would look more like a similitude , than a reason ; and be ridiculous to alledge the one to be the cause of the other ; because yellow is not white ; nor has the notion of the one any influence upon , nor any thing to do with the notion of the other ; in regard both of them stand upon the same bottom , or on the same level . but , should any sceptick ask why the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow ? tho' 't is foolish to ask it , yet , it would not look so extravagant to answer , because every thing is what it is : and , i believe , nature would force mr. locke , or any other to give this for his reason . in like manner , should he ask why a man is a man ? it would look preter-natural to answer , because a tree is a tree , whereas , it would look very natural to answer , because every thing is it self , or , is what it is . which shews to an acute reflecter , that this universal has some kind of influence upon the others , which their fellow-particulars had not . and , the reason is , because universals do engage for all the particulars under them ; whereas , one particular owes not this duty to another particular , to which it has no such real relation as the notion of an universal has in the mind to its particulars . and , who sees not , that , from this proposition , every man is rational , it follows , that peter , john , and each particular man , is rational ? but , from this , that peter , and a few other particulars , are rational , it does not follow , that every man is rational : wnich shews , that ( as was now said ) the truth of the universal engages for the truth of all particulars , and not vice-versâ ; nor one of them for another . . another reason for the usefulness of universal maxims , and , why artists use to reduce the truth of particulars to them , is , because they are more self-evident than the particular identicals are . this position looks something odd ; for , since self-evidence is the highest evidence that can be , to put degrees of self-evidence , is to say , there can be something higher than the highest ; which looks like a bull. to clear this point , i discourse thus : in all self-evident propositions whatever , the terms are so closely connected , ( being , indeed , the same , ) that no middle term can come between them , so to prove them connected , or make them evident ; wherefore , they must either not be evident at all , ( which were shameless to say , ) or they must be evident of themselves ; that is , self-evident . and , in this regard , or in the closest connexion or identity of their terms , all self-evident propositions are equally such . but , there is another kind of evidence arising out of the greater clearness of the terms themselves . now , it has been shewn formerly , that all clearness of our notions springs out of their simplicity , and uncompoundedness ; and all obscurity out of their composition , which breeds confusion : as also , that all general notions are more simple , and consequently , more clear than the particulars are . whence follows , that the proposition , which has more-general terms in it , ( such as all general maxims are , ) do gain hence a greater degree of evidence , and are more undeniable . for example ; let mr. locke tell a sceptick , that yellow is yellow , and not blue ; he may answer , that he will yield to neither proposition ; because , yellow and blue are species of colour , and ( according to mr. locke's grounds ) he knows not the distinct bounds , or precise extent of neither of them ; and therefore , should he grant it , he must assent to he knows not what . tell him , mr. locke speaks of the ideas of those colours ; he will ask what an idea is , and , doubtless , pick new quarrels at the definition ; especially , these being the ideas of secondary qualities , which himself says , have nothing like them in the thing . but , tell him , it cannot be deny'd , but that they are something , and not meerly nothing , in regard we experience we have them ; and , that every thing must necessarily be what it is , ( which is one of the maxims excepted against ; ) he will be put to a stand , and nonpluss'd : for , what can he say ? the identity of the thing with it self , whether it be a substance , or an accident , cannot be deny'd ; nor can he deny , that the same is the same with it self , ( which is another maxim ; ) for , the word thing , signifies , a supream generical notion ; and , the word same , is a transcendent ; which are both of them clear , because the latter has no kind of composition in it , the other as little as is possible . so that he cannot begin to shuffle here , or press to know the meaning of the terms , as he did when they were particulars ; the universal terms being far clearer than those particulars are . . hence another usefulness of self-evident maxims is discover'd ; which is , not to deduce conclusions from them , as from premisses , as mr. l. seems to apprehend ; but , to reduce inferior truths , which are less clear to them . that this can be done , and how it is done , i have shewn in my * method . and , mr. locke's concession here , § . that they are of great use in disputes , to stop the mouths of wranglers , abets and confirms my late ▪ discourses : for , whence could they have this strange virtue to stop the mouths of such unreasonable men , but because their evidence is greater than any others , or than particular self-evident propositions are ? otherwise , why could not these do it as well as general maxims ? now , if this be so , why cannot they satisfie and instruct rational men , and conduce to quiet and fix their judgment , as well as to nonplus wranglers ? 't is the nature of evidence , to enlighten and instruct men of sense ; and more proper to it , than to amuse and surprize sophisters . let any learned man reflect on all the maxims in euclid's elements , in euclides physicus and metaphysicus , or any other author who pretends to reasoning with exact closeness ; and he will easily see for what they are useful , and how. nay , even mr. l.'s identicals , [ yellow is yellow , and not blue , ] are useful in their kind . tho' mr. locke does omit to shew they are so : and this identical yellow is yellow , tho' it do not influence other particulars , as general maxims do ; ( for which reason , it does not absolutely deserve the name of a principle ; ) yet , both it , ( and such other particular identicals , ) is a kind of principle to all that is , or can be , discoursed about that particular colour : for , if any part of that discourse makes yellow not to be yellow , or ( which is all one ) violates that proposition , [ yellow is yellow , ] 't is concluded to be most evidently false ; or , if it agrees with it , to be true. he seems to mislike the procedure by praecognita and praeconcessa ; whereas , his acute wit will find , upon reflexion , that it is impossible we can make an ordinary , much less any speculative , discourse , but the discoursers must agree in something that is either foreknown , or ( at least ) foregranted ; for , if the two disputants disagree in all their principles and grounds , and one of them still denies all the other affirms , 't is impossible they should discourse together at all . . but , passing by all that is said , i alledge farther , that ( not to speak of others ) these two maxims so much excepted against , [ what it is ] and [ 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once , are of such most necessary and universal usefulness , that , without them , we could neither judge , discourse , nor act . indeed , these maxims lie retruse in the most inmost recesses of our judging or intellective power , and make not their appearance in formal propositions , but only when we have occasion to produce them ; tho' they are still there all the while , and guide all our thoughts steadily , nay , all our actions too . in the same manner as when a musician plays a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord , he guides himself all along by the rules of musick lodg'd in his mind ; tho' , they being now familiar to him , he is not so sensible of those rules as he was when he first learn'd them . to apprehend more clearly the usefulness of these two principles , let us suppose a man quite devested of them , and to have neither of them in his judgment , and then reflect what he is good for . all our judgments being made by the copula [ is , ] in case he have not this first principle in his understanding , he might take [ is ] for [ is not ; ] or else indifferently for one , and the other too : which , besides the perverting his judgment quite , would make him utterly unfit for the conversation of mankind again , 't is impossible such a man should have any truth at all in his mind , which is the natural perfection of human understanding ; but , wanting a steady ground to fix his judgment , he might think all things to be chimerical , embrace every fancy , and adhere to any contradiction . . to come to the usefulness of other general maxims , we may reflect how mankind do naturally guide their actions by them . a country butcher loses his knife , and looks all about for it ; in which case 't is usual for such fellows to say , as the motive of his continuing to seek it , [ i am sure it must be somewhere or other . ] by which rude saying 'tis evident , that he guides himself all the while by this foreknown general maxim , [ every particular body in the world must be in some place . ] for , had he not had the knowledge of this maxim before-hand , that is , did he think it were possible it should be no where , or in no place , he would never have taken such pains to look for it . we may observe hundreds of such natural maxims as this in the vulgar , guiding their actions and sayings ; and perhaps , it would not be unworthy speculaters to observe their behaviour and words which proceed from uncorrupted nature , and retrieve the genuin principles and maxims that naturally produced them . to apply this : the same we may gather from our speculative thoughts ; and that the same passes in us naturally as does in the vulgar . our first principles lie habitually laid up in the closet of our minds , and govern all our thoughts as occasion presents ; and , tho' we do not put them into formal propositions , till the circumstance invites ; yet they influence all we do , or say , or think ; as was instanced lately in the unshaken and unalterable sense of the copula [ is , ] which verifies all our propositions . . in a word , it were easie to shew , that this unadvised degrading of general maxims , making them in a manner useless for knowledge , does destroy all grounds ; which either are such maxims , or , at least , have no force but by virtue of those maxims , express'd or imply'd ; unless we will pretend those are grounds in any science that want proof there ; which makes them conclusions , and no grounds . whence , it does also destroy all science it self , which consists in universal knowledges , as experience does in particular ones ; for such universal truths cannot be had , if general maxims be disallow'd , as logick demonstrates . this ingenious author thinks the need of such maxims might be supply'd by having clear and distinct ideas . which , rightly understood , comes over to us ; for art and nature both inform us , that the clearness of our notions consists in their being more general ; and as they approach nearer to the highest genus , they are still clearer . now , the metaphysical verity of a general idea or notion , if put into a proposition , is perfectly identical , and a general maxim. hence appears , that it is a most fundamental errour in the ideists , that they rate the clearness of their ideas from the fresh , fair and lively appearances they make to the fancy . whereas only the definition , by explicating the true essence of a thing , shews us distinctly the true spiritual notion of it . the former of these is obvious and sensible . and ( as i may say ) lies and appears uppermost ; and , therefore , is superficial , and a material representation made in the fancy . the later is more retruse , it requires more reflexion and labour to attain it , it is intelligible not sensible ; but , once gain'd , it is solid , durable , and ( being indeed the very nature of the thing , ) it is the ground of all our discourses about it , and of those several knowledges concerning it . hence the followers of fancy become liable to take similitudes for notions , and representations for things ; which makes their productions very plausible to other men's fancies , ( for as they were the productions of fancy , so they sute best with men of fancy ) but they fall short of instructing their judgments . to give an instance of this distinction of notions from phantasms : they think that the idea of a quadrate ( for example ) or circle , is very clear and distinct ; and that the idea of quantity is very obscure and confused : whereas , to the notion of the two former , there goes the notion both of quantity , of the termination of quantity , ( or figure ; ) and , moreover , of such a figure ; all which being essentially involv'd in the notion of a quadrate or circle , must needs make their notions less intelligible and less clear than is that of quantity only : however , the fair pictures of the former , on paper , or in the fancy , enveigles them to think otherwise . let us but reflect how many truths are deduced by geometricians out of the notions of a quadrate or a circle , and what large treatises of trigonometry are drawn out of the notion or nature of a triangle ; and we shall discover how compounded and confused those notions are in reality , however we seem , while we mind only the pictures of them , to have very clear conceptions of them , and to comprehend them distinctly and fully . now , all these truths are involv'd confusedly in the notion or nature of these figures : for all discourses concerning any notion whatever , are nothing but running division ( as we may say ) upon the nature of that object as their ground ; and all descants upon it are meerly that very notion unfolded and explicated at large , and consider'd on all sides , and throughly : which , comprising them all in its bowels , is therefore not so clear and distinct as fancy makes us imagin . whence is seen evidently , that fancy , and the first and obvious appearance , is not to be the judge or test of the clearness or confusedness of our notions ; but reason , reflecting well on the simplicity or compoundedness of those notions themselves , and on the reasons why they are so . . lastly , 't is objected , that such maxims are dangerous ; because , if our notions be wrong , loose , or unsteady , general maxims will serve to confirm us in our mistakes , and to prove contradictions . now , tho' our judgments may be such , yet i cannot conceive how our notions can be wrong , loose , or unsteady . they are what they are ; and being the things in our understanding , their existence is fix'd there , and as unalterable as our soul it self , their subject , is , notions are the same as our meanings of the words ; and , tho' we may mistake what the word signifies to others , or to the generality ; yet , if i , mistaking , or not mistaking , have such a meaning of it in my mind , ( which only can mean or apprehend , ) that meaning is truly in me : nor , tho' i be rectify'd as to the common use of that word , and put another name to it ; yet my meaning , whether properly or improperly signify'd , is still indivisibly and unalterably the same . but , suppose this so ; why must general maxims be held dangerous and faulty , when the fault confessedly lies in other things ? mr. locke grants general maxims to be true , and self-evident ; and 't is extravagantly odd , to think , that propositions so qualify'd , can be guilty of leading men into errour . if , then , he only means , that the mis-application or abuse of them does great harm , he magnifies general maxims , while he intended to disparage them : for , it is generally noted , that those are the best things , that , mis-us'd , do the greatest harm . by this argument , we must lay aside all religion , as well as general maxims ; since , not all the things in the world , put together , have done so great mischief , as mis-us'd religion : tantum religio potuit suadere malorum . . to show general maxims , or self-evident propositions , may demonstrate contradictory positions , he instances in cartestus's making body to be nothing but extension ; and in his own tenet making body to be extension and solidity together : whence , by this maxim [ what is , is ] the former may demonstrate there can be no vacuum , the latter that there may . and , i must , in behalf of truth , take leave to tell them both , that neither extension alone , nor extension and solidity together , are any more the notion of body , than a horse-shoe is a pancake . for , body signifies a thing , and their extension and solidity are onely modes or accidents of that thing ; and , therefore , the notions of them do differ toto genere ; which is a greater and wider mistake , than to say a man is a horse , or an apple is an oyster ; these being all comprehended under the same common genus . if , out of aversion to metaphysicks , and disregard to true logick , which teaches us to distinguish our notions exactly , learned men will not be brought to consider what the word [ thing , ] and [ body ] which is such a thing , mean , they must necessarily fall into fundamental errours ; and , so , stumble every step they take . the notion of [ thing ] evidently relates to being , one way or other : but , it does not formally signify actual being , as existence does ; therefore it can onely consist in this , that is , a power to be , or is capable of being actually . and this thing call'd body , since we experience it is alterable and changeable substantially , or into another thing , must necessarily have a power in it to be alter'd , or become another thing ; which power we call [ matter ; ] our common speech and common sense telling us , that when a new thing is made , 't is not created or made of nothing , but of the matter that pre-existed in the former compound . but , this matter alone , since it is a meer power to be another thing , being , of its own notion , utterly indeterminate , ( which is the true sense of aristotle's description of it , ) is not capable of existing , or a thing ; for , nothing in common can exist , but what is determinately this : therefore , this matter , or power , needs another compart , conceiv'd to determin it , ( which the schools call the form ; ) by which it is made capable to be , or a thing ; and without which , it cannot be such . it being evident then , that every single mode or accident does something distinguish bodies , therefore such a complexion of them as so distinguishes matter , that it makes it differ from all other bodies , it does consequently determin it to be this , and no other ; and therefore constitutes it such a thing , or constitutes it capable to exist ; which is , to make it this thing , or an individuum . now , if we leave all consideration of matter out of the notion of body , and make it consist of modes , or accidents only , as he seems to tell us that himself and cartesius do , we must put those modes to have no possible subject , but to hover in the air , none knows how ; and , therefore , we must needs discourse incoherently , and be too hard for our selves , by raising , at every turn , puzzling difficulties we cannot solve . all our grounds must fail us , when we do not distinguish between the mode or manner how a thing is , and the thing it self . nor do i think cartesius holds body to be extension , but extended matter . how mr. locke comes not to treat of matter in his whole book , i know not ; but i fear it is , because his fancy cannot frame an idea or similitude of it : by which it seems to me evident , that very many of his ideas are meer fancies , coin'd by his imagination : for , 't is evident he must have a notion of it , since he very well knows the meaning of those words , [ a power to be a thing , or matter ; ] which meaning is the same with our notion of it . as for vacuum , which he again mentions here , my demonstration against it , is , in short , this ; waving many others mention'd above : all our natural notions are taken from body ; and , amongst them , that of space ; therefore they are nothing but body inadequately consider'd ; and either body , or some mode of body : therefore , whatever our fancy may suggest , it is impossible there should be space , where there is no body ; since the mode , having no distinct entity of its own , cannot be where the thing , which gives it being , is not : therefore , to put space where there is no body , or a vacuum , is a direct contradiction . each part of which discourse has been made good in its proper place . . in his second instance of man , he seems again , not to distinguish between the fancy and the notion of a man ; which i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . next , he seems not to reflect , that an imperfect conception of the thing , is of the whole thing confusedly . thirdly , 't is evident , that men do only err , or discourse wrong , by imperfectly conceiving , thro' this reason ; because they are not so wise as to consider that there may be more modes wrap'd up in the thing , than we yet distinctly discover : in which case , they may err by mis-applying their general maxims ; for which they must blame themselves , and not the maxim it self . but , i absolutely deny that any man can possibly have the true and distinct notion of man , unless he conceives him to be rational . as for what he tells us , he has discours'd with very rational men , who have actually deny'd they are men ; i can only say , i wonder how they escap'd bedlam ; where , i dare say , there are many men , who are more rational than they : and , my opinion is , that those very rational men were very high-flown ideists : for , such men , by deserting their natural notions taken from the things , and the conduct of true logick , and poring perpetually on their own interiour ; and being withall unable to see the difference between those ideas they find there , or to distinguish betwixt fancies and spiritual conceptions ; are ( unless they be otherwise masters of an excellent genius ) connaturally disposed by their principles to be fanaticks in philosophy ; and to entertain as wild fancies , as the deepest enthusiasts . witness cartesius his mad fit of enthusiasm , which lasted some days , when he was laying his principles , ( as is writ in his life ; ) and those self-strangers , now spoken of , who actually deny'd they were men : whom , ( to requite mr. locke with a parallel story ) i cannot liken so well to any thing , as to a famous humourist , one john band , who serv'd my lady wootton , in kent : this fellow , in the heat of summer , going out in a cart , drawn by two horses , fell asleep in the cart : the horses not hearing any cry gee , ho , to urge them forwards , took their opportunity to rest themselves , and stood still : a companion of his coming by , and seeing how matters stood , under-propp'd the cart , took out the horses ; and ; having set them up , return'd , and lay behind the hedge , to observe how john would behave himself when he miss'd his horses : who awaking , got up , rub'd his eyes , and , in the dawning of his reason , broke out , ( to himself , ) in these words , either now i am john band , or i am not john band : if i am john band , i have e'en lost two horses ; but , if i am not john band , i have found a cart. so that all john's hopes were , that he was not himself ; for then he had been on the better hand . i much doubt , that both he , and mr. locke's rational men , wanted the help of an identical proposition ; which ( tho' mr. locke holds , they are not in the least instructive ) would have made them all so wise , as to know that every thing is what it is . . but , to be serious ; i cannot but admire that this ingenious author should , in his th chapter , so ridicule identical propositions , or esteem them trifling . he told us in his d chapter , that that knowledge he calls intuitive , is of self-evident propositions ; and identical ones are such . he assures us , that in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge , there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas ; consonantly to which , i have demonstrated in my method , book . liss . . § . . that all the force of consequence , which gives the nerves to all our discourse , must be an identical proposition . moreover , he says , chap. . that we know each idea to be it self , and not another ; and , that no abstract idea can be the same with any other , but with it self ; which are perfectly identical speeches , and equivalent to these , the same is the same with it self ; or , every thing is what it is ; nay , and general maxims too , against which he shew'd himself much offended in that chapter . nor , do i doubt , but that he judges , his knowledge by ideas is refunded into those identicals , as its ground ; as will be shewn shortly . now , after all this , to rally identical propositions after such a rate , is to me unintelligible . but , i shall be briefer here upon this subject , having demonstrated in my method , book . less . , and . by many arguments , which , i am very confident , are unanswerable , that all first principles must be identical propositions : whence , either those arguments must be shewn invalid , or it must be forcibly deny'd by him that there are any first principles at all ; which all mankind , unless they be perfect scepticks , do grant , and common sense forces us to acknowledge . for , if there be no supream or first principles , 't is impossible there should be any inferior or subordinate ones ; and so , mankind must talk ramblingly , and at random , all their lives , without any principles or grounds at all . but , waving all the other aforesaid proofs , i would beg of him to consider this one argument : we may speak of , or ( which is the same ) put into propositions , all other considerations or notions of the thing , whether they be in the same line , or be the divers modes of it ; we can say , without danger of being reproach'd , that socrates is a man , an animal , a yard high , white , a father , writing , &c. and 't is a hard case if we may not be allow'd to say something of the metaphysical verity of the thing , this being that on which all truth is built ; and without which , all we could say would be false ; and all the world , a chaos of chimoera's . and , if we may say any thing of it , i defie all mankind to shew me , that that saying can be any other but an identical proposition . this being so , i alledge farther , that as all truths are fundamentally built on the metaphysical verity of things ; so all formal truths , or true propositions , must be grounded on such propositions as express or signifie that metaphysical verity , or , say that a thing is what it is ; and , consequently , such propositions , and onely such , can be first principles . now , if first principles , and that which grounds all the force of consequence , may be called trifling , i desire to be inform'd what can be called solid , serious and useful . . i perceive , by mr. locke's managing his discourse here , that his dislike of identical propositions springs from his mistake of our manner of using them . he seems to imagin that we would place them in capite libri , ( as it were , ) and thence deduce conclusions from them ; or else , that we consider them in their bare selves , without relation to any thing else : whence he , with good reason , affirms , they do not instruct us , or teach us any thing , that there is no real knowledge got by them , &c. but the business is quite otherwise : they are the first , and most evident truths , fix'd and rivetted by rational nature , in our understanding ; at the bottom of which they lie , perhaps unseen , and and unreflected on ; yet so , that they give the perfect light to guide all our thoughts and discourses . whence it comes , that speculaters do by art , what the * vulgar do by nature ; and make them the ultimate ressort of all their persuasions , and endeavour to reduce and resolve all their other knowledges into them : this will appear evident to any man who reflects , that , if those be false , or we be not pre-imbu'd with them , we could have no truth , nor any knowledge at all . they are such deep-laid foundations , that all science is rais'd upon them , tho' they make no formal appearance in the symmetry or beauty of that structure : nay , even those who rally them as dry , and useless , must be forc'd , for their own interest , to have recourse to them : for , unless mr. locke does first know , that each idea he has , is it self , and not another , which is an identical proposition , he must confess he could have no distinct ideas ; at least , no knowledge that they are distinct ; whence , the fabrick of his whole book would fall to the ground . after which kindness and support from them , in requital , to call them trifling , is not so gentile a return . hence is seen , that we make no other use of them , than himself does , and must do , or neither of us can possibly speak one word of sense ; for , neither could he , without them , ( suppos'd and held , at least , in his mind , if not express'd , ) be certain of any idea ; nor we , of any notion we have ; nor , consequently , could either of us build any discourse upon them . mr. locke acknowledges , book . chap. . that the metaphysical truth of his ideas do contain a tacit proposition : which being so , what blame can we deserve for speaking out , or writing what is tacitly in our minds ? the chief reason why we put those tacit propositions into formal ones , is for the scepticks sakes ; who , having an utter aversion against metaphysicks , would not heed the metaphysical verity of things , unless it were produced , and forced upon them , by putting it into such an undeniable form of speech as all mankind uses , and must grant . whence , as mr. locke confesses that they are very useful to stop the mouths of wranglers ; so , experience teaches us , they are of no less use to convert or confute scepticks : nay , absolutely necessary for that end ; because scepticks will not admit any thing to be true , but identical propositions onely . for which reason , i have attempted , in my method , to give some hints how to reduce all others to them . i once thought to have written a particular treatise on that subject ; but , i hope those short hints i gave there , may excite some other speculaters to perfect what , having a large field of matter to pass thorow , i did there but briefly touch upon . all this while , i am well aware that mr. locke , book . chap. . mentions other self-evident propositions , which are not identical ; but then , he acknowledges withall , that unless those ideas , which make the two terms of those propositions , be fix'd in their own natures to be such , or to be themselves onely , and therefore not to be another , none of those propositions could be evident at all . so that nothing can be known to be true , or be evident , but by having recourse , finally , to identical propositions . . another sort of trifling propositions , he says , is when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole ; that is , the genus or difference of the species . i answer ; what have we to do with ideas when we predicate ? for predicating is the saying something of another which we call the subject : if then the thing it self be not predicated , then ( to predicate being to say ) we do not talk or speak of it , but perhaps of our own fancies ; especially since mr. locke has declared , b. . chap. . § . that he takes idea indifferently for what is meant by phantasm or by notion . secondly , what means [ predicated of the name of the whole . ] for , if the name of the subject have not some idea , or notion , or some thing for its signification , 't is insignificant , and a meer useless sound : and , if it have , then the notion of the species or genus is that which is predicated , and not the name onely . if things , ( of which onely , as philosophers , we ought to speak ) are turn'd into ideas , realities into spiritual resemblances , and those empty resemblances into emptier names , philosophy will be brought to a strange pass . thirdly , none ever intended to instruct men by this proposition [ homo est animal ; ] because every man knows it already , who knows what the word [ man ] means ; without knowing which , 't is impossible to know any thing by any word whatever ; nor are such propositions as that , which frequently occur in logicians , meant for any thing but meerly for examples of such and such predications : but yet , nature tells us how instructive it is on all occasions , to know what sort or kind ( whether general or specifical ) every thing is , and how it differs from others of the same kind . now , mr. locke , contrary to his equity in other occasions , will neither allow us to predicate the whole definition of the thing defin'd ( as was seen above in the definition of extension ) because 't is the same notion with that which is defin'd ; nor part of the definition , because 't is part of the same ; and yet common reason assures us no predication is true , unless the subject and predicate be , in part or wholly the same ; as the sense of the copula [ est ] tells us . i wish mr. locke would put mankind into a wiser method ; for they have , it seems , done nothing , but perpetually trifled hitherto . . upon the main , he would have nothing that is essential predicated of man , or any other species , ( because the word signifies that already ) but only what 's accidental to him ; and he thinks that then a proposition is instructive , when it tells us something not contain'd in the idea of man. he instances in this ; [ in whatever thing , sense , motion , reason , and laughter are united , that thing has actually a notion of god. ] now this he conceives , does tell us more than barely what the word [ man ] means ; and therefore has somewhat of instruction in it . i much approve his design of bringing disparate notions to close and connect : but yet i must say , that all he can say of man , or any other thing , must either be taken from the intrinsecal nature of the thing it self , or it can never be instructive , solid , or capable of demonstration . v. g. it is essential to man to have natural notions , and to connect those notions orderly by his reason , and by doing this he may attain to the knowledge there is a god. now , all this is contain'd in the notion of man ; only it requires a deeper inspection into that nature , and a more particular reflexion upon what the word [ man ] signifies . for ( quite contrary to his sentiment ) 't is the nature of the thing , signified by its name , which only can instruct us solidly ; and it instructs us by our attention to it , and our frequent and penetrative reflexion on it . whence i cannot commend his instance , nor see how the predicate [ has the notion of god ] can ever be connected with the subject he puts , by virtue of any thing found in the subject it self as he exhibits it . sense belongs to man as he is an animal , motion as he is a living thing ; from neither of which considerations such a connexion of the terms are likely to follow . reason is the most likely ; but since mr. locke holds , that brutes too have some reason , and yet can have no notion of god , it cannot be deduced out of the common word [ reason , ] that man has any such notion . laughter there should seem , according to him , to be the most peculiar to mankind ; for brutes do not laugh at all ; but this is less likely than the others to be that precise consideration , by virtue of which man comes to have the notion of god. again , in his discourse against innate principles , he declar'd his opinion , that there were some men who had actually no notion of a god at all ; tho' , no doubt , they had sense , motion , reason , and laughter too . so that if this proposition be instructive , it can ( even according to himself ) instruct us in nothing but an errour . lastly , what needs this circumlocution ? if sense , motion , &c. huddled together , be signified by the word [ man , ] why could it not as well be said , [ every man has a notion of god ] without more ado ? since by his discourse to predicate what the word [ man ] signifies , is not instructive . or , if they be not signify'd by the word [ man , ] how is the proposition true ? or what means it to say , he intends [ man ] by those many words , and yet would not have it thought so ? or that no intrinsecal predicate instructs , but only what is extrinsecal to any nature ? or , if this be meant for an instructive definition , as it must , ( for the subject in that proposition agrees to nothing but to man ) why are the parts of it so disparate , and so many ? or rather if so many , why no more ? if we may gain the knowledge of more accidents in every species by degrees , as 't is granted we may ; and that we ought to define those species , not by the old beaten way of genus and difference , but by this new one , of cluttering together confusedly the multitudes of accidents we find in them , we may come in time , by finding still more and more , to have definitions so large , that the whole side of a leaf cannot hold them , nor man's memory retain them ; and then what do they serve for ? . indeed , when words are taken in divers significations , if men contentiously adhere to the different senses themselves give them , it is , as mr. locke says well , meer trifling . but i cannot grant that all predications of abstract words are only verbal and trifling . he says , they amount to nothing but significations of terms . and is not this enough ? i wish he would consider his own words . by [ signification of terms ] he means , i suppose , the sense or meaning of them : now the meanings of words being the same with our notions , which as has been demonstrated , are the things themselves , how can those abstract terms be meerly verbal ? since they as much signifie the thing as any other terms whatever ; only they signifie it with a restriction to such a precise respect or considerability found in that whole ens or substance . reflexion twentieth , on the th , th , th , and th chapters . . this excellent author discourses very solidly , when he says , that universal propositions , of which we can have certain knowledge , do not concern existence . i add , nor our notions neither , of which those propositions do consist , ( and much less propositions that are uncertain . ) for , taking the notion alone , or according to the direct signification of the terms , objectively consider'd , they abstract from ( that is , are indifferent to ) all kinds of existence , whether in the mind or in nature . but , when he says that such propositions do not concern existence , he means ( i suppose ) existence in nature , or out of the mind ; ( or else not at all ; ) and the copula [ est ] must necessarily signifie some kind of existence , as well as identifie the two terms in every proposition ; or otherwise it would be a sound or no word . but this discourse is perhaps needless , being , as i think , in great part granted here . all i intend by it , is to clear the notion of existence in the title , and that it means existence out of the mind , by which things or individuums are in themselves , whether we think of them or no. i grant too , that we have so certain a knowledge of our own existence , that it can need no proof ; but i deny we have it by intuition ; and i affirm we got it , and have it , by plain sensation or experience , in the same manner as we know the existence of other bodies ; as will be shewn , when we come to reflect on the th chapter . . his demonstration of a deity , chap. th , is very acute , nor does he here affect recourse to his ideas , or build on them expressly , or ( as he too often does in other places ) take phantasms for notions ; which takes off the force of his reasons . particularly , he argues so strongly that a cogitative being can never be made of meer-matter , that i do judge it unanswerable : and , withall , that it necessarily concludes that brutes can have no knowledge , without having something in them that is spiritual ; which i am sure he will not say . i could wish mr. l. had been steady to this distinction of those two natures , of spiritual and corporeal , which adequately divide ens : which , i think he was not , when he said b. . ch. . § . that he sees no contradiction in it that god should , if he pleas'd , give to certain systems of created senseless matter , put together as he thinks fit , some degrees of sense , perception and thought . for , if the nature of meer matter , by being commodiously put together , can bear the having thoughtfulness ; it is but compounding it more artificially , and it may be as cogitative as the wisest man living ; and so farewell to all spirituality of our soul , nay , to all spiritual nature whatever : for , to what end should god create the distinct nature of spirits , if matter wisely orderd could perform all their operations ? if once we yield that matter , conveniently contrived , can be capable of any degree of knowledge , it is but contriving it better and better , ( and who can stint gods omnipotency in this , more than in other things ? ) and it may be capable of the highest degree of science ; and , consequently , to create spiritual nature at all , would be needless , and to no purpose . besides , if men and brutes differ onely in the degrees of knowledge , they ought to be of the same species ; since magis et minus non variant specïem : for , otherwise , every single man would make a distinct species , which is a plain contradiction . against this position of the possibility of matters being cogitative , he argues here very vigorously § . and shows clearly that incogitative matter , and motion , whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk , could never produce thought . he will say that , tho' it could not do this of it self , yet god could make it do it . but if god cannot contradict himself , or do unwisely , then , since his creative wisdom has establisht each kind of nature to be it self and no other ; then , to put in god a power to confound those natures again , ( which he does if he should confound the primary and proper operation of spirits , which is thought , knowledge or reason by giving it to bodies , ) is to put a power in god to do contradictions , that is , to do impossibilities ; for whatever is against the essence or nature of any thing , makes that thing not to be it self ; which is against an identical and self evident proposition , and a direct contradiction . . the clear distinction of corporeal and spiritual natures , is of that vast importance ; that ( tho' it may seem a little unseasonable ) i cannot but take this occasion to reflect , once more upon mr. l's doctrine in this point , apprehending i may not meet with a fitter opportunity hereafter . i have reason to think , that he does not exclude materiality out of the idea of spirit , or at least of the soul , which all christian philosophers and most heathens too , hold to be of a spiritual nature . on the other side he attributes reason and knowledge ( in some degree at least ) to brutes . now , out of these two positions it follows demonstratively . . that the corporeal and spiritual natures are not clearly distinguisht , which utterly destroys all possibility of truth in philosophy , and seems to do no small prejudice to truths of a higher concern ; which are left inexplicable to men of sense , if those inferiour truths , which relate to the clear distinction of those two natures , be violated and render'd uncertain . for , corporeal and spiritual natures , comprizing , or dividing between themselves , the objects of all the sciences a philosopher can treat of , whether they be physicks , ethicks or metaphysicks , all which must necessarily build their discourses , and draw their conclusions from such notions as are taken from , and do of right belong to those two distinct natures ; it follows that , if these two natures be confounded and jumbled together , and be not clearly distinguisht , it is impossible any clear conclusion can be drawn from either of them , or any rational discourse made concerning them . . that mr. l's way of philosophizing by ideas , which leads him into such strange errours , or at least affords him no certain light to distingush those natures , is good for nothing at all . for , if it cannot furnish him with means , to put a clear distinction between natures so widely distant , and different from one another ; much less can it assist him to show clearly what modes , accidents or properties belong to one nature , what to the other ; or to distinguish those natures , which are infericur to those two general ones ; and therefore differ far less from one another than they did . it remains then to show that mr. l's doctrine by way of ideas , does not put a clear distinction between the aforesaid natures , but confounds them together . he holds it not to be certain that immateriality , is not included in the notion of our spiritual part the soul ; it may , therefore , be material , or have matter in it , for any thing his way of ideas tells him ; and therefore since matter cannot be crampt into an indivisible , it may be divisihle or extended ; and , so , may be divided or shatter'd , that is ( its unity being thus lost , and , consequently , its entity , ) it may cease to bee , or be corrupted . again , if it be divisible , it must be to some degree , or either more or less , divisible ; that is , rare , or else dense . if rare , then ( since passivenes is essential to the notion of matter ) it may by the operation of other material causes , which never wants , be condens'd ; and consequently , become opacous or visible ; or , it may by the same causes become rarer , and be turn'd into fire . also being divisible , it may have parts of which one must be without the other , that is , it must be impenetrable as to its own parts , and thence be able to protrude another material being , and be solid too ( in his sense of that word ) which is the same with impenetrable . moreover , since it must be divisible , it must be quantitative or extended , and this not infinitely but finitely ; that is , it must be terminated ; wherefore , termination of quantity , being the notion of figure , it may have figure too . in a word , if it may possibly be material , there is no property of body , but may agree to the soul ; and therefore , the soul , tho' spiritual , may be corporeal ; and so the nature of body and spirit may be one and the same . but what needs more than meerly his ascribing materiality to it , at least , permitting it to belong to it ? our notion of [ matter ] is taken from body , and from nothing else , and therefore can be nothing but body , consider'd as ( not what it actually is , but ) as 't is alterable , changeable , or apt to be another thing , that is , as 't is corruptible ; which , i am sure , mr. l. will not say or think of our soul. perhaps he may say , that he only means that it may have matter annex'd to its spirituality . but then he must grant , that since this materiality did not , as an accident , accrue to the soul afterwards , she had it from her nature ; and therefore it must be intrinsecal to her , and help to constitute her peculiar nature ; and , if this be so , then , when this material kind of compart is dissolv'd or corrupted ( for if material , it may be alter'd , wrought upon , and corrupted as other material compounds may ) the complex or compound it self is dissolv'd , and so no longer the same , but perish'd . besides , what should the soul do with two material comparts ; one , organical ; the other , inorganical ? especially , since there are as subtil parts in this visible body of ours , with which , as the form of the body , she is united , ( viz. the spirits ) as any , perhaps , mr. locke can conceive to be annex'd to her . . to proceed , he does but think it possible , for any thing he knows , that the soul may have some materiality ; but he positively judges , that brutes have reason ; nay , that 't is as evident to him as that they have sense . now , if they have reason , they must know how to draw consequences , this being essential to the notion of reason , or rather the same thing in other words . again , if they can reason , they can compare what 's meant by our terms , and have the sense of those sayings we call propositions in their knowing power . and , since that reason is not given them for nothing , but for their preservation , they can compare agreeable and disagreeable objects , and pursue , out of that reason , that which is most agreeable ; that is , they can will , chuse , and act freely , which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their reason what is better or worse for them , and thence determining themselves to it accordingly : i say , themselves ; for , if they have reason , then reason is part of themselves , and not a distinct thing from them . out of which two things follow : one , that the nature of man and brute are confounded ; since all those chief operations proper to man , are communicable to brutes . secondly , that mr. locke will be at a loss to get an idea of the spirituality of his soul , or of other spiritual beings , by reflecting on the operations of his mind ; since the same may possibly be found in such beings as are meerly corporeal . wherefore , to conclude this discourse , all our natural notions of body and spirit , and of all their operations , must be jumbled together in a kind of indifferency to either ; and therefore those two natures must be confounded , if either the soul , which is spiritual , may have materiality annex'd to her ; or brutes , which are material entities , may have thought , knowledge , and reason annex'd to them . and since mr. locke affirms very rationally , that one of his ideas is not another , i cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the natures of those two things , liquidly and precisely , how those two natures are distinguish'd ; or else his way of ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly phantastick and unphilosophical ; being most unlike the ideas in the divine understanding , the original ground of all truth , which do not confound natures , but establish them in a most perfect distinction to be what they are , and no other . i press not here how no discourse at all in philosophy can be conclusive , unless the nature of body and spirit be perfectly and clearly contradistinguish'd ; nor repeat what i have shewn , reflex . . § . . that our natural notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between body and spirit , which his ideas do not , but confound them , and thence deprave our natural knowledge of things . i know he says , but proves not , that the having general ideas , puts a perfect difference between brutes and us ; to which i have spoken formerly . i add , that 't is a thousand times easier to have general ideas , they being but imperfect perceptions of the thing , than to have reason ; as is easie to be demonstrated , and has been manifested above . . as for making something out of nothing , or creating ; after we have prov'd that existence is essential to god , and not accidental to him , which mr. l. clearly demonstrates ; it follows thence , and out of the commonest notion of causality , that it is not a matter of wonderment , or hard to believe that he should create , but that if he pleases to operate ad extra , this is his peculiar action ; since nothing is more evident than that every thing acts as it is . whence , if god's essence , and his very nature be existence or actual being , 't is demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause actual being or create , as it is for fire to heat , or light to enlighten ; but , moreover , that this is the onely effect that can immediately or without the intervention of second causes , proceed from him . . i much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true argument for the possibility of creation , to bring the instance of our thought moving our body ; whence he concludes that gods power to do a thing is not to be deny'd because we cannot comprehend its operation . for , . mr. locke thinks he experiences this , viz. that the soul moves the body ; whereas we do not experience that god created any thing . . as mr. locke has shown very ingeniously , that onely the man is free : so i affirm 't is the man that , wrought upon himself , moves his body , and not his thought onely . and , that , as when we gaind our first notions , the man was acted upon , both according to his corporeal and spiritual part ; so , every new act he had afterwards , that proceeded from him as he was man , is perform'd by the concurrence of both those parts . whence , in every act of his soul , he must be re-excited by some object that is out of the soul , either striking on his senses ; or else , by the repeated strokes of the material phantasms , lodg'd within , upon the seat of knowledge . these propose a-fresh the motives , and continue those impressions all the while he deliberates , compares , discourses , and determins ; and , when the man , according to that part call'd the fancy , is full ( as it were ) of those agreeable phantasms ; and , consequently , the soul ( hic est nunc ) is full too of those notions or apprehensions of their agreeableness , the whole man acts for them , and moves to attain them . in which case , what is purely material in those actions , or belonging meerly to corporeal motion , is refunded into the stupendious contrivance of the body , whose motions follow connaturally from the phantasms , in the same way as it does in brutes ; which is equally wonderful , we knowing no more than they , ( that is , not at all ) how it is done : but , the manner of the action , as to its design , direction , wise ordering of it , and its proceeding from knowledge , freedom and reason , ( all which we know it does , ) springs peculiarly from the soul , or from man , according to his spiritual part. now , the fundamental ground of my position is this , man is not two things ; nor ( which is the same ) made up of soul and body , as two actual parts ; but one thing , of which , consequently , those two are potential parts onely . wherefore , neither of those parts is actually , but the whole ; and therefore , neither of them alone can act , because neither of them exists alone ; * the existence of the thing being that in which its virtue of operating consists . but , in truth , his argument proceeds as well from this topick , as it does from that of meer thought moving the body ; for , we can comprehend as little , how man , tho' acting with his phantasms and thoughts too , does move the body , and all its distinct parts , so variously , as how the thought alone can do it . nor , were there some flaw in this particular , does it prejudice his main demonstration of a deity , they being distinct questions . add , that if we may conjecture from some expressions of his in other places , he may perhaps be of my opinion in this point , and , by the word [ mind , ] mean the man ; tho' in many places he speaks very ambiguously ; or rather , seems too plainly to maintain the contrary position . . i take leave on this occasion , to recommend it to speculative men , to endeavour to draw all their demonstrations from the nature of the thing , ( this being the onely solid way , ) and not from foreign topicks . after we have prov'd a deity , let us next demonstrate that god is self-existent ; or , that his essence , or nature , is existence ; and then , all that concerns the deity , or his immediate operations , nay , even the rational explication of the trinity it self , will ( if right logick and reflexion be not wanting ) follow more solidly , and more clearly , than the clearest mathematical conclusions ; if we rate clearness and evidence , ( as we ought , ) not from the figures on paper , which make it easie to our fancy ; but from the greater simplicity and clearness of the notions , and their terms , and of their equally-evident connexion ; which , coming nearest to first , and self-evident principles , do most firmly establish the judgment . . the th chapter treats of our knowledge of the existence of other things ; by which words he means , other things than our selves . he seems to ground his discourse on this position , that no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when , by actually operating upon him , it makes it self perceiv'd by him ; which he calls the way of sensation , or experience . now , if , by the words , [ any other being , ] he means bodies , nothing can be more solid , or worthy a philosopher . but , why we may not gather by our reason , the existence of spiritual beings , or angels , ( tho' they do not operate upon us actually , ) from some operation on other things in nature that can onely proceed from them , i cannot discern : rather , i hope i have demonstrated we can , in my method , book . less . . thesis . indeed , the notions of angelical natures are not proper ones , as our natural notions , which are imprinted by sensation , are ; which makes our conceptions , and consequently , the words which we use when we discourse of them metaphorical . nor matters it , that our expressions concerning them are oft-times negative , or signifie that they are not such beings as bodies are , but immaterial , unextended , indivisible , and , consequently , their operations unsuccessive ; in regard we intend all the while to signifie by those words , a positive being , tho' our low natural conceptions cannot reach its particular nature , as in it self : and , if we intend this , then this is the meaning of those words , or our notion of them ; meaning and intention being all one . yet , these predicates , tho' negative , or metaphorical , are , notwithstanding , truly said of them ; and , therefore , we can argue and discourse as consequently from them , as we can from the most positive or proper notions we have . indeed , as mr. locke says well , § . . we cannot know they exist , by the ideas we have of them in our minds ; and the reason is , because those ideas , or notions , taking them as ●●stinct , are but inadequate conceptions of the thing ; and , consider'd distinctly , are formally but a part of that complexion of accidents that constitute the individuum , which only is capable of existing , or the whole ; because parts cannot exist out of the whole : but he is much mistaken if he thinks we can no more know they are capable of existing by the notions we have of them , than we can that centaurs are : for , the idea or fancy of centaurs involves inconsistent notions in its very nature , ( or rather , no-nature ; ) which the notion of a subsistent spirit , called an angel , does not . add , that knowing , willing , and operating , which we attribute to such beings , are all positive notions ; and consistent , or capable to meet in a spiritual thing . . whereas mr. locke says we can onely know the existence of any other thing when it operates upon us , and therefore we know it is actually by sensation , i cannot see the least reason why we should not know our own being by sensation too , as well as that of other bodies , without having recourse to intuition ; which , apply'd to that case , 't is hard to understand ; or , to know how it differs from the direct knowledge had by sensation or experience . we can hear , see , feel and smell some parts of our own body , as well as we can those of others . indeed , now , when we are ripe for more express knowledges , those impressions made by one of our own parts upon others , do not cause in us the notion of existence , ( tho' , perhaps , they may tacitly repeat it , ) because we know already , and before-hand , that we do exist : but , put case we did not , would not these impressions make us know by sensation our own existence , as well as that of any other body whatever ? i doubt not but mr. locke will grant they would . since then the embryo in the womb lies in a roundish posture , why may not one part of it , by touching another , or operating upon it , cause in us , as soon as the soul ( which has a capacity of receiving notions ) is in it , a notion of our own existence , by way of sensation ? especially , since operation is nothing but the existence of the agent body , press'd or imprinted ( as it were ) upon another , by motion . certainly , it becomes us who deny innate ideas , to shew how all our first notions do come into us by impressions on the senses ; and , not to say rawly , that some of them come by intuition ; which is the way of knowing proper to angels , whose knowledges are all innate , and none of them acquir'd , either by sense , or discourse , for they have neither . this , i say , is certainly best for the interest of our tenet ; of which , intuition gives but a slender account . i believe mr. locke proceeds upon this , that he finds he not only does , but must as firmly assent to the proposition ego sum , as he does to the most evident proposition whatever ; nor can he at all doubt of it , nor can it need proof . but , my judgment is , that this introversion , and studying our own interiour , is a very fallacious guide , and will often lead us astray , if we keep not a steady eye , attentively bent to our principles ; which he seems here to neglect . for , many positions need no proof , and force our assent , and yet their certainty may depend on different causes . . the th chapter treats of the improvement of our knowledge , which mr. locke says , does not depend on maxims . but , first , he mistakes the use of general maxims : they are not made for the vulgar , or beginners , to gather knowledge by them ; tho' it may be observ'd , that men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose ; nay , sometimes make proverbs of them . nor was this maxim , [ a whole is bigger than a part , ] ever intended for boys , or to teach them that their hand is bigger than their little finger , or such like ; but , being premised to the ensuing proofs , they are occasionally made use of by learned men , in the process of their discourse , to clinch the truth of the point , when it needs it , by their self-evidence . in the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to metaphysical principles , and made use of them , in my preliminaries and reflexions , as occasion presented , to make my discourses evident ; and , to rivet the truths i advance , in the minds of my readers ; as any attentive peruser of them may easily observe . he speaks against our receiving principles without examination , and of principles that are not certain ; that is , against such sayings , as are no principles ; for , if they can either need , or admit of examination , or , if they be not certain , none but meer fops will let them pass for prinples . yet , tho' mr. locke does thus oppose maxims and principles , 't is , notwithstanding , very evident , that himself must make use of some maxims and principles all the while he disputes aganst their usefulness ; otherwise , he cannot discourse at all ; or , his discourse can have no force : in the same manner as he that wrastles with another , must either fix his foot on some firm ground , or he will fall himself , instead of overthrowing his adversary . let us then examin his principles . he alledges , that the knowledge of the certainty of principles depends only upon the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas . this , then , is one of his principles ; both because it runs through good part of his d and th books , as also because 't is equivalent to this universal , [ all certainty of principles depends , &c. ] now , this is so far from self-evident , that it needs examination enough ; and is one of those i judge not certain ; and , therefore , can be no ground or principle at all : nor is it possible it should , unless the word [ idea ] be cleared to mean spiritual notions in our mind , and not meer resemblances , or material representations in our fancy ; to clear which , ( tho' the whole treatise needs it , ) no provision is made ; but , on the contrary , those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded ; as is shewn in my first preliminary . another principle seems to be this , [ none ought , with a blind and implicit faith , to receive and swallow principles . ] this is of universal influence , and self-evident ; and , therefore , in all points well qualify'd for a principle . for , principles were not principles , if they needed either faith , or deductions of reason , to make them go down , since they ought to be evident by their own light. but , what good can this do to any , but to such as have renounc'd common sense , even to ridiculousness ? and , perhaps mr. locke had some such weak writers in his eye , when he advanc'd this cautious position , as a warning to learners . . now , the general maxims and principles , on which the learned part of the world has hitherto proceeded , can onely be overthrown ( if they must needs be so ) by other principles , more evident than themselves are ; or else it will be but a drawn match ; and so they may hope still to stand ( as the lawyers phrase it ) in their full force , effect , and vertue . we are to consider then , what principle mr. locke has substituted in their room , when they are discarded ; for , 't is a very ill case to be left without any principles at all . 't is this , [ all knowledge of the certainty of principles , and consequently , the way to improve our knowledge , is , to get , and fix in our minds , clear , distinct and compleat ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them proper and constant names . ] now , if the ideas must be clear , the terms must be very simple , and consequently ( as was shewn above ) general ones ; and this will force us back upon general maxims , which it was intended we should avoid , as good for little . to be distinct , if we go to work like artists , we must distinguish those general and common notions ; which will bring us back into the old road of those ten common heads , called predicaments ; and , consequently , of genus , species and differences , which was lately dislik'd ; i suppose , because it was too much travell'd in , and beaten ; tho' , i think , such a common path should not be left , because some may have here and there laid a block or briar in the way . lastly , compleat ideas ( as he grants ) are not to be had of the species , much less of the individuums . and , as for names ; 't is not we that are to annex them , but the common usage of the vulgar , or of the generality of learned men , ( in case they be artificial ones ; ) for , these are they who gave them their constant and proper signification . whence is seen , that so many difficulties are involv'd in this one thesis , or principle , ( besides what is said above , of the word [ ideas , ] ) that we can build no degree of certainty , nor improvement of knowledge upon it ; especially , since mr. locke himself ( according to his usual candour and modesty ) declares here , he does but think it true . but , which is the hardest case of all , to embrace this principle , we must be oblig'd to quit all our self-evident maxims , as of little use , upon which our selves , and all the learned part of the world , have proceeded hitherto . . 't is a great truth , that it is a right method of advancing knowledge , to consider our abstract notions : but , if these be not the things , nor ( as mr. locke's complex ideas are ) so much as like them , i see not but that , let us consider them as much as we will , we shall be never the nearer attaining any real knowledge by such a consideration . i add , that it is also as necessary to find out middle terms , that are proper ; without which , no science can be had of any new conclusion ; nor , consequently , can we , without this , advance one step in exact knowledge . 't is a certain truth also , that morality is capable of demonstration ; tho' i do not remember that any author , but mr. locke , and my self , have been so bold , as openly to profess it . the current of slight speculaters having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of maxim , that [ there is no perfect certainty to be had , but only in lines and numbers : ] whereas , the principles of morality are as evident , and the notions belonging to such subjects as clear , as those in natural philosophy , perhaps clearer ; as this worthy author has shewn most manifestly . 't is also true , that knowledge may be better'd by experience . but , if he means scientifical knowledge , which is the effect of demonstration , i must deny it , unless common principles of nature do guide experience , and give it light of the true and proper causes of what experience inform'd our senses ; for , without their assistance , ( as i have shewn in the preface to my my method , ) experimental knowledge can never produce any one scientifical conclusion . i add , that true science would be a thousand times more advanc'd , did learned men bend their endeavours to begin with the primary affections of body , and thence proceed gradually to secondary , or more compounded ones : for , this method would furnish studious men with good store of proper middle terms , to deduce their demonstrations . lastly , 't is true , that we must beware of hypotheses , and wrong principles : but , where shall we find any sect. of philosophers , who , for want of exact skill in logick and metaphysicks , are not forc'd to build upon hypotheses , ( and those generally false ones too ; ) but our anti-ideists , whom i take to be true followers of aristotle , in his main principles , and the only true understanders of his doctrine . it being , indeed , scarce possible , that those who are not well qualify'd with those two sciences , should be capable to comprehend his true sense . . mr. locke judges , that a man may pore long enough on those maxims us'd by euclid , without seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths . self-evident truths need not be por'd upon at all ; nor were they ever meant for the attaining new knowledges by poring on those propositions , singly consider'd : yet , these maxims must be pre-supposed to be true , and admitted , or the arguments would very often want their best cement , that gives them an evident and necessary coherence . they are prefix'd by euclid at first , both because they may often come in play afterwards ; as also , because it would throw off the tenour of the discourse , to mention them still expresly every time there needs recourse to them : whence it was judg'd fit by him , and others like him , to premise them at first , and then refer to them . let men but observe how , and in what occasions , euclid makes use of them , and it will then be best seen what they are good for : but , if they are good for nothing at all , i am sure it must be concluded , that both euclid himself , and such writers and users of maxims , were , all of them , a company of vain , idle fops , to amuse their readers by proposing so solemnly such ridiculous trifles ; and dubbing those insignificant baubles with the honourable titles of maxims and principles . to fix which dis-repute upon him , and his imitaters , will , i doubt , much scandalize every true member of the commonwealth of learning . reflexion th . on the fourteenth , fifteenth , and sixteenth chapters . . i am sorry i must declare , that in mr. locke's th chapter , which treats [ of judgment ] there is scarce one line that i can yield to . i discourse thus : judgment does most evidently import the fixure of our understanding in its assent to the truth or falshood of any proposition . for to say , i judge a thing to be so ; is the same as to say , [ i am fully and firmly persuaded it is so . ] now , this fixure of the mind may arise from two causes ; reason and passion . under the word [ reason , ] taken at large , i comprehend all kind of evident knowledge whatever , that can belong to a rational creature . to passion belongs all precipitancy of assent , from what motive or cause soever it springs . the former makes us adhere to what we judge , upon such motives , as by their evidence do determine the understanding to assent , and fix it in that assent ; which motives , therefore , can be only such as are purely intellectual ; or such as , by our proceeding upon them , we see clearly the thing must be so , or not so , as we apprehend . the later springs from the will , corrupted and byassed by some interest or pleasure , which inveigles our understanding to adhere to it as a truth , because the will would have it so . again , there are two sorts of objects man , as having two natures in him , may be employ'd about , viz. outward action and inward assent . the former does ( generally ) concern the external conveniences or necessities of our temporal life here ; the later , the interiour and natural perfection of our soul ; which is the adhering to truth , and rejecting of errour . in the former of these we can have no clear evidence , or very seldom ; both because outward actions are employ'd about particulars , of which we can have no science ; as also , because those particulars about which we are to act , are surrounded with almost innumerable circumstances which we cannot comprehend , and way-laid by the undiscoverable ambushes of fortune ; so that we can seldom or never , with absolute certainty , know whether they may , or may not prove successful . notwithstanding which dangers , when there is necessity or great conveniency to act outwardly , we may , without disparaging our reason , fall to acting upon a probability ; the necessity obliging us to do so , and the impossibility of perfect assurance acquitting us of imprudence . but , of assenting , or of judging inwardly , that a proposition is true or false , there can be no necessity , unless evidence forces us to it ; in regard god's goodness has furnish'd us with a faculty of suspending our judgment in such cases , lest we run into errour ; which is always prejudicial to our nature ; and , if the errour does concern matters of high moment , pernicious to our souls eternal welfare . this i take to be plain reason , nor do i doubt but that each branch of this discourse may be reduced to perfect evidence . we come to examin now what mr. locke delivers in this most important point . . first , he confounds outward action , of which there is necessity , and can be no evidence of success ; with interiour judging and assenting , of which there can be no necessity , if there can be no evidence ; and of which evident knowledge may oftentimes be had ; as also concerning whose truth or falshood , till evidence appear , we may safely and honourably suspend our judgment ; nay , if , in such a case , we do not , we hazard to do our selves an injury when we need not . that he thus confounds those two vastly different , or rather contrary considerations , appears hence ; that , § . he shews the unreasonableness of not eating , and of not going about our business , till we have a demonstration that the meat will nourish us , and the business will succeed ; which instances evidently relate to outward action ; but in § . he speaks in the same tenour of taking the proposition to be true or false ; which clearly relates to inward assent . secondly , god 's wisdom has indeed given us , generally , no more but probability for our outward actions doing us good , or succeeding ; but to think our all-wise maker has given us no better grounds to make us assent ; or rather , that he intended we should assent upon probabilities , which are still liable to be false ; and , if they be but probabilities , may all be false , is to think that god meant to expose our souls to innumerable errours ; nay , allows and designs we should embrace errours . for , if ( as mr. l. says ) god has given as a faculty to judge that to be true , which , the reasons for their truth being but probable , may not be true ; then , since god has most certainly intended we should make use of the faculty he has given us , it must follow that god has exposed us to errour , or design'd we should err ; and that , ( this faculty , as he says , not being knowledge ) very frequently . which is hardly consistent with the reverence we do both of us owe to our creatour , who governs his creatures according to the nature he has given them ; which , is to avoid errour , and never ( as will shortly be seen this does ) to admit a contradiction . . what therefore i extremely admire , is , that mr. locke should say in express terms , that judgment is that faculty , whereby the mind takes any proposition to be true or false , without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs ; and that this faculty is given man by god to enlighten him . for , first , judgment does not enlighten us at all ; as appears evidently , because false judgments are errours ; which are so far from enlightning the mind , that they manifestly darken it . all that judgment does , is to fix the mind in the perswasion it has , whether that persuasion springs from clear reason or dark passion ; and mr. locke seems to make good my words , while he contradistinguishes judgment to knowledge ; which later , and onely which , is our intellectual light. secondly , the words [ taking propositions to be true or false ] must mean assenting to them as such ; for every judgment is not only an assent , but a full and firm assent . now , that no probability can , with reason , cause assent , ( and certainly god , who gave us our reason , has not given us a faculty to use it against our reason ) will be seen hereafter . thirdly , which is yet worse , by contradistinguishing judgment and clear knowledge , he makes those assents which spring out of clear knowledge to be no judgments at all ; whereas these are the onely judgments that we can be sure will do us good , and are according to our true nature , reason . he tells us indeed , in the close , that when we judge as things really are , they are right judgments . but , how does this agree with his contradistinguishing formerly [ judgment , ] according to its whole latitude , or in its general notion , from knowledge ; unless we should say , that we only do right when we judge at hap-hazard , or judge right by chance . qui quod aequum est statuit parte inauditâ alterâ , aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus est tamen : by which rule , we are ill men , even tho' we judge right ; because we precipitate and hazard to embrace errour when we need not . besides , things are so really to us as we know them to be : and , if we do not know them to be such , we cannot with reason say or judge them to be such ; and , if we do , we act against our true nature ; to do which god has given us no faculty . fourthly , amongst the causes mention'd here that make us judge , necessity is reckon'd as one , when certain knowledge is not to be had : but , this can be no cause at all to make us judge . for , there can be no possible necessity , forcing us to judge , but clear evidence . this , indeed , obliges us to interiour assent , and compels us to judge that the thing is so as we see it to be . but , if no evidence can be had , what necessity is there at all of judging one way or other ? cannot we suspend our judgment till evidence appears ; or whether it does ever appear , or not ? why are we in such hast to hazard falling into error ? or who bids us judge at all till we see a good ( or conclusive ) reason why ? i am sure , whatever many men may do out of weakness , neither god nor nature ever impos'd upon any such an absurd duty . lastly , what means his making it then to be judgment , when we have no demonstrative evidence ? may we not judge a conclusion that is demonstrated to be true , because it is demonstrated ? or that an identical proposition is true , because 't is self-evident ? or , rather , ought we not to judge all such propositions to be true for this very reason , because we know evidently they are so . so far then is certain knowledge from being contradistinguish'd from judgment , that they are in some manner the same , as i have shewn in my method , b. . less . . § . where , i hope , i have set the nature of judgment in a clear light ; as i have that of assent , suspense , and certainty , b. . § . . i should be glad to think my self mistaken in mr. locke's meaning , if his express words , the tenour of his discourse , and his next chapter [ of probability , ] which runs in the same strain , would give me leave . perhaps , he thinks that , since none can embrace christianity without judging it to be true , and few know it to be so , we should exclude the generality from the way to salvation , if we do not allow such a faculty given us by god , as judging without knowing . i answer , . those gifts that come from above , from the father of lights , are all perfect , as being the endowments of his infinitely-bountiful hand ; and , that men act imperfectly and foolishly , springs from the limitedness of creatures . scarce a faculty they have but has its weakness when we come to act , as well as our reason . when then any one is reduc'd to christianity upon weak motives , what 's good or sincere in that action is refunded into god the author of all good ; what 's defective ( as all inconclusive reasonings are ) is to be refunded into the imperfection of creatures . indeed , it belongs to god to lay and establish such motives to embrace high and concerning truths , as are of their own nature apt to convince , not only people of all sorts , but even the most speculative wit living ; but it does not belong to him to provide , that every weak man shall , untaught , penetrate them throughly ; nor every careless man make use of them . rude and imperfect motives are sufficient to move rude and imperfect understandings . . this notwithstanding , god has furnish'd even the rudest , who cannot speculate at all , with a power to understand such motives , after some fashion , called practical evidence ; which teaches them , by a common converse with natural things , and with mankind , to know ( dully at least ) the force of witnessing authority attesting the miracles that abetted christianity , and the books that deliver'd it . but , what i chiefly insist upon is , that it teaches all men , that the nature of its precepts , and of its morality , is most agreeable to our reason ; that it curbs passion , which breeds such turmoils in the world ; and that , ( if settled in men's lives , ) it would establish all the world in peace and concord ; especially , since they cannot but see what inconveniencies and ill consequences do ensue the breach of the commandments . and this gives an entire satisfaction to every man who is capable of knowing common morality , ( as , who is not ? ) and assures them , that the doctrine it self is true ; since they experience that errour puts all into confusion and disorder . but , this on the by. in a word , he must be a mean speculater , who does not observe that god has laid motives , and solid knowable ones too , for every man to embrace christian faith , of what degree soever he be , if he be but so wise as to doubt , and require a reason : if those motives be not apply'd to all , 't is either the fault of those that do not care to be instructed ; or of those who should inculcate and explicate to them those motives , and shew how solid and clear they are . let them then bear the blame ; god's providence is justify'd , and his wisdom and goodness magnify'd , by his making ample provision for such negligent and unworthy persons . see method to science , book . less . . §§ . , . . hence , i have little to say to his th chapter , which treats of probability ; * having shewn from the ground of all consequence , ( the connexion of the middle term with the two extreams , ) that , when the medium is proper or immediate , it causes demonstration , and begets science ; when common or remote , it makes the thing onely probable , and begets opinion ; when unconcerning , it causes improbability ; when clearly repugnant , it breeds dissent . i am therefore onely to reflect on those expressions of mr. locke that seem to say we may assent , or judge the thing is so upon probable reasons ; or , as mr. locke expresses it , assent as firmly as tho' the thing were infallibly demonstrated , tho' it do but border near upon certainty . i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . that no truly wise man does assent or judge upon motives , tho' very highly probable ; nor can do so , tho' they be never so probable and likely , if he sees it but likely , or probable : for , all reasons or motives that are but probable , permit that the thing may not be so , or may not be ; and to assent , or judge the thing true , is to say in our mind , that the thing is : whence , to assent the thing is , upon a probability , is , equivalently , to hold , that , it is possible the thing may be , and may not be , at once : it may be , because it is ; and , it may not be at the same time , because the onely grounds for its being so , are but probable . which , therefore , being against a first , and self-evident principle , is the greatest depravation that a humane understanding can be liable to , and ( if put in clear terms ) absolutely impossible ; both because contradictions being repugnant to the nature of ens , or thing , are unintelligible ; as also , because it would make our mind , which is essentially intellectual , to be not intellectual , that is , chimerical . for , 't is impossible it should be intellectual , if it denies first principles . . this ground laid , 't is obvious to discern what is to be said to his th chapter , [ of the degrees of assent . ] for , . i must deny that any assent at all that the thing is so , can be built upon the sandy foundation of probability , without a most prodigious perversion of humane understanding . . hence i reflect upon the very subject or title of this chapter ; and i object against it , that it is an absolute impossibility there should be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . to assent to any truth , ( as was lately shewn , ) is to say interiourly , the thing [ is ; ] and to dissent , is to say the thing [ is not . ] these two notions then are evidently the objects of those two acts , which give those acts to be what they are , or ( as the schools express it ) do specifie them . wherefore , each of those two acts consists in an indivisible , as their objects do ; and , consequently , there can be no more any degrees of assent , than there can be any middle between is , and is not ; which is neither the one nor the other ; or , in part the one , in part the other ; whereas , being both of them indivisible , neither of them can have any parts at all . the degrees then which can possibly be put in this case , and which i would be willing to think mr. locke meant , are the degrees of bending or inclining , more or less , towards assent or dissent ; that is , greater or lesser opinions of the things being , or not being . assent then , and dissent , or is and is not , in the judging power , are the two fixed butts and bounds of that large field , in which innumerable swarms of opinions , probabilities , likelihoods , doubts , deemings , and uncertainties reside ; driven perpetually up and down , in a wild-goose chase , by those unsteady guides , probabilities ; now nearer , now farther off from those immoveable barriers . but , it is to be noted , that the degrees of probability and likelihood may sometimes be so very great , that they may seem , even to the wisest men , while they regard them heedlesly , to counterfeit assent , till they come to take a narrower and stricter re-view of the grounds on which they are built ; as i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . mr. locke enumerates here many probable topicks , grounding opinion ; and i have done the same , in the place now quoted , § . . all which do agree in this , that they are common or remote mediums : whence they are , in true reason , inconclusive ; and therefore , utterly unable to cause assent in a being that is rational ; there wanting in them that visible and certain connexion , in which all the force of consequence consists , and which mr. locke puts to be onely known by intuition . there may , indeed , be degrees of assent taken from the subject's side , by which the understanding assents more or less firmly ; according as the medium is more or less evident . whence , metaphysical mediums , which approach nearest to self-evidence , cause a firmer assent , than those which are taken from inferiour notions , which depend on the other for their certainty : and , that medium taken from the divine authority , does rationally beget the firmest assent of all : yet , still , the object of the assent or dissent is [ is , ] or [ is not . ] but this cannot be mr. locke's meaning here ; because the least of these assents is built upon clear evidence ; which is impossible to be found , where the medium is but probable . . i am very apprehensive that this discourse , and others such like will seem very uncouth , and be very displeasing to those short-sighted speculaters , who , either out of disadvantagious education , or out of diffidence that there can be any certain method to science , are sceptically inclin'd : especially to those of our modern schoolmen ; who , not being accustom'd to demonstrate themselves , think it a disgrace to them , and incredible to boot , that any else should do it . one of whom , a worthy friend of mine , of an acute understanding , and very ingenious , but not yet wean'd from insignificant school-terms , nor aware of their trifling way of distinguishing ; uponmy discoursing with him about this point , did imagin it might all be answered , and over thrown by an easy distinction of assent , into absolute and probable . alledging that absolute assent had indeed [ is ] for its object , and so consisted in an indivisible ; but that probable assent did not so ; by which means the imputation of holding a contradiction is avoyded . thus he reply'd : wherefore , it were not amiss for his sake , and others of the same pitch , to lay open the frivolousness of this insignificant distinction ; that , by reflecting on this , they may correct their carriage in all other like occasions . first then , he seems to join the epithet of [ probable ] to the act of assenting ; which is perfect nonsense . for , since every accident or mode has its metaphysical verity , by which it is what it is , as well as any substance ; it is equally against the first principle [ every thing is what it is ] to apply that distinction to any accident ( of which assent is one , ) as it would be to apply it to any substance . put case then we were discoursing concerning the nature of a stone , or of any other substance or body ; and were disputing whether its nature were such or such ; and he should go about to elude the whole force of this discourse , by distinguishing [ stone ] into a probable stone , and an absolute stone , would it not be highly ridiculous : for the same reason it would be equally ridiculous to apply [ probable ] to the act of assenting ; since that act is as absolutely it self , as a stone is a stone , or any other body is what it is . but , that i may not be too severe , let us imagin he meant to apply [ probable , ] to the object of the act or some proposition , as standing under motives onely probable ; whence , 't is equivalent to this proposition , [ this tenet is probable : ] then , in case the proof of that tenet were onely a probable medium , that proposition is a plain truth , for what is inferr'd by a probable medium , is beyond all question , probable ; and therefore the assent to that proposition , ought to be call'd absolute , and not probable , which quite spoiles the distinction by making the two branches of it to be one and the same . . hence , this contradistinguishing probable and absolute , is faulty in another regard , because the two parts of it are not ( some way ) opposit ; as they ought to be ; because the defendent in the schools uses to say , that according to one of them , he grants the proposition , and according to the other denies it . now , absolute and probable , are not at all proper opposites : [ absolute ] signifies consummate or perfect in its kind , and relates to the minds perfectly yeilding or assenting that the thing is true ; whereas , [ probable ] must relate to the motives , or the common medium under which the proposition stands , or else ( as was lately shewn ) it is meer nonsense , and ridiculous . the proper opposite to probable , is improbable ; and , what has improbable to do with absolute ? lastly , granting he speaks of the object or thesis proposed to our assent , it will appear evidently that my assertion will stand good , and that the formal object of assent is what is express'd by the copula [ is , ] or the connexion of the two terms , in which truth ( which onely is to be assented to ) consists . for example ; when we say that [ a thesis prov'd onely by a common medium , is probable ; ] the truth , even of this proposition , is onely express'd by the copula [ is , ] and consists in an indivisible ; so that you no sooner step out of [ is probable , ] but you must run into its contradictory , [ is not probable . ] . this instance will give us occasion to note the vanity and folly of innumerable distinctions , which pass current amongst disputants ; in which , if examin'd strictly , sometimes the two parts of them are not opposit , but onely oddly disparate ; sometimes coincident ; sometimes they are applied to such terms as are incapable to admit them , without palpable nonsense ; very often when all is done , they are impertinent : and , frequently , whereas the distinction should divide the notion of the genus , and include it , one of the members will perfectly contradict the whole generical notion , and pretend to pass for one sort of it , when it is point blank opposit to it , and to every part of it : for example , i remember an eminent school divine , when ( honest nature putting a scruple into me , when i was young ) i askt him how a man could say he had done such a thing when he had not done it ; he answerd very soberly , that he had done it intentionaliter , tho' not realiter : now , to do it ( as he call'd it ) intentionaliter , is onely to have an intention to do it , which signifies not to have done it . so that [ doing ] is , by virtue of a distinction , divided into doing and not doing ; and not doing is made one sort of doing . and i do assure my friend his probable assent is not a jot wiser ; but has more faults in it than had the other , 't is not enough then , nor at all satisfactory , to give an answer fork'd with a distinction ; but care must be had that the distinction be pertinent , and well qualify'd , as is hinted above . see other distinctions of the same leaven with the former , laid open , method to science . b. . less . . § § . . . i heartily joyn with mr. locke in his discourse about preserving mutual charity , and forbearance . tho' the demonstrations of learned men do much good , yet i am sure the want of charity does more harm . 't is in the highest manner preternatural that rational souls should be forced , or dealt with any other way than by reason ; unless they come to wrong common morality , or the peace of the common wealth in which they live ; both which are so evidently against the law of nature , that their reason must needs see and acknowledge it , unless most wickedly blinded with passion and vice. alas ! what silly reasons do good weak people take for certain , and are convinced by them as perfectly as we are by the clearest demonstration ! and , ( which more obliges us to pity them ) if we propose to them strong reasons , they are too weighty for their weak strength to wield ; and their own ridiculous ones do sute better with their size and pitch of wit. . i am clearly of mr. l's judgment , concerning the degrees of probability in several matters ; as also that in traditional truths , each remove weakens the force of the proof , if it descends meerly ( as he expresses it ) by the way of the hearsay of a hearsay . the bare narative must either be supported by a consonant , frequent , open and obligatory practise , and be strengthen'd by the acknowledged high concern of perpetuating the matter of fact attested , or it may in time dwindle away into a feeble tittle-tattle . and , i very much esteem his remark , as both very acute , and very solid , that no probability in historical relation can arise higher than its first original ; unless that first original were afterwards abetted and corroborated by other motives . his allowance of the validity of the testimony for miracles , is wise , and pious ; and his making divine revelation to be the highest certainty , is well becoming a christian philosopher : for , all our knowledge whatever is taken from things , made and establish'd by god , as the first cause ; and , therefore , if it be certain that god's revelation or testimony stands engag'd for any point , the truth of that point is prov'd by a nobler , stronger and higher medium than can be drawn from physicks , or even metaphysicks ; that is , from the soveraign cause of all those objects , whence those respective mediums are taken ; and , by whom onely they they have any truth at all in them ; no , not so much as their metaphysical verity it self . . it would not be impertinent on this occasion , to present mr. locke with a short story . a very judicious cantabrigian desir'd to know of me , whether we ought not to assent to a point of christian faith , supposing it was evidently reveal'd , more firmly than to any scientifical conclusion ? i answer'd , that we ought . he ask'd , why ? alledging , that , since there could not be any greater certainty that it was reveal'd than demonstration , the assent to the conclusion could not , in true reason , be more firm than that which a demonstration produces , or than the conclusion of any science : for , let the syllogism be this , [ whatever god said , is true : but , god said there will be a resurrection of our bodies ; therefore , there will be such a resurrection : ] none can pretend ( said he ) any greater certainty than that of science , for the certainty of the authority that gave us the minor ; therefore , since conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem , the assent to the conclusion can be , in true reason , no greater than that of science . i reply'd , that that saying of the logicians was meant of the particularity or negativeness found in the premisses , and not of the force of the medium . i alledg'd , that the major had the greater influence upon the conclusion , ( whence that proposition so called , had its appellation , ) than the minor ; which was onely an applier of the force of the major to some particular , or some other notion , in order to conclude concerning it ; and therefore , the certainty of the conclusion was chiefly to be rated from the force of the major : whence , those enthymems , which have the major for their antecedent , are more natural than those which have the minor. i insisted , that the divine authority being alledg'd for the onely medium or motive for all revealed points whatever , our assent to the verity of all such points , was onely to be refunded into it ; and , that it lost not its force by its being apply'd by a weaker medium to some particular , provided that supream authority's standing engag'd for that particular , were closely apply'd to our mind ; which is done by absolute certainty and evidence . to illustrate which , i brought this instance . let there be two agents , whereof the one is calidum ut octo , the other calidum ut duo , and both of them apply'd to the same patient equally ; it will not follow from this equal application , that they will have an equal effect ; but the heat produced by the one , will be more intense than that which was caused by the other . so , supposing two syllogisms , the minors of which are both known by science ; but of the majors , one is known onely by science , the other by an infinitely higher evidence , viz. by the essential veracity of the divine authority ; it will not follow , from the equal application of it , by the respective minors , to this or that particular , subsum'd under them , that the assent to the two conclusions , which is the effect they are to produce in our minds , will be equal ; but they will operate according to their several forces , provided the force of both be but closely apply'd to our minds , so to make it work its full effect ; which is done by seeing both the minors to be absolutely certain and evident . i have not time to dilate on this high point as it deserves , but leave it to the sober reflexion of all judicious lovers of truth , who seriously desire that christian principles may approve themselves to be , in all respects , perfectly rational . and 't is a duty we all owe to our selves , and to the world , to shew that christian faith does not pervert or impair , but perfect and exalt our reason . reflexion th . on the th , th , th , and last chapters . . this learned author states reason very right in all its parts ; but , i believe , he mistakes the right end , intention and use of syllogisms ; and that , while he opposes them , he takes his measures from the modern school-way of syllogistick arguing , and the little fruit it has yielded . such forms of reasoning were , certainly , never intended for the vulgar , as by his discourse he seems to apprehend ; nor for men of good mother-wits , to attain ordinary knowledge , by casting their thoughts in those exact molds . for , mankind could use their reason , and improve in it too ; nay , could draw their consequences ( generally ) very well , before syllogistick reasoning came in fashion ; tho' they could not so well make it out to themselves or others , why the consequence must follow , nor refund it into its causes , and so set it above contest , by reducing it to evidence . their own natural genius taught them to discourse right , very often unreflectingly ; as it does also the vulgar in things within their ken. in process of time , reflecters upon nature , finding ( as it were ) by experience , that some discourses were evidently consequent , some not , they began to cast about and find out by what virtue some discourses came to be so evidently conclusive above others . and , to this end ( art , if truly such , being nothing but a deep inspection into nature ) they set themselves to anatomize and dissect a rational discourse , that so they might discover the hidden nerves and ligaments that gave force and connexion to the whole . they found that such a discourse did consist of three main parts , call'd propositions ; and each of these again , of three lesser parts , called by them subject , copula , and predicate ; all which had distinct natures and offices in the discourse . they discover'd that the connexion of the two terms in the conclusion , in which consists the truth of it , depended on their connexion with a third or middle term in the premisses ; and that , if they be not connected with it or immediate , but remote from it , as all common mediums are , which beget probabilities ; nothing is concluded , and so the conclusion may , ( for any thing we know ) be false . they observ'd hence , that there could be but three terms in such a discourse ; and that , were they more , it caused a blunder and inconsequence . hence they took care those three terms should be so placed , as would render the connexion of the other two with the medium most clear at first sight . this done , they treated of each of those greater and lesser parts , that is , of propositions and notions singly and apart ; adding such rules as they saw convenient for each . from these observations , laid orderly together , sprung the art of logick , and all the rudiments belonging to it . all which have their force from nature ; nor ought any thing be esteemed art , but what has honest downright nature for its ground : and , i hope , that in every tittle of my whole method , i have not one argument in those many trains of consequences i have drawn there throughout it , that is not taken from the nature of the thing in hand . now , things standing thus , who can think logick , or syllogism ( the main end of it , ) are to be slighted as of little or no use ? can any man think that art and reflexion do add no advantage to untaught nature ? or that our rude , natural , and common reason may not be cultivated and improv'd , as well as our natural voice , walking and handling , may be better'd , by being taught to sing , dance , or play on the lute artificially . . i am very apt to think , that at first the inventers of logick and syllogisms did never intend to use them perpetually themselves , nor to instruct others in any science by using constantly that method . since neither aristotle , nor any other author i ever read , ancient or modern , ever went about to deliver a scheme of doctrine in a syllogistick way : but that , after they had by study and reflexion , found out in what their evidence lay , they made use of them as exemplars or tests , by which they might try whether their loose and dishevell'd discourses had an evident and necessary connexion of terms at the bottom ; or else , in some signal occasions , to confute and convince an acute or obstinate adversary ; especially , if the auditory and judges of the dispute were men of learning . for which reason that way is still continued in learned assemblies : such as the schools often are , and always should be . but , when at length that way grew too common , and that sophisters and bunglers would needs constantly use it , and it only , in their extempore disputes ; which could be manag'd right , and as they ought , by none but those who were exact masters of logick ; it came at length to degenerate into insipid artless wrangle and talking at random . for , the multitude of ill-understood and barbarous school-terms encreased , frivolous distinctions ( as i lately instanced ) grew rife ; principles were either neglected , or else supplied by their masters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the natures of things , and the ways dictated by nature , were left off ; and hence it came , that no progress was made in science ; nor any point decisively concluded . . in divers parts of this discourse i doubt not but mr. locke agrees with me : what i disagree with him in is : . i deny that in learned and philosophical discourses , ( for which syllogisms were intended ) the mind can perceive the connexion of the proofs where it really is , as easily , nay perhaps better , without them . certainly , the seeing the middle term placed in the middle , as it ought , will make a reflecting man see better the connexion of the terms ; whence , besides its own aptness to connect , it comes , even by vertue of its place , to be seen to be immediate to each of the extremes ; and , so , more apt to connect them . again , in a syllogism there is no necessary word left out , nor one unnecessary word put in ; whereas in loose discourses this last is always wanting : and , can we think it adds no degree of clearness to the discourse to keep it from being pester'd with many unnecessary words , in many of which there will not want ambiguity ? nor is this all , for in loose discourses , the fine language and plausible tricks of rhetorick do too often dazle the eye of the mind ; and make that seem excellent reason , which , brought the test of a syllogism , will be seen to be plain foolery and ridiculous nonsense . lastly , good logicians , who are skill'd in the solid reasons why the conclusion follows , do , while they discourse syllogistically , guide their thoughts all along by steady and ( generally ) self-evident rules ; and see a priori , and this , by the highest causes , why , and by what means the conclusion must follow ; which conduces in a high measure to demonstration and science : whereas , those that have only the assistance of their uncultivated natural reason , do both want this knowing satisfaction to themselves , and are utterly unable to give it to others . i grant then , that the untaught vulgar in common conversation and obvious affairs can need no syllogisms ; and that the gentlewoman he speaks of , may have wit enough to avoid catching cold , tho' neither her self , nor any for her , do put the reason of it into a syllogism ; and so does a milk-maid , without the help of mathematicks , know certainly that the diameter of her pail is shorter than the circumference of it ; nay , both of them would be blunder'd , and know those truths worse , were the true reasons for them put into the uncouth garb of a syllogism ; for art is not their talent : but to think that learned men and disputants gain little or no advantage by them above the vulgar , is to maintain , that art , tho' never so solidly grounded , is good for nothing . . secondly , to say that syllogism helps little in demonstration , is , i am sure , against reason and experience both . he might as well have said in one word , they are good for nothing at all . for it cannot be thought they are good to know principles , they being self-evident ; and , it is manifest they cannot help us in probabilities ; for a syllogism that does not conclude is not worth a straw ; and no medium that is meerly probable ( it being a remote one ) can be connected with the extremes , nor consequently can it conclude . 't is left then , that if they help little in demonstration , they do not help us much in any thing . we need then very strong arguments to make us yield to such a paradox . mr. locke confesses syllogism is sometimes good to discover fallacies : i take leave to say they are always good for that end : and does this help us little in demonstration ? all argumentations are either conclusive or inconclusive ; conclusive ones have a middle term immediately connected with the extremes ; inconclusive ones either are aim'd to deceive us , by bringing a bad medium , or by using a bad form ; and those are the worst sort of fallacies , or of such syllogisms as lead us into errour ; most of those fallacies noted in common logick-books , being but trifles . if then the syllogistick way discovers fallacies , it cannot be deny'd but it exceedingly helps conclusive argumentation , or demonstration . he grants too , that it sets the absent proposition ( and , so , the whole argument ) before the view in a clear light. i infer ; therefore without it , we should not have had so clear a knowledge of the proof , nor consequently of the conclusion ; and is this nothing ? but he thinks this good is over ballanced by this , that it engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure , equivocal and fallacious terms . let us blame then those logicians , who multiply terms and needless crotchets , ( which i have endeavour'd in my method , to lop off as superfluous ) and those authors who do not define those terms they use ; and not syllogism nor artificial logick , which tells them they ought to do it . i know no more , properly and peculiarly belonging to syllogism , but a middle term rightly placed ; as is usually done in the first figure , and according to the first four moods . nor do i see any thing in these that in my method is not reduced to clear evidence . 't is confest too that it is adapted to the attaining victory in disputes . now , if this be so , then the champion of truth , by means of syllogism , will make truth victorious ; and then , how it can be deny'd ( as mr. locke does ) that it confirms truth in fair enquiries , is to me unintelligible ; unless by fair enquiries he means loose discourses , which are not syllogistical , nor reducible to that form ; which i think is an improper and lukewarm expression ; for , a philosopher ought to esteem no discourse fair , which is not clear and conclusive . . indeed mr. locke says very well , that syllogism is of no use at all in probabilities . and there is very good reason why . for syllogism shows an infallibly-certain way of concluding ; whence nothing can bear that test but what does conclude ; whereas probabilities being grounded on common mediums , do not conclude at all ; and therefore it would do probability a great disservice to bring it to the touchstone of all true or conclusive reasoning , a syllogistick form. this would quickly lay open the incoherence of the terms , and consequently , show those men to be less rational who do assent , or say interiourly , the terms do cohere , or the thing is true , upon a probable argument , in which they do not cohere . 't is then by sagacious prudence , and not by syllogisms , that the degrees of probability are to be weighed and try'd . he grants also that syllogism serves to fence : and so it does , tho' not in mr. lock 's sense of that word . for , as an expert fencer easily wounds , and overthrows an enemy , who is not skilful in that art : so a man who is skilful in syllogism , which is the art of concluding evidently , will quickly confound and overthrow an adversary of truth . but why he should think it does not serve to increase knowledge , is a strange riddle ; the whole design of artificial , or syllogistick , reasoning being to deduce conclusions not yet known , from premisses which are either perfectly foreknown , or at least better known . . mr. locke has then good reason to say , that other helps should be sought : but , if syllogism be discarded , where any other help can be found to make the force and clearness of the consequence better appear , or upon more evident and more certain grounds , not the wit of mankind can imagin : and i defy any man to bring me any reason , that is a good one , or conclusive , but i will show him that it is equivalently a syllogism ; and i will undertake to reduce it to that form ; and manifest that it has all its strength and evidence from the same principles which give a syllogism to be clearly conclusive . i know not what authors mr. locke may have met with , who say we cannot reason about particulars , or , that no syllogistick reasoning can be right and conclusive , but what has at least one general proposition in it : i am sure i have shown the contrary in my method . b. . l. . § . indeed i show § . and § . that such syllogisms are not instrumental to science , as are those which have one or more , universal premisses : for , all science is of inadequate or abstracted notions , which are universal ones , and not particulars ; for who can pretend to have science of the whole complexion of accidents , which constitute any particulars ? and , to let my reader farther see , that the knowledge of particular conclusions cannot reach science , i desire him to reflect , that if a physician knew onely that this particular individual herb is good for such a disease , and not that all of that sort or kind is so , he could not pretend to have science of the nature of herbs ; or , if a mathematician knew onely that this individual triangle , which he is describing in paper , has three angles equal to two right ones , but knew not that any other , or all , had so , none would much praise him for his science in mathematicks . the so much neglected and abus'd aristotle , who had too much , and too well-grounded sense to be rightly understood by those who did not much regard grounds , nor the highest causes of things , told us that singularia non perficiunt intellectum ; the knowledge of singulars does not perfect the understanding . since then science is a perfection of our soul , it must be employ'd about the understanding universals : plain reason abetting his saying , as i have shown ibid. § . . i cannot let this chapter pass , without reflecting particularly on mr. l's saying , that inferences or consequences in words , are a great part of reason , tho' the agreement , or disagreement of ideas be the principal . now , it is evident by those expressions that he speaks of words abstractedly or contradistinctly , from the ideas signify'd by them ; that is , from their sense ; taking words in which sense they are no more but meer sounds . whence i see not but black-smiths striking orderly and regularly upon their anvil , may make as good consequences , as those he speaks of , and puts them to be a great part of our reason . i have observ'd that this acute author fancies unintelligible mysteries in the annexing words to his ideas ; nay , ( as appears here ) in words taken without ideas , or the sense of them ; that is in senseless sounds or characters . whereas my weak speculation , tho' i bend my sight never so strongly , cannot discern any annexion other than this , that men have agreed that such words , shall signify such and such things or notions ; all other annexion being unaccountable . nor , can i see how in such sayings as this , mr. locke does ( as philosophers ought ) guide himself by the natures of the things in hand , viz. words , and reason . for words , abstracted from his ideas . which he puts to be signify'd by them , are meer articulate sounds , and out of the mind ; whereas reason and all its acts ▪ are compleated in the mind , and sense . how then the consequence of words ( thus understood ) should be a great part of reason which is sense ; or what reason , which is an internal and spiritual power , has to do with those external and material sounds or motions of the ayr , more than to know their signification , and to take care they be not ambiguous , quite surpasses my understanding . the complexion of ideas , he speaks of , which the words are to signify , is confessedly made first by the understanding ; and , the memory can retain our notions as well , or better than it can sounds ; and tho' such sounds , thro' the use of the words are apt to re-excite the memory , yet all this amounts to no more but their aptness , thro' use , to signify our notions , let them be what they will : which is plain sense and easily understood ; whereas the consequence of sounds , abstracted from our notions , is very amusing , and utterly unintelligible . . the th chapter [ of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces ] is admirably clear , and in great part very solid . i grant no new simple ideas , that are proper ones , can he convey'd by traditional revelation . the author of nature gave us our natural notions ; and the author of grace , ( who is the same person , ) brought no unheard-of objects of our senses to increase the stock , already sufficient for all our knowledge ; yet , if the points thus convey'd are spiritual ones , as most points of the revealed faith are , there will be convey'd new metaphorical notions , translated from our natural ones which are proper . i grant too , that revelation cannot be admitted against clear evidence of reason . i wish , that instead of the word [ revelation ] he had rather said [ pretence of revelation ] for , otherwise , some readers may hap to take his words in a dis-edifying sense ; as if it were a possible case , that revelation it self may be supposed to be opposit to clear evidence of reason ; and ( which is worse , ) in case they hap to contract , must truckle and submit to it . my judgment in the point is this , that supposing the revelation is grounded on the means laid by god to assure us he has reveal'd such and such points , ( which therefore cannot but be certain to us , or evident , at least to those who are guides to others ) the case imply'd here is impossible ; because it is impossible that god , who gave us our nature , should ( as mr. l. well expresses it ) will us to admit any thing for true , in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of our understanding . i add , not to admit it as true , if the motives be but probable , or ( which is the same ) if the thing may be false . what i am here to note , is that , two cautions are necessary in this occasion . the one , that since god does nothing needlessly , therefore the points reveal'd by god are such as humane reason could not other ways attain to ; whence they being such as those mr. locke holds to be above reason , hence they must oft look very oddly to those low conceptions which the course of nature affords us : whereas the motives laid by god for mankind , to embrace christian faith , do , for that very regard , lie level to our natural reason . wherefore , in our enquiry what we are to embrace , what not ; we ought not to begin our quest , by scanning the points propos'd to us as reveal'd ; but , by examining whether the motives to judge they are reveal'd , be certain or no. otherwise , we shall neglect to employ our reason , in such things as are suitable to her capacity , and in which she can have evidence ; and task it to consider what 's perhaps above her reach , and of which , consequently , she can have no evidence ; which way of proceeding is clearly irrational . how many are there in the world who are reputed for learned men , and yet have no principles which are not taken from fancy ? let then such short speculaters loose , to judge of the verity of points ( perhaps ) incomprehensible to our natural reason , they will be apt to fancy twenty contradictions in the trinity , the incarnation , a virgins conceiving , the resurrection , and in many other main points of christian faith : and , were it allowable for any to begin his search after truth on this preposterous manner , the persons must be highly qualify'd to decide what is a contradiction , what not , ere their sentiments can be thought to have any kind of weight . they must be excellent logicians to know the force of a consequence , and how many things go to make a contradiction . they must be acute metaphysicians to know all the many several respects belonging to things ; without which it will be hard to determin certainly what notions are in all respects contradictory , which not : and , if they be not thus qualify'd , their skill is incompetent for such a performance . again , if the point do concern the nature of body , they must be able to comprehend the nature of that subject . and , in a word , unless they can demonstrate their own opposit tenet , plain terms give it that they can never show the other side to be a contradiction : for , since both sides of a contradiction cannot be true , they must demonstrate their tenet to be true , or they cannot demonstrate the other to be false and contradictory ; for 't is one labour to do both . . the other necessary caution is , that men do not take the bad explications of some weak divines for the point of faith it self . for , such men , as mr. l. well notes , being very forward to stop the mouths of all opponents by crying out such a position is of faith ; and , withall , having a high opinion of their own sentiments , and miscall'd authority ; are apt to fancy that all is of faith which belongs to their own explication of it , or seems to them consequent from it , or connected with it ; which is no better , in effect , than to obtrude their own skill in drawing consequences upon men for divine revelation . now , if the explicater be not truly learned and candid , then in stead of showing the point of faith , conformable to nature , as a solid divine ought ; he may hap to represent every point of faith so untowardly , that it may have twenty contradictions in it . 't is therefore the duty of every ingenuous man , to distinguish such explications from the point it self ; and not to pronounce too hastily of it , till it appears it cannot possibly bear any other rational explication , and such a one as is agreeable and not contradictory to the true principles of reason and nature . which i the rather note , because i have observed that scarce any one point of faith that is controverted has escap'd this misfortune ; nay more , that metaphorical expressions have often ( i may say , generally ) been mistaken for literal ones : in a word , let but the grounds for god's revealing christian faith be held and shown absolutely certain ( and the motives lay'd by god to that end , cannot but be such ) and the divine authority , thus evidently engaged , and closely apply'd to our mind , ought to subdue our understanding to assent , notwithstanding our seeming-rational dissatisfactions . i say , seeming ; for , to put the grounds and motives we have to know god revealed it to be thus certain , and yet that there is clear evidence against the point reveal'd , is to put a perfect contradiction , or impossibility . which makes me something apprehensive that those authors , who put such a case ( however their meaning may be good and pious , and they see not the consequence of it ) do deem that the grounds we christians have for god's revealing our faith , are not altogether certain , but probable onely ; which leaves all our faith in a possibility of being false for any thing any man living knows ; that is , of being perhaps not true. . hence i think 't is but a very sleight deference to divine revelation to affirm , that in matters where reason cannot judge , or but probably , revelation is to be hearken'd to : but that in matters where reason can afford certain knowledge , reason is to be hearken'd to . for , tho' it were so that reason can do this , yet experience tells us that reason does not actually , ( and this very often ) what it can do , or all that lies within the compass of that power ; but that we may often presume we have certain knowledge when we have none . especially since of the two it is far more likely our reason may discourse wrong of the points that are reveal'd , than of the motives which god has lay'd for mankind to know they are so ; the later being within its sphere , the other oft-times not . . the th chapter treats of wrong assent , or errour . this learned author seems here not to speak constantly of the same point . to assent to any proposition , is to say interiourly , [ it is true ; ] or , that the thing is so as the proposition exhibits it . now , these propositions may be of two sorts : the one is express'd thus , [ the thing is so , or is true : ] the other thus , [ the thing is probable . ] hitherto , and in some places here , he speaks of the former , or of assenting to the truth of the thing ; or , of taking the probable proposition to be true : in other places here , he seems to speak of the latter ; as , when , § . . he complains that probable doctrines are not always receiv'd with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability : which clearly makes the object of assent to be the probability of the thing , or as it stands under such motives as make it to a higher degree probable ; or , ( which is perfectly equivalent , ) that propositions to such a degree probable , are to be assented to , as to such a degree probable . now , this is an evident proposition ; and the assent to it , most rational . for , since we call that probable that stands under probable motives , it is as perfect a truth , and as firmly to be assented to , as 't is to assent , that what 's probable , is probable ; or , what 's probable to such a degree , is probable to such a degree : both which propositions being evident , nay , the terms of it as closely connected as they are in this proposition , [ what is , is , ] we not onely may , but are forced to assent to them , as being both of them self-evident . but , i much fear this is not mr. locke's meaning ; but , that he means , we must assent to a thing as true , or that the thing is , upon a proof which , of its own peculiar nature , and as it is distinguish'd from evidence , is so far from concluding it is , that it permits and allows it may not be , or be false . in which case , to assent , is both against clearest reason , and even ( as was shewn above ) against a first principle of our understanding . . what confirms me in this apprehension , is , his making way to his ensuing discourse with these words ; [ if assent be grounded on likelihood , and if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability , &c. ] now , both those hypothetical ifs i must categorically declare against ; and positively affirm and maintain , that likely motives can onely , in true reason , make us assent the thing is likely ; and that motives but probable cannot , without highly wronging our reason , cause us to assent the thing is more than probable : lastly , that [ may be , or may not be , ] cannot be a good argument that the thing is . i affirm farther , that this position of mine is clearly demonstrable : for , all motives or proofs affecting the conclusion , and our assent to it , according to their different nature and force ; therefore , as evident motives make the thing evident , so likely motives can onely prove the thing to be likely ; and probable motives can onely prove the thing to be probable ; and that , the proof being the cause of the conclusion , and those proofs being proper , and adjusted to those respective effects , 't is as perfect a demonstration , drawn from the proper cause to its proper effect , that they can make the conclusion no more than probable ; and , consequently , our assent to it ( if rational ) no more than that it is onely probable ; as it is that an agent which is hot but to such a degree , can onely cause heat to such a degree ; and this is as evident , as that no cause can act beyond its power to act , or can do what it cannot do ; which is an identical proposition , and self-evident . . 't is in vain then to start this question , how men come to give their assent contrary to probability , till this question be first satisfy'd , why men should assent at all upon meer probability ? but , this being supposed without any proof ; and , it being allow'd by me , that men may assent contrary to probability all the ways he assigns , i am not to pursue that point any farther , because it is quite besides my aim ; which is , to concern my self onely with what promotes true science ; with which , probability , as being both uncertain , and inevident , has nothing at all to do , but to injure it , ( if it meets with rash concluders , ) by ill-grounded assents . but , casting my eye on the title of this chapter , which is , [ of wrong assent , or errour , ] i observe , that he has not so much as touch'd upon one main cause of errour , which has an unhappy influence even upon some wise and good men , and oft proves prejudicial to their best concerns ; i mean , the assenting absolutely upon very high probabilities ; or , ( as mr. locke expresses it , ) as firmly , as if they were infallibly demonstrated . we are , indeed , more often deceiv'd by assenting on slight probabilities ; but , we are far more grosly deceiv'd , when a very high , and very likely probability fails us : whence , in such occasions , men use to say , [ who could ever have thought or imagin'd it ? ] or , [ i was never so abominably deceiv'd in my life . ] i will explain my self by one signal instance , shewing how dangerous it is to yield up our reason , by assenting absolutely upon very great likelihoods , and even the highest probabilities . which discourse may , i hope , edifie some , and thence convince others , that such an assent is irrational . . a man who is at this instant in perfect health , is apt to assent absolutely , that he shall not die suddenly of an apoplexy before morning ; that a tile shall not fall from a house , and kill him when he walks the streets ; that his house shall not fall on his head , and crush him ; that a drunken or quarrelsom ruffian shall not , without provocation , run him thorow ; that a bit of meat , a crum , or a bone , shall not choak him ; or any such sudden disaster befall him that day ; and 't is very highly probable they will not . now , the greatest concern we can have in this world , is , to die well prepared for the other . put case then , a man of a loose life , ( such men being most apt to presume , and lull themselves in a blind security , ) assents firmly and absolutely , upon such a high probability that he shall not be taken off suddenly , but shall have time to die penitent , haps to be surpriz'd by some such unlucky accident , without having any leisure to repent ; the case of his soul is very desperate . now , 't is evident , that that this eternal loss of happiness lights to such men thro' their acting contrary to their reason ; and their assenting , and relying firmly upon the frail assurance of a probability : for , had they used their reason right , it would have naturally suggested to them these thoughts : i can see no bottom nor foundation for assenting so fully that i shall not die very shortly , or suddenly . how many men , who thought themselves as secure as i do now , have , notwithstanding , been taken away in an instant ! every man living is liable to these , and a thousand other unforeknowable mischances : nor have i any kind of privilege above others ; nor know i any reason why those sinister chances that happen'd to other men , may not as well be my lot. this plain and obvious discourse , join'd with the infinite concern of the thing , might have conduced to make those carelesly secure men rectifie their wanderings , and endeavour to keep a good conscience , lest they should be suddenly arrested by death , with their debts uncancell'd : which good thoughts and motives they had wanted , had they assented upon a high probability that they should not die suddenly , as firmly as tho' the thing were infallibly demonstrated . this infallible and irrational security , i say , would , in all likelihood , have made such weak souls run on in sin , defer the amendments of their lives , and put it off with a dangerous presuming on death-bed repentance . hence i infer two things ; one , that our position , that we ought not to assent upon a high probability , but to retain some degree of suspence , is a great and very important truth , since it has so great an influence ( not to speak of our many other concerns ) upon the best and most important part of christian morality . errour does not use to be so favourable to goodness and piety , no more than ignorance is the mother of devotion ; whereas truth reduced to practice , is ever the genuin parent of virtue . the other , that to judge or assent without knowledge , springs from our weakness , or else from passion ; and that judgment taken in this sense , is not ( as mr. locke affirms ) the gift of god. . he proceeds to the reasons why men take wrong measures of probability , and so come to assent wrong or err. but , it appears evidently from what 's said , or rather indeed , it is evident out of the very terms , that all errour or wrong assent , does onely spring from assenting at all upon probable motives . for , did they assent onely upon evidence , it is impossible they should ever erre ; since evidence for an errour is in it self impossible . or , did they suspend their assent , or not assent when the thing is but probable , 't is again impossible they should err ; for , it is impossible they should err , or assent wrong , when they do not assent at all . whence follows , that ( excepting invincible ignorance , which concerns not our point in hand ) all wrong assent , or errour , springs from our assenting upon probability . the reasons he assigns , why men take wrong measures of probabilities , serve better to shew why men do not assent upon evidence ; viz. doubtful and false principles , receiv'd hypotheses , predominant passions , and authority ; by which last , i suppose , he means , such authority as may deceive us . all these are so many remora's to the advancement of science , and motes in our intellectual eye , hindring it from seeing evident truth . yet , none of them , but has some kind of probability , ( as the world goes ; ) or , at least , will furnish men with probable arguments : for , a very slight thing serves to make a thing probable . so that the upshot is , that the chief , and most effectual way for men to avoid wrong assents , or errours , is to instruct them in the way how to conclude evidently ; which is the sole end and aim of my method to science ; and , particularly , of that part of it which treats of the self-evident conclusiveness of syllogisms , in which no man can possibly be deceiv'd . for , this shews , that the inference or consequence of the conclusion , when the medium is proper , is as certain as self-evidence can make it ; and , that common mediums , ( such as all probable ones are , ) can never conclude ; and , therefore , such conclusions cannot be assented to , or held true , without wronging our reason . whence follows , that the way to avoid wrong assent , is , to exclude probability from having any title at all to our assent ; it being highly and manifestly irrational for any to judge , a proposition not at all demonstrated or shewn to be true , should be assented to as firmly as if it were infallibly demonstrated : for , this is directly to judge a thing to be such as it is not ; which is a manifest errour , or untruth . nor , matters it what most people do out of weakness : man's true nature , which is rational , is to be rated according to the conformity we ought to conceive it had from the idea of it in the divine understanding , its true essence ; where none can doubt but it was perfect , till it came to be slubber'd and sully'd by the tampering of second causes , and their never-uniform circumstances . the natural perfection , then , of a rational creature being to arrive certainly , or without missing , at knowledge and truth , which cannot be had without evidence ; hence , 't is his true nature to be guided in his way to acquire those interiour perfections of his mind , onely by evidence ; without which , he is liable to fall , every step he takes , into the precipice of errour . nay , 't is so clear a truth , that man 's true nature is onely to be guided in his interiour assents by evidence ; that , even in our outward actions , which do not directly concern the perfecting our soul , and in which we can have no evidence of their success , or of the good they will certainly do us ; yet , still we must ( unless we will incurr the note of folly ) have evidence that it is better to act , or better to venture ; otherwise , we shall clearly act with some precipitancy , and against our true nature , reason . . besides , it is extream hard to take right measures of probability . every measure is a certain standard ; whereas , probabilities are not capable of any ; but , like desultory ignes-fatui , whiffle now to this side , now to that ; doubling , and re-doubling ; so that none can take their just dimension , or proportion . they vary every day , oft-times every hour ; and , what 's more probable , this minute , may , by some new circumstance lately come to our knowledge , become less probable ; the next , perhaps , improbable . even the highest probabilities are not exempt from this frailty , and fickleness . i may think my house will certainly stand ; nor do i see any reason to make the least doubt of it : a prudent neighbour , whom i take to be more judicious than my self in such things , spies a flaw , or crack , near the foundation , which he thinks weakens it ; which makes it now improbable it will stand , and probable it will fall . hereupon , i send for an expert master-builder , who has ten times the skill of the other ; and he assures me , that late formidable crack is nothing at all to the firmness of the foundation , and therefore it will certainly stand : which said , the motive shifts faces again , and it becomes very probable it will not fall . amongst school-men , some hold , that the opinion of three doctors makes a point probable ; some think , the opinion of two is sufficient ; some say , one , who has maturely weigh'd the point , will serve ; and , in the mean time , perhaps it is scarce probable , at most but probable , that any of these say true. but then , these later say , that it is certain that what seven learned men agree in , is probable : let then these seven learned men agree that what some one very learned man , whom they nominate , says , makes the thing probable ; that one man has the virtue of all the seven center'd in him ; and , therefore , that one single learned man's opinion makes it probable enough in all conscience . where then shall we fix the bounds , or whence take any certain measures of greater and lesser probabilities ? whoever peruses , and considers well the several sorts of probable motives , enumerated in my method , b. . l. . § . . and by mr. locke here , in his th and th chapters , will see , ( tho' we have not reckon'd up half of them , ) by reflecting on their variety , and their crossness to one another , ( abating the several degrees of each , ) how insuperable a task it is to settle any fix'd limits by which we can be constantly assur'd , which sort of probability is greater , or lesser . 't is a thousand times easier to establish absolutely certain rules of demonstration , were men but as zealous to pursue truth , as they love to talk at random ; either because they think that noblest quest not worth their pains ; or , perhaps , because palliated scepticks inveigle them into a conceit , that science is unattainable . to obviate which calumny , has , these fifty years , been the butt of my endeavours . . as for authority , this one maxim , pursu'd home , secures us from being deceiv'd by relying on it ; viz. [ no authority deserves assent , farther than reason gives it to deserve . ] so that all the certainty of authority is to be refunded into intrinsecal arguments , taken from the nature of mankind , the attesters ; and the nature ( i mean , the notoreity and concern ) of the things attested ; and , thence ascertaining the attesters knowledge , and veracity : which , if they can be demonstrated , or put beyond probability , ( for , till then , none who are able to raise doubts , and see the medium is inconclusive , can be bound in reason to assent upon any testimony , ) even the wisest men may rationally assent to what they attest ; otherwise , not ; tho' weaker arguments ( as i hinted above ) may suffice for the vulgar , and for our outward actions . . to close my reflexions on this chapter , i am apt to think that this learned author is here drawn aside from using his excellent reason to his best advantage , by apprehending some things to be onely probable , which ( or the certainty of the authority for them ) are perfectly demonstrable ; as , in particular , that of the existence of julius caesar. the same i judge of these , viz. that alexander the great conquer'd asia ; that there are such cities as rome , or paris ; that the same chances cannot light often upon a hundred dice ; that i shall not think over again , in order , the same thoughts next year , as i did this ; and a thousand such like . which , perhaps , many will take to be but highly probable ; whereas i , upon good reason , cannot but judge they are all of them demonstrable . but i am weary , and hasten to an end. . the last chapter bears for its title , [ of the division of sciences . ] the two first general branches of this division are , in my opinion , co-incident ; as will be seen hereafter . however , the learned world is much oblig'd to the author , for putting ethicks to be capable of demonstration , and a true science . but , as to his third branch , which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the doctrine of signs , i must confess , i do not well know what to make of it : for , to make the doctrine of words to be a science , or part of philosophy , is to make philosophy wordish . he defin'd philosophy , in his preface , to be the knowledge of things ; and here he seems to make the knowledge of words a part of science , or philosophy , taken distinctly from the knowledge of things ; which is his first branch . all science is connected sense , and both sense and science are in our minds . the common agreement of men gives words to be signs ; common usage shews this agreement ; grammar helps them with congruity ; critick gathers from authors , or derivations , the genuine signification of such words as are not so much worn by common use , but mostly used by the learned : for , when they are thus common , critick is useless . logick , which is to direct our reason , and define our notions , so to keep our thoughts or discourses steady , takes care they be not ambiguous ; or , if they be , gives rules to detect their double sense , lest the ill-understood signs lead us astray from the point . but , all begins and ends in this , that we be sure our words do signifie our notions , rightly , and sincerely . sometimes we have simple notions ; and then we use such words as signifie them : sometimes we join many simpler notions in a complex one ; and then we make use of such a word as signifies that complex idea , or notion : sometimes we connect divers notions affirmatively , and frame judgments , or mental propositions ; and then , verbal propositions signifie that verbum mentis , or interiour saying . we may fancy that words do ty together many simple ideas in a complex one ; ( for , there is nothing which men of wit , by much bending their thoughts , cannot fancy ; ) but 't is we who ty our notions together in our mind ; nor can meer articulate sounds any more connect simple ideas , than they can connect or identifie our notions which are the terms of a proposition : nor can they do this , any more than they can frame a judgment ; that is , judge , or know. we may fancy too , that they record our thoughts , which otherwise would be lost : 't is true , that after we have agreed such words should signifie such things in our mind , they have an order to one another , and do ordinarily come together into our thoughts ; and so the word infers the thing ; but so does the thing infer the word too , to which we , by our agreement of its signification , do relate it ; and , of the two , the word is sooner lost out of the memory , and more needs a recorder , than the notion does ; especially , when our memory is of connected sense . how often do we remember very well the sense of an author we have read , and yet cannot at all call to mind his words ! my self , when i was young , had words , and great variety of them , at my tongue 's end ; my expression was copious , and florid , and now i am old and past my autumn , my stile is dry ; and the flowers and leaves fall off , when the fruit is ripe ; and tho' i still retain and increase my stock of thoughts , i have lost that multiplicity and choice of words i had formerly . but , i must complain that it is a great injury to that excellent and most useful science , [ logick ] which treats of the operations of our understanding , and of the way how to manage them , to make it nothing but the doctrine of signes , or words ; and to pretend it has its name thence . as if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not signify ratio , and uerbum mentis , as properly as it does vox ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 far more often [ rationalis , ] than it does sermone utens . but , above all , i am sure , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is never found to signify the art or doctrine of words , but the art of discoursing or reasoning . . i cannot but think that the subordination of sciences , is as useful and necessary to be known , as their division or distinction , in philosophy ; they being the exact knowledge of things , taking this last word in its largest sense , as it comprehends rem and modum rei . also every notion being the thing inadequately conceiv'd , and having a kind of distinct nature peculiar to it self in our minds ; and all sciences ( they being distinct and not confused knowledges , ) having , consequently , for their object , the thing as thus distinctly or inadequately consider'd , ( by which objects they are specify'd and distinguisht ; ) it follows , that there may be as many sciences as we have such distinct notions of the thing ; and that each of them is got by looking more penetratively into those distinct natures in our mind , or distinct notions : science being in reality nothing but descants ( as it were ) on those notions , and grounded entirely on their metaphysical verity . whence follows likewise that the subordination of sciences is grounded on this , that those notions ( their objects ) are subordinate ; or that one of them is more universal or general , others more particular . to instance ; the highest science in the line of that general notion we call substance , is that which treats of the supreme genus , or of ens as ens , and of what belongs to it as such ; and this we call metaphysicks or trans-natural knowledge . the imediate notion under ens is corpus ; and this is the object of natural philosophy , or physicks . next under that is vivens ; which ( as its object ) constitutes the science or knowledge of living things , and what belongs to them as such . under that is animal , which is the object of the science that treats of sensitive things , as they are sensitive , and of what appertains to them , as they are such . the lowest of our notions in that line , which are in any degree common or general , is that of homo ; which treats of humane nature , of its operations proper to man , as man ; and chiefly of his primary operation reasoning ; and then , the science which shows how to order those operations right that belong to his understanding , is logick ; as that science which shows how to order those operations right that belong to his will , is call'd ethicks . lower than this , science proceeds not ; individuals , by reason of the complexion of innumerable accidents that constitutes them , not being knowable to us , as such , so as to give us exact knowledge of their singularities . corollary i. from what 's said it appears ; that mr. locke's two first branches fall into one . for his first branch being [ the knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings , their constitutions , properties and operations ] and his second , viz. ethicks , having for its object the operations of mans will ; and logick , the operations of his understanding , which proceed from him as man , ( all outward actions that proceed not from his interiour knowledge and will , being meerly animal ; ) it follows that ethicks , which is his second branch , is coincident with his first . for man is a thing , and has a proper being of his own , and his understanding and will are his properties ; and their operations are his operations . corollary ii. each of the subordinant sciences deduces conclusions about its proper object : which , tho' conclusions there , are the principles to the immediately inferiour or subordinate science : so that none can know exactly what homo is , who is such an animal , if he be ignorant what animal is ; nor what animal , which is such a living body , is , if he knows not what living body is : nor what living body , which is such a body , is , if he knows not what body is ; nor , what body , which is such an ens , is , if he knows not what ens or thing is . corollaay iii. hence is seen evidently , how necessary , and according to nature it is , that those notions which are most universal , should be most knowable or clear ; in regard the inferiour ones cannot be known but by them ; and that being most clear , they must ( as was often shown above ) be also most simple . corollary , iv. hence is seen also how all sciences conversant about our gradual notions in the line of substance ( and the same holds in all the other lines ) come to be connaturally subordinate to those which have a superiour notion for their object ; and how perfect knowledge or skill in the inferiour science , is unattainable without knowledge or skill in the superiour . corollary v. hence is demonstrated , that metaphysicks is absolutely the highest science ; and that , without knowledge or skill in it , none can perfectly understand the inferiour sciences , so as to resolve them into their first , and most evident principles . corollary vi. and , since the greater clearness of that notion , which is the object of any science , gives a greater clearness and evidence to the science it self ; and the greater clearness of any notion arises from its being more simple ; and the more general they are , the more simple they are ; and the notion of ens is evidently more general than all the rest : it follows demonstratively that the science of metaphysicks , which treats of ens as ens , is the most clear of any others ; and , in the highest degree , evident ; and that they who think otherwise do guide themselves by fancy , to which such very abstract notions are unsuitable . corollary vii . and , since evidence determins our understanding to assent , and therefore certainty which is the determination of our judging power , follows evidence as its proper cause ; it follows , that , as no inferiour science can be evident without knowledge in metaphysicks , so neither can our knowledge of any of them be perfectly , ( or in the highest degree , ) certain , but by virtue of it , or of such maxims , or first principles , as belong to it. corollary , viii . the same discourse that is made here of objects found in the line of ens , and their proper sciences ; may be made and have equal force in the objects belonging to all the lines of accidents , and the sciences proper to them . corollary last . hence the doctrine of words is no part of philosophy , taking them as aparted from our notions ; because it has neither for its object , rem nor modum rei ; nor any thing found in nature , or belonging to it ; since words are meerly signes , appointed by our voluntary designation , to assist us in communicating our conceptions to others , which can be no part of the knowledge of things or true philosophy ; words being neither simple nor complex , adequate or inadequate notions , nor in any manner taken from the things themselves . finis . the contents . preliminary first . § . introduction . § . the using the word [ idea ] in disparate senses obstructs the way to science . . philosophical words generally used , not to be laid aside without great necessity ; much less changed for others less proper . . mr. l.'s acception of the word [ idea ] very ambiguous . . the ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . . the putting brutes to have knowledge associates them with mankind . . the first consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that brutes know . . the second consideration pre-requir'd . . that our selves both asleep and awake , do , without knowledg , perform as strange operations as brutes do . . the resemblance of reason in some actions of brutes , no argument of their knowledge . . brutes have phantasms , but no notions or meanings . § . ideas , if not spiritual notions , inexplicable . . experience that we have ideas gives no distinct account what they are . nor the saying , they are resemblances . . to have ideas of our own ideas inexplicable . . no operation , external or internal , begins from the soul alone . . mr. l. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this discourse . . to ground all knowledge on ideas not distinguish'd from phantasms , makes science impossible . preliminary second . § . that the elements or materials of our knowledge are properly to be called notions . . the word notion and cognition are taken here objectively . . what notions are . . fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about spiritual conceptions . . the question about notions stated . . a notion is the thing it self in our understanding . proof . because knowing is an immanent act. . proof . because the thing known must be in our knowing power . . proof . because a resemblance is not the object of our knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . . otherwise ideas only could be said to be known . . proof . because otherwise all philosophy would be destroy'd . . proof . because similitudes cannot possibly give us the first knowledge of things . § . as was prov'd formerly . . proof . because ere we can know the idea resembles the thing right , both of them must be in the mind , to be there compar'd . . proof . because both the correlates must be in the understanding . proof . because the prototype must be first known . . proof . because the notions are what 's meant by words . . proof . because , when the thing it self is intended to be made known , the thing it self is the first meaning , or what 's first meant by the words . . proof . because the ideas cannot be foreknown to our agreement what the words are to signifie , but the things only . hence the question , whether the things or our notions , are immediately signified by vvords , is frivolous . . proof . from the verification of propositions . . proof . because what 's perfectly like is the same . . proof . this last reason maintain'd by the instance of the notion of existence . . proof . the same reason abetted by the natural sayings of mankind . . the difference in the manner of existing prejudices not the identity of the notion and the thing . . the eminency of the spiritual nature of the soul gives her a power to be all things intellectually . § . shewn that things may have two different manners of existing . . no solid philosophy can be built on ideas . . what knowledge is . preliminary third . § . an objection against the possibility of the whole thing being in our mind . . some notes premis'd to clear this objection . . our knowledge is such as our notions are . . we can have such a notion of a thing ( or essence ) as distinguishes it from all other things . . confused notions suffice for a remote ground of science . . only distinct or abstracted notions are the immediate ground of distinct knowledge , or science . . science thus grounded , is truly called the knowledge of the thing . . abstracted ideas , tho' exclusive of one another , do include or connotate the thing . . this point farther explicated and enforc'd . . arg. . prov'd , because abstracted notions , if essential , do evidently include the thing . . arg. . prov'd , because all modes do the same . . arg. . as having no being of their own . . this makes , or shews philosophy to be the knowledge of things . . hence aristotle expresses the modes or accidents by concrete vvords . this point elucidated by abstract and concrete words . . hence space without body , or vacuum , is a contradiction . preliminary fourth . § . the state of the question . . aristotle neglects to shew particularly how knowledge is made . . later philosophers were at a great puzzle about it . . how the schools explicated this point . . how the ideists behaved themselves as to this point . . how far the author engages to clear this difficulty . . the first cause carries on the course of second causes by immediate dispositions . . and , therefore , he affists nature , if dispos'd , when it cannot reach . . therefore , if the matter can be dispos'd for a rational soul , god will give it . . there can be such a disposition in matter . . therefore , some material part , by which immediately the soul has notions from the objects . . therefore effluviums are sent from bodies to that part. . therefore man is truly one thing , which is corporeo-spiritual . . therefore some chief part in him which is primarily corporeo-spiritual , or has both those natures in it . . vvhich is affected according to both those natures , because of their identification in that part . . the peculiar temper of that part consists in indifferency . . that part very tender and sensible , yet not tenacious . § . that part the most noble of all material nature . . perhaps 't is reflexive of light , or lucid. . the effluviums have in them the nature of the bodies whence they are sent . . they affect that part , as things distinct from the man. . vvhy they imprint abstract notions . . the peculiar nature of our soul renders those notions perfectly distinct , and indivisible . . vvhence complex notions come . . the soul cannot , alone , produce any new act in her self ; . but by the phantasms exciting her a-new . . how reminiscence is made . . memory and reminiscence inexplicable , unless phantasms remain in the brain . the manner how reminiscence is made in brutes . . how reflexion is connaturally made . . direct notions are common to all mankind , and their words proper ; reflex ones , improper ; and their words metaphorical . . whence we come to have negative notions . . but those negative notions do not abstract from the subject . . how we come to have a notion of [ nothing . ] . hence great care to be had , lest we take non-entities , or nothings , for things . . logical notions are real ones . . the test to try artificial notions . hence all philosophy is real knowledge . . how our soul comes to have phantastick notions , or ( as we call them ) fancies . how to avoid being deluded by them . . how we may discourse evidently of those natures of which we have no proper notions . § . we can have no proper notion of god 's essence . . the author speaks not here of comparing notions , or of judgments . . the author's apology for this discourse ; and , what can be the onely way to go about to confute it . preliminary fifth . § . the design of the author here . § . the meaning of the word [ existence . ] . the extream danger of misconceiving it . . the meaning of [ ens , ] or [ thing . ] . the meaning of [ entity , ] or [ essence . ] . the meaning of [ matter ] and [ form ; ] or , of [ power ] and [ act. ] . what is meant literally by the common saying , that matter and form compound body . . the literal meaning of substantial or essential forms . the reason why some moderns oppose substantial or essential forms . the meaning of metaphysical composition and divisibility . . what is the principle of individuation . . the meaning of the word [ substance . ] the word improper . . that the word [ supporting , ] and [ inhering , ] taken metaphorically , may be allow'd ; and ought not to be ridicul'd . . the meaning of [ suppositum , ] or [ hypostasis . ] . the meaning of [ suppositality . ] . the meaning of the word [ individuum . ] . the meaning of [ substantia prima , ] and [ substantia secunda . ] . the word [ accidents ] is improper . § . the word [ modes ] more proper . . the word [ quantity ] is very proper . . the word [ extension ] very improper . . the meaning of divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability . . a short explication , what quantity , quality , and relation are . . what transcendents are . . the five sorts of transcendents . . great care to be had , that transcendent words be not held univocal . . what great errours spring thence , shewn in the univocal acception of the transcendent word [ compounded . ] . the cartesians unadvised in going ultra crepidam . reflexion first . § . the excellent wit , and unbyass'd ingenuity of the author of the essay acknowledg'd . . 't is probable he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks . . the incomparable excellency of the science of metaphysicks , shewn from the objects it treats of . . and from the manner , by which it handles them . . the knowledge of these high objects attainable by natural reason . . mr. locke's tenet of no innate ideas , solidly grounded , and unanswerable . reflexion second . § . in what the author agrees , and disagrees , with mr. locke . . we may have notions , without perceiving we have them . § . vve may think , without being conscious that we think . . 't is impossible to be conscious , or know we know , without a new act of reflexion . . 't is impossible to be conscious of , or know , our present reflex act , but by a new reflex one . hence , we can never come to know our last reflexion . . 't is utterly deny'd that consciousness causes individuation . the unreasonableness of the opinion , that men do always think . reflexion third . § . no notion simple , but that of [ existence . ] the order of our notions is to be taken from nature . . the word [ solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by mr. locke . . his solidity not at all essential to body . . space without body , or vacuum , is a meer groundless fancy . . the contrary to that tenet demonstrated . . therefore 't is impossible there should be any true experiment to prove a vacuum . reflexion fourth . § . mr. locke's first chapter commendable . § . privative notions connotate the subject . . meer motions made upon the senses , insufficient to give us knowledge of the objects . . sensible qualities are the same in the objects , as in the mind . § . the pretence of god's voluntary annexing improper causes to effects , is unphilosophical . . the power in the object to cause sensation and knowledge , is improperly such . reflexion fifth . § . ideas or notions are not actual perceptions , but the object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . it destroys the nature of memory , to make it consist in the reviving ideas . the mind cannot revive perceptions . . ideas in the fancy may fade ; but notions are never blotted out of the soul. reflexion sixth . § . if brutes can know , they may have general notions , and abstract and compare too . . the distinguishing our notions guides our reason and judgment right . . all complex ideas or notions must consist of simpler ones , united in the thing . . otherwise , they are groundless fancies . . the manner how all complex ideas or notions are made , elaborately explain'd . . how the doctrine of cartesius , mr. locke , and j. s. differ , as to this point . reflection seventh . § . extension , not well explicated . immensity , worse . . place , well explicated . . body and extension , not the same notion . § . space cannot be without extension . . extension and space differ onely formally , or in some nice respect . . the common explication of extension defended . . ens adequately divided into body and spirit . . vacuum must either be res , or modus rei ; otherwise , we can have no notion of it . . the extravagant arguments for vacuum refuted . . vve can set bounds to space , time , and to all durations but god's . . annihilation implies a contradiction ; and is not an act of omnipotency , but of impotency . . the cartesians can hardly avoid vacuum . . the having an idea of vacuum , distinct from that of plenum , no argument to prove it . reflexion eighth . § . the plain sense of the vulgar gives us the true notion of time. . duration is not succession , but rather opposite to it . . 't is a strange paradox to say , the notion of succession or duration is to be taken from the train of ideas in our mind . . our not perceiving duration when we sleep , no argument for it . . this tenet is against experience . . and , against the nature of things , and of resemblances too . . one motion , if known and regular , may , and must be a measure to another . . there is no shew of reason , that the equality of the periods of duration can possibly be taken from the train of our ideas . . this odd tenet not positively asserted by mr. locke . reflexion ninth . § . imaginary time before the vvorld , a meer illusion of fancy . . they who advance tenets against nature , must alter the meaning of those vvords that express our natural notions . . god's immensity not commensurate to an infinitely expanded space . . vve can have no notion of a vacuum , but a fancy onely . . scripture-texts the worst sort of arguments for philosophers , unless they be most plain , and literally meant . . onely self-existence , and what flows from that notion , is peculiar to god. . our natural notions assure us , that 't is meer fancy to explicate god's attributes by respect to corporeal natures . reflexion tenth . § . endless addition of numbers can never give us the notion of infinity . . how we come to have that notion . . and with what ease . . the notion of [ infinite ] is most perfectly positive . . duration easily conceivable without succession . reflexion eleventh . § . thoughts are not to be called sensations . § . thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul. § . mr. locke's position , that things are good or evil onely in reference to pleasure or pain , is true and solid . reflexion twelfth . § . the due commendation of mr. locke's doctrine , in this chapter of power . . that some spiritual agent is the first mover of bodies . the vvill cannot move our bodies . . the understanding and vvill not distinct powers . . man's freedom , or self-determination , deduced from principles . . the difference between men and brutes , in their determination to action . . man naturally pursues what is according to reason , or virtuous . therefore his nature has been perverted since his creation . . therefore supernatural motives are added , to strengthen man's weaken'd nature , or reason . . supernatural motives being the stronger , would always prevail , were they duely apply'd to a subject disposed . . why the understanding and vvill must be the same power substantially . . how to conquer in our spiritual warfare . . 't is evident that man determins himself to action : . yet , as pre-determin'd by god. . determination to virtuous action does perfect , and not destroy freedom . . good , if evidently appearing such , does certainly determin the vvill. . how wrong judgments come . § . sin generally springs from true , but disproportionate judgments . . of uneasiness ; and mr. locke's discourse concerning it . . good is the onely determiner of the will ; and not uneasiness . . prov'd from our natural defire of happiness . . the appearance of good is of greatest weight ; but , in a manner , disregarded by mr. locke . . putting this appearance , his reasons do not conclude . . prov'd , because ease is not the perfection of a soul. . the truth of this point stated . . mr. locke omits here the idea of power to be a thing , tho' nature suggests and forces it . reflexion thirteenth . § . our mixture of our notions is regular ; mr. locke's , irregular , and disorderly . . without knowing what substance or thing is , we cannot pretend to philosophy . . all our notions , and , amongst them , that of substance , or res , is taken from the thing . . we cannot be ignorant of the notion of substance , or thing . . we know the more inferiour notions of things less perfectly . and , individual essence , the least of all . . to gain a distinct notion of substance , or thing , we must consider it abstractedly from its modes , singly consider'd . . the literal truth , how substance and its accidents , or the thing and its modes , are exactly known . § . 't is impossible not to know extension , it being in a manner , self-evident . . the cohesion of extended parts is above physical proofs , and can onely be known by metaphysicks . . whence , 't is in vain to seek for natural efficient causes for those effects that depend on formal causes . . we may have clear knowledge of spiritual natures by reflexion . . the reason why , and the manner how . reflexion fourteenth . § . the mind alone does not collect notions , or compare them . . verbal relations come not from defect in our language , but for want of a real ground . . what causality is , and what grounds the relations of cause and effect . . the knowing the principle of individuation must antecede the knowledge of identity and diversity . . what gives the ground to specifie all notions . . what gives the ground to our notions of the individuum . . how individual men are constituted . . existence cannot possibly be the principle of individuation . . the outward circumstances of time and place cannot conduce to constitute the individual essence . . an individual man is formally an individual thing of that kind , and an individual person too . § . the essence of things not to be taken from the judgment of the vulgar , nor from extravagant suppositions . . consciousness cannot constitute personal identity . . that consciousness is inseparable from every individual man. . yet angels , who are pure acts , are constituted in part , by the act of knowing themselves . . no soul is indifferent to any matter . the notion of the individuum is essential . the substance is the same , tho' some quantity of the matter does come and go . reflexion fifteenth . § . that is onely true virtue , which is according to right reason . . how we come to have confus'd ideas , or notions . . the vvhole thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . . the metaphysical reason why this complexion of accidents , which constitutes individuums , should be almost infinitely various . . vve can sufficiently know things without comprehending fully this complexion . . no formal truth or falshood in ideas or notions . reflexion sixteenth . § . whence proper and metaphorical notions and vvords have their origin . . the general rules to know the right sense of vvords . § . words of art most liable to be mistaken . . the way how to avoid being mistahen in words of art. . even in terms of art , the thing is chiefly signify'd . . metaphysical vvords not unintelligible , but most clear. . this third book concerning words seems unnecessary . . vvhence j. s. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . . nature teaches us to define by a genus , and a difference . . those who oppose this method , must be forced to use it . . the mind does not frame universal notions designedly ; but is forced to it by nature . . nominal essences groundless and catachrestical . . aristotle's definition of motion defended . . aristotle's definition of light most proper . . the cartesian definition of motion faulty . . individuums under the same species differ essentially . . whence we must take our measures of simple and compound notions . . the same rule holds in accidents as well as in substance . . the idea or notion can never be in fault when we name things wrong . . confused notions may have more distinct ones annex'd to their subject . . coofused notions do not exclude but include those distinct ones which are yet undiscover'd . . we must not judge which notions are simple , which compounded , from clear or obscure appearances they make to our fancy , but from the rule given above , § , . § . shewn hence , because those men conceit that metaphysical notions are obscure , whereas they are evidently the clearest . . not the design of avoiding different significations of words , but plain nature forces us to put real essences . . vvords are not ambiguous for want of settled standards in nature . . the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of vvords ; but their ambiguity , ill contexture or misapplication . . imperfect knowers agree in the thing and not in the name only . . the knowing things by abstract notions promotes and not hinders science . . by mr. locke's principles , there is no way to remedy the abuses of vvords . . mr. locke's sentiment , after all , ambiguous . reflexion seventeenth . § . of the second operation of our understanding . . mr. locke's definition of knowledge in many respects faulty . . knowledge cannot consist in the connexion or disagreement of ideas . . the true definition of knowledge . . our definition of knowledge farther maintain'd . . hence , there is but one sort of connexion , in which knowledge consists ; viz. that of co-existence . . the degrees of our knowledge assign'd by mr. locke , very solid . § . every step we take in demonstrative knowledge , or every consequence , must be grounded on self-evidence . . the great usefulness of this last position . . scepticism and dogmatism are , both of them , highly prejudicial to science . . vve have sensitive knowledge of other notions besides existence . . onely principles and demonstration , and not experiments , can give us any intelligible explication of natural qualities . . short hints of the true aristotelian grounds . . how all secondary qualities come to be made . . the course of nature is fundamentally built on on the admission of rarity and density . . that by these grounds , the nature of secondary qualities is demonstrable . . the true reason why some men think them inexplicable . . the possibility of demonstrating them shewn by the instance of colour . reflexion eighteenth . § . the state of the question . § . how we know the things by means of ideas , inexplicable . . the ideists must be forc'd to grant , that the thing known is in the mind . . the necessity of the things being in our mind , farther enforced . . mathematical and moral knowledges are grounded on the thing in the mind . . all essential predicates , and accidental ones too , are truly the thing , and the whole thing imply'd confusedly . § . that our complex notions are regular , and well-grounded ; mr. locke's not so . . in what manner we compound such notions . . all pleas fail the ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish phantasms from notions . . odd miscarriages of nature ought not to shock natural principles . the cartesians are concluded against by j. s. as well as other ideists , or rather more . . all truth consists in joining or separating partial conceptions of the things ; and not in joining or separating ideas . . the distinction of truth into mental and verbal , extravagant ; and the parts of it co-incident . reflexion nineteenth . § . universal propositions in the mind are easily knowahle , antecedently to vvords . . 't is not necessary to know the precise bounds and extent of the species . . unnecessary knowledge not to be coveted , nor the vvant of it complain'd of . . the nature and use of general maxims mistaken by mr. locke . . the terms of general maxims clearer than those of particular propositions . . such general maxims are never used to deduce conclusions from them , but to reduce inferiour truths to them . . the absolute necessity of first principles asserted . . how other general maxims do govern all our actions and sayings . . the discarding general maxims destroys all science . this errour springs from men's taking wrong measures , in judging what notions are clear , and what confused . § . that not general maxims , but their abuse , breeds danger to science . . his instance , that general maxims are fit to prove contradictions , shews he quite mistakes the notion of body . . ideism is the genuin parent of enthusiasm in philosophy . . identical propositions not to be ridicul'd . . the right way how to use them ; and that mr. locke himself does , and must rely upon them . . neither ideas nor names can be predicate , or subject ; but the thing it self , as conceiv'd by us , in whole , or in part . . mr. locke's new instructive way is utterly insignificant . . that the signification of words is the meaning of them ; their meaning is our notion ; and our notion is the thing . reflexion twensieth . § . universals must relate to the existence they have in the mind . . to put any knowledge in brutes , is against the nature of things , and implicatory . . mr. locke confounds material and spiritual natures . . mr. locke's principles confound humane and brutal natures . . to create , is the peculiar effect of self-existence . . the thought cannot move the body ; and why . § . the notion or nature of the deity being once setled to be self-existence , all that can be said of it follows demonstratively . . we can know there are angels , tho they do not operate 〈◊〉 us . . we know at first our own existence , in the same manner as we know the existence of other things ; i. e. by sensation , and not by intuition . . no improvement of science , without some general principles . mr. locke's principles examin'd . . mr. locke's main principle ; which is to ascertain all other principles , inevident . . what things hinder the advancement of science . . euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying principles , or general maxims . reflexion twenty first . § . the point stated . § . mr. locke confounds outward action , to which we may proceed upon a probability ; with inward assent , to which we may not . . a strange character of our judging faculty . . that god has provided due motives of enjoin'd assent to all mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . . to assent upon a probability , is against the commonest light of reason . . there cannot be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . . probable assent is nonsense , or impertinent . . what kinds of distinctions are disallowable in disputation . § : charity to sincere and weak mis-understanders is a christian duty . . tradition built on meer hear-say , has little or no force . . a more firm assent is due to points certainly known to be reveal'd , than to scientifical conclusions . reflexion twenty second . § . how syllogisms came to be invented at first . § . the true use and abuse of them . . objections against syllogistick arguing clear'd . . syllogisms are useful for demonstration . . syllogisms are of no use in probable discourses . . other mistakes about syllogisms clear'd . . inferences and consequences of words abstracting from their sense , is strangely against all reason , and preposterous . . what is due to reason , what to divine revelation . the first caution to be observ'd , in order to this point . . the second caution to be used in this point . . reason not to be rely'd on in things beyond its sphere . . the notion of [ is true , ] must be distinguish'd from the notion of [ may be true , or may not be true. ] . therefore , that no assent ought to be built upon probable mediums , is demonstrable . . all errour comes by assenting upon probabilities . . the tenet that we ought to assent upon probability , is highly prejudicial to piety , and to best christian morality . § . to apply our selves to the right method to find out truth and science , is the onely antidote against errour . . no possible way , or certain standard , to take the just measure of probabilities . . the certain rule not to be mis-led by authority . . mr. locke seems to take some things for onely probable , which ( or the authority for them ) are demonstrable . . the members of mr. locke's division of sciences , are , partly co-incident , partly not belonging to science at all . . the connatural way how sciences are to be divided , and subordinate . some very useful corollaries concerning that subject . finis . errata . page . line . which last . l. . notion , which . p. . l. ult . poor weak . p. . l. . so far . p. . l. . to be . p. . l. . extra causas . p. . l. ult . words do . p. . l. . definition . p. . l. . it treats . p. . l. , . at least . p. . l. . insuperably . p. . l. . god at . p. . l. . no otherwise . p. . l. . found in . p. . l. penult . to be so . p. . l. . as is fetch'd . p. . l. . the referring it . p. . l . supposition . p . l. . given them . p. . l. . may walk . p. . l. . t is hard . p. . l. . l. . or other . p. . l. . brought to . p. . l. . enquiries . p. . contrast . p. . l. , . probable the next ; perhaps improbable . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the using the word [ idea ] in disparate senses , obstructs the way to science . philosophical words generally used , not to be laid a side without great necessity . much less chang'd for others less proper . mr. l's acception of the word [ idea ] very ambiguous . the ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . the putting brutes to have knowledge , associates them with mankind . * method to science , b. . less . §. . the first consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that brutes know . the second consideration prerequir'd . that our selves both asleep and awake , do , without knowledge , perform as strange operations as brutes do . the resemblance of reason in some actions of brutes , no argument of their knowledge brutes have phantasms , but no notions or meanings . ideas , if not spiritual notions , inexplicable . experience that we have ideas , gives no distinct account what they are . n●r to say , they are resemblances . to have ideas of our own ideas , inexplicable . no operation internal or external begins from the soul alone . mr. l. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this discourse . to ground all knowledge on ideas not distinguish'd from phantasms , makes science impossible . that the elements or materials of our knowledges are properly to be called [ notions . ] the word [ notion ] and [ cognition ] are taken here objectively . what notions are . fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about spiritual conceptions . the question about notions stated . a notion is the thing it self in our understanding ; proof . because knowing is an immanent act. proof . because the thing known must be in our knowing power . proof . because a resemblance is not the object of knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . otherwise , ideas only could be said to be known . proof . because , otherwise , all philosophy would be destroy'd . proof . because similitudes cannot possibly give us the first knowledge of things . as was prov'd formerly . proof . because , ere we can know the idea resembles the thing right , both of them must be in the mind , to be there compar'd . proof . because both the correlates must be in the understanding . proof . because the prototype , must be first known . proof . because notions are what 's meant by words . proof th . because when the thing it self is intended to be made known , the thing it self is the first meaning , or what is first meant by the words . proof . because the ideas cannot be fore-known to our agreement what vvords are to signifie , but the things only . hence the question , vvhether the things , or our notions , are immediately signified by vvords , is frivolous . proof . from the verification of propositions . proof . because what 's perfectly like , is the same . proof . this last reason maintain'd by the instance of the notion of existence proof . the same reason ab●tted by the natural sayings of mankind . the difference in the manner of existing prejudices not the identity of the notion and the thing . the eminency of the the spiritual nature of the soul , gives her a power to be all things intellectually . * b. . l. . §. . shown that things may have two different manners of existing . no solid philosophy can be built on ideas . . vvhat knowledge is . an objection against the possibility of the whole thing being in one mind , cleared . * b. . l. . § . some notes premis'd to clear this objection . our knowledge is such as our notions are . we can have such a notion of a thing ( or essence ) as distinguishes it from all other things . confused notions suffice for a remote ground of science . only distinct or abstracted notions are the immediate ground of distinct knowledge or science . science thus grounded , is truly called , the knowledge of the thing . abstracted ideas , tho' exclusive of one another , do include or connocate the thing . this point farther explicated , and enforced . prov'd , because abstract notions , if essential , do evidently include the thing . prov'd , because all modes do the same . as having no being of their own . this makes or shews philosophy to be the knowledge of things . hence aristotle expresses the modes or accidents , by concrete words the point elucidated by abstract and concrete words . hence space without body , or vacuum , is a contradiction . the state of the question . aristotle neglects to shew particularly how knowledge was made . later philosophers were at a great puzzle about it . how the schools explicated this point . how the ideists behav'd themselves as to this point . how far the author engages to clear this difficulty . the first cause carries on the course of second causes by immediate dispositions . and therefore he assists nature , if dispos'd , when it cannot reach . therefore , if the matter can be dispos'd for a rational soul , god will give it . there can be such a disposition in matter . therefore , some material part , by which immediately the soul has notions from the object . therefore effluviums are sent from bodies , to that part. therefore man is truly one thing , which is corporeo-spiritual . therefore some chief part in him which is primarily corporeo-spiritual , or has both those natures in it . which is affected according to both those natures , because of their identification in that part. the peculiar temper of that part consists in indifferency . that part very tender and sensible , yet not tenacious . that part the most noble of all material nature . perhaps 't is reflexive of light , or lucid. the effluviums have in them the naturee of the bodies whence they are sent . they affect that part , as things distinct from the man. why they imprint abstract notions . the peculiar nature of our soul , renders those notions perfectly distinct and indivisible . whence complex notions come . * method to science , book . less . . § . the soul cannot alone produce any new act in her self , but by the phantasms exciting her anew . how reminiscence is made . memory and reminiscence , inexplicable , unless phantasms remain in the brain the manner how reminiscence is made in brutes how reflexion is connaturally made . direct notions , common to all mankind , and their words proper ; reflex ones improper , and their words metaphorical . whence we come to have negative notions . but negative notions , as they are negative , do not abstract from the subject . how we come to have a notion of [ nothing . ] hence great care is to be had , lest we take non-entities , or nothings , for things . logical notions are real ones . the test to try artificial notions . * see method to science , b. . l. . §. , . hence all philosophy is real knowledge . how our soul comes to have phantastick notions , or ( as we call them ) fancies . how to avoid being deluded by them . how we may discourse evidently of those natures , of which we have no proper notions . we can have no proper notion of god's essence . the author speaks not here of comparing notions , or of judgments . the author's apology for this discourse ; and what can be the only way to go about to confute it . the design of the author here . * book . less . . the meaning of the word [ existence . ] * method . . b. . l. . § . the extreme danger of misconceiving it . the meaning of [ ens ] or [ thing . ] * b. . l. . * ibid. the meaning of [ entity ] or [ essence . ] the meaning of [ matter ] and [ form ; ] or of [ power ] and [ act. ] what 's meant literally by the common saying , that matter and form compound body . the literal meaning of substantial or essential forms . the reason why some moderns oppose substantial or essential forms . the meaning of metaphysical composition and divisibility . what is the principle of individuation . the meaning of the word [ substance . ] the word improper . that the words [ supporting ] and [ inhering ] taken metaphorically , may be allow'd , and ought not to be ridicul'd . the meaning of suppositum or hypostasis . the meaning of [ suppositality . ] the meaning of the word [ individuum . the meaning of [ substantia prima ] and [ substantiasecunda ] the vvord [ accidents ] is improper . the word [ mode ] more proper . the vvord [ quantity ] is very proper . the vvord [ extension ] very improper . the meaning of divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability . a short explication , what quantity , quality , and relation are . vvhat [ transcendents ] are . the five sorts of transcendents . great care to be had , that transcendent vvords be not held univocal . vvhat great errors spring thence shown in the univocal acception of the transcendent word [ compounded . ] the cartesians unadvis'd , in going ultra crepidam notes for div a -e the excellent wit , and unbyassed ingenuity of the author of the essay acknowledged . 't is probable he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks . the incomparable excellency of the science of metaphysicks , shewn from the objects it treats of . and from the manner by which it handles them . the knowledge of these high objects attainable by natural reason . mr. locke's tenet of no innate ideas , solidly grounded , and unanswerable . notes for div a -e in what the author agrees and disagrees with mr. locke . we may have notions , without perceiving we have them . we may think , without being conscious that we think . 't is impossible to be conscious , or know we know , without a new act of reflexion . 't is impossible to be conscious of , or know our present reflex act , but by a new reflex one . hence , we can never come to know our last reflexion . 't is utterly deny'd that consciousness causes individuation . the unreasonableness of the opinion , that men do always think no notion simple but that of existence . the order of our notions is to be taken from nature . the word [ solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by m. l. his solidity not at all essential to body . space without body , or vacuum , is a meer groundless fancy . the contrary to that tenet demonstrated . therefore 't is impossible there should be any true experiment to prove a vacuum . * method to science , b. . l. . §. . mr. locke's first chapter commendable . privative notions must connotate the subject . * see prelim. . §. , , . meer motions made upon the senses , insufficient to give us knowledge of the objects . * prelim. . §. , , , &c. sensible qualities are the same in the objects , as in the mind . the pretence of god's voluntary annexing improper causes to effects , is unphilosophical . the power in the object to cause sensation and knowledge , is improperly such . * b. . l. . §. , , . ideas or notions are not actual perceptions , but the object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . it destroys the nature of memory , to make it consist in the reviving ideas . the mind cannot revive perceptions . * prelim. . § , , . ideas in the fancy may fade , but notions are never blotted out of the soul. if brutes can know , they may have general notions , and abstract , and compare too . the distinguishing our notions guides our reason and judgment right . all complex ideas , or notions , must consist of simpler ones , united in the thing . otherwise they are groundless fancies . the manner how all complex ideas or notions are made , elaborately explain'd . how the doctrine of cartesius , mr. locke , and j. s. differ , as to this point . extension not well explicated . immensity worse . place well explicated . body and extension not the same notion . space cannot be without extension . extension and space differ only formally , or in some nice respect . the common explication of extension defended . ens adequately divided into body and spirit . vacuum must either be res , or modus rei ; otherwise , we can have no notion of it . * preliminary . §. . the extravagant arguments for vacuum refuted . psal. . v. . we can set bounds to space , time , and to all duration but god's . annihilation implies a contradiction , and is not an act of omnipotency , but of impotency . the cartesians can hardly avoid vacuum . the having an idea of vacuum , distinct from that of plenum , no argument to prove it . the plain sense of the vulgar gives us the true notion of time. duration is not succession , but rather opposit to it . 't is a strange paradox to say , the notion of succession or duration is to be taken from the train of ideas in our head. our not perceiving duration when we sleep no argument for it . this tenet is against experience . and against the nature of things , and of resemblances too . one motion , if known and regular , may and must be a measure to another . there is no shew of reason that the equality of the periods of duration can possibly be taken from the train of our ideas . this odd tenet not positively asserted by mr. l. imaginarytime before the world , a meer illusion of fancy . they who advance tenets against nature , must alter the meaning of those words that express our natural notions . god's immensity not commensurate to an infinitely expanded space . we can have no notion of a vacuum , but a fancy only . scripture-texts the worst sort of arguments for philosophers , unless they be most plain , and literally meant . only self existence , and what flows from that notion , is peculiar to god. our natural notions assure us , that 't is meer fancy to explicate god's attributes by respect to corporeal natures . endless addition of numbers can never give us the notion of infinity . how we come to have that notion , * prelim. . § , . and with what ease . the notion of [ infinite ] is most perfectly positive . duration easily conceivable , without succession . * james . . * apocal. cap. . v. . thoughts are not to be call'd sensations . thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul. mr. l.'s position , that things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain , is true and solid . the due commendation of mr. l's doctrine in this chapter of power . that some spiritual agent is the first mover of bodies . the will cannot move our bodies . * preliminary . §. . . refl . . §. . the understanding and will , not distinct powers . man's freedom , or self determination , deduced from principles . the difference between man and brutes in their determination to action . man naturally pursues what is according to reason , or virtuous . therefore his nature has been perverted since his creation . therefore supernatural motives are added , to strengthen man's weaken'd nature , or reason . supernatural motives being the stronger , would always prevail , were they duly apply'd to a subject dispos'd . why the understanding and will must be the same power substantially . how to conquer in our spiritual warfare . 't is evident , that man determines himself to action , yet , as predetermin'd by god. determination to virtuous action does perfect , and not destroy freedom . good , if evidently appearing such , does certainly determine the will. how wrong judgments come . sin generally springs from true but disproportionate judgments . of uneasiness , and mr. l's discourse concerning it . good is the only determiner of the will ; and not uneasiness . prov'd from our natural desire of happiness . the appearance of the good is of greatest weight , but , in a manner , disregarded by mr. locke . putting this appearance , his reasons do not conclude . prov'd , because ease is not the perfection of a soul. the truth of this point stated . mr. l. omits here the idea of power to be a thing , tho' nature suggests i● our mixture of our notions is regular , mr. l.'s irregular and disorderly . without knowing what substance or thing is , we cannos pretend to philosophy . all our notions , and , amongst them , that of substance or res is taken from the thing . we cannot be ignorant of the notion of substance or thing . we know the more inferiour notions of things less perfectly ; and the individual essence least of all . to gain a distinct notion of substance or thing , me must consider it abstractedly from its modes , singly consider'd . the literal truth how substance and its accidents , or the thing and its modes are distinctly known . 't is impossible not to know extension , is being , in a manner , self-evident . the cohesion of extended parts is above physical proofs , and can only be known by metaphysicks . whence 't is in vain to seek for natural efficient causes for those effects that depend on formal causes . we may have clear knowledge of spiritual natures by reflexion . the reason why ; and the manner how. * reflex . . §. . * see method to science , b. . c. . §. . the mind alone does not collect notions , or compare them . verbal relations come not from defect in our language , but for want of a real ground . what causality is , and what grounds the relations of cause and effect . the knowing the principle of individuation , must anteceede the knowledge of identity and diversity . what gives the ground to specify all notions . what gives the ground to our notions of the individuum . how individual men are constituted . * method to science , b. . l. . §. . existence cannot possibly be the principle of individuation . the outward circumstances of time and place cannot conduce to constitute the individual essences . an individual man is formally an individual thing of that kind , and an individual person too . the essence of things not to be taken from the judgment of the vulgar , nor from extravagant suppositions . consciousness cannot constitute personal identity . * reflex . . § , , , . that consciousnes is inseparable from every individual man. yet angels , who are pure acts , are constituted , in part , by the act of knowing themselves . no soul is indifferent to any matter . the notion of the individuum is essential . the substance is the same , tho' some quantity of the matter does come and go . that is only true virtue , which is according to right reason . how we come to have confused ideas , or notions . the whole thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . the metaphysical reason why this complexion of accidents which constitutes individuums , should be almost infinitely various . * job . . we can sufficiently know things without comprehending fully this c●mplexion . no formal truth or falshood in ideas or notions . notes for div a -e whence proper and metaphorical notions and words have their origin . the general rules to know the right sense of words . words of art most liable to be mistaken . the way how to avoid being mistaken in words of art. even in terms of art the thing is chiefly signify'd . metaphysical words not unintelligible , but most clear. this third book concerning words seems unnecessary . whence j. s. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . nature teaches us to define by a genus and a difference . * b. . l. . § . those who oppose this method must be forced to use it . the mind does not frame universal notions designedly ; but as forced to it by nature . nominal essences groundless , and catachrestical . aristotle's definition of motion defended . * see method to science , b. . l. . §. . aristotle's definition of light , most proper . the cartesian definition of motion , faulty . individuums under the same species differ essentially . * b. . l. . § . whence we must take our measure of simple and compound notions . the same rule holds in accidents as well as substance . the idea or notion can never be in fault when we name things wrong . confused notions may have more distinct ones annext to their subject . confused notions do not exclude , but include those distinct ones which are yet undiscover'd . we must not judge which notions are simple , which compounded , from the clear or obscure appearances they make to our fancy , but from the r●le given above , § , . shown hence , because th●se men conceit that metaphysical notions , are obscure , whereas they are evidently the clearest . not the design of avoiding different signification of words , but plain nature , forces us to ●put real essences . words are not ambiguous for want of setled standards in nature . the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of words ; but their ambiguity , ill contexture , or mis-application . imperfect knowers agree in the thing , and not in the name only . the knowing things by abstract notions promotes , and not hinders science . by mr. locke's principles , there is no way to remedy the abuse of words . mr. locke's sentiments , after all , ambiguous . notes for div a -e of the second operation of our understanding . mr. l.'s definition of knowledge in many respects faulty . knowledge cannot consist in the connexion or disagreement of ideas . the true definition of knowledge . our definition of knowledge farther maintain'd . hence , there is but one sort of connexion , in which knowledge consists : viz. that of co-existence . the degrees of our knowledge assign'd by mr. l. very solid . every step we take in demonstrative knowledge , or every consequence , must be grounded on self-evidence the great usefulness of this last position . scepticism and dogmatism are , both of them , highly prejudicial to science . we have sensitive knowledge of other notions , besides existence . onely principles and demonstration and not experiments , can give us any intelligible explication of natural qualities . short hints of the true aristotelian grounds . * see method to science , b. . l. . § §. , . how all secondary qualities come to be made . the course of nature is fundamentally built on the admission of ratity and density . that by these grounds , the nature of secondary qualities is demonstrable . the true reason why some men think them inexplicable . the possibility of demonstrating them shewn by the instance of colour . the state of the question . how we know the things by means of ideas , inexplicable . the ideists must be forced to grant that the thing known is in the mind . the necessity of the thing 's being in our mind , farther inforced . mathematical and moral knowledges are grounded on the thing in the mind . all essential predicates , and accidental ones too , are truly the thing , and the whole thing , imply'd consusedly . that our complex notions are regular , and well grounded ; mr. l's , not so . in what manner we compound such notions . all pleas fail the ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish phantasms from notions . odd miscarriages of nature ought not to shock natural principles . hence , no vacuum . the cartesians are concluded against by j. s. as well as other ideists , or rather more . all truth consists in joining or separating partial conceptions of the things ; and not in joining or separating ideas . the distinction of truth into mental and verbal extravagant , and the parts of it coincident . universal propositions in the mind are easily knowable antecedently to words . 't is not necessary to know the precise bounds and extent of the species . unnecessary knowledge not to be coveted , nor the want of it complain'd of . the nature and use of general maxims , mistaken by mr. locke . the terms of general maxims clearer than those of particular propositions . such general maxims are never used to deduce conclusions from them , but to reduce inferiour truths to them . * book . less . . the absolute necessity of first principles asserted . how other general maxims do govern all our actions and sayings . the discarding general maxims destroys all science . this errour springs from men's taking wrong measures in judging what notions are clear , what confused . that not general maxims , but their abuse , breeds danger to science . his instance that general maxims are fit to prove contradictions , shows he quite mistakes the notion of body . ideism is the genuin parent of enthusiasm in philosophy . identical propositions not to be ridicul'd . the right way how to use them , and that mr. locke himself does and must rely upon them . see meth. to science , b. a. l. . § neither ideas nor names can be predicate or subject ; but the thing it self , as conceived by us , in whole or in part . mr. l.'s new instructive way is utterly insignificant . that the signification of words is the meaning of them ; their meaning is our notion ; and our notion is the thing . universals mnst relate to the existence they have in the mind . to put any knowledge in brutes is against the nature of the thing , and implicatory . mr. l. confound ; material and spiritual natures . mr. l's principles confound human and brutal natures . to create is the peculiar effect of self-existence . the thought cannot move the body , and why . see method to science , book . less . . §. . the notion or nature of the deity being once settled to be self-existence , all that can be said of it follows demonstratively . we can know there are angels , tho' they do not operate'on us . we know at first our own existence , in the same manner as we know the existence of other things ; i. e. by sensation , and not by intuition . see method to science , book . less . . §. . no improvement of science , without fome general principle . mr. locke's principles examin'd . mr. locke's main principle ; which is to ascertain all other principles , inevident . what things hinder the advancement of science . euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying principles , or general maxims . the point stated . mr. l. confounds outward action , to which we may proceed upon a probability , with inward assent , to which we may not . a strange character of our judging faculty . that god has provided due motives of enjoin'd assent to all mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . * see method to science , b. . l. . to assent upon a probability , is against the commonest light of reason . there cannot be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . probable assent is nonsense , or impertinent . what kinds of distinctions are disallowable in disputation . charity to sincere and weak misunderstanders is a christian duty . tradition built on meer hearsay , has little or no force . a more firm assent is due to points certainly known to be reveal'd , than to scientifical conclusions . how syllogisms came to be invented at first . the true use and abuse of them . objections against syllogistick arguing clear'd . syllogisms are useful for demonstration . syllogisms are of no use in probable discourses . other mistakes about syllogism clear'd . inferences and consequences of words , abstracting from their sense , is strangely against all reason , and preposterous . what is due to reason , what to divine revelation . the first caution to be observ'd , in order to this point . the second caution to be used in this point . reason is not to be rely'd on in things beyond its sphere . the notion of [ is true , ] must be distinguish'd from the notion of [ may be true , or may not be true . ] therefore , that no assent ought to be built on probable mediums , is demonstrable . all errour comes by assenting upon probability . the tenet , that we ought to assent upon probability , is highly prejudicial to piety , and to best christian morality . to apply our selves to the right method to find out truth and science is the onely antidote against errour . no possible way , or certain standard , to take the just measures of probabilities . the certain rule , not to be mis-led by authority . mr. locke seems to take somethings for onely probable , which ( or the authority for them ) are demonstrable . the members of mr. locke's division of sciences are partly co-incident , partly not belonging to science at all . the connatural way how sciences are to be divided , and subordinated . some very useful corollaries concerning that subject . a letter from the authour of sure-footing, to his answerer sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter from the authour of sure-footing, to his answerer sergeant, john, - . p. s.n., [london : .] caption title. by john sergeant. imprint from wing. imperfect; pages stained, tightly bound with slight loss of text. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- controversial literature -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - melanie sanders sampled and proofread - melanie sanders text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter from the authour of sure-footing , to his answerer . sir , i am certainly inform'd there is an answer to my book intended , and a person chosen out for that employment ; whose name i am unconcern'd to know , it being only his quality as a writer i have to do with . i receive the alarum with great chearfulness ; knowing that , if my adversary behaves himself well , it will exceedingly conduce to the clearing and settling the main point there controverted . but , because there is difference between being call'd an answer and being an answer , and that 't is extremely opposit to my genius , to be task't in laying open mens faults even as writers , ( though it has been my unhappiness formerly to meet with adversaries , whose way of writing made that carriage my only duty ) wherefore to prevent , as much as i am able , all occasion of such unsavory oppositions , and to make way to the clearing the point , that so our discourse may redound to the profit and satisfaction of our readers , i make bold to offer you these few reflexions ; which in effect contain no more but a request you would speak to the point , and in such a way as is apt to bring the matter nearer a clearing . this if you please to do , you will very much credit your self and your endeavours in the opinion of all ingenuous persons . if you refuse , and rather chuse to run into rhetorical excursions , and such discourses as are apt to breed new controversies not pertinent to the present one under hand , you will extreamly disparage both your self , your party and your cause , and give me an exceeding advantage against them all ; i shall also have the satisfaction to have manifested before-hand by means of this letter , that i have contributed as much as in me lies to make you avoid those faults , which i must then be forc't to lay open and severely press upon you , little to your credit nor your causes neither ; you being ( as i am inform●d and reason gives it ) signally chosen out as held most able to maintain it . . that there may be no more distance between us than what our cause enforces , i heartily assure you that though i highly dislike your tenets negatively opposit to what we hold faith , and the way of writing i foresee you must take ( unless you resolve to love candour better than your cause ) as being inconclusive and so apt to continue not finish debates , yet i have not the least pique against yours or any mans person . nor have i any particular aversion against the protestant party ; rather i look upon it with a better eye than on any other company whatever which has broke communion with the catholick church : it preserves still unrenounc't the form of episcopacy , the church-government instituted by christ ; and many grave solemnities and ceremonies , which make our union less difficult : many of their soberest writers acknowledge divers of the renounc't tenets to be truths : some of them also profess to hold tradition , especially for scripture's letter ; and even for those points or faith-tenets in which they and we agree ; that is , where their interest is not touch't . i wish they would as heartily hold to it in all other points which descended by it , and look into the virtue it has of ascertaining , and declare in what that virtue consists ; i am confident , a little candour of confessing truly what they finde , joyn'd with an endeavour of looking into things rather than words , would easily make way to a fair correspondence . i esteem , and even honour the protestants from my heart for their firm allegiance to his sacred majesty and his royal father ; this uniting them already with all sober catholiks under that excellent notion of good subjects , and in the same point of faith , the indispensableness of the duty of allegiance we owe our prince by divine law. lastly i declare , that for this as well as for charitable considerations , i have a very particular zeal for their reconcilement to their mother-church ; and that 't is out of this love of union i endeavour so earnestly to beat down the wordish and dissatisfactory way of writing , and go about to evidence the ground of all our faith ; knowing , that , as wounds are never connaturally and solidly cur'd , by uniting the distant sides at the surface , and leaving them disunited and unheal'd at the bottom , but the cure must begin there first ; so , the onely way to heal the wounds of the church , is to begin first to win some to acknowledge the most radical and bottom-principle of all faith , as controverted between us ; without which all agreement in particular points must needs be unsound and hollow-hearted . this is my onely aym in sure-footing . that therefore you may not obstruct so good a work , and withall perform the duty of a solid and candid writer , i offer to your self and all ingenuous readers these few reflexions : not sprung from my will ( for what authority have i to prescribe you your method ) but from true reason working upon the thing ; which makes it just duty in you , and so ought oblige you to follow it . . in the first place , since the scope of my whole book is about the first principle in controversy , or the ground of all faith , as to our knowledge ; that is , about a point antecedent to all particular points ; i conceive it reasonable you should let your discourse stand firm to the matter in hand , and not permit it to slide into controversies about particulars . for so , 't is evident , we shall be apt to multiply many words little to our present purpose . on what conditions you may have right to alledge particulars as pretended instances of traditions failing , shall be seen hereafter . . next , i desire you would please to speak out categorically , and declare whether you hold faith absolutely certain to us , or else possible to be false for any thing we know . to explicate my self better , that so i may void some common and frivolous distinctions , my intent is to demand of you in behalf of the christian reader and his due satisfaction , whether you hold gods providence has laid in the whole creation any certain means , by way of proper causes to such an effect , to bring down faith truly to us , and whether we can arrive at certain knowledge of those means , that is , come to see or know the connexion between such causes and their effect spoken of . i make bold to press you earnestly to this declaration ; and my reason is , because nothing will more conduce to the conclusion of our present debate : for , in case such causes be laid and can be seen by us , then they are evident or demonstrative reasons for the ground of our faith's certainty : but , if no such causes be laid , or being laid , cannot be seen by us , then all the wit of man can never avoid the consequence , but that we can have onely probability for all our faith ; that is , for any thing we absolutely know , 't is all as false as an old wife's tale ; since there are no degrees in truths and falshoods . if you advance this civil piece of atheistry , you must pardon me if i be smart with you in opposition to so damnable and fundamental an errour : i love christianity and mankinde too well to suffer that position which destroyes effectually the root of all their eternal happiness , and the substance of all their hope , to pass unstigmatiz'd , as it deserves . nor think to avail your self by some discoursers in our schools , it will be shown , when prest , that they are still preserv'd good christians through the virtue of tradition which they all hold to , notwithstanding their private speculations : but you not , because of your want of certain grounds , to make you rationally hold christs faith. they onely mistook a word , whereas you will be found to erre in the whole thing , or the ordinary means to true christianity . again , if such causes be fitting to be laid by god's providence , 't is impossible to avoid the doctrin propos'd in sure-footing , because 't is absolutely impossible to invent any thing that looks like such causes , but those which are deliver'd there ; nor did any other way ever attempt to show any such . whence i foresee your cause will force you to fly for refuge to the actual uncertainty , or possible falshood of all our faith for any thing any man living knows by ordinary means . a sad consequence of an erroneous tenet ! but 't is connatural , and , so to be expected , such effects should follow the renouncing the rule of faith. . thirdly , i conceive it very reasonable that you would please to declare whether controversy ought to have any first principle or no ; if none then to speak candidly out , and confess that controvertists are certain of nothing they say , since their discourse has no ground or first principle to rely on . if any , whether tradition be it ; or , if it be not , what else is ; and then vouch ( as plain reason tells us you ought ) that what you assigne has truly in it the nature of a first principle , which common reason gives to be self-evidence . or , lastly , to profess ( if you judge it your best play ) that , what you substitute in stead of tradition , though it be a first principle , yet it need not be at all self-evident . any thing shall content me , so you will but please to speak out , and to the point . . again , since it is evidently your task to argue against tradition's certainty , 't is as evident that while you argue against it , you must bear your self as holding it uncertain ; i conceive then plain reason obliges you not to produce any thing against tradition which depends upon tradition for its certainty ; for , in doing so you would invalidate and even nullify all your own proofs : since , if tradition be held by you uncertain , and they have no certainty but by means of it , they must be confest uncertain too ; and so they would be incompetent to be produc't as proofs , and your self very dis-ingenuous to produce them : i add self-contradicting too , and vnskilful ; nature and aristotle teaching us , that a discourser ought not sustain contrary to himself . hence plainest reason excludes you from alledging any kind of testimony , either from scripture , councils , fathers , or history , till you answer my corollaries , , . which pretend to demonstrate the certainty of all these dependent on tradition's ; and the onely way to show my discourses there to be weak , is to manifest my mistake by declaring into what other thing your certainty of those testimonies is finally resolvable , which is not coincident with tradition ▪ when you produce such a principle , and prove it such , you have right to alledge the foresaid testimonies , for then you can make good their authority : till then , you can have no right in true reason to do it . not onely , because till then you are to be held a renouncer of that thing 's certainty upon which there are pretended demonstratious against you theirs is built ; and those presum'd true ones , because you let such strongest attempts pass unanswer'd ; but very particularly for this consideration that our present matter restrains you from it : for , our discourse is about the ground of that authority which ascertains to us faith ; which therefore is antecedent to the notions of faith , faithful , church , councils , fathers , nay and creditable history-books too ; since those rely on tradition ( taken at large ) for their certainty , as is evident by plain reason , coroll . , . which devolves into this , that tradition is first authority , and so not proovable or disproovable by any other secondary authorities , but ought to be impugn'd by pure reason . but , if you think fit to grant this certainty to tradition taken at large , yet deny it to christian tradition , which hath , besides its human force , most powerful divine motives also to strengthen it ; please to speak it out , and the strange unreasonableness of the position will quickly be made appear . or , if you grant christian tradition certain in bringing down those common points in which we agree , yet fallible , nay actually erring , in bringing down to us those other points which we were found holding upon tradition when you left us , and for which , as grievous errors , you pretended to leave us ; please to declare in what you hold the virtue of tradition consists , ascertaining to us both those common points , and how we come to know tradition is engag'd for them ; which done , it will quickly appear whether its ascertaining virtue has its effect upon some , and not others ; or on all . unless you do this , your very admittance of tradition's certainty in some , overthrows you without more ado : for , to acknowledge it argumentative for the certainty of some , grants it a virtue of ascertaining , which therefore you are oblig'd to grant in all , unless you give the reason of your exception : otherwise to admit it when your interest is not toucht , and reject it when it opposes you , is plainly to confess that tradition is able to certify , yet that you admit it when you list , and reject it when you list . . being inform'd then by evident reason , that no kind of authority but only the way of reason is a competent weapon to fight against tradition with ; i have three things to propose to your thoughts on this occasion , which i hope will sound reasonable to any intelligent man by the very mentioning . first , that you would not alledge such argumments as strike as well at the constancy of every species in nature , especially rational nature ; that is , such natural mediums as tend to destroy all natural certainty . secondly , that your objections be not forrain , or fetch 't from afar of ; for these are multipliable without end , and apt to be suggested by fancy upon every not-seeing the coherence of some other remote ( whether real or conceited ) truth , with the tenet we aim to impugn ; but that they be immediate and close , that is , taken out of the intrinsecal nature of the thing ; for so , they will be more forcible and by consequence be apt to do your cause much service ; and unless they be such , they will do it none : for , in regard my whole process is grounded on the nature of the thing , as appears by my transition , and every logician knows that remote and common considerations are liable , for any thing we know , to be connected or not-connected with the point we would apply them to , because we see no connexion but what 's immediate ; it follows that 't is a very incompetent and dissatisfactory way to impugn an adversary who endeavours all along to frame his discourse out of the intrinsecal nature of the thing , by remote , or unimmediate , that is , indeed , unconnected mediums . the third thing i request is , that you either grant that no argument or reason is conclusive , obliging-to-assent , or satisfactory , but what is either proper ( at least necessary ) cause or effect ; or else show us out of logick that other mediums have this virtue , and how they come to have it . this way of procedure will give me a great respect for you as taking honestly the way which is apt to clear truth ; and you will have this satisfaction to your conscience that you have endeavour'd it to your power by following the best method you could imagin to give your cause its due advantage , in case it can bear that test ; that is , in case it be truth . and , if it cannot bear it , that is , if it be no truth , 't is your own best advantage by this strict procedure to have discover'd it . your judicious readers also that look seriously for satisfaction , will rest much edify'd and thankfull for your pursuing that method which is likely to save them a great deal of fruitless pains in reading multitudes of books writ in a loose way , whence no conclusion or satisfaction is likely to result . . my fifth request , and i hope 't is just and reasonable , is this ; that , if you conceive your discourse has made good the certainty of written authorities or quoted testimonies , without tradition , ( which i see is impossible , ) and hence you make account you have title to produce them against tradition's certainty , ( that being the matter in hand ) and therefore you resolve to pursue the way of citing authours ; you would then be pleas●d to vouch your citations to have truly in them the nature of testimonies ; that is , to be built on sensible knowledge , and not on speculative , or opinion in the authour alledg'd , and that they fall under none of dr. pierce's faulty or inconclusive heads ; or else show they are conclusive though thus faulty , which is done by confuting my grounds laid in my first appendix . § . , , . or , lastly , to declare , that though thus faulty and inconclusive they ought still to be alledg●d ; and to give your reason for it ; which , candidly spoken out , i am sure will be this , that you must either produce such , or none . i hope all our ingenuous readers will think me very reasonable , who am well contented with any thing which is spoke out expressly and declaratively of what method or way of satisfying you take ; and onely desire you would not quote and speak confusedly and in common , as if you meant to persuade your readers that your discourse has in it some strange force taken in the bulk , though you will vouch no one particular piece of it to be certain ; or , as if you suppos'd their reasons were to be amaz'd and stupify'd meerly at the venerable names of authors and the solemnity of a diverse-letter'd , or diverse-languag'd quotation , without clearing to their judgements the virtue by which such citations can pretend to have force able to subdue their understandings to assent , or ( which is all one ) satisfy them . if you refuse to do me reason in this point , and still resolve to pursue the huddling together testimonies without warranting their certainty by showing upon rational grounds they must be such , i shall declare beforehand to my readers , that i must be forc't to do right to my self ; which is , to rank all your testimonies under dr. pierce's faulty heads , and so let them go as they are . . particularly , i beg the justice of you not to think to over-bear me with the conceiv'd authority of other divines resolving faith in their speculative thoughts after another manner than i do : since this can onely tend to stir up invidiousness against my person ( which yet their charity secures me from ) and not any wayes to invalidate my discourse . for , every one knows t is no news divines should differ in their way of explicating their tenet , which they both notwithstanding hold never the less firmly ; and every learned man understands that the word divine , importing a man of skill or knowledge in such a matter , no divine has any authority but from the goodness of the proofs or reasons he brings and on which he builds that skill . please then to bring , not the empty pretence of a divines authority or name to oppose me with , and i shall freely give you leave to make use of the virtue of their authorities , that is their reasons against me as much as you will. i easily yeeld to those great discoursers , whoever they be , a precedency in other speculations and knowledges , to which they have been more addicted , and for which they have been better circumstanc't ; in this one of the ground of faith , both my much practice , my particular application , my discourses with our nations best wits of all sorts , my perusing our late acute adversaries and the answers to them , with other circumstances ; and lastly , my serious and industrious studying the point , join'd with the clearing method god's providence has led me to , have left me ( as far as i know ) in no disadvantage . what would avail you against me and our church too ( for my interest as defending tradition is indissolubly linkt with hers ) is , to show that our church proceeds not on tradition , or that in her definitions she professes to resolve faith another way rather than mine , or ( which is equivalent ) to rely on somthing else more firmly and fundamentally than on tradition . but the most express and manifold profession of the council of trent to rely constantly on tradition , has so put this beyond all possible cavil on my side , that i neither fear your skill can show my grounds in the least subcontrary to hers , nor the goodness of any learned and considering catholik ( however some may conceive the infallibility of the church plac't ad abundantiam in somthing else ) will or can ever dislike it . i expect you may go about to disgrace my way as new : but i must ask , whether you mean the substance of it is new , or onely that 't is now deeper look't into and farther explicated than formerly : if you say the former , my consent of authorities ( p. , , &c. ) has clearly shown the contrary ; and common sense tells us no other way was or could be possibly taken ( for the generality of the church at least ) in primitive times till scripture was publisht universally and collected : if the later , please to reflect , that every farther explication or declaration , as far as 't is farther , must needs be new ; and so , instead of disgracing us , you most highly commend our reasons for drawing consequences farther than others had done before us . again , if it be onely a farther explication , 't is for that very reason not-new ; since the sence of the explication is the same with the thing explicated ; as 't is onely an explication , then 't is not-new ; as farther , 't is indeed new , but withal innocent , nay commendable . but there are three things more to be said on occasion of this objecting catholik divines ; one is , that , taking tradition for the living voice of the present church as i constantly declare my self to do , not one catholick does or can deny it ; for he would eo ipso become no-catholick but an arch-heretick ; and this all acknowledge . in the thing explicated then , that is , in the notion of tradition all agree with me ( and consequently in the substance of my explication ) nor can any do otherwise , except they be equivocated in the word tradition and mistake my meaning , which i conceive none will do wilfully after they have read here my declaration of it so unmistakably laid down . the second thing is , that an alledger of those divines will onely quote their words as speculaters , not those in which they deliver themselves naturally as christians or believers ; which sayings were they collected , we should finde them unanimously sounding to my advantage , and not one of them oppositely . and , lastly , speaking of our explication as to its manner , divines contradict one another in other kinds of explications , but not one author can be alledged that expresly contradict● this which i follow . . my sixth request is , that you would speak to the main of my book , and not catch at some odd words , on the by as it were : otherwise , understanding readers will see this is not to answer ▪ but to cavil . . and , because we are ( i hope ) both of u● endeavouring to clear truth ( i am sure we ough● to be so ) therefore , to acquit your self to you● readers that you ingenuously aim at it , i conceive you will do your self a great deal of right and me but reason , nay ( which is yet weightier ) do the common cause best service , if you wil● joyn with me to retrench our controversie a● much as we can . let us then avoid all rhetorical digressions and affectations of witty and fine language ; which i have declin'd in my whole book , and chosen a plain downright manner of expression , as most sutable and connatutural to express truth . likewise all repetitions of what particulars others have said or answer'd before us , such as are the objections made by that ingenious person , the l. faukland , and the answers given them in the apology for tradition ; unless it be conceiv'd those solutions are insufficient , and reasons be offer'd why they are judg'd so . for i conceive it an endless folly to transcribe and reprint any thing others have done before us , except it be grounds which ought to be oft inculcated and stuck to ; and those particulars which we show to be not yet invalidated , but to preserve still their strength . much less do i suspect it can fall under the thought of one who aims to discourse rationally ( such my answerer ought to be ) to rake together all the filth and froth of the unwarrantable actions or opinions of some in the church , or to run on endlesly with multitudes of invective & invidious sayings on his own head without proof ; & then apply them to the church , as does the disswader . it would also very much conduce to the bringing our differences to a narrower compass if you would candidly take my book endwayes , and declare what in it is evident , and so to be allowed , what not : what principles are well laid or consequences right drawn ; and what are otherwise : to requite which favours , i promise the same carriage in my reply to you . by this means it will be quickly discover'd whether or no you have overthrown my discourse by showing it ill coherent , and how far 't is faulty ; that , if i cannot clear it to be connected , i may confess my fault and endeavour to amend it . for , however i see my grounds evident , yet i am far from judging my self infallible in drawing my consequences ; though i see withal the method i take , will not let me err much ; or , if i do , my errour will be easily discoverable ; because i go not about to cloud my self in words , but to speak out as plain as i can from the nature of the thing . . in the next place i earnestly request you , as you love truth , not to shuffle of the giving me a full answer , nor to desist from your enterprise ( as i hear a certain person of great esteem for his learning and prudence has already done ) though you find some difficulty where to fasten upon the substantial part of my discourse . there are perhaps many difficult passages which my shortness forc't me to leave obscure ; these will naturally occasion mistake , and mistake will breed objections to impugn me with . please , if others fail , to make use of those at least . 't is no discredit in you to mistake what 's obscure ; rather it argues a fault in me ( did not my circumstance of writing grounds , & onely to schollers , excuse me ) that i left it so ; to make amends for which i promise you to render it clear when i see where it pinches you or others . and on this score , i owe very particular thanks to mr stilling-fleet , that by speaking clearly out his thoughts , he gave me a fair occasion to open that point he impugn'd , i think , upon mistake of our tenet . . if you think fit somtimes to argue ad hominem , be sure what you build on be either our churches tenet or mine ; for i am bound to defend nothing else . if then you quote fathers , first , see they speak as fathers , that is as believers and witnessers ; for so 't is evident our church means them by her expressions in the council of trent ; as also did antiquity . for both of them constantly alledge and stand upon traditio patrum , not opinio patrum : next , see you bring consensus patrum , or an agreement at least of very many of them speaking as witnesses , otherwise you will not touch me nor our church ; for she never abetted them further . in case you bring councils , it would be very efficacious you would chuse such testimonies ( if you can finde them ) as i brought from the council of trent ; that is , such in which they declare themselves ( or the circumstances give it ) they proceed upon their rule of faith : for , otherwise , every one knows that bishops in a council have in them , besides the quality of faith definers , those also of governours , and of the most eminent and solid divines in god's church . if scripture , you must make evident the certainty of your way of arguing from it , ere i or our church shall allow it argumenative . thus much for authority . if you oppose me by my own principles or discourses of my reason , i must defend my self as well as i can . one thing on this occasion , i must mind you of ; 't is this , that though you should conquer in this way of arguing ad hominem , you onely conquer me as a discourser , by showing that i contradict my self ; not my tenet : for to prove that false , you must fix your foot and build your discourse on some certain ground ; which barely my holding it ( on which your discourse ad hominem relies ) cannot make it . you must build then on some grounded truth if you will go about to overthrow a pretended one . indeed , if you can show tradition contradicts her self , you will do more than miracle , and so must conquer . but i fear not the gates of hell , much less man's wit can prevail against that impregnable rock . onely , i beseech you bring not as parallels against our tradition in hand , which is a vast and strong stream , other little petty rivulets sprung originally from the sensations of two or three : for , then , as one side was liable , in a thing not known publikly , to bely their senses ; so the conveyance down of such sleight built attestations may easily be self-contradictory . in a word , if you will argue , take first into your thoughts the nature of the thing you argue against , and then fall to work assoon as you will. now , if you should chance to say you hold the sayings of fathers and councils ( some at least , to be certain , my reason tells me from principles , that , having renounc't tradition which onely could ascertain them , rational nature in you will not let you have any hearty conceit of their convictiveness , whatever you pretend ; but that you rawly alledge them , and so let them go with a valeant quantum valere possunt . that therefore we may have some security more than your bare word ( which experience tells us is now affirmative now negative in this point , as it best sutes your interest , or , after a pretty indifferent manner , half-one-half-tother ) that your profession of holding to such authorities is not hollow-hearted but rooted in your reason , 't is just your readers should expect you would declare in what the virtue of certifying consists , and that they have this virtue . this if you do , you acquit your self to go to work solidly , and you offer us fair play in giving us some hold of your reason , whereas a common expression gives none . this procedure also will show , when apply'd , whether you are justifiable or no for admitting some authorities of that nature and rejecting others . . my last request is , that , if in the course of your answer you think fit to complain of me for bringing history and other proofs heretofore commonly without more ado admitted , into incertainty : please to amend the fault you finde , and settle their certainty on some better principles than i have endeavour'd . in the mean time 't is evident my whole book ayms at settling the certainty of all authority , by evidencing the certainty of first authority ; upon which the assuredness of history , fathers , councils , church , faith , nay virtue or christian life must all be built . this is my way ; if you judge it incompetent to do the effect spoken of , be pleas'd to manifest it unfit and show us a better . . perhaps i may have demanded more of you in some particulars than is due from the strict duty of meerly answering : in the schools , a bare denial , or distinction is enough for a respondent . but i conceive we are not on these terms : in regard we are not met face to face , where the returns of the one to the other can be quick on every occasion . this obliges us , for the readers satisfaction , to enlarge our selves and bring reason for every thing we affirm or deny , lest we should be thought to do it gratis . and , your case here , is particularly disadvantageous : for , if you go about to overthrow that on which i aym to show the certainty of all authority built , and yet declare not on what your self hold them built , and , by your faithful promise to show it shortly , give them strong hopes you will perform it ; you send them away very much dissatisfy'd either with you or with all the authority in the world , though built on sensitive knowledge : of which it being impossible rational nature should permit them to doubt , they must needs dislike your attempt , and have an ill conceit of your performance . sir , i understand , to my exceeding satisfaction , that multitudes of the most eminent , solid and ingenuous wits of our nation have been diligent perusers of my book . consider , their eyes are upon you while you answer ; i am confident they will judge i have requested no more of you in this letter , but what 's reasonably due to their and my satisfaction ; and so , will look your answer should be correspondent . they are weary of endless contests about faith ; and , seeing we are not now controverting the signification of some ambiguous testimony , but penetrating deep into the very bowels of a point which is of the greatest concern in the whole world ; and pursuing ( in a method likely to decide ) the clearing of it , their expectations are very much erected and attentively observing what will be the issue of this rational combat . frustrate not their desires to see truth manifested by bringing the question back from the plain open field of evidence-in-our-method , to a logomachy or word-skirmish in a wilderness of talk , out of which the thread of grounds or principles had disentangled it . to them therefore as well as your self i address this ; requesting those of them who are acquainted with my answerer , to press him to do himself , me , the world ( his cause too , if it can bear it ) the right due in reason , and here demanded , this sir , if you will perform , i shall lay aside the remembrance of the justice i have to it , and look upon it purely as a favour and most obliging civility to him who is , next to truth 's , your friend and well-wisher , j. s. feb. th . postscript . if you complain of this fore-stalling as vnusual ; as long as 't is rational you can have no reason to do so : and it will appear such to him that considers it was an unusual circumstance occasion'd it . 't is this : i had endeavour'd to bring controversie from an endless to a conclusive way : and both my reason and experience made me apprehend my protestant answerer would have such strong inclinations to bring it bac● into the way of quoting and glossing testimonies ( that is , into a wordish scanning a great part of all the libraries in the world ) that a slender touch at it in my book was not forcible and express enough to oblige him to take notice of it . having communicated therefore my thoughts with intelligent and ingenuous persons , both catholiks and protestants , and receiv'd their approbation , i resolv'd , and pursu'd it as you see ; and i hope the manifold usefulness of it ( as shall be seen what way soever now you take upon you of answering ) will sufficiently justify my action . finis . the mysterie of rhetorique unveil'd wherein above the tropes and figures are severally derived from the greek into english : together with lively definitions and variety of latin, english, scriptural, examples, pertinent to each of them apart. conducing very much to the right understanding of the sense of the letter of the scripture, (the want whereof occasions many dangerous errors this day). eminently delightful and profitable for young scholars, and others of all sorts, enabling them to discern and imitate the elegancy in any author they read, &c. / by john smith. smith, john, gent. approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the mysterie of rhetorique unveil'd wherein above the tropes and figures are severally derived from the greek into english : together with lively definitions and variety of latin, english, scriptural, examples, pertinent to each of them apart. conducing very much to the right understanding of the sense of the letter of the scripture, (the want whereof occasions many dangerous errors this day). eminently delightful and profitable for young scholars, and others of all sorts, enabling them to discern and imitate the elegancy in any author they read, &c. / by john smith. smith, john, gent. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by e. cotes for george eversden ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. wing attributes this to john sergeant. halkett and laing suggest him as possible author. examples of proper english and latin punctuation [ ] p. at end. advertisement p. [ ]-[ ] at end. index: p. [ ]-[ ] created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng rhetoric -- early works to . english language -- rhetoric -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion imprimatur , joh. hall , r. p. d. episc. lond. à sac domest . th august . . the mysterie of rhetorique unveil'd , wherein above the tropes and figures are severally derived from the greek into english ; together with lively definitions and variety of latin , english , scriptural , examples , pertinent to each of them apart . conducing very much to the right understanding of the sense of the letter of the scripture , ( the want whereof occasions many dangerous errors this day ) eminently delightful and profitable for young scholars , and others of all sorts , enabling them to discern and imitate the elegancy in any author they read , &c. by john smith , gent. ut hominis decus est ingenium : sic ingenii lumen est eloquentia . cic. london , printed by e. cotes for george eversden at the mayden-head in st. pauls-church-yard , . to the right worshipful , sir martin noell , knight . honoured sir , the good affection you bear unto all kinds of polite literature , accompanied with your genuine inclination thereunto , and in particular to elocution , together with those manifold obligements which your noble self , and worthy stock ( viz. mr. edward noell , and james noell of tottenham in the county of middlesex esq ) have accumulated upon me , doe incite and encourage me to employ that breath which i would have spent in expressions of gratitude and observance , to beg your worship to increase the causes of it , and doe thereupon beseech you to accept the tender of my duty in this small present , to grant that your protection , and the author your pardon , with favourable permission to style himself your worships faithful humble servitour , john smith . the author to the reader . courteous reader , were it absolutely necessary for him that would write of eloquence to be perfectly eloquent , i would easily confesse myself too rash in this enterprise : but having seen often those treat knowingly of painting that never held pencil , and cicero remarking that aratus , by the common consent of learned men , wrote excellently of the heavens and stars , though he was no noted astronomer ; i 'm encourag'd to say , why then may not i too discourse of eloquence without being an oratour ? galen , that great master of physick , who wrote so learnedly of every part of that science , was little seen in the practick ; nor are those that discourse best of the embattailing armies , and differencing military functions , alwayes the best warriers , or the most daring . the like may happen in this subject , that he , who is able to set down the rules and laws which ought to be observed in speech or style , may notwithstanding find himself defective in the application ; and so may be said to give that to others , which he hath not himself : but this treatise indeed may not so properly be termed a direction to the art of rhetorique , as a key to unlock and lay open those abstruse difficulties which the tropes and figures have hitherto , not only been masked with , but lock'd up under ; i mean from such at least , as are altogether unacquainted with the greek tongue , and have not directed their studies to that subject . object . but it may be you will say , there were several books extant before , that much illustrate the tropes and figures of rhetorique . answ. it is very true , that many learned worthies have done exceeding well herein ; yet to use the expression of one of them : that a child upon a gyant shoulders can see further then the gyant : so i , having the help of th●ir labours , and of other books , have by divine assistance ( without ostentation be it mentioned ) used a more distinct and easie method throughout the whole current of my discourse , then any other upon this subject yet extant ; whereby matters of high and excellent sublimity are bowed down to the weakest capacities . i render the english of each trope and figure , & likewise the english of the words , from whence they are derived , whether from the greek or latin , then a brief definition and lively character and representation of each trope and figure , then choyse latin and * english examples pertinent to each of them , as also a brief and plain explanation of the terms used in rhetorique , with an alphabetical table for the ready finding each of the tropes and figures . lastly , for that the holy scripture is not barren of , but abounds with * tropes and figures of all sorts , as containing the most excellent and sublimest eloquence , and is like a pleasant garden , bedecked with flowers , or a fruitful field , full of precious treasures , i apprehended it a work worthy the undertaking , to dig into those sacred minerals for the better finding out the metaphors , metonymies , synecdoches , &c. which lie hid there , and have given scriptural examples pertinent to each of the tropes and figures : for the bare reading of the scripture , without searching into its heavenly mysteries and meaning , is like the coming into a treasury , wherein we see many costly things folded up , and some ends appearing out , but when they be all unfolded , then doth their glory more affect us for the present , yea , and leave in us a deep impression of their excellency : besides , the ignorance of rhetorique is one ground ( yea , and a great one ) of many dangerous errors this day ; as upon perusal of the scriptural examples of synecdoche , metonymie , &c. will manifestly appear , where you have not only bare instances , but divers texts cleared and explained ; for though the spirit of the lord be indeed that golden key , that opens the sealed mysteries of the book of truth , and inspires the soul with the understanding of the hidden wisdom therein ; and those men , whose understandings are not opened by him who hath the key of david , be they never so learned , yet by reason of the blindnesse of their hearts , seeing , they see not , and hearing , they understand not the wonders in gods law : yet , all science , and particularly , rhetorique , where it is reduced to a blessed subordination and conformity to the teachings of the spirit of truth , is a good gift of god , proceeding from the father of lights , and very conducent to the unfolding and right understanding of the figurative and tropical elegancies of that blessed book , which abounds with the most excellent and divinest eloquence : * and herein we must beware that we take not those things literally which are to be understood spiritually ; that we go not out to a figurative acceptation of any place of scripture , where we have not a sufficient reason ( grounded upon some word of truth ) why the proper sense or signification of the words may not be adhered unto ; for we must never leave off the proper sense , unlesse the coherence of the text , the analogie of faith , or some other place of scripture require a figurative exposition . and it is very dangerous to make figures , where the scripture makes none ; or to make the scope and sense bleed with straining it too hard . origen would sometimes take that literally , which ought to be understood mystically , and thus mistaking that place , matth. . . and there be eunuches , which have made themselves eunuches for the kingdom of heavens sake : he gelt himself ; and he also sometimes would allegorize plain scriptures , that is , such as are to be taken literally , or in their proper signification : but the difference will easily appear to the wise and observant reader ; * mat. . . i will not henceforth [ drink ] of this fruit of the vine , untill that day when i drink it new with you in my fathers kingdom ; where the first word [ drink ] hath a proper or literal signification ; but the later a metaphorical , of their communion , or partaking of the joys of heaven . this work will also be very useful and advantageous to youth , and others , enabling them to find out the elegancy in any author , and likewise help the invention of learners , who may beautifie a speech , and adorn a discourse with elocution , by drawing their discourse through the several tropes or figures , and taking what may best befit their purpose : so i will detain thee no longer in the porch , but in●ite thee into the house , and such as i have , set before 〈◊〉 , i● there be no such varieties as were expected ; yet , let it have acceptance with thee , seeing it is according to my ability ; thus doe , and thou wilt engage him , who is thy real wel-wisher , john smith . from my chamber in mountague close , southwark march . . the contents of the pre-ambular part of this book , viz. rhetorique , what , with the use thereof , page . a trope , what , the affections of tropes , what ; and how many . . a figure , what , ibid. the difference between a trope and a figure . . a figure of a word , what , . a figure of a sentence , what , , . the d●fference between a figure of a word , and a figure of a sentence , , . figures of a word , which , , . figures of a sentence , which , . . the alphabetical table , or a synopsis , whereby the reader may on a sudden , view all the tropes and figures , or find out which of them he principally aims at ; where , next after the trope , or figure , is the genuine signification of the word in english , then a brief description of each trope and figure , and lastly a referring to the pages , where they are largely explained and exemplified : note likewise that some words which are neither tropes , nor figures , yet being abstruse words , and incident to the unveiling divers of the figures , are here inserted , and the reader referred to the pages , where they are also described and exemplified . a. aenigma , a riddle , or an obscure allegory . pag. aetiologia , a rendring of a reason : a figure when the reason of a thing is shown . allegoria , inversion or changing : a trope whereby a sentence must be understood otherwise then the literal interpretation shews , anacoenosis , communication : a figure whereby we consult , and as it were argue the case with others anadiplosis , redoubling : a figure whereby the last word , or sound of the first clause , is repeated in the beginning of the next . anamne●is , remembrance : a figure whereby we call to mind matters past , &c. anaphora , rehearsal : a figure when several clauses of a sentence are begun with the same word or sound . anastrophe , a proposterous placing of words or matter . antanaclasis , a bearing back : a figure when the same word in likenesse is repeated in a various ( if not in a contrary ) signification . anthropopathia , a speaking after the manner of men . anthypophora , a contrary illation , or inference : see it in prolepsis . antimetabole , a turning of the words in a sentence upside down . antiphrasis , a word or speech to be understood by the contrary . antiptosis , the putting of one case for another . antistoechon , a change of letters : a figure whereby one letter is put for another . antithesis , opposition : a figure whereby one letter is put for another . it is also a rhetorical exornation when contraries are opposed to contraries in speech or a sentence . antonomasia , a putting of one name for another : a figure when another name , a common name , or a nick name is put instead of the proper name . aphaeresis , a taking away : a figure whereby a letter , or syllable is taken away from the beginning of a word . apocope , a cutting off , a figure when the last letter or syllable of a word is cut off . apodioxis , rejection : a figure when any argument or objection is with indignation rejected , as very absurd , &c. apodixis , demonstration or evident proof . apophasis , a denying ; a kind of an irony , whereby we deny that we say , or doe , that which we principa●y say or doe . aporia , doubting : a figure whereby we deliberate , and as it were argue the case with our selves . aposiopesis , an holding ones peace : a figure when through vehemency , the course of the sentence begun is so stayed , as thereby some part of the sentence not being uttered , may be understood . apostrophe , a turning away or dislike ; a diversion of speech to another person , then the speech appointed did require . astismus , a civil and pleasant jest . asyndeton , without a copulative , auxesis , an encreasing ; an exornation when for amplification , a more grave and substantial word , is put in stead of the proper word . c. catachresis , abuse : it is the abuse of a trope , and is when words are too far wrested from their native and genuine signification . charientismus , pleasantnesse : a trope whereby unpleasing matters are mitigated with pleasant words . chronographia , a description of times and seasons . climax , gradation : a figure when the succeeding clauses of a sentence transcend each other by divers degrees . compar , even , equal ; a rhetorical exornation whereby the parts of a sentence doe consist almost of the like number of syllables , &c. d. diaeresis , division : a figure when one syllable is divided into two parts . dialogismus , a conference between two : a figure when as one discussing a thing by himself , as it were talking with another , doth move the question and make the answer : see prosopopoeia . dialyton , disjoyned : this figure and asyndeton are alike . diastole , extension : a figure whereby a syllable , short by nature ▪ is made long . diatyposis , description or information of a thing : a figure whereby we having spoken of a thing in general , descend unto particulars , &c. dilemma , an horned or double argument : which every way convinceth , &c. dissimilitudo , dissimilitude . e. ecphonesis , exclamation . ecthlipsis , a striking out : a grammatical figure when the letter m , with his vowel is taken away , the next word beginning with a vowel . ellipsis , def●ct : a figure when in a sentence a word is wanting , to make that sense which hath been spoken . ● emphasis , efficacie of expression : a figure whereby a tacite vertue and efficacy of signification is given to words ; &c. enallage , a change of order : a figure whereby the number or gender , mood , &c. are put one for another . enantiosis , contention : a figure when we speak that by a contrary , which we would have to be understood as it were by affirmation . enthymema , conception of the mind ; an euthymem or imperfect syllogism , wherein the major or minor proposition being wanting , is looked for . . epanalepsis , a taking back : aꝭ figure when a sentence is begun and ended with the same word or sound . epanados , regression , or turning back : a figure when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the middle , in the middle and end of a sentence . epanorthosis , correction , or amending : a figure when in our speech , something that went before , is called back and corrected , &c. epenthesis , interposition ; it is the interposition of a letter or syllable in the middle of a word . epimone , a tarrying long upon one matter : a figure whereby we continue and persist in the same cause , much after one form of speech , &c. epiphonema , acclamation ; an applause of a thing approved , &c. epistrophe , a turning to the same sound : a figure when divers sentences end alike , &c. epitrope , permission : a figure when we seriously or ironically permit a thing . &c. epizeuxis , a joyning together : a figure when the same word is doubled by way of emphasis , &c. erotesis , interrogation : a figure whereby we either demand a question , earnestly affirm , or vehemently deny a thing . evocatio , a calling forth : a figure when the nominative case to a verb of the third person is set before a verb of first or second person , &c. euphemismus , a fair or favourable kind of speech : a figure whereby a word of a good and bad signification is interpreted to the better part , &c. exegesis , explication : a figure when that which was first spoken more darkly , is afterwards in the same sentence more manifestly explained and confirmed . exergasia , a polishing or trimming : a figure when we abide still in one place , and yet seem to speak divers things . &c. expeditio , expedition , or quick dispatch : a figure when many parts or reasons of an argument being enumerated and touched ; all are destroyed , save that only , upon which the speaker intends to stand and rest upon . g. gnome , a sentence : a figure when we bring in a sentence or some remarkable saying of anothers to the same purpose with the author , he being not named . h. hebraism , or a speech after the manner of the hebrews , &c. hellenismus , a grecism or imitation of the greeks in phrase or construction . hendiadys , a dividing of one thing into two : a figure when one thing is expressed by more words . hirmos , a bond or knot : a figure whereby a sudden entrance is made into a confused heap of matter , &c. homoeoptoton , falling out alike : a figure whereby divers clauses end with the same letter or syllable . homoeoteleuton , ending alike : a fig. whereby divers parts , or members of a sentence end alike , &c. horismos , definition : a figure whereby we declare what a thing is , and is usually when we distinguish between two words by defining both of them , &c. hypallage , a changing : a figure when the natural order of the words is changed , &c. hyperbaton , a passing over : it is a transposed order of words ; a figure when words agreeing in sense , are in place disjoyned . hyperbole , exuperation , or a passing of bounds ; it is when the trope is exceedingly inlarged ; or when in advancing or repressing one speaks much more than is precisely true , yea , above all belief , &c. hypophora , an objection ; it propounds an objection , and is , when the speaker makes answer to his own demand : see prolepsis . hypothesis , a supposition . hypotyposis , representation : a figure when a whole matter is expressed so particularly and in order , that it seems to be represented unto ocular inspection , &c. hypozeugma , a joyning together in the end : a figure when the common word is put in the last clause : in zeugma . hysterologia , a preposterous speech ; or a placing of that before which should succeed , and contrarily , &c. i. incrementum , an increasing : a figure when a speech ascends by degrees from the lowest to the highest , &c. inversio , a turning upside down : a figure whereby the speaker brings in a thing for himself , which was alledged against him . ironia , mocking or counterfeiting : a trope whereby in derision , we speak contrary to what we think or mean. l. litotes , smallnesse , or extenuation : a figure when lesse is said then signified : hereby sometimes a word is put d●wn with a sign of negation , when as much is signified as if we had spoken affirmatively ; if not more , &c. m. martyria , testimony : a figure when the speaker confirms something by his own experience . meiosis , extenuation , or diminution : it is when lesse is spoken , yet more is understood , or when for extenuation sake we use a more light and easie term then the matter requires , &c. see in hyperbole . mesozeugma , a joyning together in the middle : a figure when the common word being placed in the middle clause , knits together the precedent and subsequent words , &c. see this in zeugma . metabasis , transition : a figure when we are briefly put in mind of what hath been said , and what remains further to be spoken , &c. metalepsis , participation : it is the multiplying of a trope in one word , and is when there are many tropes in one word , &c. metaphora , translation : it is a translation of words from one species to another : a trope when we expresse our selves by a word of like signification unto that which we mean , &c. metaplasmus , transformation , or a changing from one shape to another : a figure when by reason of the verse , &c. something is necessarily changed , &c. metathesis , transposition , or an alteration of the order of a thing : a figure whereby one letter is put for another . metonymia , transnomination , or change of names : a trope whereby the cause is put for the effect , the subject for the adjunct , or contrarily , &c. a metonymie of the efficient . , a metonymie of the effect . a metonymie of the subject . a metonymie of the adjunct . a metonymie of the matter . a metonymie of the instrument . a metonymie of the antecedent . a metonymie of the consequent . a metonymie of things going together . a metonymie of the end . a metonymie of the form . m●mesis , imitation : an imitating the language of others , &c. mycterismus , a disdainful gibe or scoffe , near a sarcasm . o. onomatopoeia , the feigning of a name : a figure whereby a word is made by a certain sound , &c. oxymoron , subtilly foolish : a figure when the same thing is denyed of it self , or when a contrary epithet is added to any word . p. parabola , a parable or similitude , a comparison made under some similitude . paradiastole , distinction : a figure when we grant one thing , that we may deny another , &c. paragoge , production , or lengthening : a figure when a letter or syllable is added to the end of a word paralipsis , preterition , or overpassing ; it is a kind of an ironie ; and is when you say you passe by a thing , which yet with a certain elegancy you touch at full . paralogismus , false reasoning or a sophistical conclusion . parathesis , apposition : a figure of construction , whereby substantives are added in the same case , &c. parecbasis , digression , or excursion : a figure whereby something beyond the purpose or intended matter , goes out from the appointed discourse . parechesis , allusion : a figure when we bring in something of anothers to another intent then his own . paregmenon , a derivative , or derived from : a figure when words , whereof one is derived of another , are joyned together . parelcon , prolonging : a figure when a syllable or whole word is added to another in the end of it , &c. parenthesis , interposition ; it is a clause comprehended within another sentence , without which notwithstanding the sentence is full , or the sense sound . paroemia , a proverbial speech , &c. it is the continuation of a trope in a speech when proper and peculiar respect is had to the common use , &c. paronomasia , likenesse of words : a figure when by the change of one letter or syllable in a word , the signification also is much altered , &c. parrhesia , liberty or boldnesse of speaking : a figure when we speak freely and boldly concerning things displeasing , &c. pathopoeia , expression of the affections of the mind , or an exceeding stirring up of the affections , &c. periphrasis , circumlocution , or speaking of one word by many ; a figure when we shadow out a thing by some equivalent expressions , &c. pleonasmus , superfluity : a gram. figure whereby some superfluous word ( though not without its sufficient importance ) is added in a sentence , &c. ploce , binding together , or a continuation without interruption : a figure when a word is by way of emphasis so repeated , that it denotes not only the thing signified , but the quality of the thing , &c. polyptoton , variation of cases , or a change of the termination , end , or case : a figure when several cases of the same noune , and tenses of the same verb , are used in conjoyned clauses , &c. polysyndeton , diversly and many ways coupled by conjunctions : a figure signifying superfluity of conjunctions , &c. proecthesis , an exposition which is sent afore : a figure when the speaker doth by his answer ( containing a reason of what he , or some other hath said or done ) defend himself or the other person as unblameable , &c. prolepsis , anticipation , or the prevention of an objection : a figure whereby that which may be objected is anticipated , &c. it is also a certain summary pronunciation of things ; and is made when the congregation of the whole doth aptly agree with the verb or adjective , &c. prosopopoeia , a feigning of the person : a figure when in our speech we feign another person speaking , &c. prosthesis , a putting of one thing to another : a figure whereby a letter , or syllable is added to the beginning of a word . protozeugma , a joyning together in the beginning ; a figure when the common word is expressed in the beginning of the clause or sentence , and omitted after : see in zeugma . s sarcasmus , a biting scoffe or taunt ; near an irony , but somewhat more bitter . similitudo , a similitude , &c. syllepsis , comprehension : a figure of construction , when a nominative plural is joyned to a verb singular ; or on the contrary : or it is a comprehension of the more unworthy under the more worthy , &c. . syllogismus , a reasoning , or rather a conclusion , which is made by reasoning together in argument : a rhetorical syllogism is a form of speech whereby the matter is amplified by conjecture , that is , by expressing some signs or circumstances thereof , &c. a logical syllogism is a perfect argument consisting of three parts , viz. major , minor , end conclusion , whereby something is necessarily proved . symploce , complication , or an agreement of words in a sentence : a figure when all our beginnings and all our endings are alike . synaeresis , contraction : a contraction of two vowels or syllables into one . synalaepha , a mingling together : a figure of prosodia , whereby two vowels are gathered into one syllable , &c. synchoresis , concession : a figure when an argument is ironically yielded unto , and then marred with a stinging retort upon the objector , &c. syncope , a cutting away , or a rendring shorter : a figure of prosodia , when a letter or syllable is taken away from the midst of a word . syncrisis , comparison : a form of speech , which by apt similitude shews that the example brought in is either like , unlike , or contrary , &c. synecdoche , comprehension : a trope where the more comprehensive words are put for the lesse comprehensive , and contrarily , &c. synecdoche speciei . synecdoche partis . synecdoche generis . synecdoche totius . synecdoche numeri . . it is also a gram. figure when a common word or name is restrained to a part , which is expressed by the accusative case , &c. synoeceiosis , reconciling : a figure teaching to reconcile things that differ , and to repugn common opinion with reason , &c. synonymia , a partaking together of a name ; or divers words signifying one and the same thing : a figure when by change of words that are of like signification , one thing is reiterated divers times , &c. synthesis , composition : a figure of construction , whereby a noune collective singular is joyned to a verb plural , &c. systole , a shortning : a figure of prosodia , whereby a long syllable is contrary to its nature made short . t. tmesis , section , or dividing : a figure whereby the parts of a compound or simple word are divided by the interposition of another . z. zeugma , a joyning together : a figure of construction , whereby one verb or adjective , answering the nearer to divers nominative cases , or substantives , is reduced to the one expresly , but to the other by a supplement , &c. a brief explication of the terms used in rhetorique , some being borrowed from logick , and proposed in a greek , and therefore to most in an unknown , ●resse . . a cause , is that by which any thing hath its being , as god , by whom the world , &c. hath its being . . the caussate , is that which depends upon the cause , as having its being thence , as , the artifice from the artificer ; misery from sin. . the efficient , is that which brings a thing to passe : as christ , the salvation of the world . . the effect , is that which is brought to passe by the cause : as , the world by god ; plenty by peace ; penury by war. . the end , is the cause for whose sake the thing is ; or it is whatsoever is intended by any that set upon a work : as , to speak well is the end of grammar ; to grow rich , is a covetous mans end ; to get learning , is intended by a scholar . . finitum , or medium , is whatsoever is helpful to bring to passe a purposed end : as , industry and instruction , to get knowledge . . materia , is the matter or substance , of which any thing is made : as , gold , of which a ring ; silver , whereof a cup is made . . materiatum , is what is made of the matter ; as , a sword , of steel ; a ring , of gold. . forma , the form is that inward principle , by which any thing hath its being , or is what it is ; as , the soul , whereby a man is a man. . formatum , is that which hath its being from the form : as , the man from his soul. . subjectum , the subject is that to which any thing is adjoyned or belongs : as , the mind , to which knowledge , or ignorance ; man , to whom riches , or poverty , fame , or infamy , &c. belongs . . adjunctum , the adjunct , is that which belongs to any thing : as , infamy to villany ; light to the sun ; heat , to fire . . genus , is a more general title attributed to some things more special under it : as , substance , to metals . living creatures . elements . . species , is a more special title attributed to divers particulars under it : as , man to william , thomas , john. . totum , is whatsoever hath parts : as , mans body hath head , heart , arms , &c. and so parts are such as make up the whole . . contraries , are qualities which mutually destroy one another : as heat and cold : wisdom and folly , light and darkness . . similia , are such as agree in some qualities : as , the good man is likened to the palm in greenness , a wise man to an ant in providence . . abstractum , the abstract signifies some form with the exclusion of the subject . the abstract is the substantive , as , whitenesse : it is also called denominans , the thing denominating . . concretum , the concrete signifies the same form with those qualities which adhere to the subject : the concrete is the adjective , as , albus , white : it is also called denominatum , the thing denominated . the mysterie of rhetorique unvailed . rhetorica 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rhetorique , or the art of eloquent and delightful speaking ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ rheo ] loquor , to speak , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ techninôs ] artificialiter , artificially . rhetorique is a faculty by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer : hereby likewise the end of the discourse is set forward , to wit , the affecting of the heart with the sense of the matter in hand . it hath two parts , viz. , garnishing of speech , called elocution . . garnishing of the manner of utterance , called pronunciation ( which in this treatise is not principally aimed at . ) elocution , or the garnishing of speech , is the first and principal part of rhetorique , whereby the speech it self is beautified and made fine : and this is either the fine manner of words called a trope : or , the fine shape or frame of speech , called a figure . the fine manner of words , in the greek , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ tropos ] verborum imitatio , in english , a change of words , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ trepo ] muto , to change . a trope , is when words are used for elegancy in a changed signification ; or when a word is drawn from its proper and genuine signification to another . it is a garnishing of speech in one word , and is there only where the signification is changed : as , bellorum procellae . — magnes amoris . chron. . , . the fields do laugh and sing : that is , look pleasantly and delightfully . luk. . , . herod that fox : that is , that politick dissembler . in a trope there are two things to be considered : . the species . . the affections . the species of tropes are four , viz. . a metonymie , which is when one meet or convenient reason or argument is put for another . as , the efficient for the effect , the subject for the adjunct , &c. . an irony , which is when one contrary is put for another : as , oh holy gentiles , for ungodly . . a metaphor , is a trope which notes out comparison , and is when one like is put for another like unto it : as , the tempest of war , &c. . a synecdoche , which is when words more comprehensive are put for words lesse comprehensive , and contrarily . secondly , the affections of tropes ; which are such qualities as may put ornament upon any of the forementioned tropes . the affections are five , viz. . catachresis , which is when the trope is abused , or the words too far wrested from their native signification : as , hos. . . they eat up the sins of my people . . hyperbole , which is when the trope is exceedingly enlarged : as , luk. . . thou that art lifted up to heaven . . metalepsis , which is when divers tropes are shut up in one word : as , king. . i pray thee let me have a double portion of thy spirit . . litotes , which is when a word is put down with a sign of negation , yet as much is signified , as if we had spoken affirmatively , if not more : as job . . job by this figure saith he hath not eaten his meat alone . . an allegory , which is when the use of the same trope is continued in a long discourse : as ephes. . from the . to the . verse . put on the whole armour of god , &c. note likewise , that antonomasia , onomatopoeia , antiphrasis , charientismus , astismus , sarcasmus , paroemia , aenigma , &c. are ( though not so properly ) called tropes . secondly , the fine shape or frame of speech ; called a figure . a figure in the greek , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ schema ] ( among other things ) signifies principally habitum , vestitum , & ornatum corporis ; in english , the apparel and ornament of the body ; which by a metaphor is transferred to signifie the habit and ornament of words or speech : it is derived from the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ schematizo ] effingo , assimulo , to represent , fashion , or feign . a figure is an ornament of elocution , which adornes our speech , or a garnishing of speech when words are used for elegancy in their native signification : as , latet omnes hora , ut expectetur omnis hora. if error delight us , if error seduce us , error will ruine us . and as in a trope , or the finenesse of words , words are considered asunder by themselves ; so in a figure , the apt and pleasant joyning together of many words is noted : and as of words , some are proper , others changed from their proper signification ; so of speeches , some are right and proper as they are ; others are figurative , or serving for the representation of another thing . the signification of a figure in scripture is twofold : . when the scripture it self propounds an allegorical signification : as , when pet. . , . peter by the arke of noah , signifies baptism : and paul in heb. s . by the red sea , signifies baptism : and in joh. . christ his crosse by the serpent . . when a mans capacity or understanding induces or leads into a figure , and by an apt limilitude agrees with some other clear sense or signification of scripture . a figure is twofold , viz. . figura dictionis . . figura sententiae . . a garnishing of speech in words . . a garnishing of the frame of speech in a sentence . whereof the former belongs to the matter , and as it were , to the body of speech ; but the latter , to the form , and as it were , to the soul , that is , to the sentence . the garnishing of speech in words , is where the elegancy lies in the placing of one word : as , while the minde is inslaved to vanity , vanity will sowre the conversation . a figure of a word is twofold ; viz. . in the dimension or measuring of sounds or words . . in the repetition of sounds or words . a figure in dimension , is that sweet and pleasant number of sounds or words in a sentence . the figure metaplasmus , transformation , and all its kindes ( being largely described hereafter ) are figures in dimension : of this there are four kindes , viz. in striking out , two , viz. synaloepha , a mingling of vowels . ecthlipsis , a striking out of vowels . in adding to and taking from , six figures , viz. prosthesis , apposition . aphaeresis , a taking away . epenthesis , interposition . syncope , contraction . paragoge , production . apocope , a cutting off . in dividing and shortning two , viz. diae●esis , division . synerisis , a shortning . in changing there are five figures , viz. tmesis , section , or a dividing . metathesis : transposition . antithesis , opposition . diastole , extension , or stretching forth . systole , correption or shortning . secondly , a figure of a word in repetition of sounds of words in a sentence : if in the same word , it is epizenxis . if in diverse , it is anadiplosis . if in the beginnings of sentences , anaphora . if in the endings it is epistrophe . if in beginnings and endings , symploce . if in the begining and end of a sentence , epanalepsis . if repeated backward , epanados . if a little unlike , and of divers originals and descents , it is paronomasia . and if of the same original , it is polyptoton . see the table for each figure . there are likewise other figures of a word , viz. climax , antanaclasis , antithesis , ploee , paregmenon , syroeceiosis , oxymoron . synthesis , hendiadys , hypallage , hyperbaton , ellipsis , pleonasmus , asyndeton , polysyndeton , hysterologia , zeugma , hellenismus , antiptosis , secondly , garnishing of the frame of speech , in a sentence , called figura sententiae , is a figure , which for the forcible moving of affections , doth after a sort beautifie the sense and very meaning if a sentence : because it carries with it a certain manly majesty , which far surpasses the soft delicacy of the former figures , they being as it were effeminate and musical , these virile and majestical . it is when the ornament lies in the whole sentence , or where the elegancy is diffused through the structure of one , or more sentences : as , isa. . . hear , oh heavens ! hearken oh earth ! i have nourished and brought up children , and they have rebelled against me . the figures of a sentence are called pathetical , or such as move affection and passion ; and are these , viz. ecphonesis , epiphonema , parrhesia , epanorthosis aposiopesis , apostrophe , periphrasis , diatyposis , horismos , paradiastole , parechesis , erotesis . parenthesis , parathesis , synonymia , hytotyposis , metabasis . a figure of a sentence is ether in thought and musing , by the greeks called in logismo , or in questioning and answering , called in dialogismo . figures of a sentence in logismo , are apostrophe and prosopoeopia . logismus , is when a sentence is made or fashioned without conference . those are figures in dialogismo , or in questioning and answering , when a sentence is made or fashioned in conference , which consists in question and answer ; of which kinds are , aporia , anacoenosis , prolepsis , hypophora , epitrope , synchoresis . tropes and figures ( say the learned ) are the vertues of speech and style , as barbarisms and solecisms are the vices . there is no other trope more frequent , excellent , and beautiful , than a methapor , because that which is the light and star of speech , and tends to richnesse , majesty , perspicuity and pleasantnesse , is a similitude brief and contracted into one word . i shall therefore ( according to the learned farnaby ) begin with a methapor . metaphora , gr . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , translatio , translation , or a removing over ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ metapherò ] transfero , to translate . * it is the artificial translation of a word , from the proper signification , to another not proper , but yet nigh and alike : or it is a translation of words from one species t● another : o● the friendly borrowing of a word to expresse a thing with more light and better note , though not so directly and properly as the natural name of the things meant would signifie . it is a trope when we expresse our selves by a word of a like signification to that which we mean : or when the property of one thing is translated to another : as , gen. . . god is said to r●pent ; where the property of man is translated to the omnipotent and omniscient god. a metaphor is pleasant , for that is enriches our knowledge with two things at once , with the truth and a similitude : and there is nothing in the whole universe , from whence the simile may not be taken ; dat propriae similem translata methapora vocem . laeta seges , gemmant vites . duo fulmina belli . iugenii flumen . mens ferrea . classis habenas . princeps caput reipublicae . virgilius poetarum sol . invidiae flamma . fulmen orationis . flos nobilitatis . expolire orationem . amicitiam dissuere . si sic loqui liceat . si verbis audacia detur . vivis coloribus virum depinxi . two necessary rules to be observed , viz. . a metaphor ought not to be so far fetcht , as that the similitude may not easily appear . . it ought to be drawn from the noblest things , as the poets do , that choose rather to say , rosie-fingerd , then red-finger'd aurora ; as appears by the first english example , where 't is thought unfit to stoop to any metaphor lower then the heaven . english examples of a metaphor . the skie of your vertue overcast with sorrow . you are the most excellent star that shines in the bright element of beauty . the wounds of grief . — flowers of oratory . drops of dew are pearls . flowers in medows are stars . the murmuring of the waters is musick . to divorce the fair marriage of the head and body ; where besides the cutting off of the head , we understand the conjunction of the head and body to resemble marriage . to keep love close prisoner ; which is to conceal love . there came through cheapside a whole fleet of coaches ; for a great number . scriptural examples . king. . . the queen of sheba saw the wisdome of solomon ; here saw , metaphoricically signifies , proved and understood . hagg. . , you looked for much , and lo it came to little ; here to look for signifieth to hope for . jer. . . the neighing of horses is heard from dan : that is , foreseen by the prophet . eccles. . . the eye is not satisfied with seeing , nor the ear filled with hearing : we are in this place by the eye and ear to understand the desire of the minde kindled by those senses . thus in scripture christ is called a vine , a rock , a lamb , a lion , &c. and man , a shadow , a flower , grasse , a wolfe , a bear , a dog , &c. thus we read of metaphors from leaven , salt , trees , seed , &c. besides many hyperbolical metaphors ; as , in hab. . . the stone shall cry out of the wall , and the beam out of the timber shall answer it . lam. . . the wayes of sion lament or mourn , &c. so , mat. . . christ is said to baptize with fire , whereby we may understand , that fire is there put for the power of the holy ghost which purifies and refines as fire . psal. . . i have said , ye are gods , &c. whereby is signified from whom magistrates have their authority , whose place they supply , whose person they represent , and whose example they ought to follow both in executing justice , and shewing mercy . metonymia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , transnominatio , a change of names , or the putting of one name for another ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ metonomazo ] transnomino , to change one name for another : or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which in composition signifies change , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ onoma ] aeolice pro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ onoma ] nomen , a name . a metonymie is a trope , or a form of speech whereby the orator or speaker puts one thing for another , which by nature are nigh knit together . this change of name is used principally four waies . . when the cause is put for the effect . . when the effect is put for the cause . . when the subject is put for the adjunct . . when the adjunct is put for the subject . or , as others define it , it is an exchange of a name , when one word comes in lieu of another , not for a similitude , but for other natural affinity and coherence . atque metonymia imponit nova nomina rebus : . efficientis , ut inventoris ; marte . lyaeo . autoris : legitur juvenalis . livius ingens . materiae : pinus , ferrum , aeris acervus , arundo . aut instrumenti : gladius , lingua , arma manusque . effecti : clades libyae . mors frigida pallet . . subjecti : a curii . b paterae . c germania . d rostra . e vcalegon . f cor , os . g patronus . h nox . i amaryllis . . adjuncti : k fasces . l scelus . m aetas nulla . n libelli . , a metonymie of the cause , is either when the cause is put for the effect , which is called a metonymie of the efficient , or when the name of the matter is put for the thing made of the same called a metonymie of the matter . . a metonymie of the efficient , is when the efficient cause is put for its effect ; or when the name of the inventor or author is put for the thing invented , or composed : as , in farnabies inserted examples , marte , pro praelio ; mars being the feigned inventor of war. — lyaeo , pro vino ; lyaeus being one of the names of bacchus , who was the feigned inventor of making wine ; where also the names of juvenal and famous livius are put for the books or works , whereof they were authors . vulcanns pro igne . neptunus pro mari . ceres pro pane . venus pro amore . english examples of a metonymie of the efficient . vulcan for fire . neptune for the sea . bacchus for wine . venus so love . mars for war. mercurie for eloquence . so love is usually put for liberality , the fruit and effect of love . my blade is right sebastian , for of sebastians making . he learn'd his arguments of aristotle , and his eloquence of tully ; ( i. e ) out of aristotles and tullies works . scriptural examples . ezek. . . the sword is without , and the pestilence and the famine within , &c. by sword , pestilence , and famine , is signified death , the effect of those causes . hag. . . and i called for a drought upon the earth ; ( i. e. ) hunger and famine caused by drought . numb . . . and be sure your sin will find you out : where sin ( the cause ) is put for punishment , its effect . luk. . , . they have mosos and the prophets , ( i. e. ) the writings of moses and the prophets . thus in gen. . . the soul is put for life . see lev. , . psal. . luk. . . joh. . , , &c. a metonymie of the matter , is when the name of the matter , is put for the thing made of the same : as , pinus pro navi , a pine-tree being much used where it growes , for building of ships . ferrum pro gladio , a sword being made partly of iron . aes pro nummo , brasse and silver being the materials , whereof money is commonly made . ferro facibusq . invasit italiam . sylva , pro domibus . english examples of a metonymie of the matter . i want silver ; where by silver , mony is to be understood . thus seed is put for children , and earth for man. they eat the finest wheat , and drink the sweetest grapes ; by wheat is understood bread , and by grapes wine . scriptural examples . psal. . their idols are silver and gold , ( i. e ) made of those metals . psal. . . he was laid in iron , ( i. e. ) in fetters made of iron . gen. . . dust thou art , ( i. e. ) thou art formed out of the dust. gen. . . for god hath appointed me another seed in stead of abel , ( i. e. ) another childe . dan. . . worshipped wood and stone , ( i. e ) idols made of wood and stone . in like manner also the instrument is put for the effect thereby : as , gladius pro caede . arma pro bello . lingua pro sermone . manus pro scriptura . english examples . the unlikely have worn the crown ; here the crown being an instrument of royal dignity , signifies a kingdome . the sword ( being the instrument of slaughter ) is put for slaughter . in like manner the tongue , for speech ; arms , for war ; the hand , for the manuscript , or hand-writing . scriptural examples . jam. . . but the tongue can no man tame , where the tongue ( the instrument of speech ) is put for the speech . tim. . . was not ashamed of my chain , ( i. e. ) of my bonds or bondage . see prov. . . & . . job . . let god weigh me in an even ballance ; here ballance ( the instrument of equity ) is put for equity it self . see exod. . . sam. . . cor. . , &c. . a metonymie of the effect , is when the effect or thing caused , is put for its cause : as , clades lybiae , pro cladis effectoribus , qui cladem lybiae intulerunt . mors ●●igida pallet , ( i. e. ) pallidos reddit . victoria natura insolens & superba est , ( i. e. ) insolentes & superbos redait . english examples . hereby we say , death is pale , ' fear sad , a●ger hastie , wine bold ; by which is signi●●ed , that death makes pale , &c. thus , love is said to be bountiful , for that it renders one bountiful . scriptural examples . exod. . . he is become my salvation , ( i.e. ) my saviour . gen. . two nations art in thy womb , ( i. e. ) the fathers of two nations ; that is , esau , the father of the idumeans ; and jacob , the father of the israelites . king. . . there is death in the pot , ( i.e. ) some deadly thing which cause●h death . mark . , . a dumb and deaf spirit , ( i.e. ) making the possessed dumb and deaf . see rom. . . heb. . . joh. . . & . . . a metonymie of the subject , is when the subject , or that to which any thing belongs is put for the adjunct , or that which belongs thereunto : and it is made these nine waies , viz. . when the subject is put for the accident inherent : as , a curii , victory ; curius being the name of a certain victorious captain . . when the container is put for the thing contained ; as , b paterae , pro potu in eis contento , crumena , pro nummis . animosum pectus , pro corde . english examples . the cup , for the wine contained in it . the purse , for the money therein , &c. scriptural examples . mat. . . luk. . . by the cup is signified the wine contained therein . see jer. . , &c. . when the place is put for the inhabitants of the same , or for the things it containeth : as , c germania , pro germanis . vrbs , pro civibus . carcer , pro vinctis . anglia , pro anglis . english examples . the city met the general ; for the citizens , &c. it is difficult to overcome italy by war , or greece by learning ; meaning the italians and grecians . we are to war against spain , ( i. e. ) against the spaniards . scriptural examples . luk. . . oh jerusalem , jerusalem which killest the prophets , &c. by jerusalem is meant the rulers and people of that city . deut. . . i call heaven and earth to record ; here by heaven and earth , moses underderstands all in heaven and earth . gen. . . he made him ruler of his house , ( i. e. ) of all his servants , treasurers , and goods in the house . mat. . . it shall be more tolerable for sodom and gomorrah . mark . . and the whole city was gathered together at the door ; ( i. e. ) the inhabitants of the city . see luk. . . acts . . mat. . . . when the place is put for the actions properly done in the place : as , d restrum , pro sermone . academia , aut scholae , pro doctrina . sylve , pro venandi studio . english examples . the hall is done , ( i. e. ) the action of that court of judicature . thus an academy or school is put for learning . scriptural examples . psal. . . because of thy temple at jerusalem ; here by temple is understood the holy excercises and divine worship used in the temple . . when the possessor is put for the thing possessed : as , e vcalegon , a noble sage of troy , whose name is here put for nobility and sagacity . sic dicitur hominem d●v●rari , cujus patrimonium devoratur . apud me ( i. e. ) domi meae . english examples . hereby , lands , houses , and ships , are often called by the owners names . thus , with me , is usually to be understood at my house . so we say of some guardians , they have devoured the orphans , intimating the orphans patrimony . scriptural examples . joel . . judah shall be inhabited for ever ; here judah the son of jacob , is put for the land of jewry , which was promised to his posterity , and by them possessed . gen. . . a servant with me ; that is , in my house . gen. . . depart not i pray thee from thy servant , ( i e. ) depart not from my tent . . when the seat or place is put for the quality inherent to the same : as , f cor ; os . cor pro prudentiâ quae sedem habet in corde , ( unde prudentes cordati dicuntur ; ) os , pro pud●●e ; qui se ore , ( i. e. ) vul●u prodit . aut aliquando cor fortitudinem significat : non tibi plus cordis , sed minus oris inest . english examples . thus the heart is put for wisdome , because wisdome hath its seat there . and sometimes also , the heart is put for courage and fortitude by this trope . scriptural examples . jer. . . the heart is deceitfull , &c. the heart being the seat or place , where the soul keeps it chief residence , is here and elsewhere , put for the will , affections and whole soul , as the qualities inherent thereunto . prov. . . whose committeth adultery with a woman , wanteth a heart ; where by the want of an heart , is understood foolishnesse . see prov. . . . when the advocate or counsellor , who personates his client , is put for him whom he personates and represents : as , g patronus , procliente . the cause will go against the attorny general , intimating against his client , whom he represents . . when the time it self is put for the things usually done in time : as , h nox , pro somno . aestas , pro messe . english examples . the night is frequently put for sleep , and summer for harvest . the dayes thought is the nights dream . the mornings view corrects the evenings work . in the two last examples , the day and the night , the morning and evening , do signifie the actions and accidents in them . scriptural examples . job . . i said , dayes should speak , and multitude of years should teach wisdome , ( i.e. ) the aged , who have seen many dayes . chro. . . and of the children of issachar , which were men that had understanding of the times . cor. . . mans day , for mans judgement . see esth. . . joh. . . or contrarywise , when the things which are done in time , are put for the time it self , as , messis , pro aestate . calor , pro aestate . frigus , pro hyeme . ante focum si frigus erit ; si messis in umbrâ . english examples . by this metonymie , the harvest is put for summer , cold for winter , and sleep for the night . scriptural examples . exod. . . six years thou shalt sow thy land , and gather the fruits thereof . see isa. . . exod. . . deut. . . . when the name of the thing signified , is put for the sign : as , i amaryllis , pro carmine de eadem . jupiter , apollo , aencas , for the statutes or pictures of apollo &c. scriptural examples . thus in gen. . . circumcision is called the covenant , when 't was only a seal of the covenant , and of the righteou●nesse of faith ; as appears in rom. . . so in exod. . . the paschal lamb is called the lords passeover . mat. . , . b●ead and w●ne are said to be christs body and blood ; of which they are only but signes . thus in luk. . . this is the new testament in my blood ( i. e. ) a sign or seal of the new testament in my blood . so in titus . . baptism is called the new birth . . a metonymie of the adjunct , is when the adjunct , or that which belongs to any thing , is put for the subject , or thing to which it belongs or is adjoyned : as , gen. . jacob sware by the fear of his father isaac , ( i. e. ) by god , whom isaac feared . . king . . set thy house in order , ( i.e. ) thy houshold affairs . thus the captain general is often put for his army ; as , hannibal was slain by scipio ; here hannabal is put for his army which he had ●ed against the romans , and scipio for the romans who obtained the victory . sam. . . saul hath slain his thousands , &c. so in act. . christ is put for his members . psal. . . righteousnesse shall look down from heaven , ( i. e. ) god in whom righteousnesse resteth . hos. . . there is no truth , nor mercy , nor knowledge of god in the land ; by which adjuncts is signified , that there are none , or very few at most , in whom those graces may be found . this metonymie is made these waies , viz. . when the sign is put for the thing signified thereby : as , k fasces , pro magistratu , sceptrum , pro regne , toga , pro pace , arma , pro bello . huic consilio palmam damus ; ( i. e. ) victoriam . english examples . thus , weapons and armes sign●fie war , the keys power , and the palm victory , as being signs of war , power , &c. scriptural examples . gen. . . the scepter shall not dep●●● from juaah , ( i. e. ) the kingdome , in●im●●i●g that kings should not cease from the house o● judah . rom. . . he beareth not the swo●● 〈◊〉 vain , ( i. e. ) authority . jer. . . thus here the sword is put for war. thus also the name is often put for the thing it self : as , rev , thou hast a few names . prov. . . the name of the lord , ( i. e. ) the lord himself . phil. . . that at the name of jesus every knee should bow , &c. ephes. , . act. . . . when the quality is put for the person subject thereunto : as , l scelus pro scelesto , villany for a villain . deserts are preferred ; ( i. e. ) men deserving are , &c. give room to the quoise , ( i. e. ) to the serjeant . . when the adjunct of time is put for the persons , or things subject thereunto : as , m aetas nulla , ( i. e. ) homines nullius aetatis . aspera tum positis mitescent secula bellis . ( i. e. ) homines , qui istis seculis vixerunt . temeritas est florentis aetatis , prudentia senectutis , ( i. e. ) juvenum & senum : juventus , ( i e. ) juvenes ; senectus , ( i. e. ) senes . — oculisve aut pectore noctem accipit — noctem , pro somno qui noctus capitur . english examples . thus the night is put for sleep , which is usually taken in the night . take heed young idlenesse , ( i. e. ) idle youth . scriptural examples . ephes. . . the dayes are evill , ( i. e. ) the hearts and conversations of the men of these dayes are evil . . when the names of the vertues themselves are put for good men ; and of the vices , for evill men ; and also when the names of divers other things are used for the persons , to whom they are adjoyned , or appertain : as , ex hac parte pudor pugnat , illic petulantia : ubi pudor pro pudicis ; & petulantia pro petulantibus ponitur , &c. virtutem praesentem odimus ; ( i. e. ) viros bonos . justitia pro justo , &c. english examples . thus vertue is put for good men ; and justice for a just man. . when the thing set in the place , is put for the place it self : as , n libelli pro libraria . ludus pro circo . te quaesivimus omnibus libellis , bibliothecis . english examples . thus books are put for a library or study . a play for a play-house . . when the thing contained is put for the container , or the abstract for the concrete : as , aen. virg. i. — vina coronant , ( i. e. ) pateram vina continentem . wine is put for the cup that contains it . english examples . psal. . . the righteous lord loveth righteousnesse , ( i. e. ) righteous men . cor. . . helps , governments , for helpers and governors . phil. . . circumcision is put for the persons circumcised . tit. . . wickednesse is put for wicked men . see gen. . . prov. . . rom. . . gal. . . it is very usual in scripture to put the abstract for the concrete , to set forth the excellency of the person or thing spoken of . thus god tels abraham , that he shall not only be blessed , sed erit ipsissima benedictio , gen. . . ( i. e. ) affluens omni benedictione ; & non tam benedictus , quam ipsa benedicto dicitur . thus in cor. . . christ is not called righteous , but righteousnesse . . when the antecedent , or that which goes before , is put for the consequent , or that which followes : as , discumbere pro coenare . audire vel auscultare pro obtemperare . fuimus troes , pro non amplius sumus . vixit , ( i. e. ) mortuus est . strato discumbitur ostro , ( i.e. ) cibum capiunt . english examples . thus , to hear , is to obey . he hath lived , ( i e. ) he is dead . they are set ( i. e ) a● s●pper . the sword is drawn , whereby is signified the ensuing slaughter . scriptural examples . exod. . . deut. . . hear , is put for obey . so in exod. , . hearken unto my voice ; for obey my voice or commandement . . when the consequent is put for the antecedent : as , sepultus est , pro mortuus est . evigilabit , pro dormitat . english examples . the guests are risen , ( i. e. ) have supped . he is buried , ( i. e. ) he is dead . scriptural examples . gen. . . in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread , &c. here by sweat following labour , is signified labour before meat . isa. . . he that believeth , shall not make haste : this paul in rom. . . interprets , shall not be ashamed : shame and confusion being effects of making haste , &c. . when all things going together , one is put for another : as , juxta terentium castra posuerat annibal , ( i.e. ) hujus & illius exercitus . annibal ibi moratur , pro exercitu annibalis . english examples . thus hannibal is put for his army , or any captain general for the army under his conduct and command . scriptural examples . josh. . . . joshua overcame the canaanites , ( i. e. ) he and his army . so in sam. . . saul hath slain his thousands , &c. so in mat. . . christ is put for his members . a metonymie of the end , is when the end is put for the means conducing to the same : as , subeat virtus vestra experimenta majora , ( i.e. ) pericula . aris imponit honorem , ( i.e. ) sacrificium . dicitur & planstris vexisse po●mata thespis , ( i. e. ) scenas , in quibus poemata fiebant . an english example . let your courage enterprize greater experiments ( i. e. ) dangers . he layes honour upon the altar ( i. e. ) a sacrifice ; for that in the old law none but such as were priests unto god were admitted to sacrifice unto him , which was a dignity importing honour . scriptural examples . jude . sodome and gomorrah were set forth for examples , ( i. e. ) were punished for examples sake . psal. . . awake my glory , ( i. e. ) my tongue given to glorifie god. see cor. . . a metonymie of the form , is when the * form is put for the thing , to which it gives a being : as , luxuries in flagitiis , crudeli as in suppliciis , avaritia in rapinis , superbia in contumeli●s , pro luxurioso , crudeli , avaro , superbo . ars mendicando quaerit honesta cibum , ( i. e. ) artifices honesti . english examples . thus art is put for an artificer ; pride for a proud man , and covetousness for a covetous man , and the soul for man. heare you modesty it self , ( i. e. ) some one very modest . scriptural examples . exod. . . seventy souls went down into egypt , ( i. e. ) men . the like in gen. . . & . . synecdoche , es , f. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , comprehensio , comprehen●●on , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ synecdechoma● ] comprehendo , aut , una excipio , seu recipio , to comprehen , or take together . it is a trope , or a form of speech , whereby the more comp●ehensive wo●ds are put for the lesse comprehen●ive ; and contrarily : or when a part is understood by the whole , or the whole by a part , the general by the special , and contrarily : or , it is an exchange of the name of the part for the whole , or of the name of the whole for the p●rt . this figurative exornation gives a grace unto spee●h , which otherwise it would want , enforcing the understanding of the hearers to a deeper consideration of the sense and meaning : and is chiefly fourfold , viz. . synecdoche speciei . . synecdoche membri aut partis . . syn●cdoche generis . . synecdoche totius . confundit totum cum parte synecdoche . partis . a myrtoum : auster ; b hyems , mucro . c annibal ; d anglus . . totius : e orator ; color . f annus . g vixit . h atrides . synecdoche speciei , is when the special or a particular sort implies a mo●e general : as , a myrtoum , pro mari , the m●rtean se● , for the whole sea indefinitely . auster pro vento , indefinite . aristides pro justo . moecenas pro patrono . croesus pro divite . thraso pro glorioso . hostes tela parant , ( i. e. ) arma . ecce aristidem , ( i. e. ) justum . sic infinitum numerum dicimus pro magno ; sexcenta licet ejusmodi proferre ; sexcenta , ( i. e. ) p'urima . english examples . caesar , for the king. aristides , for a just man. craesus , for a rich man. auster , for the wind . it is not my sword that can help me ▪ where by sword is understood all kinde of weapons and manners of defence . scriptural examples . psal. . . our father 's trusted in thee , &c ( i. e. ) our ancestors ; where fathers , the more special name , is put for ancestors , the more general . psal. . . i will not trust in my bow , neither shall my sword save me . and in . . he breaks the bow , and cuts the spear in sunder , &c. where by bow , sword and , spear , are understood all weapons of war. see sam. . . mat. . . isa. . . thus a certain number is put for an uncertain : as , zech. . . christ is said to have seven eyes , ( i. e. ) many , to signifie his perfect and singular care of his church . the like in deut. , . psal. . . he hath remembred his covenant for ever : the word which he commanded to a thousand generations ; where a great or infinite number is put for an indefinite number , or such a number as is not determined . psal. . . the righteous m●n falls seven times a day ; that is , often . so in prov. . . thus the word [ many ] is taken for all : as , dan. . . and many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake . now that this word [ many ] signifies all , the holy ghost bears witnesse , in joh. . . all that are in the grave shall hear his voice . . synecdoche partis , or a synecdoche of the part , that is , when a part is put for the whole : as , b hyems , a storm of rain or hail for winter . tectum . pro domo . mucro pro gladio . c annibal , pro exercitu cujus dux erat , velut pars primaria . d anglus pro anglis . * hostis habet muros , ruit alto á culmine troja ; pro hostes. english examples . my name is tossed and censured by many tongues , ( i. e. ) by many men ; where the part of an intire body is put for the whole . thus the roof of the house is put for the whole house ; the edge of the sword , for the sword : and the soul , for the whole man. scriptural examples . gen. . . then abraham took sahah his wife and the souls , &c. for the men and women that were his servants . the like see in rom. . . rom. . . present your bodies a living sacrifice ; ( i. e. ) the whole man. in prov. . . & . . their feet run to evill : where by feet of men , the men of such conversation are understood . mat. . . i am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my ●oof ; where the roof signifies the house . in isa. . , , , & . . the tribe of ephraim is put for the whole people of israel . see prov. . . & . . & . . the hand is put for the whole man , &c. thus the singular number is put for the plural : as , d anglus , pro anglis . the roman was victor in battail , intimating the army of the romans . the english man overcame the hollander . scriptural examples . isa. . . the oxe knoweth his owner , and the asse his masters crib , &c. for oxen and asses . jer . . the stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed time ; for , the sto●ks know their appointed time . rom. . . therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith , &c. for , men are justified by faith . job . . . man that is born of a woman , ( i. e. ) men that are born of women , &c. synedoche generis , is when a general word comprehends the particular , or when the more general name is put for the more special : as , e orator , pro demosthene aut tullio . color , pro forma . g vixit , pro mortuus est . h atrides , ( i. e. ) agamemnon ; quippe qui in expeditione trojana rex regum diceretur . * virtus pro fortitudine . poeta pro homero aut virgilio . english examples . put up your weapon , for your dagger . he lived in such a century , ( i. e. ) he is now dead . thus living creatures are put for beasts . the poet , ( i. e. ) homer or virgil. scriptural examples . mark. . . preach the gospel to every creature : signifying to all men , and not to any other creature . gen. . . all flesh had corrupted his way , ( i. e. ) all men . mat. . . rachel weeping for her children , would not be comforted , because they are not ; for , lived not . judges . . spake to her heart : that is , comforted her . exod. . . all sweet smelling spices , are put for spikenard . see sam. . . king . . synecdoche totius , a synecdoche of the whole is when the whole is put for the part ; as , f annus , pro tempore praesenti . elephantus , pro dentibus . sylvae pro arboribus . pontus , pro fluctu . nos , pro ego . pabula gustassent troje , xanthumque bibissent : ( i. e. ) partem pabuli , partem xanthi flavii . english examples . an army so great as drank rivers dry : meaning a great part of the water in the rivers . he carries a goldsmiths shop on his fingers , for rings . he fell into the water and swallowed the thames , for the water . scriptural examples . sam. . . behold , dagon was fallen upon his face to the ground : though the same verse declares that before its fall , the head of dagon and both the palmes of his hands were cut off upon the threshold , &c. see gen. . . the world is put for the earth , in pet. . . the man is put for the soul : as in luk. . . & , . so in gen. . . till thou return to the ground ; where the man is put for his body . it is also by this synecdoche , when any thing is spoken concerning many persons together , which yet appertains not to every one of them precisely : as , gen. . . in this and the three precedent verses , you have a recital of the twelve sons of jacob , ( which as this verse declares ) were born unto him in padan-aram , and yet this appertains not unto benjamin , who yet is reckoned with the rest , as in vers . . for he was born in the way near ephrath , as in vers . . and in heb. . . the apostle having enumerated many saints , and among the rest enoch , ( as in vers . . ) generally addes , these all died in the faith , &c. and yet enoch was translated that he should not see death , and was not found , because god had translated him , as likewise appears by the . verse . thus the plural number is put for the singular : as , nos , pro ego . nos populo imposuimus & oratores visi sumus ; ubi de se tantum loquitur orator . an english example . cicero to brutus : we deceived the people , and seemed orators , speaking of himselfe only . scriptural examples . judg. . . and jephthah was buried in the cities of gilead , ( i. e ) in one city of that region . mat. . . the thieves also which were crucified with him upbraided him ; ( i. e. ) one of the thieves , namely , the unbelieving and unconverted thief . so also gen. . . & . . * compared with the , & . verses . but of the grammarians it is called a synecdoche , or comprehension , * when a common word or name is restrained to a part which is expressed by the accusative case . and they call it comprehension , because the particular is comprehended of the universal . this synecdoche is a figure of construction , and is when that which is part is attributed to the whole : as , aethiops albus dentes , an ethiopian white in the teeth ; here , white agreeing to the teeth only , is attributed to the whole ethiopian : pro toto positae partes , quam passio signat , quartum vel sextum casum synecdoche tradit . passivis , neutris , adjectis , participiisq : . dentibus alba . . caput doleo . . spoliata lacertos . . dentibus alba , white in the teeth . . caput doleo , i am pained in my head . . spoliata lacertos , bereft of the strength of the body . by this synecdoche all nouns adjectives , signifying any property ; also verbs passives , and neuters , signifying any passion , may govern an accusative or an ablative case , signifying the place wherein the property or passion is : as , aeger pedes , or pedibus , diseased in the feet . rubet capillos , his hairs are red . truncatus membra bipenni , cut in the limbs with an axe . caetera similes , uno differunt , like in other things , in one thing they differ . ironia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , simulatio , irrisio , mocking or counterfeiting , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in loquendo dissimulatione utor , to dissemble in speaking ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ eiro ] dico , from whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ eiron ] simulator , qui aliter dicit ac sontit : from which ironia is taken for dissimulation , whereby one thing is thought and another spoken ; it signifies also taunting speeches , or a speaking by contraries ; as if we should say black is whi●te . it is called the mocking trope , whereby in derision we speak contrary to what we think or mean , or when one contrary is signified by another : this trope is not so well perceived by the words , as either by the contrariety of the matter , or the manner of utterance , or both . antiphrasis and this are of very nigh affinity , only differing in this , that antiphrasis consists in the contrary sense of a word , and ironia of a sentence . contra quam sentit solet ironia jocari . scilicet , a egregiam laudem ; b pulchre ; c bone custos . a egregiam laudem , ( i. e. ) turpe potius dedecus & infamiam . b pulchrè , ( i. e. ) foediffimè . c bone custos , ( i. e. ) male custos . o salve a bone vir , curasti b prebè , ( i. e. ) a pessime , b negligenter : foedè neglexisti . si genus humanum , & mortalia temnitis arma , at sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi . alter erit maculis auro squalentibus ardens . hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem . . sperate , ( i.e. ) timete . sperare ( i. e. ) timere . . squalentibus , ( i. e. ) splendentibus . est in hic vocibus catachresis . english examples of an irony . he was no notorious malefactor , but he had been twice on the pillory , and once burnt in the hand for trifling oversights . milo had but a slender strength , who carried an oxe a furlong on his back , then kill'd him with his fist , and eat him to his breakfast . so when the persian army was at variance among themselves , philip of macedon ( their utter enemy ) said , he would send his army to make them friends . thus gnatho speaks ironically to thraso ; what ( quoth he ) they knew you not after i had shewn them your good conditions , and made mention of your vertues ? then answered thraso , you did like an honest man , i heartily thank you : here , both the saying of gnatho and thrasoe's answer have a contrary signification . scriptural examples . gen. . . and the lord god said , behold , the man is become as one of us : whereby the lord declares his great disdain of their affectation o● an impossible preheminence , in being like to god ; as if he had said , he is now by his sin become most unlike unto us ; i see how well satan hath performed his promise to them ; is he not become like one of us ? judg. . . go cry to the gods which ye have cho●en . so in isa. . , , . the lord teaches his children to deride the proud insulting king of babylon . our saviour also to awaken his drousie disciples out of their security , doth in mat. . . use this form of speech ; sleeep on now and take your rest , &c. as if he had said , a perillous ●ime is at hand , wherein you shall have little list or leisure to sleep , you have therefore now the moe need to watch and pray . so micaiah in king. ● . bids ahab go to battail against ramoth-gilead and prosper , ( i. e. ) go up and perish . thus in king. . . elijah mocked the wors●ippers of baal ; cry aloud , for he is a god ; either he is talking or he is pursuing , or he is in a journey , or peradventure he sleepeth and must be awak●ned . jo● ● . ●hus he taunts at his false friends : no ●o●bt but ●e ●●e the people , and wisdome shall ●e wit● yo● : as if he h●d s●id , in your own conceits there are none wise but your selves . no doubt but reason hath left us , and is gone wholly unto you ; yea wisdome is so tyed to your persons , that her conversation and ruine depends upon yours . cor. . , . we are fools , ye are wise ; we nothing , ye all , &c. see amos . , . eccles. . . catachresis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , abusio , abuse , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ catachraomai ] abutor , to abuse , or from the praeposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ cata ] contra , against , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ chresis ] usus , use . it is a form of speech , whereby the speaker or writer , wanting a p●oper word , borroweth the next or the likest to the thing that he would signifie . it is an improper kinde of speech , somewhat more desperate than a metaphor , and is the expressing of one matter by the name of another , which is incompatible with , and sometimes clean contra●y to it : and is when the change of spee●h is hard , strange ▪ and unwonted : or , it is the abuse of a trope , when words are too fa● wrested from their native signification , or when one word is abusively put for another , for lack of the proper word : du●ior improp●iae est catachresis abusio vocis : vir gregis ; ultorem promisi ; pulchra minatus . * vir gregis ipse caper , deerravit , — ( i. e. ) dux gregis . capitis nives , ( i e. ) cani capilli . spera●e dolo●em , ( i e. ) time●e dolorem . facies simillima lauro ; nam facies propriè hominis est . english examples of catachresis . a voice beautiful to his ears . he threatens me a good turn . i promised him an executioner . i gave order to some servants of mine , ( whom i thought as apt for such charities as my self ) to lead him out into a forrest , and kill him ; where charity is used , or rather abused for cruelty . they build a horse by pallas are divine : here the poet traduceth that to a beast , which is proper to the making of a house . and as he said that mislik'd a picture with a crooked nose : the elbow of his nose is disproportionable . by the license of this figure we give names to many things which lack names : as when we say , the water runs , which is improper ; for to run , is proper to those creatures which have feet and not unto water . by this form also we attribute hornes to a snail , and feet to a stool ; and so likewise to many other things which lack their proper names . scriptural examples of catachresis . a caution . note that though this trope be to be found in divers places of scripture , yet not as if the scripture abused words , but because those words which are catachestical depart a little from the usual custome of figurative speaking , and are spoken or hang together more roughly or hardly : as , heb. . . enoch was translated that he should not see death . hos. . . they eat up the sins of my people . deut. . . the blood of the grape didst thou drink , ( i. e. ) the juice of the grape . prov. . . by this form of speech solomon nameth the two daughters of the horseleech . psal. . . let my right hand forget her cunning : here is forgetting applyed to the hand , which is proper to the minde . jer. . . the sword shall devour ; here to devour , ( the property of a living creature with teeth ) is catachrestically applied in the sword . lev. . . and i will cutt down your images , and cast your carkasses upon the carkasses of your idols , &c. here pieces of images are called carkasses . exod. . . thou shalt not seeth a kid in his mothers milk . thus in psal. . . prayers and tears are said to have a voice ; the like of tears in psal. . . the lord hath heard the voice of my weeping . isa. . . oh that thou wouldst rent the heavens , &c. the prophet here speaks of god after the manner of men ; if a man we●e in heaven and should descend , he having a body of grosse substance , must divide and rend the heavens ; but god being a most pure spirit , passeth through all things without any dividing or rending ; yet is there in these divine condescensions of speech a singular excellency . rev. . . and i turned to see the voice , &c. so exod. . . ye have seen that i have talked , &c. ( i. e. ) ye have heard the lord speak . see exod. . , &c. metalepsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , transumptio , participatio , participation or a taking from one another , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ metalambano ] transumo , aut particeps sum , to take of , or partake with another . metalepsis is a forme of speech whereby the oratour or speaker in one word expressed , signifieth another word or thing removed from it by certain degrees . or , it is the cloathing of a trope with excellency , or the multiplying of a trope in one word ; to wit , first , when by one improper word another is signified , then by that improper word perhaps another , and so one after another till it comes to the proper word , a mean or middle degree , which affords a passing over or change intervening . it is the continuation of a trope in one word through the succession of significations . this trope is a kinde of metonymie , signifying by the effect a cause far off by an effect nigh at hand ; and it teaches the understanding to drive down to the bottome of the sense , and instructs the eye of the wit to discern a meaning afar off ; for which properly it may be aptly compared to an high prospect , which presents to the view of the beholder an object remote , by leading the eye from one mark to another by a lineal direction , till it discerns the object inquired . transcendit mediis gradibus metalepsis ad altum : hinc movet euphrates bellum . mirabar aristas . , euphrates pro mesopotamia , per meton . adjuncti . mesopotamia pro orientalibus , per synecdochen membri . . aristas , pro spicis , per synecdochen membri : spica , pro segete , per synecdochen i●em membri : seges , pro aestate , quo anni tempore in agris luxuriatur , per metonymiam subjecti pro adjuncto : aestas pro anno rursum , per synechdochen membri . invadunt urbem somno vinoque sepultam . ( i. e. ) invadunt trojanos somno vinoque sepultos . vrbem , pro troja , per synecdochen generis ; troja , pro trojanis , per metonymiam subjecti . english examples of metalepsis . virgil by ears of corn signifieth summers , by a metonymie of the subject ; and by summers , years , by a synecdoche of the part . they invade and enter the city , drowned in sleep and wine , ( i e , ) they invade troy , or the trojans buried in sleep and wine . scriptural examples . lam. . . the tongue of the sucking childe cleaveth to the roof of his mouth for very thirst , &c. here , by the extreme thirst of the sucking babes , the prophet signifies the mothers barren and dry beasts ; and by the dry beasts , the extreme hunger and famine ; and by the famine , the wofull affliction and great misery of the people . mat. . . all the city was moved ; where the city is put for jerusalem ; the general word comprehending the particular by a synecdoche generis ; and jerusalem , for its inhabitants , by a metonymie of the subject . mal. . . the sun of righteousnesse shall arise with healing in his wings . where wings are put for beams by a catachrestical metaphor . and beams for comfort and refreshing by a metaphor . see esth. . . exod. . . hyperbole , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , superlatio , exuperatio , * exuporation or a passing of measure or bounds ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hyperballo ] supero , to exceed . it is an eminent excesse in advancing or repressing , and is when the trope is exceedingly inlarged , or when the change of signification is very high and lofty , or when in advancing or repressing one speaks much more then is precisely true , yea above all belief . hyperbole sometimes expresses a thing in the highest degree of possibility beyond the truth , that in descending thence we may finde the truth and sometimes in flat impossibilities , that we may rather conceive the unspeakablenesse then the untruth of the relation . but though an hyperbole may be beyond belief , yet ought it not to be beyond measure or rule ; let it suffice to advertise , that an hyperbole feigns or resembles , not that it would by a fiction or untruth deceive ; but then is the vertue and property of an hyperbole , when the thing it self , of which we speak , exceeds the natural rule or measure , therefore it is granted to speak more largely , because as much as the thing is , can not be reached unto . hyperbole is twofold , viz. . auxesis , when we increase or advance the signification of a speech . . meiosis , when we diminish or repress the signification of a speech . extenuans augensve excedit hyperbole verum . astra ferit . pluma levior . volat ocyor euro . merita vestra caelum contingunt . candidior cygnis . hedera formosior alba . jam jam tacturos tartara nigra putes . auxesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , augmentum , an increasing . it is when for the increasing , and amplifying we put a word more grave and substantial in stead of the proper word being lesse : as , cum liberalem , magnificum ; severum , saevum ; improbum , sacrilegum dicimus . english examples . in dispraise . thus a proud man is called lucifer , a drunkard a swine , an angry man mad . in praise . thus a fair virgin is called an angel ; good musick celestial harmony ; and flowers in medowes , stars . scriptural examples of auxesis . isa. . . wars are put for some strife . jer. . . and i will make thee unto this people a strong brazen wall , &c. gen. . . let us build us a city and a tower , whose top may reach unto the heaven , &c. see mic. , . job . . gen. . . exod. . . judg. . , &c. meiosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , diminutio , extenuatio , diminution , or lessening . it is when lesse is spoken , yet more is understood ; or when for extenuation sake we us● a lighter and more easie word or terme t●en the matter requires ; or when we put a lesse word for a greater : as , cum adulator●m blandum & affabilem , prodigum aut audacem , liberalem aut fortem nuncupamus . of this further at the end of hyperbole . but the hyperbolical meiosis or dimunition , is that which increases defect : as , cum homunculum , pygmaeum ; stupidum , stipitem ; qui non resp●ndet , mutum appellamus . english examples of meiosis . thus a great wound is called a scratch ; a flat fall , a foile , and a raging railer , a testy fellow , &c. as auxesis of small things makes great matters , so meiosis of great matters makes but trifles . in meiosis , the speaker ought to take care that he fall not into that fault of speech , called tapinosis , humility , that is when the dignity or majesty of a high matter is much defaced by the basenesse of a word ; as to call the ocean a stream , or the thames a brook , a foughten field a fray , great wisdome pretty wit ; or as if one should say to a king , may it please your mastership . scriptural examples of meiosis . sam. . . after whom is the king of israel come out ? after a dead dog , and after a flea ? see psal. . . king. . . thus in cor. . . lesse is put that more may be gathered from it . jam. . . to him that knoweth to do good , and doth it not , to him it is sin , ( i. e. ) a great sin . cor. . . but with many of them god was not well pleased , ( i. e. ) was highly displeased . thus in gen. . . abraham calls himself but dust and ashes . and in job . . he calls man but a worm . english examples of an hyperbole . streams of tears gushed out of her eyes , and the greatness of her grief rent her heart in sunder : where by these incredible tokens of sorrow , her incredible lamentation and grief is signified . this form of speech is either simple , or compared : viz. . simple , as to call the belly of a great glutton , bottomlesse : him that is most hasty in his fury , brainlesse ; a notable coward , heartlesse . . an hyperbole is compared two manner of waies : by equality of comparison : as , to call a beautiful virgin an angel ; a shrew , a devill ; a drunkard , a swine ; an extortioner , a wolfe . . by the comparative degree , &c. harder then a diamond . swifter then thought the worst that ever eye saw , or heart could imagine . but in the frontiers of impossibilitie : as , though a thousand deaths followed it , and every death were followed with a hundred dishonours . the world sooner wanted occasions , then he valour to go through them . words and blows came so thick together , as the one seemed a lightning to the others thunder . beyond the bounds of conceit , much more of utterance . scriptural examples of hyperbole . judg. . . there are men spoken of , every one of which could sling a stone at an hairs breadth and not misse . sam. ●● . . . saul and jonathan were swifter then eagles and stronger then lions . gen. . thy seed shall be as the sand of the sea . see psal. . . so in heb. , . so many as the stars of heaven . deut. . . cities fenced up to heaven . psal. . . the waves of the sea mount up to heaven , and go down to the depths , ( i.e. ) they are sorely tossed up and down when the lord commands and raises the stormy winde . joh. . . the whole world could not contain the books , if they were written , &c. ( i.e. ) they would be very many . luk. . . thou capernaum which art lifted up to heaven , ( i.e. ) highly exalted . luk. . . i beheld satan as lightning fall from heaven . see psal . . & . . prov. . . joel . . the hills shall flow with milk , and the mountains with wine , &c. sam. . . nabals heart died in his breast , and he was made into a stone : this carries a far greater and more emphatical energie of signification with it , then our manner of speech , he was very much affrighted and astonished . allegoria , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inversio , permutatio , inversion or changing ; it is an inversion when one thing is propounded in the words , and another in the sense , the word is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ allegoreo ] aliis verbis allegoricè significo , to a signifie a thing allegorically under other words . observe , that in a metaphor there is a translation of one word only ; in an allegory , of many ; and for that cause an allegory is called a continued metaphor . and as a metaphor may be compared to a star in respect of beauty , brightnesse and direction ; so an allegory may be likened to a constellation , or a company of many stars . an allegory is a sentence that must be understood otherwise then the literal interpretation shewes . it is the continuation of tropes in divers words , as a metalepsis is the continuation of a trope in one word through the succession of significations ; and these are sometimes confused or distinct ; or , it is the continual prosecution of a metaphor and that proportionably through the whole sentence , or through divers sentences , or as others say , it is the continuation of a trope , and of the same allusion in the same discourse ; and is , when one kinde of trope is so continued , as look with what kinde of matter it be begun , with the same it be ended . continuare tropos allegoria adsolet : a absque et cerere & baccho venus alget . claudite rivos . a ( i. e. ) sine pane & vino friget amor . in reipublicae corpore omnia membra , manus , pedes , caput , in totius salutem conspirare debent . quoniam ex vadis jam evasisse videor , & scopulos praetervecta videtur oratio , perfacilis mihi reliquus cursus ostenditur . o naves , referent in mare te novi fluctus : o quid agis ? sortiler occupa portum , &c. in qua , navem pro republica , fluctuum tempestates pro bellis civilibus ; & portum pro pace & concordia intelligi voluit horatius ; lib. . od. . english examples of an allegory . shall we suffer the monstrous crocodile to come out of nilus and to break into our fold , to overcome our shepherd , to rent off our skins with his griping pawes , to crush our carkasses with his venemous teeth , to fill his insatiable paunch with our flesh , and to wallow a● h●s pleasure in our wool ? by this allegory our enemies are described , who either by open force or secret conspiracy are prepared and fully bent to captivate , infringe and destroy the people with their liberties , and to possesse their dwelling places and enjoy their wealth . rub not the scar , lest you open again the wound that is healed , and so cause it to bleed afresh . though this be sense and a reall truth in the letter , yet it hath an allegorical signification , ( i. e. ) renew not by rehearsal that sorrow which time hath buried in the grave of oblivion , or made forgot . philoclea was so invironed with sweet rivers of vertue , that she could neither be battered nor undermined . where philoclea is expressed by the similitude of a castle ; her natural defence , by the natural fortification of rivers about a castle ; and the metaphor continues in the attempting her by force or craft , expressed by battering or undermining . but when she had once his ensign in her minde : then followed whole squadrons of longings , that so it might be with a main battle of mislikings and repinings aginst their creation . where you have ensigns , squadrons , main-battles , metaphors still derived from the same thing , to wit , war. the world 's a theater of theft ; great rivers rob the smaller brooks , and they the ocean . sometimes an allegory is mixt with some words retaining their proper and genuine signification , whereof this may be an example : why covetest thou the fruit , and considerest not the height of the tree whereon it growes ? thou dost not forethink of the difficulty in climbing , nor danger in reaching , whereby it comes to passe , that while thou endeavourest to climb to the top , thou fallest with the bough which thou embracest . this allegory describes , though somewhat obscurely , yet very aptly the danger , vanity , and common reward of ambition : and the words which retain their proper signification are these , covetest , considerest , and forethink ; which words do make it a mixt allegory . scriptural examples of an allegory . a scriptural allegory is such as contains an abstruse and hidden sentence , and other then the native signification of the words will bear ; and it is , when under a dark and hidden saying , the literal sense contains another , to wit , a spiritual or mystical meaning . it is the representation of some mystical or spiritual thing by another , mentioned in scripture , and is , when by the things done under the old law , the mysteries of the new testament are signified : from whence an allegorical sense of the scripture hath its ●i●e . a scriptural allegory is twofold , viz. . natural . . inferr'd . a natural allegory is such as is expresly delivered in the scriptures themselves ; and this properly is the mystical sense of the scripture : as , gal. . . for this agar is mount sinai in arabia , and answeteth to jerusalem which now is , &c. the apostles meaning here is , that in a mystical sense , agar hath some proportion unto jerusalem , that is unto the jewes , whose metropolis or chief city jerusalem was : for , as agar the bond-woman obtained a place in abrahams house , and was at length cast forth thence ; so the jews were in the apostles time under the servitude of the law , and for that they would be justified by the works of the law , were ejected the house of god. exod. . . the face of moses shined , &c. this contains an allegorical sense which the apostle explains in cor. . . , , . but if the ministration of death , &c. was glorious , so that the israelites could not stedfastly behold the face of moses for the glory of his countenance , &c. how shall not the ministration of the spirit be rather glorious ? vers . . but their minds were blinded : for untill this day remaineth the same vail . &c. in the reading of the old testament : which vail is done away in christ. the like allegory you may find if you compare exod. . , . with cor. . , . . an allegory inferr'd , is such as the scripture it self shewes not , nor makes manifest , but is brought in by interpreters . allegories of this kind are like unto pictures ; but their literal expositions like to stone-wals ; the house hath its strength from the stone-wals , the pictures afford not the least strength either to the house or wals . this allegory is either offered , or inforced and wrested : . that inferr'd allegory from scripture which is offered , hath a probable ground and foundation in the literal sense , and a proportionable agreeablenesse of things , and is likewise agreeable to the analogie of faith : as , gen. . . the description there of the arke of noah doth allegorically represent gods spiritual house or church , which in pet. . . is said to be built up of living stones ; and also denotes the lords miraculous preservation of that church of his , so that neither the waves , or strange and pernicious doctrines , or tentations or persecutions can break in upon or drown it . gen. . . the olive leaf represents the gospel ; for in luk. . it is evident that oil signifies mercy and peace . luk. . the prodigal , when absent from his f●thers house , sound nothing but misery and perplexity ; which doth allegorically represent unto us , that rest is to be found in the creator only , and not in the creature . so in the whole book of canticles , the sweet conference between christ and his church , is set down in the words and expressions proper to husband and wife . thus old age is most elegantly decipher'd in eccles. . , . . an allegory inforc'd and wrested , is such as is lest destitute of a probable ground or foundation in the literal sense ; either it differs too much from the thing , from which it is taken , or it is agreeable to another and thwart object ; or otherwise it is too far remote from the analogie of the scriptures : as , such are , mat. , . and other seeds fell into good ground and brought forth fruit , some an hundred fold , &c. see psal. . . mat. . . other allegories . jer. . , . behold , the daies come , saith the lord , that i will raise unto a david a righteous branch , &c. in his daies judah shall be saved , and israel dwell safely , so in zech. . . which allegorically represents the glorious peace and tranquillity of all saints , when christ shall have set up his kingdome , and reign from the river to the end of the land . see hos. , , . job . . . prov. . . antonomasia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nominis unius pro alio positio , a putting of one name for another , or the exchanging or a name ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , pro , for , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ onomazo ] nomino , to name : antonomasia is a form of speech , whereby the oratour or speaker , for a proper name putteth another , and some name of dignity , office , profession , science , or trade . it is a kinde of a metonymie and synecdoche generis , and is when another name , a nickname or common name is put instead of the proper name , or when a word being put without a name , supplies the place of the name . antonomasia imponit cognomen , ut ; a irus ; impius ; b aeacides ; c poenus ; d cytherea ; e poeta . a irus being a poor messenger of penelopes woers , is here put for any poor man. impius , wicked , the wicked fellow is put for any man notoriously wicked . b achilles , the nephew of aeacus . c carthaginian for hannibal who was the eminent man of carthage . d any remarkable person of cythera , but here it signifies venus , who was carried to cythera in a cockle-shell , and was the goddesse of that place . e poeta the poet ; for virgil or homer . arma virumque cano ; — ubi intelligitur aeneas . english examples . this rhetorical exornation is used five waies , viz. . hereby the oratour speaking to high dignities , boweth ( as it were ) the knee of his speech , and lifts up the eye of his phrase to the bright beams of earthly glory , thereby declaring his reverence and their dignity : thus when he speaks to a king or a prince , he saith your majesty , your highnesse : to a nobleman your lordship , your honour . . in stead of name or title , he useth a decent and due epithet , thus , honourable judge , honoured sir. . the author by the name of his profession or science , as when we say , the philosopher for aristotle : the roman orator for cicero : the psalmograph for david . . a man by the name of his countrey : as , the persian the germane , the britain . . when we give to one man the name of another , for the affinities sake of their manners or conditions . in praise thus , as when we call a grave man a cato , a just dealer an a●istides , a wise man a solomon . in dispraise , to call an envious detractor a zoilus , a captious reprehender a momus , a tyrant a nero , a voluptuous liver an epicure . scriptural examples of antonomasia . prov. . . the name of the lord is a strong tower , &c. joel . . he is strong that executes his word . gen. . the everlasting god , where the common attributes , strong and everlasting are put for jehovah , the more proper name of god. so in mat. . . joh. , , . christ is called lo●d : and in joh. . . master : and in mat . . & . . the son of man : in gen. . : the angel : in exod. . the angel of the lord : and in isai. . . the angel of the lords presence : and euphrates is in gen. . . called the river : and christ in dan. . . is called the prince oft he covenant . and in gen. . . the seed of the woman : and in heb. . . the mediator of the new covenant . thus christ also calls his church , his sister , his love , and his dove ; and the church in like manner , him her beloved . litotes , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tenuitas , tenuity , smalness or finenesse , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ litos ] tenuis , small or fine . it is a kinde of synecdoche . a trope when a word is put down with a sign of negation , * and yet as much is signified as if we spake affirmatively , if not more : and by others it is called a figure . when lesse is said then signifyed , and whereby the oratour or speaker for modesties sake seems to extenuate that which he expresses . non equidem laudo , est litotes ; nec munera sperno . non sperno . ( i. e. ) diligo . rhodi romanis haud infesti , ( i. e. ) amicissimi . et gens illa quidem sumptis non tarda pharetris , ( i. e. ) velocissima . me non spernitis , ( i. e. ) di igitis . english examples . it is no small account that he makes of his own wit , or he setteth not a little by himselfe . here by the negations of small and little , or much , are both signified and properly amplified . also by denying the superlative it takes the positive degree thus : he is not the wisest man in the world , or he is none of the wisest , ( i e. ) he is not wise at all . this and such like formes of speaking are used for modesties sake ; for it were not so seemly to say , that he lacks wit , or that he is a fool . so , if a man had some good occasion or just cause to commend himself , he cannot by any means do it in more modest manner then by this form of speech , as if he should say : i was not the last in the field to engage the enemies of my countrey . here , if he should have said , i was first , or one of the foremost in the field , although he had spoken never so truly , it would have savoured of arrogancy and boasting . scriptural examples of litotes . psal. . . a broken heart god will not despise , ( i. e. ) he will highly prize it . thess. . . despise not prophesying , ( i. e ) see that you highly prize it . the like in rom. . . psal. . . touch not mine anointed , &c. ( i. e. ) hurt them not , take heed you be not found among the persecutors of my anointed ones . job . . . despise not the work of thine hands , ( i. e. ) do thou graciously take notice of the work , &c. psal. . . he will not forget the cry of the humble , ( i. e. ) he will surely remember their cry , &c. thus when the scripture would strongly affirm , it doth it oftentimes by denying the contrary : as , isai. . . thou shalt die , and not live , ( i.e. ) thou shalt certainly die . the like in ezek. . . deut. , . joh. . . isa. . . jer. . . joh. . . job . . . job saith that he hath not eaten his meat alone , and that he hath not seen any man perish for want of cloathing , or any poor for lack of covering . here if job had said , that he had feasted many , that he had cloathed every poor body that should otherwise have perished , he had not spoken so modestly , albeit he had said as truly . it is very familiar with the hebrewes , by affirming and denying to expresse the same thing for stronger confirmation of : as , deut. . let reuben live and nor die . the like in sam. . . prov. . . onomatopoeia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nominis seu nominum fictio , the feigning of a name or names ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ onomatopoieo ] nomen seu nomina fingo , fingo vocabula , á sono ea deducens ; to feign a name from the sound . nominis fictio , is a form of speech , whereby the oratour or speaker makes and feigns a name to some thing , imitating the sound or voice of that which it signifies , or else whereby he affecteth a word derived from the name of a person , or from the original of the thing which it expresseth : or , it is a kinde of metonymie , and it is properly said of words so feigned , that they resemble or represent the sound of the thing signified . a sonitu voces onomatopoeia fingit ; bambalio , clangor , stridor , taratantara , murmur . . a stammerer . . the sound of a trumpet . . a crashing noise , or the craking of a door . . the sound of the trumpet . . the noise of water running , a running or buzzing noise . teucria , a teucro . dardania a dardano . english examples of onomatopeia . this form of feigning and framing names is used . waies , viz. . by imitation of sound , as to say , a hurliburly signifying a tumult or uproar : likewise , rushing , lumbering , ratling , blustring , &c. . by imitation of voices , as , the roaring of lions , the bellowing of bulls , the bleating of sheep , the grunting of swine , the croaking of frogs , &c. . by the derivation from the original ; the city troy was so called by derivation from king tros , and before that , it was called teucria from teucrus , and first of all dardania from dardanus ; so ninivie of ninus . . by composition , as when we put two words together and make of them but one , as orator-like , sholar-like : thus also we call a churle , thick-skin ; a niggard , pinch penny ; a flatterer , pick-thank . . by reviving antiquity ; touching this i refer the reader to chaucer , and to the shepherds kalendar . . when we signifie the imitation of another mans property in speaking or w●iting ; this form of speaking is more usual in the greek tongue , and sometimes used in the latine : as , patrissare , matrissare , platonissare , ( i. e. ) to imitate his father , to imitate his mother , to imitate plato , whi●h form our english tongue can scarce imitate , except we say he doth satherize , platonize , temporize , which is not much in use ; yet we more usually follow this form , thus ; i can not court it , i can not italian it , ( i. e. ) i can not pe●form the duty or manners of a courtier , i cannot imitate the fashion of an italian . antiphrasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sermo per contrarium intelligendus , a word or speech to be understood by the contrary , or contrarily ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , antiphrazo , per contrarium loquor , to speak by contraries . antiphrasis is a form of speech which by a word exprest doth signifie the contrary . it is a kinde of an irony , and is , when one and the same word hath a contrary signification , or a meaning contrary to the original sense . antiphrasis voces tibi per contraria signat ; a lucus ; b sacra fames ; c euxinus ; d symphora ; e parcae . a lucus , signifies a lightsome place or lightning , according to the original of the word , but here it signifies a grove or thick wood , for that it takes in no light at all . b sacra fames , literally signifies holy famine or hunge● ; bue here , a covetous desire . c euxinus , originally hospitable , but here it signifies a part of the sea near thrace , which is nothing lesse . d symphora , congestion or heaping up ; but it is sometimes taken for prosperity , and sometimes for adversity . e parcae , originally signifies sparing or favouring , but here by autiphrasis it signifies the three feigned goddesses of destinie : viz. clotho , which puts the wool on the distaffe . laehesis , which drawes the thred of our life . atropos , which cuts it off and favours none . english examples of antiphrasis . it is when the speaker saith , wisely or wittily , meaning the contrary . you are alwaies my friend ; meaning mine enemy . you are a man of great judgment , signifying him to be unapt and unable to judge . scriptural examples . the word ( to blesse ) used in gen. . . , . sam. . . psal. . . doth also by an antiphrasis signifie ( to curse ) as appears by king. . . where the same word that is used in the precedent scriptures to blesse , is used in a contrary signification ; as , thou didst blaspheme or curse god and the king ; as also in job . . . it may be that my sons have sinned and cursed god in their hearts ; and likewise concerning what jobs wife said unto him in job . . . curse god and dye . see another in isa. . . &c. thus in rev. . . &c. a lion signifies christ , and in pet. . . the devill . charientismus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , urbanitas , pleasantnesse , good grace in speaking ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ charientizomai ] jocor , to jest : charientismus is a trope , or form of speech which mitigates hard matters with pleasant words . it is a kinde of an irony , and is , when for rough and unpleasing words , sweet and smooth words are returned : dat charientismus pro duris mollia verba . at bona verba precor . ne saevi magna sacerdos . english examples . a certain man being apprehended , and brought before alexander the great , king of macedonia , for railing against him , and being demanded by alexander why he and his company had so done , he made this answer , had not the wine failed , we had spoken much worse , whereby he signified that those words proceeded rather from wine then malice ; by which free and pleasant confession , he asswaged alexanders great displeasure , and obtained remission . prov. . . solomon commends that answer which turnes away displeasure and pacifies wrath. astismus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , vrbanitas sine iracundiâ , a kinde of civill jest without prejudice or anger ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ asteios ] urbanus festivus , civil or pleasant . it is a kinde of an irony consisting of a pleasant and harmelesse jest : it is taken for any mirth or pleasant speech void of rustical simpli●ity and rudenesse . astismus jocus urbanus , seu scomma facetum est : qui bavium non odit , amet tua carmina maevi : atque idem jungat vulpes , & mulgeat hircos . english examples . the merry and pleasant sayings incident hereunto are called facetia ( i.e. ) the pleasures and delights of speech which are taken from divers places . . from equivocation , as when a word having two significations , is exprest in the one , and understood in the other , either contrary or at least much differing , which as it is witty , so very pleasant . . the occasion of mirth may be taken from a fallacy in sophistry , that is , when a saying is captiously taken and turned to another sense , contrrary or much different from the speakers meaning r as , to one demanding of diogenes what he would take for a knock upon his pate , he made this answer , that he would take an helmet . now he that made the demand , meant what hire , and not what defence . to one that said , he knew not if he should be ejected his house , where to hide his head : another made him answer , that he might hide it in his cap. sarcasmus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , irrisio quaedam amarulenta , a biting scoff or taunt ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sarkazo , carnes detraho , to draw away the flesh . * a sarcasme is a bitter kinde of derision , most frequently used of an enemy ; it is near an irony , but somewhat more bitter . insultans hosti illudit sarcasmus amare : en agros metire jacens , et nuncius ibis pelidae reserens . satia te sanguine , cyre . vendidit & coelum romanus & astra sacerdos : ad stygias igitur cogitur ire domus . english examples . when m. appius in his proeme declared that he was ea●nestly entreated of a friend to use his diligence , eloquence and fidelity in the cause of his client : after all the plea ended , cicero comming to appius , said thus unto him , are you so hard a man ( saith he ) that of so many things which your friend requested , you will perform none ? the pope in this life sells heaven ; hell therefore he reserveth to himself in the life to come . scriptural examples of a sarcasme . psal. . . sing us one of the songs of sion : this was uttered in scornful and insulting manner over the poor israelites being captives in babylon . gen. . . behold , the dreamer cometh . thus michael spits out bitter reproaches against david , in sam. . . how glorious was the king of israel to day , &c. ( i. e. ) how contemptible and inglorious ! &c. thus shimei reviled him in sam. . . thus in exod. . . the children of israel taunt at moses , because there were no grave● in egypt , hast thou taken us away to die in the wilde●nesse ? mark. . , , . and they that passed by , rayled on him , wagging their heads , and saying , ah , thou that destroyest the temple , and buildest it in three dayes , save thy self and come down from the crosse . likewise also the chief priests , mocking said among themselves with the scribes , he save others , himself he cannot save . the like sa●c●sme you shall finde in nahum , . , . and mat. . , . paroemia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ paroimia ] proverbium , adagium , vulgare dictum : a proverbial speech or proverb , applyed to things and times ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ paroimiazomai ] proverbialiter loquor , to speak proverbially or in proverbs . this form of speech is a kinde of an allegory , or the continuation of a trope in a speech in specie , wherein a respect is had to the common use , and so it is called a proverb : or as others define it , it is a comparative speech or similitude which is wont to be in proverbs , or ( as it were ) a sentence bearing rule , as having the chief pl●ce in a sentence , and by its gravity rendering the same more illustrious , clear and excellent . a aethiopem lateremve lavare : paeroemia dicta est . a aethiopem ant laterem lavare ( i.e. ) frustrae laborare . contra stimulum calcas ; thou kickst against the prickes ; i.e. repugnando tibi ipsi , non adversario noces , ut facit qui contra stimulum calcat . lupum auribus teneo : i hold a wolf by the ears , ( i. e. ) dubius sum utrum inceptum peragam , an eo desistam , veluti qui lupum auribus tenet . english examples of paroemia . he that makes his fire with hay , hath much smoke and little heat : whereby is intimated , that many words and little matter render men weary , but never the wiser . all are not thieves that dogs bark at : declaring that ill tongues do as well slander good men , as speak truth of the evil . the sweetest rose hath his thorn : whereby is signified that the best man is not without his fault . many drops pierce the marble stone : declaring the excellency of constancy and perseverance in a good matter . scriptural examples . exod. . . but against any of the children of israel shall not a dog move his tongue , against man or beast , &c. which proverb denotes their great peace and tranquillity . prov. . . where no oxen are , the crib is clean ; but much increase is by the strength of the ox. ezek. . . behold every one that useth proverbs , shall use this proverb against thee , saying , as is the mother , so is her daughter , &c. a proverb is a comparative speech ; as in gen. . . he was a mighty hunter before the lord ; wherefore it is said , even as nimrod the mighty hunter before the lord , &c. jer. . . they shall say , the fathers have eaten a sowre grape , and the childrens teeth are set on edge . pet. . . the dog is turned to his own vomit again , and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire . esth. . . every man should bear rule in his own house . see luk. . , &c. p●ov . . . slothfulness casteth into a deep sleep ; and an idle soul shall suffer hunger . aenigma , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ ainigma ] oratio verborum involucris tecta : a riddle or dark saying , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ainitto ] obscure loquor , aut rem involucris tego , to speak obscurely , or to hide a thing in dark sayings : but it is rather derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ainos ] which ( inter alia ) denotes a saying worthy of praise and admiration . aenigma is a kinde of an allegory , differing only in obscurity , and may not unfitly be compared to a deep myne , the obtaining of the metall whereof requires deep digging ; or to a dark night , whose stars are hid with thick clouds . if there be a singular obscurity in a trope continued , it is called an ae●igma , for that it renders a question obscure , or a speech knotty , and as it were wrapped in : or , it is a sentence or form of speech , whereof for the darknesse , the sense may hardly be gathered . aenigma obscuris latitur sentencia verbis . filiolas cadmi profert nilotis arundo , quas serit è cnidio distillans sepia nodo . in english thus . cadmus his daughters fram'd nilotis quill , whilst sepia doth from cnidian knot distill . ( i. e. ) he writes love-letters in greek . explained thus : cadmus being the first finder out of divers of the greek letters , they are by a metonymie of the efficient called his daughters : and cadmus his daughters here by a catachrestical metaphor signifie the greek letters . nilotis quill fram'd greek letters ; for nilotis pen , &c. by a metonymie of the matter . nilus is the name of a river in egypt ; by the side whereof reeds grow ; which are here called nilotis quill by a catachrestical metaphor : also sepia a fish , whose blood is as black as ink , also black liquor , &c. here put for ink by synecdoche speceii or a metaphor . cnidus a city where venus the goddess of love was worshipped ; here put for venus by antonomasia , or synecdoche generis , and venus for love , by a metonymie of the efficient . mitto tibi a lunam , b solem simul & canis iram , quae reddas à te , dulcis amice , precor . id est , ex corde te saluto . auri b sacra c fames mortalia d pector a perdit . a aurum pro aureis nummis , per metonymiam materiae . b sacrum pro exsecrando , per ironiam seu antiphrasin . c fames pro desiderio , per metaphoram . d pectus pro homine , per synecdochen partis . quid hoc esse censes ? non ego de toto mihi corpore vendico vires , at capitis pugnâ nulli certare recuso ; grande mihi caput est , totum quoque pondus in ipso . malleus est fabrilis . dic quibus in terris & eris mihi magnus apollo , tres pateat coeli spacium non amplius ulnas . quid hoc esse existimas ? sum nondum dira confectus morte , sepultus haud urnâ , haud saxum , non humus ulla tegit : et loquor , & supio , & vitalibus abdicor auris , meque capit vivus m●que vehit tumulus . hic modus nihil nobis facesset negotii amplius si jonae historiam diligenter excusserimus , & cum hoc aenigmate contulerimus : is enim ex ventre orcae ( piscis ) seu , ut ipse existimavit , ex medio orci hoc sibi epitaphium vere ponere potuisset . english examples of aenigma . i consume my mother that bare me , i eat up my nurse that fed me , then i die , leaving them all blind that saw me . this is meant of the flame of a candle , which when it hath consumed both wax and wicke , goes out , leaving them in the dark that saw by it . ten thousand children beautiful of this my body bred , both sons and daughters finely deckt ; i live , and they are dead . my sons were put to extreme death by such as lov'd them well , my daughters dy'd in extreme age , but where i cannot tell . by the mother , understand a tree , by the sons and daughters understand the fruit , and leaves ; by the sons being put to death by such as loved them well , understand those that gathered and eat the fruit ; by the daughters death in age , understand the leaves falling off by the returning of the sap to the root in autumn , &c. anatomie of wonders great i speak , and yet am dead ; men suck sweet juyce from these black veins which mother wisdome bread . by anatomie of wonders , &c. understand a book ; by the sweet juice , instruction ; and by the black veins , the letters and lines in the book . an arithmetical aenigma . suppose malefactors , viz. english men , and turks are adjudged to be executed for piracie , and that the sheriff hath ( after this sentence ) power given him to save one half of these malefactors , but must execute every ninth man , i demand how he may place them in such order and rank , as that he may execute all the turks , and 〈◊〉 ●erve the english men ? let him place them by this verse following ; and for that he would save the english , let him begin with them ; for that o is the first vowel mentioned here , let him place or ranck four of the english men , it being the fourth vowel , &c. let o signifie the english man , and the turk . populeam virgam mater regina tenebat . . . . . . . . . . . . . but if the sheriff had been to have executed every tenth man : he should place them by this verse , rex paphi cum gente bona dat signa serena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . but if the sheriff were to execute every . . or any number of the men between two and sixteen , i shall ( since art is silent herein ) insert a mechanical way for the ready performing the same : and shall give one president ; which followed ( mutatis mutandis ) will lead to the accomplishment of your desire in any the rest of these questions : viz. suppose the sheriff had been to have executed every fifth man : first represent the malefactors by ciphers , or what characters you please , then cancel with your pen every fifth of them , till you have cancelled half of them , then have you the direct order of placing the men before your eye ; for the ciphers or characters c●ncelled represent the turks to be executed , and the other uncancelled those that are to escape . scriptural examples of aenigma . gen. . & . chap. the dreams and visions there of pharaohs chief butler and chief baker , as likewise pharaohs own dreams were aenigmatical ; the significations whereof were expounded by the spirit of wisdome and revelation in joseph , as appears by gen. . , . , . gen. . , . &c. dan. . , . &c. we have nebuchadnizzars vision , which is also aenigmatical . thus were the visions of mine head in my bed : i saw , and behold a tree in the midst of the earth , and the height thereof was great , the tree grew and was strong , and the height thereof reached unto heaven , and the sight thereof to the ends of the earth ; the leaves thereof were fair , and the fruit thereof much , and it was meat for all : the beasts of the field had shadow under it , and the sowls of the heaven dwelt in the boughs thereof , &c. which daniel by the spirit of the lord opens in the same chapter . in judg. . . we have sampsons riddle , out of the eater came forth meat , and out of the strong , sweetnesse . isa. . , . and there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of jesse , and a branch shall grow out of his roots : and the spirit of the lord shall rest upon him , the spirit of wisdom , and might , &c. see ezek , . . & . chap. of the proverbs , and divers other chapters in that book , you shall find divers riddles and dark sayings , and the same opened and explained , in the demonstration of the same spirit of wisdome they were proposed . figures of a word : see pag. . & . epizeuxis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , adjunctio , a joyning together of the same word or sound : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epizeugnumi ] conjungo , to joyn together . epizeuxis is a figure of a word , whereby a word , is geminated and repeated by way of emphasis , and usually without interposition of any other word : or it is the repetition of the same word or sound likewise when one or more words intervene by parenthesis . this figure serves to the emphatical setting forth of the vehemency of the affections and passions of the mind . ejusdem sit epizexuis repe●itio vocis : ah corydon , corydon ; me , me ; bella , horrida bella . talis amor daphnim ( qualis cum fessa juvencam per nemora atq , altos quaerendo bucula lucos , &c. ) talis amor teneat , nec sit mihi cura mederi . this figure is twofold : viz. . in part of a word , which is . in the beginning of a sentence . . in the end . of a sentence . . in part of a word in the beginning of a sentence : as , o utinam possem populos reparare paternis artibus , atque animos formatae iufundere terrae ! . in a part of a word in the end of a sentence : as , titus annius ad illam pestem comprimendam , extinguendam , fund itus delendam natus esse videtur . . in a whole word , as , ipsa sonant arbusta , deus , deus ille , menalca . si , nisi quae facio poterit te digna videri , nulla futura tua est , nulla futura tua est . excitate , excitate cum , fi potestis , ab inferis . english examples of epizeuxis . thus cicero to anthony . thou , thou , anthony gavest cause of civil war to caesar , willing to turn all upside down . thus virgil , ah corydon , corydon , what madnesse hath thee moved ? o let not , let not from you be poured upon me destruction . it is not ( believe me ) it is not wisdome to hazard our salvation upon so weak a ground as mans opinion . terrors , terrors , upon terrors laid hold on me . scriptural examples . isa. . . awake , awake , put on strength . oh arm of the lord , &c. matth. . . oh jerusalem , jerusalem , thou that killest the prophets , &c. here the wo●d is geminated to expresse the ardency of the speakers affections . isa. . . awake , awake , put on thy strength o zion , &c. see isa. . , , , , , . judg. . . ezek. . . . a sword , a sword , is sharpened , &c. i will overturn , overtu●n , overturn it , &c. ( i.e. ) i will certainly overturn it . thus david bewaileth the death of his son absalom , in sam. . . o my son absalom : my son , my son absalom ; would god i had dyed thee , o absalom my son , my son . this you may find sometimes by way of amplification , as psal. . . the lord is nigh to all that call upon him , even to all that call upon him in truth , so psal. . . and joel . . and sometimes also by way of transition ; as , hos. . . i will hear , saith the lord , i will hear the heavens , and they shall hear the earth , and the earth shall hear the corn , &c. anadiplosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , reduplicatio , reduplication , or redoubling , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , re , again , et 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( diploo ) duplico to double . a figure whereby the last word or sound of the first clause is repeated in the beginning of the next . est anadiplosis quoties ex fine prioris membri , principium fit dictio prima sequentis . pierides , vos haec facietis maxima gallo : gallo , cujus amor tantum mihi crescit in horas . spectatum veniunt , veniunt spectentur ut ipsi . english examples . with death , death must be recompensed . on mischief , mischief must be heapt . let us at any rate buy the truth ; truth will make us no losers . prize wisdom , wisdom is a jewel too precious to be slighted . scriptural examples of anadiplosis . isa. . . this is a rebellious people , lying children , children that will not hear the law of the lord. deut. . . for the lord thy god bringeth thee into a good land , a land of brooks of water , &c. rom. . . if we live , we live unto the lord ; if we die , we die unto the lord , &c. p●al . . . as we have heard , so have we seen in the city of our god , god will establish it , &c. see psal. . , . our feet shall i stand within thy gates oh jerusalem : jerusalem is builded , as a city ; see the . verse of the same psalm . psal. . . jer. . . . . luk. . , . psal. . . &c. climax , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , gradatio ; gradation , or a climbing by steps ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ clino ] reclino , acclino , to bend towards or incline to , for that its ascending is rising upwards ; and its descending , declining or turning away . gradation is a kind of anadiplosis , by degrees making the last word a step to a further meaning : it is a figure when a gradual progresse is used in the site or placing of the same word ; or when the succeeding clauses of a sentece transcend each other by divers degrees , or steps of the same sound . continua serie est repetita gradatio climax : quod libet , id licet his ; et quod licet , id satis andent : quodque audent faciunt ; faciunt quodcunque molestum est . mars videt hanc , visamque cupit potiturque cupita . nec vero se populo solum , sed senatui commisit : nec senatui modo , sed etiam publicis praesidiis et armis : nec his tantum , sed ejus potestati , cui senatus totam rempub. commisit . pulchrum est bene dicere , pulchrius bene sentire , pulch●rrimum bene facere . english examples of gradation . his arm no oftner gave blows , then the blows gave wounds , then the wounds gave death . your words are full of cunning , your cunning of promises , your promises of wind . a young man of great beauty , beautified with great honour , honoured with great valour . you could not enjoy your goods without government , no government without a magistrate , no magistrate without obedience , and no obedience , where every one upon his private passion interprets the rulers actions . out of idleness comes lust ; out of lust , impudence ; out of impudence , a contempt of whatsoever is good . scriptural examples . matth. . . he that receiveth you , receiveth me , and he that receiveth me , receiveth him that sent me ; rom. , , , . knowing that tribulation worketh patience , and patience experience , and experience hope , &c. pet. . , . add to your faith vertue , and to vertue knowledge , and to knowledge temperance , and to temperance patience , and to patience godlinesse , and to godlinesse brotherly-kindnesse , and to brotherly-kindnesse love . cor. . . the head of every man is christ , and the head of the woman is the man , and the head of christ is god , &c. rom. . . whom he predestinated , them also he called ; and whom he called , them also he justified ; and whom he justified , them also he glorified . see rom. , , . cor. . , . all are yours , you are christs , and christ is gods. anaphora 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relatio , relation , or a bringing of the same again , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anaphero ] refero , to bring again or rehearse . it is the repetition of a word of importance and effectual signification ; or , it is a figure when several clauses of a sentence are begun with the same word or sound . diversis membris frontem dat anaphora eandem . ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum ; ter frustra c●mprehensa manus effugit imago . tu pugnare potes , mici sacri est consilii vis : tu vires sine mente geris , mihi cura futuri est . sic oculos , sic ille manus , sic ora movebat . english examples . you whom vertue hath made the princess of felicity , be not the minister of ruine ; you whom my choyce hath made the load-star of all my sublunary comfort , be not the rock of my shipwrack . an example of cicero in the praise of pompey . a witnesse is italy , which lucius sylla being victor confessed , was by this mans counsel delivered ; a wi●nesse is africa , which being opprest with great armies of enemies , flowed with the blood of slain men : a witnesse is france , through which a way was made with great slaughter of frenchmen for our armies into spain : a witnesse is spain : which hath very often seen , that by this man many enemies have been overcome and vanquished . scriptural examples of anaphora . psal. . , . the voice of the lord is powerful , the voice of the lord is full of majesty ; the voyce of the lord breaketh the cedars , &c. jer. . . whom they loved , whom they served , whom they ran after , whom they sought , whom they worshipped , &c. cor. . . where is the wise ? where is the scribe ? where is the disputer of this world , &c. psal. , , . better it is to trust in the lord , then to put confidence in man ; better it is to trust in the lord , then to put confidence in princes , &c. jer. . , , . a sword is upon the caldeans , &c. a sword is upon the lyars , &c. a sword is upon her mighty men , &c. see rom. . . psal. . . . , . . , . , . , . . . ezek. . , . rom. . , . amos . . . . epistrophe , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , conversio . conversion , or a turning to the same sound , or a changing of course , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epi ] prope , near to , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ strepho ] verto , to turn or change it is a repetition of the same word or sound in the ends of divers members of a sentence . a figure when divers sentences end alike , or when divers clauses end with the same word or words . complures clausus concludit epistrophe eodem dicto : crede mihi , si te quoq pontus haberet : te sequerer cenjux , et me quoq : pontus haberet . surgamus , solet esse gravis cantantibus umbra : juniperi gravis umbra : nocent & frugibus umbrae . english examples . ambition seeks to be next to the best ; after that , to be equal with the best : then , to be chief and above the best . where the richnesse did invite the eyes , the fashion did entertain the eyes , and the device did teach the eyes . we are born to sorrow , passe our time in sorrow , end our days in sorrow . either arm their lives , or take away their lives . since the time that concord was taken from the city , liberty was taken away , fidelity was taken away , friendship was taken away . scriptural examples of epistrophe . cor. . . when i was a childe , i spake as a childe , i understood as a childe , i thought as a childe . psal. . , , . oh israel , trust in the lord , he is their help and their shield : o house of aaron , trust in the lord , he is their help and their shield : ye that fear the lord , trust in the lord , he is their help and their shield . matth. . . have we not prophesied in thy name ; have we not cast out devils in thy name , and done miracles in thy name ? cor. . . are they hebrews ? so am i : are they israelites ? so am i : are they the seed of abraham ? so am i. see joel . , . ezek. . , , . ezek . . , , ● , &c. amos . , . &c. hag. , , . lam. . , &c. symploce , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , complexio , complicatio , an agreement of words in a sentence , or complication or folding together , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ symplico ] complico , connecto , to wrap or couple together . symploce is the joyning together of anaphora and epistrophe . a figure when several sentences or clauses of sentences have the same beginning , and the same ending ; or when all our beginnings and all our endings are like . symploce eas jungit complexa utramque figuram . quam bene , caune , tuo poteram nurus esse parenti ? quam bene , caune , meo poteras gener esse parenti ? english examples . an example of cicero . him would you pardon and acquit by your sentence , whom the senate hath condemned , whom the people of rome have condemned , whom all men have condemned . o cruel death , why hast thou taken away my choice , my dear choyce , my dearest and most beloved choyce , and hid her in the dark , where i cannot find her ? can the host of heaven help me ? can angels help me ? can these inefriour creatures help me ? scriptural examples of symploce . psal. . . sing praises to our god , sing praises : sing praises to our king , sing praises . psal. . , , . let israel now say , that his mercy endureth for ever ; let the house of aa●on now say , that his mercy endureth for ever , &c. rom. . . whether we live , we live unto the lord ; whether we die , we die unto the lord ; whether we live therefore or die , we are the lords . see psal. . , , . jer. . . cor. . , . . cor. , . cor. . , &c. epanalepsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , resumptio , a taking back : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ epi ] after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ana ] again ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ lambano , accipio , to take , from whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ lepsis ] acceptio a taking . ep●nalesis is the same in one sentence , which symploce is in several . a figure , when ( for elegancies sake ) a sentence is begun and ended with the same word , or sound . incipit & voce exit epanalepsis eadem : pauper amet caut● : timeat maledicere pauper . vna dies aperit , conficit una dies . vidimus tuam victoriam praeliorum exitu terminatam , gladium vagina vacuum non vid●mus . english examples . severe to his servants , to his children severe . his superiour in means , in place his superiour . in sorow was i born , and must die in sorrow . unkindness moved me , and what can so throuble me , or wrack my thoughts are unkindness ? at midnight thou wentst out of the house , and returnedst against at midnight . scriptural examples of epanalepsis . phil. . . rejoyce in the lord alwayes , and again i say rejoyce . king. . . my son absalom , my son , &c. cor. . , . all things are yours , &c. whether things present , or things to come , all are yours . see cor. . . psal. . , . psal. . & ult . epanodos , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , * regressio , regression , or turning back : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ epi ] again , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anodos ] ascensus , an ascending or climbing up ; which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ano ] sursum upwards , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hodos ] via , a way . epanodos is a figure whereby the like sound is repeated in the beginning and ending of divers sentences , ( an anadiplosis intervening ) or , when the words of a sentence are turned upside down , or as i may say , repeated backward : the same sound being repeated in the beginning and middle , in the middle and end . prima velut mediis , mediis ita epanodos ima consona dat repetens : crudelis tu quoque mater ; crudelis mater magis , an puer improbus ille ? improbus ille puer , crudelis tu quoque mater . thus in english , whether the worst , the child accurst , or else the cruel mother ? the mother worst , the child accurst , as bad the one as th' other . nec sine sole suo lux , nec sine luce sua sol. eloquentia non ex artificio , sed artificium ex eloquentia natum . hermogenes inter pueros senex , inter senes puer . english examples of epanodos . men venture lives to conquer ; she conquers lives without venturing , &c. parthenia desired above all things to have argalus : argalus feared nothing but to miss parthenia . i never saw a fray more unequally made then that , which was between us this day , i with bearing the blows , and he with giving them , till we were both weary . account it not a purse for treasure , but as a treasure it self worthy to be pursed up , &c. unlawful desires are punished after the effect of enjoying ; but impossible desires are punis●ed in the desire it self . shew'd such fury in his force , such stay in his fury . scriptural examples . isa. . . woe unto them , who call good evil , and evill good ; who put darkness for light , and light for darkness , &c. cor. . , . for we are unto god a sweet savour of christ , in them that are saved , and in them that perish ; to the one we are the savour of death unto death ; and to the other , the savour of life unto life . joh. . . he that is of god , heareth gods word ; ye therefore hear it not , because ye are not of god. ezek. . . i will prepare thee unto blood , and blood shall pursue thee ; except thou hate blood , even blood shall pursue thee . see rom. . . gal. . . ezek. . , , cor . . psal. . , , , . ezek. . . thes. . , &c. paronomasia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , agnominatio , agnomination , or likeness of words : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ para ] which in composition signifies amiss , or with some alteration , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ onoma ] nomen , a name : or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ paronomazo ] agnominio , to change , or allude to a name or word . agnomination is a pleasant sound of words , or a small change of names ; or it is a present touch of the same letter , syllable , or word with a different meaning . a figure when by the change of one letter , or syllable of a word , the signification thereof is also changed . voce parum mutata alludit significatum paronomasia ; tu praedo , non praet ● . — agnomitatio dicitur quae fiat similitudine aliquâ vocum & vicinitate quasi verborum : that is agnomination which is made by any resemblance , and as it were by the neighbourhood and nighness of words . quis locus aut lacus ? — ab aratore orator . non emissus ex urbe , sed immissus in urbem esse videatur . video me a te circumveniri , non conveniri . inceptio est amentium , haud amantium . tibi parata erunt verba , huic verbera . nata salo , suscepta solo , patre edita coelo . in stadio & studio virtutis . — ab exordio ad exodium . english examples of agnomination . be sure of his sword , before you trust him of his word . wine is the blood of the vine . hardly any treason is guided by reason . friends turned fiends . you are like to have but a bare-gain out of this bargain . so fine a landerer should not be a slanderer . bolder in a buttery then in a battery . a fit witnesse , a fit witless . she went away repining , but not repenting . alas , what can saying make them believe , whom seeing cannot perswade ? this is no stumbling , but plain tumbling . such errors will cause terrors . scriptural examples . cor. . . though we walk in the the flesh , yet do not we war after the flesh . cor. . . as unknown and yet known , &c. psal. . . in te confisi , numquam confusi . see isa. . . rom. . . in quo alium domnas , teipsum condemnac . see cor. , . matth. . . let the dead bury the dead , &c. antanaclasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , reciprocatio , reciprocation or beating back , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ antanaclao ] reciprico , refringo , to goe back or bear back . it is a various signification of the same word : a figure when the same word is repeated in a divers if not in a contrary signification ; it is also a retreat to the matter at the end of a long parenthesis . — amari mejuvat , antanaclasis erit , si nil sit amari . veniam , si senatus det veniam . english examples . care for those things in your youth which may in old age discharge you of care . care in the first place signifies to provide , in the last , the solicitude and anxiety of the minde . in thy youth learn some craft , that in old age thou mayst get thy living without craft . craft in the first place , signifies science , or occupation ; in the second , deceit or subtilty . * shall that heart ( which does not only feel them , but hath all motion of this life placed in them ) shall that heart i say , &c. scriptural examples of antanaclasis . matth. . . i will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine , untill that day , when i drink it new with you in my fathers kingdom , &c. here the first word ( drink ) hath a literal or proper signification ; but the later , a metaphorical acceptation , concerning their partaking together of the joys of heaven . john . the world was made by him , and the world knew him not , &c. the former word ( world ) notes the whole universe ; the later , the unbelieving men , who are of the world . thus in matth. . . leaven signifies the nature of the gospel , and in mat. . , , , . sinful corruption . matth. . . let the dead bury their dead , &c. see matth. . . luk. . , &c. joh. . , . isa. . . ploce , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nexus , contextus , binding together , or a continuation without interruption : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pleco ] necto , to knit or bind together . a figure when a word is by way of emphasis so repeated , that it denotes not only the thing signified , but the quality of the thing : hereby the proper name of any man well known , being repeated , signifies the nature and permanent quality of the man , whose name it is . est ploce : corydon , corydon est tempore ab illo . hic consul est vere consul . talis mater erat si modo mater erat . tot homines adfuerant , si modo homines fuerunt . english examples of ploce . josephus speaking of our saviour , saith . there was a man called jesus , if it be lawful to call him a man. bread is bread indeed to a hungry , stomach . in that great victory caesar was caesar , ( i e , ) a serene conq●e●er . what man is there living , but will pitty such a case , if he be a man ? the last word ( m●n ) imports that humanity or compassion proper to mans nature . physician heal thy self , if thou art a physitian , ( i. e. ) if thou hast the skill and science of physick . scriptural . gen. . . esau speaking of his brother jacob , saith , is he not rightly called jacob ? for he hath supplanted me these two times . polyptoton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , variatio casuum , aut multos casus habens , variation of cases , a small change of the termination or case : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ poly ] varie , variously , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ptoton ] cadens , falling out , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ptoo ] cado , to fall . polyptoton is a repetition of words of the same lineage , that differ only in termination , and it is made by changing ( ) the mood , ( ) the tense , ( ) the person , ( ) the case , ( ) the degree , ( ) the gender , ( ) the number , ( ) the part of speech . it is a kinde of gradation , for it is continued by its degrees in words unlike , as an anadiplisis is in like words : a figure when several cases of the same noun , and tenses of the same verb , are used in conjoyned clauses ; eslo polyptoton , vario si dictio casu consonet : arma armis , pede pes , densusque viro vir . ense minax ensis , pede pes , & cuspide cuspis . cedere jussit aquam jussa recessit aqua . labor labori laborem adfert . quid facies facies veneris cum veneris antè ? ne sedeas , sedeas : ne pereas per eas . english examples . he 's faulty using of our faults . exceedingly exceeding . sometimes the same word in several cases , as , for fear , concealed his fear . sometimes the same adjective in several comparisons . much may be said in my defence , much more for love , and most of all for that incomparable creature , who hath joyned , me and love together . scriptural examples of polyptoton . gen. . the lord when he visiteth in visiting will visit you . rom. . . for of him , and through him , and to him are all things &c. eccles. . . vanity of vanities , all is vanity . gal. . . for i through the law am dead to the law , &c. dan. . . thou o king art a king of kings , &c. john . . no man hath ascended up to heaven , but he that came down from heaven , even the son of man which is in heaven . john . . . cor. . . joh . . he that doth righteousness , is righteous as he is righteous . see tim. . . heb. joh. . . isa , . . hos. . . micah . , &c. isa. . . hhpotyposis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , representatio , representation is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ hypotypoo ] repraesento per figuram d monstro , to represent , or by figure to deaneate , or draw the lively effigies of a thing . hypotyposis is a representing of a thing unto the eye of the understanding , so that it may seem rather to be felt or enjoyed then spoken of and expressed . a figure when a whole matter is expressed so particularly , and in order , th●t it seems to be represented unto ocular inspection ; or when the whole image and propo●tion of things is as it were painted out in words . res , loca , personas , a affectus : b tempora , gesta , exprimit , atque oculis quasi subjicit c hypotyposis . convivii luxuriosi descrip●io . videbar videre alios intrantes , alios vero exeuntes ; qu●sdam ex vino vacillantes , quosdamb sternâ potatione oscitantes : versaturinter h●s gallus , unguentis oblitus ; redimitus coronis : humus erat immunad , lutulenta vino , coronis languidulis , & spinis co●perta piscium . quid plus videret , qui intrasset ? english examples of hypotyposis . there were hills which garnished their proud heights with trees , humble valleys whose low estate seem'd comforted with refreshing of silver rivers ; medows enamel'd with all sorts of eye-pleasing flowers ; thickets , which being lined with most pleasant shade , were witnessed so to by the chearful disposition of many well tun'd birds ; each pasture stored with sheep feeding with sober security , while the pretty lambs , with bleating oratory , craved the dams comfort ; here a shepherds boy piping , as though he should never be old , there a young shepherdess knitting , and withal finging , and her hands kept time with her voices musick . a shew as it were of an accompaniable solitariness , and of a civil wildness . it is a place which now humbling it self in fallowed plains , now proud in well husbanded hills , marries barren woods to cultivated valleys , and joyns neat gardens to delicious fountains , &c. scriptural examples . thus apostasie and rebellion is elegantly deciphered and characterized in isa. . . the whole head is sick , and the whole heart faint : from the sole of the foot even unto the head , there is no soundness in it ; but wounds , and bruises , and putrifying sores , &c. another of famine . lam. . , , . they were more ruddy in body then rubies , &c. their visage is blacker then a coal : they are not known in the streets : their skin cleaveth to their bones : it is withered , it is become like a stick . see isa. . , , . whole chap. and jer. . , , &c. col. . , . paradiastole , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinctio . distinction , noting of difference , or a separating or disagreeing ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ paradiastello ] disjungo , distinguo , to disjoyn , or distinguish . paradiastole is a dilating or enlarging of a matter by interpretation . a figure when we grant one thing that we may deny another , and tends to the dispersing of clowds , and removing of scruples in former speeches ; and to the distinguishing of like or semblable things , to which end the contrary unto the thing spoken of is sometimes added for illustrations sake . explicat oppositum addens a paradiastole : obumbrat . virtutem fortuna ; tamen non obruit illam . fit magna mutatio loci , non ingonii . virtus premi , opprimi non potest . vir bonus oppugnari potest pecuniâ , non expugnari . non enim furem , sed ereptorem : non adulterum , sed expugnatorem pudicitiae : non sacriegum , sed &c. sometimes we confess that which will not prejudice us ; and this is called paromologia , confestion : as , i grant that they are resolute , bu● it is in matters tending immediately to their own undoing . miseros etsi inimicos fovi , fateor , habetis ergo confitentem , non reum . english examples of paradiastole . truth may be blamed , but not shamed , &c. being charged that in a former speech you have brought very light reasons : you may answer ; if by [ light ] you mean clear ; i am glad you see them ; if by [ light ] you mean of no weight , i am sorry you do not f●el them , &c. this figure paradiastole is by some learned rhetoricians called a faulty term of speech , opposing the truth by false terms and wrong names ; as , in calling drunkennesse good fellowship ; ins●tiable avarice good husbandry ; crast and deceit , wisdom and policie , &c. scriptural examples . cor. . , . we are troubled on every side , yet not distressed ; we are perplexed , but not in despair ; persecuted , but not forsaken ; cast down but not destroyed . co● . . . and into ●he maryed i command , yet not i , but the lord. &c. cor. . . and will know , not the speech of them that are puffed up , but the power . antimet abole , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , commutatio , inversio , a changing of word , by contraries , or a turning of the words in a sentence upside down ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anti ] against , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ metaballo ] inverto , to invert , or turn upside down . antimetabole is a sentence inverst , or turn'd back , or it is a form of speech which inverts a sentence by the contrary , and is used frequently to confute by such inversion . a figure when words in the same sentence are repeated in a divers case or person . opposita antimetabole mutat dicta : poema est pictura loquens ; mutum pictura a poema . in dom●natu servitus , in servitute dominatus . vere dici potest magistratum esse legem loquentem , legem autem mutum magistratum . vt nov●rum optima erunt maxime vetera , ita veterum maxime nova . inter viros foemina , inter foeminas vir . english examples of antimetabole . of eloquent men crassus is counted the most learned lawyer ; and of lawyer , scaevola most eloquent . sees● not thou these trophies erected in his honor , and his honor shining in these trophies ? if any for love of honour , or honour of love , &c. that as you are the child of a mother ; so you may be the mother of a childe . they misliked what themselves did ; and yet still did what themselves misliked . if before he languished , because he could not obtain his desiring ; he now lamented , because he could not desire the obtaining . just to exercise his might , mighty to exercise his justice . scriptural examples . cor. . . the children ought not to lay up for the parents , but the parents for the children . joh. . . ye have not chosen me , but i have chosen you , &c. rom. . . the good that i would , i do not ; but the evill that i would not , that do i. cor. . , . for the man is not of the woman , but the woman of the man : neither was the man created for the woman , but the woman for the man. matth. . . the sabbath was made for man , not man for the sabbath . enantiosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contentio , contention or contrariety : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ enanti●s ] adversus vel oppositus , opposite or contrary . a figure when we speak that by a contrary which we would have to be understood as it were by affirmation . librat in antithetis contraria enantiosis : alba ligustra cadunt , vaccinia nigra leguntur . obsequium amicos , veritas odium parit . neque me poenitet mortales inimicitias , amicitias sempiternas habere . pro posthumo . english examples of enantiosis . there was strength against nimblenesse , rage against resolution , pride against noblenesse . he is a swaggerer amongst quiet men , but is quiet among swaggerers . earnest in idle things , idle in matter of earnestnesse . where there is both antimetabole for the turning of the sentence back , and contentio respecting the contrariety of things meant thereby . could not look on , nor would not look off . neither the one hurt her , nor the other help her . just without partiality , liberal without profusion , wise without curiosity . love to a yielding heart is a king , but to a resisting , a tyrant . this is a sentence with distinctio & contentio . scriptural examples . jam. . , . out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing : doth a fountain send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter ? rom. . , . thou therefore which teachest another , teachest thou not thy self ? thou that preachest a man should not steal , dost thou steal ? thou that sayst a man should not commit adultery , dost thou commit adultery ? &c. synoiceiosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , conciliatio , reconciling or agreement , or a joyning together of things that differ : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ synoikeioo ] familiarem reddo , to render familiar . a figure which teacheth to conjoyn divers things , or contraries , or to reconcile things that differ , and to repugn common opiniowith reason ; and is , when contraries are attributed to the same thing . synoeceiosis duo dat contraria eidem : tam quod adest , de sit , quam quod non adsit avaro . aeque adest moderat oni id quo fruitur , ac quo non fruitur . english examples . the covetous and the prodigal are both alike in fault , for neither of them knows to use their wealth aright ; they both abuse it , and both get shame by it . gluttonous feasting and starving famine are both as one , for both weaken the body , procure sicknesse and cause death . the covetous man wants as well what he hath as what he hath not . a dissembler studies to over-teach as well them that trust him , as them that trust him not . scriptural examples of synoeceiosis . prov. . . there is that scattereth , and yet increaseth ; and there is that with-holdeth more then is meet , but intendeth to poverty . rom. . . one m●n esteemeth one day above another : another esteemeth every day alike : let every man be fully perswaded in his own minde . psal. . . yea , the darknesse hideth not from thee , but the night sh●neth as the day : the darknesse and the light are b●th alike to thee . job . , &c. one dieth in his full strength , being wholly at ease and quiet : his breasts are full of milk , and his bones are moistened with marrow ; and another dyeth in the bitterness of his soul , and never eateth with pleasure : they shall lie down alike in the dust , and the worms shall cover them . eccles. . . all things come alike to all ; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked to the good and to cléan , and to the unclean ; to him that sacrificeth , and to him that sacrificeth not , &c. oxymoron , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , acute fatuum aut stulte ●cutum , subtil●y fool●sh ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ oxy ] acumen . sharpnesse of wit , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ mores ] stultus , a fool . it is a sentence delivered with such affectation of wit and gravity as renders it ridiculous . a figure when the same thing is denyed of it self , or when a contrary epithet is added to any word . by this figure contraries are acutely and discreetly reconciled or joyned together , whence it comes to pass that at first sight that seems to be spoken foolishly , which afterwards is acknowledged to have been hidden under a notable and excellent witinesse . oxymoron iners erit ars , concordia discors . strenua nos exercet inertia . avara luxuries . id aliquid nihil est . vivum cadaver . innumeri numeri . cum taceut , clamant . si tacent , satis dicunt . sapiens stultus qui sapere sibi egregie videtur . cum ratione insanit . vita minime vitalis . nunquam se minus otiosum esse , quam cum otiosus ; nec minus solum , quam cum solus esset . english examples of oxymoron . if they are silent they say enough . that something is nothing . a man and no man , seeing and not seeing , in the light and not in the light , with a stone and no stone , struck a bird and no bird , sitting and not sitting , upon a tree and no tree . this is spoken of androgeus the eunuch , who being purblinde , struck a bat in the twilight with a pumice stone sitting upon a mustard-tree . a wanton modesty . froud humility . knowing ignorance . a numberlesse number . scriptural examples . job . . thou hast stripped the naked of their cloathing : he that is naked cannot be stripp'd or spoyled of his clothes ; but the word naked , here signifies male vestitum , ill or poorly clad , &c. jer. . . he shall be buried with the burial of an ass , drawn and cast forth , &c. ( i.e. ) he shall have no burial . tim. . . but she that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth . see act. . , &c. isa. . . aetiologia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causae redditio , a shewing of a reason , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ aitiologeo ] rationem reddo , to render a reason . aetiologia is a figure or form of speech , whereby the orator or speaker joyneth reason or cause to a proposition or sentence uttered , as an authentick seal thereunto . propositi reddit causas aetiologia . sperne voluptates : nocet empta dolore voluptas . intelligo quam difficili scopulosoque verser loco . nam cum omnis arrogantia sit molesta ; tum illa ingenii atque eloquentia , molestissima . divin . in ver. english examples . there are no wil●●s more privy then those which are vailed over with the dissimulation of duty , and the custome of familiar acquaintance ; for thou maist easily by taking heed shun an open enemy : but this hidden , inward and famili●r evill ▪ doth not only appear , but also oppresse , before thou shalt be able to foresee and espie it . look what wit or eloquence i have , judges , archias may justly challenge it to himself : for he was the first and principal , that caused me to follow these manner of studies . in vain it is to water the plant , the root being perished . h●ppy in wanting of little , because not desirous of much . the errors in his nature were excused , by reason of the greennesse of his youth . his heart being dissolv'd into love , spake in thoughts , as not having language enough to expresse his affection . scriptural examples of aetiologia . amos . . thus saith the lord , for three transgressions of edom , and for four i will not spare him : because he did pursue his brother with the sword , and did cast off all pitty , and his anger did tear perpetually , and kept his wrath for ever . psal. , . he brought me forth into a large place : he delivered me , because he delighted in me . rom. . , . so that they are without excuse ; because that when they knew god , they glorified him not as god , neither were thankful , &c. see in rom. . . & , . &c. , . , . prov , . . & . . inversio , by the greeks called antistrophe , a turning upside down , derived from verto , to turn or change , and in , against . inversion is a figure , whereby the orator or speaker reasons , or brings in a thing for himself , which was reported or alleadged against him . arguit allatam rem contra inversio pro se : imo equidem ; neque enim si ●ccidissem , sepelissem . romulo in coena parcius bibenti , dixit quidam ; romule , si istuc omnes faciant , vinum vilius sit : is respondit ; imo vero carum , si quantum quisque volet , bibat : nam ego bi●i quantum volui . in english thus , romulus drinking sparingly , at supper one said unto him ; if all men did so , wine would be cheaper than it is : to whom romulus answered , yea , but it would be rather dearer , if every one drunk as much as he would ; for i have drunk as much as i desire . this figure is of near affinity unto metastasis , mutation , which ancient rhetoricians called a form of speech , whereby we turn back those things that are objected against us , to them which laid them to us . thus when anthony charged cicero , that he was the cause of civil war raised between pompeius and caesar , cicero rebounded the same accusation again to antony , saying : thou marcus antony , thou i say gavest to caesar ( willing to turn all upside down ) cause to make war against thy countrey . scriptural examples . matth. . , . and he answered , and said , it is not good to take the childrens bread , and to cast it to dogs ; but she said , truth lord : yet indeed the dogs eat of the crumbs , which fall from their masters table : then jesus answered and said unto her , oh woman , great is thy faith , &c. king. . , . thus , when ahab charged elijah , that it was he that troubled all israel ; nay saith elijah , it is not i that trouble israel , but thou and thy fathers house , in that ye have forsaken the commandments of the lord , and thou hast followed balaam , &c. prolepsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , occupatio , anticipatio , occupation or the prevention of an objection , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pro ] prae , before , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ lambano ] capio , accipio , to take or receive ; from whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ lepsis ] acceptio , a taking : or it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ prolambano ] anticipo , to prevent . * anticipation , or the prevention of an objection is a figure or form of speech , whereby the orator or speaker perceiving aforehand what might be objected against him , and hurt him as to what he is about to deliver , doth confute it , before it be spoken ; or when we prevent any objection , by framing an answer ; or when we bring an objection and yield an answer thereunto : this figure hath hypophora and anthypophora necessarily relerting unto it . hypophora , signifies an objection ; it propounds an objection , and is when the speaker makes answer unto own demand ; as , isa. . . whom hast thou reproached , and blasphemed ? and against whom hast thou exalted thy voyce , and lifted up thine eyes on high ? even against the holy one of israel . rom. . , . shall we continue in sin , that grace may abound ? god forbid . anthypophora signifies a contrary illation or inferenee , and is when an objection is refuted or disproved by the opposition of a contrary sentence : as , matth. . , , . the chief priests and the elders of the people came unto christ , as he was teaching and said , by what authority dost thou these things ? and jesus answered and said unto them , i also will ask you one thing , which if ye tell me , i in like wise will tell you by what authority i do those things : the baptism of john , whence was it ? from heaven , or men ? &c. and they reasoned with themselvs , saying , if we shall say from heaven , he will say unto us , why did ye not then believe him ? but if we shall say of men , we fear the people , &c. anticipans , quae quis valet objecisse , prolepsis diluit : hic aliquis mihi dicat : cur ego amicum offendam in nugis ? hae nugae seria ducent in mala , derisum semel exceptumque sinistre . dicet aliquis ; haec igitur est tua disciplina ? sic tu instituis ▪ adolescentulos , &c. prosapodosis respensio : ego si quis , judices , hoc rob ore animi atque hac indole virtutis , &c. english examples of anticipation . did i walk abroad to see my delight ? my walking was the delight it self . he saw her alive ; he was glad to see her alive . he saw her weep : he was sorry to see her weep . he heard her comfortable speeches : nothing more joyful . scriptural examples . rom. . , . thou wilt say then unto me , why doth he yet find fault ? who hath resisted his will ? nay but , oh man , who are thou ? &c. rom. . . what then ? shall we sin because we are not under the law , but under grace ? where you have the objection : the answer whereunto is in these words , god forbid . cor. . . some man will say , how are the dead raised up ? and with what bodies shall they come ? thou fool , that which thou sowest is not quickned except it dye , &c. this must be noted , that the objection is many times wanting , which must be wisely supplyed by considering the occasion and the answer of it : as , tim. . , . they will marry , having condemnation ; now , least any might , what , for marrying ? the apostle answers here , no , for denying their first faith . prov. . . honor the lo●d with thy substance , &c. object . so i may begger my self . but this objection is prevented in the words of the next verse ; so shall thy barns be filled with plenty , &c. see the like in matth. . , &c. see isa. . , . matth. . , &c. but prolepsis is also a figure of construction , and then it is defined a certain summary pronunciation of things ; and it is made when the congregation , or the whole doth aptly agree with the verb , or adjective , and then the parts of the whole are reduced to the same verb or adjective , wherewith notwithstanding they agree not . post totum partes capiet generale prolepsis : procedunt castris hinc acron , inde quirinus : alterum in alterius mactatos sauguine cernam . duae aquilae volaverunt ; haec ab oriente , illa ab occidente . — lavinaque littora venit . * epitrope , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , permissio , permission , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epitrepo ] permitto , concedo , to permit or grant . it is the suffering of a deed : a figure when we either seriously or ironically permit a thing , and yet object the inconveniency : this ironical permission imports as much as an earnest prohibition , though the words are otherwise . plane aut dissimulans permittit epitrope factum . . permissio seria ; ut , tribuo graecis literas , do multarum artium disciplinam , non adimo sermonis leporem , ingeniorum acumen , dicendi copiam : deniq : etiam , si qua sibi alia sumunt , non repugno : testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit . . permissio ironica ; an ironical permission is then , when it only seems to be a permission , which yet on the contrary is rather the highest prohibition : — neque te teneo , neque dicta refello . i , sequere italiam ventis : pete regna per undas . i , fuge , sed poteris tuti or esse domi . sit sur , sit sacrilegus , sit flagitiorum omnium vitiorumque princeps ; at est bonus imperator et faelix . english examples of epitrope . simo in terence seems by his words very willing to permit his son to intermarry with glycerie , when in very deed he with all diligence endeavours to withdraw him from her . yes saith he , let him take her , i wish him good of her , let him go dwell and keep house with her . go , flie , but you may be safer at home . scriptural examples . eccles. . , rejoyce oh young man , and let thy heart chear thee , &c. and walk in the wayes of thy heart , &c. rom. . . behold thou art called a jew , and restest in the law , and makest thy boast of god , &c. rev. . . he that is filthy , let him be filthy still . prov. . . sleep a little , slumber a little , and fold thy hands together to sleep a little ▪ but in the next verse you have the meaning most manifestly laid open , &c. see cor. . . judg. . . rom. . . . gal. . , . prov. . . king. . . isa. . . jer. . . amos . , . incrementvn , an increasing or waxing bigger : it is a form of speech which by degrees ascends to the top of something , or rather above the top , that is , when we make our speech grow and increase by an orderly placing of words , making the latter word alwaies excèed the former in the force of signification , contrary to the natural order of things , which ever puts the worthiest and weightiest words first , but this placeth them alwaies last . this figure may aptly be compared to fire , the property whereof is alwayes to ascend as high as matter can carry it . * a figure when a speech ascends by degrees from the lowest to the highest , where the latter words are alwayes the more great and vehement , by which the speech doth gradually as it were increase and wax great . ad summum ex imo gradibus venit incrementum ; non plebs prava jubens ; solida nec mente , tyranni vis fera dimoveat justum ; non turbidus auster , fulminei non dextra jovis ; non , si ruat orbis . facinus est vincire civem romanum , scelus verberare , prope patricidium necare : quid dicam in crucem tollere ? english examples of incrementum . o my parmeno , the beginner , the enterprizer , performer and accomplisher of all my pleasures . neither silver , gold , nor precious stones may be compared to her vertues . he was carelesse of doing well , a looseness of youth ; he was inclined to do ill , a weaknesse of youth ; his mind consented to offend , a shrewd temptation , he committed the act , an unhappy fault ; he accustomed himself to abuse , a sad imployment ; yet he did not this alone , but infected others with his perswasion , and seduced them by his example : and not that only , but detained those he had drawn in , with fresh inventions , and disgraced the modesty of such as resisted his corruptions , with scorns and derisions , which could argue no lesse in him than a most pernicious and detestable resolution . scriptural examples . psal. . . blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly , nor standeth in the way of sinners , nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful . where the first degree is of ungodly men , the second of sinners who wickedly contrive in their hearts the accomplishment of their pernicious enterprizes ; the third of scorners , who glory in their wickednesse and scoffe at reproof . see more examples in psal. . , . isa. . . psal. . . psal. . , . ezek. . . dan. . . hab. . . zech. . , . cor . . joh. . , &c. as there are in the precedent examples gradual ascensions from the lowest to the highest , called incrementum , but by the greeks anabasis , ascensus ; so on the contrary are there descensions from the highest to the lowest , called catabasis descensus : as , in the names of metals , ezek. . . son of man , the house of israel is unto me as dross : all they are brasse and tin , and iron , and lead in the midst of the furnace : they are even the drosse of silver . phil. . , , . who being in the form of god , thought it no robbery to be equal with god : but he made himself of no reputation , and took on him the form of a servant , and was made like unto men , and was found in shape as a man ; he humbled himself , and became obedient unto the death , even the death of the crosse. erotesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 interrogatio , interrogation , or questioning , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ erotao ] interrogo , to question . it is but a warm proposition ; yet it oftentimes doth better than a bare affirmation , * which were but too easie and livelesse a speech ; it is easie and gentile to sharpen the flats of affirmation and down-right relations : a figure whereby we either ( ) demand a question , ( ) earnestly affirm ; or ( ) vehemently deny a thing . note that an affi●mative interrogation is a vehement denying ; and a negative , a vehement affirming : and a negative interrogation sometimes vehemently commands , and an affirmative interrogation in like manner forbids . quaerit * erotesis , poterat quod dicere recte . et procul , ò miseri , quae tanta insania , cives ? creditis avectos hostes ? aut ulla putatis dona carere dolis danaum ? sic notus vlysses ? . when we demand a question ; as , cujum pecus ? an meliboei ? . when we earnestly affirm ; as , quousque tandem , catilina , abutere patientiâ nostra ? when we vehemently deny ; as , aeneid . . et quisquam numen junonis adoret ? & eclog. . an mihi cantando victus non redderet ille ? item pro balbo . a negative interrogation commands with a chiding or threatning ; and an affirmative interrogation in like manner forbids : as , aen. . non arma expedient , totaque ex urbe sequentur ? english examples of erotesis . the credit of behaviour , is to cover imperfection , and set forth your good parts better : now for that , this is too flat and lively a speech , aptly to expresse the affection of the mind ; expresse it by interrogation thus ; is it not the chiefest credit of behaviour to set forth your good parts fairly and clearly , and to cover imperfection ? did the sun ever bring fruitful harvest , but was more hot than pleasant ? have you any fathers that be not sometimes froward ? have you any of your children that be not sometimes cumbersome ? shall we therefore curse the sun ? disobey our fathers ? and hate our children ? scriptural examples . there are in scripture nine kinds of questions ( inter alia ) . . sometimes a question is asked with desire only to receive an answer : as , the mariners of jonas . jonas . . tell us ( say they ) for whose cause is this evill come upon us ? what is thine occupation ? and whence comest thou ? such a question you may finde the wise men made touching christ , in matth. . . . interrogations in scripture are sometimes emphatical and strong affirmations : as , gen. . . if thou doe well , shalt thou not be accepted ? ( i. e. ) thou a●d thy sacrifice shall both certainly be accepted , &c. josh. . . have not i commanded thee ? &c. i have without all question assuredly commanded thee , &c. see more examples in gen. . . . . sam. . . king. . . joh. . . mar. . . jer. . , , &c. king. . . . interrogations also are sometimes strong and vehement negations : as , psal. . . who can understand his errors ? ( i. e. ) no man can understand the depth of them . gen. . . is any thing too hard for god ? job . , . doth god prevert judgement ? or doth the almighty pervert justice ? can the rush grow up without mire ? can the flag grow without water ? &c. see matth. . . rom. . , , , . & . . . interrogations sometimes diminish and abate the sense : as , zech. . . who art thou , o great mountain ? before zerubbabel thou shalt be a plain , &c. ( i. e ) thou lookest very big and great , but who art thou ? i will tell thee , oh proud oppressor of my people , though in thy own conceit thou art a mountain immoveable , yet in my peoples eyes thou art but a mole-hill , and shall shortly be made a nothing , even as a plain before them . thus in sam. . . david when he would abase himself , cryes out ; who am i , o lord god ? and what is my house that thou hast brought me hitherto ? . interrogations sometimes raise and heighten the sense by way of admiration : as , psal. . . o lord our lord , how excellent is thy name in all the world ? exod. . . who is a god like unto thee ? &c. ( i. e. ) let all the world ( if they can ) shew such a god as thou art . see mark . . who is a god like unto thee , that pardoneth iniquity , and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of his heritage ? &c. the question here puts the brightest glory upon god in pardoning sin ; there is no sin-pardoning god , but our god only . . interrogations are sometimes expostulatory and complain : as , job . , . why dyed i not from the womb ? why did i not give up the ghost when i came out of the belly ? why did the knees prevent me ? or why the breasts that i should suck ? psal. . . my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me ? &c. jer. . . wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper ? so in isa. . . &c. . you find in the scripture doubting questions : as , psal. . , . will the lord cast off for ever ? and will he be favourable no more ? is his mercy clean gone for ever ? &c. . you may also finde teaching questions : as , isa. . . who are these that flie as a clowd , and as the doves to their windows ? this teaches us the multitude of those that shall ( when the angels shall be sent out of the temple to preach the everlasting gospel ) flock in unto christ. . you may also finde learning questions : as , acts . . men and brethren , what shall we doe to be saved ? &c. ecphonesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , exclamatio , exclamation , or a crying out : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ecphoneo ] exclamo , to cry out . ecphonesis is a pathetical figure , whereby as the orator or speaker expresses the vehement affection and passion of his own mind , so he also excites and stirs up the minds and affections of those to whom he speaks . it is exprest or understood by an adverb of crying out , as , oh , alas , behold ; which are the signs of this figure . concitat ecphonesis & exclamatio mentem . heu pietas ! ô spes falsas ! proh vana voluptas ! o clementiam admirabilem ! o scelus ! ô pestis ô labes ! ò libidinem effraenatam atque indomitam ! o utinam tunc cum lacedaemona classe petîsset , obrutus insanis esset adulter aquis ! english examples . thus pyrocles seeing the milde philoclea innocently beheaded , bursts forth into this exclamation ; o tyrant heaven , and traytor earth , how is this done ? how is this suffered ? hath this world a government ? alas what delights and how great enjoyments hath one day deprived thee of ! ah poor confidence ! oh glorious triumphs over unarmed captives ! oh admirable clemency and mercy ! oh most wicked presumption , from whence art thou sprung up to cover the earth with falshood and deceit ! scriptural examples of ecphonesis . this figure is made in scripture these ten wayes , viz. . in way of admiration : as , rom. . . oh the depths of the riches both of the wisdome and knowledge of god! &c. psal. . . o lord , how excellent is thy name ! . . o happy people that are in such a case ! &c. . in way of indignation● , as acts . . o full of all subtilty and mischief , thou childe of the devil , thou enemy of all righteousnesse ! &c. . in way of detestation and abhorrencie : as , rom. . . o wretched man that i am , who shall deliver me from the body of this death ! jer. . . o doe not this abominable thing that i hate , &c. . in the way of entreaty or wishing : as , psal. . , o that the salvation of israel were come out of sion ! isa. . . o that thou wouldst rent the heavens ! &c. see chron. . . job . . o that i might have my request ! and that god would grant me the thing i long for ! psal. . . o that i had the wings of a dove , that i might flie and be at rest ! see gen. . . deut. . . . in way of commiseration and lamentation : as , luke . . o jerusalem , jerusalem , which killest the prophets , &c. how often would i have gathered thy children together , &c. lam. . . how is the golden city spoiled ! how doth the city sit solitary , that was full of people ? &c. how is she become as a widow ? . in way of reprehension : as , gal. . . o foolish galatians , who hath bewitched you , &c. see in acts . , , &c. . in way of derision : as , mark . . and they that passed by ( our saviour ) rayled on him , wagging their heads , and saying ; ah thou that destroyest the temple and buildest it in three dayes ! . in way of love : as , psal. . . o how amiable are thy tabernacles , thou lord of hosts ! . in way of exultation and triumph : as , cor. . . oh death , where is thy sting , oh grave , where is thy victory ? . in way of fear : as , tim. . . but thou o man of god , flee these things : and follow after righteousnesse , &c. epiphonema , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , acclamatio , acclamation , or a shooting out of the voyce : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epiphoneo ] acclamo , to cry out or shoot forth the voice . * it is an applause of a thing approved , or a sententio●s ●lause of a discourse , and serves for amplification , when , after a great crime , or desert , exclaimed upon or extolled , it gives a moral note , worthy of credit and observation . acclamation is a figure , when after a thing is done or declared , a clause or pa●t of a sentence is added , briefly purporting some emphasis , and the speakers censure of the thing so done or declared . narratae subit & rei epiphonema probatae . acclamation is brought in with these words , viz. sic ita , adeo ut , quippe , tantus , quantus , talis , qualis , ecce , videamus ergo , &c. ut , tant molis erat romanam condere gentem . quam ut adipiscantur , omnes optant : eandem accusant adepti — tanta est stultitia et perversitas . cic. de senect . tantum religio potuit suadere malorum . lucr. . adeo à te teneris assuescere multum est . jam indicant tot hominum fletus , quam sis charus tuis , adeo ut omnes videant , quam misere insaniunt , qui opes virtuti praeferunt . english examples of acclamation . thus after the relation of scipio affricanus's course , who having been generalissimo of the greatest armies in the world ; having for a long time had kings s●itors for his favour , and to the day of his death , nations kept in aw of 〈◊〉 name ; yet in years neither bought nor sold goods nor lands , nor built any house or castle of his own , left not above l. in gold , and l. in silver behind him at his death . it may be folded up in this acclamation ; so little need hath he to stoop to private cares , that thrives upon publique victories ; and so small leisure has he to be desirous of riches , that hath been so long possest and satisfied with honour , which our ancestors reputed the immortal end of mortal actions . so inconstant is the favour of princes . thus dangerous is the satisfaction of a sensual appetite . so hard is it to escape the force of temptations . so weighty a matter it was to set up the roman nation . scriptural examples of acclamation . thus in matth. . in the beginning of the chapter , after the relation of the parable of the kings sons marriage , and of the man , who ( for that he had nor on a wedding garment ) was cast into outer darkness , &c. you finde this acclamation elegantly added at the end of that discourse : as , in the verse , for many are called , but few are chosen . so the psalmograph having in the former part of the . psalm spoken of the terrors of gods indignation when his wrath is kindled against his adversaries , we find this acclamation , in the last verse ; blessed are all they that put their trust in him . thus also he having in the . psalm highly set forth the glorious excellency of the name of god ; shuts up his praise with this acclamation , in the last verse ; blessed be his glorious name for ever , and let the whole earth be filled with his glory . luk. . . see act. , . matth. . . mark. . . epanorthosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , correctio , emendatio , correction or amending ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epanortho● ] corrigo , to correct or amend . * correction having used a word of sufficient force , yet pretending a greater strength of meaning , refuses it , and supplyes the place with one of more extension . it is the reinforcement of the clause last uttered by the subsequent . a figure when in our speech , something that went before , is called back and corrected ; whereof there are two kinds ; the one is when a word is corrected after ; the other , when a word is corrected before it is spoken . this exornation is made four ways , viz. . by degrees of comparison . . by comparison of the greater and lesser . . by doubting . . by the signs of repenting . est epanorthosis positi correctio sensus : o clementia , seu potiûs patientia mira ! dixi , filium habeo ; ah quid dixi ? habere me ? imo habui chreme ! nunc habeam necne , incertum est . facti quasi poenitentia : sed quid ego ità gravem personam induxi ? english examples of epanorthosis . joseph was amongst his brethren , did i say brethren ? nay tyger-like monsters . i perswade you not to let slip occasion , whilst it may not only be taken , but offers , nay sues t● be taken . for this thy shameful and accursed fact , what shall i call thee ? a wretch ? nay a beast ; nay a poysonous serpent ; yet none of these are fit enough for thee , a devill thou art both in respect of thy malice which thou possessest , and o● the sundry mischiefs thou daily dost commit . cicero against verres . we have here bought before you judges , not a thief , but a violent robber ; not an adulterer , but a breaker of all chastity , &c. i have in your service spent not my time only , but my strength and estate . scriptural examples . gal . . but now after that you have known god , or rather are known of god , &c. thus in act. . . paul corrects his doubtfulnesse of agrippa's belief , where he saith , believest thou king agrippa ? i know thou believest . cor. . . i laboured more abundantly then they all , yet not i , but the grace of god in me . see more examples in rom. . . isa. . . gal. . . luk. . , , &c. when the word is corrected before it be spoken : as , cor. . . forasmuch as ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of christ , ministred by us , written not with ink , but with the spirit of the living god ; not in tables of stone , but in the fleshy tables of the heart . aposiopesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reticentia , a holding ones peace , derived from , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ apo ] post , after ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ siopao ] obticeo , to hold ones peace or be silent . aposiopesis is a form of speech whereby the speaker through some affection , as either of sorrow , bashfulnesse , fear , anger , or vehemency , breaks off his speech before it be all ended . a figure , when speaking of a thing , we yet seem to conceal it , though indeed by this means we aggravate it ; or , when the course of the sentence begun is so stayed , as thereby some part of the sentence , not being uttered , may be understood . aposiopesis sensa imperfecta relinquit : qu●s ego : sed motos praestat componere fluctus . quem quidem ego si sensero . sed quid opus est verbis ? de nostrûm enim omnium — non audeo totum dicare . cic. ego te furcifer , si vivo . caetera gestu agit . nunquid , vos medici , quid characteres ficti ? quid vocabula ignota ? sed aicere dispudet . english examples of aposiopesis . the use hereof is either to stay the vehemency of immoderate affections proceeding to some excesse , or to signifie by a part what the whole means . i let passe your frequent drunkennesse , your wanton company . much more might be said , but i dare not utter all my minde . how doth the childe ascanius , whom timely troy to thee : — breaking off by interruption of sorrow . i might say much more , but modesty commands silence . scriptural examples . psal. . . my soul is sore vexed , but thou o lord how long ? ( i. e. ) how long wilt thou delay to send me help ? luke . . if thou hadst known , even thou , at least in this day , the things which belong unto thy peace ! ( i. e. ) how happy hadst thou been , if thou hadst known them ! king. . . dost thou now govern the kingdom of israel ? arise , art thou a king ! ( i. e. ) if thou beest a king , thou mayst do what pleases thy self . arise speedily and be doing . but remember this was the counsel of a jezebel . heb. . . to whom i sware in my wrath , if they enter into my rest ; ( i. e. ) they shall never enter into my rest ; if they come there , let me cease to be god , or let me not be true . see john . . psal. . . . . cor. . . hos. . . isa. . . aporia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , addubitatio , doubting , or a want of counsel or advice ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ aporeo ] animi pendeo , animi dubius sum , & nescio quid mihi sit faciendum ; to be doubtful of minde , or not to know what is best to be said or done : or it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ aporos ] which signifies as it were not having a way or passage . aporia is a figure whereby the speaker sheweth that he doubteth , either where to begin for the multitude of matters , or what to do or say in some strange or ambiguous thing ; and doth as it were argue the case with himself . consulit addubitans quid agat dicatve aporia . quid faciam ? roger , anne rogem ? quid deinde rogabo ? en quid agam ? rursusne procos irrisa priores experiar ? nomadumque p●tam connubia supplex ? at length the answer of this doubt follows ; quin morere , ut merita es , ferreque averte dolorem . addubitatio sola est , — heu quae nunc tellus , quae me aequora possunt excipe●e ? aut quid misero mihi denique restat ? english examples of aporia . whether he took them from his fellows more impudently , gave them to a harlot more lasciously , removed them from the rom●ne people more wickedly , or altered them more presumptuously , i cannot well declare . what shall i doe ? whither shall i flie ? whom shall i blame ? what shall i pretend ? i know not what to term it , folly or forgetfulnesse , ignorance or wilfulnesse . scriptural examples . phil. . , , . but if i live in the flesh , this is the fruit of my labour : yet what i shall choose , i know not ; for i am in a straight between two , having a desire to depart and to be with christ , which is farre better : neverthelesse to abide in the flesh is more needful for you , &c. psal. . . whither shall i goe from thy spirit ? or whither shall i flie from thy presence ? see rom. . , . lam. . . luke . , . anacoenosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , communicatio , communication , or an imparing a thing to another ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ana ] with , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ coinoo ] communico , to communicate unto another . anacoenosis is a figure whereby we consult with , deliberate , and as it were argue the case with others . this form of speech is elegantly used with such as are ( ) dead : ( ) with the judge : ( ) with the hearers : ( ) with the opp●nent : ( ) with such as are absent : ( ) with sensitive or inanimate things . english examples . were it your case , what would you answer ? tell me , i appeal to your inmost thoughts . would you judge him unworthy to be your friend , that began his fidelity with an inviolable covenant never to be an enemy ? scriptural examples of anacoenosis . mal. . . if then i be a father , where is mine honour ? if i be a master , where is my fear ? &c. isa. . , . now therefore , oh inhabitants of jerusalem and men of judah , judge i pray you between me and my vineyard ; what could i have done any more to my vineyard that i have not done unto it ? &c. jer. . . am i a god at hand ? am i not also a god a far off ? see luke . . cor. . . chap. . , . chap. . , . gal. . . . . &c. prosopopoeia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , fictio personae , the feigning of a person , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ prosopon ] persona , a person , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ poieo ] facio vel fingo , to make or feign . pr●sopopoeia is the feigning of a person to speak , or the attributing of a person to the inanimate creatures ; as , when we bring in persons that are dead , or the inanimate creatures speaking or hearing , &c. a figurative exornation , when in our speech what thing soever which is not a person , is metaphorically brought in and represended as a person ; or when the properties of man are for similitude and agreeablenesse sake attributed unto other things ; whence it is said that this form of speech animates and makes dead men speak ; or it is , when in our speech we feign another person speaking . by this figure god , angels and men , dead , or alive , the heavens , earth , sea , &c. are brought in speaking , hearing , &c. personam inducit * prosopopoeia loquentem : hósue mihi fructus , hunc fertilitatis honorem officiique refers ? quod adunci vulnera aratri rastrorumque fero , totoque exerceor anno . sic aeneae prosopopoeiam virgilius aeneid . composuit , cum aeneas sociis cibum vinumque dividit , & dictis marentia pectora mulcet . o socii ( neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum ) o passi graviora ! dabit deus his quoque finem &c. tandem sic prosopopoeiam claudit : talia voce refert . look that your access to , and retreat from this figure be comely , lest you seem precipitantly to rush in upon it . english examples of prosopopoeia . thus sir philip sidney gives sense and speech to the needle and silk in pamela's hands , and life , and speech unto learning , and a lilly ; yea death it self is feigned to live and make a speech . thus , if an orator having occasion to commend truth or any vertue unto his hearers , he may after some due praise of it , feign it a person , and bring it in bitterly complaining how cruelly she is oppressed , and how little esteemed ; how many be her enemies , and how few her friends ; how she wandereth hither and thither without entertainment , and remains without habitation , &c. i see my words will not move you , but suppose some of your grave ancestors should thus speak to you ; children , can we behold your manners without indignation , being full of pride , effeminatenesse , &c. if your ancestors were now alive , and saw you abusing your self in mispending your estate by them providently gathered together and conferred upon you , would they not say thus , &c. scriptural examples of prosopopoeia . josh. . . behold this stone shall be a witnesse unto us ; for it hath heard all the words of the lord which he hath spoken unto us , &c. judg. . . thus jotham brings in the trees speaking as men : the olive-tree will not leave his fatnesse , nor the figtree his sweetnesse , nor the vine his wine , to reign over others ; but it is the bramble that affecteth soveraignty and domination , a base , scratching , worthlesse , fruitlesse shrub , good for nothing but to stop gaps and keep out beasts from spoyling the pleasant fields , and afterwards to be burnt . kings . . and he cryed against the altar in the word of the lord , and said , o altar , altar , thus saith the lord , &c. psal. . . let the floods clap their hands : let the hills rejoyce together . thus in isa. . , . the prophet attributes joy and singing to the wildernesse , the solitary place , and the desert . see psal. . . psal. . . psal. . , . rom. . , . isa. . . thus in joel . from . to the . ver . you have a most lively rhetorical prosopopoeical description of the terrible army of the babylonians . prosopopaeia is two-fold ; imperfect , or perfect . . an imperfect prosopopaeia is when the speech of another is set down lightly and indirectly ; as in ps. . . david brings in the wicked , as saying unto his soul ; flee as a bird unto your mountain . . a perfect prosopopoeia is when the whole feigning of the person is set down in our speech , with a fit entring into and leaving off of the same . thus in prov. . wisdom cryeth at the gates , &c. unto you o men i call , &c. where the entrance is in the beginning of the chapter , her speech in the latter part of i● . apostrophe , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , aversio , a turning away or dislike : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ apo ] from , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ strepho ] verto , to turn . apostrophe is a diversion of speech to another person then the speech appointed did intend or require ; or it is a turning of the speech from one person to another , many times abruptly . a figure when we break off the course of our speech , and speak to some new person , present , or absent , as to the people , or witnesses , when it was before directed to the judges , or opponent . this diversion of speech is made these nine wayes ; viz. ( ) to god , ( ) to angels , ( ) to men in their several ranks , whether absent or present , dead or alive , ( ) to the adversary , ( ) to the heavenly bodies and meteors , ( ) to the earth and things in it , ( ) to the sea and things in it , ( ) to beasts , birds and fishes ( ) to inanimate things . sermonem a praesenti avertit apostrophe : et auro vi potitur . quid non mortalia pectora cogit auri sacra fames ? vos sanctissimi angeli , testes volo meae innocentiae . quousque tandem , catilina , abutere patientiâ nostrâ ? vos adeste ciconiae , et ingratitudinem hominum redarguite . vos agri , vos parietes obtestor ; an non sudabatis , cum tantum nefas hoc loco perpetrabatur ? per apostrophen poeticam mutando casum : terretur minimo pennae stridore columba , vngnibus , accipiter , saucia facta tuis . english examples of apostrophe . to the people thus , now let me entreat any man here present , that thinks himself not exempted from the like wrong , but lyable to the like prejudice , to imagine himself in my case , and to undertake for my sake some few thoughts of my distress . herein you witnesses are to consult with your own consciences , and to enter into a true examination of your own memory . did you mark his speeches ? did you note his looks ? sometimes the occasion is taken from some quality , or other thing , whereto your self gives shew of life : as , hope , tell me , what ground hast thou to hope for , &c. love , be ashamed to be called love. scriptural examples of apostrophe . the lord by his prophet hosea having long complained of israel for their high provocations against him , doth break off from speaking of israel , and turns his speech to israel : as , hos. . o israel , thou hast destroyed thy self , but in me is thine help . thus david having denounced gods judgments against the kings and rulers of the earth in the . psalm , doth presently divert his speech to the kings and great ones themselves . psal. . , . thou shalt break them with a rod of iron , &c. be wise therefore oh ye kings , be instructed ye judges of the earth . thus isaah finding the people to be rebellious , to whom he was speaking , diverts his speech to the inanimate creatures . isa. . . hear oh heavens , and give ear oh earth : for the lord hath spoken , i have nourished and brought up children , and they have rebelled against me . david being dismayed with the number of his enemies , turns his speech to god , saying , psal. . . but thou , oh lord , art a shield for me ; my glory , and the lifter up of my head . see gen. . . psal. . , , . judg. . . synonymia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nominis communio , seu nomina diversa idem significantia , a partaking together of a name , or divers words signifying one and the same thing , whereof the latter is usually explanatory to the former : derived from , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syn ] simul , together , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ onoma ] nomen , a name or word . a synonymie is a commodious heaping together of divers words of one signification . * a figure when by a variation and change of words that are of like signification , one thing is iterated divers times . this kind of elocution is to be used as often as we see not enough in one word evidently to signifie the dignity or magnitude of the thing mentioned . this figure and palalogia , which signifies repetition of the same word , are alike ; and serves to amplifie and to excite vehement affection and passion , when from one thing many wayes expressed , we fasten many stings as it were in the minde of the hearer . verba synonymia addit rem significantia eandem . enses & gladii . superatne & vescitur aura aetherea , nec adhuc crudelibus occubat umbris ? prostavit , perculit affixit . abiit , excessit , evasit , erupit . english examples of a synonymie . wisdom in the poor man , lyes as a thing despised , rejected , oppressed , buryed and utterly extinct . is it not a certain mark and token of intolerable arrogancy and venemous envy , where the tongue is still exercised in depraving , slandering , defacing , deriding and condemning of other mens words and works ? who more worthy of renown , honour and same , then caesar ? who more worthily esteemed , beloved , reverenced and honoured then noble cesar ? who amongst men was his equal in knowledge , understanding , policie and wisdom ? what was he that might be compared to him , either in courage of heart , in fortitude of minde , or magnanimity of nature ? thus to describe a beautiful woman , may be said ; she hath a most winning countenance , a most pleasant eye , a most amiable presence , a chearful aspect , she is a most delicate object , &c. your beauty ( sweet lady ) hath conquered my reason , subdued my will , mastered my judgment . scriptural examples of a synonymie . isa. . . the fishers also shall mourn , and all they that cast angle into the brooks shall lament , &c. psal. . . the lord also thundred in the heavens , and the highest gave his voyce , &c. here the first sentence is repeated by the latter , but yet with other words of the same signification : for in the former is , the lord ; in the latter , the highest ; in the former , thundred ; in the latter , gave his voyce . psal. . . the lord is my rock , and my fortresse , and my deliverer : my god , my strength , in whom i will trust ; my buckler , and the horn of my salvation , and my high tower. prov. . . wisdom cryeth without , she uttereth her voice in the streets . prov. . . so that thou encline thine ear unto wisdom ; and apply thy heart to understanding , yea , if thou cryest after knowledge , and liftest up thy voyce for understanding , &c. prov. . , . enter not into the path of the wicked , and goe not in the way of the ungodly ; avoid it , passe not by it , turn from it , and pass away . prov. . . the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom : and the knowledge of the holy is understanding . prov. . . the poor from off the earth , and the needy from among men . see prov. . , . . , . psal. . , , . prov. . , . prov. . . . . isa. . , &c. hirmos , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nexus , series a bond or knot , or an heaping up of many things of different kinds : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ heiro ] necto , copulo , to knit or couple together . a figure whereby a sudden entrance is made into a confused heap of matter ; or when that which might have been spoken in one word is for plainnesse and evidence sake mustered together , or rehearsed through many species or forms . diversas specie res multas congerit hirmos : grammaticus , rhetor , geometres , pictor , aliptes , augur , schoenobates , medicus , magus ; omnia novit . english examples of hirmos . all men exclaim upon these exactions , nobles , gentry , commonalty , poor , rich , merchants , peasants , young , old , high , low , and all cry out upon the hard impositions of these butthens . loves companions be unquietnesse , longings , fond comforts , faint discomforts , hopes , jealousies , rages , carelesnesse , carefulnesse , yieldings , &c. scriptural examples . isa. . . because the daughters of sion are haughty , and walk with st●etched-out necks , and with wandering eyes , walking and mincing as they goe ; and making a tinckling with their feet . isa. . . what have i to do with the multitude of your sacrifices , saith the lord ? i am full of the burnt offerings of rams , and of the fat of fed beasts ! and i desire not the blood of bullocks , nor of lambs , nor of goats , &c. see isa. . , , . rom. . , . gal. . , , , , &c. apophasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , negatio , a denying , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ phao ] dico , to speak and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ apo ] which sometimes signifies a denying ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ apophemi ] nego , to deny . it is a kind of an irony , whereby we deny that we say or doe that which we especially say or doe , non dico apophasis : nec ea dico , quae si dicam , tamen infirmare non possis . nil dico . quid memorem , efferam , repetam ? &c. english examples . i say nothing . neither will i mention those things , which if i should , you notwithstanding could neither confute nor speak against them . for that this figure and the next differ only in the manne● of speaking ; take the scriptural examples of both together . paralipsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ paraleipsis ] praeteritio , an over-passing , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ paraleipo ] praetermitto , omitto , to pretermit , or leave out . preterition is a kind of an irony , and is when you say you let passe that which notwithstanding you touch at full : or , when we say we pass by a thing , which yet with a certain elegancy we note ; speaking much , in saying we will not say it . the forms of this figure are these , viz. i let passe , i am silent . i will leave out . i omit . i say not . — taceo , mitto , est paralipsis . sunt haec et alia in te falsi accusatoris signa permulta , quibus ego non utor . praeterire me nostram calamitatem , que tanta fuit , ut eam ad aures l. luculli , non e praelio nuncius , sed ex sermone rumor afferret . hic praeterire se simulat orator suorum calamitatem , quam tamen significantius exprimere non posset . apophasis , is not unlike to this figure , for it differs not , unlesse in the manner of speaking , and is the same in the matter and sense . english examples of paralipsis & apophasis . i urge not to you the hope of your friends , though that should animate you to answer their expectation . i lay not before you the necessity of the place which you are to supply , wherein to be defective and insufficient were some shame ; i omit the envious concurrences , and some prepared comparisons in your countrey , which have some feeling with young men of fore-sight . i only say , how shall our promises give judgment against us , &c. i doe not say you received bribes of your fellows . i busie not my self in this thing , that you spoyl cities and kingdoms , and all mens houses . i let passe your thefts and your robberies . a scriptural example of both figures . philemon v. . albeit i do not say to thee , thou owest thy self unto me . periphrasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , circuml●cutio , a long circumstance , or a speaking of many words , when few may suffice ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ periphrazo ] circumloquor , to utter that in many words which might be spoken in few . * it is the using of many words for one thing . periphasis is a figure when a short ordinary sense is odly exprest by more words ; or when a thing is shadowed out by some equivalent expressions . rem circumloquitur per plura periphrasis unam : trojani belli scriptor . chironis alumnus . this figure is made principally four wayes , viz. . when some notable enterprise , ones native countrey , or a sect , or strange opinion is put in stead of the proper name , &c. as in the first example , trojani belli scriptor , the writer of the trojan war , for homer . chironis alumnus , he that was educated by chiron the son of saturn , for achilles . . when by the etymologie , to wit , when the cause or reason of a name is unfolded : as , vir sapientiae studiosus , a man studious of wisdom , for a philosopher . . when by annotation , that is , by certain marks or tokens something is described : as , cubito se emungit , pro salsamentario . anger is a vehement heat of the minde , which brings palenesse to the countenance , burning to the eyes , and trembling to the parts of the body . . when by definition a thing is described : as , ars ornatè dicendi , pro rhetoricâ . the att of eloquent speaking , for rhetorique . legum ac civium libertatis oppressor , pro tyranno . an oppressor of the laws and liberties of the people , for a tyrant . other english examples of periphrasis . thus , for , having risen early , having striven with the suns earlinesse . so in stead of mopsa wept ill-favouredly , mopsa disgraced weeping with her countenance . to sleep among thieves ; by this figure thus , to trust a sleeping life among theives . when they had slept a while , thus ; when they had a while hearkened to the perswasion of sleep ; where , to be inclined to sleep , is exprest by a metaphor ( which is very helpful in this form of speech ) taken from one who moves and inclines by perswasion . thus instead of plangus speech began to be suspected , it is said ; plangus his speech began to be translated into the language of suspicion . scriptural examples of periphrasis . pet. . . to put off or lay down this tabernacle , ( i. e. ) to die . josh. . . i am going the way of all the earth , for that none can escape it : ( i. e. ) death . eccles. . , . surely i will not come into the tabernacle of my house , nor go up into my bed ; i will not give sleep to mine eyes , nor slumber to mine eye-lids , untill , &c. the sense is , i will not rest untill , &c. rom. . . the father of the faithful , ( i.e. ) abraham . tim. . . a teacher of the gentiles , ( i.e. ) paul. joh. . . the disciple whom jesus loved ; ( i. e. ) john. mark . . the fruit of the vine : ( i. e. ) wine . job . . the king of terrors ; ( i. e. ) death . * metaplasmvs , transformation , it is a figure when by reason of the verse , &c. something is necessarily changed redundant , or defficient . prosthesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , appositio , a putting of one letter to another , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ prostithemi ] appono , to put or add unto . a figure ( contrary to aphaeresis ) whereby a letter or syllable is added to the beginning of a word . aphaeresis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ aphairesis ] ademptio , detractio , a taking away . a figure contrary to prosthesis , and is , when a letter or syllable is taken away from the beginning of a word . prosthesis apponit capiti , quod aphaeresis aufert . examples of prosthesis and aphaeresis . vt ; gnatus . tetuli . ruit . & non temnere divos . gnatus , for , natus . tetuli , for , tuli , ruit , for , eruit . temnere , for , contemnere . syncope , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a cutting away . syncope is a figure contrary to epenthesis , and is when a letter or syllable is taken or cut away from the midst of a word . epenthesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , interpositio , interposition , or a putting in between . epenthesis is the interposition of a letter or syllable in the midst of a word . syncope de medio tollit , quod epenthesis infert . examples of syncope and epenthesis . relligio . mavors . jusso . surrexe . repostum . relligio for , religio . repostum , for , repositum . abiit , for , abivit . petiit , for , petivit . dixti , for , dixisti . apocope , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , abscissio , a cutting off . apocope is a figure contrary to paragoge , and is when the last letter or syllable of a word is cut off or taken away . paragoge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , productio , a making long . paragoge is a figure when a letter or syllable is added to the end of a word . aufert apocope finem , quem dat paragoge . examples of apocope and paragoge . ingeni . hymen . curru . tyrio vestirier ostro . ingeni , for , ingenii . curru , for , currui . peculi , for , peculii . dicier , for , dici . antithesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , oppositio , opposition , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ antitheton ] oppositum , opposite , set or placed , against ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anti ] against , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ thesis ] positio , a position , or state of a question , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ tithemi ] pono , to put . antithesis is sometimes a figure , whereby one letter is put for another ; and then it is the same with antistoichon , which signifies change of letters . litterulam antithesis mutat , quod & antistoechon : olli subridens , vostrum , servom . faciundo . olli , for , illi . vostrum , for , vestrum . servom , for , servum . faciundo , for , faciendo . antithesis , is also the illustration of a thing by its opposite , or the placing of contraries one against another , as spokes in a wheel ; and is a rhetorial exornation when contraries are opposed to contraries in a speech or sentence ; or when contrary epithets are opposed , as also when sentences , or parts of a sentence are opposed to each other . in bonâ segete nonnulla spica nequam , neque in malâ non aliqua bona . this exornation is of contrary words ; or contrary sentences . . of contrary words : as , hujus orationis difficilius est exitum , quàm principium invenire . quisquis ubique habitat , maxime nusquam habitat . . of sentences : this antithesis marvailously delights and allures . obsequium amicos , veritas odium parit . habet assentatio jucunda principia ; eadem exitus aemarissimos adfert . — plus hujus inopia ad misericordiam , quam illius ope ad crudelitatem . cujus adolescentia ad scientiam rei militaris , non alienis praeceptis , sed suis imperiis , non offensionibus belli , sed victoriis , non stipendiis , sed triumphis , est traducta . but that is the most elegant antithesis , when contrary words are oftnest opposed to each other : as , egentee in locupletes , perditi in bonos , servi in dominos armabantur . or when contrary sentences are oftnest opposed : as , conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello ; hujus praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris victoriâ ; hujus cohortem impuram cum illius exercitu invicto ; hujus libidines cum illius continentia : ab illo qui cepit conditas , ab hoc qui constitutas accepit , captas dicetis syracusas . verr. act. . english examples of antithesis . he is gone , but yet by a gainful remove ; from painful labour to quiet rest , from un quiet desires to happy contentment , from sorrow to joy , and from transitory time to immortality . so well sighted were the eyes of his mind , that by them he saw life in death , an exultation in falling , glory in shame , a kingdome in bondage , and a glorious light in the midst of darknesse . compare the ones impatiency with the others mildnesse , the ones insolency with the others submission , the ones humility with the others indignation , and tell me whether he that conquer'd seem'd not rather confounded , then he that yielded , any thing discouraged ; or set the ones triumph against the others captivity , losse against victory , feasts against wounds , a crown against fetters ; and the majesty of courage will appear in the overthrown . what 's more odious then labour to the idle , fasting to the glutton , want to the covetous , shame to the proud , and good laws to the wicked ? art thou rich ? then rob not the poor : if thou beest wise , beguile not the simple ; if strong , tread not the weak under thy feet . scriptural examples of antithesis . prov. . . the house of the wicked shall be overthrown : but the tabernacle of the upright shall flourish . verse . righteousenesse exalteth a nation : but sin is a reproach to any people . isa. . . we wait for light , but behold obscurity ; for brightnesse , but we walk in darknesse . lam. . . how doth the city sit solitary that was full of people ! how is she become as a widow ! she that was great among the nations , and princesse among the provinces , how is she become tributary ! prov. . . when the righteous are in authority , the people rejoyce : but when the wicked beareth rule , the people mourn . prov. . . an unjust man is an abomination to the just ; and he that is upright in the way , is an abomination to the wicked . prov. . . the wise shall inherit glory , but shame shall be the promotion of fools . see isa . . prov. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . prov. . , . metathesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , transpositio , transposition . transposition is a grammar figure whereby one letter is put for another . transponitque elementa metathesis ; ut , tibi thymbre . thymbre , pro , thymber ▪ item , pistris , pro , pristis . ecthlipsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , elisio , a striking out . it is a figure of prosodia , especially when ( m ) with his vowel is taken away , the next word beginning with a vowel . synaloepha , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ synaloiphe ] commixtio , a mingling together . it is a gathering of two vowels into one syllable : or a collision or dashing together of a vowel before another in divers words . ecthlipsis m. vocales aufert synaloepha . examples of ecthlipsis and synalaepha . tu in me ita es , hem ! in te ut ego sum : ac tu me ibi ama , ut te ego amo hic jam . systole , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , correptio , a shortning . a figure of prosodia , whereby a long syllable is contrary to its nature made short . this and synecphonesis are alike , whereunto diastole is contrary . diastole , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , extensio , extension , or lengthening . a figure of prosodia , whereby syllable , short by nature is made long . systole ducta rapit ; correpta diastole duc●t . examples of systole and diastole . recidimus . steterunt . naufragia . semisopi●a . synaeresis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ synairesis ] contrictio , contraction . it is a contraction of two words or syllable into one . syllaha de binis confecta synaeresis esto : acripides . alveo . cui . tenvis . parjetis . aurea . seu lento fuerint alvaria vimine texta . alvaria pro alvearia . diaeresis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ diairesis ] divisio , division . it is a figure of prosodia , and is when one syllable is divided into two parts . dividit in binas partita diaeresis unam : evoluisset . aheneus . evohe . materiai . debuerant fusos evoluisse suos . evoluisse , for , evolvisse . ahe●eus , pro , aeneus . evohe , pro , vae . materiai , pro , materiae . ellipsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ elleipsis ] defectus , defect , or want : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ elleipo ] deficio , to lack or want . * a figure when for expressing of passion and affection , some word ( necessary in construction ) is forborn : or , when in a sentence , a word is wanting , to make that sense , which hath been spoken . dicitur ellepsis , si , ad sensum , dictio desit : non est solvendo . dicunt . quid plura ? quid istis ? so that deficient speech of venus , aen. . carries matter of admiration with it . sed vos qui tandem ? ubi omittitur [ estis ] . and that of pamphilus his indignation . ter. act. . scen. . tantamne rem tam negligenter agier ? ubi deest [ decet ] . ex pede herculem : ubi omittitur computes magnitudinem . scriptural examples of ellipsis . gen. . . and he said to the woman , ( i.e. ) the devill in the serpent . exod. . . then zipporah took a sharp [ stone or knife ] which is understood , but not exprest in the original . numb . . he also that shall have dominion shall be of jacob , &c. ( i. e. ) the off-spring of jacob. see numb . . . king. . . . . isa. . . i cannot iniquity , ( i. e. ) i cannot bear iniquity . hos. . . trumpet to mouth , ( i. e. ) set the trumpet to thy mouth . psal. . . and thou lord , how long ? zevgma , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , junctura , a joyning or coupling together : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , jungo , to joyn or couple . zeugma is a figure of construction , whereby one verb or adjective answering the nearer to divers nominative cases or substantives , is reduced to the one expresly , but to the other by a supplement . suppositis multis si verbum inserviat unum , aut adjectivum , fit zeugma : hic illius arma , hic currus fuit . hircus erit tibi salvus & hoedi . vicit pudorem libido , timorem audacia , rationem amentia . but when there is a comparison , or similitude , the verb or adjective agrees with the former nominative case or substantive : as , ego melius quam tu scribo . ego sicut foenum arui . hoc ille ita prudenter atque ego fecisset . zeugma is made three wayes ; viz. . in person : as , ego & tu studes . . in gender : as , maritus & uxor est irata . . in number : as , — hic illius arma , hic currus fuit . zeugma hath three kinds : viz. . protozeugma . which is when the verb or adjective is expressed in the beginning of the clause or sentence ; and omitted after : — sunt nobis mitia poma , castna●ae molles , & pressi copia lactis , dormio ego & tu . for neither art thou he cataline , whom at any time shame could call back from dishonesty , either fear from perill , or reason from madness . here the verb [ could call back ] is the common word which is exprest in the first clause , and understood in the rest following . . mesozeugma , when the common word is put in the middle clause : as , semper honos , nomenque tuum , laudesque manebunt . ego dormio & tu . what a shame is this , that neither hope of reward , nor fear of reproach could any thing move him , neither the perswasion of his friends , nor the love of his country ! . hypozeugma , which is when the verb or adjective , or the common word is put in the last clause , or in the end of the clause : as , ego mihi illum , sibi me ille anteferebat . ego & tu d●rmis . non venus & vivum sublimia pectora fregit . the foundation of freedom , the fountain of equity , the safeguard of wealth , and custody of life is preserved by laws . by this figure zeugma , a verb is sometimes reduced to two nominative cases , and agrees with both , and then it is called a zeugma of locution , not of construction ; as , joannes fuit piscator & petrus . john was a fisherman and peter . syllepsis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , comprehensio , comprehension , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syllambano ] comprehendo , to comprehend or contain . a figure of construction , and is when a nominative case plural is joyned to a verb singular , or a nominative singular to a verb plural : or it is a comprehension of the more unworthy under the more worthy . personam , genus & numerum conceptio triplex . accipit indignum syllepsis sub mage digno : tuque puerque eritis . rex & regina beati . quid tu & soror facitis ? in english , what doe you and your sister make ? ego & mater miseri perimus : i and my mother being miserable , doe perish . tu & uxor , qui adfuistis . testis estote : you and your wi●e , who were present , be ye witnesses . syllepsis is threefold : viz. . of the person : as , ego & pater sumus in tuto : i and my father are safe . neque ego , neque tu sapimus : neither i nor you are wise . tu q●id ego & populus mecum desideret audi : hear thou what i and the people with me do desire . . of the gender : as , ●ex & regni beati : the king and the queen be blest . . of the number : as , ego cum fratre sumus candidi : i with my brother are white . so ovid. impliciti laqueis nudus uterque jacet : they lie both naked fast tyed together with cords , speaking of mars and venus tyed together in vulcans net . dialyton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dissolutum , disjoyned ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ dialyo ] dissolvo to disjoyn . it is all one with asyndeton . asyndeton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inconjunctum , disjoyned , or without copulative : derived from the privative a , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syndetos ] colligatus , bound together ; which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ deo ] ●ig● , to bind . a figure when in a heap or pile of words , a conjunction copulative it not only fo● speed and vehemency , but for pathetical emphasis sake left out . dialyton tollit juncturam , ut asyndeton , idque * articulus faciet : rex , miles , plebs negat illud . frangetoros , pete vina , rosas cape● tingere nardo , tot res repente circumvallant , unde emergi non potest ; vis , egestas , injustitia , solitudo , infamia . vbi singulae voces asynditae , sunt emphaticae . caeteros ruerem , agerem , raperem , tunderem , proste●nerem . veni , vidi , vici . here if the words were copulated with conjunctions , the quick vertue , vehemency and earnest affection of the speech would languish and decay . english examples of dialyton and asyndeton . her face with beauty , her head with wisedom , her eyes with majesty , her countenance with gracefulnesse , her lips with lovelinesse ; where many [ ands ] are spared . the king himself , the souldier , all sorts of people deny this . by the folly and wickednesse thou hast lost thy substance , thy good name , thy friends , thy parents , and offended thy creator . in some places only the conjunction is put in the last place , in a compare of three : as , a fair woman doth not only command without entreaty , but perswade without speaking . her wit endeared by youth , her affection by birth , and her sadnesse by her beauty . scriptural examples . cor. , , , , . charity suffereth long , envyeth not , vaunteth not it self , is not puffed up , behaves not it self unseemly , seeketh not her own , is not easily provoked , thinketh no evill , &c. tim : . , . for men shall be lovers of their own selves , covetous , boasters , proud , blasphemers , disobedient to parents , unthankful , unholy , &c. the like also you may find in rom. . , &c. psal. . , , . rom. . , , &c. thes , , . &c. polysyndeton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , varie & multipliciter conjunctum , diversly and many wayes joyned or coupled together : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ polu multum , valde , very much , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syndetos ] conjunctus , joyned together . a figure signifying superfluity of conjunctions , and is when divers words are for their weightinesse , ( and not without an emphasis ) knit together with many copulatives . conjunctura frequens vocum polysyndeton esto : fataque forsunasque virûm moresque manusque liv. lib. . dec. . et somnus & vinum , & epulae , & scorta , & balneae , corpora atque animos enervant . english examples . overmuch sleep also , and wine , and banquets , and queans , and bathes enervate and enfeeble the body and minde . he was both an enemie to his countrey , and a betrayer of his trust , and a contemner of the good laws , and a subverter of the peoples liberties and immunities . scriptural examples of polysyndeton . cor. . , , . though i speak with the tongues of men and angels , and have not charity , i am become as sounding brass , or a tinckling cymbal , and though i have the gift of prophesie , and understand all mysteries , and all knowledge , yea , if i had all faith , so that i could remove mountains , and had not love , i were nothing . act. . . where abode both peter and james , and john , and andrew , &c. g●l . . . ye observe dayes , and months , and times , and years . the like examples you have in rom. . , . p●al . . , &c. pleonasmvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , redundantia , superfluity : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pleonazo ] redundo , to abound superfluously . a figure whereby some superfluous word is added in a sentence to signifie emphatically the vehemency and earnestnesse of the speaker , and the certainty of the matter spoken . vocibus exuperat pleonasmus & emphasin auget . auribus his audivi , oculis vidi , ore loquutus . cic. accipies igitur hoc parvum opusculum . vbi gentium ? quo terrarum abiit ? te● . te interea loci cognovi . nilo amn● vectus . te● . eg● hominem callidiorem vidi n●minem quam phormionem . english examples . i heard it with these ears . i saw it with these eyes . i spake the words with my own mouth . scriptural examples of pleonasmus . the god of all grace , out of the fountain of his rich mercy oft uses this manner of speaking , thereby to condescend to the weaknesse of our capacities , clear up things to our understandings , and beat them as it were into our dull apprehension : as , deut. . . ye shall walk after the lord and fear him , and keep his commandments , and obey his voyce , and you shall serve him , and cleave unto him . deut. . . o foolish people and unwise , &c. prov. . . let another man praise thee , and not thine own mouth ; a stranger , and not thine own lips . joh. . . we have seen with our eyes , &c. so joh. . . . , , . these pleonastical inculcations are not vain , but serve to work things the better upon our hard hearts . the scripture is often exegetical ; what it speaks darkly in one place , it explains in another . parelcon , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , protractio , protraction , or prolonging ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parelco ] potraho , to protract or prolong . a figure when a syllable , or whole word is added to another in the end of it . syllabicum adjectum sit vocis fine parelcon : quipote . numnam . etiamnum . ehodum . tu sosia adesdum . parenthesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , interpositio , interposition , or an inserting between : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parentithemi ] insero , interjicio : to interpose , or cast between . parenthesis is a form of speech or a clause comprehended within another sentence , which ( though it give some strength ) may very well be left out , and yet the speech perfect , or the sense sound . herein are two rules observable , viz. . let it neither be long nor frequent , because then it will render the sentence obscure . . let it be very seldome that one parenthesis be inserted within another . membrum interjecto sermone parenthesis auget : credo equidem ( nec vana fides ) genus esse deorum . horat. caetera de genere hoc ( adeo sunt multa ) loquacem delassare valent fabium . english examples . sometimes a parenthesis makes your discourse more graceful and intelligible : as , tell me ingenuously ( if there be any ingenuity in you ) whether , &c. that what his wit could conceive ( and his wit can conceive as far as the limits of reason stretch ) was all directed to the setting forth of his friend , &c. and indeed all parentheses are in extreams , either graces or foyls to a speech ; if they be long they seem interruptions , and therefore at the end of them must be a retreat to the matter , called antanaclasis , in which figure you shall find examples of such parentheses as require a retreat to the matter . a parenthesis is often put in . when the speaker supposing that the hearer may demand a reason of , or make an objection to what he saith , p●even●eth him by an interposition expressed before the sentence be all ended : so that hereby it may appear that a parenthesis serves to confirm the saying by the inte●position of a reason , and to confute the objection by the timely prevention of an answer : also where the sentence may seem dark , or doubtful , it puts in a short annotation or exposition to give light , and to resolve the doubt . scriptural examples of parenthesis . cor. . . are they ministers of christ ? ( i speak as a fool ) i am more , &c. isa. . . at th●t time all vineyards ( though there were a thousand vines in one , and sold for a thousand silverlings ) shall be turned into bryars and thorns . evocatio , evocation or calling forth . * evocation is a figure of construction , and is when the nominative case to a verb of the third person is set before a verb of the first or second person , which draws and as it were calls it away to its own impropriety : or , when as the first or second person doth immediately call unto it self the third ; they do both become the first or second person . personam ad primam revocatur sive secundam . tertia : qui legis hac . populus superamur ab uno . ego pauper laboro ; tu dives ludis . where note that the verb must agree with the person calling ; as may yet further appear ; viz. ego tuae deliciae istúc veniam . magna pars studiosorum amoenitates quaerimus ; a great part of us students doe seek pleasures . parathesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , appositio , apposition , or a putting of one thing to another ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ paratithemi ] appono , to put or adde unto . apposition is a continued or immediate conjunction of two substantives of the same case , by the one whereof the other is declared : as , vrbs roma , the city rome . and it may be of many substantives : as , ma●cus tullius cicero . apposition is a figure of construction , ( which the ancients called interpretation or declaration ) whereby one noune substantive is for declaration and distinction sake added unto another in the same case : as , flumen rhenus , the flood rhenus . et casu substantiva apponuntur eodem . turba molesta proci . mons taurus . fons aganippe . this figure is made for a threefold consideration : viz. . for the restraining of a generality : as , animal equus , a living creature , an horse , . for the removing of equivocation : as , taurus mons asiae . lupum [ piscem ] non vidit italia . . for the attribution of some property : as , erasmus , vir exactissimo judicio : erasmus , a man of a most exact judgment . nierus , ●dolescens insigni formâ : nireus , a stripling of an excellent beauty . a scriptural example of parathesis . john . . judas saith unto him , not iscariot , lord how is it that thou , &c. antiptosis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 casus pro casu positio , the putting of one case for another derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anti ] pro , for , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ptosis ] casus , a case . it is a position of one case for another . a figure of construction , and is when one case is put for another , and sometimes with a very good grace . antiptosis amat pro casu ponere casum : vrbem quam statuo vestra est . b srabeate salutat . the city which i me●n is yours . sermonem quem audistis non est meus ; the talk which you have heard is not mine . aristotelis libri sant omne genus eloquentia referti ; for omnis generis . terence : nam expedit bonas esse vobis . vobis , for vos . virg , haeret pede pes , densusque viro vir . pede , pro pedi . but this figure and hypallage are found rather to excuse the license or the error of authors , then to shew that we may do the same . scriptural examples . rev. . . him that overcometh will i make a pillar , &c. rev. . , luke . . hellismvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , graecorum imitatio , sermo graecanicus , graecismus seu proprietas graecorum verborum ; a graecism or speech after the manner of the greeks , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hellen ] deucalions son , from whom the greeks are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hellenes ] fróm whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hellenizo ] grecè loquor , to speak after the manner of the greeks . a graecism or an imitation of the greeks in phrase or construction , or a speech after the manner of the greeks : which is , when the construction proper to the greek tongue is used in another language . hellenismus erit phrasis aut constructio graeca : desine clamorum . fallunt , ardebat alexin . nobis non licet esse tam disertis . ( terentius , vtique vobis expedit esse bonas ) — didicisse fideliter artes emollit mores . virg. cui nec certaverit ulla . hor. desine curarum , pro à curis . this graecism edm. spencer uses also not unelegantly in the english tongue : as , for not to have been dipt in lethe lake , could save the * son of theris from to die . tmesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sectio , a section , or dividing , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ temno ] or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ tmao ] seco , scindo , to cut or divide . tmesis is a figure whereby the parts of a compound or simple word are divided by the interposition of another . compositae in partes est tmesis sectio vocis : quae mihi cunque placent . septem subjecta trtoni . hor. est quadam prodire tenus , si non datur ultra . ( i. e. ) licet quadantenus prodire . plaut . sed nae ego stultus , qui rem curo publicam . ( i. e. ) qui rem publicam curo . hendiadys , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hediaduo ] unius in duo solutio , a dividing of one thing into two : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ edo ] corrodo , to bite or gnaw in sunder , quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hen dia duoin ] unum per duo , one thing by two . hendiadys is a figure whereby one thing is divided into two , or when one thing is expressed by more words . hendiadys unum in duo solvit , mobile fixum dans : auro & pateris , chalybem fraenosque momordit . pateris et auro , ( i. e. ) aureis pateri● . chalybem fraenosque &c. ( i.e. ) fraenos chalybeos . in regione & umbrâ mortis , ( i. e. ) regione umbrosâ mortis . english examples . cups of gold , ( i. e. ) golden cups . in the region and shadow of death , ( i. e ) in the shadie region of death . scriptural examples of hendiadys . gen. . . and jehovah rained upon sodom and gomorrah brimstone and fire , &c. ( i. e. ) firie and burning brimstone , or sulphurous fire . see gen. . . jer. . . ad dandum vobis finem & expectationem , ( i. e. ) finem expectatum . matth. . . they that sate in the region and shadow of death ; ( i. e. ) in the shadie region of death . matth. . . then came the mother of zebedees children with her sons , worshipping him and desiring , &c. ( i. e. ) desiring by worshipping . enallage , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ordinis permutaetio , a change of order ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ enallatto ] permuto , to change one thing for another ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ enallos ] inversus & praeposterus , turnd upside down and disorderly . a figure whereby the number or gender , mood , person , or tense are changed , or put one for another . personam , numerum , commutat enallage tempus , cumque modo genus ; ut : pereo a quod charius est mi. ni faciat vici . praesto est , hinc spargere voces . ovid. et flesti , & nostros vidisti flentis ocellos . flentis , pro flentium , nisi nostros pro meos dixeris . cicero ad trebat . sed valebis meaque negotia videbis , meque dits adjuvantibus ante brumam expectabis : pro vale , vide , expecta . the future tense of the indicative being put for the imperative mood . ter. in phor. si quis me quaerit rufus , praesto est , desine : pro , praesto sum ; nam de se loguitur . virg. omnis humo fumat neptunia troja . pro fumaevit . the present tense being put for the preter-perfect . scriptural examples of enallage . this change of order is sometimes of the number : as , psal , . . the fool hath said in his heart , there is no god : they are corrupt , they have done abominable works , &c. see exod. . . prov. . . matth. . . here the singular is put for the plural number ; or on the contrary . thus in isa. . . women shall bear rule over them , &c. ( i. e. ) effeminate men shall , &c. the feminine gender put for the masculine , effeminate men are called women . psal. . . blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly , &c. ( i. e. ) whose heart , affections and will god hath so renewed , that he will not walk in their counsel , &c. where the present is put for the future tense . see matth. . . psal. , . for by thee i have run through a troop : and by my god have i leaped over a wall . deut. . . but jesurun waxed fat , and kicked : thou art waxed fat , &c. the like example you have in gen. . . synthesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , compositio , composition , or a joyning together ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syntithemi ] compono , to compose or put together . it is a construction made for significations sake , or a speech congruous in sense , not in voyce . it is a figure of construction , whereby a noun collective singular is joyned to a verb plural . of others it is also called a figure whereby two words are joyned into one by a sign of union . synthesis est seusu tantum , non congrua voce : turba ruunt . aperite aliquis . pars maxima caesi . gens armati ; a nation or people armed . sometimes it is made in gender only : as , elephantus gravida , an elephant great with young . or for supplements sake : as , centauro in magna ; where the word puppi , or ship is understood . sometimes it is made both in gender and number : as , pars mersi tenuere ratem . part being drowned , held the oar . laudem semper-florentis homeri . monti-feriens fulmen . english examples of synthesis . the tempest-tossed seas . the earth-incircling ocean . the green-mantled earth . a heaven-faln star . a rock-rending whirlwinde . marble-hearted cruelty . anastrophe , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , praepostera rerum collocatio , a praeposterous placing of words or matter ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anastrepho ] retro verto , to turn back . a figure whereby words which should have been precedent , are postpon'd : digna praeire solet postponere anastrophe verba : transtra per. italiam contra . maria omnia circum . hyperbaton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , transgressio , transgression , or a passing over , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hyperbaino ] transgredior , to passe over . by rhetoricians , it is called a transposed order of words ; such as the cause and comeliness of speech often requires . hyperbaton is a figure when words are for elegancy and variety transposed from the right order of construction , ( which is the plain grammatical order ) into another handsomer and more fit order : or , when words agreeing in sense are in site or placing disjoyned : est vocum inter se turbatus hyperbaton ordo : vina , bonus quae deinde cadis onerarat acestes , littore trinacrio , dederatque abeuntibus heros , dividit . but this figure and antiptosis are found rather to excuse the license or the error of authors , then to shew that we may doe the like . scriptural examples of hyperbaton . ephes. . . and you hath he quickned who were dead in trespasses and sins . ephes. . . but fornication , and all uncleannesse , or covetousnesse , let it not be once named amongst you , as becometh saints . ephes. . . which is the earnest of our inheritance , untill the redemption of the purchachased possession , unto the praise of his glory . hypallage , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , immutatio ; a changing ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hypo ] in , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ allatto ] muto , to change . a figure when the natural order of the words is changed , as when two words change their cases , or when words are altered among themselves . casu transposito submutat hypallage verba : impia trabs , videt hos ortus . dare classibus austros : for dare classes austris . et gladium vaginâ vacuum in urbe non vidimus : for vaginam gladio vacuam . scriptural examples of hypallage . job . . . thou hast hid their heart from understanding ( i. o. ) thou hast hid understanding from their heart . isa. . . the light shall be darkned in the heavens thereof , ( i. e. ) the heavens in the light thereof . psal. . . who maketh his angels spirits , ( i. e. ) the spirits his angels or messengers . heb. . . through the deceitfulnesse of sin , ( i. e ) by deceitful sin . see isa. , . psal. . . amos . . pro. . . hysterologia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dictio praepostera , a praeposterous or disorderly speech , when that which by order ought to have been spoken first , is brought in last . it is otherwise called hysteron proteron , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , postremum primum , the last first : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hysteros ] postremus , the last or hindmost , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ legos ] verbum , a word or speech . it is called in the english phrase , the cart before the horse . a figure when in a speech that which in course of nature ought to have preceded , is brought in last . hysteron & proteron sive hysterologia secundo prima loco ponit : lavindque littora venit . detrudunt naves scopulo . nutrit peperitque valet atque vivit . postquam altos tetigit fluctus , & ad aequora venit . english examples . the ship arrived at the lavinian shore : it came foul of the rock . she nourished and preserved him , she brought him forth into the world . he is in health and alive . scriptural examples of hysterologia . the order o●●ime is not alwaies kept in scripture ; but sometimes ●hat which was done last is placed first ; the saints looked more at the substance then at small circumstances in their writings ; and therefore the placing of things in scripture must not be strictly urged ; for it is usual by this figure or anticipation of time to relate that first which either as to course of nature , or as to the time of accomplishment , should have had the last place : as appears by joh. . . compared with ch . . v. . psal. . . he travaileth with iniquity , and hath conceived mischief : here note that the birth is set before the conception . luke . . the devils leading up of christ unto the top of the pinnacle of the temple , is mentioned after his taking him up into the exceeding high mountain : and yet that preceded this , as appears by mat. , . see gen. . . . , . isa. . , . synchoresis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , concessio , concession , or granting of an argument : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ synchoreo ] conced● , to grant . a figure when an argument is ironically or mockingly yielded unto , and then marred with a stinging retort upon the objector . this form of speech delights most , either when that which we grant is prejudicial to , and stings the objector , as in controversies it often happens ; or when the argument granted , brings no losse unto him that grants it . sit sacrilegus , sit fur , fit , flagitiorum omnium vitiorumque princeps : at est bonus imperator . sint christiani pauperes , sint mundo immundo exosi ; sunt tamen coeli haeredes . cum adversarium pungimus : ut , habes igitur tubero , quod est accusatori maximè optandum , confitentem , se in ea parte fuisse , qua te tuboro , quâ virum omni laude dignum patrem tuum . itaque prius de vestro delicto confiteamini necesse est , quàm ligarii ullam culpam reprehendatis . english examples . i admit you are resolute ; i grant your determination is immoveable , but it is in things directly repugnant to the grave advice of your knowing friends , and in things of a great tendency to your utter undoing . they are proud , vain , disobedient , i acknowledge it ; yet they are our children . scriptural examples of synchoresis . james . . thou believest that there is one god , thou dost well : the devils also believe and tremble . eccles. . . thus solomon also checks the young mans folly : rejoyce o young man in thy youth , and let thy heart chear thee , &c. and walk in the wayes of thy heart , &c. but know thou , &c. here first you have an ironical concession , but after this , a stinging [ but ] which mar●s all . the like examples you may find in cor. . . rom. . , . cor. . , . cor. . , . anthropopathia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , humanus affectus , humane affection : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anthropos ] homo , a man , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pathos ] affectus , affection : or rather from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ an●hropopatheo ] humano more afficior , aut loquor , to be affected with , or to speak after the manner of men . it is an attributing to god humane affections , or it is a speaking after the manner of men . a metaphor whereby that which properly is agreeable to the creatures , and especially to man , is by some similitude transferr'd unto the creator and heavenly things . this is very frequent in scriptures , when it speaks of god after the manner of men , and by bodily things sets forth the divine excellencies of the spiritual and eternal being . this metaphorical form of speech is also by others called syncatabasis , condescensio , condescension , for that in holy writ the lord doth as it were descend unto us , and under humane things resembles and expresses heavenly mysteries unto our capacities . thus the lord is said to have a face in psal. . . . . and eyes , in psal. . . to signifie his omnisciencie ; bowe 's in isa. . ; and a bosome in psal. . . to denote unto us his infinite mercy and most ardent love . thus in psal. . . he is said to be his peoples guide even unto death ; and in psal. , . the rock of their strength and their refuge ; in psal. . . their buckler and the horn of their salvation ; thus in psal. . . he is said to have wings , to shew his care and protection of his people . these and such like are the condescensional characters of comfort , whereby we may easily read and plainly understand the goodnesse and rich mercy of the incomprehensible jehovah . thus the lord also in respect of his adversaries is by this metaphor pourtrayed with letters of a contrary signification ; as , a giant to wound , a judge to condemn , and a fire to consume . exegesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , explicatio , explication or exposition : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ exegoumai ] explico , to explain or expound . exegesis is a figure very usual in scripture , when those things which were first spoken more darkly , are afterwards in the same sentence manifestly explained : or , when a thing spoken in one member of a sentence , is by way of explication and confirmation repeated in the latter part of it . an english example . time at one instant seeming both short and long , short in the pleasingnesse in calling to minde , long in the stay of his desires . scriptural examples . rom. . , . god hath given them the spirit of slumber : what 's that ? eyes that they should not see , and ears that they should not hear . isa. , , . look unto the rock , whence ye are hewen : look unto abraham your father , &c. rom. . . for i know , that in me , that is to say , in my flesh , dwelleth no good thing . isa. , , . the latter part of the third verse expounds the second verse , &c. isa. . , . thy silver is become dross : thy wine is mixt with water : ( i. e. ) thy princes are rebellious and companions of theeves , &c. prov. . . let not mercy and truth forsake thee : bind them about thy neck , write them upon the table of thine heart . the like in psal. . . . . , , . . . . . , . zech. . , . king. . . prov. . . deut. . . tim. , , , &c. jonah , , , . cor. . . tim. . . syncrisis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , comparatio , a comparison ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syncrino ] comparo , to compare . . syncrisis is a comparison of contrary things and divers persons in one sentence . . comparatio is a form of speech , which by apt similitude shews that the example brought in , is either like , unlike , or contrary : like things are compared among themselves ; unlike , from the lesse to the greater in amplifying , and from the greater to the lesse in diminishing ; and contraries by opposing one another . english examples of syncrisis . the subtle commit the fault , and the simple bear the blame . he that prefers wealthy ignorance before chargeable study , prefers contempt before honour , darknesse before light , and death before life . scriptural examples of syncrisis . luke . , , . there you have the guilty opposed to the just , and injurie to equity ; in these words , saith the believing thief to the other thief , we indeed are justly here , for we receive the due reward of our deeds , but this man ( meaning christ ) hath done nothing amiss isa. . , . behold , my servants shall eat , but ye shall suffer hunger ; my servants shall drink , but ye shall abide thirst : behold , my servants shall rejoyce , but ye shall be ashamed : behold , my servants shall sing for joy of heart , but ye shall cry through sorrow of heart , and shall howl through vexation of spirit . many of solomons proverbs are compounded and garnished with this exornation : as , prov. . . as the whirlwind passeth , so is the wicked no more : but the righteous is an everlasting foundation , . . prov. . . every wise woman buildeth her house : but the foolish plucks it down with her hands . . . a wise son maketh a glad father : but an indiscreet son is an heavinesse to his mother . . . the curse of the lord is in the house of the wicked : but he blesseth the tabernacle of the just . english and scriptural examples of comparatio . . comparison of like things : as , each book sent into the world , is like a barque put to sea , and as lyable to censures , as the barque is to foul weather . herbert . in the greenest grasse is the greatest serpent : in the clearest water the ugliest road : in the most curious sepulchre are inclosed rotten bones : the estrich carries fair feathers , but ranck flesh . tim. . . as jannes and jambres withstood moses , so do these also resist the truth ; men of corrupt minds , reprobate concerning the faith . . comparison of unlike things : as , brutus put his sons to death , for conspiracy of treason : manlius punished his son for his vertue . matth. . . behold the fowls of the air , for they sow not , neither do they reap , nor gather into barns : yet your heavenly father feedeth them : are ye not much better then they ! . from the lesse to the greater : as , heb. . , . for if the blood of buls , and of goats , and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean , sanctifie to the purifying of the flesh : how much more shall the blood of christ , who through the eternal spirit offered himself without spot to god , purge your consciences from dead works to serve the living god ? the like examples are in matth. . . . . . from the greater to the lesse : as , pet. . . if god spared not the angels that sinned , but cast them down to hell , and delivered them into chains of darknesse , to be reserved unto judgment , &c. much lesse will he spare the wicked , who walk after the flesh in the lusts of uncleannesse . pet. . . if the righteous scarcely be saved , where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear ? similitvdo , a simil●tude : it is a form of speech whereby the orator or speaker compares one thing with the other by a similitude fit to his purpose . this exornation yields both profit and pleasure , profit by its perspicuity , and pleasure by its proportion . a similitude is a metaphor dilated , or enlarged , and a metaphor a similitude contracted . english examples of a similitude . as it makes no matter whether you lay a sick man in a bedsted made of plain wood , or in a bedsted guilded and garnished with gold ; for whithersoever you remove him , he carries his disease with him : even so is it all one , whether the minde which is sick with insatiable avarice , be placed in riches or in poverty ; for while the disease hangs still upon it , it finds no rest . this comfort in danger was but like the honey that samson found in the lyons jaws , or like lightning in a foggy night . scriptural examples . note that similitudes are rather to make dark things plain , then to prove any doubtful thing ; similitudes are not argumentative ; as appears by the parable of the unjust steward , in luk. . , , &c. prov. . . as snow in summer , and as rain in harvest ; so honour is not seemly for a fool . vers. . as the door turneth upon his hinges , so doth the slothful upon his bed . prov. . . as a roaring lyon , and a ranging bear ; so is a wicked ruler over the poor people . dissimilitvdo , dissimilitude . dissimilitude is a form of speech , whereby divers things are compared in a diverse quality . an example of chrysostom . if we have any disease in our body , we use exercise , and all other means , that we may hence forward be delivered and free from it ; but being sick in soul , we dissemble and make delay : we leave the fountain uncured , and count necessary things superfluous . scriptural examples . luke . . the foxes have holes , and the fowls of the air have nests , but the son of man hath not where to lay his head . jer. . . the stork in the air knoweth her appointed times , and the turtle , and the crane , and the swallow observe the time of their coming ; but my people know not the judgment of the lord , &c. the like in isai. . , &c. homoeoptoton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , similiter cadens , similes casus habens , falling out alike , or having cases alike : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ ptoo ] cado , to fall out or happen , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ homoi●s ] similiter , alike . it is a rhetorical exornation whereby in the latine tongue divers clauses end with like cases : but in respect of the english , which is not varied by cases , it may be called , setting of divers nounes in one sentence which end alike , with the same letter or syllable . a latin example of homoeoptoton . pomp. non enim illae sunt solae virtutes imperatoriae , quae vulgo exstimantur , labor in negotiis , fortitudo in periculis , industria in agendo , celeritas in conficiendo , consilium in providendo . english examples . in activity commendable , in a common-wealth profitable , and in war terrible . let thy countrey be served , thy governours obeyed , and thy parents honored . art thou in poverty ? seek not principality , but rather how to relieve thy necessity . foolish pitty undoes many a city . a friend in need is a friend indeed . scriptural examples of homoeoptoton . prov. . . it is an abomination to kings to commit wickednesse : for the throne is established by righteousnesse . prov. . . he that is slow to anger is better then the mighty : and he that ruleth his spirit , then he that taketh a city . isa. . . and righteousnesse shall be the girdle of his ioyns ; and faithfulnesse the girdle of his reins . homoeotelevton , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ homoiotel●uton , ] similem finem habens , aut similiter desinens , ending alike : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ teleuton ] ultimum , the last , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ homoios ] similiter , alike . a figure when divers parts or members of a sentence end alike : this exornation for the most part shuts up the clauses of the sentence either with a verb or an adverb . latin examples . quàm celeriter pompeio duce belli impetus navigavit ? qui siciliam adiit , africam exploravit , inde sardiniam cum classe venit . cicer. pro. pomp. vt ejus voluntatibus non solùm cives assenserint , socii obtemperârint , hostes obed●erint , sed etiam venti tempestatesque obsecundârint . english examples . he is looked upon as an eloquent man , who can invent wittily , remember perfectly , dispose orderly , figure diversly , pronounce aptly , confirm strongly , and conclude directly . no marvel though wisedome complains that she is either wilfully despised , or carelesly neglected , either openly scorned , or secretly abhorred . scriptural examples of homoeoteleuton . isa. . , , . their children also shall be dashed to pieces before their eyes , their houses shall be spoiled , and their wives ravished . neither shall the arabian pitch tent there , neither shall the shepherds make their folds there , but wild beasts of the desert shall lie down there , &c. isa. . . cry unto her that her warfare is accomplished , that he● iniquity is pardoned , &c. compar , even , equal . alike : it is of grecians called is●colon and parison . it is an even gait of sentences answering each other in measures interchangeably . a rhetorical exornation whereby the parts of a sentence doe consist almost of the like number of syllables ; or when the words of a sentence match each other in rank , or the parts accord in a fit proportion ; which is , when the former parts of a sentence or oration are answered by the later , and that by proper words respecting the former . latine examples . sic ergo in pompejana : qui plura bella gessit , quàm caeteri legerunt : plures provincias confecit quam alii concupiverunt . ibid. extrema hyeme apparavit , ineunte vero suscepit , media aestate confecit . idem pro sylla : permitto aliquid iracundiae tuae , do adolescentiae , cedo amicitiae , tribuo parenti . english examples . he left the city garnished , that the same might be a monument of victory , of clemency , of continency ; that men might see what he had conquered , what he spared , what he had lest . cicero . if you compare the parts of the later clauses with the former , you will find that they are fitly matched . my years are not so many , but that one death may conclude them ; nor my faults so many , but that one death may satisfie them . save his gray hairs from rebuke , and his aged minde from despair : where gray hairs , aged minde , rebuke and despair , answer each other . it connects contraries , thus : an innocent although he be accused , he may be acquitted ; but the guilty , except he be accused , he cannot be condemned . scriptural examples of compare . amos . . let equity run down as waters , and righteo●snesse as a mighty stream . isa. . . the oxe knoweth his owner , and the ass his masters crib , &c. prov. . . the lot causeth contentions to cease ; and parteth between the mighty . prov. . . he that loveth pleasure shall be a poor man : he that loveth wine and oyl , shall not be rich . vers. . the wicked shall be a ransome for the righteous ; and the transgressor for the upright . see the like in prov. . . prov. . , . . . . . . . . . , . . , &c. isa. . . prov. . , , , . parabola , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parabole ] a parable , or a similitude of a thing : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ paraballo ] confero , comparo , assimilo , to confer , resemble , or make comparison . a parable is as it were a shadow that goes before the truth : and is by nature a comparison of things that differ , made under some simili●ude . it is said to be a similitude , when by some comparison we make known that which we would have to be understood . so we say a man to be made of iron , when we would be understood to speak of a cruel hard-hearted and strong man. it is a comparing , signifying a similitude , ( or a comparative speech ) tending to the explanation and perspicuity of the things under it : or it is a similitudinary speech , whereby one thing is uttered and another signified . these are english parables , or similitudes . as a vessel cannot be known , whether i● be whole or broken , except it have liquor in it : so no man can be throughly known what he is , before he be in authority . if we need look so far back for an example , we may see this truth veryfied in hazael ; compare king. . . with ch . . v. . like as it is a shame for a man that would hit the white , to misse the whole but : even so it is a shame for him that thirsts after honor , to fail of honesty . this is a saying of a heathen philosopher . a parable in the gospel signifies an aenigmatical or allegorical comparison , as also an algory and aenigma . a parable must be expounded , and no further strained then things agree with the principal inten●ion scope and drift of the spirit of god in that scripture : as matth. . , , &c. where the scope is , god is not a debtor unto any man. in parables we must alwayes look more ●o the sense and scope , then to the letter . note that in a parable there are three things essen●i●lly considerable ; viz. . cottex , t●e rind or shell ; that is the words and terms . . radix , the root or the scope unto which the pa●able tends . . medulla , the marrow , that is , the mystical sense of the parable , or the fruit which may be gathered from it . matth. . . as from the budding and sprouting of trees , ye may know that summer is nigh ; so likewise ye when ye shall see the signs of the son of man , know that his coming is near , even at the doors : so in mark. . . matth. . . the kingdome of heaven is like unto leaven , which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal , till the whole was leavened . here the former part of the parable is that which is brought into the similitude : whereof the literal sense is , that a little leaven ( being put together with the meal into one lump ) hath that effect , that it pierces into and spreads over the whole lump . the later part is that unto which the former is applyed , and by our saviour signified in the first words : the kingdome of heaven . the mystical sense thereof is , that the gospel hath that efficacy , that being preached in palestina , it should presently be spread over the whole world , and make the church far larger then it was ; for leaven doth mystically signifie the gospel ; and the whole lump , the church , which god hath from eternity decreed to call unto himself out of the world by the gospel . isa. . . the parable of the vineyard you have there ; which in the . verse is explained thus , the vineyard is the house of irael ; the pleasant plant is the men of judah ; by grapes judgment is understood ; and by wilde grapes oppression . ezek. . . a great eagle with great wings , long winged , full of feathers , which had divers colours , came unto lebanon , and took the highest branch of the cedar , he cropt off the top of his young twigs , and carryed it into a land of traffique , &c. this obscure parable the holy ghost explains in the ver . thus , the great eagle signifies the king of babylon ; by lebanon is signified jerusalem : and by the highest branch of the cedar and the top of his young twigs , the king and princes of jerusalem ; by a land of traffique and a city of merchants , is signified babylon . see luke . . mat. . . . . luke . . mat. . , &c. exergasia . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , expolitio , repetitio , a polishing or trimming ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ exergazomai ] repeto , effectum reddo , to repeat , to polish a thing after it is finished . a figure when we abide still in one place , and yet seem to speak divers things , many times repeating one sentence , but yet with other words , sentences and exornations . it differs ( as m●lancthon saith ) from synonymia , forasmuch as that repeats a sentence , or thing , only with changed words : but this with like words , like sentences , and like things , having also many exornations to the garnishing of it . thus to describe a beautiful woman , may be said , she hath a winning countenance , a pleasant eye , an amiable presence , a cheerful aspect . she was the object of his thoughts , the entert●inment of his discourse , the contentment of his heart . your beauty ( sweet lady ) hath conquered my reason , subdued my will , mastered my judgement . scriptural examples . psal. . . hear the right , o lord , attend unto my cry , give ear unto my prayer , that proceeds not from feigned lips . . , . plead my cause ( o lord ) with them that strive with me : fight against them that fight against me ; take hold of shield and buckler , and stand up for mine help ; draw out also the spear , and stop the way against them that persecute me : say unto my soul , i am thy salvation . more examples you have in psalm . , . jonas , , , . zech. . , . chronographia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , temporum descriptio , a description of times and seasons : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ grapho ] scribo , to write or describe ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ chronos ] tempus , time or season . chronographie is a rhetorical exornation , whereby the orator describes any time or season for delectations sake : as the morning , the evening , midnight , the dawning and break of the day , the sun-rising , the sun-setting , spring , summer , autumn , winter , &c. when break of day had drawn the curtain of heaven . when the morning had won the field of darknesse . when bright aurora with her glittering beams , sweet and comfortable rayes , had re-assumed her dominion in the air . when the morns fair cheek had not yet lost her tears . when the bright beams of the east had driven away the dark shadow of the night , and the chearful birds had welcomed the first dawning light with their glad songs , and when black and sable clowds were changed into golden glory . when the stars begin to glory of the light which they borrowed from the sun. when the nights black-mantle over-sp●eads the sky . when candles begin to inherit the suns office . when the night clad in black , mourns for the losse of day . when the darknesse ariseth in the east , and stars begin to appear ; when labourers forsake the fields , birds betake themselves to their night-boughs , and when the silence of all creatures is increased through the desire of rest . when all weary creatures take their sweet slumber , when cares are slackned , and hearts forget their labours , &c. when the sun visits the face of the earth with the warming and enlivening influence of his beams ; when fountains and streams wax clear , pastures green ; when the flowers of the field , with the trees blossomes do present their beauty to the eyes of the beholder , &c. when trees are widowed of their leaves . by the like observation of circumstances are all other descriptions of ti●e . evphemismvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , bona dictionis mutatio , seu favorabilis locutio , a good change of a word , or a fair kind of speech : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ e● ] bene , well or pleasingly , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ phemi ] dico , to speak ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ euphemeo ] faveo linguâ , aut bona verba dico , to favour in ●peech or to give pleasing wo●d's . it is a fair kind of speech , or a modest way of expressing ones mind . a figu●e whereby in scripture you shall finde a fair name put on a foul vice , and a word of a good and bad signification interpreted to the better part ; and it is also when things ( which would offend a most modest and chast ear ) are vailed with periphrasis , or circumlocution . thus in deut. . . to sanctifie is put for to defile . thus incest and adultery is sometimes exprest by a modest term of uncovering the nakednesse ; this you have in lev. . , , , . ezek. . . thus the vessel wherein nature eases it self , is for seemlinesse vailed with the periphrasis , a v●ssel wherein is no pleasure , and this in jer. . & hos. . . thus in prov. . . solomon most seemly observes the modesty of speech ; where he saith , let her breasts alwaies satisfie thee , why shouldest thou embrace the bosome of a stranger ? thus urine is vailed with a circumlocution , water of the feet . parrhesia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , licentia , loquendi libertas & audacia , liberty or boldnesse of speaking : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pan ] and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . [ rhesis ] license , or liberty . a figure when we speak freely and boldly concerning things displeasing and obnoxious to envy , especially when fear seemed to hinder it ; or , when in any case we shew our confidence for the present , our fearfulnesse for the future , or our ability to confute a false accusation ; or , as other say , it is either when we boldly acknowledge and defend a fault not proved against us , or when we venturously and confidently upbraid and rebuke others for their faults ; in which form of speech , it being to superiors , such an asswaging may elegantly be used ; to wit , may i with your leave , speak freely what i think ? or a modest insinuation made by shewing the necessity of freedom of speech in that behalf . vide quam non reformidem , quantà possum voce contendam ; tantum abest ut tuae sententiae subscribam , ut in publico hoc consessu decedere non reformidem : ecce , adeo non curo iram vestram . english examples . you may suppose me proud and inconstant , but my sincerity shall out-dare all their calumnies . it is contrary to the known rules of justice to condem any man ( as you have ) without hearing him first , whom you condemn . scriptural examples of parrhesia . job . , . let me not i pray you , accept any mans person , neither let me give flattering titles unto man , for i know not to give flattering titles , in so doing , my maker would soon take me away . elihu having in the , , & verses made his apology or insinuation , do●h here declare his purpose of free speech , and adds his reason in vers . . gal. . . for doe i now perswade men , or god ? or doe i seek to please men ? for if i yet pleased men , i should not be the servant of christ. psal. . , . therefore will not we fear , though the earth be removed : and though the mountains be carryed into the midst of the sea ; though the waters thereof roar and be troubled , &c. hebraism , or an imitation of the hebrews in phrase or construction ; it is when the construction proper to the hebrew tongue is used in another language . the hebrews doe often in stead of an epithet , put the substantive in the genitive case ; as , men of mercy , for , merciful men . a land of desolation , for , a desolate land . a man of desires , for a man very desirable and lovely , in dan. . . the son of perdition ( i. e. ) one ordained unto condemnation : as john . . thes. , . the man of sin ; there is a great emphasis in it ; it is as much as if the apostle had said , a very sinful man , a man made up of wickednesse , being as it were sin it self in the abstract . this is an hebraism very frequent in scripture ; hence in isa. . christ is called a man of sorrows , ( i. e , ) a man even compacted and compounded of all kinds and degrees of sorrows . the hebrews doe also often use the imperative mood for the future tense , to shew the certainty of a thing ; as , amos , . seek the lord and live , ( i. e. ) ye shall certainly live . so deut. . , . the lord bids moses goe up to mount nebo and dye there ; ( i. e. ) thou shalt certainly die there . and contrarily they sometimes put the future tense for the imperative mood ; as , exod. . thou [ shalt ] not kill , steal , &c. for doe not kill , steal , &c. mal. . . the priests lips shall preserve knowledge ; for , let the priests lips preserve knowledge . when the hebrews would expresse an excellent or glorious thing , they o●ten joyn the name of god with it : as , gen. . . abraham is called a prince of god. exod. . , , . horeb is called the mountain of god : that is , a most high and excellent mountain . psal. . . the city of god ; ( i. e. ) a glorious city . if , among the hebrews is a note of swearing : as , heb. . . therefore i sware in wrath , if they shall enter into my rest ; ( i. e. ) they shall never enter into my rest . the like in sam. . . apodioxis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rejectio , expulsio , rejection or an expelling : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ apodioco ] rejicio , expello , to reject or expell . a figure when any argument or objection is with indignation rejected as extreamly absurd , impettinent , false and by no means to be admitted of . a latin example . sed de lucullo alio dicam loco , & ità dicam , ut neque vera laus ei detracta oratione meâ , neque falsa affixa esse videatur . english examples . cicero for milo : what should milo hate clodius , the flower of his glory ? and would any wise man ever have so said ? were not ignorance the cause of this opinion , folly could not be the fruit . scriptural examples of apodioxis . matth. . . thus christ rejects peters argument , touching his endeavour to avert christ from his suffering ; get thee behind me , satan , thou art an offence unto me : for thou savourest not the things of god. thus when james and john would have leave of christ to command fire to come down from heaven upon the samaritans that would not receive him , christ rebukes them , and said in luk. . . ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of , &c. see act. . . mat. . , . psal. . . apodixis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , demonstratio & evidens probatio , demonstration or evident proof derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; [ apodeiknumi ] rationibus seu argumentis demonstro , aut probo , evidently to shew or prove . a form of speech by which the orator or speaker grounds his saying upon general experience : it differs from ( the next figure ) martyria in this that in martyria , the speaker confirms what he saith by the testimony of his own knowledge ; in this he infers his reason and confirmation from known principles , which experience proves , and no man can deny . english examples . hereunto appertain many proverbs , and common sayings , which arise from general proof and experience : as , trust not an horses heel , nor a dogges tooth . fire and water have no mercy . scriptural examples of apodixis . gal. . . be not deceived , god is not mocked : for whatsoever a man soweth , that shall he also reap . job . . can the rush grow up without mire ? can the stag grow without water ? prov. . . can a man take fire in his bosome , and his cloaths not be burnt ? can one goe upon hot coles , and his feet not be burnt ? martyria , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , testimonium , testatio , testimony or evidence : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ martyr ] testis , a witnesse . a figure when the speaker confirms something by his own experience . thus the physitian makes report of his own proof in diseases and cures , and sometimes records them to the great benefit of succeeding generations . thus the captain which hath been in many battails , at many seiges , and hath had experience in many stratagems , teaches young souldiers , and confirms his advice by his own testimony founded upon often proof . scriptural examples of martyria . job . . i have seen the foolish taking root : but suddainly i cursed his habitation . psal. . . i have seen the wicked in great power , and spreading himself like a green bay-tree , yet he passed away , and so he was not , yea , i sought him , but he could not be found . verse . i have been young and now am old : yet have i not seen the righteous forsaken , nor his seed begging bread . so john . . that which was from the beginning , which we have heard , which we have seen with our eyes , which we have looked upon , and our hands have handled of the word of life ; ( for the life was manifested , and we have seen it , and bear witnesse , and shew unto you the eternal life which was with the father , and w●s manifested unto us ) that which we have seen and heard , declare we unto you , &c. epimone , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , commoratio , item persoverantia , a tarrying long upon one matter ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ epimeno ] maneo , ( i. e. ) expecto ob rem aliquam , to stay or wait for something . epimone is a figure whereby the speaker dwels upon , and persists in a former conclusion , or the same cause much after one form of speech , but repeated in other words more plainly : by others it is said to be when the speaker knowing whereon the greatest weight of his cause or matter doth depend , makes often recourse thither , and repeats it many times by variation . english examples . and shall so eminent a vertue be expelled , thrust out , banished , and cast away from the city ? what didst thou covet ? what didst thou wish ? what didst thou desire ? scriptural examples . eccles. . . what profit hath a man of all his labour which he hath under the sun ? what profit ] to wit , towards the attaining of happinesse ; otherwise in all labours there is some profit towards the helping of our earthly estates , as prov. . . this is an elegant epimone or dwelling upon the former conclusion , of the vanity of all things delivered in the former verse , and here repeated in other words more plainly . gen. . , &c. here you have a good examample in abrahams suit to god for the sodomites , in these words ; if there be fifty righteous within the city , wilt thou destroy , and not spa●e the place for the fifty righteous that are therein ? that be far from thee to do after this manner , to slay the righteous with the wicked , &c. and thus he perseverantly continues his suit to the sixth request . john . , &c. thus christ speaks to simon peter , simon , son of jonas lovest thou me more then these ? feed my sheep ; which saying he persists in and repeats three times one presently after another . matth. , , . all manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men : but the blasphemy against the holy spirit shall not be forgiven unto men : and whosoever speaketh a word against the son of man , it shall be forgiven him : but whosoever speaketh against the holy ghost , it shall not be forgiven him , neither in this world , neither in the world to come . the like examples you may find in mar. . , , . col. . , , . cor , . , . horismos , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , definitio , definition , or an expresse declaring what a thing or the nature thereof is ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ horizo ] definio , to define , or make a plain description of a thing . a figure whereby we declare what a thing is , or delineate the nature of it ; and it is often used when we would shew a difference between two words : namely by defining both . latine examples . est virtus placitis abstinuisse bonis . virtus est habitus rationi consentaneus . nolo te parcum appellars , cum sis avarus ; nam qui parcus est , utitur eo quod satis est , tu contra propter avaritiam , quo plus habes , eo magis eges ; gloria est illustris ac pervulgata multorum ac magnorum vel in suos cives , vel in patriam , vel in omne genus hominum , fama meritorum . english examples . godlinesse is the exact care of a christian , to worship god in the spirit according to the dictates of his will , with all sincerity . he that subverts the laws , and infringes the peoples liberties , is a tyrant . fear is an apprehension of future harm . in way of gradation : to refuse good counsel is folly ; to contemn it , wickednesse : to scorn it , madnesse . beauty is nothing but a transitory charm , an illusion of senses , a slave of pleasure : a flower which has but a moment of life ; a dyal on which we never look , but whilst the sun shines on it : it is a dunghil covered with snow : a glass painted with false colours , &c. this is not fortitude , but temerity ; for fortitude is an heroick contempt of evil through due consideration of the justnesse of the cause , controversie and call : but temerity is a foolish enterprise of perils without due consideration of either . scriptural examples of horismos . job . . behold , the fear of the lord , that is wisdom ; and to depart from evil , is understanding . isa. , , , , . thus you have an hypocritical fast elegantly defined , and distinguished from such a one as is acceptable with god. see luke . . isa. . . gal. . . , , , &c. prov. . , . metabasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , transitio , transition , or a passing over from one thing to another : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ metabaino ] transeo , to passe over from one thing to another . a figure whereby the parts of an oration or speech are knit together : and is , when we are briefly put in mind of what hath been said , and what remains further to be spoken . this exornation conduces to eloquence and attention ; to the understanding and remembrance of the things handled in a speech . the first part of this figure hath respect unto the precedent ; the later part makes way for , or prepares the reader unto the following matter . latin and english examples interwoven . this figure is made eight ways : viz. . from the equal . at haec erant jucundissima , nec minus voluptatis attulerunt illa : in english , but these things were most pleasant and delectable , nor shall those bring lesse pleasure . the matters which you have already heard , were wonderful , and those that you shall hear , are no lesse marvellous . . from the unequal . sed haec utcumque ignoscenda , illud quis ferat ? audistis gravissima , sed audietis graviora : in english , but these things howsoever to be forgiven , who can bear that ? you have heard very grievous things , but ye shall hear more grievous . i have declared unto you many of the commendable faculties of his mind , yet i will tell you of many more , and far more excellent . . from the like . haec perfida designavit , cujus generis sunt & illa , quae nuper romae patrasse dicitur : in english thus , he hath evidently marked out these trayterous and disloyal acts ; of which sort also are those which are reported to have been lately perpetrated at rome . i have hitherto made mention of his noble enterprises in france , and now will i rehearse his worthy acts done in england . . from the contrary . sed haec juv●nis peccavit , nunc senis virtutes audietis : in english thus , but this young man hath offended , now ye shall hear the vertues and properties of an old man. as i have spoken of his sad adversity and misery , so will i now speak of his happy prosperity , which at length ensued , as the bright day doth the dark night . . from the differing . de moribus habes , nunc de doctrinâ reliquum est ut dicamus : in english thus , you have a relation touching manners , now it remains that we speak concerning doctrine . . as it were by anticipation or the prevention of an objection . jam ad reliqua properabimus , si prius illud unum adjecerimus : in english thus , now we will hasten unto that which is behind , if we shall first add in that one thing . by anticipation more clearly thus ; peradventure you think me too long in the threatnings of the law ; i will now passe to the sweet promises of the gospel . . by reprehension . quid his immoror ? ad id , quod est hujus causa caput , festinet oratio : in english thus , why stay i upon these things ? i shall hasten my speech unto that which is the principal point of the matter in question . . from consequents , or from things relating to something precedent . habes quod in illum contulerim beneficiorum ; nunc quam gratiam mihi retulerit audi : in english thus , you have heard what kindnesses i conferr'd on him ; now what return he made me of those favours , attend ye . you have heard how he promised , and now i will tell you how he performed , &c. scriptural examples of transition . cor. , . and i will yet shew you a more excellent way . the first part looks to the precedent , but the latter makes way for the subsequent matter : which is as much as if paul had said , you have heard of the gifts of prophesying and interpretation ; of the gifts of miracles , of healing , of diversity of tongues , &c. which are indeed eminent gifts , and such as i exhort you to desire and look out after . but the way of love ( which this transition makes way for , and which he comes to in the first verse of the next chapter ) is a far more excellent way then all these . it is the custome likewise of the same apostle , that passing over from one matter to another , he gives a certain entrance , or a little beginning whereby he doth as it were prepare the reader to the following matter : as , cor. . , . he admonishes the corinthians to remember what they had learned ; so cor. . . having briefly reprehended them , he passes over unto another matter . parecbasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , digressio , digression , excursion , or a going from a matter in hand to speak of another thing : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parecbaino ] digredior , to digress or goe from the purpose . digression is as it were a wandering from the purpose or intended matter . it is the handling of some matter going out from order , but yet upon sufficient ground , and for the advantage and illustration of the cause or matter we have in hand . digression is a figure when something is added beside or beyond the purpose or intended matter , and goes out from the appointed discou●se . note that digression ought in some respect to be agreeable , and pertinent to those matters which we have in hand , and not to be strange or remote from the purpose : and that by the abuses of this exornation , namely , by going forth abruptly , by tarrying too long abroad , and returning in unto the matter overthwartly , we shall in stead of adorning and garnishing our cause or speech , darken our main cause or principal matter , and deform the oration . this exornation is frequent in scripture : as , rom. . from . to . the apostle paul here digresses from his name , to the description of his calling in the first verse ; then unto the definition of the gospel in the . verse , by and by to the description of christ in the . & . verses ; then he again as it were slides unto his calling in the . verse ; at length he prayes for grace and peace for the romans , unto whom his epistle is directed , and so he doth , as it were , finish his course or compasse : and these are occasioned by the words in the sentences or things spoken of . col . , . we give thanks to god [ even the f●ther of our lord jesus christ , alwayes praying for you ] : since we heard of your faith in christ jesus , and of your love toward all saints . where you see the digression noted , then you have the apt return into the matter : since we heard of , &c. gen. . . to . verse . and the lord god planted a garden eastward in eden , and there he put the man whom he had made : [ for out of the ground made the lord god to grow every tree pleasant to the sight , &c. the digression here , begins at the . and ends with the verse ] then in the . verse you have the return unto the matter in hand ; in these words ; then the lord god took the man and put him into the garden of eden , &c. see cor. . . ephes. . . gen. . the whole chapter . parechesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , allusio , allusion , or a resembling of one thing to another : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parecheo ] sono assimilis sum , to resemble , or allude unto . parechesis is a figure when we bring in something of anothers to another intent then his own : or : when the allusion of words is to be searched after in another language or speech then in that wherein the author wrote . latin examples . quod orator de caecitate , de ignorantia dico : vultus perpetua nocte coopertus , non concipit nefas , ad quod ducibus oculis pervenitur ; tua ( quo nero senecae ) in me merita , dum vita suppetit , aeterna erunt . de bonorum societate dicere licet , quod ovidius de jovis sui habitaculo , lib. . metam . hic locus est , quem , si verbis audacia detur , haud timeam magni dixisse palatia coeli . english examples . i may say of flatterers , as tacitus of courtiers : they speak more readily with the princes fortune then himself . we may say of providence , as ovid of the sun , it sees all things , and by it all things on earth are govern'd . i may say of an ill conscience , as socrates of a wandering traveller , it is no wonder if it be out of temper , when it hath it's self for its companion . scriptural examples of parech●sis . matth. . . we have piped unto you , and ye have not danced , &c. john . . he that entreth not in by the door into the sheepfold , but climbeth up another way , he is a thief and a robber . cor. . . but we preach christ crucified : unto the jews , even a stumbling block , and unto the graecians foolishnesse : but unto , &c. see gen. . ▪ &c. john . . gnome , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sententia , a sentence : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ gnoo ] nosco , to know . a sentence is some excellent profitable and remarkable saying : it is a pearle in a discourse . gnome is a figure when we bring in a sentence or such a remarkable saying of anothers to the same purpose with the author , he being not named . latine examples . fit ex malè agendo consuetudo , deinde natura . ita vivendum est cum hominibus , tanquam deus videat ; sic loquendum cum deo , tanquam homines audiant . civitatis anima sunt leges . english examples . where ever the sun shines , is a wise mans countrey . the rich mans bounty is the poor mans exchequer . error and repentance are the companions of rashnesse . the covetous man wants as well that which he hath , as that which he hath not . unlawful desires are punished after the effect of enjoying ; but impossible desires are punished in the desire it self . scriptural examples of gnome . sentences are by solomon in prov. . . called words of wisdom and understanding . prov. . . in the multitude of words there wanteth not sin : but he that refraineth his lips , is wise . vers. . he that gathereth in summer , is a wise son ; but he that sleepeth in harvest , is a son that causeth shame . see eccles. . . and divers other places of the scripture . paregmenon , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , derivatum , deductum ; a derivative , or derived from : this word is a particle of the preterpefect tense passive of the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ parago ] deduco , derivo , to derive or take from . a figure when words , whereof one is derived of another , are conjoyned . latin examples . is domum miser , cujus miseriam nobilitas locupletavit . ingenioque faves ingeniose tuo . english examples . marvel not at that which is so little marvellous . a discreet discretion . sometimes there is a double paregmenon in one sentence ; as , he wished rather to die a present death , then to live in the misery of life . the humble soul is established by humility . scriptural examples of paregmenon . dan. . . he giveth wisdome unto the wise , &c. rom. . . for they stumbled at that stumbling stone . cor. . . the first man was of the earth , earthy , the second is the lord from heaven , heavenly . prov. . . he that hateth suretyship is sure . see cor. . . prov. . , , &c. mimesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , imitatio , imitation ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ mimeomai ] imitor , to imitate or resemble . it is an imitation or a using of the language of others , which is usual in the scriptures ; as . in psal. , . david uses the language , of rebellious rulers : let us break their bands , and cast away their cords from us . so in cor. . . paul uses the words of epicures , what advantages it me , if the dead rise not ? let us eat and drink , for to morrow we shall die . thus the prophet isaiah speaks in the language of the profane rulers in jerusalem who made a mock at gods word and threats ; isa. . . we have made a covenant with death , and with hell are we at agreement , we have made lies our refuge , and under a falshood have we hid our selves . the like in micah . , &c. mycterismus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , subsannatio , irrisio , a disdainful gibe or scoffe ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ mycterizo ] subsanno , naso suspendo , to mock or scoffe with bending of the brows , or with blowing the nose at one ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ aeiro ] erigo , suspendo , to lift up , or hang up , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ mycter ] nasus , the nose . it is a privy kind of mock or scoff , yet not so privy but that it may well be perceived . it is near to a sarcasm , but that is more manifest , this more privy , that more easie ; and this more hard : and sometimes is a figure , when in shew of disdainful contempt of a person or thing we fling up our nose . thus when a certain man that was bald , had spightfully r●yled against diogenes , after a little pawse diogenes answered him thus : my friend , further i have done thee no harm , but this i must say to thee , i do much commend the hai●s that are fallen from thy head , for i suppose they were wise , in that they made haste to leave the company of so foolish a skull . to one that demanded of demonax the philosopher , if philosophers did use to eat sweet cakes : demonax made this answer , dost thou think ( saith he ) that bees gather their hony for fools only ? luke . . thus the pharisees derided christ ; they did not simply contemn him , but they shewed their contempt of him by their gestures . anamne●is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , recordatio , remembrance , or a calling to minde : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ anamnaomai ] recordor , to remember or call to minde . anamnesis is a figure whereby the speaker calling to minde matters past , whether of sorrow , joy , &c. doth make recital of them for his own advantage , or for the benefit of those that hear him : as , psal. . . by the rivers , there we sate down ; yea , we wept when we remembred sion , &c. luke . . the prodigal son , when he came to himself , said , how many hired servants of my fathers house , have bread enough and to spare , and i perish with hunger ? i will arise and go to my father , &c. gen. . . thus jacob in his return from laban , in thankful remembrance of the goodnesse of god to him , breaks out ; with my staffe i passed over this jordan , and now i am become two bands , &c. psal. . , . saith david , i have considered the days of old , the years of ancient times ; i call to remembrance my song in the night , &c. see prov. . , &c. expeditio , expedition , or quick dispatch . expedition is a figure when many parts or reasons of an argument being enumerated and touched , all are destroyed , save that only upon which the speaker intends to conclude , stand to , and rest upon . one of these courses must be taken ; either you must distinctly observe and practise these rules , or deny that ever you received instructions , or alledge want of capacity in your self , or want of use of them in your life . that they are not necessary , you cannot say ; for what more necessary in your life , then to write well ? that you are uncapable , is a slander , and a contradiction to your own conscience and my experience , that hath seen such fair essays of your endeavours : and to say you had never any directions , were to give your two eyes the lye , and to make me believe , that i did never but dream your good . therefore must your labour conspire with my inventions , and so much you unavoidably become skilful . seeing that this land was mine , thou must needs shew that either thou didst possesse it , being void , or made it thine by use , or purchase , or else that it came to thee by inheritance : thou couldst not possesse it void when i was in possession ; also thou canst not make it thine by use nor custome . thou hast no deed to evidence thy purchase of it ; i being alive it could not descend upon thee by inheritance : it follows then that thou wouldst put me from mine own land , before i be dead . diatyposis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , descriptio , informatio , description , information of a thing : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ diatypoo ] describo , informo , to describe , inform , &c. a figure when a thing is so described by more words , that it may seem to be set , as it were , before our eyes ; or , when we have spoken of a thing in general , descend unto particulars . latin examples . personabant omnia vocibus ebriorum , natabant pavimenta mero , madebant parietes , &c. vid. ovid. in descript . pestis , lib. metam . . v. . . procellae , lib. . ver . . diluvii , lib. . v. . virgil. in descrip . scuti aeneae , lib. . aeneid . v. . english examples . if you desire that i make you a picture or lively description of the nature of desire , i will tell you ; it is a strange countrey , whereunto the prodigal child sailed when he forsook his fathers house to undertake a banishment : a countrey where corn is still in grasse ; vines in the bud ; trees perpetually in blossome , and birds always in the shell ; you neither see corn , fruit , nor any thing fully shaped , all is there only in expectation : a countrey where the inhabitants are never without feavers , one is no sooner gone , but another comes into its place : here time looks on you afar off , and never comes neer you , but shews you an inchanted looking-glasse , wherein you see a thousand false colours , which amuse you . here at best you have nothing to dinner but smoke and expectation . scriptural examples of diatyposis . psal. . , . god judgeth the righteous ; god is angry with the wicked every day ; if he turn not , he will whet his sword : he hath bent his bow , he hath also prepared for him the instruments of death : he ordaineth his arrows against the persecutors . tim. , , , &c. this know also , that in the last days perillous times shall come : for men shall be lovers of their own selves , covetous , boasters , proud , blasphemers , disobedient to parents , unthankful , unholy , &c. so if speaking of war , the blood-shed , enemies , clamours depopulations , &c. which happen by it , are laid open . see revel . . . revel . . . isa. . , , &c. proecthesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , expositio quae praemittitur ; an exposition which is sent afore : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ porectithemi ] priori loco expono , to expound in the former place . it is as it were a prae-exposition or a praeposition of a speech , wherein that which comes into controversie , or debate , is presented unto the eye . a figure usual in scripture , when the speaker doth by his answer ( containing a reason of what he , or some other hath said or done ) defend himself or the other person , as unblameable in such speech or action . thus job being accused and rebuked of his friends , of impatiency , sin , folly , &c. replyes thus : job . , &c. o that my grief were throughly weighed , and my calamities laid together in the ballance , for the arrows of the almighty are within me , the poyson whereof drinketh up my spirit , &c. doth the wild asse br●y when he hath grasse ? or loweth the oxe over his sodder ? in this form of speech our saviour many times defends his doings against the accusation of his adversaries : as , for healing the man with the withered hand on the sabbath day . mark . . and he saith unto them , is it lawful to do good on the sabbath dayes , or to do evill ? to save life , or to kill ? but they held their peace . the like in matth. . . what man shall there be among you , that shall have one sheep , and if it fall into a pit on the sabbath day , will he not lay hold on it , and lift it out ? how much then is a man better then a sheep ? wherefore it is lawful to doe well on the sabbath dayes . in like manner in luke . , , &c. mark. . he defends his disciples being accused for pulling the ears of corn on the sabbath day , by alledging the example of david eating the shew-bread in his great hunger . secondly , by shewing his authority , as lord of the sabbath . and then by citing a saying of hos. . . i will have mercy and not sacrifice . and in matth. . , . he being accused for eating and drinking with publicans and sinners , answers ; they that are whole need not a physitian , but they that are sick ; i came not to call the righteous , but sinners to repentance . dialogismvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sermocinatio ; a di●logue or conference between two : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ dialogizomai ] sermocino , to dispute or talk . dialogismus is a figure or form of speech , whereby the speaker feigns a person to speak much or little , according to comelinesse ; much like unto prosopopoeia ; differing only in this ; when the person feigned speaks all himself , then it is prosopopoeia ; but when the speaker answers now and then to the question , or objection , which the feigned person makes unto him , it is called dialogismus . or it is , when as one discussing a thing by hims●lf , as it were talking with another , doth move the question , and make the answer : as , hos. . , , . saith the lord by the prophet there concerning ephraim ; he is a merchant , the ballances of deceit are in his hands ; he loveth to oppresse : then follows the fiction of ephraims speech ; yet , i am become rich , i have found me out substance : in all my labours they shall find none iniquity in me , that were sin . then you have the lords answer to this objection . and i that am the lord thy god from the land of egypt , will yet make thee to dwell in tabernacles , as in the days of the solemn feast , &c. here note that care be taken that the speech be suitable to the person feigned , and that it be no otherwise then in probability the same person would use : as , here in this example ; ephraims speech savours of pride , arrogancy , and self-justification , suitable to the condition this and other scriptures prove him to be of ; if this caution be not observed , this form of speech will seem vain and absurd . emphasis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , efficacia significandi , the vertue and efficacy of signifying ones mind : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ emphaino ] repraesento , to represent : or it is an earnest , vehement , or expresse signification of ones mind . emphasis is a figure whereby a tacite vertue and efficacy of signification is given unto words ; or it is a form of speech which signifieth that which it doth not expresse ; the signification whereof is understood either by the manner of pronunciation , or by the nature of the words themselves . english examples . when the signification is to be understood by the pronunciation . darest thou presume to praise him ? ( i. e. ) is ignorance fit to commend learning , or folly me●● to praise wisdom ? wilt thou believe a scot ? whereby is signified , not simply a man born in scotland , but any other dissembler , after the nature and disposition of that nation . thy looks upon a sudden are become dismal , thy brow dull as saturns issue , thy lips are hung with black , as if thy tongue were to pronounce some funeral . he talked with such vehemency of passion , as though his heart would climbe up into his mouth to take his tongues office . i could wish you were secretary of my thoughts , or that there were a crystal casement in my breast , through which you might espy the inward motions and palpitations of my heart , then you would certified of the sincerity of my heart in this affirmation . scriptural examples of emphasis . eccles. . . solomon there uses an excellent emphasis , where he gives us warning that we should not speak or think evil of the king , no not in our bed-chamber ; for saith he ; a bird of the air shall carry the voyce , and that which hath wings shall tell the matter . job . . i have said to corruption , thou art my father : to the worm , thou art my moher and my sister . heb. . . to the blood of sprinkling , that speaketh better things then that of abel . prov. . , . give me neither poverty nor riches ; feed me with food convenient for me : lest i be full and deny thee , and say , who is the lord ? or lest i be poor , &c. see isa. . . . micah . . king. . . mat. . . syllogismvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ratiocinatio , collectio quae ratiocinando fit ; reasoning , a conclusion which is made by reasoning together in argument ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ syllogizomai ] ratiocinatione colligo , to conclude by reasoning . a rhetorical syllogism is also by the grecians called epichirema , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , argumentum , quo aliquid probari , illustrari , & argui potest : an argument whereby any thing may be proved , illustrated and reasoned . a rhetorical syllogism is a form of speech , whereby the speaker amplyfieth a matter by conjecture , that is , by expressing some signs or circumstances of a matter ; which circumstances are of three sorts , either going before it , annexed with , or following after it . . as to circumstances going before the matter . kings . . as the lord god of israel liveth , before whom i stand , there shall not be dew nor rain these years , but according to my word . here by the great drought , elisha signifies the great famine and dearth which should be brought by it . gen. . . isa. . . mat. . . & . . . as to circumstances annexed with the matter . sam. . , . the huge statute and great strength of goliah is signified by the weight of his brigandine and spears head , and by the monstrous bignesse of his spear staffe , compared to a weavers beam . see act . . matth. . . kings . . isai. . . luke . . . as to circumstances following after the matter . sam. . . there davids sorrowful bewailing of his son absoloms death is described : whereby may be collected how dearly he loved his son , notwithstanding his evill inclinations . see isai. . , &c. a logical syllogism is a perfect argument consisting of three parts , inferring a necessary conclusion ; or whereby something is necessarily proved . the first part of a syllogism is called , the proposition or major , whereby the consequent of the question , or the conclusion is at least disposed with the argument . the second , the assumption or minor ; and this is affirmed from the proposition . the third , the conclusion , this embraceth the part of the question and concludes it . examples of a syllogism in logick . major , . every vertue is honorable ; minor , . patience is a vertue ; conclusion , . therefore patience is honourable . every just thing is profitable ; every honest thing is just ; every honest thing therefore is profitable . every rationable creature is sensible ; but every man is rationable creature ; therefore every man is sensible . enthymema , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , animi conceptus conception of the mind ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ enthymeomai ] animo concipio , to conceive in the mind . an enthymem is a form of speech , which quintilian interpreteth a comment , for that it may well be called the whole action and sentence of the mind ; and it is , as cicero saith , when the sentence concluded consisteth of contraries . when any part of the syllogism is wanting , it is said to be an enthymem . it is an imperfect or an unprofitable syllogism , where one proposition is reserved in the mind , and not declared : or it is a syllogism of one proposition , in which one argument or proposition being laid down , the conclusion is inferred . enthymema est imperfectus syllogismus ; in qu● nimirum major minor ve desideratur . it is an imperfect syllogism ; that is to say , such a syllogism , wherein the major or minor being wanting is looked for . latin examples . pius fuit , fortis , sapiens . deum quippe coluit , hostes contudit , fortunam utramque moderatè tulit , imo superavit . quem alienum fidum invenies , si tuis hostis fueris ? english enthymems . our ancestors made war , not only that they might be free , but also that they might rule : but thou thinkest war may be left off , that we might be made bondslaves to serve . if great wealth brings cares , and poverty misery , then the mean between these two extreams is a great blessing . they which may doe me good , will not ; and they which are willing , cannot ; therefore my distresse remains . if intemperance be hurtful , temperance is profitable : and if intemperance be not hurtful ; neither is temperance profitable . if fish bred in the salt water may want salting , then laws may need a law to mend them . dilemma , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , argumentum cornutum , an horned argument , or a double argument : derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ dis ] twice , or double , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ lemma ] assumptio , the assumption or minor proposition , but sometimes it signifies the major proposition also . dilemma is an argument which convinceth every way , and consists of two propositions , which both wayes conclude or convince ones adversary ; wherein , whether of the two you grant , he will take hold of , or reprove you . if he be a good man , why speak you ill of him ? if he be naught , why doe you keep him company ? why should i sharply reprove him ? if he be a good man , a friendly admonition is better ; but if he be an evill man , reproof is odious and contemptible with him . if you deem me unworthy of an answer , it proceeds of contempt if your passion defers a reply ; it argues a displeasure . either covetousnesse , or poverty exposed him to this act ; not covetousnesse , for the course of his life declares him no covetous man ; nor poverty , for he hath large possessions . scriptural dilemma's . cor. . . for if i doe this thing willingly , i have a reward : but if against my will , a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me . john . . if i have spoken evill , bear witnesse of the evill : but if well , why smitest thou me ? mark . , , &c. hypothesis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , suppositio , a supposition or argument , derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hypotithemai ] suppono , to suppose ; or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ hypo ] sub , beneath or under , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ thesis ] positio , a position or sentence propounded . hypothesis is an argument or matter whereon one may dispute ; or it is a conditional proposition . by rhetoricians it is in its peculiar signification said to be a finite question . of questions there are two kinds ; the one is infinite or endlesse . the other finite or limited . the infinite question is by the greeks called thesis , which signifies also a general argument proposed . the finite question they call hypothesis , which is as it were a conditional proposition . suppositions in scripture are no positions . when the speech is only hypothetical , it concludes nothing ; for a conditional proposition doth not simply affirm ; and therefore conclusions gathered from it , as if it were affirmative , will not hold : as , ezek. . . if a righteous man turn away from his righteousnesse , &c. hence would some conclude that a righteous man may finally fall from grace ; but this is no other then a supposition , and so concludes not . matth. . . if the mighty works which were done in you , had been done in tyre and sidon , they would have repented long ago in sack-cloth and ashes . it follows not that there was some inclination in tyre and sidon to repentance . luke . . if these should hold their peace , the stones would immediately cry out . it will not hence follow that there was some inclination in the stones to speak or cry out . paralogismvs , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , falsa ratiocinatio , false reasoning or debating of a matter , or a decietful conclusion ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ paralogizomai ] subdolâ supputatione fallo , vel falsâ argumentatione utens decipio , to deceive by supposition full of deceits and wiles ; or to defraud by false reasoning . a paralogism is a sophistical or deceitful conclusion : it is a manner of argument , which seems true when it is not . examples . he that affirms william to be a living creature , saith true . he that affirms william to be a jack-daw , affirms him to be a living creature : and therefore he that affirms william to be a jack-daw saith true . all sin is evill . every christian doth sin : therefore every christian is evill . it may be answered that the assumption in this place doth not take the argument out of the proposition , but puts in another thing , and so it is no right frame of concluding , the assumption being not affirmed from the proposition . sometimes all the parts of the syllogism are denyed ; as , no pope is a devill . no man is a devill : therefore no man is a pope . this may be answered , that it is not according to the definition of a negative syllogism , which must have always one affirmative . pathopoeia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pathopoiia ] affectus expressio , expression of the affection of the mind ; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ pathos ] which signifies every more vehement affection , or an exceeding stirring up of the affections of the mind ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ poieo ] qualitate afficior , to be affected with the quality of such ardent affections . pathopoeia is a form of speech whereby the speaker moves the mind of his hearers to some vehemency of affection , as of love , hatred , gladness , sorrow , &c. it is when the speaker himself ( being inwardly moved with any of those deep and vehement affections ) doth by evident demonstration , p●ssionate pronunciation and suitable gestures make a lively expression thereof . scriptural examples . isa. . . can a woman forget her sucking child ? yea they may forget , yet will i not forget thee : behold , i have graven thee upon the palms of my hands , &c. jer. . . is ephraim my dear son ? is he a pleasant childe ? for since i spake against him , i do earnestly remember him still : therefore my bowels are troubled for him ; i will surely have mercy upon him , saith the lord. jer. . , . o that my head were waters , and mine eyes a fountain of tears , that i might weep day and night for the slain of the daughter of my people ! oh that i had in the wildernesse a lodging place , &c. see hos. . , . cor . , . cor. . . jer. . , . finis . a brief explanation of the several points used by the learned in their writings , illustrated by particular and pertinent examples upon each . forasmuch as the points or notes used by the learned in distinguishing writing ( though not precisely pertinent to rhetorique ) are not the least part of orthography , or of the right manner of writing : the ignorance whereof is frequently not only an obstacle to the discerning of the elegancy in writing , but likewise to the perceiving of the writers scope , drift and sense : it will therefore not be impertinent here to add a few lines in explanation thereof . the points used by the learned in their writings are , viz. . a comma . . a semi-colon . . a colon. . a period . . a note of exclamation or admiration . . a note of interrogation . . parenthesis . which are particularly and orderly illustrated and exemplified . comma , subdistinctio , the point in the part of a sentence without perfect sense : a comma or cutting short is a shutting up of the sense , the measure and order in syllables being not filled up , extending from two unto seven syllables , or thereabouts : or as others define ; it is a note of convenient silence , or rather a place of pausing or taking breath , whereby the bound or limit of pronunciation or utterance ( the sense remaining ) is so respited , as that which follows ought forthwith to succeed ; it is a short pause , and thus noted — , a latin example of a comma . ovid. vtendum est aetate : cito pede praeterit aetas , nec bona tam sequitur , quam bona prima fuit . english examples . by this point or note all the parts of a sentence are distinguished : as , embrace in your sweet consideration , i beseech you , the misery of my case , acknowledge your self to be the cause , and think it reason for you to redresse the effects . thus she said , thus she ended , with so fair a majesty of unconquered vertue , that captivity might seem to have authority over tyrannie , &c. loves companions be unquiet longings , fond comforts , faint discomforts , hopes , jealousies , carefulnesse , &c. . semi-colon , semi-media distinctio , a pause somewhat longer then a comma , and thus noted — ; a latin example . cujus vita turpitudinis conscientia vacat ; ejus nomen ab invidiosa , quantum in nobis est , malevolentia vindicetur . an english example . her witty perswasions had wise answers ; her eloquence recompensed with sweetnesse ; her threatnings repelled with disdain in pamela , and patience in philoclea , &c. . colon , media distinctio , a mean distinction between a comma and a period , is where there remains almost as much of the sentence to come , as is then past : or , as others define it ; it is a part of a sentence which finishes the sense , shut up in measure and order of syllables , but being pull'd away from a period it defers the hearers expectation , as not perfecting the sentence ; and it goes forward from the twelfth to the eighteenth syllable , and sometimes to the twenty fourth : it is a longer stay then the former , thus noted — : a latin example of colon. quemadmodum horologii umbram progressam sentim , us progredientem non cernimus : & fruticem aut herbam orevisse apparet , crescere autem nulli videtur : ita & ingeniorum profectus , quoniam minutis constat auctibus , ex intervallo sentitur . an english examples if i speak nothing , i choke my self , and am in ●o way of relief : if simply , neglected : if confusedly , not understood : if by the bending together all my inward powers , they bring forth any lively expressing of that they truly feel , that is a token , forsooth , the thoughts are at too much leisure , &c. . periodus plena ac perfecta distinctio , a period , a perfect or full point , or distinction ; this is to be put at the end of a complete sentence . that period is the most excellent , which is performed with two colons ( and sometimes commas ) or four parts of a sentence , as that which suspends the mind , and satisfies the ears . a period is thus noted — . herein beware that the period be not shorter then the ear expects , nor longer then the strength and breath of the speaker or reader may bear , and that it finish its course in a handsome and full comprehension . a latin example of a period . est enim haec non scripta , sed nata lex ; quam non didicimus , accipimus , legimus ; verum ex n●tura ipsa arripuimus , hausimus , expressimus : ad quam non docti , sed facti non instituti , sed imbuti sumus . english examples . lines cannot blush ; so as modesty admits a freedom to my pen , which would be taxed immodesty being delivered by the tongue . that every one may understand , i seek not to talk any thing by silence , or to cloud any thing by words . . a note of exclamation or admiration , thus noted — ! latin examples . ingens , atrox , horridum , facinus ! quale nec antiquitas vidit , nec credunt posteri ; omnium denique flagitiorum compendium in ferrei hujus seculi faeces reservatum ! o miseras hominum mentes ! o pectora caeca ! qualibus in tenebris vitae , & c ! an english example . o endless endeavours ! o vain glorious ignorance ! . a note of interrogation marked thus — ? latin examples . et quae tanta fuit romam tibi causa videndi ? — quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacta fames ? english examples . how is my sun , whose beams are shining bright , become the cause of my dark ugly night ? or how do i captiv'd in this dark plight , bewail the case , and in the cause delight ? . parenthesis , which signifies interposition , is a sentence shut in with two half moons ( which set aside ) the former discourse notwithstanding remains intire and sound : it is thus marked — ( ● ) latin examples . credo equidem ( noc vana fides ) genus esse deorum . — princeps ( quia bella minantur hostes ) militibus urbes praemunit & armis . an english example . tell me ingenuously ( if there be any ingenuity in you ) whether , &c. finis . a catalogue of some books printed for , and sold by george eversden at the maiden-head in saint pauls church-yard . an exposition with practical observations upon the ix first chap. of the proverbs , grammatical , rhetorical , logical , and theological ; by francis taylor , b. d. late minister of canterbury . in . an exposition on the whole book of the canticles , by john robotham late minister of dover , in . the natural mans case stated , or an exact map of the little world man : in xvii sermons by christopher love in . the doctrine of mortification , with the hearers duty , by christopher love , in . a treatise of prayer and of divine providence as relating to it , by edward gee minister of the gospel at eccleston in lancashire in . the . edition corrected and amended . a comment on the first and second chapters of ruth , by thomas full●r , minister of waltham abby in essex , in . mr. culpepers treatise of aurum potabile being an universal remedy for all diseases , in sion and pernassus , being divine epigrams on several texts of scripture by j. h. gent. in . the life and death of sir tho. more sometime lord chancellour of england . enoch's walk ; being the substance of sundry sermons digested into a tested into a treatise by william bell m.a. pastour of the church at highton in lancashire , in s. usurpation defeated , and david restored , being an exact parallel between david and our most gracious soveraign king charles the ii. in their dangerous dissettlement and wonderful restauration , laid open in a sermon on sam. . . by henry newcom . a sermon preached at the collegiate church at manchester , on the coronation day : by richard horri●k , warden of the said colledge . the sinners hope , as his priviledge and duty in his worst condition , stated , cleared , and improved by henry newcom m. a. and one of the ministers of the gospel at manchester . grace , the truth and growth and different degrees thereof , being the substance of 〈◊〉 sermons preached by christopher love late minister of laurence jury london , to which is added a funeral sermon being the last sermon he ever preached . king james apology for the oath of allegiance and supremacy , against the two breves of pope paulus quintus and the letter of cardinal bellarmine to g. blackwell the arch-priest . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * the english examples are most of them streams from sir phillip sidnyes fountain . * note that rhetorique sets forward the end of the discourse , to wit , to affect the heart with the sense of the matter in hand : as eccl. . . vanity of vanities , saith the preacher , vanity of vanities , all is vanity , where we may see that it is no vanity to teach the vanity of the creatures in rhetorical elegancies . luke . . isa. . , . rev. . . eph. . . luke . . * mat. . , . this is my body , &c. take heed you take not the sign for that whereof it is but a sign . vvhere there is a sentence in scripture which hath a tropical word , we may n●t think the whole place figurative : as matth. . . this is my blood which is shed for many , &c. * the like in joh. . . . . & . , notes for div a -e a trope is an in●●●u●ent of elocution wh●ch adorns out speech . metonymie irony . metaphor . synecdoche . catachresis . hyperbile . me●alepsis , litotes . allego●ie . a figure ▪ a note in the garnishing of speech in words , and in garnishing the frame of speech in a sentence . . kinde . . k●nde . . kinde , . kinde . by the table may he found each figure , and where they are opened , illustrated and exemplified . figura sententiae . * esteum nomen aut verbum ex prop●io loco , in ●●m transfertur , in quo aut proprium d est , 〈◊〉 sla●um prop●io melius est . farnaby . farnaby . met. efficientis . met materiae . met. instrument . met essecli . met. subjecti . 〈◊〉 , adjuncti . met. an●eceden●is . met. consequontis . met. connext . met. finis * see the explication of the termes . met. formae . farnaby . syn●c . numeri see pag. . * in exercitu militum virtus quam maxime juvat . synecd . numeri . see p. . * 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 and ●is sons daughters , when it appear by the , & . verses , that he had but an only daughter , by name dinah , and one of his sons daughters . * cum nomen aut verbum universale restringitur ad partem vel aliquid saliem speciale , quod per accusativum effertur . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . * vir gregis ( i.e. ) caper . est autem haec in metalepsi natura , ut inter quod transfertur sit medius quidam gradus , nihil ipse significans , sed praebens transitum ; quem tropum magis affectamus , ut habere videamur , quàm ut ullo in loco desideremus . farnaby . virg. aenoid . virg. aenoid . * alicujus ougendi minuendive causa superat veritatem . farnaby . the glory of the odl testament . farnaby . * negatio contrarii auget vim affirmationis . farn●by . farn●by . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farn●by . * quod in 〈◊〉 dentes nudan●ur carne . farn●by . farnaby . note that he that will understand proverbs , must mark their opposition . prov. . . farnaby . a ☽ b ☉ . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . see homo●teleuton . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . * cumter eadem recurrimus , verba inverso ordine relegentes . when we return back again by the same words , reading again the words in a clean contrary order . farnaby . terence , farnaby . * thus it is a retreat at the end of a parenthesis . farnaby . farnaby . in symplece . a s●e patiop●ta . b see chronographia . farnaby . c s●e diatyposis . see psal. . , . a it argues a paralogism of the consequent . farnaby . farnaby . cicero . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . cicero . cicero for archia . farnaby . * this is called a figure of speech between two . farnaby . farnaby . * hereunto is synchoresis of kin . farnaby . * it is a kind of a climux . farnaby . terence . * this form of speech solomon in prov. . ● . uses 〈…〉 h●● affirmation do they not erre that devise evill ? farnaby . * this is f●equently usu●l in an enthymema . farnaby . * it is a kind of exclamation . , farnaby . * epanorthosis and aposiopesis are kinds of revocation . farnaby . this is also a kind of revocation . farnaby . virgil. farnaby . cice●o . * of this kind are mimesis and dialegismus . farnaby . this exsornation hath some affinitie with prosopopoeia . farnaby . * this figure adorneth and garnisheth speech as a rich wardrobe , wherein are many and sundry changes of garments to adorn one and the same person . farnaby , a synonymie of word● . a synonymie of sentences . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . * whatsoever may be more briefly signified , & is with eloquence more amply manifested , is a periph●asis . far●aby . * see it further in pag. . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . * it is somewhat like unto aposiopesis . farnaby . farnaby . cicero against cataline . farnaby . farnaby . * articulus hath been accounted among the ancient rhet. a figure , but now asyndeton . supplies its place . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . * i● is an immediate reduction of the third person either to the first or second . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . b trabeate the vocat . for traheatus , the nominative . the no. for the genitive . the dat. for accul . abl. for dat. edm spencer . ch . . * achilles . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . enal . gen. a pro qui mihi charior sum , enal . numeri . enal . modi enal pers. enal temporum . enal . of the number . enal . of the gend . enal . of the tense . enal . of the pers. farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . farnaby . see epistrophe . an epigmatical parable . the morning . the evening . midnight . the spr. autumn . see antiphrosis . sentences . this exornation is of kin to aetiologia . faith vindicated from possibility of falshood, or, the immovable firmness and certainty of the motives to christian faith asserted against that tenet, which, denying infallibility of authority, subverts its foundation, and renders it uncertain sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) faith vindicated from possibility of falshood, or, the immovable firmness and certainty of the motives to christian faith asserted against that tenet, which, denying infallibility of authority, subverts its foundation, and renders it uncertain sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. [s.n.], lovain : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- apologetic works. catholic church -- infallibility. faith. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion faith vindicated from possibility of falshood : or , the immovable firmness and certainty of the motives to christian faith , asserted , against that tenet , which , denying infallibility of authority , subverts its foundation , and renders it uncertain . desistes adversus alios dicere ; caeterùm ita pro veritate loquêris , ut ea quae dicuntur argui refellique non possint . dionys. areopag . epist. . lovain , a. d. mdclxvii . introduction . though nothing be more natural than that all , who deny the certainty of the rule of faith , should deny also the certainty of faith it self , since the certainty of this later depends on the certainty of the former ; and , it is impossible the conclusion should be held certain , unless the premisses be held so too , yet , the conceit which the generality of those who call themselv's faithful or christian , have of their faith , and , consequently , the nature of that kind of assent , is such , that nothing can sound more horridly and blasphemously to their ears , than bluntly and without disguise to say , that all their faith may possibly be a ly for any thing any man living absolutely knows . for , a certain goodness of rational nature , has fixt this apprehension in them , that , since the world is made for the salvation of mankind , it is unsuitable to the wisdom and goodness of providence , which has furnisht us with means of certainty for our inferiour concerns , that the principles on which eternity depends , should fall short of that certainty , and , consequently , of strength and efficacy to move & carry us on to a steady pursuit of that greatest , and , in comparison , onely interest . notwithstanding , so unresistible is the force of this evident truth , that , whoever has deserted the catholick church , and her rule of faith , tradition , can have no absolute certainty of faith ; that is , indeed no true faith ( for that truly is faith which the generality of those who use the word mean by it ) that the more intelligent amongst them , conscious of the manifest weakness of their grounds , are necessitated , in their controversies , when they should defend their faith , in plain terms to disgrace and betray it ; chusing rather candidly to confess it to be all a possible falshood , than to undertake that impossible performance to maintain that it is an absolute truth . i cannot resemble this natural conceit of the perfect certainty of faith , inbred as it were in the generality of those who have had even a glimmering of christianity , to any thing so well as to the apprehension , the former world had of a godhead . for , as natural instinct forc't those , who had not light to know the true god , to affix the notion of a deity to some false one , as some eminent heroe , the sun , thunder , fire ; nay , there was nothing so ridiculous but they would make a god of it , rather than forgoe the tenet of a soveraign power so deeply rooted in them by nature ; so , our modern misbelievers , rather than they will relinquish their opinion , that faith and the means to know the way to heaven is absolutely-certain , springing naturally from the conceit they have that god has a providence for the salvation of mankind , chuse to misplace the notion of the certain means to know god's will , or rule of faith , in the most unlikely things imaginable ; as , in a ridiculous whimsy of fancy little better than a dream , nay sometimes in a dream it self , or in the motion of some hypocondriacal vapour , as do the fanaticks ; others , in other things seemingly wiser ; as , in their opinions of some men they esteem good and learned ; in meerly their being educated thus by parents who confess they have relinquish'd what themselves had been educated to ; in interpretations of words by grammatical skill which were writ long ago , and in dogmatical points , where every word is capable of equivocalness ; nay ( which is indeed as mad as the most extatick of them all ) to affirm that such words are so plain to every reader that none can miss the right sense of them : all which , though plainly confuted by this principle which nature teaches the rudest , that , that can never be a way which many follow to their power and yet the greater part are misled , joyn'd to their plain experience that many followers of these wayes exceedingly differ ; yet , so prevalent is the force of the other truth , that they will wink at this later to embrace that ; insomuch that none of those ( i except seekers , by what name soever they are call'd , as not being pretenders to faith ) but , were they ask'd whether they be not as certain of their faith as that they live , would readily and heartily answer affirmatively ; i mean those of every sort who follow meerly the guidance of uncorrupted nature in this affair . notwithstanding , as in the pa gan world there were found many witty men , who , out of unacquaintance with the true godhead and the unworthyness of the false gods then in vogue , or out of a conceit of many misgovernments in the world , speculated themselves out of their natural notions and went about to deny absolutely there was any god at all ; so it happens that , amongst those who have deserted the catholick church , there are found diverse men of speculative and searching brains ; who , out of unacquaintance with , or at least their sleightly penetrating the nature of the catholick rule of faith , the living voice and practice of the church , or tradition , and , withal , seeing the vanity and manifest inability of their own pretended rules to ascertain them absolutely their faith is true , joyn'd with the experienc't disagreement in faith amongst diverse pretenders to it , would speculate themselves out of their natural christianity , and deny any absolute certainty at all of faith , or the way to salvation ; contenting themselves with a probability in the grounds 't is built on , miscall'd by them moral certainty ; confessedly consistent with a possibility of falshood . which kind of grounds permits ▪ that perhaps all may chance to be shown to morrow a meer illusion and a bold lye ; and all the christian world hitherto to have been possibly led by the nose by a false impostùre ; nay , to have held that imposture most sacred , and preferr'd the adhering to it before all the goods , life or nature could bestow . how near this wicked tenet approaches to atheism appears hence , that 't is next to the denial of a god-head , to deny that in proper speech we know him , or the way to him ; yet this is the very position of those who put a possibility of falshood in faith ; since none can truly be said to know that to be true ; which he sees and acknowledges may not be true at the same time . this seed of infidelity sown when the rule of faith was renounc'd , first dar'd to appear publickly above ground in the writings of mr. chillingworth and the l. falkland ; and , though , had it been propos'd barefac't , in another occasion , it could have hop'd for no welcome reception even amongst the generality of the protestants themselves , who were made believe ever since their breaking from the church , their faith had the word of god for its basis , which they honestly understood to have the same certainty as if god himself had spoke it ; yet , being drest up by their plausible rhetorick , and , advanc'd in a circumstance when they were confuting the papists , the middle sort of protestant readers at unawares let it pass as meritorious to their party ; and the wiser sort embrac'd it both as a real truth , and also as making best for the interest of their cause when they would oppugn us ; what disservice soever it did tot he common cause of religionor christianity . for , they were not at all sollicitous ( so strangely did faction transport them ) so they could in their conceit overthrow the infallibility of the catholick church , though they reduc'd all faith into incertainty , and all the grounds on which 't is built , into a tottering contingency . it seem'd to threaten a mischief considerable enough to christianity , that such a pernicious tenet should be publickly own'd in controversy , to taint the wiser sort of readers with atheism , in which it hath been too successful ; but , it grew intolerable when it durst take the boldness to appear in sermons pronounc'd in very honourable assemblies , and afterwards publish'd in print ; where , under the title of [ the wisdom of being religious ] and a great many seeming shows , and , i heartily think , very real intentions of impugning atheism , by an ill-principled , and ( in that circumstance ) imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent terms of the possible falshood of faith , nay even as to the chiefest and most fundamental point , the tenet of a deity . religion receives a deep wound , and atheism an especial advantage : as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter . i envy not that sermon , and some other productions of mr. tillotson their authour , their due commendations , though he be my adversary ; i acknowledge that in his clear method , or disposition of his matter , and the cleanness of his style , which fit him for an excellency in preaching , he hath few equals ; and that , had he good principles , he would deliver them as intelligibly as any man i know ; onely i could wish he had right principles to ground his discourse , without which he can never make a controvertist , but must needs undermine the solid foundation of christianity , if he undertake to meddle with the grounds of it , even while he goes about to defend it . what i am on this occasion chiefly to reflect on , is my own obligation ; which is , the boldness of owning and publishing the incertainty of christian faith , being come to the height , to assert it's absolute firmness and certainty in the best manner god shall enable me : and his providence seems to require it of me at present ; in regard 't is expected i should reply to mr. tillotson 's pretended answer to sure footing ; whose first principle in that reply seems to be this , that , what he deems the rule of christian faith , and , consequently , that faith it self is possible to be false ; for , by virtue of this position , which he defends p. , and in diverse other places implies and builds on , he more oppugns my discourse than by any other thesis whatever . the contrary to which if i evince , then the protestants own confession , that they have no absolutely-certain ground or rule of faith , confutes them without more ado , and concludes them to have relinquish'd its onely right , because its onely truly certain rule , tradition . yet , were it not my chief design to establish the absolute truth of christian faith in it self , by all the arguments i can imagin , and not meerly to confute protestant controvertists , i needed not take the pains thus to multiply demonstrations , or even alledg so much as one . for , since , whatever they pretend seemingly to antiquity or authority of fathers by their voluminous quotations , yet they will finally and heartily stand to nothing in contests about faith , as conclusive , but their own interpretations of scripture ; which being so weak a ground that every dayes experience shows it's failings ; an ordinary probability is abundantly enough to overthrow their discourses , whose very principle is not onely improbable , but evidently a false one ; whence , the meanest catholick writer cannot fail to have the advantage over their best in a prudential man's esteem ; because he cannot possibly miss of a medium more probable than is their main ground . i declare then that my chief end in this treatise is to settle christian faith , or to demonstrate that it must be truly or absolutely certain ; and that my applying it now and then to my opposers , is onely a secundary intention , and meerly occasional . ere i fall close to my proofs , that faith cannot possibly be false , to avoid equivocation in the words , i declare that by the word [ faith ] i am not sollicitous whether be meant our act of faith or the points of faith , that is , the object of that act ; but judg that distinction wholly impertinent in this present discourse ; and , the reason is , because i cannot affirm a point true or false , but as it stands under motives able to make me judge , assent or beleeve 't is such or such ; which motives , if they be such as are able to convince that the point cannot but be so , then my iudgment or assent tothose points , thusconcluded , that is my act of faith cannot but be true ; because it depends intirely on grounds impossible to be false , viz. those motives ; but , if those motives are not of such a nature as is absolutely conclusive the thing is , then both the thing , object , point , or proposition of faith , as being onely knowable by virtue of them , may be otherwise , and also my act of faith or belief of those points may be a wrong or erroneous iudgment ; that is , both of them may be false . to ask then if faith can possibly be false , is to ask whether the motives laid by god's providence for mankind or his church to embrace christian faith , must be such as of their own nature cannot fail to conclude those points true ; and , to affirm that faith is not possible to be false , is equivalently to assert that those motives or the rule of faith , must be thus absolutely conclusive , firm , and immovable . hence is seen , that i concern not my self in this discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly diverse persons penetrate those motives ; or how they satisfy or dissatisfy some particular persons ; since , i onely speak of the nature of those motives in themselves , and as laid in second causes by gods providence to light mankind in their way to faith : to which the dimness of eye-sight , neglect to look at all , or looking the wrong way , even in many particular men , is extrinsecal and contingent . lastly , to avoid mistake and confusion , i declare , that there being two sorts of questions , one concerning the existence of a thing , call'd an est , viz. whether there be any certainly-conclusive rule of faith , or no ; and the other about what is the certain or truely-conclusive rule of faith , call'd quid est ; i am not now discoursing about the later ( that was the work of sure footing ) but the former onely . indeed , in my first discourse there i endeavour'd to evince this truth from par . . to par . by diverse arguments ; but , because mr. t. waves the speaking to those premises as they tend to infer my conclusion , and onely discourses a little ( mistakingly ) against the conclusions themselves , therefore , being resolv'd to write a treatise to establish christian faith , i thought fit to apply it to his proceedure there ; that so i may both more forcibly invite him to that necessary though neglected duty , and , withall that by settling the existence & nature of faith and it's rule first , i may clear the way methodically to discover what , and onely what , can be the right rule of faith. and , possibly in my next treatise if mr. t. and mr. st. think fit to continue on this discourse forwards by answering this , they may , by denying that in true speech the points of faith are truths , or faith is true , oblige me to begin yet higher , and make use of such mediums as are more direct and immediately fit to confute atheism . the understanding reader will easily pardon the speculativeness of this treatise in great part of it : if he reflects that discourses built on intrinsecal mediums and manag'd in the way of severe reason , do naturally , nay must necessarily , bear up to the first principles ; yet , by the harmony and connexion of truths with one another , there will be found also very many proofs fairly intelligible by the middle sort of prudential men ; especially in those arguments which are drawn from practice ; and , if i flatter not my self , some proofs , and those convincing ones too , suitable to every capacity . this comfort my readers may expect to reap by this procedure that it must forcibly shorten disputes , and bring controversies after a while to a period , unless our adversaries be still obstinately bent to play the drolls instead of soberly and pertinently disputing . for , hardly can errour hide her deformity , when she is exposed naked to the view of rational nature in the noon-day-light of first-principles . faith vindicated from possibility of falshood . first eviction . § . i lay for the basis of my present discourse these two propositions . . christians are oblig'd to hold firmly , profess , and stand to it , even with the loss of their lives , that points of faith are truths . . none can be thus oblig'd to hold , profess , and maintain that to be truth which they know not to be so . the later of these is as certain , as that god , the imposer of this obligation , is good : for how unworthy his infinit goodness were it , to will that rational nature or mankind should act irrationally by holding firmly what it has no firm grounds to hold ; that is , what it knows not to be so ? or to sacrifice its very being to testifie the truth of those points , concerning which , if it work according to right reason , the nature god has given it , and deviate not from that by a weak credulity , it can never be perfectly satisfy'd that they are indeed truths ; which it can never be , if , notwithstanding all it knows , they yet may possibly be falshoods . no man in true morality ought to say what he knows not , much less so asseverantly , as to seal it with his blood . as for the former proposition , which i account most fundamental to the ensuing discourse , i am to declare that by holding , &c. a thing to be a truth , i understand the holding that the thing absolutely , in reality , or indeed , is so as i judge . whence to this holding a thing to be truth , 't is not enough that a man hold it is so to the best of his judgment ; but 't is requir'd moreover , that he hold he is not deceiv'd in making such a judgment ; and this , because he holds his thought conformable to the thing . for , this settles verity or truth on its proper and firm foundation , the thing ; and not on the unstable motions of his judgment , as does the other . my first and chief postulatum thus understood , i esteem to be self-evident to all that converse with christianity taken in its largest sense , as i declar'd in my introduction ; setting aside that sort of speculaters ; i mean those of our modern adversaries , against whom i dispute at present ; and of whom the question is now agitated , whether they are indeed to be held right christians or no. and i conceive that he who should deny it , must be bound to put the contradictory position ; and to affirm , that christians are not bound firmly to hold , profess , and maintain with the loss of their lives the truth of their faith , but its likelihood onely . he that affirms this , if he would be held a christian , is to be confuted by the contrary sentiment of the generality of christians , from whom he dissents in so fundamental a point as is the rightly understanding the nature of faith , which they profess , and which it so highly imports them to know ; that is , indeed , in rightly understanding the meaning of the word faith. if he be no christian , yet hold the godhead , 't is to be demonstrated partly from the proper effects of faith , and the nature of the great difficulties , both intellectual and moral , which 't is ordain'd to master : partly out of the nature of god and his attributes , obliging him to lay means proportion'd to an intended end ; or to establish every thing according to the concern that depends on it , which concern in our case is the highest imaginable , to wit , the salvation of mankind , the end of creating those very entities on which the certitude of science is built . or , lastly , if he be an atheist , the deity and it's attributes are first to be demonstrated : as also what is man's summum bonum , and the immediate disposition to it ; and then the nature and certitude of faith , and consequently of it's rule are to be demonstrated . supposing then my later postulatum to be evident to all that know there is a wise and good governour of the world , and who understand the common principles of morality ; and my former postulatum to be clear and undeniable matter of fact to those who converse with christianity ; and therefore to have unavoidable force upon all that would be held professors thereof , i shall be bold to proceed upon them . and , first , logick , whose proper office 't is to look into the nature and actions of our soul as rational ; and as it were , to anatomize her thoughts , takes up the discourse , and proceeds thus . § . truths are found in propositions ; a proposition consists of two notions called subject , and predicate , and a third , whose office 't is to connect them ; whence to know a thing to be truth or true , is to see the conn●xion between the two notions spoken of , or to see that the third truly connects them . now there are but two wayes imaginable ( abstracting from experience ) how this may be seen : either by seeing immediately that those two notions are the same with one another out of the very notions themselves ; or else by seeing that they are each of them the same with a third ; whence follows , that , unless that third notion can fail to be the same with it self , those two notions which are the same with it , cannot possible fail to be the same with one another . the former is called self-evidence ; this later , evidence by deduction : both are built immediately upon this grand verity , that , the same is the same with it self ; wherefore , unless it be seen : that the truth of that most self-evident axiom is engag'd in their patronage , they cannot be even known to be true ; and , if it be seen that it is thus engag'd , they must needs be known impossible to be false ; since 't is most manifestly impossible , that first principles should be false , or that the same should not be the same with it self . wherefore , either points of faith need not be known to be truths , or else they must ( by reflecte●s at least ) be known impossible to he false . § . the same is evinc't from the nature of the subject in those propositions which affirm the truth of any point of faith : for , if we look narrowly , we shall find that the subject in those is , either formally , or in effect , a proposition it self ; as when we say , this proposition [ christ is really in the sacrament ] is true ; [ that god is one and three ] is true , &c. where the subjects are manifestly these ; christ is really in the sacrament ; god is one and three , or , a trinity is . a proposition then being a speech apt to express truth or falshood , nay necessarily determin'd to do the one , ( excepting those which speak of a future contingent ) it follows , that who ever is bound in reason to affirm that the proposition expressing the point of faith is true , is bound likewise to affirm 't is impossible to be false , if taken in the same sense he means it ; that is , indeed , if taken for the same proposition , since 't is impossible truth should be falshood . either then christ's followers are not oblig'd to affirm the points they profess are true , which thwarts the sentiments of the christian part of mankind ; or else , they must necessarily be oblig'd , withall , to affirm them impossible to be false . § . the same is concluded from the nature of the copula , [ is ] whose office being to connect or identifie the notions of the subject and predicate , that is , to express that what is meant by those two notions is to be found in the same thing , or that they have one common stock of being , its proper signification is being or existence ; not absolutely , as if it meant that either of the terms exists in things ; but comparatively or conditionally as it were , that that being which belongs to one of the terms , is the same being with that which belongs to the other ; or that by the same being whereby one of the terms is , the other is also . now then , this kind of expression or signification being such as has no latitude between it and its utmost opposit or contradictory , [ is not ] it being the most uncompounded notion that is , and not capable to be mingled with any alloy or participation of its opposit , as it happens in contraries : it follows that who holds the truth of the proposition , or , which is all one , the identification of the two terms exprest by the copula [ is ] must hold it absolutely , and the opposite to be impossible to be false ; nothing being more impossible than that is and is not should both be true at once ; or that the same thing should be the same and not the same in the same respect , that is , should be true , and not be true : and hence it is , that though distinctions use to fall upon the equivocalness of the two terms , yet no man that knows what logick meant , ever distinguisht the meer copula , its simplest notion not admitting any possible division . § . our argument from the copula is particularly strengthen'd from the nature of the predicate in the propositions we speak of ; i mean in such speeches as affirm such and such points of faith to be true. for true means existent , in propositions which express onely the an est of a thing , as most points of faith do ; which speak abstractedly , and tell notwherein the nature of the subject it speaks of consists , or the quid est . so that most of the propositions christians are bound to profess , are fully exprest thus ; a trinity is existent , a christ god-and-man is existent , &c. and the like may be said of those points which belong to a thing or action past ; as , creation was , christs crucifying was , &c. for , existent is the predicate in these too , onely affixt to another difference of time ; and 't is equally impossible such subjects should neither have been nor not have been , or have been and have not been at once , as it is that a thing should neither be nor not be at present , or both be and not be at present . regarding then stedfastly the nature of our predicate , [ existent ; ] we shall find that it expresses the utmost actuality of a thing ; and , as taken in the posture it bears in those propositions , that actuality exercis'd ; that is , the utmost actuality in its most actual state ; that is , as absolutely excluding all manner or least degree of potentiality , and confequently all possibility of being otherwise ; which is radically destroy'd when all potentiality is taken away . this discourse holding , which in right to truth i shall not fear to affirm ( unconcern'd in the drollery of any opposer ) to be more than mathematically demonstrative , ( as shall be shown more particularly hereafter ) it follows inevitably , that who so is bound to profess a trinity , incarnation , &c. is or was existent , is also bound to profess that 't is impossible they should be not-existent ; or which is all one , that 't is impossible these points of faith should be false . § . the same appears out of the nature of distinction or division apply'd to our predicate existent , as found in these propositions : for , could that predicate bear a pertinent distinction , expressing this and the other respect , or thus and thus , it might possibly be according to one of those respects , or thus consider'd , and not be according to another , that is , another way consider'd : but this evasion is here impossible ; for , either those distinguishing notions must be more potential or antecedent to the notion of existent , and then they neither reach existent , nor supervene to it as its determinations or actuations , which differences ought to do ; nor can any notion be more actual or determinative in the line of substance or being , than existent is ; and , so , fit to distinguish it in that line ; nor , lastly , can any determination in the line of accidents serve the turn ; for , these suppose existence already put , and so the whole truth of the proposition entire and compleat antecedently to them : 't is impossible therefore that what is thus affirm'd to be true , should in any regard be affirm'd possible to be false ; the impossibility of distinguishing the predicate pertinently , excluding here all possibility of divers respects . § . the same is demonstrated from the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of those faith-propositions ; for those subjects being propositions themselves , ( as was shown § . ) and accepted for truths , as is suppos'd , they are incapable of distinction , as shall be particularly shown hereafter , ( evict . . § . ) besides those subjects being points of faith , and , so , standing in the abstract , that is , not descending to subsuming respects , even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent distinguishableness . § . the same is demonstrated from the nature of truth , which consists in an indivisible : whence there is nothing of truth had , how great soever the conceived approaches towards it be , till all may-not-bees , or potentiality to be otherwise , be utterly excluded by the actuality of is or existence : which put or discover'd , the light of truth breaks forth , and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vanish and disappear . § . the same is demonstrated out of the nature of connexion found in the aforesaid propositions . for , 't is evident their truth consists in the connexion of those notions which make the subject and predicate . whoever therefore sees not the connexion between those notions in the principle of faith , sees not the truth of any of those propositions ; that is , those propositions are not to such a man true. wherefore , connexion excluding formally inconnexion , so that 't is clearly impossible they should be found together in the self-same subjects , and the falshood of such propositions consisting in the unconnectedness of their terms , it follows that he who is oblig'd to profess those faith-propositions true , must see the connexion between their terms , and consequently that they cannot possibly be inconnected or false . again , since all approaches or vicinity to connexion , by how near degrees soever they are made , are not connexion , it follows that all connexion consists in an indivisible , and can admit no latitude for a possibility to be otherwise , to be grounded on . lastly , all connexion being necessarily immediate , or seen by virtue of immediateness , and to see immediate connexion being the producer of certain knowledg , or of assurance the thing cannot but be so ; it follows , that to see the truth of such propositions , or , which is all one , the immediate connexion of their terms , is to see they cannot but be so , or that they are absolutely void of all possibility of falshood . § . . by this time we are brought orderly to look into the nature of opinion . which word i take not here in a large sense for any kind of assent , however produc 't ; but for an assent or adhesion to a tenet without sufficient grounds to evince the thing is so as the opiner judges ; as it is taken in that proverb , turpe est opinari . now , 't is most evident , that there would be sufficient grounds to convince , in case , the term or point were seen to be deduc't by immediate steps , or a train of immediate connexions to that very conclusion . 't is manifest then , that 't is therefore opinion , and blame-worthy , because its grounds , as they are laid in the understanding of the assenter , want or fall short of this immediate connexion ; so that opinion is a judgment upon remote or unimmediate considerations . by which means it comes to pass , that the most necessary verity of that grand principle , [ the same is the same with it self ] upon which all certainty both of first principles and of deduction is built , and whose perfect self-evidence and interessedness in whatever belongs to right discourse , seem to make the very light of reason consist originally in it , is not engag'd in the opiners discourse ; whence , wanting immediateness , it becomes unconnected , incoherent , weak , and slack , or rather indeed null . no wonder then if all opinion , how near soever it approaches seemingly to immediate connexion , and how strongly soever it be supported by an experienc'd seldomness of such effects , or the conceiv'd unaptness and fewness of causes fit to produce them , yet it admits possibility of being otherwise ; in regard it fails in its very root and basis , by not relying on the main principle and foundation of all steadiness in humane discourse , and which is of so necessary a truth , that 't is impossible to falter or give way , to uphold and exempt it from a liableness to disconnexion of those notions which it pretended , and ought to identify ; that is , from a liableness to errour . § . from this declaration of the nature of opinion , it is render'd manifest out of what fountain-head all rational assents flow ; namely , from seeing the immediate connexion of one term with another ; or , which is all one , that this principle [ the same is the same with it self ] stands engag'd for their verity : also , that the light of reason consists fundamentally in this ; and formally in deriving the perfect visibleness of this to make other propositions also visible to the eye of our understanding . likewise , that assents not springing from this light of reason , must be , as such , irrational ; and arise necessarily from the will , taken as not following the light of understanding , but as prompted and put forward by some passion , viz. some irrational desire or inclination the thing should be so , which prest and precipitated the understanding into assent before due motives forc't it . as likewise , that since none can be bound constantly to profess what he cannot steadily see to be true , a christian who is thus bound to profess his faith true , must see that the first principle now spoken of , which gives all steadiness to our intellectual sight , is interessed in the patronage of the proposition he assents to : whence , true faith , by reason of its immoveable grounds , can bear an asserting the absolute impossibility of its being false ; whereas , who ever affirms faith may possibly be false , makes it built upon remote mediums , that is , such as are either not immediate ; or ( which is all one ) not seen to be immediate to the two terms of the proposition assented to ; and so , they become destitute of the invincible strength of that first principle which establishes all deduc't truths , and legitimates all assents to them . whence follows inevitably , that he turns all faith into opinion ; makes faith absurd , preternatural and irrational ; importing that 't is a thing which men must assent to or say interiorly 't is so , and yet see no solid grounds why it must be so ; profess stoutly 't is true , and that they are sure of it ; and yet , if they will speak truly , profess with all , that it may be false , and that the whole world may be mistaken in it ; and lastly , he leaves all christs doctrine indefensible , and utterly unmaintainable to have , absolutely speaking , either any solidity or steadiness in its grounds , or one true word in it self . second eviction . § . . from this not-seeing the connexion of the two terms in the conclusion by a medium immediately connected to them both , but by distant glances onely , which have not the power to make one see intellectually the thing is , or assent ; joyn'd with this that , notwithstanding , 't is not seen those terms are opposit or inconnectible ; the soul becomes hereupon , as it were , invironed with a kind of intellectual darkness , and sees not which way to step forwards , without danger of harming hor cognoscitive or truth-affecting nature by errour . whence , she remains in a kind of neutral condition , which we call suspence . but , 't is to be well noted , that this suspensive condition of the soul , not being a state of actuality or determination , ( much less of utmost actuality , as is the seeing , by virtue of that main principle before-nam'd , that a thing is ) but of indetermination , potentiality , and confusedness ; its nature admits consequently infinite degrees , according as the appearances which incline her towards assent or dissent are greater or less . moreover , as in the passing from indetermination to determination ( for example ) in a motion to a terminus of rest , there are diverse approaches of that motions quantity so very near the terminus or end , that their distance is undiscernable to a vulgar eye , and needs exact skill to distinguish them : so it happens here , that there must necessarily be found divers inclinations or approaches towards assent , which have so small a degree of suspence in them , that they are hard to be distinguisht from absolute assents , but by a learned reflecter ; and the way he takes to distinguish them must be to observe whether the understanding , acting reflectingly , that is , looking into the nature of its own act , finds there that it absolutely yields it self over to judg the thing is existent or true , or whether it onely judges it very probable or truthlikely . for , any assent to the greatest likelihood of a thing is as far from being an assent to the things existence , as the notion of existent or true is from the notion of very likely to be true . and if the assent to the former be not actually an assent to the later , yet tend towards it , as it does ; then 't is potential in respect of it , and so includes some degree of suspence ; which defect only can in our present case , hinder the other from being actually it , according to our former discourse . assent , then , to the meer likelihood of a thing , is , or at least implies , suspence of its existence § . another thing which inclines men to confound the assent to the likelihood of a thing , with the assent to its existence or truth , is habituation or custom . for , men being us'd to proceed naturally to outward action upon a very high probability , without more adoe or examination , they are hence apt to apprehend that a conceit , which had so little and so undiscernable a proportion of suspence in it , was a perfect assent : and that , because the soul quite yielded to the motive as to exterior action , therefore it yielded likewise as to interior assent . whereas , by reflecting on the nature of this act in the soul , and by retriving its grounds , we come to discover that , however the soul runs promptly and rationally to outward action upon such a motive , when she is concern'd to act , even after deliberation ; yet , not so to interiour assent , if she acts rationally ; but , upon reflexion , finding in her self nothing to fix in her the existence of the thing , or elevate it beyond the possibility of not-being or being false , she hangs back from assenting the thing is , and is constrain'd to say interiorly , or acknowledg in her own breast , she may possibly be mistaken , and the thing possibly be not-existent , for ought she sees ; which restrains her from truly assenting that the thing is . § . an instance will render our discourse clearer . 't is propos'd then ( for example ) to our judging power , whether america be or no ? and we 'l suppose ( to avoid a disputed case ) the evidence of authority has convinc'd the understanding it once was , by the impossibility the several attesters should either be deceiv'd in a plain object of eye-sight , or have a common motive able to make them conspire to bely their eyes . but , the question is , whether it be now or no. and , the uncouthness and unlikelihood that so vaste a place should be destroy'd , joyn'd with the customariness of acting upon a very great probability , makes him who is to act in order to it , ( for example , send a ship thither ) proceed to his intended outward action fearlesly , and esteem him mad who desists upon a conceit of so unlikely a failure . for , since all action is in particulars , and particulars are the very sphear of contingency , it follows , that we must not act at all , if we expected demonstrations of the several objects and adjuncts of our outward action : whence he deserves justly to be accounted frantick who should desist from action where there is so high a probability ; for this extravagant cautiousness were in effect to take away the motives to any exteriour action in the world , and consequently all such action it self . but now , let two speculaters or scholars meet together , who consider not the practicableness , but meerly the truth of things ; and aim not to better their purse by merchandizing or outward endeavours , but their understandings by rightly-made judgments or assents , that is , by knowledges : and we shall see their working on the point turns upon other hinges . in the other , there was necessity of acting , without which the world could not subsist : but , here 's no necessity of assenting , which we suppose onely aim'd at , at present ; nor can there be any , unless that principle or cause of all assent [ the same is the same with it self ] comes to exercise its over-powering virtue upon the soul. there , it was enough that prudential considerations discover'd a betterness to act exteriourly , all things weigh'd ; to which needed not a severity of principles forcing the truth of the thing : but here , those principles , which are the maxims of metaphysicks or supreme wisdom , are the only things to be consulted ; and the prudential weighing of particulars avails little or nothing towards the secure establishment of the truth aim'd at . there , some harm was likely to ensue , if they acted not exteriourly , and went not about their work : but , here , no harm at all could come by not acting interiourly ; i mean , by not-assenting , but suspending till the beams of truth , by the fountain-light of that first principle , clear'd their understandings : rather on the contrary , a great harm was certain to ensue upon assenting in that case , that is , an injury to reason , their true nature ; by concluding , without seeing a middle term connecting the two extreams , on which every act of right reason is built . these scholars then , or pursuers of truth , consult with speculative , not practical principles , to guide their assents by . they are certain that such an effect ( as is the destruction of america ) cannot be without a cause ; and experience tells them such causes seldom or never happen : yet , knowing that all material things have contingency annext to their natures , and not discovering any evident principle in nature hindering the vast oceans on either side america to overswell the continent , and so destroy it ; they are forc'd to confess interiourly america may , for any thing they know , possibly not be ; whence they are forc'd to suspend , as to its existence , and only assent to it's extream likelihood of existing . § . the use i make of this discourse at present is this : that , though likelyhoods have a great latitude ; yet assent , ( being the terminus of those inclinations towards it , which gradually exceed one another ) consists in an indivisible , as does the notion of is , on which ( either seen , or deem'd to be seen ) 't is built , and to which it goes parallell . that , all acts falling short of assent to the existence of a thing advance no farther than great assents to it's likelihood , and fall under the head of suspensive acts ; as to that things existence , as the soul will discover upon reflexion : and that , when we mistake one for the other , 't is for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward action , and as to the speculative truth ; as also between assenting to the extream likelihood of a thing , and assenting to its existence . that , whensoever we see the possibility of a things being false or not-existent ( which in our case is all one ) we cannot have an assent to it's existence , but to the likelihood of it only , and suspend as to its existence or actual being : and that , therefore , they who acknowledg that , notwithstanding all the means used and all the grounds it has , faith may possibly be false to us , cannot be held to assent to the existence or truth of those points ; but to suspend concerning their truth , and to assent only to their likelihood to be true , which , whether it be a sufficient disposition to denominate such persons christians , will easily and best be determin'd by the vulgar of christianity , who possess the genuin and natural meaning of the word faith , untainted with the frantick conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of fancy ; not , as they ought , from the nature of the thing . § . the same argument may be made from the nature of firmly holding , as was from assent ; and the self-same discourse , mutatis mutandis : since 't is most evident , none can firmly hold a thing to be true , which he sees and acknowledges , that is , holds may be false ; however he may hold it very likely to be true. § . the same is evinc'd from the notion of knowing : which word i take here abstractedly , unconcern'd what kind of knowledg it be ; provided it be true and proper knowledg , and not abusively so call'd . for , since nothing can be known to be but what is , nor known to be such but what is such : again since christians , if they have either honesty or wit in them , must , some way or other , know points of faith to be true , whose truth they esteem themselves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives ; it follows , those points must be what they are known to be , that is true ; and consequently ( unless knowledg can be ignorance ) impossible not to be or to be false . § . what hath been said of assent and holding and knowing may also be discours'd from the notion of certainty : for this has the same nature with the former , as it is a determination of the understanding ; i mean , intellectual determination is the common genus to them all : and they differ only in this , that knowledg and certainty are proper effects of evidence , whether sprung from the thing or from the attester , nor can they be where there is wanting the intellectual light issuing from that first principle of all evidence so oft spoken of ; whereas h●lding or assenting can proceed from the blindness of passion , or from ignorance , as well as from the clear sight of the understanding . now that the nature of certainty consists in an intellectual determination thus originiz'd , and consequently , when put , excludes all possibility of being otherwise ( which is the point i aym to evince ) appears , partly from the etymology , and most evidently from the use of the word . for , certus signifies determinate . as then , when the matter spoken of restrains that word to volition , it signifies an absolute determination of will or resolution ; as , certus ●undi : so , when we are speaking of the ground of intellectual certainty , and say the thing is certain , we intend to express full as much as when we say , the thing is ; which speaks ultimate determination and actuality in the object , consider'd in it self : and , in like manner , when the same word is intended to signifie formal certainty in us , or that disposition of the understanding whereby it is said to be certain , it must necessarily signifie ( unless , contrary to the nature of words it's most formal notion be less rigorous then those which are less formal ) a determinate state of the understanding , or an intellectual determination . whence , as a thing is then certain or determinate when it is ; so the understanding is then determin'd according to it's nature , or certain , when the thing is seen to be as it is , which immediate effect of the other is impossible , but by virtue of the first principle of evidence making that clear discovery ; and , this engaged , all intellectual potentiality , or possibility of not being seen to be , is totally and formally , that is , most absolutely excluded . the true and genuine notion , then , of certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judgment which so fixes and determines the understanding should be an errour , or false : since nothing can be seen to be , but what really is . § . again , since determination in any kind , is the terminus of all indetermination in the same kind , and so , beyond it : it follows , that certainty or intellectual determination , is plac'd beyond all possible degrees of indetermination of the mind , or uncertainty . certainty , therefore , is not attain'd till all possible degrees of uncertainty , and , consequently , possibility of falshood to us , or errour , be transcended and overcome . faith , then , must be deny'd to be certain , if it be put possible to be false . § . and , as my former discourse has endeavour'd to display the nature of certainty from its genus and difference , which compound it's definition ; so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinc't from observing the language of mankind , when they use the word certain . for , that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent users of that word intend to express by it : if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signifie such a conception by that word , that will infallibly be the true meaning of it , and that conception will have in it the true nature of certainty . let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts , when they use these and the like familiar discourses , which naturally break from them . how frequent is it , when any one asks another , is such a thing true ? and the other replies , i verily think it is ; he returns upon him with this pressing demand ; i , but are you certain of it ? may not you be mistaken ? which clearly intimates that that disposition call'd certainty , is beyond all inclinations , motions , or indeterminate tendencies of the understanding , making it verily think 't is true , which speaks the next remove , as it were , from a certain assent ; and , consequently , that 't is an absolute determination and fixure of the soul that 't is true : as also , that certainty elevates the soul beyond hazard of mistake . again , many times , when one is smartly questioned , if he be certain of a thing ? not daring , upon better reflexion , pretend to certainty , he replies warily ( in a moderate word which diminishes and falls short of the other ) that he is morally certain of it ; which evidences that the notion of certainty is in point of fixing or determining the understanding , beyond that counterfeit certainty , call'd moral certainty : wherefore , since all moral certainty ( as they call it ) how great soever , though it be penetrated perfectly according as 't is in its own nature , is seen to consist with a possibility to be otherwise ; true certainty , which exceeds it , must needs include an impossibility to be otherwise . faith , then , is not , in true speech , certain , unless it be impossible to be false . § . again , let an overweener , after his mistake becomes visible , be challeng'd with it ; we find that , in common speech , we use these or the like words , you said , or thought , you were certain of it , but you see you are mistaken , is it not evident that the word certain excludes a possibility of being otherwise ? since his being certain of it formerly is deny'd purely upon this score , because he was mistaken : which shews that the true notion of certain is inconsistent with mistake ; that is , that certainty implyes unmistakableness or , which is all one , inerrability hîc & nunc in the present affair . whereas , had the notion of certainty admitted a possibility not to be as he judg'd , he had not been so mistaken in judging that certain which by actually happening not to be was shewn afterwards possible not to be . to think to evade , by alledging that it was not meant his mistake consisted in judging that certain or impossible not to be , which was possible not to be , but in judging that would be , which afterwards hap'd not to be , is meerly childishness and folly amongst men , who hold that things are carry'd on by the course of cause and effect ; and that things therefore happen because a cause puts them , or not happen because no cause puts them . to judg , then , a thing would not be is the same , amongst intelligent men , as to judg there would be no cause to make it be ; and , if there would be none such , 't is most evident it could not be , or was impossible to be in this order of the world . such answers are fit for men who are led more by sounds than sense ; and who think a different word will gain them an escape , though that word signifies the same thing as the former . . the same will appear from the absurdity , which palpably discovers it self in any expression that modifies the true notion of certain with a contingency : as if one should say , 't is certain per adventure , or 't is fallibly certain : the nonsence of which shews that the true notion of certainty implies an oppositness to all contingency , or an impossibility to be otherwise . you 'l ask , what then must be said of the phrase , [ moral certainty ] where certainty seems to admit an allay of contingency ? i answer , 't is evident even hence and from all my former discourse , that the word certainty is there us'd catachrestically or abusively , for some great likelihood , and its epithet means such a degree of it as is found generally in humane exteriour actions which depend on free-will , and are contingent as being particulars ; and speaks not proper certainty , as 't is meant to signifie that perfect intellectual determination , whose principles and causes being high truths , are unalterable . whence , moral certainty , how high soever it be exalted and triumph in an empty name , is in reality uncertainty ; and the highest degree of moral certainty is the lowest degree of uncertainty , truly so call'd ; that is , of that which expresses an intellectual indetermination . § . thus much from the use of the word ; which , when it falls naturally and unaffectedly from the tongue of the speakers , is a proper effect of the notion or meaning in their souls , that is , of the signification of that word ; whence 't is an apt medium to demonstrate that notion , its proper cause , à posteriori . § . from this discourse follows , first , that , since , speaking of the present , ( and the same , in proportion , holds of other differences of time ) 't is the same to say , the thing is certain , as to say the thing is ; and to say the thing is speaks indivisibility ; the notion of certainty too consists in an indivisible . by which is not meant that one certainty may not be greater than another , both from a greater perfection in the subject , and a greater certifying power in the object : but , that certainty , in the way of being generated in the soul , is either there all at once or not at all ; in the same sort as there is no middle between is and is not , ( or half-beings of them ) which are the formal expressers of certainty . whence , again , appears that what we abusively call moral certainty , is indeed none at all ; because it reaches not that indivisible or determinative point in which true certainty consists . § . secondly , since true certainty is caus'd in us by seeing the thing is ; and this cannot be seen but by virtue of principles ; ( especially that chief one , a thing is the same with it self ) which principles being truths , cannot possibly be false : it follows both that what is certain cannot possibly be false , and that what can possibly be false subsists upon no principles . whence , all moral certainty , as they call it , as also all high probabilities , which confessedly may possibly be false , are convinc'd to subsist upon no principles : and they , who acknowledg they have but moral certainty and high probabilities for their faith or opinion , confess they have no principles , which in true language deserve that name , to ground them ; but , at best , certain likely topical mediums that oft prove true , or hold for the most part : which may serve for a talking kind of discourse , or exteriour action ; but are flat things and useless when truth is to be concluded . § . thirdly , it follows that true certainty of any thing is the self-same with infallibility or inerrability , as to the same thing . for , certainty is not had , till it be seen , that that first principle , [ a thing is the same with it self ] is engag'd for the identification of the two notions which make up the proposition we are certain of ; that is , for the truth of that proposition : wherefore , since we can have infallible assurance of the truth of that first principle ; as also of this , that nothing can be seen to be , unless it be ; we can frame an inerrable judgment that , when we see that first principle engag'd for the identity of those two notions , 't is engag'd for it , and so they identify'd ; that is , we must know infallibly that that proposition is true . this i say in case it be a true certainty , and not an only deem'd or mistaken one : yet even then there is a deem'd infallibility , and the person that mistakingly judges himself certain of a thing , judges withall that he cannot be mistaken , hic & nunc , in that particular , which manifests that the notion of certainty is the same with that of infallibility , however it may be misapply'd . again , since the natural use of words gives it not to be nonsence to say , [ i am infallibly certain of such a thing ] 't is plain that the notion of infallibly is not disparate from the notion of certain , or incompetent to it : it must then be either tautological , or else be a different yet appliable notion , and so apt to difference or distinguish it ; but it cannot be this later , for then the notion of certain ought in all reason and logick admit with equal sense the opposit difference [ fallibly ] which we experience it does not ; nothing being more absurd and foolish than to say , [ i am fallibly certain of a thing ] 't is clear then that infallibly is not fit to difference the notion of certain , or not a different notion from it ; but the same sense reiterated in another word for aggravations sake , as when we say , i saw it with mine own eyes ; or such like ; that is , if we consider it calmly , we shall find that that malignant word infallibility which so bewonders our opposers , amounts to no more but true certainty , and has the self-same notion with it . § . fourthly , it appears that , seeing what may be otherwise , how unlikely soever , needs but a lucky chance to be so ; they who say faith may possibly be false , instead of establishing it , subject it to chance and contingency ; and confess it has no grounds so to secure it but a greater wit than has been formerly , may possibly shew it to be false ; that is , may subvert all the grounds it now stands on . so that these men are convinc'd not to settle faith upon any firm grounds , or on the nature of the thing : but to hang it on humane wit , that is , on the wit of the present christians maintaining its plausibility ; and , possibly , on the fortunate want of an acuter wit than any now extant ; who , when he shall arise , may perhaps outwit them , and shew all their faith to be a ridiculous foolery . § . lastly , speaking of truths , 't is perfect nonsense to say they can possibly be false ; since 't is a direct contradiction truth should be falshood ; as is evident in predications of past or future things , viz. in these , christ has dy'd , the resurrection will be : the former of which , if once true , has been , and so cannot have not been , the circumstance of time being gone in which only it could not have been ; and the later , if once put to be true , that is , to stand under certain or unimpedible causes , is impossible to be false , or not to succeed . so that 't is the greatest madness and folly in the world to put either of these possible to be false . if they be once rightly judg'd truths : and indeed i fear rather that they who judg the later possible not to be , subject them to impedible causes ; and so make them , or at least their grounds as to our knowledg , future contingents , which have neither determinate truth nor falshood . speaking then of those propositions or points of faith which predicate de praesenti , it will be found by the considerer , that they are all in a matter which is unalterable , and above contingency ; and , in case this were not , their very determination to the present frees them from being other than they are for the present : every thing while it is being necessarily what it is . there is no shadow , therefore , of ground , for a man , who affirms points of faith to be truths , to affirm withall they may possibly be false . all i can imagine in their behalf , to excuse them from speaking palpable contradictions , is this ; that perhaps they may mean our discourse , while in viâ to find out these truths , was impedible , and so there was then a possibility they might not become seen to be true , that is , might be no truths to us . but , the question returns , whether , in the end of our weighing their motives , we discover them to be truths or no ? if not , why do we so asseverantly affirm they are ? and why are we bound by religion to profess them to be so ? or , if we come to discover they are truths , how are we so stupid as not to discover withall , that they cannot possibly be falshoods ? § . my last argument from logick shall be this , that there is no way left to prove faith , or perswade it to another that acts according to perfect reason , in case it , that is , its grounds as to our knowledg , can possibly be false . and , that this is so , is not so much evident from any particular consideration in logick , as from the whole nature of artificial discourse , or disputation . for , in case the premisses be but morally certain , ( as they call it ) or possible to be false , that is , if the two terms be not seen to be connected , these propositions may , nay ought to be deny'd by the respondent ; whose office and right it is to grant nothing but what is evident , lest he ensnare himself ; but to put the arguer to prove them . what then must the opponent or arguer do ? must he bring a syllogism consisting of premisses only morally certain or possible to be false , to make the other good ? what will it avail ? since these premisses are also deniable for the same reason , and so in infinitum ; that is , nothing at all can possibly be concluded finally , till grounds impossible to be false be produced ; which put , the conclusion may be such also . wherefore , unless faith have grounds impossible to be false , ( and , consequently , able to shew it such also ) none can rationem reddere fidei , give a true reason of their faith ; but such an one at best as , in due right of dispute , is ●●deniable at pleasure : whence faith is rendred both unmaintainable or indefensible in it self , and unperswadable to others that guide themselves by perfect reason . for , however all who discourse of religion , when they would convert any to faith , use not to pin their motives to syllogistical form : yet , since no reason in the case of convincing the understanding , is allowable , but what will bear the test of true logick ; and this assures us there 's no concluding any thing at all , without relying finally on premisses or grounds impossible to be false : it follows that , how finely and quaintly soever these men talk , unless they produce such grounds , they can conclude nothing at all ; and all their importunate perswasions , which are not reducible to these grounds , ( nay , are made use of by persons who declare against having any such grounds for faith ) signifie just as much as if they should say , i beseech you , sir , be so good natur'd as to believe me ; though to tell you true , i acknowledg sincerely neither can i bring , nor can there possibly be brought any ground able to make good what i say , or any undeniable premisses to force my conclusion . third eviction . § . thus far logick : let 's see next what nature and metaphysicks say to the point , in which quest yet we must not leave logick's assistance . and , first , these sciences assure us , that as all capacity of different beings springs from first matter , so all capacity of contrary determinations arises from what we call potentiality or indifferency in the subject . now the subject in our present case is not so much our meer faculty of understanding , as the points of faith it self in our soul , or the judging power of our soul consider'd precisely as affected with these points ; for , 't is these , or our judging power taken meerly as conversant about these , that is , our judgments , which our opponents must affirm true , yet possible to be false . since therefore both the points themselves and our judgments consist formally in affirmation and negation , that is , in is and is not , which are indivisible , and constituted such by a formality the most formal and actual that can be , ( as hath been shown ) they can have , as such , no indifferency or potentiality in them to the contrary , neither natural nor metaphysical ; nor , consequently , possibility of falshood . § . the position of our adversaries is still render'd more absurd by this consideration , that even in nature where there is the greatest potentiality that is , viz. first matter , the subject is not yet capable of opposit qualities at once , but successively ; at least in the same part : whereas , their position is not that faith which is now true is possible to be false afterwards upon the alteration of some contingent matter ; but , that 't is possible now to be false , or possible to be now false , for any thing any man knows ; that is , the understanding may have possibly truth and falshood in it at once , and as to the same part or point . § . but 't is still far more irrational , in regard these seeming contraries , ( true ) and ( false , ) apply'd to the propositions we speak of , have in them the perfect nature of contradictories ; it being necessary that in those which speak de praesenti , one should be exprest by [ is existent ] the other by [ is not existent ] as 't is in those which speak preteritly and futurely , that one should be exprest by ( hath been ) or ( shall be , ) the other by ( hath not been ) or ( shall not be : ) to think then they can at once be true and false , is to judg that contradictories may be verified of the same , or that both sides of the contradiction may be true . § . again , truth being a conformity of the mind to the thing , and falshood a disconformity ; to say , a proposition is true , and yet possible to be false , is to say , that the mind , consider'd as judgingly conversant about that proposition , may be at once conformable and disconformable to the same thing . too wild a position to be introduc'd into a rational nature , by any thing but such a wilful and blind passion , as must first actually corrupt , and , in fine , tend to destroy the very nature it self . § . and , to void this thesis from all possible evasion , here can be no different respects according to which these affirmations and negations may be made , so to avoid contradiction ; but all such respects are excluded , both out of the nature of the predicate in most of those propositions , as hath been shewn ( evict . . § . ) as also out of the nature of the points of faith ; which , standing in the abstract , descend nor to , nor meddle with subsuming respects , but have their notions compleated in the common words which express them . and , lastly , because truths and falshoods are not capable of distinctions and respects : for , however a proposition taken into consideration and scanning whether it be true or no , may admit respects and distinctions , and so be affirm'd to be in this regard true , in that false ; yet , what is once accepted to be true , cannot in any respect afterwards be affirm'd possible to be not true , or false . for example , this proposition [ an ethiopian is white ] is distinguish'd by respects to several parts , and in regard to his teeth 't is true ; to his skin , 't is false : but after those respects have distinguish'd the ambiguity of it , and so , by dividing it into two propositions , settled one to be true , the other to be false , there can be no further use of respects or distinctions , which are to antecede to truth and falshood by clearing the doubtfulness of propositions , and can have no place after the truth is once acknowledg'd , or supervene to it . he then that once acknowledges points of faith to be truths , can have no assistance from recourse to this and the other respect , to evade a contradiction when he affirms they may be false . § . again , 't is particularly opposite to the nature of a soul to have such an act in her as to judg a thing true yet possible to be false at the same time . for , our soul as to her judging power is essentially a capacity of truth ; whence the first principles which ground all truths are so connatural to her , that she cannot but embrace them and judg them true . nothing therefore being more opposit to truth than a contradiction , it follows that nothing is more impossible to be receiv'd or subjected in the soul according to her judging power than a contradiction ; that is , no implicatory or contradictory act can settle there . now , to judg a proposition or point to be true , is to judg the thing to exist just as it affirms ; and , to judg it possible to be false , is to judg it possible not to exist as it affirms ; and this , not in order to different times but the same ; that is , to judg a proposition or point true yet possible to be false , is the same , as to judg the thing actually is , and yet perhaps is not at the same time ; and this , as appears by our former discourse , not to be avoided in our case by difference or diversity of respects . wherefore , since such an act is not possible to be in the judging power of the soul , 't is most manifest , that he who holds one side of the contradiction , cannot possibly hold the other ; that is , he who holds faith may be false , cannot hold that 't is true ; and that , if it be held and profest to be true , it ought also to be held and profest impossible to be false . § . moreover , the soul , antecedently , to its being inform'd by the object , was indifferent and undetermin'd to judg it true or false , that is , to be or not to be ; but , when it came afterwards through consideration of the thing or object to judg it true , it became determin'd ; and how , but by a notion the most determinative of any other , viz. that of being or is : wherfore , since to put in her at the same time a judgment of its possibility to be false , puts her to be indetermin'd , and this in order to the same , this position puts the soul to be at once determinate and indeterminate as to the same ; which states are as vastly distant as actual being and not-actual being can remove them . nay , this monstrous thesis makes the soul indeterminate to either side , that is to truth as well as to falshood , even after it had suppos'd her determin'd to truth ; for , to judg a point possible to be false , puts the judgment potential or indetermin'd as to the falshood of it ; and false signifying not-true , possible to be false must signifie possible to be not true , and so include potentiality or indetermination to truth also : in regard , were it actually true , it could not be possible to be not true , or not it self . the soul must then be indeterminate to either , that is , neither judg it true nor false , even after she was supposed to judg it true , in case she can then judg it possible to be false : and , consequently , this position of faith's possibility to be false , cannot , without highest contrad●ction , stand with a hearty conceit that faith is true. to think to escape the force of this argument by alleadging the respect to different motives , or , that the understanding was not perfectly but partly determin'd , is in our case frivolous . for i ask , was it determin'd enough by any intellectual or rational motives to judg the thing is ? if not , what made it judg so when those motives could not ? is it not evident it must be some weakness or some blind motive in the will , not light of understanding ? but , if it were determin'd enough to judg the thing is or is true , 't is also enough for my argument and purpose . § . especially the force of this argument will be better penetrated when it shall be well consider'd in what truth and falshood formally consist ; and that , taken rightly , they are certain affections or dispositions of our understanding . for , that is not to be called true by me which is not true to me ; not is any thing true to me , but when 't is seen by me to be so in the object ; and to be thus seen by me , is the object to inform and actuate my understanding power as 't is judicative ; whence that power , as 't is thus actuated , gains a conformity to the thing it self , in which consists the precise nature of truth . however then truth come from the object which is the ground or cause of it , yet 't is formally no where but in the understanding or judgment ; as appears evidently from this , that truth is found in propositions : now propositions are not in the thing formally , ( though , when true , they are deriv'd hence ) but in the mind only , and significatively in words . truth then is that whereby i am true or veracious when i say interiourly , the thing is , or is thus and thus ; wherefore the truth of any point is not had till this actuation or determination of my power by the object , which as it's formal cause makes this conformity to it , be put : and , this put , to think that at the same time or at once the mind can be unactuated , undetermin'd , potential or disconformable to it , is too gross a conceit to enter into the head of any man endued with the common light of reason . whoever then affirm's faith or those propositions which express faith possible to be false , he is convinc't by the clearest light of reason ( in case the desperation of maintaining the truth of faith , for want of grounds , drives him not to say any thing , but that he speaks candidly what he thinks ) not to judg or say from his heart , his faith is indeed true , having never experienc't in his soul , for want of principles to put it there , that the object or ground of his faith hath wrought in it that conformity to the thing , in which truth consists ; and , consequently , that , when he professes points of faith to be truths , he either by a fortunate piece of folly understands not what he sayes , or collogues and dissembles with god and the world for honour or some other interest . § . 't is hence farther demonstrated that the position we impugn destroys the notion of metaphysical unity , consisting in an indivision or indistinction of any notion , nature or thing in it self , and a division or distinction of it from all other : for , according to this tenet , truth or the conformity of our understanding to the object , put by our joynt supposition that the proposition of faith is true , may possibly be disconformity or falshood , and this determinate state , indeterminate ; which makes the mind as having in it one notion , that is indeed that one notion , capable to admit into its bowels another , not only disparate , but opposit , that is , one possible to be not one , but another . § . the same is demonstrated concerning metaphysical verity . for this position makes the self-same mental proposition or disposition of the understanding we call truth , possible to be falshood ; that is , possible not to be the same with it self , which subverts all metaphysical verity ; that is , the foundation or ground of all formal verity or truth in the world. § . the same injury demonstratively accrues to metaphysical bonity or goodness . for , it makes that conformity of the mind to the thing which is truth , and so the good or perfection of the understanding , to be at once possible to be falshood , that is , possible to be not good but harmful and destructive to it . § . i make no question but my adversaries will think to elude the force of these three last demonstrations , and perhaps of some others by alleadging that they deny absolutely truth can possibly be falshood , and that they mean only that though the points of faith appear now upon considerable motives to be true , yet those motives secure it not from being absolutely false ; but not so that they can really be both . and i grant this would be a good answer , in case they did not affirm points of faith to be really true , ( upon which supposition taken from the common language and sentiments of all that profess christianity , even theirs too as christians i proceed ) but only profest they were likely to be true ; for then it would be so far from following that truth could be falshood , or that the same points could be both true and not true at once , that , in that case , it would follow they ought to affirm they were neither true nor false ; since likely to be true and true indeed are no more the same , than a statue which is like a man is the same with a man. but , if all christians be bound to profess , and themselves actually do so , that their faith is indeed true , then let us see how they will avoid the consequences of my former discourse , when they assert it withall possible to be false . for it is that very individual judgment they make concerning a point of faith , or an act of faith , which they must affirm to be true or a truth , that is conformable to the thing ; and 't is of the self-same judgment , though call'd by them a truth , of which they affirm that 't is possible to be false , or disconformable to the object : and , this is not so meant as if it should become so afterwards , either by some alteration of that judgment into another , or of the thing to which it is conformable ; but that even that very self-same judgment , while they speak and hold it after their fashion true , may even then possibly be false ; from which 't is evident , that for want of solid grounds to settle poin●s of faith in their soul as truths , they hold them indeed only likelihoods , whose nature 't is to be possible to be f●lse ; and yet , forc't by the natural sense and language of christianity , which 't is dishonourable to them too palpably to contradict , they become oblig'd to profess them truths , whose firm grounds make them impossible to be false ; though at the same time they affix to them the proper badg of likelihoods , possibility of falshood . whence by confounding the purest and solidest nature of truth 's gold , with other notions of so base an alloy that it cannot admit any mixture with them , all principles which are to support the true natures or beings of things , are by consequence attacqu't ; and , could their position stand , would quite be overthrown . fourth eviction . § . the very first principle of all truth cannot escape the pernicious attempts of this erroneous tenet . 't is this quicquid est , dum est , impossibile est non esse , or , the same thing cannot both be and not be at once . for in faith-propositions , especially those in which existent is the predicate , [ as the trinity is , &c. ] 't is the same to say the proposition is true , as to say the subject is existent ; and the same to say it may be false , as to say 't is possible to be not existent , or that it may not be ; and our adversaries relate not this to a several circumstance of time in which they may be conceiv'd to agree to the subject successively , for their sense is that this proposition [ a trinity is , &c. ] may ( for any thing they know ) even now possibly be false while they pronounce it true . since then to affirm a thing existent , and yet possible to be not existent at the same time , is to say directly , that it may be and may not be at once , 't is most manifest that either they must not say a trinity is existent , or else 't is not possible not to be existent at the same time ; that is , if indeed that point of faith be true , they must withall affirm it impossible to be false ; as also that they who affirm both , profess to hold direct contradictories . so that while these men go about to violate the sanctuary of faith , whose solid nature is so built that 't is intrinsecally repugnant to falsity , they by consequence subvert the ground-work and bottom-principles of all truth . so wisely did that best master of mankind settle his doctrin , that we cannot call into question that which makes us christians , without renouncing all that makes us men. § . i foresee my adversaries will still object that i mistake them and impose upon them to relate their discourse to the real being of the thing as it stands in the thing it self , whereas they intend it only to mean the thing as standing under notion , or consider'd according to divers motives they either have or may have to perswade or disswade them as to the verity of it ; and in plain terms that they mean only this ; that faith is not so conveniently proposed to them but that the grounds of it for any thing appears evidently are possible to be false . i answer , that i also speak of the thing as standing under notion , else how could i put it in propositions , and discourse from the nature and contradictoriness of those propositions as i do all along ? but yet , lest my notions should be aiery and empty , i am careful to take them from the nature of the thing , and to rate the truth of my propositions from the conformity they have to the object as in it self ; and the force of my motives from the relation they have to first principles ; and then i am sure to discourse and speak solidly . the same i expect from them : whence i ask them , whether they assent to this proposition , [ a trinity is existent ] that is , judg it really and indeed true , or not ? if not , i argue not against them at present , but leave them to be confuted by the natural sentiments , and punsh'd by the abhorrence of all that profess themselves christians , even their own party ; of whom i have so good an opinion that they will heartily abominate that man who shall make any difficulty to profess and maintain that there is indeed a trinity , or that his faith is true. but , in case they do assent indeed to this proposition , [ a trinity is ] or judg it true , then i contend farther that they must be forc't likewise to affirm it to be so in the thing in it self as they predicate ; that is , there is found in the same thing or being what corresponds to the notion of trinity and the notion of existent ; which put , and that they thus judg it to pass in the thing , i affirm that , out of the formal opposition between existent and not-existent , and their incompossibility in the same subject , which they cannot but know , it follows necessarily that they must judg it impossible it should be not-existent , or that that proposition should be false at the same time they judg it true and the thing existent ; nor ever afterwards , unless the thing whence it 's truth is taken be alterable . i will endeavour to explain my self a little clearer if i can . as real existence so ultimately determines and actuates the thing in which it is , that it excludes , while there , all possibility of real non-existence : so intellectual or iudg'd existence exprest by the word [ is ] so ultimately determines and actuates the soul as to its judging power , that it excludes , whiles there , all possibility of judg'd non-existence ; in such sort , that ( the soul being by nature fram'd a capacity of truth ) 't is no less impossible it can judg a thing may be and may not be at once , than 't is that a thing should at once be and not be in reality . again , i affirm that , 't is equally impossible the motive , which ( in case she acts rationally ) convinces the soul the thing is , should consist with a possibility of it 's not being , as 't is that the soul can at once judg it to be and not to be , or that the thing can both be and not be really ; since this motive was the cause of the other iudgment , and an effect of the thing 's being so in reality ; and depends on the same incompossibility of being and not-being , or on the simplicity of the notion is ; and , lastly , on a maxim as evident as what is most ; namely , that the same is the same with it self . whence i make account whoever has sufficient grounds to affirm a point of faith is , or is true , that is , is more than likely to be true , has withall true grounds to affirm it impossible to be false ; and that , who confesses it possible to be false , disclaims any true grounds of judging or professing it is , or is true ; and so judges it in his heart to be but a high probability or a good likelihood at most , which is enough for plausible talkers , but falls far short of making a man a true christian. § . and , hence , we may with horrour and pitty reflect upon the perniciousness of heresy , in corrupting the understanding , that eye whose defect fills ( as our saviour discourses it ) the whole body with darkness ; by subverting fundamentally all those principles in which the common light of all knowledg consists ; and perverting ( as much as the goodness of nature establish't by our creator will suffer it ) that very faculty which makes us men in what is most intrinsecal and essential to it , the knowledg of the first principles , that is , despoiling it quite of all intellectual perfection due to it's nature : but to return to our arguments . § . can any discourse be taken higher than from first principles ? yes , in some sort there can ; that is , from the first cause or being , or , à patre luminum , the father of lights , from whom all created natures , whence those principles are borrowed , and the very nature of our understanding it self , where they are found , derive their origin . this first being metaphysicks demonstrate to be self existent , that is , infinit and unlimited in existence , and consequently in all perfections ; amongst which , since to be a self-determination to act according to right reason is one , god has or rather is that too . it being then according to right reason to do what is seen clearly to be best , all things consider'd ; god , seeing what is absolutely best , must therefore be self-determin'd to do still what is best . this put , looking into the notions of good and best , we find them to be both relative , and that what is good to none is is not good at all : applying which to god's perfection every way infinit and no way farther perfectible , 't is seen manifestly that when he is said to operate exteriourly in this world what is best , it cannot mean what is good or best to himself , or any thing which is his own good , or perfection , but , what is good or best to his creatures . and hence we settle this most comfortable , most evident and most enlightning conclusion , that god does what 's best for his creatures . and , it being evidently best for them to be guided or govern'd according to the true natures which he has given them , it follows also that god governs his creatures connaturally , or sutably to their right natures . § hence it follows that , if we can once demonstrate that to act thus or thus is most connatural to such a species or nature , we can demonstrate from the highest , first , best and most immutable cause , that , however contingency finds place in divers particulars , yet that kind , as 't is subjected to gods guidance , is govern'd most agreeably to its true and right nature , which his creative wisdom and goodness had at first given it . § particularly , 't is consequent that it cannot be god should command or expect from his creatures what is opposit to the true nature he had given them . for , since their being what they are , or their metaphysical verity is fixt by the idea's in his own divine understanding , from which in their creation they unerringly flow'd , hence , as to put them at first was to act conformably to himself or his own wisdom , so , to violate them , is to work disconformably and unlike to himself ; which it cannot be thought god should do through inclination or choice , and as little be made to do it through force . § . again , since we can no otherwise discourse of god but by such notions as we gather here from creatures ; which , however improper , yet all grant to be truly pronounc't of him if they signify perfection ; hence , if we can demonstratively evince that such an action is truly agreeable to wisdom , goodness , mercy , &c. and such others disagreeable , we can know demonstratively that those are worthy to proceed from him , these impossible to have so infinitely perfect an author . § . what use may be made of this principle of supream wisdom [ god does what is best for his creatures ] will be seen hereafter . the use we make of it at present , is to adde a new degree of establishment to our former discourses by applying it to them . i argue then thus : since 't is agreeable to rational nature , or rather since 't is the very nature it self , not to hold any thing but upon the tenure of immediate connexion , or seeing that the first principle of all rational discourse , [ the same is the same with it self ] is engag'd for the truth both of the premisses and consequence ; since assents not thus abetted are but opinions , and , as such , deprave humane nature ; since nothing but true certainty can fix the understanding in a steadness of judgment ; since 't is connatural to rational nature to proceed upon principles , which is not to be had where there is possibility of falshood ; since this possibility renders faith unmaintainable ; and so , contrary to rational nature , makes christians hold and profess what they cannot make good ; since the putting points of faith to be truths , yet possible to be false , puts the soul in violent and incompossible states , as of indetermination and determination , conformity and disconformity to the object ; nay subjects her to the judging contradictions true , which is most repugnant to her nature ; since it subverts all the principles of our understanding , both logically and metaphysically consider'd , that is radically and fundamentally destroys all possible rationality ; since it destroys the nature of faith it self , and by consequence the stability of all the natures in the world ; since , i say , these things are so , as hath been particularly prov'd in my precedent discourses , it follows that 't is the greatest impossibility that god , who does the best for his creatures , can govern or manage his darling-creature , mankind , on this preternatural fashion : but , 't is certain that the way to arrive at faith is particularly laid by gods providence , and so is an especial part of his government of mankind ; 't is known also and acknowledg'd that he has commanded us to profess the truth of our faith in due occasions ; therefore , 't is impossible the means , grounds or rule of faith , and , consequently , faith it self , should be capable to be false ; seeing this last position , joyn'd to the other immediately foregoing , induces all the absurdities mentioned in my former discourse , and pins them upon the deity as on their first cause . so horrible and diabolical a tenet is this of the possible falshood of faith , that it calumniates heaven it self ; nor can any thing but an invincible ignorance in the maintainers of it , excuse them from highest blasphemy , & from making the unenvious fountain of all goodness like our own narrow and crooked selves . fifth eviction . § . let us hear next what the science of divinity both speculative and moral will award concerning the point in question . § . the wisdom of the eternal father having been pleas'd to take our nature upon him , and , amongst his other offices he perform'd towards mankind , that of a master being manifestly one ; we cannot doubt but that he both would and could , that is , did accomplish what belong'd to that office. again , true d●vinity assigning one main , if not the chiefest , reason why the second person was made man , to be this , that , it being requisite god should come and converse with us visibly , to cause in us knowledg of his heavenly doctrine , or be our master , and knowledg or wisdom being appropriated to the second person , it was therefore most fit that person should be incarnate ; it follows that the office of a master in our saviour christ springs peculiarly out of the nature of his divine personality , and not of his humanity precisely , as does his suffering and dying for us , &c. wherefore the proper agent of instructing and teaching mankind being , as such , infinitely perfect , 't is evidently consequent christ perform'd the office of a master , or wrought the effects proper to a teacher as such , with all imaginable perfection . § . it being then the proper office or effect of a master or teacher to make his schollers know his doctrin is true , we cannot think but that this divine or infinitely-perfect master made them absolutely or perfectly know the truth of his doctrine . § . and , because the end of this teaching was not terminated in those few himself convers'd with , nor in the christians of the first age , but was principally intended for the body of mankind , which was future in respect of them ; it follows that this enlightning and instructing now spoken of , was to be equally extended to the following world of christians : they being all sectators or followers of his doctrin ; that is , his scholars , and he their master . unless then he had taken order that succeeding ages also should have perfect assurance or know his doctrine was absolutely true , he would have set up a school and laid no means to preserve the far greater part , and in a manner the whole body of his scholars ( or christians ) from ignorance and errour . § . all christians then both the primitive and their successors had and will have means to know absolutely christian doctrine is true. this means we call the rule of faith : both the rule of faith then must be known to be veracious , and faith which is built on it to be absolutely t●ue , and by consequence to be absolutely impossible to be false . § . besides man being an intellectual creature , 't is evident the true perfection of his nature consists in knowing ; and this , whether we consider him as a speculater , or as an acter . for if the thing may possibly be false for any thing he knows , then he is most evidently ignorant whether it be false or no ; that is , whether it be true or no ; which speaks imperfection in his nature as 't is a capacity of knowledg ; and , if he be to act about it , 't is evidently a less perfection and worse for mankind to go to work unassuredly than assuredly ; faith then being gods ordinance , and god doing what is best for mankind , it follows faith is perfectly secure to him ; that is , he must know it to be such ; and , consequently , 't is not subject to the contingency of being false . § . but , leaving man , the subject of faith , and reflecting upon faith it self in us , the first thing that offers it self to our consideration is , that it's habit is a virtue , and consequently rational . also that it's act is an assent upon authority ; since then 't is demonstrated formerly that there can be in reason no assent without certain grounds , and that what is certain is impossible to be false , it follows that the grounds of faith , and , consequently faith it self is not possible to be false . § . next , faith is an intellectual virtue , that is , apt to perfect mans understanding as such ; that is , 't is to him a knowledg , and so informs his mind with truths . the nature of faith then forces that points of faith must be truths , and , so , as is manifoldly demonstrated , faith it self is not possible to be false . § . again , this intellectual virtue call'd faith is also a supernatural one ; and , therefore , as such , proceeds from an agent infinitely more perfect than any can be found in nature ; therefore the immediate effect aim'd at by faith , that is , the informing the understanding , would be perform'd with infinite advantage as far as concerns that supernatural agent 's or god's part ; and , if it be not so exquisitely perform'd , it must spring from some incapacity in the subject . there being then in this effect of informing the understanding two considerations , viz. evidence , which is had either by experience of our senses , ( of which spiritual natures , the chief objects of faith are incapable ) or by intrinsecal mediums , that is demonstration of those spiritual things ; of which , taking the generality of mankind , the subject of faith , very few are capable ; and that other of certainty , attainable both by those intrinsecal and also extrinsecal mediums , or authority ; which authority , by means of the practicableness of it's nature , all are to a great degree able to understand ; it follows that , here being no violence or unsuitableness to humane nature consider'd in it's generality , the ●upernatural agent or cause of faith will effect here a greater certainty than meer natural impressions could produce ; that is , ( all extrinsecal arguments being finally resolv'd into intrinsecal ones ) the best and chief nature in the world will be made use of , and most strongly supported to make up the greatest authority that is possible , and so to establish this certainty of faith and it's principles beyond that of any humane sciences . but divers pieces of humane science , nay the least particle of true science is acknowledg'd impossible to be false ; faith therefore à fortiori must be such also . § . this supernaturality of faith , ( by which word we mean divine faith ) convinces that it ought to exceed all other faith 's according to the notion of faith in common ; that is , it ought to partake whatever perfection truly belongs to faith or belief , as such , in an especial manner ; and far above what is found in humane faiths ; in a word , it ought to have as much in it as can elevate it under the notion of faith , without wronging that notion or nature : faith then in common , as distinguisht from science and opinion , being an assent upon authority , and firmness being evidently a perfection in an assent , divine faith ought to have a far greater degree of firmness in it than any humane faith whatsoever ; wherefore , since humane faith can rise to that degree of stability , that mankind would think him mad , that is , a renouncer of evident reason , who can think seriously it can be an errour or possible to be false , ( for example , the belief of this present age concerning the existence of france or k. iames ) divine faith being supernatural , ought to be more firmly grounded ; and consequently more highly impossible to be false . § . again , we find that the more we are ascertain ' that a convictive authority is engag'd for the truth of any thing , the more strongly that authority is apply'd to our understanding ; and consequently , more forcibly works its effects there , or subducs it to assent ; whence this certitude is so far from being against the nature of belief , that 't is most manifest it strengthens and perfects it under that notion . divine faith then being supernatural , has a peculiar right to have such an application of the divine authority to the understanding , as may be truly certain or impossible to be false ; since by such an application 't is most evident that not less but more belief is given to the said authority , and the understanding becomes more humbled and subjected to it ; that is , by such an application , how scientifically evident soever it be , the act of faith is never the nearer being an act of science , but is perfecter under the very notion of an act of faith ; being still a steadier , heartier , and firmer assent for the authority's sake , which is thus strongly and closely apply'd , and a greater reliance on it . § . moreover , faith being to work through charity , and to guide our actions as we are christians ; and rational actions being so much more perfect by how much more knowingly they proceed from the agent ; unless faith were truly certain , that is , impossible to be false , christian action would fall short of the perfection found in most ordinary humane actions of an inferiour and ( in comparison ) trifling concern ; and a christian would go to work with less assuredness and steadiness than a carpenter and cobler ; and this , not out of the impediments of original sin , ( which is contingent and extrinsecal to faith or religion ) but meerly out of a defect of certainty in the intrinsecals of faith it self and it's grounds ; which beyond all evasion , affixes the imperfection upon christianity it self . § . i may add , that arts and sciences , ev'n the most slight and inconsiderable ones , and which are most lyable to contingency in their effects or the actions springing from them , have yet all of them certainty in their principles . religion then being the art of carrying or guiding souls to bliss , and the points of faith its principles , in virtue of which 't is to perform this effect ; and the ground of faith the main and supream principle , whose firmness is to establish the rest , and , so , render them efficacious : unless faith it self and its grounds were truly certain , the principles of all religion would be exceedingly more defective and inefficacious than those of any petty mechanical trade , and indeed no principles . sixth eviction . § . the foregoing considerations are more enforc'd by this , that faith is the light which discovers to us our last end and the way to it ; that is , which is to guide us in that to which all our other concerns are subservient , and all our actions directed . unless therefore this knowledg or light of faith be steady and firm , all our whole life , as christians , would be feeble , tott'ring and uneven : as wanting certainty of the first practical principles which are to ground our christian behaviour ; nay , certainty of the end we should aim at , without which the whole course of our life must needs be staggering and inconstant , and it self but a blind groping in the dark . § . moreover , since all mankind , even the heathens themselves , had perfect evidence and certainty of the practical principles of natural morality , which grounded their moral ( seeming ) virtues , as is confest ; which virtues yet , for want of the light of faith teaching them to know their true last end , and so perform the acts of those virtues for it's sake , or order them to heaven , fell short of elevating them towards it and bringing them thither : it follows that , had there not been provision made that points of faith , the principles of christian morality , should be as certain as were the other , things would have been perversly order'd ; that is , greater care would have been taken to create those imperfect dispositions of the soul , which alone were not able to secure one man from the state of eternal misery , than for those sublime perfections , call'd christian virtues , which are the direct steps for man to arrive at eternal bliss , and the immediate means to attain the end he was created for , the sight of god. § . especially , since this last end and chief good of mankind is not attainable by external actions or local motions ; but intellectually , or by interiour acts of the soul ; by which he is promoted forwards even to the very assecution of it ; that is , by force of knowledg or truth exciting him to act , and guiding him in those actions : 't is manifest , the points of faith must be truths , and so , as has been manifoldly prov'd above , impissible to be false . § . again , virtues spring connaturally from truths , and vice from falsehoods : if faith then be possibly false , the practises springing thence are possibly no virtues but vices ; and , so , they , and consequently , faith , whence they proceed , possibly would not dispose , but indispose us towards our last end ; which destroyes perfectly the notion of faith and virtues too . faith , therefore , would be no faith , were it possible to be false . § . you 'l object , a reason merely probable or morally-certain is sufficient to make us act for a temporal good ; much more , then , for an eternal and infinite one ; since the greater goodness is in the object , the less is the hazard ; and consequently the more the reasonableness to act for it . i answer , though , if all other things corresponded , the objection would be valid , and the reason given for it , speaking abstractedly , be really conclusive : yet , in our present case , there are so many things which make it unparallel that no shadow of consequence can be made from the one to the other . first , for the reason lately given ; viz. because our last end being in it self spiritual and most perfect , is not attainable but by means of best spiritual perfections or virtues ; and the more knowingly these proceed from us the better they are ; according to that saying , none is cordially and solidly good , who knows not why he ought to be good : whence they cannot be best in their kinde , nor , consequently , means fit to attain that end , unless they proceed at least , from true knowledg ; which cannot be had by a mere probability , how high soever it be . whereas , material and temporary goods depend not on a constant course of causes or dispositions towards them knowable by us : but very frequently , if not equally on a chanceable or contingent cast of things ; whence we use to say , fools have the best fortune . hence , the intending and directing part in such actions depends on the knowledg of some particulars ; but the attainment is carry'd on by material means : nay , very frequently , there is no knowledg at all requisit in any respect . for example , he that , by the death of a hundred relations in a plague-time should alone survive and so inherit their estates , would be really rich , whither any interiour act of his minde in the least contributed to it or not ; that is , though he never desir'd , aim'd at , or even thought of it . but , if a man in time of persecution and martyrdom should say within himself , i cannot believe there is a god or a next world ; yet i le venture to dye rather then deny them ; in hopes that , if perhaps there be such a thing or state , he will give me a far greater reward : such a man i dare affirm to be no nearer gaining heaven by this act no better principled , than if he had never had any such act at all ; in regard he wanted that first necessary disposition which st. paul and connaturality require ; accedentem ad deum oportet credere quia deus est . heb. . v. . . again , faith is intended for a spiritual armour to rebeat all the assaults and temptations of our three ghostly enemies , original corruption in us , the vanity of the world about us , and the cruelty of the devil and wicked men over us . hence the advice of the apostle , cui resistite fortes in fide ; hence his recommending to us above all things to take scutum fidei ; hence the contempt of all worldly honours , pleasures , and riches in gods choice saints , and their suff'ring persecution gladly for conscience sake ; hence , lastly , their embracing and ev'n courting torments and death it self with such alacrity and constancy . but , alas , how unactive had their charity and zeal been : how dull their desire to forego all present goods , ev'n life too among the rest ; if this wicked doctrine had been in their hearts , that perhaps all was a lye , which they profest , suff'red , and dy'd for ! and , how coldly and timorously would they have look'd death in the face , having perfect certainty on one side that they were about to lose all the known goods they possest , for others unknown and uncertain ? well may a natural sincerity preserve diverse persons who are out of the church morally honest and innocent : but we must not hope for any eminent sanctity or heroick act of virtue from any professors of such a faith , if they follow their teachers , maintaining there are no stronger motives for the truth of christianity , to comfort and establish the souls of the faithful . and 't is to be feared that , though their highly-conceited probability or moral certainty ( as they call it ) be enough to exclude actual doubt , while men are in a state of security and all things go well with them ; yet it will scarce be able to preserve them from doubting actually , when they are upon the point of foregoing all the goods they at present enjoy , and are so highly concern'd to be certain of the existence of those future ones they hope for in lieu of them . § . moreover , we are perfectly certain by manifest experience , of the existence of temporal goods , viz. honours , pleasures , riches , &c. or , that such things are in the world ; whereas , unless faith be truly certain , that is , impossible to be false , the generality of mankind cannot be perfectly assur'd ev'n of the existence of heaven , or those future goods for which they are to relinquish all present ones . wherefore , the existence of the thing being the first and main basis of all humane action , and the ground of all the other motives : 't is clear there 's a manifest difference between acting for heaven and for temporal goods , ev'n in this respect , whatever parallel may be pretended in some other considerations . besides , all acting ev'n for temporal goods were unjustifyable , unless those goods be held attainable ; and de facto we are perfectly certain that honours , pleasures , riches , &c. not only exist , but are of such a nature also as they may be attained to , due means us'd ; since we experience multitudes of men have and do daily arrive at them . but , ev'n , though heav'n be held to be , yet it cannot be held to be attainable , unless the proposals of faith be certain ; since neither have those who are to come to faith seen nor experienc'd any man get heav'n , nor discours'd with any whom they know to have come thence and seen it . so that i fear , were the objection , concerning the sufficiency of probable motives to make us act for inferiour or humane goods , distinctly clear'd , it would be found not to mean that probability of those humane good 's existence or attainableness suffices ; for example , that there are riches in common , or that they may be gotten one way or other , both which are presupposed to the action as certainly known : but it seems to mean only this , that men ought to proceed to action though there be but moral certainty or great likelihood that those goods are actually to be attain'd in this or that circumstance of time or place , or by such or such means , as , by sending ships to the indies , inventing water-works , husbandry , souldiery , and the like : which assertion held within its bounds will break no squares ; seeing ev'n in the actual attainment of heav'n by me or by this particular way or means , when those means depend on material circumstances , there is found the same room for failure and contingency , notwithstanding the certainty of heav'ns existence and attainableness in common , secur'd to us perfectly by faith. for , though virtue practic'd is an infallible way to bring souls to bliss ; yet no man has certainty that any extrinsecal state he puts himself into , or material means he uses , will make him truly vertuous , or finally get him the end he aims at : but must content himself with likelihoods , or the seeming-betterness of his putting himself in that state or circumstance , or his using this or that means ; in the same manner as it happens when he acts for temporary goods ; and , for the success , leave it humbly in the hands of divine providence , or miserentis dei , acknowledging with david , that in manibus tuis domine sortes meae , and working out his salvation with fear and trembling . § . besides , to act externally is in the power of the will ; but , to act internally , at least as is requisite for each effect , is not so . for , however the will may set the understanding to consider the motive ; yet it must be the truth of the object 's goodness , or the clearness of the proposal of it , which only can oblige connaturally the understanding to conceit it as it ought , and consequently the will to love it accordingly : in which conceiting and heartily loving not onely the intending and commanding part of the action is plac'd in our case , as it happens in our acting for material goods ; but also the executive and assecutive parts of it . not the same sleightness of motive ; therefore , or moral certainty , will here serve the turn ; but true certainty or impossibility of falshood is requir'd : this being the best and properest to beget a hearty , lively , steady , and all-over-powering affection for heav'n ; and such as may ( as it ought ) make christians practically repute all other things as dung in comparison of that . § . but , the main consideration which forces the certainty of faith and the motives which are to beget it , ( that is , of the rule of faith ) above those which ground our action of pursuing temporary goods , is the unconceivable mysteriousness of the points of faith : truths exalted above the ordinary course of nature as far as heav'n is above the earth : many of them looking so odd and uncouth to our course humane reason unrefin'd by faith , that , as they seem'd of old to the greeks foolishness , so still they are acknowledgedly most unsuitable to the grossness of fancy , by which the generality of the world , especially those who are yet unelevated by christian principles , are led ; and confessedly above reason ; insomuch as it costs the best wits of christianity no small pains to maintain them not to be contradictory or impossible to be true. putting , then , the motives of faith , and consequently faith it self , possible to be false ; the only seeming certainty ( i might say , the confest want of certainty ) of the motives to believe would be so counterballanc'd by the incredibleness and seeming contradict●riness of the thing or object , or rather indeed overballanc'd in the conceit of all those who are yet to embrace faith ; that there would be no over-plus of weight left to incline them to hold those points true rather than false : much less to make them absolutely hold they are certain truths . and , he that sh●uld assert the contrary , i wonder how he would go about to prove it , or by what standard he would measure whether is the greater of the two counterpos'd unlikelihoods , viz. that the possibly false motive of faith should hap to be actually such , or that the seeming-impossibility in the objects should chance to be a real one . for , 't is not enough to say here that we are in reason to expect the divine nature should be exceedingly exalted above its creatures , and incomprehensible ; and therefore we are not to measure his perfections by the ordinary rules found in creatures , but think it reasonable he should infinitely exceed them : for , however this has weight in points of faith which concern the divine nature and its perfections as in it self , yet here it will not serve the turn , in regard faith teaches us many other points seemingly repugnant to the divine nature it self , and most strangely debasing and vilifying it ; as , that god , infinitely happy in himself , should be expos'd to injurious bufferings , scourgings , and an ignominious death , for a creatures sake that , in comparison of him , is a meer nothing ; and that omniscience and omnipotence could not invent and practice some easier and more honorable way to work the end they intended ; and , lastly , that it should beseem infinite goodness that a person superlatively innocent should be so severely punisht , to do an undue favour to those who were enormously wicked , this consideration , then , necessitates plainly the impossibility of faith's being false ; for else 't would be irrational to believe it . and lastly , it shews the case of christian interiour acts utterly unparallel to that of acting exteriourly for sensible and material goods ; which one may apprehend to be attainable ; and also comprehend the way to attain them , without puzz'ling his understanding with any unconceivable mysteriousness in the business to check his assent . e're i leave this point , i must desire the reader to reflect well on the condition those persons are in who are yet to embrace faith. they have no light but their pure natural reason , and to this are propos'd for objects to the one side the motives to faith , or the authority ( in our case ) that god has spoke it ; on the other the strangeness of the mysteries . let then those persons understandings no better elevated , go about to scan the profound mysteries of faith , 't is clear , and i think confest by all , they must needs seem to them impossible to be true ; which therefore nothing but a motive of its own nature seemingly impossible to be false , can conquer so as to make them conceit them really true. but this motive or this rule of faith is confest by our adversaries possible to be false ; nor ( it being a fit and proportion'd object for humane reason ) is there any thing to make it seem better than it is , or impossible to be false ; 't is then against all reason to believe , were faith and its grounds possible to be false ; the motives of dissent being in that case evidently greater than are the motives of assent . § . again , since 't is incomparably more easie to throw down than to build , or less difficult for the understanding to comprehend an objection , than 't is to lay orderly in the soul a severely-connected frame of discourse forcing the truth of a point ; particularly , when those points are utterly unsuitable to fancy , and even exalted above reason ; and so lie open to very plausible and easily penetrable objections , on which disadvantage or disproportion to weak judgments , ( that is , indeed , a high excellency on the object 's side ) atheists ground their drollery against the mysteries of our faith : it follows , that were not the chief motives to faith , or rule of faith practically self-evident , and , so , impossible to be false ; there would be , considering the rudeness and unelevatedness of the generality of those who are to come to christian faith , and the unsuitableness of the mysteries to their fancyled understandings , greater temptations and more plausible , ( that is , to them stronger ) motives laid to make them dissent to those mysteries , than to make them assent . the motives to faith , then , must be practically self-evident , and , so , faith it self must be impossible to be false . seventh eviction . § . perhaps the language and practise of christianity , expressing most manifestly their sentiments , may give to some a more natural and penetrable satisfaction , that 't is impossible faith should be false ; than all the speculative and scientifical proofs hitherto deduc'd . § . for their language , then , i onely hint to the memory of my prudential readers , ( for , to transcribe them were endless ) all those expressions so frequent in scriptures , fathers , councils , and the mouths of the faithful to these very days , viz. that faith is the knowledg of god , his will , and of revealed truths . nor will i streighten the signification of the word knowledg , to mean scientifical knowledg , ( 't is neither my tenet nor interest ; ) but will leave it at large for any that are concern'd , to explicate how this knowledg is bred : provided they leave the true nature of knowledg , and do not abusively call that knowledg , which in reality is ( when look'd into ) no knowledg . hence i argue ; since 't is impossible any one should know what is not to be known ; and what is not , is not to be known ; it follows , that the object of faith is , and so , ( here being no contingency in the matter ) impossible not to be ; and consequently faith , or the belief of it , impossible to be false . § . nor am i affraid of those canting distinctions without sense , that 't is morally a knowledg , or that they know it to be true , morally speaking . for , if it be expended what is meant by these words [ morally a knowledg ; ] it will quickly appear , that , as true knowledg can onely be an effect of the thing 's being : so this counterfeit knowledg , call'd moral , falling short of the other , can onely be the product of the thing 's likelihood to be , and so can onely have for its object the thing 's likelihood : which , whether it be enough to specifie and terminate an act of christian faith , i appeal to the constant expressions of all who are generally call'd and reputed christians ; and challenge my adversaries to produce one expression of theirs , which sounds thus dwindlingly and feebly , as if it meant onely some high likelihood , or their apprehension of it as no more but such . observe but the life and energie of their words in such occasions : as that of iob : scio quod redemptor meus vivit ; and that of s. paul : scio cui credidi , & certus sum &c. and we shall find their understandings so perfectly possest of the object 's existence , & not deeming onely its likelihood ; that they seem rather to want words to express their absolute certainty of it . oftentimes indeed they deny faith to be evidence or science , and affirm it to be obscure : but what 's this to the purpose ? while all relyance on authority is obscure ; and certain knowledg can be had by means of authority , as appears in diverse instances of humane faith. § . particularly , waving the former , we will reflect on some places more expresly assertive of our position ; as , that of the prince of the apostles , acts . . certissimè sciat ergo omnis domus israel , &c. where , about to bring them to faith , he exprest it to be a most certain knowledg , and this attainable by the whole house of israel , which must mean the generality at least . § . i add , ( omitting many others ) two of his fellow-apostle paul. the first , col. . . si tamen permanetis in fide fundati , & stabiles et immobiles à spe evangelii : now , how any one can be founded or grounded in faith , if faith be possible to be false , that is ( eviction . . § . ) have no foundation , principles or grounds it self ; how any one can be stable and immoveable in a persuasion , which very persuasion and its grounds may not only be moved but overthrown & subverted ( as must inevitably follow , if it be possible to be false . ) i expect to be inform'd by mr. tilletson and mr. stillingfleet . do these words sound onely an exclusion of actual doubt , or suspicion of it at present , which protestant writers make sufficient to an act of faith ? or rather does it not mean that which of its own nature is such as can admit no possible cause of doubt at any time for the future ? let them dispense a while with pursuing their affected gaynesses in the out-sides of words , and take the pains to look into their meanings ; and then , if they can make out that groundedness , stability and immobility can consist with possibility of falshood , i shall promise them my utmost endeavour to hold contradictions with them ; for , in that case , those would be the onely truths . § . the second shall be that most emphatical one of the same apostle . licèt nos aut angelus de coelo annuntiaverit vobis praeter id quod accepistis , anathema sit . though we or an angel from heaven should preach to you otherwise than you have receiv'd , let him be accursed . which were a very rude and unreasonable carriage ( especially for us christians now adays ) were faith possible to be false , and so , short of the credit due to so incomparable authorities : for since 't is known that many things which have seem'd , ( that i may use mr. t 's words ) morally impossible to be false , have prov'd to be actually and indeed false , and 't is granted that 't is always possible to be so : but it was never heard that an apostle of iesus christ , or an angel from heaven could , or at least did at any time preach false : 't is most manifest that nothing which was possible to be false , can with any reason sustain it self against the force of their authority ; and that faith , which ought to do so , must be impossible to be false . § . from the language and sense of the saints and christians of former times , let us come nearer home , and see how unsuitable 't is to the notions and expressions of present christianity , to say , faith is possible to be false . now , the possibility of faith's falshood , is built on the contingency of the motives which are to ground it : for , were there no contingency in them , but that their causes were so laid , that 't were impossible they should not be conclusive , they could not possibly fail of being able to conclude ; and so faith would of its own nature be impossible to be false . considering , then , the nature of contingency , whether speculatively in it self , or practically in instances wherein 't is found , we may observe that it implies a certain kind of proportion between the frequency of effects on the one side , and the seldomness on the other : which we usually express by ten to one , a thousand to one &c. if then faith be possible to be false , its nature will bear , nay oblige us to express the probable degree of its likelihood in such kind of language ; and that we assert it to be likely in such a proportion , but not-likely in a higher : for example , it would be perhaps wise and agreeable to the nature of the thing , as thus propos'd , to say , v. g. 't is a hundred to one there is a trinity , a heaven or a hell ; but 't is not a thousand to one that there are any such things . or , if any contend i have assign'd too-small an over-proportion to faiths likelihood ; yet at least he must grant that , in a greater , it would inevitably follow , that such language ought , in true speaking , be used , when we are to express the degree of faith's firmness . wherefore , it being experientially manifest , that nothing sounds more ugly to a christian ear , than to say , that 't is so many to one faith is true , but not so many more : 't is evident that the nature of faith is plac'd beyond all proportions of its failing to its standing , and all degrees of contingency ; that is , 't is impossible to be false . § . moreover , to say , 't is a thousand to one faith is true , or there is a trinity , is not to say , 't is true , or there is a trinity ; christians , therefore , ought in due candor , then when they are to profess their faith , express onely how much over-proportion , in a moral estimation , its likelihood bears to its unlikelihood ; and not to stand telling a lie , when they are to make profession of their faith ; saying , 't is true , when 't is onely to such a degree likely to be true ; that is , lying , when they should be doing a chief duty of religion . and , which is worst of all , as being not onely most unwise and imprudent , but most diabolically wicked and impudent , to stand stiff in the profession of that ly , though they hazard the loss of their estates , and even lives too , by the bargain . yet , this imputation of such a most foolish and most damnably-dishonest obstinacy is unavoidably to be affixt upon christians , if they thus profess their faith true , in case it be possible to be false ; that is , in case it be onely a thousand to one ( for example ) that 't is true. if it be said , they saw not perhaps this possibility of falshood , and so acted virtuously in that absolute profession of its truth , because of their good meaning ; the answer is ready : first , that mr. tillotson , mr. stillingfleet , and such who maintain , and , so , if they write what they think , see faith possible to be false , are bound not to profess faith to be true , and to forewarn others not to make such a lying profession : next , that if god have commanded us to make such a profession , as all christians grant he has ; then , not onely their meaning , but the act it self is good and laudable . which , joyn'd to these mens principles , and their natural consequences laid open in our former discourse , signifies that dishonesty is honesty , and a most foolish and wicked obstinacy a high virtue , as being commanded by god : nay , that god is the author of sin , commanding them to tell a ly in professing their faith true. positions most abominable , as well as contradictory ; but 't is most fit the nature of all goodness should go to wrack , when the nature of truth is once violated . § . again , if contingency have place in faiths basis , there must be some stint of this contingency , according to the moral estimation of things : be it then , for example , a thousand to one , or what other proportion you please , for it alters not the present case : if then it be but a thousand to one faith is true , then 't is one to a thousand 't is not-true , that is , it will bear a wager that faith is a ly ; and a christian , according to these principles may , without injury to his faith or its grounds , and with a great deal of honesty , lay a wager that his faith is actually false . nay , if he get any one to cope with him at excessive odds ; he is bound in reason and prudence to undertake him , and lay a wager all christian faith is a ly. which sounding highest impiety in the ears of all reputed christians , of what sect soever , that govern themselves by the natural conceit they have of faith ; 't is plain that the nature of faith is plac'd beyond all contingency of failing , that is , all possibility of falshood . if it be objected , such a wager could never be try'd , and so , it could never in prudence come to be layd : i reply , my discourse is unconcern'd how able or unable mans understanding is to decide it , and onely contends that the nature of the thing , that is , of faith no better settled , would bear or justify it ; which is unavoidably consequent . § . particularly , 't is strange that none of the christian martyrs , who from time to time have dy'd for their faith , should when their life lay at stake , endeavour to mitigate the fury of their persecutors with such like language . i beseech you , ( great nero ; or dioclesian ! ) understand us christians right : we deny not absolutely the possibility of your opposit tenets being true , nor assert our own faith so far as to say it may not possibly be false . what we profess is onely this , that it seems to us so highly probable , or morally-certain , that we have no actual doubt of it at present ; though we cannot absolut●ly say but we may come to discover it to be false hereafter , and your opposit tenets true , and so renounce christianity and joyn with you : indeed we dare venture a thousand to one ( or perhaps something more ) that our faith is true ; yet for all that we shall not stick to lay one to a thousand 't is false . these had been moderate and mollifying expressions , and questionless might have sav'd the lives of very many : which why they should not have used , they being ( according to our adversaries principles ) true , and honest to profess them , and highly prudent to do it , their lives being concern'd ; nay , consciencious too , ( for there is none but holds it highly sinful to conceal any truth which may save another mans life ) no other reason can be given but this , that the possibility of faiths falshood had never enter'd into their hearts ; but they held gods promises of a better life full as certain , as was their present possession of this , or present determination of losing it for christ's name . all their expressions sounded the certainty of the truth they profest , and their most comfortable hopes grounded upon that certainty . nor did any of the circumstant faithfull ever judg them too lavish of their bloud , for standing so stiff upon their avowing the rigorous truth of their faith , and the falshood of its contradictory ; but always esteem'd their action no less wise and honest , than it was undaunted . what kind of profession of his faith a protestant , thus principled , would make , in case of imminent martyrdom , i know not ; but i should esteem my self the foolishest knave living to tell aly to hang my self , by professing my faith true , which i could never heartily judg it to be , whilst i held it possible to be false ; and so , at best , onely likely to be true. § note here , that i have conceded very much in yeilding a thousand to one of the likelyhood of christian faith in the protestant grounds without traditions certainty , which they deny : rather , taking in the incredibleness of the mysteries , it would be ( in that hypothesis ) above five to one , speaking modestly , that all faith is false . for , since 't is evident the certainty of books cannot be had at all without the certainty of tradition ; and protestants deny the certainty of tradition , and bring multitudes of exceptions against it ( as may be seen in mr. tillotson's answer , or rather abuse of sure footing ) there is some degree of incredibleness in the right conveyance of christ's doctrine hitherto : to which difficulty add the incredibleness of the mysteryes themselves , exceedingly enhauncing the other ; 't is manifest there would be a high disadvantage on faith's side . nay , granting a pretty high probability ( which is perhaps as much , as they care for ) yet , the not-onely improbability , but seeming-impossibility of the mysteries of faith , if taken , not as standing under authority , but as objects of our humane reason ( as in this counter-ballancing case they ought to be ) would quite overpoise the probable motive , and incline the soul strongly towards dissent , unless interest , custom , or some other affection come in to the assistance of the weaker motive , printing it in a bigger letter , and diminishing the difficulty in the object by not letting it be considered or penetrated , that is , by hindring the working of right reason . now , in this case , if this discourse holds , a protestant may with a safe conscience lay odds , and wager two to one at least , his faith is all a f●lshood : a strange impiety , but yet the natural consequence of that impious tenet [ faith is possible to be false ] as this is the genuine sequel of denying the right rule of faith. § . the same is deduc'd from the very notion of a martyr and the proper signification of that word , which is to be a witness ; and this , as appears by his circumstances , of all witnesses the most solemn and serious , and the perfectest under that notion that can be imagin'd ; as engaging not onely his word , but his life and dearest bloud for what he testifies . now all witnessing or attestation being most evidently of what the witnesser knows to be true , and nothing sounding more unnaturally , or being more disagreeable to the nature of that kinde of action than to have a likelyhood for its object , or to witness what he knows not , ( as will appear by the constant practice of it in all other occasions ) it follows that a martyr or witness of the truth of christs faith , must know it to be true , that is , he must know it to be more than likely to be true ; and , consequently , ( nothing being more impossible than that one can know what is not ) impossible not to be true , or to be false . § . no less unnaturally would it sound should we gather together , and make use of all the equivalent speeches to this proposition , [ faith is possible to be false ] such as are , there is no certain way to heaven . no man knows there is a heaven , a hell , a iesus christ , a trinity , &c. no man sees any reason securing faith from being a lye . the ground of all our hope is unstable and may be overthrown . absolutely speaking it may be there is no such thing as that which christians are to profess , and ought to dye for . it may be points of faith are so many lyes , and false as so many old-wives tales . the light of faith may be spiritual darkness and errour . what we hold to come from god , the author of all truth , may perhaps come from the devil , the author of all lyes . all our supernatural truths may be diabolical falshoods . faith has no principles . the points of faith are not truths , but likelihoods onely . these and innumerable such others , are all equivalent periphrases to this proposition [ faith is possible to be false ] as in this treatise has been manifested ; but , how horrid and blasphemous , needs no proof but thebare rehearsing of them . § . . from the language and practise of the generality of the faithful professing faith , we come next to the practise of the wits of christianity ; not proceeding as speculaters and scholars ( a most trifling impertinent topick when we are speaking of faith , yet most frequently us'd by our adversaries , especially mr. stillingfleet , and mr. pool , who are obstinately bent to practise that wilful mistake ) but as christians or faithful : and this , not only acting or speaking in abstraction from humane knowledg , but as in direct opposition to it , and ( as it were ) in defiance and despight of it . now , with these intelligent persons 't is very solemn , after , by penetrating the grounds of faith , they have come to embrace faith itself , immediately to discard & renounce all tenets opposit to the said faith , how certain soever they held them formerly : nay , to stand with a mind prepared to disassent to anypiece of humane learning , how scientifical soever it look't , which they saw evidently to thwart any of those believed truths . making account it was their duty captivare intellectum in obsequium fidei , to captivate their understandings to the obedience of faith , or , to yeild them totally up , by an absolute and perfect assent to the truth of those mysteries ; and not to heed or credit any objections or proposals of humane reason to the contrary , when once the stable and immovable grounds or motives of divine belief , that is , the rule of faith , had subdu'd their judgments to that invincible assent ; but to rest well assur'd that all reasons were fallacious , and all positions false which went against those sacred and establish't truths . this was ever their unanimous and constant profession ; particularly the fathers are full of expressions of that kind : an evident argument that , as christians , they ever held faith and it's grounds impossible to be false ; for , otherwise , they had bin oblig'd , by honesty and their love of truth , not to have so readily rejected their formerly-conceited truths , nor to have stop'd their ears so obstinately to new reasons against faith ; but , as long as faith was possible to be false , they ought in due candor to have still weigh'd the opposit thesis and the objections perpetually alledg'd , against the strength of faith and it's rule , and consider'd which was more likely to be true ; and not have still concluded so partially on faiths side , and obstinately resolv'd to hear nothing against it ; bearing themselves as if all must needs be true which faith's rule teacheth us , that is , indeed , as if faith could not possibly be false . § . . whence follows , that all who hold faith is possible to be false ought , in conscience and their natural duty or love to truth , remain seekers all their lives : for , however they may hope at present that what they adhere to is true , yet , since they hold 't is possible to be false for any thing they know , they ought , the affair and its concern being so weighty , to be still examining it's grounds , and casting about to see whether this possibility of falshood , which they already see , be not indeed actually such , though as yet they see it not ; or at least , whether some other profession may not , after long consideration , appear less possible to be false , and another still less than that ; that so they may go as near truth as they can : weighing discreetly and impartially what deism , paganism , turcism , and such others , wisely represented without their poetical fancyes , and fooleries , can say for themselves . or , lastly , if they come to such a scepticism in religion ( which i doubt is the true case ) as to judg such a quest lost labour ; because , when all 's done , the sullen dame [ truth ] will never the sooner discover her face , nothing being to be found but what will still appear possible to be false : the practical conclusion naturally following hence will be this , to fix there where it lights most advantageous to their temporal interest ; in the same manner as men addict themselves to this or that trade ; cry it up and maintain it stoutly to be truth , because 't is creditable to the profession , though they judg all the while it may be a falshood ; and , because they see their faith can have no certain or firm grounds , undertake to make it good that faith it self needs have none , by the best assistances plausible rhetorick , seemingly-probable reasons , weak or mis-us'd testimonies and voluntary cavils and mistakes can lend them . and , in a word , since they are not in circumstances to settle any thing , to laugh heartily at those who go about it , and to endeavour very politickly to pull down every thing ; which any intelligent reader will manifestly see by this establishing treatise , compar'd to their performances , to have been the effects of my adversaries labours . § . the unnaturalness of this tenet will perhaps be brought nearer home , and so be better penetrated even by our opposers themselves , if we reflect how wickedly it would sound from the mouth of preachers ; if , after a sermon , exhorting and pressing the faithful to the love of heaven , or particularly , to stand stedfast in their faith , they should in the close , to prevent in their auditors the misunderstanding some overstraining expressions , add an ingenuous caution , that they should not , for all that , adhere to faith as if it could not be false , nor work for heaven as if there were any absolute certainty of the being of any such a thing . is it not manifest , this ( in our case ) honest-dealing profession would enervate the force of all the motives they had proposed and prest ? and , if so , is it not as evident , that all the efficacy of christian preaching springs naturally from the impossibility that faith should be false ? for , 't is not only the unseasonableness of this profession , but the impiousness of it , which would so scandalize the hearers ; and either avert them from the preacher , or make them cold in virtue . 't is clear , then , that all the forceable application of christian motives to the hearts of the generality of the faithful , is grounded on the impossibility of faith's falshood : and that , therefore , he who holds the opposite tenet , and would be honest , should either leave off preaching , for which this tenet makes him unfit ; or else use much caution while he preaches , least , by implying the perfect certainty of faith , while he practises assentation to that , he becomes injurious to truth , and consequently to it too , if it be true. § . . but , to conclude ; it has bin no less the practice of the governours of the church , or ecclesia docens , to oblige the faithfull to beleeve what they recommended to them as the doctrine of christ and his apostles , ( nay mr. whitby , in his late treatise [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] page , . asserts the same of the church of england , as to their creed or fundamentals ) which , had faith been held by the governors and the governed possible to be false , had signify'd just thus much , as if the governours should say , you shall believe it , though we know it may be false ; or , you shall believe us telling you the apostles taught it , though both we and the authority we trusted for it may be deceiv'd , for any thing we know : and as if the persons governed should answer , we will believe you , though we know you may be in the wrong , and the point it self false ; which is in effect the same as if they should profess they are resolv'd to believe them , let it prove what it will , right or wrong , true or false . so strange a tyranny in the imposers or commanders , and slavery in the believers or obeyers , as is impossible in either to consist with humane nature , had not both of them ( the obeyers at least ) been verily perswaded those commanders had such motives to propose as should have been able to oblige assent ; without which all command of an interiour act of the soul is nonsence and folly. oh , but ( will a witty atheist say ) humane policy might have made the governours conceal the cheat , by which means the ignorant govern'd were frighted into a belief of any thing ! very likely , indeed , that amongst so many millions , and of those , many saints by our adversaries own confession , all should persist and be true conspirators in so unnatural a confederacy : or that , in so free an admission of all sorts of prudent people to any kind of knowledg , as is practic'd in christendom , insomuch that there are found many thousands of the governed equal in parts and learning to divers of the chief governours , and superiour to very many of them , all should so camely permit themselves and the world to be abus'd in a point no less important than their very manhood . 't is then above policy and force , and only atchievable by the natural strength of the motives , to oblige such multitudes , and so qualify'd , to christian faith : and these motives must have been impossible to be false ; none else being able to subdue the understandings of such a great portion of mankind to hold their proposals true , or justifie all the church-governours in all ages from a most unjust and most unnatural tyranny . divers principal objections answer'd . to mistake every passage voluntarily is so in fashion , and so continually pursu'd , as the best method to answer discourses which proceed by the way of principles , that , perhaps , it were not imprudent to forestall such blinds , and prevent such mis-representers from raising their light and aiery dust , by acting our selves , if we can , the part of an opponent after a solider manner than we are to expect from those prevaricating discoursers : besides , nothing more clears a point than to manifest that such objections which aim at the root of it , quite lose their force while levell'd against it . i recommended this foregoing discourse , when i had finisht it , to the perusal of divers of the most judicious and impartial friends i could pick out ; courting their severest candour to acquaint me with its defects . their most pertinent and most fundamental exceptions , i present the reader with ; which i have strengthen'd as well as i could , and added divers of mine own ; protesting , that , did i know my self , or knew where to learn of others , more forcible and efficacious ones , i should not have declin'd the proposing them ; nor have fear'd to oppose the invincibleness of the truth i here defend against the strongest assaults of the most ingenious , most rational , and most acute discoursers . objection i. the word truth is both in the postulata , and all over this treatise taken in too metaphysical a rigour : in which sense it may , perhaps , be deny'd that faith is true , or that the generality of christians do so esteem it . answer . i take that word in the plain natural , and proper sense , in which all mankind takes it , for what in reality and indeed is so ; which i affirm to be sufficient for my purpose , or to ground all those arguments which i bring thence to evince the impossibility of faith's falshood . but , i fear the objecter confounds the first operation of our understanding with the second , that is , our simple apprehension or meaning of the word truth or true with the propositions or judgments made concerning it . for , not only weak people judg many things true which stand under no certain grounds ; but even solid men , when the concern of the point is sleight , and no circumstance awakes them into a heedfulness , and , as it were , engages their honesty to speak rigorous truth ; oftentimes carelesly and unconcernedly admit things for truths which are far short of having grounds elevating them to an impossibility of falshood ; and , indeed , are far from being judg'd truths even by themselves while they seem to admit them for such ; nay more , though they sometimes use them as truths , when the weight is not much whether they be so or no ; as when in a rhetorical discourse , ( or even in a solid one for illustration sake ) we make use of the story of the phoenix , or such like ; or when in ordinary conversation we relate many passages abetted by no certain authority , but taken upon the account of rumour , perhaps invented by witty humour ; the truth of which it were in those circumstances imprudent and impertinent to discountenance , but to let them go with a kind of transeat , or a valeant quantum valere possunt ; yet , in both cases , what the solid man out of unconcernedness passes , and what the vulgar man out of weakness judges as a truth , both the one passes the other judges to be in reality and indeed so : whence both of them have the genuine simple apprehension or meaning of the word [ truth ] and the same all other men have , however the one misapplies it , the other permits it to be misapply'd in propositions . nor will any distinction of truths morally speaking , probably truths , &c. serve the turn ; for truth ( as was said ) speaks the conformity of the judging power to the thing ; that is , a real disposition of the mind : which therefore either is or is not , in the same manner as the wall is either white or not white ; not admitting for it's difference probably or not-probably , any more than being does : but , as it is impossible but the wall if it be not white , must necessarily be not-white , or have some other disposition in it which is not-whiteness ; so 't is impossible but the minde , if not conformable to the thing or true , must be un-conformable or not-true ; ( meaning not-true negatively , not privatively so as to signify false ) and , consequently in stead of that conformity , it must have some other disposition in it ; whatever that disposition be . objection ii. in some places of this foregoing treatise objective truth is confounded with that disposition of the understanding or conformity of it to the thing call'd formal truth or , truth in us . answer . the clearing this requires the making an exacter discovery into the nature of truth . to do which we will begin our explication with noting that our understanding hath two operations ( omitting the third , discourse as not pertinent to our present purpose ) viz. simple apprehension and iudgment . the result or effect of the first is call'd a notion ; concerning which philosophers discourse thus : that , when i apprehend what is meant by the word man , or have that notion in me , mans nature is both in the thing , and in my conception ; for 't is impossiole ( my conception being an imminent act ) i should conceive what is not in my conception , or that my act of conceiving should be intrinsecally determin'd to be this , but by what is intrinsecal or in it . what is meant then by the word [ man ] has two states : one in the thing as existent out of me ; the other in the thing as existent in me : as the self-same figure is in the seal and the wax . yet , neither of these different states enters into the notion i have of man , but meerly what is common to the thing , under either state , which is what answers to the definition ; for , both man , taken as in himself , is a rational creature ; and also what i conceive , or mean by the word [ man ] is rational creature ; though the words [ rational creature ] express neither the being in my minde nor out of it , but abstract from either . by this means my mind concieving man gains an unity of form with the thing out of it , or a conformity to it : which disposition wants nothing to be call'd truth , but that 't is incapable of grounding affirmation or negation ; the bare meaning of the word [ man ] neither implying [ is ] nor [ is not ] whence truth and falshood are usuall said to be incompetent to the first operation of our understanding , we will make way to the second operation of our understanding by another instance of the first . imagin then there is propos'd to my eye a round pillar ; which it affects , and by it my brain , and , so , my understanding ; it cannot fail to beget there a simple apprehension , and consequently a notion of what is directly imprinted ; which is , that thing with as many of its qualifications as were apt to be convey'd in by means of that sense , confusedly blended together ; as also ( by my experience that it affects or is affecting me ) of it's existence . moreover , as occasion , or indeed nature guides me , i may have distinct or abstracted notions of pillar , roundness and existence , nay more of pillar and roundness as exercising or actually having the same existence ; or , which is all one , of what is meant by this proposition , [ the pillar is round ] that is , of what corresponds to those three distinct notions , put now in a frame of a proposition , and , so immediately apt to express truth or falshood ; and yet not proceed to behave my self affirmingly or denyingly , or judg any thing concerning them , but meerly to conceive what is meant by those words . way being thus orderly made towards the second operation of the understanding by disposing the separate notions in a fitting posture by the first ; nature seems to require it should supervene ; and , so , the understanding sets it self to judg whether those extream or distant notions , exhibited by the first in the posture of connexion , be indeed connected or no ; the standard or measure of which is to be taken from the thing . now in self-evident propositions and first principles the understanding guides it self by that imbred or nature-taught principium intellectûs ; [ the same is the same with it's self ] in deduc't propositions ; by the same principle fundamentally , or originally , and immediately by this , [ those notions which are the same with a third , are the same with one another , ] but , in our present instance , experience alone suffices to inform the understanding , supposing the obvious knowledg of what pillar and roundness are , and that a pillar is a thing , whereas roundness without pillar is none , but onely an affection or determination of a thing ; both known by plain nature , whatever som schoolmen speculate . for , these put , meer experience teaches us that that thing which is call'd pillar , is the same thing which is call'd round , or , which is all one , that in this proposition , [ the pillar is round ] the two extream notions are indeed , ( that is , with a conformity to the thing ) identifi'd , or that that proposition is true. but to return home to our purpose : 't is clear that pillar and roundness existing by the same existence or in the same thing , are found in the thing after it's manner , and in my judgment ( or soul as apt to judg ) after it 's , that is judgingly : but truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of being ( as was discourst formerly in the parallel case of notions ) but purely and adequately consists in the unity or community of form which my judgment has with the thing ; by having which in her , the soul gains a conformity to it . in this common form consider'd as in the thing , consists it's metaphysical verity , or it 's being what it is ; and this verity , consider'd as apt to stamp or imprint it self on my iudging power , is call'd objective truth ; as receiv'd in me , and fashioning or conforming my said power to the thing as in it self , and so making my judgment true ; 't is call'd formal truth . this declar'd , i deny that i any where confound objective truth with formal , or what 's in the thing , with what 's in me as in me ; for , that were to identifie those two most vastly and most evidently different states : a supineness too gross for any attentive discourser to fall into i conceive then what the objecter would alledge is , that i confound those truths spoken of with truth to us , or quoad nos , as the schools speak . for , though what 's truth to us must needs be truth in it self , and in us , in regard we cannot know that to be which is not ; yet what 's truth in it self , or truth in us , is not therefore truth to us , in regard one may upon probable , nay improbable , or even false grounds , light upon a right judgment ; in which case his mind as judging , is conformable to the thing or true : yet , still , that thing is not true to him , in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such , or to make him see it to be true . truth then to us , is the same with our sight of it ; that is , with certainty or determination of our understanding by force of intellectual motives ; and , this indeed i often seem to confound with truth in the two former acceptions ; but i therefore seem to do it because i am loath to transcribe and apply so often my postulata , and suppose my judicious reader bears them in mind . which if he pleases to understand as subjoyn'd to those discourses , it will follow that what is so in the thing it self , or perhaps in us , if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly profest and held so , and consequently ( by my later postulatum ) necessary to be known to be so , all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it true to us , that is , certain . you will say , why is it not enough for god to provide that our acts of faith be indeed true in us , since , so , they would perfect our understandings by conforming them to the thing ; and guide us right ; but they must also be true to us , or be known to be true. i answer , for two reasons . one , because god's government of mankind would by this means be preternatural , obliging him to hold , profess , and dye for professing the truth of those points which he knows not to be such . the other reason is , because every act of faith as exercis'd would perpetually involve an errour , in case the motives to those assents were not conclusive of the truth of those points : for , however one may light by hap-hazard , or through weakness on a truth from an inclusive motive , yet , since 't is impossible a rational creature should assent but upon some motive , good or bad ; hence , every assent practically implies [ 't is true for this reason ] wherefore , if the reason grounding such assents be unapt to conclude the truth of the thing , that judgment necessarily involves a falshood or errour ; however it be , otherwise , conformable to the thing abstractedly consider'd . truths then being bastard , illegitimate and monstrous , both the intellectualness and supernaturalness of that virtue call'd faith , make it scorn to own such defective pr●ductions . objection iii. the meanings of words are indeed to be taken from the vulgar , but the truth of propositions is to be taken onely from the judgments of learned men : though then that be indeed the meaning of the word [ faith ] which the generality of christians mean by it , yet the truth of this proposition [ faith is possible to be false ] must be judg'd of by the sentiments of the most learned divines ; the generality ( at least the best ) of which , and catholicks amongst the rest , grant the grounds of faith as to our knowledg , and consequently faith it self , to be possible to be false . answer . that maxim is to be understood of those propositions which require some speculation to infer them ; in which case also even the unlearned are not bound to assent upon the authority of learned men , taken precisely as men of skill , because generally 't is practically-self-evident to them , that such speculative men differ oft times in their sentiments , and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right : yet , if they are to act in such affairs , they are bound in prudence to proceed upon the judgments of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest ; and then their proceedure is laudable , because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae , or that lies in the power . whence learned men who have ability to judg of the reasons those speculaters give , behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action , meerly upon their judgments without examining the reasons they alleadge , in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so . but now the maxim holds not all for those propositions in which 't is either self-evident , or evident to common and uncultivated reason that the predicate is to be connected with the subject : as 't is , for example , in this , [ man is a rational creature ] or this , which is palpably consequent from the former , [ man is capable of gaining knowledg ] for in such as these the natural sentiments of the vulgar are full as certain as those of speculaters ; perhaps certainer . and with the same evidence the predicate [ possible to be false ] must necessarily be seen to be connected with [ faith ] by all those who esteem themselves oblig'd by gods command to profess and dye for the truth of those points they believe . besides , they hold that faith makes them know god and his will , that their assent of faith is to be immoveable , or adher'd to all their lives ; that is , such as cannot be overthrown or shown false by any reasons brought against it ; both which equivalently imply impossibility of falshood . again , 't is deny'd that catholick divines , even as speculaters , hold faith possible to be false ; since they all , to a man , ( whatever they hold besides ) hold the catholick church infallible ; and that we ought to receive our faith from her living voice and practice : now the tenet of infallibility in the proposer necessarily draws after it the tenet of impossibility of falshood in what is propos'd , that is , in faith , but , because it may be said this is their sentiment as catholicks , not as schoolmen , let the angel of the schools speak for the schools themselves ; his expressions are common , and so reach all . scientia ( saith he , sum. theol. â e q. â a. ad m . ) cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem ; quia de ratione scientiae est , quòd id quod scitur ex ●stimetur impossibile esse aliter se habere ; de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum existimetur possibile aliter se habere : sed id quod fide ten●tur , propter fidei certitudinem , existimatur etiam impossibile aliter se habere . and again in the same question , ao . o. ad o. ea quae subsunt fidei dupliciter considerari possunt : uno modo in speciali , & sic non possunt esse simul visa & credita ; alio modo in generali , scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis ; et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit ; non enim crederet nisi videret ea esse credenda , vel propter evidentiam ▪ signorum , vel propter aliquid hujusmodi . it were easie for me to avail my self by these testimonies to confirm the main of my doctrine ; but , what method will permit me , and leads me to at present , is only this , to show that this great father of the church , and doctour of all schools , declares the common sentiment , drawn out of the conceit of faith's certainty , to be this , that 't is impossible that points of faith should be otherwise , or false ; and that we must , e're we believe , have evidence of the grounds of our belief , which amounts to the same . all then that can be objected from some of our divines is this , that they explicate their tenet so , as by consequence faith is left possible to be false ; but , what is this to the purpose ; since 't is one thing to hold a tenet , and another thing to make it out . in the former they all agree , in the later ( as is the genius of humane understandings where our heavenly teacher has not settled them ) they disagree with one another , sometimes with themselves . nor , can it bear any objection , nor breed scandal , that the ground of faith should be more particularly and distinctly explicated now than formerly ; for , since controversie is a skill , why should it be admir'd , nay , why should it not be expected that it should receive improvement , that is , better explain its proper object the rule of faith , than formerly ▪ since we experience a progress in all other arts and sciences which are frequent in use , as this has been of late dayes : objection iv. a great part of the first eviction , in case it proceed concerning truth in us , as it ought , supposes the vulgar skilful in logick , and to frame their thoughts and assents in the same manner as artificial discoursers do . answer . it supposes no skill or art in the vulgar or generality of christians , but onely declares artificially what naturally passes in rational souls when they assent upon evidence . and this it ought to do ; for the art of logick frames not it's rules or observations at randome , but takes them from the thing or it's object ( as all other skills do ) that is , from what is found in rational souls as rational , or apt to discourse : by observing the motions of which when it behaves it self rationally , the logicians set down rules how to demean our thoughts steadily and constantly according to right reason : so that the manner of working in artificial discoursers in this onely differs from that of natural ones , that the one acts directly the other reflectingly . for example , a vulgar soul when it assents interiourly a thing is , or affirms , has truly in it what a logician call's a proposition ; and that proposition has truly in it what corresponds to the notions of subject , copula , and predicate ; though he reflects not on it , as does a logician . in the same manner when he gathers the knowledg of some new thing , he has truly in that discourse of his what corresponds to major , minor and conclusion , nay he has practically in him what necessitates the consequence or that maxim [ the same is the same with it self ] of whose truth , it being a principle of our understanding , he cannot possibly be ignorant . though all this while he reflects not how or by virtue of what he acquires this knowledg . and hence light is afforded us to understand in common how the vulgar come to have practical self-evidence of divers truths : for , the maxims which even scientifical men have of the objects of several sciences , being taken from the things or the objects of those sciences ; and ( those maxims being common or general ones ) from the obvious or common knowledg of those things , which the vulgar who convers with them cannot chuse but have ; again , nature imbuing them with the knowledg of that principle on which the force of all consequences is grounded , as also with the knowledg of all those we call principia intellectûs , or principles of our understanding , hence their rational nature is led directly by a natural course to see evidently and assent to divers conclusions , without any reflexion or speculation ; which rude but unerring draught of knowledg is call'd by me in sure footing and elswhere practical self-evidence , because 't is a natural result of practice or ordinary converse with those things ; an instance would at once clear this , and , if rightly chosen , be serviceable to the readers of sure footing . an unlearned person that cannot read a word believes fully there was such a man as k. iames ; and that we may not mistake the question , we will put him to be one that has a handsom degree of conversation in the world . we finde him assent to the affirmative heartily ; but the point is how he is led into that assent , and whether rationally ? to ask him a reason why , is bootless ; for this puts him to behave himself like a reflecter on his own thoughts , which he is not : whence we shall find him , upon such a question , at a puzzle to give the particular reason ; though , as taught by experience , he will stand stiffly to it in common that he has a reason for it , and a good one too . to help him out then , the way is to suggest the true reason to him , for then he will easily acknowledg it , finding it experimentally in himself ; which done , deny the goodness of it , and you shall find , he will , as taught by nature stand to it , and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it . for example , tell him he believes there was a k. iames because those who pretended to live then have told us so ; but what if they were mistaken ? his answer would in likelihood be to this purpose ; what a god's name were they blind in those dayes , that they could not see who was king then ? which expresses naturally his conceit of their inerrableness in such a point , in case they had eyes , which nature taught him men generally have . insist farther ; perhaps they were not mistaken , but had a mind to cozen all england that came after them . nature will lead him to this or some such kind of reply ; to what purpose should they all make fools of every body ? which words , though rudely exprest , yet couch in themselves the full reason given in sure footing , as far as 't is built on nature . for , first , it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose , end or reason . next , his interrogatory way is in his rude style , equivalent to a negative , and so it signifies there could be no reason for it ; and , lastly , his standing to his former tenet implies virtually a conclusion from the reason given , that the thing could not be done ; which involves necessarily a knowledg of that first principle on which all force of consequence is grounded ; and also of that principle , no effect can be without a due cause ; both perfectly suppos'd and held by him , though not exprest in his rude enthymeme . from this discourse is collected what this practical self-evidence is ; and , that 't is distinguish'd from experience in this , that experience is onely found of what uses to make the minor in this virtual discourse , but practical self-evidence is of conclusions deduc't ( as it were ) from a common maxim naturally known , as the major ; and a minor ( for the most part ) experientially , or else practically known ; which , joyn'd with the self-evident principle in which the force of consequence consists , make up that virtual discourse . again , it differs from science , in that a man of science reflectingly sees a medium identifying the two extreames , and is aware of the virtue of those causes which beget evidence ; whereas the other is rather passive from natural impressions than active by any self-industry in these knowledges , and rather feels the force of those causes in his own adhesion , than sees it . secondly , 't is collected that this practical self-evidence is notwithstanding , true knowledge ; though , perhaps , it be the sleightest kind of it ; in which 't is differenc't from opinion built on probabilities . for , seeing such assenters have both by experience or by common conversation true knowledg of the natures of diverse things in common , which make the minor , as also by nature of all the principles of our understanding , which countervail the major , and force the consequence ; it comes to pass that this practical self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true knowledges both as to premises and consequence ; and cossequently 't is it self a true knowledg likewise . which consideration will help to explain my later postulatum , and shew by what means 't is possible all christians may know their faith to be true , or the same the apostles taught , by the churches testimonie , because they know the inerrableness and veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of fact which are practiceable daily . and lastly , 't is collected that what is practically self-evident to the unlearned , is demonstrable to the learned : in regard these are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this self-evidence bred that knowledg , which the other 's incultivated reason would give no account of . objection v. that first principle [ every thing while it is , is necessarily what it is ] seems to be often times misapply'd , particularly evict . . § . & . to truth at present ; whence the arguer would conclude that 't is impossible that a thing should be also at present false . which is true , if it be meant of objective truth ; but then it seems to miss the question . but , the consequence holds not , in case the discourse be of formal truth ; that is , of truth in us , or of truth to us , that is , of certainty ; for none pretends that his judgment can at the same time be conformable and disconformable to the thing , which speaks those inrintsecall dispositions , call'd truth and falshood in us ; or that himself can be cetrain or uncertain of it at once , which expresses truth and falshood to us ; this being put those motives which only he had at present in his understanding , able to prove the point true and false both or at once : whereas , what is pretended by the objecter is only this , that , though upon present motives he now judges it true and certain , yet , afterwards , upon other motives he may come to see it false . answer . i mean in those places truth to us , or certainty : but , the objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world , or as if true , false , certain and uncertain could be relative to one person only . first , then , my position is that , whoever puts a thing true to himself , yet possible to be false to another , puts no less a capacity of the thing 's being at once thus true and false though in several subjects , than as if it were in one subject onely . next , he supposes each of those different judgers to have possibly just grounds for so judging , since he puts in one motives sufficient to evince the truth of the thing , in the other , possible ones to conclude it's falsehood . for our question is not , to what degree weak souls can miscarry in assenting , but what degree of strength is found in the motives to faith ; which , the objecter , as a christian , that is , as a holder that points of faith are truths , must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it true ; and yet , as himself contends , leaves it still possible to be false ; that is , proveable by other grounds to be so ; for , else , the word false , cannot mean false to us , or in the subject , as is pretended ; that is , he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason , held by one true , by the other false . now 't is the impossibility of such opposite grounds i constantly maintain ; or that the grounds of faith are impossible to be false . thirdly , hence i go farther and urge , that , if those different motives can oblige justly one man to hold faith true , the other to hold it false , then , putting them in the same man , it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the contradiction : and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my third eviction . i know it will be readily answe'rd , that this will not follow ; because , the motives being disparate , the more probable one would , when in the same subject , over-power the other , and so hinder the opposite assent . but i desire it may be consider'd that intellectual motives or reasons have their power to bind the understanding to assent , not from their relation to other extrinsecall proofs corresponding or discorresponding with them , but from the truth of the premisses on which they intrinsecally depend , and the goodness of the consequence ; and , finally , by virtue of their being built on first or self-evident principles . if then the motives one man has at present be sufficient of their own nature to oblige him , acting according to right reason , to judg faith true ; who ever has humane reason ought to assent upon them : and , if faith be still possible to be false , that is , false to us ; that is , be possible to be shown false , or possible that others may have just ground to hold it so , put those grounds also in the same man , and , since they must be convictive of humane understanding , they ought to have their formal effect where they are ; that is , convince it of faith's falshood too ; which however absurd , yet 't is the genuine and necessary sequel of this source of absurdities , viz. that faith and its rule may possibly be false . how the force of this discourse is avoidable but by alledging that no man acting according to right reason has just grounds to hold his faith true to us , or can ever have just grounds to hold it false to us , ( which is to deny the possibility of faith's falshood to us , the opposers own position ) i profess my self utterly unable to discern . now , he that holds these positions is a perfect sceptick or a pyrrhonian as to matters of religion ; since he puts an absolute desperateness of knowing the truth on either side , in that matter or subject . objection vi. when 't is said that faith and its rule may be false , the arguer misunderstands it to mean that we assert it may actually and indeed be shown so , whereas 't is only meant by those words , that 't is possible to be false for any thing we know ; or , for any thing the grounds of faith as to our knowledg , evince or force to the contrary . answer . i know not what possibility to any thing means , if it be not a relation to its being actually and indeed : nor a possibility of being false to us , but a possibility of being actually and indeed such ; that is , of being actually shown so to us . and all this must be forcibly admitted by him who puts no proper or necessary causes in the thing , nor consequently conclusive motives in mens understandings why this faith now profest should necessarily be the same christ and his apostles taught . 't is indeed a different thing to say , it may be so , and to say , i do not know but it may be so . but , he who maintains that faith may possibly be false , if he be honest , knows what he maintains to be true ; otherwise , certainly he were very wicked who would thus disgrace or diminish faith , if he did not know his position to be a truth ; whence follows that such a man must not onely say , i know not but it may be false ; but he must , if he will speak out what he thinks , be oblig'd to say , i know it may be false ; however he be loath to declare categorically and sincerely his tenet in so odious a point , or hazard his credit with the generality of christians , whose sentiment he contradicts so expresly . objection vii . 't is enough that faith be as certain as that the sun will rise to morrow , that america will not be drown'd , as that there was a henry the eighth , &c. which are onely morally certain , and enough for humane action , since they exclude actual doubt , or leave no suspicion of doubt behind them ; which as mr. stilling fleet tells us , app. p. . is the highest actual certainty which the mind of any reasonable man can desire . in the same manner as it is certainty enough for me to use my house that i am morally certain it will not fall on my head , though i have no absolute security but it may . and this kind of certainty seems more suitable to mankind , being more easily penetrable by the generality than the other rigorous and over-straining certainty ; which seems more fit and proper for the higher sort of speculaters , than for a world of men , which comprehends capacities of all degrees and sorts , and the greatest part of them , perhaps , of little learning . answer . the objecter must prove that all those instances are only-morally-certain or possible to be false , e're he alleadge them for such : that of henry the eighth , which does indeed oblige the understanding to belief , i affirm to be practically self evident and demonstrable , and so impossible to be false . as for the rest , they are utterly unfit to parallel faith's certitude , being all of material things , whose very essence is to be mutable ; whereas points of faith , being truths , and in matters not subject to contingency , are essentially incapable of being otherwise than they are , that is , still truths : so that far easier is it that all material nature should undergo all the changes imaginable , than that any such truth can not be it self , or the principles on which 'c is built in us desist to be true or conclusive . in particular , i would ask● whether it be enough for faith to be as certain to us christians , as it was to those immediately before the flood , that the whole world should not be drown'd , which exceeds the case of america's possible destruction ; or , as it was to those after the flood , that the sun should never stand still or go back ; or , lastly , as it is that a house , of whose firmness none had actual doubt , should fall ? if so , then the standing of the sun in ioshuah's time , and it's retrogradation in ezekiah's , show the unparallelness of these instances . you 'l say these were both miraculous . but , this alters not the case ; first , because it was never heard , nor can it be held by any sober man , that even miracle can make such truths , falshoods ; or those motives , which are of their own nature able to conclude the truth of any such points , inconclusive or invalid . next , because , if the motives to faith , and so faith it self are possible to be false for any thing we know , 't is impossible to give a satisfactory answer to a deist , demanding how , in case they should prove indeed false , we can be assur'd gods goodness to mankind will not step in even miraculously to discover the vanity of so universal an illusion , and the abuse of falshoods so absurdly imposing upon the world , as to obtain the highest repute of sacred and divine truths . concerning the last instance of the moral certainty of a houses standing , which hath been objected to me by learned protestants , as sufficient to make me act as steadily and heartily as if i had a demonstration that it would not possibly fall , besides the general answer that points of faith are truths , which renders the case unparallel ; i reply , that the two houses , the one in holborn , the other in kings street , which of late years , & a third in cock lane , which of late days fell , when none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it , else surely they would never have staid in them , inform us sufficiently to what a changeable , tottering and ruinous condition christian faith would be reduc'd by these principles and parallels : no fewer than three houses fell in the compass of a short time , and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an event ; therefore , may an atheist say , down falls christian faith too , whose foundation was ( by this doctrin ) but parallel for strength to the other ; or , if it fall not in so long time , it has only something better luck , not better grounds than had the three houses . as for the objected unsuitableness of such a certainty as i require , 't is reply'd , that nothing is more natural for the generality of mankind , than to be led by authority ; nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the infallibleness and veracity of exceedingly vast and grave authorities relating matter of fact , as we experience in their beleef that there was a q. elizabeth and such like ; to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining , as the obiecter imagins . which being so , i make account that god both in his power and wisdom could , & in his goodness would render the authority of his church , the ground and pillar of truth , as evident to all her children , both as to its inerrableness and veracity as the other ; nay incomparably more , it being in every regard so requisit . objection vi. if the motives to faith must be impossible to be false to us , they would necessarily conclude the truth of faith ; wherefore they would , of themselves , oblige the understanding to assent , and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the will ; which yet both councils , fathers , and catholick divines with one consent require . nay , more , were not such a pious affection put , acts of faith would not be free. answer . if experience teaches us that even assent to humane sciences , though evident from intrinsecal reasons , comprehensible by our understanding , and purely speculative , is not to be acquir'd without an affection to see truth ; as is evident from the carriage of meer scepticks , who having entertain'd a conceit of it's hopelesness , come thence to want love or affection for it , and so never come to see it , how conclusive soever the reasons be . much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to divine and supernatural truths , which are obscure in themselves , as depending upon authority ; incomprehensible to our natural reason ; and practical , that is obligingly-efficacious to break out into christian action or love of heaven above all sublunary things , as true faith must be . the first obstacle of the three mention'd has this difficulty , that the beams of truth , which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our understanding more naturally , penetrate it more deeply , and to stick in it more immovably , than those which are reflected to us from the knowledg of another , such as are points of faith ; besides the new difficulty of seeing the veracity of the attester , which , how evident soever it be , yet it puts the understanding to double pains ; whereas , evidence had from the thing is but a single labour , and so less confounding and distracting the thought . the second obstacle , incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the understanding and retard assent ; nay even to deter it from considering them as truths ; the atheistical temper of the world ( which could not subsist were metaphysicks duly advanc'd ) sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter ; the reason whereof is , because it being natural that our fancy be in act while our understanding is so , and there being not proper phantasms , ( the onely agreeable ones to material men , who are not strong enough to guide their judgments purely by principles and connexions of terms ) which sute to such abstracted conceptions , but metaphorical ones onely , which the understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones , even while by necessity 't is forc't to make use of them ; hence the life of a christian , as such , being to serve god in spirit and truth , and , so , the objects and principles of his new life for the most part and principally spiritual ones , it comes to pass that for this very regard alone , there will need a great love of truth and spiritual goods to make the understanding appliable to them , or even admit a consideration of them . i was told by a worthy friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man , but a great hater of metaphysicks , and mentioning a spirit , he in a disgust broke out into these words [ let us talk of what we know . ] by which expression 't is manifest that he mistook the question an est , for quid est ; but what makes for my purpose is , that the unknowableness of the essence or nature of a spirit to us in this state , obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no ; & consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know spiritual things , to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being , much more to conceit it . but incomparably more needful is such an affection , when to the spirituality of those points there shall be added an incomprehensibleness , nay , if onely those points be consider'd , an incredibleness ; when no parallel can be found in nature , nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and it's possibility ; nay , when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural causes , whence all our other knowledges have their stability . then , i say , if ever there is requisit an affection for the nobleness and excellency of those high spiritual objects , to make us willing to hearken to any authority proposing them , how evident soever the motives be for the credibleness of that authority . the third obstacle follows , taken from the end for which faith is essentially ordain'd , that is , from what it essentially is , viz. a mover of the will to virtue and goodness , or a practical principle . now , nothing is more evident than this truth , that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting , or even attending candidly and calmly to these reasons , ( how clear soever they be ) which make against any beloved interest ; whence , there needs a contrary affection to these other , to remove the mists those passions had rais'd , and purge the eye of the mind , that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before , though in it self most visible . how much more , ( not only requisite but even ) necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrin of christian faith , containing principles which enjoyn a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to flesh and blood , nay even of livelihood and life it self . 't is most manifest then that a plous affection pre-requisit to faith , derogates nothing from it's certainty , but is perfectly consistent with the evidence of those motives which are to generate it ; and that the governours and officers of the church , though proposing the most convincing reasons in the world for the authority conveying down faith to us , can prevail nothing , unless the great governour of the world and giver of every good gift , by his peculiar power , plant antecedently in their hearts this good disposition , and prepare terram bonam , that their endeavours may take effect , and the sowers seed take root ; no more than paul , though miraculous , could convert all that saw his miracles or heard his preaching , but only such whose hearts god open'd as he did lydia's . it appears also by the same discourse how the acts of faith are free , that is , as depending on this pious disposition of the will , which sets the understanding on work to consider the motives , and so produce them . the whole humane action is free , because the will orders it ; though she do not produce it all , or though freedom be not formally in the body : so the act of faith is free , because it is order'd by the will which is free ; though no freedom be found in the understanding , which is incapable of such a qualification , but pure necessity of assenting when the motives are seen to be conclusive . no need then is there upon any account of a pious disposition of the will to peece out the defect of the reasons why we believe , and to oblige the understanding to assent beyond the motive ; that is , assent , to a degree , beyond what it had reason to do . an impossibility in humane nature rightly and connaturally govern'd , and ( i much fear ) no small disgrace to christian faith ; considering the obstinate bent of the church's adversaries to confound the speculative thoughts of divines , explaining faith and its grounds less carefully , with their sentiments issuing naturally from them as christians , nay with the doctrin of the catholick church it self . what can revincingly be reply'd to an atheist , objecting on this occasion that christians make the evidence of faith's grounds stand need to be pecc'd out by obscurity ; our knowledg of them by ignorance , and the rationality of them by will without reason , that is , willfulness . wherefore i carnestly obtest and beseech , even per viscera christi , all who shall read this treatise , and yet have speculatively held and maintain'd this opinion i here impugn , ( for practically , and as christians , they hold the contrary conclusion ) seriously to weigh the point once more , and not to obstruct the resolving christian faith into immoveable principles , or absolutely certain grounds , by an opinion onely sprung from the conceited difficulty in making out those grounds to be impossible to be false ; which yet themselves to a man profess and hold , as they are christians . i humbly beg leave to propose to them these few considerations : first , 't is certain faith is no less faith , or an assent upon authority , though that authority be demonstrated to be infallible : but on the contrary , that 't is both firmer and more rational even for that very regard . secondly , 't is certain that the generality of christians hold their faith to be true , or impossible to be false , ( that is , 't is true to us ) and withall perfectly rational , and consequently that its grounds or principles are so able to ascertain it that they place it beyond possibility of falshood . thirdly , 't is no less evident that , an inclination or motion of the will , being of such a nature that it can have neither truth nor falshood in it , can be no rational principle or ground of our assents or acts of faith ; that is , apt to ascertain them , or indeed apt to establish the truth of any tenet . fourthly , that 't is most evident from my foregoing discourse , that an antecedent pious disposition of the will is still requisite to faith , notwithstanding the perfect conclusiveness of the grounds on which 't is built ; and , that all acts of faith depend on this quoad exercitium at least , ( as the schools speak ) which in the judgment of many divines is sufficient . fifthly , that 't is the common opinion of the solidest divines , that faith consists with evidence in the attester . sixthly , that faith or a firm and immoveable assent upon authority , is not thoroughly rational , and by consequence partly faulty , if the motives be not alone able to convince an understanding rightly dispos'd , without the will 's assistance ; for , what can be said for that degree of assent which is beyond the motive or reason ? is it not evident from the very terms that 't is irrational or without any reason ? but , the worst is , that , whereas all good christians hold their faith impossible to be false , or judge their acts of faith immoveable assents , these authors as speculaters put all the reasons for faith to leave it still possible to be false , and make this pious affection the onely thing which elevates it to impossibility of falshood , which is vastly higher in point of certainty ; as if a rational creature , not deviating totally from its nature , but acting according to right reason , ought therefore to hold a point impossible to be false , because it self has an affection , or ( as we say ) a great mind it should be so . seventhly , this assertion renders the impossibility of faith's falshood , not only unmaintainable , ( as hath been now shown ) but also unperswadable to others ; for , how shall i be able to give account to others that my affection which works this perswasion in me is rational , and not apt to mislead me , when as the very position obliges me to profess the contrary , and to grant that this affection pushes forward my understanding to assent beyond the reason it has , that is , as to this degree in my assent , ( which is no small one since it raises it from judging faith possible to be false , to judge it impossible to be such ) without reason ? or , will not this speculative tenet seem to force this inference , that the grounds of faith , as to its most intrinsecal consideration , viz. the impossibility of its falshood , is made by this doctrin full as dark a hole as 't is to alledge the private spirit ? nor can the reverence due to the divine authority suffice for such an effect ; both , because 't is impossible god should will that mankind for his sake should act irrationally ; as also , because there is no poison in the world so pestilent as an errour abetted by the most sacred patronage of god's authority , as the histories of the fanaticks in all ages , and our home-bred experience testifies . whence , that very reverence to the divine authority obliges us to be so sure 't is engag'd for a truth e're we admit it for such , that we may securely though with an humble truth say with richardus de sancto victore , domine , si error est quod credimus , à te decepti sumus ; so that there is indeed no greater injury and abuse to the divine name imaginable , than to hazard the making it patronize falshoods : against this deceit our saviour hath fore-arm'd us , by his fore-warning us with a nolite credere , when any one pretends , loe here is christ , or there is christ. lastly , 't is visible to any indifferent understanding , that those divines who defend this influence of the pious affection upon the settling of faith's certainty , though in other points very rational and acute , yet when they come to this , they are at an utter loss , and can make nothing cohere . philippus de sancta trinitate contradicts himself twice or thrice in one leaf while he attempts to defend it . but , i instance in one for all , that is , father vincentius baronius , a doctour of tholouse , and of the holy order of s. dominick ; a person of as much eminency , gravity and learning as any of late dayes . this great writer in his manuductio ad moralem theologiam , p. , . falls upon caramuel in these words , distinguit caramuel duplicem honestatis certitudinem seu veritatem ; formalem unam vocat , alteram objectivam ; istam negat cuilibet opinioni probabili , ill am concedit , &c. — sed hoc nobis ignorantiae prodiglum est aut temeritatis , dari veritatem aut falsitatem , certitudinemque cui nulla objectiva correspondeat ; hoc ne deo quidem concessum est , ut scientiam habeat rei non scibilis , i. e. veritatem formalem rei quae objectivâ careat . yet the same authour , p. is forc't , by the defence of this ill grounded tenet which he had espous'd , into the same paralogysm which he had so gravely , severely and learnedly reprehended in another . where putting the objection very home , he asks , si praevium illud ad fidem iudicium sit intra probabilitatis fines , quâ ratione poterit mens assurgere in assensum illo seu opinione firmiorem ? ergo fidei certitudo nutlat si ab illo iudicio , quod prudenter probabile dixi , pendeat , nec aliunde repetatur : this done acknowledging that tota controversia & fidei summa is contain'd ( as indeed it is ) in this argument , he addresses himself to answer it . first sleightly by an example , that this precedent judgment is to faith as accidental alteration to the substantial form , and so being onely a disposition to it may be less noble or certain than faith is it self ; whereas , if our assent of faith ought to be thoroughly rational , this previous judgment being that on which this assent is built , as to us or as to our knowledg , must at least be firm and immovable it self , since the assent of faith built on it ought to be such , and consequently beyond probability ; whence the example is most unsuitable ; signifying that as nature disposes matter by imperfect degrees towards a perfect and ultimate effect , so infirm principles may rationally beget a firm assent . after this , he alledges that the certainty of faith is to be fetch 't from god the authour of it , who infuses light and gives most efficacious strength to beleeve . but the question is whether god ordinarily and abstracting from miracle infuses light into rational creatures , but by means of motives or reasons ; and whether it requires such strength , or rather be not an unwise credulousness , that is a great weakness , to beleeve beyond what we have reason to do , and so unworthy god the giver of every good and perfect gift . lastly , he affirms that the certainty of faith is to be fetch 't from the pious affection of the will , qui mentem rebus credendis indubitato & immoto assensu alligat quasi nodo indissolubili ; which , as it were by an indissoluble knot , ties the mind to the things to be believ'd with an undoubted and unmov'd assent . but , the question is how this knot is indissoluble , in case the probable reason prove false , unless the soul be wilfully blind ; or why a resolvedness in the will can rationally establish a true intellectual certainty . what i chiefly conclude from these answers of his is , that he perpetually waves certainty had from the object , and so unavoidably is forc't to put a formal certainty in as , to which no objective certainty corresponds ; which his excellent wit in another circumstance saw to be prodigiously faulty , and a certainty ( that is a perfection ) not competent even to god himself . so impossible 't is that errours prejudicing the rule of faith should not either by opposition to first principles be discover'd to be falshoods , or , by self-contradictions in their maintainers , confess it themselves . objection vii . 't is manifest that diverse weak people assent upon very inconclusive , nay silly , or less than probable motives ; whom yet no sober man will deny have saving faith ; the true nature of faith then requires not necessarily motives impossible to be false , or that faith be true to us , but may be without any such qualification . answer . when we say faith is impossible to be false , we take the word [ faith ] in its proper and primary signification ; now , that being the proper signification of a word that is most usual , and that most usual which is found in the generality of the users of it , the proper signification ( that is the true nature ) of faith is that which is found in the generality of christians ; which being evidently an assent to be adher'd to all one's life , to be dy'd in , and dy'd for , and the object , or form of that assent being truths ; and , so , it self true ; 't is most manifestly , in each of those regards , imply'd that it must be impossible to be false to us , or to the generality of christians ; that is , it must have grounds able to show it , nay actually showing it so to them , whatever contingency may happen in a few particulars for want of applying to them the right rule of faith. besides , faith must be a knowledg of divine things , a virtuous act , and , so , rat●onal ; and a most efficacious cause of working for heaven : also , its grounds must be apt to establish the most speculative faithful , to convert or confound the most acute witts denying or opposing it , &c. all which and much more is prov'd in the first discourse of sure footing by arguments as yet not attempted to be invalidated by any ; however something hath been offer'd against those conclusions : which attributes it cannot possibly justify , nor yet perform those offices , without being true to us , or having grounds impossible to be false . the word [ faith ] then , apply'd to those weak persons now spoken of , signifies not the same as when 't is found in the generality of assenters ; but , meerly , a simple credulity of any thing told them by a person that looks seriously when he speaks it , and is conceited by the beleever to be wiser , or to have heard more than himself . which kind of assent , if it be seconded by favourable circumstances laid by god's providence , especially by such means as are found in the discipline of the church , so as it begets a love of heaven above all things , may suffice to save those weak and well meaning catholicks . but , how incompetent an assent no better grounded were for the establishment or propagation of christianity ; that is , how insufficient for the body of the faithful or the church ; how unfit for the ends , and unable to produce the effects true faith ( or the faith found in the generality of the faithful ) ought to do , needs no declaration to manifest it ; since no person of ordinary capacity can without difficulty refrain from smiling at the ridiculous levity of such kind of assenters . inferences from the foregoing discourses concluding all controversy . . it rests , then , evinc'd and demonstratively concluded , with as great firmness , as first principles made use of for premisses , and immediate consequences from those principles can establish it , that , that most firm or unchangeable assent call'd christian faith , laying an obligation on its prof●ssors to assert it with the greatest seriousness , constancy and pledges imaginable , to be true , and its object , points of faith , to be truths , is not ▪ possible to be false to us , that is , to be an erroneous iudgment , or a mistake of our understanding , . 't is with the same certainty concluded , that the ground of faith as to our knowledge , and , so , the rule of faith , must be likewise impossible to be false . for , since nothing can or ought in true reason be stronger than the ground it stands on , if this be not impossible to be false , it can be no rule of faith ; because it would weaken faith it self , which is built on it , into a possibility of falshood , inconsistent with its nature . . it follows with the same clearness , that , if the rule of faith , or the immediate means to convey the knowledg of christ's doctrin to us , be any living authority , that authority must be infallible , as to that effect . for , if fallible , faith which is built on it would still be possible to be false . as , likewise , that , if it be any book , both the letter of that book must be known to be imposs●ble to have been corrupted , as to what concerns faith built on it ; and withall , the sense known to be impossible to be ●istaken . for , in case either of these ( all the causes being put to preserve them such as we have said ) be truly judg'd or found to be possible , faith , which is to depend on them , will still be left possible to be false . . it follows immediately , that those pretended faithfull , who have not grounds of faith thus qualify'd , have no true faith ; that is , no act of belief , but what , notwithstanding all that they know , or can know of it , may possibly be false : nor , consequently , are they to be accounted truly faithfull , as not having true faith ( that is , in our case , an assent built either on infallible living authority , or on unmistakeable letter and sense of a book , § . ) but opinion onely . . it follows with like evidence , that , a controvertist being one who is to assert faith , not by looking into the mysteries of faith and explaining them , ( this being the office of a school-divine ) but into the motives to it or rule of faith , if he goes not about to bring proofs which he judges and is ready to maintain , nay , which are of their own nature apt to shew faith and its rule impossible to be false , he does not the duty he ows to faith , nor behaves himself like a controvertist ; but he betrays faith by his ineffectual and probable managery of it , making it seem a sleight opinion or lightly grounded credulity . especially , if he professes that all proofs which can be produc'd in this matter , are possible to be false : for , then , 't is a plain and open confession all his endeavours are to no purpose ; because he is to shew faith , the subject of his discourse , to be what in reality it is ; that is , impossible to be false . nay , since faith must be thus certain , he manifestly destroys faith , when he should defend and establish it , by professing all its proofs or grounds possible to be false . . it follows immediately , that unless some other medium can be found , or way taken , in that skill or science call'd controversie , which is able to show faith impossible to be false , than what is laid down in sure-footing , which partly by our adversaries confession of the inability of theirs to reach infallible certainty , partly out of the nature of the thing ( as is seen sure-footing , corol. and . ) is evidently impossible ; nor was it ever yet attempted by any other means , except by looking into the nature of tradition : it follows , i say , that as it is certain that faith and its grounds are impossible to be false , that is , false to us , or may be shown thus impossible to be false : so 't is by consequence certain , likewise , that the main doctrin there deliver'd will stand , whatever particular miscarriages may have happen'd in the managing it ; which are to be judg'd of by the strength of my reasons there given , and the force of my adversaries objections . . 't is necessarily consequent from the foregoing paragraphs , that , if i have discours'd right in this small treatise of mine , and have prov'd that faith , and , consequently its grounds , must be impossible to be false ; then mr. tillotson's confession p. . ( to which m. stillingfleet's doctrin is consonant ) that [ it is possible to be otherwise ( that is , to be false ) that any book is so antient as it pretends to be , or that it was written by him whose name it bears , or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it ] is a clear conviction that neither is the book-rule he maintains the true rule of faith , ( § . ) nor have he and his friends true faith , ( § . ) and , consequently , there being no other rule owned ( taking away private spirit ) but tradition , that tradition is the onely-true-rule of faith , ( § . ) and , so , the main of sure-footing stands yet firm ; and , lastly , 't is evinc'd , that his own book which opposes it , opposes the onety-true , ( because the onely-impossible-to-be-false ) ground of faith : that is , he is convinc't in that supposition , to go about to undermine all christian faith : whence the title of his probable-natur'd book is manifested to be an improper * nick-name , and the book it self to merit no reply . . this last point is hence farther confirm'd because mr t. ( and mr. st. ) can claim no admittance into a dispute whether this or the other be the true rule of faith , till they approve themselves to be christians and show they hold there is such a thing as faith , or that it can bear the having any rule at all ; since an assent to a point seen and acknowledg'd possible to to be false , can never rise to be more than an opinion ; nor can the motive of assenting to what may possibly be false , in true speech be call'd the rule of faith ; both , because there is in that case no faith , ( infer . . ) and , so , it cannot be a rule to what is not ; as also , because what we see possible to be false , cannot with any propriety be cal'd a rule to the understanding directing it to truth , in regard , for any thing it sees , 't is a crooked path and a false light leading it into errour . what therefore they are to do , in the circumstances they have brought themselves into , is , to show that they destroy not the truth of faith , that is , the nature of faith it self , and the nature of the way to that truth or the rule of faith , by putting them both possible to be false . i saw they did ; and therefore was oblig'd to begin my discourse higher , and to settle the existence of faith by removing the possib●l●ty of it's falshood ; that , so , it might be shown able to bear the having a rule ; which , while it was in the tottering and uncertain condition to which mr. t. and mr. st. had reduc't it , that is , in a possibility of being all a ly , and indeed is an actuality of being as to us not-truth , but at most a great likelihood , it was utterly incapable of . since therefore in the right method of discoursing an est ought to antecede quid ests they have lost their right to be discours't with about the quid est of the rule of faith , or what is that rule , till they can justify themselves not to have destroy'd the very an est or existence of rule and faith both , with which mr. t. is now challeng'd from his own words , and mr. st. from his abetting him and espousing his patronage . both nature , therefore , and art excuse me from replying to mr t. and mr. st. where the just laws of severe and rigorous reason exactly obseru'd ; and , so , 't is onely a voluntary courtesy not an obligatory duty to afford them or any other writers thus principled any answer at all , or to admit them to a dispute about this point , what is the rule of faith. lastly , hence is inferr'd that a conclusive method or short way of ending all controversies between the catho lik church and all her relinquishers , is settled by this doctrin . for , if right faith must be impossible to be false to us , or to the generality of christians , that is , if the motives to embrace christianity , must be thus firm ; then 't is evident that that party whose writers renounce the having any such motives , in case those writers speak the sense of that party , is not rightly christian or truly faithfull , * but a distinct sect from the body of right christians : or , it being most unjust that the discourses of private speculaters should be pinn'd upon the whole party , if they write things deniable by that party ; in case any such party should think fit to disclaim such writers as private discoursers and their tenet of christian faith's not being absolutely certain , which they are at liberty to do , and set some other writers to maintain the opposit thesis , it will quickly be seen whether they are able to bring infallible grounds of faith , i mean any authority conveying christ's faith down to us infallibly ( which they must bring * if they will prove faith impossible to be false ) distinct from what the catholik church holds to , and which themselves renounc't when they forsook her communion . but that there are , any such grounds as these , that is grounds inerrably bringing down the knowledg of christs faith to us , that is a , rule of faith impossible to be false to us , i could never yet discern by the carriage , writings or discourse of any party that dissented from the catholick church , to be their tenet : if , then , it be a most certain truth , that faith must be impossible to be false , as , i hope , i have abundantly concluded ; 't is , also , most certain , that those who deny they have such a faith , do , by that very denyal , confess they have no true faith , nor are truly faithfull , nor of the true catholick church . postscript . thus , reader , thou seest i still endeavour candidly to put controversy home as far as my discourse can carry it ; and that i have resum'd here all the scatter'd ends of voluminous disputes into one point . by which means the sincere protestant , and all others out of the church , may see at a short view what they are to do . if they look into their own breasts , as they are professors of christianity , they will find it writ there in capitals , that christian faith cannot be an illusion ' or falshood ; also , that faith is to be held by them true , and that they ought to suffer all persecutions and death it self for the professing it to be such : this found , and duly reflected on , the next thing to be done is , that they press their learned men , by whom they are led , to shew them by such grounds as their separation from the catholick church permits them to hold , that is , by their grounds , that christian faith is impossible to be false ; if they can ; ( as hitherto they have told us they cannot ) then their adherents may in reason hope well of their own condition till they see those attempts evidently shown invalid . but , if they profess still they cannot ; and that faith needs no such certainty ; then , not onely the natural dictamen of christianity in their own breasts ought to make them distrust the principles of their party , found to be so destructive to christian faith , but also i shall hope there are some proofs in this foregoing treatise which they will judg require an answer . i expect my answerer will sow together many thin rhetorical fig-leaves to cover the deformity of that abominable thesis , that faith may be false ; which to propose undisguiz'd were too openly shameful : but , i hope thou wilt be able to discern their sense through their rhetorick , and heedfully to mark with a stedfast eye , that , in how quaint and elegant phrases soever they cloak their tenet , yet the genuin , downright and natural sense of the position they go about to defend , will still be this , [ the mysteries of christian faith may all be so many lies , for any thing any man living absolutely knows , and the whole body of christian doctrine a bundle of falshoods . i expect also many plausible instances and pretended parallels of the sufficiencie of inferiour degrees of certitude for such and such particular ends . but , what thou art to consider , is , whether those ends be parallel or equal to that highest end and concern of christian faith. these things i expect ; but i expect not that so much as one principle , that will be found to deserve that name , will ever be thought prudent to be produc't to justify a tenet every way so irrational , and unprincipled ; or rather destroying the certainty , and consequently the essence and nature , of the best body of principles that either nature , or the author of nature and grace himself ever instill'd into mankind . lastly , i beseech thee to obtain for me if thou canst , that , if any think fit to reply to this treatise , they would be perswaded to set aside all witty prevarication and elegant drollery , ( the two chief , and in a manner onely , sticklers in the pretended answer to sure-footing ) and , beginning with first principles , to draw thence immediate consequences , as i have constantly endeavour'd in this discourse . by their attempting or neglecting to do this , and onely by that test , it will be seen whether my evictions stand or fall ; whereas from flashy wit so little is gain'd , that even what 's solid suffers disgrace by such a managery . and , i here very penitently beg pardon of my readers that i have sometimes heretofore spent my precious time and less-fruitful labour which might have been better employd , in pursuing that way of folly. for such my more deliberate thoughts now discover it , however the reputed profoundness , but , indeed , real shallowness of my adversaries , made it at that season seem most convenient . finis . corrections of the press . page . line . built upon . p. . l. . the ten et . p. . l. . acts. as p. . l . not be , is . p. . l. is deniable p. . l . objects on : p. . l. ult . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . 't is neither affirmation nor . l. usually . p. . l. . such truths . p. . l. . their power . l. . at all . p. . l. . of the schools . p. . l. . find . p. . l. . being to . l. . both at . p. . objection viii . p. . l. . parologysm . l : : nut at . p. l. . objection ix . l. . to have . p. . l. . onely-true . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e postulata . the thesis demonstrated from the nature of evidence . from the nature of the subject in faith-propositions . from the nature of the copula from the nature of the predicat● in most of those propositions , from the nature of distinction , as apply'd to the predicate . from the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of faith-propositions . from the nature of truth , consisting in an indivisible . from the nature of connexion from the nature of opinion . notes for div a -e the origin and natures of suspence and assent . the point evinc't from the natures of suspence and assent from the nature of holding . from the nature of knowing . from the nature of certainty , in many regards . from the impossibility that what may be false can have any principles . from the identity of certainty with infallibility . from the contrary opinion's unavoidably subjecting faith to chance and contingency . from the incompossibility of truth with falsehood . from the nature of disputation , and the impossibility otherwise to evince the truth of faith . notes for div a -e the main thesis demonstrated from the want of potentiality in the subject . from the , otherwise , necessity of putting a consistency of truth with falshood . from the , otherwise , necessity of putting contradictories to be true . from the , otherwise , necessity of putting it possible the minde should be at once conformable and disconformable to the thing . from the impossibility of different respects here so to avoid a contradiction . from the nature of the soul. from the necessity of putting the soul at once determin'd and indetermin'd in order to the same point . from the formal natures of t●uth and falshood . from the notion of metaphysical unity from the notion of metaphysical verity . from the notion of metaphysical bonity or goodness . notes for div a -e from the contrary thesis being destructive to the fi●st principle in all metaphysicks . from the impossibility of a sufficient motive to judg a thing true , with a motive to judg it possible to be false . from the nature of the first cause , or the deity . notes for div a -e from the nature of the proper agent in instructing mankind . from the nature of the persons instructed . from faith's being a virtue . from faith's being an intellectu . al virtue . from faith's being a supernatural virtue . from the firmness supernatural faith ought to h●v●●bove natural . another proof from the same head . from the requisiteness ▪ that christian action should proceed from the acters in the perfectest manner . that otherwise christian religion would be more defective in point of principles than any other art or science . notes for div a -e from faith's being the knowledg of our last end , and of the way to it . from the certainty the heathens had of the principles of their imperfect morality . from mans last end being only attainable by intellectual means . from virtue 's being the connatural effect of truth , and vice of falsehood . from the otherwise inability of fai●h , to resist & overcome temptations . from the , otherwise , uncertainty of the existence of spiritual goods , or the attainableness of them in the next life . from the , otherwise , preternaturali●y in producing a due love of heaven from the incredibleness of the mysteries nor superable by any motive possible to be false . from the otherwise greater plausibility of objections against faith. notes for div a -e from faith's being a knowledg of god , & of his will from faith's being plac'd beyond contingencie . from the manner in which christians express themselves when they profess their faith from this , that otherwise it were lawful to lay a wager christian faith is a ly. from the carriage of the martyrs , if suppos'd honest & prudent . from the blasphemousnes of the equivalencies to this proposition faith is possible to be false . from the practice of learnedst christians in captivating their understandings to faith. from the duty incumbent on the maintainers of the impugn'd tenet to remain seekers all their lives . from the inefficaciousness it brings to christian preaching and exhortation . from the churches constant practice of obliging to belief . notes for div a -e * rule of faith. * infer . * infer . . schism dis-arm'd of the defensive weapons, lent it by doctor hammond, and the bishop of derry by s.w. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) schism dis-arm'd of the defensive weapons, lent it by doctor hammond, and the bishop of derry by s.w. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. by m. blageart, at paris : . "errata": p. [ ] at end. this work is in answer to henry hammond's "of schisme", , and john bramhall's " a just vindication of the church of england from the unjust aspersion of criminal schism", . reproduction of original in duke university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng hammond, henry, - . -- of schisme. bramhall, john, - . -- just vindication of the church of england from the unjust aspersion of criminal schisme. schism. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion schism dis-arm'd of the defensive weapons , lent it by doctor hammond , and the bishop of derry . by s. w. prov. . . qui justificat impium , & qui condemnat justum abominabilis est uterque apud deum . at paris : by m. blageart . . to the reader . before you can have past three chapters , i know you will be objecting , that the blows i give are too rude for so civil an adversary , and therefore i have plac'd these few lines to meet you in the very entry , and stop you , till you have answered this question . how would you take it , if one should spit in your face , and justifie the affront , because his breath is sweet ? or , what would you say to him , that ruines your estate by perjury , and defends himself , that he held up his hands and eyes to heaven , and swore demurely ? whatever answer you give , i am confident it will perfectly clear my behavior towards the doctor ; with whom i should have very little contention , were the difference between us in any thing of less concernment then eternity . let him , if he please , maintain , with all his rhetorick , that king richard was a strait and handsom person ; let him employ as much wit ▪ as he thinks he has , to prove perkin warbeck no counterfeit ; for my part , i shall be so far from finding fault with him , that i shall not so much , as seek any : but if he will abusively treat matters of so high importance as religion , and think to escape , because his perverse meaning goes disguis'd , under the mask of a courteous stile . i conceive my self sufficiently warranted , if sometimes in pulling off his vizard , i twitch him by the beard ; especially since falshood is so much the worse , the better it is exprest , every one being apt to believe there is surely some reason , where there appears no passion . s. w. the table of the contents of the several sections . the introduction . the first part. containing an answer to the four first chapters . sect. . notes upon dr. hammonds first chapter , of the danger and sin of schism p. sect. . concerning his notion of schism , and the excommunication of the church sect. . of his plea of a weak conscience , not suffering him to subscribe to the churches doctrine , against his present perswasion sect. . concerning the ground of unity , groundlesness of schism ; and of his manner of arguing to clear himself of the later sect. . contains some observations upon his third chapter , of the division of schism sect. . of the doctors advance towards the question , in the beginning of his fourth chapter sect. . of his first evidence against st. peters universal pastorship sect. . the examination of his second evidence , that the apostles had distinct provinces , so to prejudice st. peters universal pastorship sect. . some consequences out of the doctors former grounds , and his further process in evidencing sect. . the examination of ten dumb testimonies , which dr. hammond brings to plead for him sect. . the examination of his irrefragable evidence , and other silent testimonies produced by him sect. . another dumb show of the doctors testimonies , to prove st. peter over the iews onely sect. . his second general evidence against st. peters supremacy , from the donation of the keys , found to be obscurer then the former the second part. comprehending the answers of the fifth , sixth , and seventh chapters . sect. . of the pretended primogeniture of antioch , and the doctors mistake of the council of chalcedon sect. . his arguments from the canon of ephesus , and the instances relating to justiniana prima refuted sect. . a discovery of the doctors fundamental error , which runs through this chapter , and his ingratitude for our countreys conversion sect. . his continuance of the same fundamental error , and some mistaking proofs , that kings can erect patriarchates . sect. . the doctors testimonies from councils and histories , found to be partly against himself , partly frivolous , and to no purpose sect. . the examination of his testimonies produced to prove his fundamental position , that kings are supreme in spiritual matters sect. . other empty proofs of his pretended right , confuted sect. . a reply to the doctors narrative ▪ confession of his schism sect. . the nature of schism , fetched from its first grounds ; and the material part of it fastned on the protestants sect. . that the reforming protestants were , and are guilty of the formal part of schism sect. . the doctors argument , that the popes power in england was derived under the kings concession , refuted the third part. containing the answers to the four last chapters of dr. hammonds schism . sect. . his second sort of schism , and his pretence , that they retain the way to preserve unity in faith , refuted sect. . his evasion in recurring to the first three hundred years , and concerning the humble and docible temper of his church sect. . an examination of some common notes , produced by the doctor , to particularize his clients , to be no schismaticks sect. . of his charitableness in admitting all to his communion , and our pretended uncharitableness , for refusing to go to their assemblies sect. . our pretended uncharitableness in judging , and despising others , retorted upon the objectors sect. . our objection , that the pretended church of england is now invisible , maintain'd and asserted to be just down-derry , or dr. bramhals , iust vindication of the church of england , refuted the stationer to the reader . though the entertainment , to which the author invites thee , be almost wholly new , and the food substantial and solid ; yet the stomach of the times , seeming quite cloid with controversie , obliged both him to quicken thy rellish with a little piquant sauce , and me to tempt thy coy appetite with this short and drolish bill of fare . how the doctor of divinity ▪ has forgot his accidence pag. dr. hammond turn'd a zealous advocate for bastwick , burton , and prynn's ears how the doctor has found iudas a diocess among the devils ; wherein he would have st. matthias succeed him how the doctor has got all the apostles leave to play , except st. peter and st. paul ; and , consequently , established the pp . their successor , universal pastor how the doctor makes account , there is no communion but in eating and drinking the doctors miraculous gift , in making dumb witnesses speak as he pleases , , &c. a general rendevouz of the doctors auxilliaries the doctor brings his evidences , at length , to a fair market , by the unlucky introduction of one blabbing testimony p. the doctor falls into a sudden fit of popery , too violent for the constitution of many strong papists well done doctor how dr h : would have all the apostles called peter the doctor winks and fights the properer man the worse luck a comfortable sample of the doctors annotations , in folio , on the bible how doctor h : will have the allowance of a house to dwell in , and meat to eat , the erection of a primacy the doctor constant to his principles , putting the strongest argument in the rear the doctor cryes , he is out of his way , when he comes to a passage he cannot get over how doctor hammond blows and sups all at once the doctor as valiant as sir iohn falstaff doctor hammonds two sorts of gifts , given and not-given how the doctors ill-favored , &c. dashes out the best dr. h. like the fellow that thought the sun set at the next town the doctors confusion , for methods sake dr. h. neither goes to church , nor stays at home , &c. the doctors courteous point of faith , obliging all the apostles , under pain of damnation , to make a leg to st. peter the doctors wise appointment of time and place for his duel , in a wilderness and a da●k night a magnanimous piece of docible humility , in dr. h. and his church how the world must needs look upon dr. hammond , as another st. iohn baptist the doctors logick , proving protestants no schismaticks , because they have all noses on their faces how dr ▪ hammonds church keeps open house for all comers the doctor never meddles with any point , but he blunders , and destroys all the reason that ever concerns it the doctors goliahs sword has no more edg then a beetle dr. hammonds artificial , incomparable nonsence , &c. and for digestion , a solid postpast , under the slight name of down-derry . the introduction . it bred in me at first some admiration , why the protestant party , who heretofore seem'd still more willing to skirmish in particular controversies , then bid battle to the main body of the church , or any thing which concern'd her authority , should now print books by pairs , in defence of their disunion from her , and subducing themselves from her government . especially , at this time , when it were more seasonable for the church of england , ( as they entitle themselves ) to denounce to those many minute sects gone out of their communion , the unreasonableness of their schism , then plead the reasonableness of their own ; and to threaten them with the spiritual rod of excommunication , unless they return , then cry so loud not guilty , after the lash has been so long upon their shoulders . but the reason of the latter , ( i mean why their pens rather decline to endeavor the reducing their own desertors ) i conceive , is , because no colourable pretence can possibly be alleaged by the protestants , why they left us , but the very same will hold as firm , nay , much more for the other . sects , why they left them . for , that we pressed them to believe false fundamentals dr. hammond , and his friends will not say , since they acknowledge ours a true church , which is inconsistent with such a lapse : they were therefore , in their opinion , things tolerable which were urged upon them ; and , if not in the same rank , yet more deserving the church should command their observance , then copes or surplisses , or the book of common-prayer ; the allowance whereof they prest upon their quondam-brethren . the reason of the former , that is , their earnestness at this time to clear themselves from the imputation of schism , i conjecture to be the self-consciousness of feeling at length the smart of their own folly , in the present dissipation of their church , proceeding from their leaving that body , in which alone is found the healthful vigor of peace-maintaining discipline , the want of which causes all their distractions . yet , not willing to acknowledge an inveterate error , they seek to cover the deformity of their breach , with the veil of innocency ; that that which evidently causes their misfortune , may at least seem not to have been their fault . and indeed , this is the last game they have to play ; for after their coy conceit of an invisible church was unmasked , and found plainly to be nothing but a blinde chimera , and less then a conventicle : after that , by consequence , a visible church was found necessary to perpetuate a line of successive governors ; without obedience to which , they saw by dear experience all order would be level'd into anarchy : after the consideration of this had oblig'd them to grant , that to raise a schism , or to subtract ones self from obedience to those governors , was in a high manner destructive to gods church ; and therefore a sin deserving the deepest damnation in the abetters and maintainers of it , as also in their voluntary adherents : lastly , since it was most manifestly acknowledged on all sides , that our church was that body of christianity , in whose bowels their predecessors , the first reformers , were bred ; with whom onely , and no other community in the world , before the rupture was made , they communicated ; and from which body , by little and little they became , and now are totally disunited ; they saw plainly , and dr. hammond will not stick to grant it , that no sacrifice remained to expiate that hainous sin of schism , in the present protestants , but to wipe off the aspersion from themselves , and lay the occasion of the breach at the doors of the catholick church . this is the scope , as far as i understand , of dr. hammonds book , at which i aym this answer : only solicitous , that he was so tedious in things acknowledged by both parties , or which little or nothing concern'd the main point in question , as to make up three parts of his books of these trifles : and of the very hinge of the controversie , which is , when and why the schism began , to say so little , and so weakly ; that being the chief knot to be untied in this difficulty . but , since the doctor will have it otherwise , i must be content in most of the book , to answer meer words , that is , to fight with the air ; at least , when any thing occurs , which may seem to have some mixture of a solider element , i shall allow it such a reflexion , as i conceive in reason it may deserve . i am his friend , and will goe along with him hand in hand through his whole book ; not that the solidness of the treatise it self requires so exact a proceeding , but the weakness of less-understanding readers , who suspect frivolous things that bear a bulk and a specious shew of words , to be important , unless the answerer either out-word them , or manifest them plainly to be impertinent ; of which , as the former is far from my intent , so the later must , for the reason alledged , be a part of my present task , and consequently i hope , a satisfactory plea for my seeming unnecessary tediousness to the more judicious reader . schism disarm'd . the first part . containing an answer to the four first chapters : sect . . notes upon dr. hammonds first chapter , of the danger and sin of schism . his first chapter is most of it a good sermonlike preparative to his ensuing theme . who would not think he intended to treat the question in earnest , seeing him begin with so serious a preamble ? in the first five paragraphs there is not a word concerning our question to be taken notice of in quality of a difficulty , being nothing but a moral preface , indifferent to either side . only i desire by way of memorandum , that we may reflect well upon , and bear in mind that vertue of ready and filial obedience of those under authority , to their lawfully authorized superiors ; mentioned by him , and extolled for a vertue of the first magnitude . and the indifferent reader will a● once both easily discern hereafter , whether the present catholicks , who hear the church , and believe her in her lawfully authoriz'd governors , or the first reformers , who without any , and against all authority , disobeyed and disbelieved her , have the better title to that eminent vertue ; and he will also wonder why the doctor should face his book with the encomiums of that vertue , the bare explication whereof applyed to the carriage of the first reformers , must manifestly condemn them , and quite confute and disgrace all doctor hammonds laborious endeavours . but a pretence to a vertue , if confidently carried on , seems to the vulgar an argument of a just claim ; and high commendations of it makes the pretence more credible : for who willingly praises , but what is either his own or his friends , or dispraises but what is his enemies . which makes him in the next three paragraphs , proceed in the same tenor of rhetorick , and from scriptures and fathers , paint ●ut the horrid vice of schism in her own ugly shape , as that it is carnality , self-condemning , contrary to charity , bereaving one of the benefits of prayers and sacraments ; as bad as , and the foundation of all heresies ; that there is scarce any crime , ( the place cited is absolute , that there is not any crime , though he mince it with scarce ) so great as schisme ; not sacriledg , idolatry , parracide , that it is obnoxious to peculiar marks of gods indignation , antichristianism , worshiping or serving the devil ; not expiable by martyrdom ; it being according to iraen●●s , impossible ( though the dr. mitigates the dangerous expression with , very hard , if not impossible ) to receive such an injury or provocation from the governors of the church , as may make a separation excusable . and lastly , impossible , according to st. austin , that there should be any just cause for any to separate from the catholick church . instead of which last words , the doctor , full of jealousies and fears , puts , the church truely catholick , as if there were much danger , lest perhaps any should imagin christs church ( of which i conceive st. austin meant it ) to be untruly catholick . and now , what good , honest , well-minded reader , not much acquainted with the doctors manner of rhetorick , would be so unconscionable as to think him guilty of that vice , which he so candidly and largely sets forth in its own colours ; although in those expressions which might too directly prejudice his future work , he seems something chary . and indeed , i wonder for whose sake he hath gathered such a bundle of severe rods out of the sacred scriptures and the best fathers , to whip schismaticks . such expressions as i hope will strongly incite the protestant reader , whom a true care of his eternal good , may invite to seek satisfaction in this point , seriously to consider , that the decision of no one controversie is more nearly concerning his salvation , than this ; as appears by the abominable character of schisme , which the doctor hath with so much pains deciphered to be an abridgement of all the most hainons , damnable , inexcusable , unexpiable vices that can be named or imagin'd . of which augaean stable , if mr. hammond can purge the protestant church , he shall ever wear the most deserved title of the reformers hercules . but i am sorry to foresee that the more he handles his work , the more the dirt will remain sticking upon his own fingers . he proceeds , or rather infers from the former premises , an irrefragable conclusion ( as he cal● it , that the examination of the occasion , cause or motive of any mans schism is not worth the producing or heeding in this matter . this ( besides the manifest advantage it gives us , of which hereafter ) is the pre●tiest fetch to wave the whole question , and whatsoever is material in it , that i ever met with . that you are excommunicated , or separated from the communion of our church ( whence , as you say , the schisme springs ) all the world sees and acknowledges : what remains then to justifie or condemn you or us , but that there was or was not , sufficient cause to cast you out , and deny you communion : for , that our church had authority to do it , if you be found to deserve it , being then her subjects or children , none doubts . if then there were no cause , our church was tyrannical : if there were , you are truely and properly schismaticks ; first , in giving just cause of your own ejection ; next , in remaining out of our church still , and not removing those impediments which obstruct your return . this is most evidently the very point of the difficulty ; which , being in great haste , to shorten your method , you would totally decline . make what haste you please , so you take the question along with you : for , assure your self , however you would avoid it now , you cannot possibly treat it without examining the causes and motives of breaking , as de facto you do afterwards . although , if you can evidence that there is actually no schisme made between us , then indeed i must confess there can be no need of examining the causes of a thing that is not : but it is impossible to make this seem evident , without putting out ours , your own , and the whole worlds eyes . but you desire only that the truth of the matter of fact be lookt into , whether the charge of schisme be sufficiently proved , &c. it is proved , mr. doctor , if you be proved to have so misbehaved your selves within the church , that , to conserve he government inviolate , she was forced to our-law you from her communion . these are the motives and causes , which you ( conscious of , and very tenderly sensible in those parts ) would have us leave untouch'd . but on this we shall insist more at large when the very handling the question forces you , though unwilling , to touch the occasions or causes of schisme ; at least such as you thought fit , and seem'd most plausibly answerable by the notes you had glean'd up and down to that purpose . sect : ▪ concerning his notion of schisme , and the excommunication of the church . his second chapter begins with the distinction of heresie and schisme ; concerning which , what he hath said is true , but yet he hath omitted some part of the truth which was necessary to be told . wherefore let him but take along with him , that not only schisme is a dissenting from authority , and heresie , an introducing a false doctrine into the church ; but also that all heresie ( which it concerns his cause to be willing to pretermit ) must necessarily include schisme , and we shall not fall out about this point : for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying electio , that is , a chusing to onesself some private opinion contrary to the commonly ▪ received doctrine of the church , it follows , that by every heresie the church is truely wounded and rent asunder , the proper effect of schisme . so that , to conserve her self in her primogenial integrity , when shee sees that pertinacity hath throughly and irrecoverably corrupted such a member , she is obliged even in charity , as well as justice to cut it off , ne pars sincer a trahatur . his next observation is an eagle ey'd criticisme about the passive vetb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he will have to signifie reciprocal action , and passion from and upon himself , and to answer to the hebrew hithpael ; which he tels you , he could largely exemplifie in the use of other words . but first , if we may have leave to criticize upon so acute a critick , since it is only for want of conjugations ( as he saies ) designed to supply the place of the hebrew hithpael ; how knows he it must necessarily supply that place here ? since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and its fellows coming from perfect actives , must in the first place have a signification perfectly passive ; and so , only for want of conjugations , be translated upon occasion to signifie the neutropassive . so that all the doctors criticisme ( at the best ) is come to this , that the verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be capable of such a signification , in which ( though the word did not force it ) he was pleased without any end or necessity , but only to shew his art , to take it at this time . secondly , though in the hebrew language the voyces and conjugations be jumbled , and therefore the grammarians admit there eight conjugations , whereas in reality there is but one , and rather eight votes , as the said grammarians affirm ; yet it is certain and evident to every school-boy , that in the latine and greek tongues , voyces and conjugations are things distinct , and of a farr different nature . the former alluding chiefly to the sence and signification of the word ; as appears in our active , passive , &c. the latter being taken from some diversitie in the letters of the word ; which in the greek is the characteristical letter , in the latine , some long or short , letter or syllable correspondent , and fit to cause , by a constantly-divers manner of varying a distinction in the conjugation . now comes this doctor of new grammar , who hath quite forgot his accidence , and tels us , a passive verbe must have a neuter signification for want of conjugations ; as if vapulo and amo could not be of the same conjugation , and yet have a different sence , the one signifying actively , the other neutrally . thirdly , if conjugations will do the deed , that is , make the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie neutrally , i see no reason why the dr. should complain for want of conjugations in the greek language , there being , more there than in hebrew . fourthly , whereas he saith this nice kind of signification is fully exprest by the latine neutrals , which partake both of active and passive , but are strictly neither ; i conceive the instances of such verbs , as sto and ardeo will best fit his purpose ; the former signifying either , i stand , or , i am standing : the latter , i burn , or , i am burning : and then he need not have run so farre as hithpael , since the first conjugation kal , more properly challenges such kind of absolute or intransitive verbs , as appears by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stetit , which is of that conjugation . fifthly , our latine neutrals , as such , do not signify reciprocal action or passion fr●om and on himself , though the dr. saies they fully expresse it ; for we say , roma ardet , and yet affirm also that the action of that burning came from nero , and use not to blame rome that it burnt it self . sixthly , the hebrew hithpael , when it ▪ is not coincident with kal , or niphal , ( as sometimes it is ) signifies an express action upon it self , as fully as two words in latine or greek can render it ; insomuch as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 expresse , as perfectly , he delivered over himself , as in greek is denoted by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or in latine by tradidit seipsum ; and then i would know where the doctor , among all his critical observations , can shew me one verb in all the latine or greek language to parallel it , or ( as the doctor expresses it ) that is of the nature of hithpael . seventhly , either he meant his criticisme of the verbal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which seems more likely , it being the word in question ) or of the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; if , of the former , it is most evident to any man that ever saluted greek , à limine , that those verbals signifie a thing done , in a sence as perfectly passive as can be imagined , without relating at all to the person , or any the least intimation whether the action , which inferr'd that passion , were performed by himself or some others ; as appears by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. which denote a work done , an ordinance constituted , without reference to the person that wrought or ordained it . the self-same is visible in our present verbal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a rupture made ; for which reason st. pauls words ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are rendred in the latin translation , audio scissuras in vobis esse ; which scissure or rupture signifies most perfectly a division made , passively ; not , as the doctor would have it , a reciprocal action or passion from and on himself ; since a rupture is equally called a rupture , whoever it be that makes it . but if the doctor means the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ then i desire to know where he reads that passives in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 forming verbals in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are used in his sence upon the account of being such passives . indeed it may happen , and does often , that a verb in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath a neuter signification , and consequently is used in a neuter sence ; but that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a verb perfectly passive , coming from a perfect active ( and consequently that all passive greek verbs ) should be observable to be of the nature ( as he saies ) of the hebrew hithpael , is such an observation as none could ever before discern but doctor hammond ; who , both here , and all over his book , by much hending his sight , creates objects at pleasure , o● else by an extraordinary faculty sees things tha● are not ; no not even so much as in their cause●… lastly , whereas the word was out of controversie between us , and good enough before he medled with it , he has made it by his unnecessary scruing it , speak perfect nonsence ; as is manifest by the plain link of consequences which evidently follow out of the nice sence , which maugre all grammar , he will needs give it . fo● ( that i may be allowed to speak rigorously and critically when i am examining a criticisme ) if it signifie reciprocal action or passion , it must signifie an act of dividing , exercised upon himself who therefore is the thing divided ; and since , divisio est motus ab unitate ad pluralitatem ; division i● a progress or motion from unity to plurality , its proper and formal effect is to make that which it works upon more of one ; but that which it works upon ( saith the doctor ) is himself the schismatick ; therefore it cuts the schismatick in two , and either kils or mangles him , as the critick pleases . see to what a pittifull case the doctors acuteness hath brought a poor schismatick , from the too quaint notation of the killing letter of the hithpael-like verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ! i crave the readers pardon for transgressing so long upon his patience to lay open a foolery ; but i did it to the intent mr. dr. and his friends may see how ridiculous , and sometimes unsecure a thing it is to stand shewing ones skill in grammar , or letting the world see they understand a little greek and hebrew , or interlarding their discourse with so many scraps of exotick languages to amuse the vulgar ; and in the mean time very little , and very weakly to close with their adversary in the point in controversie with rigorous discourses , solid , pregnant , and convincing reasons , only which ( and not greek and criticisms ) are expected in so grave , and concerning a treatise . but the former impertinences , with sayings indifferent to both parts , intermingled with some few glean'd citations , and blind stories , sawced with some pretty expressions , sugar'd over with scripture-phrase , and then dish'd up handsomly with the help of a learned distinction , will serve to make up several paragraphs ; paragraphs , chapters ; chapters , a book : iamque opus exegi , &c. and the work is done , which if none thinks worth the pains of a reply ( all the substantial part being already confuted an hundred times over , and only the cooking it up changed ) presently with the loudest trumpet of fame it is proclaimed unanswerable ( as this book hath been ) and hath a solemn triumph sounded in its behalf , whereas only its contemptibleness made it victorious . but to proceed ; all he concludes from his criticism is this , that schisme is a voluntary recession from the church : and might not plain sence have told us this without critically straining and spoiling a word to prove it from grammar ? for , what man in his wits could possibly imagin , schisme being such an horrid sinne , that one might perhaps fall into it , whether he would or no , and so become a schismatick against his will. there needs neither greek nor hebrew to understand this : every child knows by the very first principles of nature that no man sins , if he cannot help it . yet mr. hammond goes on a whole leaf , and with most potent argument● overthrows that which would fall of it self ( like him that all-to-be-bang'd the dead bear ) not the least hair of an objection bristling it self against him to fright him from his conquest . he maintains therefore that the actual excommunication used by the governors of the church , is not the crime of schisme ; as if he should go about to prove that the sentence of a judge , when he condemns a murderer or a thief , is neither the sin of murder nor the every . for excommunication ( as all men know ) is the churches condemnation or punishment of the crime of schisme , as the iudges last sentence of death is of the aforesaid delinquencies . who will not grant him this at the first word ? yet nevertheless he will needs prove it with many . but governors ( you say ) being men , may possibly erre , and so censure and excommunicate the innocent . if what you say here , may be , you prove to have been , i shall grant you have acquitted your self well . in the mean time what onely may be , may also not be ; and till such time as you can evidence an immunity from error in the governed , as well as pretend a liableness in the governors , the whole oeconomy of the world gives it , that the opinion of right shall stand on the governors side : for surely , the order of the politick world were a very pitiful slack thing , if every frivolous and probable exception of subjects , should be held a sufficient cause to break asunder the well compacted frame , and dissolve the strongest nerves of a long-setled government ; even in may-be's , then you are worsted : what will become of you when we come to demonstrate to you hereafter , that however in some private proofs of a particular fact , the governors may be mistaken , yet in such publick misbehavior , as your few new-fangled predecessors used , when they opposed themselves to the ever-self-constant church , it was impossible the governors should be mistaken in judging you to be truly-named schismaticks , and consequently did well in treating you accordingly . that there may be a continuance out of actual communion without schism , as also , that unjust excommunication hurts no man , would have been granted you for one word in plain english , without the citing of so much greek to so little purpose . onely we desire you would grant us in recompence , what in all reason is due , that a voluntary continuance in a just excommunication , makes the thus excommunicated schismaticks . which part of the distinction being counterpois'd to those others you mentioned , of actual continuance out of the church , and unjust excommunication , hurting no man , and most neerly concerning the question , being objected by us to be your guilt , whereas the other you treat , are out of controversie between us , it could not stand with the sincere treating a question , wholly to omit it , and pass it over in silence . but the seeming exactness of your method , can yet easily over-slip that part of the distinction , which sounds dangerously , and is hard to be confuted , though the main of the question onely stands upon it ; and mention onely that which is easily excused , because none objects it , and very facile to be proved , because none denies it . scilicet isthuc est sapere ! your other testimonies here alledged , tending onely ( as i conceive ) to prove , that unjust excommunication hurts no man , are very currant and allowable : and i could have helped you to twenty more as good as these , to the same purpose , some of them in greek too , which would have made a fine show . your interpretative excommunication runs upon the same strain , and so needs no further answer , besides that which the following section affords it . sect . . concerning dr. hammond's plea of a weak conscience , not suffering him to subscribe to the churches doctrine against his present perswasion . but now the doctor hath got a new cloak for his schism , to wit , the pretence of a weak conscience ; which makes him think he ought not to communicate with the church , but is excused for not-communicating , because the conditions of the communion contain in them a sin . and what sin should this be , but to subscribe to things which their conscience tells them is false : nay even ( saith the doctor ) though the truth be on the churches side , yet really apprehended by him , to whom they are thus proposed to be false , it is hard to affirm that that man can lawfully subscribe ; and therefore rather then do it , the doctor makes account he may remain out of communion , and that lawfully too . this is the doctors assertion , which indeed might serve out of a pulpit to an auditory that he would claw , with giving them that sweet and ( as they esteem it ) christian liberty of holding what they list ; but to any judicious person that knows what government is , it is , in reality , the sublimated quintessence of perfect non-religion and anarchy . the position comes to this , that none should be condemned or punished by his governors for not-doing that , the contrary whereof he thinks is to be done . to give which position the least shadow of likelihood , the doctor is necessarily obliged to prove first , that no pride , interest , or passion can make one think wrong , and consequently culpable in so thinking ; which if the doctor do , he will work wonders , and with a turn of his hand , convert this world of miserable sinners , into a heaven of pure and perfect saints . but let us hear an argument or two upon the doctors principles : an ambitious or proud man , blinded by his passion , begins to think ( and really true ) that the long established government of the commonwealth is tyrannical ; and upon this thought , he proceeds to jumble all the land into intestine seditions , and to dismount the governors from the top of authority , and ( as he tells you ) conscientiously too , that is , with a perfect perswasion according to his present passion . force him not to subscribe to obey his lawful magistrate , ( saith the doctor ) he may not do it lawfully , it is against his conscience . a revengeful or malicious man thinks that in all right and reason he may endamage the party that offered the affront ; and upon the lawfulness of his so doing ( while his humor possesses him ) he would lay his soul , controle him not ( saith the doctor ) he is in an ●rror , but yet governs himself at present according to conscience , he may not lawfully subscribe , or ●eal a pardon , contrary to his present perswasion . the anabaptist thought himself nearly touched in conscience , to cut off the heads of his mother and sister for kneeling at the communion . urg●… him not to the contrary ( saith the doctor , ) 〈◊〉 cannot lawfully spare them , it is against his prese●… perswasion . the puritans ( following the protestants example ) refuse obedience to the church of england , seeing in her so many dreg●… of popery remaining . unjustly did the church of england ( saith the doctor ) in obliging them to her obedience , and cutting off poor bast●… wicks , burtons , and prynnes ears , who did according to their conscience , or present perswasion . neither will it avail you to answer , that these were told by gods law , that their act●… were unwarrantable , and therefore were culpable : for , it is easie to reply , that you were as much , and as earnestly commanded by god to hear the church , and obey your lawful superiors ; and incurred a far greater sin , if you did not , to wit , the sin of schism ; which your selfe unfortunate pen has out of the fathers described to be a venomous compound , swoln with the mixt poyson of all sorts of vices . the reader will by this see , to what a pass this doctors logick would bring the world , if his position should take place , that no man should be obliged to , or punished for anything against his present perswasion , which he terms his conscience . the contrary to which , that i may a little more elucidate from its first grounds , the reader may please to consider , that this present perswasion , which a man is so fixt in , may either begin in the understanding , or proceed from the will : if in the understanding , it must be onely a perfect demonstration that can beget in it so firm an adherence ; and then , being rational , it is not onely excusable but laudable : otherwise it is an irrational resolvedness sprung from a passionate distorsion of the interessed will ; pushing and exciting the understanding without due deliberation first to pitch upon , and afterwards pertinaciously to adhere to a thing , more then the light of reason it self gives . which being in the will vicious , is consequently ( as all other vices are ) culpable , liable to correction , and by correction reformable . so as , licet non possumus opinari quando volumus , that is , although we cannot deem or think a thing true , but we must have some motive or other , true or false , why we think so , yet with this it well consists , that a perverse affection in the will , may blinde and lead astray the understanding , by proposing false motives for true ones . and therefore when the will by deserved punishment is whipt out of her viciousness , the native lustre of the understanding will quickly disenvelop its self from the cloud of mistake , in which the passion ▪ exhaled vapors had enwrapt her . you see then , doctor , ( which perhaps you never reflected on before , ) a man may be obliged to retract a present perswasion , and ( however he pretends conscience for his excuse ) be punished too , if he does not , since his bad will was the cause of his erroneous judgment , as the cases of the fore-mentioned malefactors , your clients , have , as i hope , by this time better informed you . but perhaps you would not have this method used in matters of religion : and why not ? unless the violating the ever-sacred authority of christs church , and renouncing the main support of all religion ▪ the rule of faith , ( things in the conserving of which , the eternal salvation of mankinde consists ) be less deserving punishment in the offenders , or less worth taking notice of by the governors of the church , then the wrong of thirteen-pence half-penny is by the laws and governors of the commonwealth . the result then of your discourse comes to this , that all your dwindling suppisitions an● may ▪ bees , ( which you wisely put down fo● proofs , and sometimes for grounds ) remain still in question , or rather unquestionably unsupposable . your tenderness of conscience not to sin against god in subscribing to the errors ( forsooth ) of his church , which he hath commanded you to hear , onely pharasaical arrogancy ▪ and singularity in you , which makes you think and style at pleasure any thing error , which the whole church holds , if contrary to your private judgment : lastly , our pretended making communion impossible , will be found to be onely a self-opinionated pride in you , and of all pride 's the most miserable and filly , to adhere so pertinaciously against evidence of authority to a few obscure scraps of writers speaking on the by , and your own self acknowledged fallibility . all these , and whatever pretences you here in sinuate , will all lie at your doors , and loudly call you schismaticks , unless you can evidence , with most perfect demonstrations , that those things were errors which the church obliged you to subscribe to ; that is , that the churches doctrine was , or is erroneous , and consequently her self not infallible . this , if you evidence , i shall grant you have not onely overthrown ours , but all religion ; not onely acquitted your self of schism , but also quite taken away all possibility of being a schismatick ; since no authority can with any face or conscience , oblige to a belief ; of which her self is not certain . but , i doubt not , you make your self sure of the conquest , not apprehending any but saints and angels in heaven , and god himself , to be infallible . to which you adde , of your own invention , impeccable ; as your custom is , never to speak of our tenet , without the disgraceful addition of some forged calumny or other imposed upon us . but that none else should be infallible except those you mention , i much wonder . i thought the apostles had been also infallibly assisted , when they pen'd the sacred writ , and peach'd the gospel : i thought also our saviour when he sent them to teach , and promised them his assistance , had said , he would remain with them always , even till the end of the world ; that is , with the succeeding church . i thought there had been some means to be infallibly-certain , that such and such books were gods word , and genuine scripture , without an angel , saint , or christs coming from heaven , or the doctors private-spirited opinion , which he will call , god. neither do i doubt , but the doctor himself will grant it impossible , that all the protestants in england should be fallible or mistake , in witnessing whether twenty years ago , there were protestant bishops , or no ; and that such was the tenet , and government of their church at that time : yet a thousand time● greater evidence have we of the indefectibility of the churches faith , and her infallibility . as you may to your amazement see ( if you will but open your eyes ) in that incomparable treatise of rushworth's dialogues , vindicated from all possible confute , by that excellent apology for it , writ by the learned pen of mr. thom●● white , in his friends behalf , whose dialogues he set forth , enlarged , and defended against your acute friends , faulkland and digby : persons who did not use to treat controversies i● such a dreaming shallow way , as it hath been your misfortune to do here ; nor stand preaching to their adversary , when they should dispute . to these dialogues , and their apology , i refer you , that you may know what to do ; if you confute them solidly , and demonstrate plainly , that our church is liable to error , you will eternally silence us , and clear your selves . but take heed you bring not whimpering probable may-be's , and onely-self-granted suppositions for proofs ; these might serve your turn in your first book , which might hope for the good fortune to scape without answering ; but in your second , and after you are told of it , it will fall short of satisfactory . remember , mr. hammond , that you granted ● cheerful obedience and submission of your judgments and practices to your superiors , under penalty o● not being deemed true disciples of christ. if this be real ( as i wish it were ) then what easier condescension and deference to the judgment of superiors can be imagined , then to submit one● private judgment , when he has onely probability to the contrary ? evidence therefore , demonstrable evidence you must give in , of the churches erring , ere your pretence , that you were obliged by her to subscribe to errors , can take place , and so excuse you from schism . but as your profession of the obligation you have , to submit your judgment to the church , renders your probable reasons insufficient to fall to judge her ; so ( god be praised ) your own self acknowledged fallibility will secure us from the least fear of your demonstrations . yet unless you do this , you undo your cause ; for if the church could not erre , she could need no reforming . so that your preaching of reformation is vain , your faith vain ; and by consequence your selves schismaticks , and an ace more . sect . . concerning the ground of unity , groundlesness of schism , and of dr. hammonds manner of arguing to clear himself of the later . all that is material in the doctors second chapter , is sum'd up in these two heads , that the church does ill in obliging men to subscribe against their present perswasion ; and , that the church which they left , was erroneous , and so obliged them to the subscription of errors . upon these two notes , as on a base-ground he runs division all along this chapter ; repeating them so often in each paragraph , that i was forced to omit my intended method at present ; not making a countet-sermon to each in order , but bringing together his dispersed doctrine into heads , and then confuting them ; not doubting , but the leaves and branches , which counterfeit some small flourish of devotion , will quickly fade into hypocrisie , when the sapless roots are pluckt up from their rotten ground . the former of them hath been discovered in the former section , to be worse then weak ; his manner of arguing from the second , shall be laid open in this . but , because i perceive mr. hammond very much unacquainted with our grounds , why our church obliges her sons to rest in her belief , and continue in her communion , thinking her ( doubtless ) very discourteous , that will not le● her subjects in civility ( as the modest and moderate church of england does ) hold and do what they list , i will at present ▪ undeceive him somewhat in that point ▪ having a better occasion to do it more largely hereafter . first , the doctor stumbles much , and ( as ignorance i● ever the mother of admiration ) thinks master knot 's inference very strange , that the church i● infallible , otherwise men might forsake her communion . whereas , on the contrary , i not onely think it strange to infer otherwise , but as great an absu●dity as can be imagined ; for why may not me● forsake the communion of the church , if they may forsake her doctrine ( since it is impossible to preserve the former , if he renounce the latter ; ) and why may they not forsake her doctrine , if she have no power nor authority ●o tie them to the belief of it ; and how can she have any authority to binde them to the belief of it , if she her self knows not certainly , whether it be true o● no ; that is , be not infallible : or what man living ( who hath so much wit as to raise or understand the difficulty ) can possibly so degenerate from reason , which is his nature , as to submit it , in believing things above his reason , and which concern his eternal salvation , upon such an authority , as may perhaps lie , and , so damn him for believing her , since , without true faith it is impossible to please god. hence follows by an inevitable consequence , that , since the church pretends , and hath ever pretended to have a promise from christ of a perpetual assistance from error , if christ have made good that promise , that is , if she be infallible , then her obliging her sons to rest in her faith , is most plainly evidenced , to be charitable , just , and necessary ; because in that case it were both mens obligation , and also their greatest good to believe so qualified a mistress . whereas , on the other side , any other congregation that professes her self fallible , that is , uncertain of the truth of her doctrine , cannot without accusing her self of the greatest injustice and tyranny in the world , binde others to the belief of the said doctrine : for , it carries the prejudice of the highest unreasonableness with it ; for a man to tell me , i will force you ●o believe that , which yet i my self know not whether it is to be believed , or no. let not dr. hammond then blame our church for obliging men to subscribe to her doctrine , unless he can evidence first , that she hath not that which she hath ever from the beginning of the church , pretended to ; to wit , a security from fallibility by the perpetual assistance of her spouse and saviour . but rather let him invent , if he can , any rational excuse for his own church , which professing her self fallible , and so wanting all power to oblige to belief , would notwithstanding have others believe her , accounting the puritans , anabaptists , presbyterians , and independants , schismaticks if they do not ; and dares enstyle her self a church , that is , a commonwealth which hath power and means to oblige to unity in belief , whereas , her own professed fallibility or uncertainty , evidences , that she wants all the nerves which should connect the members of such a body . these grounds laid , it were not amiss to insert here , what the author of that epistle which was writ from bruxels , in answer to dr. hammond , saith upon this place . by this ( saith he ) you may perceive much of his discourse to be not onely superfluous and unnecessary , but contrary to himself ; for he laboreth to perswade , that the protestant may be certain of some truth , against which the roman catholick church bindeth to profession ▪ of error ; which is as much as to say , that he who pretends to have no infallible rule , whereby to govern his doctrine , shall be supposed to be infallible , and that he who pretends to have an infallible rule , shall be supposed to be fallible ; at most , because fallible objections are brought against him now then consider what a meek and humble son of the church ( as this dr. would he thought ) ought to do , when on the one side is the authority of antiquity , and possession ( such antiquity and possession without dispute , or contradiction from the adversary ; as no king can shew for his crown , and much less any other person for any other thing ) together with the perswasion of infallibility , and all the pledges christ hath left to his church for motives of union : on the other side , uncertain reasons of a few men pretending to learning , every day contradicted by incomparable numbers of men wise and learned ; and those few men confessing those reasons , and themselves uncertain , fallible , and subject to error : certainly , without a byass of interest or prejudice , it is impossible to leave the church , if he be in it , or not return if he be out of it . for , if infallibility be the ground of the churches power to command belief , as she pretends no other ; no time , no separation within memory of history , can justifie a continuance out of the church ▪ thus far that letter ; which , had it not been strangled in the birth , and miscarried in the printer's hand , might have saved me the labor of this larger con●ute ; and , being exactly short , might justly be styled dr. hammonds iliads in a nut-shell ; since the force of it was so united , the reason in it so firmly connected , as might have cost the doctor a full ten years siege , ere he could make a breach into it with his brown-paper bullets . but now it is high time to reflect upon the doctors manner of arguing ; who tells us here , that he needs give no more answer to our objection of a schismatical departure , then this , that they who acknowledge not the church of rome to be infallible , may be allowed to make a supposition which is founded in the possibility of her inserting errors in her confessions , &c. and so goes on with three or four suppositions , all built upon that first general supposition , that the roman catholick church hath erred , or is not infallible . i commend the doctor for his wit. the whole question is reduced to this one point , whether the church erred or no ; as is most manifest : for if she evidently err●d , he and his ancestors may possibly be excused for not believing her , and rejecting her government by schism , which she told you was sacred ; but if she was infallible , no plea nor evasion can possibly serve your turn ▪ neither is it your , or their supposing it , which can make her fallible , and so be a fit ground to build your excuse on . now comes this gentleman , who in the first page of his book is entitled doctor of divinity , to handle this question ; and onely desires in courtesie , that the main matter in controversie ( out of which it was easie to infer what he pleased ) should first be supposed or granted , and that upon that ground he would evince his cause . just like that young smat●e●er in logick , who undertook to prove his fellow a goose ; but first he would needs have him suppose , that whatsoever had two legs , was one of those tame fowl ; which his wary fellow , notwithstanding his importunity , refusing to grant , he was left quite blank , and his wise argument at an end . such is the on-se● , such must be the event of the doctors logick : you and your first reformers , are schismaticks ( says the catholick ) in rejecting the government of the church , and her chief pastor , which she told you was both lawful and sacred . your church erred ( saith the doctor ) and so we could not be obliged to believe her . i but ( answers the catholick ) you must first prove evidently , that she is fallible , and subject to error . o ( replies the doctor ) we suppose that to be most certainly true , and without all dispute . risum teneatis amici ! yet mr. hammond hath involved another error in the same passage more unpardonable ( if possible ) then the former , so fruitful is his logick of inconsequent absurdities . for what man ever arrived to that heigth of mistake , as to endeavor to manifest his innocency by the voluntary confession of a crime , which implies the objected fault , and much more to boot ; or to alledge for his plea against the accusation of his adversary , that which more deeply condemns , and is objected to him as a far more hainous crime by the same adversary ? yet such is this doctors acuteness . he is accused by us of schism , and lays for the ground of his excuse , that he acknowledges not our churches infallibility , which is charged upon him , not onely to be both schism and heresie , but as the very sink of all infidelity . for what man of reason , but stands in an hovering disposition of minde to embrace any religion , or rather irreligion , nay even turcism it self ( as your best champion , the lord faulkland , professes he would ) when a stronger blast of a more probable reason , shall turn the sail of his wind-mill judgment ; knowing and acknowledging ( as he must , and does ) that neither his own private interpretation of scripture , nor the church he is in , is infallible , or secured from error by any promise of christ. the denying this infallibility therefore , ( mr. doctor ) is the greatest crime we charge you with ; but you ( free of your suppositions ) suppose it your chief virtue , and put it for the ground of all your excuse . in this infallibility is founded all the power of the church obliging to belief , the inviolableness of her government , the unjustifiableness of any schism , the firm security , that faith is certain , and lastly , whatever in the church is sacred . the doctor therefore in clearing himself , by denying the infallibility of the church , does the self-same , as if some discontented subject having first out-lawed himself , by denying the laws , and rejecting the government of england , and afterwards becoming obnoxious to those laws by robbing , murthering , &c. should endeavot to plead , not guilty ; by alledging , that though indeed the english subjects , who accept the laws , and allow the government of england , are liable to punishment , if they offend against them : yet i ( saith he ) who suppose this government tyrannical , and these laws unjust , especially , having a present perswasion , and thinking in my conscience they are so , cannot be obliged to keep them ; and therefore must not be accounted a factious man , nor be liable to punishment , if i break them . what will become of this malefactor , master doctor ? your logick clears him : but , the reader , and i am perswaded , wiser judgments will think him more highly deserving the gallows , for refusing subjection to the laws and government , and you more deeply meriting excommunication for rejecting the churches infallibility , the onely ground of her authority , then for all the rest of your particular faults which issue from that false principle . but it is pretty to observe , how the doctor never clears himself from schism , upon any other grounds then those , which , if admitted , would prove all the malefactors in the world innocent ; and make it lawful , nay , an obligation in conscience to dissolve the whole fabrick of the worlds government . so true it is , that the very position of a fallibility of faith first lays , and in time hatches the cockatrice eggs of both atheism and anarchy . sect . . containing some observations upon mr. hammonds third chapter , of the division of schism . when i had perused his third chapter , with intent to see what it might contain worth the answering , finding scarce any thing which made either against us , or for him , i thought i had mistaken the title of his book ; but looking back , i found it to have indeed this inscription ; of schism . a defence of the chvrch of england , against the exceptions of the romanists ; by h. hammond , d. d. so that now i remain'd satisfied what was the title , but much more unsatisfied to find my expectation so totally deluded ; and that in a large chapter containing thirty six pages ( almost a full quarter of the book ) not five words were found which touched the question directly , nor could in any way be a preparative to it . so as we have here pages of . well towards half the book ) premised by the doctor to introduce the question ; like the mindian gate , too large an entrance for so narrow a corporation . frivolous then had been the long preamble of this chapter , had it been to the purpose , and tended to the question ; but if it be found nothing at all to the question , but to wave and conceal the main , and indeed sole matter which concerns it ; nay more , to have prevaricated from the very scope for which he would seem to intend it ; then i will leave it to the reader to imagin what commendations this chapter and its author doth deserve . our question is of schism : in this chapter he undertakes to shew the several sorts of it ; which therefore he divides into schism against fraternal charity , and schism against some one particular governor ; as in the people against a priest or deacon ; in those against a bishop , in bishops against their arch-bishops ; in arch-bishops against their primate or patriarch ; and there he stops ; lest , if he had ascended a step higher to the authority of the pope , he should have said more truth then will serve his turn . for you must know he has a deep design against antichrist ; and is resolved that half a score odd stories , or some few words and unwarrantable practices of discontented persons ( especially , being cited in greek ) shall utterly overthrow him ; in despite of manifest practice of antiquity , clouds of testimonies from fathers , and the doctrine of the catholick church , of whose fallibility he is far from even pretending to any infallible evidence . but that we may manifest what we laid to his charge , that all this long chapter is but waste-paper , the reader may please to take notice that the schism we charge the protestants with , is not of the peoples schism against a deacon or presbyter ; nor of a deacon or presbyters schism against a bishop , nor any link in that chain of schisms which he there enumerates ; but we accuse them and their fore-fathers , the first reformers . first , of a breach or schism from the whole catholick church . this is without controversie the schism of schisms ; and which in the first hearing of the word ( schism ) objects it self to our understanding , as being simply , properly , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such ; whereas the other are nothing but particular refractory diso●●diences in comparison of this ; and may well consist with your obedience to the universal church . this , this , i say , is the chief and main schism we impute to his fellow protestants ; yet the doctor in his present book entituled , their defence from schism , takes no notice of the chief thing he ought to clear them of ; will not have it come into play , nor allow it a place in his division , as if it were either none at all , or else such a slight one as was not worth taking notice of . strange ! that he could use such prolixity in trifling schisms impertinent to the present discourse , and not afford the least mention to the greatest schism of all , when the scope and aim of his chapter necessarily required it , and the question forcibly exacted it . strange ! that he could remember even the peoples schism against a deacon or presbyter , and forget that which breaks from the whole body of the universal church . but the doctor is more carefull to preserve his own copy-hold then the churches free hold ; for , according to his division and doctrine in this chapter , his parishoners would be schismaticks for disobeying him , or a puny deacon ; but neither he , nor the deacon schismaticks at all for disobeying the whole church . and thus the dr. has established his own authority to be more inviolable then the popes , and by this one division , has quite conquered and got the upper-hand of antichrist . secondly , what is become of general councils all this while ? have not they as great an authority as any private patriarch , primate , arch-bishop , bishop , dr. hammond , or a deacon ? far gr●●ter sure , if i be not mistaken . doubtless then a schismatical rejecting their decrees and authority , is more hainous , grievous , and more worthy to be ranked amongst his fellow-schisms then any of the others . yet of this , in this chapter where he expresly undertakes and prosesses to enumerate all the several sorts of schism , we hear not a syllable . thirdly , what is become of schism against the head of the church ? is not the papal authority greater then the authority of any patriarch , primate , arch-bishop , bishop , dr. hammond , or a deacon ? surely all imagin so , but dr. hammond and his fellows ; why is this over-slipt then , as if it were a matter of nothing ? but dr. hammond will answer , that the popes is not indeed an authority , but an usurpation , and therefore there can be no schism against it : to which i reply , that i expect not that he should grant it here , but since he knows very well and grants that the papal authority was in a long possession of this island , held and acknowledged then , and still pretended to be sacred , and of divine institution ; nay more , since it is confessed by them , that they rejected this authority , and that this rejection of it is objected to them by us , as a far greater schism than any of the other he mentious , he ought at least have taken notice of it , and shown in what degree of schism the casting off such an authority was to be reputed ( as being chief , and instituted by christ ) unless he could manifest the pretended authority of the hope to be null , and an usurpation . moreover , since it is the use of the multitude , which makes words signifie ; and that three parts of four of those who bear the name of christians ( if taken in the double extent or space , both of time and place ) have acknowledged , and called it a main schism , and greater then any the doctor here reckons up , to reject the supream authority of the bishop of rome , the doctor could not in reason avoid the mention of this so-commonly-called schism , unless he had first manifested that it was none . again , to state the matter indifferently to both sides , let us take the word , head of the church , as abstracted from an ecclesiastical or secular governor , that is from both pope , and emperor or king ; nay , if he pleases , let us take it only in the later sence , which is his ; i desire to know , since the emperor or king , is ( according to him ) supreme in ecclesiastical affairs , head of the church or churches in his dominions , above patriarchs ▪ and primates , &c. why is not the denying this authority a greater schism even in his own grounds , than a schism against a patriarch , deacon ? &c. for , the authority of the head rejected , what means possible remain to reconcile and unite the members . in omitting this therefore , the doctor hath neither been true to our question , nor his own grounds . in sum , so wise a logician is this doctor of divinity ; that whereas the members of the division should adequately comprehend all the several sorts of the thing divided ; he has onely omitted the three principal schisms against government , and those not onely principal in themselves , but also solely importing the present controversie ; and onely mentioned those , which were not objected , and so nothing at all concerning our question . where , i desire the doctor to remember , that all those testimonies he hath huddled here together out of the fathers against petty-schismaticks , will light far heavier upon him , and his fellows , if they be found to have separated from the incomparably greater authority of the whole church ; and that not onely by a bare schism , but also ( which you here acknowledge to adde very much to the guilt of the former , ) by an open and most manifest sedition . the rest of your chapter is taken up is things which tend not at all to the matter you purposed to handle , that is , to defend your church against the schisms we object ; which makes you also so ample , and large in handling them . you show therefore with a great deal of pains , the particular dignities of deacons , priests , bishops , arch-bishops , primates , patriarchs ; you tell us many things of the * seven churches of asia , &c. i will onely glean what may seem worth animadversion , treating it briefly , because you speak it ( as you say ) by the way , in passing , and the question is not much concerned in it ▪ and omiting those testimonies which are slightly objected here , and come over and over again afterwards . first then you affirm , that the roman patriarchy extended not it self to all italy ; which , though a known untruth , and which i have heard learned , and unpassionate men of your own side acknowledge ; yet you will needs evince out of the obscure testimony of one ruffinus , a discontented , ●illy , and barbarons writer ; and if you blame me for excepting against him , one of your late most extolled writers , monsieur daille shall defend me ; who characters ruffinus to be an arrant wooden statue , a pitiful thing ; one that had scarce any reason in what he said , and yet much less dexterity in defending himself ; yet you account here his testimony very competent . but how small soever the popes patriarchy be , what is this to his papal authority , since even we our selves acknowledge him a private bishop of rome , which yet prejudices not his publick authority , as the churches universal governor . your testimony alleaged out of the council of chalcedon , shall be answered hereafter , when we come to discuss the question of the popes authority ; as also your other out of the council of ephesus in its proper place , where it is repeated . your other claw against the pope , is , that these was none antiently above the patriarchs , but the emperor , which you think to evince , because the emperor made use of his secular authority in gathering councils . and who denies , but however the intention and ordering that great affair belonged to the popes , yet the emperors , as being lords of the world , were fittest to command the execution of it . but ere you can conclude hence against the popes authority over the church , you must first evince , that the emperors ( and the like may be said of kings ) did this without the popes signifying such their desires to them . next , that , if they did it sometimes against the popes will , or pretending it their proper power , such an action or pretence of theirs was lawful . and thirdly , had it belonged to the emperors ( which yet none grants you ) yet how will your consequence hold good , that therefore the pope hath no authority over the universal church ? as if there were no other acts of an universal authority , but to gather councils ; which is all one as to say , that the kings of england could have no universal temporal command or jurisdiction in england , but onely to call a parliament . all your marginal testimonies therefore , which you here bring ( signifying no more to us , but that the emperor executed that business ) are far from making good the position you alleage them for : to wit , that the emperors did it by their own proper power . sect . . of doctor hammond's advance towards the question , in the beginning of his fourth chapter . the doctor having so wisely and securely laid his grounds , that is , having omited all grounds that might either preiudice his cause , or touch the question , advances at length towards the controversie it self ; but with the same reeling-pace as formerly : in which , he continues throughout the whole progress of this chapter with such a rambling career , as if what he had said hitherto , were but preparatives to absurdness , or but nonsence in jest ; which here , being come to the point , he more exactly performs in earnest . which , if my answer to this chapter do not plainly demonstrate , i will submit my self willingly to be branded by the readers censure for a most unjust calumniator : but if it do , then let him think of mr. hammonds manner of proceeding , and his cause , as they shall be found to deserve . and first , stumbling at the threshold , he expects that the church should produce evidence for her own , or her supreme head's authority in england . which , since it is confessed by all sides , that the pope was in quiet possession of such a primacy , it no more belongs to us to prove just , then it doth to the emperor , who had derived the succession of his right from a long train of ancestors , to evidence his title to the kingdom ere he can punish a rebel . it is wonderful the doctor should be ignorant of that which all the world knows and acknowledges , to wit , that a long-setled possession is of it self a proof , until the contrary be evinced ; so as he who should deny the authority of such an emperor , were truly and properly a seditious person ; and you , for the same reasons , truly and properly schismaticks , unless he can produce sufficient , that is , evident causes and reasons , why he refused obedience to that emperor ; and you , why you denied subjection to the pope ; who ( as you were told before ) was not less found in a quiet and long-acknowledged possession of primacy in england , nay , much more then any emperor or king in christendom was of his crown ; to wit , even by your own grants , for the space of eight or nine hundred years . neither imagin that the modern protestants , who finde the pope outed from his jurisdiction in england , are therefore excusable from their fore-fathers schism : for , however changeableness of humane affairs , and pretence , that temporal laws were constituted , and are disannulable by men , may render such rights and titles obnoxious to alienation or alteration ; and so cause a deseazance of any obedience formerly due to a secular governor : yet , if christ himself hath constituted any authority , and enjoyned obedience to it , no length of time , no vicissitude of secular affairs , nor intercession of humane laws can ever disoblige from this duty . so that , it lies still as freshly as at the first breach encharg'd upon the protestants , under the penalty of schism , to manifest with most convincing and undeniable arguments , that the pope could never claim any such authority from christ. which claim of ours , and ( as the doctor will have it ) our first evidence , he goes about to confute in this chapter . but , first , in big terms he layes out an ample narration , how king henry the eighth , the universities , and parliament , not onely said , but testified under their hands and seals , nay , more ( saith the doctor ) took their corporal oaths on it , that the pope was not head of the church ; and , all this ( saith mr. hammond ) is look● on and condemned as an act of schism in this church and nation . what a piece of wit is here ! this is the very thing for which we accuse your church and nation of schism ; and you , by a bare narration that it was done , think ( it seems ) to have half proved it was lawfully done . and all this , said , seal'd , and sworn by a king , parliament , and universities , is enough to amaze a vulgar-headed reader into a belief , that their votes could not be other then true . and i doubt not , but the doctor himself wonders , that the whole catholick church should be so unreasonable , as not to grant and think her self ever to have taught , and the whole world ever to have believed a lie , rather then to judge so uncharitably , that a lustful and tyrannical king , with some number of his subjects , partly out of flattery , partly out of fear , adhearing to him ( though these not a handful in comparison of the even-then-present christian world ) should say , seal and swear a falshood : especially , the cause of the breach being most notorious to the whole world , not to have been conscience , but vicious and unlawful pretences : and , on the other side , multitudes of conscientious and learned men opposing it ; and many laying down their dearest lives in testimony of the contrary truth ; whose taking the affirmative upon their deaths , is more to be believed , then the other true , taking it upon their corporal oaths . among those who died in defence of the popes supremacy , was our renowned and worthy countryman , sir thomas more ; whose esteem for piety , learning , and prudence , as the king professed , was so eminent , that his subscription alone , if it could be procured , was worth half the realms . yet this so notorious acting and commencing of schism ( though sprung from unlawful lust , and managed with most cruel tyranny ) the doctor seems to think so laudable , that the very mentioning it will something conduce to justifie a schismatick . all this ( saith he ) is looked on and condemned , as an act of schism in this church and nation ! next he proceeds to state the question , by branching the objection into many parts ; which the doctor will needs have belong to us to manifest ere the objection will have any force . so as , possession beyond memory is of no force with him , which yet is the basis of all the firm peace this poor world enjoys , and the ground upon which every man remains quietly instated in his own . when such a possession is once setled , all controversies are silenced ; when it is question'd , a gap is open'd to all litigiousness . necessity therefore , and evidence , must both be pleaded , ere any one can justly quarrel with this nurse of peace . yet the church must plead her evidence ( saith the doctor , ) that is , seem to bring in question her own longpossessed title ; and at whose bar ( think you ) must she plead it ? at no other then that of her quondam sons and subjects ; and now , rebels and enemies . but the doctor , most unfortunately accurate in his divisions , tells us , that we must manifest first , the matter of fact , that thus it was in england . secondly , the consequence of that fact , that it were schism , supposing those successors of saint peter were thus set over all christians by christ. as for the first , the reader , i doubt not , will smile at the doctors folly , in telling us , we are to manifest that which no man living ever denied ; and which himself immediately before , and far more largely hereafter , relates and acknowledges . for , who ever imagin'd it a matter of controversie , needing to be manifested , whether or no king henry the eighth denied the popes supremacy . the second is yet more ridiculous then the former ; since not even the most impudent heretick in the world ever had the face to deny , but that , if the popes universal authority was constituted by christ , the consequence was inevitable , that it was both schism and heresie to reject and condem it , * as he confesses they did . yet is this the second thing ( saith he ) which we must manifest ere the objection will be of any force . but , to make the jest compleat , after telling us , that we are to manifest them ; he , out of his courtesie , and to expedite the matter , is pleased to grant them , not requiring the pretenders farther to prove them . as if he could have resisted them , but had done us a great favor , in saving us from a most disgraceful foil we should have sustained , in maintaining , that a fact was done , which himself and all the world acknowledges ; and in being puzzled with proving , that what christ bid us do , was to be done , and the authority instituted by god himself , to be obeyed . to what purpose was it to bring such unnecessary and frivolous distinctions , and afterwards wave them ? but the doctor ( as i have shown before , and shall demonstrate more largely hereafter ) hath a most special gift of his own , in dividing his text ; and he must upon all , or rather no occasion , show it . which trick of his , though it counterfeit an order , and breed an apprehension of a methodical exactness in discourse to ordinary readers ; yet when it shall be discovered to tend to no solidity , being like the philosophers dividing of spatium imaginarium ; all men will see plainly it is but a meer knack to be-wonder children and ignorants . sect . . of doctor hammonds first evidence against st. peters universal pastorship . but now the question is stated ; this chapter is to prove no donation of any primacy to st. peter by christ ; the next , that no such authority is devolv'd upon the pope , his successor , in the see of rome . and now the long-expected time of the doctors evidences is come : i told you he had a horrible design in lavander against the pope ; now truth is come to light . this , this is the fatal time that the horns of the beast in the apocalypse must be broken , and the walls of that whorish-babylon thrown down by the inevitable and unresistable evidences of dr. hammond . but , to be serious , the doctor and i joyntly request the ingenuous reader , to bestow more attentive and deliberate diligence , in examining and weighing well this part of the controversie , then what hath gone before . the important weight of the truth in question , now hot in pursuit , and the very sound of evidence , now mainly pretended , do both invite to a more particular attention . the doctor especially granting , that the question must be managed with evidences , and so concluded , either on the one side , or the other . if the doctors proofs conclude and manifest themselves to be indeed , what they are pretended , that is , evidences , then i will grant the truth on his side , and the controversie at an end . but if all the evidence they bring , be onely , that they are most evidently repugnant and most injurious to gods word , to all ancient histories , and to themselves ; that they are open forgeries , and most absurd deductions , shamefully abusing the readers judgment , and ev'n his very eyes ; then i hope , the reader will pardon me , if i seem to bear less respect to him , in telling him plainly of his faul●s , who manifests himself to have quite cast off all respect to truth , gods word , antiquity , his readers , and even to his own conscience . but the doctor begins to argue , have at saint peter then in this chapter , have at the pope in the next . his first evidence then ( as he calls it ) is from scripture , that st. peter was the apostle of the circumcision , or iews , exclusively to the uncircumcision , or gentiles . whence he insers , that st. peters authority , being restrained to the jews onely , could not be universal to the whole church . so that all his first evidence is to evince the no-authority that apostle had over the gentiles , or the exclusiveness of any apostleship in respect of them . but first mr. hammond tells us , what he means by an apostle , to wit , a commissioner of christ , endued with authority by him ; and this commission given to him , as to all the other apostles , indefinitely and unlimitedly ; not restrained by christs words to any particular province , but equally extending to the whole world. where , since he would go about to define an apostle , he might have done well to show in what he is distinguished from a disciple . however , all he there says , is true ; onely we adde , that neither by any subsequent act of theirs ( as the doctor imagines ) was this illimited commission given to each by christ , restrained to particular sorts of men , or several large diocesses or provinces , so as to make them lose thereby their jurisdiction over other persons or places : however they might agree for the better propagating the gospel , to disperse themselves into several nations ; or by the provident cooperation of gods spirit , have a more especial gift in converting some sorts of people , then others ; and so applying more their industry , where they experienced more fruit of their preaching , got thence by their particular addiction to that sort of people , or that nation , the appellation of their apostle or doctor . no exclusiveness therefore of their ample authority and apostolical jurisdiction from any sect or nation ; no hedging or fencing in the unbounded vastness of their universally-extended mission and commission within the verge of any particular province or people . yet mr. hammond will needs have all their authorities limited , for fear st. peters should prove unlimited ; and therefore layes for his ground , to conclude st. peter apostle of the jews onely , that they distributed their universal great province into several lesser ones . this he evidences ( for you must conceive , that all these chapters are perfectly connected discourses , that is , manifest and noon-day evidences ) out of two places in the sacred scripture , in explicating which also his chief talent-lies . these therefore we must endeavor to clear as far as our abilities will give us leave ; for the reader can imagine no less , but that these two places , being the foundation of the doctors future discourse , must be most unconfutable evidences ; and consequently must needs cost as much toil and labor in the answering . the first place he alledges to prove , that the apostles had especial and peculiar provinces exclusively to one another , is that of acts . . where the apostles pray god to shew , whether of the two proposed ( justus and matthias ) he had chosen , that he might receive the lot of that ministry and apostleship , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whence ●udas strayed to go to his own place ; where he will needs have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. to signifie a lesser province . whereas first it is evident to common sence , that the lot of an apostleship is nothing but the charge and office of an apostle . secondly , it is most manifestly shewn to be nothing else , by the whole intent and transaction of the business ; which was not , to allot one of them a lesser province , but to chuse a twelfth apostle . thirdly , the subsequent effect of the casting lots no less manifests it , delivered us in this tenor of words , the lot fell on matthias ; and , he was numbred with the eleven apostles ; nor , and thereupon he got the government of a lesser province . fourthly , it is most plainly opposite to scripture ; for in the seventeenth verse of this very chapter , st. peter useth the self-same phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. ( which the doctor makes here stand for lesser provinces ) to express iudas his dignity whence he fell ; and in which , ( as the very place cited by the doctor , manifests ) the apostles desired another should succeed , but no man ever dream'd that iudas had a lesser province assigned him : it is therefore point-blank opposite to scripture , to writh the words to this interpretation . fifthly , this supposed , the doctor is contradictory to himself , to imagine that , in which st. matthias succeeded iudas , a lesser province ; since he acknowledged before , that this division of provinces was made after our saviours ascension ; and consequently iudas , who was dead ere his resurrection , had no such province in which another might succeed him . sixthly , it is most notoriously contrary to all antiquity ; and consequently , either manifesting a most shameful ignorance , or wilful malice in so mistaking it : for whosoever gave but a glance into those studies , will plainly discern , that the apostles distributing themselves into several provinces , was done a long time after the coming of the holy ghost ; whereas this installing of st. matthias into his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he will have lesser provinces , was manifestly before the coming of the holy ghost , as whoso reads the end of this chapter , and the beginning of the next , will clearly discover . lastly , it is against your own translation , which expresses that , the room of this ministration and apostleship , from which judas hath gone astray ; which your special gift of interpreting scripture makes signifie , st. matthias his lesser province . so that , all accounts made up concerning this place alledged , the result is , that this first evidence , or rather the ground of dr. hammonds future evidences , is so strong and unmovable , that it alone resists the whole world ; being evidently opposite to common sence , repugnant expresly to scripture , injuriously contrary to all antiquity , prevaricating from the translation of their own church , and lastly , contradictory to the doctor himself . but , humanum est errare , no man but is subject to error ; he will make amends ( doubtless ) for this mistake in the next testimony . sect : . the examination of doctor hammonds second evidence , that the apostles had distinct provinces , so to prejudice st. peters universal pastorship . his next ground from scripture ( to put it out of doubt , that the apostles had even then particular provinces exclusively to one another ) that st. peter calls the going to those lesser provinces , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to go to his proper place or assignation . good reader , view but the place alledged and wonder . st. peter speaks there of iudas his prevaricating from the apostleship , and going to hell ( which is there cal'd his proper place ) to receive his eternal damnation ; and the doctor calls it , going to his proper place , or assignation for the witnessing the resurrection , and proclaiming the faith or doctrine of christ to the world. so as now the doctor hath found iudas a diocess amongst the devils ; and by his blasphemous interpretation would have st. matthias succeed him . so blinde is schism , when it is grown to an inveterateness , that a proof of quidlibet è quolibet , is a sufficient argument , nay an evidence to legitimate disobedience ; of which , these two testimonies the ground of this chapter , are most pitiful proofs . and now can any man , that entitles himself a preacher of gods word , have the face to appear in the pulpit , to interpret those sacred oracles , after he hath been challenged and discovered to have so wilfully , and shamefully abus'd and corrupted them . and , alas , kinde readers , and dear countrymen , how tender a sence of your misery it must forcibly breed in any charitable heart , to think upon what slender reeds your present faith , by which alone you hope for salvation , depends and relies . these are the men ( for no priviledge is annext to your first reformers and teachers , more then to mr. hammond ; ) these , i say , are they , to believe whose interpretations of scripture you have left , the sence and faith of the whole world ; to follow whose false call , you have abandoned , and forsaken the cherishing and gathering wings of your tenderest mother , the catholick church , to stray up and down in a disordered wilderness of distractions . that church , under whose care , your prudent and pious ancestors for so many hundreds of years were brought up in a secure unanimity and settledness of belief : that church , in whose bosome they died , and from whose holy arms they quietly delivered their happy souls into the hands of their redeemer , her ever-blessed spouse . that church whose authority was under-propt with the strongest supports which can possibly be imagin'd to strengthen the frailty , and settle the fickleness of humane belief , in a most firm and constant adherence to supernatural truths ; such as are the motives of a never-interrupted apostolical succession , universality , sanctity , unity in faith , uniformity in practice , the ever-constantly-self-like order in hierarchical government ; the exactness in discipline ; the possession of , and skill in the sacred writ ; the conversion of all nations , and ours amongst the rest ; the splendor and reverence she observes in her ceremonies , and administring the sacraments ; the long-enjoy'd continuance of the belief of infallibility ; the learning and multitude of her doctors and fathers ; the unmoved constancy of her martyrs ; the angelical purity , and seraphical devotion of her religious sons and daughters ; the higher and more elevated strain of piety in those cherubins in flesh , her sublime and heaven-soaring contemplatives ; the eminently good and charitable acts ( proper fruits of that tree ) many remainders whereof our thankless and ungrateful countrey still enjoys : and lastly , all these , with many more , by a conspicuous visibleness to the eye , easie to be known , and most of them actually acknowledged by our very enemies . this church , i say , and all those pregnant motives , greater then which , the world cannot afford , nor mans wit invent to oblige to a secure belief , you have slighted ; and suffer your dear souls to lie at stake , under the most dangerous accusation of a grievous schism , without having any better game to play , or any other excuse to alleage in counterpoize of so many weighty motives , then onely the bare fidelity and skilfulness of some few private men ( such as is this doctor ) who pretend to be wiser in interpreting scripture , then all the world besides ; and who will not stick , when they want better shifts , to delude your eyes with obtruding their own forgeries and sillilycritical explications ( as doth this doctor ) for most absolute evidences . awake then , as you tender your souls endless good or misery , awake ; and let these gross-absurdities , with which they impose upon you , rouze you from the lethargy of such an easie credulity . wisely bethink your selves in time , how unsafe it is to relie on the bare authority of their slippery interpretations , and relinquish the sence of the whole catholick world : which both possesses a thousand motives they dare not lay claim to , and even in their own pretence , which is the right interpreting of scripture , ought in all reason to have infinite advantages . of this , dear reader , i thought good to admonish thee by the way ; in which , if i may seem to have said too much , the doctor will make my words good in the process of this work ; and if i have now complain'd for nothing , he will give me cause , ere he ends this chapter , to complain for something . but ere i proceed , i desire the reader to heed attentively what is in question , and what is granted . it is granted , that saint peter preach'd to those of the circumcision or jews ; and for the more particular fruit , which by gods especial assistance he found , and the more pains he took amongst them , was called their apostle : as also , that st. paul preached to the gentiles ; and for the greater cooperation he experienced of gods assistance in that work , which made him more particularly addict himself to them , he thence had the appellation of the apostle of the gentiles ; as he himself clearly explicates himself in the place the doctor alleages , gal. . , . where he gives the reason why the jews more particularly belonged to st. peter , and the gentiles to him in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for , he that wrought with peter for the apostleship of the circumcision , wrought with me also ●…mongst the gentiles . where the particle ( for●… manifestly renders the reason why these t●… apostles were more properly particularized 〈◊〉 these two parts of the world ; to wit , by 〈◊〉 other designation , then the more especial c●●operation of gods efficacious assistance , as 〈◊〉 yet more plainly shown in the ninth verse 〈◊〉 the same chapter . this therefore is evide●… and out of question , that st. peter more peculiarly applied himself to the jews , and st. paul to the gentiles , at least in the beginning of the church . that which is in question , th●… is , whether the jews were so particularly st. peters province , that his authority was limited to them ; so that he neither did , nor coul●… intermeddle in the conversion of the gentile●… that is , had no jurisdiction over them ; an●… the contrary of st. paul. this is the docto●… position , from whence he takes his first evidence against st. peters universal pastorship ▪ that this apostle was apostles of the circumcisi●… or iews , exclusively to the uncircumcision or gentiles . which assertion is so shamelesly false , s●… expresly-opposite to all scripture , and ancient history , that it was not possible for a man to invent a paradox so totally unwarrantable ▪ and improbable as this . nay more , i promis●… the reader , and mr. hammond too , that if amongst those many testimonies he produces to prove it , there be but found any one sentence ▪ line , word , syllable , or letter , which exclude● st. peters authority from the gentiles , more then what this man puts in his of own head , i will be content to yeeld him the whole controversie . and may not a doctor of divinity be asham'd such a proffer should be made him in those very proofs of his , which he would bear the reader in hand are most perfect evidences . and first his pretended place of scripture , ●al . ● . . ( which we have before explicated ) ●nely says , that the apostleship of the iews or circumcision was committed to st. peter ; but ●hat it was of the iews onely , or none but them , ●o as by the particular commission to convert ●●em , he lost or was excluded from any jurisdiction over the gentiles ( which is the doctors ●ffertion , and can onely advantage his cause , ) ●…ere is neither in that place , nor any where ●…se , the least syllable . whereas it is impossible 〈◊〉 should not see that the contrary ( to wit , that 〈◊〉 . peter both had authority , and did preach 〈◊〉 the gentiles ) was as manifest in scripture as 〈◊〉 sun at noon-day ; half the eleventh chap●… of the acts being employed in a most ex●…ss narration of st. peters vision , exhor●…ing ●…n to preach to the gentiles , which he accordingly did , and went immediately by an espe●… mission of god to convert cornelius a gen●… , where he preached to him , and his whole ●…se . as also st. peter in the council at ieru●…m affirmed saying , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . god hath chosen amongst us , that the gentiles should hear the ●…d of the gospel by my mouth , and believe . what 〈◊〉 we think now of this doctor , who puts , ●…vident out of scripture , that st. peter had no authority to preach to the gentiles , where as the scripture expresly says , he was chose out of the rest , and particularly authorized so that end ? is this man fit to be accounted 〈◊〉 expounder of gods word , who thus wilfull perverts , and purposely contradicts it ? besides , if st. peter were made apostle 〈◊〉 the jews exclusively to the gentiles , by the same reason st. paul was made apostle of 〈◊〉 gentiles exclusively to the jews . for the wo●… alleaged ( gal. . . ) the gospel of the uncircumcision was committed to me , as the gospel of 〈◊〉 circumcision was to peter , ( upon which on●… the doctor builds this tenet ) equally inser●… exclusiveness of jurisdiction in one , as in 〈◊〉 other , over his fellow apostles province ) as 〈◊〉 particle ( as ) signifies , and the doctor him●… confesses section seven , unless the word ( peculiar ) must lose its signification . yet it is 〈◊〉 evident that st. paul , where ever he ca●… preached first to the jews , as appears most evidently , acts . . & . . & . , , . wh●… it is said , that it was st. pauls manner or c●… to go into the iews synagogue , and preach ch●… faith. also acts . , . where st. paul s●… of himself , that ever since he came into asia , witnessed both to the iews and grecians , the 〈◊〉 pentance towards god , and faith towards ch●… likewise acts . . & . . where the formation against st. paul , was , that he t●… all the iews , such and such things that foll●… there . so acts . the whole chapter al●… being a sermon of his to the iews . again 〈◊〉 . . & . . where we finde , that , 〈◊〉 at rome , st. paul preached to the iews , 〈◊〉 and now let the reader judge if this be ●… most steel'd impudence , thus point-blank , and diametrically opposite to the whole stream of scripture , and onely upon his bare word to impale and confine the authority of the apostles , to mutually-exclusive and contradistinct jurisdictions ; and all this , meerly out of malice ( forsooth ) against the pope , to cut short his authority , as he is successor of st. peter . these are the evidences , dear countrymen , your doctors bring you to secure your souls from the most dangerous sin of schism . sect . . some consequences out of the doctors former grounds , and his further process in evidencing . yet let us see , at least , what work the doctor will make of it , if we let him alone to run blindly forwards upon his own grounds . he will have all the apostles to have several provinces limiting their jurisdictions , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as the doctor misfortunately called them ) which must be peculiar to each , and exclusive of one anothers right , else this preparative ground will make nothing to the doctor 's purpose . consequently to this foundation laid in the fifth paragraph , he begins the sixth thus , if the circumcision or iewish christians were peculiarly st. peters province ; and ( section seven ) the gentile christians , peculiarly st. pauls , &c. now if this doctor will stand to these grounds thus laid , i would gladly ask , what becomes of the rest of the apostles ? must they stand by , and look on while st. paul converts all the gentiles , and st. peter all the iews ? you dare not say , that they were subordinate to st. peter and st. paul ; that would endanger a kinde of primacy in jurisdiction : will you say then , they onely help● them ? that sounds dangerously still , and intimates some principality in the others ; allowing them no jurisdiction at all , but as far as the others please to accept of their aid . you must say , then that these provinces of st. peter and st. paul were promiscuously , and indifferently given to the rest . but the main pillars of your evidences , i mean your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which you say all the apostles had , and which apply'd to st. peter and st. paul , you will have to signifie peculiar and exclusively-proper provinces , will not bear , apply'd to the rest of the apostles , the sence of a promiscuous authority . it onely remains then , that they have no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is no exclusive jurisdiction or peculiar province at all , and therefore nothing at all to do . thus this courteous doctor hath by his acute way of reasoning , infinitely obliged the rest of the apostles in freeing them from the hard and laborious task their master enjoyn'd them , and getting them all leave to play . nor hath he less obliged the pope , if it proceeded from good-will in him , and not from malice and ignorance ; for indistributing between st. peter and st. paul the diocess of the whole world , he hath at unawares confirm'd the pope , their successor , to be the universal pastor of the whole christian world ; since it is most certain ; and by the doctor acknowledged , that the bishops of rome ( beginning with clemens ) succeeded them both in that chair and see. but is it not a pretty thing , that in his section six , contrary to the grounds he had laid himself ; and having no other reason , but his own conjecture , he cramps the vast jurisdiction of that bishop , apostle , and our saviours large commission of euntes in universum mundum praedicate evangelium omni creaturae . going into the whole world , preach the gospel to every creature ; given to each apostle , into those few pitiful parishes of the jews of the dispersion . and yet afterwards , repenting he had granted him so much , he balks his former too liberal donation to st. peter , of the lydian asia , and bestows it on st. iohn . but me thinks i hear the doctors evidences call aloud upon us to lend them a due consideration ; which therefore , especially the world , being now adays so scant of demonstrations , it were an infinite wrong to the advancement of sciences , carelesly to omit . and first he evidences , that st. peter had no primacy at ierusalem where st. iames sate ; or , as he terms it , singular supremacy . by which expression , if he would say , st. peter was not particular bishop of that place , it needs no evidencing : but if he intends such a primacy as is pretended st. peter had , what means the word singular ? or how does the doctor so quite take off all pretensions of st. peter to such a supremacy , as he brags , pag. ? because ( forsooth ) not peter alone , but james and john entrusted that charge to him : what a miserable doctor is this ? who makes account saint peter could not be chiefer in authority than the rest of the apostles , unless he did all things alone by himself . and how can it invalidate st. peters greater authority that he took other two with him ; since it is well known an archbishop going to consecrate a bishop , takes two other bishops with him , and yet it follows not hence , that an archbishop hath no higher degree of authority than the bishops . o , but he findes st. iames named before st. peter , gal. . . and that ( doubtless ) he fancies to be an invincible evidence ; not considering that if that argument were allow'd any weight , his cause were lost ; since in most , if not all other places in the scripture , st. peter is constantly named first of all the apostles . lastly , he tells us that st. iames had the principal place in the council of jerusalem , where st. peter is present ; and accordingly gives the sentence , acts . upon which , the rescript is grounded . where first , that st. iames had the principal place , is a pitiful guessing assertion of his own , without the least pretence of a testimony ; and yet he puts the word principal in other letters , as a main business . next , whereas he alleages that st. iames gave the sentence , and then quotes acts . . i finde onely that st. iames , after he had produced his reasons , sayes , wherefore my sentence is , &c. but the doctor turns my sentence which can onely signifie his opinion or judgment in the matter , into the sentence , which sounds a conclusive definition and decision of a business under debate . no wiser nor honester is his next assertion , that the rescript is grounded upon st. iames his sentence in particular , citing for it , ver. . of the same chapter ; but there is nothing there particularizing st. iames , but onely that , then ( to wit , after st. peter , st. paul , barnabas , and st. iames , had spoken ) it seemed good to the apostles and elders , with the whole church , &c. and upon what grounds can this demonstrative doctor affirm , that the rescript was grounded particularly upon st. iames his sentence , and thence deduce his priority of dignity , when as it is manifest to any one that shall read the chapter , that st. peters sentence was the same with st. iames , in the main matter controverted ; both concurring , that the gentiles should be freed from the grievous burthen of circumcision : and although the abstaining from fornication , things strangled , and blood , be found in st. iames his sentence onely , yet how can this argue a greater authority in iames ? did st. peter vote the contrary , and st. iames his sentence oversway ? or would not the advice of commanding them to abstain from the things there prohibited , have been voted and accepted of by the council , though the proposition had been made by one of inferior dignity ? unless , perhaps the doctor imagines the apostles and elders of the church , assembled in the council , were such weak , passionate and partial men , that they did not decree things because they were reason and fitting , but because st. iames spoke them , whose greater authority ( the doctor seating him in the principal place ) they were , you must think , somewhat afraid of . but any thing serves this doctor for an evidence . his all ▪ swallowing faith makes that seem a demonstration against the pope , which to us poor men , because of our unbelief , bears not so much as the least show of a probability . and , he imagines ( from the particle then ) in the two and twentieth verse , which he misunderstands ) that he who gives his sentence after another , hath an authority above him . though in reason one should rather think , after such debate as had been concerning this matter , verse . it argued some greater authority in him who should first break the ice , and interpose his judgment in such a solemnly-pronounced oration , as did st. peter . but the doctor will have the contrary a demonstration , and who can help it ? the up ▪ shot then of this paragraph is , that the doctors concluding against st. peters primacy from st. iames his being first named , is a prejudice to his own cause ; from his principal place in the council , the doctors own fiction ; from his giving the sentence , and on it grounding the rescript , two fine little diminutive frauds and abuses of scripture ; from his instalment , a frivolous peece of affected ignorance ; and thus you have a perfect account cast up of the doctors sixth paragraph in his fourth chapter of evidences . ere i remove to another , i desire the reader whose little curiosity has not invited him to look into languages , not to be amazed at the large greek citations , which here swell the margin : i can assure him they are nothing at all to the question , but of indifferent matters acknowledged by our selves : and i will be bound , both at this time , and hereafter for the doctors innocency in this point , that he is never tedious , nor over large , either in citations or reasons , which tend directly to the thing in controversie ; as hath heretofore in part been declared , and shall more particularly be manifested hereafter . in the seventh paragraph , to omit what hath been answered already , he tells us , that st. paul had no commission received from , nor dependence on st. peter , citing for it gal. . , . which words may import a double sence ; either , that the manner of conferring upon him the power of an apostle , was not by means or dependence on st. peter ; and so far indeed the scripture is clear , and we acknowledge it ; or else , that this power given him was not dependent on or subject to st. peter , as the cheif of the apostles ; which is the question here treated ; denied by us , nor contradicted at all by the place alleaged . but he proceeds in his fundamental absurdity , that those two great apostles wherever they came , the one constantly applied himself to the iews , the other to the gentiles , where if by , ( constantly ) he means most commonly or even always , yet so as they retained jurisdiction over the others province , then ( to omit , that it hath been shown contrary to scripture ) it makes nothing against us . but if it signifie exclusively , or so , that neither had any authority over the others province , ( in which sence onely it can limit st. peters universal authority , which as he expresses section six , is his aim ) then i refer the reader to my eighth section of this chapter , where he shall see the contrary manifested to the eye by nine or ten most express places of scripture ; yet the doctor goes on to evidence it by testimonies , which obliges us to address our selves with new vigor to bear the shock of so terrible an encounter . his first testimony is his own knowledge . thus we know ( saith he ) it was at antioch , where st. peter converted the iews , and st. paul the gentiles : but puts down no testimony at all to confirm the weaker ones of his own , we know ; which yet had been requisite , that we might have known it too . but he tells us , that certainly st. paul was no ways subordinate to st. peter , as appears by his behavior towards him avowed , gal. . . that is , from his withstanding him to the face . yet wiser men then mr. hammond , to wit , st. cyprian and st. austin thought otherwise , who interpreted st. peters bearing it so patiently , not as an argument of his less or equal authority , but of his greater humility ; that , being higher in dignity , he should suffer so mildly the reprehensions of an inferior , quem ( saith st. cyprian ) quamvis primum dominus elegerit , & super eum aedificaverit ecclesiam suam , tamen cum secum paulus disceptavit , non vindicavit ●ibi aliquid insolenter aut arroganter assumpsit , ut diceret se primatum tenere , & obtemperari à novellis & posteris sibi potiùs oportere ; nec despexit paulum quod ecclesiae priùs persecutor fuisset sed consilium veritatis admisit , &c. whom , though our lord chose to be the first of the apostles , and upon him built his church ; yet when paul contended with him , be did not challenge and assume to himself any thing in an insolent and proud manner , as to say , that he had the primacy , and so should rather be obeyed by newer and later apostles ; neither did he despise paul , because he had formerly been a persecutor of the church , but admitted the councel of truth . thus that ancient , learned and holy father st. cyprian ; yet mr. hammond hath certainty of the contrary . sect . . the examination of ten dumb testimonies , which dr. hammond brings to plead for him . the next testimony begins thus , accordingly ( that is , to the doctors own we know ) in ignatius his epistle to the magnesians , we read that the church of antioch was founded by st. peter and st. paul. after which follows another of the same author in his epistle to the antiochians , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , you have been the disciples of peter and paul. what then ? these testimonies are stark dumb in what concerns the doctors purpose ; for the founding the antiochians church and teaching them , might have been done by the promiscuous endeavors of those apostles . here is not the least news of distinction , much less exclusion of authority and jurisdiction ▪ true indeed , the testimonies are defective , and to blame ; but the doctor knows how to mend them by his interpretation . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , you have been the disciples of peter and paul. id est ( saith the doctor ) converted and ruled by them ; the iewish part by one , and the gentile by the other . was ever such an id est heard off ? to infer an exclusive distinction and limitation of authority from terms plainly promiscuous , and from which a confusion of jurisdiction might more properly be deduced . so as not a letter of the question is found in the testimony , but what mr. hammond with a blinde id est , addes of his own : insomuch as it is left a drawn match , whether his id est or we know be the better testimony : however , this is certain , that in the doctors apprehension they are both of them most absolute evidences , because it is most evident , he says them both without either authority or reason . he labors in the next place to found a distinction of the iewish and gentile church at antioch ; which , though it be not a jot to his purpose had he demonstrated it , yet it is pity to see what shifts he is put to in proving it . necessity makes many a man forfeit his honesty , a● this doctor hath also done too plainly here . where he abuses most grosly st. peter with his jewish proselytes , and the sacred scripture too , citing gal. . . that they withdrew from all communion and society with the gentile christians . whereas , in the text , there is no such word as all , in which alone he can found the distinction of the jewish and gentile church . neither ( as the place alleaged manifests ) did they any otherwise withdraw from them , tha● in refusing onely to eat the gentile diet ; yet this he calls , withdrawing from all communion ; as if the doctor made account there were no other communion , but in eating and drinking ▪ moreover , since to withdraw from all communion with another church , is against fraternal charity , and according to his formerlylaid grounds , a schism , ( a sin inexcusable by such light trifles as were then between them ) it follows most necessarily , that while he goes about to prove a perfect distinction of the two churches at antioch , he hath consequently made the iewish church , for withdrawing from all communion with the gentiles , schismatical ; and blessed st. peter himself , a schismatick , nay , a ring-leader of schismaticks : but , god be praised , the place is proved to be falsified , and so good st. peter is vindicated . his fourth testimony or evidence of the mutually-exclusive jurisdictions of these two apostles , is taken from the writer of the apostolical constitutions , who ( as the doctor saith pag. . ) accordingly tells us that evodius and ignatius at the same time sate bishops of antioch , one succeeding st. peter , the other st. paul , one in the iewish , the other in the gentile congregation . whereas the place alledged in the author ( which i will put down , because he slubberingly omits it ) is onely this , ( lib. . cap. . ) antiochiae evodius ordinatus est à me petro , ignatius à paulo : at antioch evodius was ordained by me peter , ignatius by paul. this is all ; there being neither before nor after , a syllable more concerning that matter . where ( besides that , the doctor will , i am sure , acknowledge the book of no sound authority ) you see the testimony produced , expresseth onely their ordination by the apostles ; but saith nothing of their sitting together , nor succeeding the apostles ; much less talks of the distinction of the iewish or gentile congregation ; least of all , of any mutual exclusiveness of st. peter and st. pauls jurisdiction there ; but all these , ( which are indeed all that is to the purpose ) are either voluntarily added by the doctor , or groundlesly supposed , or else must be pretended as deducible thence by mr. hammonds all-proving id est. however the story goes ( for it matters not much whether it be true or no ) it is manifest first that the doctor hath not brought a syllable of a proof to serve his turn , were it granted : next , that the testimonies by himself alleaged here out of eusebius and origen , calling ignatius the second , and out of st. ierom , calling him the third , make much against the sitting of two together : neither will he finde st. paul was ever accounted a parcel-bishop in antioch with st. peter , that he should have a properly-call'd successor there : however he might perhaps ordain some bishop to assist there after his departure . lastly , ere he sees what he does , he blindly sweeps down all his own laborious cobweb-work with a testimony out of theodoret , which affirms , that ignatius received the archisacerdotal honor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the hand of that great apostle st. peter , where the doctor leaves out the word great , iest st. peter should have too much . now then , the apostolical constitutions being a book which is excepted against by all sides , and theodoret being an author beyond exception , we have far more reason to judg by these testimonies , that great st. peter ordained ignatius also , rather then euodius onely ; so as the doctor is far from gaining , nay even comes off with no small loss from his own testimonies , notwithstanding the faithful endeavors of his id est to the contrary . his fifth testimony is out of st. irenaeus , which affirms , that the apostles founded and built the church at rome . the sixth , ( which the doctor praises for more express ) is of st. epiphanius , who testifies , that peter and paul were apostles and bishops in rome . the seventh from eusebius , who tells us , that the inscriptions on the apostles tombs mentions them as founders of that church . the eighth is from gaius , an ancient writer , who calls their monuments , the monuments of them that founded that church . the ninth is out of dionysius of corinth , who affirms both of the church of rome and corinth , that each of them was the foundation of peter and paul. the tenth out of st. prosper , who witnesseth , that peter and paul , the apostles , consecrated or constituted a church in the city of rome . these are six testimonies of his , which i have put down in order as they lay , and fully as he cited them , not omitting a syllable . and now tell me , i beseech thee , good reader , ( for it may be thou hast better eyes then i ) canst thou discern any the least word in any of these six testimonies , which even seems afar off to limit st. peters authority to the jews , and st. pauls to the gentiles , which is the point in question ? is there any thing spoken here more than in a general and promiscuous sense , that they builded , founded a church , were bishops , &c. do they ●ound any distinction or exclusiveness of jurisdiction ? when thou hast well examin'd thi● ; next , please to consider that to evidence by testimonies , cannot be done otherwise than by expressing the thing to be evidenced : which thing in our present case , being the restriction , limitation , exception , and exclusion of st. peters jurisdiction ( which , as given to our saviour , to him , and the other apostles , was , without controversie , universal ) this cannot be expressed , nor consequently evidenced by testimonies , otherwise then by restrictive , limitative , exceptive , and exclusive terms ; such as are onely , solely , alone , to none else , &c. this once understood and apply'd to the present occasion , and the doctors manner of proceeding , whosoever thou art that readest this answer , whether thou be'st catholick , protestant , puritan , nay , even the doctor himself , it is impossible but thou shouldst manifestly see that the doctor hath not said one syllable to the purpose ; there being neither in any of the former , nor following testimonies , either out of scriptures , fathers , or histories , any the least restrictive or exclusive sentence , particle or syllable for him : to say nothing , that all , both scriptures , fathers , and ancient histories are most expresly against him . what a most unfortunate man is this doctor to vent these for evidences ; and how unfortunate they , who hazard the eternal loss of their souls upon such mens writings . but , to return to our six testimonies : by what means , think you , does he make them speak to his purpose ? not by torturing and screwing the words , to confess what they never intended ; that were impossible in such stubborn allegations , and perfectly-silent in what concerns him : nor by intermingling words of his own to prompt them , and make them speak out , which is the old and often-discover'd trick of his fellows ; nor by criticizing , his former unsuccessful art ; but by pinning a paper of his own forging to the testimony alleaged , and gulling the reader to his face , that the author sayes it . so as the device is the same , onely the method altered ; for the said necessary paper-which he used to pin behinde the testimony , now he pastes before it , beginning the ninth paragraph , which introduces the formerly-recited testimonies , thus ; the same is as evident at rome , where these two great apostles met again , and each of them erected and managed a church , st. peter of iews , and st. paul of gentiles . ( hold doctor , the testimonies should have told us that ; why do you forestal them ? ) and then , as in the eight section , after his own bare we know , he used the transition of accordingly to bring in his authors : so now after he had straw'd the way with his own evident , as he pleased himself , he ushers in the modest testimonies with so many soe 's : so irenaeus , so epiphanius , so the inscription , so gaius , whereas indeed the following testimonies are no more so , or like his preface to them , and to the question they are produced for , then ( as the proverb says ) the running of the wheel-barrow is to the owing of six pence . the doctor shall put the similitude in form , and the reader shall judge : just as i say ( saith the doctor ) that st. peter , and st. paul , each of them erected and managed a church , one of iews , the other of gentiles , with exclusion of st. pauls authority over st. peters , and st. peters over st. pauls congregation : even so st. irenaeus says , that they built the church there ; st. epiphanius , that they were apostles and bishops there , &c. the reader may perceive the fitness of the rest , by applying them at his leasure . onely , ere i take my leave of these testimonies , i would gladly learn of the doctor , why , in his preamble to them , he maintains a distinction of churches belonging to st. peter and st. paul , and , then brings in st. prosper with a so , to witness it ; whereas himself in the nineteenth section of this very chapter makes the same st. prosper testifie the quite contrary , and a promiscuous jurisdiction over the gentiles , saying expresly , that peter and paul at rome , gentium ecclesiam sacrârunt , consecrated the church of the gentiles . were ever such mistakes incident to any other man , as are natural to this doctor ? but it seems he wants a good memory , a necessary qualification for him that says any thing at random , without ground , authority , or reason , to maintain a false cause ; or rather , indeed foreseeing the danger , he made the testimony whisper softly in english , lest it might be taken notice of ; translating ecclesia gentium , the church of the nations ; because the word ( gentiles ) would be too much reflected on , being that which throughout this whole chapter he hath absolutely interdicted st. peter to have any thing to do with . alas poor man ! sect ▪ : the examination of dr. hammonds irrefragable evidence , and other silent testimonies produced by him . but now we are come to his evidence of evidences , the seals of the popes , which the doctor ▪ here calls an irrefragable evidence . i know , the reader will expect some most express and unavoidable testimony out of some ancient writer , beyond all exception , and of the first class , witnessing , as the faith of that age , the contradistinction and contralimitation of st. peter and st. pauls jurisdiction . the testimony is out of matthew paris , which i will transcribe word by word , together with the doctors comment upon it . in the bull of the pope stands the image of st. paul on the right hand of the cross , which is graven in the midst of the seal , and the image of st. peter on the left . and this onely account ( saith the doctor ) given for st. pauls having the nobler place , quia , &c. because he believed in christ , without seeing him . ( here on earth ) addes the doctor , in a parenthesis . here is all that belongs to this testimony , transcribed to a word ; without any more , either explication or application to the matter before or after , than is here put down . and now , for gods sake , reader , tell me what canst thou discern here of st. peters being apostle of the iews onely , and exclusively to the gentiles , which may deserve it should be called an irrefragable evidence . my eyes are dazel'd , it seems , with striving to see a thing at such an unproportionable distance ; for i can espie nothing at all in it : had the question between us been , whether st. paul believed on christ without seeing him , or no , it might have served to some purpose ; but to our case it hath no imaginable relation . yet this eagle-ey'd doctor , in the bare pictures of st. peter and st. paul on a seal , can discern clearly an irrefragable evidence , that their authorities are exclusively-limited , st. peters to the iews , st. pauls to the gentiles ; which none living could see without his colour'd and insincere spectacles , to wit , blackest hatred and rancor against the pope : while he looks through these , any thing appears an irrefragable evidence , which may seem possible in his perverse imagination , to be detorted to the popes prejudice , and to wound him , though through the sides of st. peter . after this testimony or irrefragable evidence follows immediately in the doctor , and all this very agreeable to scripture , which onely sets down st. peter to be the apostle of circumcision , ( and of his being so at rome ( saith he ) we make no question . ) what means his all this ? for neither in any testimony , nor yet in the popes seal , is there any the least expression of st. peters being onely the apostle of the circumcision , save in his own words onely ; yet he says , that all this , is in that point agreeable to scripture ; it is then of his own words he means , which how disconformable , and totally repugnant they are to scripture , hath already been shewn . nor are they less dissonant in this very place to sacred writ ; for neither doth the scripture onely set down saint peter , as apostle of the circumcision , but james and john also . gal. . . nor is st. peter any where exprest as apostle of onely the circumcision , but expresly particulariz'd the contrary , as hath been manifested out of acts the fifteenth and seventh . so as that onely is your own forgery pin'd here to the scripture , as before to your too sober testimonies . neither your authors then , nor scripture , speak a word of saint peter being at rome the apostle of the iews onely ; the onely proof of it is your own unquestionable certainty of it exprest here , that of his being at rome you make no question ; so that your onely grounds and proofs of your position is , we make no question , and we know : and i here again confirm my former promise to you , that if you can shew me the least syllable , either in scripture or your other testimonies , expresly and without the help of your id ests , and scruing deductions , restraining st. peters jurisdiction to the iews onely , and exclusively to the gentiles , i will yeeld you the laurel , and quit the controversie . his twelfth testimony ( for his irrefragable evidence from the popes seal , was the eleventh ) is brought in with another so. so the scripture affirms of st. paul , that he preached at rome in his own hired house , receiving them which came unto him , acts . . which the doctor most fitly applies to the gentiles of th● city , the iews having solemnly ( saith he ) departe●… from him , vers. . but looking into the te●… i finde no such word as solemnly , which he , after his accustomed manner , pin● to the testimony nor any sign of a solemnity of departure , bu●… rather the contrary , there being in that plac●… no expressions , either of absolute relinquishing him , nor pertinacity , nor contempt ; but onely that after he had spoken , they departed and h●… much discourse or debate amongst themselves ; which is rather a sign of hoveringness and unsetledness in the business , not indisposing them t●… a return , then of a fixed and solemn rejectio●… of his society ; and rather a solemn dispute●… whether they should return or no , than so solemn a departure as master hammond imagin●… next , the doctor might have seen in acts ▪ . both paul and barnabas tell the jews boldly ▪ ( saith the text ) that they would turn to the gentiles , and depart more solemnly , shaking off th●… dust of their feet against them , vers. . another manner of parting then this was , and yet many times afterwards did they preach to the jews , notwithstanding their so solemn departure . lastly , what became of the jews which ( a●… is manifest in this eight and twentieth chapter and twenty fourth verse ) were converted by st. paul ? must they necessarily quite fall ou●… with st. paul , and never see him more , because he had perswaded them to believe in christ. yet the doctor upon authority onely of the word solemnly , which was of his own coyning , thinks he hath evidenced that st. paul at rome treated with none but gentiles ; the text it self not admitting so much as a probability of it . but all is good corn that the doctors mill grinds . his fourteenth testimony is out of st. ignatius ; i will first cite the words as i finde them in the author , in the place quoted by him , and then let you hear the doctors comment upon them . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( saith st. ignatius ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . what are deacons , but imitators of the heavenly powers , exhibiting to him ( the bishop ) a pure and blameless ministery ; as holy stephen did to blessed james ; timothy and linus to paul ; anacletus and clement to peter . this is all . and now , good reader , ( pardon me , that i am forced to trouble thee so often , ) i intreat thee , as thou lovest truth and honesty , to take this testimony and sift it well over and over , and then give in thy verdict , what thou canst discover in it , which , in the most far fetcht construction , can be said to evidence , that st. peter was onely over the iews , and st. paul over the gentiles . here to an ordinary eye , nothing seems to be said , but onely that st. peter had such two deacons , and st. paul other two , which are there named ; wherefore , i say , sift it well , and that with the disquisitive exactness as men do riddles ; and when thou hast spent all thy industry in vain , i will bring thee doctor hammond , who will cure both thine and my blindness by his exposition ; beginning his eleventh section thus , accordingly ( observe the old transition ) in ignatius ep. ad trall . we read of linus and clement , that one was st. pauls , the other st. peters deacon , both which ▪ afterwards succeeded them in the episcopal chair ; linus being constituted bishop of the gentile , clement of the iewish christians there . and there he stops . where all that any way makes to the purpose , is subjoyned by the doctor out of his own head . there is no dealing with such a terrible adversary ; who though he should chuse out his testimonies blindfold , and at all-adventures , yet hath such a perilous faculty , that nothing can come wrong to him , but he will , ere he hath done with it , make it speak pat to his purpose . what follows in this section , is onely a vain-glorious conceit , that he hath found out a way to enucleate a difficulty in history concerning linus and cletus , which all the historians in the world never dream't on before ; and this onely ( forsooth ) out of his own wrong ▪ laid erroneous grounds . but because the doctor says that this rare and unheard-of discovery , or as he calls it , his scholion , is unquestionably true ; as also because it is built onely upon the slippery sand of his own saying , already proved to be false , i will forbear to vex him , or trouble my self unnecessarily by vouchsasing it any farther confute . his twelfth section proceeding upon the grounds of his own scholion , lately brought to light , to teach the world new history , never heard of before , tells us , that in pope clemens the union of the iewish and gentile congregations was first made , and not in st. peter . so that the doctor first , upon his own giddy imagination , ●ancied them distinct , and now ( because he saw no more but one bishop succeed in the roman chair ) fancies them united , without any word from history to countenance the former , or any thing but his own scholion to make good the latter . and surely it were very strange that whereas the difficulty about the succession of clemens , was so ventilated , and the opinions so various amongst the ancient fathers , ignatius , tertullian , ierome , &c. no man could ever understand the business aright , till this happy age in which dr. hammond was born ; whose glow-worm fancy evidenced more then all the former lights of the church could discover . many evasions they found out to solve the difficulty ; as that anacletus and cletus were the same ; that clemens ( who ( as tertullian says ) ●ate the fourth , and yet was ordain'd by st. peter ) refused the office till the successive death of linus and cletus : to which solution recur s. epiphanius , ruffinus , &c. but none ever dream'd of dr. hammonds facile all-solving scholion , that linus was the first bishop of the gentile-christians after s. paul ; clemens the first of the iewish after st. peter ; which had been very obvious to those that lived so neer those times ; but the reason why they did not , is evident , because they never dream'd of a distinction of iewish and gentile church and bishops , whereas the doctor dreams of nothing else . the fathers and ancient writers were ( alas ) in a great mistake , imagining , that all the endeavors of the apostles ( as far as they could without scandalizing either part ) tended to reduce both the iews and gentiles to unity and uniformity in one church , and to unite them in him whom they taught and preacht to be the head ▪ cornerstone christ iesus , in whom is no distinction of iews and gentiles , till one mr. hammond , a protestant minister , came with his scholions and id ests , to teach them contrary doctrine . in the beginning of the thirteenth section , he affirms stoutly , that for another great part of the world it is manifest , that st. peter had never to do , either mediately or immediately in the planting and governing of it . if it be so manifest ( master hammond ) it had been easier for you to make it manifest to us ; and was requisite you should , it being your proper task ; otherwise to cry it is manifest , and yet bring nothing to prove it , is as much as to say , it is manifest , because i fancy it so . but as before you brought the invincible testimonies of we know and we make no question , for evidences , so now onely with an authentick it is manifest , you think the deed done , and your cause evinced . in his fourteenth section , he tells us , that st. john had the dignity of place before all others in christs life time , even before st. peter himself . this he proves plainly ( he says ) from his style of beloved disciple , and leaning on christs brest at supper . as if , because iacob loved ioseph more then all his other brethren , and therefore out of particular favor might have let him lean on his brest at supper , it must needs mean plainly , that yong ioseph was the highest of his brethren in dignity , had due to him the birth-right and inheritance , &c. and who sees not , that the posture of leaning on christs brest at supper , was not an orderly and ordinary manner of sitting , but onely a peculiar grace and familiarity used towards him by his lord ; yet the doctor is certain of it , and for more security gives us a gallant instance , that leaning on christs brest , signifies the first place next to christ , as being in abrahams bosom , plainly signifies ( saith this all-explaining doctor ) being in dignity of place next to the father of the faithful : from which instance of his , if true , it follows , that lazarus , who was in abrahams bosom , was above all the patriarchs and prophets except abraham ; as also , that none was in abrahams bosom except lazarus onely ; since there can be no more nexts but one . but it is no wonder to see the doctor trip now , who hath stumbled , nay faln down flat on all-four so often . in the rest of this paragraph , he tells us , that the jews in the lydian asia were st. iohns peculiar province ; in the next , that the gentiles there were st. pauls ; and when he hath done , destroyes both the one , and the other , with a testimony out of st. chrysostom concerning st. paul , which says that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; a whole entire nation , that of asia was entrusted to him . to which joyn what is manifest all over in the acts that st. paul preached to the jews in asia , it is palpable that this testimony affirms st. paul to have had jurisdiction over all in asia , both jews and gentiles . again , since the doctors ground● make the jurisdictions of the apostles exclusive to one another , and this place tells us , that the whole entire nation of asia was under st. paul , it must follow out of his doctrine of exclusive iurisdiction , that poor st. iohn had not so much as the place of a parish-priest allow'd him of his own , but what he was beholding to st. paul for . what an unpardonable blindness was this to prove st. paul over the gentiles onely , by a testimony which entitles him to the whole entire nation ? sect . . another dumb show of dr. hammonds testimonies , to prove st. peter over the iews onely . after such invincible testimonies alleaged ▪ the doctor begins to triumph , and tells us , that we cannot say any thing in any degree probable for st. peters universal pastorship over the churches in the lydian asia . and the reason he gives , is because they were so early famous , as that christ honored them with an epistle in the revelations . it must be a wonderful acuteness in logick , which can make this conclude ; christ wrote an epistle to those churches , therefore st. peter had nothing to do with them : as if the same reason did not as well exclude all the rest of the apostles as st. peter from their jurisdiction . but the doctor says they were early famous ; i ask him , were they earlier than our saviours chusing twelve apostles , and simon peter the first ? if not , their earliness will not hurt us , nor help you . his next two demands concerning st. iohns and st. pauls jurisdiction there , are already answer'd out of his own testimony from st. chrysostom . it follows , doth not ●t . paul give him ( meaning timothy ) full instructions , and such as no other apostle could countermand or interpose in them , leaving no other appeal , nor place of application for farther directions , save onely to himself , when he shall come to him . and then to make the reader believe , that all this is scripture , he quotes for it immediately , tim. . , . doctor , doctor , play fair above board . in the place you quote , there is not one word of all this long rabble , but the bare word come , as is evident even in your own translation , where i finde it thus . these things write i unto thee , hoping to come unto thee shortly . but if i tarry long , that thou maist know , how thou oughtest to behave thy self in the house of god , the pillar and ground of truth . where , in the fifteenth verse there is nothing at all of this rambling story , which the doctor talks of ; in the fourteenth verse , onely the word come : so as out of this seemingly-barren monosyllable come , the doctor hath miraculously caused a fruitful harvest of testimonies arise for his purpose ; to wit , that st. paul gave him such instructions , as no other apostle could countermand or interpose in them , that he left no appeal or place of application for further directions , save onely to himself , &c. where are all those quarrelling and exceptive terms ? but the doctor seems willing not onely to limit the apostles jurisdictions , but also to set them together by the ears ; as if they were jealous , that their fellow apostles , like usurping competitors , would intrude into their right , and therefore give express charge to debar their ambition from putting their sickl● into another mans harvest . good mr. hammond , let us have no more of these insincere dealings . let the restrictive and exclusive words , which onely make for your purpose , be the witnesses , not yours ; at least put them down with that distinction , as may easily be discerned ; and do not , after a company of your own expressions , mainly prejudicial to the controversie , immediately cite a place of sacred writ , without producing the words , and so gull the reader to to believe , that all which went before , is perfect and pure scripture . whereas , indeed scarce so much as a blank monosyllable is found in the testimony to countenance your alleaging it . but this is your solemn method all over your book . his next argument is , that st. paul gave commission to timothy without st. peter . and who doubts , but that each apostle might by his own single power , delegate and constitute whom he pleased , and where he pleased in any place of the world . i perceive by this whole chapter , that the doctor understands not the question , or at least could not have made a book , without counterfeiting , not to understand it . we voluntarily yeeld him , that each apostle had an apostolical commission over the whole world ; and yet fear no prejudice should hence arise to st. peters primacy , amongst the rest of the apostles . had master hammond known this , it might have saved him all that pitiful puzzle in making good his first evidence , that st. peter was over the iews onely , by patching those old garments of ancient testimonies with the new peeces of his self-woven additions . this concession of ours , and mistake of his ; shews the next paragraph , which harps upon the same string , to wit , that st. paul constituted titus primate in creet , to be nothing to the purpose : and i observe , that the doctor ( to give him his due ) hath very good luck in this , that he proves those things pretty plainly , which none ever denied . after this he tells us , that simeon metaphrastes affirms st. peter to have been in britanny sometime , and baptized many into the faith of christ , and constituted churches , ordaining bishops , presbyters , and deacons in the twelfth year of nero. how now , doctor , what will become of your excluding st. peter from any authority over the gentiles , if this testimony be true ; were not all the ancient britains , at that time heathens or gentiles ? alas no ; we and all antiquity were mistaken , the doctor tells us . that in all reason it must be extended no farther then st. peters line , as he was apostle of the circumcision , id est , ( saith he ) to the iews which might at that time ●e dispersed here ▪ so as though the story were true , yet the doctor hath ever a help at maw ; and rather then st. peter shall touch a gentile , he will fancy strongly , that there were i cannot tell , how many diocesses of iews in england ( since there must be several diocesses , where there are several bishops ) for st. peter to convert and govern . so that britain must swarm with jews , which might have been ( saith this evidencing doctor ) dispersed there ; and this without any authority , or likelihood , but onely because master hammond and his id ests say it . in the last place , the doctor concludes out of his former laid grounds , that is , out of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , iudas his going to hell , out of his own id ests , we know , it is manifest , we make no question ; out of his clasping together very unlike , and disaccording testimonies to his own voluntary assertions with the hooks and eyes of so , and accordingly ; but most of all out of the papers of his own additions , pin'd before and behinde the too-bashful proofs . out of these grounds , i say , without so much as one word in any testimony , either out of scripture , fathers , or history , restraining the commission of st. peter to the iews onely , he concludes , that that apostle could not be universal pastor of the church . this done , he hooks in with another accordingly a testimony of st. prospers , which calls them hereticks , who depart from the communion of christ , and his apostles ( in the plural ) says the doctor ; and then reckons up promiscuously such and such apostles , founding such and such churches . what follows hence against st. peters authority ? this testimony seems also something aenigmatical , and requires lynxe's eyes , or the doctors far-seeing and all-penetrating optick to look through the thick rinde of it ; which he willingly lends you in these words . where , as the church had the several apostles for their founders ( and those independent one from the other ) so the unity from which hereticks and schismaticks are said to depart , is said to have been founded equally in each of them , in john , james , and andrew as well as in st. peter . the word where , and is said , would almost perswade the reader , that all that follows is in the testimony , but nothing is there , or any where else , that the apostles were independent of each other ; nor , that this unity was founded equally in each of them ; nor in the rest as well as st. peter : but all these his doctorship huddles together of his own head . all the shadow of proof , one can have a glimpse of from this place , is , that the apostles are here named promiscuously , and without distinction , and that therefore all were equal : which , as it is onely a negative and non-concluding argument to say , that no distinction is here mentioned , therefore there was none ; so , were the conclusion admitted as consequent , it makes as much against christ , as against st. peter : for he is also named joyntly with his apostles , as those whose joynt-communion hereticks leave . so as if the mentioning of several persons indifferently together without distinction of superiority , argue an equality in their authorities , the doctors logick may with the same reason infer , that christ and his apostles were independent of one another ; that the unity from which schismaticks depart is founded equally in them , in john , james , andrew , as well as christ , &c. and this may serve for a sample of the doctors solidness in reasoning . yet , it is some sign of wit , if one can do himself no good , at least to do himself no hurt ; but the doctor by this very testimony , which made nothing at all for him , has most expresly undone all his former work , even beyond the help of an id est ; that is , beyond all hopes of remedy . for whereas he had bent all his endeavors to prove , that some apostles had the iews onely for their province , and had more especially insisted for nine whole paragraphs together , in limiting st. peters authority to the iews , no body knows where ; as likewise st. iames his to the iews in iudea , section six , and st. iohns to the iews of asia , section fourteen . this testimony by himself here alleaged , expresly manifests a jurisdiction over the gentiles , in all the before-limited apostles ; nay , even in all the rest ▪ the words are these , as himself cites them . in ipsâ ierusalem jacobus , joannes apud ephesum , andraeas & caeteri per totam asiam , petrus & paulus apostoli in urbe româ gentium ecclesiam pacatam unamque posteris tradentes , ex dominica pactione sacrârunt . james in ierusalem , john at ephesus , andrew and the rest of the apostles throughout all asia , peter and paul at rome consecrated the church of the gentiles , &c. where , though the doctor would blinde the reader with englishing gentium ecclesiam , the church of the nations ; yet it is most notorious , that that word in the plural , denotes particularly the gentiles in opposition and contradistinction to the jews ; as is evident , matth. . . in viam gentium ne abieritis , &c. go not into the way of the gentiles , but rather to the lost sheep of the house of israel . the same is manifest , matth. . , . & . . & . . & . . mark . . luke . . acts . , . & . . and in almost innumerable other places , both in the old and new testament . thus the doctor by this his strongest testimony which he had laid up in store to conclude with a plaudite his foregoing proofs , hath quite invalidated all the rest ; and so ha● brought his evidences at length to a fair market , which as before they were shewn to be but feeble props to support his partition-wall of schism , which he is about repairing , and daubing , or playstering over ; so now by an unluckily-lavish testimony of st. prospers , which told more then he would have had it , he hath made clean-work , and quite razed down his former crazy tottering structure ; and that from , the very foundation , id ests , and all . sect . . doctor hammonds second general evidence against st. peters supremacy , from the donation of the keys , found to be obscurer then the former . the second quarrel the doctor hath against st. peter , which he calls his second evidence is , that no power of the keys was given especially to st. peter , and therefore no supremacy . but before we come to scan the doctors pretended evidences , it were not amiss to advertise the reader first , what an evidence is ; that this notion being set , as it were , in the confines and mid-way between the past and following proofs , he may at once , and with a readier glance of his judgment , examine the strength and validity , both of those the doctor hath already produced , and those he shall produce for the future . an evidence therefore , is that which is so clear and manifest a representation of a thing to the eye of reason , as unless we should with a wilful blindness shut those discerning powers , it is impossible not to see it . this clear and undeniable manifestation in arguments drawn from reason , must be both of the verity of the promises in themselves , and also of the necessary and immediate sequel of the conclusion out of the premises , thus evidenced ; and if evidence in either of these be wanting , then that argument cannot in true reason be styled an evidence . but now a proof from authority is then call'd an evidence , when both the testimony it self is authentick beyond dispute , and also the words alleaged so directly expressing the thing to be proved , that they need no additions , nor explications to bring them home to the matter , but are of themselves full , ample , and clear , nor possible without manifest wresting to bear any other interpretation ; and , in a word , such as the alleager himself ( were he to express his own thoughts in the present controversie ) would make choice of to use . this presupposed as a certain rule ( as no man of reason can or will deny it ) both to judge the doctors former evidences by , and also these in question , we will now fall to examine them . but first we charge the doctor with prevaricating against his pretended promise : for whereas he begins as bearing us in hand he would bring evidence , that st. peter had not the keys given to him in particular , he brings not one express proof for the negative , but goes about onely to solve our testimonies for the affirmative ; which is not to produce evidences of his own , but to endeavor an answer to our strong allegations for it : and this is a quite different thing ; for he who undertakes to evidence , sustains the part of the opponent ; but he who strives to evade anothers objected testimonies , manages the part of the defendant ; whose offices ( as appears ) are opposite and contradistinct . neither indeed is this to bring evidence , but rather obscurity ; for though he should obtain his purpose , he can onely shew by this means , that such or such arguments do not conclude , but not that the thing it self is untrue ; the evidence of which must depend on the strength of the grounds and goodness of the deductions , out of which and by which , the contrary is inferred . secondly , we charge him with a palpable injuriousness in making the answering our testimonies out of scripture , the sum of his first proofs , and yet omitting our chiefest , strongest , and most important place of all , iohn . , , . thirdly , we charge him with manifest calumniating , in saying , we pretend this donation of the keys , as a peculiarity , and inclosure of st. peter , and impugning it accordingly ; whereas he cannot be ignorant , that the catholick church holds no such thing , but that each apostle enjoyed an universal commission of jurisdiction , and power to binde and loose ; which yet debars not st. peter from being the head of them , and having an especial authority or primacy . these things premised , to shew the doctors false manner of proceeding , we buckle close to the question . the first place which the doctor cites , as alleaged by us for the particular donation of the keyes to st. peter in particular , is matth. . . i will give unto thee the keyes of the kingdom of heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt binde on earth , shall be bound in heaven . which the doctor acknowledges a promise to st. peter ; yet thinks to defeat it with other two places , iohn . . and matth. . . where they are delivered in common , and in the plural to them all . indeed , if we pretended out of the former testimony a peculiarity and inclosure of st. peter , so that he onely , and not the others , had power to binde and loose , then the doctor had by the following places extending it to all , concluded strongly against us . but we never pretended any such thing ; so that the doctors own calumny is the onely ground of inferring his conclusion , and solving the objected testimony . all therefore that we intend to deduce out of this place in st. matthew , is , that ( whether those words ▪ be the instrument of christs donation , as the doctor calls it , or no , yet ) something was said to st. peter , in particular , and by name , which was not said to any other apostle in particular , and by name , as is most undeniably evident : for it was never said to iames , iohn , philip , &c. in particular by name , and in the singular , i will give thee the keys , much less after such a solemn manner , as was to st. peter . first , with a particular blessing and encomium of him , blessed art thou ( in the singular ) simon bar ▪ jona , for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee , but my father which is in heaven . then , alluding to his name in particular : and i say unto thee ( again the singular ) that tu es petrus , &c : thou art peter , and , super hanc petram , upon this rock will i build my church , and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it . then follows , and i will give unto thee ( still in the singular ) the keys of the kingdom of heaven , &c. necessarily therefore it must be granted , that something was said to st. peter in particular , and that solemnly and upon particular occasion sprung from st. peters own person , vers. . which was not said to any other apostle in particular . and , since this saying was a promise , it follows , that a promise of some thing was made to st. peter in particular : wherefore , seeing this thing promised was the giving the keys of heaven , it follows , that the promise of giving the keys of heaven was made to st. peter in particular : neither will the doctors proving , that they were given afterwards in common to the rest , prejudice this at all ; for there is no difficulty , but the same thing may be given to many in common , and yet to some one of those many in a more particular manner . now then , this promise being made not onely to all the apostles in general , but also to st. peter in particular ; it is most consonant to reason , and worthy our saviour , not onely to perform his promise , but also to perform it according to the tenor and manner in which he promised : but the doctor cannot or will not finde any performance in particular , but wholly omits it ( and indeed it was dangerous , for it was our best and most express testimony ) and instead of it , produces onely a performance to them all in general . whereas iohn . , , . he might have seen it expresly recommended and encharged upon st. peter particularly and by name once , twice , thrice ; with as many repetitions of his name particularizing him over and over feed my lambs ; feed my sheep , feed my sheep . and least such an one as mr. hammond should after so many expresly-peculiar designations , doubt yet there might be an equality , our b. saviour asks st. peter , amas me plus his , dost thou love me more then these ; which manifestly puts a particularity , comparison , and inequality in saint peter from and above the rest of the apostles in the interrogatory ; and therefore the inference upon its resolution ( feed my sheep ) encharged upon him as an argument of this greater love , and the cause of this trust , must in good consequence of reason be unequal , and particular in saint peter , in comparison of the other apostles . these and some others are the testimonies from scripture , which ( to speak with the least ) every impartial man will see , that even taken in themselves they sound much to our advantage , and the prejudice of our adversaries ; but interpreted by the catholick church , according to her never-erring rule of faith , give us an infallible certainty , that they express a primacy in st. peter , whatever the doctors private judgment imagines or ghesses to the contrary . in a word , the result of all dr. hammonds answer is , that our saviour promised indeed in particular , but did not perform as he had promised , that is particularly , but in common onely : that is , by such a solemn and singularly applied promise , he made good st. peter expect great matters , ( as any man in reason would , by such a carriage ) and then , when it came to performance , quite deluded his expectation , giving him no more then the rest of his fellows ▪ it follows in the doctor . the applying the words particularly to saint peter hath one special energy in it , and concludes , that the ecclesiastical power of oeconomy or stewardship in christs house ( of which the keys are the token , isa. . . ) belongs to single persons , such as st. peter was , and not to consistories or assemblies , that whatsoever st. peter acted by virtue of christs power thus promised , he should be fully able to act himself , without the conjunction of any other ; and that what he thus did ( clave non errante ) no one or more men on earth could rescind without him ▪ which is a just ground of placing the power ecclesiastical in the prelate , not in the presbytery , &c. this is master hammonds corollary out of the former texts , out of which ( ploughing with our heiser ) he concludes against the presbyterians . but first since those words are particularly applied to st. peter , all that is implied in those words are particularly also appliable to him ; and this being the donation of the keyes ; it follows , that the donation of the keys , and whatever is consequent out of that donation , or signified by those keys , is particularly applied to him ; but the keys are the token ( saith the doctor ) of ecclesiastical oeconomy or stewardship in christs house . this office therefore must be particularly applied to st. peter ; and seeing those words were no otherwise particularly applied to st. peter , then by our saviours speaking them to him in the singular , and in a singular manner , ( as he did ) it follows , that our saviour told st. peter in the singular , and in a singular manner that he should be steward of his house . also , since all particularizing is a kinde of exception from an universality or community , and the universality or community before whom our saviour spoke it , and from whom any kinde of exception could be imagin'd to be there made , was the other apostles , it follows , that st. peter was particularized out of that community for the office of steward in christs house . again , since the keys are the token ( as the doctor proves ) of the ecclesiastical oeconomy and stewardship in christs house , and , however we read that the effect of the keys , that is , power of binding and loosing , was given to others , yet it is no where exprest in scripture , that the keys themselves , the badge of that office , were given to the rest even in common , ( for it s no where read ●●bis dabo claves ) it follows manifestly , that if our saviour kept his word to st. peter , since he promised him the signal token of that office of steward , he performed it to him making him steward of his house , and by the delivery of the keys ▪ installing him in that charge ; so as onely st. peter was installed ; and if the doctor will needs contend the rest were , he must confess withal , that he hath no ground for it , since he will never read either of such a promise or performance made by our saviour , that he would give the keys themselves , which onely are the badge of that function to any of the rest . thirdly , since the giving the keys is particularly applied to st. peter , and that those keys are a token of an oeconomy or stewardship in christs house , it follows , the apostles being a part of christs house , or his church , that saint peter was constituted ecclesiastical steward over them . fourthly , the doctors inference from the particular application of these words to st. peter , that the stewardship belongs to single persons , and not to consistories and assemblies . if he intend to deduce hence a power in all the rest of the apostles , and all other prelates , superior to their assemblies or consistories , is something scrued and far-fetch'd ; whereas if the words be applied to infer , that one was made steward or superior in the consistory or assembly of the apostles , they are plain and obvious , the present circumstances making that explication natural . lastly , saint peter being thus constituted steward in christs house , all that follows in the doctor ( though otherwise meant ) runs on very currantly , and upon his grounds ; to wit , that whatsoever st. peter acted by virtue of christs power thus promised , he should be fully able to act himself without the conjunction of any other , and that what he thus did ( clave non errante ) no one or more men on earth could rescind without him . thus hath doctor hammond , while he disputes against his brother presbyters , faln into a sudden fit of popery , and at unawares laid grounds for a greater authority in the pope , then many papists will grant him . but it is onely a fit ; he will recover , i doubt not speed●ly , as soon he begins to combate us afresh . but now ( as i said ) the scene is chang'd ; the presbyterian being routed by our weapons , that the words were spoken particularly to st. peter , he throws them away ; affirming here pag. . most shamelesly and expresly against scripture , alleaged by himself , ( which named st. peter in particular , and no other in particular ) that this power was as distinctly promised to each single apostle , as to st. peter , alleages for his first evidence the words of scripture , matth. . . which he says are most clear for that purpose . but looking into the text , i finde it onely spoken in common , and general to all the apostles ; not a word particularizing each single apostle ▪ and distinctly ( as the doctor would have it ) which yet was done to saint peter , matth. . . his second most clear proof , is introduced with the old accordingly thus ; and accordingly , matth. . the promise is again made of twelve thrones for each to sit on to judge , id est , ( saith the doctor ) to rule or preside in the church . well done , doctor ; give you but your own proper weapon of id est , in weilding which you have a marvellous dexterity ▪ and i 'll lay an hundred crowns on your head against the best disputant in christendom . all the world ( as far as i ever heard ) except this doctor , understands the place as meant of our saviours coming to judgment at the resurrection , and the apostles sitting with him to judge . but the doctor with the help of an id est , hath made the day of judgment come in the apostles time , turned judge into preside ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a throne , or iudgment seat into cathedra , an episcepal chair or see. his third proof is a dumb negative , that the holy ghost descended on all the apostles in fire , without any peculiar mark allowed ▪ to st. peter . which reduced into form , mutters out thus much , that st. peter had no peculiar mark of fire , ergo , ( concludes the doctor ) he was not head of the apostles . where first i would ask the doctor , how he knows there was no peculiar mark allowed st. peter . he was not there , i suppose , to see , and there is no history , either sacred or prophane , that expresses the contrary . next , if we may judge by exterior actions , and may believe , that out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks , then perhaps the doctor may receive some satisfaction in this point also , that st. peter had in a more peculiar manner the holy ghost : for it was he that first burst out into that heavenly sermon which converted three thousand . but nothing will serve the doctors curiosity , except a greater tongue of fire ; if he have not that , it is most clear , he is no head of the apostles . what a wise man is he to think st. peter could not be chief pastor of the church , but god must needs be bound to watch all occasions , to manifest it by a particular miracle . his fourth is from these words , and they were all filled with the holy ghost . in the name of wonder , what can be deduced from this place against st. peters primacy ! the doctor will manifest it plainly ; and so ( saith he ) the promise of the spirit equally performed to all . suppose it were equally ; what follows thence ? therefore st. peter not chief of the apostles ? as if none could be higher in dignity , but he must necessarily have more of the holy ghost in him . this reason then , you see , is so shallow , that even a childe may foard it ; but his consequence is still shallower , inferring from their being full of the holy ghost , that they had it equally . as if each could not be full according to their diverse capacities , and yet receive it in a very unequal degree . our saviour ( luke . ▪ ) is said to be full of the holy ghost , so is barnabas , acts . . yet ▪ as i hope , the doctor will not say , barnabas had the holy ghost equally with our saviour ; so , all the saints in heaven are full of glory , yet differ as one star from another in the degrees of that glory , distributed to them according to the measure of their several capacities . which puts me in minde of a story of a plough-man , who dining with his fellowrusticks , when his companions strove to get the bigger eggs , he indifferently chose the lesser ; affirming , that all were equal : for which , when he was laught at , he defended himself with this ( as he thought ) serious reason , that the little eggs had as much meat in them , as they could hold , and the great ones had no more ; and therefore there was no difference between them . surely the doctor heard this dispute , stole the argument ; and now infers here from all , being full of the holy ghost , that all had it equally . the testimonies you alleage out of the fathers , that the power of the keys was conforred on all the apostles ; that from the giving st. peter tho keys , the continual successions of bishops flows ; that the church is built upon the bishops , &c. we allow of to a tittle , and charge it upon you , at either a pittiful ignorance , or a malicious calumny , to pretend by objecting those , that we build not the church upon bishops in the plural , nor allow any authority to them , but to the pope onely ; whereas you cannot but know how great authority we give to councils ( consisting of bishops ) insomuch , as it is a school-dispute amongst our writers , whether the pope or the council be of higher authority . neither do the testimonies of bishops ( in the plural ) in the least manner touch us ; there being not one word in them , excluding the pope . nay , rather they make for us ; for the church being founded on apostles and bishops , prejudices not st. peter and his successors to be the chiefest : and if so , then the church is built most chiefly , and especially on st. peter and his successors , which is all we catholicks say ; and not on them onely ; which he first calumniates us with , and then dreamingly impugns ; ending his two and twentieth paragraph with a testimony out of st. basil , who calls episcopacy , the presidency of the apostles ; the very same ( adds the doctor ) that christ bestowed upon all , and not onely on one of them ; as if we held there were but one apostle , or else that those bishops who succeeded the rest of the apostles , and were constituted by them , were not truly and properly bishops . it follows in the next section . by all which , that is , by your omitting our best proof from scripture , and answering the weakest ; by supposing a calumny ; by your mistake of twelve thrones ; by st. peters having no greater a tongue of fire , and all the apostles being full of the holy ghost ; by the testimonies of fathers , naming bishops and apostles in the plural , our of which meer plurality , he infers an equality of authority . by all this , the doctor says it is evident again , that the power which christs commission instated on st. peter , was in like manner entrusted to every other single apostle , as well as to him , &c. whereas he hath not produced one syllable , expressing any singularity used to any other single apostle , as was to st. peter ; nor one equalizing term , of as well , equally , &c. but what he addes himself : though these be the onely expressions can serve him , and which he pretends to here , as already produced ; and by producing them to have made the matter evident . but the doctor being by this time pump'd dry of his own evidences , betakes himself to his former method of answering our arguments , or ( as he calls it ) to evacuate them . and what argument think you will he chuse to evacuate ; but that which is drawn from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and how will he evacuate it , but first from homers iliads , next from the revelations . but indeed he puts our argument so weakly , or rather not at all ; that is , he swallows our proof so glibly , and yet evacuates it so groaningly , that it were charity in some good body to ease him in this his greatest extremity . the sum of his solution of i cannot tell what ( for he urges no argument of ours , but onely puts down the bare word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) seems to be this , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and therefore signifies vulgarly a stone , and in homers iliads is applied to denote an huge loggerly stone like a mill-stone ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : ) next , this stone by the scripture must needs be a foundation stone ; and there being twelve foundation-stones named in the apocalypse , called there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it must follow , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which before was a vulgar-stone ) is now advanced to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or a precious stone . now follows his first inference ( as well as i can gather it ) that all the twelve apostles being in like manner ( and not st. peter onely and above the rest ) styled foundation-stones ; it is consequent hence , that all were equal . where first the argument is again onely negative , to wit , that no distinction is there put , therefore there was none : to make which inference good , he must first shew that , if there were any distinction , it must necessarily be exprest upon all occasions . next , it is a most pitiful peece of reason to perswade the reader from onely a plurality , and naming twelve apostles , that all were equal : as if out of the very naming in the plural twelve signs , shires , cities , or magistrates , it must necessarily follow out of the bare common name of sign , magistrate , &c. given to each of them , that all were equal . again , the doctor hath quite overthrown his cause by arguing , that not onely st. peter , but the rest also were called foundation-stones ; and therefore they were all equal : since , granting ( as he does ) that a foundation-stone , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being the same , and onely st. peter having the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it follows in the doctors grounds , that he onely , and , in good reason , that he more particularly should be a rock or foundation-stone . where note , that the doctor would have all the apostles call peter ; for the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being given st. peter , by our saviour , for no other end but to signifie he was a rock , or ( as the doctor will have it ) a foundation-stone , and every apostle being according to master hammond equally such , it follows , that they have all as good title to be called peter , as that apostle , who alone ( till master hammond writ , ) had that appellation . it follows ( to strengthen his former weak reason ) and it being there in vision apparent , that the wall of the city , id est , of the church , being measured exactly , and found to be an hundred forty four , id est , ( saith he ) twelve times twelve cubits , it is evident , that that mensuration assigns an equal proportion , whether of power or province , to all and every of the apostles ; which is again a prejudice to the universal pastorship of any one of them . thus the doctor , intends for an up-shot-argument to evidence an equality in all the apostles by the equal division of this wall. but i crave leave to ask the doctor , whether he be certain , that none of those precious stones , which equally made up this wall , is richer then the rest . for the richness in things of this nature , being more considerable , and more enhancing their value , then the bulk and quantity ; it follows ▪ that the greater preciousness and lustre which manifests it self in one above another , may better claim a signification , that that apostle , who is represented by it , had an authority above the rest , then the equal measure of the wall can infer an equality ; nay more , if there be an equality in the bigness , and an inequality in the worth , there is no evasion , but it must resemble a worthier person . in order to which , there comes a congruous argument to my minde ; such , as if it were on the doctors side , and he had the managing of it , i know he would make it a most irrefragable , and unquestionable evidence : and , though catholicks ▪ who understand the grounds of their faith , ●light such poor supports as a self-fancied explication of the obscurest part of scripture ( in which chiefly consists the doctors talent in evidencing ) yet because perhaps he may fancy it stronger then twenty demonstrations , and so it may come to do him much good , he shall have it very willingly . amongst these twelve pretious foundation-stones , denoting the twelve apostles , the doctor will not deny the first to signifie st. peter , to whom , he and his fellows , are content at least , to grant from our saviours words a priority of order . this first foundation then shadowing to us st. peter , is here chap. . . said to be a iasper ; the self-same stone whose lustre shined in our saviour , apoc. . . and also in his church , apoc. . . whence follows ( would the doctor triumphantly cry out ) as an irrefragable evidence , that st. peter onely having the same lustre with our saviour , is like him in representation , and so onely he resembles him as his vicegerent or vicar : as also , that being the same stone the church is made of , and the first of all the rest , it is unquestionably true ( would he say ) that he is the first part of the church , that is , her head. under what luckless constellation was mr. hammond born , to meddle with the foundation-stones in the apocalypse , and not fore see this dangerous rub ; which makes him so far from evidencing against us thence , that the very place objected , happens to be an evidence against himself ; i mean , such a kinde of proof , as he would call an evidence . and thus he concludes his fourth chapter , containing the first substantial part of his book . in which , as i sincerely profess i have not found one word to the purpose , that is , not one restrictive word of st. peters universal pastorship , nor one express equalizing term of his power of the keys to the rest of the apostles ; so , i must confess withal , that i have both wearied my own patience , in laying open such a gallimaufry of shallow impertinences ; and , i fear , my reader also , who may think his time ill-employ'd in perusing the confutation of so weak a writer . the second part. comprehending the answers of the fifth , sixth , and seventh chapters . sect . . of the pretended primogeniture of antioch , and the doctors mistake of the council of chalcedon . this champion of schism having ( as he thought ) empal'd the universal jurisdiction of st. peter to the dispersed iews onely ; proceeds , laying first his own mistakes for his grounds , in this fifth chapter to depose the pope , which he entitles thus , the evidences from the bishop of romes succeeding saint peter , examined ; as he did the fore-going chapter , the pretended evidences of the romanists , &c. where , first , he would perswade many good honest readers , that he had urged our evidences home , and afterwards salved them ; whereas indeed he onely puts down a word or two of our bare tenet , and that not even as we explicate it , much less as we evidence it . secondly , he would seem to intimate again , that , it belongs to us to evidence ; let the doctor know , the churches evidence is her long-and-quietly enjoy'd possession of the belief of infallibility ; in which , she was actually found when his upstart and disobedient forefathers , the first reformers , went out from her-communion . possideo , quia possideo ; olim possideo , prior possideo , is all the evidence , and all the reason she is bound to give to her rebel-sons and out-lawed subjects . so as it is your part to evidence , hers to hold and possess her own , till you sufficiently , that is , demonstrably , evidence her title to be unjust . thirdly , the doctor is here also , as indeed generally every where , contrary to himself , inscribing the chapters , as answers to our evidences , yet spending almost the whole chapters in producing pretended evidences of his own ; so performing the quite contrary to what he promised . but this is nothing with him . his first paragraph sayes onely , that st. peter having no primacy , the bishop of rome his successor , could consequently have none . but because his antecedent hath already been dash'd in peeces by my answer to his former chapter , no consequence can be built upon it , till he have repaired his ground-work by a stronger reply . yet mr. hammond is so self-conceitedly confident of the invincibleness of his former chapter , that he accounts this a work of supererogation . whereas , if to prove his first evidence , he hath produced any one express testimony , that st. peters iurisdiction was limited to the iews onely , which onely was the thing in question ; or if to prove his second evidence , he hath produced any one express place to prove , that the keys ( though given to all ) yet were not more particularly given to st. peter ( which onely is there the thing in question , ) i will quit the field , and yeeld , though not my cause , yet my own particular conquer'd . but if he have not , what a vanity is it to brag , when he had said nothing at all to the controversie , that he hath said all that is necessary , nay , even supererogated , and said more then needs . in this second paragraph , the doctor would evidence , that the priviledges attending st. peters succession , belong rather to the bishop of antioch , then of rome . and this he endeavors by asking three questions , to which i shall answer in order . first , he asks , whether st. peter did not as truly plant a church of iewish believers at antioch , and leave a successor bishop there , as at rome he is supposed to have done . i answer , if you mean he planted a church there of iewish believers onely , so as he had no power over the gentiles also , i absolutely deny it ; and in your last chapter , your proper place to prove it in , you had not one word to bless your self with , but what you added of your own . that he left a successor bishop there . if you mean such an improperly call'd successor , as both himself and st. paul left in many other places , that is , made some one a bishop , and left him to overlook and govern that church , i easily grant ; but if you mean such a successor as should succeed in the amplitude of saint peters authority , so as st. peter should devest himself of his primacy , and give it him , not carrying it along with him to rome , i deny he left there any such kinde of successor , neither can there be the least shadow of reason , why he should ; nor is there any testimony or ground that he did . your second quere is , whether this were not done by him , before ever he came to rome ? i answer , in the manner i have declared , doubtless he did . your third quere is , whether these two concessions do not devolve all power and jurisdiction on the bishop of antioch , st. peters successor there , which by that tenure and claim of succession from st. peter , can be pretended to by the bishop of rome ? i answer , the first is not a concession , unless first distinguished , as i shewed before ; and the distinction given , intercepts the passage to his conclusion . to manifest which the better , we may distinguish in st. peter , resident at antioch , two diverse qualities of dignity : first , his particular care of that church , as private bishop in that see : secondly , his publick office of head of the church , in which , consists his primacy . now when he left that city and went to rome , he devested himself of the private care of that church , and so it was necessary he should substitute another in the charge of that private bishoprick ; but did not devest himself of the dignity of chief of the apostles ; and so no pretence can be competent to his substitute in antioch . this dignity annexed to his person by our b. saviour , went along with him , whithersoever he went , and remained with him living ; so that onely he who succeeded him dying ( the bishop of rome ) could claim the inheritance of that sacred dignity , which nothing but his blessed predecessors death could delegate unto him . at rome he died , and was by dying devested ; where he was devested , there was necessary a succession into the dignity , which he left , and was wanting by his death to the whole church : this was his primacy . this therefore must be the title of his truly called successor there , and no pretence left for his substitute at antioch made in his life time . most vain then is the doctors conceit of the primogeniture in antioch , unless he could prove st. peter died there ; in vain are his self-affirmed , and onely-self-proved positions in his third section , to this purpose . in vain his assertion in the beginning of the fourth , that if rome derived any authority from the succession of st. peter . antioch , must for the same reason be preferred before alexandria ; since st. peter onely constituted there a successor to himself in the dignity which he then stript himself of , that is , of the private charge of that church ; which being onely an ordinary office , and no particularity resulting from st. peters personal authority ; it had consequently from the force of such a substitute instalment , nothing to elevate it beyond the pitch of an ordinary bishoprick ; and so it remained ▪ liable upon convenient reasons afterwards ensuing , to be ranked after alexandria . this bolt then falling short of the mark , he is resolved at length to shoot home , and for his better advantages , stalks under the patronage of the council of chalcedon ; citing a canon thereof , that the see of constantinople shall have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , equal priviledges , dignities , and advantages with rome , upon this account , that constantinople was new rome , and the seat of the empire at that time ; which , say they , was the reason , that rome enjoyed such priviledges ; and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the fathers at constantinople being moved with the same reasons , had rightly judged , that now the same priviledges should belong to that church or city . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and that this being next to old rome , should in all ecclesiastical affairs have the same dignity or greatness that old rome had . thus far the doctor . where , first , i would ask him how he knows that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies the primacy ; are there no kinde of priviledges , but of equality in jurisdiction . next , i would know why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , can exact no other interpretation but as she , must needs be interpreted , as much as she , or have the same dignity or greatness ; deducing an equality or identity from the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which onely denotes a similitude or likeness . thirdly , i must chide mr. doctor , ( and with very good reason too ) for englishing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in all ecclesiastick businesses , whereas there is no such word as all in the council ; and in this word all , purposely added by the doctor , consists the most efficacious part of the testimony . for the wor● all may include possibly the authority o● primacy it self , which no other word there alleaged , can in any way signifie . but the doctors pen is still very free to let down ink , when any thing of importance is to be added to a testimony . fourthly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying nothing but certain honorary , pompous , or ceremonious priviledges , which might have accrued to some church , by the residence of the supreme secular power there . i see no necessity why the popes legates might not omit to oppose the reason there given , for the collation of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; whereas had the word signified primacy , which was then as strongly and expresly pretended to come from christs donation to st. peter ( as is evident in pope leo's epistles , whose legates presided in this council ) as it is now by these present popes , then we should have heard another story . fifthly , the doctor grants , that this decree was as derogatory to the dignity of antioch as rome ; but it is evident , that antioch pretended to no primacy over the whole church : evident therefore it is from the doctors own concession , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not signifie primacy of jurisdiction , neither consequently was that struck at by the tumultuous constantinopolitans sixtly , the very council where this was handled , calls and acknowledges rome the first ; which the doctor will interpret a precedency of order onely , and this he will grant she retain'd notwithstanding these equal priviledges arrogated to constantinople , if then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 equal priviledges , may be supposed to be given to another , romes precedency and priority in order remaining untouched ; why should we think , or indeed , how can we think that that word meant the primacy , or that this was concerned in the decree , being much higher then the former ; since this was sacred , the other complementary ; this ever held as not possible to come otherwise then from christs especial donation , whereas that might have probably proceeded from ecclesiastical constitution . seventhly , the doctor ( onely proceeding upon a whimsie born and bred in his own brain ) tells us , pag. . that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a patriarchate , and the pomps attending it , and that canstantinople wanted onely the dignity of a patriarchate to be equal to rome . which is a most gross mistake , and plainly demonstrating , that the doctor took this testimony , as he found it dropt from the pen of some petty writer , and never ●etcht it from the fountains of ancient history it self : for it is certain , and by all acknowledged , that constantinople was a patriarchate before , but the fourth ; and now pretended to be the second , and so make alexandria the third , and antioch the fourth . yet the doctor runs on upon this ground , and ignorant of the truth of the history , winks and fights most cruelly ; paying the primacy of rome with his own sayings , even to utter desolation , till he comes to the end of the paragraph . eighthly , it is manifest by the history and acts of the council it self , that this was no free act , nor ever came off clear : the ambition of the clergy of constantinople , extorting it with a tumultuous importunity ; it being voted after most of the fathers were departed , and onely those of the party of constantinople left to determine in their own behalf , what they or their instigators pleased ; whereupon it was contradicted and exclaimed against vehemently the next day , by the western church , in the popes legates ; disavowed and rejected by the patriarch of antioch , and those under him . no patriarch of alexandria was there ; and all the metropolitans and bishops under him , refused to subscribe . the act it self , not numbred amongst the acts of the council ; till ambition , which , at first , receiving such a check from so grave authority , was modest , growing more impudent , when the reprehending and curbing power was absent , legitimated that bastard-issue , and pin'd it to the end of the council , as dr. hammond does his own sayings to the end of his testimonies . yet the doctor tells us , he could vindicate the validity of this canon , but that he means not to go out of his way . is it out of your way , mr. doctor , to vindicate that testimony to be valid , which you object for a strong proof against us , and we reject as of insufficient authority and illegitimate . in my poor judgment , it lies so directly in your way , that you cannot possibly do your cause better service , then to clear this point ; else why did you produce a testimony lying under a just exception , unless you would stick to it , and maintain it . it lay in your way , it seems , to put that large-senc'd monosyllable all into the testimony , that was just in your way , but to make good your own weak allegation , was quite out of your way . yet you were something excusable from under-propping your testimony , if you had been better employ'd in the mean time ; but i finde the whole fifth paragraph , in which you wave it , from the beginning to the end , made up onely of your own sayings , and some of those too false ; upon which ( as upon grounds ) you proceed with an unresistable career . so as your proofs are perfect cobwebs ; both the ground and the work upon it , being spun out of your own bowels . but instead of vindicating it , you first quarrel with us for strange dealing in not admitting any testimony against us , but wherein we have given our own suffrage , which you call a method of security , beyond all amulets , &c. thus the doctor , plausibly indeed , if his readers were fools , otherwise nothing can sound more unconsonantly . for either the pope is head of the church , or no : if he suppose negatively , then he plainly begs the question which hangs yet in dispute ; and then , upon this supposition , i will grant it is not onely strange dealing , but injustice , usurpation , tyranny , impiety , or whatever he will ; or else the pope was and is head of the church ; and then , the doctors words may be objected as well to any governor , or any man living , as to the pope ; and it is not strange dealling , but very good reason , that he should refuse to subscribe to an act , endamaging the canons of the church , it being his duty and obligation to keep them inviolate . and if pope leo could in reason reject it then , when one siding and self-interessed part of the council had voted it ; we can with as good reason reject it now , when dr. hammond alleages it . sect . . the doctors next evidence , that the pope is not head of the church , is from a canon in the council of ephesus ; where ( saith mr. hammond ) the independency of cyprus , not onely from the patriarch of antioch , but from all others whomsoever was contested then , as from the apostles times , &c. thus the doctor desirous to make the reader believe that cyprus had no kinde of dependency on any one whomsoever . though the testimony it self contests no more , but that from the apostles time they could never show , that the bishop of antioch was there , et ordinaverit vel communicaverit unquam insulae ordination is gratiam , neque alius quisquam , that is , and ordain'd or conferred the grace of ordination upon that i●and , nor any other . the testimony speaks onely , that neither the patriarch , nor any other ordained there , the doctor interprets it , that cyprus was independent on the patriarch of antioch , or any one whomsoever . which is not ingenuously done ; for there may be a dependency of subjection to the jurisdiction of another , though they never received from that other their ordination . thus you see , the doctor seldom brings us an account of any testimony , but less or more he will be sure to enflame the reckoning . but the council exempted cyprus from the peculiar subjection to a private patriarch in particular : true , but is there any thing exprest there , that either cyprus or the patriarch of antioch himself , were exempted from the obedience or jurisdiction of the bishop of rome , as publick head of the church , or was the popes primacy there called in question . this should have been exprest to make good your inference . but of this , we have not so much as a syllable , nor any thing that can deduce it ; since the i le of cyprus might well have been exempted from the obedience of any particular patriarch , and yet both it , and the patriarchs themselves subjected to one chief or head of the church : as there may be some free state or city in europe independent of any particular kingdom or province , and yet both that state , and all the kingdoms and provinces in europe , dependent or subject to the universal rule of an emperor , who is lord of the whole . yet the doctor hath not done with us thus , he hath another fling at us out of this council of ephesus , which determined ( saith the doctor ) that no bishop shall encroach upon anothers province , or usurp a power , where from the apostles times he had not enjoyed it . which how directly ( adds the doctor ) it prejudgeth the pretensions of rome , is so manifest , that it cannot need farther demonstrating . this therefore being dr. hammonds , primum principium , first principle , which is so evident by the light of nature , and cannot need farther demonstrating , it were not amiss , if we put it in a syllogism ; to let the reader see how unavoidably the doctor deduces a break-neck conclusion to the cause of rome out of it . the argument then stands thus . the canon of ephesus constitutes , that n●… bishop shall encroach upon anothers province , o●… usurp a power , where from the apostles time h●… had not enjoyed it : but the pope ( must dr. hammond subsume ) hath encroacht upon anothers province , and usurpt a power , where from the apostles times he had not enjoyed it . therefore , his pretensions are prejudiced by this canon of ephesus . where , as every childe may see , nothing follows out of the words of the council against the pope ( which are the major ) until the doctor makes good his minor , that the pope hath thus encroached , &c. yet this ( being all that belongs to him to prove ) he either supposes as a first principle , though it be the onely thing in controversie , or else begs of us to grant him gratis ; and then tells us the conclusion is so manifest , it cannot need farther demonstrating , surely he was afraid here also to go out of his way ; and with good reason , for had he gone about to evidence his minor , he would never have arrived at his conclusion . after this most palpable and evident demonstration , he gives us two instances of the same alloy : one of the archbishop of carthage , whom the emperor iustinian made equal in priviledges to the bishop of iustiniana prima ▪ the other of this last named bishop himself , to whom the constitution grants , omnem censuram ecclesiasticam , summum sacerdotium , summum fastigium , summam dignitatem : all ecclesiastical iurisdiction , the supreme priesthood , supreme dignity . these words sound high , and ( as the doctor thinks ) terribly to us : but first he must consider , that iustinians constitution is no decree of a council , nor his fact ( in case he had pretended it ) able to invalidate that sacred dignity of head of the church , had any such been constituted by our saviour . next he never intended any such matter as to crop the aspiring growth of rome , ( as the doctor imagines ) which is manifest by his sending to pope vigilius ( as strong a pretender of the primacy as any of his successors ) to bestow a pall upon his new archbishop of iustiniana prima ; nor would pope vigilius have consecrated him bishop ( as the doctor shufflingly grants he did ) upon these terms ; neither was it iustinians pretence , who onely meant to exempt him from the jurisdictions of them , whose patriarchates heretofore extended to that province . but let us come to the testimony it self ; either the words , all ecclesiastical iurisdiction , supreme priesthood , and supreme honor , must mean a supremacy over the whole church , or in his own particular diocess . if over the whole church . iustinian constituted him pope ; which no man in his wits will say , if over his own diocess onely , he might be supreme there , and yet subject to the pope too , as is visible de facto , even nowadays ▪ the next testimony is from an old mouse-eaten manuscript , concerning the authority of the said archbishop , forbidding appeals to any other , in these words , tu & omnes justinianae primae antistites , quicquid oriatur inter e●s discrimen , ipsi hoc dirimant & finem eis imponant & nec ad alium quendam eatur , sed suum agnoscant archiepiscopum omnes praedictae provinciae . what authority this manuscript is of ( for the latin shews , is to be of no antiquity nor humanity ) i know not , having not seen the book , it being hard to be found , and therefore a fit ground for an invisible doctrine . but this i know , it was pat for the doctors logick , which was to be besides the purpose . for here is nothing said , which was not common to the patriarch , and such metropolitans as cyprus was , to wit , that they had no ordinary appeal farther , as generally was none from any other patriarch , unless peradventure ierusalem , which was onely an honorary patriarchate . yet this no ways hinders , but that extraordinary cases , which could not be ended among themselves , should be carried to rome , such as are controversies betwixt the metropolitan himself , and the bishops his subjects , or betwixt him and some stranger bishop or patriarch : so that all this testimony is quite different from the case we handle , and leaves this bishop as subject to the pope , as any of the patriarchs , or any out of the patriarchate of the west was . but our kinde doctor is so free-hearted , he would not part without shaking hands , and doing us some good turn , and so was pleased to determine the question for us , in his next citation ▪ which is out of the of novel , of iustinian , c. . and the sense of it is , that he should be in all that diocess , the popes legate , which now we call to be legatus natus ; and in catholick times , was a thing annexed to the bishoprick of canterbury : wherein two things are clear , one , that his diocess remained notwithstanding all these priviledges , subject to the pope ; and that to magnifie his dignity , this was necessary to make him the popes delegate , as it was also divers times used to the very patriarchs ; to whose dignity all these priviledges did not elevate iustiniana prima , though they exempted it from them . iustinians words are , that in all that diocess he shall have locum apostolicae sedis ; which the doctor , ( not to seem an open prevaricator against his own party ) translates the place or dignity of an apostolical seat ; whereas he should have said , the place or lieu of the apostolical seat ; that is , should be the popes substitute . and i pray ( good doctor ) where did you read the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 explicated for honor or dignity ? and in what history do you finde such a dignity , as an apostolical seat in common ? what dignity had ephesus for st. iohus sitting in it , that the like should be given to iustiniana ? he goes on and tells us this was the occasion , why nicephorus said the emperor had made it a free city , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which to make more efficacious , he explicates with full power , independent from all others . we shall never out of the old proverb , the properer man , the worse luck ; he must needs be doing against himself , for this word convinces all the doctors process of nullity : for since nicephorus speaks not of the city onely as an ecclesiastical state , but also as a temporal one , and that by being made free and self headed , he exempted it not from the emperor by parity ; these words do not exempt it in ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the pope , whose power is as universal as the emperors , and extends it self much farther . the doctor was not so blinde , but he saw the consecration of the first metropolitan by the pope , did stand in his way : therefore to leap over this block , he tells us , it was necessary he should be consecrated by some body ; and that it is evident , being consecrated , he was independent , and his successors to be ordained by his council of metropolitans . it is a hard case , that this good doctor cannot speak three words , but one must unravel what the other knit . his excuse , why the pope consecrated the first bishop , was , because some body must do it ; and presently after , he tells us , not the pope , but the suffragans were to consecrate his successor . i pray then master doctor , why could not the metropolitans have consecrated the first , as well as the others , if that signifie independency ? but that is not our argument , nor do we think consecration implies dependency . but the argument we make from vigilius his consecrating him , is from two heads which the doctor either saw not , or thought not fitting his reader should see . the first is , that it draws a main consequence of the popes consenting to this erection , and so absolutely evacuates the doctors argument . the other is , that he did not onely consecrate him , but give him a pall , which act was a sign of superiority , and a kinde of benediction , and at least an honor , if not a jurisdiction . true it is , all this is nothing , if it be evident , that after consecration he was absolute , as the doctor affirms , and all are to believe , who will take his word for their faith . in the next paragraph , he tells us , that this particularity that his successors were to be consecrated by their council of metropolitans , is a second instance of the point in hand ; and i do not deny , but sometimes to be subject for ordination , was sign of subjection , but not always . the bishop of ostia hath the priviledge to consecrate the pope , yet the pope is not to be his subject : the council of sardica ordains , that the next province shall give bishops to a province that wants , yet makes not that province subject to it : the patriarch of alexandria gave the indians bishops , yet claimed no jurisdiction over them ; and consecrated the patriarch of constantinople , yet was not constantinople in his territories . therefore this is no rule of subjection , and if it were , the doctor must say this primate was subject to his own suffragans . neither did ever popes or patriarchs in ancient times , demand the ordination of all the bishops in their patriarchates ; nor does the pope at this day , demand it in other patriarchates , though he claim jurisdiction over them . but now , who can tell us what the doctor means , when he says the emperor did all this onely by making it a primates , or chief metropolitans see ; and that carthages being the prime metropolis of africk , is expressed by having the same priviledges with prima iustiniana . can any man think he intendeth other then to mock his auditory ? for as far as i understand , these words signifie , that the emperor said onely , be thou a chief metropolis ; and in so saying , gave all these priviledges : whereas all the doctors labor hitherto , and the texts by him cited , wherein every priviledge is set down so particularly , make it manifest , there were none or not eminent examples of any such cities or bishopricks ; and therefore so many particularities were necessary to be expressed , and it be made an example to others : yet upon this relieth the doctors main evidence , and demonstration . though , if you will believe him ▪ the conclusion of it self is most certain , and might otherwise be testified by innumerable evidences ; which we ought to suppose the doctor omits for brevities sake , and contents himself with this riff-raff , and his readers with bold promises and solemn affirmations . in his tenth section , immediately following , he draws out of his so strong discourse , a consequence able to make any sensible man understand the former discourses , were all vain and wicked : for says he , if from the apostles time there hath been an independent power vested in each primate , or chief metropolitan ; then how can it be necessary to the being of a member of the catholick church , to be subject to that one primate . worthy doctor , your inference is very strong and good . but i pray consider what is the consequent : surely this ▪ if there be no catholick church , the obedience to the pope , is not necessary to be a member of it . a very learned conclusion , and worthy of so long a discourse to introduce it ; yet see whether it be yours or no. you say , every chief metropolitan was independent from all others , they made therefore so many absolute churches ; therefore made not any one church . where then is the catholick church , of which we ought to be members ? many houses to be one house , is as fairly contradictory , as many men , or horses to be one horse ; and so of many churches , to be one church . a church ( saith st. cyprian ) is a people united to their bishop . if then there be a catholick church , there must be a catholick bishop ; and taking away the obedience to one bishop , you cannot save one church . i know you can talk like a saint , that christ is the head in which all churches are united : but the church is a government upon earth , and as an army with its general , or a commonwealth with its chief magistrate in heaven ; were no army , nor commonwealth : so without subjection to a visible supreme pastor , there will be no church on earth left us , whereof we ought to be members ; which is the true protestant tenet , whatsoever they may shuffle in words , an art wherein they are the most eminent of all modern hereticks . therefore he had reason to enlarge himself no farther , but conclude with the authority of his convocation , an. . to which , i confess my self unable to answer ; for it is a pregnant and unavoidable testimony : onely i may remember our old english proverb , ask my fellow , whether i am a thief ; or ask caiphas , whether pilates sentence against our saviour , was not just . you know it was a convocation of bishops , who for fear , renounced their oaths taken in their consecration ; and therefore men of no credit , upon their pure words in this case . now their arguments are no other , then what are already discussed , that is , meer cobwebs woven out of a tainted heart : besides , those who supervived that wicked king , for the most part , with hearty penance , washed away that crime ; and with their tears blotted out , as far as in them lay , the black indentures of that dismal contract . sect . . a discovery of dr. hammonds fundamental error , which runs through this chapter , and his ingratitude for our countreys conversion . the doctor proceeding in his own mistaking method , which is , to produce faintly , and then impugn our pleas , in stead of pleading for himself , who stands accused of schism , entitles his sixth chapter , their third plea from the bishop of romes having planted christianity among us : as if we pretended the conversion of this nation , to have been the reason , why the pope challenged here the supremacy ; or , that his being head of the universal church , depended upon his private apostleship , performed towards this nation . this is the ground of all his ensuing chapter , which being absolutely false , and forged upon us , it had been sufficient to have past it over with this civil reproof , doctor you mistake . for what catholick author ever affirmed , the pope is beholden to his ancestors care in bringing england to christs faith , for his supreme jurisdiction there ; or that his title of primacy had not been equal in this countrey , in case it had hapned constantinople or alexandria had sent to convert it ? we will therefore free the doctor from any obligation of subjection to the popes primacy , which he causlesly fears may come by this title ▪ so he will acquit himself , and the church of england , of another which lies heavy on them , and makes up the full measure of their schism , unless they retract it . for if greatest benefits , draw on greatest engagements ; and no benefit be so great , as that which rescues us from the devils tyranny , the the bonds of infidelity ; and brings us , by enlarging our hearts by faith , into the glorious liberty of the sons of god : sure no obligation can be conceived so indispensably-binding , as that which is due to those who were authors to us , of so inestimable a good . this consideration should make the enjoyers of that benefit , while they were sons to such a mother , more humble and obedient , in an especial manner , and by consequence in an high measure , aggravate the horrid sin of schism , in not onely rebelliously , but most ingratefully abandoning the communion of so tenderly beneficial a parent . this should make them after the breach made ( though they cannot yet so overcome their proper-will , and proper-judgment , as to return ) at least , candidly to acknowledge the benefits received from her , and to bear her a due respect ; however ▪ not to revile and reproach her . but against all history , and onely out of a few obscure and unauthentick sayings , to disacknowledge your highest obligation to her ; in stead of grateful courtesie , to slight , and contemn her ; to naturalize in the hearts of your poor auditors , an hatred against the very name of rome , and the pope ( to which , rome and its pope , you and they , are beholding , next , and immediately under god , for all the knowledge you have of christ , or his holy word : ) lastly , to revile that church , which ( till you broke from her ) had ever the most sacred title of christs onely spouse , with your scolding sermon-invectives ( grateful elegancies to your applauding hearers ) of idolatrous , antichristian , strumpet , whore of babylon , and all the venemous spiteful expressions , that ever were vomited from a malice-imposthum'd heart : these things , i say , are they which brand you beyond infamy in the judgment of prudent men , and double dy the dark-coloured sin of schism , with the deepest tincture of the blackest ingratitude . of this ingratitude , master doctor , clear your selves , first in breaking , next in your carriage and comportment ever since , and we will without much difficulty , disoblige you from any other duty , which you seem afraid you ow us , upon onely that score of conversion . yet you will needs have us hold , whether we will or no , that the pope is head of the church , because his predecessor converted england : and this ground laid in the air of your own fancy , you impugn as inconsequently , butting at us most formidably with a dilemma , or cornuted syllogism ; and telling us , that the popes primacy in this iland , is either from the donation of christ , or conversion by austin the monk : if the latter , then england was not subject to the pope before austin ' s coming : if the former , then is that other title of the conversion by austin , a fallacious pretence , a non causa pro causa , &c. this is the sum of his dilemma . in answer to which , i confess indeed , the latter title is , a fallacious pretence , a non causa pro causa ; but the fallacy is on the doctors side , who feigns us to pretend what we never thought on ; to wit , that the popes supremacy is grounded on any such title . one of the horns then of his dilemma , is a false one , and so the danger of being catcht between them , easily avoided . nor is his dilemma it self , more solidly founded , were both the particular pretences true ; for it wholly insists and leans upon this position , that no man can claim a possession upon two titles : on which ground ( to let us see he is a lawyer , as well as a divine ) he descants in these words , he that claims a reward , as of his own labor and travail , must be supposed to disclaim donation , which is antecedent to , and exclusive of the former ; as the title of descent is of that of conquest . thus this doctor of law. whereas , what more ordinary then to plead two titles at law , ( as for example , birth-right , and a formerly-given judgment ) for the same thing ? or , what more unreasonable then to affirm , that iacob who wrought other seven years for rachel , could not claim her as a reward of his service for that time , unless he renounce his right to her due at the former years end . do not we see daily , that those who have palpable right to their estate , when they cannot quietly enjoy it otherwise , by reason of the injustice of a wrangling adversary , are forced to compound for , and buy their own , without ●isclaiming their former title ? neither is his last instance more solid , then its fellows , that the title of descent is exclusive to that of conquest ; since the titles of donation and conquest , are as opposite as those he mentions , and yet it is well known , that william the conqueror pretended a right to the kingdom upon both these titles ; and henry the seventh ( if i mistake not ) upon three . but the thing is so clear , that it requires no further proof ; save onely to advertise the reader , that dr. hammond is the first lawyer i ever heard of , who denied a possibility of a double title to the same thing : yet i am glad to see by the doctors perfect ignorance , and utter unacquaintance in law , that he is , at least , a good , honest , quiet , sober soul ; not used much to trouble himself with law , nor wrangle with his neighbors ; which is a very great commendation , and better beseeming his innocent nature , which was never shaped to be a controvertist . next , proceeding still on his own false grounds , he goes about , first , ingratefully to deny , that st. austin the monk converted our forefathers : secondly , after some acknowledgment , to prove very unmannerly and uncivilly , no thanks due . as for the first , he tells us , that this iland was converted to the faith of christ , long before augustines preaching to the saxons ; citing many authors for it . where if by the word iland , he mean the ilanders , as i suppose he must ; i would then ask him , ( though the former ilanders were before converted by the missionaries of pope eleutherius , yet ) whether those that st. augustin was sent to convert , that is , the saxons were reduced before that time to christianity , or no ; if they were not ( as i am sure he must , and will acknowledge ) all the ancient inhabitants , the britains , being driven by them into wales ; then what a perversness and want of ingenuity is it in master hammond , to wave so ungratefully , that incomparable benefit which we englishmen received in our ancestors , by the popes fatherly care , first converted to christs faith ? and what a pitiful shift it is , to shew a willingness to put it off by quibbling in the words , this iland ; as if they did not signifie these ilanders , or the ilanders of the same race ; but these trees , woods , and mountains . the next page goes on very currantly , and without any rub , proving , that the formerlyplanted faith of christ , in this iland , was not totally extinguished by the ancient persecutions ; so to infer a less beholdingness of us englishmen to rome , and pope gregory the great for our conversion ; but all in vain ▪ for unless he proves , that they who had formerly embraced and retained that faith , propagated it to the after-comers , the saxons , ( who were ancestors to us englishmen ) or that st. austin was not the first that preached to these , ( which he will never do ) all the evidence he can bring from hence is , to prove himself ungrateful . then he ends this paragraph with a testimony out of the old obscure annals of gisburn , and brought to light by one of his own side , in which it is said , that the bishop of st. davids was consecrated by the suffragan bishops o● that province , nulla penitus professione vel subjectione factâ alteri ecclesiae . no profession or subjection at all being made to another church . where first , i would ask the doctor in which of these words he places most force ; in , their consecration by their own suffragans , and by no other ? what difficulty in this ? as if the pope could not be head of the church , but he must needs consecrate all the bishops in the world ; yet more then once the doctor hath bob'd us with this : or is it in these words , nullâ penitus , &c. no profession , & c ? as little follows hence ; for the custom of making a profession , or exhibiting subjection to the see of rome , when the bishops were consecrated ( exprest in those words , facere subjectionem ) was not then in use ; and though it were not now , it would not at all prejudice the amplitude of the popes jurisdiction , as head of the church . besides , the words being alteri ecclesiae , to another church ; not specifying rome in particular , it affords nothing express for the doctors purpose ; but may well bear the interpretation of the bishop of st. davids being independent of any within that continent , or ( as before was said of cyprus ) of any private patriarch : with which , as is evident , may well consist a subjection to the pope , as the churches chief and universal pastor . to what follows in the fifth section of the abbot of bangors answer , who flatly denied subjection to the pope of rome : first , we reply , it matters not much what the old abbot said ; for every one who hath read those histories , knows the ill-will of the britains was so extreme against the saxons , at st. austins coming ; th● apprehension of their tyrannous usurping their country , and driving them out of their own being , then ●lagrant and fresh in their memories , that they refused to joyn with st ▪ austin for the salvation of their souls . and they might probably be afraid , lest admitting and coming under saint augustins jurisdiction , they might open a gap for the further encroachment of their late cruel persecutors . neither was it hard to imagin , seeing the britains ever since aetius came to assist them , by reason of the turmoils of the empire , and several incursions of barbarous nations , had little or no commerce with rome : a remote abbot , whose office is to look to his own private monastery , should be ignorant of what was due to the chief pastor of the church , especially other as great errors being crept in among that nation . but what 's all this to us ? unless the doctor can prove that , whereas the whole christian world held the then pope , gregory the great , head of the church , as appears by his epistles to all churches . this abbot did well in denying that authority which all else granted , and submitted to ; or that this abbot communicated with them , who admitted and acknowledged it . for we do not undertake to defend , that there could not be at any time two , three , or more persons , who either out of disgust , ambition , interest , or ignorance , might speak or act against the popes authority , but that it was the profession of the then catholick church ▪ the words therefore of this abbot can make nothing against us , unless the doctor will undertake to vindicate him from ignorance and interest , and that out of settled and imprejudiced reason , he in so saying , pronounced the sence of the whole catholick church . yet i have not done with this story of the abbot thus ; i alleage moreover , that it is either absolutely fa●ulous , or else , both all ancient histories , and ( which is more ) doctor hammond himself is mistaken ; and therefore however it may possibly be true , yet can claim no credit if it be once taken in a lie . it makes the abbot in the close of his blunt speech , affirm , nos sumus , &c. we are under the rule of the bishop of caerlegion upon usk , who is to overlook and govern us under god. whereas it is manifest there was no such bishoprick at that time ; it being translated in king arthurs days ▪ which was fifty years before this , from caerusk to st. davids , as the doctor himself grants in the foregoing paragraph . but for a more full and perfect answer to this upstart instance of that ancient nation ( if what i have said , suffice not ) i desire the readers perusal of the ingenuous and solid appendix to that excellent manual of controversies , lately composed by the learned h. t. where i believe he will finde this new piece of antiquity irrecoverably confuted . what follows in the sixth paragraph , is onely a conclusion out of what he hath said , that the whole iland is not schismatical , because st. augustine converted not the whole . where first he onely proves the welshmen no schismaticks , but still leaves himself and his fellow-englishmen ( whom he ought to have cleared first ) in the suds . nay , though the britains were not then schismaticks upon that account , not being converted by st. augustine , yet now being subjected to the english bishops , and incorporated into their church , if this church be proved schismatical : the welshmen , who are sons , subjects , depending on . and a part of her must needs incur the same censure . besides , his premises being all invalidated , and his grounds wrongly laid , his conclusion must needs be weak and ruinous : for we do not accuse him of the substance of schism , for refusing obedience to the pope , as his successor , who sent to convert england ; but as successor to him , who had the primacy by the donation of christs own mouth : however , the former may render the rupture more enormous , seeing that part of christs seamless-coat was close knit to the whole , by such a near and firm obligation . sect . . his continuance of the same fundamental error , and some mistaking proofs , that kings can erect patriarchates . by this time the doctor , through gods assistance , and his readers christian patience , is come to the second part of his text ; which is , that even this part of the iland , which was converted by st. austin , cannot entitle the pope to supremacy over them . where , to omit that his whole grounds are erroneous ( as i have before manifested ) in supposing that to be our plea sor the popes primacy , let us see , at least , how consequently he handles it . to prove his position , he tells us , the nations converted by st. paul , were not to be ever subject to that chair , where st. paul sate ? good mr. doctor inform us what you intend by the chair , where saint paul sate : whether in the church of antioch , or rome , or the like , say you . but first , it is meerly a fiction that st. paul ever sate in any chair , or was fixt bishop in any place , but at rome onely with st. peter ▪ and to demand whether all countreys converted by him , ought to be subject to his successor there ( that is , to the pope , who succeeded both him , and st. peter ) is onely in another phrase to ask over again the question of the whole book , and is the same , as if he should ask whether the pope be head of the church . next , you tell us , that timothy and titus were supreme in their provinces , and independent from any other see. this indeed the doctor says , and we must believe him , though he brings not a word of proof for it ; which the second part of his assertion , concerning their independency , did necessarily require ; onely , he says , the contrary hath no degree of truth in it , which he makes account will carry the business , without bringing the least degree of probability for it . as for the first part , i would ask the doctor , whether st. paul were supreme over them in his life time , or no ; if he were , ( as i suppose both his epistles to them , and the doctors former large testimony from the monosyllable come , will manifest ) then their being supreme in their own provinces , consisting still with the superiority of st. paul , may ( for any thing deducible from that reason alone ) admit the supremacy of the head of the church , and their subjection to him : and the obligation lies yet upon the doctor to prove positively , that timothy and titus were totally exempt from st. peters jurisdiction ; for which , negative proofs are insufficient , or indeed for any thing else . yet the doctors quiver is full of such blunt shafts ; and it is an evidence with him to argue thus , i have not read it , or it is not exprest in this testimony ; therefore there is no such thing , or , therefore it is false : as hath been often discovered in the process of this answer . that which follows , that it is the nature of primates or patriarchs , to have no superior to exercise iurisdiction over them , is onely his own saying ; and so with like facility denied , as asfirmed . the ordination of them , by others , i have already shewn , not to prejudice the universal authority of the head of the church ; whose duty it is not to descend to otherwise suppliable actions , about particular members of that body ; but from the top of his primacy , to govern and overlook the whole , and to be conversant about that more universal sort of actions reserved , and proper to his larger power ; to the managing of which , the short-handed jurisdictions of particular patriarchs , were not able to reach . but now comes the most dangerous blow of all : the doctor did but take his aym all this while ; now he is fetching the fatal stroke , and me thinks i see the ax even now falling upon the neck of rome . he threatens in his ninth section , to put the whole matter out of controversie . and how , think you ? he tells us , that kings could ever erect and translate patriachates in their own dominions ; and therefore that the kings of england may freely remove that power from rome to canterbury , and subject all this iland to that independent archbishop or primate . there is a trick now for the pope , which he never dream'd of : where first you see mr ▪ hammond supposes , as granted , that the popes power is but meerly patriarchal , which is the chief , if not onely thing in question between us : so as his method to put the whole matter out of controversie , is to beg the supposal of the whole matter in controversie . this supposal laid for a ground , he repeats again for his first instance , those two late answered acts of iustinian , erecting iustiniana prima and carthage , two arch-bishopricks or primacies : though himself acknowledges , that carthage was not originally dignified , but onely restored to its primacy by the said emperor , after the wandals were driven our ; which being onely an act of preserving the former canons of the church inviolate , every good christian emperor , and prince , not onely may , but also ought to do it ; and when he does it , it is by the power of the canons of the church . as for the first instance concerning iustiniana prima , the dr. thinks perhaps , good man , that he doth well ; but put the proof in form , and he will , i am confident , be ashamed of the consequence . iustinian erected patriarchates ( saith the history ) therefore kings have power to do such acts of themselves , ( infers the doctor ) where the force of the illation is the same , as if one should say , the late parliament took away bishops ; therefore parliaments have a power to take them away : that a particular matter of fact may conclude a self-and-proper power in him that did it , you must first prove that power to be originally his own , and not delegated to him by another , pretending to it himself , who in our case is the pope : next you must prove , that if he did it without that delegation , yet his action was lawful . these , if you first prove , your instances will come to something ; otherwise , they are senceless , and infer less then nothing ; wanting both the crutches which may enable them to advance forwards to a conclusion . your next instance is , that the emperor valentinian did by his rescript constitute ravenna a patriarchal seat , where you quote no author but anno dom. . and indeed you did well , for the rescript is accounted spurious , and to have been foisted into the monuments of that church in the time of their schism . had you told us , how invalid the authority of it was , and how not onely for that , but for many other things it lay under just exceptions , you had been put to the puzzling task of defending its authentickness . the exceptions against it , are these : first , it begins in a different manner from the constant tenor of all other rescripts : next , the decree is singular , and consequently to be suspected in this ; that all the other rescripts made in the reign of the two emperors , though constituted by one of them onely , yet were ever authorized by both their names , whereas the name and authority of the emperor theodosius is wanting to this . thirdly , the inscription of imperator major is new and unheard of ; all the rest , entitling valentinian , imperator maximus . fourthly , the bishops of rhegium , placentia , and brixillis , are in the rescript named , as under the archbishop of ravenna , which is a plain forgery ; since , not long afte● ▪ pope leo commanding eusebius , archbishop of millain , to gather a provincial council of the bishops subject to him ; those three bishops met there , and subscribed to that council , as appears by the synodal epistle yet extant . fiftly , the same rescript which gives them archiepiscopatum , an arch-bishoprick , ( which you make a patriarchate ) granted them also the use of the pall ; which was never accustomed to be given by the emperors , but by the popes onely ; as appears by the epistles of gregory the great , to the then archbishops of ravenna . this last rub so puzzled hieronymus rubens to smooth it ( who out of a preposterous love of his countrey , cited this rescript for its priviledge ) that he was forced to explicate that pall to be caesarum paludamentum , such an imperial robe , as the cesars used to wear ; whereas , besides the unlikeliness of the action , it is plainly contrary to the rescript it self , which grants them such a pall , sicut caeteri sub nostrâ christianissimâ potestate saepe degentes fruuntur metropolitae ; as the rest of the metropolitans in his dominions often wore : which every one who hath but tasted of the study of ancient history , knows to have been another manner of thing , then the emperors robe . we cannot then in reason think other , but that either the rescript is false , and ( because no new bishop of ravenna could use the pall , without a new concession from the pope , as appears in st. greg. lib. . epist. . ) forged in the time of the schism , that they might have some pretence to retain still the use of the pall , which they accounted honorable . or , at least , it cannot be imagined to have been made without the popes consent ; since the pope in the very next year after the making of this presumed rescript , appointed and constituted ( even those of ravenna at first , being unwilling ) st. peter chrysologus to succeed in that see , after the decease of iohn ; as the same monuments affirm : whence , the doctor , but from a manifestly corrupted part of them , pickt out this testimony . that the after-bishops of ravenna were sometimes schismaticks , all the world knows ; none excusing them , much less bringing that action of theirs for a testimony , or example , till such as mr. hammond arose , who were involved in the same crime : but that from valenti●●ans time , ravenna held the patriarchate till the time of constantinus pogonatus , without dependence on the bishop of rome ( as the doctor tells us ) is an intolerable mistake , as any one meanly versed in history , knows ; and as is manifest by pope gregories letters to the bishops of that place ; who was made pope in the year five hundred and ninety , whereas pogonatus began his reign in the year six hundred sixty and eight . their sact then , master doctor , can onely stead or excuse you thus far , to shew , that others have been schismaticks as well as your selves ; and therefore you are not the first , nor onely men that have faln into a such a lapse : and thus far indeed , we grant your consequence ; but it will not serve , to shew that you are faultless , because they were faulty . you should have manifested first , the justifiableness of their fact , and then proceed by applying it , to justifie your own . or rather indeed it infers you are schismaticks , because you cling to none but those , whom all the world esteemed to be such . but me thinks , i hear the doctor gravely complain , that i call all those schismaticks , whom he alleages as testimonies against me ; and that this also is , a method of security beyond all amulets . i answer , let it neither be as he , nor i say , but what the whole christian world , both then and ever since held ; none contradicting , but those who were accused of the same fault . let us therefore make plain reason our judge in this present controversie . the popes , at the breach of the ravennates from their subjection , made head against them , and stood upon their authority , as universal pastors of the church , ( as the doctor will grant . ) which therefore in all likelihood would have been looked on by the rest of the catholick bishops , as a proud usurpation , and being against their common interest , to let the pope pretend to an universal pastorship , ought in all reason to have engaged them in the ravennates quarrel : is there any news of such an universal siding ? not a word : by which one may , at least , conjecture , that they thought the popes pretence to the primacy , lawful . how did the ravennates behave themselves in the business ? did they stick close to , and constantly claim their non subjection to the pope , from canons or scripture ? nothing less : they recanted often and acknowledged subjection , as the doctor grants , and says they did it , sometimes out of fear of other enemies , sometimes out of friendship , or despite to their own clergy ; yet the people ( adds the doctor ) thought themselves injured . well , but what said the governors of the world all this while , to whom it appertained to see justice rightly administred : how did the emperor iustinian , the then head of the church ( as the doctor will have it ) decide the controversie , when he came to conclude it ? he vindicated the pope , and punished most severely the people of ravenna ; banished the bishop , and in a judiciary manner put the ringleaders of the schism to death at constantinople , whither they were carried bound . what a pitiful controvertist then , is this doctor , to alleage the bare fact of a turbulent , rebellious , never-quiet city , against the justly-presumed acknowledgment , and the unanimous belief both of the then-present , and future christian world : lastly , against the decision of those who were their temporal lords , and lawful judges ; and ( according to the doctors grounds ) against the verdict of the head of the church , to whom the rightful power in those matters legally pertained . his fourth instance is out of balsamon ( an enemy to the see of rome , and a writer for the greeks against it ) who says , that some arch-bishopricks had from the emperors charter , that priviledge , not to be subject to the patriarch of constantinople . where , first , if we may trust balsamon , who seems in this very place and treatise , to plead for the greeks against the bishop of rome , then mr. doctor , you know your double task , necessary to make good your premises , ere you can conclude any thing ; to wit , that the emperors did it with order from the church ; or , in case they did not , that it was done lawfully . next , does the testimony say , that the emperor priviledged them from subjection to the pope , as head of the church ? if not , there is no hurt at all done to our question ; if it did , there had not been much , since an enemies saying , is no slander . his fifth instance is , that under phocas the patriarchate of grado , in italy , was erected . where first it seems , the testimony says not it was done by him , but under him , or , while he reigned ; and then , for any thing , you can conclude from hence , the pope did it in phocas his reign . secondly , since it was not indeed of new erected , but translated thither from aquileia , burned not long before by the longobards ; it was no sign of a presumed jurisdiction , but rather of a pious generosity ( whether in phocas or charls the great ) to bestow a new seat on the destitute patriarch . to omit , that in the council of grado , was read the epistle of pope felagius the second , granting to elias of grad● the place of the patriarch of aquileia . the doctor did wisely then to put under phocas , in stead of by phocas , that so he might seem to intimate by ambiguity , what he durst not speak out for want of evidence . sect . . the doctors testimonies from councils and histories , found to be partly against himself , partly frivolous , and to no purpose . after his evidence , from a forged rescript and a tumultuous rable , that the right of erecting patriarchates belongs to the secular power ; and that this in the western part of christianity , was an ordinary custom ; he proceeds to shew , that this was a frequent usage in the east also ; citing for it , no less authority then that highest one of general councils . sacred witnesses ! whom to abuse , by imposing on them a false meaning , borders upon prophaneness . the first testimony is , from the twelfth canon of the council of chalcedon , where there is mention made of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . cities honored by letters patents from the kings or emperors , with the name and dignities of metropolisses ; where ( saith the doctor ) the council represses the ambition of the bishops , but not cassates the rescripts , nor withdraws the honor from the metropolis so erected . what cause the doctor hath to brag of those newly-erected metropolitans , we shall presently shew . he proceeds , that balsamon saith , many emperors had erected many metropolitans , and that they did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , according to the power that was given them . thus far the doctor ; whereas , first the council says onely that those cities were honored with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the name alone , which the doctor , fluent in his expressions , englishes the name and dignity ; the later whereof they wanted , that which should dignifie them in a degree of a metropolitan , being absolutely interdicted them by this very canon , in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , let them enjoy onely the honor . secondly , what this honor was , your friend balsamon tells you ; saying , some desired to know what that honor mean't ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and received answer , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that except onely that this bishoprick was called a metropolis , in all other things it was subject to the former metropolis . thirdly , answerable to this are the very words in the council , calling the former metropolis in contradistinction to this , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ the true metropolis , signifying the other to be meerly titular . fourthly , our question being , whether the emperor could give ecclesiastical iurisdiction , not whether he could name places as he pleases ; and it being evident hence , that either the emperor never gave any iurisdiction to the new metropolis , or if he did , it was cassated by the council , nothing follows against us , but totally against your self : now that they had no new jurisdiction given them , is manifest out of the former pla●● in balsamon , saying , the episcopacy was onely called a metropolis ; to which he subjoyns , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for the bishop of it ( this new metropolis ) shall be ordained by the old metropolitan , and shall be judged by him , and in plain terms shall be subject to him . fifthly , balsamon tells us , the emperors did this according to the power that was given them , which words the doctor cites ; but leaves out a thing called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rendred by the interpreter olim , that is , once , formerly , or by some precedent council ; which balsamon in that very place , judges to have been the eight and thirtieth canon in trullo ; as shall be more clearly manifested hereafter . the sum then of this first testimony , is , that the emperor conferred onely a name or title , and that not without power given by the church in her councils ; both which are perfectly innocent to our cause , and prejudicial to the alleagers . his first observation hereupon , is , that this council was within twenty years after that grant of valentinian ; and consequently ( saith the doctor ) if balsamon say right , that at that time many emperors had erected many , there must needs be others before valentinian . where the observer is faln into a great mistake . balsamons words are these . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. the canon determining these things , may some one say , how then have divers kings honored divers episcopacies to be metropolitans : for now the metropolis of lacedemonia was a bishoprick of the metropolis of old patrae , madita of heraclea , abyous of cyricum ; and other bishopricks also were honored . it ●●ems therefore to me , from the eight and thirtieth canon , &c. where ( to omit that balsamon in the first part of this testimony , intimates , that kings may be checkt in such things by councils , and not freed from that check , but from some concession of another council ) the words are plain , that balsamon speaks of his own times , in which he lived , that is , six hundred years after the council ; and that then such and such metropolitans were made , not of the time , when the council was held . but the observation is not much worth arguing or clearing . his second observation , is , that the seventeenth canon of the council of chalcedon , doth more expresly attribute this power to the prince , saying , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if any city be built or restored by the kings power , let the ecclesiastical order follow the political . thus the doctor walks up and down , and yet at the same time disputes against motion : he is to prove , that it is the kings proper right , independent of the church or her canons , to transfer the ecclesiastical dignities according to his political orders ; and he brings for proof , a canon of a council , or the church constituting and ordaining it ; which shews that the matter depended upon the ecclesiastical state : and he calls that a more express attributing this power to the prince , which is indeed not attribuere but tribuere ; not an acknowledgment of it , but a bestowing and conferring it . this is most evident to the eye of any one who can read greek , out of the scholion of your friend balsamon upon the eight and thirtieth canon in trullo ; which scholion you quote here , as if it were to your purpose , and which very canon you alleage here for your self in these words , and the same power is acknowledged to belong to the prince by the council in trullo , can. . upon which canon , balsamon saith thus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. but since the present canon defines that those cities which are erected , or shall be erected by the emperor , be honored also by churches conformably to the emperors disposition , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we say ( saith balsamon ) that also by the present canon it is given to the emperor to make new bishopricks , and raise others to the right of metropolitans ; and to ordain concerning their election and administration , as it shall seem good to him . and a little after he recites an edict of the emperor to that purpose , in which are found these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. my imperial power not suffering the priviledge which is granted it by the divine canons to be neglected , ordains , &c. was ever good man so mistaken as to cite such places , which , lookt into , are as expresly against him , as if they were coyn'd purposely in defiance of his doctrine ? yet he , forgetting the question , runs on with a long testimony , that the emperors could do it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of his own motion , and without the ambitious sollicitation of them that sought it . whereas the question is not upon what terms it was lawful , for the emperor to give it ; but whether it were his own proper power annext to him , as head of the church , sollicited or not sollicited , to give it at all , and erect such metropolitans at pleasure ; or rather , whether it were an indulgence or priviledge , granted and given him by the church in her canons : which last is our tenet , and most evidently visible in the very testimonies alleaged against us . his second testimony ( for the two last were onely his over-sights or observations ) begins after the old strain thus : and accordingly the same balsamon ( on conc. carthag . can. . ) doth upon that canon professedly found the authority of princes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to advance an episcopal see into a metropolis , and a new to constitute bishops and metropolitans . thus far the doctor : where he is over head and ears again in a grievous mistake ; for neither doth balsamon found the authority of princes to execute such acts , as of their own power , on that canon , there being not a word in it to that purpose : neither doth he professedly say any thing as of himself , but that you are professedly mistaken : and had he said it , i conceive it no such strong argument , that a professed adversary should speak so professedly against one . but indeed , neither he nor the canon say any such matter . the canon not so much as names , either episcopal or metropolical se●s ; but the main business there treated , is , that bishops and priests should not live upon base occupations , nor employ themselves in secular businesses : which balsamon in his scholion or comment , more elucidates from like prohibitions of other patriarchs ; adding in the end out of other mens opinions , and not his own profession , these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — but some say these canons or constitutions take place , when any one , who hath taken holy orders , shall exercise a secular ministery without the command of the emperor . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. and they adde ( saith balsamon ) that the king is neither under laws nor canons ; and therefore he may securely make a bishoprick a metropolis , &c. — and anew constitute bishops and metropolitans . where the reader may see he introduces this as a deduction of others ; and that from no other grounds then this , a king is neither bound by canons nor laws ; that is , his will is his law , or he may do lawfully what he lists ; and then indeed ( these grounds supposed ) i blame not the inference that he should erect , transplant , n●y , pull down , not only bishops and patriarchs , but the whole hierarchy it self ( your present lot , consequent to these your grounds . ) thus at length we have found the bottom-stone of the doctors grounds , why kings may erect patriarchates by their proper power , not to be councils , as he pretended ; but their own all-lawful inerrableness to do what they please , let councils , canons , parliaments , and laws say what they will to the contrary . a foundation fitting indeed to build the doctors assertion upon , but in all other respects , able to ruine and overthrow both laws , commonwealths , canons , and church . in his fifteenth section , persisting still in his seigned supposal , that the popes power is onely patriarchal ; he goes on to prove , that the antiquity of translating patriarchs and bishops belongs to kings , as well as of erecting . of which he gives some instances in our countrey of england : by which , what he means to prove , i cannot easily conjecture . if he intends that kings did oft do such things , i wonder who denies it ; but if they did it by their proper right , without the order or consent , either of the apostolical see , or the ecclesiastical state of his own bishops ; he brings not one word in proof , but rather expresly manifests the contrary from the carriage of st. anselm , then archbishop of canterbury , as learned and pious a prelate as that age produced ; who ( as the doctor confesses ) when the king would have cut off as much from the diocess of lincoln , as would make a new bishoprick at ely , anselm wrote to pope paschalis , desiring his consent to it ; assuring him he would not give his consent , but salvâ authoritate papae , the authority of the pope being secured . where you see plainly , the archbishops consent was necessary , and that without it , the kings desire seemed controleable : next , that the archbishop himself , even with the kings authority to back him , would not venture on it till the pope's consent was asked . here then mr. doctor you have a positive testimony of the gravest prelate our countrey hath ever been honored with , refusing the sufficiency of the kings sole authority to conclude such businesses , without his , and the popes consent ; which therefore more justly challenges audience in the court of reason , then all your dumb negatives , though they were a thousand more . to conclude , in what your testimonies were positive , to wit , that such things were done de facto , so far we yeeld to them ; in what they are negative , tacitly inferring , that because they were done , and no mans right named , therefore they were done de jure , by the proper right of him that did them : so far we allow them no credit at all . first , because they might have been performed by the secular authorities , either with consent of the bishops , or some indulgent grant of the church to pious princes ; or , by order from the pope ; or else , concession of some former council ; an example of which , we had lately in the council of chalcedon . next , because histories , intending onely to relate matters of fact , mention rather those that put things in execution , and more visibly appear in the transacting them , such as are secular magistrates ; and stand not scanning or debating much , by whose right things were done ; which belongs to lawyers , and would be but a by-discourse hindering the orderly process of their narrative strain . thirdly , because every one who hath the least smack of logick knows , a negative argument proves nothing , such as are all yours here alleaged . for this is the tenor of them , historians say , some kings translated some patriarchates , and it is not mentioned , they did it by the churches power ; therefore they did it by their own ; which will be found in good logick , to fall very far short of concluding . lastly , because the church ever challenged , as her own proper right , asserted to her by the canons , the jurisdiction and power , to intermeddle in businesses purely ecclesiastical . in his seventeenth paragraph he proposes two other objections of the same nature with the rest . the first , in common , that the king could exempt from episcopal jurisdiction , which he says is largely asserted and exemplified in coudrayes case , report . . and truly the doctor is to be commended for his fair and sincere expression . for it is indeed meerly asserted and exemplified without the least shadow of proof . in the first example there alleaged , king kenulphus is said to have exempted a monastery , consilio & consensis episcoporum & senatorum gentis suae , which was no instance of power in him , unless it was also in the bishops and nobles , that he could not , or would not do it without their agreement . the exemption of reading abbey , by henry the first , argues no authority , he being the founder of it , and not bound to give his goods to the church , but upon the conditions which pleases himself . which answer likewise serves for all hospitals , and such like pious houses founded by the king. the third example of the abbot of buries exemption by the king , is recorded without particular circumstances , and so must stand for an example of the kings execution or command , to the secular magistrate , to proceed accordingly , but proves nothing , that the king did it without consent of the bishop , under whom it was . these are all the cases of secular exemptions , produced by that learned lawyer , which you see are pure examples of the kings exempting , either with the bishops consent , or by title of asking , what conditions he thought fit to annex to his own liberalities , as every private person may , or at most alleaged so abstractedly , that any of these , or many other causes , may justly be supposed to have intervened . but i mistake , there is yet one more , to which the doctor thought good to give a particular efficacy , by citing the very words of the charter , which are these , hoc regali authoritate & episcoporum ac baronum attestatione constituo . i appoint this by my royal authority with the attestation of my bishops and barons . but had the doctor remembred he had named this king , before william the conqueror , he would have understood that regali authoritate , signified as much as in the first of kings doth that famous phrase ius regis , that is , the power of the sword , the power of taking away any mans goods , and giving them to another ; the power of doing all wrong , as is not onely known of the conquerors other proceedings , but even out of this fact , taking the goods of a bishop , and the provision ordained for souls , and attributing them to an abbey : and this by the very words of the charter , without any course of law or consent of any justice , or power in the commonwealth : so that our doctor has brought us in a very special example for henry the eighth , the worst of his successors to imitate , and justifie his spiritual authority by . to that which he affirms of the chatholick german emperors , the kings of france and england ; that they claimed to be founders of all bishopricks in their dominions , and patrons of them to bestow them by investiture : i answer , they did very well to found as many as they pleased , that is , to enrich and enlarge the church with episcopal revenues by their pious donations ; and when they have done , to claim deservedly the advowsons , and present whom they please to be invested by the church ; whom yet , if they be found unworthy , the church rejects , notwithstanding the kings presentation and authority , and consequently this is done by the consent of the church : neither is this annexed to the kingly dignity onely , as a particular badg of his authority over the church ; but even private subjects , when either themselves or their ancestors have founded some ecclesiastical benefice , challenge to themselves the advowsons , without any prejudice to the church ; who allows it reasonable , that the friends of the donors should rather enjoy that benefit , then others . unless , perhaps , the persons be found unfit ; which in that case , obliges the church to use her authority , by interposing her resusal . this therefore private persons can do , as well as kings , and yet , i hope , the doctor will not say , that all those are lords and heads of the church . lastly , he might as well have made mention of the pope and clergies ressistance to kings that usurped the investitures , as of the others claiming of them ; both being equally notorious in history , and the princes in the end , having yeelded that their pretence was unjust . next he tells us , the kings of france and england , claimed a just right , that no legate from rome could use iurisdiction here , without their leave . what a terrible business is this ? or , what follows hence ? none can imagine but the dr. himself , who certainly had some meaning in it , or other ; they did so indeed , and so do catholick kings sometimes to this day ; who yet communicate with the church , and are accounted obedient sons , as long as they proceed with due moderation . but that they did it in disacknowledgment of the popes supremacy ; or , that the legate brought not his jurisdiction with him from rome , but was glad to receive it of the king , ere he could use it , this the doctor will never be able to make good . nay , they were so far from denying the popes authority even in this kinde , that our kings of england procured of the pope , that the archbishop of canterbury should be legatus natus . but now the doctor hath resolved me of my former doubt , which was , with what art possible he could make these imperfect testimonies serve his purpose ; adding here immediately these words , all these put together , are a foundation for this power of the princes , to erect or translate a patriarchate . as if he should have said , though there be not one word in any single testimony expresly manifesting , that it is principally the kings power , or excluding the churches ; yet i have produced many things little to the purpose ( if considered in their single selves ) which , notwithstanding i would intreat you to believe , that all these put together are a foundation , &c. where note , that here again also he observes his former invincible method of reserving his strongest arguments till the last ; putting immediately before his conclusion , that the legates were often not admitted in england ; so as out of the very non-admission of the legates , the doctor infers an absolute power in princes , to erect and translate patriarchates . besides , were all this granted , what is it to your , or our purpose ; since we accuse you not of schism , for breaking from the popes subjection , as a private patriarch , but as the chief pastor and head of the church . but , because the doctor could not handsomly transfer this primacy from rome to canterbury , to secure him from the subjection to antichrist ; therefore he was pleased to mistake it , all along this chapter , for a patriarchate ; and then undertakes to shew from some few testimonies de facto , that it was not the churches , but the kings authority to erect and translate them . whereas ( besides the answers in particular already given ) no prudent man can doubt , but in the process of fifteen or sixteen hundred years , and in such a vast extent as the christian world , there may be found twenty or thirty matters of fact ( if one will take histories to collect them ) either out of ambition , ignorance , rebellion , or tyranny , against the most inviolable right that can be imagined . besides , many things might often be mentioned , by historiographers , as done , without particularizing the authority , by which they were done . especially in our case ; where , by reason of the connexion between the soul and body of the politick world ; the ecclesiastical and secular state ; they seem to act as one thing : the temporal authority most commonly putting in execution the intentions of the church . and this also makes them appear more visibly to proceed from the temporal part , then from the spiritual ; as humane actions more apparently spring from the body , then from the soul. but if the doctor would have proved sincerely , that kings indeed had that pretended power , he should not have stood piddling with half a dozen fag ends of history , to prove such a thing was sometimes done de facto , but recurred to the apostolical and ecclesiastical canons , where such things are purposely treated , and there he should have found another story . but he is wiser then to confine himself within the proper lists of any question ; he had rather be in the open field , where his little fayeryreason may hop and skip from bough to bryar ; and weary his adversary not to combate , but to catch him . sect . . the examination of the testimonies produced by mr. hammond to prove his fundamental position , that kings are supreme in spiritual matters : the endeavours of mr. hammond in the foregoing part of this chapter was first , to suppose the pope onely a private patriarch , next , that the king can erect and translate patriarchates ; after which ( though other men of reason use to put their grounds , ere they deduce any thing from them ) he lays the grounds in this paragraph of his formerly built discourse , saying , that the reason of all is , the supreme power of kings , even in ecclesiastical matters . where , ( to omit how he has mangled that one poor paragraph with ten parenthesisses , no more ) he so intermingles and shuffles together , in an equal tenor , truths with falshoods , things dubious and unprov'd , with things acknowledged , and that need no proof , things to the purpose , with things to no purpose , that it would loath any well-order'd reason , to see in so little a room , so perfect a map of disorderly confusion . but ere we come to answer that ; his marginal testimonies which he huddles together briefly of all sorts , would seem neglected , if we should not allow them a cursory reflection . first , what he objects out of chomatenus , though his author were of any authority , yet it makes nothing at all to his purpose ; since the very words he cites , that the king is as it were the common director and ruler of the church , signifies rather he was not so ▪ then was so ; unless he can prove that quasi , as it were , can bear the sence of revera , indeed , or in reality . and then how handsomely think you , would these words hang together , that the king is in reality as it were , the ruler of the church . nay rather the words alledged plainly signifie the contrary : for , if there be a common ruler of the church , and the king be onely as it were that ruler ; it is plain , there is some other , not , as it were , but truly and properly such . the second is yet much more absurd ; for never was there testimony , nor can be imagined in so little room , more expresly witnessing , that kings have nothing to do with ecclesiastical affairs then this of constantine ; which the doctor brings to prove the contrary . i mean if we take the words as the doctor cites them ▪ in greek , without his can●ing translation of them . the words are these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in english thus , as neer word by word as it can possibly be render'd . you truly ( speaking to the bishops ) are constituted overseers ( or bishops ) of those affairs which are within the church ; but i am constituted under god overseer of those affairs which are without the church . but the doctor seems willing to take there the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or church , for a material church of stone , and so ▪ renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , those things which are celebrated within it ; yet is pittifully puzled notwithstanding , rendering 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which signifies things without the church ) external things ; because the right words would have excluded the emperors power over ecclesiastical affairs ; and yet even so it will not serve his turn ; for unless he can make his own words ( external things ) signifie spiritual things , to which they will be very unwilling , the testimony is still expresly against him . besides , it is pretty sport to observe how sillily insincere the doctor is , telling us that constantine the great spake those words in an assembly of bishops ; by which and the doctors wrong translation , the simple reader would judge that constantine had told a general council of bishops to their face , that he was head of the church : but when i came to finde out the author and the place ( both which the doctor had prudently omitted ) i found it was onely spoken when he was at dinner with some bishops . the author is eusebius , de vita constantini , l. ▪ c. . the title of the chapter is this , as i finde it in the translator , ( for i had not the greek ) quod externarum rerum quasi episcopum se quendam professus est , that he professed himself , as it were a kinde of a bishop over external things . then follows the chapter in these words . ex quo etiam factum est , ut cum episcopos nonnullos convivio excepisset , ipse se nobis audientibus episcopum appellaret , his ferè verbis : vos , ( inquit ) intra ecclesiam , ego extra ecclesiam à deo episcopus constitutus sum . itaque cùm quae loquebatur eadem secum mente cogitaret , animum in omnes qui ejus suberant imperio intentum habuit , hortatus pro virili utpiam omnes vitam excolerent . whence it came to pass , that when he had entertained some bishops at a feast ( or banquet ) he in our hearing , called himself a bishop in those words : you ( saith he ) are constituted bishops within the church , i without the church . wherefore since his thought went along with his words , he apply'd his mind to those who were under his empire , exhorting them , to his power , that they should all lead a pious life . where , besides what i formerly found the doctor faulty in , we see that the author of this testimony , who was present , when the emperor spake these words , and so could best judge of his meaning by the circumstances , deduced no more out of them , then that he called himself bishop , because it belonged to his calling to exhort all his subjects to lead a pious life , and administer rightly those things of which they were overseers by god. his third testimony to prove the king head of ecclesiastical , as well as civil affairs , is , that irreprehended saying of leo isaurus , who said to the pope , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am a king and a priest , which was indeed a saying worthy an anti-heretick , as isaurus was ; being a ring leader of the iconoclasts . a wise man would wonder what the doctor intended by producing such a saying , which himself must acknowledge extravagant : since none of the late kings of england ever assum'd to themselves the title of a priest , as did this infatuated emperor ; who gave more credit to sooth-sayers and fortune-tellers , then to god and his church . the third is from socrates , who says , the affairs of the church depended on the emperors . and who denies it ? therefore what ? ergo kings are supreme in ecclesiastical affairs ? how follows that ? since the onely word is wanting , to wit , supreme , which can make good the inference . the affairs of the head depend on the arms and shoulders ; therefore will the doctor infer they are supreme or highest ? as though dependence could not be both mutual and unequal . it must needs argue a soul very empty of reason , to catch thus at every shadow of any aery word , and think to deduce thence a full sentence . the fourth is from optatus , noting it as a schismatical piece of language in the donatists to say , quod imperatori cum ecclesiâ ? what has the emperor to do with the church , citing for it his second book . but ( though perhaps i may be mistaken in not seeing so small a testimony ) i finde no such thing in that place he quotes . indeed i finde that ancient father arguing like a present catholike , calling the doctor schismatick , and quite confuting and contradicting all his book ; saying , negare non potes scire te in urbe româ petro primo cathedram episcopalem esse collatam ; in quâ sederit omnium apostolorum caput petrus ; thou canst not deny that in the city of rome the episcopal chair was given to peter the first ; in which sate peter the head of all the apostles . then he proceeds to reckon up all the popes of rome , successors of s. peter , till pope siricius , who lived in his days , cum quo nobis totus orbis in commercio formatorum in unâ communionis societate concordat ; — with whom the whole world agrees in one society of communion , by correspondence of communicatory letters . — ▪ and afterwards , probatum est nos esse in ecclesiâ sanctâ catholicâ — per cathedram petri , quae nostra est , & per ipsam caeteras dotes apud nos esse , etiam sacerdotium . it is proved that we are in the holy catholike church by the chair of peter , which is ours : ( what will become of the doctor , who can lay no claim , nor hath any right to it , nay hath disclaimed its right , and who findes here a reason why we may justly be called roman catholikes ) it follows , and by the chair of peter , other gifts are also with us , even priesthood . alas poor doctor hammond , who having lost communion with that church , hath lost also his priesthood , mission , and power to preach , if this holy father say true . what hard fortune it was that optatus lived not in the primitive times , for then the doctor had believed him and turned papist ; but in regard he wrote after the three hundreth year , ( the fatal period of any certain truth in gods church , as the doctor afterwards intimates ) he hath quite lost his labour , and his authority is invalid for writing truth so late . as for the testimony it self , which probably is this fathers in some other place , i see no difficulty at all in it : for the emperor being a nursing father to the church , whose secular power she invoked to punish and repress such as were the donatists ; none but schismaticks would deny that power so granted to be sufficiently authoritative to punish their pernicious apostasie . then follow six testimonies out of heathen writers all in a cluster , that their kings ought to be priests and augurs , &c. and the doctor would have the example transfer'd to christianity . indeed if iesus christ had not come from heaven to found a church , and ( besides what hath been said of st. peters primacy ) left it under the government of ecclesiastical persons , the apostles , committing all jurisdiction in affairs of that nature to them , without dependence of any secular superior ; then , for any thing i know , we might have come ere this to have been in statu quo prius , that is , heathens again ; and so the doctors argument might have ta'ne place ▪ but if christ founded a church upon apostles , ecclesiastical persons , without the help of secular supports , leaving all power both of ordination and iurisdiction to it , the doctor must either prove no disparity between the sacred oeconomy of christs house , and the babel of heathenism ; or else grant his parity improper and absurd . i never imagin'd there was any such extraordinary holiness in the heathenish rites , but a secular power might serve to perform and overlook them : and , as the reason why they were used by the emperors , was onely because their mock-religion was nothing but a policy to delude and bridle the vulgar ; so if christian religion were nothing but a trick of state-policy , it would do very well indeed in a secular princes hands , to alter and fashion it to the mold of the peoples humors . but our all-wise god hath dealt more prudently with his church ; encharging his sacred mysteries and the churches-government to those persons , whose very state of life being purely dependent on god and his service , secures them from being cross-byass'd by worldly interests , and secular pretences . yet the doctor is so deeply immers'd in schism , that he relishes and fancies better the pope-destroying example of heathen policy , then the ever-sacred , and heaven-instituted government of christianity . his eleventh instance is from david who order'd the courses of the priests , and solomon who consecrated the temple ; but the doctor may consider , that david and solomon were prophets as well as kings , and so no wonder , if , according to the more particular prudence given them by god , they did something extraordinary . neither doubt i , but if nowadays any king were both a saint and a prophet , it were very convenient he should assist and instruct the church in a more particular way , and yet not thank his kingly dignity for that authority neither . but indeed , neither david nor solomon shewed any strain of a higher jurisdiction . their greater zeal might invite them , and their exacter knowledge make their assistance requisite to order the courses of the priests . and as for solomons consecrating the temple , it was performed by offering sacrifice ; which he himself ▪ offer'd not , but the priests ; so as his consecrating it was nothing else but his causing them to consecrate it . a pittiful proof that kings are over the church in ecclesiastical affairs . his twelfth testimony is of hezekiah and iosiah , who ordered many things belonging to the temple . so wonderfully acute is this doctor , that no king can do a pious deed , or even scarce say his prayers , but his honor-dropping-pen , streight way entitles him head of the church . his thirteenth is of st. paul , who ( saith he ) appealed from the judgement of the chief priests to the tribunal of caesar. so as now caesar , a heathen emperor , is become head of the church ; nay of two churches ( according to master hammond ) the heathenish , and the christian. but the good doctor is most grievously mistaken here , as he hath been almost in every place of scripture he hath yet produc't & i observe , that though he be pretty good at mistaking all over his book , yet when he omes to alleadge any thing out of gods word , he errs far more accurately . for st. paul appealed not from the tribunal of the jews , much less their synagogue ( representing their church ) as the doctor would perswade us ; but from the tribunal of portius festus , a roman governor under caesar , to caesar himself ; i will onely put down the words as i finde them in their own translation , and so leave the doctor to the readers judgement , either to be accused for willfully abusing , or ignorantly mistaking them : but festus willing to do the iews a pleasure , answered paul and said , wilt thou go up to ierusalem , and there be judged of these things before me : then said paul , i stand at caesars judgement-seat where i ought to be judged , &c. act. . , , &c. and now is not this doctor think you the fittest man among all the sons of the church of england to have a pension for writing annotations in folio on the bible . his last proof is , that iustinians third book is made up of constitutions , de episcopis , clericis , laicis ; bishops , priests , laymen . first we answer , and the same may be said of the theodosian code , that all the laws found there must not necessarily be iustinians ; since the keepers of the laws use not onely to put in their law-books those constitutions , themselves made , but also those they are to see observed ; among which are the canons and laws of the church , made before by councils and other ecclesiastical powers . secondly , we grant iustinian may make constitutions of his own concerning bishops , and clergymen , in what relates to temporal affairs , or as they are parts of the civil commonwealth ▪ and lastly , if he shall be found to have made any laws concerning them , and without the authority of the church entrenching upon ecclesiastical businesses , let the doctor prove he had power to make such , and he will in so doing , clear him in that part , from that note of tyranny , which is objected against him . what you say concerning the canons of councils , that they have been mostly set out by the emperors ; it is very certain , you might , if you had pleased , instead of your mostly have put always , the causing them to be promulgated belonging to the office of the supreme secular powers ; whose obligation it is to see that the churches decrees be received and put in execution . what you clap in within a parenthesis ( as your custom is to intermingle truth with falshood ) that canons of councils received their authority by the emperor ; in the sence you take it is a great error . for never was it heard that an emperor claimed a negative voice in making a canon of a council valid , which concerned matters purely spiritual ; nay , nor disaccepted them , decreed unanimously by the fathers , but all the world lookt upon him as an unjust and tyrannical incroacher . they receive indeed authority from the emperor in this sense , that his subscription and command to proclaim them makes them have a more powerful reception , and secures them from the obstacles of turbulent and rebellious spirits ; but this will not content you , your aym is , that they should not have the authority or validity of a canon , without the last-life-giving-hand of the emperors vote , which is onely a strain of your own liberality to him , or rather of your envy towards the church , without any ground of his rightful claim to any such jurisdiction over councils . sect . . other empty proofs of this pretended right , confuted . these rubs being removed , it will be our next sport to address an answer to his nineteenth section it self ; where omitting his ten parenthesisses , which contain nothing , but either sayings of his own , or greek out of strabo's geography , that the romans kept their assizes at divers places ; or testimonies from the council of chalcedon , already answered ; omitting these , i say , i will briefly resume the whole sence of the paragraph , as well as i can gather it out of the some-thing-more - lucid intervals of his mad parenthesisses : and this i take to be the sum of it , that kings should , according to emergent conveniences , change their seats of iudicature ; and that the same reasons may require a removal of ecclesiastical seats ; wherefore , there being nothing to the contrary constituted , either by christ or his apostles , it follows , that kings may , when they please , erect , and consequently remove primacies and metropolitans . i answer , that secular courts may be removed upon good occasions , is so evident to every fool , that it needs neither greek , nor strabo to prove it . that ecclesiastical seats , for greater conveniences of the church , be also subject to removal , is likewise evident and constituted by the council of chalcedon , can. . but his inference , that it belongs to the right of kings to erect and transfer them , is weaker then water ; nor has the doctor infused into it , the least grain of reason to strengthen it . yet first to prove it , he says , nothing is found either by christ , or his apostles ordered to the contrary . which is a most pitiful negative proof ( as indeed the greatest part of his book i● ) and supposes , to make it good , that neither christ , nor his apostles , said , did , or ordered any thing but what is exprest in scripture ; which is both expresly contrary to scripture it self , and to common reason also . besides , this wise proof is both most unjust towards us , and silly in him to expect ; unjust towards us , ingaging us to prove out of scripture , that kings cannot erect primacies and patriarchates , whereas there is no such word there , as either primate or patriarchate , which he would have us shew thence not subject to kings . nor is it less silly in him to expect , that the scripture should make mention of the erection , or not erection of primacies and patriarchates by secular powers ; since the secular powers , when the scripture was written , being most bloody tyrants and persecutors of the church , were more likely to hang up all primates and patriarchs , then either erect or remove their seats to a more convenient place . yet if you would see something to the contrary , why kings should not use ecclesiastical jurisdiction , i can produce you the sence of the catholick church , the best testimony that can be alleaged for the meaning of gods spirit ; but because this weighs little with you , i shew you next , the testimony of common sence and reason , which tells you , faber fabrilia tractet ; and that those , whose education , institute of life , particular designment to , and total dependence on any course of life , makes them more strongly addict all their thoughts to perfect themselves knowingly and magisterially in that their proper profession , are fitter by far for such an employment , then those whose diversly-distracted studies , render them half-knowing , or half-careful in such performances . how much then is it more convenient , that ecclesiastical persons should manage the affairs of the church , then secular princes , whom partly their necessary temporal occasions , partly voluntary recreations , court attendances and entertainments , so quite take up , that they can have but saint and weak reflections , either of knowledge or care , in comparison of the others , upon the most concerning business imaginable , the ordering gods church . the doctors conclusion then , which he says is , both rational and evident , is both irrational , and very dim-coloured to any eye but his own , who supposes ( as he tells us here , for our farther confirmation ) that he hath made it already clear from the refutation of our plea for st. peters universal pastorship ; whereas , it hath been manifested , he had not one express word of proof to make good his pretended confutation ; insomuch , as i promise him a general pardon , and acquittance for the frivolousness of all the rest , if he can shew me in his answer , that any one place expresly testified , that which he pretended to evidence by testimonies . what he adds , that it was appointed by the council of chalcedon , de jure , that the king may erect a primacy when he pleases . i dare be bold to call a forgery ; and that , it needs an id est of the seventeens , to make the councils words sound to his purpose . what he tells us next , as a thing certain , that king ethelbert at the time of austins planting the faith , did erect a primacy at canterbury , the seat of his kingdom : imperii sui totius metropolis , saith bede , &c. is such a childish piece of insincerity , that it craves as much pity as it deserves anger . for bede onely tells us there , how the king answered them , that he could not assent to their new doctrine ; yet because they were strangers , and desired to communicate to him what they believed to be true , he would not trouble them , but rather kindly entertain them , &c. then follows the doctors testimony , dedit ergo eis manfionem in civitate dovernensi quae imperii sui totius erat metropolis . eisque , ut promiserat , cum administratione victus temporalis , &c. wherefore he gave them a dwelling place in the city of canterbury ( the mother-city of his whole dominions ) and with administration of temporal food , he hindred them not from preaching . so that the giving them an house in canterbury to dwell in , and meat to eat , is a clear evidence with master hammond , that the king ( yet a heathen ) erected a primacy , when certainly he knew not then what a primacy meant . lastly , to convince absolutely , that kings were heads of the church , and translated and erected primacies at pleasure , he concludes , that had it not been for this , there is no reason assignable , why this nation being in constantine's time , under three metropolitans , there should be an addition of two provinces ; or that the metropolitical power should be so removed . as if it could not be done at all , unless the king did it . what an argument is here , to bring for an up-shot of his proofs , that the king is head of the church ? we both acknowledge , that some removals of ecclesiastical seats have been in england ; but the question is , whether it belongs to the kings , or the popes , to cause these removals ; he undertakes to prove it the kings right , we deny it . the doctor produces his sacra anchora , or last proof , that there is no reason assignable why these sees were removed , had it not been that the king had power : we answer , we can tell how to remove them without the kings power , to wit , by the popes ; which is the question he professes to make head against : but proceeds not farther , then onely to say it must needs be the king , and that we cannot assign the pope ; and that the thing was done , and therefore the king must necessarily be the doer of it . thus you see the doctor is constant to his principles , in putting his strongest arguments in the rear . what man living is able to withstand so potent and cunning an adversary ? besides , suppose there had been neither pope nor king , was there any impossibility that consent of bishops might remove the primacy to another see ? especially , the bishops being anciently of such authority in england , that no weighty affairs were transacted , but they had a share in the managing of them . you see then mr. doctor there are two reasons assignable for the fact , which you prove to be the kings power , because he did it , and then prove he did it , because otherwise it could not have been done . after he hath thus convinc't kings to have power also over ecclesiastical affairs , he proceeds to prove , that this power of theirs ( taken away by the laws ) is resumable : and , although his supposition being shown to be groundless , there needs no answer to what he builds upon it , yet we will not be so discourteous as to slight his mistakes by affording them no reply . under pope melchiades in constantines time was made a decree , that if the donatist bishops in africk would return to the unity of the church , they should be allowed either to keep the bishopricks they had , or be provided of others : their obstinacy permitted not this to be executed , and therefore it was recalled . neer a hundred years after under pope anastasius , a national council in africa ordained a request to him and other bishops of italy , by whose predecessors the revocation had been made , that the donatist bishops might retain their places , if they would return to the catholike church ; the cunning balsamon puts the provision it self for a canon of this council ; and it had been a foul offence in the doctor to have taken notice of the request , though he must needs have read it in baronius , whom he cites in the very place . therefore he concludes , that laws made at rome do not take away the liberty of another national council to make contrary laws thereunto . although as far as can be drawn out of the fact and council , it argues the direct contrary , and that it was not lawful , for their national council to infringe what had been done at rome : so unlucky is the doctor in bringing arguments so restiff and kicking , that they cast their rider out of his inte●t . he tells next , that a law though made by a general council and with the consent of all christian princes , yet , if it have respect to a civil right , may in this or that nation be repealed ; quoting one roger widrington and suarez ; the latter of them , gives this reason ; because such a law made at a general meeting of princes , is intrinsically a civil law. but what the doctor will do with this after he hath produced it i cannot certainly say , onely i see he must be very fruitful in unprov'd suppositions , ere it will be able to do him or his cause any good . first , he must suppose that the title of the head of the church is a thing not ecclesiastical , but belonging to a civil right ; next , that that same title is denyed their kings , only upon pretence of a canon of a council , and not upon christs donation of it to st. peter , these two unproved ând ungranted positions ( i say ) he must suppose gratis . otherwise to what end does he argue that the canons of councils are repealable and the kings right by consequence resumeable . what follows next in the section , that this is affirmed and intended by balsamon to all canons in general , as the judgement of learned men , in his notes on the sixteenth canon of the council of carthage , hath already been answered , and shown that it is not balsamon who affirms it , but other men ; neither doth he call them learned men , as the doctor here imposes on him , but onely says , that some men say the emperor can do such and such things . and he adds , that those persons proceed upon this ground , that the emperor may do lawfully whatever he lists . his last paragraph , for which ( as his former custom was ) he reserves the best of his strength , proves that this right of kings to be head in ecclesiastical affairs , cannot be alienated by prescription . the testimony he introduces is of one sayr , a late monk , who wrote his book at rome ; a man likely to speak much in the doctors behalf ; whose opinion , in case he should say any thing against us , being but of a private casuist , may with the like facility be rejected as alleadg'd ; but what says honest sayr ? he tells us , that when prescription is neither of the law of nature , nor the divine law , nor the law of nations , but onely the civil and canon law , there it extends no farther then every supreme prince in his realm by his law is supposed to will that it shall be extended , and therefore that no subject can prescribe exemption from making appeal to his king , or that his prince may not punish him when reason and iustice requires . let the testimony it self be what it will , what was the doctor dreaming on when he produced it ? marry he dreamt two things ; first , that the pope had heretofore prescribed against the kings of england in their pretended right of being head in ecclesiastical matters ; next this prescription of the pope hath not its force from any thing but a canon or civil law. these two points the doctor dreamingly supposes to be certain principles , and it is discourtesie in us not to grant them gratis , for fear we should spoil his learned conclusion . what a shame is this for a doctor of divinity , ( whereas every boy that hath been but two years at cambridge , knows he is first to establish his premises firmly , ere he can claim any certainty of truth in his conclusion ) to suppose his premises true ▪ and upon that grant , kindly made by himself to himself , conclude at pleasure what he lists . and what an unconscionable piece of affected ignorance is this , to bring a testimony which could not possibly be applyed to his purpose without proving the two former self-made suppositions ; and yet to neglect that necessary task , and conclude in these vain words , it were easie to apply this distinctly to the confirming of all that hath been said , but i shall not expatiate . it is now become an old excuse with the doctor to cry he is out of his way , when he comes to a passage he cannot get over ; but all-to-be-labours things frivolous , and which ( his self-laid grounds once supposed ) would be out of question . thus you see an end of his sixth chapter , which was totally built upon this ground , that the authority of head of the church was no more then patriarchal , and consequently needed in rigour of dispute no other reply but onely to deny the supposition , and bid him prove it . what has been answered to each particular , was onely to let the reader see how inconsequently and weakly he builds , even upon his own foundations . sect . . a reply to doctor hammonds narrative ▪ confession of his schism . the doctor having laid his tottering grounds for the kings supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs , by alleadging some testimonies expresly against himself and his cause , and not one expresly for them , but what his fellow-schismaticks afforded him . next having supposed upon his own strongly-dreaming imagination , without one direct place of any authentick writer , against clouds of most plain testimonies from fathers and councils , frequent in our controvertists , and not touched by him in way of answer ; against the most visible practice and universal belief of the whole catholick world ; that the pope is onely a private patriarch and hath no right of jurisdiction over the universal church . and lastly , out of a few testimonies witnessing de facto , that kings did erect and remove patriarchates , without any word excluding the churches precedent orders , having concluded that such a power belonged de jure to kings , and was annext to a crown : these three things , most gravely supposed , he goes about to clear the church of england from the imputation of casting off obedience to the bishop of rome at the reformation ; which is the intent of this chapter . but first he lays down at large the whole history of schism ( ommitting onely the main things that might disgrace it ) ▪ and by what degrees or steps this miserable kingdom and church came to renounce the obedience to those ecclesiastical superiors , who had ( by their own confession , for eight or nine hundred years ) steered that-then-secure barque in a calm unity of faith ; and which authority all the then present world , except king henry's now friend , but late antagonist luther , acknowledged and submitted to : first he tells us this was done by the clergy in a synod , recognizing the king to be supreme head of the church of england ; secondly , by their submitting themselves to the king ; and thirdly , the definition of the universities and monasteries after debate , that the pope had nothing to do more in england then any other extern bishop ; that is , nothing at all : and all this in this sort concluded , subscribed and confirmed by their corporal oaths , ( which word corporal was well put in , for their souls and consciences never went along with it ) was afterwards turn'd into acts of parliament , in which it was resolved upon the question to defie the pope and all his works . in answer to which ( though a bare narration how a schism was made , deserve none ) yet to devoid it of al excuse it may pretend to , i object , first , that it did not originally spring from conscience , no not even an erroneous one , but from manifest malice and viciousness . next that the kingdoms assent to this il originiz'd breach was not free : and thirdly , that though both these were granted , yet this act of theirs , so largely laid out by doctor hammond , is truly and properly a schism , and entitles them schismaticks ; nay the more the doctor dilates upon it , the more schismatical he makes the breach , of which the two latter himself though never so loath must acknowledge , unless he will deny his own words . to begin with the first , all the world knows that , till king henry violenced the breach , all england both clergy and laity were as equally and as peaceably conjoyned to the catholike church under the government of her supreme pastour , the bishop of rome , as either france or spain are now : neither did they ever express any scrupulosity that they had remained under such a government ever since the conversion of their first fore-fathers ; nor were scandalized at the then received doctrine of the church , holding as a point of faith that the pope was its head , but abominated the contrary as sacrilegious and schismatical . the first urger of the breach then was the king ( as is also acknowledged ) let us see then what or who urg'd him , that so we may trace the schism to its first original , and shew the new-born brat its right parent . as for the king , while his blood was yet in due temper and not over-heated with passion , that is , while his conscience was uncorrupted , it is well known he was as humble a son to the church and her supreme pastour , the bishop of rome , as any king in christendom is at this present ; admitting appeals thither , and his jurisdiction here ; nay , indeed more officiously obedient then any king now-adays can pretend ; writing ( or else causing to be set out in his name ) a book against luther in defence of the roman-catholick faith and the popes authority which that apostate rejected ; for which work also he received in recompence from the pope the title of defender of the faith , inherited by the succeeding kings , though they have forfeited the claim to it by disavowing the fact which deserved it . what was king henries judgment of the popes universal authority till he fell into passion , is easie to be seen in his own book , where he strongly and rationally proves it in these words . negare lutherus non potest , quin omnis ecclesia fidelium sacro-sanctam sedem romanam velut matrem primatemque recognoscat ac veneretur , quaecunque saltem neque locorum distantiâ neque periculis interjacentibus prohibetur accessu . quamquam , si vera dicunt qui ex india quoque veniunt huc , indi etiam ipsi tot terrarum , tot marium , tot solitudinum plagis disjuncti , romano tamen pontifici se submittunt . ergo , si tantam & tam latè fusam potestatem neque dei jussu pontifex , neque hominum voluntate consecutus est , sed quâ sibi vi vendicavit , dicat velim lutherus , quando in tantae ditionis erupit professionem ? num potest obscurum esse initium tam immensae potentiae , praesertim si intra hominum memoriam nata sit ? quod si rem dixerit unam fortasse aut duas aetates superare ; in memoriam vobis redigat ex historiis : alioqui si tam vetusta sit , ut rei etiam tantae obliteratae sit origo , legibus omnino cautum esse cognoscat , ut cujus ▪ jus omnium hominum memoriam ita supergreditur , ut sciri non possit cujusmodi habuerit initium , censeatur habuisse legitimum : vetitumque esse constat omnium consensu gentium ne quae di● manserunt immota moveantur . luther cannot deny , but all the church of the faithful , acknowledges and venerates the see of rome as their mother and chief : at least whatsoever church is not hindred from coming thither by distance of place or dangers in the way . although if credit may be given to those who come from the indies , even the very indians separated by such vast lands , seas , and wildernesses , submit themselves to the bishop of rome . — wherefore if the pope hath obtained so great and far-spread an authority neither by the command of god , nor the will of men , but hath arrogated it to himself by some violence , i would know of luther , when and at what time the pope broke forth into the profession of so ample a iurisdiction ? can the beginning of such a vast power be obscure ? especially , if it were born within the memory of man. but if he shall say this power exceeds one or two ages , let him bring it into our memory by histories . otherwise , if it be so ancient that the original of a matter , even of so great importance , be worn out of memory , then let him know it is expresly provided for by the laws , that his right and title which so transcends all memory of man as it cannot be known how it began , is judged to have had a lawful original ; and it is manifest that the consent of all nations forbid those things should be moved which have long remained setled and firm . thus was king henry affected , and in this affection continued till he found an itching i conceive not too conscientious ) to his darling anne bullen ; she being too crafty to forgoe the glittering offer of a crown made unto her by the love-besotted ▪ king ; he grew straight perplext in minde for his former marriage ; began to think it unlawful , though till now neither he nor any in the world ever scrupled it . the devotion he bore to his saint anne bullen put a new heat of religion into his tender heart ; his restless conscience ( alas ) perswaded him that his marriage with katherine , although confirmed by two and twenty yeers continuance , and sealed with the endearing pledge of issue , must needs be disanuld . the pope was urged to dispence with his second marriage , though his former wife lived : king henry wooed , intreated , bribed ; then grew into choller , and at last plainly threatned a schisme , unless the pope would grant and justifie his unlawful desire . here now if the romish religion were made up onely of policy ( as those think whose eys her prudent and heaven-ordered government dazles into a blind envy of her priviledges ) the pope should rather have sought pretences to yeeld to this unwarrantable request , then have denyed it with the loss of a kingdom from his jurisdiction ; but the common father of the church more considered ( unless we will give way to the suspicious reports of enemies ) what detriment and scandal to the whole world was likely to result from such an impious example in so eminent a person ; then consulted with flesh and blood how to second his desire or cloak his grant with the outside of a dangerous necessity . he first counselled friendly , then reprehended him fatherly , at last refused his consent absolutely : upon this king henry grew furious , put away his most pious and vertuous lady queen katherine , whose angelical sanctity and dove ▪ like patience he always continued to honour , when as he beheaded her assumed rival . her disenthronement was anna bullens enstalment : the marriage was celebrated with a divorce of our poor country from the church : appeals to rome , denied under pain of death . the popes authority , which had remained inviolable , ever since we english were by its means converted , utterly rejected ; nay , the very name of pope rased out of all the books in england ; monasteries and religious houses pulled down or robbed , their revenues ( given by their devout founders to pious uses ) confiscare and consecrared to the kings riotous lust. subscriptions forced to a new , and till that time unheard of , church-government , a secular head of an ecclesiastical body ; they that would not subscribe , disgraced or put to death . thus the reformation was first set on foot ▪ and this lust of king henry was so fruitful ▪ that it at once begot tyranny , rapine , the reformation , adultery . protestancy , at least the embrio of it , sacriledge , queen elizabeth , and schism . and , though the doctor excuses the imputation of king henries sacriledge , saying , that sacriledge is no more schism , then it is adultery ; yet it is enough , if he grant ( as he must ) that both his sacriledge and his schism , were born of the same mother-occasion , the kings lust ; and so , though the doctor say , that — — facies non omnibus una ▪ yet i answer , nec diversa tamen , qualem decet esse sororum : — — their faces not the same ; nor different yet , as sisters well became . neither is this all to shew , that the first occasion of the breach , was not conscience . the king himself desired oftentimes afterwards a reconcilement ; which being not possible , without revoking all he had done , despair made him resolve , over shooes , over boots , to make the rupture still wider , while he lived ; though at his death , when it was no time to dally , the care of his soul now out-weighing the pleasure of his body , he with extream grief of heart repented him of his schism . by this , one may see , how justly the doctor pretended , pag. , ▪ as an excuse of his schism , the care of their conscience , and the not-admitting any sin , which the church may oblige them to subscribe to ; whereas , if the original of the breach be this ( as it most evidently is ) then i cannot conceive the church obliged the ring leader of it to any sin in bidding him keep his own wife : but if you pretend another , which by the whole scope of this chapter , you seem not to do , it will be found to have no nobler an extraction , then the former ; onely perhaps , the carnal sin in him , may be changed into a spiritual one in you ; that is , king henries lust , into your self-conceited pride , and refractory disobedience ; which may indeed out●vy and excel him , though not excuse you . but perhaps your grounds , which before absolved the rebel , out ▪ law , and anabaptist , will absolve him too , by saying it was king henries present perswasion , that his wife was to be put away ; and then comes in the whole eighth paragraph of the second chapter , to plead for the adulterous king , thus ; nay , though the error be really on his side , yet if the doctrines so proposed ( that he ought to keep his wife ) as the condition of communion be indeed agreeable to truth , but yet be really apprehended by him , to whom they are thus proposed , to be false , and disagreeable ; it will even in that case be hard to affirm , that that man may lawfully subscribe ( or k●-henry lawfully keep his wife ) contrary to his present perswasion . thus much for the first thing i undertook to shew , that the original of this breach proceeded not from conscience ; the second will also appear no less manifest , that the progress and promoting of it , was altogether as unconsciencious . the second consideration , which renders this schism more inexcusable in the now protestants , is , that when it first was brought into this kingdom , it was no free choice of the ecclesiastical state ; which , could the doctor prove , he would think it perhaps , of some weight . the king using all means , both by perswasions and force , to make men subscribe ; persecuting continually those that refused , and putting to death many upon the same score ; among the rest , those two lights of our nation for learning and piety , bishop fisher , and sir thomas moor , most intimate with the king , and in the sincerest loyalty addicted to him , till their knowing conscienciousness made them refuse to subscribe , lest they might at once prejudice loyalty and religion by a preposterous obedience . but what need more proofs , since the doctor grants here , section five , that it is easie to believe that nothing but the apprehension of dangers , which hung over them ( by a praemunire incurred by them ) could probably have inclined the clergy to subscribe , thus he : though , blowing and supping both at once , he striaght-way addes , that the reasons or arguments offered in debate , were the causes ( as in all charity we are to judge ) of their decision . whereas i cannot see any reason , why the doctor should be so uncharitably charitable , as to judge them not ▪ onely weak , but to have been hardned , and lost for the future all feeling of conscience for their lapse ; since the fore-going fear bears the weight of a strong prejudice against the clear verdict of conscience , and the future recantation of all the bishops ( who then subscribed ) in queen maries time , and their persisting in queen elizabeths days , rather evidences , that the curb being removed , which misled them , it was conscience which made them return ; and strength and force of conscience which made them afterwards persevere in the same judgment . the third thing i am to prove , and make the doctor confess , is , that there was a breach made , which denominates them truly and properly schismaticks . the first part is so clear , that it needs no proof , since the very deed bears witness . for first , your self acknowledge , you renounced the authority of the roman see , and cast it out of this iland . which authority yet you must acknowledge likewise , that all the whole world , which before the breach you held the onely good christians , submitted to as sacred , and descended from christs institution ▪ which authority was known and held , both by them , and your selves , till then , to be over both you and your king , in ecclesiastical matters ; and had enjoyed the possession of that claim , confessedly eight or nine hundred years ; nor this upon title onely of a patriarchate , your conversion , or grant of kings , but of an universal primacy and pastorship over the whole church by christs grant , and before your conversion was dream'd on . lastly , the government of the church thus established , was held by all those whom before that day you accounted the onely faithful , as of divine right , and a point of faith ; and that the denial of it , twisted into one crime , both heresie and schism . a manifest breach then , and schism there was made by you ; first , from that supreme ecclesiastical governor , under whom , both you and your ancestors , till that time , had ever-continued , and next , from the universality of christians ; by erecting to your selves a new structure of church-government , which all the vast congregation of these , from whom you broke , detested and abhorred as sacrilegious and schismatical . singularity therefore most clearly manifested it self in your new church-government ; and if singularity be opposite to a community , of which , communion is the form , it follows evidently , that your singularity destroyed communion , and so was formally schism . again , if multitudes of things of the same species cannot be made one , otherwise then by the unity of order , it follows , that what dissolves this order , dissolves the unity , and so causes a breach or schism . but you manifestly unravelled all the then constituted order of gods church , by casting out of the kingdom , the supreme authority , in which , as in a knot , the other several ends were sum'd and tied up ; therefore you also unravelled and broke asunder its unity . this then , as it is acknowledged by you , so in it self , is as clear , as the most palpable matter of fact can make a thing visible to the eyes of the world , that there was indeed , at least , a material breach or schism , by you made , from that body which communicated with the church of rome ; and of which body , you were formerly as properly and truly a part , as a branch is of a tree . to which adde your proofs out of the fathers , in your first chapter , affirming ▪ no just cause can be given for a schism ; and it will follow , that your own words clearly convince , and your own proofs evidently conclude you to be formally schismaticks . i will put the argument in form , to make it more plain , onely premising , that material schism , as far as it concerns us , at present , is the extern action of breaking from a community : formal , the causlesness or unjustifiableness of that material fact ; which must needs be criminal , because it admits no just excuse to plead in its behalf . then thus , no separation from the whole body of christians can possibly be justified , say the fathers , by you alleaged , chap. . sect. . but your separation was from the whole body of christians : therefore impossible to be justified . where all the evasion i can imagin in your behalf , is to distinguish the major , that the fathers meant , criminal separation , or the crime of schism could have no just cause given for it , not the material and external fact of schism . but first , this makes the fathers very shallow , to go about to shew , that no just cause can be alleaged for the crime of schism , since every one knows there can be no just excuse possible for any crime . next , the fathers there alleaged , pretend to particularize some special viciousness in schism , and are to that end produced by the doctor : but there is no speciality in schism above other sins , to say , that no just excuse can be given for the crime of it , since the like may be said of all sins , as well as it . the fact of schism therefore it is which they call unjustifiable ; the same fact , which with a large narration you here set down , and acknowledge , that they said it , voted it , swore it ; taking a great deal of pains , to prove those whom you undertook to defend , to be voluntary , deliberate , and sworn schismaticks . now all the testimonies alleaged by your self against schism , come in troops , bandying against you , and your cause , as strongly , as if they had been expresly gathered to that purpose . as , that a schismatick is à semet-ipso damnatus , self-condemned ▪ which you have here very learnedly performed , as i lately shewed , that ultrò ex ecclesia se e●icerent , they cast themselves voluntarily out of the church , &c. quomodo t● à tot gregibu● scidisti ? excidisti enim teipsum . how hast thon cut off thy self from so many flocks ? for thy self hast cut off thy self ; of which accusation , your fifth paragraph infers the confession : your own voluntary recession from us , and our government , by your self here acknowledged , is an indelible token , and ( as it were ) a visible ear-mark , that you are a stray ▪ sheep , and a run-away , à to● gregibus , from the flock . this badg of a voluntary recession , your church must always necessarily carry about her : nor will you ever be able to wipe it off with all the specious id ests , or criticisms , your wit can invent . sect . . the nature of schism fetch ▪ t from it's first grounds ; and the material part of it fastened upon the protestants . to lay this charge of schisme yet more home to the protestants , we will open more clearly the nature of schism , and describe it more exactly , that the reader may see how perfectly the protestant church is cast in the mold of it . for the better conceiving of which , it will be necessary to shew first what it is , which makes the sons of the catholike church like brethren live together in unity : and this will lead us into the consideration first of the formal unity it self , and secondly of the reason and ground of this unity . the unity it selfe consists in two things ; one is , the submitting to and communicating in one common head or government ; the authority of which , if it be establish't in an undoubted possession ( as it was at the beginning of mr. drs reformation ) is as necessary to the ecclesiastical community , as the acknowledgement of the undoubted supreme magistrate is necessary for the unity of any temporal common-wealth . the second is the communication of the member-churches with one another , consisting in the acknowledging the same articles of faith , and using the same sacraments &c. to these was added anciently communicatory letters ; which afterwards , by reason of the perfect colligation of the several members with their head , was neglected as unnecessary . and these two unities may be conceived again either negatively or positively . by negative communion in the same head , i mean a not disacknowledging only of the supreme pastor ; or at least such an indifferent acknowledgment , as having no tie upon it , may be at pleasure refused ; and the authority rejected . as likewise negative communication between the member-churches imports either a ●leight not denying of communion , or such an acceptance and embracing of it , as , having no obligation , may at pleasure be turned into disacceptance and disavowing . on the contrary ; these two communications are then called positive , when there is a positive obligation to acknowledge that head , and communicate with the other churches . and this is that which can only make a church , and found church-government : or rather indeed there can be no government imaginable , either spiritual or corporal , without such positive communion , for a company of men without an expresse and positive obligation to obey their superiors , and comport themselves towards their fellows , according to the laws , may indeed be called a multitude ( such as is a●e●vus ●ap●dum , an heap of stones ) but not an army , city , commonwealth or church , which imply connexion and order . neither is the obligation of only charity sufficient ( though in it sel●e a great ciment of unity ) but it must be a visible one , resulting out of the very nature of government , which is visible and exterior . besides , charity extends universally to all , even those out of the church ; and therfore cannot be that proper , peculiar and sole tie , which unites the faithfull , as they are a common-wealth of beleevers . the second thing is the reason of this double union , or rather of this double positive obligation of unity in the church ; which to conceive more clearly , the reader may please to consider , that a christian is a christian by his faith ; and so a congregation of christians is a community of the faithfull . whence it followes , that the unity of the faithfull , as such , being in faith , their faith must be one ; the ground therefore of the unity of their faith is the ground of the unity of the faithfull ; but the infallibity of the church is the ground of the unity of faith : therefore the same infallibility is the reason of the unity or positive communion of the faithful . this rule therefore , broken or rejected , dissolves all positive communion amongst christians , both in faith and sacraments . for what tie could they possibly have to communicate in any thing consequent to faith , as sacraments , government , or any good work , unless they first communicate in faith , the rule and ground of those sacraments , government , and good works ; and how can they communicate in faith , if there be no infallibility to binde them to an unity in it ? the denying therefore of this infallibility is the reason of all schism , and even of heresie too ; nay , it selfe is the heresie of heresies , opening a liberty for every man to embrace his owne new-fangled opinions and introducing principles of incertitude , and at best probability in religion , whose natural course is to wander at last into a civil kind of atheism . nor can there be any rational pretence to oblige mens consciences to a religion , whose con●est uncertainty must needs infer an absolute abolishment of all church discipline , and content it selfe with a meer voluntary obedience , that is , legitima●e all schism , by taking away the very possibility of schismatizing . another reason may be given , why the denying this infallibility perverts & quite overthrows all unity in church-government . for the preservation of the churches unity in government being essential to religion , that is , to the art of breeding up mankind to know and love god , it cannot possibly be conceived to be of humane but div●ne institution ; and therefore , being taught and instituted by christ , belongs to faith , and so requires to be recommended by the same never-e●ring rule , which teaches us the rest of his doctrine . he therefore that denies this infallibility , hath no sufficient reason to beleeve the article of the churches government , and consequently will easily finde evasion to excuse his obedience to her commands . the unity of the church being thus clearly delivered , there needs no new task to shew what schism is ; it being nothing else but the unknitting and dissolving these several manners of this unity and communion , and in breaking a●under that tye and obligation , by which these unions of the several members with one another , and of all with the head , are firm'd and made inviolable . what remaines to be done is onely to shew that this anatomy of schism is the perfect picture , nay the very sceleton of the carkasse-church of england ; and that they have infring'd the lawes of unity in all the aforesaid manners . and as for the first , which is the unity of all the members under one head or chief bishop and pastour of the church , in whom , at the time of the breach , all the hierarchical order was summed up , as in the highest top of that heaven-reaching climax , you confesse here sect. . that you cast it out of this island . the authority , i say , of the chief pastourship of the bishop of rome , to which you and the whole church you were then in , were subject ; acknowledged by you not patriarchal onely , but a large step higher , to wit , universally extended over all patriarchs and the whole church , was that which you cast out , and subtracted your selfe from its obdiencee . if then you will hold to your former grounds , so largely to your disadvantage laid in your third chapter , that it is schism in a deacon or priest to disobey a bishop , in a bishop to refuse subjection to his aroh-bishop &c. how will you excuse your selves from schism in rejecting the authority of the head of the church ( unless you can evidence that authority null ; that is , that doctrine false ) to which you had been subject ever since your first conversion , as to a more superiour governour than either bishop , arch-bishop , primate or patriarch . in vaine then was your long frivolous digression , that kings may erect and translate patriarchates , since a greater authority than a patriarch was rejected by you and cast out of this island ; which no king ever pretended to erect and remove at pleasure . in vain do you think to shelter your schism under the wings of the regal power ; since your king , being at that time actually under the pope , as far as concerned ecclesiastical matters , and acknowledging his supreme pastourship , lies himself as deeply obnoxious to the charge of schism , as you his subjects and followers ; or rather much more , as being the ringleader of the breach . so as no plea is so unwarrantable as to bring him for your excuse , who is the person accounted most guilty , and who needs a plea himself for his own far more inexcusable schism and disobedience . but what excuse you bring or not bring concerns us not at present ; onely this remains certain and acknowledg'd , that you cast out of the island that supreme authority , in which at that time , the faithful of the church you were in , communicated ; and in which chiefly consisted the unity of the hierarchical government , arising orderly and knit np peaceably in acknowledgment of and subjection to that one head. whether you did this justly or no belongs to the formal part of schism , and shall be discussed in the following section . next , for what concerns the unity of one member-church with another , it is no lesse evident you have broke asunder all positive communion , not in government onely ( as hath been shewn ) but in faith and sacraments with all churches which communicated with the see of rome , whom , before your schism , you 〈◊〉 the onely and sole true members of christs mystical body . that you broke from their communion in government hath been already manifested from your rejecting her supreme governour , in the subjection to whom they all communicated . nor is it less evident that you have broke from their faith , as appeares from the irreconcileable diversity of the points of faith between us , and the large difference between your . articles , and our council of trent . nor has the unity you and those churches had in sacraments escaped better ; five of them being par'd away as unnecessary ; the sixth transelementated from the sacred price of our redemption into the egena elementa of bread and wine : and the seventh onely , that is , baptism , with much adoe remaining inviolate , lest you should forfeit the name of christians also , together with the reality . if the denial of these , and your styling the best act of our religion , to wit , the the oblation of the unbloudy sacrifice ( in your . article ) a blasphemous fiction and pernicious imposture ; and lastly , if your persecuting us to death be signes of a positive communion with us ; then killing may be called kindness , and railing votes against us , may perhaps be styled communicatory letters with us . all communication then both positive and negative , with the church you were in formerly , was by you renounced ; yet at least some pretence of excuse had been producible , if , departing out of that church , you had either kept or renew'd communion with some other , which was acknowledged by all the world , or at least by your selves before the breach to have been a true one . but you can pretend no such thing as communication with any church either true or even fals . for first at your dawning or rather twilight in king henry's dayes ( for your progress hath not been to noon-day-light , but to midnight ) you had nothing at all to doe with any other church in christendom . since that time , though you have indeed a kinde of communication with some few of your fellow schismaticks , yet , if well examin'd , it is negative onely . faction against rome initiates you into so much friendship as to converse with the calvinists ; sometimes to call them brethren ; somtimes to be merry with your doublejug companions in the synod of dort , of whose drunken and beastly behaviour , wallowing worse then swine , in their own vomits , i have heard a pillar of your own church scandalously complain , having too much spirit of draff forced by them into his quea●ier stomach . though . i say , you may thus communicate with them in eating and drinking ( in which acts * before you made all communion consist ) yet any other positive tie and obligation either with them or any others to conserve you in communion , so as you may be said to make up one ecclesiastically-politick body , united by some inviolable order , such an obligation , i say , could never be discover'd between you and any other church good or bad , true or fals . the greek church holding almost all that we doe , and scarce two points with you , which are against us , as your friend alexander rosse hath particularly told you . the lutherans hold much more with us in opposition to you , than with you in opposition to us . the cal●inists are excluded by the most understanding protestants from their church , since they admit not the government of bishops , held by the others to be of divine right , nor the protestants fundamental , or , as the doctor calls it , the bottome of the foundation of the reformation ; to wit , that the king is head of the church . the . articles , which ( as the kings supremacy is the imprimis , so these ) are all the items of the protestants faith , obtain not a total admission from any church but themselves ; nor amongst themselves neither , their great champion , mr. chillingworth , rejecting them at his pleasure . nor is there any visible form of government uniting them all together , but they are forced to fly sencelesly to an invisible one ; either of onely christ in heaven , or onely charity : pretences to gull the easie vulgar , not to satisfie prudent men ; who know that the church , though it be a spiritual common-wealth , breeding up soules to a state of a future eternity ; yet , while it is here on earth , it is a common-wealth of christians , visibly comporting or discomporting themselves in order to christs laws , of which the church is the keeper and conserver ; and therefore it must have visible governours , without expecting a miraculous recourse to christ in heaven , to resolve emergent difficulties , or to cherish and punish her weldemeaned or misdemeaned subjects . but for a more full demonstration that the church of england has no perfect communion with the greek , lutheran , calvinist , or any other church , i refer the reader to the learned exomolog●sis or motives &c. of mr. cressy , a late protestant dean , but now religious of the ancient and holy order of st. benet , where the doctor may also read ( among other controversies excellently treated ) the charge of schism , sufficiently prov'd against his church . perhaps the doctor will alledge , that their positive communion with other reformed churches consists in the acknowledgment of gods word and the holding to it . but i would ask him , whether he means they agree in the name of gods word , or in the thing , or sence of it . if in the name onely , then all that have the title of christians , that is , all hereticks and schismaticks in the world are of one communion ; nothing being more rife in their mouths and pens , than wrong alledged testimonies out of the bible ; the bare name then is not sufficient , it must be the thing , that is , the sence and meaning of gods word , in which he must make their positive communion consist ; but since they have no one certain , known , and commonly acknowledged rule , by which to interpret gods word , and fetch out the true inward sence , lurking in the imperspicuous bark of the letter , it followes they have no positive way or meanes to communicate in the same sence , and therefore no positive unity can be grounded on that pretence . and it would be as sencelesse to object that they communicate at least in fundamentals , found in gods word ; since the scripture not telling them , they cannot tell certainly themselves which points are fundamentals , which not , all being there with equal authority and like tenour delivered and proposed to them . and if we should goe to reason to know what are fundamentals , surely reason would give it that the rules of faith and government are more fundamental , than all the rest . no positive communion therefore have they with our church , as little with their fellow schismaticks ; it being the nature of boughs separated , not to grow together into one tree , after they have once lost connection with the root ; where they are cut off , there they lie ; and though for a short time they retain some verdure , and some little moystning sap , counterfeiting life ; that is , as much religion as serves them to talk of god and christ ) yet after a while they wither , ro● , and molder away into an hundred atomes of dust ; or else ( if they chance to be gathered up , or taken away sooner ) they serve for nothing but to be thrown into the fire . sect . . that the reforming protestants were and are guilty of the formal part of schism . that you have made then a material breach or schism is as evident , as fact and reason can make the most manifest thing to the clearest understanding . the formality of schism comes next to be enquired into , which consists in its injustifiablenesse , or doing it without just causes or motives ; which consequently unlesse you can shew , you must unavoidably be concluded formal schismaticks : and though the testimonies of the fathers , which you formerly produced , affirming that there can be no just cause given of schism , render all further proof unnecessary ; yet to make this matter stil more manifest , i desire mr. hammond , in the churches behalfe , that he would give me leave to summon him to the bar of reason , that we may see what he can answer for himselfe , and his friends , whose defence here he undertakes . cath. do not you know that the church ( in whose bowels your ancestors , til k. henry began the breach , were bred ) had no other form of government then that which now is of the bishop of rome ; held chiefe pastour of the universal church , and supreme in ecclesiastical matters ; and that , til the breach was made , you held as sacred , and were under that government ? dr. i pretend not to deny it ; for this is the very authority i told you in my . c. . sect . we cast out of this island . besides kings can erect and remove patriarchates at pleasure . cath. do not answer , ( dr. ) de cepis , when we ask de alliis ; you might have sav'd your labour in a great part of your book , wher you slipt the question , and digrest to patriarchs . our question is not of patriarchal , but of papal authority ; and so we ask you , whether it be not evident , that this papal authority was in actual possession of this islands subjection at the time of the breach ; and so had been for yeers , ever since pope gregory sent austin the monk to convert the saxons , forefathers to us english. dr. i know no authority he ever had in england more than patriarchal . cath. do not you know that the popes authority then acknowledged in england was held above patriarchs , and therefore more then patriarchal ; and that you grant you cast out of this island , not a patriarchal authority only , but a papal one ? dr. true ; but the pretended authority was usurpt , and not according to gods ordinance . cath. how know you it was usurpt ? wil bare probabilities be a sufficient ground to renounce an authority so long establisht in possession , held sacred ever before , and to which your selves were till then subject ; wil , i say , a meer probability , that perhaps that authority was not sacred , but unjust , serve your turn to excuse you from disobedience in renouncing it ? dr. no sir , we have evidence it was unjust ; and that the church we were brought up in erred in that point of beliefe . cath. this evidence of yours must either be a demonstration from natural reason ; or an undeniable testimony , either divine or humane . dr. i doe not pretend natural demonstration ; but we have evident testimonies against it . cath. can you manifest that those testimonies ( and the like may ▪ be said of arguments from natural reason ) have not been answer'd twenty times over by our writers ; and ( in case they have ) can you shew that you have replied upon all their answers , so as they bear now no probable shew of satisfaction ? if not , you cannot call your testimony an evidence . next , are you certain that our authors cannot produce an hundred testimonies for one of yours ; or at least an equal number ; and those seeming as expresly , or more , to make for us , as yours doe for you ? if so , your testimonies are at least counterpois'd with the weight of ours , and so cannot make an evidence , but hang only in the hovering scales of a doubtfull probability . thirdly , are your testimonies such that they are of greater weight than the judgment of all the catholick world , holding the pope head of the church ( as our greatest adversaries , the puritans , say for twelve hundred years , or , as you say , two hundred years later ) are they of that weight to over-ballance so far-extended , so numerous , and so learned an authority ? if not , they are so far from evidences , that they fall short of being probabilities . dr. i see you will hold to no authority , but that of your own church , and this is a method of security beyond all amulets . cath. and good reason too , unless you can shew us a greater . dr. a greater we have , id est , gods word , out of which we can evidence , that your church , we were brought up in , was fallible , yea en'd in many points , and particularly in this of the popes supremacy . cath. you cannot with any face pretend an evidence from scripture against us , unless you can evidence a greater faculty and meanes to interpret those oracles in you or your first reformers , than there was in the church you left : and since these meanes are either supernatural light or natural parts and knowledge , you must evidence an advantage above us in one of these ▪ and first , as for natural knowledg , you cannot be ignorant , that at the time of the breach , the catholick church had an hundred doctors for one of yours ; what an unproportion'd advantage then must that number swel to , if all the learned men in the many foregoing ages , without any one of your sect ( then unheard of ) to counterballance them , be heaped into one bulk , and those too , such as your selves must acknowledge far more eminent in schoole divinity , study in scripture , and all kinde of learning both divine and humane , than any of king henry's fellow-reformers were ever deemed ; or if you stiffely deny an advantage , we as stiffely pretend it ; and so leave it a drawn ma●ch for what concernes their parts ; yet you your selves must giant , you are incomparably overpower'd in the numerous multitude of them . in natural meanes then of interpreting scripture , our extraordinary advantage over your reformers , makes it an impudence in them to pretend their advantage evident . it must be then an evidence of a supernatural faculty in interpreting gods word , better than their superiours and pastors , which can make them pretend to a clear knowledge thence that our church hath err'd : but since no supernatural thing , that is latent and invisible in it selfe , can be evidenced or acknowledged to be such , without some exteriour token exceeding the power and skill of nature , as are miracles , gift of tongues , &c. none of which you can lay claim to ; it followes , that neither your reforming forefathers nor your selves can produce evidence of any better meanes , either supernatural or natural to interpret scriptures than the church you left ; therefore no evidence that they more truely interpreted it than that church ; therfore none thence that the church err'd ; therefore none from divine authority , and no humane authority being found comparable to that of the church , it followes they can have as little evidence from thence . evident therefore it is that you neither had nor now have any evidence at all , but onely a probable perhaps , that the church erred ; which being too sleight a reason to shake off subjection to an authority so long establish't and held as a point of faith by the present and past world , consequently they who upon no better grounds should shake it off , are guilty of a most rash and grievous disobedience , and schism . but your selfe here confesse sect. . that you cast this authority out of this island , without power to evidence that that church erred , as hath been shewn . what excuse then can you alledge to clear your father-reformers , and your selfe from a most irrational , and selfe-condemning schism , nay more , heresie ? dr. at least they had such proofes as they thought evident , and bred in them a present perswasion that the church hath erred , which they could not in conscience goe against ; and therefore it was hard dealing to punish them with excommunication for proceeding conscientiously according to their present perswasion . cath. i doubt not but they might have a present perswasion that the church hath err'd ; but i doubt much whether this present perswasion be sufficient to excuse them either from sin or punishment . for this perswasion of theirs is either rational or irrational ; if rational , a sufficient reason may be render'd why they deny'd so qualified a government ; and reason it selfe telling us that no reason less than evidence is sufficient , it would follow that evidence may be rendred that the government was injust ' which , as you see , could not : irrational therefore was that present perswasion of theirs ; and if so , not sprung from reason , therefore from unreasonable passion , that is , from vice , therefore sinful and obnoxious to punishment , as all other like perswasions are , which make men think and act against their duties and obligations ; besides , all the logick we have hitherto heard , assures us nothing can convince the understanding but evidence , and therefore men take so much paines about the moods and figures , that the discourse may prove evident ; wherefore whatsoever assent comes not out of evidence , must come from our will and wilfulnesse ; and by consequence cannot be free from desert of punishment , if it happen to be wrong and wrongfull . neither availes it to pretend invincible ignorance , since no man living , if free from a proud spirit , can be so sottish as not to know that it is his obligation to obey his superiors so long setled in the possession of their command , till most open and undeniable evidences , and not seeming ones onely , should discover that authority null . and , if the obligation be of belief , he must condemn the churches judgment in not seeing the falsity of her doctrine , and prefer his own before millions more learned , who liv'd and dy'd in that faith , which savours too strong of a self-conceited pride ; or else imagin so little sincerity left in the church , that all see and wilfully adhere to a known falshood , but himselfe ; which is a plain sign of a rash and pharisaical presumption . and are not those punishable ? yet the doctor would stroke such a fellow on the head , and give him sugar plums for following his present perswasion and self-conceit , which he nicknames conscience . nay he highly applauds his first reformers , whose conscience no doubt was tainted with the same leaven . the material schism then , which was manifestly your fact , is made formal by your want of evidence , that the doctrine was erroneous and consequently her government violable ; both which joyn'd together give you in plain termes your own name of flat proper and formal schismaticks , and entitle you to all the bed-roll of vices and curses which you hoarded up for your self and your friends in your first chapter . sect . . the doctors argument ▪ that the popes power in england was deriv'd under the kings concession , refuted . but it is now high time to returne to overlook the work ; who , after the declaration of the matter of fact , confesses no great hold can be taken from the freeness of the clergy's determination , and therefore the whole difficulty devolves to this one enquiry , whether the bishop of rome were supreme head or governour of the church of england in the reign of king henry the eighth . that is , we are come about again to the beginning of the book . but i am mistaken , he tells us he hath largely disproved , in his chap. , , . all pretensions from st. peters supremacy , and from englands conversion ; ( to whose particular answers i refer the reader for full satisfaction ) and he has now invented a new ground of the popes supremacy in england , to wit , the voluntary concession of our kings . what the doctor meanes i cannot imagine . some particular priviledges , and ( as i may say ) pious curtesies have , out of a special respect , been granted by our kings to that see , to whom they owe their first knowledge of christ , and his law ; but these are not the thing in debate ; the right of supreme authority is our question ; now , who ever held this to come from the concession of our kings ? yet this ayr-beating champion of schism first fancies this to be our tenet , and then beats it all to dirt . he is as valiant as sir iohn falstaff ; let him tell his own story , and hee 'l make you beleeve he has kill'd eleven enemies , when but one opposed him . we onely found the popes primacy upon his succession to st. peter : this is the onely adversary-point the doctor is to combate , which he hath most weakly opposed with grosse mistakes , palpable contradictions to scripture , and pinning all the words that made for his purpose to every testimony , as hath been shew'd : but to counterfeit a triumph , he makes every trivial thing , done either by or about the pope , to be the very ground of his primacy , and then falls to work and impugnes them as really , as if he thought we held them . the pope cannot doe any good action , or convert a nation , but that must be the ground of his universal pastorship over us , and be impugned accordingly ; a beggerly penny cannot be given to the pope by our kings for pious uses , and out of a gratefull obligation , but the poore peter-pence and such like petty grants must presently be the popes universal authority , given him by the concession of our kings , and that , as such , must be impugned . the kings of england , france , &c. cannot be said by g ▪ de heimburgh to be free from swearing obedience to the pope at their instalment ( an obligation peculiar to the empire of germany ) but presently the doctor concludes hence an absolute power in our princes ; i suppose he means in ecclesiastical matters , for in temporal , none denies it ; so as now the very ceremony of swearing obedience to the pope , is become the very granting of the formal universal pastorship ; and they that doe it not are concluded to be free from the popes jurisdiction ; though he knows well enough , that the king of france , who as he confesses performes no such ceremonious courtesie towards him , acknowledg'd notwithstanding himselfe subject to him , as the head of gods church . lastly , ( which he touches here againe ) he cannot read in some authors that kings de facto executed the erecting and removing of patriarchates , though the testimony doe not exclude the churches fore ▪ ordering it ; but presently the popes universal power must be supposed to be transdignifi'd into a private patriarchate , and as a patriarchate impugned . thus nothing can come amiss to the doctor : every argument he undertakes to manage is equally strong and unresistable . a pot gun will serve him to batter downe the walls of rome . he was borne a controvertist ; and it is an even wager whether hee be better in the gift of use and applicatioon , or in the art of dispute and consutation . next comes another dilemma or forked argument , which though , proceeding on the former false supposition , needs no answer ; yet for the readers recreation we will afford a glance . first , it is observable , that he never brings this bug-bear argument upon the stage , but when he has made a prologue for it of some forg'd supposition of his own ; and then the thing , in vertue of that , acts and talkes through the vizard of a mistake ; and yet , ere it comes to a conclusion , the doctors weak reason cracks to make both ends meet . the summe of it is this , that the authority of the pope was either originally in our kings , so as they could lawfully grant it to the pope , or not ; if not , then the grant was invalid : if it were , then either the same power remaines still in the king to dispose of it to some other ; or else , it does not remaine in him , and ▪ then is his power diminish't , and so the act is againe invalid . i answer , the authority of the pope was never held , by concession of our kings , in any other sence than this , that our kings ( as all other christian kings did ) yeelded him what they held as of faith to be due to him , that is , supremacy in ecclesiastical matters ; and therefore that they not onely lawfully granted it , but could not deny ▪ it , except most unlawfully . therfore their act of yeelding to it was not invalid , but very valid for what it was intended , which was to expresse their obligation in deferring to the head of the church what was his due . wherefore he cannot dispose of it to any other or remove it , since the papacy ( which is the thing in question ) was never imagin'd at any private kings disposal till doctor hammonds time . again his inference , that if it were in the kings power , the same power remaines still in them to dispose of it , is as groundless as the former ; for we see by experience that kings often diminish their power , by yeelding sometimes forts , sometimes an island or country to an over-powering enemy ; and yet that act of theirs held valid notwithstanding . then ( to prove this assertion ) as the fellow that put foure kinds of men that pray , some that pray for others and not for themselves , othersome for themselves not others , some for themselves and others , but some neither for themselves nor others ; or the preacher , upon the text seek and you shall finde , put four kinde of seekers , some that seek and finde not , others that finde and seek not , others that both finde and seek , but others that neither seek nor find : so the doctor tells us here , that there are two sorts of gifts , one that is so given that it is given ; another that is so given that it is kept with the giver ; that is , not given ; and then brings for an instance this curious peece of philosophy . thus the sun communicates his beames , and with them his warmth and influence , and yet retaines all which it thus communicates , and accordingly withdraweth them againe . this book ( as the reader must conceive ) is the doctors en●yclopoedia , encompassing at once the whole world of sciences . he hath before given us notice of scriptures , fathers , councils , history , law , greek , hebrew , grammar , and criticismes : now he gives here a proof of philosophy and knowledge of nature , and lets thee understand so strange a truth as no man , unlesse he were out of his wits , could imagine ; to wit , that the very beames , sent hither by the sun , are notwithstanding retain'd there still ; and therefore are in more far-distant places at the same time ; so granting , that the ordinary course of nature performes more in a creature , than he will grant gods omnipotency can work in the glorify'd body of our lord creator in the ever-blessed sacrament . nay more , he assures us that the sun accordingly withdraweth them again . what he meanes by accordingly in that place i cannot tell ; lesse can i understand how the sun withdrawes his beames again ; i see indeed effects in nature of warmth witnessing that they remain here incorporated in other bodies , but i see no natural causes to bandy the suns beames back to him ; much lesse pullyes and long strings in the sun to withdraw them ( as the doctor expresses it ) accordingly too . but the doctor had fram'd his ▪ observation from the accesse and recesse of the beames of a candle in his own eyes , when he was drowsie ; and dreamt it seemes ●●at night , that the eye of heav'n had the like faculty . your next parity from god almighty shoots beyond the mark : no bargain can be made with him by reason of his universal dominion over his creatures by which they may challenge a proprietary right to his gifts ; therefore none with kings over their fellow-creatures ; that is something impious , unless you had moderated the harsh-sounding expression : neither are we properly our own , for so we might dispose of our own life at pleasure , and the book of your donne , holding selfe-murder lawful , might pass as allowable , whose wit knew better how to maintain a paradox and with more plausible grounds , then you doe your faith. but the truth is , that god never takes away what he gives ; but is then said to take away any thing , when he withholds his bountifull hand from a further bestowing it . this supposed , he tells us the king retaines yet the power granted to the pope , and so may dispose of it to a bishop of his own ; and that the kings power frees them from that obedience and cleares the whole businesse of schism . alas ! what a weak reed you catch at to secure you from falling into the gulfe of schism ? huic ipst partono opus est quem defensorem paras . your patron , the king , needs a patron himselfe . you should first evidence that the king might lawfully renounce the so long possessed , so universally acknowledg'd authority over himselfe as well as his subjects in ecclesiastical matters , ere you lanch forth into such selfe-said , and selfe-authoriz'd conclusions ; otherwise to run widly forwards on your own seign'd and false suppositions , first that his title of universal pastor comes by concession of our kings ; next , that our kings were not found subject to that authority ; and thirdly ( which is yet higher ) that our kings are over that authority and can dispose of it at pleasure ; such voluntary talking as this , i say , is better for a sermon to your good women , where all coine goes currant , than for a controversie , where no progress is allowable but what is already made good by undeniable testimonies and well-grounded reasons . he shuts up the paragraph with talking of the popes willingness to enlarge his territory . true sir , the church is his territory , which he is dayly both willing and industrious to enlarge , by converting barbarous nations to christs faith ; as he did once ours amongst the rest ; for which you are so thanklesly disacknowledging . this territory we hope and pray may be enlarged beyond the envy of all maligners , till all the ends of the earth , and plenitudo gentium the whole company of the gentiles shall see the salvation of god. among whom the church that heaven-planted tree , which beares folia ad sa●itatem gentium is even at this day spreading out her sacred branches ; and the authority of her head goes on not intensively but extensively enlarging ; while your poor broken bough , rootless and sapless , shrinks dayly into nothing , resolved already into its first principles , of a few seditious , disobedient spirits ; whom at first common hatred and then fragrant factiousness against the church held together ; now , that being a far off and such a common interest not so necessary , the spirit of schism , kept in a while by humane policy , begins at length to work , and like a swelling torrent scornes to be held in by a weak bank of turfe , which once forc't its passage through the midst of a rock ; and with good reason too , for why should an acknowledg'd fallibility bridle them now , whom before an acknowledg'd infallibility could not restrain . but you would make queen mary co partner in your schism , and alledge her retaining for some time the title of head of the church ; and her refusing to admit of a legate from rome ; which things you say will make it lesse strange , that this supreme power of the popes should be disclaimed in the time of king henry the eighth . yet , as for the first , you know well enough that she never pretended it as her lawful title , but onely permitted that the former phrase of the lawes , which nick-named her so , might be used ; till she , having setled the turbulent spirits , raised by your good doctrine , which opposed her renouncing it , found an handsom occasion to disclaim that title , usurp't by her late predecessors . your selfe confessing , that she urg'd the matter afterwards in a parliament , and with much difficulty obtained it . which plainly cleares her , and makes your bringing her authority upon the stage very frivolous , the fact being acknowledgedly against her will. but i see not how it can excuse you ; rather it accuses your brethren at that time both of schism and impudence , in forcing their princess to retain an unjustly assumed title against both her will and her conscience . what force he puts in her denying a legate no man knowes , unless he could dive into the mysterious depth of the doctors thoughts . for , besides that there was another legate in england at that time , all catholick countries when they saw it convenient have done the same , and yet ar● reputed true sons of the church , since they retaine as humble an obedience to the see of rome , and as firmly acknowledge her authority as those who admit them . but i see the doct●● knowes not in what the absolute supremacy ( as he calls it ) of the pope consists ; every waving of any request or favour is with him a flat denial and rejection of the authority ; as if they who denied the former kings of england subsidies , deny'd them to be monarchs or heads of the common-wealth . neither can i see that this , as you fancy , makes your breach lesse strange ; but rather much stranger , that whereas rome was so farre from that tyranny falsely by you imputed to her , that you might have ( as queen mary and as catholick kings now doe ) deny'd to admit the popes legats , and all such flowers of pious friendship , or ( as you will call them ) extravagant encroachments , and yet have remained in true charity with the faithful and communion with that your superiour ; yet neither this moderate carriage nor any thing else could satisfie your resolute and desperate disobedience ; but to reject the very authority it selfe , utterly to extirpate it root and branch , and cast it out of this island . this renouncing then of the chiefest authority of the church you left , you call , in a strange expression the bottome upon which the foundation of reformation was laid ; upon which by the same workmen ( who pulled downe a good house to build a worse ) was erected a superstructure : in king henry's dayes , the number of the sacraments , translation of the bible , and the use of the lords prayer in the english tongue ; as if the lords prayer was never used in the vulgar language till king henry's holinesse ordained it . as for the kings vicar-general , who presided in his duely-assembled councel ( as you call it ) i can say no more of him , but he was a proper fellow . domini similis , like his master ; vicegerent to him in that high and mighty title of the chief of schismaticks , the rotten head of the corrupted body . but mr. doctor proceeds in his schism , much farther advanced ( as he tells us ) in king edwards dayes : yet first he is resolved to clear the way , and remove a rub which he apprehends very dangerous , to wit , lest we should think to prove the acts made in his dayes invalid and vilifie them , because the king was yet alas but a child , assuring us therefore that the lawes of this realm ordain that what is done by the protector is done by the child , and that too , as well as if the child had been a man. but i will secure the doctor of his s●are ; for though the child had been a man and had had as many wives as his father , yet neither he nor they had been a jot further from being plain schismaticks ; unless this child or man had been wiser , holier , and olde● than all gods church , so to justifie the breach which his father had made . very pitiful then had been the doctors re●uge , had the infant king the head of thei● church been at yeares of discretion ; but ye● far more pitiful is it , the then protector steering the helm of the common-wealth ; who●e traiterous and ambitious designe to intercept queen mary's succession being manifestly discover'd , whatever he acted against catholicks or their religion ( q. mary's supports ) ought in all reason but the doctors be rather imputed to interest than piety . but nothing can prejudice ( as he thinks ) the regularity of his reformation . schism once admitted , as sacred , no wonder if tyranny , treachery and ambition be not onely lawful but pious and commendable . yet his tyranny in secular matters is become even the supream power in ecclesiastical ; and so the reformation goes on in the doctors book currantly and merrily ; especially though some bishops resisted and were punisht , yet ( as the doctor sayes ) arch-bishop cranmer ( who kept a wench in king henries time ) and the far greater number of bishops joyning with him , all is well and the reformation valid : then to cry quits with us for their persecuting our bishops , he puts us in mind how their friends in queen maries dayes , were not onely persecuted with fire but with ●agot too ; to answer which , let the dr. but clear those malefactors from schisme and sedition , and we shall acknowledge the cruelty ours , and the innocency theirs ; otherwise let them remember our pretended persecution was onely execution of justice , and theirs a most sacrilegious and irreligious tyranny . but i smell by the dr. that he hath been in iohn foxes kennel . the reformations he mentions , introduced in the popedom of this head junior of their church , are many changes ( as the dr. tells us ) and recessions from the doctrine and practises of rome . that is now grown reason enough to think all that was done to be lawfully done ; besides ( saith he ) that of images , the lawfulnesse of the marriage of the clergy was asserted , ( the dr. likes that point of faith dearly ) the english liturgy formed , the people got wine to their bread , &c. but that ill-favord , &c. dashes out the best . then , then it was ( the dr. should have added ) that those two sweet singers of israel , hopkins and sternhold , ( as cleveland expresses it ) murdered the psalmes over and over , with another to the same ; then did the later of these in a fit of divine fury no doubt , bid god , give his foes a rap . then , then it was that that second solomon , robert wisedom , inspired questionless from heaven , warbled out that melodious and exquisit hymn , which with a sweet twang closes up the book of psalmes . preserve us lord , by thy dear word , from turk and pope , defend us lord. and the rest of that devout piece , able to ravish any christian heart to hear it . these and such other rarities of reformation were then added , as harmonious epithalamiums to this under-age bride-church , to celebrate her espousals or marriage with her infant-head . after this the dr. treates of the reformation made under queen elizabeth in his . paragraph , consisting of five or six lines on either side a long parenthesis ; which parenthesis tells us partly strange news , that queens as well as kings have according to our laws regal power ; partly open fictions , that this plenitude of power is as well in sacred as civil affairs ; and that they have this by the constitution of our monarchy . whereas he cannot but know there had been many a monarch in england , ere their schismatical laws were made , which first allowed the king a plenitude of power in sacred matters . in the next place he touches the ordination of their new created bishops , evidenced ( as he saith ) out of the records to have been performed according to the ancient canons by the imposition of the hands of the bishops . yet this modest evidencing record durst never shew its head for about fifty years , notwithstanding the outcries made by catholicks against the pretended ordinations of protestant bishops , and strong presumptions to the contrary : till at length , when the memory of that present age was past , which might discountenance that pretence and argue it of impudence , out steps a new old record assuring us that they were regularly ordained . and this is the firmest basis the protestant ministry or bishops have , to witnesse that they have any more authority to preach then an anabaptistical zelot , whose profession is perhaps a weaver ; his calling , his own intrusion ; his pulpit a tub , and his diocesse a conventicle . but suppose you had a material mission from the hands of catholick bishops , and that mr. mason had vindicated you in this point ; yet can either mr. mason or any else even pretend to manifest that those catholick bishops gave you a mission , that is , sent and authorised you to preach protestant doctrines , or could do it , in case they would , having no such power from the church , from whom they have all their power . unlesse you evidence this , both mr. mason and dr. hammond may as well say nothing . for since they gave you no such authority as you make use of , that is to preach against the formerly received faith ; nor sent you any such errand as you now declare and preach , it follows that whatever you do to prejudice and extinguish that doctrine ( to propagate which they meant your mission ) is done onely upon your own head , without any authority but your own selfe-assumed licentiousnesse to talk and say what you list ; not derived from the consecrated hands of your catholick ordainers , but from your own unhallowed schismatical hearts . but mr. dr. is always afraid , where no fear is ; answering at large here a supposed objection of ours against q. elizabeth for unchairing some bishops and installing others . but ( alas ! ) i am more courteous to the queen than the doctor imagines , and think no worse of her , but onely that in that fact she did after kind ; for supposing her once the head of schisinaticks and chief-bishopesse of their church , i see no reason but she should depose bishops , catholikely affected , and install heretical ones ; and in a word , she and her bishops vo●e and act whatever they thought good , and i cannot tell what should hinder them , since the now rejected authority of gods church could not . all the superstructures of the reformation then , which the doctor so often and so largely in this chapter hath shown to be done regularly , i grant him to have been done as regularly as his own heart could wish or mans wit imagine ; for the authority of the church being schismatically renounced , and the infallible rule of faith , which could onely oblige men to an unanimous beleefe , being broken and rejected ; these grounds ▪ i say , being layed , i yeeld that the superstructure not onely of their heresie , but even of lutheranism , zuinglianism , calvinism , arminianism , puritanism , brownism , socinianism , presbyterianism , anabaptism , with those of quakers and adamites , but even of turcism and atheism , were all very regular , orderly , rational and connatural superstructures , upon the forelaid foundations . the ruine of all faith must needs accompany the renouncing of certainty . yet i had forgot to let the reader see how the doctor excuses the queen for devesting some bishops of their dignity ; and his excuse is , because those bishops refused to take the oath of supremacy ; concluding that therefore she dealt justly in devesting those bishops , which thus refused to secure her government , or to approve their fidelity to their lawfull soveraign . by which one may see the doctor knowes not the difference between the oath of allegiance and the oath of supremacy . the oath of allegiance or fidelity was instituted expresly for that purpose ; what needed she then presse them to take the oath of supremacy , to approv● their fidelity or allegiance ; cannot one be a true subject to his king by acknowledging him his liege soveraign , unless he will take his oath he is head of the church ? as if neither any of the former kings of england , nor any of the catholike princes that now are or ever have been , had so much as one true subject , because none of them takes the oath of supremacy . what followes , is onely a narration how the schism went on and the rent was made worse . at length he shuts up this chapter , by pronouncing an absolute negative of their guiltiness of schism , from this one evidence , that all was done by those to whom , and to whom onely the rightful power legally pertained , to wit , the king and bishops of this nation . so as the king must be head of the church , that 's concluded , hoagh all the world say and swear the contrary though himselfe have not brought one express word to prove it : nay more , he hath evidence it is no schism , because the king and the bishops voted it ; as if whatsoever the king and bishops vote , let it be what schismatical doctrine it will , though socianism and turcism , it must not be schismatical ; so blind is prejudice , that it can neither see without its own spectacles , nor beyond its own narrow limits . the doctor discourses all this chapter long , as if he made account all the world were comprised in one poor corner of it , england ; like the home-bred fellow that thought the sun set at the next town ; if a king or queen here with a few bishops , partly out of feare , partly out of favour , some out of malice ( and contradicted by others ) decree any thing , it makes the case irrefragable in the doctors judgment : not considering ( which yet any prudent man would ) that the whole world , whom before they accounted onely catholick , and in which had been hundreds of kings queens and bishops , nay perhaps thousands for one of theirs , had ever condemned by their contrary beliefe these votes and acts to bee scismatical and heretical . besides , this king before the breach acknowledging himselfe subject to that authority in ecclesiastical matters , as all catholick kings now doe , and as all his ancestor-kings ever since englands conversion had done , it must be , as i have told you often ▪ most apparent evidence , and such as greater cannot be imagin'd , which may warrant him to exal● himselfe above the popes authority , so long setled in possession , and that in those very things in which before he was acknowledgedly under him ; especially the contrary verdict of such an universality , as i have before mention'd , with its weight not to be counterpois'd , preponderating , and mightily prejudicing any pretence of evidence . again , if the thing were evident , how happened it that no christian king till the time of king henry the eighth , and in his time none but he should discern this clear evidence , unless perhaps ( though they say love is blind , yet ) his desire to anna bullen did open his eyes in such miraculous manner , that he saw by the heavenly light of her bright star-like eyes , that the pope was antichrist , his authority unlawful ; and himselfe , who was then found under it in ecclesiastical matters , to be indeed above it , in case the popes spiritual power should cross his carnal pleasure . to conclude my answer to this chapter , i would ask two things of mr. doctor ; one is , in case a king should have broke from the church , and brought in schism into his country , whether it could probably be perform'd in any other manner than the very method by which their reformation was introduced ? the other is whether the reformation be yet perfectly compleat , or rather that queen elizabeth swept the church indeed , but left the dust sluttishly behind the door ; if it be not yet compleat , i would gladly know how far this reformation and receding from rome may proceed ; and what be the certain stints , and limits of this rowling sea , which it may not pass ? for i see no reason in the doctors grounds , but if the secular powers think it convenient , they may reform still end ▪ wayes as they please , nay even , if they list , deny christ to be god ; an acute socinian will solve very plausibly all the objections out of scripture , and produce allegations , which i doubt not he will make far stronger , than the doctor doth his against the pope ; nor will there want some obscure testimonies out of antiquity , and express ones from the arrian hereticks to evince the tenet ; if this then were voted by a king , some of his bishops and a parliament , the doctor must not disobey and hold christs divinity ; since the thing was done by them to whom ( as the doctor sayes ) rightfull power legally pertain'd . they having no infallibility then , may happen to vote such a thing ; and the doctor having no infallible certainty to the contrary , ought not recede from his lawful superiours , so as upon these grounds all religion may be reformed into atheism ; and ( the infallibility of the church once denied ) the temporal power hath no reason to have his rightful authority stinted , but at pleasure to make reformation upon reformation from generation to generation , per omnia saecula saeculorum . the third part . containing the answers to the foure last chapters of dr. hammonds schism . sect . . doctor hammonds second sort of schism , and his pretence that they retain the way to preserve unity in faith , refuted . master hammond hath at length finish't his greatest task , and done preaching of the first species of schism , as it is an offence against the subordination , which christ hath by himselfe and his apostles setled in the church ; and is now arrived to the second sort , as it signifies an offence against the mutual unity , peace and charity , which christ left among his disciples . this schism against charity , for methods sake , ( as he tells us ) he divides into three species . the first is a schism in the doctrine or traditions , a departure from the unity of the faith once delivered to the saints , from the institutions of christ , of the apostles and of the universal church of the first and purest times , whether in government or practises , &c. where first this methodical dr. makes faith and charity all one ; putting his schism against faith for the first species of his schism against mutual charity . next , he ranks also the rejecting christs institution of government under this second species of schism against charity , which most evidently was the first general head of schism hitherto treated of ; that is , of the offence against subordination setled by christ in the church : for christ could not settle such a subordination in the church , but he must at the same time institute the government of the church ; since there can be neither subordination without government , nor government without subordination . so as now the schism against government is come to be one of the schisms against mutual charity ; and , to mend the matter , comprehended under the same head with schism against faith. was ever such a confusion heard of ? and yet , all this is done ( saith the doctor ) for methods sake . but to proceed , the second species of his schism against mutual charity , is an offence against external peace and communion ecclesiastical . where i find as much blundering as formerly . for these words must either signifie an offence against superiors and governors of the church ; and then it is again co-incident both with the first general head of schism , which dissolves the subordination of the churches subjects ; and also with the first particular species of schism against mutual charity , which ( according to the doctors method ) included a breach from the government instituted by christ. or else , they must signifie an offence against the mutually and equally-due correspondence and charity , which one fellow-member ought to have to another ; and then it falls to be the same with his third and last species , which he calls , the want of that charity which is due from every christian to every christian. so that , if the jumbling all the bells together in a confused disorder may be called musical , then the doctors division may be styled methodical . after this , he subdivides this first species , ( to wit , schism against faith ) into a departure from those rules appointed by christ for the founding and upholding truth in the church ; and into the asserting particular doctrins contrary to christs and the apostolical pure churches establishment . but first he cleares himselfe of the former of these by answering our suggestion ( as he calls it ) that in casting out the authority of the bishop of rome , they have cast off the head of all unity . to which he tells us the answer is obvious ; first that the bishop of rome was never appointed by christ to be the head of all christian unity , or that church to be the conservatory for ever of all christian truth , more than any other bishop or church of the apostles ordaining or planting . where i find almost as many absurdities hudled together as words . for first , what signifies the bp. of rome was not appointed by christ ? christ was not on earth when st. peters successors in the see of rome , sate there ; and when he ordained st. peter chief of the apostles , saint peter was not yet bishop of rome . next , if he meanes that st. peter was not appointed by our saviour , as the head of christian unity , st. hierom's testimony , i suppose , will be as good as the doctors word , who tels us , inter duodecim , &c. amongst the , twelve one was chosen , that a head being constituted , the occasion of schism might be taken away . where we see expresly saint peter , the popes predecessor , was advanced to be head ; and this to take away occasion of schism , that is , to be head of christian unity . thirdly , hence also follows that christian unity is conserved by him more than by any other bishop , contrary to the doctors assertion . fourthly , he equivocates in the word roman church , and takes in it a sence which he knowes we never mean't : our acception of it being of the universal church communicating with the mother church of rome ; his , of the private diocess of rome it selfe . fifthly , it is groundless to affirm , even of this private church of rome it selfe , that she is not the conservatory of christian truth more than any other ; since the doctor cannot but know the fathers are of a contrary beleefe , holding that the two chief apostles , dying there , bequeathed to that church , as a sacred legacy , a greater vigour of christian tradition . again , histories and fathers witnessing so unanimously her firm persistance above the rest ; objections often urged by our authors to that purpose ; the doctor might at least have afforded us one testimony of the contrary , besides his own bare saying . lastly , what is the doctors intent in saying christ did not appoint the church of rome conservatory ( for ever ) of all christian truth ? what meanes this canting parenthesis ( for ever ) as if christ might perhaps appoint her to conserve truth for a while , but meant after some time to discharge her of that office . but this parenthesis the doctor reserved for a starting-hole , that he might at pleasure cry out she had erred , when he had found out some odd testimony , which with the help of an id-est-clause might overthrow the authority of the whole world. his second defence for relinquishing the means to preserve unity of faith , which we charge them with , is this ; that the way provided by christ and his apostles for preserving the unity of faith , &c. is fully acknowledged by their reformation . which way ( sayes the doctor ) is made up of two acts of apostolical providence ; first , their resolving upon some few heads of efficacy to the planting of christian life through the world , and preaching and depositing them in every church . secondly , their establishing an excellent subordination of church-officers , &c. as for the first of these acts ( as he calls them ) of apostolical providence ; if these two heads he speaks of , as thus deposited , be indeed sufficient to form a christian life in order to the attainment of eternal bliss , and that they came down certainly to us by this depository way at first in the churches , and so derived successively age by age , dr. hammond is suddenly become a proselyte and a plain papist : for , we neither say we have any point of faith superfluous for the community of the faithful ; nor that those we have , came to us by any other meanes than seruando depositum , by preserving uncorrupted those necessary doctrines thus deposited . but i fear much , when the matter comes to scanning , mr. hammond , in this his doctrine , neither goes to church nor stayes at home , but halts very lamely in the mid-way . he stayes not at home ; for his church of england is so far from holding the points deposited by the apostles in churches , a certain way to preserve unity of faith , that nothing is more abominable to her than the name of tradition . this appeares by the sixth article or canon of queen elizabeth's female-headed general council , where the scripture is made the sole ground of faith , and nothing affirmed as necessary to salvation , but what is built upon it ; whereas the doctor here builds points necessary to salvation ( for sure those few heads of special efficacy to the planting a christian life , can be no lesse ) upon their preaching and depositing them in the churches ; nay more , the unity of faith , that is , faith it self , ( for faith , if not one , is none ) upon this way of depositing . yet for all this he will not goe to church neither , though he stay not at home . for ask him , are those few heads all that are necessary ? he will tell you , n● ; yet which be those necessary heads , how many , and why no more were thus delivered ( since this he sayes is a way to preserve unity in faith ; and on the other side he sees what multiplicity is bred by the diverse interpretations of scripture ) ask him , i say , these questions , and no particular account can he give you ; only he had a mind to say somthing in geneneral , lest he might be thought to have utterly contemned all traditions . again , these churches , in which were deposited those few heads of such special eefficacy to plant christian life , were they infallible , that is , such as we may certainly trust to in their preserving that depositum ? if they were ▪ they might as well be infallible in other necessary points also , and so the doctor hath slipt , by good hap , into our rule of faith , and ( though hoodwink't ) goes to church again . but if they be not infallible , that is , connot certainly tell us that they delivered us the right depositum , and the same they received , then the drremaines as he is , and hath brought nothing to his purpose . for since unity of faith cannot be preserved without some efficacious meanes of bringing it down to us inerrably true , unless this depositing was such as must upon necessity continue for ever , ( which is that we call infallibility , or indefectibility of the church ) the providence of the apostles had been very sleight , and nothing at all to the doctors purpose ; that is , it had been no efficacious way to preserve unity of faith. he addes afterwards , and all this is asserted and acknowledged by every true son of the church of england as zealously as is pretended by any romanist . here again the doctor seemes to step forwards towards the church ▪ and to draw a great troup of backward unwilling protestants after him . for if they hold ( as i conceive he meanes by these words ) the doctrines deposited in the church , as zealously as the romanists , they must hold them as of faith ; for so farre our well-grounded zeal carries us , and that the depositary is so trusty as it cannot deceive us . now you see the doctor is got as farre as the church-door . but when he heares them within the church talk that a company of men can be infallible ; he leaps you back at one jump as far as the sceptick schooles of the heathen academicks . but how could mr. hammond imagine this pretence sufficient to acquit him from scism in renouncing the way to preserue unity of faith , or to prove that he and his fellowes still fully acknowledged it . the way to preserve unity of faith , held by all the christian world before their breach , was the beleefe of the churches infallibility ; and we think mans wit cannot invent a better for that end. either then , this must be the way to preserve unity in faith , or some other ; if this , you manifestly broke and rejected it , as hath been shewn , and as the th article of queen elizabeths new creed professedly declares ; if some other , whatever it is , it must needs include a fallibility and uncertainty in the church , of the doctrine she teaches . wherefore , either evidence to us that a professed and beleeved fallibility can be a better way to preserve unity in faith , than a beleefe of infallibility ; or else grant that renouncing the latter you renounced the best and most efficacious way to conserve such an unity . the second way to preserve unity in faith here mentioned by the doctor ( as fully and zealously acknowledged by him & his fellows ) is the establishment by our saviour and his apostles of an excellent subordination of all inferiour officers of the church to the bishop in every city , of the bishops in every province to their metropolitans , of the metropolitans in every region or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to patriarchs or primates ; allowing also amongst them such a primacy of order or dignity a● might be proportionable to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . &c ▪ thus the doctor . in answer to which , w● will examine a while , whether this way , thu● laid out , be indeed the way to preserve unity i● faith ! for , if notwithstanding this subordination , no priest is bound to beleeve his bishop , nor bishop his metropolitan , nor metropolitan his patriarch , how can this conduce to the unity of faith ? but peradventure he will say this subordination in obedience is a great help to keep out errours , and then , if this be so , we must take into consideration how this point relates to unity of government , as it is a means to conserve truth , the breaking of which unity is called schism . so the question in that case is reduced to the examine how his subordination provides against schism . let us admit then that all the world were made up of churches governed in this order as the doctor hath put them ; i would ask , if in the time of the arian heresie , a priest had dissented from his bishop , an arian , but yet consented with his metropolitan , had it been schism in so doing ? the doctor must answer , no ; for the metropolitan being of higher authority than the bishop , the adherence to him would more secure the priest from schism , than the relinquishing the bishop could endanger him . next , if a bishop dissent from an heretical metropolitan , but consents with a catholick patriarch , is it yet schism ? surely no , since the same reason clears him that cleared the priest before . again , if the metropolitan dissent from his own primate or patriarch , but agree with all the rest , is it yet schism ? certainly no ; for the collection of all the rest , being of greater authority than any one in particular , can by consequence more excuse him , than the other can condemn him . hitherto then we have found none of the doctors amulets against shism . let us proceed ; if a patriarch dissent from the first , from the doctors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but yet concedes to all the rest , is it yet schism ? the doctor answers , no ; for in regard he owed the other onely something more of a civil respect , as a younger brother does an elder , without any inferiority to him in command or jurisdiction , it cannot be a schism . forwards still ; suppose some nation or some patriarch dissent from a general council , is it yet schism , still the dr. answers , no ; for in his third chapter , which branch't schism into all its species , he put no such schism as that against a general council . how then hath mr. hammond by this new way provided against schism , if according to this subordination , all the church may fall together by the eares , and all may find lawful excuses to secure them from ▪ being scismaticks ; since the oeconomy of that distracted family is so order'd , that neither any one in particular , nor any in common , have any tie to hold them to the rest , without which ty of consent in matters of faith , this imagin'd subordination can no way be a meanes to preserve unity of faith ; and conquently the drs. church ▪ government ( without some stronger obligation to knit up all this order in an unity ) is not an act of providence , either worthy our saviour or his apostles . but what is become of the king or emperour all this while , is he no body now , who before was the chief ? it seemes the apostles made no reckoning of him in all their providence . it is wonderful mr. hammond should so forget himself , and proceed so inconsonantly to his own grounds ; that , whereas before the king was chief governour , head of the church , supreme in ecclesiastical matters , over and above both metropolitans and patriarchs , &c. now in treating the government of the church , instituted to preserve the unity of faith , he thinks the head of the church , whom he had formerly exalted above all that is called holy , not worth the mentioning . does he think the unity of such a head conduces nothing to the preservation of unity in faith , which yet he grants to a far more inferiour , bishop ? or accounts he it a small sin for a patriarch to dissent from so sacred a head of his church , and his lawful superiour , nay supreme in ecclestastical matters , and to whom the rightful power ( as the doctor told us ) in those things legally pertaines ? yet mr. hammond had good reason to omit it . for though he may talk of , and advance that doctrine in common , so to escape the supremacy of the pope ( for you must conceive that he had rather have even a bramble ▪ rule over their church , than that all ▪ o're ▪ spreading cedar , the bishop of rome ) yet he declines it as handsomely as he can , when he should apply that doctrine to particulars , as is seen in our present case . for indeed who would not laugh at him , if he had told us ( as he must , had he introduced the king ) that it was the heighth of schism to dissent in a point of faith from a thing which neither the catholikes , nor yet protestants ( as you here see ) acknowledge ; but a kind of a lay-elder , an office , which ( were it not three dayes older ) might seem borrowed from their dearly beloved brethren the presbyterians . yet the doctor is grown kind ; and allows that the scripture grants to s. peter some primacy of order , or dignity . if so , mr. hammond , then , for any thing you know , it may be a primacy of iurisdiction ; and it stands onely upon the certainty of your , and our interpretation of scripture , whether it signifie such a primacy or no. neither indeed could it be any other , if any hold may be taken from your words . for s. peter , as you grant , and as the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simon , the first of the apostles , plainly evidence , had some kind of primacy then given him ; and if it were then given him , he then had it , that is , he had it in our saviours life time ; but you told us before that s. iohn had the dignity of place ( which is the same with primacy of order ) before all others in christs life time , even before s. peter himself ▪ the primacy then which s. peter had in christs life time , must be some other primacy ; and what primacy could this be , but the primacy of iurisdiction ? again , if by this primacy he allows s. peter , he means such a precedency as hath any effect or efficacity in the church according to the nature and degree of a primacy ; this is all the substance of the popes authority , and all that is held by us as of faith ; but if he means by primacy there , a meerely inefficacious and dry presidency and precedency of order ; such as is with us the walking on the right hand , or sitting first at a table , without any superiority more than a courteous deference of the rest ; then the doctor must imagine our blessed saviour had no better thing to do , when he made s. peter the first , but to take order , for feare the good apostles should fall to complement , who should sit , go , or speak , in the first place : and consequently this tenet ( being an act of our saviours , register'd in scripture ) must bee a courteous point of faith , obliging all the apostles , under pain of damnation , to be civil , and make a leg to s. peter . in the next paragraph the doctor is full of feares and jealousies , and makes a great doubt that the subjection of this church to the authority of the bishop of rome will never be likely to tend to the unity of the whole . and why think you so , mr. doctor ? doe you not find evidently that the church ( before luther and k ▪ henry renounced the said authority ) enjoy'd most perfect peace and tranquillity , as those who are under that government doe most blessedly now ? and on the contrary , that after that authority was rejected , nothing has succeeded the rejecters , but perpetual turmoiles , schisms , divisions and subdivisions into sects ; and daily mutations in faith and government , as far as the temporal sword did not hinder them . is not this as evident as all history , and even our very eyes can witnesse a truth ? lastly , doe not the present distractions you now groan under awake you , to see that the source of all your misery springs from the leaking cistern of schism you have digg'd for your selves ? did your ancestours find so little unity under the government of the roman catholike church , or have you found such a constant unity since you left it , that you can presume the re-admitting that government is never likely to tend to unity ? yet you cannot think otherwise , unlesse all other churches of christians paid that subjection too . do you your obligation ; why should their backwardnes in their duties make you deny yours ? besides , whom doe you call christians ? all that cry lord , lord , that is , professe the name of christ , but deny the onely certain rule to come to the knowledge of his law ? such as were the gnosticks , carpocratians , donatists , socinians , and all the heresies that ever arose since the infancy of the church ; or doe you mean by the word christians , onely those , qui faciunt voluntatem patris , doe the will of our heavenly father , that is , all that hear the church , or have a certain and common rule to know what christs law is ? if so , all these acknowledge subjection to the head-bishop of rome , never denied by any but those , who , at the same time they denied it , cast themselves out of the church , refusing to hear her . you say the eastern churches had not acknowledg'd it ere your departure . admit they had not : can their pattern warrant you ( more than it can warrant the arrians , nestorians , eutychians , &c. ) unless you be certain they did well in it ? they rejected it indeed , and for their reward were by all the christian world ( till you , falling into the same fault , began to call them brothers ) and by all your ancestours justly held and called schismaticks . yet , when they were in their right mood , they admitted it as much as any roman-catholike , as appeares in the acts of the florentine council , to which they subscribed ; nay even when they were disgusted and refused unity , they acknowledged the power of the bishop of rome ; as appeares by a testimony of gerson , cited by your friend bishop bramhall against himselfe ( in his just vindication of the church of england , p. . ) which witnesses that the greeks departed from the then-pope with these words , wee acknowledge thy power , we cannot satisfie your covetousness , live by your selves . his second doubt is , that the bishop of rome is not able to administer that vast province . i wonder how he did of old ; and why he may not do the same again as well as formerly . but the dr. calls it a politick probleme whether hee can or no ; and would have it judged by those who are by god entrusted with the flock . id est ( saith he ) by the princes , the nursing fathers in every church . it is indeed a politick probleme , that is , a question concerning government ; but since it concernes government ecclesiastical , it falls not under the scanning of temporal politicians . the christian common-wealth would be brought to a pretty pass , if the government of gods church , so long acknowledged as left by christ , and continued in the church . yeares ( by their own confession ) ere there were any christian princes , should anew be call'd into question by humane policy . but these two words of scripture nursing fathers make it plain to the doctor ( satisfy'd with any thing himself fancies ) that the government and jurisdiction over the church belongs to kings ; as if to nurse , cherish and foster , were to rule , order , govern and command ; or , as if ioseph , who was foster-father to our saviour , was as good as , or the same with god almighty , who was his true father . and i wonder where this doctor ever read , that our saviour entrusted the government of his church and ecclesiastical affaires to any but the apostles , ecclesiastical persons ; or that any held nero , the heathen emperour , to have right and title o be head of the church . again , if our saviour left that authority with his apostles , i would gladly know , by what new orders from christ , it came to be transfer'd from their successors into the hands of secular princes . but the doctor has by his former words brought the matter at length to a finall decision . the question is , whether it be sitting the pope should rule over the whole church , which none denies but a few schismatical princes ; he comes to take up the controversie , and tels us those very princes ( for all catholike princes have already determined the contrary ) must decide the truth of the businesse . as if an umpire , being to arbitrate a quarrel about the authority of the vice-chancellour of oxford , opposed by the major , his competitor , should take up the businesse by saying it was a politick probleme , belonging to the government of the university , and so ought to bee decided by none but the major . sect . . of dr. hammonds evasion in recurring to the first . yeares , and concerning the humble and docible temper of his church . having thus cleared the protestants for renouncing the rules of faith ; ( which was part of his well-divided schism against mutual charity as far as it concernes faith ) he is come to treat next of the second part of that first species of mutual charity , which concernes faith , to wit , of the particular doctrines in faith : in which he sayes he doubts not but to approve himselfe to any that will judge of the apostolical doctrines and traditions by the scriptures and consent of the first . years , or the four general councils , &c. which is a very plausible and pithy piece of shuffling , expressing a plain tergiversation from approving himselfe willing to do any thing , but to wave and shift the question . for first , we must judge of apostolical doctrines and traditions by scripture . i ask , are those doctrines clearer exprest in scripture than they are in the depositories of the churches , by which he told us before they were brought down to us , or no ? if they be clearer in scripture , what needed we those depositives at all , and to what end does that apostolical providence serve ? if not , how can we judge of them by scripture , which speakes more obscurely of them ? again , since we must judge of apostolical doctrines by scripture , what rules does the doctor give us to settle our judgement , when things are cleare in scripture and when not ? for we see many men , who govern themselves by fancy , think that evident , which another judges to have no apparence of truth . and , for my part , i even despair of bringing clearer proofes from scripture , than that s. paul converted iewes , and s. peter gentiles ; which yet you saw could give the nice doctor no satisfaction . another tergiversation is his standing onely to the first . yeares ; where the authors being scarce , by reason of the churches obscure state under persecution ; and hardly any occasion to speak of the late risen controversies between us , he hopes no great matter can be concluded against him thence , where scarce any thing is found that concernes our quarrel . as if , being to fight a duel with an adversary , he would stand to the appointment of no place and time , but onely in a wildernesse and a dark night ; where they might be sure never to meet , or being met , never see one another . no better is his standing to the four first councils onely ; which were all call'd upon other occasions , and so touch not any point of debate between us , except onely on the by , and therefore obscurely ; the best testimonies out of which have been already objected by him , and solved by us . but why onely foure ? since all councils are of equal authority ; there being nothing found to authorize the first foure , but was found in the fifth , sixth , &c. so that this challenge of the drs. is all one as if an arian heretick would be judged by no place in scripture , whether christ were god or no , but out of the proverbs of solomon ; where nothing is found concerning that point ; dilating much upon the praises of solomon , and what a most pure and uncorrupted piece of scripture that book is ; but producing no evidence in the world why the other books of scripture were not as pure and sacred as it . but the doctor escapes not so ; he has engag'd himselfe by this ( as he thought ) secure grant , further than he imagines . his allowing of foure councils to examine his faith by , is an acknowledgement that he admits the authority of councils as sacred and binding . he must either then shew evidence that the th council erred , or that the church and her pastors had declined from the faith of the foregoing age , or else he is obliged to accept it , and so the rest , under the penalty of forfeiting the title of a good christian : for no lesse blot will fall to his share , who rejects an authority held sacred by himselfe , without most clear evidence of a just exception . as he who acknowledges the authority of parliament , by admitting the acts of some as valid lawes , is bound , by the very acknowledgment of some , to accept all the rest , unless an open evidence convince their votes not to have been free , or that there was some other known defect in the managing of them onely in this latter a far lesse evidence will serve the turn , the authority of parliament being but humane , whereas the other was held and acknowledged to bee sacred . but indeed , the truth is , hee accepts not even of those four , because he thinks councils to be of authority ; but because he thinks there is no doctrine in these against his fancy or faith ; or if any , he hopes he can make a shift to shuffle it off : in the mean time gaining a very great patronage and countenance to his cause , in pleading it relies on such highly authoriz'd supports . no candider than the former is his evasion of being judged by the purest ages ; which in reality signifies onely such times wherein nothing was treated against those heresies which afterwards cling'd together to compound protestantism . this is manifest by his admitting . yeares next after christ , no more ; by which he excludes the fourth and fifth ages , yet at pleasure admits the fourth general council held about the middle of the fifth age. so that , the whole church must be imagin'd to be first pure , then impure , afterwards pure again , according as the supposition of it suits best for the doctors purpose . if none of their particular heresies were rife , and therefore not condemned in the first obsure . years , presently the dr. cries up those ages for pure ; but the church in the next age , having now got rid of persecution , became pester'd with home-bred factions and heresies ; which made the fathers of the church take pen in hand , vigorously confuting them and some of the doctors tenets among the rest . hereupon the doctor presently decries that age as impure ▪ popish , corrupted . but then in the middle of the fifth age was call'd a council , which chanced to treat nothing professedly of the errours afterwards embraced by the protestants ; nay more , had a certain passage in it ( which i have before cleared ) serving them to blunder in against the pope ; immediately that council was sacred , and that age ( or at least that year ) was pure again . for it cannot be imagin'd the doctrine of that council was pure , but the beleefe of the faithful in that age taught by those pastors which there resided must be pure also . far more consonant then to their grounds is the doctrine of the puritans , denying promiscuously all antiquity ; than to pick and cull out at pleasure what serves their turn ( as doe the protestants ) and to like and reject , allow and disallow what makes for or against them , without giving ▪ any evident reason , why they put such a difference . in vain therefore does the doctor ( like a very saint ) pretend in behalfe of their church an unaffected ignorance though they should mistake , being conscious to himselfe what pitiful shifts he makes use of in stead of grounds . in vain does he hope that this ruliness ( as he calls it ) and obedience of theirs will render them approvable to god ; unless they can render god an approved reason , why they will at pleasure hold his sacred spouse , the church , holy in one age and adulterate in another ; and shape and fashion christs seamless coat , according to the mode of their ever-changing fancy . lastly , most vainly doe they hope this ruliness in holding to the first . yeares will lead them into all truth , unless they could shew that all the points of truth between them and us were professedly treated and decided in those times , and the decision on their side . he ends in a preaching manner with extolling the humble and docible temper of his church . truly , mr. doctor , it is a wonderful commendation to your church that she is yet to bee taught : pray , when will she be at age to leave going to school ? when will she be out of her prentice-like tutorage , and set up for her selfe to professe truth , as a church should do ? i thought a church should have been columna & firmamentum veritatis ; the pillar and firm foundation of truth ; but yours is like the hinge of a door , or a weather-cock , docibly turning with every wind of doctrine . how doe you think the puritans or any other sect should in reason yeeld any authority to your church , since she professes her selfe yet learning her faith ; that is , as yet knowes it not ? if it be such a commendation in your church to be docible , i suppose it is so in others ▪ and consequently in the whole church ; and then , i p●ay , who must teach her , or what greater professor is there on earth of the knowledge of christs faith , to whom the universal church may submit her selfe as doci●le ? perhaps you will say that one particular church must sisterly and charitably assist and teach another ; that is , though each be ignorant it selfe , yet ( like the blind leading the blind ) they must all be supposed mutual mistre●ses , and consequently all learned . but let us examine a little further this docible and humble temper of your youngling church . is it d●ciblenesse or humility think you , to forsake a mistress , who had all the qualities which could give ●er authority , and fall to teach your selves new reformed doctrines without any authority at all ? such is the humble d●ciblenesse of your church . is it docibleness to cast off the authority of . general councils , and the consent of christendome for twelve hundred yeares , and rely upon your own judgments to interpret the rest as you list ? this is the so much ▪ brag ▪ d on docibleness and humble temper of your church . parallel to the former , or rather far ou●vying them ( though of a contrary strain ) is that most heroick act of your docible humility to be willing to hold things concerning your eternal salvation upon the authority of the four general councils , or the doctors and church of the first . yeares ; which drs. and councils notwithstanding it is an article of your faith that they are fallible : and as for the church of those times , that it was fallible your selfe grants ; for you confesse that the same church erred in the fourth age. now , to hold articles or points of faith upon that authority , which it is an article of faith may deceive me , is such a magnanimous piece of docible humility , as i dare be bold to say , in the doctors behalfe , neither the apostles nor any saint in the succeeding church durst ever own . neither can the present catholikes , whom some ( who neither understand their own , nor catholike grounds ) laugh at , as blindly humble and obedient to the church , lay claim to such an incomparable degree of humility , proper and peculiar to the protestants onely . for we pretend not faith certain , but upon a deemed infallibility in the authority assuring it ; so as , though they may be supposed blameable by you for failing in their grounds , that is , in believing the church infallible ; yet they cannot be condemned for proceeding inconsequently upon those ground● ; for an infallible authority deserves a firm assent . but to stand to the acceptation of matters of faith , which you pretend most certain , upon an authority confessed by your selves uncertain , is such a condiscension of humility , such a prostrating your proper knowledge , as is not onely a blindly-cap●ivating your judgment , but even an utter renouncing all judgment , prudence and common sence ; not a submitting the reason by a voluntary winking at objections , but a quite extinguishing and perfect putting out of the very eye of reason it selfe ; and is all one as if a man should say , for any thing i know , such a one may lye in what he tells mee ; yet neverthelesse i will strongly perswade my selfe that all hee sayes is most certainely true . yet this humility the doctor calls here a special mark of the church of englands reformation . and surely you have reformed well ; since you have not only reform'd the unity you before enjoy'd , into distractions ; the faith you formerly profest into new-fangled misbeleefes : but your former reason and judgment into present folly and fancy . what is said of your accepting the four councils , &c. may also bee apply'd to your private interpretitions of scripture , which found your faith ; which faith you will have to be certain and firm , though the persons interpretation it is built on , be fallible and obnoxious to errour . the pious words in your own behalfe with which you close up your chapter , spoken in an elegiack tone , are very moanfully moving words out of a pulpit ; rhetorical enough for women , not rational enough to satisfie any prudent man. you professe you would preserve the unity of the apostolical faith and primitive practises , as entire as christs body or garments . good mr. hammond , leave mocking your readers ; and tell us why the primitive times must needs just end then , when the church began to flourish , and the fathers to write against your doctrine . and as for christs body or garments , i see no such great respect in you or your churches doctrine allow'd towards holy reliques , that i should be willing to trust those sacred pledges to your unhallowed hands ; from whose rude usage his mystical body , his church , faith ( its rule ) sacraments , government , nor any thing , though never so sacred , left by our saviour , hath found any security . sect . . an examination of some common notes produced by dr. hammond , to particularize his clients to bee no schismaticks . his th ch. undertakes to clear his church from the d . sort of his schism against mutual ●●arity , to wit , from that schism which is against extern peace , or communion ecclesiastical . and first , he alledges for his plea , that they have retain'd the right form of government , &c. so that now , schism against subordination or government ( for they are all one ) which was the first general head of schism , and also comprehended under the first species of the second head , as appeares c. . s. . is by the doctors accurate method come to be under the second species also of the same second general head. which is all one , as if dividing vivens into sensitive and insensitive , and then subdividing the genus of sensitive into the two species of rational and irrational , or man and beast ; he should first treat of insensitive , the first genus , and ( that done ) fall in hand with sensitive , the second ; and then , under each species of that , returne to treat professedly of insensitive again ; that is , to speak of trees , shrubs , and herbs , when he should speak of men and creatures endued with sence . surely doctor hammond is more methodical in his sermons ; otherwise , the world must needs look upon him as another s. iohn baptist , because hee preaches in a wilderness . but let us follow him through all his mazes , distinguish't by no orderly path , but what his own inconstant and desultorious track makes . first then he tells us that they retai● the form of government , in and under which the apostles ●ounded ecclesiastical assemblies or communion , viz. that of the bishop and his inferio● officers in every church . as if the arian hereticks , who denied christ to be god , and almost all heresies that ever broke from gods church , did not retain afterwards the authority of their own bishops . but what availed it either them or you , but to the greater danger of damnation ; if you adhered to those bishops , who had rejected the authority of their former superiours , and taught you doctrines contrary to the order of gods church ; without whose order , much lesse against it , they had no authority to teach at all ? again , you tell us of one piece of your government ( that of bishops ) constituted indeed by the apostles ; but you tell us not of the main hinge of your churches government , which is , of the king being its head and supreme in ecclesiastical matters . this is the sum and top of your churches government , put us not off with an odd end of it . this is that , for substituting which , in stead of the ecclesiastical head you rejected , wee charge you of schism and breach of communion ecclesiastical : for in so doing you cut gods church into as many single headed , and consequently diverse-bodied and disparate congregations , as there are kingdoms in christendome . shew us that this your novelty in government was practised by the apostles in their assemblies , or instituted by them or their blessed master , and then you will say something to the point . remember your purest times of the first . yeares ; shew us that all that time the church was ordered by the emperours presidency , or that this government was instituted by christ and his apostles : if you cannot , then tell us , how comes it to be held now as a chief point of faith ? you may not in reason think to uphold your self your by testimonies out of the following ages , unles you wil disavow your own grounds ; for those ages were ( as you say ) all impure . lay your hand then on your heart , mr. hammond , and tell us in good sadness , if you be not gravell'd in your own doctrine , while you maintain this new lay ▪ ecclesiastical government . his second plea is , that , as they maintain the order of bishops , so they submit to the exercise of it , acknowledging the authority of those governors . in answer to which , no new thing is to be said , this being the very same with the former ; only first changed into secondly . for , the obeying , submitting to , and acknowledging the due authority of governours , is the very formal maintaining and accepting the government , which was his first branch . so as this is another orderly production of the drs. methodical head , which vents it selfe in first , secondly , thirdly , &c. upon all occasions , though both his first , second , and third bee the selfe-same formal thing . his third plea is , that they observe the circumstances necessary to the assembling themselves for publick worship . first , that of place ( churches . ) secondly , that of time ( the lords day , primitive festivals . ) as if all schismaticks in the world doe not meet at some set times , and in some appointed and set places . thirdly , formes of prayer and praises ( almost all out of our mass and breviary . ) celebration of sacraments ( onely five of them being quite abolish't , and three quarters of the sixth . ) sacramentals , copes and surplisses , which you might by the same principles , call rags of rome . preaching ( against christ and his church ; such doctrine as none ever sent you or your first fore-fathers to preach . ) cathechising ( infecting and imbuing tender and easie minds with your tainted doctrine . fourthly , that of ceremonies , such as the practice of the primitive church hath sent down recommended to us . pray , by whom did she send them down and recommend them to you ? examine wel , and you shall find that the same authority recommended to you many more , as from her , though you only accepted of what you thought convenient . lastly , that of discipline to binde all to these performances . doubtlesse all sects in the world impose some obligation upon their subjects to keep them together , else they could not bee a sect. yet that your tie , either to that , or any thing else concerning government , is as slack as may be , is manifest out of the slender provision made against schism according to the protestant grounds , see part . sect. . as i have shewn in my answer to the fore-going chapter . neither are you beholding to your doctrine for any discipline sufficient to hold you together in unity , ( a professed fallibility is too weak for that ) but to the secular power ; the threat of whose sword held you in awe for a while ; but as soon as that power was dissolv'd , your slack-sinew'd church , which no tie either in reason or conscience held together , bewrayed its composition , and like the statue seen by nabuchadonosor , fell all to pieces . it were not amiss ere i leave these three pleas , already mentioned , to take a second survey of them , that the reader may visibly perceive how less than nothing this doctor hath said , either to his , or indeed any purpose . to make this discovery sincere , we must mark his intent and scope in this chapter , which is to free or clear their church from the breach of commmunion ecclesiastical , which he makes to consist in such and such things . now a man that goes about to clear another of an imputed fault , should ( as i conceive ) propose the objected fault with the presumptions of the defendants guiltiness : and then diluere objecta , wipe off the stain of the accusations , and clear his innocencie . what does the dr ? he takes no notice of what is objected ; but in stead of that , onely reckons up some few indifferent things which their church hath not rejected ( and sure it were a hard case if they had rejected all which their forefathers taught them ) and then thinks the deed done . in particular , he tells us first that they retain the government of bishops ; but why they have innovated a new church-government , making the king head in ecclesiastical matters ; or why they obey those bishops , who can derive their mission of doctrine from no former church or authority ; which only are the things objected to them , as schism ; of these two points hee sayes nothing that they now obey their bishops he tells us , but why they obey'd not him , or why they cast out his authority , whom they held before to bee the chief-bishop , that 's a matter not worth clearing . the pope's antichrist , and ther 's an end . then he clears his side from schism , because they assemble in churches : but he never considers that wee charge them with plain sacriledge for meeting there , and deatining those places ( anciently ours , and built by us ) out of the true owners hands , and applying them to prophane uses : all that with him , is very laudable , and needs no clearing either from injustice , or sacriledge . he clears their church of schism , because they observe yet some festivals ( and the like may bee said of sacramentals and ceremonies ) but considers not that the schism consists in this , that they , at their own voluntary pleasure , refusing some , and admitting others , denied consequently obedience to that authority which recommended both unto them ; and which disobedience their own grounds condemnes , as shall presently bee shewed . he cleares his church of schism , by alledging they observe some form of prayer : but never takes notice that the crime wee object to them is this , that they ruin'd religious houses to build dwelling halls ; so they mangled our holy and ancient service-books to patch up their reformed piece of the book of common-prayer ; leaving out all the most sacred parts of it , to wit , canon missae , and what ever concerned the heaven-propitiating sacrifice , that highest and soul-elevating act of religion ; and onely taking out of it those sleighter things which might satisfie the lowersiz'd devotion of their reformed spirits , and was enough to serve them to cry , lord , lord. he brings , as a proofe of their innocencie from schism , that they have celebration of sacraments , preaching and catechizing , &c. but thinks it not worth clearing , that of seven sacraments they have retain'd onely the substance of one , and the shadow of another . nor ever considers whether their doctrine be true or false . all is one for that with the doctor ; if they doe but preach , pray , and catechise , let it be what it will , it is a certain note that they are no schismaticks . lastly , hee puts as an argument to cleare them from schism , that they have some discipline to bind to these performances , &c. ( that is , they use some little wit or meanes to maintain their schism , and hold their tribe together ▪ ) but he waves that for which onely we accuse them of schism ; to wit , that they utterly renounced all the discipline , and even all ground of it , in that church , of which theirs was once a member , and fancied to themselves a new one , without any ground of authority , and with direct opposition and contempt of the former discipline . nor hath he onely , in this present endeavour to clear his church of schism , omitted the very mentioning those matters which were to be cleared , but even the things he alledges , as whose retaining , hee makes account frees their ▪ church from schism ▪ are such pitifull ordinary businesses , so indifferent to all or most schismaticks and hereticks , that they can no way particularize them to be none , or exempt them from the common crue of their fellowes . for what schism ever arose , but had some kind of government or discipline , had their meetings in some set places , at some set times , pray'd in their own new way , preach't , taught and catechiz'd their own doctrine . so as the doctor might with ●ar better logick have concluded the protestants no schismaticks , because they have all noses on their faces ; this being common to catholikes as well as schismaticks ; and so might seem partly to excuse them : whereas the other , of admitting such points and no more ( which are the doctors notes of his church ) are disclaimed by all catholikes , and common to almost all schismaticks . nay some schismaticks and hereticks have retained much more of what their ancestors taught them , as lutherans ; some almost all points , as the greeks and the old arians ; the latter of which ( excepting their one heresie against christs divinity ) had twenty times more markes of a church in all other things , than the drs could ever pretend to . fourthly , hee assures us , that the popes authority is an usurpation , and the use of more ceremonies and festivals an imposition of the romanists . how so mr. doctor ? if the supremacy of the bishop of rome was brought in . yeares agoe , when pope gregory sent to convert our forefathers to christs faith , as your selfe and your followers grant , then how is it an usurpation of the present romanists ? were wee , who now live , alive . yeares agoe ? or are they who lived . years ago , alive now ? but in regard you onely say it , and bring no proof , i shall not trouble my self in vouchsasing you an answer . as for the imposition of more ceremonies , which you say the present romanists used towards you , without any authority from the primitive church , it is so silly , so contrary both to our grounds and your own also , that you make your selfe ridiculous to any man that , understands either one or the other . for since the institution of ceremonies is one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or things indifferent , left to the ordering of gods church , as both the th article of the new english creed expressely determines , and all moderate protestants hold , i wonder why our church should not , when she saw convenient ▪ ordain new ceremonies ( and the like may bee said of new festivals , which are things indiferent also ) and recommend the observation and practice of them to you , who were then members of that church , her subjects and children . most lawfully then did our church , ( even in your own grounds ) in imposing new ceremonies on you ▪ her then-subjects ; and , if so , as unlawfully did you in spurning against her ordinances . neither consequently , can those few you retain upon your own head ( and not her authority ) excuse you from schism . equally absurd is your zealous profession of conforming your selves in ceremonies to the primitive times ; for if the church hath authority upon emergent conveniences and difficulties to institute new ceremonies and alter old ones ; then , you must either grant our church in the fifteenth age to have been no church ( which you dare not affirm for fear of spoiling your own mission ) or else grant that you were more bound to hold the ceremonies recommended by her , than those which descended from the primitive times ; since our church could better see what was expedient for her present circumstances , than the primitive could foresee so long before hand , what was likely to be convenient for future ages . sect . . of doctor hammonds charitablenesse in admitting all to his communion , and our pretended uncharitablenesse for refusing to goe to their assemblies . in the fifth place the doctor professes , like a good charitable man as hee is ; that they exclude no christian from their communion , that will either filially or fraternally embrace it with them . no truly , to give your religion its due , it is a wonderful civil and courteous profession , and admits all the old condemned heresies into communion , provided they but professe christ ; whatever points else they deny , it matters not . nay it is sufficient , if they call themselves christians ( though all the world else calls them hereticks ) yet your kind hearted church cannot but friendly entertain them . you keep open house for all commers . the doctrine of oportet haereses esse , there must bee heresies , is changed by your boon behaviour into it is impossible there should be heresies . for whereas the world heretofore understood those to be hereticks , who held the letter of the scripture , and some points of christianity , but deny'd others , which were the tenets of the universal church at that time ; you have now quite chang'd the former notion ; and think none to bee excluded from communion , that is , none to be hereticks that bear the name of a christian ; so as though they deny all points of christs doctrine , yet professe christs name , and the outward letter of the scripture , let them come , and welcome . anabaptists , brownists , presbyterians , quakers , carpocratians , perhaps arians ; nay even simon magus himselfe ; all these sew'd together only with the aiery sound of the word , christian , will serve for broken-ware pieces to patch up doctor hammonds motley church . for since they hold to his grounds , that is , to professe christs name , and the letter of the scripture , he cannot in any reason admit some , and refuse the rest . again , the doctor is willing to admit any that will filially or fraternally embrace communion with them , that is , all that will be either under them , or at least not above them ; but is loath to admit communion with any that will paternally communicate with them , that is , be over and govern them : no , take heed of that ; as much courtesie as you please , but not a dram of humility , obedience , nor subjection to superiours : these peace-preserving virtues would quite break the neck of schism and faction . if there bee any such over-powering authority , though never so long setled in possession over the countrey , and acknowledged and beleeved by all christians , in never so many ages , to bee of divine institution , yet presently the spirit of schism , in the first place , endeavours to break asunder the bonds of this paternal communion ; to pluck it down to the ground , and cast it out of the island . you are willing ( you say ) to admit all to your assemblies that acknowledge the foundation laid by christ and his apostles . you love mightily to talk plausible words in the aire , and in general , as if you made account your readers should bee all fooles , to search no further than the empty sound of your universal sayings , not applying them to the thing in question . good mr. doctor , tell me what it is to acknowledge the foundation laid by christ and his apostles ? is it to acknowledge scripture ? all heresies in the world fly onely to it , and make it their armour-house to oppugn christ and his church . arians and socinians most of all , and yet they can deny christs godhead : so as by this means indeed , you will have store of communicants . is it the true sence of the scripture ? then truth being one , and falshood manifold , if their interpretation be different from yours , both cannot bee true , and consequently both acknowledge not the foundation left by christ : for , falsifying his word , cannot be that foundation . again , if this bee the foundation left by christ ; you must have some certain and known rule to come by the true sence of the scriptures ; else you cannot be certainly assured who acknowledge this foundation , and so admit rashly to your communion you know not whom . is it perhaps the true sence of scripture , but restrain'd to fundamentals ? still the same difficulty remaines , unlesse you have some certain rule to distinguish and sort out the essentials from points of less importance ; to talk much of fundamentals , and never tell us which are they , is but a shuffling trick of a mountebank , and very unbecomming a grave divine . or is this foundation perhaps the solid sence of christs law written and planted in the tables of mens hearts by the apostles , and thence by a welllink't chain of universal tradition derived to our times ? if so , you must admit onely catholikes , and exclude all the rest ; since onely they hold this foundation . or rather indeed , since you deny this way of bringing down faith to bee sufficient , which catholikes hold as a certain and infallible rule , it followes , that if you will goe conseqently to your own grounds , you must not admit them neither , since this is not the by-you acknowledged foundation laid by christ and his apostles . it remaines then that you are willing to admit all those that shall say they have the foundation laid by christ and his apostles ; and then you cannot doubt but to have the brotherly fellowship of all hereticks and schismaticks in the world , that have been , are , or shall bee ; since all pretend strongly in general termes to acknowledge that foundation . nor is hee lesse devoutly charitable in the following words , that they earnestly desire to bee admitted to the like freedome of external communion with all the members of all other christian churches , as oft as occasion makes us capable of that blessing of the one heart and the one lip . this it is to bee so inured to a drowsy ▪ sounding vein of preaching quodlibets , till a man hath humm'd and drumm'd away all reason out of his head . speak sence , man ; and let your pretended charity come clad in truth , or else i must justly suspect it to bee nothing but pharisaical hypocrisie . i hate contradictions , though told me in never so pious a tone . was it ever heard that any catholike deny'd you communion , if you were capable of that blessing of one heart ( the same interiour beleefe ) and one lip ( the same exteriour profession . ) to what purpose then are those seemingly pious words produc'd . leave off paying us with this hollow language , empty of sence ; render your selves capable of that blessing in your actions ; renounce and repent your disobedience to your so-long-acknowledg'd superiours : repeal your schismatical ordinances against christs church : re-acknowledge a certainty in faith , which is now brought , by your professed uncertainty , to the very brink of atheism ; return to the never-erring rule of faith , the voice of the church , which held you for eight or nine hundred yeares in the firm and undivided unity of the same beleef . doe , i say , this efficaciously , and then you shall be freely , cordially , and with open armes received into communion by them ; who would willingly ( though they lovingly reprehend you , to make you reflect on your errours ) not onely spend empty words , but even lay down their lives to procure your salvation . sixthly , the doctor charges us , that the only hindrances which obstruct external communion , are wholly imputable to us : which hee proves first : because the pope excommunicated all those catholikes that went to the protestant assemblies in the tenth year of queen elizabeth . and was it not well done think you ? this has ever been the constant practice of gods church , to enjoyn the faithful to abstain from the communion of those , who maintained a different , that is , an heretical doctrine . the simpler sort of catholikes were gull'd by you to beleeve you had onely turn'd into english what was in latine before , and therefore out of an unwariness , went to your churches , which lately had been theirs ; and not out of love to your new reformed doctrine : till at length , the father of the church thought fit to disabusethem from the errour into which your false perswasions had led them ; and forbid them the same room , who were not of the same company . and i wonder how it can stand with reason or sence , that , holding you hereticks , we should let the poore people goe to your assemblies , to bee taught false doctrine ; nay even nature it selfe seems to interdict such an unnatural commerce ; that catholikes , who held the bishop of rome's supremacy of divine institution ; mass , and the rest of our doctrines , from which you receded , sacred , should goe to your congregations , to hear the first rail'd against , as antichristian ; the second , as idolatrous and a blasphemous fiction ; the rest , as erroneous and pernicious deceits . blame not then , mr. hammond , nature , reason , and the pope , for hindering this confusion , which you call external communion ; but rather blame your selves for introducing new doctrines , whence result such incompossible and inconsistent practices . yet the doctor tells us , that from this prohibition , proceeding from the popes excommunication , it is visibly consequent , that they were cast out , and cannot be said to separate . sure it must bee a temper of shame above brazen , to tell us this now in the tenth year of queen elizabeth ; whereas himself hath laid out knot by knot how the unity of the church , in which they were formerly , was unloosed , or rather violently broken , in the time of king henry the eigthth , king edwards protectour , and all the first ten yeares of this queen . to which , though enough , and more then enough has been said , yet i will once more presse it home to the dr. and then leave him to his wordish shifts , and the reader to be his judge . you and your king also were once members of the roman catholike church , and subject to the authority of the pope ; this authority you confess ( c. . s. . ) you cast out of this island ; but a rejection of an authority , is a recession from that authority ; therefore you are guilty of a recession from the formerly-acknowledg'd authority . so far for government . now for doctrines and practices . you once beleeved and practised as the roman catholike church , to wit , when you were in her : that you reformed you confess ; and c. . s. . call your reformations , recessions from the doctrines and practises of rome . a recession therefore was made by you , both from the former government , as also the former doctrines and practises : but a recession is a voluntary departure , as plain sence evidences ; therefore you made a voluntary departure from the formerly-acknowledg'd government , doctrines and practises of rome . now then , to tell us so long after ; and after so large a narrative confession of your own to the contrary , that you departed not , but were cast out , as if nothing had been done by you till the tenth year of queen elizabeth , is such a piece of forgetfulness , as could onely be peculiar to dr. hammond . but i perceive the doctor thinks there is no schism , till the pope have actually excommunicated : as if there might not bee a criminal departure from the former faith , its rule , sacraments , and the churches government , before the church comes with her spiritual rod of excommunication to whip the offender . from all these , i have already manifested , that you had divided , and by so doing , made your selves uncapable of communion with the former faithful . upon this , it was necessary to separate the faithful from you in divine offices and therefore both just and fitting to excommunicate you ; as well to punish you ( who were long before schismaticks ) for your crime , as to warn the sounder flock to abstain from your contagious communion . neither can you blame us for excommunicating you , whom your own grounds , here delivered , clear in that point from any imputation of rigour : your selfe confessing that you rejected roman catholike● from your assemblies , and censur'd them upon thei● avowed contumacy against the orders of your church ▪ let us know then , why our church might not doe the same , and with much more reason to you , who were once members of her , and whose recession from her orders , and contumaciou● persisting still , your selfe will witness ; shew us , i say , why she had not as great authority ●ver those , who were once hers , as your● claimes over those , who were never yours ; o● if you cannot , then grant , you were justl● excommunicated by her once , and remain a● justly excommunicated still , until you disavo● that contumacy , which obstructs your communion . his second reason why wee hindred the external communion ( as he calls that confusion ▪ is our imposing such conditions on our communion , that they cannot subscribe without sinning or seeming to sin against conscience . and what sin , or seeming to sin , is this , think you ? the beleefe of doctrines , or approbations of practises , which they neither beleeve nor approve of . the question is not , mr. doctor , whether you beleeve or approve of them , or no , but whether it were your own sinful pride of understanding which made you and your first reformers disbelieve all their teachers , and think themselves understood more of gods mind , than all the world before them ; and yet , when they had done , acknowledg'd themselves but fallible in their contrary beleefe ; that is , uncertain whether they or their teachers were in the right ; and is not this a wise ground for any schollar to disbelieve his master , or any child to disobey his father and mother . if it were pride , which made you think otherwise , ( as truly no man knowing the grounds you build your reformation upon , and how the greatest and most learned authority this world could shew , opposed you can in reason judge any other ) then it is not innocency in you , nor a sufficient excuse for your not-communion , that you doe not believe these doctrines ; but it is your sin ; and the root of all your misery and schism , that you correct not that vice , and so leave off that erroneous judgement , which misleades you from the truth ; usurping the office of your spiritual guide the holy catholick church . free the soul then first of that vice , and then you 'l stand in no need to offer violence to your minds , nor be afraid to make an unsound confession ; the feare of which you pretend for your excuse . but of this i have said already more then was needful . yet mr. hamond is ready to contest and maintain his negatives by grounds that all good christians ought to be concluded by . i hear again a sound of words in general hovering in the aire . but what are those grounds in particular , by which he will contest his doctrines ? he tells us in his last paragrapraph that they are proofes from scriptures , or the first writers ( those of the first . yeares ) or the four general councils . but let us ask first by whose interpretation of scripture he will contest his negatives ? hee will tell you , by his own , or some few others like himselfe , which ( not professing themselves infallible ) he must tell you also hee is uncertain whether it be right or no : and is not this a wise ground to contest his negatives by , against the positive doctrine of gods church ? but let us ask whether he thinks our saviours command to hear the church , bee a ground by which all christians ought to bee concluded . perhaps , after much shaking his head between loathness to reject our saviours words , and unwillingnesse to grant any thing to the church , he will answer , yes ; the church of the first . yeares . then ask him again , who taught all good christians , that they should hear the church of the first . years onely , and then stop their ears against her perpetually for the future ? hee is gravell'd . again , ask him whether those first three century of yeares treat of all late ▪ sprung negatives ? hee must tell you , no , they do not treat all our n●w ▪ controversies ; but he will praise them notwithstanding , to put you ●ft your question ; and tell you they are the purest and most primitive times . ask him next , why hee recurs to such obscure times , and stark dumb in our present controversies ? and hee must answer , if he will speak out candidly , that durum telum necessitas , necessity drives him to adhere to them . all the following ages , except that holy year in which was celebrated the council of chalcedon , inveighing most impurely against his new doctrine . thus the dr. chuses obscurity for the patron of his cause , which can bee no sun to reveal truth , though it may serve for a dark hole to hide falshood . neither can hee from his grounds pretend otherwise to contest his negatives , than by meer negative arguments , so as the inference must bee this ; our points of doctrine were not contradicted by the writers of the first . yeares , therefore they are true : this is the utmost he can conclude thence ; whereas , to make this illation valid , he must first prove , that all truths about faith were debated in those dayes ; next , that all which was debated then , is come downe certainly to our times . neither of which he will bee able to manifest . will not any judicious reader think such rules as these like to binde all good christians to bee concluded by them ? dr. hammonds interpretations of scripture , councils , and fathers , that say nothing , or else very litle on the by , concerning the question ; and lastly , negative arguments . to omit that the writers of those his primitive times , speak as much and as efficaciously against the doctors cause , as is imaginable their present circumstances should invite or give them occasion . to end then this chapter with the doctors words something alter'd , these pitiful evasions , and unwarrantable shifts , put together , and applied to this matter , will manifestly charge him with an apparent guilt of this second branch of the second sort of schism . sect . . our pretended uncharitableness in judging and despising others , retorted upon the objecters . in his tenth chapter hee gives us a short sermon concerning the third species of schism , which is against mutual charity ; divided by him into two heads , of judging and despising others : both which hee very charitably disclaimes in behalfe of their church , and would very courteously present us with them . but , to omit his pious formalities , and come to grounds . doe you think it is uncharitablenesse to judge as our saviour judg'd ; that is , to beleeve what he said to be true ? our sauiours judgment is , that if any one doe not heare the church , let him be to thee , as a heathen or a publican . if therefore we see with our eyes , that you acknowledge no church to be heard , and yet proceed not to such harsh termes as our saviour himselfe hath laid down to us , i hope you will impute it to us as a great moderation , and not as uncharitablenesse . now , that you did not hear the church , when you broke from ours ( and much lesse since ) is most evident : for your first reformers most manifestly receded from the former acknowledged government , rule of faith , sacraments , doctrines , and practises of the roman catholike church , of which you were then a member , as hath been shewn and acknowledg'd ; and she teaching them the contrary then , it could not bee said they heard her , when they began their reformations . neither did they joyn themselves with any other church , whom they might bee said to hear ; nor was this doctrin taught by the very church of england it selfe in the former age ; since their forefathers held and taught them a contrary beleefe . evident then it is , that those few , who , in the time of king henry the th , adhered to his lust-born reformation , neither communicated with , nor heard any church at all ; but began a new church , a new government , a new faith , and new practises , both without and against the command of that church , which both they and their forefathers , ever since that church first taught them christianity , held to be the onely true christian congregation . how can we then , seeing evidently they heard not any church , judge otherwise then that our saviours words are true , that is , that they are in a sad condition ; and you much fadder , who have not returned whence they receded , but followed their steps , and have made the breach wider ; unlesse perhaps you think or hope the crime is lesse , because there is now a greater multiplicity of offenders , which harden one another to obsti●acy by their number . next , is it uncharitablenesse not to renounce that rule of faith , in which clearly is founded ●ll the certainty we have of christs law , and all the hopes of our salvation ; to wit , the inerrability of our church , beleeved by our ancestors , ever since christs doctrine first dawn'd to the dark world ? yet this which witnesses your doctrine heretical , wee must absolutely renounce , ere wee can deem you other than hereticks : either wee must judge the highest tribunal in the world , upon whose living voice wee build all faith and true sence of the scriptures , to have lyed ; that is , wee must judge our highest superiours , pastours , teachers , and church to be erroneous in faith , and heretical , or else we must judge you our equals at most , and ( till you out-law'd your selves ) her subjects , to be truly criminal , and rightly condemned . thirdly , unus deus , una fides , unum baptisma , there is but one faith , as there is but one god. that your faith and ours cannot be one , is most evident . all our whole church condemning yours as heretical ; and yours , when the humour takes them , as much detesting ours as erroneous : nay , the most dreadful sacrifice of our saviours body and bloud , our holy of holies , reviled and abhorred by your church , as a blasphemous fiction and pernicio●● imposture . both our faiths therefore cannot be one , and consequently one of them is none but erreur against faith ; which , if firmly adhered to , as it is , must be heresie ; either your faith then , or ours , under penalty of maintaining a contradiction , must necessarily bee held as heresie . now comes this doctor , and accuses us for the most uncharitable men in the world , because wee will not judge our own faith heretical , and so free theirs . remember our saviours words ( mr. dr. ) he that believes not , is judg'd already ; joyn this to una fides , and our contradicting one another in most important points of faith ; and you must necessarily conclude , that neither of us , if hee bee certain he beleeves and has that one faith , can make conscience of judging the other , since the other is judged already , in receding from , or not having the true faith. nay , if he judge him not to be already judged , he must judge himself to be in the same state of a self-judg'd unbeleever ; or rather , on the contrary , hee must make conscience of not judging him , for such ; but , by a colloguing piece of courtesie , draw him into eternal perdition , and himselfe follow him , for his uncharitable connivence . thus you see the dr. never meddles with any point , but he blunders and destroys all the reason that ever concerns it . neither is it charity , but partly fear of most open shame , partly ignorance of any grounds , or what belongs to a church or a government , which makes him not judge us to bee both hereticks and schismaticks ; since one of us must be such , and he has a good mind to give us these new titles , whom hee very angrily here calls his vaunting enemies . but as the former body of our church , out of which their few reformers receded , standing and remaining still one and the same , together with that plain and common notion that a tree is not said to be broken from a branch , but the branch from the tree-leaves them so much light of apprehension , as not to dare to call us schismaticks ; so the acknowledg'd antiquity of our doctrine , ever persisting the self-same , and the confessed innovation of theirs frights them , though unwillingly from styling us innovators and hereticks . fourthly , our judging you , may indeed seem to bee errour , but malice and uncharitablenesse it cannot . for since the grounds of our faith , which necessarily oblige us to judge thus of you , and all such , were held by us , as firmly before you were ever dream'd of ▪ as at present ; you cannot object that wee invented new grounds to conclude so hardly of you in our thoughts ; nor that they were purposely and maliciously aymed at your then-unhatch'd congregation . so as you may , if you please , pretend that all the grounds , on which wee hold our faith , gods word , and its true interpretation , are erroneous , and therefore that our so judging of you , necessarily springing from those grounds , is an errour ; yet malice or uncharitablenesse you cannot call it , since wee cannot hinder the consequence from following , without denying the grounds which infer it ; that is , without denying the certainty and truth of all our faith. and me thinkes the zeal of our missionaries to reduce others from the ill state wee conceive them in , with daily hazarding , and often laying down actually their lives for that end , both in this countrey and many others , should transfer the charge of uncharitablenesse to your colder part● ; for sure it can bee no lesse to judge them uncharitable , who so readily and willingly lay down their dearest lives , to redeem the soules of their very enemies and persecutors from a beleeved danger . yet this is the doctors goliah's sword ( as he calls it ) wherewith he threatned to give a fatall wound ; though in truth i can discern no more edge in it than in a beetle . s. cyprians testimony of neminem damnantes , neminem a communione nostrâ arcentes , condemning no man , nor driving any from his communion , was spoken of himselfe , of his own temper towards the rest of gods church , acknowledged by himselfe to be such , and that in the point of rebaptization of infants ; which , though held stiffely by himselfe ; yet his charity so moderated his zeal , that hee exprest his indifferency in those alledged words ; neither had he reason to deny communion to other catholikes for a private opinion onely , till the church had interpos'd her authority . but where did the doctor read either in s. cyprian , or any other father , that they admitted to their communion those who had been condemned as schismaticks and hereticks , by all the churches in communion with the see of rome ; as were the protestants ? unlesse hee can shew this , hee abuses most absurdly that holy and learned father , by seeming to make him allow a promiscons admission of all sects , let them be what they please : which savours more of doctor hammonds spirit , who would have all come to his church thas call themselves christians , than of blessed s. cyprians , who knew better what belonged to church-order and discipline . but i thought there was one of the drs mysteries in it , when i saw the words of the father alledged to an end so in●onsonant to his doctrine , without quotation of any place , book , chapter , or epistle . but mr. hammond will have the thing between us to bee onely differences in opinion ; and indeed if that supposition , that the onely ground of all our faith , in which consists our main difference , were but an opinion ( as on his part it is not ) i see no reason why either hee or i should trouble our selves to write books in defence of an opinionative faith ; it were better in that case to eat , drink , shake hands , and be merry ; nor trouble our selves with thinking whether there bee a heav'n or no , which wee can never come ( the ground of faith being but an opinion ) to any certain knowledge of . in the last place of his first part of this schism , hee tells us , we beg the question in calling them schismaticks , because they deny it , and offer to prove the contrary . certainly mr. hammond has been so long in the pulpit , that hee has forgot the fashion of the universities , where there is no disputation , but the one affirmes , and the other denies ; and the defendant holds his conclusion for true , till the opponent proves the contrary ; without being judged to incur the fault of begging the question . besides , to what dark holes you run for clear proofes , we have already shewn ; and , till you can shew us a greater authority to acquit you , than is the churches tribunal , which condemned you , your denying it will but double the fault , not clear it ; especially since the material fact of schism , that is , dividing from the persons with whom you formerly communicated , cannot bee deny'd , however you may pretend the intention or cause of it to be doubtful or obscure . ere i leave this first part , of judging other●● i desire the reader to fancy in his own minde as perfect a schismatick as can bee imagin'd , and therfore deservedly cast out by the church ▪ which done , let him read this doctors tenth chapter , and hee shall easily perceive that hee has not brought one word for himselfe , which the other justly-condemned schismatick may not with as good reason make use of . so easily it is discoverable by the manner of weapon the dr. wears , whose side he is on , and whose banner he fights under . his second charge of schism against mutual charity , is , that we despise and set at nought the brother . good brother doctor tell mee how we despise you ? we pity you indeed , seeing the calamities you are fallen into by your former fault ; as also to see you persist still obstinately blind in the midst of your punishment : but despise you wee doe not . yet you conclude the cause by the effect , that is , our casting you out of the church ; and therefore say the guilt lies on our side . euge quanti est sapere ! let us put the demonstration a posteriori in form , and you shall see the invincibleness of it . they , who cast others out of the church , despise them , and are guilty of schism against charity . but the roman church cast us out of the church . therefore they despise us , and are guilty of schism against charity . by which account no church can condemn any one of schism , but shee must bee a schismatick her selfe ; whereas wee did not cast them out , but upon their avowed contumacy against the orders of our church , which the doctor himselfe holds as a reason sufficient for the protestant to excommunicate catholikes . where you see the first proposition can onely be sustained by making this shameless assertion good , that no man can cast another out of the church , but he must despise him , and consequently bee guilty of unchartiableness and schism . but the doctor argues , as if a rebel should confess at large , that indeed he rejected the authority of the supreme magistrate , and receded from the former lawes and customes of the common-wealth ; yet notwithstanding they must not punish him and his company ; or if they doe , they are guilty of faction , sedition , dissention , and despising their fellowes . what king now could bee so hard-hearted as to punish a rebel defending himself with such a wise , solid , and rational plea ? the doctor confess'd that they rejected the authority of the pope , formerly acknowledg'd to bee supreme ; that they receded from the doctrines and practises of rome , of which church they were a little before members and subjects ; and ▪ when he has done , tells this church it must not punish them , nor excommunicate them ; or , if she doe , she is guilty of schism , uncharitableness , of despising and setting at nought the brother . but pray mr. doctor , what schism is it ( after you had run away from the church , ever since king henry fell in love ) to tell you in the tenth year of queen elixabeth , when she saw you would not mend , but grew daily worse and worse , that she could no longer forbear to punish your pertinacious disobedience ? after this the doctor crouds together a great company of advantages of our religion , with which wee pre-possesse our subjects ; though the doctor mistakes in some ; and which hee sayes are so many reasons , why they doe not set us at nought , and despise us . first , the advantage of our education . true , indeed we are taught to obey our superiors , and hear our pastors . secondly , the prescribed credulity to all that the church shall propose . good mr. dr , whom should the faithful beleeve in telling them the sence of gods word , if not the church ? such pitiful guessing southsayers as you ? are not our saviours words hear the church ; and i am with you ever till the end of the world , plaine enough , and sufficient to secure their credulity to such a heav'n-assisted-mistress ? and indeed how can you think those , who cannot employ sufficient time to study out their faith , should be otherwise instructed than by credulity ? look whether your proselytes doe not rely even upon your private authority ? so natural and necessary is it there should bee an authority to governe weak people . thirdly , the doctrine of infallibility . that is , wee tell them faith is certain , and hath certain grounds : a grievous accusation ! fourthly , the shutting up the scriptures in an unknown languge . that is , taking order that the unlearned nor unstable pervert them not to their own damnation . fifthly , the impossibility that the multitude should search or examine tradition with their own eyes . that is , the doctor is utterly ignorant what tradition is . is it such an impossible matter for the meanest person that hath age enough , to know what doctrine was held by christians ten yeares agoe ? or for them that liv'd ten yeares agoe , to know what was held ▪ years since , and so forth . especially , faith not being a meer speculation , but shewing it selfe in practise , which proclames that heavenly law of grace so openly , that all must see it except such as neither have no eyes , or wilfully shut them . this ( sir ) is the main mystery of tradition , which you imagin'd wee kept reserved like the ark of the testament and mose's tables , from the sight of the people . sixthly , the prosperous estate of the roman church , and the persecutions and calamities of yours . i see wee are in some sence beholding to our good fortune , or your misfortune , for your chariritablenesse . but you complain for nothing ; what persecution suffer you in england in comparison of the catholikes ? what laws make it treason to become a protestant , as they do to bee reconciled to the catholike religion ? what oaths are impos'd on protestants to renounce their faith under pain of high treason and forfeiture of their estates , as in those of supremacy and abjuration against catholikes ? read over the large volume of penal statutes made in the dayes of your dominion , and you shall find , that catholikes can neither be married , nor baptiz'd , nor taught at home , nor sent abroad , nor maintain'd by their parents while they live , nor buried , when they dye , without incurring the danger of a premunire , or some other severe penalty . in all these i am confident your kind of protestancy never endured the least punishment ; but a light cross is enough to overload a weak patience , and every small discountenancing makes those that have enjoy'd a long case , cry out , persecution . i see your parchment church shrinks and ●na●kles at the sight of the fire , while the catholike remaines firm and unconsum'd , nay grow● clearer in the midst of it . and yet i doe not intend to deny , many of you have been very great losers by these late revolutions , but onely to say your sufferings are to bee refer'd to a civil , not religious account , or at least that nothing , even in your own judgment , essential to religion , is persecuted , or so much as deny'd in england ; for bishops , and service-book , and kings supremacy you must not call essential , without contradicting your own both profession and practise , since you can so kindly embrace your sister-churches , and communicate with them , who deny those points as zealously as the fiercest anabaptist . lastly , our literal sound of hoc est corpus meum , which the doctor calls our principal espoused doctrine of transubstantiation . indeed wee had rather wed our beleefe to that sence of gods word , which fathers , councils , and the perpetual doctrine and practise of gods church hath recommended to us , as the virgin-daughter of him who is the truth ; than to a loose polygamy of . several interpretations ; minerva's born of your own heads , whose mutually-contradicting variety ●hews them to come by the paternal line , from him who is the father of all falshood . for these prejudices instill'd into the hearts of catholikes , the doctor and his church spare us very charitably , and are far from casting us out of the church . for gods sake , mr. dr. whither would you have cast us ? would you throw the house out of the windowes ? i mean the church , gods house , out of the window of schism , which you broke in the side of it . again , let us but see how artificial , nay incomparable nonsence this dr. speakes . i conceive nothing can bee cast out of a thing that was never in it ; shew us then that ▪ there was once a constituted church of protestants , govern'd by the king as supreme head , and holding their doctrines and practises , in which the roman catholike once was , but receded from that doctrine and government , and invented this new religion which hee holds at present . unlesse the catholikes were once thus in you , how could you cast them out ? what a weakness is this to think that robin hood , little iohn , and a few outlawes , doe king richard and all england a great deal of favour in not casting them out of their rebel-commonwealth , as no true members of it , and denying them the protection ▪ of their seditious counter-lawes ; under which lawes , and in which common-wealth , neither the king nor his good subjects were ever reputed . one word more ere i leave this point , to let the rational reader see , whether the protestants or we bee more chargeable of judging and despising others . suppose , mr. doctor , wee , who are sons of the catholike church , had both judged and despised you upon our own private heads , it had been but to judge and despise our equals . but your reformation had been impossible , unlesse you had first both judged , despised , and prefer'd your selves above your supreme governours , the church and all your forefathers . the chief government , impower'd actually over you in ecclesiastical affaires , you rejected and cast out of this island . next , many of your wise brethren since , preaching , teaching , and writing whole bookes , to shew that that governour is antcichrist , the beast in the apocalypse , and what not ? could these things bee done without judging and despising ? you made reformations and recessions from the former churches doctrine , cry'd out she had erred , was a strumpet , the whore of babylon , impious , sacrilegious , idolatrous . was not this the most rash judging , the most venemous railing at and reviling of gods sacred spouse , formerly your mistresse and mother , that ever was foam'd out of the mouth of madness it selfe ? again , the whole world , whom you esteemed , before , good christians , and all your ancestors in england , condemned , by their contrary beleefe , your new reformed doctrine : and , doe you think your innovators could have broach't their opposite doctrines without both judging and despising all this vast authority ? your charity then , mr. doctor , in this point , can bee onely imagin'd to consist in this , that you have not judged and despised your selves ; for all else , that you thought formerly to deserve any authority , you both judged , despised , rejected , revil'd , and condemned . in a word , our judging you , is our subscribing in our own thoughts to that verdict , which the church has past against you , whose tribunal was held by all the whole christian world ( and your selves also , till you became guilty ) to be the most high and sacred that ever gave sentence since the world's creation . as for despising your persons , we deny it as a meer calumny ; and professe our selves bound to honour every one according to his quality and degree ; the reasons indeed , which you produce to clear your selfe from schism , we despise , as worse than ridiculous ; a paradox in a matter indifferent , if maintain'd ingeniously , deserves its commendations : but the most manifest absurdities that can bee imagin'd , and in which are interessed mens salvations , such as is the renouncing an authority granted to bee the most ancient , most sublime , most sacred , in the world , upon fallible , incertain , and unevident grounds ; and onely sustain'd by plain contradictions , false and self-●eign'd suppositions , id ests of our own adding , the best proof not arriving so high as a probability ; these , i say , mr. doctor , have nothing to secure them from our despising , unlesse perhaps , it bee their falling below ou● contempt . of the mixt temper of these is the constitution of your book ; which shews that you have been used to row at your own dull pleasure in the shallow and softly-murmuring current of a sermon ; but never launch't with a well ▪ rigg'd ship of reason into the ●oysterous maine of deeper , controversies . thus the doctor concludes his treatise of schism , closing up his tenth chapter with these words ; i foresee not any objection which may give mee temptation or excuse further to enlarge on this matter . no truly , i could never yet discern you guilty of that fault , that objections gave you any great temptation to answer them ; since i have not seen you put one objection or argument of ours worth a straw , from the beginning of the book to the end ; on the contrary , when you light on a wrong supposition of your own , as that the pope is onely a private patriarch ; that the papal authority in this island came to the pope from the title of its conversion , or from concession of our kings ; then i observe a very strong temptation in you to enlarge a whole chapter upon that , which no body objects , except your own fancy . hee adds , that he professes not to know any other branch of schism , or colour of fastning that guilt , upon our church , made use of by any , which hee hath not prevented . yes , mr. doctor , i told you before , how you have omitted the two chief branches of schism , and most of all made use of by us against you ; to wit , schism from the whole body of the church , and from its highest tribunal , the general councils ; which wee as freshly , and more chiefly , charge upon you , than any of the ●est . the last sect . our objection that the pretended church of england is now invisible , maintained and asserted to be just . schism being thus establish't , as legitimate and laudable , the patron of it resolvs to prosecute his project home , and therefore strives in this last chapter to wipe off any prejudice arising from their present distractions and persecutions , the proper effects of their schism . the occasion seemes taken from some of our side , calling them the late church of england ; as if now a fuit were put to their former being by their present misfortune . our advantage offer'd from thence hee formes ( and that rightly ) in to this objection ; that it is absolutely necessary to communicate with some one visible church ; that now the church of england is not such , and consequently the church of rome , so illustriously visible , must be taken up in stead of it . thus far , abstracting from the partiality in his manner of expression , wee both agree , in answer to which , the doctor alledges first that a member of the english church was not under this guilt of not communicating with some one visible church twenty yeares agoe ; and consequently unlesse he have contracted this guilt since by commission or omission of something , hee can no more bee charged with the crime now , than formerly . all this while the doctor is in a mistake , and runs on very currantly , but quite out of his way . for we doe not object this present condition to them , as a crime or guilt ( rather that which was twenty yeares and more ago , was their crime , and this their punishment ) but as a different state from the former , or indeed more truly , the want of a state. for twenty yeares agoe , though they wanted the substance , yet they had at least a shadow or ghost of a church , which might delude the eyes of the simple ; but now even that has disappear'd and vanish't into aire . our advantage , not taken , but offer'd , from thence is this , that as before they had a shew of a church ; so their adherents , whose weaker eyes could not distinguish substance from shadow , might have then some shadow of motive or excuse , for remaining in it , and not returning to us ; but now this fayery apparition being gone , not even so much as the least resemblance of a motive is left to lead them through the wayless path of their dark doctrine ; or hinder them from returning to the common beaten road of their ancestors . the objection of this then is not vain , as the dr. imagins , since a new and stronger motive offer'd , deserves in reason a new , distinct , and fresh proposal . i grant therefore , mr. dr. that it is not your choice , crime , or offence , to bee in this misery , though it bee your fault that you were brought into i● ; it bring a connatural punishment , orderly subsequent to the vice of schism , as shall afterwards be shewn . and the present invisibility of your church is never the lesse true and real , though we admit it be your misfortune , not your crime ; since a ship may as well bee cast away in an unavoydable storme , as by the negligence of the pilot . neither doe i take it to be the saddest part of your infelicity ( as you call it ) but rather the greatest happiness that gods sweetly-chastising mercy could have sent you , that , by weighing your present dissolution , and the causes of it , you may retrive your wandrings , and recollect all your scatter'd and distracted members into the ever-firmly united body of the holy catholike church . thirdly ( for the doctor was so eagerly zealous to clear his twenty-years-ago protestant , that hee put first and thirdly , but quite forgot secondly ) he runs on in his errour , that wee impute this state of their church to the protestant as a guilt , from which he goes about to clear him . for if he hath contracted this guilt , ( saies the dr. ) it must be by some irregularity of actions contrary to the standing rule & canons of this church ; whereas i conceive it very regularly consequent to your new canons , that you should fall into this very condition you now groan under ; for your rule and canons granting the authority of the secular power to be the basis of your reformation , head of the church-government , supreme in ecclesiastical matters , and your onely defence and excuse , when wee ask you upon what authority you left us , it is natural and imbred in the very primogenial constitution of your church , that it should be dissolvable at the pleasure of the same power which set it up . it is not therefore the standing to the rule and canons of your church , which secures you in a firm and immutable perpetuity , but those very grounds are they which engage you in a fleeting and perpetual mutability . you applaud with your encomiums the protestant , that hath actually lost his possessions , liberty , &c. rather than depart from his rule ; which truly i conceive a very irrational action in him , and deserving more pity than commendations . for the . articles , being the most distinct rule protestants have , one of which defines that general councils both can erre and have erred ; whence follows a fortiori , that their own meeting where these articles ( their rule ) were made , being at most but a provincial assembly , is much more lyable to errour , i see no reason why hee shold lose the certain possession of present goods for maintaining an uncertain opinion : especially since hee holds salvation can bee had in other sects , as appeares by dr. hammonds admitting all whom hee calls christians to his communion . and if the doctor reply , it was their conscienciousness to hold what they supposed true : i answer , their conscience is imprudently govern'd , whilst it instigates them to professe with their own so great disadvantage and loss , what they had no obligation to hold ; for none can be oblig'd to the beleef of a point which himself & those who propose it are uncertain whether it be true or no. though ( if i be not misinform'd ) the greater part of your suffering-fellow-protestants have had more wit , and most commonly were put out upon other pretences than their religion . thus ▪ far the doctor hath proceeded clearing himselfe from the want of a visible church , imagining we object it a guilt or crime , whereas we only propose it and more urgingly press it to the consideration of the misled protestants , as a decay , corruption , annihilation of the former visible shadow of a church , and the occasion of a new fault in them ; that , having lost their own , they return not to ours , out of which they confesse they came , and of which they protested theirs to be a member . in the next place hee tells us , that as yet , blessed bee god , the church of england is not invisible , it is preserved in bishops and presbyters rightly ordained , and multitudes rightly baptized , none of which have fallen off from their profession . where the last words are most certainly true , if he means that none of those who yet stand have as yet fallen off , which i conceive is his meaning ; for all these who have not stood , have fal'n off , which are enow to shew of what mettal their church was made ; and whether more have fal'n or stood , let the doctor judge . but as for the rest of his selfe-congratulation , it is a miserable piece of self flattery , and which his own grounds quite discountenance . for if a church be a congregation of the faithful , and faith ( as s. paul argues ) comes by hearing , hearing from preaching , preaching from mission , or being sent ; which mission is an act of iurisdiction ; it follows , that if their bishops and presbyters have now no iurisdiction , then the protestants have neither lawful mission , preaching , hearing , faith , nor consequently , church . now , that they can claim no iurisdiction , followes out of their own grounds ; for when we urge them upon what authority they cast off the former ecclesiastical superior , governing gods church in chief , they run for their defence , to the secular power , to which they attribute supreme iurisdiction in matters ecclesiastical within this island ; it is acknowledg'd ( saith the dr. c. . s. . ) that the papal power in ecclesiastical affaires , was both by acts of convocation of the clergy , and of parliament , cast out of this kingdome . thus you see he recurs to a power meerly secular , in the parliament , for renouncing and abolishing a spiritual power and jurisdiction , held before , greater than ever the protestant prelacy was imagin'd . meerly secular , i say ; for the doctor confesses here , that it is easie to believe that nothing but the apprehension of dangers which hung over them , could probably have inclined the clergy to that their first act ; and how great influence this apprehension of danger might have over the secular part of the parliament , is easie to be determined , since they saw the gravest patriot in the kingdome in danger of death , for holding against the kings new pretended title ; and many others , for the same respect , most cruelly persecuted . a parliament therefore meerly of seculars , and those such as can in no wise be presum'd free , was held by you of sufficient authority to renounce a jurisdiction , deemed formerly much higher , and known to bee almost ten times longer setled in possession than your prelacy ; i see not therefore why a secular power should not bee , in your grounds , sufficient to abolish a jurisdiction , which onely leaned and relied on a secular support . but what was done in king henry's dayes , being disannul'd again by both the spiritual and secular power in queen maries reign , must necessarily bee held of you invalid , if you will goe consequently to your own grounds . let us then examine the resurrection of your church , by a parliament held in the beginning of queen elizabeth ; in which parliament ( to omit the small title the queen had to the crown , being born of a second bedfellow , whilst king henry's former wife was yet alive , and declared illegitimate both by the whole parliament and her own fathers act ) were wanting the spiritual lords , the bishops ; who were , for their religion , kept , at that time , in prison ; for which reason , when a quere was raised about the beginning of the late long parliament , whether acts made without bishops , were valid , it is said to have been resolved affirmatively , upon this ground , because otherwise the protestant religion , voted by a parliament , in which was no bishops , would be invalid also . i see not then what great advantages could be in that parliament , to vote out the greater authority of the pope , or give your new-made bishops ( ordained god knowes how ) iurisdiction ; but the same may be pretended by a succeeding parliament , to deprive them , and set up a new form of their own . certain it is , that you acknowledge the secular power for the source and first fountain of your iurisdiction ; since then , the present secular power has put a stop to your father ordination , and disannul'd your former iurisdiction , your own grounds conclude you de facto no church ; for if you have no iurisdiction , you can have no influence of power over the layity ; and so no spiritual common ▪ wealth made up of bishop , as head and pastour , and of the layity , as body and flock . and , as for the present , this general suspension ( should we say no more ) of your ecclesiastical power , makes you de facto no church ; so , in time the very inward right it selfe , which you pretend , may be justly extinguish't . for , since your jurisdiction confessedly depends on the secular authority , it followes , if this be suspended or abolish't , that must needs share in the same fate : now , all the world agrees , that not onely the possession of a secular power may be interrupted by force , but the right it selfe in time be absolutely lost ; and the new government , however at first introduc't , be at length purged of its original blemishes , into a clear and unquestionable title . in which case certainly your church would be no more visible in england , than it is now at geneva . which sufficiently differences your condition from that of the primitive christians , or the present english catholikes , they claiming a jurisdiction underived from the secular power . in vain therefore would it be to tell us their character remains , and therfore they are stil bishops and presbyters , since the character can only entitle them to a name , the thing being gone , to wit , their power of iurisdiction , and consequently their mission ; for if they have no authority to teach and preach more than the layity , they are level'd into an equal pitch with them ; so as now they cannot bee said to bee a body , but a company of mutually distracted parts ; not an orderly church or congregation ▪ but a rude and indigested chaos of confusion . it is not then , mr. doctor , your serving god in private families which wee object to you for being an invisible church ( which you run upon in your . sect. ) but that which your self confesse here , that now all order , form , bishops , and liturgy is thrown out of your church together . it is your want of pastoral and episcopal authority , which makes us conclude you no church . yet so good is your logick , that in the next paragraph , you think , though bishops be abolish't , yet in case this come not through your fault , it cannot be charged against you : so as though all prelacy and superiority be taken away , that is , though there be none that have power to preach and teach , and all be reduc'd into an equally-level'd anarchy , yet as long as it happens not through your fault , yen are still a church ; as if doctor hammond should say , though his body were cut into millions of incoherent atomes , yet , as long as this happens not through his fault , it is still a well-ordered body , id est , it is still hammond . the parts of gods church are compacted into a whole by order , and as much depend upon spiritual superiours , having power to teach and preach christs law , as the common-wealth doth on secular magistrates to preserve their temporal lawes , and govern according to them ; without this order the whole is dissolved , the body is lost , the church is gone . doubtless , mr. doctor , it is not the fault or choice of the present protestants , that they are thus bassled and persecuted ( which yet you have spent this whole chapter , except onely the first paragraph , to prove . ) so needs no such great and large disproose , to manifest that that which is so much against mens wills , should bee their choice and crime . yet wee may justly impute your churches ruine to the sandiness of her foundation ; which being the authority of the secular governors , must render her liable to change , as often as the unconstant wind of temporal circumstances shall alter the former government , or as oft as the former government yet remaining shall see it necessary for the present peace or conveniences of the common wealth , to introduce or admit the more prevailing sway of a new religion . but i foresee that the doctor , to avoid this objection , will cling in with us , and call the antichristian and idolatrous romanists their dear brethren , and tell them they acknowledge their iurisdiction and mission to come from them , desiring them not to reject them now in their greatest necessity , but let them seem to have an authority deriv'd from the apostles by their meanes ; proffering that they , in courteons recompence , will acknowledge rome to bee a true church . this indeed is ordinary with them ; but yet as frivolous still as the former . for the authority which our church could give you , was onely to teach and preach catholike doctrine , and ordain others to doe the same ; to govern the catholike flock , and to preserve them in the anciently received unity of faith. the authority to doe these could come indeed from us , and so if any who pretend to have received iurisdiction from us , continue to execute and govern themselves by that commission , so far they are warranted by the former authorization ; but if they went beyond their commission , nay more , acted quite contrary to their commission , i wonder what iurisdiction or mission they can pretend , as derived from us . our question then is of such a power as your bishops pretend to , and exercised ; that is , of bearing the ensign of a squadron of the churches enemies , preaching an opposite doctrine to the church , which you pretend to have impower'd you , and ordaining others to doe the same . evident it is that the roman catholike church , which is the only spiritual power you can think to have any iurisdiction or mission from , never gave you this authority , wherefore it must come to you from the meer secular power ; on this power therfore is built all the authority you have to act as protestants , or in order to the protestant church ; and consequently the whole building of your church was erected onely and solely upon this uncertain and sandy foundation . this made mr. hooker ( one of the best , and perhaps the most prudent writer of all that profession ) affirm of their church , that it was not likely to continue more than fourscore years ; nor could he judge otherwise , seeing it bear evidently the principles of corruption and mutability in its very constitution ; to wit , the materia prima of a secular basis ; which continually exposed it to a mortality , as the formes of government should have their ever-limited period ; and discovering the professors and governours of it to bee none of those to whom our saviour promised his perpetual assistance to the end of the world . how much happier then would you be , if leaving this fleeting and unbodied shadow , you would return and unite your selves to the catholike church , which , enjoying this promise from our saviour of an indefectible perpetuity , not onely experiences the certain faithfulness of that promise in a large continuance of . yeares , but also sees with evidence , perhaps more than scientifical , that the walls of this hierusalem are built upon such strong foundations , that the church , and the authority and jurisdiction of her governours can never fail or decay ; since they rely not on the slippery and weak prop of the temporal power for their authority , but on those who received it from the eternal never-altering fountain of all power , with commission to delegate and transmit it with an uninterrupted succession to the future governours of the church , till wee all meet in the unity of glory . nor is the means of transmitting this heavenfounded jurisdiction to posterity , less certain than is the law of grace , written in the hearts of the faithful , in indelible characters , that inviolable rule of faith , a rock too adamantine to be undermin'd by human policy . let then her enemies , though even princes , rage as much as they please , nay even bandy and conspire together to subdue this free-born kings daughter to their prophane yoke ; her jurisdiction , as it ever hath , so will it ever remaine secure and inviolate , being independent of them , and ( by reason of the state of eternity , her end and aym ) of a superiour order to their authority ; which was instituted only for the rightly dispencing the transitory goods of this world . your parallel of the jews suffering under the zelot's fury , or the old roman yoke ▪ which you make account is so evident , that the reader will supercede all necessity of making it up , i conceive to aym very little or nothing at your purpose : for ( though they intruded unfit men into the priestly dignity , yet they did not actually , neither could they possibly take away the jurisdiction of the high priest , because this jurisdiction was not given them by those secular powers , but by god himself ; the contrary of all which happens in your case , as has been shewn : for the jurisdiction of your bishops may be taken away by the same parliamentary power that set it up . that it was not their guilt , nor yours neither , wee willingly grant ; and i wonder you could imagine us so unwise , as to object that to be your voluntary crime , which you cannot but know we hold to bee your involuntary punishment . your wishes and prayers for peace and communion among all who are called christians , are no less ours ; and this , not in words only , but in efficacious endeavours ; and , in several nations , with daily labours , and extreamest hazards , to reduce the straying flock to their safely-guarded fold . nay , this communion is so vehemently desired and thirsted after by us , that we are ready to buy it at any rate , except the forfeiture of the certainty of faith and its rule ; the forfeiture of which , is the loss of our own communion also . if mr. hammond can perswade himself and his friends to return to this rule of faith , the churches infallibility , which onely can unite us in the same stedfast belief of christs doctrine ; and to acknowledg the supremacy of the bishop of rome ; in the acknowledgment of which , consists the constant unity of church-government ; then not onely we , but all the angels and saints in heaven , who rejoyce at the conversion of sinners , shall joyn in exalting jubilees for the blessed and long wish't for return of òur wandring and self-disinherited brethren . the former of these ( if mr. hammond will not beleeve it ) i have told him where he may see it as visibly as is possible any thing should be made to the eye of reason . the latter , to wit , the popes supremacy , is defin'd in the florentine council , subscribed to both by the greek and latine churches ; where , what the fourth general council , held at chalcedon , wrote to pope leo , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that he was over the members of the church , as their head , is more plainly exprest in these words , wee define that the holy apostolical see , and the bishop of rome have the primacy over all the world , and that the bishop of rome is successour to s. peter , the prince of the apostles , and truly christs vicar , and head of the whole church ; and the father and teacher of all christians , and that there was given him in s. peter from christ a full power to feed , direct and govern the catholike church : to these two points , if the protestant will subscribe , that is , secure inviolate that which touches the root , and most vital and intrinsecal part of the chruch , to wit , the rule of faith ; she will not stick to open her outward rind , that is , offer some violence to her uniformity , in indifferent and more extrinsecal practises , to re-ingraft their dry and sapless branch , which now lies withering , into her ever-flourishing body . to which , if these poor endeavours of mine , may in the least contribute , i shall for the future not reprehend , but congratulate dr. hammond for his fortunate errours , and honour his ill grounded reasons , as of richest value ; which , by stirring up others to detest them , and shew what weak pleas are producible for schism , became the happy occasion of his own , and others salvation ; and of embosoming the daughter-church of england in a charitable communion with her dearest mother ; by whose painful throwes she was first born to christ , her spouse ; at whose breasts shee suck'd the first milk of his doctrine , and from whose arms and ever-cherishing embraces , first by the malignity of an ill-govern'd passion , next by humane policy , shee has been so long separated . finis . down-derry : or bishop bramhal's iust vindication of the church of england refuted . my choice at first directed me , rather to answer mr. hammond , than my lord of derry ; having observ'd his book not only to bear a greater vogue in the world , but to be inwardly furnished with arguments more suitable to the profession of a divine ; but after i had advanc'd past the mid-way of my journey , i met some protestant friends , who , though formerly they had still cry'd up the doctor , yet soon as i told them , in confidence , that an answer to his schism would instantly bee ready for the the press , they immediately began to extol the bishop , and demand either a present reply to him , or else they should not spare to conclude the victory their own . when i had exprest how weak and unreasonable their discourse was , which , if admitted , would always judg him to have the right cause , that speaks the last word . i parted with a promise ; if , in stead of that sport , which he far more than the other , tempts a wit-at leasure to make with him , they would accept of a short refutation of the substantial passages , i should not fail to endeavour their satisfaction : which thus i perform . reading , with some diligence , the bishops book , i find , that as there is much commendable in it for industry , so is it expos'd to an unavoidable check of being patron to an ill cause ; whence it may bee a pattern of wit and labour , but little assistance to the truth , further than by shewing how weak errour is . but , not to spend time and paper in vain , let us state the controversie clearly , that it may be seen how strongly and pertinently his discourse proceeds ; not that i intend minutely to examine his whole work , whereof the far greater part is little or nothing to our controversie , as will appear by the bare stating the question ; but onely to say enough for him whom the substance can content , without engaging into unnecessary and circumstantial disputes . he begins his book , telling us nothing can be objected with more colour of truth against the church of england , than that they have withdrawn themselves from obedience to the vicar of christ , and separated from the communion of the catholike church . and that this crime is justly charg'd upon his church , not onely with colour , but with undeniable evidence of fact , will appear by the very position of the case ; and the nature of his exceptions . as for the first , it is unquestionably certain , and universally assented to by all protestants , who understand any thing , that at the beginning of henry the eighths reign , nay at his first courting his protestant mistress , the church of england agreed with that of rome , and all the rest of her communion , in two points , which were then , and are still the bonds of unity betwixt all her members ▪ one concerning faith , the other , government . for faith , her rule was , that the doctrines , which had been inherited from their forefathers , as the legacies of christ and his apostles , were solely to bee acknowledg'd for obligatory , and nothing in them to bee changed . for government , her principle was , that christ had made st. peter first , or chief , or prince of his apostles ; who was to be the first mover under him in the church , after his departure out of this world , and to whom all others , in difficulties concerning matters belonging to the universal , either faith or government , should have recourse ; and that the bishops of rome , as successors of st. peter ▪ inherited from him this priviledge , in respect of the successors of the rest of the apostles ; and actually exercised this power in all those countries which kept communion with the church of rome that very year wherein this unhappy separation began . it is no lesse evident , that in the dayes of edward the sixth , queen elizabeth , and her successors , neither the former rule of unity of faith , nor this second of unity of government ( which is held by the first ) have had any power in that congregation , which the protestants call the english church . this is our chief objection against you . as for us , our tenet is , that those churchs , who continue in communion with the roman , are the onely churches ; which , in vertue of the first principle above mentioned , have the true doctrine ; and , in vertue of the second , the right government ; and , in vertue of both , the unity and incorporation into the church of christ , necessary for salvation : and by consequence , wee hold them onely to make the entire catholike or universal church of christians ; all others , by misbelief or schism , being excluded . now , because no understanding man can deny this to be the true charge , the only way for a protestant to clear his church from schism , is to shew it not guilty of doing this , either by disproving the former to be the necessary rule of unity in faith , or the latter the necessary bond of government ; both which , though they somtimes say , yet because in these books , professedly composed for their vindication from the guilt of schism , they , directly and of set purpose , handle neither ; it is clear they intend to shuffle , not speak pithily . the first principle ( which also includes the truth of the second ) wee hold by this manifest evidence , that still the latter age could not bee ignorant of what the former beleev'd ; and , as long as it adhered to that method , nothing could bee alter'd in it ; which way of assurance carries with it the testimony of all that are truly called christians ; and this by so ample a memory and succession , as is stronger than the stock of human government and action : no right of law or human ordinances being able to offer so ample , clear , and continued a title . they must remember how their forefathers , who began that which they call the reformation , were themselves of this profession before their pretended reform . they ought to weigh what reasons their ancestors should have had to introduce such an alteration . they must confesse themselves guilty in continuing the breach , unless they can alledge causes sufficient to have begun it , had the same ancient religion descended to these daies ; for the constant beleefe of the catholike world both was at the time of your division , and still is , that these principles are christs own ordination , recorded in scripture , derived to us by the strongest evidences that our nature is capable of , to attain assurance what was done in antiquity ; evidences inviolable by any humane either power or proof , except perfect and rigorous demonstration , to which our adversaries doe not so much as pretend , and therefore without further dispute , remain unanswerably convicted of schism . and though after this , it bee superfluous to say any thing to any book , which does not so much as attempt to demonstrate either of these points false , yet i shall bestow a few thoughts to declare the quality of the lord of derry's arguments , not examining them any further , than to shew how litle they are to the purpose . in his two first chapters , though there bee many things false , and more taken up without proof , yet i will not touch them , because hee onely pretends to settle the question , which is already done for my part ; and so i will begin my animadversions , where he begins his arguments , in the third chapter . his first proof is , because not protestants , but roman catholikes themselves made the first separation . . if it were so , how does that acquit you ? since continuance in a breach of this nature , which cannot be sodered by time , is as guilty as the very beginning . now these two bonds of unity , being of christs own institution , no time can sear the bleeding wound ; and this because we hold by the fore-declared strength , they now must have demonstrations to contradict it , as well as the first separaters . . how does he prove they were not protestants ? because they persecuted protestants : what then ? did not luther persecute carolstadius and zuinglius ? doe they not now in germany and other countries ? lutherans permit no calvinists ; calvinists no lutherans . did not you persecute puritans and brownists ? doe you not now complain to bee persecuted by others ? will you make all these , papists ? or why are not they reformers as well as you ? you will say many of these first breakers died catholikes ; true , but upon repeutance . of gardiner ( whom you presse so particularly ) it is recorded , that upon his death ▪ bed , he said , peccavi cum petro , exivi cum petro , sed nondum flevi cum petro ; and so fell on a bitter weeping for that offence . but in a word , is not this renouncing the pope the most essential point of your reformation ? all the rest your good natur'd religion can either embrace or censure ; and , as occasion serves , admit or refuse communion with the deniers of any other article , never so fundamental , this only is indispensable . then be sure wee never hear you again deny but that they who made this first breach , had in them the quintessence of your reformation , and were far less consistent with catholicism , than your modern younger ▪ brother sectaries are with your kind of protestancy ; since your selves confess the admittance of the popes authority more destructive to you , than the denial of prelacy . his second argument is , because in the separation of england from rome , there was no new law made , but onely their ancient liberties vindicated . the first part is so notoriously false , that i wonder any one can have the face to pronounce it ; a law was made in henry the ths time , an oath invented and exacted , by which was given to the king to be head of the church , and to have all the power the pope did at that time possess in england . that this was a new law none but impudence it self can deny . as for the second part , let us see how hee proves it . hee brings divers allegations , wherein the popes pretences were not admitted , as being in the prejudice to the state or church of england . what is this man about , that hee so forgets the question ? doe wee professe the pope can pretend no more than his right ? or is the question of this or that particular action of the popes ? or does he think a legitimate authority in common is rejected , when the particular faults of them who are in authority are resisted ? is magistracy or royalty rejected , when pleas are commenced against kings or commonwealths , as going beyond their true jurisdiction ? yes , but the pope is expresly deny'd the power to doe such or such things . why then , even by this fact hee is acknowledged to have power in other things ; since to limit an authority implyes an admittance of it in cases to which the restraints extend not . but hee presses lawes anciently receiv'd in our kingdome . what is his meaning ? were not those lawes in force in the beginning of henry the eighths reign ? or was his breach but the conservation of these lawes , and wee began our religion there ? are there any of these laws which are not equivalently in france , spain , germany ; nay italy it selfe ? are none of these therefore catholikes ? are they in as little communication with the pope , as henry the eighth after his breach , or the protestants in q elizabeths times ? how ridiculous , how impudent a manner of speaking and arguing is this ? to force his readers to renounce their eyes and ears and all evidence . in this fifth chapter , hee argues out of the liberties of the britannick churches . but first i would know what this belongs to us , unless it bee prov'd that their practicks were an obliging precedent to us ; have wee any title from the britannick churches , otherwise than by the saxon christians , who onely were our ancestors , and by whose conquests and lawes all that is in the britannick world belongs to us , and is derived to us ; yet is this also false ▪ for nothing in history is more evident , than that the british churches admitted appellations to rome at the council of sardica : and , as much as we have records in our histories of the pope eleutherius , so much appeares the popes authority in that time . and out of st. prosper contra collatorem , & in chron. wee have that the pope celestinus , by his care , and sending st. german , vice sua , in his own stead , freed the britans from pelagianism , and converted the scots by palladius , though venerable bede , as far as i remember , does not touch that circumstance . but that which is mainly to the purpose , is , that since the priviledge wee pretend was one that descends upon the pope ▪ in quality of successor to st. peter , how far it was executed , may be unknown , but that it was due , none can bee ignorant . and here our late bishop begins to shuffle from the priviledge of st. peter , to the patriarchal jurisdiction of the pope , which is another , an historical , a mutable power , and so concernes not our present debate . two objections he makes seem to deserve an answer ; first , that the welsh , or britans , sided with the eastern churches against the roman in the observation of easter . to which i answer , 't is true , they observ'd not easter right , yet never so much as cited the eastern churches , in abetment of their practise , but onely the custome of their own ancestors : neither was there any cause of siding , wee not hearing it was ever pressed by the church of rome , after victor's time , to any height . the council of nice , and the emperour constantine exhorted the christian world to it , but without any coercitive force : and if the britans resisted , or rather neglected them , i think wee ought not to say they sided against them , but onely did not execute their desires . st. iren●us was of the french church , yet testifies this question was no matter of division ; so that it cannot bee guess'd by this what influence the roman church had or had not upon the british . it seemes certain also , that st. lupus and germanus neglected this point , that is , thought it not necessary to be corrected ; however st. austin seem'd more rigorous . and though palladius , sent from celestinus , converted the scots , yet we find some of them in the same practise . the second objection is out of a piece of a worn welsh manuscript , hoped by the protestants to bee a copy of some ancienter original , which , though it has already been proved a manifest forgery , counterfeited by all likelyhood in q. elizabeths time , when the english protestants sought to corrupt the welsh , by catechisms and other writings , printed and not printed ; yet if their great antiquaries can shew , that in st. gregories time , this name papa , or pope , taken by it self , without other addition , as papa urbis romae , &c. was put ( as in later ages ) for the bishop of rome , i shall confesse my selfe much surpriz'd ▪ if they cannot , these very words sufficiently convince the manuscript to bee a meer imposture . another suspition against the legitimatnes of this paper naturally arises from this , that sr. henry spelman , one so diligent in wi●ing off the dust from old writings , found no other antiquity in it worth ▪ the mention ; which shrewdly implies the book was made for this alone . and so this demonstrative proof of the bishop , is a conviction of the forgery of some counterfeit knaue , and the easiness of assent in mr. mosten , and the knight . in his th chapter he pretends three things ; . that the king and church of england had sufficient authority to withdraw their obedience from rome . ly , that they had sufficient grounds for it ; and ly , that they did it with due moderation . i doubt not but the intelligent reader understands by the first point , that the bishop meanes to shuffle away the true difficulty ; and , whereas the question is of the priviledge given by christ to saint peter , and from him descended to the popes , his successors , spend his time about a patriarchal authority , which wee also acknowledge to be of humane institution ; and here i must confesse , that generally when no body opposes him , his lordship carries it clearly and gives his empty reader full satisfaction . hee tells you out of catholike authors , that princes may resist the oppressions of ecclesiasticks , and themselves have priviledge to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction : that popes have been convented and deposed : that emperors have changed patriarchs , and that the kings of england have as much power as emperors . and all this to handle the question , which is not in hand , since our dispute is not what can be done in respect of the popes patriarchal authority , which the good bishop himself professes the pope has renounced these . years . no doubt but th' other two points will follow the former in missing the question . for , admitting the popes authority to bee derived from christ , what grounds can there bee for renouncing it , or what moderation is the rejjecting it capable of ? nay even , if it were of humane institution , many things there are which cannot bee rejected , unless it appear the abuses are not otherwise remediable . suppose then the christian world had chosen themselves one head for the preservation o●●o precious a jewel , as unity in religion , how great absurdities must that head commit , what wrong● must it doe , to cause it selfe to bee justly deposed , and not onely the person deposed , but the very government abolish't . suppose again , that this alteration should ●ee made by some one party of the christian common-●ealth , which must separate it selfe from the assistance and communication of the ●●st of christianity ; ought not far weightier causes bee expected , or greater abuses committed ? suppose thirdly , that by setting aside this supreme head , eternal dissentions will inevibly follow in the whole church of christ , to the utter ruine of faith and good life , which our saviour thought worth the comming down from heaven to plant among us ; and then tell mee , whether the refusal to comply with the humours of a lustful prince , be ground enough ●o renounce so necessary an authority . let the bishop bee now asked , whether kings deserve to bee deposed , and monarchy it self● rejected for such abuses as hee gathers against the pope ? or whether there may not easily bee made a collection of as many an i great misgovernments against the court of england , or any other country ? let him remember whether like abuses were not alledged against his own parliamentary-prelacy , when it was put down . will hee justifie , that if the m●●demeanours pretended against them had been true , the extirpation of prelacy had been lawfull ? surely hee would find out many remedies which hee would think necessary to bee first tryed ; and s●●ggin should as soon haue chosen a tree to bee hanged on , as ●hee have ended the number of expedients to be ●●yed , before hee would give his assent to the extirpation of episcopacy . it is then of little concern to examine whether his complaints bee true or false , since he does not shew there was no other remedy but division : and much more , since it is known , if the authority be of christs institution , no just cause can possibly be given for its abolishment : but most , because all other catholick countries might have made the same exception which england pretends , yet they remain still in communion with the church of rome , whose authority you cry out against as intolerable ; nay , the former ages of our countrey , which your selfe cite , had the same cause to cast the popes supremacy out of the land , yet rather preferred to continue in the peace of the church , then attempt so destructive an innovation as schism draws after it . neither n●w after we have broke the ice , do our neighbour nations think it reasonable to follow our example , and drown their unity in the waters of contradiction . lastly , the pretences on which the english schism was originally made , were far different from those you now take up to defend it ; there was then no talk of imposing new creeds as the conditions of communion ; no mention of the abominations of idolatry and superstition , which now fill your pulpits , nor indeed any other original quarrel , but the popes proceeding according to the known lawes of the church , which unfortunately happen'd to bee contrary to the tyrannical humour of the king. the other point of due moderation , is a very pleasant topick , had i a mind to answer at large his book ; the first part of moderation , is the separating themselves from their errours , not their churches ; this signifies to declare them idolaters , superstitious , wicked , and neverthelesse communicate with them ; reconciling thus light to darkness , and making christ and antichrist to be of the same society . i confesse this a very good moderation for him that has no religion in his heart , or acknowledges his own the worst , there being no danger for him to fear seducing by communication with others . but whoever is confident of his own , by this very fact implicitely disapproves others . i cannot say mine is true , but i must say the opposite is false : mine is good , but the opposite , i must say , is naught : mine necessary , but i must judge ▪ that which is inconsistent carries to damnation , though i am bound both to pity and love the person that dis●ents . therefore , who does not censure ▪ a contrary religion , holds not his own certain , that is , hath none . the second part of moderation hee places in their inward charity , which , if hee had manifested by their external works , we might have had occasion to beleeve him : our saviour telling us the tree is known by the fruit it bears . the third part therefore , hee is pleased to think may bee found , in that they onely take away points of religion , and adde none . wherein is a double errour . for first , to take away goodnesse , is the greatest evil that can be done . what more mischievous than to abrogate good lawes , good practises . let them look on the scotch reformation , who have taken the memory of christ from our eyes , by pulling down pictures and crosses ; the memory of his principal actions , by abolishing holydayes ; the esteem of vertue , by vilifying his saints , and left him onely in the mouths of babling preachers , that disfigure him to the people , as themselves please . what if they took away the new testament too , and even solemn preaching , and left all to the will of a frantick teacher , were not this a great moderation , because they added nothing ? the second abuse is , that he who positively denies , ever adds the contrary to what hee takes away . hee that makes it an article , there is no purgatory , no mass , no prayer to saints , has as many articles , as he who holds the contrary . therefore this kind of moderano is a purefolly . the last point hee deems to be a preparation of mind to beleeve and practise whatever the universal church beleeves and practises ● and this is the greatest mock-fool proposition of all the rest . first they will say , there is no universal church , or if any , indeterminate , that is , no man knowes which it is ; and then , with a false and hypocritical heart , professe a great readiness to beleeve and obey it . poor protestants , who are led by the nose after such silly teachers and doctrines : who , following the steps of our old mother eve , are flatter'd with the promses of knowledge , like the knowledge of god , but paid onely with the pure experience of evil . in his seventh chapter , hee professes , that all princes and republicks of the roman communion , doe in effect the same things which the protestants doe , when they have occasion , or at least plead for it what non sense will not an ill cause bring a desperate man to ? all this while hee would perswade the world that papists are most injurious to princes , prejudicing their crowns , and subjecting their dominions to the will of the pope . hee has scarce done saying so , but with a contrary blast drives as far back again , confessing all hee said ▪ to be false ; and that the same papists hold the very doctrine of the protestants in effect , and the difference is onely in words : so that this chapter seems expresly made to justifie the papists , and to shew , that , though the popes sometimes personally exceed , yet when their passion is over , or the present interest ceases , then they acknowledge for catholikes and orthodox , those who before oppos'd them , as also that the catholike divines , who teach the doctrine of resisting the pope in such occasions , are not , for that , cast out of communion ; which is as much as to say , it is not our religion , or any publick tenet in our church , that binds any to those rigorous assertions , which the protestants condemn . if this be so , what can justifie your bloody lawes , and bloodier execution , for the fourscore years you were in power ? why were the poor priests , who had offended no farther than to receive from a bishops hands the power of consecrating the body of christ , condemned to die a traitors death ? why the lay-man , that harboured any such person , made liable to the same forseiture of estate and life ? why were baptisms , churchings , burials , marriages , all punished ? why were men forced to goe to your synagogues under great penalties ? seldom any lawful conviction exacted , but proceeding upon meer surmises . a priest , arrested upon the least suspition , and hurried before the magistrate , was not permitted to refer his cause to witnesses , but compelled to be his own accuser ; and , without any shadow of proof so much as enquir'd after , if he deny'd not himselfe , immediatly sent to prison as a traitor . a priest , comming to his trial before the judges , was never permitted to require proof of his being a priest ; it sufficed , that , having said mass , or heard a confession , he could not prove himselfe a knave . what shall i say of the setting up of pursuivants to hare poor catholikes in all places and times ; i have seen , when generally they kept their houses close-shut , and , if any knock't , there was a sudden pang and sollicitude , before they durst open their doors . they could neither eat nor sleep in any other security , than that which a good conscience gave them . but the cruelst part of all , was to defame us of treason . first you make a law , that , to acknowledge the successor of s. peter had a common superintendency over the church , was treason ; and then brand us for traitors . should a presbyterian or independent power make it treason to acknowledge prelacy , would you think it reasonable presently to conclude all the older-fashion'd protestants traitors ? nor can i perswade my selfe i offer any violence to charity , if i plainly and roundly charge you , that in all this you proceeded flatly against your consciences , it being impossible you should really judge the bare receiving orders beyond sea to be treason , which is abundantly convinc't by your very offer of pardon , nay sometimes preferment , if hee , whom you made the people beleeve was a dangerous and bloody traitor , would but go to church with you ; for what priest dyed for being a priest , but hee might have rescu'd himselfe at the last hour by such submission ? what priest was so bad , whom you were not ready to entertain with honour , if hee would take party with you ? so unlucky is his lordship in this chapter , that , whatever his intention is , he absolves us , or at least condemns himselfe , if he would be understood as the letter of his exceptions sounds , he absolutely clears our religion of a calumny , which the protestants most injuriously charge upon us , that our vassalage to the pope destroyes our subjection to our prince ; citing so many instances , where catholikes , remaining such , have disobey'd the pope . if he on purpose layes his sense to bee ambiguous , of which i have some jealousie , because hee uses that jugling phrase in effect , then hee absolutely proves himselfe a deceiver . in short , if he mean honestly , he justifies us ; if otherwise , every honest man will condemn him ; but whatever his inward meaning is , the case open'd will declare it self . christ , being to build his spiritual kingdom upon the basis , not onely of the roman monarchy , then flourishing , but of a multitude of kingdomes , either bred out of the destruction of that , or originally independent and distinct from it , which , in process of time , should embrace his faith , saw it necessary to make such a ▪ band of unity betwixt the churches , of which his spiritual empire was to be integrated , that it neither should be offensive to temporal princes , nor yet unprovided of meanes to keep the church in such amity as to be able to work like the congregation of hierusalem , which had cor unum & animam unam . for this reason he gave the principality among his apostles to s. peter , and consequently to his successors among theirs . the effect of this principality was , that when publick meetings of bishops were necessary , all emulation , who should have recourse to the other , was taken away , since it was known all were to defer to him , meet as and where , was most fitting for him . again , if any inconvenience fel among christians , there wanted not one who was by office to look to it , though in the place where it fell out , there were no superior authority to curb the offenders . this one seat might , by the ordinary providence of almighty god , keep a continuance of succession from s. peter to the end of the world , whereas the vicissitude of humane nature permitted not the like to be done to all the sees where all the rest of the apostles had signed their faith by their precious death . hence 't is the see of rome is invested with the special priviledge of mother and mistress of the church . but , not to dive into all , or the questionable consequences of this primacy , this onely i intend to insist upon ; that it is the hinge upon which all the common government and unity in faith , sacraments , ceremonies , and communication of spiritual fraternity depends , which being removed , the church vanishes into a pure anarchy , no one province or country having the least obligation to any other , to repair to it , to obey it , to make meetings and common ordinances with it . so that the whole frame of the church will be utterly dissolv'd , ceasing to be a church , and becomming a ruinous heap of stones , precious indeed in themselves , but without order , shape , or connexion . by this it clearly followes , whatever is the truth of those questions which our bishop reckons up to have been disputed between other christian countries and the papacy , that as long as this principality wee speak of , is acknowledged , so long there is an unity in the christian church , all particular churches being by this subordination perfectly one , both with their head , and among themselves . this is the bridle our saviour put in the mouth of his church , to wield it sweetly which way he pleased . no dissention in faith or discipline , nay not any war among christian princes could annoy the world , if this authority were duly preserved and governed ; many excellent effects we have seen of it , and more the world is likely to enjoy , when the admirable conveniences of it shall bee unpassionately understood . what christian prince can chuse but be glad to have an arbitrator , so prudent , so pious , so disinteressed , as a good pope should be , to reconcile differences , and to hinder bloodshed , either in his own people , or between his neighbours ; and , who sees not , that the popes office and condition , among those who reverence him , is perfectly proper for such an effect beyond the hopes of wisedom that had not known th'exprience of it . what a desperate attempt then is it to bite at this bridle , and strive to put the whole christian world in confusion ? this is your crime , in this consists your schism , in this your impiety and wickedness . agreeing then , that this is the substance of the papacy , temporal preheminences and wealth being but accidental to it , wee shall presently see all those arrows which the bishop shoots against us , fall directly on his own head ; for if the papacy stand firm and strong in all those countries that have resisted the pope when they conceived hee encroach'd on their ' liberties , it is evident , notwithstanding all such disputes , the being and nature of one church is entirely conserved , they all governing themselves in an unity of faith and sacraments and correspondence like one body , as is visible to any that will but open his eyes , and so are members of one christian community . whereas the reform ( as they call it ) has cut off england from all this communication and correspondence , and made it no part of any church , greater than it self ; and by consequence , that can pretend to universality and catholicism , but a headless synagogue , without brotherhood or order ; if joyned with any other , it is not in a common head , but with the tayles of opposition to the roman catholike . no more can the several protestant churches be allow'd to compose one body , than all the ancient hereticks did , nay than turks and iewes and christians may be now said to doe ; since the sole root of unity protestants can pretend , is onely their agreement in certain general points , which most of the old hereticks profess'd ; and even turks , and iewes beleeve some part of the christian faith : as for the protestant distinction , that all are of one communion , who agree in fundamentals , 't is no better than a meer shift , til they exhibit a list of such points , and prove them obligingly and satisfactorily to all the rational people of the world , that they , and they onely , are essential to christian communion . his eighth chapter would fain be thought to prove the pope and court of rome guilty of schism . first , because shee takes upon her to bee mistress ▪ , where shee is but sister to other churches . it is their saying , and our denying it , till they have proved what they affirm . the second argument is a mee● calumny , that shee obtrudes new creeds , and unjustly excommuicates those who will not receive them . at the third blow hee layes the axe ( as he sayes ) to the root of schism ; but , if i understand his words , it is to his own legs . the papacy ( sayes ●ee ) qua talis , which hee interprets , as it is maintain'd by many . good-night my lord of london-derry , for certainly your wits are in the dark . if you once begin to say , as it is maintain'd by many , you imply , it is not maintain'd by all , and therefore not the papacy qua talis , for so catholikes have not the least difference amongst them . if you will dispute against private opinions , cite your authors , and argue against them , not the church , whose beleefe is contain'd in the decrees of councils , and universal consent of fathers and doctors . his fourth charge is , that the popes hold themselves to bee bishops of every particular see ; which is a more gross and false imputation than any of the rest . other two branches he offers at , but confesses them not to be decided in our church , and therefore can make nothing for him . his ninth chapter pretends to solve the romanists arguments ; and first that grand one of schism ; which hee maintaines to be so clearly unimputable to protestants , that he sayes they hold communion with thrice as many christians as wee doe . and truly , if by christians , he meanes those who lay claim to the name of christ , i neither deny his answer , nor envy him his multitude ; for m●●ichees , gnosticks , carpocratians , arians , nestorians , eu●y●hians , &c. without number , all ●surp to themselves the honour of this title ; and i most faithfully protest , i do not think his lordship has any solid reason to refuse communion to the worst of them . but if he meanes by christians , those , who never changed the doctrine which their fathers taught them , as received from the apostles , so let him shew me one , who is not in communion with the roman church , and i also shall be of that one's communion . the second argument hee undertakes , is , that protestants admit not the council of trent . to which hee replies , it was not general , because the heretical patriarchs were not called ; many bishops were absent ; too many italians there ; fewer bishops present at the determination of weightiest points , than the king of england could assemble in a moneth . what trivial stuff is this ? is not a parliament the general representative of the nation , unless every lord , though a known and condemn'd rebel , be summon'd ? or unless every member , that has a right to sit there , bee present ? who is so impertinent , as to quarrel at the generalness of a parliament , if some court ▪ lords bee admitted to their voices ? or if the number of voters in some parliaments bee fewer than in others ? what 's this to the purpose , if none that have a true right , be excluded ? yet these are the grand exceptions ; only in some words , wherein hee expresses his anger , passion made him quite forget they might possibly be retorted upon his own condition ; else what a blindness is it to call the bishops of italy , hungry parasitical pensioners ? it seemes , my lord , you keep a good table , speak the truth boldly , and have great revenues , independent of any . as for the instance of the french churches non-admittance of the council of trent , your selfe confesses it is there received for matters of doctrine ; and i confesse , that for other canons , the execution of them may be omitted , unlesse the true superiours presse their observance . secondly , he sayes it was not free ; a false and injurious calumny , taken out of sleidan , accounted by our part a frank lyar and forger . thirdly , he seigns an objection to himself , their breaking from the patriarchat , which already wee have clear'd , is not the question , and himself , though weakly and sillily , endeavours to prove cannot stand with the claim of papal authority from christ. after these , he descends to consider such of our arguments as hee is pleas'd to think of lesser importance . as first , that protestants have no clergy ; because no priests : for the notion of a priest is to bee a sacrificer , and their reform renounces all truly called sacrifice . this he hides in obscure and common terms of matter and form , and shuffles likewise certain common words in answer . secondly , because their ministers , whom they term priests , were made by no bishops . the controversie is largely treated by doctor champney against mason . hee answers it with childish and impudent words . father oldcorn , whom he cites , was known to be a weak and timorous man , who might bee easily surprised . i could never hear , that any catholike , esteemed judicious , was ever admitted to a free perusal of their registers ; but know wel , that the contemporaries protested against any lawful ordination of their first bishops , and were answer'd by silence . he sayes they hold no spiritual jurisdiction from the crown ; but the statutes of the nation , and their own oaths say the contrary . let him dispute it with the lawyers . the tenth chapter containes what he expects to be the result of his book . hee first complaines of hard usage , and thinks the very turk not so cruel as those who now persecute protestants in england . truly no good man , i beleeve , wishes his party harm ; but mee thinks he might remember , they suffer not so much as themselves have done in their reign , against those , who , in respect of them , were aborigines ; whose possession was the same that christian religion had among us ; and would to god , they could , even now be quiet and friendly , when they are in eadem damnatione ; prelacy , as well as popery , being voted damnable heresie by the late parliament , 't is true , their religion , as consider'd including episcopacy , is cast out of the land ; but then how comes episcopacy to be essential to their religion ? have not the bishops alwayes profess'd themselves of the same communion with the huguenots of france , the zuinglians of switzerland , &c. who hold episcopacy abominable ? the persons of such bishops as reside in england , and are accus'd of nothing but episcopacy , live free and secure , enjoy their whole estates , except what belonged to their dignity , and have no oaths impos'd on their consciences . were catholikes permitted this liberty , i am ▪ confident you should seldom bee troubled with hearing their complaints of persecution ; and yet on all occasions you are still upraiding the liberty given to papists , which is a meer blindness of malice . do you not see all the catholikes of england , such as never engag'd in the war , are , purely upon the score of religion , at this day sequestred , and two thirds of their estates taken from them ? doe you not see our priests , when discover'd , proceeded against as traitors ? is it not enough to satisfie your ▪ uncharitable eys , that so many of them have been hang'd , drawn and quarter'd for their religion ▪ are these the men that pretend moderation , and all day long cry up brotherly charity ? i will offer ther● this bargain , in the name of all the catholikes of england , who i am perswaded will readily subscribe the contract . that two indifferent persons read over all the statutes made since the reformation , and every where , in stead of papist , write protestant , with this mercy too , that the execution shall be now and then interrupted , and a condemned minister sometimes have reprive ▪ nay , and more than wee can obtain of them , they shall enjoy all the priviledges of papists , without the least envy from us . if they refuse this faire offer , let them never hereafter be so impertinent as to repine at our liberty , and with the same breath complain of their own sufferings . as to his desirable intention of unity in the church ; first i could wish they would let real charity take root in their hearts . secondly , not think the misdemeanours of some popes a sufficient warrant to break the unity of the church . thirdly , to receive the root of christianity , that is , a practical infallibility in the church , the ready and onely meanes to know the truth of christs law ; which being denied , there is no religion left in the world. this is that which is chiefly requir'd , without this , how muchsoever wee have christ in our tongues , wee are atheists in our hearts , proud luciferian erecters of our selves above all that 's called god , judgers of christ and his law , not obeyers and servants . this is that which onely can make a reconciliation both in doctrine and government ; and , as long as it is neglected , all wee endeavour towards peace , is labour cast away . if truly and cordially hee , or any other study meanes for peace , let them endeavour it so as to leave a religion and a known law of christ , and an open method of comming to it in the world. otherwise all lovers of christ and christianinity can have no share or participation with them . finis . errata . page . line . parricide . p. . l. . nice . p. . l. . self-acknowledg'd . p. . l. . pope . p. . l. . sect. . p. . l. . other crew . p. . l. . this . p. . l. . given by . p. . l. . premisses . p. . l. . alleaging . p. . l. . call'd . p. . l. . solv'd . p. . l. . which can . p. . l. . quaere the title in the table . p. . l. : shews it . p. . l. . patriarchs . l. . the novel . p. . l. . be one man or one hors p. . l. . did it not . p. . l. . by some p. . l. . rake . p. . l. . arch-heretick . p. . l. . quid. p. . l. . their su - p. . l. . which . p. . l. . flagrant . p. . l. . on any . p. . l. ▪ it in . p , . l. . by your . p. . l. . as they . p. . l. . in that . p. . l. . of your . p. . l. . in his . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e cap. . sect. . cap. sect. , . c. . s. . s. . s. ▪ c. . s. . ● . : ● . . cor ▪ : : c. : s. : ● . . ● . . c. . s. , , . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. , , , . c. . s. . c. . s. , , , . c. . s. . c. : s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. ▪ in his reply , p. . c. . s. ▪ . s. . c. . s. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . * c. . s. , , . s. . mr. daille , l. . c. . c. . s. . see afterwards part. . c. . s. c. . s c. . s. . c. : s. . c. . s. . * c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. c. . s. , , . c. . s. . acts . acts . . c. . s. . c. . s. . mark . . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. ibid. ibid. c : . s. . cyp. epist. . ad quint. aug. . de bapt. contra donatistas . c. . s. . ibid. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. : s. : c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. ignat. ep . ad trall . c. : s. . c. . s. . ignat. epist. ad mariam cassobil . tert. l. . carm . in marc. hieron . in isa. . & l. de script . eccles. in clem. tert-de praescript . c. . epiph . haer. . ruffin . praef. lib. praecognit . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c ▪ . s ▪ . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. ▪ c. . s. . c. . s. : c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . notes for div a -e c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. , . c. . s. . c. ● . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. c. . s. . ibid. ibid. ibid. c. . s. , . c. . s. . c. . s. . ibid. ibid. c. . s. . ibid. c. ▪ s. . ibid. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. , , . henricus in assert . . sacram : contra luth. art. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . part. . sect. . cap. . sect. . c. . s. . c. . sect. . c. . sect. c. ● . sect c. . sect. ● c. . sect. c. ▪ sect. c. sect. ● c. . sect. . c. . sect. c. . s. . notes for div a -e c. . sect. . sect. . sect. . c. . s. . c. . sect. . hierom. contra iovinian . c. . sect. c. . sect. c. . ● . . c. . sect. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . sect. c. . s. . c. . sect. . c. . s. . see the art. of the church of england . c. . sect. c. . sect. c. . s. . ibid. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . s. . c. . s. . dr. ham. c. . s. . art. . of the church of england c. s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. s. . c. . s. . c. s. . art. c. . s. . c. . s. . c. . s. . c. s. . lib. . num . rushworth's dial. & the apol . for tradition . reason against raillery, or, a full answer to dr. tillotson's preface against j.s. with a further examination of his grounds of religion. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) reason against raillery, or, a full answer to dr. tillotson's preface against j.s. with a further examination of his grounds of religion. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. s.n.], [london : . errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng tillotson, john, - . -- sixth catholic letter. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion reason against raillery : or , a full answer to dr. tillotson's preface against j. s. with a farther examination of his grounds of religion . the gravest book that ever was written may be made ridiculous , by applying the sayings of it to a foolish purpose . dr. tillot . serm. p. . anno dom. mdclxxii . advertisement . it being the general temper of mankind to call any thing by an odious name which themselves dislike , and particularly the humour of the times to call every thing popery which comes cross to their interest , i cannot expect my present adversary , whose zeal ( as will appear by the perusal of this treatise ) carries him much farther than his reason , should be exempt from a failing so epidemical , and withal so necessary for his purpose . for nothing more easily solves all arguments , or more readily answers any book with the vulgar than this short method ; inure them to a hideous apprehension of popery , then call any production by that name , and all farther confute is needless . with the vulgar , i say ; for i shall presume that whoever reads this treatise will judge it incredible dr. t. should hereafter attempt to write to such as are truly learned , till he thinks fit to settle and pursue some conclusive method of discoursing ; which i am sure he will not , because his cause will not bear it . i am to expect then from the disingenuity of my opposers , that this piece will be branded for popery , thence the publishing it made an insolence , and ( to lay on more load ) strain'd to an immodest abuse of the late merciful indulgence . i am forc'd therefore to stop the reader at the very entrance , and to declare to him before-hand , that in perusing this treatise he shall find that the points at present maintained by me are onely these , that christian faith and the tenet of a deity are absolutely certain . if this be popery , all the sober and well-meaning protestants , presbyterians , and almost all england , nay all true christians are papists ; for not one of them who uses or discourses of the word [ faith ] but r●tains in his natural thoughts ( unless bad speculation have corrupted nature ) this hearty conceit of it , that 't is absolutely impossible to be all a ly for any thing any man living knows ; and abhor the contrary tenet ; that is , they are all on my side . if then dr. t. does not in discoursing here the grounds of faith , sustain this contrary tenet , and so violate the nature of faith , i have at present no quarrel with him , but he a very grievous one with me for wronging him ▪ and i must acknowledge i owe him satisfaction as publick as the injury . if he does , all protestants , presbyterians , &c. have the same quarrel with him i have , and so ought to joyn with me against him ; and he will owe satisfaction to them all , as well as to catholicks , for corrupting the nature of faith ( which we all acknowledge necessary to salvation ) into opinion , and so quite enervating its force and influence towards bringing souls to heaven , as will be shewn hereafter . i could alledge , to justifie my writing at present , the earnest and daring provocations of dr. t. and his friend , publickly in their late books ; also that this treatise was near printed ere his majesties gracious declaration was published . but i shall make use of no other justification but the nature of my cause , which is the common concern of all good christians , and can never be unseasonable to defend , or be offensive to any who is heartily a friend to christianity , to see it defended . and , if any clamours be rais'd against me for so doing , 't is abundantly satisfactory to me that the world before-hand understands how worthy the cause is for the maintaining of which i suffer this reproach . to the knowing candid wits of this nation : especially those who are an ornament to the universities , and other learned societies . gentlemen , i know not to whom all attempts to advance truth in any kind can more properly belong than to you , to whom knowledge gives ability to discern ; the profest study of truth , candour and sincerity to own what you discern , and both together a perfect qualification to be iudges in affairs of this nature . the enemies to learning are ignorance , and passion ; and i take you to be as much above the later , as the world will witness you are free from all suspicion of the former . i have great reason to believe i am not mistaken in the judgment i make of you , and that few nations can produce an equal number of men so acute to discover the truth , so wise to judge of it , and ( speaking generally ) so unbyass'd to acknowledge it . this consideration gives me a high esteem for your authority , and that esteem the confidence to make choice of you for my umpires . the wise iustice of this nation has provided that all differences betwixt contending parties be try'd by their peers ; and though your dissenting from me , in some particular points , might possibly cause iealousie in one who was not well assured of his own cause or your integrity ; yet the interests of learning are common to us both , and of the right or injury done to that , you are the best , and peradventure onely iudges , and for that point i confidently appeal to you. having made my address , give me leave in the next place to declare my case . i had observed with much grief the swarms of new sects ( not to mention the declining of many good wits towards atheism ) which pester our country , and looking into the causes of such sad effects , it needed no great reach to discover , that the fancies of men being both by nature and circumstances fram'd to great variety , it could not be expected but they should take their several plies , and sway mens thoughts and actions accordingly , unless some principle , evident , in a manner , to all , should oblige the judgment of the wiser ( at least ) to adhere unanimously to the same profession of faith , and satisfie by motives within their own ken , and even forestall , by the way of nature , the irregular deviations to which weaker fancies must of necessity be subject . nor could i , nor indeed can any man think , but that as god , the author of every perfect gift , settled faith most firmly at first in the hearts of the primitive believers by evident miracles , so he intended , and ordered , as far as was on his part , that it should continue all along the same ; or , that his church should persevere in unity of faith ; and , consequently , that he settled such a rule to convey the knowledge of it to us , as was of a nature able to establish it , and satisfie , according to their several capacities , both the wise and the unwise . whence necessarily follows that all division about faith is to be refunded into the faulty unwariness of men who deflect from that rule , not into want of fore-sight in the all-wise founder of the church , in leaving us such a rule of faith as should set us all on wrangling , instead of keeping us at unity . these considerations discover'd to me that i could not bestow my pains better on any subject than in making known what was the right rule of faith ; and evidencing , to men capable of evidence , out of the nature of the thing in hand , that it had indeed the qualities proper to a rule of faith , that is , virtue or power to acquaint us that live now ( without the least danger of errour ) what christ and his apostles taught at first . to this end , i shew'd first in sure-footing that the letter of scripture had not this virtue , and by consequence could not be the rule intended and left us by christ. many arguments i us'd from p. . to p. . though these two short discourses are sufficient to evince the point to any who is not before-hand resolv'd he will not be convinc'd . first , that , that can never be a rule or way to faith , which many follow to their power , yet are misled , and this in most fundamental points ; as we experience in the socinians and others . for i see not how it can consist with charity , or even with humanity , to think that none amongst the socinians or other erring sects endeavour to find out the true sence of scripture as far as they are able , nor how it can be made out that all , without exception , either wilfully or negligently pervert it ; and yet , unless it be shewn rational to believe this it can never be rational to believe that the letter of scripture , as useful and as excellent as it is in other respects , is the rule of faith ; for , if they be not all wanting to themselves and their rule , 't is unavoidable that their rule is wanting to them . next , they who affirm the letter is the rule , must either say that the bare letter as it lies , antecedently to and abstracting from all interpretation whatsoever , is the rule ; and this cannot be with any sence maintained , for so god must be held to have hands , feet , passions , &c. or else , that the letter alone is not sufficient to give as assurance of gods sence in dogmatical points of high concern , as the trinity , incarnation , &c. without the assistance of some interpretation ; and , to say this , is to say as expresly as can be said , that the letter of scripture alone is not the rule of faith , since it gives not the certain sence of christ without that interpretation adjoyned : nay more , since 't is the nature of interpretation to give the sence of words , and the nature of the rule of faith to give us the sence of christ , this interpretation manifestly is the rule of faith , and the revelation to us who live now , of what is christs doctrine . i know it is sometimes said that the letter may be interpreted by it self , a clear place affording light to one more obscure : but , taking the letter as antecedent to all interpretation , as in this case it ought , i can see no reason for this pretence . for let us take two such places , e. g. it repented god that he had made man , and , god is not as man that he should repent ; abstract from all interpretation , and let him tell me that can of the two places taken alone , which is the clear , and which is the obscure one . atheists will be apt to take such pretences to reject the scripture , and impiously accuse it of contradiction ; but how that method can assist a sincere man , who hopes by the meer letter to find his faith , and hinder the obscure place from darkning the clear place , as much as the clear one enlightens the obscure one , i understand not . in fine , it exposes a man to the scandal and temptation of thinking there is no truth in scripture , but absolute assurance of truth it gives no man. besides , the former of the reasons lately given returns again : for the socinians compare place to place as well as others ; other sects do so too , and yet all err , and some in most fundamental points . wherefore it must be either presum'd they all err wilfully , or the way cannot be presumed a right way . farther , it may be ask'd when one pitches upon a determinate sence of any place beyond what the letter inforces , by what light he guides himself in that determination ; and then shewn that that light , whatever it is , and not the letter , is indeed the formal revealer or rule of faith. much more might be said on this occasion , but my business now is to state my case , not to plead it . the letter rule secluded , i advanc'd to prove that tradition , or that body call'd the church , which christ by himself and his apostles constituted , taken as delivering her thoughts by a constant tenor of living voice and practise visible to the whole world , is the absolutely-certain way of conveying down the doctrine taught at first , from age to age , nay year to year , and so to our time ; which is in other terms to say , that pastors , and fathers , and the conversant faithful , by discoursing , preaching , teaching , and catechising , and living and practising , could from the very first , and so all along , better and more certainly make their thoughts or christs doctrine be understood by those whom they instruct , than a book which lies before them , and cannot accommodate it self to the arising difficulties of the reader . i am not here to repeat my reasons , they are contain'd in my book which i called sure footing in christianity . and because i observ'd our improving age had in this last half century exceedingly ripen'd , and advanc'd in manly reason , straining towards perfect satisfaction , and unwillingly resting on any thing in which appear'd a possibility to be otherwise ; or , to express the same in other words , bent their thoughts and hopeful endeavours to perfect science ; i endeavoured in that treatise rigorously to pursue the way of science , both in disproving the letter-rule , and proving the living rule of faith : beginning with some plain attributes belonging to the natures of rule and faith , and building my whole discourse upon them , with care not to swerve from them in the least . and being conscious to my self that i had , as i proposed to do , closely held to the natures of the things in hand , i had good reason to hold my first five discourses demonstrative , which is all i needed have done , as appears p. , and . the rest that follow'd being added ex abundanti , and exprest by me an endeavour to demonstrate , as by the titles of the sixth and eighth discourse is manifest , though i do not perceive by the opposition of my answerers why i should not have better thoughts of them than at first i pretended . this is the matter of fact concerning that book , as far as it related to me , and a true account why i writ on that subject , and in that manner : what thoughts i had of its usefulness , and hopes it might prove serviceable towards composing the differences in religion , of which the world has so long complained , though from the long and deep meditation i must necessarily have made upon those principles , i may reasonably be judg'd to see farther into them , and know better whether they will carry , than those who look not so well thorow them ; yet it being an universal temptation to flatter our selves with our own productions , i think best to omit . i am next to declare what reception it found in the world. men are subject to several tempers , and learned men not exempt from the weaknesses of humanity . candour and obstinacy divide mankind : some are fixt to nothing but reason , and whenever that appears , whether conformable or opposite to their former perswasions , they always follow it , striving to accommodate their iudgments to reason , not reason to their iudgments , and resolute to be of the party of reason , of whatever party reason be . others are so fixt to their perswasions that they can hardly be induced to believe what is contrary to themselves can be agreeable to reason , and will sooner believe reason not to be reason , than their own thoughts not reasonable . this crosness of nature is heightned by the unhappy circumstances of our country , where the mixture of several opinions , so strangely blended together , breeds a great partiality to those perswasions which men have taken up , and renders reason less welcom and less effectual . my book it seems , as it needs must , encountred with some of this spirit , and immediately a loud noise was made against it , and a complaint of it to a great magistrate , as of a most pernicious treatise . he believing his information , testify'd much resentment , and exprest an intention of much severity against the author ; first banishment , then imprisonment in that banishment , and the liberty of ever writing more to be debarr'd in that imprisonment , for so far the instigators prest it . and this was the first attempt to answer the book , and i must confess a very strong one , and which oblig'd me to a very secret retirement . but it happened that a person of quality who had read the book , gave a character of it that it was a serious piece , that it took the way of sober reason , and was far from the information he had received of it , leaving one with him for his own perusal . from which time i heard no more of his resentment . i conceive it was not thought honourable to employ authority against that which bore a semblance of reason , and permit power to be abus'd in defence of other mens heats , and possibly the less , where there was found a loyal deferrence to the state , p. . and elsewhere . whatever the reasons were , the threats were chang'd into a desire of a solid and home answer , and this he recommended and prest often and earnestly . hereupon five choice persons whom i could name , met constantly on mundays ( as i was inform'd ) to consult and consider of it ; which being all men of parts and business , was found to be the day of greatest leisure . mean time i became acquainted with several excellent wits , to whose civility i am as much obliged as i was satisfied of their parts ; particularly with mr. felton of gonvil and caies colledge in cambridge , in whom ( not to speak of others ) i found such a concourse of excellent endowments , that i cannot but lament the loss of him as a great loss to learning and the nation ; his temper was sweet and friendly , his discourse calm and unpassionate , his wit acute and throughly penetrative , his iudgment , by attending heedfully to principles , solid and steady , his expression clear and natural ; and to all this he joyn'd a sincerity and candour which none could see without esteem . from him i receiv'd some objections to my book , of a strain far beyond what has since appeared ; wherefore finding in him ability to say all that could be said , and yet so much candour as not to say what was not to purpose , i earnestly courted him by letters to undertake the answer , that the world might have the satisfaction of seeing the truth impartially try'd , and my self secur'd from the fear of indirect dealing , and all pass without bitterness , and as a great man would have it , with the sweetness of love-letters . his modesty refus'd at first ; yet second thoughts prevail'd with him . but providence over-rul'd my hopes and expectations of so learned and fair an adversary , and to the grief of all that knew him , and the value due to learned worth , particularly mine , took him soon after away ; though , if i be rightly informed , not before he had preach'd at st. mary's of the absolute certainty of tradition , and ordered his executors to burn all his papers ; among which i conceive were those against me . being thus defeated of my best hopes , and inform'd of the iunto of five , i began to consider if i could by any means contribute to their endeavours , and provide that the world might reap the benefit of a solid satisfaction from our common labours . wherefore i writ and printed a little piece which i intitled , a letter from the author of sure-footing to his answerer ; not out of vain glory to boast my self author of that book , as dr. t. whose zealous nature and education , inclining him still to unhandsome misconstructions , puts upon me ; but because , not knowing yet the persons name , i could onely call him by the answerer of sure-footing , and so was to express my self by the opposite relation i had to him as such . this letter was full of civility to the protestant party , though i said no more than i truly meant , and unoffensive to any . the sum of it was to desire that we might not abuse the world and our selves by discourses not pertinent , but closely pursue the point in hand in a method which might be truly conclusive and satisfactory ; and if he lik'd not the way which i had proposed , i humbly requested he would assign any other , with which , provided he would shew it was conclusive , i should be content . i heard some queries were to be antecedently propos'd to me , either in writing or in print ; but instead , as i conceive , thereof , a personal conference was desired with dr. tillotson , and another worthy gentleman ; to which i consented readily , and when we met , discoursed freely , little suspecting the return would prove so unsuitable to my open plainness . the next news i heard was the answer it self , which came forth under the name of dr. tillotson , who whether he foresaw the unlucky success of a rigorous method , or that his genius lay more for smart irony than blunt demonstration , or for whatever reason , he rejects the method i had propos'd , and establishes no other instead of it , not assigning any reason why he did so , but that he had the same liberty to manage his answer , which i had assum'd to prescribe laws to it ; whereas i had beforehand disclaimed any authority of prescribing , and onely shew'd that reason and the satisfaction of the world requir'd it . much wit there was in his book , and much art , and much good language , but so little to the purpose , that people could not but suspect , as he handled the matter , his purpose was not to speak to purpose . generally he neglects the import of my discourse , and picks out here and there something from its fellows , perverts and makes it fit to be laugh'd at , and then laughs exquisitely at it . as if any degree of wit will not serve to abuse and find fault , and a little wit furnish a man for satyr , as he has since taught the world himself , serm. p. . 't is common with him to deny the conclusion , and alledge some pretty plausible thing against it , and never take notice of the premises , or attempt the proof on which 't is built ; a method against which euclid himself has said nothing strong enough to be secure . neer three parts of his book impose wrong tenets on me , changing constantly my sence , and sometimes my words : and , whereas in things subject to reason no scholar is bound to defend more than himself maintains , he often puts me to defend the reasonings of other men . as for omissions and dextrous waving the principal difficulty , they are endless ; and these and some other prevarications of the like strain , are the ingredients of that highly-applauded book . the rest of its commendations are a delicate style , a fair print , and good paper ; whereof as the two last are of credit with the vulgar , so i wonder to see the number of those who are carried away with the first . yet it suits well with a prudential pitch , and such who are not much used to the strength of reason ; especially being accompanied with the advantage of being truly victorious over counterfeit tenets ; for in truth what he sets up most artificially , he pulls down most irrecoverably . i was griev'd to see my well-meaning , and the pains i had taken for the benefit of my country , so crosly checkt , and the more , to perceive by the loud applause given to such a piece , that the peevishness whether of humour or faction , was either more numerous or more active than the sincerity of those who meant well . i thought fit to give a stop to this wild carreer of passion and partiality , and not being then in circumstances to make a full answer , principally for want of health , which was then so bad that i thought i should soon have ended this dispute with my life , i cursorily noted some few of its defects in a little treatise , which , as dr. stillingfleet had advis'd me , i call'd a letter of thanks . in that i laid open in some signal passages of universal concern that he quite mistook the question , and so insincerely mis-represented in a manner the whole , that his much-applauded endeavours were indeed no better than a well-worded prevarication ; and in short , by instancing in several particulars i made good that charge of divers faults which i have here laid against his book . and being then in the heat of my first resentments , and not judging it due to him who had provok'd me without occasion to conceal or diminish the faults of his writing , i could not restrain the inclination of my genius , which leads me to shew little respect to those who shew none for truth , but call'd his faults by their own course though true names . but i had soon occasion to be sorry my nature was not fram'd to more wariness . for letting my book alone , an argument ad hominem was us'd , of a temper much stronger than those which are forg'd in the schools . i know not by what suggestions , but i know without other demerit more than i have here express'd , an order was procur'd by his best friends to seiz upon my person , and my friends were inform'd by some great men , that if i were apprehended it was not possible to save my life . to inforce this project , besides divers extravagant calumnies , information was given to magistrates making me guilty of doing more good than it was almost possible any one single man should commit . i cannot accuse dr. t. of having a particular hand in this unhandsome malice ; onely i can with truth aver , that the laying open in my letter of thanks his faults as a writer , was ( as appears by the circumstance ) the immediate occasion of it ; and that about that time i was told by an honest protestant who convers'd with all three , that he judg'd in his conscience d. w. was civiler than to take such ungentile ways , and dr. st. soberer or warier , but that i should have a care of dr. t. for it was easie to discern by his words that , if it lay in his power to ruine me , he would do it . to the belief of which information his known genius and humour contributes too much ; which is ( poor man ! ) to be a great papist-hater ; so that had rome but one neck , i know no man living more fit to be the executioner and strike a speeding blow . against this storm i had no shelter but a lurking hole ; into which i retir'd the second time , and plac'd stricter centinels of care upon my security . in this confinement i began to write a very particular answer to dr. t's book ; intending when the conjuncture was more seasonable , and my ability sufficient , to publish it . but no favourable crisis of this morbus animi appear'd . time had not its usual influence upon spirits implacably exulcerated , and the motion continued very violent , though the first impulse were long past . when my person appeared not , my friends were found out , and a family with which 't was suspected i conversed , design'd for ruine : so exemplary virtuous and in all respects worthy , that should i speak what i know , i might perhaps be thought to flatter . against these , while the rest of the nation sat quiet in the undisturbed comfort of the general mercy , the severity of the law was prosecuted , and urged almost to the extremity before they could find out the reason of the partiality us'd to them , for they were very far from giving particular offence . at last , upon strict inquiry , they found that all this anger sprung from my being seen at their house , though that was both a very little space , and long before ; and that the same was intended against all who should entertain me . the apprehension of the like inconvenience drove me from the circumstances in which i was , and which were all my livelihood , nor could i easily find admittance any where . i understood this to signifie i was to be aw'd , at least by the apprehension of my friends danger , if i were more careless of my self , from printing the answer i had promised , was preparing , and was expected . however , i proceeded in it , though i must confess i found the task sufficiently troublesome . for there being few passages in which my sence was not voluntarily perverted , and not one in which the nature of the thing in debate was rightly stated , and solidly prosecuted , my business still was by frequent repetition of my own words to set the discourse right again , which had been so industriously disordered : an employment which how wearisom and distasteful it is , those know who have been condemn'd to the like drudgery . my papers were grown pretty bulky , when divers of my most iudicious friends , solicitous of my safety , dealt earnestly with me to surcease . they alledged that unpassionate examiners might easily discover , by what had been done already , how frivolous and insignificant the whole way was which my adversary took , and that another and more convictive reply might possibly heighten the anger to fatal extremities . that if i were less sensible of my own safety , i should yet have regard to my friends and all catholicks ; that it was to be feared that an exception against a particular person , might in that iuncture be enhanc'd to a crime of the whole , and the crossing the humour or interest of that implacable party , raise the storm of the great diana of the ephesians , and give the gospel-trumpeters occasion to sound out aloud papa ad portas . to this was joyned ( for why should i be ashamed to acknowledge my poverty , into which that persecution had driven me ? ) that i had written more then i was able to print . in fine , authority and reason , and necessity prevail'd with me , and i forbore to finish what i had begun , and to publish what i had finish'd . but yet the desire i had to be instrumental in settling so important a truth , suggested to me a middle way , which , as i hoped , would be incapable to be wrested into offence , so i saw plainly would be much more beneficial to the world , and to the learned more satisfactory . i had observ'd in the sermon which dr. t. call'd the wisdom of being religious , a concession which amounted to this , that the very tenet of a deity might possibly be false . i saw the same sence often imply'd in his rule of faith , and p. ● . plainly own'd . i perceiv'd and knew all men of insight must needs perceive with me , that , as this was the onely material , so 't was a full answer to my book ; and rendred the disquisition whether this or that be the rule of faith very superfluous , if it might be maintained it had no rule at all , nor was capable of any . for a rule ( speaking of an intellectual rule as both of us do ) being a means to make us certainly know something to be a truth , he who says that thing may possibly be false , or not be a truth , says it neither has nor can have any rule . i resolved therefore to write a treatise in behalf of christian faith in common , in which i endeavoured to demonstrate from all heads i could invent that the generality of christians , or those who rely on the common motives left by god to the church ( as i exprest my self in my introduction ) the assent called [ faith ] must be impossible to be false or erroneous . and applying this to dr. t. and his adherents , who as i shew'd from his own words , granted his assent built on that which he esteems his onely rule of faith , possible to be false , i concluded them beyond all possibility of evasion not to have true faith , nor be truly faithful . and this i conceive was to follow on my blow , as i had promised ; it being unimaginable how the controversie could be prest more home , than to conclude my adversary and his whole cause from the very an est of faith , the subject of our dispute ; nor how his whole book , which he calls the rule of faith , can be more fundamentally overthrown than by shewing from his own words and the nature of the thing , that his mis-called faith has no rule at all , nor can have any . i conceiv'd too that this was to make good the engagement into which i had enter'd , to force them either to lay principles which would bear the test , or let all the world see they had none . for , in case they did manifest their faith impossible to be false , they must of necessity build it upon such grounds as would sustain such a building ; if they did not , the world must needs judge by their silence that they had none , and that they knew and confest they could not evidence themselves truly faithful and right christians . i saw besides that this method permitted me to pursue a rational close way of discourse , without the continual interruption which the insisting upon my adversaries mistakes must needs occasion ; which , as it was more satisfactory to me , and more creditable to my cause , so i judg'd it more beneficial to the intelligent reader ; for a particular answer must of necessity be made up for the greatest part of accusations , where the answerer thinks it his best play to mistake all along , instead of direct confuting : i cannot say i am in the right , but i must say likewise that who says otherwise is in the wrong , and that he either misunderstands or misrepresents , and this either ignorantly or wilfully ; to show which is a task no more pleasant to the reader than the writer , people being of opinion , and i think they have great reason , that the time and pains spent in such wranglings might with much more advantage be employ'd in convincing the truth in question . lastly , my aim was from the beginning to bring controversies to a conclusion , in order to which i had proposed a conclusive method ; my adversary neither accepted of mine , nor proposed any other of his own , as i had desired ; and i saw that by proceeding with him in his talking fashion , the point might come to be lost in a wilderness of unconnected words : wherefore i judg'd it better to pursue my design more closely , and by the bare stating the nature of christian faith , to reduce all disputes to this short period , either produce and vouch such grounds for your faith as are impossible to be false , or 't is evident you have none . it seemed by the event the way i took was not ill chosen . dr. t. being still able to boast his book was not particularly answer'd , and so uphold his credit with those who look not deeply into things , seem'd by his silence well-appay'd ; and i heard of no more extraordinary anger against me ; and for my part i was contented that superficial people should judge as their wit serv'd them ; it being abundant satisfaction to my labours that intelligent and insighted persons might perceive by them how matters stood , and into how narrow a compass controversie was reduced . and of this i have ample experience from the most iudicious of our nation , who unanimously assur'd me that it was impossible to carry things farther , or bring controversie to a shorter method , since now the whole cause depended upon one single proposition , by the sole examination of which it was to be decided . thus stood the controversie , and thus for some years it rested . for the future i intended when it might be seasonable to write onely such grounds as i judged might be a solid foundation for union , which as i have always look'd upon as the best of works , so i know 't is impossible , till order be first taken to secure the absolute and immoveable certainty of faith it self , which i think is not otherwise to be done , then by shewing how and which way it comes to be certain . in this calm i heard several reports that the two doctors wondred at my silence , which they interpreted weakness , and despair of an unmaintainable cause ; and that i might not pretend want of means for my disability , some of their friends offered to get any thing printed which should concern either of them . but i was not stirred , till a gentleman of quality and worth , who , for his friendship , as i conceive , to dr. t. believ'd his book truly unanswerable , offer'd a friend of mine to prevail with him to get licence for me to print an answer , if i would or could make any . so fair an invitation mov'd me to accept of it , and i sollicited , with as much earnestness as i could , the performance . but the gentleman it seems mistook the doctors humour as much as his book , for his credit prevail'd not . all seem'd bush'd and quiet , when dr. st. publishes a private paper writ two years and an half before , with a reply swell'd into a large book , intitled , a discourse concerning the idolatry , &c. in the preface to which , and elsewhere , he insults over my silence , which he calls leaving my poor demonstrations alone to defend themselves , and with keen ironies upbraids my pretence to principles and demonstration , which in his language is but canting . of all things in the world i should not have expected such an objection from a scholar . for , certainly , whoever writes on a serious subject so as to confess he has not concluded what he maintains , is an impudent trifler ; and how to conclude without principles and demonstration , is a thing not known to any logick which has hitherto appear'd in the world. dr. st. would deserve wonderfully of learning and the world , if he would please to teach us this admirable new logick of concluding without demonstrating , and demonstrating without principles , for in the dull way of learning hitherto in use , 't is so far from shameful in a scholar to own he has demonstrated what he pretends should be assented to , that 't is unpardonably shameful to pretend another mans assent to that which he does not pretend and judge to have demonstrated . i had not time to settle the thoughts which these and the like passages stirr'd up , when i met with the preface to dr. t 's sermons , directed particularly to me , and meant , as far as i can guess , for an answer to two or three books . i must confess the bitter smartness i found there , and the piquant upbraiding me with deserting the defence of sure-footing ( though all men that car'd to consider any thing , saw i had already writ two books in defence of it ) stirred me sufficiently ; but i know not whether all this provoking raillery would have prevail'd with me to answer particularly , if i had not thought they would not have urged me so pressingly , if their friends had not indeed desired i should write , and that certainly i should not offend sober men of what perswasion soever , by doing onely what themselves so prest . warier people have indeed suggested to me that the desires of adversaries are suspicious , and the more because of the time they had both chosen , since they could not but fore-see mine and others answers would in likelihood come out about the time when the parliament was designed to sit , which might be look'd upon as a proper season to inflame the minds of such as were apt to believe them , and stir up a new persecution by making those answers which themselves had so provokingly and peremptorily prest for , an argument of the insolency of papists , and the growth of popery . at least i see there can be no greater security for one in my circumstances , than to mean uprightly ; and i hope every body will see by my long silence i have used all the caution i can not to give just cause of offence , and will acknowledge that 't is none to write , vvhen i am pressingly and publickly solicited , and this with no other design than to contribute , if i can , to the long desired happiness of bringing disputes and disagreements in religion to a period . if this be insolence or crime , i think there is no honest man in this nation or world who is innocent . once more then i take my pen in hand , with this promise to dr. t. and his friend , that if it be not stopt again by their indirect proceedings ( as i have reason to judge the printing of this has been already by the diligent searching for it ) they shall have no reason to complain of any arrears of mine . but what needs any apologizing at present to prevent a sinister character of my writing . the point in hand now is neither the defending any tenet of protestant or presbyterian on dr. t's side , nor the impugning them , on mine . the main business controverted between him and me at present , is , whether faith be absolutely-certain , or rather ( as he calls it ) onely morally such . in which point i doubt not but to have all unprejudic'd conscientious men of both those parties now nam'd on my side , and against him. there is creeping into tho world insensibly , and scepticism is now hatching it , a sect more dangerous than any that has hitherto dissented from the church in particular points : they go as yet under the name of christians , because they profess many perhaps most points of christianity , but yet , if we may trust their own expressions so as thence to frame a iudgment of them , have notwithstanding no faith at all , or no hearty firm immoveable assent to those points , or any of them , as certain truths , but onely a dwindling apprehension , or at most ▪ a good lusty hope that by the grace of god they are true , or at least may be true. now these men , on the one side owning no infallible or absolutely-certain authority , so to preserve the nature of faith inviolate , or defend it from the weakness of their speculation ▪ that is , to protect it from possibility of being an errour ; on the other side , relying either on some authority hic & nunc fallible , that is , which they see may perhaps be actually deceiv'd in all it proposes , or else on their own speculation and wit , whether exercis'd in arguing from things , or in interpreting scriptures letter ; and withal being men of some parts , and so , seeing it impossible to make out that either those reasons are conclusive or demonstrative , or that their interpretation of scriptures letter is not possibly a mistake ; hence they are forc'd to confess in equivalent terms , all christian faith may possibly be a ly ; though they express it warily and craftily , because they see the nature of faith in the conceit of the generality who use that word , and the whole genius of christianity is opposite to their sentiments in that point . nature therefore standing against them , necessitates them ( contrary perhaps to their intention , taking them in other circumstances ) to pursue indirect ways ; and so at unawares , though certainly not without some mixture of carelesness and precipitant passion , to undermine the solid foundation of faith. the means by which they work this mischief , is , first , to laugh at principles and demonstration , that is at all absolutely-certain grounds and conclusions ; which if they can bring into disgrace and contempt ( as they hope they may because such reflexions are unusual and unsuitable to the fancies of the generality ) they see plainly their work is done , and that all infallibility and absolute certainty which stands against them because they can with no show of reason pretend to it , must be quite overthrown . the next way they take , is , to abuse with ironies any man who offers or attempts to settle faith on immovably certain grounds , as confident swaggering men , or vapouring dogmatists ; as if it were such a piece of confidence to say and go about to maintain , that christian faith cannot possibly be a lying imposture , or that god cannot deceive us in the grounds he has laid for his church to embrace faith. a third means they use , is , to abuse and baffle the nature of true certainty , by clapping to it the epithet of moral , and then proposing that to the world , dilating upon it , and fitting it to faith as well as they are able ; which conception being suitable to the fancies even of the weakest , they hope it will take with those who reflect not that the basis of mankind's salvation must be incomparably more secure than that which we usually have for the attainment of a bag of money , a place at court , merchandise from the indies , and such like trivial concerns . fourthly , they avoid by all means looking narrowly into the natures of faith , truth , assent , demonstration , principles , or shewing the necessity of consequence for any thing they produce , and above all settling themselves , or yielding to any conclusive method of discoursing propos'd by others , or any other things equivalent to these ; and in their stead they are given to talk much of probabilities , fair proofs , great likelihoods , more credible opinions , prudential reasons , or such as are fit to satisfie prudent men in humane affairs , of not-doubting , seeing no just cause of doubt , and such-like bashful and feeble expressions , which they dress up plausibly , and talk prettily , and doubt not but by this means to find understandings enow so shallow as to admire their superficial gayness . this is the character of this dangerous sect , of which what opinion we are to have , or by what name to to call them , this short discourse will inform us . if we know any thing of christianity , or have any notion of what is meant by that word , 't is questionless this , that 't is a means to attain bliss or heaven by ; nor does any christian doubt but that it performs this by raising us to a vigorous hope of it as a thing attainable , and to an ardent and over powering love of it , in christian language call'd charity , as also that both these excellent virtues are built upon the basis of faith , this being as s. paul calls it , the substance of things to be hoped for , the argument ( that is , the conviction ) of things unseen : again , common reason informs us that the assent of faith depends on its grounds ; and consequently cannot be stronger than they are . these things understood , let us consider how impossible 't is that any one should have an efficacious hope and a love of heaven , while he judges himself capable to understand all the grounds of it as to our knowledge , and yet sees they may be all false , and consequently that perhaps there is no such thing as this thing call'd heaven . can any one that is not frantick , connaturally hope for and love effectually a thing which he sees perhaps is not , or has not absolute certainty of its existence ? a merchant hopes and desires wealth from the indies , but then he holds it absolutely true , that there is in nature such a thing as wealth , and that it is not a chimera , else he were mad either to hope or desire it : and stark mad to love it above all things , ( as we must do heaven ) even above the dearest goods he at present sees , experiences , possesses and actually enjoys . wherefore , ( to omit diverse arguments produc'd for this point in faith vindicated , from p. . to p. . ) 't is concluded that the denying any grounds for faith , but what we see are onely-morally certain , that is , possible to be false , is unable to breed that disposition in the soul as fits it for heaven , and so ( as far as is on its part ) destroys the nature of christianity , ( or the means to carry souls to heaven ) in those men who see that what they are to love above all things is perhaps a chimera ; wherefore , being by this means destitute of the nature of faith and christianity , they are concluded ( taking them precisely as holding this tenet of faiths possible falsehood ) to be in reality no christians , though they should profess all the points of faith that are . how catholicks that speculate amiss , become not liable to this note , i have shown in faith vindicated , p. , . and elsewhere in this present treatise . if these men then be not indeed or in true speech , christians , what must we call them ? seekers ! no : for these , though they judge they have not yet found out certainly what is truth , yet they hold 't is to be found , and thence continue to enquire after it : whereas these men are doubly irrational ; first in resting satisfied when as they see they have not yet found out certainly that what they hold to is truth ; and , which is much worse , equivalently say that it cannot be found out to be truth , by saying the nature of the thing cannot bear it . atheists or iews they are not , because they deny not the tenet of a deity , or christianity , though they do not hold them absolutely certain . nor yet are they , taken under this notion , hereticks ; for those deny still some point of faith or other ; whereas these men may deny none , but hold all , and yet be what they are ; their errour consisting in a wrong apprehension concerning the grounds or certainty of faith , which renders all the points of faith ineffectual for for what they were intended . whence the malice of this tenet is something above that of heresie , as not destroying some one or a few points , but quite enervating all faith. nor yet are they meer scepticks in religion , or hovering indifferently between the opposite sides of the contradiction ; but they bend strongly towards thinking it true. they are therefore certain incliners to christianity , or deemers that 't is true ; and , not of the [ faithful ] that is , holders of a deity or christs-doctrine , but rather of the [ hopeful . ] for , whereas faith being a firm belief or assent that christs doctrine is true , and so settles the existence of of it ( and particularly of a heaven ) in our minds antecedently to hope of attaining heaven , these men substitute hope to faith , and onely hope those points are true , or in all likelihood may be true : whence , though this be a good name ( i must not say to christen them , but ) to call them by , yet perhaps their own dear word moral will best suit with their genius ; and so we may call them moral christians ; which epithet being opposite to absolute , signifies they are not absolutely christians ; and since nothing is indeed that which 't is not absolutely , it 's true sence is , that they are indeed no christians ; yet since they like the word [ moral ] so extremely well when they are to express the certainty due to faith , 't is but fitting they should wear it when we express them as faithful . though then [ the hopeful ] seems very well to represent their humour , yet 't is but fitting they should have the priviledge of naming themselves , and moral christians let them be . against these moral christians , and them onely , i discourse in this present treatise . but what have i to do with the persons ? i doubt not , but gods goodness ( the method of whose gracious providence is to support the failings of his creatures as far as the natures of particular things and the order of the world will permit ) very often supplies the defects of mens speculations with connatural ways of knowledge , fixing them thus in a strong adherence to the most concerning truths , by ways which even their unreflecting selves are not aware of : whence , i am the farthest from judging any mans person perhaps of any living , and endeavour all i can to retain a charitable opinion even of dr. t's personal intentions in common , and excuse him diverse times in this very treatise where i write against him , as far as evidence of the contrary will give me leave . 't is this wicked tenet then ( and it onely ) which i combat at present , and which i see plainly so unsettles , unhinges , and renders useless and ineffectual all christianity , that i ought to declare an utter and irreconcileable enmity against it ; and that i shall , through god's assistance , prosecute it home to the very doors of scepticism , ( the bane of all humane science as well as faith ) in whose gloomy grott , situate in the confines of dark ignorance , ( mankind's natural hell ) they first saw the twilight , or rather indeed were born blind . yet it cannot be expected that , declaring , as i do , a just indignation against this wicked tenet , i should treat a writer favourably , considering him precisely as a maintainer of it ; or bear my self respectfully to those insincere and unhandsome methods and ways which he makes use of to abet it , and prejudice the sacred truth it opposes ; whether those ways be sophisms in reasoning , or else scurrility supplying the place of reason , the main engine employ'd in this preface . i shall then take a little of that much liberty he uses , to give them the entertainment and return due in iustice to their demerits . yet , that i may avoid all just occasion of offence , i shall endeavour for the most part to use his own words , ( omitting still the rudest ) hoping he will have less reason to be angry at his own eccho ; since if he had not originiz'd it , it had not reflected . and if he assum'd to himself the freedom to abound so with irony , and wholly neglect speaking to my reasons , of which ( whatever they be ) none can deny but that i use to have good store in my writings ; i hope it will not be indecent if now and then i speak to those plausible ironies themselves , there being nothing else to refute ; otherwise , since according to dr. t's method of disputing , these are my onely confuters , and full of brag and triumph , he and his friends would most certainly have pretended , as they did formerly on the like occasion , that inability to reply had caus'd my desistance . i come then to examine this spruce preface ; in doing which , i must be forc'd to lay open at large his knack of answering books , that so i may have just title to make some requests to you our umpires , in behalf of the rights proper to learning : declaring before-hand , that where-ever i am large in any discourse becoming a scholar , 't is not a duty paid to his preface , which has nothing like a show of solid scholarship in it , but a respect due to you , our learned iudges , to whom i appeal . index . assent , dissent , and suspense , pag. , , &c. catholick divines vindicated , p. , . certainty of scriptures letter and sense deny'd by dr. t. p. , , . asserted by j. s. p. , . definitions of general councils , why necessary , p. , . demonstration , p. , , , , , . found in ethicks and physicks , p. . to . first principles identical propositions , p. . to . dr. t 's firm principle shown weak , p. , , &c. freedom from doubt not sufficient for faith , p. . to . p. . to . infallibility asserted , p. . to . . to . requisite to assent and faith , p. , . in what sence it admits of degrees , p. . to ● . unlearned believers how infallible , p. , , , . moral certainty , p. . to . objections from catholick divines refuted , p. . to . practical self-evidence , p. , , , , . prudential grounds incompetent for faith , p. , to . scriptures letter no rule , pref. p. , , . , . tradition the rule of faith , p. , , . granted to be such by dr. t. p. . to p. . held by other catholick divines in j. s. his sense , p. . to . explained , p. . to . it s certainty , how a first principle and self-evident , p. , . a full answer to dr. t's preface , with an examination of his grounds of religion . discourse i. clearing the way to the following ones by manifesting his two fundamental exceptions to be perfectly injust , and voluntarily insincere . § . his preface begins ( p. . ) with two charges , viz. that i still persist to maintain after so fair an admonition , that first and self evident principles are fit to be demonstrated ; to which he addes a third , that i make identical propositions to be first principles in the matter under dispute . he argues too against the two former imaginary assertions of mine ( which in this preface is a rare thing ) thus , p. . there can be nothing to make first principles more evident , because there is nothing before them to demonstrate them by . and i acknowledge the reason given to be as victorious as any passage in his rule of faith , where he has multitudes of such wrong-aim'd arguments ; intended , i conceive , to shew how far his reason can carry when it shoots at rovers , for 't is levell'd at no mark . but observe , i beseech you , gentlemen , how i am dealt with , and let these two leading cases , discovering his way of confute , obtain a just suspence of your judgments concerning all his other performances till you see them examined . § . in sure footing p. . d edit . ( which i st●ll quote ) i deduc'd two propositions ; the former that tradition is the first principle in way of avthority as it engages for matter of fact long ago past ; or , as in other places i therefore name it , first authority ; because 't is manifest that the authentication of books and monuments all depend upon tradition . the other was this , tradition in the matter of tradition , or matter of fact before our time , is self-evident to all those who can need the knowledge of such things , that is to all mankind who use common reason : that is , self-evident practically , or by ordinary converse with the world ( see sure f. disc. . § . . ) it being impossible to conceive that those words [ all mankind who use common reason ] should mean speculaters . and it seems very consonant to reason , that if the vulgar must rely on and use attestation , as 't is manifest they must , they should ( since they are not schol●ars ) know by a natural means that 't is to be rely'd on . the fair admonition which he speaks of for these two faults of mine , is found rule of faith p. . where i am soberly warn'd to take heed how i go about to demonstrate first and self-evident principles . which , first , is no fair return to a scholar , to fall to exhort him with fatherly admonitions not to hold his conclusion ( i mean that which is suppos'd his conclusion ) without speaking at all to his premises : next , 't is far from fair in another regard which i am loth to mention , to pick out of those two propositions now mentioned those two words first principle and self-evident , so closely woven there with other words to make up that one notion call'd the predicate in either of them ; by this means making the readers apprehend that i made tradition not first [ in way of authority ] onely , as i had exprest my self , but one of those principles which are the very first of all , or , as himself expresses it , such as have nothing before them ; as also that i made tradition ( or the attestation of a visible matter of fact by so great multitudes as nothing can be imaginable to have byass'd them , as i had often exprest my meaning ) not self-known practically , but speculatively ; that is , of the self-same nature with the very first principles of all ; such as are 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be , a whole is greater than a part , and such-like . observe next i beseech you , that all his confute is intirely built on his carriage here laid open ; for he attempts not to shew that tradition is not that which principles , grounds , or which is all one authenticates all other authority , or that 't is not self-known practically , but all the cry and irony is spent upon my ridiculousness in proving first and self-evident principles , and this because they have nothing before them and need no evidencing . how ? nothing before them ! does not every scholar who ever read or studied the subordination of sciences know very well that what is a first principle to the inferiour science , is a conclusion to the superiour ! does not all mankind know that maxims of reason are before authority , and that no authority deserves assent farther than right reason gives it to deserve ? does not the meanest speculater know that most of the employment of learned men is to make out speculatively , by looking into proper causes , what is naturally or practically known to the vulgar ? an old wife knows by practice that such an herb cures such a malady ; are naturalists therefore forbid to make out according to the nature of causes how or by what virtue it performs that effect ? the vulgar have a rude yet true knowledge of what is meant by hot and cold , moist and dry ; is it needless therefore for philosophers to define them artificially , and so gain a more express notion of their natures ? is it needless for picture-drawers to delineate with curiosity and exactness , because some country-fellow can draw a rude , yet right , resemblance of a face upon a wall with a piece of charcoal ? or for learned men to polish their knowledge and make it accurate and distinct , because the vulgar know the same thing bluntly , confusedly and in gross ? lastly , is are needless because there is nature ? yet this is the very case : the vulgar know practically that there was such a one as k. james ; yet 't is not needless for one who is treating of the nature of authority to make out speculatively that their knowledge is rightly grounded on the nature of mankind , and how this assurance is wrought in them out of the practically-instill'd knowledge of that nature . § . . but what i most complain of , because ( which i am loth to say ) it argues a perfect wilfulness of insincerity , is this ; that after i had in my letter of thanks p. . offered my proof that first principles were identical propositions , and could be no other ; also after that p. , . i had shown that things practically self-evident may be demonstrated , and produc'd divers instances , as that the vulgar know the diameter of the square is a nearer way than to go by the two sides ▪ that things seen afar off are not so little as they seem , which yet mathematicians demonstrate , and none apprehends them to do a needless action : dr. t. not so much as attempts to answer either my instances or my reasons , but perfectly conceals them from his reader , and bears himself all along triumphantly , as if i had produc'd none at all , barely says over again his own raw sayings a little more merrily , and there 's an end . i beseech you , gentlemen , would this be held a competent answer in the university-schools ; first , to admonish the defendant to relinquish his conclusion instead of beating him from it by reason ; then to combat the conclusion instead of invalidating the premises on which 't is built ; next to pick a word or two out of those conclusions which taken alone alter their whole sence , and then confute onely that new sence his designed alteration had given them ; and lastly , when he was told of it , his mistakes rectified , reasons and instances brought to make good the true point , to neglect them all , say over again barely what he had said before , break a jest or two upon a ridiculous point meerly invented by himself , and then cry victory ! certainly , though such performances may serve a prevaricator or a terrae filius , yet some wiser kinde of return ought in reason to be expected from a scholar and a sober man. as for that point which he most confutes with laughter , viz. that first principles are identical propositions , though something has been produc'd in my letter of thanks in the place cited , and not yet answered , and so no farther proof is due or needful ; yet because the clearing this point fundamentally conduces to settle the way to science , therefore for their sakes who are truly learned and aim at solid improvement of their minds by exact knowledge , more than at pleasing their ears by pretty expressions , i shall treat the point more accurately . the stating the nature of first principles must needs be speculative , therefore those readers who pretend not to science may please to pass over these two discourses , and go on to what follows : though i shall endeavour as well as the matter will bear , to deliver it so , that a good natural wit may in great part comprehend it . discourse ii. shewing by reason that every first principle is an identical proposition . the great architect of the universe knew in himself , or saw clearly and distinctly in his own divine understanding , what he intended to make , and this to the least thing in nature , as is granted by all who hold such a soveraign being : also , there being nothing able to check or cross his omnipotent efficiency , we cannot doubt but they flow'd from that first source of all essence and being without any errour , mistake , or ( as we may say ) monstrous abortion , but perfectly adjusted and proportion'd according to their several degrees of being , to the idea's in the divine understanding of their creator . hence each of them gain an establishment in their peculiar natures or the respective portions of being assign'd them , ( or rather which they essentially are ) and a kind of participated immutability and eternity by their conformity , proportion or essential relation to those divine ideas . wherefore since all our knowledge is either taken from the things , or else proportion'd to them ; also since there neither is nor can be any consideration in things so primary , so fundamental or immoveably grounded as is this , 't is manifest that the first , most firm and most deeply grounded truth which can be conceived or spoken of any thing , is , that 't is establisht thus immutably in its proper nature by this soveraign relation to what 's essentially immutable . wherefore , if the first principles of all , must be the most primary , most fundamental , and most immoveably-grounded truths of all other , 't is most evidently concluded that the very first principles can be no other but those propositions which express the establishment of things in their very natures , or their being what they are , which can no other way be exprest but by identical propositions . § . . also , a definition being granted by all the learned world a chief instrument to science ; if any thing could maintain a competition with identical propositions to be ●he very first principles , certainly definitions , of all other , seem to have the best claim . but what i contend is , that there is some consideration taken from things antecedent to their definitions , viz. their capableness or possibility of being defin'd ; common sence teaching us that the power to be such , naturally goes before actually being such . to declare this , i desire the nature of a definition may be look'd into , which is to assign by way of expression the certain bounds and limits of such a nature , that so way may be made to science : but in case the thing could bear two disparate definitions , first a contradiction would follow , for neither of these two imagin'd definitions would be in reality any at all , since neither of them would describe the certain limits of that nature ; next if the thing could bear more definitions than one , the discourser about it would be never the nearer to science , but in a perfect confusion ; now considering it thus , now not thus , but otherwise ; so that no discourse could proceed for want of a steady basis to ground it , and make its several parts center in one point , or tend to one end . wherefore the thing must be antecedently establish'd to be incapable to bear more definitions than one , else no right definition could be made of it , nor any thing be known concerning it : now that which establishes the thing in an impossibility to bear but one true definition , is its metaphysical verity and vnity , or its being what it is ; which frees its nature from chimericalness and division in its self , whence it becomes intelligible , or capable to be known , exprest , defin'd , and discours'd of . wherefore the things being what it is , is that which not onely grounds all definitions , but even all possibility of defining ; and this it participates ( as was said ) from its essential relation and dependance on the immutable ideas or forms in his divine understanding who is unchangeable truth it self . 't is concluded therefore that identical propositions , which express a things being what it is , are antecedent in priority of nature to definitions , and consequently the very bottom principles of all science . nay definitions themselves , which all the world admits for principles of our discourses about the thing defined , are in reality nothing else , setting apart the manner of expression , but identical propositions ; for 't is the self-same sence to say , a man is a rational creature , as to say , a man is a man ; nor were the definition as it should be , if it were not identical in sence . so that , if he quarrel with first principles for being identical , or for having a subject and predicate which are of the same notion , and not for being worded alike ( the reason of which shall be given anon ) he must deny the use of definitions too , and by so doing oppose all the learned men in the world . § . . thus far metaphysicks . let us see next what logick says to the point . to conclude , is to show evidently that two notions we call the subject and predicate are identify'd or truly connected in that proposition we call the conclusion . to do this , we find a third notion call'd a middle term , to be identify'd with those two in the premisses , whence we infer them to be the same with one another , and consequently assert the truth of the conclusion . but , how shall we know that third notion to be t●uly connected with those two others ; that is , how shall we know the major and minor propositions to be true ? by finding ( if they need proof ) another medium connected with the two terms found in each of them. and how far must this go on ? endlesly , or no ? if endlesly , then , since every following connexion is proved by some foregoing ones , in case we cannot come to see some first connexion ( or first principle ) we could conclude or evidence nothing . and how must we evidence the connexion of the terms ( or of the subject and predicate ) in these first principles ? by another antecedent connexion of their terms with a third ? no : for these are suppos'd the first connexions : wherefore since they cannot be evidenc'd by any thing out of themselves , and yet must be evident , else nothing could be evidenc'd by them , it follows that they must be evident of themselves , or self-evident . and in what consists this self-evidence ? manifestly in this , that no middle term can come between the notions of their subject and predicate ; which devolves finally into this , that the subject and predicate are the self-same notion , or that the proposition is identical : and this not onely materially , or found in the same thing , for so are the terms of every remote conclusion if it be true ; but formally ; and this either simply in notion onely , as are the definition and the thing defin'd ; or else most formally and in expression also , as in those i alledg'd . § . . again , we experience that the most immediate notions , if they in the least differ , ( such are , proper causes and effects ) can be connected with the subject to which they belong in a conclusion of a syllogism , that is , they can be concluded , or admit of proof : wherefore ▪ since 't is a contradiction to say that the prime verities can admit proof , their terms must be farthest from having any middle term coming between them that is imaginable , that is , must be of the self-same notion ; and so they must be identical propositions . the former of these discourses was put down by me ( letter of thanks p. , , . ) which one would think it became a logician to speak to . but my adversary is of another metal , not the very same but near akin to aes sonans aut cymbalum tinniens : he never meddles willingly with premisses or proofs , but denies the conclusion stoutly , never acknowledging what was said in its behalf , and tinkles a little rhetorick against it ; which done , ( who would think it ? ) immediately , as with some charm , the terms unconnect of themselves , and miraculously fly asunder ; and though before it look'd like good honest reason , yet by his giving it a disguise instead of a confute , 't is turn'd perfect nonsence . but to return to our argument . § . . logick tells us moreover , that ( whatever accidental considerations may enhance opposition ) 't is agreed by all that a contradiction is formally and intrinsecally the greatest or first of falshoods ; also that a contradiction is an affirming and denying the same of the same according to all the same respects ; wherefore the very first principles being the first of truths , ought to be diametrically opposite to those , that is , an affirming ( or denying ) the same of the same according to all the same respects , which is impossible to be exprest but by an identical proposition . § . . add that , since contradiction is faulty , and all fault is a privation of the opposite good which it violates , it follows that a contradiction were innocent did it not violate some opposite truth : since then the light of nature teaches every reflecter that 't is impossible to assign any truth opposite to a contradiction but an identical proposition , it follows that first truths or first principles must be identical propositions . § . . to explain this better , we shall find by reflexion that two contradictory propositions are comprisable into one equivalent to both , whose subject and predicate contradict one another , as [ peter here and now runs , peter here and now runs not ] are necessarily equivalent to this , [ what here and now runs , here and now runs not . ] so likewise [ scripture's letter is a rule , scripture's letter is not a rule ] is equivalent to this [ something which is a rule , is not a rule ] and so of the rest . by which 't is easie to discern how clear a truth it is , that identical propositions are the proper opposites to contradictions , or the truths they directly and immediately violate , and consequently . first principles : since 't is impossible mans wit rack'd to its utmost can invent any opposite to [ what runs , runs not ] but [ what runs , runs ] or to [ what is a rule , is not a rule ] but [ what is a rule , is a rule . ] lastly , the nature of contradiction in common puts a thing to be and not be at once , and consequently puts this proposition , [ what is not , is ] to which the onely opposite truth is , [ what is , is ] which is therefore the first standard of all truth , and all other first principles , as [ a rule is a rule , a man a man , &c. ] are but particulars subsuming under it , and partaking in the most perfect manner of its clearest light. § . . farther , 't is observable that the more remote the terms of a proposition are from formal identity , the less evident they are , and the more proof they require ; as also that they still grow nearer and nearer to evidence , according to the degree of their approach toward the said identity . wherefore , since all approach of distant things , if pursu'd , ends in a conjoyning and centering in the same ; 't is manifest that all distance in notion amongst terms , ends in their being the same in notion , that is , in an identical proposition ; as also that such propositions are for the reason given the most evident that may be ; and so in both regards the very first principles . § . . farther , all propositions which are capable of proof , or all conclusions , must have their terms materially identical ; that is , what corresponds to both their notions must be found in the same thing , else they could not be true , nor capable to be proved : wherefore the terms in first principles must be formally such , nay the most formally that is possible ; but nothing is or can be more formally identical than to have the predicate and subject every way the same ; such therefore the very first principles ought necessarily to be . § . . there is also in logick a way of arguing by bringing one to an absurdity or contradiction . and this is performed two manner of ways . one , by forcing the defendant to contradict himself ; the other , by obliging him to contradict the nature of the subject in question . the former of these is available as an argument ad hominem ; but the latter attempt , if brought to effect , is a perfect conquest : and why , but because it puts the defendant to violate the nature of the thing under debate ; that is , to thwart this first principle , the same is the same with it self : for example , to make quantity not to be quantity , a rule not to be a rule , faith not to be faith , as shall be shewn hereafter more clearly , when we come to see the use of the first principles in particular instances . § . . moreover , if it be well examin'd , 't will be found that all efficiency and passiveness , that is , all kind of operation , is nothing but the existence of such a nature exerting or ( as it were ) imprinting it self upon the subject in which it works its effect : for example , when a brass seal makes an impression upon soft wax , no account can be given of this effect ( abstracting from motion which is caus'd by a nature superiour to body ) but onely this , that the agent is of such a degree of density or hardness , as , if mov'd or apply'd to that matter , is apt to alter the figure of its parts according to its own mould ; and the patient of such a yielding nature in comparison of the other , as to receive its impression ; and yet not to that degree rare , as to lose it again by the action of the common causes in nature , till some more particular agent comes to efface it . 't is manifest then , that all causality essentially depends on , and is finally resolv'd into this truth , that things are such as they are , which is their being ( in part ) what they are . all knowledge then of cause and effect , and consequently all demonstration is ultimately refunded , that is , primarily built on those propositions which express things being what they are , that is , into identical ones . § . . lastly , he who is essential wisdom and truth it self , has propos'd to us an identical proposition in those words [ i am what i am ] which is the first increated truth , as 't is the first created one , or the first principle in discoursing about creatures as to their natures or ess●nces , that every thing is what it is ; which is therefore true because god is what he is , or because self-existence is self-existence , as was explicated above , § . . & . which i hope dr. t's goodness will so much prevail above his ignorance as not to judge ridiculous , whatever he thinks of the first created truths which immediately depend on the other . § . . but why must first principles be necessarily exprest with that most perfectly-formal identity ? or the subject and predicate be put in the self-same words ? is it not enough the sence be the same , as is found in definitions , but the words must be the same also ? which bears a show of ridiculousness , and seems to admit of no possibility of advance towards new knowledges ? why cannot then the definition serve to principle all our discourses about the thing defin'd , without recurring to such propositions as appear little better than fl●t and insignificant as to that purpose ? i answer : the objection , in great part , demands what use can be made of first principles ; which shall be spoken to in the next discourse . but that definitions are not the very prime verities of all , appears evidently already ; because those propositions which express the things possibility to be defin'd , must necessarily antecede the definition . and the same will be farther clear'd by these following considerations . . that definitions are often liable to dispute , but identical propositions never . i have heard a certain learned and ingenuous person disallow [ a rational creature ] to be a right definition of a man , and discourse very soberly how proud a thing mankind was , to arrogate all the reason to himself , whereas diverse birds and beasts in their several spheres have as much or more reason than he. and yet i dare say the same gentleman would heartily allow the truth of this proposition [ a man is a man. ] nay , indeed all the scepticks in the world admit identical propositions to be true , yet the same men quarrel every definition extant . since then 't is directly against the nature of the very first principles to be dlsputable , 't is evident that definitions cannot be the very first principles of all . . first principles ought to be principia intellectus and naturally ingrafted in us , that so they may oblige all under forfeiture of their nature to acquiesce to their verity ; whereas definitions are not such , but acquir'd by practical self-evidence ▪ for example ; by a long course of observation heedfu●ly attending to the actions of men as men , and thence ( by means of some first principle evidencing so constant a hitting in so many particulars to be beyond chance or accident ) gathering his primary and proper operation , we come to know the definition of man , none of which needs to know the truth of this nature-taught proposition , [ a man is a man ] or [ a rational creature is a rational creature . ] moreover , definitions generally need some skill of art to make them , and all art presupposes some first principles ; whence 't is impossible definitions should be the first principles of all . . experience teaches us that words being liable to equivocation , where there are fewer words there is less room for equivocating ; wherefore since first principles ought to be the c●earest , and consequently the most unequivocal that can be imagin'd , definitions , which explicate the notion in more words , afford more room for equivocation , and consequently are even in this regard , less fit to be first principles . . lastly , logical tricks of nicely distinguishing , sometimes elude the truth of a proposition , at least darken it ; from which inconveniences first principles ought to be the most free that may be : now definitions yielding more room for equivoca●ness , do by consequence give more occasion of distinguishing : whereas identical propositions afford not the least : for example , this proposition , [ a man is a rational creature ] bears this distinction , a man is rational in some things , as in discoursing those notions that concern quantity , but not in others , e. g. those which concern being ; or , rational , that is capable to discourse right the nature of some bodies , but not of spirits : is it not evident hence that this definition of man , is by this means render'd in show ambiguous ? and i wish there were not too many in the world who out of their ignorance of the true method to science , think this distinction both well-grounded and very pertinent . now this being so , who sees not that the true limits of the definition of man , become doubtful by such kind of distinctions , and consequently the sence of the definition it self unknown ; whereas nothing of this can possibly happen in that identical proposition [ a man is a man ] since whatever distinction affects the predicate must also affect the subject , and so the proposition remains still intirely identical , and perfectly true , and not in part onely , as it happens in the other . 't is concluded then from all imaginable considerations that can belong to this peculiar matter , that the very first principles neither are nor can be any thing else but identical propositions . § . as for their seeming ridiculous to some persons , the reason is , because those men of mirth being led much by fancy , and inur'd all their lives to pretty plausibilities , and seldom or never reflecting on or discoursing orderly from such grounds , are hence apt to imagine that first principles a●e certain great rarities or productions of some extraordinary height of wit ; when therefore they come to hear identical propositions alledged for first principles , seeing their high expectations so strangely disappointed , they hereupon grow pleasant at the defeat of their fancy ; never considering that , because first principles ground all possible discourse of what nature soever , and therefore are common to all mankind , even the rudest in the world , and inbred in them , they must therefore be the farthest from being the effect of wit , and the most plain down right sayings that can be conceiv'd : whence they are better learn'd from the vulgar , than they are from great scholars ; and therefore the most learned men that are , if they would go to work solidly , ought , in such things as are the results of pure natural knowledge , attend to such as speak meer nature , rather than to those who mingle and perhaps corrupt it with airy speculations which have not that firm basis to ground their discourses . now 't is obvious to observe that the nature-instructed vulgar are apt to deliver themselves in such kind of plain speeches , in due occasions , and make use of them as truths which fix their judgments in an unalterableness . for example , if a man would force one of them to forgo what 's very evident , he will stick firmly to the point , and tell you soberly , that truth is truth , or that he 's sure a spade is a spade , or that he knows what he knows ; or , if it be in a point belonging to justice , that , right is right ; and brings in these as evidences from which he can never be driven : which signifies that such truths as these are the principles which naturally determin and fix him in an immovable adherence to the point , as the ultimate resort and reason of his persuasion ; that is , they are to him first principles . 't is observable also that they are never more serious than when they are put to express themselves in this positive kind of blunt manner ; nor would any by-stander ( perhaps not dr. t. himself , though he be the merriest man living when any talk is of principles and demonstrations ) fall a laughing at them as ridiculous for their adhering finally to identical propositions : which evidences that he has a conceit that first principles are some fine elaborate inventions of wit , and that they are to tell a man something he knew not before ; whereas they are such truths as no man can possibly be ignorant of ; as appears in those in euclid , and other such-like , which seem at first blush full as ridiculous as those he so laughs at . lastly , 't is observable that those witty half-speculaters who scorn to follow nature in their grounds , when they come to lay any themselves , propose meer whimsies for first principles ; of which dr. t. is a pleasant instance , as shall be seen hereafter . discourse iii. that first principles are identical propositions , proved by many instances ; and their right use shown . § . . thus far we have discours'd the nature of first principles from logick and metaphysick , within whose confines that matter was plac'd : which no intelligent reader could expect to be less speculatively deliver'd , considering the nature of that subject : for common reason tells any competent judge in such affairs , that if any sublunary matter can require high speculation , certainly a discourse which states the nature of the supreme verities must forcibly exact it . wherefore to make it more intelligible , i shall for my readers sake do three things : first instance in some particular identical propositions granted by all the world to be first principles in their respective sciences . next , show the use of these first principles which my ignorant adversary so miserably mistakes : and now and then , by the way , apply them to the present controversie about tradition . § . . as for the first , i show'd dr. t. ( letter of thanks , p. . ) an example of one first principle granted to be such by all who treat of the nature of quantity , though he , out of a constancy to his 〈◊〉 humour , never heeds to take notice of it . 't is this , a whole is more than a part : nor perhaps will so profound a man at superficial talk deny this to be a first principle , in regard the subject and predicate of that proposition , by reason of the different manner of expressing ( only which he minds not the sence ) seem disparate in their notion , and , so , not identical or too closely connected , which he hath a most special antipathy against in first principles , as is seen by his impugning it in mine , and will more amply appear when he comes to put his own . nay , the great difference in the sounds of the subject and predicate will make it to one who looks not much farther , to bear the face of a certain kind of distance and disagreement in sence between them , which will , no doubt , please him hugely . yet i must contest that that proposition is self-evident , and that its self-evidence consists in this , that its subject and predicate ( consider'd logically and not grammatically ) are perfectly identical , that is , to dr. t. are fully as ridiculous as a rule is a rule , faith is faith : which i thus shew . the subject of that proposition [ a who le ] is defin'd to be that which consists of parts ; or ( since a thing is that of which it consists ) it 's equivalent in sence is , in reality , [ a whole is parts . ] now the word [ parts ] being plural , necessarily and formally imports more than one part ; wherefore this proposition [ a whole is more than a part ] is perfectly the self same in sence with this , [ that which is more than one part , is more than one part : ] which is directly identical . § . . moreover , some late philosophers build their physicks on this principle , corpus est quantum , in which the subject and predicate differ indeed grammatically , one being substantively , the other adjectively exprest ; but if we rifle the words to clear the inward sence , ( as is the duty of scholars or philosophers ) we shall find that since all the essential difference we know between a body and a spirit , is this , that this is indivisible , the other divisible ; as also that quantity and divisibility is the same notion , it will appear evidently , that this proposition [ body is quantitative ] is , a●cording to them , perfectly equivalent in sence to this , [ what is divisible is divisible : ] which is manifestly identical . § . . again , all the learned world hitherto have held that we have certain maxims ingrafted in us by nature , i mean imbuing our mind by the first impressions on our understanding , without our contributing to their generation in the least , more than by having an intelligent nature passively receiving those impressions ; and these they call principia intellectus , which generally concern the nature of being ; that conception being the most luminous , and by means of which striking the eye of our soul , all our intellectual sight is produc'd : as will appear to any one who attentively considers that all our discourses consist of judgments exprest by propositions , and those essentially depend on the notion of being ; wherefore , unless this be known antecedently , 't is impossible either to judge , think or discourse . hence follows that the first of our knowledges is of the self-discovering nature or notion of being ; and the most obvious knowledge of being is this , that it formally excludes , or is extreamly opposite to , not-being , and therefore inconsistent with it in the same subject : which we use to express by this proposition , [ impossibile est idem esse & non esse ] 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be . this therefore hath ever been deservedly held a first principle in metaphysicks , establishing all our discourses that concern the actual being of things , and grounding in a manner all logick . and yet 't is plain to the meanest speculater , that this proposition is the self-same in sence with this , what is , is : which is most formally and supremely identical : the impossibility mention'd in the former lighting onely on this , that actual being and not being should agree to the same subject , or which is all one , that the subject and predicate in this later proposition should not be connected . § . . but , it may be the principles of mathematicks will better rellish to our fastidious age , which neglecting to consider what 't is that makes geometry a science , think there is no demonstration but in lines and numbers . to them then let 's go ; and at first entrance into euclid we are met with these famous and useful principles . those which are equal to the same , are equal to one another . if equals be added to equals , the wholes are equal . if equals be taken away from equals , the remainders are equal . those which are twice as big as the same , are equal . those which are halfs of the same , are equal . besides others of the same strain ; and amongst the rest , a whole is greater than a part of it self , of which we lately discours'd . now i contend that all these are in effect identical propositions , and in the common sence of every intelligent man , amount meerly to as much as this , aequale est , aequale sibi , an equal is equal to it self : or else suppose it necessarily as the very first principle upon whose most evident verity ▪ their 's depends . for example , this proposition , [ if equals be added to equals , the wholes are equal ] is clearly made up of the now mentioned identical proposition thrice ( as it were ) repeated ; and is plainly as much as to say , the two suppos'd equals are equal to one another , the two equals added are equal to one another , and so the two wholes made up of both those equals , that is , the equal wholes are equal to one another . and the same may be said of all the rest of that kind . which were it not that men expect rigour of discourse in the subject of geometry , and have entertain'd a conceit that 't is not to be expected nor had in other matters , would look full as ridiculous by reason of their seemingly too great plainness and evidence , as a rule is a rule , or faith is faith. § . i come now to perform the second thing i promis'd , which is to show what use is to be made of first principles , and how . in which hard point my friend dr. t. is at his wits end . and first he tells you soberly ( pref. p. . ) if you will take his word , that the mischief is , they are good for nothing ; which were , i confess , a mischief with a witness ; for without these , no man living could either know , judge , or discourse . § . . next , he quotes aristotle against me , as disliking a proposition of the very same stamp with ●y first principles ; to which my answer is , ( and i desire it may serve for his objecting all other mock-authorities of this nature ) that , though i value and honour aristotle exceedingly , yet neither he nor any man living taken as a reasoner , or in things which are the proper object of humane discourse , has any the least authority over my understanding , but by virtue of the reasons he produces : let him then make use of aristotles reasons ( and the like i say of school-divines ) against me as much as he will ; since those , if convictive , may subdue my understanding to assent ▪ i● i be intelligent and candid ; or else expose me to the disesteem of learned men , if i be either so ignorant as not to understand their force , or so insincerely obstinate as not to admit them though i see they conclude : otherwise , to neglect to alledge their reasons , and think to combat and overthrow me by objecting their bare sayings , is so senceless a conceit as onely could enter into the head of such a puny logician . in a word , let him either prove this a necessary consequence , aristotle , school-divines , or other discoursers , say such a thing , ergo , 't is true ; or else desist from such an insignificant method of confuting . add , that he puts me , by his indistinct citing the place , to find out one half line perhaps in a large treatise ; otherwise i should not doubt to show that great man not so opposite to my doctrine as dr. t. would perswade his readers . § . . after this he assures us that by ten thousand of these identical propositions , a man shall not be able to advance one step in knowledge because they produce no conclusion but themselves . by which he gives us very learnedly to understand that he either never knew or else hath quite forgot that there ought to be two prem●sses to infer a conclusion , and three terms in every legitimate syllogism , and not one premiss , and one or at most two terms onely . and lest you should think i abuse him in putting upon him such an absurdity as never junior sophister yet was guilty of , he pursues the acknowledgement of it home , and to convince me ( forsooth ) of the foolery of these principles , he will needs try what can be done with them either in a categorical or hypothetical syllogism : thus ; a rule is a rule , but tradition is a rule ; ergo tradition is a rule . again , if a rule be a rule , then a rule is a rule ; but a rule is a rule , ergo. and when he hath done , he asks if any man be the wiser for all this ? i answer , not a jot ; but i know a certain person much foolisher for it . yet he says it may be mr. s. may make better work with them , and manage them more dextrously . and truly i hope so too ; else he would deserve to be as ridiculous as himself that manag'd them so childishly . in the mean time 't is observable what a scholar-like way he takes to confute , and what a high conceit he has of his jests . was drollery ever till now held a convictive , or a jeer a demonstration ? alas poor trifler ! § . . to make way towards the declaring the proper use of first painciples , i am first to remove dr. t.'s misconceit , and to instruct his ignorance that the very first principles or identical propositions cannot be the premisses in any syllogism . to do which he may please to know , or rather to reflect , that every legitimate syllogism has three distinct terms ; of which , the proposition which is to be prov'd , or to be the conclusion , affords us two ; the third or middle term is to be sought for , and taken from the nature of the subject in hand , or from what 's intrinsecally or ( at least ) necessarily connected with it , in case we would conclude the thing certain . this middle term ( in that figure which is the onely natural and proper one ) joyn'd with the predicate of that proposition which was in question , or to be concluded , makes the major ; the same with the subject of the said proposition , makes the minor. whence is seen that each proposition in a legitimate syllogism has two terms formally distinct that is two , which are not formally the same , or identical : and consequently that the very first principles can never be premisses in an exact syllogism , speaking , as he does , of those which are every way identical . § . . to show then their proper use , i explain my self thus . all solid discourse concerning any subject , ought to be grounded upon the nature of the thing under debate , and to endeavour all what may be to hold firmly to that nature : which if it does , 't is rightly made and demonstrative ; if not , 't is absurd and contradictory . wherefore he who discourses right , guides himself all along by the thing 's being such , ( that is , by being what it is ) which is rooted in his judgement , & keeps a steady eye upon that point , lest in discourse he deviate and swerve from its nature : on the other side , he who discourses ill , violates the nature of the thing , and runs into contradictions absurdities ; and what means violating the nature of the thing , or speaking contradiction , but the making the thing not be what it is , and so falsifying by his discourse that principle which was diametrically opposite in this circumstance to the contradiction he sustain'd , which was that things being what it is . for example , dr. t. puts scripture's letter to be a rule of faith , and yet unless he will be strangely uncharitable , must grant ( convinc'd by experience in the socinians and others ) that many follow it to their power and yet judge not right concerning what 's true faith , what not ; which destroyes the nature of a rule , or makes a rule not to be a rule , contrary to the very first principle in that affair : for he puts it to be a rule ex supposit●one , and yet puts it to be no rule , because the followers of it to their power are misled , which argues ( there being in this case no fault in them ) the want of a regulative virtue in it , and that 't is no rule . § . . hence is easily understood what use is to be made of the very first principles : viz. not to make that which is the first principle in such an affair one of the premisses in a syllogism , much less to make that one single identical proposition both the premisses ( or two propositions ) as our shallow logician in his wild rant of drollery would perswade the reader . but the very first principles have a far more soveraign influence over the discourse than any of those particular propositions , decisively ( as it were ) abetting or dis-approving the whole . 't is therefore to stand fixt in the mind of the discourser , and be heedfully attended to , so to give a steadiness to all his ratiocination . 't is its office to be the test or touchstone of truth and falshood , or a rule which is a measure of what 's right , what crooked , oblique , or deviating from true nature . if in dispute one hold firmly to that , it authenticates his discourse to be the solid gold of truth ; if any plausible talk make a mock-show of connexion or truth ; it discovers the cheat , showing by its own most evident connexion the unconnectedness or loosness of the others empty babble , and demonstrates it to be the meer dross of falshood , how fair soever it appear to the eye at first , and how prettily soever it be superficially gilded with sophisticate rhetorick or other artificial tricks of counterfeit truth . 't is like an immoveable basis , that sustains all the superstructures of truth ; though it self rise not above its own firm level ; or like a rock , which by its rigid hardness , dashes asunder into contradiction and folly the ill-coherent and weak productions of witty ignorance . no wonder then dr. t. abuses so the first principles as good for nothing , for he perceives them dispos'd to abuse him , by shewing all his discourses to be nothing but well-clad nonsence ; and though ( his way of discourse or his cause not bearing it ) he cannot work with them , yet if i be not much mistaken they will make work with him ere it be long . but , to return to our instances . § . . faith , meaning by it a believing upon motives left by god in his church , to light mankind to his truth , as i exprest my self in my preface to faith vindicated , and elsewhere , is an assent impossible to be false ; and this is found in its definition as its difference essentially distinguishing it from opinion , which is possible to be false , and is prov'd by more than forty demonstrations in faith vindicated , not one of which has yet been in the least reply'd to : wherefore , being a direct part of the definition , it engages that first verity on which the definition it self is grounded , that is , if faith be not impossible to be false , faith is not faith : wherefore dr. t. who for all his shuffling makes faith ( thus understood ) possible to be false , is convinc't to clash with that self-evident identical proposition by making faith to be not faith ; and , if the pretended demonstrations in faith vindicated , or any of them stand , he and his friend dr. st. ( if they truly say what they think ) are as certainly concluded to be none of the faithful , as 't is that faith is faith. § . . also tradition being a delivery of the faith and sence of immediate forefathers to their children , or to those of the next age , by living voice and practice , that is , by c●techising , preaching , conversing , practising , and all the ways th●t can be possibly found in education , it follows that if mankind cannot express what they have in their thoughts to others at long run ( as we use to say ) so as to make generality ( at least the wisest ) understand them , we have lost mankind ; since to do this , requires little more than eyes , ears , power of speaking and common sence : wherefore let this way of tradition be follow'd , and it will convey the first-taught faith , or the doctrine of the first christians , that is , true faith , to the end of the world : therefore it hath in it all that belongs intrinsecally to the rule of faith ; that is , if men be not wanting to themselves , but follow it to their power , it will infallibly derive down the first , that is , right fa●th : since then every thing is what it is , by its having such a nature in it , tradition having in it the nature of a rule , is indeed a rule : wherefore he who denies that tradition has in it the nature of a rule , denies by consequence that mankind is mankind ; and he who denies it , having in it all that is requisite to the nature of a rule , to be a rule , denies by consequence a rule to be a rule . § . my last instance showing withal more amply the use of first principles , shall be of that identical proposition which grounds the whole nature of discourse : and 't is this , [ the same is the same with it self ] which is thus made use of . the copula [ is ] expresses the identity or ( as we may say ) the sameness of the subject and predicate which it connects , and 't is the aim of reason to prove these two terms identify'd in the concsusion , or ( which is all one ) that that proposition we call the conclusion is true. but how shall this be prov'd ? a third term is sought for , which is the same with those two others , and thence ' t●s evinc'd that those two are the same with one another in the conclusion ▪ and why ? because otherwise that third term would not be the same with its own self , or be what it is , if it were truly the same thing with two others , and yet those two were not the same thing with one another ; but it would have division in its very nature , or not be its self ; being in that case distracted into more essential natures , ( that is , being chimerical , and consequently two things ) according to one of which , 't is the same with one of those terms ; according to the other , the same with the other : which being impossible , in regard every thing is precisely what it is , or the same with it self , it follows likewise that 't is impossible that a conclusion thus deduc'd should not be true ; or , which is all one , that the extreams of it should not be the self-same , as far as concerns verifying or justifying the truth of the propositions . for example , in this syllogism : virtue is laudable . courtesie is a virtue . therefore courtesie is laudable . the two first propositions being true , and the copula [ is ] expressing identity of the extreams , we see that laudable and courtesie must needs be the same with virtue ; wherefore also , either they must forcibly be the same in the conclusion , or else virtue must be not one but two ; that is , must involve in its self two dis-agreeing natures , according to one of which 't is the same with laudable , and according to the other , with courtesie ; by which means courtesie and laudable become not the same in the conclusion . but 't is impossible virtue should have intrinsecal disagreement or division within its own self , or not be the same with its own self ; ( or , which is all one , be not-it-self . ) wherefore 't is impossible those two terms truly exprest to be the same with virtue in the premises , should not be the same with one another in the conclusion ; or , which is all one , 't is impossible that the conclusion should not be true. § . . hence is seen that the light of reason , or that light by which we draw new knowledges out of fore-going ones , is that very light which shines in th●s self-evident proposition , the same is the same with it self : which would make one think verily this identical proposition were neither ridiculous nor good for nothing ; as also ( which our great doctor will wonder at ) that if the terms be freed from ambiguity , and a middle term be rightly chosen , a man who understands logick may come to be infallibly assur'd of his conclusision ; for the same reason a mathematician may be infallibly certain that omne triangulum habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis ; and upon this assuran●e given him by these ridiculous first principles , as our ridiculous logician calls them , grow so hard hearted in holding to his conclusion thus demonstratively deduc'd , that he will not forgo it , though two admirable vndemonstrating doctors of no principles , dr. st. and dr. t. break jest after jest ( which my friend calls here fair admonitions . ) upon principles , demonstration , rule , &c. and upon me for holding them ; even so far as to make good dr. t. quite despair of convincing me , as he here soberly and sadly complains to his reader , pref. p. . § . . lastly , hence is seen in what way we make use of this first principle , the same is the same with it self ; and the like is to be ●aid of others of this nature : to wit , thus ; that , if the discourse be so fram'd as necessarily to engage the verity of that first principle , it must most inevitably and infallibly be certain and demonstrative ; but , if the discourse clash with it and thwart it , 't is as certainly contradictory , absurd , and false . § . . i foresee this first principle now spoken of , which grounds all reason , will even for that regard incur dr. t's high dis-favour as well as its fellows : ( for a very small stock of reason will serve to set up a talking divine , and too much will quite break him ) and therefore i have a great desire to reconcile them , by letting him see that himself through the goodness of nature is forc'd to guide himself by those first principles , though he strive all he can to pervert nature , and slight them ; nay , that himself must grant that identical propositions deserve to be call'd and esteem'd first principles , after all this ranting and swaggering noise against them . to do this ▪ i will put them on his side , hoping his own interest , passion and partiality , to wh●ch his reason seems a sworn slave , will invite him to see that truth , which in other circumstances he was not capable of . in his rule of faith , p. , . he combates sure footing , as making moral motives and arguments necessarily produce their effect upon a free agent , the will of man ; and argues pretty well against it ( if he were not mistaken all the while ) out of the nature of man as free : and , certainly , he must see 't is his own best and closest play to contend that i subvert the nature of a free agent , as such , by my discourse ; and what means this , but that my discourse makes that which is free to be not-free : and is not this as plainly to say that i wrong that principle , what 's free is free , as man can speak ? if he say 't is not : i ask him what first truth or principle i wrong by making that which is free to be not free ? if i wrong no principle , my discourse would be unblameable ; if any , the wit of man can assign none but that identical proposition , what 's free is free ; this and onely this be●ng formally oppos'd to that other in which he must contend my discourse is faulty , namely , the sustaining that what is free is not free . again , ( as was said ) a contradiction is the chief of falsehoods , and being faulty in point of truth , and all fault or defect being , as such , a negative or privative , its malice can onely be known by the positive good which it violates or excludes , that is , in our case by the opposite truth which it destroys . but the proper opposite to a contradiction is an identical proposition , as hath been shown ; also it s proper opposite ( it being a chief falshood ) is a chief tru●h or first principle ; therefore not onely all first principles are identical propositions , but in case those were not establish'd first , contradictions would be harmless innocent fools , hurting no truth or principle in the world ; and even though they be establish'd , dr. t. tells us very seriously , pref. p. . they are good for nothing ; and so still he pleads for the innocency of contradictions , and disgraces their enemies , first principles ; one would guess he hath far more of those on his side than of these ; as it will appear when his answer to sure footing comes to be scann'd , and particularly in that passage i lately cited ; where though it be the most plausible part of his book , yet it shall be shown partly hereafter in this treatise , partly more in the next , that he mistakes the natures of necessity , liberty , will , and even manhood ; or else , when he haps to hit right , mis-applies his objections to the wrong parts of my discourse . § . . if after all this , dr. t. cannot conceive that the first principles are identical propositions , let him imagine a man divested of the knowledge of all identical propositions , and then let him tell me how or in virtue of what such a man could either judge , know or discourse ; or let him show me what could h●nder such a soul from taking direct contradictions to be first principles , and adhering to them as such ? since on the one side , they are of a large extent , as principles use to be ; and on the other side , he sees no principle they are opposite to , and so ought to take them for tru●hs . when dr. t. gives the world ●at●sfaction in this point , i will follow his nonsensical admonition ▪ and renounce all pr●nciples as far as god and nature will give me leave ; for in that case nonsence would be the best sence , and contradictions the perfectest truths : but till he does this , he must remain in his despair of convincing me , i cannot for my heart help it . § . . i shall adde one word more to the truly learned reader ; our imperfect manner of knowing in rhis state , obliges us to detail , or , as it were , divide the object we would know into many abstracted , inadequate , or partial conceptions , which we use to rank orderly in the ten predicaments , and then to compound those single conceptions into propositions , and those into discourses : whereas separated substances when they know any object neither compound nor divide at all , but with one intuitive view see the whole to be as it is . wherefore there is nothing in all our knowledges that in the manner of it comes so near their way of operating as our act of knowing identical propositions . it divides as little as is possible for our state ; for it predicates the whole of the whole ; for which very reason it as little compounds again ; and did not our condition here forcibly exact o● us to frame a proposition , or connect together inadequate notions by a copula when we would express a truth , it would be a kind of intuitive seeing the thing as it is ; and so indeed after a sort it is , but confused , ( all clearness here arising from a perfect distinguishing our notions ) yet it resembles not a little in its absolute evidence , immovable firmness , and its nearest approach possible to simple intuition : whence it hints to a soul de●irous of truth , the glorious satisfaction it will enjoy , when the screen of our body is taken away , to have at one prospect all the whole creation and each single thing in it , presented to her ravish'd understanding , and seen to be what they are , with a far greater evidence , possest and held with an incomparably greater firmness , and penetrated by a transcendently more excellent and simple manner of knowing , than wh●t we now experience here in those weak yet best resemblances , our knowledges of the first principles . and indeed ' ●is but fitting , that those supreme knowledges , which ground both our definitions , the matter , and all force of consequence , the form of our inferiour way of knowledge by reasoning , should be nearest ally'd to the manner of knowing proper to those higher sort of intellectual creatures ; that so , as the wisest order of the world requires , the supremum infimi may touch or immediately confine upon that which is infimum supremi . § . . by this time i hope those learned and intelligent persons to whom i address this discourse , will discern i had some reason to hold identical propositions to be first principles . i beseech them to review all dr. t. hath said against them either here or in any other place ; and when they have discover'd it all to be meer empty drollery , they will justly wonder at his confidence , that dare appear before scholars in print , and think to carry it off with soppish jests , as if his readers had onely risibility in them , and no rationality . yet in reliance on these unfailing grounds , he ends with a declaration to all the world , that if there be no other principles but such as these , meaning identical propositions , he neither has any principles , nor will have any . an excellent resolution , and hard to keep ! yet i 'll wager ten to one on his head that in despight of both art and nature he shall hold it as well as any man living : and that when he comes to lay any principles of his own , the terms shall be so far from identical , that all the wit of man shall not make them hang together at all . § . . the sum of th●s whole discourse about principles , is this : all science à priori is thus originiz'd . the first being is what he is ; that is , self-existence is self-existence , and so essentially unchangeable : wherefore the essences of things depending solely on the relation they have to what is in in god , that is , to what is god , are unchangeable likewise , or are establisht in their own being , that is , fixt in their own particular and distinct natures , which we fitly express by identical propositions , affirming them to be what they are . hence they become capable of having the determinate bounds of their natures described in certain forms of speech call'd definitions ; which are nothing else but expressions of their distinction from all other things in the world. the way to make these definitions is two-fold . one by collecting the natural sayings of the generality of mankind about that thing as such , and then observing in what notion those several sayings of theirs do center ; the distinct expression of which must needs be the definition . for they knowing through practical self-evidence the distinction of one thing from another by a perpetual converse w●th them , have the right notion or nature of the thing in the●r minds ; and those sayings genuinely deliver'd , are the proper effects of that notion , imprinted there by the teaching of nature . the ot●er way is , by sorting all our notions under certain distinct heads , and then dividing the highest or most general notion in such a head , by i●trinsecal differences , till by descending they light on that difference which constitutes , and ( joyn'd with the genus which it divides ) defines that nature . the definition had , that is , a di●●inct knowledge being gain'd of what 't is in which any nature ag●ees with others , and in what it differs from them , reason has more room to stir her self in , or more matter to work upon in order to bring things to a further distinction and clearness : and first , by a due consideration and reflexion , practical self-evidence still assisting , ( for the greatest men of art must n●t leave off being children of nature ▪ nay perhaps 't is their best title ) the proper causes and effects of such a nature begin to appear ; and thence middle terms for demonstrative syllogisms disclose themselves , and science begins to spread it self and advance . or , if two notions are to be shown connected , which seem'd remote , the notions which directly compounded their definitions are to be resolv'd farther , and their resolution pursu'd , till something appears in both of them which is formally identical , that is , till some identical proposition comes to be engag'd . for example , if one would prove that virtue is laudable , he will find that laudable is deserving to be spoken well of , and practical self-evidence as well as reason telling us that , our speech being fram'd naturally to express our thoughts , that thing deserves to be spoken well of , which deserves to be thought well of ; and that what 's according to our right nature , or true reason , deserves to be judg'd right or good , that is , thought well of ; and withal , that virtue is a dispositi●n to act according to right reason , it comes to appear that virtue and laudable have in the●r notions something that is formally identical , and that this proposition , [ virtue is laudable ] is as certain as that what 's according to right reason ( or humane nature ) is according to right reason : which seen , the thing is concluded , and all further disquisition surceases . § . . this is my method which i observe to my power , whenever i profess to demonstrate : onely because we are not discoursing in severe logical form , i endeavour to engage at the very first identical propositions , or the first principles , to avoid all possible cavil which uses to take occasion , from a definitions being too large or too narrow , to confound and obscure the discourse . which being so , i challenge dr. t. before our peers , as he pretends to be held a scholar and an honest man , to declare why in his preface , p. . he tells his readers , without any the least proof , that certainly , the sacred names of principles and demonstration were never so profan'd by any man before . let him , i say , state the natures of principles and demonstration , and then make out in what my way of discoursing wrongs either of them . this done , let him show what his has in it elevating it beyond meer superficial talk. till he does this , i accuse him of affected ignorance in himself , and unjust calumny towards me ; and that he stands hooting ( or , as himself elsewhere call'd it , whooping ) aloof with flams and jeers ▪ but dares not for his credit come close to the point : as judging it his interest and safety to avoid by all means the settling any conclusive method of discoursing ; lest his loose drollery , which now is the onely stickler , and domineers so briskly , come then to be quite out of countenance , and hang its head very sorrily ; being by that means discovered to be perfectly insignificant , and good for just nothing at all . discourse iv. how dr. t. advances to prove a deity , by denying the absolute certainty of all sciences but mathematicks . § . . we have seen how unfortunate dr. t. has been in impugning my first principles and method of discoursing : it comes next to be examined how successful he is in settling his own . but ere i come close to that matter , i must say something to his impertinent drolleries , because he thinks them rare things , and ( as appears by his carriage all along ) places most of his confidence in those trifles ; nay , which in my mind is no very wise project , he would have his readers think those feathers weighty , because they are gay . besides , these are my onely confuters , and so 't is in a manner my duty not to neglect them . § . . he challenges me , p. . to have threatned never to leave following on my blow , till i had either brought dr. st. and him to lay principles that would bear the test , or it was evident to all the world they had none . and i conceive i performed this in my inferences at the end of faith vindicated , and had done more but for certain reasons which i gave in my preface . but this was no such great threat : i knew them prone enough of their own genius to do voluntarily things of this nature ; and now both of them have , like true friends , conspir'd to do me that favour of their own accord . for dr. t. declares here to no fewer than all the world , that he neither has any principles , nor will have any , if there be no other but identical propositions , as , speaking of first principles , i have prov'd there are not ; and dr. still . has laid such principles of late , as would make any understanding man that reads them , swear he is as far from having any as his friend . excellent ones indeed he puts at first , but the mischief is , they make nothing at all for his purpose : some fumbling propositions there are that make for his purpose , but the ill luck is , they are so far from having the least semblance of principles , that no wit of man shall ever make them look like good conclusions : and to put it to the trial , if out of any principle forelaid there , he can infer that main and in a manner onely point , viz. that scripture's letter is the rule of faith , and put it in a conclusive syllogism or two , i promise him upon the sight of it to become of his perswasion . but my friend tells me here , he perceives great minds are merciful , and do sometimes content themselves to threaten , when they could destroy : and , in return i tell him ▪ i am sorry to find by these words , that a certain person not unknown to him , is far from having a great mind , who immediately upon the publishing my letter of thanks , fought to destroy me without threatning . § . . i charg'd him formerly , and now charge him again , to make the rule of christian faith , and consequently faith it self , to be false ; also i charg'd the same position in equivalent terms upon a sermon of his , and that as to the chiefest and most fundamental point , the tenet of a deity : and still am ready to maintain that charge . but first 't is observable that on this occasion my friend is grown much out of humour , and from the merry conceited ▪ vein of wit and drollery , falls into down-right scolding : with — he knew in his conscience — he durst not cite , &c. — notorious falsehood — groundless calumny — he durst not refer to the place , &c. — this is the man — it would make any other man sufficiently ashamed — he may blush to acknowledge , &c. why , what 's the matter ? surely there is something more than ordinary in the business , that makes a man of mirth , of late so pleasant , on a sudden thus pettish . he says i durst not cite the words of his book or sermon : how i durst not ! i will not be so rude as to use dr. t's words here , p. . certainly one would think that this man has either no eyes , or no forehead ; but i must say that all who have eyes may see , and all who have any degree of sincerity will acknowledge that i did cite those words out of his book in faith vindicated , p. . where i fastened that position on him , dr. st. his abetter , and their adherents . and , as for the words of his sermon , it was no proper place to cite or confute them there : it was enough there to add , as i did , after my charge , these words , [ as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter ] relating to a future examination of it intended in another treatise . i use not to confute books in prefaces , as is the late mode of answering : witness dr. pierce against mr. cressy , the dissuader against the discovery , and dr. t. here against three of mine ; which , as his friend sayes well , is like rats gnawing the corners of books , or ( as dr. t. himself expresses it here ) manfully nibbling . § . . but i may blush ( he says ) and what 's the crime ? why , to acknowledge that ever i have read my lord falkland , mr. chillingworth , and doctor stillingfleet , and have no better a style and way of reasoning ; whom he praises for persons of admirable strength and clearness in their writings . what would he have ? i freely confess , and ever did , that they are persons of much wit and a clear expression ; yet i never understood till now that men us'd to read their books to learn a good style and methods of discoursing . as for their admirable strength , i could never find it . the strength of a discourse , as i imagine , consists in its grounds , not in witty plausibilities and and fine language : though i know dr. t. who seems never to have aym'd at any higher pitch , thinks verily such ingenious knacks make a discourse stronger than all the principles in the world . and for them all put together , if dr. t. can show me any one principle in any of them , which they heartily stand to , able to put christian faith beyond possibility of falsehood , i promise to yield all i have writ for false , and accordingly renounce it . § . . as for their clearness , and dr. t's too , whom i rank with them in that quality , having really a disposition to do him all just honour he makes himself capable to receive ; i acknowledge 't is found in them to a fair degree of excellence . but i must distinguish clearness into two sorts : one that clears their own thoughts by means of language , the other that clears the truth of the point in dispute , which is done by means of principles . the former makes the reader understand them , the latter makes him understand truth . the one renders it clear that they say thus ▪ the other makes it clear that they say right when they say thus . in the first sort of clearness they have not many fellows ; in the latter , they are like other mortals , or rather indeed they are quite destitute of it . for being utterly void of grounds , they leave the point unseen to be true , that is , obscure , and far from clear. and if dr. t. thinks i wrong them , i desire him to show me either in any of them , or in himself , any principle he can justly call theirs or his , and then go to work logically , and make out how and by virtue of what its terms hang together ; and if he can do this , i shall acknowledge publickly my errour , and make them all honourable satisfaction the very next piece i print . in a word , they are pretty dextrous at pulling down , or bringing all things to incertainty , as becomes men of wit and fancy ; ( and what easier than to raise a thousand wild objections at rovers , without ever heeding the natures of the things ? ) but a● building , which requires a judgment made steady by grounds and principles , they ever did , and ever will , and so must all who follow their steps , fall infinitely short . § . . as for my style ; i declare that i regard it no further than it serves to express my thoughts ; especially not intending to perswade the vulgar rhetorically by advantage of language , but to prove severely the point to scholars by the connectedness of my sence . i am of st. austin's mind , that , in this circumstance , an iron-key is as good as a golden one , where no more is requisite , but aperire quod clausum erat , to open what was before conceal'd or shut . in my younger years and spring time of my life . i apply'd my self much to those flourishes of poetry and rhetorick ; but i am now in my autumn ; and my riper thoughts applying themselves to study knowledge , the flowers fell off , when the fruit-time was come . i endeavour , as far as i am able , to fill my mind with grounded and sollid reasons for the point in hand , and then let my sence give me my style , and not frame my sence to my words , or make my words supply the want of sence , as gay discoursers use . besides , no mans attention is infinite ; and so , should i mind my style too much , in all likelihood i should mind sence ( which i a thousand times more value ) less ; and i take this to be one reason why dr. t. ( for otherwise the man has a very good wit ) heeding his style and words so extreamly much , scarce attends at all to his sence ; or , ( as an ingenious person reading this preface exprest it ) had rather be guilty of ten errours than one incongruity . lastly , how does dr. t. know my style , were i to make a sermon ? does not every oratour know that the style due to a sermon and a strict discourse of close reason , are the most different imaginable ? i will not say dr. t. has no good judgment in words , for this would make him good for little ; but i must say he was very rash in concluding absolutely of my style from seeing it in one kind of matter onely , and this the most incompetent of any in the world , to show what language one is master of . now to his sermon ; and let him remember 't is himself forces me to lay open the weakness of his discourses by his frequent and scornful provocations : which i was very loth to do in this circumstance , lest it might wrong the common cause of christianity against atheism . but i consider'd that , should christian divines acquiesce and seem to consent by their carriage that they judge such quivering grounds competent to build their faith and the tenet of a deity upon , it would be a far juster scandal to atheists , than 't is to disclaim from them , and avow in the name of the rest the absolute certainty of those maxims which ground our persuasions as christians . add , that it was my duty to those who yet are firmly persuaded of their faith , not to permit them to slide into a less hearty conceit of it than the nature of faith and the obligations springing from it , do require at their hands . these considerations justifying me fully to the world , and dr. t's daring provocations particularly to h●s friends , i resolv'd to answer his challenge ; though i foresee my discovering the weakness of his discourses upon this subject , engages me to make better of my own in conf●tation of that irreligious sect , of which i here acknowledge my self a debtor to my readers , and shall perform that obligation , as soon as i have done with those pretenders to christianity who make faith and its grounds uncertain . ●nward ulcers are far more dangerous , and require speedier cure than those which are without . § . . his intent in his first sermon was to show the vnreasonableness of atheism upon this account , because it requires more evidence for things than they are capable of . but let us christians take heed that we give not scandal to atheists , and obstruct their conversion by exacting of them what is opposite to the true nature god has given them , or right reason , and requiring of them impossibilities . and for this end , let us impartially consider what 't is we invite and perswade them to , viz. to assent to the existence of a deity , and other points of faith , as certain truths , nay lay down their l●ves , upon occasion , to attest they are such . and what is it to assent ? 't is to say interiourly , or judge verily that the thing is so . and can a motive or reason possible to be false , ever induce in true reason such an obligation , or work rationally such an effect ? how should it be ? since in that case a man must on the one side judge the thing impossible to be false , because he is to assent to it as a truth ; and yet must at the same t●me necessarily judge it possible to be false , because he sees the motives he has offer'd him raise it no higher : that is , he must hold both sides of the contradiction , which is absolutely impossible . now true evidence that the thing is so , takes away all possibility of falsehood , and so obliges to assent ; and if dr. t. produces such proofs as make the point truly evident , an atheist is unreasonable and obstinate if he do not assent to it : but , if by those words , atheism is unreasonable because it requires more evidence than the things are capable of , he means that the things afford no true evidence at all , and judges atheists unreasonable for not assenting without true evidence because the things afford none , he in effect tells them they must forfeit their manhood ere they can be christians ; than which , nothing can more reflect on the profession of christianity , or be more unworthy a christian divine to propose . let us ●ee how far dr. t. is blameable in this particular . he discourses thus ; and since he so earnestly presses it , we will take his words in order . § . . aristotle ( says he ) hath long since observed how unreasonable 't is to expect the same kind of proof for every thing which we have for same things . aristotle said very well . for , speaking of proofs in common and at large , those we have for success in our exteriour actions , on the hopes of which we proceed to act , are for the most part but probable : but this reaches not our present business about a deity , ( in order to which this preamble is fram'd ) where exteriour acting will not serve the turn , but an interiour act of assenting to the existence of such a soveraign being is necessarily requir'd : the question then is , whether aristotle did or could with any reason say that a rational creature ( that is , a creature whose nature 't is to deduce conclusions by discourse from premisses , or build the certain truth of those , upon the certain truth of these ) could be oblig'd , in true reason , or acting according to right nature , to assent , judge or conclude a thing true , without such motives or proofs which did conclude it true ; or that , what concluded a thing true , did not also conclude it impossible to be otherwise , or to be false . 't is granted then that in our exteriour operations , exercised upon particulars where contingency rules , we must rest contented with probabilities of the event , and proceed to act upon them , the necessity of acting obliging us ; for , should all the world surcease from action till they were assur'd of the good success of it , all commerce and negotiation must be left off , nay all the means of living must be laid aside ; but then we are not bound to assent or judge absolutely that the thing will succeed well , because we have no certain grounds or conclusive reasons for it , but onely that 't is best to act , though upon uncertain grounds of the success , for which assent also we have absolute evidence from the necessity of act●ng now spoken of . whereas , on the other side , where the whole business of our christian life , ( which , as such , is spiritual ) is to worship god in spirit and truth , or approach to him by ascending from virtue to virtue , that is , from faith to hope , from hope to charity , the top of all perfection ; the whole interiour fabrick is built on a firm assent to the truth of the points which ground our profession . wherefore , if the foundation for this assent be not well laid , all the superstructures of religion are ruinous . now nature having fram'd things so , and the maxims of our understanding giving it , that those who guide themselves by perfect reason , that is , the strongest and wisest souls , are unapt to assent but upon evidence , ( whereas the weaker sort ( as experience teaches us ) are apt to assent upon any silly probability ) hence unless such men see proofs absolutely concluding those points true , they are unapt to be drawn to yield to them , and embrace them as certain truths ; especially , there being no necessity at all to assent as there was to act outwardly , in regard nature has furnish'd us with a faculty of suspending , which nothing can subdue rationally ( in such men at least ) but true evidence had from the object , working this clear sight in them either by it self , or else by effects or causes necessarily connected with it. other evidences i know none . it may be dr. t. does . let us see . § . . mathematical things ( says he ) being of an abstracted nature , are onely capable of clear demonstration : but conclusions in natural philosophy are to be proved by a sufficient induction of experiments : things of a moral nature by moral arguments , and matters of fact by credible testimony . and though none of these be strict demonstration , yet have we an vndoubted assurance of them , when they are proved by the best arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear . this discourse deserves deep consideration . and first it would be ask● why metaphysicks are omitted here , which of all others ought to have been mentioned , and that in the first place , since its proper subject is those notions which concern being , and to give being or create , is the proper effect of him who is essential being ; whence it seems the properest science that is to demonstrate a deity , in case metaphysical things be demonstrable ; and that they are such , dr. t. himself cannot deny ; for if ( as he says here ) things are therefore demonstrable because they are of an abstracted nature , the object of metaphysicks , which is being , is far more abstracted from matter and so from motion , and its necessary concomitant vncertainty or contingency , than is quantity , the subject of mathematicks ; for this primary affection of body is the ground and proper cause of of all variation and unsteadiness , since all natural motion or mutation arises from divisibility : yet , because all science is taken from the things as standing under our notion or conception , and not according as they exist in themselves , where thousands of considerabilities are confusedly jumbled into one common stock of existence or one thing ; also because we can abstract by our consideration the notion or nature of quantity , nay consider the same quantity meerly as affecting body , as it were , steadily , or extending it , without considering the same quantity as the proper cause or source of motion ; hence the mathematicks have title to be truly and properly a science ; for this abstraction , or manner of being in our mind , frees the notion or nature thus abstracted ( that is , the thing , as thus conceiv'd by us ) from vncertainty , nay indeed fixes it in a kind of immutability ; whereas were it consider'd as found in the world , there would be no firm ground at all for any discourse . for example , perhaps by reason of the perpetual turmoil of things in nature , there is not to be found in the world any one body either mathematically straight , circular , or triangular ; yet because the nature of body conceiv'd as in rest bears it , & we can abstract from motion , and so consider quantitative things according to what they can bear in themselves , taken as not moving , or in rest , therefore we can make such steady notions , and when we have done discourse them , and ground a long train of new conclusions ( which we call a particular science ) upon such a nature thus conceiv'd . § . . and for that reason i would gladly know why ethicks or morality is not equally demonstrable as mathematicks . for we can equally abstract those moral notions of virtues and vices , and consider them apart , as we can do those mathematical ones of lines and numbers . i know 't is grown a common humour in the world , taken up i know not how , by course , and continu'd none knows why , to think otherwise : but i must confess i never could discern any reason for it , and shall be thankful to that man who can show me any that convinces . in the mean time i give mine for the affirmative ; which is this , that the same reason holds for ethicks as for mathematicks , since all the perquisits for demonstration are found in the one as in the other . to put it to the test , let 's consider what euclid does when he demonstrates , and by virtue of what : we see he puts his definitions and some common maxims peculiar to that subject , and then by his reason connecting the first deductions with his principles , and the following deductions with the foregoing on●● , weaves them into a science . and is it not evident that we can as well know what 's meant by those words which express virtues and vices , and so as well define them as we can those other ? also that the common maxims of morality are as self-evident to humane nature as any first principles in the world ? i admire then what should hinder ethicks to be as perfect a science as the clearest piece of mathematicks , since we can equally abstract the several notions handled in it from matter , equally define them , and , consequently , assisted by common maxims equally-evident , with equal clearness discourse them ; which is all that is requir'd . § . . if it be said that particular moral actions are liable to contingency ; 't is answer'd that this hinders not but the speculative part of morality is a true science : even mathematical demonstrations , when reduc'd to practice , and put in matter , are subject also to contingency , as we experience daily in mechanicks : and yet the speculative part , which abstracts from matter , is never the less scientifical . § . . the greatest difficulty is in that cardinal virtue call'd prudence ; and i confess that because the exercise of this virtue is surrounded with an incomprehensible number of accidents , and way-laid , as it were , with all the ambushes and stratagems of fortune ; and consequently to make its success certain , we must be put to fathom the natures of many several things ; nay more , their combinations or joynt-actings with their several circumstances ; and especially of those things which are the common causes of the world , as the influences of the sun , moon , and other stars , ( if they have any that is considerable ) and lastly of the elements which 't is impossible for our short-sighted knowledge to reach ; hence prudence , in its execution , or put in matter , is liable to more contingency by far than any piece of the mathematicks , where we have but one or two single notions or natures to grapple with and weild ; yet notwithstanding all these difficulties , i must still contest that the maxims of prudence , upon which its dictamens are chiefly grounded , are self-evident practically , and to the learned demonstrable , viz. that we ought to sow and plant in their proper seasons , that 't is best for merchants to hazard though they be insecure of the event , and a thousand such-like . § . . i expect dr. t. will object the fickle nature of the will , which renders all contingent where this perpetually-changing planet has any influence . but yet there 's a way , for all that , to fix this volatil mercurial power , and make it act with a constancy as great as any other thing in nature . to conceive how this may be effected , we are to consider that the will too has a peculiar nature of its own , which it can no more forgo than the most constant piece found in nature can do its : that is , the will can no more leave off being a will , than a rule can not-be a rule , faith not-be faith , or any other of those ridiculous identical propositions ( as dr. t. calls them ) not be true . now the will being a power , and powers taking their several natures from their objects , or , as the schools express it , being specify'd by them , and the object of the will as distinguish'd from the understanding , being good , and this propos'd to it by that knowing power ; that is , good , ( at least ) appearing such ; if it can be made evident that such a thing can never appear a good to the subject thus circumstanc'd , 't is demonstrable the will cannot will it , nay as evident as 't is that a will is a will. § . . to apply this to particulars : in case there be a trade or profession of merchants , and it be evident to all the followers of that sole employment , that themselves , wives and children must starve unless they venture to sea , the notventuring can never appear to them ( thus circumstanc'd , that is , addicted to that onely way of livelihood , as is suppos'd ) a good ; and so 't is demonstrable that ( abstracting from madness or exorbitant passion , which is not our case ) they can never will not-to-venture . or if a great multitude of men have embrac'd no profession but that of the law , and , as we 'll suppose , have no other livelihood but that , so that it becomes evident it can never appear a good to them not to take fees ; 't is as certain they will not refuse them , as 't is that a thing is it self , or that a will is a will ; because a will is a power whose essence 't is to have such an object as is appearingly good. § . . to come closer to our purpose . suppose innumerable multitudes of fathers or immediate predecessors in any age had an inclination to deceive their children or immediate successors in the world , and consequently that the immediate end they propos'd to themselves were to make them believe such points of faith were received by them from forefathers , which were indeed newly invented ; these men , i say , in case they must see it impossible to compass that end , viz. to deceive the under-growing world in so open a matter of fact , it follows that ( end , motive , and good being the self-same thing in our case ) it must necessar●ly appear to them no good , or want all power of moving them , since a seen impossibility can never be a motive to one not frantick : wherefore 't is as certain they cannot conspire to will eff●ctually in that circumstance , nor consequently to do such an action , as t is that the will cannot will any thing but an appearing good , that is , as evident as 't is that the will is it self . and this is the true force of my argument as to that part of my proof , ( sure footing p. . ) however dr. t. is pleas'd perpetually to disguise it , that it may better become his necessary drollery . how then ? is not the will free ? i reply , it is not free in this , nor is it at the will 's pleasure to chuse whether it will be its self or no : whenever therefore its essence is engag'd , those acts are not free ; in all other cases where its essence is not engag'd , 't is free , provided there be on the objects side variety enough for choice . yet in those former cases those acts of the will are voluntary , because they are hers ; and more voluntary , because they are more according to what 's essential to her , or to her very nature . § . . as for natural conclusions being prov'd by a sufficient induction of experiments , i must absolutely deny any induction to be sufficient to beget new science , if it be understood of experiments alone , without the assistance of common maxims in that affair . and i would gladly be inform'd why physicks or natural philosophy should be debarr'd the power of deducing its conclusions scientifically , or , why the same reason holds not for its being a science , as does for the mathematicks and morality . we can arrive to know the meanings of those words which express natural notions , as heat , cold , moisture , driness , &c. again , the common maxims belonging to nature are full as evident as any in the mathematicks or morals ; as that a dense or less divisible body prest against a more divisible ( or rare ) one will divide it , and such like . we can consider too those natural notions abstractedly ; and , so , define them , and discourse them evidently , thus abstracted ; which is all that is requisite to a science . it would be well consider'd then why we ought to relinquish that method , which is , confessedly , the road way to all science in the mathematicks , and take up , instead of it , this new and contingent way of induction . the objections against this discourse are the same which are made against morality's being a science , to which i have lately spoken . but dr. t. is pardonable in this mistake , because he errs with a great multitude , and those too very ingenious persons ; who , unfortunately missing the right method to science , and having taken a prejudice against all beginning à priori by way of principles , conceit natural knowledge onely attainable by amassing together great multitudes of experiments . and as they who pursue that fruitless study of the philosophers stone , light upon many pretty things by the way which entertain and please their fancies , and , by that means , decoy them forwards to spend their thoughts , their money and industry to little purpose : so they who solely affect this way of experiments , hit upon many pleasant and delightful productions , useful indeed to some degree for practical men or artificers ; but full as barren to create any new science , as the other to make gold. whence , though i dare not be so bold as to suggest my advice , yet i crave leave humbly to express my wish , that those excellent wits would think fit maturely to consider in the first place whether they be secure of their method ; which will be best determin'd by looking into the nature of humane discourse when rightly made ; and discovering by what means 't is effected when we conclude evidently some new truth in the mathematicks , or any other science , and then considering whether meer induction have any such virtue . the zeal i have that the precious thoughts and diligent industry of such ingenious pursuers of truth should not miss their end , transports me a little unseasonably , and perhaps needlesly , beyond my present duty ; for which yet i know their candour such , that i shall easily obtain their pardon . § . . it follows in dr. t. matters of fact are to be proved by credible testimony . but what i desire to know is , whether any testimony is to be held credible for any thing , unless it either be , or at least be held , hic & nunc , infallible in that affair : for credible signifies [ to be believed ] and belief is a yielding over the understanding to assent upon authority , and all assent is a saying interiourly the thing is : now that any man can according to maxims of true reason say interiorly , that is , judge or hold the thing is , and yet at the same time judge that the persons on whose sole authority that assent is built , are hic & nunc fallible , that is , may perhaps be actually deceiv'd , and consequently that the thing it self is possible not to be , is direct●y to judge that a thing may at once be , ( since he assents it is ) and yet possibly not be , because the authority upon which its being so as to my knowledge solely depends , may possibly be in an error , or deceiv'd actually in that very particular . § . . again , by these words [ matters of fact are to be prov'd by credible testimony ] i suppose he means [ prov'd true ] or , which is all one , impossible to be false : now i would gladly know of dr. t. whether a testimony possible to be deceiv'd , or fallible hic & nunc in such a business , is able to prove that that very matter built onely on such a testimony , is impossible to be false . but if he means that matters of fact are not provable to be true , but onely to be probab●e or likely-to-be true ; then 't is the probability of those matters which is concluded to be true , and not those matters themselves . § . . i wish i could see an answer in a sober and candid way to this or any such argument . the best i have had yet is given here ( p. . ) in these words , all humane testimony is fallible for this plain reason , because all men are fallible . good god! is it possible there should be found among mankind a writer so weak , as to put that for a plain reason which is so plainly contrary to common sence ? is it so plain that all mankind may be deceiv'd in their sensations , on which kind of knowledge authority or testimony is built ? may all the world be deceiv'd in judging whether the sun shin'd or no yesterday , or that themselves live in such towns , converse with acquaintance , or lastly that they live ; since they may be equally deceiv'd in their experience of this , as in their dayly sensations of familiar objects ? yet dr. t. hopes by virtue of the plain evidence of this one paradox to overthrow the certainty of tradition ; nay the certainty of all natural sciences to boot , for these according to him are solely built upon induction , which depends on sensations ; and these if we may trust him , are all possible to be deceiv'd . § . . and is not faith it self by these grounds left in the same pickle ? it s rule , whether it be tradition or scriptures letter , evidently depends upon humane authority ▪ and this , says he , is all fallible , and what 's built on a fallible authority , ( says common sence ) may possibly be an errour , or false ; therefore 't is most unavoidable from his principles that all faith may possibly be false ; however the shame of owning so unchristian and half-atheistical a tenet , makes him very stifly and angrily deny the conclusion ▪ but he shall never show why 't is not a most necessary and genuine consequence from his position of all humane authority being fallible . i expect that instead of a direct answer to the force of my argument , he will tinkle a little rhetorick against my conclusion , or start aside to a logical possibility that men may be deceiv'd , and affirm that 't is not a contradiction in terms , and so may be effected by the divine omnipotence . but that 's not our point : we are discoursing what will follow out of the ordinary course of causes ; the conduct of which , is the work of the worlds all-wise governour ; whence , if those portions of nature or mankind cannot be deceiv'd without miracle , and 't is most vnbeseeming god to do a miracle which reaches in a manner a whole species , as that no fire in the world should burn , no water wet ; especially if it be most absurd to conceive that god the author of all truth , nay essential truth it self , should do such a stupendious and never-yet-heard-of miracle to lead men into errour , as is our case ; 't is most manifestly consequent it cannot be effected at all , that mankind should be fallible in knowledges built on their constant sensations . § . . it follows . and , though none of these be strict demonstration , yet have we an undoubted assurance of them when they are prov'd by the best arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear . to this we will speak when we come to examine his firm principle . he proceeds . none can demonstrate to me that there is such an island in america as jamaica ; yet upon the testimony of credible persons , and authors who have writ of it , i am as free from all doubt concerning it , as from doubting of the clearest mathematical demonstration . true ; none can demonstrate there is either jamaica or any such place ; yet i see not why they may not demonstrate the knowledge of the attesters from the visibility of the object , and their veracity from the impossibility they should all conspire to act or say so , without some appearing good for their object , or intend to deceive in such a matter , and so circumstanc'd , when 't is evidently impossible they should compass their intended end . as for his affirming that he is as free from all doubt concerning it , as he is from doubting of the clearest mathematical demonstration ; i answer , that a man may 〈…〉 yet not hold the thing true , as shall presently be shown : and , if dr. t. ple●se to look into his own thoughts , he shall find instill'd through the goodness of nature , by practical self-evidence , more than a bare freedom from doubt , viz. such a firm assent & adherence to it as a certain truth , that he would deem him a madman or a deserter of humane nature , who could doubt of it and in a word , as firm an assent as to any mathematical demonstration ; which why he should according to maxims of right reason have , unless he had a demonstration of it , or at least saw it by practical self-evidence impossible that authority should hic & nunc be deceiv'd , or conspire to deceive , and so held the authority infallible as to this point , i expect his logick should inform me . § . . we are now come to take a view of dr. t's performances hitherto . he hath omitted the proper science for his purpose , metaphysicks , ( i suppose because it sometimes uses those hard words , potentiality and actuality , which his delicate ears cannot brook ) and has secluded morality , physicks , and the knowledge we have of the nature which grounds all humane authority and christian faith , from being sciences , allowing it onely to the mathematicks ; which would make one verily think the vvorld were perversly order'd , and odly disproportion'd to the nature and good of mankind , for which we christians agree it was created ; that greater evidence and certainty ( and consequently power to act aright ) should be found in those things which are of far less import , than in those which are of a concern incomparably higher . yet it matters less ( some may think ) as long as we are not bound to assent to any of those conclusions in those respect●ve subjects , the absolute certainty of wh●ch , dr. t's discourse calls into question , or rather denies , whence , i● we have in these , and such as thes● , knowledge enough to determine us to act exteriourly , it may seem to suffice . but now , when we come to faith , where we are oblig'd to assent , or to hold f●rmly , and verily judge the thing true , and where exteriour acting will not do the work , or carry a soul to bliss , but interiour acts of a firm faith , a vigorous hope built on that faith , and an ardent and over-powering love of unseen goo●s springing out of both these , are absolutely necessary to fit us for an union with our infinitely-blissful object ; and the strength of all these , is fundamentally built on the securene●s of the ground of faith. in this case , i say , a rational considerer wou●d think it very requi●●●e that the reasons of so hearty an ass●nt ( but especially for that most fundamental point of the existence of a deity , it being of an infinitely-higher nature and import ) should be f●ll as evident as the most evident of those inferiour concerns , and in comparison tr●fling curiosities . and not that the world should be manag'd on such a fashion as if mankin● were onely made to study mathematicks ; since absolute evidence , his best natural perfection , is according to dr. t. onely found in these . whence we see that mathematicians are infinitely beholding to him , but philosophers not at all , and i fear , christians , as little . now these two points are , according to my way of discoursing , for this very reason taken from the end and use of faith , and the obligation lying on us to hold and profess it true , self-evident practically to the generality of the vulgar , and demonstrable to the learned ; let us see what strong grounds of such an immovably-firm assent dr. t. will afford the world for that first and most fundamental point of all religion , the tenet of a deity ; of which if we cannot be assur'd , all else that belongs to faith is not worth heeding . discourse v. dr. t's firm principle examin'd . of suspence and assent . of great likelihood , freedom from actual doubt , fair probabilities , and other mock-certainties . § . . he introduces his discourse thus : so that this is to be entertain'd as a firm principle by all those who pretend to be certain of any thing at all , that when any thing is prov'd by as good arguments as that thing is capable of , and we have as great assurance that it is as we could possibly have supposing it were , we ought not in reason to make any doubt of the existence of that thing . this is dr. t's firm principle , and it should be a kind of first principle too , being so universally necessary that without admitting this , no man can be certain of any thing at all , nor any thing at all be certain to any man. you see , gentlemen , how much depends upon it , and i conceive you will easily conclude it ought to be as evident and as firm as any first principle extant ; since according to his way of discourse , all truths , even the most precious concerns in the world ( particularly the possibility of proving a deity ) must run its fate , and be establish'd or ruin'd by its standing or falling . now my judgment of it is this , that 't is the most ridiculous piece of folly , and the most pernicious abstract of pithy nonsence that ever was laid down since mankind was mankind , by any sober man , for such a principle without which no certainty at all can be had , no not even that there is a god. i charge it therefore with four faults . first , that 't is unprov'd ; next 't is unevident of it self , and so no principle ; thirdly , that were it evident , 't is impertinent to the end 't is produc'd for ; and lastly , it betrays all religion into the possibility of being a lye , instead of establishing it . § . . and , first , it appears that he intends it as a conclusion by his introducing it with so that , &c. after his former discourse : but as i have already confuted that , so i discern not any title it has to be sequel from those premisses , in case they were true. for what a mad consequence is this , diverse things bear diverse kinds of proofs , some weaker , some stronger , therefore when we have the best the object can afford us , we are to rest satisfi'd the thing is ? how , i say , does this follow , unless he had first ma●e out , or at least suppos●d , that the least of those proofs was satisfactory ; or that there is no object in the world but is capable of yielding light enough to satisfie ; which position every days experience convinces of falshood , indeed , if he meant by these words , that upon our seeing the thing is capable of no conclusive proof , it is wisdom in us to sit down satisfy'd that no more is to be had , and so surcease our farther quest , i understand him very well ; but that i should be satisfy'd the thing is so , or acquiesce to its truth , ( as he must mean to make it 〈◊〉 for his purpose ) not from the conclusiveness of the grounds it stands under , or the prevalence of the object upon my understanding subduing it to assent , but because that object is capable to bear no more , or to discover it self no better to my sight , is in plain terms to say , that because the obj●ct affords me no certain light to know whether it be or no , therefore i will hold my self well appay'd , and think 't is certain ; or thus , though i see absolutely speaking 't is uncertain , yet as long as i see withal the object can bear no more , or cannot be made absolu●ely certain , i will therefore rest sat●sfy'd , or judge 't is absolutely certain . if this be not his meaning , i desire himself to inform me better : 't is evident to me it can be no other , if he mean anyth●ng at all . his intent is to evince a deity , and i declare heartily i have that good opinion of him as to hope that , settled perhaps in that assent by practical self-evidence as are the vulgar , and not by skill or principles as scholars are , ( for his speculation makes it absolutely uncertain ) he judges it to be absolutely certain : either then he judges his motives he has to evince it , conclusive or no ; if conclusive , there needs no running about the bush to tell us of several kinds of proofs , or laying such whimsical principles , fit for nothing but to make the witty atheist laugh at christianity ▪ but it had been enough to stand to it heartily that the thing must be so , because the arguments he brings conclude it to be so . but , in case he fear'd his motives were not absolutely conclusive , or able to evince the truth of the point , ( and that this is his sentiment appears by his blaming me here , p. . for pretending to such to ground faith ) then indeed it was but good policy , or rather plain necessity , to lay some principles , by means of which he might compound the business between the object and the understanding , after the same manner ( though this seems but an odd method of proving ) as friends take up differences between good natur'd creditors and the debtor , when he that owes is willi●● to do his utmost , but yet is not solvent ; and 〈◊〉 was said before ) so to accord the business to avoid rigorous disputes ; that , though the understanding sees , absolutely speaking , the thing is vncertain , and more ligh● , if it could be had , is in reality due ere it can be satisfy'd of its absolute certainty ; yet , because the object is able to afford no more , 't is awarded by their umpire dr. t. that the kind-hearted understanding is to be content to rest appay'd , and hold it notwithstanding to be absolutely certain ; which is the same as to say , that though i do not see the thing to be so , yet because the thing it self cannot be seen to be so , i will fancy strongly or judge i see it to be so . let us parallel it by analogy to our corporal sight , and the discourse stands thus : though i see not the wall to be white , because 't is so far distant , or the air dusky , yet because i can see it no better , the wall thus circumstanc'd not being able to inform my eye clearly ; therefore despairing of the walls affording me any better sight of it self , i will piece out that degree of obscurity in the object , with a strong bending my eyes till i fancy verily i see it to be white ; or rather , out of a civil compliance with it's defect of visibleness , i will verily judge and conclude it to be indeed of such a colour ; and then if any object folly to me for assenting upon infirm grounds , i will tell him he is ill-natur'd and unmerciful , the poor wall has done ( alas ) all it can , and who can in reason desire more ? § . . i expect dr. t. will pretend degrees of intellectual sight , and that by a less degree of evidence he sees the thing to be , though 't is not manifested to him by the greatest ; but 't is impossible and even contradictory to common sence to imagine that a reason which fal's short of being ( according to the maxims of right logick ) absolutely conclusive , should beget any true evidence or intellectual sight at all : if then he have no conclusive reason , he is convinc'd to have no kind of evidence : if he have , let him produce it and stand by it ; and not persist thus to wrong the most weighty and most excellent cause in the world , by advancing such r●diculous principles which like gilded babbles look pretti●y at first , but if we come once to grasp them close , instead of solidity and firmness , which ought to be the temper of principles , they vanish into perfect nonsence and contradiction ; importing in effect , that though we ought to hold the absolute certainty of the thing ( for , i suppose he would have his auditors hold so concerning a deity ) yet , because the obj●ct admits no more certainty , we must fancy we have it without the object : which amounts to this , that we must necessarily hold a thing to be that which 't is impossible it should in those circumstances be seen to be ; that is , it must be held to be that , ( viz. absolutely certain ) which at the same time 't is held impossible it should be . is not this strange logick ! § . . this firm principle then is far from being prov'd . perhaps , it can need none , and so dr. t. is excusable for not having prov'd it ▪ nay more , commendable ; for , first principles , even by their being first , are incapable of proof , as himself says very well , ( p. . ) because there is nothing before them to demonstrate or prove them by ; and certainly , this principle , if any has title to be held one of the very first because ( as dr. t. says here ) no man can be certain of any thing at all , unless he entertains this as a firm principle . wherefore , because it cannot be prov'd or made evident , and yet must be evident , it must be self-evident ; that is , its terms must need nothing to discover their necessary connexion but themselves , or the knowledge of their own notions . to do dr. t. right then , we will take its terms asunder , and then see what they have to say to one another . his principle form'd into a categorical propositi●n , is this : whatever thing is proved by as good arguments as 't is capable of , and as well assur'd to us as it could possibly be , supposing it were , — is — not to be doubted of in reason but that ' t is . where all before the copula [ is ] is the subject of the proposition ; and all afte● it the predicate . this known , that i may offer my adversary fair play , i will endeavour to clear his true meaning , lest cavilling at equ●vocal words , i may justly seem to baffle , as himself does constantly , when i ought to dispute . his pred●cate seems to me very clear and void of all amb●gu●ty : but these words in the subject as 't is capable of ] and [ as it could possibly be ] may bear two sences ; one that the thing is absolutely incapable in any circumstance to be seen more evidently , or absolutely impossible to be better assur'd to us ; or else that 't is onely ●ncapable or impossible to be such hic & nunc , that is , taking the understanding and object thus circumstanc'd , though , absolutely speaking it could most perfectly be seen , and most absolutely assur'd to us : now 't is evident from his instance of jamaica , and the end he designs by it . viz. the knowledge of a deity , that he takes the words [ capable ] and [ possible ] in this later sence ; namely , for what 's such ( partly at least ) from the circumstance , and not wholly from the object it self absolutely consider'd for 't is manifest that jamaica it self is more evidently known by them who live in it than by us , and the existence of the deity more clearly seen and better assur'd to those in heaven , and in likelihood to some particular saints on earth , especially illuminated , than 't is to us , or the generality . this being so , the true meaning of his principle stands thus : whatever thing is prov'd by as good arguments as ( considering the circumstances of the object and the understanding ) 't is capable of , and as well assur'd to us as ( considering the same circumstances ) it could possibly be supposing it were — is — not to be doubted of in reason but ' t is . and now i request dr. t. to go to work like a scholar , and show me by what means one can possibly see these two terms to be the same , and so the proposition to be true ? is it by means of their being materially the same , or the same with a third ? where is this third term to prove it ? and why does not he produce it ? or indeed how can this be pretended , since , according to him , no man can be certain of any thing at all , nor consequently of the connexion of that third term with two others , unless this firm principle be first admitted . is it then by their being the same with one another immediately , or of the same most formal notion ? dr. t. disavows it absolutely , for then the proposition were identical , which he makes a publick declaration to all the world he will have nothing to do with . is one of the terms the definition , or a direct part of the definition of the other , that so ( at least ) they may deserve to be held to some degree formally identical , though not most formally ? himself pretends it not ; and did he pretend it , 't will appear shortly how far they are from such a near relation and connexion to one another . is there then any other way left for these terms to cohere , which is neither by themselves immediately , nor by a third ? not all the wit of man can invent or even imagine any other : 't is evident then they cohere not at all , and so the proposition is so far from being a first principle , that 't is absolutely false . § . . this is farther demonstrated , because its contradictory is true. for 't is plain to common sence that many things prov'd by as good arguments as ( in these circumstances ) they are capable of , and as well assur'd to us as ( in these circumstances ) they could possibly be , supposing they were , are yet , for all that , liable to doubt : for some things are so remov'd from our knowledge that we can have but very little light concerning their natures and existence : must therefore every reason in that case , how slight and trivial soever , be necessarily judg'd sufficient to make the thing be held undoubtedly true. some think they have probable arguments that there are men in the moon , and in the rest of the stars ; must they therefore upon some likely or seeming reason judge the thing is so , because 't is not capable , considering our circumstances , even though it were , to be known better . there is some probability the king of china is now while i write , consulting about the affairs of his empire , or else at a feast , or a hunting , because monarchs use such employments and entertainments , and in these circumstances 't is all the light i can have concerning that point : is it therefore past doubt that 't is so ? who sees not that witty men find plausible reasons for any ●hing , even though it be most forrein from our circumstances of knowing it certainly ; and , so , in case it were , could give us no mo●e light concerning it self ; must it therefore be forthwith held undoubtedly so ? suppose it were propos'd to debate whether the stars were even or odd , and no better argument could be found ( as truly , though it be a ridiculous one , 't is hard to find a better ) but onely this , that virgil says , numero deus impare gaudet . and therefore odd number is the best , and so fitting to be found in such vast and noble parts of the universe as the stars . were it not a wise business now upon so simple a reason to judge that the stars are undoubtedly odd ? yet this is perfectly agreeable to dr. t's first principle . this is all the light the stars are capable to give us at this distance , and were they indeed odd , yet we could have no knowledge of them by any better arguments than this ; so that we must either content our selves with this , or take nothing : wherefore says dr. t. unless you will deny a most firm principle , and by doing so be rendred incapable of being certain of any thing ( too great a penalty one would think for so small a fault ! ) the thing must be concluded certain , and odd they shall be . § . . be it spoken then with honour to dr. t. he is the first author of this all-ascertaining first principle , which by the way , is a shrewd argument 't is none , since nature never instill'd it into all mankind ) and of a new method to arrive at certainty of all things , so easie , so compendious , as the world never heard the like ; all , even the rudest may comprehend it , nay perhaps be as wise as the wisest : for all can understand as much of the object as in their circumstances they can do , and the wisest can do no more ; and this rare method requires no more but that the object be known as well as 't is capable to be known in every ones circumstances , and that the persons do not doubt of it ; which the rudest will do the least of all other ; which done , they are according to him certain of it , and all is well . § . . this principle is moreover utterly impertinent to the end 't is produc'd for . to show which , we are to consider , that we are bound to assent to the existence of a deity , to hold it firmly as a certain truth , and dy ( if need were ) to attest it , and not barely not to make any doubt of it . to declare this point more fully , and so manifest how far short dr. t. falls , when he undertakes to lay principles , we are to reflect , that we have two acts of our understanding , call'd assent and dis●●●sent , that is , an interiour yielding or denying a thing to be ; between which is plac'd a kind of neutral act , which is neither one nor the other , call'd suspense . now the two former of these consist in an indivisible , as do their objects , is and is not , and so admit no latitude . but suspense , even for that very reason , admits of many degrees , which i explain thus . if we consider it abstractedly from its differences , 't is a meer not yielding to assent and di●●ssent , and ( if any where ) 't is found , or at least conceiveable to be found in the very middle between those two acts now mention'd , without the least inclination to either of them ; wherefore one of its differences is inclining towards assent , and may perhaps not unfitly be call'd intellectual hope ; because , if the thing be our concern , 't is apt to principle that disposition of the will which we properly call by that name . the other difference is a dis●inclining to assent , or an inclining towards dis●●ssent , which it were not much amiss to term intellectual fear ; because , if we be concern'd in the being of that thing , 't is apt to excite in us that passion or disposition of the will which is call'd by that name ; whence 't is generally call'd doubt , which includes some degree of fear . these two differences have innumerable multitudes of other differences or degrees compris'd under them , according as the probabilities ( which here solely reign ) are apt to beget more or less appearance of likelihood that the thing is ; but no probability how high soever can in true reason beget assent , because the highest probability that is can only render the thing seen to be highly probable to be , which is evidently a different effect from making it seen to be absolutely , really , and indeed ; since when i once see this by virtue of some conclusive ( that is , more than probable ) motive , i see 't is impossible hic & nunc not to be , or impossible my conclusion should be false ; but i do not see this when i have a very high probability ; experience telling every man who is meanly practis'd in the world , that very high probabilities often deceive us ; as when a glass thrown against the ground breaks no ▪ when a house deem'd very strong falls down suddenly , and a thousand such-like odd contingencies . but there needs no more to evince that all is to be called suspense , till we arrive at assent , than to reflect that suspense is relative to assent , as appears by the english phrase [ to suspend ones-assent ] intimating that assoon as suspense is taken away , immediately assent follows ; which devolves into this , that all is suspense till we come to assent . indeed , some things so very seldom happen , as , that a house , seemingly firm , should fall , and such like rare casualties , that unattentive men are apt to assent absolutely upon such a very high probability , and even in the wis●st it seems to counterfeit a perfect assent , and to have no degree at all of suspense in it ; notwithstanding i absolutely deny any truly-wise or rational man goes to work on that manner ; but , by seeing the casualties to which our uncertain state is expos'd , and laying to heart the sudden chances that happen to others , which might have been his own case ; hereupon , not with a perpetual anxious doubt ( the danger is too unl●ke●y to require that ) but with a prudent care , lest it should be his own lot to be so suddenly surpriz'd , he endeavours to stand daily on his guard , and out of that consideration , to keep a good conscience and a will resign'd to gods in all things ; which disposition evidently discovers some degree of suspense . as for careless and inconsiderate livers , i doubt not but they often assent absolutely the world 's their own , beyond reason , that is , out of meer passion and precipitancy , till some imminent danger give a check to their blind security ; but the reward of their unreasonableness and rashness in assenting absolutely without just ground , is this , that they have even from hence some less degree of concern to amend their lives ; and , if they be overtaken with any sudden disaster , less ( if any ) resignation to gods holy disposition than they would have had , had they kept awake that degree of suspense in their minds which right reason ( the nature god had given them ) requir'd they should . § . 't is time now to apply this discourse to dr. t's performances . it appears hence that one may have no reason to doubt of a thing , and yet withall have no reason in the world to assent firmly to it as a most certain truth , which onely is to his purpose : and this may be done two ways , either by perfectly suspending and inclining to neither side ; as we experience our understanding now bears it self in order to the stars being even or odd : or by strongly hoping or inclining to assent the thing is true ; as when we expect a friend such a time at london who never us'd to break his word ; which expectation , though one may have very great ground to hope will not deceive us , yet it were a mad thing to assent to it as firmly as i do to my faith , or that there is a god. but what i most admire is , that dr. t. can think an actual not doubting , or seeing no just cause to doubt , is a competent assurance of the grounds for christian faith , as he all over inculcates . for not to repeat over again what hath been lately prov'd , that a bare not doubting is not sufficient to make a man a christian● 't is evident first that turks , jews and heathens , the generality at least , are fully perswaded what they hold is ●rue , and see no just cause to doubt it ; whence by this kind of arguing , if it be sufficient for christian faith to have such grounds as exclude doubt in its adherents , turcism , judaism , and perhaps paganism too , may claim to be true religions by the same title ; and , if the certainty or security of christian religion be no more but a freedom from doubt , all those wicked sects have good reason to be held certain too ; and so both sides of the contradiction may become certain , by which stratagem dr. t. is as compleatly revenged of his enemies , identical propositions , as his own heart could wish , and rewards his dear friends and faithful abetters , direct contradictions , very honourably ; advancing them to be first principles , and even as certain as faith it self . secondly , passion and vice can breed in a man a full persuasion that an errour is true , and such an apprehension as shall take away all actual doubt ; nay the more passion a man is in , and the more obstinate he is in that passion , the less still he doubts : so that by dr. t's logick no man can tell whether christianity be indeed rationally-wise or passionately-foolish , in ca●e the test of its certainty , or the adequate effect of its grounds be not a steady assent that 't is true ; that is , if the motives to embrace it be not conclusive of the truth of its doctrine , but one●y exclusive of doubt . thirdly , ignorance and dull rudene●s is easily appay'd with any silly reason and so a most excellent way to be void of actual doubt , nay of all men in the world those who are perfectly ignorant see the least cause of doubting , being least able to raise any ; wherefore , if being free from seeing any just cause of doubt , be the utmost effect of christian grounds , let all christians be but grosly ignorant , and they shall immediately without more ado become as free from actual doubt as may be ; and by that means be the best christians in the world ; and , consequently , ignorance be fundamentally establish'd by dr. t. the mother of all true devotion . fourthly , though out of a stupid carelesness men use to take many things for granted upon slight grounds while 't is cheap to admit them , and no danger accrues upon the owning them ; yet experience teaches us , that when any great inconvenience presses , as the loss of friends , livelihood , or life , reason our true nature , teaches men to study their careless thoughts over again ; by which means they begin now to doubt of that which before they took for granted , if they have not certain motives to establish them in the truth of what they profess , and to ascertain to them some equivalent good at least to what they are in danger to forego . in which case i fear it will yield small strength to a man put in such a strong temptation , to find upon review of his grounds , that they were onely able to make him let them pass for good ones , while the concern was remoter and less , but that notwithstanding all these , he sees they may perhaps be false , and himself a great fool for holding them true without reasons convincing them to be so ; and consequently foolish ( perhaps wicked to boot ) for suffering so deeply to attest them . if dr. t. reply , that such men dying for what they conceiv'd truth , meant well , and consequently acted virtuously ; i must ask him how he knows that , or can make them know it , unless he propose motives to conclude those tenets true : for as errour is the parent and origin of all vice , so is truth of all virtue ; nor is virtue any thing but a disposition of the will to follow reason or truth . whence , if we cannot be ab●olutely certain any tenet we follow is truth , we cannot be absolutely-certain any action is virtuous ; and 't is not enough to make a man virtuous to mean well in common , or intend to do his duty , and be onely free from doubt all the while , unless they have some substantial truth to proceed upon , which renders their meaning and particular action good as to the main , by directing it to that which is mans true happiness : for 't is questionless that the generality of the heathens who worship'd juno , venus , vulcan , and the rest of that rabble , meant well in common , were free from actual doubt , nay had dr. t's moral certainty too , that is ▪ had a firm and undoubted assent upon such grounds as would fully satisfie a prudent man , for many of them were men of great natural prudence , and were actually satisfy'd with the motives they had for polytheism ; lastly , they had dr. t's firm principle too on their side , for they had ( as far as they could discern ) the judgment of the whole world round about them , that is , as much as the nature of the thing could give them , though it were ; for had there been indeed such gods and goddesses , yet , being in heaven , they could have no more light concerning them than by authority of others ( relating also , as doubtlesly they did , many wonderful things conceived to be done by their means ) and on the other side they had all the authority extant at that time for them ; and what doubts soever a few speculative and learned men rais'd concerning them , yet the generality , who were unacquainted with their thoughts , had no occasion to raise any at all : these advantages i say , the heathens had , parallel within a very little , if not altogether , to dr. t's grounds and principles ; that is , able to produce an equal effect , viz. not-doubting : yet because all hapt to be a lye that they proceeded on , all their religion for all this was wicked ; and the the most zealous devotion to dame juno and the rest , nay dying for their sakes , was notwithstanding their good meaning in common , dr. t's moral certainty and firm principle , a diabolical and mischievous action , not a jot better , as to the effect of gaining heaven , than the making their children pass through the fire to moloch ; perverting and destroying the soul that perform'd it , nay dy'd for it ; by addicting it to what was not its true last end or eternal good ; and all this because there wanted truth at the bottom to render those actions and sufferings virtuous : wherefore unless dr. t. produces some immoveable grounds to establish christianity to be most certainly true , especially the existence of a deity ; which enfe●bled , all the rest falls down to the ground , he can never convince that either acting or suffering for it is a virtue , any more than it was in heathenism when the same was done for their false gods , and so he can never with reason persuade his auditory to it ; but having once prov'd that , it matters less whether all the assenters penetrate the full force of the motive or no ; for if once it be put to be true , all actions and sufferings proceeding from those truths shall connaturally addict those souls to their true last end , and dispose them for it , though their understandings be never so imperfect ; and their good or well-meaning will certainly bring them to heaven ; but 't is because their will and its affections were good ; which they could not be ( as is prov'd ) were they not built upon some truth . § . . again , dr. t. discourses all along as if all were well when one is free from all doubt ; but i would desire his friends seriously to ask him one question , which is , whether , though his grounds exclude all doubt from his mind at present , yet he sees any certain reason why he may not perhaps come to doubt of all his faith , and even of a godhead too to morrow ? if he says , he sees not but he may , he must say withal , that he sees it not ( and consequently holds it not ) to be true ; for if he once saw it to be truth , he could not hold it possible ever to be doubted of with reason . if he affirms that he sees he can never come with reason to doubt of it , then he sees his grounds for holding it cannot possibly be shown false , else it might both be doubted and ( what is more ) deny'd , and if he hold his grounds cannot possibly be made out to be false , then he must say they are impossible to be false , and if they be humane authority , infallible ; which yet he stifly denies . but the plain truth is , he holds not ( by virtue of any grounds he lays ) his faith to be true , but onely a plausible likelihood ; else common sence would force him to acknowledge and stand to it , that the grounds on which he builds his assent are impossible to be false , and not to palliate his uncertainty of it with such raw principles and petty crafts to avoid an honest down-right procedure ▪ which is to say plainly , my grounds cannot fail of concluding the thing absolutely true , i will justifie them to be such , and here they are : but he is so far from this , that the best word he affords them who do this right to christianity , is to call them vapouring and swaggering men , with all the disgraceful ironies he can put upon them . § . . by this time my last charge that this firm principle of his betrays all religion into the possibility ( i might have said likelihood ) of being a lye instead of establishing it , is already made good , and needs onely a short rehearsal . for , . he asserts that we cannot be certain of a deity unless we entertain his firm principle , which is so full stuft with nonsence and folly , that unles● it be in bedlam , i know no place in england where 't is like to find entertainment . that the evidence or visibleness of an object begets certainty in us , is that which the light of nature ever taught me and all mankind hitherto ; but that the obscurity of an object , or its affording us no true evidence grounding our absolute certainty of it , nay that even its incapableness to afford us any in our circumstances , and consequently our despair of seeing any such evidence for it , should contribute to make us certain of it ; nay more , that this must be entertain'd as a firm principle , and which is yet more , be obtruded upon all mankind under such an unmerciful penalty that unless they entertain this as honourably as a firm principle , not any man shall be certain of any thing , no not so much as that there 's a god , is such a super-transcendent absurdity as surpasses all belief , or even imagination : but a rhetorician may say any thing , when talking pretty plausibilities is onely in vogue , and a melodious gingle to please the ear , is more modish than solid reasons to satisfie the understanding . next , he vouches not any reason he brings to be absolutely conclusive , and consequently owns not any point of faith , no not the existence of a deity , to be absolutely certain ; which not to assert , but ( as has been shown from his firm principle ) equivalently to deny , even then when he is maintaining it , is an intolerable prejudice to that weighty and excellent cause he hath undertaken , and , so , is engag'd to defend . . he waves the conclusiveness of his reasons that the thing is true , and contents himself that it keeps us free from actual doubt , which reaches not assent ; for to doubt a thing is to incline to think it false ; and so , not to doubt , is barely not to incline to think it false , which is far short of holding it true , and consequently from making a man a christian . besides , our not doubting may be in many regards faulty , and spring from surprize , passion , and ignorance , as well as from ignorance ( as hath been prov'd ) but a good reason cannot be faulty . wherefore to relinquish the patronage of the goodness and validity , that is , absolute conclusiveness of christian proofs ( of which there are good store ) for this point , defending onely their plausibility , and instead of that victorious way of convincing the understanding into assent , requiring onely a feeble not doubting , is in plain terms to betray his cause , and tacitly ( or rather , indeed , too openly ) to accuse christianity of an infirmity in its grounds , as being incapable to effect what they ought , a firm assent to the points of christian doctrine as to absolutely certain truths . . by making our certainty of it , or the adequate effect of its motives consist meerly in our not doubting of it , he makes its effect , and consequently the efficacy of those motives themselves , no better than those which heathens , turks and hereticks have ; for these also exclude actual doubt from the minds of the generality of these respective sects : if he says christians have no just reason to doubt , i ask him how he will prove that it must needs exclude all reason of actual doubt from the minds even of the wisest christians , unless he can prove those grounds cannot possibly be doubted of with reason ; for , otherwise , if those men may possibly doubt with reason , 't is ten to one they will do so actually at one time or other . he ought then to say those motives exclude all possible doubt , or are undoubtable of their own nature , and so take it out of the subjects strength or weakness , and put it upon the objects : but this he is loth to say , dreading the consequence , which is this , that he who affirms a thing can never be possibly doubted of in true reason , must affirm withal that he has motives concluding it absolutely true , that is , absolutely impossible to be false , and , if it depends on authority , infallible testimony for it , which his superficial reason , fully resolved against first principles or identical propositions , can never reach . it remains then that he must hold to actual not-doubting on the subjects side ; that is , he must say the motives are onely such as preserv● prudent persons from doubt ; and then he must either make out that christians have more natural prudence than those in those other sects , ( natural , i say , for all motives antecedent to faith , must be objects of our natural parts or endowments ) or else confess that he knows no difference between the reasons for those other sects and those for christianity , according to the grounds deliver'd by him here . both exclude actual doubt in persons , as far as appears to us , equal in prudence as to other things ; neither of them exclude possible rational doubt ; each one had as much evidence of their deities they ador'd as they could have in their circumstances supposing those deities were , and no true or absolutely ▪ conclusive evidence appear'd on either side ; both had as good proofs as the thing afforded supposing it were , and such as excluded doubting , therefore ( according to dr. t's doctrine ) both had certainty , and all is parallel : and so farewel christianity , religion , and first principles too , that is , farewel common sence , and all possibility of knowing any thing . all truth and goodness must needs go to wrack , when principles naturally self-evident , and establish'd by god himself , the founder of nature , are relinquish'd , and others made up of meer fancy and air are taken up in their stead . § . . i know dr. t. will sweat and fume , and bestir all his knacks of rhetorick to avoid these consequences of his doctrine : i expect he will pelt me with ironies and bitter jeers , cavil at unelegant words , tell me what some divines of ours say , and perhaps mistake them all the while , stoutly deny all my conclusions instead of answering my discourse , nay fall into another peevish fit of the spleen , and say i have no forehead for driving on his principles to such conclusions as he ( who was too busie at words to mind or amend his reasons ) never dream't of . therefore to defend my forehead , it were not amiss to make use of some phylacteries containing such expressions taken out of his first sermon as best discover to us his thoughts as to the certainty and uncertainty of his positive proofs , and the point it self as prov'd by them , i mean the existence of a deity , or a creation . such as are serm. p. . a being suppos'd of infinite goodness , and wisdom and power , is a very likely cause of these things . — what more likely to make this vast world &c. — what more likely to communicate being — what more likely to contrive this admirable frame of the world — this seems no unreasonable account — p. . the controversie between vs and this sort of atheists , comes to this , which is the more credible opinion , that the world was never made , &c. or that there was from all eternity such a being as we conceive god to be — now , comparing the probabilities of things , that we may know on which side the advantage lies , &c. — p. . the question whether the world was created or not , — can onely be decided by testimony and probabilities of reason ; testimony is the principal argument in a thing of this nature ; and if fair probabilities of reason concur with it , &c. — p. . the probabilities of reason do all likewise favour the beginning of the world. — p. . another probability is , &c. — p. . these are the chief probabilities on our side ; which being taken together , and in their united sence have a great deal of conviction in them . § . . upon these words and expressions of his , i make these reflexions . . that ( as appears by his own stating the point p. . ) he makes it amount to the same question ( as indeed it does ) whether there were a creation , or a first being creating the world , whom we call god ; so that all his proofs are indifferently to be taken , as aim'd to evince one as well as the other . . that , this being so , he stands not heartily to any one argument he brings , as able to conclude the truth of a deity 's or creator's existence . . that his words which are expressive of the evidence of his g●ounds and the certainty of the point , ( viz. that there is a god ) manifest too plainly that he judges ( according to his speculative thoughts at least ) he has neither one nor the other . for , if it be but likely , though it be exceedingly such , yet ( as common experience teaches us ) it may notwithstanding be false : if the account he gives of a deity creating the world , be onely no unreasonable one , this signifies onely that it has some reason or other for it ; and every man knows that seldom or never did two wits discourse contrary positions , or lawyers plead for contrary causes , or preachers preach for contrary opinions , but there was some reasons produc'd by them for either side ; and , so , for any thing he has said , the atheist may come to give no unreasonable account too that there is no deity , though it be something less reasonable than that for a deity . and if the controversie between atheists and us be onely this , whether is the more credible opinion , then the other opinion , ( viz. that there was no creation , or is no god ) is yielded to be credible too , though not so credible as that there is . also , if we ought to compare the probabilities of things that we may know on which side the advantage lies , 't is intimated to us , and granted that 't is probable there is no god , though it be more probable there is ; and while 't is but probable , though it be very much more , yet it may very easily be false ; as every days experience teaches us in a thousand instances , wherein our selves were mistaken through the whole course of our lives ; which commonly happen'd when the far more probable side prov'd false , else we had not inclin'd to think it true , and by that means been mistaken . again , if the probabilities of reason do but favour our side , 't is a sign that the small strength they have when they do their utmost , is not earnestly and heartily engag'd neither in the patronage of our cause , or in proving it probable there 's a god ; but onely incline favourably towards us rather than the other ; besides , those who are of moderate tempers use to be favourable to every body ; and there is not in the whole world such sweet , soft-natur'd , melting , pliable , tender-hearted , compassionate and indulgent things as these same probabilities : they are ever at hand to lend their weak help to any body that wants a good argument , and will fit any cause in the world , good or bad : yet for all their kind and gentle behaviour in obliging none to assent to them , or say as they do , as your rude demonstrations use , i have notwithstanding a kind of prejudice against them ; which is , that they are false hearted , and use to play jack-a-both-sides most egregiously ; for scarce was there ever any tenet in the world so absurd , but , when not one good reason durst appear for it , this tatling gossip , dame probability , would for all that undertake it ; and let her have but her neat chamber-maid rhetorick to trick her up with laces , spangles , curles , patches , and other such pretty baubles , she will dare to incounter with any truth in the world , or maintain the most absurd paradox imaginable , as dr. t. and his friend well know , else they would be out of heart ever to write more . and this is the reason , i conceive , why p. . he calls them fair ; saying , if fair probabilities of reason concur with testimony ; and no less than thrice in the same page he makes mention of fair proofs : he says not good proofs , or conclvsive that the thing is trve , or that there 's a god ; no , take heed of that ; this would quite take the business out of the hand of probability , which a rhetorical divine ought not to do ; for nothing suits with rhetorick's humour so well as probabi●ity does , and demonstration cares not one straw for her : but he gives them their just due , and calls them onely fair proofs , and fair probabilities , that is , pretty , plausible and taking ; and if they were not so of themselves , what is there which a little daubing with rhetorical varnish will not make fair ! but the upshot o● sum total of his proofs is the best sport , if it were not most pernicious ; 't is this , that these fair probabilities taken together and in their united force , have a great deal of conviction in them . which amounts to this plain confession , though couch'd in wary terms , that there is not one good proof amongst them all , yet many bad ones put together will make a good one . i know indeed that a concurrence of many likelihoods renders a thing more probable , and encourages us to outward action ; but to think that many probabilities will reach that indivisible point in which truth , and consequently our assent to any thing as a truth , is found , is quite to mistake the nature of truth and assent too , which consist in is or is not ; and since to convince rationally is to conclude the thing is , i desire dr. t's logick to inform the world how ( since a probable proof is that which onely concludes the thing probable , and consequently many probable ones are terminated in rendring it more probable ) how , i say , many proofs onely probable , can conclude the thing to be more than probable , that is , to be certainly , or convince the understanding that 't is ; unless they happen to engage some nature or other , and consequent●y some identical proposition ; which dr. t. neither pretends , nor goes about to show , but on the other side declares himself an utter enemy to such principles , and consequently to such a way of discourse . § . . in a word , dr. t's positive proofs of a godhead are reducible to these two heads , humane testimony and probabilities of reason , ( as appears by his own words serm. p. , . ) and testimony ( which p. . he tells us is the principal argument in a thing of this nature ) he divides into vniversal tradition and written history : now written history is not therefore true because 't is writ , but depends upon living authority or tradition to authenticate it ; and how ridiculous he would make the certainty of tradition , even that which is confessedly grounded on the sensations of great multitudes which is vastly above this here spoken of , is seen in h●s rule of faith ; and here again he tells us , pref. p. . all humane testimony is fallible ( and so all built on it is possible to be false ) for this plain reason , because all men are fallible : wherefore , according to his grounds , 't is concluded there may possibly be no god , for any thing humane testimony says to the point ; and 't is as evident from the very word , that probabilities of reason , though never such fair ones , conclude as little . lastly , he tells us serm. p . that fair probabilities of reason concurring with testimony , this argument has all the strength it can have : and thus dr. t. instead of proving there is a god , has endeavour'd to make out very learnedly that it may be there 's no such thing , and that neither reason nor authority can evince the truth of the point . § . . i omit his abusing the word testimony ( which is built on sensations ) in alledging it to prove a creation , which neither was nor could be subject to the senses of the first mankind , nor consequently could the persuasion of future deliverers and writers have for its source attestation or testimony : i omit also his neg●ecting to make use of testimony to prove miracles , god's proper effect , which are subject to sense , and which both christians , jews and heathens of all nations and times , both unanimously have and the first seers could properly attest . i suppose his confidence in his rhetorick made him chuse the worser arguments to show how prettily he could make them look ; or perhaps the genius of things lie so , that the slightest arguments most need , and so best suit with rhetorical discoursers . § . . by this time i suppose gentlemen , there will appear just reason for that moderate and civil hint i gave dr. t. in my introduction to faith vindicated , of the weakness of his grounds , in these words : in which sermon , under the title of the [ wisdom of being religious ] and a great many seeming shows , and i heartily think very real intentions of impugning atheism , by an ill-principled and ( in that circumstance ) imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent terms of the possible falsehood of faith , nay even as to the chiefest and most fundamental point , the tenet of a deity , religio● receives a deep wound , and atheism an especial advantage , as may perhaps be more particularly shown hereafter — after which i give his sermon all its due commendations , and then subjoyn , onely i could wish he had right principles to ground his discourse ; without which he can never make a controvertist , but must needs undermine the solid foundation of christianity , if he undertake to meddle with the grounds of it , even while he goes about to defend it . these were my words then , and i am sorry he would needs dare and provoke me to make them good . in which , if i have justified my self too particularly , let him blame himself . all this while i seriously declare that i am far from thinking that dr. t. himself is not assur'd that there is a god ; and farther yet from imagining that already holding one , he should hold it possible afterwards god should cease to be ; which ridiculous folly ( constant to his prevaricating humour ) he puts upon me , p. . what i affirm is , that his ill principles do equivalently confess it possible there neither is nor ever was a god ; and this i have abundantly shown out of his own words . yet i doubt not but himself , through god's goodness , has by practical self-evidence ( in the same manner the vulgar , who are no speculaters or scholars , also have it ) absolute certainty of the existence of a deity , in despight of his weak speculations ; nay , that in this very sermon he hath one or two proofs which have in them the force of a demonstration ; though his not understanding and so ill-managing of them , and then calling them probabilities , has endeavour'd , all that may be , to render them good for nothing . i end with some of his own words , pref. p. . that if dr. t. did in truth believe that the existence of a deity or a creation , are ( as he says , serm. p. . ) so evident , that they can hardly be made plainer than they are of themselves , he should by all means have let them alone ; for they were in a very good condition to shift for themselvs ; but his blind and sceptical way of proving them is enough to cast a mist about the clearest truths in the world . and i must take the liberty to admonish him that it lies not in the power of all the enemies of christianity in the world to do it half that mischief as one christian divine may ; who by his earnestness manifests a desire to do the best he can ; by the vogue he bears seems able to do the best that may be done ; yet produces not any one proof which he vouches to be absolutely conclusive of the truth either of christianity , or a deity , but rather by his carriage denies there are any such , while he talks of likelihood , probability , more credible opinion , moral certainty , and such-like , whose very names ought not to be heard or endur'd in a discourse aiming to settle the grounds of faith , or the tenet of a deity . let him consider that he must take his measure of the certainty of grounds from the object or thing , not from our freedom from doubt , and such-like , for these may be light and silly , whereas the grounds of faith being ●aid by god , must necessarily be wise and solid ; and , so , when look'd into , absolutely-conclusive of the thing . let us then who hold a god , ( leaving creatures to their weaknesses ) vindicate our maker from the scandalous imputation of governing mankind tyrannically , by commanding us to assent th●t a thing is , which at the same time we see may not be ; so obliging us to hold ( contrary to the light of nature , and the very first principles which himself had ingrafted in us ) that what is , is at the same time possible not to be ; and to profess a point true , nay dy to attest its truth , which may perhaps be shown false to morrow , nay which our selves see may be now false . he tells us here in common p. . and he tels us truly , that which way soever we turn our selvs we are incountred with clear evidences and sensible demonstrations of a deity : why does he then coming to make out that point , say , the nature of the thing will not bear clear demonstration , and that onely mathematical matters are capable of it ? why pursues he not such proofs as these , and makes them out , and stands by them , and reduces them to first principles , and so obliges humane nature to assent to them under evident forfeiture of their sincerity and even manhood ? is he afraid clear evidences and sensible demonstrations will not necessarily conclude ? why does he put suppositions that the thing were , and then argue thus blindly , that since supposing it were it would give no more light of it self than it does , therefore it is ? is there any necessity for such a ridiculous perplexing and inconclusive method , when we may vouch we have clear evidences and demonstrations ? lastly , why does he distrust the objects strength , and explain our assurance of a deity and faith by moral certainty , or such as will satisfie prudent men in humane affairs , probabilities amassed together , not doubting , and other such-like feeble diminutive expressions ? are not clear evidences and sensible demonstrations ( that is , demonstrations à posteriori ) in point of certainty incomparably beyond such quivering grounds and such dwindling adhesions ? i wish dr. t. would take these things into his better thoughts , and , at least by amending his expressions and reasons hereafter , make some tolerable satisfaction for this intolerable injury done to faith and god's church . discourse vi. that dr. t. makes all the grounds of christian faith possible to be false . of infallibility , demonstration , and moral certainty . § . . thus much to justifie my first charge that dr. t. made that fundamental tenet of a deity ; and consequently all religion possible to be false . my second charge is , that he particularly makes all christian faith possible to be false , and 't is found faith vindicated , p. . where i put down his own words which concern that purpose ; though he , who , presuming on the partiality of his friends , takes the liberty to say any thing which even eye-sight may confute , assures his reader pag. . that i durst not cite them . i laid my charge in this tenor : 't is necessarily consequent from the foregoing paragraphs , that , if i have discours't right in this small treatise of mine , and have proved that faith , and consequently its grounds , must be impossible to be false , then mr. t.'s confession , p. . ( to which mr. st.'s doctrine is consonant ) that [ it is possible to be otherwise ( that is , to be false ) that any book is so antient as it pretends to be , or that it was written by him whose name it bears , or that this is the sence of such and such passages in it ] is a clear conviction that neither is the book-rule , he maintains the true rule of faith ( § . . ) nor have he and his friends true faith , ( § . . ) and consequently there being no other rule owned ( taking away private spirit ) but tradition , that tradition is the only-true rule of faith , ( § . . ) and so the main of sure-footing stands yet firm . and , lastly , 't is evinc't that his own book which opposes it , opposes the only-true , because the only impossible-to-be-false , ground of faith ; that is , he is convinc't in that supposition to go about to undermine all christian faith : whence the title of his probable-natur'd book ( rule of faith ) is manifested to be an improper nickname , and the book it self , to merit no reply . you see here , gentlemen , how great stress i lay upon dr. t.'s confession , that the ground of his faith ( and consequently his faith it self ) is possible to be false : and really , if he clears himself of it , i must acknowledg i suffer a very great defeat , because i so much build upon it : if he does not , he is utterly overthrown as to all intents and purposes , either of being a good writer , or a solid christian divine , and he will owe the world satisfaction for the injury done to faith , and the souls of those whom his doctrine has perverted , by turning their faith which ought to be an assent whose grounds ( and consequently it self are impossible to be an error , or false , into opinion ) whose grounds ( and , by consequence , it self ) are possible to be such ; and , lastly , unless he avoids or r●●ants this error objected , all he has written 〈◊〉 ●●nvinc't without any more ado , to be again●●●ith and its true grounds ; and so it will be quite overthrown in the esteem of all those who have the nature of faith writ in their hearts ; and that 't is impossible an act of right faith ( that is , an asse●● built on those grounds god has left in the church for mankind to embrace faith , and commanded them to believe upon those grounds , whether scripture's letter , or the churches voice ) should be an error , or the profession of it a lye ; which all sober protestants , presbyterians , nay almost all sects , except some few witty men , inclining much by reading such authours , to scepticism ; that is , inclining to be nothing at all ( & perhaps some socinians ) reject , abhominate , and hate with all their hearts . the charge is laid , and the case is put , now let us come to the trial : which ere we do , i desire those readers who have dr. t.'s preface by them to read his th . page , or else his whole page . in his rule of faith , lest either of us may injure him by a wrong apprehension . i discourse thus , § ▪ . first , 't is evident that he who makes the ground and rule of faith possible to be false ▪ makes faith it self such likewise ; since nothing is or can be stronger than the grounds it stands on . next , the rule of faith to dr. t. is the scripture's letter , and consequently that what he conceives the sense of the scripture is god's sense , or faith. lastly , that in the place now cited and related by him , he speaks of the authority of the book of scripture , and of its sence , as he acknowledges here , page . these things thus premised , i put him this dil●mma . either he holds what he conceives to to be the sence of scripture ( that is his faith ) true , or he does not : if he holds it not to be true , then 't is unavoidable he must hold it ( at least ) possible to be false , if not actually such . but if he says he holds it to be true , then since after he had spoke of the security he had , or had not of the book and sense of scripture , he immediately subjoyns these very words , it is possible all this ●ay be otherwise : he as evidently says that what he conceives the book of scripture ▪ and sence of such or such passages in it ( that is his faith ) is possible to be false , as 't is that what 's otherwise than trve , is false . i do not know how dr. t. could possibly speak more plainly what i charge him with , than he has done in those words , unless he should use the word [ false ] which too candid and rude expression , would expose him openly to the dislike of all sober m●n , and therefore he disguiz'd it in its more moderate equivalent [ otherwise . ] i say equivalent : and , if it be not , i would gladly know of him what the word [ otherwise ] relates to : human language forbids that any thing can be said to be otherwise unless it be otherwise than something . i ask then otherwise than what does he mean , when , being in the circumstance of discoursing , what security he had of the antiquity , writers , and sence of scripture , he told us , it is possible to may be otherwise ? is it not as evident as words can express , he must mean , it is possible the book of scripture is not so anti●nt as the apostles time : it is possible it was not writ by the apostles and evangelists : it is possible this is not the sence of it in such passages as concern faith ; for to these , and these only our discourse , and the nature and title of his book determin'd it ; which amounts to this , that none has absolute certainty of either letter or sence of scripture , nor consequently of his faith , in case it be solely grounded upon that , as he professes . see reader , how all truths even the most sacred ones go to wrack , when men fram'd only for fine talk undertake to prove ; and how parallel his defence of the ground of all christian faith is to that he gave us lately of the existence of a deity : he so prov'd a god , that he granted it possible there might be none , and now he so proves scripture to be a rule , that he grants it possible it may be no rule , since common sence tells us that can never be an intellectual rule which followed may lead into errour . by which we see dr. t. needed here the blessing ( as he calls it ) of that identical proposition [ a rule 's a rule ] else he would not write a book to prove scripture a rule , and then ever and anon in equivalent language tell us 't is none . i wish he would now and then reflect upon such evident truths ; and not out of an openly-declar'd feud against those first principles fall thus perpetually into manifest contradictions . § . . but how does dr. t. clear himself of this charge of mine , or how comes he off from his own words ? first , he again puts down those very words , which say over and over what i charge upon him ; and then asks very confidently where he says any such thing ? which is just as wise a craft as children use when they hoodwink themselves , and then tell the by-standers they shall not see them . next , he tells us , that all , he sayes , is , that we are not infallible in judging of the antiquity of a book , or the sence of it , meaning that we cannot demonstrate these things so , as to to shew the contrary necessarily involves a contradiction ; but yet , &c. is this all he sayes ? what then is become of those famous words , [ it is possible all this may be otherwise ; ] which were onely objected ? but let us examine what he does acknowledge . whether he be infallibly certain or no , it matters not : but it should be shewn why , if scripture be the sole ground of faith , some at least in the world who are to govern and instruct the church should not be thus certain of both in case we be bound to assent , and ( as we questionless are ) dy to attest the points of our faith to be absolutely-certain truths . again , if dr. t. be not infallibly certain of these things , then let him say he is fallibly certain of it ; which done , nature will shew him how perfect nonsence he speaks ; whence the same nature will tell him with a little reflexion , that , since the word infallibly can with good sence be joyn'd with the word certain , either 't is adeqaate to that word , and extends its sence as far as the others , and then there is no certainty where there is not infallibility ; or it does not extend as far as the word certain ; and then we may be certain of some things yet not-infallibly certain ; which , since [ not-infallibly ] means [ fallibly ] signifies clearly we may be fallibly certain of those things : but common sence teaches us how ridiculous 't is to say , we are fallibly certain of any thing . 't is most evident therefore and demonstrable , that there is no certainty but where there is infallibility ; and that we can never be said to be truly certain of any thing , till all circumstances consider'd , we see our selves out of possibility of being deceived , hic & nunc , in that very thing . whence dr. t. denying infallible assurance of both letter and sence of scripture , is convinc'd to deny all true certainty of either , and so to render all faith built upon it uncertain , that is , possible to be false ; and , could he with sense take the other part of the distinction , and say , he is fallibly certain of it , yet the guilt of the same position will still remain with him . this logical demonstration i produc'd in faith vindicated , pag. . of which dr , t. takes notice here pag. thus : mr. s. is pl●as'd to say that certainty and infallibility are all one : concealing thus from his reader i had ever prov'd it ( lest he should be oblig'd ●o speak to my proofs , which he neither likes nor uses ) and bears himself as if i had only said it : which suppos'd , then indeed his bare saying the contrary was a competent answer . this done , he confutes it manfully with telling his readers , i am the first man that ev●r said it , and that 't is foolish . i beseech you , gentlemen , is it the fashion in the univeesities to solve arguments on this manner ? that is , to neglect the premisses , call the conclusion foolish , and think to overthrow the reason in the opinion of his readers ▪ because 't is not some hackney argument , brought into play perhaps an hundred times over , and ninety nine times answer'd , but now produc'd first ? certainly , one would think in reason that what has been many times alledg'd should rather be slighted , because it may have received already many answers , and not such pcoofs as first appear , because 't is certain they never yet had any at all , nor do i conceive that the noble and learned virtuosi of the royal society use to reject any production because the author of it is the first that invented it ; but , they allow it examination , and , if it hold the trial , approve it , and commend the author . § . . i shall endeavour to give him another argument of the necessity of admitting infallibility , though i have good reason to fear he will afford it again no other answer but only this , that i am the first man that ever produc'd it . 't is this . taking the word [ false ] or [ falsus ] subjectively , or as in the subject , that is , as making the jugment false or erroneous : 't is a participle of the verb [ fallor ] and signifies deceived actually , to which corresponds as its proper power [ fallible ] or , capable to be deceived : now the contrary to [ false ] thus understood , is true , taken also subjectively , or as making the judgment which in it is true or un-erroneous in that its act. wherefore the proper power corresponding to that act must necessarily be that which is oppos'd to fallible , that is [ infallible . ] again , taking the word false objectively , or as found in the proposition which is the object or cause of our judgment as 't is false or actually deceived : it s proper power corresponding to it is [ capable to deceive . ] wherefore , also , taking its opposit [ truth ] objectively , or for the object of our judgment when 't is true , the proper power corresponding to it must be incapable to deceive . 't is concluded then from both these considerations , that we can neither affirm points or propositiont of faith ( which are the objects of such acts ) true , but we must affirm withal that they are incapable to make us judge erroneously while we assent to them ; nor that our judgment or act of faith can be true or un-erroneous , but we must be infallible in so judging . thus far concerning the necessity of admitting infallibility , if we once put our assents or acts of faith to be true judgments . from which 't is a different question to ask how we become thus infallible ; onely 't is evident , that , in case the former proposition be put , ( viz , that we must affirm our acts of faith true , ) infallible we must be , or impossible to be in an errour when we make those acts. but now , to this infallibility in those acts god's providence leads men diversly according to their several degrees of capacity : those who are arriv'd to a great pitch of learning come to it by absolutely-concluding proofs , call'd demonstrations , that is , by penetrating the nature of the authority on which it is built : and , such men can make out clearly and distinctly to their own thoughts the certainty of that authority , by discoursing it to themselves & others ; they can resolve it into its grounds , meet with and answer objections , and in a word , see themselves to be infallibly certain of it . in these men therefore , though the truth of their tenet be indeed taken from the object ( as 't is always ) yet the clearness , distinctness , and firm strength of it springs from the perfection of their well-cultivated understanding . those who are of a weak pitch are led to it by practical self-evidence of the nature of authority , and of the way in common by which they receive faith ; which dim , rude sight , even in the simplest , serves to carry them on to act according to right nature when they assent ; but they cannot discourse their thoughts , nor resolve them into principles , nor answer objections , nor see themselves clearly to be infallibly certain . nay more , the greatest part of these , especially if very simple , do by some lucky chance ( or rather by a particular disposition of gods good providence ) light upon this right way , more than by any strength of their own wit , looking into grounds ; but , being in it once , they find that which satisfies them according to knowledges familiariz'd to them by converse with the world , and which are of themselves , solid and satisfactory . in a word , it became gods goodness so to order things , that the acts of all the faithful might be as much as was possible in men of every pitch and capacity , rational or virtuous ; whatever contingency may happen in some particulars ; original sin , and by it , passion , ignorance , or interest sometimes byassing them and making them act with precipitancy . in which case whatever is good in those acts of faith is refunded into god , the author of every good gift as its original cause ; what defective , into the limitedness and imperfection of creatures . § . . this tenet of infallibility which unprejudic'd nature teaches even the rudest in things subject to sense and common reason , and learned men in things provable by exact art , the adversaries of true certainty , our scepticks in religion , endeavour to render ridiculous and cast a mist about it by the most unreasonable pretence that ever was invented ; which is , to affirm that a man cannot be infallible in one thing but he must be so in all . as if i could not infallibly know what 's done in my chamber or practic'd openly amongst those i converse with , but i must be likewise infallible in knowing what is done in the moon . and dr. t. is one of these ; ( for contradiction is as natural to him , as 't is to a fish to swim ) : who tells us here pag. . that omniscience within a determinate sphere , is an infinite within a finite sphere ; as if it were very evident that to know all in such a matter is to know infinit , or all things in the world ; or so hard to comprehend that one may know all the money in ones purse without knowing all the money that is extant , or all the men in the room without knowing all mankind ; i wish dr. t. would shew us why knowing all in such a particular matter must needs argue an infinit knowledg ; or why the knowing all things ▪ [ in a determinate sphere ] ( which last words when he came to answer , that is , break his jests , our prevaricator prudently omitted ; ) may not consist with an ignorance of many things out of that sphere : must the word all in such a matter needs signifie infinit ? or did the commonest reason ever thus go wrack ? i suppose my friends resolute hazard against identical propositions made him fall into this more than childish mistake : for this plain truth , what 's all but in one matter onely , is , all but in one matter onely , had preserv'd him from this nonsense ; but he took this for his ground to proceed upon , that all in one matter onely , 〈◊〉 all in every matter , or , which is more , is infinit , and so still he continues most learnedly to lay contradictions for his first principles , because their interest , and his are inseparably link● against the common enemy , identical propositions ▪ this i must confess is a very smart and ing●nious kind of reasoning , and proper to dr. t. unless perhaps his sworn brother at hating first principles and papists , put in for a share ; it appears by a certain paper , called dr. stillingfleet against dr. stillingfleet , he is a strong pretender , and will cry halfs . but 't is time now to return to examine his answer . § . it is not necessary indeed to truth that every one should demonstrate a thing so as to shew that the contrary necessarily involves ● contradiction ; for the same thing may be known also through practical self-evidence to those who cannot demonstrate ▪ but yet the thing must be demonstrable , else 't is not knowable or ascertainable . for demonstrable is a plain honest word , what game soever dr. t. and his friend make at it , and imports no more abstracting from subtle quirks , but only capable to be known , or intellectually seen by way of proof ; whence , a learned man who goes about to prove any thing by strength of severe reason , ought either to demonstrate it , or he falls short of his d●●y . once more i desire dr. t. to take me right , and to reflect that when i say , the thing is demonstrable , or pretend to demonstrate , i do not take the word demonstration with all those many subtleties and perquisits the schools require ; i as little love niceties as any man living , and can as easily dispense with them so the solid part be well provided for , and the truth of the thing establisht , which if it be not done , i make account nothing is done , in these cases in which assent & dying to attest things to be truths are required . i onely mean then by demonstration such a proof as is taken not from any exrinsecal consideration , as is authority , which grounds belief , but from the intrinsecal nature of the thing or subject in dispute , and such a proof as necessarily concludes the thing to be ; which cannot be possibly done without engaging finally some identical proposition , or that things being what it is , on which all is built . now , this being evidently so , ( and if it be not , let dr. t. shew the contrary ) i would ask our verbal divine , why he ought not to demonstrate , that is , prove by necessary concluding argument both the letter and sence of scripture , if he would have men assent most firmly to faith built according to him solely ▪ upon their certainty ? is it not his intent in his discourses to conclude ▪ what he speaks of ? how can he do this unless he shews the conclusion necessarily follows ? again , does he not intend to conclude 't is a truth , that this is the letter and sence of scripture ? he must do so , or else he can never pretend that faith built upon it is truth : and if he proves it tru● , must he not at the same time , prove it's contradictory false : and is any thing false but what says a thing is so , when indeed 't is not so ; or is not so , when indeed 't is so : which is a direct contradiction . wherefore dr. t. can never conclude a thing to be true , unless he brings a proof necessarily engaging the nature of the thing , that is unless ( according to my sence of the word ) he both demonstrates , and also shews the contrary necessarily to involve a contradiction . both these satisfactory certainties , my grounds attribute to scriptures letter and sence ( see sur●f ▪ pag. , ▪ ) in points appertaining to faith , and he here denies both , pag. . whence is seen which of us two has more real honour and respect for scripture : he who makes neither its letter or sence to have any grounds able to ascertain them , that is , as to our purpose makes them good for nothing , or i who grant and prove both . § . . i suppose dr. t ▪ will say again as he did in that point of a deity , that the nature of the thing will not bear a certainty of scriptures letter or sence , that so he may be true to his firm principle , and make all faith alike uncertain . i answer , the more blame will fall to their share , who take away the certainty of that which is the first principle in way of authority , or , first authority , namely tradition , which , and onely which can authenticate books ; and , the thing being of high concern , practically carry down the same doctrine ; and so easily preserve the book significative of the same sence ▪ no● doubt i , but 't is demonstrable that the practice of england , and the concern of the thing joyn'd with the necessary evidence of any alteration in a matter daily so nicely canvast and continually us'd , can and will with infallible certainty , bring down the letter of magna charta , the statute book , and some acts of parliament , the self-same , from year to year , at least in matters of high consequence ; and by means of the sense , writ traditionally in some mens hea●ts , correct the letter , if printers or copiers should mistake . if dr. t. asks how i prove it : i would tell him that the nature of the thing must make it notorious , if altered ; be cause great multitudes are conversant in it , and it being esteemed of a kind of sacred nature , weigh every tittle of it warily , especially those passages that immediately touch some weighty point ; whence should some whose interest 't is to alter it , go about such an action , it cannot appear a good to the generality , whose concerns are highly violated by that alteration , to conceal and permit the letter to remain uncorrected : and if it could not appear a good to the generality to consent to alter it , nor become a motive to the rest to attempt a seen impossiblity , neither one nor the other could will to alter it , much less both conspire to do it ; and should they attempt it , their will must either have no object and then 't is a power to nothing ( that is , no power ) or else act without an appearing good ▪ and , in both cases the will would be no will. this short hint will let the reader see the grounds i go upon : 't is not now a proper place to pursue such arguments close , or press them home . i wish i might see some return of the like nature from our two undemonstrating adversaries , who think it their best play to laugh at principles and demonstration , because they know in their consciences they are perfect strangers to both . § . well : but though dr. t. denies any infallible certainty of the ground of all christian faith , let 's see at least what other certainty he affords us . and , at the first sight any honest man might safely swear it must be ( if any ) a fallible certainty , that is , a very fair piece of nonsense ; for 't is evident to all mankind ( the abhorrers of first principles always excepted ) that if any certainty be infallible , and there be any other besides this , it must needs be a fallible one , since there can be no middle between contradictaries : so that dr. t. is put to this hard choice , either to bring such a certainty for the ground of all christianity which is no certainty , or else such an one as is perfect nonsense , if it be named by its proper name . l●t's see what choice he makes . we are not ( sayes he ) infallibly certain that any book , &c. but yet ( observe now the opposit kind of certainty delivered here pag. . ) we have a firm assurance concerning these matters , so as not to make the least doubt of them . i marry , this is a rare certainty indeed ! we have not infallible certainty ( sayes dr. t. ) of either letter or sense of scripture , but onely such an one as keeps us from making the least doubt of them . now , since a very easie reflexion teaches us that we have no doubt of many things being true , nay more , have strong hopes they are true , and yet for all that , hold them notwithstanding possible to be false ; 't is a strange argument to prove he avows not the possible falshood of faith , to alledge that he declared himself he had onely such an assurance , as not at all to doubt it : for [ not to doubt ] a thing signifies no more , but [ not to incline to think it false ] which a man may do , and yet not at all hope , 't is true ; seeing he who suspends indifferently from both sides , and inclines to neither , does not at all doubt a thing , or fear 't is false , having no imaginable reason to ground the least degree of any such fear , more than he has to ground any hope of its truth . again , those speculators who attend not to principles are oftentimes in a perplex'd case , and through the goodness of nature , hold a thing absolutely true , while they attend to such motives as connaturally breed that perswasion , which thing notwithstanding coming to make it out as scholars , and unable to perform it , hereupon consider'd as speculators they must hold possible to be false for any thing they know : and this i conceive is dr. t's condition . regarding the nature of faith , and the common conceit of christianity , he cannot but see he must , if he will be a christian , profess faith impossible to be false ; and doublesly he will avow it such as long as he speaks nature , and avoids reflecting on his speculative thoughts ; but , coming once to consider the points of faith , as standing under such proofs as his unskilful art affords him , and conscious to himself ( as he needs must who sleights first principles , and all methods to knowledge ) that he hath never an argument that is absolutely or truly conclusive , he is forc'd again , taking in these unlucky circumstances , to avow faiths ground , and consequently its self to be possible to be otherwise , or false ; being willing to lay the blame on the grounds of faith , and to say , they cannot bear absolutely-conclusive proofs , rather than on the defectiveness of his own skill ; and to represent them as unworthy to have the name of stable grounds , rather than he will lose a tittle of the fame of being an able divine . yet i will not say , but the christian in dr. t. might overcome the speculator , at least ballance him in an equal suspence , or beget in him a pretty good conceit of faith's impossibility to be false ; but then , when he once reflects that this cannot be maintain'd without admitting infallibility , which is the word the abhominable papists use , nor made out without using first principles , or identical propositions ( which that malignant man i. s. pretends to build on ) immediately the byass prevails , and the idea of popery once stirred up ( which haunts his and his friends fancy day and night in a thousand hideous shapes ● he runs in a fright so far from impossibility of falshood in faith , that he comes to a very easie possibility of its being all a plain imposture or ly for any thing he absolutely knows , since grounds prevailing onely to make him not doub● of it , can raise it no higher . moreover , if this be a good argument , [ i declar'd my self so assur'd as not to make the least doubt of a thing , therefore i could not avow it possible to be false ] it must be allow'd argumentative to say , i am so assured as not in the least to doubt of it , therefore 't is not possible to be false . dull universities ! that had not the wit to light all this while on dr. t's principles and way of arguing ! they ascertain all things at the first dash without more adoe . i have a firm assurance so as not to doubt of the grounds of christian faith , the letter and sense of scripture , therefore by this new logick , they are concluded certain and impossible to be false : in opposition to which , if you tell him the firmness of a rational assent ought to be taken from principles or the object , not from the subject's firmly adhering to it , and admonish him that this later sort of firmness without the other signifies nothing but an irrational resolution to hold a thing right or wrong , he cuts you off short , and blames the grounds of christian faith , telling you the nature of the things will bear no more . at which if your reason repines , and begins to despair of satisfaction , he tells you smartly that you contradict a first and firm principle , that to have as much assurance as the thing affords you , is to be certain of it . prodigious folly ! not to distinguish between these two most evident notions [ i am fully perswaded ] and [ the thing is certainly so . ] and alledging our not doubting or strong adhesion to a thing , for an competent explication of that certainty which ought to be the greatest in the whole world , since more sacred concerns than any the world can shew are built upon it ; which adhesion also , as nature teaches us , is very frequently an effect of passion : common experience manifesting it to be a fault annext to the very nature of man , that his u●derstanding is liable to be byast by his will , where his very essence is not concern'd , so as not to make the least doubt of , may more , oftentimes to hold firmly whatever habitual prejudice , affection to friends , precipitate hast , or fullen ignorance has once addicted him to . all i can imagine in dr. t's behalf is this , that he must alledge he conceives this assurance or firm adhesion is a proper effect of the object working it in his understanding , and that therefore he could not have this firm assurance or adhesion to it unless the thing were indeed such in it self . this every intelligent man sees is his only way to come off ; but this he neither has attempted to do , nor ever shall be in the least able to compass , till he retract his costly anger against first principles , his drollish abuses against demonstration , his accusing the things of invisibleness instead of blaming his own bad eyes ; and lastly , his miscall'd firm principle , which makes all built upon it , no better than empty contradiction . yet if he pleases to shew us that the object doth rationally assure him the thing is so , by affording such proofs as of their own nature are able to make us assent firmly to it as a truth , and not only incline us towards it as a likelihood , let him go to work logically ( that being the proper science in this case ) and shew us how , and by what virtue any proof of his is able to effect this , and i promise him faithfully to respect and treat him with a great deal of honour , though his performance comes off never so short . but i foresee three insuperable difficulties lie in his way ; first , that he sees his cause cannot bear it , for which he still blames the nature of the thing . next , that the deep study , or the most learned science of elegant expressions so totally possesses his mind , it will not let logick have any part in his thought : and lastly , if it does , yet he may hap to meet there with some unelegant terms of art which will quite fright him from his business , and make him forswear the most evident truths in the world . § . but he hath only skirmish'd hitherto , now ●he comes to close dispute and will prove that , take faith how i will , he does not in these words avow the possible falshood of faith , and , that he may not fail to hit right on my meaning of the word faith , he divides the text , and gives us many senses of that word , & those as ridiculous as he could imagine , which would make the unexamining reader judg verily that i were out of my wits to take the word [ faith ] in such absurd meanings , and then hold it impossible to be false . this done , he shews himself a most victorious conquerour and confutes me powerfully from pag. . to pag. . at least , would not dr. t's . best friend , so he were but any thing ingenuous , think he might safely swear that either he did not know what i meant by the word [ faith , ] when i say faith is impossible to be false , or else candidly acknowledg that he is strangely insincere to counterfeit so many imaginary tenets , and then one by one confute them , read them here from the middle of pag. . to pag. . and then reflect on my words found in my introduction to faith vindicated , pag. ▪ which are these : to ask then if faith can possibly be false , is to ask whether the motives laid by gods providence for mankind , or his church to embrace christian faith , must be such as of their own nature , cannot fail to conclude those points true ; and to affirm that faith is not possible to be false , is equivalently to assert that those motives , or the rule of faith , must be thus absolutely conclusive , firm , and immovable . hence is seen that i concern not my self in this discourse with how perfectly , or imperfectly , divers persons penetrate those motives ; or how they satisfie or dissatisfie some particular persons ; since i only speak of the nature of those motives in themselves , and as laid in second causes by gods providence , to light mankind in their way to faith : to which the dimness of eye-sight , neglect to look at all , or looking the wrong way , even in many particular men , is extrinsecal and contingent . observe , gentlemen , what exquisite care i took to declare my meaning so perfectly , that the common regard to readers , and his own reputation , might restrain dr. t. from imposing wilfully a wrong sence , to which habitual fault i knew he had otherwise most strong inclinations : observe next , that all his confute is wholly built on this known mistake . hence his objecting the weak understandings of some believers ; which is both forestal'd by the wo●ds now cited , declaring that i only speak of the motives to light mankind or the church to faith , and what they are of their own nature , or in themselves , not how perfectly or imperfectly others penetrate them ; besides i put this very objection against my self ( faith vindicated , p. . ) and answer it ; which he , never acknowledging it was mine , puts here as his own against me , without taking the least notice of my answer there given . the last meaning he gives of the word [ faith , ] which is the means and motives to faith , is nearest to mine : but , because he leaves out the consideration of their being ordained by god for his church ▪ as also of what they are in their own nature , or by virtue of the object , and speaks of them only as in the worst subject , viz. in weak persons which penetrate them very little , he misses wholly my sense , and so impugns me nor at all , but skirmishes with his own shadow . for ▪ what kind of consequence is this , st. austin says , some persons are sav'd not by the quickness of their vnderstandings , but by the simplicity of their belief : therefore the motives laid by god for mankind , or his church to embrace faith , are possible to be false ? as if the simplest could not , nay , were not most likely of all other to believe upon weak and incompetent motives , which therefore could never have been laid by god for his church to embrace her faith upon : or , as if the most simple that are , could not rationally believe the church , and so become infallible in their assents by adhering to her , though their weak understandings do not penetrate or comprehend how the church or themselves come to be so ; nay , perhaps have not a clear sight of what the word [ infallible ] means , till some discourse awaken the apprehension of it in them . § . having thus acted the disputant , exit theologus , intrat scu●ra ; and pag. . . plays the old tricks of legerdemain over again ; that is , leaves out half an argument of mine , and play● upon the other half , with all the disingenuous craft , a wit bent that way could invent . in faith vindicated , pag. . and . i discours't thus : the profound mysteries of faith will seem to a heathen , impossible to be true , therefore the motives must ( at least seem impossible to be false , but dr. t. confesses both letter and sence of scripture ( which are his rule of faith ) possible to be false ; nor ( it being an object proportion'd to humane reason ) is there any thing to make it seem better than it is , that is , to make it seem impossible to be false ; therefore , were there no better grounds than his , it would be against all reason to believe . having view'd my discourse , i desire the reader to peruse the answer here given by my confuter : he names the word argument , says two pretty words upon it , that 't is pleasant and surprizing ; leaves out better half of it , conceals perfectly all that part of it which concludes strongly against his own insufficient grounds ; catches at a word , and would make my discouse and argument aim to prove faith impossible to be false , because the motives are only seemingly such . whereas every page in that book , and its whole design shews i meant and prov'd them to be actually , really and indeed such . had i a mind to evade such petty cavils , i could alledg that both may seem impossible to be false ; yet one more seem so than the other : but the truth is , advancing to confute him , i argu'd ad hominem , and contended that against a seeming impossibility to be true , nothing but motives seemingly impossible to be false , can with any show of reason be held convictive ; but he had no motives even seemingly impossible to be false , but confessedly possible to be such , therefore they had no imaginable show of convictiveness . i grant then ▪ 't is a drawn match ( as he calls it ) between equally-seeming impossibilities ; and because 't is so , therefore a seeming impossibility to be true , in the object , is by much an overmatch to what 's less than a seeming impossibility to be false in the motives , or grounds ; but , both letter and sence of scripture , his grounds of faith , are confessedly possible to be otherwise , that is , false , and so are less than seemingly ( even to himself ) impossible to be false , therefore his motives to believe are incomparably overmatcht by the difficulty of the mysteries to be believed , and so there could be rationally , according to his grounds , no faith at all . this is my true argument , which perhaps might be surprizing to him , which made him thus start aside from putting or answering it , though we may perceive by his carriage he esteems not it , and others such like , very pleasant . indeed he still puts on a pleasant look when he should be sober , and is ever most merry when it becomes him to be the most serious ; but this is long since understood to be a necessary policy , not a genuine effect of nature . he tells us that transubstantiation is evidently impossible to be true : if so , then it implies some contradiction ; which if he shows me in any thing held of faith by catholicks in that point , i will become dr. t's . convert , and obedient auditor . but , alas ! how will he prove any thing to be a contradiction ? since those faulty propositions are ( as was prov'd disc. . . ) therefore such , because they are opposite to identical ones , or the first principles , as hath been prov'd . seeing then dr. t. has long since renounc't all those from being first principles , for any thing i can discern he must either hold there are no contradictions at all , or else ( which comes to the same ) hold that contradictions are truths . § . . but he goes forwards amain , in confuting a point which no man living ever maintain'd , viz. that every single christian must be infallible ; that is ( as dr. t. will needs take it ▪ ) must so penetrate his grounds , and what relates to them , as to see clearly he cannot be deceiv●d in judging his grounds of faith ▪ conclusive ▪ whereas my tenet is , that , let any man , though of the acutest understanding and greatest learning that may be , entertain any tenet as faith o● reveal'd by god upon any other motive than what god has lost to his church ; this man , however thus endow'd , not only may , but in likelihood will be deceiv'd ; not for want of wit , but for want of grounds ascertaining , and infallibly engaging the divine revelation . on the other side let the simplest and weakest understanding that is , happen to embrace faith upon the motives laid by god and left in his church ▪ he is infallibly secure from being in an errour , not through the strength of his understanding perfectly discerning and penetrating the conclusive nature of his grounds , but though the strength of those grounds themselves , or of the causes laid by gods providence , to plant and continue right faith in the church ; by means of which what he has thus ( more by the peculiar disposition of god's gracious providence , than any reach of his own wit or judgment ) fortunately embrac't , is preserv'd impossible to false , and consequently his assent to it impossible to be an errour , because the churches authority upon which he receiv'd it , is infallible . and surely 't is but fitting that all who believe upon that rule god has left and commanded us to follow , should be thus secur'd from possibility of mistake : for , otherwise , since a power is relative to its proper act , what 's possible to be false may , actually be so , and so we might come to be led actually into errour by obeying god's commands , which is impossible . to apply th●s : if dr. t. therefore makes scripture's letter the rule of faith left by god for mankind to receive their faith upon , and by doing so has commanded them to believe it , he must either say that its sence and letter ( taking them as he builds his faith on them ) have no possibility of falshood , or ( besides the many absurdities already mentioned ) grant that our all-wise and good god can possibly lead men into actual errour , nay command them to profess and die for a ly , than which nothing can be imagin'd more blasphemous against essential truth and goodness . farther i declare 't is my tenet , that notwithstanding this failure in some particulars , yet i hold that the generality of the faithful are so familiarly acquainted with the nature of testifying . authority , as to know grosly and confusedly by means of practical self-evidence that 't is a certain rule to proceed upon ; and thence either discern themselves , if they be very prudential , or else are capable to be made discern who proceed upon that rule , who not : hence also i hold that tradition or testifying authority is the best provision that could be made for all mankind to receive faith upon , it being the most familiarly and most obviously knowable and penetrable by all sorts that can be imagin'd ; and far more than languages , translations & transcriptions , on which the letter-rule depends . lastly , i hold that what is thus practically self-evident , that is , known in gross and confusedly by the vulgar , is demonstrable to the learned , who scan with exact art the nature of those causes which wrought constantly that certifying effect in the generality , and find out according to what precisely they had that certifying virtue ; which found , it will be the proper medium to demonstrate the certainty of that authority by . this is my true tenet , which my prevaricating adversary perpetually mistakes , because he will do it , and he therefore will do it , because it must be done . in mala causa ( as st. austin sayes ) non possunt aliter . § . he goes about to argue pag. . from the end of faith , and alledges that a freedome from seeing just cause of doubting the authority and sense of scripture , may make one believe , or really assent to the doctrine of it , live accordingly and be saved : by which i conceive he judges a christians life consists in moving ones legs , arms , or hands ; for 't is enough to stir us up to external action that the motive be onely probable ; but , if a christian's life be spiritual , consisting in interiour acts of the understanding and will , as a vigorous hope , and a fervent love of unseen and unconceiveable goods , with other virtues subservient to these , and all these depend on faith as their basis , and faith depends for its truth ( which gives it all its efficacie ) on the rule of faith , i doubt it will scarce suffice to work these effects heartily , if learned men speak out candidly , and tell the christians they are to govern , that , notwithstanding all they can discern , they cannot see , absolutely speaking , that christian faith is a certain truth , but only a high likelihood , a more credible opinion , or a fair probability . it must therefore be beyond all these , and so impossible to be false . the main point then that dr. t. ever misses in is this , that he still omits to state what certainty is due to christian faith , and its grounds per se loquendo , or according to its own nature , and the interiour acts it must produce , and the difficulties it must struggle through and overcome , even in the wisest and most rational persons , who are to be satisfied of its verity , and so embrace it ; and considers it perpetually according to what per accidens , that is , not essentially belongs to it , but accidentally may consist with it without utterly destroying its nature ; that is , he considers it not as found in those subjects where it is in its true and perfect state , or freed from all alloy of irrationality , but as in those where 't is found most defectively and imperfectly , or , as it most deviates from its right nature . and this he is forc'd to do , because he sees that , should he treat of it as it ought to be , or according to what it would be by virtue of the motives laid by the giver of every perfect gift , to bring mankind to faith , singly and solely consider'd , without mingling the imperfection of creatures with his otherwise most powerful and wise efficiency , the grounds of christian faith must be able to subdue to a hearty assent the most learned and wisest portions of mankind , which they could never do while they are seen by them to be possible to be false . § . he argues that infallibility is not necessary to the nature of faith , because this admits of degrees , that ( being the highest degree of assent ) of none : besides , infallibility is an absolute impossibility of being deceived , and there are no degrees in absolute impossibilities . i answer : that , let a thousand intellectual creatures , angels or men , know , and that infallibly too , the self-same-object , yet they all know it in different degrees of perfection , not by means of knowing more in the object ( for we will suppose it one single point ) but intensively , or better on the subjects side ; because of the different perfection of their understanding power penetrating more clearly the self-same-object . to conceive this better , let us reflect that the self-same thing may be corporally seen by several men , and each infallibly know what it is by means of that sight ; yet because one of them has better eyes than another , one sees more clearly what 't is , the other less . also , the blessed saints and angels in heaven differ from one another in glory , or , in greater and lesser degrees of the blissful vision ; that is , one sees the divine essence better , another not so well ; yet the object being one indivisible formality , one cannot see more than another ; wherefore their great degree of glory consists in this , that one penetrates it better , and ( as it were ) sinks it deeper in the knowing power than another does ; which springs out of the several dispositions of the subject , or the antecedent love of god ; which when 't is greater , it more intimately and closely applies the divine object to the fervently●addicted power . again , on the objects side there may be in some senses several degrees even of absolute impossibilities . first , because of the greater disproportion of the object to the power : as , put case it be impossible that twenty men should lift such a weight , 't is good sense to say , if twenty men cannot lift it , much less can two : or ▪ if ten men cannot possibly resist the force of five hundred , much less can they resist ten thousand of equal strength . next ▪ because one of the impossibles depends upon another ; a● , if be impossible the conclusion should be false ▪ 't is more impossible the premisses should be so ; and yet more that the very first principles should : or thus , 't is impossible and should not make ● ▪ yet 't is more impossible . god , who is self-existence should not be ; because in these the later impossibility which depends on the forme● is onely impossible by consequence , ( though still absolutely such ) that is , were not at all impossible , if that which grounds it were not so . whence is seen , that unless dr. t. will say that all created understandings are of the self-same pitch of excellence , he must say that , even supposing ●he self-same object or motive apt to assure infallibly , one may better penetrate it , and so be more infallibly certain ( on the subjects side ) than another . and thus in the same person his faith may be come more lively than formerly , according as he renders it more express to his thoughts , and better dinted or imprinted in them ; which is done two manner of ways ; habitually , by often thinking on the points , which way is proper to the vulgar ; or knowingly , by penetrating it's grounds still better and better , and so making those judgments solider and firmer . 't is seen also that one object maybe justly said to be more impossible to be false than another , because that other is not at all such , but by virtue of it , and dependence on it , according to that axiom , quod per se est tale , est magis tale , what is so of it self , is more ( or more perfectly ) such than what is such by means of another ; and with good reason , for being impossible to be false solely by dependence on another , 't is consequently of it self possible to ●e false . yet this possibility can never be reduc'd into act , because that object or truth is never found unconnected with that other on which it depends , but ever most intimately united with it , and so engaging it's verity . § . pag. . dr. t. endeavours to acquaint us with the notion of moral certainty , which i should be glad to learn , for i am not ashamed to own that i never understood it perfectly in my life ; some mean one thing by it , another means another thing , as their fancy leads them ; now i for my part declare that i have no distinct notion or knowledge of any thing that i cannot define , nor can i define that the limits or bounds of whose nature i see not , nor , i am confident , any man living . i wish dr. t. better success . moral certainty ( says he ) is sometimes taken for a high degree of probability , which can onely produce a doubtful assent . he means i suppose ; such an assent as is a doubt or suspending of assent ▪ that is such an assent as is no assent ; i wish dr. t. would go to school a while to honest dame nature , and learn his ho●n-book of first principles , and not thus ever and anon commit such bangers . to doubt signifies to fear a thing is not true , or not , not to dare to assent to it , that is , not to assent , and so a doubtful assent , is not assenting assent , that is , an assent which is not an assent . he proceeds , yet it is also frequently us'd for a firm and undoubted assent to a thing upon such grounds as are fit fully to satisfie a prudent man. here are many things worth remark if one had leasure : and first , what means an undoubted assent ? 't is the thing , properly speaking , is undoubted , or not-doubted of , and not the assent : but that 's but a slip of word ; i conceive by the word [ yet ] which introduces it , he means an undoubtful assent ( onely he fear'd the inelegancy of the word ) in opposition to the doubtful assent here spoken of ; and , because ▪ ( speaking properly ) the opposit to doubt is hope , an vndoubtful assent means a hopeful assent ; which , since doubting speaks a disinclining to assent or judge the thing so , and hoping an inclining to it , very fairly gives us a second dish of an assent which is no assent ; for inclining only to be , is not being such , and so inclining to assent , how strong soever it be , is in reality no assent . well ; dr. t's resolution against identical propositions was certainly the most fatal bolt that ever was shot , making him discourse like the man that said he had three lights in him , a great light , a little light , and no light at all . next , i would know what grounds are fully fit to satisfy a prudent man ; one man likes some grounds , others like others : a sleight proof from scripture likes some man better than the practice of the church , the consent of mankind , or the clearest demonstration ; another ( i mean the atheist ) likes a plausible reason that sutes with and takes fancy better than all of them together : a third likes nonsense prettily exprest better than the clearest truths unelegantly deliver'd . a fourth values nothing that is produc'd to ground assent but what , when examin'd , subsists by engaging first principles , and bears the test of right logick ; my friend on the other side bids defiance to first principles and logick too , and is all for likelihoods , more credible proofs , fair probabilities , doubtful or rather hopeful assents . yet there want note now in the world , esteem'd sober persons who judge all these to be prudent men. where then is this prudent man that we may take measure of his pitch , and fit him with grounds ; for any thing yet appears 't is as easie to fit the moon with a coat . there are many prudent men among the protestants who judge the scripture's letter interpreted by private wit is a competent ground for faith : there are other prudent men among catholicks , who judge the contrary . nay more there are questionless amongst turks , and even heathens divers men of grert natural prudence ( and we can only mean such a prudence antecedently to the illumination of faith ) and they too have grounds fit fully to satisfie them , for they doe actually satisfie them , so that they see not the least reason to doubt of what they profess ; and , so according to dr. t's discourse these too have moral certainty of what they hold . wherefore , unless we could state what 's meant by a prudent man , we can never come to understand what is meant by dr. t's moral certainty , nor consequently when faith is certain , when not ; nay , which is worse , if moral certainty be that which he appoints as sufficient for faith ; and for any thing appears by his words , turks , heathens , and all hereticks have the same ( since they have such grounds as do fully satisfie prudent men ) it will follow that they may have as good grounds as christians have ; at least , that no man can tell who have right grounds of faith , who not , since this notion of [ what is fit fully to satisfie a prudent man ] has no determinate limits to state the nature of this mock-certainty . besides , 't is common in the course of the world , and i have divers times observ'd it my self ▪ that two persons may contest about some passage , even in humane affairs , as when any thing is by a strange surprize , or forgetfulness , lost or to seek ; each of them may seriously protest they are morally certain of it , each may alledge reasons , they may be both prudent men too , and both be fully satisfi'd with their reasons , and yet the plain discovery of the thing may shew afterwards that one of them prov'd to be in the wrong : now , if this happen in a controversie ( for example ) between a prudent socinian and a prudent protestant , how must it be decided ? both alledge scripture , each sees no reason to doubt of his own interpretation , and both are fully satisfi'd , that is , both have dr. t's moral certainty , and so both must be in the right , if his grounds be in the right ; that is , both sides of the contradiction must be true , if dr. t's faith be true , built only on moral certainty ; which would utterly destroy his enemies identical propositions . i would gladly know , at least , why these two equally matcht moral certainties shall not make a drawn battel of it , or how it shall be determin'd on whose side the certain truth stands . i doubt it will be the hardest task that ever was , for him to make it even morally certain there is a trinity , for this cannot be done but by manifesting the letter of scripture , bears no shadow of reason on the socinians side ; otherwise that seeming reason may be a just cause for a protestant to suspend , perhaps doubt of it , and so not be morally-certain . § . the meaning then of these word [ moral certainty ] being so indeterminate ▪ that dr. t. himself cannot tell what to make of it , no wonder our divines cannot agree about it . if he says he understands it very well , i desire to put it to the trial , by producing any one proposition held by him to be but morally-certain , and shew us logically ( art being the test of nature ) how or by virtue of what it's terms hang together , or to make out according to his own notion of moral certainty , that not one prudent man in the world does , or can be dissatisfi'd with it . what i conceive is meant generally by moral certainty is a high probability or some great likelihood , which being an insufficient ground for faith ( for we are to profess and dy for the truth of our faith , and not for its likelyhood onely ) ● judge the name of it ought not to be heard when we speak of the certainty due to faith and it● grounds , unless it be signifi'd at the same time that 't is us'd catachrestically or abusively to mean absolute certainty . § . . i expect d. t. will , instead of making out the nature of this chime●ical certainty , run to instances ; for example , that of our being morally certain of the sun 's rising to morrow , and such like ▪ but , first i contend he is not certain of this his own instance : if he be , let him give his grounds of certainty for it , and go about to prove or conclude the night before that it will. i doubt much he will , when he comes to try it , find himself gravel'd , and confess with me that 't is only highly likely . 't is well he did not live in joshuah's or ezekiah's time , and tell them the day before that moses his law was only as certain as that the sun would not stand still or go backwards the next day ; for , if so , i doubt much those who had heard and believ'd him , would have taken a just scandal at their faith , seeing points held equally certain as it , prove actually false . again , what more certainty has he now of the suns rising again within hours after his setting , than they in those days were the day before that it would not go back , or stand still ; and yet we see they were not certain of it , for we know they had been mistaken in it , and that judgment an error . by which we see that d. t's moral certainty means such a certainty w ch ( as appear'd by this event ) was vncertain , or such a certainty as was certain peradventure , now this nonsence has no harm in it but that 't is opposite to an identical proposition [ what 's certain is certain ] which weighs not with dr. t. who has renounc't all first principles . in a word ▪ our b. saviour has beforehand prevented all such instances ▪ by ●elling us that heaven and earth shall fail , but his words shall not fail : intimating that the whole fabrick of the world ( much more some one great part of it ) is tottering and unstable in comparison of the unchangeable nature of truth , and such all good christians are to profess their faith , and be ready to dy to attest it . § . having thus done more than miracle , and establisht moral certainty which were not its self were it not unestablisht , ●e procceeds ( p. . ) to overthrow infallibility : alledging that the vnderstanding cannot be absolutely secur'd from all possibility of mistake , but either by the perfection of its own nature ( which he thinks all mankind but mr. s. have hitherto granted that it could not ) or , by supernatural assistance . i desire he would not stretch my tenet beyond the bounds my self give it : i never said that human understanding● could not possibly be mistaken in any thing at all , but only in knowledges built on sensations , in knowing the truth of first principles , in knowing ( while left to nature , till speculation , for which they are too weak , put them into a puzzle ) by practical self-evidence confusedly and in common something belonging to some natures daily converst with ; and lastly , some learned men in diverse deductions of evident reason , for example , in diverse propositions in euclid . but , that which our subject restrains it to ( being about the infallible conveyance down of faith ) is the first of those , viz. infallibility of our sensations ; for , once putting this , tradition is an infallible rule . speaking then of this ( which is all my present purpose requires ) i am so far from being the only man who holds it , that dr. t. ( excepting scepticks , if perhaps he be not one of that sect ) is i think the only man that ever deny'd it ▪ are not both of us infallibly certain that we eat , drink , write , and live ; or did any but a mad-man ever think seriously that sober mankind ( abstracting from disease in some particulars ) might possibly be deceiv'd in such knowledges as these ? are not our senses contriv'd naturally , as apt to convey impressions from the objects to the knowing power ( i speak not of the different degrees of perfection necessarily annext to each , but as to the main so as to be sufficient for use and needful speculation ) as any other causes in nature are to do their proper effects ? have they not also as little contingency in them , and that contingency as easily discoverable by the standard of circumstant mankind with whom they converse , as in i●terical persons and such like ? this being so , i affirm that the basis on which our rule of faith is built ( viz. natural knowledges ) is more secure than any part of nature ; since naturally 't is impossible mankind can err in these ; and , whereas we are not certain but it may , in some conjuncture , become god's infinite wisdom and goodness to exert his divine omnipotence , and alter the course of nature even in considerable portions of it , as in the instances given of the sun 's standing still and going back , the universal deluge , and such like ; yet in our case 't is impossible ; beeaus● the altering nature's course in such as these were directly to create false judgments or errour in mankind ; of which 't is impossible essential wisdom , goodness , and truth , should be the immediate and peculiar cause . naturally therefore it cannot happen , nor yet supernaturally ; for though taking the proportion between gods omnipotence , singly considered , and the object , 't is possible or within the compass of gods power to make all mankind err ; yet taking in his other attributes which determin his omnipoence to do only what 's wise and good , and according to truth , it cannot be god should either will or do it , and so it cannot be effectively done at all . § . . he objects that the church of rome challenges infallibility upon no other account but that of supernatural assistance : i answer , the church had her rule of faith left to her hand by jesus ch●ist who founded and constituted her , and found it not out by speculative reason : whence 't is not the proper concern of a church to discourse very particularly about the manner and nature of the rule of faith , but of speculative divines who look into the natures of things , and there find the reasons of those truths god has barely told us . next , 't is only of faith that christ has promis'd to assist his church , but whether supernaturally only , or also by natural means is no where defin'd ; my tenet is that he assists his church both ways , as i at large defend in surefooting , and that the best strength of nature and grace are both of them exerted to their utmost , to ascertain the infallible authority on whose testimony we receive our faith : but , with this difference , that the supernatural assistance exceedingly comforts faith in those who are true believers already ; and the natural assistance ( as far as concerns the due satisfaction of reason ) informs the understanding of those who yet discern no supernat●rality at all in the church , and have nothing but their natural reason to guide themselves by : without which i see not how either a circle is avoidable , or rational satisfaction to such men possible : for were not a natural assistance admitted to introduce the knowledge of the other , supernaturals would be the way to supernaturals , and faith the means to arrive at faith , which would confound the means with the end. i wish dr. t. would leave off this new way of confuting , by telling me still i am the only man , or first man , that said ( he should have said , proov'd ) such or such a thing ; which cavil , if he answer not my argument ( as he seldome thinks of that duty ) signifies either nothing at all , or else a high commendation to me as improving knowledge to some degree . but more of this point when i come to defend my method . § . hitherto then dr. t. has given us no absolute certainty ( either of the existence of a deity , o● ) of christian faith , as far as it depends on the letter of scripture , but onely such miscall'd certainty as means vncertainty , whence his pretended certainty of its sence falls to the ground : but let us see how he vindicates the certainty of faith ( and himself not to hold it possible to be false ) by ascertaining at least the sense of it , supposing the letter were right . he tells us pag. . that as for the sense of books 't is plainly impossible any thing should be delivered in such clear and certain words as are absolutely incapable of any other sense : and what 's the natural sequel of this appli'd to scripture , but that 't is plainly impossible faith , built on tha● sense , or rather which is that sense , should not be possible to be false , and consequently the letter can never be a competent rule of faith : whereas in this way of conveying i● down by living voice and practise of the church , that is , ●y cate●hizing ▪ publike preaching ▪ private discoursing ; & consonant living , 't is made so manifest to the generality what was held in each year immemediately before ; that no prejudice can make them all so mad as either to mistake or misrepresent it ; as 't is , for example in england , for the generality of protestants to err , or impose this this year upon the belief of england , that last year they held and practic'd prayer for the dead or assisting at the christian sacrifice . by which 't will be easily seen ; whether of us two makes better provision for the certainty of faith. he proceeds . yet notwithstanding this , the meaning of them may be so plain , as that any unprejudic'd and reasonable man may certainly understand them . let him apply this to scripture , & the discourse stands thus , all men are unreasonable and prejudic't who take not scripture in my sense : if this be not the meaning of his words , let him tell us by what other maxims he guides himself in judging who are such ▪ when he tells us any unprejudic't and rersonable man may certainly understand the sense of scripture . if he can assign no other reason of those mens faultiness , but their disagreeing with him in the meaning of scripture , i doubt his readers will scarce believe him that all socinians and other sects , who differ from him in main points , are passionate and prejudic't . if an indifferent man stood by while d. t. and a socinian disputed , and heard one of them cite place after place ▪ compare one place to another , and use all the means he could to make out the right sense of the words ; and the other use the self-same method , and yet nothing concluded decisively ( as it never was in this way of managing disputes ) i fear he would be little the nearer satisfaction and embracing dr. t's . tenet , upon his saying that his adversary was passionate and prejudic't . he parallels the certainty of scripture sence to that of euclids definitions and axioms , in the sense of which men are universally agreed ▪ and think themselves undoubtedly certain of it , and yet the words in which they are exprest may possibly bear another sence . he trifles ; let him show me the generality of scripturists as unanimously agreeing in the sense of scripture , as geometricians do in those axioms and definitions , or let him leave of bringing such disagreeing parallels , importing that there are not men of all sides and sects as willing to see truth in things belonging to their eternal salvation , as to see the truth in mathematicks . how many interpretations are there of [ this is my body ] and of those many texts which signifie christ to be true god : both of main concern , the understanding them wrong , being on one side idolatry , on the other blasphemy . yet we have eminent learned men , acute wits , excellent linguists , good logicians and historians , and lastly , very great scripturists who compare also place to place ; yet , all this notwithstanding , nothing is decided finally ; still they debate , write , quote , interpret , and will do , while this method is taken , to the worlds end. does dr. t. find such a disagreement amongst men learned in the mathematicks , in the understanding the axioms and definitions of euclid ? add , that those men in other matters are not passionate or prejudic't , but are held pruden● and sober by great portions of mankind , nor do they lose their repute amongst indifferent judges as renouncing their manhood or perfectly deserting reason ; that is , they are not held madmen for not adhering to such a determinate sense of those places : which argues evidently , that they renounce not evidence ; and that the scriptures letter , thus manag'd , is not apt to ascertain them at all , and so no rule . yet he gives us one great reason ( as he calls it ) why men do not agree in the sense of scripture as well as in the others , because their interests , and lusts , and passions are more concern'd . so that according to dr. t. a man who is to be guided by his pastors and teachers cannot be certain of the sense of scripture , nor consequently of faith , unless he can look into the hearts of men ( which is proper to god alone ) and discern who are passionate , prejudic'd , interessed , and lustful . again , this reason is found on either side to a great degree , for were not those axioms and definitions so evident that absurd men would incur the shame of mankind to deny them , there wants no temptation of interest and passion to make authors go about to control and contradict the writings of others to gain themselves applause and credit . but , if this be one great reason of disagreement in the sense of scripture , i would gladly know , what are the other great reasons . but of these we hear nothing : and there is good reason why ; for since his one great reason is the ill-disposedness of the persons , the other great reason must be the defectiveness of the thing , that is , the inability of scripture's letter , by reason of its inevidence to private understandings , to make them agree in one sense of it ; which manifestly makes it unfit to be a rule of faith. § . to conclude , the summe of dr. t's . vindication of himself from making according to his grounds , faith possible to be false , amounts to this ; he produces words to disprove it , which manifoldly confess it ; he endeavours all along to shew that infallible certainty cannot be had , of either scripture's letter or sense ; that is , he grants , that the whole world may be deceiv'd ( though all the causes be put to secure them ) in the ground of faith ; or denies that , absolutely speaking , faith is certainly-true . again , loath to speak out to that point candidly , he shuffles about , and puts upon his adversary divers odd and ridiculous acceptions of the word [ faith ] omitting the right one , which was given to his hand , lastly , being to give account what kind of certainty he allow'd to faith , he gives such a notion of it as signifies nothing , and has all the marks of vncertainty imaginable ; taking his measure of certainty , which ought to proceed from the object , or proof , from the subject's perswasion or adhesion to it ; which common experience testifies , may indifferently be found in truths and falshoods , and common sense confutes ; nature telling every man that my assent is not therefore certain , because i do not doubt it , see not the least cause of doubt , am fully perswaded , and verily think so ; but because the thing is seen indeed to be so , or because the proof is conclusive . either then let him bring such proofs , and own and shew them to be such , or he leaves his cause in the lurch , and his credit ( which he is here defending ) unclear'd ; by yielding faith possible to be absolutely false ; that is , for any thing any man living knows , actually such . discourse vii . in what manner dr. t. replies to faith vindicated . § . dr . t. has no fellow , nor his way of confute any parallel . not to provoke the peevishness of malice too far , and yet follow home my blow more fully , and yet withal to uphold the efficacie of faith grounded on the just conceit of its absolute certainty ; i writ a a book , call'd faith vindicated , in behalf of christian faith in common , shewing the absolute certainty or security from error of that kind of assent , provided it be grounded on those motives god had left to settle his church , and , by it , mankind in faith , as i declared my self in my introduction : it pretended demonstration from the beginning to the end , and had not one drollish or unsober expression in it : take a map of it in a few words . i conceiv'd my self debtor both sapientibus and insipientibus , and hence the concern being common to all christians , amongst the rest to speculative divines , i resolv'd to prove it by arguments sutable to every capacity . to the more intelligent , to the end of the third eviction : to the middle or prudential sort , to the end of the fifth· and to them of the lowest capacity in the last : every one being enabled by tradition or education to comprehend what the common language and practice of christianity teaches them , as to speechees and carriages appertaining to faith. i begun ( after i had put two postulatum granted by all christians ) with logical arguments ; which i pursu'd at large , because as 't is a common trick in sophisters and half logicians , to abuse that excellent art to elude the clearest evidendences , so it became a more necessary duty in me to prevent by the closest proofs , fetch 't from almost all heads imaginable that belong'd to that skill , any misusages of its maxims to patronize falshood . this could be no other than very speculative , and accordingly i declar'd in my introduction , what my reader was to expect , in discourses of that kind ; nor will any man indu'd with common sense wonder that i should use logical expressions when i make logical discourses , or terms of art when i speak to scholars . these things reflected on , let us see now what a dextrous way our learned confuter takes to answer that whole book , ( for he manifests here an intention to give it no other ) and to overthrow so many demonstrations . § . his first way of confute is , to pick out a leaf or two of the most speculative part of that treatise , only intended for scholars , and apply it to the understandings of those who are onely sermon-pitch : to whom , because such discourses are unsutable , and withal too hard for him to answer , hence he very politickly both gratifies the fancies of those readers , and avoids himself the difficult task of answering the pressing reason in it , by playing the wit , when 't was dangerous to act the scholar , and making use of his constant friend at a dead lift , drollery , in stead of relying on the patronage of reason , which ( as he experiences ) so often betrays and exposes hss weakness . he runs on therefore a whole leaf or two in this jovial career ere he can recover himself , till even his own friends who are not aware of the necessity , admire at his endless raillery ; and , true to his method , neglects wholly the sense , and excepts mightily against five or six hard words ; namely , potentiality , actuality , actuation , determinative , supervene , and subsume ; which , it seems puzzle him exceedingly ; for he professes to think them mystical . he calls the discourse jargon , foolish and nonsense ( which two last words he is ever most free of , when his reason is most at a loss . ) he likens it to the coptick and slavonian language , talks of astrology , palmistry , chymistry , and what not ? and with such kind of stuff confutes , it most unmercifully even to utter desolation . § . . in return to which kind of carriage , ( though it deserves only contempt ) let us hear first how dr. t. answers himself ; who ( serm pag. . . ) very zealously reprehends and preaches against this absurd fault in himself , in these words . let none ( sayes he ) think the worse of religion [ or those reasons which oblige us to profess 't is absolutely-true ] because some are so bold , to despise and deride . — for , 't is no disparagement to any person or thing to be laught at , but to deserve to be so . the most grave and serious matters in the whole world are liable to be abus'd — nothing is so excellent , but a man may fasten upon it something or other , belonging to it , whereby to traduce it . a sharp wit may find something in the wisest man , whereby to expose him to the contempt of injudicious people . the gravest book that ever was written , may be made ridiculous by applying the sayings of it to a foolish purpose ; for a j●st may be obtruded upon any thing . and therefore no man ought to have the less reverence for the principles of religion [ or those reasons which oblige us to hold and profess faith absolutely-true ] because idle and prophane wits [ nonplust controvertists ] can break iests upon them . nothing is so easie [ dr. t. knows that by long and very useful experience ] as to take particvlar phrases and expressions out of the best book in the world ; and to abuse them by forcing an odd and ridiculous sense upon them . but no wise man will think a good book foolish for this reason ; but the man that abuses it . nor will he esteem that to which every thing is liable to be a ivst exception against any thing . at this rate ase must despise all things . but , surely , the better and shorter way is to condemn those who would bring any thing that is worthy into contempt . also in his foregoing sermon , pag. , . he gives good doctrine to the same purpose ; but never intended to follow it himself . these things [ whether faith be absolutely true or no ] are of infinit consequence to us , and therefore — 't is not a matter to be slightly and superficially thought upon , much less ( as the way of atheistical men is ) to be plaid and iested withal . if any one shall turn religion ( or a discourse aiming to shew it absolutely certain ) into raillery , and think to confvte it by two or three bold iests , this man doth not render it , but himself ridiculous . again , though the principles of religion ( or the proofs of faith's absolute certainty ) were never so clear and evident , yet they may be made ridicvlovs by vain and frothy men ; as the gravest and wisest personage in the world may be abus'd by being put into a fools coat , and the most noble and excellent poem may be debas'd and made vile by being turn'd into bvrles qve . thus dr , t. by preaching what he never intended to practice has most amply laid open his own folly , and hits himself still , while he aims at the atheist : and no wonder , for their causes ( as far as i impugn him here ) are not very wide of one another ; since nothing approaches neerer to the denying all religion than to hold it all vncertain . at least i would gladly know of him in what his way of discourse here against my reasons for the absolute certainty of faith differs from that of atheists against a deity , and all religion . the points to be considered by both of them are of a solid and concerning nature , and both handle them drollishly , and make raillery supply the place of reason . nor will it avail him to reply that my proofs were not solid , and so oughr to be confuted with mockery ; for he ought first shew by reason that they thus highly misdeserve , and then employ his talent of irony upon them afterwards ; and not make meer irony supply the place of reason . besides , himself acknowledges pag . that , if the principles of religion were doubtful and vncertain , yet this concerns us so neerly that we ought to be serious in the examination of them . and , certainly , no judicious or good man will doubt , but that it highly and neerly concerns all good christians to know , whether their faith , the substance of all their hope , particularly the existence of a trinity and incarnation , the points i mention'd , be absolutely certain or not . i leave it to the choice of dr. t's friends whether they will rather approve his doctrine in his sermons , or his unconsonant practice in this preface . if the former , they must condemn him out of his own mouth to be foolish , ridiculous , and an imitator of atheists , and his way of writing insignificant : but , if they like the later , then they must conclude his sermons as equally blame-worthy for opposing so laudable a practice . unfortunate man , who very gravely takes texts against scoffers , and makes sermons upon them ; and then behaves himself all over so scurrilously and drollishly in his whole preface to them , as levels those very sermons as directly against himself , as could possibly be contriv'd or imagin'd : which is in effect by his carriage , to tell the atheist , that that scoffing and drollish way of answering and managing discourses about religion , which is so horrid sin in them because they are of the vngodly and wicked , is notwithstanding none at all but a very great virtue in the saints and the godly ; and in a particular manner meritorious so it be practis'd against those men of sin , the most abhominable papists . § . . besides , as dr. t. well observed when he was in a more sober humour , every thing , even the best , is liable to be abus'd and made ridiculous by drollish jests , and consequently this method be so exactly observss when he is to confute me , will ( as he very well expresses it in his pref. pag. ) equally serve to prove or confute any thing . to shew the all-powerful strength and virtue of it , let us imagine that euclid , had been a catholick , dr. t. might have preacht ● sermon or two full of zeal against witchcraft , and have produc't some fair probabilities to perswade the people that mathematicians were all meer frier bacons , and absolute conjurers , because they use to draw circles and uncouth figures which look like magick ( to second which dr. st's . book concerning images , would ( mutatis mutandi● ) light very pat and home ) and then when he had done , writ a preface to those sermons against the prince of conjurers , or the belzebub of those incarnate devils , euclid ; and confute him on this manner . first he might pick out some demonstrations of his in which were five or six words harder than ordinary ( at least too hard for the vulgar , though clear enough to the learned men in that art ) as isosceles , parallelograms , parallelepipe , cylinder , diameter , eicosaedron , and such like ; and when he had transcrib'd them into a ridiculous preface which he was sure no good mathematicians would ever care to read , but vulgar souls would much admire , and out of their hatred to these popish conjurers , cry up : he might proceed to confute him on this manner . i have here ( reader ) presented thee with a discourse , which , if we may believe euclid is mathematically demonstrable . a rare sight indeed ! certainly , the sacred names of principles and demonstrations were never so prophan'd by any man before . might not any one write a book of such jargon and call it demonstration ? — if he intended this stuff for satisfaction of the people ( as it seem'd by his writing it in greek , the vulgar tongue , he did ) he might as well have writ it in the coptick or sclavonian language . yet i cannot deny but this is very sutable to the principles of the roman church , for why should not their science as well as their service be in an unknown tongue ? — certainly his talent does not lie for science . — learned men are less apt to admire nonsense than the common people — neither harphius , nor rusbrochius , ( dr. faustus , frier bungy ) nor the profound mother juliana ( or mother shipton ) ever spoke any thing ( charm ) more sensless and obscure . — he hath a style peculiarly fitted for mysticks ( magick ) for even in this parcel of stuff there are five or six words ( such as isosceles , patallelograms , parall●lepiped , diameter , cylinder , eicasoedron ) which if they were but well mingled and discreetly ordered would half set up a man in that way ; and ●nable him to write as mystical ( magical ) a discou●se as any man ( or the devil himself ) would wish . thus , reader , thou seest how true ▪ 'tis that dr. t's . method of talking is none ; since i dare undertake take that let him and his fellow-conspirators , in malice against catholicks but resolve to preach and write as earnestly that mathematicians are conjurers , as they do that catholicks are idolaters , ( which , of the two , is the far easier to prove , ) and the method he observes in this preface of his , would equally serve to confute euclid as it does me . and the like force it would have against any logical , metaphysical , natural , medicinal , rhetorical , poetical , or even grammatical discourse : each have their terms of art proper to themselves , which look odd and uncouth to the vulgar ; and so are equally liable to be abus'd and rendred ridiculous , to men whose practice is to read sermons . § . . but can dr. t. seriously think these words to be indeed so hard as he pretends ? the word [ potential ] was familiar to us both when we were in our accidence and talkt of the potential mood ; also [ actual ] and determin are very obvious ; i suppose then 't is their ending in those common terminations [ ty ] [ tion ] and [ tiue ] which makes potentiality , actuality , actuation , and determinative so insuperably hard . as for supervene and subsume , it may justly be wondred whether the difficulty lies in knowing what 's the signification of the verbs venio and sumo ▪ or the prepositions super and sub. but he means they are not trim and elegant enough : alas , good gentleman ! i doubt there are some who complain of the tenderness of their ears , when the true reason is the softness of their heads . but enough of this . § . . let us now proceed to examine the true force of one of these demonstrations which he most opposes with drollery ▪ we shall see that it was both his concern to answer it , and withal impossible he should , which joyn'd , no wonder he endeavoured to evade thus , it being the best shift he had . all logicians know that the respondent by bringing a pertinent distinction , evades granting the whole proposition and is lic●nc't to admit it but in part ; that is , indeed , to deny the former proposition as it stood under an undistinguisht manner of expression . also , that amongst human notions some are more potential , that is more general than others , and that those general notions are divided or distinguisht into more particular ones by certain in●eriour notions adjectively exprest , call'd differences . 't is evident likewise that , since 't is impossible there should be a house or a man in common , only individuals can exist , that is , only these have a capacity or power to existence , and consequently that existence is related to them as their proper act. all determining notions therefore that can belong to any nature , or to that which has such a nature in it or the thing , are presuppos'd to existence , and so it can admit no further determination , or any differences , and consequently , the predecate [ existent ] can never be pertinently distinguisht ; wherefore , it being impossible to distinguish the copula , in case the subject can be distinguisht as little as the other ( which i there prov'd ) it must follow that those propositions which have in them such a predicate must be admitted in their whole latitude ▪ and simply as the words lie . seeing then christians are bound to profess their faith true as to those points of a trinity ( for example ) or incarnation , or that a trinity or incarnation exist , and the predicate existent , can bear no distinction dividing its simplest notion , such as are morally , hopefully , in great likelihood , or such dwindling kind of sceptical or half-atheistical expressions , it follows that it must be affirm'd and held that a trinity , or incarnation absolutely is , and , consequently , that 't is impossible not to be ; whence follows that , it being blasphemy to say that god has made a rational nature , or a nature to assent upon motives , and then commanded it to be not-rational , that is to assent beyond the motive , whieh is ( as to that degree of assent which is beyond ) without a motive , we must conclude that , however created understandings fall short in penetrating them , or miscarry in discoursing them , the grounds of our holding thus , as laid by god , must be absolutely conclusive , or impossible not to conclude the thing is ; and not only morally conclusive , morally certain , great likelihoods , fair probabilitys , freeing only from actual doubt , and such like . wherefore if dr. t. would approve himself worthy to write or discourse concerning the grounds of faith , he ought to profess and produce such , since nothing else reaches the nature of faith , or can rationally ground the the obligation impos'd by god himself , of professing and holding that the thing absolutely is : but he was conscious to himself he had none such , or absolutely conclusive , therefore he was forc't to play the droll and mock at the close reasons that would oblige him to it , instead of answering them . § . . this is the argument which our great divine , who is still most merry when he should be most serious , likens to astrology , palmistry and chymistry ; and sayes that arguments from these could not have been more ridiculous than to argue that what is true , is imprssible to be false from the nature of subject , predicate , and copula : for ( sayes he ) be the propositions true or false ; these are of the same nature in both ; that is , they are subject , predicate , and copula . which learned answer is built on two manifest falsifications of that whole discourse . one that i am meerly proving or concluding there , that what is true is impossible to be false ; whereas my ultimate intent in the former proof ( as put down by himself here , pag. . ) is to conclude it impossible that these points of faith should be false ; that is , svch points as express only the an est of a thing , and so have for their predicate existent , as i exprest my self in that argument . and my conclusion of the d. proof is this as put down by himself here , pag. . 't is impossible therefore that what is thus affirm'd to be true ( that is in such words as can bear no pertinent distinction ) should in any regard be affirm'd possible to be ▪ false ; the impossibility of distinguishing the predicate pertinent , ly , excluding here all possibility of diverse respects . is this barely to go about to prove that what 's true is impossible to be false , or rather , that no different regards or respects can in such faith-propositions as these be made use of to elude or diminish the granting their intire truth . the proposition [ an ethiopian is black ] is but in part true , because it can bear diverse respects or regards to distinguish it pertinently ; viz. according to his teeth , and his skin : but in those propositions which have [ existent ] for their predicate , no imaginable regards can be found appliable to it , so to distinguish it pertinently . the next falsification of my intention is to pretend that i argue barely out of the nature of subject , copula , and predicate , whereas by my whole discourse , 't is most evident that i argue precisely from their being such subjects and predicates , that is such as could bear no pertinent distinction diminishing the integrity of their truth . in a word , the question was about the truth , or which is all one impossibility of falshood in faith-propositions , and i was there treating it logically ; i would gladly then have any sober and intelligent man inform me , why it was not as proper and pertinent for me to argue out of the nature of propositions ( in which only truth is found ) and particularly out of the nature of such propositions , that is , those who have such subjects & such predicates in them , as it is for a mathematician writing a discourse of trigonometry to argue out of the nature of such a kind of angle , or a triangular figure ? or why in so doing i can justly be thought to have deflected from the rules or method of exactest art. § . . in a word , had i in a christian english sermon stood very gravely repeating sixteen verses out of a heathenish latin poet ; or had i , after i had so often mock't at others for bumbast rhetorick , and so , indirectly extoll'd my self for my smooth style , talkt of persons of a profligate temper , as did dr. t. here , pag. . and pag. . some idle wit who had nothing else to do might perhaps have taken just occasion to sport himself with my imperfection . but , to mock at a writer for using the terms proper to the art he is discoursing in , seems to argue a very profligate temper of levity at least , that i may say no worse . § . . thus much for his first answer to faith vindicated , consisting wholly of drollery , neglects and other worse faults , his second is , that the main of that book being to prove that what 's true is impossible to be false , i oppose no body that ●e knows of , in this matter . i answer , whoever pleases to run over the several heads from which i argue in faith vindicated , hinted briefly in the margent , will see that that which he pretends in a manner the only point , is but once designedly made use of , and very rarely toucht at in other places ; and that there are near forty proofs of another nature , though sometimes ( all truths being connected ) they happen to be partly coincident into the same . sometimes also i suppose it , but it bears no show of reason that most of my book is spent in proving it . but is it so clear that i oppose no body he knows of in proving that what is true , is impossible to be false ? does not he know one dr. t. ? that same person , i suppose , will tell us soberly that he can prove his faith true , relying on what he conceives to be the letter and sense of scripture , and yet , speaking of the certainty he had of both these , he told us expresly ( rale of faith , pag. . ) all this may possibly be otherwise ; that is , that possibly he has neither right letter nor right sense of scripture , and consequently that what he affirms to be his faith and true , is notwithstanding possible to be false . the same man being to vindicate himself in this pref. pag. . explain'd his meaning to be , that he could not demonstrate those things so as to shew that the contrary necessarily involves a contradiction : now , if he cannot prove that the contrary to any thing involves a contradiction , he can never prove that contrary to be false ( nothing being false which clashes not by consequence at least with some first principle , or involves a contradiction ) and as long as he cannot prove it false , 't is possible to be true for any thing he knows ; and , if the contrary to faith be affirm'd possible to be true , faith it self must be possible to be false ; and yet , though his discourses make it possible to be false , the obligation incumbent on him as a christian , forces him 〈◊〉 affi●m that 't is notwithstanding true. so that the goodness of christianity joyn'd with the badness of his grounds , oblige him to grant equivalently , though he be warier than to do it directly , that what is true is possible to be false . § . . now , because 't is against the very grain of rational nature to admir of such a palpable contradiction , if the word truth be rightly and properly understood , hence i am certain he and such as he are provided with a d●stinction at the bottom of their hearts , and only hold that their faith is morally true , that is , some great likelihood ; or as true as many things are of which we judg our selves morally certain , and did not in the least doubt of them , yet oftentimes , upon clearer information , have found our selves deceiv'd in our opinion of them , and the thing to be false . and , that this is dr. t's . sentiment in this matter , appears farther ( besides what hath been now said ) from his owning such a moral certainty only for the grounds of his faith as frees one from doubt , from his feeble and dwindlings expressions of his certainty of a godhead ; and , lastly , from his blaming me , pag. . for r●sting contented with no less ▪ certain grounds than such as are absolutely conclusive of the thing . and , how one who relies on his speculative proofs ( for the renouncers of tradition can have no claim to practical self-evidence ) can be thought to hold faith absolutely true , and yet disclaim himself and blame in others the pretending to such motives as absolutely conclude or prove it to be true , or how a man can with honesty affirm a thing is absolutely true , and yet deny he is absolutely certain of it , i must confess both passes my imagination , and i am confident every man's living who considers well what he says . 't is evident then from dr. t's . whole carriage in this business , that ( unless perhaps the natural force of tradition work a practical-self evidence in him of those points in which they who hold to tradition and he agree , which he is not aware of ) dr. t. does not hold his faith absolutely , but morally true , which is a very strong piece of nonsence , as was shown in faith vindicated , and will be seen hereafter ; and , therefore , it was but ●itting and necessary that i should clear the word [ truth ] from a ridiculous equivocation or impertinent distinction put upon it by such sceptical pretenders to christianity , and manifest , that the word truth in those propositions which express the an est of a thing , speaks being , and so necessarily involves impossibility of not being , or impossibility of falshood in its notion , or ( which is all one materially , though formally 't is different , ) that what 's true must be impossible to be false . § . . hence will appear the reason why i affirm'd that discourse more than mathematically-demonstrative ; because it was immediately built on that first principle in metaphysicks , 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once : which is superiour to and clearer than any mathematical principle , since the verity of all the maxims of this , depend on the truth of the other ; or ( to explain my self more fully ) because 't is intirely built on the notion or nature of [ being ] which is more evident than any mathematical one : if he denies it , he is desir'd to produce any mathematical notion which is of equal clearness ; which done , a little reflexion will teach him that that mathematical notion ( whatever it is ) can bear a definition , that is , can be represented or made clearer than it was while exprest by that single word defin'd ; whereas the notion of [ being ] cannot possibly bear any , but while we go about to explicate it better , we are forc't to put its own notion in its definition , and other notions besides , less evident than it self ; and so , while we go about to explicate it better we explain it worse ; whence it will appear evidently by our defeat when we attempt to clear it better , that 't is the clearest notion that is , or clearer than mathematical ones ; and , consequently , the discourses grounded on the nature of being are more than mathematically demonstrative . but i pardon this mistake to dr. t. whom i verily judg to be sincerely ignorant in such kind of speculations , and not affectedly only , as he discovers himself to be in multitudes of others . hence , by the way , is seen also how strangely the world is mistaken in metaphysicks ; esteeming that highest science intolerably obscure , and impenetrably difficult ; whereas its object being those notions that concern being , all its obscurity and hardness to one whom right logick hath taught accurately to distinguish , and steadily to keep distinct his notions , consist only in this that 't is too luminous and intelligible ; in the same manner as the sun is hard to be seen at noon-day ; whence it happens that because we are inur'd by custome to make definitions or explications of what we are discoursing about , and here , the subject not needing nor bearing it , we can make none of [ being ] which is the principal object in that science , hence , being put out of our road , we are at a puzzle , and seem to have lost our way through too much light . but 't is time now to return to his confutation of faith vindicated . § . . his next answer is , that in asserting infallibility to be necessary to the true nature of faith , i have the generality of my own church my professed adversaries .. that is , dr. t. will say any thing . let him show me , i will not say the generality or any great number , but even any one particular catholick professing either that he relies not on the church for his faith , or that the church he relies on is not infallible , and i here declare that he is no catholick , and doubt not but ●ll good sons of the church will joyn with me in looking upon him as such . i hope those readers who are scholars will by the way reflect how solid a method dr. t. still takes to confute my discourse ; which is , to let all my proofs or premises alone untoucht , and fall to combat my conclusion with extrinsecal mediums . next , he tells ●s the church of rome pretends only to infallibility founded on christs promise to secure the church from errour by a supernatural assistance , which is evidently different from mr. s ' s. rational infallibility of tradition . in which discourse are almost as many faults as words : for , . it supposes the church excludes the concurrence of natural means to her infallibility , which he shall never show . next , it supposes i exclude supernatural assistance and admit only natural ; whereas i expresly include and openly vouch it in sure footing , from pag. . to pag. . and ly . he supposes that supernatural and rational are inconsistent ; whereas in the place now cited , and never spoke to in his much applauded [ rule of faith ] i all a long prove the supernatural means to be very rational ; and have so good an opinion of god's government of the world as to make account that supernatural things , have far more excellent reason for them than natural ones ; and that god does not enviously hide from us the sight of those reasons , but permits and wills they should be seen and penetrated by those who are disposed and capable by the antecedent illumination of faith assisted by other natural knowledges to look into them . § . . after this he tells us , that the divines of our church ( before this new way was found out ) did generally resolve faith into the infallible testimony of the church ▪ and this into our saviours promise , and the evidence of the ●rue church into motives onely prudential . so ▪ that what he lately put upon our church , is now come to signifie divines of o●a church ; which gives us to understand ▪ dr. t. makes account that faith and school-divinity , church and schools , humane deduction and divine revelation , signifie one and the same thing . next , he ●cquaints us , that this new way of ours was the old way , in case the divines did generally ( before this new way was found out ) resolve faith into the infallible testimony of the church : for nothing is more evident than that all the late explicaters of tradition , make it the same with the attestation or testimony of the church . in that which follows i partly agree with that other sort of divines , partly i dissent from them . i agree with them that our saviour promist infallibility to his church ; as also that the knowledge of this promise , had by faith , is an excellent satisfaction to those who are already faithful ; but i say withal that , being a point of faith , it can be no part of the rule of faith ; for , so , the same thing would in the same respect be before and after it self ; as also , that for the same ▪ reason it can have no force upon one not yet arriv'd at faith ( as the rule of faith ought to have ) because 't is as yet unknown to him . § . again , i agree with them that there are & ought to be many several prudential reasons , suted to men of several capacities and circumstances , moving them to disquisition , and inclining them to embrace the right faith and joyn themselves to the true church ; but i say withal , that 't is one thing to move a man to enquire , and incline him to assent ; another thing to settle him in a most firm assent to such and such points as absolutely certain truths , which is requisit to faith. hereupon i affirm , that this later effect cannot be wrought rationally without grounds truly evident and absolutely conclusive of the thing , and knowable either by practical self-evidence to men of all sorts , or also to the learned by a certainly concluding proof , which i call a demonstration . i affirm moreover ( with due respect to those divines ) that motives onely prudential seem improper to be named in this case ; and that they must be principia sapientiae , and not prudentiae , which can rationally make us absolutely certain of the being or not-being of any thing , that is , of its truth or falshood ; the object of prudence being agibilia , and not intelligibilia , as such ; and its proper exercise and use being to determine a man to act exteriorly , or to act thus in circumstances , where contingency and hazard is found ; and not to act interiorly , or meddle in the affair of intellectual certainty or truth , depending solely on the principles of our vnderstanding , which are impossible to be false , and therefore plac't beyond all contingency and hazard . in a word , i shall not fear to be thought singular in my principles while i ground my self on the nature of faith , which both all catholicks and the generality of those who are call'd christians hold ; and st. thomas of aquin , the prince of school-divines asserts , as i shew'd faith vindicated , pag. . § . as for all objections of this nature , once more i request dr. t. to make good this consequence , that my discourse cannot be true , unless all our divines ( even of the same way in common ) agree with me , and i promise him this done , to reply distinctly to all his extrinsecal and impertinent exceptions , which ( waving in the mean time my premises ) he so constantly lelevels against my conclusions . and , whereas he sayes , i cannot reasonably charge him with those things till i have vindicated our own divines ; i desire him to consider , that i could not , were i their adversary , charge them , with what i can justly charge him . they all to a man hold the catholick church , on which they rely , infallible , and hold this more firmly than they do any of their speculations ; and , consequently , they hold their faith impossible to be false , and so preserve the true nature of faith inviolate : whereas , what he is to hold to most firmly , according to his principles , is his own private interpretation of scripture , which he himself and all the world besides see and hold to be fallible ; and so he must say , that all his faith built upon it is possible to be a ly for any thing he knows ; by which means he destroyes the nature of faith ; ( as far as gods goodness will give him leave ) in himself and others , and corrupts it into opinion . they produce motives , which , though they call them prudential , are indeed some of them demonstrative , and coincident in part with tradition ; whereas dr. t. has nothing at all in his grounds ( taking him as opposing catholicks , or standing to his own rule of faith ) which rightly stated , has even the least sh●w of prudential to an unbyast man , much less of demonstrative : lastly , were it a proper place to handle the point at large , it were easy to shew they differ onely in a word , but dr. t. errs in the whole thing ; though indeed in most of our divines here cited , he mistakes them , and not they the main point , whatever he pretends ; for , however they make prudential motives sufficient to find the church , yet not one of them but makes the authority of the church when found ( on which they ground their faith ) of far greater weight than such an evidence as does ordinarily satisfie prudent men in humane affairs , since they all hold it infallible , which is vastly more than dr. t. holds to ground his faith. § . his third answer is , that this principle of mine makes every true believer infallible in matters of faith , which ( sayes he ) is such a paradox as i doubt whether ever it enter'd into any other mens mind . now this charge of his , joyn'd with my true tenet , that true believers are those who rely on the motives or means left by god in his church to light mankind in their way to faith , signifies thus much , that 't is a wonderful and strange paradox , that those that follow and rely on the motives laid by gods providence to direct them to truth , should in so doing not possibly be led into error ; that is , 't is a most absurd paradox to say , that essential truth should not be the immediate and proper cause of falshood . but he discourses still upon this point , as if i had held that the vulgar are preserv'd from possibility of errour ( or are infallible ) not through the goodness of the grounds left by god to preserve them from erring , but from the strength of their own vnderstanding ; which i do not remember , i ever thought or said , even of the most learned . he asks , if this be true , what need then of my infallibility of pope or council ? and i ask him , what need governors when people know their duty , or judges seeing the main of the common law is traditionary , & to men verst in such affairs , self-known practically ? let him but assure the world that no upstart shall have an humour to rebel and innovate , but that all christians shall practice and hold to what they know evidently was practic'd and held by the immediately foregoing church , and i will assure him there will need no infallible desiner , not any at all , as to such points . but dr. t. discourses still as if there were no difference between the rude dim degree of knowledge in the vulgar , and the accurate , exact and oft-refl●cting knowledge of those who by their great learning , their education , their posture and office are particularly verst and most deeply insighted into the affairs of faith and all that belongs to the right explaining or wording it : & thence declaring it authentickly ; so to keep its distinct sense clear in the minds of the faithful , which the equivocating witty heretick endeavours to render confus'd and obscure . i wish he would study our tenets a while , and understand them ere he undertakes to confute us . he is very raw in things of this nature . § . his next errour is worse than the former . he would fain perswade catholicks if any would believe him , that my principles do plainly exclude from salvation ; at one blow excommunicate & vnchristian all that do not believe upon my grounds . and nothing is easier than to prove it in his way . 't is but mistaking again the notion of school-divines , for the notion of faithful , and school for church ( as he did lately ) and the deed is done immediately without any more trouble , he is the happiest man in his first principles and his method that i ever met with ; the parts of the former need not hang together at all , but are allow'd to be incoherent , and the later is a building upon false pretences and wrong suppositions , and then what may not he prove , or what conquest cannot he obtain by such powerful stratagems ? he sayes he has proov'd at large in the answer to sure-footing , that the council of trent did not make oral tradition the sole rule of her faith. possibly i am not so lucky as to light on this large proof of his ; all i can finde with an ordinary search is four or five lines rule of faith , pag. . where after a commonly-objected & often-answer'd citation from the council of trent , declaring that christian faith and discipline are contain'd in written books & unwritten traditions , & therefore that they receive & honor the books of scripture & also traditions with equal pious affection and reverence : he adds , which i understand not how those do who set aside the scripture , and make tradition the sole rule of their faith. now , i had put this very objection against my self , sure-f . pag. . and proceeded to clear it to the end of pag. . particularly pag. . . upon this reason , because , taking the scripture interpreted by tradition ( as the council expresses it self to do , and forbids any man to interpret it otherwise ) it has the full authority of gods word , and so equally to be reverenced . whereas , taking it interpreted by private heads ( which only will serve dr t's turn ) 't is nothing less ; as not engaging the divine authority at all . but now to the notion of a rule there is more required , as dr. t. himself grants , and contends 't is found in scripture , viz. that it be so evident that every sensible may understand it , as to matters of faith , and this ( building on the council of trents authority and judgment ) i deny to be found in the bare letter of scripture ; and hence say 't is no rule : i omit the repeating very many arguments from the council for that point , deduc't from pag. . to pag. . never toucht , nor so much as taken notice of in that mock-answer of his . § . but that he may not mistake me ; i shall not stick to declare whom i exclude from salvation ( at least from the way to it ) whom not , and upon what grounds , speaking of the ordinary course of gods providence , as i declare my self to do throughout this whole treatise . i make account that perfect charity or love of god above and in all things is the immediate disposition to bliss , or vnitive of a soul to god ; also , that this virtue cannot with a due heartiness be connaturally or rationally wrought in souls , if the tenet of a deity 's existence and of christian faith be held possible to be a ly. hence , i am oblig'd by my reason to hold that those who judge there are no absolueely-conclusive reasons for the existence of a deity , nor for the truth of christian faith , are ( as such ) out of the road of salvation . on the other side , those who hold the church , the pillar and ground of the truths they profess , infallible , and by consequence their faith impossible to be false , as all catholikes do , though , as divines , they fail in making out how , and by what particular means it comes to be infallible ; yet through the virtue of this firm and steady adhesion to such principles as are , because they are truths , apt to beget solid and well-grounded ( that is , indeed true ) virtues , such as are a vigorous hope , and a fervent and all-ovre-powering charity ; hence they possess the connatural means , or are in the right way to heaven . and , for this reason i esteem dr. t 's way of discoursing concerning a deity and faith in his sermons most pestilent and mischievous to souls , as being apt of its own nature to incline them ( if they have wit to discern its shallowness ) first to a kind of scepticism in religion , and at next to carelesness , irreligion and atheism ; though truly i think 't is not his intention to do so , but that his shortness in understanding the nature and grounds of christianity makes him conceit he does excellently , even to admiration , all the while he commits such well-meaning follies . nor do i think the church of england will upon second thoughts think fit to patronize principles so destructive to the nature of faith , found in the breast of every protestant i ever yet met with ; who all with one mouth will own that 't is absolutely impossible christian faith should be a lye , and abhor the contrary position as wicked , and damnable . how dr. t. may have season'd some of his own auditors by preaching controversy to them , which he extremely affects , i cannot tell ; 't is according as they incline to believe him more than the generality of the christian world , whose sentiments he opposes in his discourses about the ground of faith. discourse viii . with what art dr. t. answers my method . a present made to his credulous friends , shewing how solidly he confuted svre-footing by readily granting the main of the book . what is meant by tradition . that j. s. is not singular in his way of discoursing of the grounds of faith. § . he makes a pass or two at my method , and that i conceive must serve for an answer to it : for an answer , i heard , was threatned would appear very shortly , but this pleasant preface was the only thing which appeared ; and all that appears like answer in it , is that he would make it believ'd he ought not answer at all . and this he does very neatly and like a master : for , let no man think i have a mean opinion of dr. t. but every one is not good at all things : some are good at proving , some at disproving , some at shifting of the question without either proving or disproving ; every one in his way ; and in his way i know no man living a greater master , nor so great as the dr. two things he does , and both of them strange ones : first , he affirms that discourse is founded on the self-evident infallibility of ora● tradition : next , that he has sufficiently considered that point in the answer to surefooting . the first of them would make the reader apprehend i there suppos'd oral tradition self-evidently infallible , and then run on all the way upon that supposition ; which if it obtain belief ( as from his credit he hopes it may ) since every scholar knows all discourses must be founded either on first principles , or at least on such as are granted by those against whom we argue , he sees i must needs be held the most ridiculous discourser that ever spoke or writ , to build a whole treatise upon a supposition unprov'd , and which begs the whole question . now , whatever i concluded in that short discourse , i deduced step by step , and made the foregoing proposition draw still after it by undeniable consequence the following one : he concealing all mention of proof , or endeavour of it , calls my conclusions , principles ; and then who would think but that i had laid them to build that discourse upon them , and deserted my usual way of beginning with the known natures of the things in hand , as i there did with those of rule and faith , and from them proceeded minutely to whatever i concluded . had his friend dr. st. taken the same course , his principles would have evidently discovered their own weakness of themselves , and had excus'd others the unnecessary trouble of answering them . next , he makes me say , that the infallibility of this rule is evident to common sense ; and says himself , that the foundation of this method is the self-evident infallibility of oral tradition : by which words an honest reader would verily think i suppos'd it gratis to be s●lf-evident to common sense , and never troubled my self to prove it ; whereas , though i indeed hold 't is practically self-evident ( of which i have elsewhere given account ) yet i proceeded as if i did not , but proved § ▪ . out of the natures of rule and faith , that the rule of faith , whatever it be , must be infallible : § . that therefore scripture's letter is not that rule , and § . that tradition is . the reader being thus questionless well dispos'd to think it very unnecessary he should consider , as he calls it , or answer any passage of a thing made up of unprov'd principles , or built on an unprov'd supposition , he tels him farther , that he has sufficiently considered that point in the answer to sure-footing ; whence he is not concern'd to take notice of it at present . and so the business is done ; for why should he take pains to give answer to that which deserves none ; or , if it did , is answered ? this reason though , by the way , is a little open . for , in case i did bring any arguments in my method to make good that tradition is an infallible rule of faith , and this after i had seen , and perhaps sufficiently consider'd too , what he replies to surefooting ; for any thing appears , i may either have amended the reasons given in surefooting , or produc't better in my method ; and so , whatever he has said to surefooting , it might have been proper to have considered , and said something to the method too ; unless ▪ he could say with truth that he had already answered the ve●y reasons urg'd in it , which i do not remember he has , nor am confident himself neither . § . . but yet ; ●o instance in this one passage , how rare a piece his cry'd-up rule of faith is , and how excellently it answers surefooting , let us ● little reflect what this sufficient consideration of his ●mounts to : surefooting was divided into two parts , the first from the properties of a rule of faith , proved that tradition was that rule , and this was the business of that book from the beginning to pag. . and particularly of the th discourse , whose title was [ of the notion of tradition , and that all the properties of the rule of faith do clearly agree to it . ] the d. part begins discourse . and endeavors to demonstrate the indefectiveness of tradition , or that it has hitherto ever been followed . the confutation of my first part ends in his rule of faith , pag. ▪ the answer to my d. begins pag. . or these two the former was in a manner the whole concern of my book ▪ for if it were prov'd that tradition was the rule of faith , that is , the only conveyer of christs doctrine hitherto , it must either be said by those against whom i argue , that it hath not been hitherto convey'd to us at all , and so that there are no christians in the world , which they will not say , or else that those who proceed upon tradition for their rule are the right christians . whence the later part was only ex abundanti ; not of absolute necessity , especially in case i argu'd ad hominem . this being so , let dr. t's friends and mine , when they hap to discourse about us , please to send for his book and mine , and with a● equal partiality distrusting us both , rely upon sir tho. moors pair of honest unbyass'd witnesses , their own eyes . they will find that his rule of faith undertakes pag. . to answer my th . disc. which pretended to shew that all the properties of the rule of faith do clearly agree to tradition , and thence concluded tradition the rule of faith , and accordingly quotes pag , . where that discourse began in surefooting , they will see the title of his sect. . ( which he uses to put in the margin ) is , that the properties of a rule of faith do not belong to oral tradition . now i assigned seven such properties surefoot , pag. , and . he was pleas'd to make but two , part. . sect. . sufficiently plain , & sufficiently certain . coming then at the bottom of pag. . to confute that whole discourse , which was the most substantial part of my book ; and contained the most pressing arguments to my main purpose , he compleats his answer to it in one single page , viz. . nay , in one piece of that page . this would seem strange , and something difficult , if any thing were so to dr. t. and his singular method of answering books . all , sayes he , that he pretends to prove in this discourse is , that , if this rule hath been followed and kept to all along , the christian doctrine neither has nor can have received any change . 't is all indeed i pretended , and all i desired to prove ; for , certainly , if it can preserve christian doctrine unchanged , it has in it the nature of a rule ; and what has in it the nature of a rule is , i conceive , a rule , whether it have been followed or not , which is a question i had not then examined , but reserved to my following discourses . to this then after his sufficient consideration , what sayes the dr. ? all this , sayes he , is readily granted him . for my part , i have no reason to except against that answer ; for all my writing aims at is that people should see the tru●h and acknowledge it ; and since he readily grants all i pretend to prove , i were very unreasonable if i should not be contented . though , if i were dispos'd to be cross , this word readily is something liable to exception . after he has employ'd a good part of his book in preparing to speak to the main question , in dividing and subdividing , and playing all the tricks which may make it look like an answer ; and when he comes to the question to grant it , because he could do no other , is indeed to grant it , but not very readily . people will not think he was very ready to do that which before he comes to he makes such a pother , and still hangs back , and pretends to hold the contrary , even there where he grants it ; as is seen in his title . but i am not so peevish , and so the truth be agreed , mean not to fall out about the words , let him use what he pleases in god's name . marry , i suspect his friends will not so easily be satisfied , & perhaps be apt to think that this is a more speedy way of answering , than a good way of confuting : for in truth , 't is an odd way of shewing , that the properties of a rule of 〈◊〉 do not belong to oral tradition , ( which he undertook in his title ) to grant , &c. that it can do what a rule should do , that is , has all the properties of a rule of faith. all i have to complain of is , he recals his grant , and will not stand to his word given publickly , and after sufficient consideration ; but after he has acknowledged the truth , continues still to contradict it , and bear others in hand that he has sufficiently answered what he has plainly granted . this cross proceeding is a thing which as well as he has deserv'd of truth and me , i cannot approve , and i heartily wish for his own and the worlds sake , he would stedily own , at least his own concessions . in the mean time let us see , if the thing be not as plain as plain may be . in stead of s●ven properties prov'd in my discourse to belong to tradition , he puts two of his own : first , that it be plain and intelligible , and this he grants here pag. . is found in tradition . his second is , that we must be sufficiently assured that the doctrine delivered down by oral tradition hath receiv'd no corruption or change in the conveyance : and here , he sayes , is the difficulty . where , good dr ? we are inquiring which is the rule ; must we before we can find it , be assured of the doctrine , when the rule is the very thing which gives us this assurance ? if we must before-hand be assured of the doctrine , we need a rule no more , for the business is done already ; or , if we did , it is impossible to find one ; for assurance of the doctr●ne being the effect of the rule , we make the rule the effect of this assurance , and so can have no assurance till we have a rule , and no rule till we have this assurance . this indeed is a d●fficulty , and i think an insuperable one : but all proceeds from his j●mbling two distinct questions , and confounding the first , which alone i treat , and he pretends to answer there , namely , which is the rule of faith ; with the other which i treat afterwards , and examine , whether it have been alwayes followed ? for nothing can be more plain , than that the two ways by which christi●● doctrine may have received corruption or change are these ; either a defect of power , or aptitude in the rule to convey it , or defect of will in the persons who were to have been guided by it , and make use of the power it has . and 't is no less plain , that in case we be sufficiently assured that tradition has power and is apt to convey it uncorrupted down ; we are sufficiently assured , that it has all that is requisite to a rule . and since dr. t. grants 't is plain and intelligible , he must grant the persons and not the thing ( or tradition ) is to blame if it have not done what 't is qualified to doe . to have a will to follow tradition is the property of the persons ( or good christians ) and not of the thing they are to follow , or of the rule , which if it be plain , they might have followed it if they would . a sword is a sword whether men cut with it or no ; and a pen is a pen though no man write with it . distinguishing then the properties of of a rule , from the properties of the persons who are to use it , 't is plain that his second qualification sufficiently certain agrees no less to tradition than his first , sufficiently plain . for what can sufficiently certain signifie more , than that , in case it have been used , christian doctrine neither has nor can have received any change . both these he grants , and plainly and readily , and these two are all himself requires . wherefore 't is as plain as can be , that there is no difficulty about the point i there treated , whether tradition have all the properties belonging to a rule of faith : & dr. t. his difficulty is this , whether 〈◊〉 have been followed , which belongs to the persons who should be guided by it , and is wholly extrinsecal to the nature and constitution of a rule . § . . the dr. then had good reason to say , her was not concern'd to take notice of this point , so when a thing is granted ▪ there is in truth little more to be said to it . i for my part finde some difficulty how to reconcile his difficulty and his ready grant , and make them hang together with sense . the difficulty is , sayes he , whether we have sufficient assurance that the doctrine delivered down by oral tradition hath received no corruption or change in its conveyance . he puts it then delivered by tradition , that is , he puts this rule has been followed ; and before he sayes , that if this rule has been follow'd , christian doctrine neither has nor can have received any change ; and then makes a difficulty whether there have been a change , where there neither is nor can be any . this i must confess is something difficult to apprehend . otherwise there is no difficulty at all in conceiving , that if there have been any change in christian doctrine , this must have happened , not by defect of the rule , which , if follow'd , he sayes , leaves not so much as a possibility of it ; but of the persons who were deficient in their duty , and would not follow it . he may perhaps say , that by delivered down , he meant no more , but pretended to be delivered down ; but to omit that by delivered to mean not delivered , is something uncouth ; this is plainly to fasten the difficulty upon the doctrine , not the rule , and ●o doubt whether it have been follow'd , not whether it be a rule . and so we have sufficient assurance , at least as far as the dr. can give it us , that tradition is as well sufficiently certain as sufficiently plain , since he assures us , that if it be follow'd , no change in the doctrine either is or can be : which being all the certainty can possibly be expected from , or desired in a rule , his difficulty , such as it is , belongs to another place , where 't is expresly treated . and this is dr. t's sufficient consideration of the point . § . . what pretty fantastical things these words are , and how apt they are to trapan a man who looks not narrowly into their sense . one would have thought , & i imagine the dr. intended men should think that his [ sufficiently consider'd ] meant sufficiently confuted . when alas ! they signify plainly and readily granted . 't was a neat and a safe expression though ; for had he said , sufficiently answer'd , or confuted , or opposed so much as by a bare-denial , or even attempted to do any of these ; [ all this is readily granted , ] would have been a filthy stumbling block in his way . but those safe easy words [ sufficiently considered ] are very choice , and may signify any thing , or nothing , which you please ; for one may sufficiently consider a thing in his mind , and upon sufficient consideration finde it best to let it alone , and say never a syllable to it , or one may grant , or deny , or do any thing with it , and these pliable words will fit whatever he does . those who are a little straitned and find ●mpartial reason not so favourable to them as they wish , should by all means learn this gentile insignificant way of expression , which may happen to do them more service than a great deal of crabbed knowledge , which is of a stubborn nature , and does ve●y well where truth is of the party , but is quite out and signifies nothing against it ; whereas this , like those easy pliable things , probabilities ( the matter which best fits this pliant manner of expressing ) is wonderful complaisant , and if you happen to change sides , will be as serviceable to falshood . and i would particularly commend this phrase [ sufficiently considered ] for a pattern to those who study the art , and need it . § . . people will not expect from me to give a reason of this unexpected kindness of the dr. for they are sufficiently assured i am not of his council . but i think he granted no more than what he knew not how to deny . for , whoever reads suref . p. . & . will find the self-evidence of tradition so explained , that , supposing it sufficiently plain & intelligible , which i there proved , and he here grants , its ruling power is as plainly made out as this identical proposition , that the same is the same with it self : and particularly in my method , pag. . and . which kind of propositions a man may be angry at , but cannot so handsomly deny ; for , if he could , i suppose he rather would have done ●t , than yielded the very point in controversie , and which is besides so favourable to catholicks , and destructive to his cause . this possibly is the cause of his resentment against identical propositions , of which he would ●evenge himself for the injury they have done him ▪ and therefore in his prefac● very politickly bids opens defiance to all the whole tribe of such ill-condition'd principles . in the mean time , the beginning and end of that sixth section are very observable . the title is , that the properties of a rule of faith do not belong to tradition ; and this signifies , that it is not the rule of faith : coming to make good this undertaking , he granted that 't is plain and intelligible ; and can , if people stick to it , preserve christian doctrine from change : and this signifies , that the properties of a rule do belong to it , and that it is the rule . for i do not remember he ever pretended there were two rules of faith ; wherefore since tradition hath power to do what a rule should do , viz. preserve faith uncorrupted and unchanged , tradition certainly is the rule , and so he expresly calls it , p. . but that this rule hath alwayes been followed , &c. and may for any thing appears here , hold perhaps , that scripture is not the rule . and yet all this while his title is , that tradition had not the properties of a rule , or is no rule . but the conclusion is every jot as remarkable , for he had no sooner readily granted all i pretended to prove , but he as readily diverts the reader from reflecting upon it , by these words : but that this rule has alwayes been followed , nay that 't is impossible there should have been any deviation from it ( as he pretends ) this we deny , not only as untrue , but as one of the most absurd propositions that ever pretended to demonstrative evidence . would any reader suspect this serious clutter of words should be both untrue , and nothing to purpose besides ? for , it plainly speaks of a question , which is not the question in that place . but reserv'd for another , and which he should have let alone till its time come . yet i was to blame to say , it was nothing to purpose . for t is to great purpose ; and the transition is so nimble and delicate , that the reader ceases to reflect upon the import of his concession , and begins to think me a man of confidence , and strange confidence too , who can hold such palpable nonsense . but pray where did i ever pretend 't is unpossible there should have been any deviation from tradition ? sure 't was in my sleep , and the dr. has taken me napping . otherwise as far as i am acquainted with my self , and mine own actions , i am so far from having writ or said , or so much as thought that there never was nor could be any deviation from it ; that on the contrary i have alwayes thought , and have said and writ , that there have been many deviations from it , and as many as there have been heresies in god's church . nay , ( as far as i remember ) i have not said so much , as that i had absolutely demonstrated there had or could be no total defection from it . indeed i endeavour'd to demonstrate there could not , but i pretended no more but to endeavour it ; and the titles of the sixth and eighth discourse in surefooting will bear me witness . but i know not under what unlucky planet the dr. wrote this discourse , where nothing will fadge and every thing he says , proves against h●mself . this untrue and absurd proposition as he calls it , and as it is indeed , that 't is impossible there should have been any deviation from tradition , implies at least thus much , that this deviation is extrinsecal to the nature of a rule ; for else scripture could not be said to be a rule ; from which 't is plain that many both can and do deviate . wherefore the proposition as absurd as it is not more absurd than it is to urge it against tradition ; which , whatever become of the proposition , is never a whit less a rule . and indeed the true difference , and true poin● of controversie betwixt us stands thus : i say , and prove , and himself by granting all my th . discourse , and that tradition is plain , grants , that tradition is so excellently qualifi'd for a rule , that let men but endeavor to follow it still to their power , it will bring down the same uncorrupted faith to the worlds end : whereas 't is known and evident , that multitudes of men have follow'd and do foll●● scripture to their power , and differ enormously in their tenets , and that as far as contradiction will let them go ; as far as there is a trinity , and there is not a trinity ; christ is god , ●nd christ is not god , than which as none can be more wide , so , execepting the tenet of the deity it self , none can be more fundamental , or have greater influence upon christian life . § reflecting then that i never said or thought it was self-evident that tradition had alwayes been followed , but only that it is of own nature 〈◊〉 evidently , infallible rule , abstracting from being followed , his answer to my method is this : i have not spoken to the point before , and therefore am not concern'd to speak to it now , for why should people expect more from me here than elsewhere ? or rather , i have granted the point already , and therefor● am not concern'd to say more to it . and i , for my part , think he is in the right ; & because it seems a little unreasonable to require the same thing should be done twice , i think it best to leave him to his sufficient-consideration , and go on to the next . onely , i desire the reader to reflect , how empty a brag 't is in the drs. how partial in their friends to magnify this peece as vnanswerable . yet in one sense 't is such ; for a ready grant of what 's evident truth can never be answer'd , or refuted . § . his next pretence is , that my method excludes from salvation the far greatest part of our own church . to which , though enough hath been said already , yet , because the clearing this will at once give account of what i mean , when i affirm faith must be known antecedently to church , which bears a shew as if i held we are not to rely on the church for our faith : i shall be something larger in declaring this point . to perform which more satisfactorily , i note , . that those who are actually from their child-hood in the church , have faith instill'd into them after a different manner from those who were educated in another profession , and after come to embrace the right faith. the form●● are imbu'd after a natural way with the churches doctrine , and are educated in a high esteem and veneration of the church it self : whereas the later are to acquire faith by considering and looking into its grounds ; and are educated rather in a hatred against the true church than in any good opinion of her . the former therefore have the full weight of the churches authority , both as to naturals and supernaturals actually apply'd to them and working its effect upon them ; practical self-evidence both of the credit due to so grave , learned , ample and sacred an authority , as also of the holiness , the morality or agreeableness of her doctrine to right reason ( which they actually experience ) rendring in the mean time their assent connatural , that is , rational or virtuous . the later fancy nothing supernatural in her , nor experience the goodness of her doctrine , but have it represented to them as wicked and abhominable : in a word , the former have both faith and the reasons for it , practically instill'd into them in a manner at the same time , and growing together daily to new degrees of perfection , whereas , the later must have reasons antecedently to faith , and apprehending as yet nothing supernatural in the church , must begin with something natural , or meerly humane , which may be the object of an unelevated reason : and , withal , such as may be of its own nature able to satisfie rationally that haesitation and disquisitive doubt wherewith they are perple●● , and settle them in a firm belief . . my discourse in that treatise , ( as appears by the title ) is intended for those who are yet to arrive at satisfaction in religion , that is , for those who are not yet of the church ; and , so . i am to speak to their natural reason , by proposing something which is an object proper and proportion'd to it , and as it were , leading them by the hand , step by step to the church , though all the while they walk upon their own legs , and see with their own eyes ; that is , proceed upon plain maxims of humane reason every step they take . . though i use the abstract word [ tradition ] yet i conceive no wise man will imagine i mean by it some idea platonica , or separated formalility hovering in the air without any subject , but that the thing i indeed meant to signifie by it , is the church , as delivering or as testifying , and , ( taking it as apply'd to those who are not yet capable to discern any supernaturality in the church ) the natural or humane authority of the church , or the church testifying she receiv'd this faith uninterruptedly from the beginning . so that tradition differs from church , as a man consider'd precisely as speaking and acting , differs from himself consider'd and exprest as such a person ; which known by speech and carriage , or by himself as speaking and acting , other considerations also belonging to him , which before lay hid , and are involv'd , or ( as the schools express it ) confounded in the subject ( or suppositum ) become known likewise . so the churches humane testimony or tradition , which ( as was shown sure ▪ f. p. , , . ) is the greatest and most powerfully supported , even naturally , of any in the world , is a proper and proportion'd object to their reason who yet believe not the church ; but , it being known thence ▪ that the body who proceeds on that ground , possesses the first-deliver'd , that is , right faith , and so is the true church , immediately all those prerogatives and supernatural endowments apprehended by all who understand the nature of faith to spring out of it , or attend on it , are known to appertain , and to have ever appertain'd to the true church ; and , amongst the rest , goodness or sanctity , the proper gift of the h. ghost , with all the means to it , which with an incomparable efficacy strengthens the souls of the faithful as to the delivery of right faith ; whence she is justly held and believ'd by the new-converted faithful to be assisted by the h. ghost ; which , till some motive meerly humane had first introduc'd it into their understandings , that this was the true church , they could not possibly apprehend . § . . in this way then of discoursing , the church is still the onely ascertainer of faith , either taken in her whole latitude , as in those who are already faithful ; or consider'd in part onely , that is , as delivering by way of naturally testifying , ( which i here call tradition ) in order to those who are yet to embrace faith. whence appears the perfect groundlesness of dr. t's objection , and how he wholly misunderstands my doctrine in this point , when he says the discourse in my method does vnchristian the far greatest part of our own church . for first , he mistakes the ground of believing to those actually in the church , for that which is the ground for those who are yet out of the church , to find which is the church : next , since all believers actually in the church , even to a man , rely on the church both naturally and supernaturally assisted , and i am diseoursing onely about the natural means for those who are out of the church to come to the knowledge of it , his discourse amounts to this , that , because those who are yet coming to faith , rely onely on the humane testimony of the church , therefore they who are in the church and rely upon the church both humanely and divinely assisted , are no christians . in a word , this way of divinity or resolution of faith which i take , makes every man , both those in the church , and those out of it , rely on the churches authority or testimony diversly consider'd in order to their respective capacities , and so still makes the church the pillar and grovnd of trvth , which all catholicks in the world ( not so much as any one school-divine excepted ) hold the securest way that can be imagined ; and should any one dislike it , i see not what he can with any show pretend . he must allow some natural motive antecedent to faith , and what is known by means of it ; that is , he must grant some motive antecedent to the knowledge of supernatural assistance , and where he will find in the whole world any such motive stronger than is the humane authority of the church as to matters of faith , i profess i know not , nor i am confident can any man living imagine . if this then be , absolutely speaking , the securest way that is , 't is securer or firmer than is the way of proceeding upon motives of credibility , and incomparably more secure than is that of resolving faith into motives onely prudential . though indeed , things rightly stated and understood , the motives of credibility are some of them coincident with tradition , and the rest which can lay just claim to certainty depend on it , taken at large , as their ground , as hath been prov'd in the corollaries to sure-footing . it may be ask'd , why , since tradition and church are one and the same thing , i did not chuse to say , that the chvrch gives us knowledge of the first deliver'd faith rather than that tradition does so , seeing none could have scrupled or excepted against the former manner of expression ; whereas this gives occasion of mis-apprehension to some unattentive readers . i answer , i us'd on that occasion the word [ tradition ] rather than the word [ church ] for the same reason the geometricians use the words line or surface , when they have a mind to express body as long or broad ; for these are in reality the same thing with body ; but , in regard body is the subject of many other considerations as well as these , and these speak body precisely according to the considerations of length and breadth , to which onely it was intended to speak , hence it was better both for succinctness of expression and exactness of science , which is built on the perfect distinction of our conceptions to use the abstract or distinguishing words [ line ] and [ surface ] rather than the concrete or confused word [ body ] which involves much more than the discourser in that circumstance intended to consider or speak to . now this being the very method observed in that science which bears the name for the greatest exactness in discourse , i much fear , the objecters mistake proceeds from not reflecting that whoever pretends to an accurate and connected way of discourse , and rigorously to conclude what he intends , must either follow that best of methods , or he falls short of his duty , and wrongs his cause . § . . to clear this a little better , and withal to apply it , i shall make choice of another familiar instance . we use to say in common speech that the countenance or carriage of a man makes known his genius . now all these three , viz. countenance , carriage , and genius , are in reality most evidently the same thing with the man himself ; onely they differ from it in the manner of expression ; the word man nominating the whole or intire thing which is the subject of all these and innumerable other considerabilities , confusedly imply'd in that word . the other three are more distinct indeed in their manner of signifying , but they fall exceedingly short of the others vast extent , and express man but in part , or onely a few respects found in that subject , whereof some are less known , some more , and so a means to know others . whence it comes to pass that countenance signifying man as looking , or according to the outward appearance of that part in him call'd the face ; also carriage signifying him as bearing or demeaning himself ; and , lastly , genius , as having such a peculiarity of humour or nature in him , hence these words , [ the speech , countenance , and carriage of a man discover his genius ] amount to this , the man according to his speech , countenance , or carriage , which are visible and more intelligible considerations belonging to him , is a means to notifie himself to us according to something in him which is latent and less manifest , viz. his genius . this i say is the plain sense of the other words , onely this later manner of speaking is prolix and troublesome , the other short and yet fully expressive of the speakers intention . again , the other manner of expression is proper and apt , whereas should one put it thus , [ the man makes known the man ] besides the confusedness of the expression , since man signifies the whole intire thing without distinguishing any particular respects , it would make the whole ( or the self-same thing ) abstracting from all different respects to be before and after , more known and less known than it sel● ▪ which is a direct contradiction . § . . applying then this discourse . the word church being a congregation of men , answers in its way of expressing to the word man in the example now given , and involves confusedly in its notion innumerable considerations belonging to that body ; of which true faith , which is , as it were , the genius or nature of the true church , is of it self latent , unknown , and far from self-discoverable . others , such as is the humane testimony of the church , meant in those circumstances by the word [ tradition ] in regard it depends on testifying authority , is more known , and being oral and practical , fitly corresponds to speech , countenance , carriage , and such-like . it being known then by this means that such a body has in it the first-deliver'd , or true faith , 't is known immediately that having in it the genius or nature of a true church , 't is indeed the true church : again , it being known likewise and conceived by all who understand what is meant by that word , that true faith is a firm adhesion to christs doctrine , also it being apprehended by those against whom we dispute ( nay demonstrable out of the nature of that doctrine ) that 't is a means to love god above all things ; hence 't is justly concluded that there is in the generality , or in great multitudes of this body , a due love of heaven call'd sanctity or charity , which is the gift peculiarly attributed to the h. ghost ; and it being known and experienc'd by those already in the church that this love of heaven or sanctity gives the faithful a particular strength and power to perform all good duties , and this of preserving uncorrupted the deliver'd faith being one , and that a most concerning one , hence they come to know that the church is assisted by the h. ghost , as in all other good duties , so especially in this , of delivering and continually proposing right faith : so that ( as reason requires ) by some natural and therefore more easily-known assistances belonging to the church , those out of her are brought to the knowledge that she is supernaturally assisted . this is the method i take in resolving faith : if any man can show me any other that is either more solid , more orderly , more connatural and agreeable to the nature of faith , or more honourable to gods church , i shall as willingly and easily quit it , as i now out of long and serious consideration embrace and firmly adhere to it . but it appears plain to me , that whoever contradicts this , especially as to that point which occasion'd this discourse , must withal contradict a maxim on which all science is principally built , namely , that the definition is more known than the notion defin'd ; which i take to be understood not onely of the whole definition , but of each single part of it ; for if any one part be more obscure than the thing defin'd , the whole definition , as having that obscure part in it , must necessarily be more obscure likewise . wherefore the definition of a church being coetus fidelium , &c. a congregation of faithful , &c. the notion of faithful ( and consequently , of faith ) must either be more known and knowable than that of church , and consequently antecedent to it in right method of discourse , or the definition would be obscurer than the thing defin'd , which if it be said , i must confess i know not to what end definitions are , or why they do not rather conduce to ignorance than to science . add , that true faith being most intrinsecal and essential to a church , 't is by consequence a more forcible and demonstrative argument to convince inevitably that such a body in which 't is found is the true church , than is any extrinsecal mark whatsoever . and if it be objected that extrinsecal marks are more easily knowable , i doubt not but in those who are led away by superficial appearances there is some show of reason in this objection , but i utterly deny that if we go to the bottom to settle the absolute certainty of any of these marks , any of them can be known at all , much less more easily known , if the certainty of tradition in visible and practical matters of fact be questionable ; and that neither scripture , fathers , councils , histories , monuments , or any thing else of that nature can pretend to absolute certainty , if tradition be uncertain , or can pretend to be known , unless tradition be first - ( that is , more - ) known , as is shown particularly in the corollaries to sure-footing . § . . hence is seen that the word [ tradition ] is taken in a threefold sence ; for the way of tradition or delivery taken at large ; for the humane or natural authority of the church , as delivering ; and lastly , for its divinely-assisted or supernatural authority , call'd properly christian. when 't is taken in one fence , when in another , the nature of the matter in hand and the concomitant circumstances will evidently determine . onely we must note that these three notions are not adequately contradistinct , the later still including the former , as length , breadth , and depth do in continu'd quantity . for , the humane authority of the church includes tradition taken at large , and adds to it the best assistances of nature , as is shown sure-f . p. , . the supernatural authority includes all found in the other two , and adds to it the best assistances of grace , as is particularly declared there from p. . to p. . so that all the perfection of tradition that is imaginable is to be found in that which we call christian , or in the testifying authority of christs church . § . . but because 't is still d. t 's best play to make use of extrinsecal exceptions so to divert the readers eye , and avoid answering my intrinsecal reasons taken from the nature of the things , with which he is loth to grapple ; and since amongst the rest , he is very frequent at this impertinent topick of my discoursing the grounds of faith after a different manner than other divines do , it were not amiss , omitting many pregnant instances which might be collected out of dr. stratford , the learned author of protestancy without principles , and many others to the same purpose , to show how far he mistakes in this point , by instancing in one controvertist of eminent both fame and learning as any in his time ; one who writ before rushworth's dialogues appeared , or perhaps were thought of , and so cannot be suspected a follower of that new way , as dr. t. call it : i mean mr. fisher. this able controvertist , in his censure of dr. white 's reply , p. , , maintains that vnwritten ( that is , oral and practical ) tradition is the prime grovnd of faith , more fundamental than scripture , and shows how his adversary mr. white the minister grants in effect the same . in his answer to the nine points , p. . he concludes strongly that scriptures are not the prime principles of faith supposed before faith , which infidels seeing to be true , resolve to believe the mysteries of faith , but onely are secondary truths , dark and obscure in themselves , believed upon the prime principles of faith. which words as amply and fully express that scripture is not the express rule of faith as can be imagin'd : for how should that have in it self the nature of an intellectual rule , which in it self is dark and obscure ? or how can that which is believed upon the prime principles ( that is , partly at least , upon the ground or rule of faith , be any part of that rule ; since what 's believ'd is the object of faith , and so presupposes the rule of faith. also in the beginning of his argument he makes the prim● principles of faith ( or vnwritten tradition as he elsewhere calls it , that is , the same we mean by oral and practical ) evident in it self . and p. . he puts the question between us and protestants , to be what is the external infallible ground unto which divine inspiration moveth men to adhere , that they may be settled in the true saving faith. where , first , besides gods grace moving us to every good act , ( which all catholicks hold to be necessary ) there is requisite , according to him , an external infallible ground ; next , that without such a ground a man cannot be settled in true saving faith. again , p. ▪ coming to lay the ground of knowing any doctrine to be apostolical , he mentions none but onely publick catholick tradition taught unanimously and perpetually by pastors ; which p. . he calls a rule infallible , and says that onely hereticks charge it to be fallible ; where also he explains the meaning of his principle , that [ the apostolical doctrine is the catholick ] after this manner , the doctrine which is deliver'd from the apostles by the tradition of whole christian worlds of fathers unto whole christian worlds of children , &c. of this tradition ( which by the words now cited appears to be evidently the same i defend ) he affirms ( p. . ) that 't is prov'd to be simply infallible by the very nature thereof ; and quotes suarez to say that 't is the highest degree of humane certitude ; of which it may simply ( or absolutely ) be said [ non posse illi falsum subesse ] that 't is impossible it should be false . can any thing be produc'd more expresly abetting my way of discoursing the grounds of faith ? nothing certainly , unless it be that which immediately follows , containing the reason why tradition is by the very nature of it simply infallible . for ( says he ) tradition being full report about what was evident unto sense , to wit , what doctrines and scriptures the apostles publickly deliver'd unto the world , it is impossible it should be false ; worlds of men cannot be uniformly mistaken and deceiv'd about a matter evident to sense ; and , not being deceiv'd , being so many in number , so divided in place , of so different affections and conditions , it is impossible they should so have agreed in their tale , had they so maliciously resolv'd to deceive the world. observe here , . that he alledges onely natural motives , or speaks onely of tradition as it signifies the humane authority of the church , that is , as taken in the same sense wherein i took it in my method . . he goes about to show out of its very nature , ( that is , to demonstrate ) 't is absolutely infallible . . he makes this tradition or humane authority of the church an infallible deriver down or ascertainer that what is now held upon that tenure is the apostles doctrine , or the first-taught faith ; which once known , those who are yet unbelievers may infallibly know that body that proceeds upon it to possess the true faith , and consequently infallibly know the true church ; which being the very way i took in my method , and other t●eatises , it may hence be discern'd with how little reason dr. t. excepts against it as so superlatively singular . but to proceed . hence p. . he avers that the proof of tradition is so full and sufficient that it convinceth infidels ( that is , those who have onely natural reason to guide themselves by . ) for though ( saith he ) they be blind not to see the doctrine of the apostles to be divine , yet are they not so void of common sense , impudent and obstinate as to deny the doctrine of christian catholick tradition to be truly christian and apostolical . and p. . the onely means whereby men succeeding the apostles may know assuredly what scriptures and doctrines they deliver'd to the primitive catholick church , is the catholick tradition by worlds of christian fathers and pastors , unto worlds of christian children and faithful people : which words as fully express that tradition is the onely or sole rule of faith as can be imagin'd . and whereas some hold that an inward working of god's spirit supplies the conclusiveness of the motive , this learned writer p. ▪ on the contrary affirms , that inward assurance without any external infallible ground to assure men of trvth , is proper unto the prophets and the first publishers of christian religion . and , lastly , ( to omit others ) p. . he discourses thus : if any object that the senses of men in this search may be deceiv'd through natural invincible fallibility of their organs , and so no ground of faith that is altogether infallible : i answer , that evidence had by sense being but the private of one man , is naturally and physically infallible ; but when the same is also publick and catholick ▪ that is , when a whole world of men concur with him , then his evidence is altogether infallible . and now i would gladly know what there is in any of my books touching the ground of faith which is not either the self-same , or else necessarily consequent or at least very consonant to what i have here cited from this judicious author and great champion of truth in his days , whose coincidency with other divines into the same manner of explication , argues strongly that it was onely the same unanimous notion and conceit of faith and of true catholick grounds which could breed this conspiring into the same way of discoursing , and almost the self-same words . § . . hence is seen how justly d. t. when he wanted something else to say , still taxed me with singularity in accepting of nothing but infallibility built on absolutely-conclusive motives , with talking such paradoxes as he doubts whether ever they enter'd into any other mans mind ; that all mankind excepting j. s have hitherto granted that no humane vnderstanding is secur'd from possibility of mistake from its own nature ; that my grounds exclude from salvation , and excommunicate the generality of our own church ; that no man before j. s. was so hardy as to maintain that the testimony of fallible men ( which word [ fallible ] is of his own adding , mine being of mankind relying on sensations ) is infallible : that this is a new way , and twenty such insignificant cavils . but the thing which breeds his vexation is , that , as my reason inclines me , i joyn with those who are the most solid and intelligent party of divines , that is , indeed , i stick to , and pursue , and explain , and endeavour to advance farther those grounds which i see are built on the natures of the things . would i onely talk of moral certainty , probabilities , and such wise stuff , when i am settling faith , i doubt not but he would like me exceedingly ; for then his own side might be probable too , which sandy foundation is enough for such a mercurial faith as nothing but interest is apt to fix . discourse viii . in what manner dr. t. answers my letter of thanks . his attempt to clear objected faults by committing new ones . § . . my confuter has at length done with my faith vindicated , and my methed , and has not he done well , think you , and approv'd himself an excellent confuter ? he onely broke his jests upon every passage he took notice of in the former , except one ; without ever heeding or considering , much less attempting to answer any one single reason of those many there alledg'd ; and as for that one passage in which he seem'd serious , viz. how the faithful are held by me infallible in their faith , he quite mistook it throughout . again , as for my method , he first gave a wrong character of it , and next pretended it wholly to rely upon a point which he had sufficiently considered , that is , which he had readily granted , but offer'd not one syllable of answer to any one reason in it neither . my letter of thanks is to be overthrown next ; and , first , he says he will wholly pass by the passion of it ; and i assure the reader so he does the reason of it too , for he speaks not a word to any one piece of it . next , he complains of the ill-language ; which he says proceeded from a gall'd and uneasie mind . he says partly true ; for nothing can be more uneasie to me , than , when i expected a sober and scholar-like answer , to find onely a prettily-worded fardle of drollery and insincerity . i wonder what gall'd him when he lavish'd out so much ill-language in answer to sure footing . in which treatise there was not one passiona●e word , not one syllable of irony , or any thing in the least of an impertinent nature , but a serious pursu●t of the point by way of reason from the beginning to the end . it seems , there being in it no show of passion , it was the reason of it which gall'd and was so uneasie to him . what need was there to fall into such down right rudeness as to call a proposition of mine , for which i offer'd my reasons , most impudent , ( as did dr. t. rule of faith , p. . ) and in forty other places to make the droll supply the divine ? was it not enough to answer the reasons , and let the world judge ? if he can show any such rude language in my letter of thanks , i here blame my self for it , though it be responsum non dictum . the worst word i use is charging h●m with falsifying my words and sense ; and it seems to me but hard law , if he may take the liberty to commit such faults frequently , and i may not so much as name his faults , when 't is my duty as his answerer to discover them . § . . he would clear himself of some faults objected ; to do which , he summons together all his best arts ; first , he picks out generally what can best bear a show of reply . next , he counterfeits a wrong objection , and lastly , conceals in what manner and for what reasons it was prest against him ; and by this means he hopes to escape blame . § . . first , he would justifie himself for saying i went about to explain words , because my self said i would examine well what is meant by them , which seems equivalent to explaining them , but he conceals what kind of explications i deny'd my self to mean , and what he unjustly imputed twice in one page , ( p. . ) namely , definitions ; he conceals how he would needs make me intend to define , and yet most disingenuously put down himself at the same time my very words in which i disclaim'd any pretence to define , but onely to reflect on some attributes , predicates or properties of what was meant by those words , that is , some pertinent and true sayings concerning rule and faith ; which though they in part explicate them , which i never deny'd ; yet they are far from looking like those compleat explications call'd definitions , or even like those less artificial ones call'd descriptions ; or like those explications industriously compil'd ( which was the word i us'd ) to adequate the intire notion of the word under consideration . for example , faith being there taken for believing , i come to discover it imports some kind of knowledge , and then argue from it as such , § . . again , i affirm , § . . that the notion of the word faith , bears that 't is a perfection of the soul , or a virtue ; and thence discourse from it as it imports a virtue . also § . . i affirm that faith mainly conduces to bliss or salvation &c. and thereupon frame such a discourse as is apt to spring out of such a consideration . now all these in part explicate the thing , that is , disclose or say some truth that belongs to its nature ; yet not one of those sayings looks like an explication of the word [ faith ] for this speaks an intireness and an adequateness to the notion explicated , which 't is evident not one of these particular affirmations or sayings have the least show of . he conceals also what was a●ledg'd letter of thanks , p. . ( for indeed 't was not creditable that candid scholars should reflect on it ) viz. that the word faith being equivocal , and sometimes signifying conscience , sometimes fidelity or honesty , &c. i was necessarily to explain my self in what sense i understood it there , and to declare that i took it for belief , and accordingly said , faith is the same with believing ; which no sooner done , but my pleasant confuter will needs have that expressing or clearing its distinct sense in one single word to be a definition too , and plays upon it p. . with such affected raillery as would make any sober man , unacquainted with the arts he uses to escape the duty of replying , justly wonder . but i shall easily satisfie our readers what 's the true reason of this carriage : he thought it not fit to give one word of a sober and solid reply to any one of tho●e many reasons in that first discourse of mine ( built all upon those affirmations or predications now spoken of ) though this be the substantialest part of my book , and the foundation of the rest , on wh●ch i ground rhe properties of a rule of faith , importing its absolute certainty ; but neglecting all my premisses and proofs he falls to deny my conclusion , and talk something against it in his own way . so that 't is evident these jests were to divert the reader from the point , and , so , serve instead of a confute to that whole discourse . a rare method ! signifying thus much , if candid●y and plain●y laid open , and brought to term● of reason ; because i can pretend any thing and play upon it with ironies prettily exprest , therefore ( my kind unexamining friends being inur'd to believe all i say to be gospel ) let my adversary say what he will , he shall never be held to discourse solidly . i charge him then afresh with an affected disingenuity , design'd to palliate h●s ●eglect of answering ; and let him know that ( as 't is manifest out of my book ) i built not there those seven properties of the rule of faith , ( ●he reasons for which he no where refutes ) on the exactness , intireness or goodness of any ( falsely-pretended ) definition or explication , but on the truth of those propositions , or the agreement of those attributes or properties to the respective natures of rule and faith as their subjects . also he may please to reflect that these being involv'd in the signification of those words , by discovering and then dilating upon each of those singly , i declare by consequence what is meant by those words as far as concerns my present purpose , without compiling explications , or framing definitions , which onely were the things i deny'd . lastly , i charge this insincerity far more home upon him now than ever ; that , whereas in my letter of thanks from p. . to p . i had at large refuted these ridiculous exceptions of his , he in this very place , where he pretends to speak particularly to my letter of thanks , never takes notice of any one word there alledg'd , but conceals all that had been produc'd to answer those exceptions , and bears himself as if no such answers had been given . this i must confess falls much short of either nibbling or gnawing ; and i am forc'd to declare that this constant carriage of his , discovering too openly a perfect disregard of truth , abates in me much of that respect which otherwise his good endowments would naturally give me . § . . his second remembrance of my letter of thanks ( for though he says here p. . he must not forget it , yet he ha● been perfectly unmindful of it hitherto ) is , that i say , my testimonies were not intended against the protestants , whereas my book was writ against them , and i declar'd the design of my testimonies to be to second by authority what i had before establish'd by reason . all this is well , were there not ( i fear ) two mistakes in it . one , that i writ that book against protestants particularly ; whereas it equally oppugns all that hold christ and his apostles to have taught true doctrine , b●t deny the churches living voice and practice to be the means of conveying it down hitherto , of what denomination soever they be . his second mistake is , his not considering that the whole substance of a book may be writ against such or such a sort of men , and yet the whole way of managing it not be against or different from them , but from some particular divines ; who ( as i conceiv'd ) would better rellish my reasons if they saw all the several conclusions deduc'd from them seconded by authority : and this was the true case . but dr. t. is not to understand this till he be willing to acknowledge the distinction between the church and the schools , which he is resolved he never will , lest it spoil his writing controversie . § . . but what i complain of is , that he objects i do this because i am conscious of the weakness of those testimonies : by which words his partial friends will easily conclude he had so weakened those testimonies that i was not able to uphold them ; whereas letter of thanks from p. . to p. . i very particularly reply'd to all he had alledg'd against them in his rule of faith , and gave an account of his performances in these words , p. . this , sir , is the up●hot of your skill in note-book learning : the three first testimonies from scripture you answered not , mistaking what they were brought for ; the fourth you omitted ; you have given pitiful answers to eight from the fathers , ( as i there shewed ) and shuffled off nine more without answer , &c. which charge , as to every branch of it , i there make good particularly and he no where clears here , or attempts to clear , more than by barely saying that i am conscious of the weakness of my testimonies . i think 't is best for me to take the same method , and say dr. t. is conscious of the weakness of all he has written , and so in a ●rice confute all he has writ ; and with far better reason than he can pretend to ; seeing any feather will serve to sweep down such cobweb stuff as his fair probabilities . now gentlemen , did dr. t. let his readers understand this performance of mine , and this neglect of his , it would not appear his answers to these testimones had been so strong , that my self had any cause to be conscious of their weakness , therefore ( contrary to his promise ) they were to be quite forgotten : it was but fitting and needful ▪ well , there have been perhaps many others equally-excellent in the art of memory , but , certainly , in that ra●e and useful art of oblivion he bears away the bell from all writers extant . by virtue of this , and the assistance of that fallacy in logick call'd non causa pro causâ , he obtains all his imaginary victories . § . he comes next to clear himself of false citations : and to let the reader see how little i am to be trusted , he will instance in two or three ; and i heartily desire i may be no otherwise trusted , than as it shall appear upon severe examination of what we both alledge , that he is culpable , and my self innocent . now in culling out and managing his instances , we may be sure he favours himself as much as he can handsomely ; the two first of them being trifles in comparison of many others omitted ; ond neither of them ▪ charged by me as false citations ( whatever he pretends ) meaning thereby adding , diminishing , or altering the words of the author . also the very first of these is the easiest to bear a tolerable explication of any one objected in the book . in examining which , i request our respective friends to be severely impartial and attentive to what was imputed by me , and what answer'd by him ; in doing which , eye-sight is to be their best guide . and , if i have to any degree wrong'd him , i shall not think it a jot prejudicial to my credit to declare that upon second thoughts i ought to mitigate or retract my words , accordding to the just degree the truth of the thing shall require . § . . i charg'd him with a notorious abuse of the preface to rushworths dialogues , in citing the author of it to say what he makes others say , and condemns them for saying it . to go securely to work , we are to put down first the words of the prefacer , which are these : this term [ moral certainty ] every one explicated not alike , but some understood by it such a certainty as makes the cause always work the same effect , though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherways : others call'd that a moral certainty which , &c. a third explication of that word is , &c. of these three ( says the prefacer , who having related the opinions of others , now begins to speak his own sense ) the first ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true certainty , and the authors consider'd as mistaken in undervaluing it . am not i sure i shall never repeat in the same order all the words i have spoken this last year ? yet these men will say i am onely morally ▪ certain . now the question is ▪ whether i did well or no , in blaming dr. t. for imposing on the prefacer to say that what consists with possibility of working otherwise is true certainty ; whereas that author avows that to be true certainty which [ others said ] took not away the possibility of working otherwise . what i affirm is , that he annexes no● those words [ though it take not away the possibility of working otherwise ] to true certainty , but onely adds them as explicating the conceit of others ; and that those words [ when the cause always works the same effect ] contain the just notion of what he allows there for true certainty . dr. t. thinks the contrary : and that he allows or approves that for true certainty , which did not take away the possibility of working otherwise . to state the case clearly , that we may see on whose side the fault lies , let us consider what was imputed by me , what reply'd by him . my charge is two fold ; one blaming his manner of putting it directly upon the prefacer , by leaving out the words [ some understood , &c. ] and so far is evident . see the words of the preface ; some understood by moral certainty , &c. see dr. t. rule of faith , p. [ lastly , mr. wh. doth most expressly contradict this principle of m. s's in these following passages . in his preface to mr. rushworth he says that such a certainty as makes the cause always work the same effect , though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherwise ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true certainty , and those authors are mistaken who undervalue it . now , though , one who cites another ought to be allow'd the liberty of taking those words which express his sentiments without putting them always in the very method and posture in which they are found in the author , while there is no ambiguity or doubt of the authors sense in that place ; yet where 't is at least doubtful that the sence is otherwise , as is manifest to any one who reads that preface , which , as i alledg'd , though dr. t. never takes notice of it , was wholly intended to evince the absolute certainty of faith , 't is not so fairly and clearly candid to introduce it as a most express saying of an author , and putting it directly upon him as his saying , whereas there at least needs a discourse and the drawing some consequences to prove it his sense and doctrine , ( as will appear shortly ) and on the other side , 't is opposite to the whole strain and scope of the treatise in which 't is found : thus far then i conceive my self in rigorous truth justifiable , namely for imputing to dr. t. that he left out the words [ some understood ] for he did so , and by so doing put that saying directly upon the prefacer himself , and expres● not that himself onely gather'd it by consequence from his words . § . . the chief and main part of the charge is , that the imputed tenet is not the sence of the prefacers words in that place ; and since he does not directly say it , but 't is inferr'd onely from his approving an others tenet ( either in whole or in part ) the point is to be decided by such reflexions as give us best light of his sense : in order to which , i alledge , . that the whole scope of that treatise is aim'd to prove the quite contrary position ; which consideration being confessedly the best interpreter of any author , to neglect that , and catch at any little semblance in two or three particular words , and then force upon that author a tenet perfectly contrary to what his whole discourse is bent to prove , favours too strong of a wit resolv'd to cavil . this i objected in my letter of thanks , and this dr. t. thought it his best play not to take notice of here , for it was unanswerable , and too evidently concluded him injurious to the prefacer . first , then , i desire the reader to reflect that there is not any show of relating the possibility there spoken of to the divine omnipotence , but onely to the natures of second causes ▪ next , that since every thing is what 't is made to be , if those causes can possibly work otherwise , the thing may be otherwise : these due reflexions made and settled , to those who have not leasure to read the whole preface , i offer these particularities . p. . he blames ▪ those who bring not an absolute certainty , or coactive of the vnderstanding , and at the end of that § . he presses those who say those ( moral ) motives are such as all are oblig'd to yield to , to show how all can be bound to believe that which they evidently see may be false . and , which is remarkable , these expressions are found in the § . immediately before the citation d.t. so misrepresents , whence 't is likely he could not but see and reflect on them . again , p. . else you will be forc'd to say , that the very way god himself has shewn to heaven , may possibly lead to hell. p. . the formal part of our action unless it carry evidence and certainty with it , cannot be ventur'd on vvithout reproach . now , as appears p. ▪ he ayms this discourse at actions belonging to faith , and answers , that is , opposes those who say the reason or ground of our action need be no more but a high probability , or contingent , as a thousand to one , &c. — p. . this necessity binds god to put an inevitable certitude in the motives of faith. — p. . there is nothing advanc'd towards the truth of the assent ▪ since this remains known , that the position may be false , &c. and , to omit others , p. . he puts the question whether a desultory assent ( which so agrees to this side , that the believer sees it fallible — ) be sufficient for christian life and action ? — and coming in the next § . to answer it , he calls this an incertitude , ( or defect of certitude ) and declares that it makes a religion either absolutely none , or not a rational one , but a meer folly . these citations duely reflected on , it will appear very strange to any ingenuous man , that dr. t. could easily imagine an author , never noted till now to be given to contradict himself , who so expresly , in such and so many signal passages , and in the whole tenour of that discourse , nay the very immediately foregoing § . manifests him●elf to hold that the grounds of faith cannot possibly lead men the wrong way , that they must be evident and inevitably certain , that , if it may be false , we cannot assent to it at all as a truth , that if the believer sees 't is fallible , 't is irrational , a meer folly to hold it , or else destructive of religion ; 't is strange , i say , to imagin that a writer who is any thing in his wits , should put forth a treatise purpose●y to evince the absolute certainty or impossibility of falsehood in the grounds and motives to faith , and in it so often and so particularly avow it , and yet in the same treatise confess that what 's possible to be false is true certainty , and , so , a competent ground to establish faith on ; that is , maintain the contrary position to what he intended or pretended . § . . having thus amply made good this part of my charge laid against dr. t. letter of thanks , p. . viz. that 't is the plain tenour of the prefacers discourse , and the whole scope of that preface , to force the direct contrary position to what dr. t. would so disingenuously have put upon him , of which he here takes no notice , nor gives account why he hapt not to mind or regard that best way of interpreting an authors words , or not to see so many clear expressions against his interest , rather than one obscure one seemingly for it , we come next to consider the particular words in the place cited , and see wha● strong temptation they could give dr. t. to take him in a sense never intended , notwithstanding so many pregnant evidences to the contrary . § . . the prefacer said , that some understood by moral certainty such a certainty as makes the cause always work the same effect , though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherways . he adds afterwards , that this ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true certainty , and the authors considered as mistaken in undervaluing it . and i must confess that to one who lights by accident on this single passage , taken abstractedly from the rest , and could reach no deeper than the grammar or superficial placing of words , it bears at first sight a show as if the prefacer had approv'd that to be a true certainty , not onely when the cause always works the same effect , ( as i take him to mean ) but also when it takes not away the possibility of working otherwise , ( in which sence dr. t. understands him . ) but i must avow that 't is impossible any rational deliberate man who endeavours to looke into the sence of words , can justly frame even hence any such imagination . for which i offer these reasons : . that though the distinct limits of moral certainty be unknown , yet in the general conceit of those who use that word , particularly those alluded to here , moral certain●y is that which consists with a possibility of being otherwise ; wherefore true certainty which is here counterpos'd to moral , must be counterpos'd also to that which constitutes moral certainty , namely , to a possibility to be otherwise . . since absolute certainty is that kind of certainty which is oppos'd to the moral one , the true certainty here mention'd must mean the same with absolute certainty , which is also avow'd and requ●r'd by that author . p. . now cited ; but 't is acknowledg'd that absolute certainty excludes all possibility of falsehood , therefore the true certainty allow'd and approv'd here by the prefacer , is that which has no possibility of being false . . these things being so , viz. moral certainty being that which has annext to it possibility of falsehood , and absolute or true certainty being confessedly inconsistent with it , 't is unimaginable that he who blame● any man for mistaking or undervaluing a thing for morally certain , should not also blame him for mistaking and undervaluing it as possible to be false ; since this is annext in the conceit of those blame-worthy persons to moral certainty , as its proper constitutive and equivalent . also 't is unconceiveable that he who approves a thing as truly or absolutely certain , should not also mean it impossible to be false , this being the proper constitutive ( and con●equently ) equivalent of true or absolute certainty . 't is evident then that authors sence can be no other than this , that when the cause always works the same effect , 't is true or absolute certainty , and not moral certainty onely , and consequently that 't is impossible to be false : and that , those words which he added in their names , expressing it onely morally certain [ though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherways ] are utterly disapproved by him in his disapproving their calling it moral certainty ; which is of the self-same notion . my charge then is justify'd to a tittle , viz. that dr. t. left out the words [ some understood ] and put upon the prefacer to say it most expresly , whereas the sense he imposes is contrary to express words of his in divers places , nay to the whole intention and drift of that preface , and necessarily opposite to the sence of those words in that very particular place he cites for it . this is manifestly dr. t's fault ; mine , if any , is this ; that i might have mitigated the phrase , [ notorious abuse , &c ] and have been so wise as to consider that dr. t. does not use to look so narrowly into the sense of words as i still expect from him , nor regards the antecedents or consequents , as candid adver●aries use , but contents himself with the first countenance they bear , right or wrong , especially if it make for his interest ; and hereupon i ought to have been more merciful to hab●tual imperfections . i have been larger in clearing th●s point , because i hear his friends apprehend he has gain'd a notable advanta●e against me in this particular , and i dare even submit it to their judgment , if friendship will permit them to examine it with any degree of impartiality . i hope this will serve for an instance how dr. t. still misunderstands our d●vi●es when he objects them against me ; as also how far i have been from imposing any thing unjustly upon him in the least . god be praised , i do stand in need of such petty crafts . § . . in clearing himself of the next fault objected , he is still himself , and i wish he did not still grow worse and worse . the fallacy ca●l'd non causa pro causa , or pretending a wrong reason , which runs through half his performances , was never more needful than in this present conjuncture . i invite then even his best friend dr. st. himself to judge of the case , and desire him , having first read the p. . in my letter of thanks to determine the point in controversie . in that place i represented dr. t. as quoting from rushworths dialogues , after himself had preambled ( rule of faith , p. . ) that probably it was prudent to cast in a few good words concerning scripture [ for the satisfaction of indifferent men who have been brought up in this verbal and apparent respect of the scriptures ] and then adding as a kind of comment upon those words , [ who it seems are not yet arriv'd to that degree of catholick piety and fortitude as to endure patiently the word of god should be reviled or slighted . ] now this preamble , & comment introduc'd by [ it seems ] ( that is , from those words he had cited ) did put upon that author , and by him on catholicks , so unworthy and invidious a meaning , that it oblig'd me to put down the rest of the words immediately following in the dialogues , and omitted by dr. t. that so i might clear the sober meaning and intention of that author from what he had so unhandsomely impos'd ; and ( not troubling my self to repeat over again what he had newly said ) i introduc'd them thus ; whereas in the place you cite he onely expresses [ it would be a satisfaction to indifferent men to see the positions one would induce them to embrace , maintainable by scripture ] which done , i added as the result of my whole charge , [ which is so different from the invidious meaning your malice puts upon it , and so innocent and inoffensive in it self , that one would wonder with what conscience you could thus wrest and pervert it . whence 't is evident that my total charge was of imp●sing an invidious meaning , of wresting and perverting an innocent and inoffensive meaning ; that he onely exprest ( which words i immedia●ely subjoyned after the doctors comment , and not after rushworths words ) it would be a satisfaction , &c. — to see those positions maintainable by scripture ; nor was there in the whole charge any controversie about the right or wrong , perfectly or imperfectly quoting the words . this being evident , as it will be to any ordinary understanding that guides it self by eye-sight and common sense , let us see what disingenuous ways dr. t. uses to escape blame . . he never in the least mention'd his imposing upon those words an invidious meaning , or of wresting an innocent and unoffensive [ intention , ] which was solely objected ; whence he is so far from clearing himself from the fault imputed , that ( out of an over-tender kind-heartedness to his own credit ) he not so much as names it , or takes notice of it . next , instead of that , he substitutes a false charge , never dream't on by any man but himself ; namely , that i deny'd those words [ who have been brought up in this verbal and apparent respect of scripture ] to be found in rushworth ; whereas there is not a syllable to that purpose in my book . thirdly , to give countenance to this false charge , those words of mine , [ whereas in the place you cite he onely expresses ] which in me were immediately subjoyned to his comment , and were evidently design'd to restrain that authors words to a sense different from what he had impos'd , he here joyns immediatly after the very wo●ds themselves , though there were three or four lines between one and the other . by this stratagem making the reader apprehend the word [ onely ] was exclusive or negative of more words found in rushworth ; whereas by the who●e tenour of the charge , by all the words which express it , and lastly , by the placing those words , [ he onely exprest ] immediately after his unhandsome comment , 't is most manifest they onely excluded any ground or occasion of so strange a misconstruction , and aim'd not in the least at denying any other words , but onely at clearing that this was that authors sole intention . yet in confidence of these blinding crafts , and that his unexamining readers will believe all he says , he sounds the triumph of his own victory in this rude and confident manner , certainly one would think that either this man has no eyes or no forehead . i will not say as dr. t. does here in a sermon preach'd against himself , p. . that a little wit , and a great deal of ill-nature will furnish a man for satyr ; onely i must say that the tenth part of this rudeness in another ( though justly occasion'd too ) would have been call'd passion and ill language . but i see what 's a most horrid sin in the abominable papist , is still a great virtue in the saints . on this occasion since he is so hot and rustick , i must be serious with him , and demand of him publickly in the face of the world satisfaction for this unjust calumny ; and , that i may not be too rigorous with him , i will yield him innocent in all the rest , if he clears himself of this one passage in which he counterfeits the greatest triumph and victory ; of this fault , i say , which he has newly committed , even then when he went about to clear himsellf of a former . § . . his last attempt is to give an account why he added that large senc'd monosyllable [ all ] to my words , which is the onely false citation be hath yet offer'd to examination ; the former two not being objected as such , whatever he pretends . now the advantage he gains by adding it , is manifestly this , that if that word be added , and that i indeed say , the greatest hopes and fears are strongly apply'd to the minds of all christians , it would follow that no one christian in the world could apostatize , or be a bad man ; which being the most ridiculous position that ever was advanc'd , and confutable by every days experience , his imposing this tenet on me , by virtue of this addition , i● ( as he well expresses it , serm. p. . ) putting me in a fools coat for every body to laugh at . i appeal'd ( letter of thanks , p. , . ) to eye-sight , that no such word was ever annext to the words now cited , and thence charg'd him with falsifying ; he would clear himself , in doing which , he denies not that he added the word all , ( this was too evident to be cloak'd ) but he gives his reason why he added it , on this manner : he ▪ alledges my words , that christian doctrine was at first unanimously settled in the minds of the faithful , &c. — and firmly believ'd by [ all ] those faithful to be the vvay to heaven . therefore , infers dr. t. since in the pursuit of the d●scourse 't is added , that the greatest hopes and fears vvere strongly apply'd to the minds of the first believers , those first believers must mean all those faithful spoken of before , and the same is to be said of the christians in after ages . this is the full force of his plea : my reply is , that i had particular reason to add the word [ all ] in the former part , where i said that that doctrine vvas firmly believ'd by all those faithful , for they had not been faithful had they not firmly believed it ; and yet had equal reason to omit it when i came to that passage , ( the greatest motives were strongly aprly'd to the minds of the first believers ) , because i have learn'd of our b. saviour that many receive the word , that is believe and gladly too , yet the thorny cares of this world ( to which i add passions and ill affections springing from original sin ) choak the divine seed and hinder it from fructifying ; whereas , had it had the full and due effect which its nature requir'd , it had born fruit abundantly , now , since those motives are of themselves able to produce it in all , and oftentimes convert the most indispos'd , that is , the most wicked sinners , i conceive this happens for want of due application making the motives sink deep into the understanding power so as to make it conceit them heartily ( which vigorous apprehension we use to call lively faith ) nothing else being required to any effect but the agents power over the patients indisposition , and a close application of the power to the matter t is to work upon : which kind of application being evidently not made to all , there was no show of reason why i should put that word in that place , and much less that dr. t. should put it for me : i was forc't indeed to name the word believers , because it was impossible to conceive that those motives should be strongly apply'd to the minds of jews or heathens . again , i was forc't to express it plurally , since no sober man can doubt but the doctrine of faith sunk deep into the hearts or wills of more than some one , and thence wrought in them through charity : but that i should mean by that word onely plurally exprest a number of believers , having those motives strongly applyed to them , equal to those who firmly believed or were faithful , is unconceivable by any man who looks into the sense of words ; this being the same as to apprehend that all who believe speculatively , lay to heart those motives to good life which faith teaches them ; a thing our daily experience confutes . moreover , i endeavoured to prevent any such apprehension in my very next words after my principles , which were these [ this put , it follows as certainly that a great nvmber of the first believers and after faithful would continue , &c. now , these words [ a great number of the first believers ] having most evidently a partitive sense , that is , signifying onely a part or some of them , it might seem strange to any man that knows not dr. t 's might in such performances and that nothing is impossible for him to mistake , who will do it because he must do it , that ▪ he could interpret those very same words [ first believers ] to mean all , not one excepted . 't is a trifling evasion then to hope to come off by saying as he does here p. . if it contradict what he sayes elsewhere it is no new or strange thing ; for this is not elsewhere or another place , but the same place , and the very next words to my principles ( as is seen sure●● . p. . ) the badness of which excuse shows he is inexcusable . but this is not all ; that discourse ends not there , but goes on at least two leaves farther clearing that very point ; and in the process of it these words are found p. . to say it preserves none good is to question christs wisdome , &c. a great part therefore would be virtuous , &c. a body of traditionary christians would still be continued , — p. . all which wayes and objects thus easily and strongly appliable were frequently and efficaciously apply'd by the education of parents and the discipline and oeconomy of the church , which brings those speculations to practice , was ever , and must needs reach the generality , — p. . must still continue in some great mvltitvde . all these expressions in the self-same discourse and on the self-same subject , perfectly explicated my sense to be that that plural word ( believers ) did not reach all , not one excepted . this then is dr. t 's habitual imperfection which runs through all his mock-answer to sure footing ▪ he has no patience to take any intire discourse of mine into his consideration , or grapple with the full import of it ; but he catches at some word at the beginning or by the way which seems easiest to be misinterpreted , and whereas any candid man would guide himself by the annext or concomitant words , and the whole scope of the discourse , dr. t. is got beyond those too-ingenuous considerations , and knowing very well , as he exprest it serm. p. . that nothing is so easie as to take particular phrases and expressions out of the best book in the world , and abuse them by forcing an odd and ridiculous sence upon them , he exactly observes that method , and abuses some expression or word by forcing ( in despight of all the concomitant circumstances conspiring to rectifie him ) an odd and ridiculous sence upon it ; and then lest those rectifying passages annext should rise up in judgment against him and accuse him to the candid reader of imposing a sense never intended by the author 't is but accusing that author of contradict●ng himself , and all 's well . thus he us'd the prefacer p. . me in this very place , in these words if it contradict what he sayes elsewhere 't is no new or strange thing ; and sure-footing in most of those places which he wilfully misconstrued throughout his rule of faith. by this rare stratagem gaining two notable advantages against any author , whereas not so much as one was offered ; first , making him talk ridiculously ; next , making him contradict himself . both of them built upon another of dr. t 's firm principles , which is this ; no author shall be allow'd to interpret his own meaning , but that shall be his sense which i please to put upon any particular expression of his ; by adding words to it or otherwise glossing it as seems best for my advantage ; and if he offers to be so wary as to annex other words which would interpret his meaning to be otherwise , he is a fool and contradict himself . now , though this principle which grounds this procedure be an odd one , yet dr. t. holds faithfully to what he has once espoused , and were it now seasonable , i durst undertake to reckon up twenty places in his rule of faith , where he vaunts himself thus doubly victorious by making use of this one artifice . § . . but in case that plural word had seem'd to him to infer an vniversality , why could he not content himself with giving his reason why it seem'd to follow thence ? had he done this none could have accus'd him of falsifying : for every one has liberty to offer his conceit , and the reason why he judges so , without meriting or incurring any harsher note than that of a mis-reasoner . whereas now , his carriage exposes him justly to these exceptions . first , that he went not about to infer or gather what he imposes , but ( rule of faith , p. . ) he makes me in express terms and directly say that greatest hopes and fears are strongly apply'd to the minds of all christians , whereas in my words put down by himself , p. . no such thing as [ all ] is found annext to those words . next , that the word ( all ) which he added , was put in the same italick letter in an even tenor with those other words which were indeed mine ; as may be seen in the place now cited . thirdly , that his whole attempt in that place , is meerly to confute that word [ all ] which himself had inserted , as may be seen letter of thanks p. . where i instanc'd in nine or ten places in which he combated that single word of his own adding and nothing else ▪ and ( as i there shew'd from p. . to p. . ) went forwards to make out that pretence by falsifying evidently my sense and sometimes my words too , in three or four places more . fourthly , that ( rule of faith , p. . l. . ) he tells the reader i say expressly , those causes are put in all the faithful actually causing : by this means endeavouring to perswade the reader 't is not his own interpretation or deduction from some words of mine , but my own express words ; which is a most express falsification . lastly , he neglects to take notice of any of those words which manifoldly and expresly show'd my tenet to be quite contrary to what he impos'd . this is my total charge against him ; of which we hear very little or rather nothing in this preface where he goes about to clear it ; onely he sayes that those first believers to whom those hopes and fears were strongly apply'd , must by the tenour of my words mean all the faithful disperst over several parts of the world , and so all the christians of that age , and for the same reason of the following ones ; which is the very thing i deny , and have given lately my reasons why they could not . besides , every scholar knows that authors first speak short and in common , and afterwards , when they come to explain themselves , more particularly ; and had he been pleas'd to contain his rare gift of misinterpreting till the very next line to my principles , woven in the tenour of the same discourse , which he pretends to build his mistake upon , he had found the express contrary to his additional [ all ] viz ▪ ( a great number or body of the first believers and after-faithful , the direct ) sense of which words is not all , but some onely . § . . again , what if i us'd the word faithful first , and put to it the word all , joyned with such words as would ●ear that universal expression , must it needs follow that when i name the same word plurally afterwards , i must needs mean all or the universality again , even though i joyn it this second time with words of a quite different sense ? imagine i had said , that all historians write of matters of fact , and then had subjoyn'd a little after that historians write of king pepin , must i needs mean by historians onely plurally exprest when i come to name them the second time , all historians , no● one excepted , write of king pepin ? what logick but dr. t's , who defies all principles , could ever stumble upon such a paradox ▪ § . . to conclude this matter . all these particularities here related , being well examin'd by eye-sight and weigh'd by reason , 't is impossible any candid considerer , however he may favourably judge dr. t. mistaken in words which at first sight bore such a semblance to one who read but half the discourse , can for all that excuse him from great rashness and strong inclinations to draw every thing in his adversary to a sinister sence , and to take him up before he is down . but i must farther say , that the constancy he shews in this kind of carriage , and the interest which evidently accrues by it to his cause , and himself as a writer , ( which is at once to make his adversary talk like a madman and self-contradictor both , and divert the readers attention from the true point , and by that means avo●d the duty of answering ) discover too palpably 't is a willing and designed mistake . what that signifies , let others judge , without putting me still to name it . i am heartily weary of such drudgery . § . . and so i take my leave of this pretty preface , which has not one word of reason in it , but built on mistake ; nor one good excuse for so many bad faults· but pretends to speak to three treatises of mine , without taking notice candidly of so much as one argument in any of them , and is a meer endeavour by multitudes of impertinent and insignificant scoffs to make some plausible show of an answer , for those merrily-conceited readers to sport at , who fancy such frothy talk far above solid reasoning . in which pleasant strain consists also his friend dr. st's greatest talent . whence , the comedian in their performances supplies the divine ; and plautus with his fellows is by far more propitious , useful , and influential to their imaginary victories , than aristotle , and all the learned authors in the world who write sence or logick . and as these comick controvertists affect the same manner of writing which those stagers did , so their end and aym is the same too , viz. not to propose any thing like exact knowledge to men truly learned , but meerly populo ●t placerent quas fecissent fabulas . the conclusion . containing the author's request to the knowing candid wits of this nation . this being the genius of my adversary , such his method of answering my books , and yet his numerous party hazarding to over-bear reason with noise , at least in the esteem of vulgar scholars , making up the generality ; who are not able to weigh either the strength of the arguments , or the worth of the authorities engag'd for either party , but onely to number them , or scan their multitude ; i am forc'd to appeal to you , our learned umpires , offering you these few proposals ; with my humble request , that , if you find them reasonable , and agreeable to the maxims of learning , or the clearing of truth , mankinds best interest , you would be pleas'd in all handsome occasions to use your power with dr. t. and his friends , and sollicit a due compliance with them . . that this extrinsecal and ignoble way of answering arguments with persecution and railing , may be left off ; and that when the reason too much presses , it may not be held supplemental to the duty of replying , to cry out popery . particularly , that they would please to consider how improper this carriage were on this occasion , in case it had been otherwise laudable in it self ▪ seeing the onely point maintain'd by me here , is this , that christian faith is absolutely or truly certain . . that when the point depends intirely on reason , and not on the ( miscall'd ) authority of speculaters , it may not be held a just disproof of my arguments to alledge the different sentiment of some speculative divines ; since that carriage supposes as its maxim , the truth of this proposition [ that cannot be true which all school-divines do not agree to . ] wherefore unless he first makes out this to be a truth to be proceeded and rely'd on , this way of arguing , which takes up no small part of dr. t's controversial writings , is convinc'd to be al●●gether impertinent , . that dr. t. would himself please to follow that doctrine which in his sermons he so oft and so pressingly inculcates to others ; and that , in handling this grave and important point , all raillery , drollery , irony , scoffs , ieers , rude and bitter sarcasms , breaking of iests , and such-like attempts of vain and frothy wit , or splendid efforts of peevish zeal , which so abound in his rule of faith , and in a manner wholly compose this preface , be totally superseded , and onely serious reason made use of . to oblige him to which sober demand , i promise on my part , that , though these being here my onely confuters , i was forc'd at present to give them sometimes their proper answers by retorting now and then his own language , onely better apply'd ; yet in my future writings i shall seriously pursue the proof of the point , without minding at all his impertinencies ; that is , i shall rigorously observe the same sober strain , which , as my own inclinations lead me , i follow'd in sure-footing , faith vindicated , and my method ; till dr. t. seeing it his interest to avoid answering in a solid manner , or closing by way of rigorous discourse with my arguments , thought it his best play to bring the controversie 〈◊〉 of the way of reason into that of burlesque . also that all childish cavilling at inelegancies or hard words , at want of rhetorick in a circumstance where none was intended or needful ▪ at my being the first that said ( he should have said prov'd ) this or that , be for the same reason laid aside , as things p●rfectly useless towards the clearing of truth . as likewise that it be not held and imputed as confidence , to maintain faiths absolute certainty , or any point else , for which i offer my reasons ; nor to pretend to self evident principles and absolutely-conclusive proofs or demonstrations ; whenas the circumstance and matter to be prov'd , nay the very name of a scholar renders it shameful to pretend or produce any thing of an inferiour strength , in case i aym'd at winning others to assent to my sayings . but above all i request that none of these trifling ways be made use of to supply the want of pertinent reason , or make up the whole confute , as is practis'd throughout this preface ; but that reason , where-ever it is found , may have its due and proper return , reason . . that , while he goes about to reply to my arguments , he would please to use my words , and not insert others of his own ; and then combat them instead of me . or , if he undertakes to speak to my reasons themselves , that he would take the full import of them , and not still catch at and then play upon some word or two which he can most easily seem to misunderstand , so to divert the discourse . a method so constantly observ'd in his reply to sure-footing , where he made witty dexterity still supply the place of pertinent solidity ; that instead of [ rule of faith ] it ought more justly have been entitled sure-footing travesty . . and since all discourse is ineffectual which is not grounded on some certain truth , and consequently not onely he who settles or builds , but also he who aims to overthrow , or the objecter , must ground his discourse on some certain principle , if he intends to convince the others tene● of falsehood , that dr. t. would therefore esteem it his duty , even when he objects , to ground his opposition upon some firm principle . and since no pretended principle can be firm , but by virtue of some first principle , and that dr. t. has disclaim'd here identical propositions to be such , 't is requisite that he either confute my discourses produc'd in this treatise proving first principles to be of that nature , and show some other way by which the terms of those he assigns for such do better cohere , or he is convinc'd to have none at all ; and so all he writes or discourses must be groundless and insignificant . . thus much in common for the manner of his writing . as for his matter , i request he would not in the subject of this present discourse , about the certainty of a deity and christian faith , hover with ambiguous glosses between certainty and uncertainty , that is , between is and is not ; but speak out categorically , and plainly declare whether he holds those points absolutely true ; that is , whether they be absolutely true to us ; or whether any man in the world can with reason say he sees they are true , or has any reason or argument to conclude them true ▪ if not , then ●et him show how 't is avoidable but all the world must with truth say , both these may be false , for any thing they can discern ; than which , nothing sounds more horrid and blasphemous to a christian ear. if he says there are such reasons extant , but he has them not , then let him leave off attempting to settle those tenets , or writing on those subjects , since he confesses himself unqualify'd and unfurnish'd with means to manage them . if he says there are such proofs , and that he has them , let him produce them ▪ and stand by them , and not blame the nature of things for bearing no more , and others for saying they have more , and that the things do bear more . to express my self closer and more particularly ; let him speak out ingenuously and candidly to these queries , whether be holds that god's church , or any man in the world , is furnish'd with better grounds for the tenet of a deity or for christian faith , or any stronger reasons to prove these points true , than those in joshua's and hezekiah's time had or could have the day before , that the sun should not stand still or go back the next day ; than that person who threw a glass on the ground which broke not , had or could have that it would not break ; ●han the inhabitants of divers houses had that they would not suddenly fall , which yet did so ; or , lastly ▪ to use his own words , than those reasons are which satisfie prudent men in humane affairs , in which notwithstanding they experience themselves often mistaken ? if he say he has , let him produce them , and heartily maintain them , and endeavour to make them out , and i shall hereafter express as much honour for him , as i have done here of resentment and dislike , for advancing the contrary position . but , if he profess he has no better , or that ( the nature of the thing not bearing it ) there can no better be given , then 't is unavoidable , first , that the most sacred tenets of a deity 's existence , and all the points of christian faith may be now actually false , since points which had reasons for them of equivalent strength did prove actually such . next , that no man in the world is ( in true speech ) certain there is a god , or that the least word of christian religion is true ; since 't is nonsence to say any of those persons ( in those former instances of equivalent strength ) were or could be truly certain of points which prov'd actually false , and in which themselves were mistaken . in a word , i would have him without disguise let the world know whether , as there was contingency in those causes , and so the imagin'd or hoped effects in the former instances miscarried , and prov'd otherwise than was expected , so there be not also contingency in the motives for those two most sacred tenets , upon whose certainty the eternal good of mankind depends , so as they may perhaps not conclude , and so both those tenets may perhaps be really and actually otherwise than we christians now hold . if he professes to embrace this wicked tenet , ( and his words are too express for it ever to be deny'd , though upon second thoughts i hope they may be retracted ) he owes me an answer to my faith vindicated , which hitherto he has shuffled off without any at all , and to my reasons alledg'd in this treatise for the same point , faith's absolute certainty . now , gentlemen , since nothing conduces more to knowledge in any kind , than that the matter of the dispute be unambiguously stated , and clearly understood , and that a solid method be observ'd in the managing it , i become a humble petitioner to your selves , as you tender that excellent concern of mankind , and that most sacred one of christianity , to use your best interest with dr. t. that he would please to yield to these duties here exprest ; and i oblige my self inviolably to observe the same carriage towards him , which i here propose and press he would use towards me ; which if he refuse , i declare i shall leave him to the censure of all truly-learned and ingenuous persons , however he triumphs amongst those who are great admirers of pretty expressions ; resting assur'd that your selves will not onely hold me unblameable , but also highly commendable for no● losing my precious time in reciprocating his trifling and insignificant drollery . your true honourer and humble servant , j. s. finis . amendments . page . line . read that both first , p. . l. . self , possible to , p. . l. . solid , p. . l. , . possible all this may , p. l. , judgment in which it is , l. . can never , p. . l. . resolute hatred , p. . l. . did equivalently , p. . l. . & . speculaters , p. . l. . nay more , p. . l. . to be , p. . l. . greater degree , p. . l. . is not true , or not to dare , p. . l. . chimerical , p . l. . fourth eviction ▪ l. . of the sixth , p. . l. . sermons equally , p. . l . parallelepiped , p. . l. . predicate , p. . l. ult . all good , p. . l. sensible man may , p. . l. . deduc'd there , p. . l. . of discoursing the , p. . l. . it is , is not more , p. . l. . of its own , p. . l. . not the rule , dele express , p. . discourse ix . p. ▪ l , . reason in it — p . l. , . the authors mistaken in undervaluing it , p. . l. . i do non stand . p. . l. . apply'd , l. . i had . schism dispach't or a rejoynder to the replies of dr. hammond and the ld of derry. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) schism dispach't or a rejoynder to the replies of dr. hammond and the ld of derry. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. s.n.], [paris? : m.dc.lvii. [ ] a reply to "a reply to the catholick gentlemans answer to the most materiall parts of the booke of schisme" by henry hammond and "a replication to the bishop of chalcedon his survey of the vindication of the church of england from criminous schism" by john bramhall. place of publication suggested by wing. with a postscript leaf followed by a blank and an index. annotation on thomason copy: "august.". reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng hammond, henry, - . -- reply to the catholick gentlemans answer to the most materiall parts of the booke of schisme -- early works to . bramhall, john, - . -- replication to the bishop of chalcedon his survey of the vindication of the church of england from criminous schism -- early works to . schism -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion schism dispach't or a reioynder to the replies of d r hammond and the l d of derry . in mala cavsa non possunt aliter ; at malam causam quis coëgit eos habere ? aug. m.dc.lvii . to the indifferent reader . i present thee here with a full view of errour 's vtmost , and of the method it must necessarily take in it's progress . first , weaknesses of reasoning & insincerity must endeavour to establish the groundles fabrick ; which once discoverd , there is no way left but to fall into worse paralogisms & contradictions , and more open & inexcusable falsifications . this is my charge in generall against my two adversaries ; the roll of their many faults in particular may bee collected out of the index . if i have wrong fully imposed any thing on them , let mee sink in thy esteem ; if iustly , let them . i court no favour from thee but this that thou wouldest not give credit to this reioynder of mine , read alone , but in company still of their replies : sometimes also upon occasion reflecting back on d r hammonds book of schism , my l d of derry's iust vindication of the church of england , and schism di●arm'd : consider , i put thee upon neither an uniust , unprofitable , unecessary not too troublesome a method . not uniust , since this gives thee a fair opportunity to ballance equally in thy thoughts what both alledge . not unprofitable , since these two first books of theirs being cry'd up for the best peeces which have come forth in these late dayes upon so concerning a subject , nothing can more largely contribute to thy soul's repose than to bee satisfactorily conuinc't whether they stand or fall . not unnecessary ; because without method no secure satisfaction can bee had ; there being so many by-wayes incident to obstinate and disingenuous maintainers of their tenet , as of omitting to answer things important , wauing the true point controverted , enlarging upon unconcerning passages , misrepresenting the true state of the question ▪ testimonies , and one anothers words , &c. that , without a ioynt-perusall of both party's writings , 't is impossible to receive any rationall satisfaction ; nor , indeed , any at all without a confident reliance upon the private writer's word or authority , than which kind of partiality nothing hath more endamag'd rationall soul's . nor yet is this method too troublesome ; since , by seeing so numerous and such gross faults truly made good to bee in these their writings , thou mayst iustly hold thy self excused from reading the rest of their past or future works till they clear these their best to bee both convincing & true dealing ; which , unles they perform effectively , i must challenge thy judgment and thy sincerity neither to give them assēt nor credit . i confess , indeed , that , while i intreat thee to make use of this method , i have a private end of mine own ; knowing nothing could do mee more particular right than this . many sober & candid persons reading schism disarm'd ( not considering that what is spoken in opposition to truth must necessarily bee nonsence , and easy to bee shown such if the discoverer of it vnderstands his own grounds , bee true to his cause , and will speak out ) apprehended it impossible a bishop and a doctour , persons of so high repute for learning , should bee obnoxious all over to such innumerable faults and such incredible weaknesses ; and rather look't upon it as a peece of wit , framing an idea , as it were , of what humane frailty could possibly bee subject to , than that it was so indeed : till , coming to compare it with it's adversary-books and scanning one in order to the other , they remain'd , as on the one side perfectly satisfy'd , so , on the other , extremely astonish't at the weaknes of errour . i know good natures are loath to think men to bee monsters , that is , sencelesly irrationall or voluntarily insincere : but , i hope i shall gain so far upon their reasons without wronging their good natures , ( for i concieve reason to bee their best and onely nature ) as to consider that in what wee oppose one another , wee contradict one another , and the one part onely of the contradiction can bee truth ; wherefore the other part must necessarily bee falshood , that is , non-sence . hee then whose task it is to oppose the true side , must unavoidably talk non-sence if hee oppose it directly ; or else hee must prevaricate from his duty in opposing something else in stead of it , and so bee very impertinent ; or bring against it mediums or arguments which concern it not but look another way , and so become extremely weak : or , lastly , if hee brings any necessary and enforcing argument , which admitted would destroy the true position , it must infallibly ( since one truth cannot quarrell with another ) bee a meer pretence or a falsification , and so render the alledger insincere . wherefore , since they and i , in what wee oppose one another , maintain contradictory position , whereof one side and one onely , must necessarily bee right , 't is impossible but that one of us must either mistake in opposing the true point , and so manage our discourse w●akly ; or wilfully neglect it and so play the fool maliciously ; or go about to oppose it with a reall truth , and so talk non-sence ; or , lastly , bring against it a fictitiously pretended truth , and so prove a falsifier ; and this , in every step of our process . to these faults then , i say , one of us must necessarily remain obnoxious , and that continually ; which of us 't is , is left , reader , to thy judgment ; onely bee so sincere as to give it due information in examining both together . to this end i have for the most part quoted the page and very line of d r hammond ; the other is so diuided into short sections , to which mine are correspondent , that there needed no such exactnes . one request more i have to offer thee that thou wouldst observe by the way as thou readest , the different genius of my two adversaries . the former would make a show of saying something by labouring with a multitude of little petty divisions , frequent intermixtures of greek phrases and citations , smooth and plausible language , & the like quaint and pretty flourishes ; whereas , indeed , hee never sayes any thing severely to the purpose , nor ever speaks home ; but his discourse is made up of such indifferent terms , so far from immediate , his testimonies for the most part so totally unconcerning the question , or , at least , so easily appliable to another sence , which yet hee presses not close to the point but leaves them still in their pure neutrality , that even the quickest eye stands in need of a tube optick to see from the premisses to the conclusion , or from the argument to the question . or rather , indeed , it would puzzle a good logician , who understands how necessary connexion there ought to bee between the conclusion and premisses , to pick an argument out of the whole book ; his notions are so dishevell'd and loosely scatter'd about after a meer orationall and declamatory fashion . the latter is more candid and speaks plain , and so falls into more direct contradictions , which hee bolts out confidently . the one is of a wary nature and endeavours to cloak them that they may not show their faces ; the other is more down right , puts a good countenance on them and bids them out face the world . the one makes his advantage from niaisery and shyness , the other from boldnes . the ones way of writing is properly characterd to bee shuffling , and packing the cards beneath the table ; the other's playing foul above board . lastly , the one raises mists all over , and would steal common sence from a man , as it were , in the dusky twilight ; the other will needs rob you of it at noon-day . nor do i intend by this frank censure to derogate from the iust opinion of learning due to them ; i doubt not but they are men of much reading : onely i contend that their manner of schollar-ship is an historicall and verball kind of learning , and improperly call'd such , since to bee learned is to know , which none can do except those who have undeniable grounds and can proceed with evident consequence upon those grounds ▪ either side may talk rhetorically , cite a testimony , and by quibbling in the words show it plausibly sounding to his sence , but to speak consequently and convincingly belongs onely to them who have grounds , that is truth on their side , since there can bee no true grounds nor solid reason for an errour . whence again since one of us must have truth , and but one of us can have it , 't is manifest one of us onely can have grounds , or discourse consequently , the other must shuffle , falsify or talk verbally . at whose door the guilt lies is not my part to decide , but is wholly submitted to the tribunal of the rightly inform'd reader ; whose pardon i humbly beg for using the same words so often , as non-sence , shuffling , weaknes , &c. the frequent repetition of such unsavory tautologies sounded no less ingratefull to my ears , being really much ashamed to name so often what they so often did . but i de●ire it may bee consider'd i was here to speak truth not to vary phrases ; and , both for this , as also for the seeming harshnes of my expressions , i crave leave to pose the disliker with this dilemma ; that , since it was my task to bee their accuser where i found them reproovable and accusers are to call crimes by their own names , either they misdeseru'd or not ; if not , i am willing to bearthe censure of having added passion to calumny ; but if they were indeed thus blamable , then 't was a rationall carriage in order to maintain truth to call their faults by their proper names how often soever they committed them . nor are my reprehensions ( frequent indeed , but never without iust occasion nor over proportion'd to the degree of their faultines ) at all intended to vent my anger towards the persons , but onely to breed in the reader a due reflexion on their faults : and , if this bee ill nature , i must avow it , that i hate a contradiction with all my heart ; resenting it as a far greater iniury that any man should go about to disorder my soul by imposing upon it a falshood or contradiction with stratagems and tricks ( especially in matters so concerning ) than if they should break my head or even endanger my life by betraying mee into an ambush ; and , i conceive that any one , who knows and prizes his soul , will bee of my temper . i cannot but impute it to art not to vice that excellent musicians whose ears are inur'd to the smoothest and best-proportion'd stroaks , should not endure to hear harsh discords without some impatience : neither in making my self the parallell to such skilfull artists do i arrogate more to my self than onely this that i have had the happines to light on an excellent master of reason , who is able to tune the thoughts of a rationall soul to the perfectest harmony ; and that it pleased god to give mee such an unprejudic'd sincerity and such a competent degree of capacity as would permit and enable mee to understand truths , in themselves as evident as that two and three make five , when the terms were clearly proposed in an orderly connexion , and the meanings or notions made plain by definitions . may i intreat this fair opinion from the protestant reader that hee make not my smartnes against mine adversaries an argument that i am a lover of dissension or a desirer to keep the discord still on foot between us . i protest with all sincerity there neither is nor can bee any man living who more cordially longs for or shall more industriously ( to his power ) endeavour an vnion between all those who lay claim to christ's name than my self , as those who know my heart best can testify ; and that i would willingly consecrate all my studies , sacrifice all my interest , nay even my life it self , to such an happy end . but , on the other side , since an vncertainty in the rule and root of faith is diametrically opposit to an vnion in faith ( for how shall rationall soul's center when they know not where to meet , nor have grounds to bind them to a ioynt-assent , as without evidence of authority there can bee none ) hence i shall hope to have deserued well from all rationall lovers of vnion in impugning vigorously and disgracing this tenet of vncertainty , the seed of all heresies , schisms & dissension , and the bane of vnion ; which pestilent doctrine hath got such root in our poor country by two or three plausible pens , that aswell religion as philosophy amongst many excellent wits is reduced to meer scepticism . for this end i have , upon all fitting occasions throughout this whole treatise , inculcated a certainty in the sayd rule of faith and an evidence of that certainty ; to fix by those many little dints a strong impression in the reader 's mind that such a thing there is , to bee found by those who with a iust and impartiall diligence seek it . and , if any in this so noble an enquiry will venture to take my word ( and i have this advantage that i speak by experience ) i shall send them no long iourney but onely address their study to those two little treatises of rushworth's dialogues and the apology for tradition . this principle then being such that , it once establish't all the rest will infallibly follow , and without it no ground of agreement can possibly bee expected , i was obliged even out of my love to vnion to maintain it inviolable by all means which truth could iustify to bee lawfull , and by consequence what ever is held upon that rule , as is the substance of the authority i defend . in other points , where the certainty of the rule and root of faith is not concern'd , the protestants shall find mee alwayes proceed with the greatest condescendence and moderation that prudence and charity can dictate to the most indifferent mind . as for my smiling upon occasion at my adversary's toyes and affected weaknesses , let the reader fancy throughly my circumstances by perusing both books together , and hee shall see clearly it had been most improper to return those passages any other answer : or , if there bee any so wedded to a severer humour that they will not allow circumstances their due , but think that such kind of carriage is not to bee used at all in controversies about faith , i shall send them to tertullian , the rigidest and severest in points of this nature among all the ancients , for better information . if you find ( saith hee , writing against the adversaries of faith ) in my book some passages which move one to laughter , 't is because the matter it self occasions it . there are many things which deserve to bee thus mock't at , lest by combating them seriously you should signify they are of weight . nothing is more due to vanity than laughter ; and this carriage is proper to truth , to whom it belongs to laugh , because shee is naturally pleasant ; and to exult over her enemies , because shee is secure of the victory . care , indeed , is to bee taken lest the mirth bee base and unworthy of truth ; but , otherwise , when one can fittingly make advantage by it , 't is a duty to use it . thus hee . to which i shall onely adde these few words of s. austin , whose spirit , though all composed of charity and sweetnes , breaks out into this smart demand . vvho is so bold as to say that truth should come forth unarm'd when it combats falshood , and that it is lawfull for the enemies of religion to fright the faithfull with great words and inveigle their fancies with witty conciets , but that catholikes ought to write in a dull and drowsy stile , fit for nothing but to make the readers fall asleep . this is all i have to apologize for , except onely for the long delay of this rejoynder ; the reason whereof is too well known to have been it's miscarriage a twelve-moneth ago & the difficulties since in bringing it to light in a forrain country . vvhich also pleads for an excuse of it's many lapses in spelling and other frequent little mistakes , occasion'd by the composer's being a perfect stranger to our language . the grosser faults shall bee noted in the errata at the end , which i desire the reader to correct ere hee address himself to peruse the book , in regard one of mine adversaries did mee so little iustice as to cavill heretofore at a mistake of the printer's in schism disarm'd , though it were rectify'd very carefully in the errata . this done , i leave the indifferent reader to the fruit of his own industry , and to that success which the force of truth is wont to effect in an impartiall and sincere mind . schism dispatcht . first part . containing some preparatory grounds decisive of the whole controversy ▪ and a refute of dr. hammonds defence of his first three chapters . sect. i. the occasion of the disarmers writing , and his writing in such a manner . dr. hammonds weaknes in imputing contumeliousnes . what mr. hammond professed of himself , that his chief design is to enjoy calm and peacefull thoughts , and to retire from polemicall engagements , is no lesse the wish of his friendly disarmor ; who had permitted him to enjoy his halcyon sollitarinesse , and to ●leep securely in a whole skin had not himself ounded the allarm and made the onset ; of which , though the latter were very feeble , yet the former being full of noise in the mouths of all the docteurs friends , it awaken'd him from his quiet silence into a necessary resistance . he saw the most in violable , the most long●settled , the most sacred , and most universally●acknowledged government the sun ever beheld , despited and wronged : he saw , by consequence , the eternall and infaillible rule of faith , in which was fundamentally interessed the salvation of mankind , broken and disannull'd , by the rejecting that government which it recommended to us , as the safeguard of our faith : he saw his dearest mother the holy catholick church christs sacred spouse , by relation to wihch onely he could hope for any title to salvation , abused and vilify'd : he saw his dear countrymen run distractedly into an hundred sorts of sects , all springing originally from that grand one of the schismaticall protestant congregation : he observed how the protestant party , though of late not reprehended much by catholick writers ( hoping their own vexatious divisions would at length give them understanding ) were yet so unseasonably clamorous , as then most to plead their innocence when their fault of schim was most palpable , and god's severe correction of it most visible upon them : lastly , he took particular notice how one dr. hammond , a private man , had bent his weak utmost to continue and propagate that schism , so uniuersally destructive to government , faith , god's church , his countrey ; and perceiving by the cry of ●is followers that his book was likely to contribute much to this great harm , he thought these motives sufficient prouocations to make the confutation of that treatise the prentisage of his endeavours in controversie . rationall therefore and convenient was the disarmers determination to write , and to write against dr. hammond . the manner then of his writing comes next to be examined , which will not down with the doctours stomach , ( and indeed it is no wonder if those who are resolved not to mend do not love to be reprehended ; ) whereupon he has by self imagin'd applications of some texts , voted here poor s. w. whom he sayes ( pag. . ) he has taken in the flagrant fact of abusing him , to be in reality no christian , a detestable person , under the censures of the church , nay ipso jure , ( saith he ) excommunicate ; in a speciall sort one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unritghteous , and without repentance uncapable of going to heaven ; and lastly ▪ to be none of those saints who , clave non errante , ( saith the dr. ) shall judge the world . a sad case that no punishment lesse then hell must be poor s. w's doom , because he laid open the weaknesse of dr. hommonds defense of a pernicious cause , after the manner that such a a defence deserved and i wonder he had no more charity then not tho be afraid lest he should drive s. w. into despair of his salvation , by denouncing and preaching to him such horrid judgements for writing against the saints , and using ( as , pag. . mr. hammond sayes ) that very dialect which the obstinate iews used towards the true prophets of god. but first he does me right in acknowledging that it was not i who gave him his bill of fare , to which i may with truth adde , that i not so much as knew of it : yet he thinks he has got a notable advantage against me , from my own confession , that my blows were rude , and mine adversary civil where as , i used both those phrases as an objection of the readers , as is most palpable ; and had i used them , the rudenesse of blows argues not that they were not just , since none doubts , but malefactours are very rudely , yet most justly whipt ; and the courteous epithet of civil , deny'd not but the oyl in his tongue was accompany'd with venome in his heart , and so made it more necessary to discover that , whose onely advantage it was , to lurk undiscoverable under the smooth outsde of a fair-languag'd courtesie . the twitchings by the beard ( which he reiterates to make his reader smile , ) is indeed something too rude a carriage if understood in the downright sence as he seems to take it ; but since i spoke-it onely in an allegery , and in order to his wearing a vizard which i pluck'd off , let him but acknowledge that i found him attired in such a mask ( to which the other words related ) and i am contented to be thou●t so unreasonably uncivil as to pluck it off so rudely . next , with what logick does he huddle together those testimonies out of scripture for s. w's pasport to hell , unlesse he could evidence that they were particularly appliable to him ? are words , which in their own nature found even contumeliously , so perfectly damnable that no circumstance can render them inculpable ; or at least venial , if not necessary , or convenient ? for the dr. maintains the generall thesis in such à manner , as if one taken in such a flagrant fact , is long ago condemned to hell and disinherited from his right to heaven . p. . and . what becomes then of good s. iohn baptist , who called the ill-prepared iews a generation of vipers ? what of s. paul who ( acts . . ) called elymas , son of the devil , full of all treaechery and deceit , enemy of all justice , &c. what of our saviour , who called herod , fox , the prophaners of the temple , theeves , the scribes and pharisees hypocrites ? and , to come nearer our present circumstances , what will become of blessed s. polycarp , ( disciple to s. iohn the evangelist , the tenderest recommender of charity to his disciples of all the apostles ) who yet meeting with an heretick , who began complementally to insinuate into acquaintance with nonn agnoscis nos ? do not you know us ? rejected his courtesy with this rude language , agnosco primogenitum di boli , yes , i know thee to be the first begotten of the devil . what of s. iude , who calls hereticks clouds without water , autumnal trees , twice dead , rooted out , waves of the raging sea foaming out their own confusion . lastly , to come yet nearer home , what shall we think of gods church , whose custome it ever was to anathematis and curse all hereticks , and of s. paul who bids anathema even to an angel from heaven , if he should preach false doctrine ? i ask now , are not all these expressions , revileing , contumelious , rude , and ( which the doctour most resents ) beard-twitching language , if taken in themselves ? must then all this good company be deem'd detestable , unrighteous , excommunicate , and blindly pack'd all away to hell together , for revilers , contumelious , &c. because they gave such hard language ? the texts alledged by mr. h. are very generall , laying about them blindly and indifferently at friends and foes ; and he allowes them here no exception at all . or , if he does , as i hope he wil rather then involve such persons in his uniuersall censure ; then the reason why he exempts these must be , because the words , though taken in their own indifferency without any application , are most highly contumelious , yet , spoken to such persons as hereticks , men publickly noxious , the common good concernd ' made the private person's repute not considerable : and so ( the misdesert of the persons justifying the truth of the words ) they sounded now a laudable and necessary zeal , which in other circumstances had been contumely and inte●perate passion . whence followes , first , that i am not excommunicate ▪ or in the state of damnation , for having used contumelious words , since the use of them , if taken simply in it self , is not impious , as has beenshown : but for having used them against dr. h. vnhappy i who was not aware how sacred a person my adversary was , ere i undertook to deal with him ! next , it follows that , if dr. h. evidence not his cause to be no heresy , and himself no maintainer of it , all those former harsh expressious used against hereticks are his due , and without scruple of sin , might be given him by s. w. who had undertaken as a catholick writer to lay open his faultinesse . let any man but read the doctours first chapter of schism , and take notice what harsh-sounding characters the fathers give to that vice ; and then let him tell me what a publick propagatour of schim may deserue . wherefore , unlesse he makes his evidence good , s. w. may also justly retort upon him the charge of contumeliousnesse ; since he has no where in his whole book used towards him such rude expressions , as the dr. hath in his first chapter by his censorious self-explication of scripture loaded upon him , of detestable , impious , &c onely mr. hammond calumniates in a preaching manner , and out of scripture , which makes the well-couch'd contumely lesse discernable . thirdly , it were very easie for s. w. using the doctours method , to gather out of scripture all the vigorous words and severe execrations against the wicked ; and then , by his own voluntary explication and application , clap them all upon the dr. : as for example , that of curse ye meroz , &c. and then say that by meroz is meant such as mr. h. who writes against god's church . this , i say , were as easie for the disarmer : but he cannot but hate that in himself , which he nauseates at in another : he knows very wel , and hopes the world , now grown wiser , plainly discerns it almost as impossible certainly to demonstrate truth by clashing together meer wordish testimonies ; as to strike fire by the weak collision of two pieces of wax , which easily yield at every stroke : and therefore makes account it is his greatest misfortune to tamper with an adversary who trades in wares of no higher value , then onely , reusner like , in fragments pick'd out of severall authours , and then stitch'd together by voluntary transitions into a book . what is hitherto said is onely to show , that every using of language , even in its own nature contumelious , is fat from being a sin ; and therefore that s. w. may yet ( by god's grace ) hope to escape hell fire ▪ unlesse the dr. can evidence that his cause is neither heresie nor schisme ; since , if it be , it remain'd very lawful for him to treat the publike propagatour of it according to his desert , as has been shown . but s. w. disclaims , in behalf of his book , any such language towards dr. h. a contumely ( i conceive ) notes some personall and morall fault in another : did i note any in him ? indeed , as a writer ; he was mine and the churches adversary ; and as such it is most irrationall i should spare him , when i saw my advantage . do duellers ( if their quarrell be serious ) use to spare their enemy , and not hurt him in that place where they see him unguarded ? it were madnesse then to expect , that , where my adversary writ insincerely , i should not shew him insincere ; where blasphemously , blasphemous ; where weakly , weak ; where ridiculously , ridiculous , vpon such advantage offer'd i ought to have had no courtesie for him ; unlesse i would prevaricate from my task , and betray the cause i had undertaken to defend , by a complemental connivence . if then i might upon his desert give him those characters , i hope it is necessarily consequent that words must be allowed me to expresse them ; nor ought the lawfull help of rhetorick be interdicted me , to expresse them home . now , if all art of rhetorick gives it , that ridiculous things ought to be exprest ironically , let dr. h. blame the art so unfriendly to him , and his own weaknesse which intituled him to such expressions ; not s. w. who did but as art , nature , and reason required . if any yet object that i was still excessive in the manner of those expressions ; i answer that i shall bewilling to confesse the fault , unlesse i manifested him equally excessive in the manner of deserving them : otherwise , as long as the proportion holds , i shall in reason account my self blamelesse . as a writer then against god's church , d. h. ought in reason to expect no mercy at s. w's hands , but rigorous justice onely : nor is this by consequence contumeliousnesse , but the proper treaty which reason grants , religion avoucheth , and the circumstances make necessary . now that all the pretended revilings of s. w. are no other the dr. shall . inform the reader , complaining here pag. . that the publisher of the book hath solemny annext a list of the contumelies , three and thirty picz'd out by specialty , &c. since then these , as he sayes , are the speci all or chief contumelies , not to trouble the reader with the whole roll , we will onely take notice of the first of them , which is this ; how the dr. of . divinity has forgot his accidence . this is the first of those special contumelies , which dr. h. here compares to goliah's cursing of david ; to rabshakeh's reproches ; to the king of moab's language against israel . this is that in the flagiant fact of which ( as he expresses it ) being taken , the apostle hath therefore long ago pronounced sentence against me , that no christian must eat with me , hence it is that i have onely the name , not the reality of a christian , am a detestable person , ipso jure excommunicated in a special manner one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as he pedantizes it ) so as unreformed ( that is , without repentance ) i shall not inherit the kingdome of heaven , and do but flatter and deceive my self if i hope i may ; and lastly , am none of those saints who ( clave non errante ) shall judge the word . thus are poor catholicks poasted to hell by couples ( for i suppose the romish factour must bear me company ) without bale or mainprise , for manifesting that dr. h. had forgot his accidence . you wits of the vniuersities beware and take example by the fatall catastrophe of s. w. when you write or dispute do not accuse your adversary of inconsequence in his argument , mistakes in criticizing , sol●ecismes , or the like ; you see upon how ticklish a point your salvation stands ; if you do , the apostle hath pronounced long ago that no man may eat with you , hence you are specially contumelious , excommunicated , no christians , detestable , in speciall sort unrighteous , and do but flatter your selves , if you hope to go to heaven without true and hearty repentance , as dr. h. hath evidently prov●d out of scripture . the rest of those special contumelies ( as he calls them ) are deductions from his own erroneous reasoning , or interpreting scripture , from his self contradictions , his mistakes , &c. and therefore being onely aimed at his book ? orat himself as the writer of it , were necessary to be taken notice of by his disarmer ; and consequently not falling under the notion of contumelies , nor deserving so many censures in greek . if mr. h. yet kindly complain , that my words were too harsh ; my answer is , the very names we give to great faults are harsh words , nor can they possibly be other wise ; so as he must either suppose me so supine as not to take notice of his faultinesse , or else i must suppose him more innocent , ( that is , deny mine own eyes : ) and then , winking at his grosse and pernicious errours , substitute courtesy to zeal , and instead of confuting , fall to complement . now how can any man in reason imagine i should not mention his greatest faults , that is , not use harsh words ? for either dr. h. knew of them , or not : if not , it was his interest and my charity to let him know them ; which , i think , cannot be done without naming them : if he knew of them , and yet writ them , it was a more necessary charity , and more concerning the publick , and dearest interest of mens salvations ( waving all private respect to the person ) to let all men know his false dealing , that they might beware of him , as of a wolf in sheeps clothing . let himself chuse which side he pleases , i shall hold my self sufficiently cleared by either . nay , rather i have reason to make a counter-complaint of the dr. for , i no where in my whole book , branded him with the appelation of a detestable person , which this pattern of piety gives me : though my pretence might avouch-it , being to defend the rights of the church i live in : whereas his intemperance proceeds from a vindication of his private selfe from the contumelies ( forsooth ) he hath received ; and to aggravate his fault the more , he cannot be content to use his own words to expresse his gravity affecting passion ; but , to make his railing more authoritative ( as one said of a precise puritanical dame , that shee never cudgeld her mayd but in scripture-phrase ) so st. paul must needs prophecie long ago of my excommunication , be revived to pronounce it in dr. h's name , and for solemnity sake , in greek too : yet after the dr. hath been so hihg in the pulpit against contumelies , he is become himself so mean an auditor , as to accuse me flatly of falsifications , ( with what reason shall be seen hereafter ) calumnies certainly , if not avouch'd ; yet all sounds zeal in him , which in another would be plain contumelie : should we desire st. paul now to excommunicate dr. h. hee would presently silence-us , by assuring'us , that st. paul never meant harm to him , but to s. w. onely , so secure a thing it is to be a dexterous scripturist . sect. . that the certainty of faith ( and that onely ) justly grounds zeal ; and obliges the propugner of that faith to an impartial plainnesse with its adversary , as taken-under that notion , these ordinary considerations , and obvious to common sence , i have offer'd to the reader , to let him see this manner of writing in confuting such authors , is very rational , if the cause deserves any zeal , and the truth of the thing makes good what is said . one reason more i shall adde , which i recommend to the attentive consideration of the reader , it being indeed the fundamental ground why such a treaty should be necessary in controversies about faith , against the deemed adversaries thereof . and this is no other than the certainty of faith it self . but lest the dr. should mistake me ( as his custome is ) to beg the question , by supposing our faith certain , i professe my selfe onely to mean at present a deemed , or beleeved certainty of faith in him who is to maintain it : now whoever holds his faith and its ground certain ( as catholiks do ) is obliged , eo ipso , to hold for certain likewise , that the government recommended to him by the same rule of faith is to be submitted to , and by consequence , that the rejecting it is schism ; whence follows , that he must hold also for certain , that the propagatour of that tenet is a ringleader of schismaticks , publickly pernicious , and one who by his poisonous writings infects the souls of men with as hainous a vice as ever entituled any to damnation . neither can he hold him otherwise , unlesse he will hold the ground of his own faith uncertain , and call into question the substance of all his hope , that he may instead thereof entertain charitable thoughts of the impugner of it . now then let us consider what carriage is due towards a private person , held for certain to be one who endeavours to draw souls to hell by his writings and authority , from him who holds him so , nor can hold him otherwise , unlesse he will hold the grounds of his own faith doubtful ; ought not this catholike writer , if he has any zeal for his faith , or care of his conscience ( which obliges him in charity to prevent so great mischief ) to use the means and waies which wit and art can invent , to confute and discredit that mans harmful sophistry , and disparage his authority , as fat as truth can justifie his words ? ought hee not to trample down all tendernesse which his good nature would suggest , neglect all considerations of respect , all condescensions of civility , to lay him open plainly , and palpably to be what hee is , that is , ridiculous , nonsensical , weak , blasphemous , or whatever other epithet the defence of so bad a cause makes so bad a writer deserve : why should he make scruple ( going upon those grounds that his faith is most certain , and the former sequel no lesse ) to give him the same language , if he be found to deserve it , as st. iude gave the adversaries of faith in his daies , as the fathers gave porphyrius afterwards ; nay more , if he sees he can make him justly ridiculous , why should he not expresse himself ironically too in order to his nonsence , as well as elias might scoffe at the priests of baal ? in a word , whatever can conduce to the justly disgracing him , as the defender of a certainly deemed-pernicious cause , might lawfully , nay in charity ought have been used to undeceive his adherentes , and preserve others from a certainly-beleeved danger , and that the greatest of dangers , eternal damnation . hence sollows , that though s , w. may perhaps be blamed for holding his faith certain , yet he is inculpable for proceeding consequently to the former tenet , that is in treating dr. h. as a pernicious destroyer of soules , since ( as hath been proved ) he cannot think him otherwise , unlesse hee either doubt of his own faith , or renounce the light of his reason , which taught him to deduce thence by evident consequence that such he was , and as such to be treated . he who holds ill principles , is blameable indeed in that regard , but yet he is worthy of praise and commendations for proceding consequently upon them , since to deduce consequences aright , is very laudable . as for the culpablenesse which may accrue by holding his faith certain , to clear himseif to rational persons ( for wordish and merely testimony-men are not capable of reason ) he feares not to professe , that he makes account he hath as perfect evidence , or more than he hath for any thing in nature , that truths of no lesse concernment then eternity , written in the hearts of so many as may in a just estimate make up the account of mankind , in such a powerful manner , and with such incompatable motives as the apostles writ them being so conformable to nature , not meerly speculative , but each of them visibile , and daily practical , could never dye or decay out of the hearts of christians , in any age . nor hath he lesse evidence , that consequently ( scripture & its interpretation being subject to misprision , as far as they depend not upon this , and are regula●ed by it ) vniversal tradition is the onely certain and absolute rule of faith ; whence follows , that both they who build upon any other ground , have onely opinion to found their faith , for those points which they receive nor from tradition ; as also , that that church who relies upon universal tradition for each point of faith , erres in none , not can erre so long as the sticks close to so safe a principle . now then , finding no church doe this but the roman-catholike ( for neither greeks , nor protestants , nor any else pretended to have received ever from their immediate fore fathers those points of faith in which they differ from her ) doubt not to account her that onely church which hath the true motive , ground , and rule of faith ( since probability cannot be that rule ) and consequently which hath true faith , and is a true church : hence i am obliged to esteem all other congregations which have broken from that onely-certain rule , or her government recommended by the same rule , schismatical and heretical ; hence i conclude her infallible , because i make account i can demonstrate , that the principle upon which onely she relies is impossible to fail , hence , iastly , that i may come home to my intent , i account my faith certain , and the propagator of the contrary certainly pernicious to mens souls ; and therfore that it was both his desert and my obligation , not to let slip any possible advantage , which might with truth damnify his cause , and him as-the maintainer of it . now , that we may turn over the leaf , as certainty that faith is true is a sufficient ground to beget a just zeal in its propugners against its adversaries , so a profest fallibitily and uncertainty is uterly insufficient for that end , and unable to interest conscience in its defence . for how should conscience be inreressed to defend positions held upon no better ground , with any eagernesse , unlesse reason be interessed first ? and how can reason be obliged to the serious , and vigorous patronage of what it felf knows certainly that it knows not whether it be true or no ? see but how the working of nature in all men gives testimony to this truth ! if we hear one obstinately affirm and stand to a thing which we know certainly is otherwise , though the matter it self be but of triviall concernment , even nature seems to stirre us up in behalf of truth to a just resentment , and hardly can we refrain from giving a sharp reprehension , if the person be underus , or some expression of-dislike , if this peremptory wronger of truth exceed our jurisdiction . so on the other side if we be uncertain whether the thing be so or no , we find , it quite abates that keennesse of opposition , neither will any one unlesse very peevish and weak , engage passion to quarrel about a conjecture , or if it so happen sometimes , as when probablists dispute vehemently , yet their heat springs not from the naturall love of truth inbred in their souls , but because their honour , interest , or other conveniency is concerned in the goodsuccesse of the disputation . hence it follows , that as catholikes go not consequently to their grounds , unlesse they defend with an eagernesse and zeal proportionable to the concernment of the thing , their faith , which they hold most certain and infallible ; so protestants who confesse their faith fallible , that is , such as may possibly by otherwise for any thing they know , are obliged by their very grounds not to take it much ill at any that impugne it , nor expresse any great zeal in behalf of it ; or if they do , then , their grounds not requiring it , all their heat and earnestnesse must manifestly arise from some passion or interest . they ought therefore to defend their problematicall faith , as men defend paradoxes , calmly , civilly , and moderately ; and make conscience of being discourteous to their opposer , since for any thing they kno● he may possibly be in the right . in a word , their whole way of controversy , ought in reason to be managed as an exercise of wit ; since it consists only in this , who can most dexterously and artificially criticize upon words , and be most quick and ready to produce out of his storehouse either topicall reasons , or testimonies ( gleaned from all places and authours ) as shall seem most pat for the present occasion . and this is the reason why they desire no more , but that catholike writers should treat them with a luke-warm courtesy , and by a respectfull behaviour towards them , as leanerd men , see , mingly leave them some apparence that their faith is probable , and then they think themselves safe , and are very well appayed , whereas it belongs to a catholike authour , who holds his faith certain to manifest the contrary to be perfectly absurd , and nonsence ; and since the knowledge of this must , in his grounds , be held so necessary for the salvation of mankind , he ought in plain terms let men know it is such , and give it home the character it deserves ; otherwise by his timorousnesse he prevaricates from his grounds , & by his fearfull mincing his expressions when truth will-bear him out in them , and the weight of the cause exacts them , he breeds a just apprehension in his readers that the contrary ( else why should he proceed so reservedly ) may have some degree of probability , which perhaps is enough for his adversary , but assuredly betrayes his own cause . i know my adversary will think he hath gained much by my forwardnesse in this last paragraph , and others also may perhaps judge that i have put my self upon the geatest disadvantage imaginable by professing voluntarily that it is my obligation to show his writings nonsence or impossible to be true ; whereas a good prohabity that they are true wil serve his turn ▪ but , both the necessity of my cause obliges me to it , which must leave them voyd of all probability , whom a probability will content and also the evident truth of it emboldens m●e to affirm this , and not to think that in so affirming i have said too much , or been too liberall to my adversary . wherefore as if i were to dispute upon the ground of my faith ( which yet is not the proper task for our party who stand upon possession ) i doubt not with gods help to leave no room for a probability to the contrary , in the judgement of a prudent and disinteressed person ; so i shall not fear to affirm that all the testimonies in dr. hammonds book , though they were twenty times more , and twenty times seemingly more expresse , bear not the weight of a probability , if cōpared to that world of witnesses in te catholike church they left , all attesting that the very points which the reformers relinquisht had been delivered by their forefathers , as delivered to them by theirs &c. and this so expressly , amply , and clearly , as leaves no place for criticisms , severall explications , with all the train of other circumstances , which mere words seldome or never want , rendering them obnoxious to a thousand ambiguities : joyn then , i say , that vast , and clear testimony to this argument , drawn from reason , that , as it is impossibile they who lived ten years before h. the eight should so conspire to deceive those who lived in his dayes , in things visibile and practicall ( such are the points of our faith ) as to say they received them from their forefathers as received from theirs , and yet no most palpable evidence remain of this most palpable and evidently , prevayling even to gull the whole world to their faces in a businesse importing their eternall blisse ; so likewise that the same impossibility holds in each ten years ascending upwards till the apostles time , and by consequence , that the faith delivered of late was the faith delivered then . ioyn i say these two together , and i doubt not to affirm that it is most perfect non-sence , to think all the testimonies in dr. hs. book ( subject to a thousand grammatical , philological , sophisticall , historical and logical difficulties ) can bear so much as a show of probability , if compared to that clear evidence of reason , and that ample one of universall testification which shines in the other . however it may happen , that some one or more testimonies of his may make the contrary seem probable to such as either never heard of , or nor well penetrated , or do not consider the grounds of vniversall tradition ; as a straw may incline a ballance , if nothing be put in the counterpoise . neither let my adversary object , i intend to evade answering his testimonies by this discourse : they shall have from me the return due from an answerer ; that is , to show them unable to conclude against this vast authority of vniversall tradition ; for he may know we hold our faith and government upon no other tenour . so as still the mea sure of their force must be according to the degree in which they invalidate this tenour of ours built upon both a long possession , and such an universall ▪ and clear testification . onely i desire the reader to take notice hence , what a pittifull task it is to stand answering a wordish book , which can bear no weight with any prudent man who considers the incomparable force of vniversall tradition , our onely tenour : but i am necessitated to it by the weaknesse of many , whose wit never carryed them farther than to hear a sermon , or to read a testimony ; and therefore they never reflected what small merit of assent can be pretended to by words of men dead long ago , left to be tost by our various expositions and criticisms , and liable to a thousand evasions , against the clear sense written in the hearts of mankind with most powerfull motives , and to be propagated truly to their posterity under penalty of eternall damnation to them and theirs . few there are i say who have refined their understanding to this degree of discerningness though i perceive , to my great comfort , that the best sort of witts begin to own their reason , and bring it home to it self , rather than suffer it to wander in a pathlesse wildernesse of words , and think it an endeavour more worthy a rationall soul to weave well compacted treatises by evident connexion of terms , than fruitlesly to stand picking thrums-ends out of overworn garments ; & when they have done , scarce know what colour they are of , or how to knit them handsomely together without the motley of non-sence . thus much to give account of my obligation not to favour mr. h. while he impugnes that faith which i esteem most certain , and most concerning . now , for his person , as it comes to me under any other notion , than of a writer against god's church , i profess with all sincerity to honour and love it in the measure which reason requires . as a member of the civil commonwealth i live in , i bear him a civil respect ; i hear he is much a gentleman and very courteous : in return to which , if it be my good fortune to meet him , i shall be as ready to serve him in what may not concern my cause , and do him as much civility , as i would to most gentlemen in england . according to the degree of scholarship i find in him , i shall candidly allow him a proportionable honour , and shall not envy it him , though mine adversary , even in his absence , amongst mine own friends . i value-him for his skill in greek , a language i much love my self , and think it a great ornament to a scholar , if he know how to use it seasonably , and not wantonly shew it upon all , or rather no occasion ; in which mr. h. hath very mvch diminish't himself , giving his readers a fair title to suspect him either of too much vanity in that , or emptiness in other knowledges . i applaud his unwearied industry , half of which employed in a rationall way by some strong brain , might be the happy mother of many rare productions . his looking into such variety of authours deserves also it's commendation ; since testimonies have their degree of probation allowed them by their governesse reason ; that is , according to the degree of knowledge ( or authority subsequent to it ) found in the testifier , and the clearnesse from ambiguity found in the words alledged : nay rather i should esteem him more for this than all the rest , were this way of testimonies in it self much estimable , since his chief and almost onely talent lies in this ; which furnishes him with sufficient store of such declamatory proofs , and enables him to bring some kind of testimony against any thing that can be opposed , as the nature of such sleight quotation-argumenrs uses to be ; for indeed what so absurd , but a testimony may be produc't , even from the best authours , seeminly favouring it , as we experience daily in scripture ? lastly and more especially , i acknowledge i am much his for the sakes of some friends common to him and me ; which ( as no man with more veneration honours that s●cred relation of minds , than my self ) doth in a manner mediately ally me to him , and makes me desirous to flatter my self , that the agreeing in a third , should make us not disagree amongst our selves . all these motives give him no mean place in my thoughts , and esteem : yet all these temporall considerations vanish , and he straight becomes again indifferent to me , when a quarrell about eternity of mankind's blisse or misery is to be controverted betwen us ; and my deemed certainty of my cause , which concludes him by consequence certainly pernicious , obliges me in conscience to confute , nay even disgrace him , as far as he shall be found the promoter of a pestilent and soul-ruining tenet . although i must confesse withall , i am sorty , that by is own fault he occasion'd this conscientious engagement in me ; for had there been no infection spread , there had needed no antidote . what i have said here was to satisfy some whom i found much mistaken in the manner how controversies ought to be treated by a catholick ; not considering that courtesy is a vertue onely in fit circumstances , otherwise but an impertinent flattery or affectation , and in a serious controversy about faith , whose both concernment and certainty justify zeal , and make it necessary , as improper , as for souldiers who are to try the field about their kings and countreys interests , to hold their sword in one-hand , and hat in the other ; complement , and kisse their hands to one another , instead of striking , or by any unnaturall mixture of both make a gallant show of a mock fight , preferring the care of court esy before the losse of their cause . for the satisfaction of these i have apologiz'd thus far , not in relation to mr. h. the proper way to answer his weak proofs out of scripture here , were to gather by the help of an honest concordance all the harsh words in the scriptures spoken by our saviour or his saints , and apply them voluntarily against him , as he has done against me ; at which if he repine , then to ask , why my interpretation should not be as valid as his . and with good-reason too , should i daing him onely a reply in this method , for why should not an answer of any thing serve to a quodlibeticall objection ? sect. . how unfortunate and weak dr. h. is , in quoting s. hierome against the disarmer for writing plainly his crafty and discourteous calumny . after the testimonies from scripture blindly levell'd at s. w. followes in the sixt paragraph , that it was a deviation from art to treat him thus unkindly ( to which i have answered above ) and that s. hierome notes it as a great errour in helvidius , that he took railing for eloquence . wherefore since mr. h. chuses s. hierome for his patron against s. w. in this point of the manner of writing controversy , let us stand to his ward and example : and see how he treated vigilantius , dr. hs. and the protestants forefather in the point of denying veneration to holy reliques ; and wether he stood upon courtesy , when he made account he had a just occasion to shew his zeal . in his epistle to riparius , the first he writ against vigilantius , he hath these words : o praecidendam ling●am , &c. o tongue worthy to be cut out by physicians , or rather , oh frantick head to be cured by them , &c. ego vidi hoc aliquando portentum ; i once saw this prodigious monster . tacita me forsan cogitatione repre hendas , &c. perhaps thou mayest reprehend me in thy silent thought , why i inveigh against one absent : i confesto thee my passion , i cannot hear so great sacriledge with patience . for i have read of the lance of phinees , the austere rigour of elias , the zeal of simon of cananee , the severity of peter killing ananias and sapphira , the constancy of paul , who condemned to eternall blindnesse elymas the sorcerer , resisting the wayes of our lord. piety in gods behalf is not cruelty . nor by consequence is zeale in behalf of faith railing ; if that faith be held to have certain grounds ; which onely can justify zeal , and make it discreet . but to proceed . his second epistle against vigilantius begins thus . multa in orbe monstra &c many monsters have been begotten in the world : we read in esaias of centaurs and sirens , screech-owls and onocrotals : iob describes leviathan and behemoth in mysticall language : the fables of the poets tell of cerberus , and the stymphals , and the erymanthian boar , of the nemean lion , of chimera , ad many-headed hydra : virgil describes cacus ; spain hath brought to light three-shap't geryon ; france onely had no monsters . suddenly there arose vigilantius , or more truly dormitantius , who with an unclean spirit fights against the spirit of christ , and denies that the sepulchres of the martyrs are to be venerated . insanum caput ! mad or frantick fellow ! sanctas reliquias andreae , lucae & timothei , apud quas daemones rugiunt , & inhabitatores vigilantij illorum se sentire praesentiam confitentur , the holy reliques of andrew , luke and timothy , at which the devils roare , and the possessours of vigilantius confesse that they feel their presence . tu vigilans dormis , & dormiens scribis : thou sleepest waking , and writest sleeping . de barathro pectoris tui coenosam spurcitiam evomens ; vomiting dirty filth from the hell of thy breast . lingua viperea ! viperine tongue ! spiritus isle immundus , qui haec te cogit scr●bere , saepe hoc vilissimo tortus est pulvere , immo hodieque torquetur ; & qui iu te plagas dissimula● , in aliis confitetur : that unclean spirit which compells thee to write these things , has oftentimes been tortured with this contemptible dust ( meaning the holy reliques , which vigilantius styled thus ) yea and is now adayes still tortur'd ; and he who in thee dissembles his wounds , confesses them in others . but let us come to the treatise our adversary cites , and see how roughly s. hierome handles helvidius ; whom dr. h. would have him accuse in the same treatise of the self-same fault . sed●ne te quasi lubricus anguis evolvas , testimoniorum stringendus es vinculis , ne quer●lus sibiles ; but lest , like a stippery snake , thou disentangle thy self , thou must be bound with the cords of testimonies , that thou mayest not querulously hiss : imperitissime hominum ! siliest of men ! nobilis es factus in scelere , thou art ennobled & made famous by thy wickednesse . quamvis sis hebes , dicere non a●debis ; although thou beest dull or blockish , yet thou darest not affirm it . risimus in te proverbinm , camelum vidimus saltantem : we have laught at the old proverb in thee , we have seen a dancing camel ▪ &c. where we see . first , that if s. hierome's verdict exprest in his own manifold example be allowable , whom dr. h hath chosen for vmpire in his matter , t is very lawfull and fitting to give the adversaries of faith their full desert in controversies concerning faith , and not to spare them as long as the truth of their faultinesse can justify the rigorous expressions . neither let dr. h. objet that i beg the question , in supposing him an adversary of the true faith : for to put the matter indifferently , and so as may please even the protestants them selves , either dr. h's cause is false , and then 't is laudable to use zeal against him , who perniciously endeavours to mantain a falsehood ; or else it is true , & then he deserves as great a reprehension who abuses his cause by going about to defend it by such wilfull falsifications , and so many frauds and weaknesses , as he hath been discovered . whence it appears that the indifferent reader is not to consider at all , whether the expressions sound harshly or no , but whether they be true or no ; for if they be , then that person will be found in reason to deserve reprehension , be the cause he defends true or false , if he defend it either senselesly or insincerely . secondly , these harsh expressions of s. hieromes being due to dr. h's forefather vigilantius , for denying veneration to holy reliques , are due likewise upon that onely score to dr. h. and the protestant writers , who deny the same point : what then may we imagine the protestants deserve for filling up the measure of their forefathers sinnes , by denying the onely certain rule of faith , vniversall tradition , the former governmēt of god's church , almost all the sacraments , and many other most important points besides , and of much greater concernment than is this of venerating holy reliques ? thirdly , the reader shall find no where in schism disarm'd such harsh language given to dr. h. or which ( if taken in it's own nature ( sounds so contumeliously as this of s. hieromes against vigilantius is ; frantick fellow , monster , prodigious monster ▪ possest with the devill , possest with an unclean spirit , snake , famous for wickednesse , blockhead , &c. my harshest words in comparison of these are moderate and ciuil ▪ mine are smiling ironies , his are stern and bitter sarcasmes , and if i whipt dr. h. gently with rods , s. hierome wihpt his forefather vigilantius with scorpions . whence followes that i am to be thank't by dr. h. for my moderation , not excommunicated for my excesse in reprehending him , since all those more severe expressions far out-vying mine , were his due as he is in the same fault with vigilantius , besides what accrues to him out of later titles ; and this by the judgement of s. hierome , the very authour he quotes for himself in this point . fourthly , what a miserable weaknesse is it to quote this father against me for using harsh language , who himself uses far harsher ? which evidences that if this fathers authority and example be of weight in this point , as dr. h. grants by bringing him against me for that purpose , then the roughnesse of the language is not railing or reprehensible , if taken alone or abstracted from the cause ( since dr. h. will not say that this holy father thought that manner of language railing or reprehensible in himself ) which showes that dr. h's first chapter , fighting against the words as abstracted from the cause , as much accuses s. hierome as me ; nay much more , as his words exprest more fully his justly-caused zeal , than my more moderate pen did . fifthly , abstracting from the cause , and impugning the manner of expression onely , as dr. h. does , who sees not that the heretick vigilantius might with the same reason as he , have entitled the first chapter of his reply to s. hierome in the like manner as he did , to wit thus , of hieroms style and contumelies : the scriptures , sentence on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the character belonging thereto ? then in the chapter it self have call'd s hierome's plain discovery of his faults , scoffes and contumelies , have told him that he had just title to the scorners chair , that his writing against him , was like goliahs cursing of david , rabshakels reproaches against israel , that the apostle had long ago pronounced sentence against him , that none should eat with him , that he was in reality no christian , a detestable person , faln under the censures of the church , ipso jure excommunicate , in a speciall sort one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unrighteous , that he shall not inherit the kingdome of heaven , that this was the very dialect which the iewes used toward the true prophets of god , that it is against the practice of s. michael and against the spirit of weeknesse , peace and long-suffering , &c. as if every heretick , nay every malefactour in the world , could not say the same to their just reprehenders and punishers : or as if peace and long-suffering were to be used at all times , even when we see we suffer divine truth to be injurd , and souls run headlong and blind to hell after such blind guides . every one , mr. h. can preach patience , peace and long suffering , quote scripture , intermix greek words pedantically ; but none can speak sense but they who have truth on their side . it must be judged then by the strength of the reasons you bring to clear your selves from schism , whether you deserved those reprehensions from your adversary or no , and not from what your quodlibeticall vein can preach to us . and till you bring evident ones , i shall ever think that s. hierome ( your own authours here ) preacht as good doctrine as you in a place lately cited , when he told us with many instances that non est crudelitas pro deo pietas . sixthly , what is it to me that s. hierome noted it as an errour in helvidius , that he took railing for eloquence , unlesse he can prove that i took it so too ? he knowes i pretend that justice , truth , and the necessity of my cause , warranted , nay obliged me to be so plain with him . i pretend no eloquence in an ordinary controversy ; neither did i think that confuting dr. h. would be such a rare businesse , that it would be worth the pains of a rhetoricall filing . lastly , to shew more and more the weaknesse of this dr. s. hieromes words of helvidius are these ; loquacitatem facundiam existimat , he thinks babling to be eloquence . but the good dr. whom any semblance of a testimony contents , construes loquacitas ( wordishness ) to be railing ; as if empty pulpit-beatres , who talk two hours without a word of solidnesse , were therefore all railers . i doubt that ere we come to an end of this treatise , loquacity , that is , voluntary talking wordishly without a syllable of sense , will be so perfectly shown to be d. h's proper and peculiar fault , that his own words will evince it without the help of saint hierome . and thus hath dr. h. sped in quoting this holy , learned , and truly zealous father for the patron of his affected courte●y and civility ; and a pattren for s. w. to follow in writing controversies about faith. i once hoped mr. h. and i should have parted very good friends from this first section , notwithstanding the contumelies which , contrary to his own grounds , he hath heaped upon me in it . but he hath so purposely counterfeited a mistake , that he might by that means fix a ●ly c●●umny upon a worthy person , that charity and pitty must both be summon'd up to pardon him in it ▪ i had upon occasion of the evidence of our churches infallibility in my schim disaerm'd pag. . told him , he might to his amazement see it in that incomparable treatise of rushworth's dialogues , vindicated from all possible confute by that excellent apology for it , writ by the learned pen of mr thomas white . what does mr. h ? he tells us that s. w. sayes , his arrowes are beyond all possible confute ; meaning that s. w. the authour of schism disarm'd , was the same with the authour of the apology for tradition ) though i am certainly inform'd that he knows s. w. to be another person ) and reports again afterwards the same phrase to the same purpose . now by this one project he gaines two advantages : first he honours himself with making the world believe he had so worthy an adversary as the authour of that apology : next , when he has done this , he dishonours his pretended adversary , as the vainest person in the world , by intimating that himself in schism disa●m'd gave himself such an high character . whereas first , i assure dr. h. it is in vain to hope for such an honour as is an answer from that miracle of with and learning ▪ it is worthy him to write grounds , not to stand replying upon meer words ; to answer such weak skirmishers is a task more proper for one of the meanest and youngest of his scholars , a very slender participation of his solid knowledge renders one able to encounter with the apuleian bladders of aiery testimonies , the victory over which can onely entitle one to domitian's triumph , and need more the flyflap of a dictionary , or turning over leaves to combat them , then the acuter and stronger sword of reason . as for the second , which is the sly calumny of that worthy person's feigned self-praise , built onely on mr. h's wilfull mistake , i fear the intimater of it will lose much credit by so ignoble a detraction of such a person ; since his profoundest humility , of equall depth with his knowledge , secures him as much from desiring praise , as his known worth from needing it ; every one freely yielding him those excellent commendations , which his detractours will needs have him , for want of good neighbours , give himself . he tells us in the close , that divines are allowed to have skill in symptomes . what symptomes are these , and of what ? that the profusest la●ghter is the worst indication of the affections of the spleen , quoting irenaeus & galen . i ask , suppose irenaeus had also said that a gravely-affected melancholy , extraordinarily representing sanctity and piety , and a professing an earnest desire to speak the full truth of god ( answer p. . ) and yet in the mean time falsifying most palpably , purposely , and inexcusably , is the worst indication of a pharisaicall hypocrisie ; were not this more competible to mr. h. then the other is to me ? i hope then he is answered , at least in as good a manner as such toyes deserve . and ere i come to finish this treatise , i flatter my self , that even dr. h's own friend● will acknowledge that such is his carriage , and manner of writing , unlesse a strong prepossession of partiality have blinded them , and shut the eyes both of their mind and body ; since to make good this my charge against him , little more then the common use of the latter is exacted of the reader . sect. . dr. h's methodicall charity , represented in his totally mistaking the common sense of a plain epistle to the reader : with a second sly calumny of the same strain , and other weaknesses . his railing against me in the first section , which he calls his ( answ . p. . ) obligation of charity , brings him methodically ( for all is charity and method in him ) to andeavour my conviction , by examining the account i gave of the rudenesse of my blowes ; which though sufficiently cleared already , yet i think my self obliged to my cause , to take notice of this methodicall charity & convincing reason that the reader may see what weak patrons schism hath ; and that if mr. h. be most grievously mistaken in a plain epistle to the reader , there is little hopes of his hitting right in higher matters afterwards , and so s. w , must utterly despair of ever being convinced by his methodicall charity . in my epistle to the reader , to render him account why the civility of mine adversary should not hinder me from giving him his own , if the care of an eternall good injured by him , interessed my zeal to lay him open , i proposed these two parallell questions . how would you take it if one should spit in your face , and justify the affront because his breath is sweet ? or what would you say to him that ruines your estate by periury , and defends himself , that he held up his hands and eyes to heaven , and swore demurely ? whatever answer you give , i am confident it will perfectly clear my behaviour towards the dr. with whom i should have very little contention , were the difference between us in any thing of lesse concernment than eternity where any man , that is not more then half-asseep , may see the meaning is plainly this ; that as the alledging that the breath is sweet justifies not the affront of spitting in ones face , nor the pretence of swearing demurely , the wrong of ruining ones estate by perjury : so neither does dr. h's civility in his former treatise of schism , justify or excuse him for abusively treating matters of such concernments as eternity , nor consequently could his courteous stile oblige s. w. to treat him tenderly and favourably , whom the weightiest and worthiest cause had more prowerfully pre-obliged to lay him open plainly . this being then most evidently the sense of that place , let us see whether dr. h's witts were well awake , or his charity very methodicall , when he answered them . he neither goes about to grant or deny the invalidity of those pretended excuses : which onely was to be done : but instead thereof makes a piece of a sermon to you , very christianly telling you how you ought to behave your self , in case you receive a private affront , and then being got into the common-place of suffering injuries patiently , he runs division upon that ground , with greek and testimonies , telling us that we must turn the other cheek to him that strikes us on the right , that we must pray forthem that despitefully use us , fraternally admonish , &c. and then layes it to s. w's conscience . in return i appeal to his conscience , and reason both , whether all this be any thing to this question , whether the sweetnesse of the breath justify the affront of spitting in ones face , or civil language sufficiently excuse pernicious doctrine . his answer to the second is yet more pleasant . for instead of telling us whether swearing demurely be any excuse for perjury , so as to secure it from the punishment or treaty which otherwise might iustly be given it , he tells us in good sober sadnesse , that a man may use all lawfull means to defend his estate and discover perjury , and blames me for accusing him of perjurious tampering ; and that i might as truly have said that he offered sacrifice to idols , consulted with necromencers , &c. which superadds to the former errour , that he mistakes the comparison or similitude , for the thing it is brought to parallel or resemble ; and by his own litterall acception of it , will needs accuse him self of perjury whether s. w. will or no. and are not these pretty mistakes ? yet these are not all , there is yet another behind greater than all the rest , if that may be call'd a mistake which sprung from the will , and can hardly be father'd upon the weakest vnderstanding : i made it my onely plea to the reader for some blowes of mine , which he might apprehend too rude , that our controversy was about things concerning mens eternall salvation ; and therefore the reader knowing that i ( as all catholicks do ) hold my faith certain , he had no reason to expect i should favour an opponent in an act of such a nature , as is publickly harmfull to men's soules ; hence i ended my first paragraph , that i would have very litle contention with him , were the difference between us in any thing of lesse concernment than eternity ; and the whole second paragraph proceeds upon the same ground . now the dr. in his answer , where he pretends my conviction , takes no notice of my plea , but leaves out the end of the first paragraph now cited , to which the two parallel questions related , and to which they ought to be applyed ; transferring the matter from the publick injury to men's soules , to the case of a private injury of one single christian to another : whereas our question is not whether if one strike one on the right cheek , according to christ's law , he must turn the other ; but whether if a man be certainly held to have ruin'd some soules eternally , christ bids us let him mine more ; or whether , if the wolf worry some sheep , the shepheard ought to give him more ? if not , then whether courtesy ought to have place towards such a destroyer of soules in those very writings with which he endeavours it , or rather whether it be not an obligation to shew it home what he is , as far as his faultinesse makes good the truth of the words ? this answer of his therefore is either totally impertinent to my question ; or else the application of it must force this inference ; christ bid us turn the left cheek to him that strikes us on the right , therefore if a perverter of soules carry one to hell , resist him not , but let him carry more ; or if a robber climbe in to the fold , and kill one sheep , a good christian ought in conscience rather than be discourteous yield him another . is not this strange logick ? but that which followes will in part justify it . is it possible one should trip so often in running over a litle leaf of paper almost as intelligible as legible ? yet we have not done so : followes in the dr's aswer p. . if he mark , his stile which was robust in the mention of perjury , is grown much fainter , when he comes to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pretends to no more than perverse meaning and abusiue treating matters of religion , &c. where you see mr. h. makes account that the abusive treating matters of religion , which is able to plunge millions of soules into eternal damnation , is of lesse moment then perjury against one's temporall estate : though one who had never read dr. h. would surely think that the charge of abusive treating matters of religion , being a businesse entrenching upon eternity , is much more robust , ( as he calls it ) than that of ruining a temporall estate by perjury ; since i think there is no good christian but holds the eternall losse of one soul redeemed with christ's most precious bloud , is of more worth than all the temporall riches this world can boast of . is this man fit to have the charge of souls , who professes to set more by his temporal than their eternal felicity ? yet this is the method of charity he promised us in the beginning of this section . it seems that in this book also his old misfortune pursues him , that he is there most preposterous still in his discourse , where he pretends to be most methodical . see schism disarm'd , pag. . . answ . p. . his last complaint against me is , that it is in s. w. a transgression of the rules of art as well as iustice , no other than the meanest begging the question , to suppose that guil● which he was to prove , to assume so early in the epistle to the reader what he must ( but hath not yet so much as attempted to ) demonstrate . where note first that dr. h. would have us believe , he made account that the epistle to the reader is to be writ by the authour before he writes the book ; though other men use to make it their last task : next , he pretends that s. w. who was to answer his book , ought to prove and demonstrate , that is , oppose and object : which are two very good counterfeited and affected mistakes ; for i should be loath to wrong his judgment so much as to think he meant them seriously . these two artless suppositions without doubt proceeded from the same method he promised us in the beginning of the section . the reader may perceive by this what a pittifull spectacle dr. h. would be , if s. w. should take the paines to dissect his book , and show how all the anatomy of his reason is composed of such weaknesses ; every section being very pregnant and full of them : but they are in these books swell'd to such a formidable number , that they both deterre him from that lesse necessary task , and he feares also lest they might cloy the reader with their too-comick relation . his third section maintains , his self-bred persuasion that ( answ . p. . ) the authour of the epistle from bruxells was the penman of at least the first part of schism disarm'd ; and his first argument to prove it , is the kindness schism disarm'd shows to that epistle , affording it a very large encomium , which he here puts down . so that first schism disarm'd must be suppos'd to be writ by the authour of the apology for tradition because he finds there the said apology highly commended ; and then straight he concludes from the same argument that the epistle from bruxells is the same authour 's also , and these positions must onely hang together by the necess●ty of that worthy person's praising himself . if this be not to profess courtesy openly , and yet s●ily to practice the height of discourtesy , i profess myself much to seek in understanding the notions of either . but why is he imagin'd the penman of but at least the first part of schism disarm'd ? is not schism disarm'd all the same style , or is it at all like the style of the catholick gentleman 's letter ? sure , no man who ever understood what a style mean't can conjecture either , unless he had wifully a mind to calumniate without any ground of reason . his second argument to prove the authour of both treatises the same , is the affinity between them ; so that all aristotelians and aristotle , all platonists and plato must be concluded to be one and the same authour , because of the affinity between their writings , i conceived the grounds of that epistle so well layd , that i could not in reason recede from them , and lay others of mine own ; nor did i disown , but rather express my beholdingness to it , and shall endeavour to requite the favour by vindicating it from his reply as far as it concernes us joyntly : nor am i much afraid that dr. h. tells us here , it is certain that he hath made a reply to it all ; knowing well how many books are called replyes and answers , which yet need never answer to those names . the deaf country-maid who being ask't which was the way to london , replyed , a poak full of plums , gave an answer ; but it is another question whether that answer were either pertinent or satisfactory . as for the authour of that epistle , he needs trouble himself no further : it was writ by one of m. h's old acquaintance , who was willing to honour his book of schism , by showing that he thought it worth the least strictures of his learned pen. the reply to the catholick gentleman consisted of . pages , this answer to schism disarm'd of . yet this latter ( answer ▪ p. . ) he calls an appendix to the former , and gleaning after the rake : as if appendixes used to be twice as big as the principal ; or that husbandmen used to rake armefulls , and leave cart-loads to be gleaned . however he shall see , i hope , ere we come to an end of this treatise of mine , how ill he hath husbanded his reason , both in taking and gleaning . his complaint , that i took no notice of his reply in my book , objecting that i had time to have done so , and that he cannot apprehend my retirement or imployment so strict , as not to hear of it , is onely his mis-apprehension ; since i assure him schism disarm'd was out of my hands , long ere his reply to the catholik gentleman came abroad ; nor was i in such circumstances as to see his reply , till my own was already printed , as all who are acquainted with me and my occasions can testify : so thar mr. h. should not have concluded i had time to have taken notice of it without certainty of the thing ; and may learn hence how many things may be true , which he cannot apprehend . he shall never find me unwilling to take notice of any thing he writes in favour of his cause ; if i conceive it likely to endamage the dear souls of my brethren and countrymen . sect. . some previous grounds proposed , concluding rationally the whole controversy . before we come to close seriously with mr. h. because the summe of his art consists in blundering the plainest truths with multitudes of wordish evasions , i thought fitting to lay down in most manifest and evident termes some grounds which were most pertinent to our future discourse , and some deductions emergent thence ; by the bare position and explication of which , i doubt not to gain so far upon the rational reader , that he shall confess he sees the question truly stated , and according to plain reason resolved : and if he carries these notions along with him with cautious and diligent reflection , he shall find no difficulty in any main point which concerns this present controversy . the first ground then shall be this , that the first pretenders to reform in the point of the popes authority in england , found england actually subiect to that authority in ecclesiastical matters . this ground carries it's evidence in it's own terms ; since they could not be truly called the first reformers from it , unless before , that authority had been there acknowledged . neither matters it when and by whom this reformation begun , since still the ground now layd stands firm ; for the very word reformation ( which they pretend ) argues that tenet was held before hence all the evasions in dr. h. are concluded vain ; who , when we plead that the pope was found in possession of this authority in england , flies off presently , and denies it , saying he had no title to such an authority there : whereas when we maintain his possession , we pretend not yet a right ( which is our inference thence ) but that actually england was under such an authority , and acknowledg'd it ; whether it were rightly pretended or injustly remains to be inferred : which the dr. mistaking , and not distinguishing between possession and right , sayes we beg the question ; when we onely take what is evident , that he was in possession , and thence infer a right , until the contrary be proved . the second ground is , that this authority actually over england , and acknowledged there , was acknowledged likewise to be that of the head of the vniversal church , and not of a patriarchate onely ▪ this ground is no less evident than the former , by our adversaries confession ; since this is the authority they impugn as unlawfull , and from which they reformed ; which last word implies the actual acknowledgment that authority had before . hence mr. h's digression , to show that kings could erect and translate patriarchates , was perfectly frivolous , as far as concerns this purpose : for whether they can change patriarchates or no is impertinent , when we are questioning an authority above patriarchs and pretended to be constituted by christ himself . the third ground is , that this papal authority actually over the ecclesiastical affaires in england was held then as of christ's institution , and to have been derived to the pope , as he was successour to s. peter . the truth of this appears by the known confession of the then roman church , and the self-same controversy perpetually continued till this day . the fourth ground is that this actual power the pope then had in england , had been of long continuance , and settled in an ancient possession . this is evinced both from our adversaries grant , the evidence of the fact it self , and even by the carriage of s. aust in the monk , and the abbot of bangor , exprest in that counterfeited testimony alledged by dr. h. whence we see it was the doctrine s. austin taught the saxons . the fifth ground shall be , that no possession ought to be disturbed without sufficient motives and reasons : and consequently it self is a title , till those reasons invalidate it , and show it null . this is evident first by nature's principles , which tell us there is no new cause requisite for things to remain as they are ; wheras , on the other side , nothing can be changed , without some cause actually working , and of force proportionable to the weight and settledness of the thing to be moved . secondly by morals , which teach us that mans understanding cannot be changed from any opinion or beleef , without motives ; ought not , without sufficient ones ; and consequently needs no new motive to continue it in any former assent , besides the foregoing causes which put it there . thirdly , we find that politicks give testimony to , or rather stand upon this ground ; assuring us when any government is quietly settled , it ought so to stand till sufficient motives , and reasons in policy , that is a greater common good , urge a change . and if possession were held no title , then the welshmen might still pretend to command england , and each line or race , which preceded and was outed , quarrel with any subsequent one though never so long settled , and so no certain right at all would be found of any possession in the world , till we come to adam's time . fourthly , as for the particular laws of our countrey , they clearly agree in the same favour for possession . i shall onely instance in one common case . if i convey black●cre to i. s. for the life of i. n. and after wards i. s. dy , in this case , because i cannot enter against mine own grant , and all the world else have equal title , whoever first enters into the land is adjudged the true and rightfull owner of it during the life of i. n. and that by the sole title of occupancy , as they call it , which they wholly ground upon this known reason , that in equality of pretensions possession still casts the ballance . nay such regards is given by our law to possession , that were the right of a former title never so evident , yet a certain time of peaceable possession undisturb'd by the contrary claim , would absolutely bar it . and here i should take my self obliged to ask my adversary's pardon , for using such words as a dr. of divinity is not presumed to be acquainted with , did not his own example at least excuse , if not provoke my imitation . thus much of the force of possession in general , without descending to the nature of ours in particular , that is , of such a possession as is justly presumable to have come from christ . hence followes , that , since possession of authority must stand till sufficient reasons be alledged that it was unjust , those motives and reasons ought to be weighed , whether they be sufficient or no , ere the authority can be rejected : wherefore since the relinquishing any authority actually in power before , makes a material breach from that government ; the deciding the question onely stands in examining those reasons which oppose its lawfulness , since the sufficiency of them cleares the breakers , the insufficiency condemns them , and in our case makes the material schism formal . let the reader then judge how little advised dr. h. was in stating the question rightly and clearly ( of schism pag . ) where he tells us that the motives are not worth he eding in this controversy , but onely the truth of the matter of fact . for the matter of fact , to wit , that there was then an actual government , and that they broke from it , being evident to all the world , and confest by themselves ; if there be no reasons to be examined , he is convinced by his own words to be a schismatick , so flatly and palpably , that it is left impossible for him even to pretend a defence . the sixth ground shall be , that such a possession as that of the pope's authority in england was held , ought not to be changed or rejected upon any lesser motives or reasons , than rigorous and most manifest evidence that it was usurp't . the reasons for this are fetch 't by parity from that which went before & onely the proportions added . for in moving a body in nature , the force of the cause must be proportion'd to the gravity , settledness , and other extrinsecal impediments of the body to be moved , otherwise nothing is done . in morals , the motives of dissent ought to be more powerfull than those for the former continuance in assent , otherwise a soul as a soul ( thas is , as rational ) is not , or ought not to be moved : and so in the rest . now that nothing less than evidence , rigorously and perfectly such , can justify a rejecting of that authority , is thus show'd . that authority was held as of faith , and to have been constituted by christ's own mouth ; it had been acknowledgedly accounted for such by multitudes of pious & learned men for many ages before , & in all christian countries of the communion of the roman church , whereof england was one . it claimed vniuersal tradition for it's tenour , an authority held of great efficacy by our very adversaries : the rejecting it , if groundless , was known to be an hainous schism , and to unknit the whole frame of the churche's present government ; which by consequence must render it in an high degree damnable to those who should go about to violate it . now then let us consider whether a reason in it's own nature probable ( for except rigorous evidence no reason can be more ) and no way in it's self obliging the vnderstanding to assent , be a sufficient and secure motive to reject an authority of so long continuance , held sacred , and of christ's institution , of such importance to the peace of the church , in rejecting which if one happen to mistake , he is liable to the horrid vice of schism , and it 's condign punishment , eternal damnation . it must then be most pe●fect demonstrative evidence , such as forces the understanding to assent , which can in common prudence engage a man to hazard his salvation by renouncing that authority . let dr. h. then remember that they must be such kind of evidences which can serve his turn ; not any ordinary , common sleight testimony-proofs , which for the most part arrive not to the pitch of a poor probability in them selves , but compar'd to the tenour of our government , vniversal tradition , vanish into aire ; or , which is less , into nothing . to make this yet clearer , let us suppose ( as it happens in our case ) that they who began to reform in this point first , and to deny the lawfulness of this authority , were bred up formerly in a contrary belief , ortherwise they must have received it from their fathers , which would quite spoil the supposition of being the first reformers : neither is it likely that multitudes began to think or speak against it all in one instant , but either one or some few chief , who propagated it by suggesting it to the rest . now then let us consider what motives are sufficient to oblige these men to this new-begun disbelief and disobedience , so as to absolve them even in common prudence from a most self-conceited pride , and desperate precipitancy . in prejudice of them is objected , that heretofore they held that forme of government as of faith , and acknowledged to receive it upon the same sole certain rule of faith which assured them that christ was god : the whole church they left had confessedly for some ages held the same , so that it was now found in quiet possession . if they were learned , they could not but in some measure penetrare the force of vniversal tradition , which stood against them in this point ▪ since orall tradition ) of which we speak ( was pleaded by catholicks for this point , but never so much as pretented by the separaters against it ; because reformation in a point of faith , and tradition of it destroy one the other . in a word , should all these most ponderous considerations be waved , and onely the authority of the church they left consider'd , t' is impossible they should reform , unless they should conclude millions of doctours which had been in the church , many of them reverenced even yet by the protestants for their admirable learning , to be ignorant in comparison of themselves ; or else all insincere , and to have wronged their conscience in holding and teaching against their knowledge . now let any ingenuous person consider whether such a strange self-extolling judgment , and condemning others , ought in reason be made by a few men against the aforesaid most important motives , without a most undeniable and open evidence , able to demonstrate palpably and convincingly that this pretended government was unjust and usurp't . and if the first reformers could have no just and lawfull , that is , evident ground to begin their disobedience to that government , neither can their proselytes and successours the protestanrs have any pretence for continuing it ; since in matters belonging to eternity , whose nature is unchangeable by the occurrence of humane circumstances , none can lawfully adhere to that which could never lawfully be begun : neither are there any proofs against that authority producible now , which were not producible then . the seventh ground is , that no evidence can possibly be given by the protestants obliging the understanding to beleeve that this authority was usurp't . this is proved by the case of the first reformers now explicated , whose words could not in any reason be imagin'd evident against such an universall verdict of the whole church they left , and particularly of all the learned men in it , incomparably and confessedly more numerous , and as knowing as any have been since . yet we shall further evince it thus . they pretend not to any evidence from natural principles concluding demonstratively that the former government was usurp't ▪ nor yet from oral tradition , since their immediate forefathers deliver'd them other doctrine , else the reformation could never have begun , against our common supposition . their grounds then must be testimonial proofs from scriptures , fathers , or councils . but since these are most manifestly liable to be interpreted divers ways ( as appears de facto ) no sufficient assurance can be pretended hence , without evidencing either more skill to fetch out their certain sense , or more sincerity to acknowledge what they knew , than was found in the church they left : a task i am perswaded few will undertake , i am confident none can perform ; since all the world knows , that the vast number of eminent and learned doctors we have had in the process of so many ages , and extent of so many countries , were persons not meanly vers't in scriptures , fathers & councills , & yet held all these most consonant●to the catholick doctrine , though the polemical vein of the schools , which left nothing not throughly ventilated , gave them ample occasion to look into them . adde to this , that our late doctors and controvertists have not feared nor neglected to answer all those testimonies , and produce a far greater number out of all the said authorities ; nor have they behaved themselves so in those conflicts , that the indifferent part of the world have held them non-sensical , which surely they would , had they deemed the other a perfect and rigorous evidence . from hence followes , that , though they may blunder and make a show with testimonies , yet in reality they can never produce sufficient , that is evident reasons thence , for rejecting a government qualify'd with so many circumstances to confirm and establish it . though i must confess , if they could demonstrate by evident and unavoidable connexion of termes from some undeniable authority that this government was unjust , their vnderstandings would in that case be obliged to assent to that inference : but this is not to be hoped , as long as divers words have divers significations , as divers sentences by reference to divers others put on different faces , or by relation to several circumstances in history give us occasion to raise several conjectures . again , if evidence were easily producible from such kind of wordish testimonies , yet they would still be as far to seek for an authority whence to alledge those testimonies , comparable to that of the church they left ; since they can never even pretend to show any company of men so incomparably numerous , so unquestionably learned , holding certainly , as of faith , and as received from the apostles , that government which they impugned , and this so constantly for so many hundred years , so unanimously and universally in so many countries where knowledge most flourish't , testifying the same also in their general councels : all which by their own aknowlegedment was found in the church they left . the eihtgh ground is , that the proofs alledged by protestants against us bear not even the weight of a probability to any prudent man who penetrates and considers the contrary motives . for the proofs they alledge are testimonies , that is words capable of divers senses , as they shall be diversely play'd upon by wits , scholars , and criticks ; and it is by experience found that generally speaking , their party and ours give severall meanings to all the testimonies controverted between us . now it is manifest , that computing the vastnefs of the times and places in which our profession hath born sway , we have had near a thousand doctors for one of the protestants ; who , though they ever highly venerated , and were well versed in all the ancient fathers and councells , yet exprest no difficulty in those proofs , but on the contrary made certain account that all antiquity was for them . thus much for their knowledge . neither ought their sincerity run in a less proportion than their number , unless , the contrary could be evidently manifested , which i hear not to be pretended ; since they are held by our very adversaries , and their acts declare them to have been pious in other respects , and , on the other side , considering the corruptness of our nature , the prejudice ought rather to stand on the part of the disobeyers , than of the obeyers of any government . since then no great difficulty can be made but that we have had a thousand knowing men for one , and no certainty manifested , nor possible to be manifested , that they were unconscientious , we have had in all morall estimation a thousand to one in the meanes of understanding aright these testimonial proofs ; and then i take not that to have any morall probability which hath a thousand to one against it . but i stand not much upon this , having a far better game to play ; i mean the force of tradition , which is fortify'd which such and so many invincible reasons , that to lay them out at large , and as they deserve , were to transcribe the dialogues of rusworth , the rich storehouse of them : to them i refer the reader for as ample as satisfaction as even scepticism can desire , and onely make use at present of this consideration ; that if it be impossible that all the now-fathers of families in the catholick church , disperst in so many nations , should conspire to tell this palpablely to their children , that twenty yeares agoe such a thing ( visible and practical as all points of faith are ) was held in that church , if no such thing had been , and that consequently the same impossibility holds in each twenty yeares upwards till the apostles , by the same reason by which it holds in the last twenty ; then it followes evidently , that what was told us to have been held twenty yeares agoe , was held ever , in case the church held nothing but upon this ground , that so she received or had been taught by the immediately-foregoing faithfull : for as long as she pretends onely to this ground , the difficulty is equal in each twenty yeares , that is , there is an equal impossibility they should conspire to this palpable lie . now that they ever held to this ground , ( that is , to the having received it from their ancestours , ) is manifested by as great an evidence . for since they now hold this ground , if at any time they had taken it up , they must either have counterfeited that they had received it from their ancestours , or no. the former relapses into the abovesaid impossibility ; or rather greater , that they should conspire to tell a lie in the onely ground of their faith , and yet hold ( as they did ) their faith built upon that ground to be truth : the latter position must discredit it self in the very termes , which imply a perfect contradiction , for it is as much as to say , nothing is to be held as certainty of faith , but what hath descended to us from our forefathers ; and yet the onely rule which tells us certainly there is any thing of faith , is newly invented . wherefore , unless this chain of tradition be shown to have been weak in some link or other , the case between us is this ; whether twenty testimonies liable to many exceptions , and testify'd by experience to be disputable between us , can bear the force even of a probability against the universal acknowledgment and testification of millions and millions in any one age , in a thing visible and practical : to omit that we are far from being destitute of testimonies to counterpoise , nay incomparably over poise theirs . by this ground , and the reason for it , the reader may judge what weak and trivial proofs the best of protestant authours are able to produce against the clear verdict of tradition , asserted to be infallible by the strongest supports of authority and reason . to stop the way against the voluntary mistakes of mine adversary , i declare my self to speak here not of written tradition to be sought for in the scriptures and fathers , which lies open to so many cavils and exceptions ; but of oral tradition , which ( supposing the motives with which it was founded , and the charge with which it was recommended by the apostles ) carries in it's own force , as apply'd to the nature of mankind , an infallible certainty of it's lineal and never-to-be-interrupted perpetuity , as rushworth's dialogues clearly demonstrate , sect. . the continuation of the same grounds . the ninth ground is , that , the catholick church and her champions ought in reason to stand upon possession . this is already manifested from the fifth ground , since possession is of it's self a title , till sufficient motives be produced to evidence it an usurpation ; as hath there been shown . by this appears the injustice of the protestants , who would have it thought reasonable , that we should seem to quit our best tenour , possession attested by tradition , and fall upon the troublesome and laborious method of citing authours , in which they will accept of none but whom they list ; and , after all our pains and quotations , directly refuse to stand to their judgment : as may be seen in the protestant's apology ; in which by the protestant's own confessions the fathers held those opinions , which they object to us for errours . the tenth ground is , that , in our controversies about religion , reason requires that we should sustain the part of the defendant , they of the opponent . this is already sufficiently proved , since we ought to stand upon the title of possession , as a ground beyond all arguments , untill it be convinced to be malae fidei , which is impossible ; they , to produce sufficient arguments that it was unjust : that is , they must oppose or object , we defend ; they ought to argue , we to answer . hence appeares how meanly skill'd dr. h. is in the art of disputing , complaining many times in his last book that i bring no testimonies out of antiquity , and that i do not prove things in my schism disarm'd ; whereas that treatise being design'd for an answer to his book of schism , had no obligation to prove my tenet , but onely to show that his arguments were unconclusive . hence also is discover'd how manifestly weak and ridiculous mr. h. was in the second part of the most substantial chapter of his book of schism , where hemakes account he hath evidence s. peter had not the keyes given him particularly , by solving our places of scripture for that tenet : where ( besides other faults in that process , which schism disarm'd told him of , ) he commits three absurditi●● . first , in putting himself upon the side of the defendant ; wheras he ought and pretended to evidence , that is , to prove . secondly , by imagining that the solving an argument is an evidence for the contrary ; whereas the force of such a solution is terminated onely in showing that illation weak , but leaves it ind●fferent whether the thing in it self be so or no , or evidently deducible from some other argument . thirdly , he falsly supposes that we build our faith upon those places of the written words , as explicable by wit , not by tradition , and the practise of our church , whereas we onely own the delivery from father to son as the ground of all our belif , and make this the onely rule by which to explicate scripture . however some doctors of ours undetrake sometimes ex superabundanti to argue ad hominem , and show our advantage over them , even in that which they most pretend to . i know mr. h. will object that all this time i have pleaded for him , whiles i went about to strengthen the title of possession ; since they are at present in actual possession of their independency from the pope : and therefore that in all the consequences following thence i have but plow'd his ground with mine own heifer . but the reader may please to consider , that , though i spoke before of possession in general and abstractedly , yet , in descending to particular sorts of possessions , we must take along with us those particular circumstances which necessarily accompany them , and design them to be such . since then it were unworthy the wisdom of the eternal father , that our blessed saviour iesus christ , coming to plant à church , should not provide for it's being and peace , which confist in order and government ; it follows that christ instituted the government of the church . in our case then the possession of government must be such a possession , as may be presumable to have come from christ's time ; not of such an one , as every one knows when it began . since then it is agreed upon by all sides , that this present possession the protestants now have of their independency was begun lately , it is impossible to presume it to be that which was instituted by christ , unless they evidence the long settled possession of that authority they renounced to have been an usurpation ; and , on the contrary , unless they evidence this , that possession is justly presumable to have come from christ's time , the maintainers and claimers of it making this their main tenour , that truly it came from christ . now then seeing we hear no news from any good hand , nor manifest tokens of the beginning of this universal and proud vsurpation , which could not in reason but draw after it a train of more visible consequences , and be accompany'd with a multitude of more palpable circumstances than the renouncing it in england , which yet is most notorious to the whole world ; again , since the disagreement of their own authours about the time of it evidently shows that the pretended invasion of this authority is not evident ; hence , both for these and other reasons also , such a possession as this , is of it's self , and in it's own nature capable of pleading to have been derived from christ , that is , to be that possession which we speak of : whereas the other is discountenanc'd by it's confest and known original , which makes it not capable of it self to pretend that christ instituted it , unless it be help't out with the additional proof , that it had been expulsed from an ancienter possession by this usurpation of the pope . so that , to say the truth , this present possession of theirs makes nothing at all for their purpose , since it is no ways valid , but in vertute of their evidences that the same possession had been anciētly setled in a long peace before our pretended invasion : and if they can evidence this , and that we usurp't , then it is needless , and vain to plead present possession at all ; since that possession which is evidenced to have been before ours , is questionless that which was settled by christ . in a word , though in humane affaires where prescription has force , we use to call●t possession , when one hath enjoyed any thing for some certain time ; yet in things of divine institution , against which no prescription pleads , he onely can pretend possession of any thing who can stand upon it that he had it nearer christ's time : and by consequence , he who shall be found to have begun it later , unless he can evidence that he was driven out from an ancienter possession , is not , for the present having such a thing or power , to be styled a possessour ; but an vsurper , an intruder , an invader , disobedient , rebellious , and ( in our case ) schismatical . i am not ignorant that dr. h. rawly affirmes that the pope's authority began in phocas his time , but i hope no reader that cares much for his salvation , wil take his word for honest , till he show undeniable and evident matters of fact , concerning the beginning , progress , authours , abetters , opposers , of that newly introduc't government of head of the church , the writers that time for it , or against it , the changes it made in the face of the ecclesiastical state , and the temporal also , with whose interest the other must needs be enlinsk't , and what consequences follow'd upon those changes ; together with all the circumstances which affect visible and extern actiōs . otherwise , against the sense of so many nations in the church they left , the force of tradition and so many unlikelihoods prejudicing it , to tell us onely a crude story that is was so , or putting us off with three or four quotations in greek to no purpose , or imagining some chimerical possibilities how it might have been done , hardly consisting with the nature of mankind , is an answer unworthy a man , much more a doctor ; and to say that it crep't in invisibily and unobserved , as dreams do into men's heads when they are asleep , is the part of some dreaming dull head , who never lookt into the actions and nature of man , or compared them with the motives which should work upon them . the eleventh ground is , that historical proofs which manifest onely fact , do not necessarily conclude a rig●t . this is evident ; first , because testimonies conclude no more than then express : but they express onely the fact : therefore they conclude onely that the fact was such a person 's , not that the right was his . secondly , because no matter of fact which concerns the execution of any business is such , but it may be performed by another who hath no proper rigth , but borrows it from the delegation of some other , to whom it properly belongs ; as we see in vice-roys . thirdly , because in a process of fifteen or sixteen hundred years it cannot be imagin'd but there should happen some matters of fact either out of ambition , inter , est , ignorance , or tyranny , against the most inviolable right in the world ; nay even sometimes out of too much zeal and piety , great men , if they have not discretion proportionable , will be medling with things which do not concern them as we see by daily experience . now a testimony of a matter of fact can never conclude any thing , unless it be first manifested that that act our when he proceeded to action was bassed with none of these , but governed himself by pure reason ; that is , unless it be manifested that he had right : and if testimonies can be produced expressing that he had right , it was needless to stand alledging those which express't onely fact. frivolous therefore it is to bring historical proofs of fact upon the stage , in a dispute about right ; since , taken alone , they make onely a dumb show , and can act no part in that controversy : for the very alledging that some of these faults might intervene , disables such premises from inferring a right . neither ought mr. h. ( which , i suppose for want of logick , or forgetfulness how men use to dispute , he is ever apt to do ) exact of the defendant a reason of his denial in particular : but it is his part to prove that none of these defects could happen , otherwise his premisses of fact hang together with his conclusion of right by no necessity of consequence . let the reader then take notice by this plain information of reason , how senselesly dr. h. behaved himself in the business of erecting and translating patriarchates , and in many other places , where from some particular matters of fact he would needs conclude a right . the twelfth ground is , that the acceptation of the secular powers , and their command to the people , are necessary to the due and fitting execution of the churches lawes ; whence follows not that the princes made those lawes by their own authority , but that they obey'd and executed what the church had order'd : for unless the churche's ordinances should be put into temporal laws , which oblige to their observance by aw and fear of punishment , they could hardly ever find an universal reception ; since otherwise refractory and turbulent spirits , who cared not much for their obligation in confcience , might at pleasure reject , disobey , and reclame against them : which would both injure the authority of the church , and scandalize the community of the faithfull . this therefore being of such an absolute conveniency for the church , we need not wonder that the temporal power ( of christians ) should put the churche's orders into temporal laws , and execute their performance ; nor consequently can testimonies of such execution and laws , prejudice the pope ' s right , since catholick governours do the self same at present , ( as far as concerns this point ) which was done then . the thirteenth ground is , that it is granted by catholicks , that kings may exercise some ecclesiastical iurisdiction , by the concession of the church , and yet not prejudice thereby the pope's vniversal pastourship . this is most visible from the unanimous acknowledgment of all catholick authours , and verifyed by divers practical instances . hence it is evident that dr. h. must either manifest likewise , that the lawfulness of those matters of fact related of kings was not originiz'd from the churche's precedent orders , or else he concludes nothing at all against us . here i desire the reader & mr. h. may joyntly take notice , that the testimonies himself alledges from the church in her councils , granting this to the secular power , is a strong prejudice against their self-and-proper right ; as also , that he hath not so much as attempted to produce one testimony , of any authority , expressing it to be the right of the secular magistrate , independent of the church . the fourteenth and last ground is , that in case scbism should invade a whole country , it could not be expected to have happen'd otherwise than d h. ( of schism c. ) hath described . for it is to be expected that the secular power should be for it , and so use meanes to make the clergy & vniversities assent to his novelty : otherwise had either the temporal government awed them , the pastours of souls consented to inform the people right , or the vniversities ( the seminaries of learning ) conspired to write against that innovation , in all likehood it would have given a stop to it's proceding , at least have hindred it's universal invasion . hence follows that dr. h's narrative discourse of his schism hath nothing in it to bewonder us ; but rather , that it is as plain and particular a confession of the fact , as any penitent malefactour could make when he is about to suffer . for , that a nation may fall into schism , none doubts ; as little , that it should fall into it by those very means , and the same degrees which he there layes down . nay more , himself disgraces his own narration by confessing ( p. . ) that the clergy were inclined to subscribe by the feare of a premunire : and the question about the pope's right in england being debated in the vniversities , he sayes onely p. . that it was generally defined in the negative ; ( that is when the king's party prevailed ) yet he omits that the kings lust first moved him to think of schismatizing , and his final repentance of that act ; which show that the first spring which mov'd the whole engine was not purity of conscience , but the impurest and basest of passions . the positions , which i have layed dow for grounds to our future discourse , will of themselves lay open the whole case clearly to the ordinary readers ; and inform the more prudent ones , that nothing is or can be sayd by dr h. of a force and clearness comparable to that of our possession , and that of oral tradition , which we ever ●laim'd for our tenour ; from which also they disclaimed , when they reform'd in this point of the pope's supremacy . so that litle more remains to be perform'd , but to manifest his shallow weaknesses , and trivial impertinences ; which i should willingly omit , if the greatest part of readers would be as willing to think a book fully answer'd , when substantial points are shown to be nothing , as they are to catch at the shadow of words as matters of importance , and so imagine nothing done , till they also be reply'd upon . nor do i fear this task , though ingratefull in it's self and less necessary , will be voyd of fruit , specially to mr. h's friends , who may see by this answer of mine , how bad that cause must be , which can cast so understanding a man , as some of them imagine him , upon such non sense , weaknesses of reasoning , voluntary mistakes , falsifications , denying his own words , and many other ridiculous shifts , as shall be seen most amply in the process of this treatise . sect. . dr. h's accurate mistake of every line of the introduction to schism disarm'd ; and his wilful avoyding to answer the true import of it . mr. h's reason which was gravelled in understanding the plain words in my epistle to the reader ( as hath been shown ) has no better fortune in confuting my introduction . i exprest in the beginning of it , that it bred in me at first some admiration why the protestants should now print books by pairs to defend themselves from schism , who heretofore more willingly skirmish't in particular controversies , than bid battel to the main body of the church , &c. vpon which dr. h. not aware that upon every new occurrence , or effect , the admirative faculty first playes it's parts , and stirres up the reason to disquisitiveness for the cause of it ( such reflections ly much out of the way of one who gleans testimonies ( will not give me leave something to admire at first , till i had found the reason , at an occurrence evidently new , that is , their writing at this time books by pairs to clear them selves from schism ; but is pleased to turn my ordinary , easy , moderate words of some admiration at first , into those loud phrase ( p. . l. . ) of great , vnheard of news and prodigy , putting news and prodigy in different letters , that himself might be thought an oedipus , who had unriddled my imagin'd aenigma . but since any thing which is uncouth and disorderly justly stirres up admiration , what necessity is there that dr. h. and his friends should hap to do all things so orderly , wisely , and reasonably , that poore s. w. ( whom he confesses here p. . l. not to have been of his councel in his designment ) might not be allow'd to have some admiration at first , at their mysterious imprudence . but he will needs undertake to allay my admiration ( though i was much better satisfy'd with my own reason there given ) by telling me , it was seasonable charity to undeceive weak seducible christians , because the romish missaries by pretence of their schism , endeavour'd to defame them out of a persecuted profession . where first i assure him , that many of those who have of late become catholicks , are as great scholars and wits as have been left behind , and so more likely to have been reduced by reason , than seduced by the industry of others working upon their weakness : the weak seducihle souls of the former protestants are either turn'd quakers , or such like kind of things ; those who have run back to the lap of their mother the holy catholick church , are such as are neither easily deceivable by our missaries , nor possibly undeceivable by dr. h. multitudes of them being such as might wi●h far better reason be wish't to have the answering of dr. h. in my stead , than be feared to be mo'vd by his reasons to renounce their own . nor needed they be tempted by others ; their own reason , if disinteressed , could not but inform them that that religion was not true , that church but counterfeit , whose grounds were rotten , and whose fates depended upon the temporal power . nor hath the other part of that poor sentence scap't better from his artificial mistakes . i onely affirmed , that they heretofore seem'd more willing to skirmish in particular controversies , than bid battel to t●e main body of the church : which he misunderstands , as if i had said that no protestants ever writ against the authority of our church , and then impugnes his own mistake , father'd upon s. w. very strongly by nominating some few books upon that subject ; ( ans . p. . l. . ) pittying himself that he should 〈◊〉 set to prove , what none said but himself : and truly i pitty him too . but are not there near an hundred times that number , who have skirmish't against us in particular controversies ? i hope then this will serve to justify those moderate words of mine , that they seem'd more willing to that task . yet he triumphs over me , saying that it is much juster matter of wonder to him , that s. w. should set out so unauspiciously , as to begin with an observation founded in a visible contrariety to a plain matter of fact , that every man that thinks of must discern to be so . thus doth he trample down and then strut over s. w. at the first onset ; so potent still and victorious is he , when he fights against his own chimaera's . i am persuaded a little sooth-saying will serve the reader to determine who began the more inauspiciously , and at whose door the sinister bird croak't . yet though ( saith he ) those words had been true , that formerly the protestants were more willing to skirmish in pa●●icular controversies , yet ( dr. h. tells us ) it were obvious to every man what might now suggest the change of that course : and what obvious reason might this be but that , after particular controversies were competently debated , to set the ▪ axe to the root of the tree , and stock up rome's universal pastourship and infallibility ? where he sees not that the question remains still to be ask't , why the competent debating of particular controversies should just then end , and the propter time then begin for the protestants to stock up rome , when themselves had never a legg left them to stand on ; and why they should hope then rather to get the upper hand , when they ly flat along themselves , as if antaeus-like they were stronger by falling . again , had many been induced by reason to return to the catholick church , yet i cannot understang why the protestants zeal should think it more seasonable to write books by pairs against us , than against their other desertours ; since they who have gone from them into other sects are above an hundred for one in comparison of the catholik converts ; so that had not s. w. found out a reason , to rid himself of his some admiration , he might still have remain'd in it for any thing m. h. hath produc't . vpon occasion of my saying , that it was more seasonable to denounce to those sects the unreasonableness of their schism , than plead the reasonableness of their own ; he voluntarily mistakes my words , as if i meant that he had confess 't it schism , and then gone about to plead the reasonableness of it : whereas i onely intended ( as is evident ) that he went about to plead the reasonableness of that which i ( who am the defendant ) doe , and must hold for schism , and consequently may nominate it so , that is of his breaking from our churche's government . yet for this i have lost my credit , this being another 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as he tells the reader , if he can understand greek ) what trust is due to s. w. in his affirmations . should he make use of the same method , and every time i name them schismaticks , or their sect schism , feign that i say they call themselves so , he might by this art make s. w. a monstrous lyer , if the reader were so monstrously silly as to believe him . in the next place , i must needs ( answ . p. . ) misunderstand the nature , and ayme of the churche's censures , because i tell them , they should rather threaten their desertours with the spiritual rod of excommunication , than cry so loud , not guilty , when the lash hath been so long upon their own shoulders ; since he sayes , a schism arm'd with mig●t is not either in prudence or charity to be contended with . whereas i pretend not that they ought to execute the punishments subsequent to excommunication , but to separate themselves ( had they any grounds to make it good that they were god's church ) from schismaticks , and avoid their communion in etern actions belonging to god's worship , as god's church ever accustomed ; not ●caring to denounce and preach to them in plain terms that they are schismaticks , and cut off from the church . neither is this against charity , since , ( schism being such an hainous and damnable sin ) charity avouches , nay makes it an obligation to manifest schismaticks to be such ; that they who have faln may apprehend the s●d state they are in , and thence take occasion to arise , and they who stand may beware of falling into that dangerous gulf , which once open'd the earth to swallow core dathan , and abiron . nor is it against prudence , since every one knows the permitting the weaker sort to commun●cate with enemies in those very circumstances which may endanger them , is the onely way to ruine any government either spiritual or temporal . at least why should they not dare ( had they grounds to bear them out ) to do the same as the catholicks did , during the time of their greatest persecution under the protestant government ; that is , let them be known to be schismaticks , and make the people abstain in divine matters from their contagious communion . but the confest uncertainty of their faith makes them squeamish to assume to themselves any such authority , and therefore they are forced by their very grounds , when their secular power is gone , to turn discipline into courtesy in matters of government , as they do in controversy turn zeal into civility and complement . when he talks here piously of the romanists sanguin try method , sure he hath forgotten that ever priests were hang'd , drawn , and quarter'd for their faith at tiburn , and all over england , in the time of their cruel reign ; or , if he remembers it , he thinks to make us amends by preaching , like a saint , of their meekness , of edification , and the more tragically-pittifull expressions of lamenting the ruptures of the christian world ( which themselves have made ) with rivers of teares of bloud . answ . p. . the next section begins with the rehearsal of my reason , why no colourable pretence can be alledged by the protestants why they left us , but the same will hold as firm for the other sects why they left them ; which i exprest thus : for that we prest them to believe false fundamentals dr. h. and his friends will not say , since they acknowledge ours a true church , which is inconsistent with such a lapse . they were therefore in their opinion things tolerable which were urged upon them ; and , if not in the same rank , yet more deserving the church should command their observance , than copes , or surplices , or the book of common prayer , the allowance whereof they prest upon their quondam brethen . which words though as moderately and modestly expressing the matter as could be invented , yet the reader shall see what a character the doctors peevish zeal hath set upon them ; to wit , that ( answ . p. . ) there are in them too many variations from the rules of sober discourse , so many indications of s. w. his temper , that it will not be easy to enumerate them . it shall be seen presently whether the doctors discourse or mine went a rambling when we writ . the tenour of my argument ad hominem , was this : the falsities which you pretend we prest upon you , were either acknowledged by you to have been fundamental , or not-fundamental , that is , tolerable : that you acknowledg'd them fundamental you will not say , since falsity in a fundamental ruines the essence of a church , which yet you grant ours to have ; therefore they were according to you not-fundamental or tolerable ; yet such kind of not-fundamental points as were more importing to be prest upon you by us , than copes or surplices , which you prest upon them : therefore you can alledge no reason why you left us , but they may alledge the same or a greater why they left you . this evidently is the sense of my words to any man who can understand common reason ; and the answer to them ought to be a manifesting-some solid motive why they left us , which the other sects cannot with better right defend themselves with , why they left the protestants . let us hear now whether the doctors discoursive power were sober , when he reel'd into such an answer . first , he willfully puts a wrong meaning upon those words false fundamentals , as if by them i meant things which we onely , not they , hold for fundamentals ; and then overthrows me most powerfully by showing ( as he easily might ) that he and his friends say not but that we prest them to believe false fundamentals , in this sense , that is such things as we held fundamentals : whereas 't is plain by my arguing ad hominem all the way , as also by those words ( they will not say ; they acknowledge ours a true church ; in their opinion , &c. ) that i meant such points as they accounted fundamentals . and when he hath thus voluntarily mistaken me , he tailes against me that i affirm things without the least shadow and ground of truth , and that i play foul play . the reader will quickly discern how meanly dr. h. is skill'd in the game of reason ; though in that of citations , where he can both shuffle and cut , that is , both alledge and explicate them , with id ests , as he pleases , he can pack the cards handsomly , and show more crafty tricks than ever did hocus pocus . and if any after all this can think i have wrong'd mr. h. in affirming he is a weak reasoner , himself shall ber ample testimony to this truth in the following paragraph . he slily touches at my true meaning of fundamentals there , and tells us that false fundamentals is a contradiction in adjecto . grant it , who ever affirmed that fundamentals could be false ? my words were onely that dr. h. and his friends would not say that our church prest them to believe false fundamentals . is it any wrong to them , or foule play in s. w. to affirm that dr. h. and his friends will not speak a contradiction ? himself ( such is his humility ) sayes it is ; affirming here , that when s. w. undertakes for him and his friends , that they will not say that the romanists have prest them to believe false fundamentals , his words are not intelligible sense ( for the following words , or else they have no degree of truth in them relate to the other acception of fundamental already sopoken of ) so that according to dr. h. it is not intelligible sense to undertake for him and his friends , that they should not speak contradictions . is this a sober discourse , which falls reelingly to the ground of it self , when none pushes it ? or was it a friendly part to involve his friends in his own wise predicament ? and now can any man imagine , that when i said dr. h. and his friends acknowledge ours a true church , there should be any difficulty in the sense of those words , or that i should impose upon them that they held our church not to have erred ? yet this doctor , who alwayes stumbles most in the plainest way , will needs quibble in the word true , and s. w. must bear the blame for grossely equivocating : whereas the sense was obvious enough to every child , as the words before cited will inform the reader , that i meant them of the true nature of a church ; which since they acknowledged ours to have , i argued hence , that they must not say we held false fundamentals , that is , such as they account fundamentals : for since a church cannot be a church , but by fundamental points of faith , and faith must not be false , it follows that a falshood in fundamental destroyes the very being of a church . this being so , i shall beg dr. h's pardon if i catechize him a litle in point of reason ( in which his cause makes him a meer cathecumenus ) and ask him how he can hold ours to have even the true nature of a church , since he hold that which she esteems as her fundamental of fundamentals , and that upon which as her sole certain ground she builds all her faith , to wit her infallible authority , to be false & erroneous ? if the sole authority upon which immeditately she builds all faith , be a ruinous falshood , she can have no true faith of any article , & consequently can have no faith at all , nor be a true church , since a church cannot survive the destruction of faith. but their ambition to honour their nag's-head bishops with the shadow of a mission from our church , makes them kindly speak non sense to do her a seeming courtesy for their own interest . i know he tells us here in general termes ( answ . p. . ) that she is not unchurch't , because she holds the true foundation layd by christ , but offends by enlarging and superadding ; but he must show why the catholicks , who hold no point of faith , but solely upon their churche's infallibility , if thar ground be false ( that is be none ) as he sayes , can hold any thing at all as of faith , that is , have any faith at all : at least how they can have certainty of any point of faith , or the written word of god , if the sole-certain rule of faith , by which onely they are assured of all those , were taken sometimes in a lie ; to wit while it recommended to them those superadditions they account false , received in the same tenour as the rest from the hands of our immediate forefathers . but let us follow dr. h. who goes jogging forward , but still rides ( as his ill fortune is ) beside the saddle to points which they accounted fundamental , i counterpos'd tolerable ones , that is such as they esteemed not-fundamental , which i therefore call'd tolerable , because they account these neither to touch the foundation of faith , as building or destroying ; such as he acknowledged in the fore-going paragraph our pretended super additions to be , saying that the dross doth not annibilate the gold. it being therefore plain that falshoods which are not in fundamentals , & so unconsistent with the essence of a church , must be in things not-fundamental , and therefore consistent with the nature of a church , that is tolerable , if taken in themselves ; he neglects to take notice of them as they are in themselves , ( that is such , as their admission ruines not faith , nor the essence of a church ) and sayes the pressing them upon them is intolerable , and not admittable without hypocrisy , or sin against conscience ; and why ? because they believe them not i ask , had they a demonstration they were false ? if so , then let them produce it , and if it bear test , i shall grant them innocent ; if not , then since nothing else can oblige the vnd●rstanding but the foresaid evidence , their pretended obligation in conscience to disaccept them is convinc't to spring from weakness of passion , not from force of reason . i added , that those points more deserved the church should command their obseruance , than copes or surplices , &c. and though mr. h. knowes very well , that one of those points was the fundamental ground of all faith in the church they left , and copes &c. but things indifferent , yet by a cheap supposal that all is false which we hold , he can deny that they are more deserving our church should command their observance : and so carries the cause clear . he addes answ . p. . that they weightier the importance of the things commanded is , the more intolerahle is the pressure of imposing them : and makes disobedience greater in things indifferent . whereas surely the governours are more highly obliged to command the observance of that on which they hold faith to be built , than all the rest put together . is it a greater obstinacy to deny a governour taxes , than to rebell absolutely against him ? the doctor 's logick sayes it is ; since obstinacy , according to him , is greater in resisting commands in things ind●fferent . especially if the rebel please to pretend , that the urging his submission to that authority is an intolerable pressure , mr. h. here acquits him without more adoe . but to return ; since it was our churche's greater obligation to command their observance of those points , and the holding of such points was not deemed then by them destructive to faith , but on the other side known by reason of their pretended importance to be in an high degree damnable to themselves and others , if they hap't to be mistaken , no less than most palpable and noon-day evidence can excuse them in common prudence from a most desperate madness , and headlong disobedience ; but the least shadow of a testimony-proof is a meridian sun to dr. h. and gives as clear an evidence as his understanding , darkened by passion , is willing to admit . thus much to show the particular miscarriarges of dr. h. in every paragraph of his answer to my introduction : there remaines still the fundamental one , that he hath said nothing at all to the point of reason in it , but onely mistaken each particular line of it . i alledged as my reason why they dealt not seriously against their own desertours , because no colourable pretence could possibly be alledged by the protestants why they left us , but the very same would hold as firm for the other sects why they left them . this proved ad hominem thus ; because the protestants acknowledge the points deny'd by both to be tolerable , that is such as could consist with faith and a church ; but , with this disadvantage on the protestants side , that the points they deny'd being of more importance , more deserved our church should command their observance . now every one sees that the proper answer to his discourse is to specialize some plea for themselves , which will not as well excuse their desertours : the doctor alledges none , nor goes about to alledge any ; but as if he were dividing his text , playes upon my words in particular , neglecting the import of them altogether . he sayes indeed it is against their conscience to admit those other super additionary points ; the same say the puritans , of copes , surplices , and organs . the doctor will object that they are indifferent , and stight matters , and therefore it is a greater disobedience not to admit them ; they will answer that surplices are ragges of rome , that organs are babylonish bagpipes , and all the rest scandalous , and superstitious inventions : still they are equall in their pleas nay , if a socinian deny christ to be god , and pretend , as doubtless he will , with as much seriouness as mr. h. that he cannot but sin against conscience , if he think otherwise , and therefore 't is tyranny to press it upon him , the church may not oblige him to believe that christ is god ; dr. h. hath pleaded his cause joyntly with his own , that is , hath said no more in his own excuse than the socinian may for his . again , if dr. h or his church press upon the socinian the belief of christ's divinity upon this ground , that it is a point of most weighty importance ; he presently answers the doctor with his own words , that the weightier the importance of the things commanded are , the more intolerable is the pressure of imposing them . and so in stead of impugning , dr. h. hath made good s. w's words , that they can alledge no colourable pretence which may not be alledged by the other sects . what if we should adde that the church they left had been in long possession of the belief of infallibility , and so proceeded upon these grounds that her faith was certain when she prest those points upon them ; but they confess their unce●t●in , and could proceed upon no better then probable grounds when they prest any thing upon their desertours ? is there not a palbable difference put between the pretended authorities of imposing points to be held , in us and them ? and a greater danger of disaccepting ours in them , than theirs in the puritans ? if they erred , onely a confest probability stood against them , which gave them just licence to dissent , if they had a probable reason that the admission of those points was bad ; since nothing but absolute evidence pretended could even pretend to oblige their vnderstandings to assent to them : if you erred , a pre acknowledg'd infallibility strengthen'd by a long possession , asserted by the attestation of tradition , and many other motives stood against you , so that nothing but most palpable , undeniable , and rigorous evidence could possibly disoblige your first reformers from their ancient belief , or oblige them to this new one . if the puritans erred , since they were onely ornaments and rituals they refused to admit , the utmost harm which could accrue by their non-admission of them was terminated in the want of exren decency onely , and held by the very authority which imposed them , to be but indifferent , and far from being essentially-destructive to a church . but if you or your first reformes chanc't to erre , ( which the bare probability of your faith confess 't by your selves , in this case makes more than likely ( then your contrary position ruin'd all faith and government , since the church you disobey'd held no other ground of faith or church government , save onely those you re●ected and disacknowledg'd , to wit , her own infallibility , and the popes authority . again , if you happen'd to be in the wrong , and that indeed there was no other , either church government , or ground of faith , than these ; then how wickeldy desperate to your own soules , and universally destructive to all man-kind , and their means of attaining eternal bliss , must your disclaiming and publikely , renouncing both these be ? none of which can be objected to the puritanes by you . so evidently true were my words , that no colourable pretence can possibly be alledged by the protestants why they left us , but the same will hold as firm , nay much firmer , for other sects why they left them . yet i doubt not but the doctor will after all this ( as he does here ( answ . p. . ) applaud his own victory with a triumphant epiphonema , and say that s. w. his probations are beyond all measure improbable , when himself had not said a word to the intent of the discourse , but onely play'd mistakingly and non-sensically upon some particular words : yet when he hath done , like a tender hearted man , he pittyes himself again , that he should so unnecessarily insist upon it truly so do i pitty him , or any man else who takes much pains to no purpose ; though i pitty more the reader , who can imagine any credence is to be given to so weak a writer . he ends his answer to my introduction with telling the reader , that i have with no shew of iustice suggested his tediousness in things acknowledged . whereas almost all his first chapter , and third , together with those where he proves the pope not head of the church , from the title of converting england , or concession of our kings , as also almost all his narrative confession of his schism , with many other scatter'd discourses , are things acknowledg'd by both parties , and were very tedious and dull to me . what he addes , that he will not disturb me when i speak truth , unless he shall discern some part of his arguing concern'd , is a very pretty jest ; intimating that he stands in preparation of mind to oppose even truth it self , if it stand in his way , or his arguing be concern'd in it , and not vindicated in his former reply . a sincere person ! hovver , let him onely grant that what he vindicates not , but leaves untouch't , is truth , and we shall without difficulty strike up a bargain . sect. . how dr. h. prevaricates from the question by stating it wrong . his powerfull way of arguing by ifs , and how he defends himself for mincing the fathers words the fathers alledged by mr. h. attested that no just cause could be given of schism ; whence he inferres ( of schism , p. . ) that the causes and motives of schism are not worth producing , or heeding in this controversy . the catholick gentleman and s. w. both exprest their dislike of this inference ; the doctor pretends to vindicate the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it , as he pedantically calls it , and referres me to his reply for his reasons : to which i shall both give a solution , and at once lay open the nature of s●hism , and the manner in which they ought to controvert it , i mean as far as it can have any show of bearing controversy . schism then ( which we joyntly acknowledge a vice of the first magnitude ) if taken in it's primary signification , to which our circumstances determine it , includes for it's genus or material part a division , or act of dividing ; the specifical difference gives it a reference to the ecclesiastical government instituted by christ . now our great masters of moral divinity assure us , that no action is in it self good or bad , but as it conduces to or averts from the attaining one's last end ; since all things else have the nature of meanes onely in order to the attainment of that , and consequently the esteem of their goodness or badness is built upon their alliance to that order . whence follows that there is no action in the world , not killing one 's own son , nor dividing from any government whatsoever , in it self so bad , but might be done , could there be assigned motives and reasons , truly representing it better to attempt it . now our all-wise god hath ordered things so providently for the peace and good of his church , that it is impossible any cause or motive can be truly imagin'd sufficient to justify the rejecting it's government ; since neither any private injury is comparable to such an universal good , nor can it happen that any miscarriage can be so publick as to force it's renouncing : for seeing our b. saviour made but one church , and that to continue for ever , if any cause were sufficient to break from that one church , there would be a just and sufficient cause to be of no church , which is against the protestants own tenet , and makes them so desirous to pretend a descent from ours . wherefore it remains impossible , that those who acknowledg the churche's government to have bin instituted by christ , should pretend to any just cause to separate from it , but they ought to behave themselves passively , in case of an injury received , not actively renouncing that government , or erecting another against it . notwithstanding all this yet it may happen sometimes that ( as no authority is or can be so sacred & inviolable , but passion can make men dislike it ) some company of men may disacknowledge the authority instituted by christ , to have come from him , alledging for the reason and motive of their renouncing it , that it is an usurpation , which they also pretend to prove by arguments drawn either from reason or testimonies . now these men's plea might take place , if it were possible they should produce absolute evidence , and such as in it's own force obliges the understanding to assent , notwithstanding the contrary motives which retard it : and without pretending such a rigorous evidence , it were madness to hazard an error in abusiness of such main concernment both to the church , mankind , and their own souls , as it would necessarily be , if that fact of theirs happen'd to be schismatical . now then let us see , whether my adversaries inference be good , that , because schism can have no just causes for it's parents , therefore dr. h. in treating a controversie of schism , ought not to heed or produce the causes or motives of it . indeed if he would grant himself and his friends to be schismaticks ; then it were to no purpose for him to alledge causes and motives , since all men know that no just cause can be possibly alledged for schism : but if he does an external act which hath the resemblance or show of schism , and nevertheless will defend himself to be no schismatick , he must give account why he does that action , and shew that that action is not truly schism ; which cannot be done without discussing reasons and motives , if common practise teach us any thing . will any man endeavour to turn one out of possession lawfully , without a plea , or produce a plea without either any motive or reason in it ? iustly therefore did the catholick gentleman affirme it to be a pure contradiction : for that a confest breach under debate should be concluded to have no just causes , that is to be indeed schismatical ; or , to have just causes , that is to be a self enfranchisment , without producing & examining any causes , is a perfect implicancy . nor will his instance ( reply p. . . ) of a seditious person or rebell , secure him at all : for as it is true that if it be known that he confesses himself a rebel , there is no pleading of causes , ( as dr. h. well sayes ) to justify his rebellion ; yet as long as he pretends to be no rebel , so long he is obliged to bring motives and reasons why his action of rising against the government is not rebellion , though it be accused and seem to be such . now if dr. h. hath not forgot the title of his book , t is a defence of the church of england against the exceptions of the romanists , to wit , those by which they charge her of schism , that is , their accusing her that this action of separation from the church of rome is schismatical ; so that the whole scope and work of his book must be , to plead those motives and reasons which may seem to traverse that accusation , and shew that this action of the church of england makes not her schismatical nor her sons schismaticks . and how this can stand without producing motives , or is not as plain a contradiction as ens and non ens , i confess is beyond my understanding . in his eighteenth p. he cunningly forges a false state of the question in these words , that it is a matter in question between the romanists and us , whether the bishop of rome had before and at the time of the reformation any supreme legal power here , i willingly acknowlege . by which he would perswade the reader , that he had condescended to a state of the question pretended by us : which is absolutely false ; for we state the question thus ; that , there being at that time an external confessed government derived and in actual possession time out of minde , ( abstracting from whether it be internally legal or no ) whether the pretended reformers either did then or can now show sufficient reasons of the substracting themselves from obedience to it . this is our state of the question , which hath it's whole force ( as the reader may see ) in the acknowledged external possession . now dr. h. would make his reader believe that the state of the question doth wholly abstract from the external possession , and purely debate the internal right , as if it hung hovering indifferently in the aire to be now first determin'd , without taking notice of the stability and force our tenet had from the long possession . and this handsome trick he gentilely put 's upon his readers by those three sly words , i willingly acknowledge . having thus mistaken voluntarily the state of the question , consequently he imposes upon me that i said , none doubts of the bishop of rome's supreme legal power over the church of england at the time of the reformation ; and then confutes me most palpably with telling me that they doubt it , or make a question of it . can any man in reason imagin i was ignorant that such was their tenet , since i impugn it in this present controversy , as schismatical ? yet dr. h's great reach of wit can by the way , and within a parenthesis , make such a dolt of s. w. his proof from my words is better then the supposi●ion it self : i said , our church could cast them out , and deny them communion , if they be found to deserve it , being then her subjects and children . actually they were under her at that time : if then they could alledge just ( that is ) evident reasons why they thought her government an usurpation , then they did not deserve it , and so she could not excommunicate them ; if they did not , and yet would subtract themselves from her obedience , then they deserv'd it , and were justly excommunicated . can any man doubt of this , or impose such a piece of known non-sense ( as his former deduction out of it is ) upon another , unless possess 't with dr. h's want of ingenuity ? yet this he repeats again , p. . and calls his own straining at a gnat , my swallowing down the question at one haust . now let us examin my words which breed his scruple : they are these , as cited in the marge by himself . that our church could cast you out , if you be found to deserve it , being then her subjects and children none doubts . here i ask , first , whether he can shew that i speak of any interiour or legal authority ; which if he cannot , 't is a plain imposture to father upon me the word legal , as he does in this place . secondly , i demand whether any protestant or dr. h. himself doubts whether there was an extern , apparent , and acknowledged authority , the which for being such was to be obeyed until it was disproved , in the church of rome over the pretended reformers . this being acknowledged , i ask what it is he excepts against . that such an authority could not proceed against her esteemed subiects , if they deserv'd it ; for this is all my words signify'd , and is so plain of it self , that no man that hath any common sense can make difficulty of it . he tells us p. . that the questions is equally and indifferently whether they or the romanists be guilty of schism , including also the remorseless governours in the romish see. where he quite mistakes the business : his meaning ( as i perceive by his whole procedure , and particularly p. . where he sayes , that the pope ought to clear his title to his pretended power ) is , that we should be mutually counter-opponent , and counter-defendants , and each produce proofs , ere we can claim any thing . but he is in a g●eat errour : we need no new proofs to convince the lawfulness of our authority ; our plea is provided to our hand before they opposed us , and started the question possession is all the proofs we need bring , and such a possession as had to strengthen it an universal belief that it came from christ's time , grounded upon the certainty of oral tradition ; so that we made no question of it ( it was a point of our faith ) and therefore need produce no proofs for our affirmative : whereas they , who first question'd this before-unquestionable , and re●ected this before-received authority , must bring reasons why they did so , and proofs why they deemed it usurp't . the question therefore in this pre●ent debate devolves to this ; whether the proofs dr. h. produces be convincingly evident against a possession so qualify'd , as is before declared : if they fall short of that force , eo ipso he and his friends are concluded schismaticks , for relinquishing without just motives an authority , whose possession is justly presumable to have come from christ ; if they be perfect evidences , then they are excusable , and in their excusableness is terminated the controversy in hand , if we may trust the title of his book , which is a defence against the except●on , of the romanists , or his own stating the quest●on , of schism , p. . from which he here prevaricates , p. . what follows further , out of their excusableness , against us , that is , whether we were unjust , usupers , tyrannical , &c. is another question ; for which sequel i would not contend with them , if the premisses could be possibly evinced . however , if we usurp't , it was not lately , but a thousand years agoe : but that our church shall in that case be schismatical , ( as he here sayes ) that expression comes out from the mouths and pens of his friends so weakly and faintly , ( the light of nature and common language of mankind checking them , that the whole is not said to be broken from a part , but a part from the whole ) that he must have recourse to the universal obligation of charity to pretend us such : for we can never be ●hown even in his supposed case schismatical against government or vnity in the church , if no such vnity can be found , as it cannot in that mould he hath cast christianity in , by making each church 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , independent , or self-govern'd ; since there can be no division made , where the things are already many . after his pretended indifferency of the question , he tells us , that it must not be begg'd on either side , and hereafter he complains of me grievously for the same fault i am sorry to see m. h. so ignorant in logick , that he mistakes the most ordinary things in disputing . let him know then that a defendant , as a defendant , cannot be sayd to beg the question ; since it is his office to hold his tenet , which is the thing in controversy , and stick close by it ; whatever prejudices or impossibilities are objected , to deny them cōsequent from it , granting those things which he takes to be consistent with it , denying those which he deems inconsistent , unless it be an open evidence ; if an ambiguity occur , to distinguish the double sense , and show again which part of the distinction is consistent with it , which otherwise : in all which it is manifest he supposes the truth of the question , and holds fast to it , nor ought he let go that hold til he be non-plust , and the dispute at an end . my part then being the defendant's ( as hath been proved out of the tenth ground ) the reader may see with how much logick d. h. complains of me all over , for only holding my tenet ; which he calls begging the question . for , however he may pretend to the name of a defender , yet , since his party begun first to oppose , that is , to object and argue against ours , who at that time quietly held their tenet , 't is clear he is in no other sense a defendant , than as one who maintains his first objected syllogism with a second , may be said to defend it ; which is very improper and abusive of the right notion . whereas we , who started not the dispute nor begun the opposition , but sate still , have yet a just title to continue in that our posture of defence , till the evidence of their arguments drive us out of it . his next complaint is against the governours in the romish see , who ( if you will trust him ) without all cause deny communion without remorse or relenting , not onely to them , but to many other churches east and west , north and south , in all parts of the habitable word . and was not this ever the constant practice of god's church , to excommunicate all those who renounced either the government , or any other point of faith received from their forefathers ; that is , all schismaticks and hereticks ; and never to readmit them till they repented their lapse , and did fruits worthy of penance ? i grant therefore that the romish governours inherit the remorslesness of the foregoing church , so that if any be found misdeserving in the same manner , in what part soever of the habitable world they live , whether east , west , north , or south , all is one to her ; or how many soever they be , arians , socinians , eutychians , nestorians , carpocratians , lutherans , calvinists , protestants ; &c. she values not their number , nor yet their situation : if they grow scabb'd with self opinionated novelties , or disobedience , they must be separated from the sounder flock ; nor ever be re-admitted , till their repentance hath wrought their cure . his fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth paragraphs , which follow , lay down for their foundation a very excellent principle , introduc'● with an if ; as , if the church of england ( p. . l. . ) be really 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; if the bishop of rome ( p. . l. . ) had really no more power and authority over this church , than the bishop of antioch over cyprus , that is none at all ; in case the bishop of rome ( p. . l. . ) have no legal authority over us , &c. and upon this he runs on very confidently a whole leaf and an half , concluding most evidently whatever he pleases in prejudice of the pope , none daring to stop his career , or deny his consequences , so great vertue there is in the particle if : onely we may take leave to propose a parallel to it , that as he who intends to dine on larks , & prepares all things necessary , whithout any greater security than , if the s●y should fall , may in all likelyhood miss his meal ; so in greater probability must dr. h. fail of his conclusion , which relies upon a conditional if , grounded onely in his own fancy . he expresses p. . much charity towards the humble members of the papacy who pray for the peace of the caetholick church . but if he would consider how litle they think of his church , under that notion , he would con them litle thanks for their prayers . they never intended to pray for the peacefull a biding of the protestants where they are , but rather for that salutiferous trouble of compunction and sorrow of heart , for their disobedience , and pervicacious obstinacy . yet he will needs be beholding to them for praying for the protestant churches peace with the rest , and in courteous requital retains the favorable opinion of salvation attainable amognst them . but cannot absolve from the guilt of the most culpable schism the setters up , and maintainers of the partition-wall betwixt us . the pope , cardinals , and all the clergy must bea● s. w. company to hell , that 's decreed ; s. paul hath ( doubt less ) long a goe pronounced sentence against them also . he would clear himself in the next place for mincing the father's words . s. austin affirmed , non esse quicquam gravius schismate ; he render'd it , scarce any so great . now s. w. knowing how willing he was to seek evasions to palliate schism by pretence of some greater sin ( as he does most amply , of schism , cap. . part . . ) and therefore not willing to grant him any the least startinhole , exprest by the way his dislike of his mincing the absolute not , with scarce . but as mr. h's good fortune would have it , his genius led him into this profitable mistake , as to translate gravius , so great ; and by the jumbling of these two together he hath compounded an excuse , alledging that scarce any is so great , is fully as much ( or more comprehensive ) than none greater . whereas first it is manifest that non esse quicquam gravius , is most obviously and easily render'd , there is nothing greater : and if a qualifying expression be made use of in stead of an absolute one , s w. had good reason to be jealous of it , specially coming from dr. h. next the reasons he alledges to make good the equivalence of the sense , that there may possibly be many crimes as great , though no one were supposed greater , is false ; moral science assuring us that no two kinds of vices are equall thirdly , if dr. h. please to rub up afresh his forgotten logick , he will find that with s. austin's proposition , that none is greater , it cannot stand that one is greater , since they are contradictories ; but with his proposition , that scarce any is so great , it vell stands , that one , or some few , may be greater : therefore it is manifest that he minced s. austin . lastly , whereas he sayes he assumed not to affirm more than his authorities did induce , that there was none greater , is the strangest lapse of all : before he onely minc'd the words non est quicquam gravius , now they have totally lost their signification ; since he tells us his authorities did not induce that there was none greater ; which is directly contrary to the words cited . this is the result of dr. h's deliberate thoughts , apply'd to remedy his disarmer's too great hast : me thinks another man in another cause might have done better ex tempore . i took notice by the way , with a glance of a parenthesis , that he mitigated s. irenaeus his words , nulla ab eis tanta fieri potest correptio , quanta est schismatis pernicies , by rendring the absolute tenour of them , nulla potest , &c. by the softer language of , it is very hard if not impossible , to receive such an injury from the governours , &c. to clear himself , he asks me first why i took no notice of his ill rendring schismatis pernicies . i answer , that it is not necessary to score up all his faults ; it suffices to note what i conceived most needfull . next , he excuses himself by telling us that he set down the latin punctually , and so left it not possible to impose on any that understood that . i answer , that my intent in noting it was , that he should not even impose on those who understand english onely , and make up the greater part of readers , thirdly , he sayes he was carefull not to goe beyond the limits of the testimonies . i grant it , and onely find fault that he was over-carefull , so as to fall short of their just sense . fourthly , he tells us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both in scripture and other authours , is render'd hard or difficult . which evasion is nothing , unless he had this testimony out of irenaeus in greek , as his words seem willing underhand to make the reader believe : which if he have , i am sure he hath seen more than other men , though very curious , could ever hear of . these are his evasions : let us see what plain reason will say against them : it is very hard , if not impossible , to receive such an iniury sufficient to excuse schism , evidently is consistent with this sense , that , it is doubtfull whether some few injuries may not be sufficient for that end ; and then if the some of these last words doe not mitigate the absolute , nulla potest , there can be none , i confess i have lost my reason . to omit that the sense of his translation or paraphrase few or none , &c. leaves room for the reasonableness of schism , since it admits a possibility for schism , in case of some injury received , to be excusable . in a word , i onely affirmed ( schism disarm'd , p. . ) that he seem'd something chary in those expressions , which i am sure the reader will think i have made good ; himself acknowledging here ( p. . l. . ) that his expression was cautious , and the fact of mincing the words being evident : as for his intention , if the reader wil believe him , he assures him ( answ . p. . ) it was out of tenderness to us ; so that we must bear the blame of his feeble paraphrase , and be beholding to him to boot . timeo danaos , & dona ferentes . howsoever , since it was our fortune to have the intention of a courtesy thrust upon us , we thank him for it , but request him to do us no more such favours for the future , as to mince the fathers words for our sakes ; they will earn a return of greater gratitude from his own cause , which stands in need of such kindnesses . my third whisper ( as he calls it ) which he will needs have speak aloud to his discredit , is that he render'd s. austin's words à communione orbis terrarum , from the vniversal or truly catholick church of christ ; as if he were afraid lest god's church might perhaps be thought untruly catholick . of which he sayes the reasons is visible , because the church of rome is by her advocates styled the catholick church . but do not others call her so besides her own advocates ? do not even our very enemyes ( forced thereunto by custome , which makes words proper ) give us that appellation , unless design cross their free and natural expression ? ask in london where a catholick lives , and see whether they will show you the house of a roman catholick , or no. should a pursuivant meet dr. h. and ask him if he were a catholick , i doubt not but his answer would be negative , unless design against us made him deliver himself otherwise . since then we onely have nomen catholicum obtentum & possessum , which s. austin ( contra epist. fund . cap. . ) holds to be a note of the church , it is a wrong to that holy doctor , to put upon him in your translation the unnecessary addition of truly , to catholick ; seing that according to him , no church can be universally called such , which is not truly such . the summe then of dr. h's supererogating truly , is ; that though all the world in their free expressions call us onely catholicks , ( that is , sons of the catholick church ) yet all speak untruly , but himself and a few of his brethren ; who also speak truly onely then , when it is their turn to dispute against us . yet he tells us , if we will believe him , that certainly our church is not such in the notion s. austin speaks : though if we should ask him what ground he hath for his certainty , he must answer that he hath none that is certain , but onely a probability ; for i conceive he hath no better ground for that than he hath for his faith. thus dr. h. ends his defence from my three whispers , as he calls them , though i hope by this time they speak loud and plain enough to every reader that he was too chary in his expressions , which was all i objected . in the close he pleases to honour me , by making me confessour of his secretest and deepest reservation : but truly ( though i pretend not to so high an office ) unless he comes with hearty sorrow for these faults without cloaking them , and gives me good hopes of his future amendment , he is never likely to obtain absolution . the catholick gentleman noted by the way , that dr. h. slightly past over the distinction between heresy and schism , which was necessary to be exprest in that place , where the matter of the futurework was to be determined , that is , what schism he was chiefly to treat of . now in this book entitled their defence he ought to state the matter so , as to treat of that chiefly which is chiefly objected : wherefore since he cannot but know that a schism coming from an heresy is that which is more charged upon them , both as greater crime , and as the cause and origin of the other schism of onely disobedience , he ought to have premised this , and let his reader have known that all heresy is schism ; at least in a place where he purposely treats of the notion of schism , it was fitting to treat it abstractedly from the heretical one , and that of bare disobedience , ( both which are objected , though the former much more ) and not speak of it as distinguish 't from heresy , as professedly here he does , of schism chap. . par . . so laying wrong grounds to his future discourse , by omitting and excluding from it the principal schism objected , and so treating schism maimedly , or rather onely one branch of it . now his first excuse why he past it over so sl●ghtly ( onely naming the word distinguish't , yet treating no distinction there , ) is that he meddled not with it at all , reply p. . l. ● . as if this made not the fault greater , not to meddle with that which was in a manner soley important in that place , and most pertinent to his ensuing t●eatise . his next is , that his method led him to it , to treat of it , chap. . whereat 'ts evidently most impertinent and unmethodical to treat of schism against faith under the head of schism against mutual charity : and besides , method gives , that we must put the definitions before we treat of the particularities . i am sorry to see that his confusion for method's sake , the non-sense of his first book is entail'd upon these also ; and that that dish in the stationers bill of fare must be cook't up again here by mr. h. to give the reader a second surfeit . sect. . how dr. h. defends his famous criticism about the hith pael-like verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with ten several mistakes of his accidence . his second section presents us with the first dish in the stationer's bill of fare , served up to the table cover'd ; but with so many pittiful evasions , and mistakes , as may serve perhaps to give the reader a banquet of mirth . but i shall treat it seriously . his first mistake is general , and slips over the whole question . our controversy is whether either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 have a reciprocal signification upon a grammatical account , from the notation of the form and termination of the word , as he declares himsel ( of shism , p. . ) to mean of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at least : now he , to evade , quite forsakes his formely-declared intent , and recurres for his refuge to the sense of the word taken from the thing signify'd , and affix't to it by ecclesiastical use , or present circumstances , not to what the word in it self requires , nor to what it is beholden to grammar for . his second mistake ( which i pardon'd him before ) is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comes from the active 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , since grammarians use to derive that verbal from the second person of the preterperfect tense passive . his third mistake ( or rather voluntary evasion ) is , that , whereas he was accused for misunderstanding the nature of a conjugation , in saying that a greek passive for want of conjugations was design'd to supply another signification , he flies off , and sayes he mean't it of such as the hebrew grammars call thus : as if he should say that greek verbs want hebrew conjugations . to omit that the conjugations in hebrew are improperly call'd such , shall be shown presently . his fourth mistake is , that he makes account it is a propriety to express conjugations to be flexions and variations both of the signification and first syllable , as the hebrew calls conjugations : for to state the matter indifferently ( though the contrary use of the word , in both latin and greek , out-sound , and so make improper the different use of it in hebrew ) let us abstract from all the three , nay from all languages , and upon grammatical principles put a difference between voyces and conjugations , no other can be imagin'd than this , that a voyce relates to the signification , a conjugation to a diversity in some letter or syllable . this being so , that expression is proper which signifyes each in it's own propriety and distinction , not both at once , blended in a confusion . improperly therefore in hebrew are they called conjugations ; and more properly did s. w. affirm that in hebrew , voyces and coniugations were jumbled , as the doctor 's words now cited justify . his fifth mistake is , that the printer's evident errour in putting eight votes for eight voyces , is the unconceivable lapse ( as hee all 's it ) of s. w. whereas no man that was no better than half blind , could possibly fall into such a toyish piece of oversight , since the wrong word votes is put once onely , but the right word voyces twice , so immediately next it , that it could not possibly leave it undiscover'd ; to wit , three lines before it , and again three lines after it . yet this hard riddle hath cost the good doctor a great deal of paines , for he tells us here ( answ . p. . ) he cannot by any enquiry discover that any grammariam hath styled them eight votes . what a wise task it was to consult all the multitude of grammars extant for such a trifle , which was just at his nose ? and what a miserable life does he lead in turning over leaves daily to so litle purpose ? but every thing delights most in it's own element . his sixth mistake is , his denial that there are more conjugations in the greek , than in the hebrew . now in hebrew none imagine more than eight , and this forgetfull adversary of mine was fit to defend in the foregoing page that there might be but foure ; whereas honest cambden will inform him that in greek , conjugationes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt tredecim , sex barytonorum , tres contractorum , quatuor verborum in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : now in our country thirteen are more than eight ; but dr. h. thinks otherwise . his reason why they are more properly such in hebrew , because there the variation is both in the signification and the first syllable is already shown to be the reason why they are improperly called conjugations , and rather voyces ; which is yet made plainer by that which follows in the doctor ( answ . p. . . ) that one and the same verb goes through all the coniugations in hebrew . for since it was never pretended that the word conjugation is improperly termed such in latin and greek , where it is distinguish't from a voyce , and yet in both those languages no verb runs through all the conjugations , but through voices onely ; it is manifest that , if theirs be proper , the notion of conjugation in hebrew is improper . his seventh mistake is ( answ . p. . ) that all neutropassives are of the active voice ; of which he is so confident , that he tells me every school-boy knows it : sure these school-boys must have dr. h. for their school-master . i am sure will. lilly would have whipt his schollars for being ignorant of their as in praesenti , had they affirmed it ; where they might have read , and dr. h. too , the rule , neutropassivum sic praeteritum sibi format , &c. instancing in gaudeo , fido , audeo , fio , soleo , moereo , which if he account actives from their manner of flection , ( besides his old errour in the nature of a voice ) he may take notice that their preterperfect , from which more tenses are formed than from the present , is altogether passive ; if from their sense , let him tell me what gaudeor , fior , &c. would signify if made passives . his eighth mistake is that sto partakes not of a passive sense : it must have then , according to him , a sense perfectly and totally active ; ( for no latine verbs can have any sense but what is either active or passive or compounded of these , except some few which signify being ) if so , then seeing it ends in o● , why should it not be an active forming a passive in or ; for so mr. lilly teaches his boyes , that if it cannot take r 't is no active . if he replies , that it signifies in the manner of an action , yet not transitively as actives , but immanently , or as received in the agent , ( as in reality it does ) then he again makes it partake of a passive sense , since to signify an action as received in the agent , is to signify an action mixt with a passion , for that reception is such . in a word , those verbs which signify action ( or in manner of an action ) of one thing upon another , are actives ; those that signify the reception of it in the other , are passives , and formed of these actives ; those that signify an action ( or in manner of an action ) of the same thing upon it self , partake of both , and are neuters ; and hence they may be render'd either actively , or passively , i stand , or , i am standing , i run , or , i am running , &c. though the difference and degrees of expressing this reciprocalness be more visible in some , than in others , according as their significatum is either a properly-called action including motion , or else the manner onely of signifying imitates the perfecter active . pardon me , reader , it is for dr. h's sake , not thine , that i make this grammatical lecture , who in his former book-had onely forgot his accidence , but in this seems absolutely to have renounced it . yet these are the exceptions which , in defiance of all grammar , he takes against me , and then triumphantly insult's , and would make the reader believe that he omits to enumerate others the like ( weightier you may be sure ) partly to preserve his graty , partly because it were unreconcileable with common compassion . well ; s w. may have many adversaries , but never shall he meet with so tender-hearted a man , who is mightily afraid to hurt him , when he never comes near touching him . if he drew any bloud , i am sure poor priscian , lilly and cambden felt the smart . his ninth mistake ( which he calls his answer to my principal scruple , but indeed is his own principal errour ) is his instancing in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for parallels of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and to be of the nature of hithpael . i answer , not onely these he alledges , but also that the second persons of the imperative mood in all verbs signifying an action indifferently performable by himself or another , may by the circumstances come to signify an action upon himself ; yet this is not to be of the nature of hith-pael , which hath this always of its own grammatical force , without being beholding to circumstances . again , the nature of hith pael is to signify expressely as much as two words in latin or greek , as i instanced in schism disarm'd , and so is perfectly and essentially reciprocal ; these pretended parallels come from perfect actives , which signify no more reciprocalness than amo and cognosco , if taken in themselves , and abstracted from circumstances . but his main errour is , that he runs to the quality of the thing signify'd , from the quality of the word upon the account of the grammatical notation : which was the sole design of this critical discourse , and formerly his intent , till he was frighted from it . i grant therefore that the ecclesiastical use and s. iude rightly take a schismatick for one who 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , divides himself from the church ; but can he show me that the church or s. iude or any , except himself , tell us that this kind of reciprocal signification accrues to that word by any grammatical observation from the passiue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; or that taken in it's own nature it is not indifferent to signify , i am cut by another , as , by my self , till some circumstance determine it ? or can any show , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( and so of the rest ) is in it's own passive nature of any farther signification , than barely i am saved , leaving it to be determin'd by other words , whether by my self , or some other ; that is having of it self no reciprocal sense ? vnless he can show this , still the doctor of divinity hath forgot his accidence , and the first dish in the bill of fare ( should i suffer it ) would be put again upon record : but i will chide the liquorish stationer , and bid him have som mercy on dr. h. who hath so much compassion upon s. w. his tenth mistake ( answ . p. . ) spent in sounding my deep subtlety ( as he calls it ) is much-what of the same strain . the word schismatick in the ecclesiastical use hath for it's total signification one who is divided voluntarily ( by himself ) from the church ; and consequently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , if the circumstances apply it's native indifferency to that kind of sense , must signify ) i am divided voluntarily ( or by my self ) from the church . now to speak of the word it self , it neither signifies i am divided voluntarily , nor yet , i am divided from another thing , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies that ) much less , i am divided by my self from the church ; but the circumstances or use give all these , and make the acception of the word such : for a breach from the church being inexcusable , that is sinful , must be voluntary ; and because in all divisions when one part bears a small proportion to the other , that part is said to be divided from it , therefore to schismatize is to divide himself voluntarily from the church . all this the use of the word yields ; and had dr. h. onely stood to this , he had found no opposition from s. w. but saved his credit at least for grammatical skill : but because he would deduce it by criticizing grammatically , i would let him see what consequence follow'd of it ; to wit , that since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was ( as he said ) of the nature of hith-pael , and signify'd reciprocal action on himself , himself , the schismatick , is the thing divided ; now the said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being a verb simple , and wanting an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make it signify a dividing from another , in dr. h's critical rigour it must make the poor schismatick be cut in two : and i much fear that all the grammatical plaster dr. , h's art can make , will not cover much less cure the wound himself would needs give himself , by meddling too much with those edg'd tools of criticisms . not to charge him with more mistakes , ( ten are enough for him to fall into about one word ) i would know why he left my ●nth page unanswer'd , which most concern'd the point . to which had he apply'd his mistaking faculty , i doubt not but we might have had a douzen , if not thirteen for good measure . thus much of dr. h's hith-pael like verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and his eagle-ey'd criticism upon it , which wil make his fame long-lived amongst all future grammarians . what follow in the next paragraph , granting his clients to be schismaticks , if i can prove their voluntary recession from us , is already prov'd by his own clear confession , schism disarm'd , p. . where the reader may see it manifested plainly ; my patience is not transcription-proof ( like dr. h's ) to stand repeating it here . but i know he will deny his words in one place or the other , as he does more than once in this treatise of his second thoughts . he told us , chap. . p. . that governours , being men , may possibly erre , and excommunicate the innocent ; i answered , that unless he could evidence an immunity from errour in the governed , as well as pretend a liableness in the governours , the opinion of right ought to stand on the governours side , and that a probable motive could not sufficiently warrant the subiects to revolt ; giving my reasons for it . now the proper reply to the import of my answer had been to stand stoutly to it , that their motiues for renouncing that authority were in their own nature more than probable , and concluded demonstratively that it was an usurpation . but he is horribly afraid of answering positively to that point : when any reason appeares , he either leaps out of the lists all afrighted , or else hides himself in words . his answer is , ( answ . p. . ) that this cannot be appliable to the business without begging the principal question . so that i must be the opponent , that 's concluded , let reason and art say what they will. i ask , was not my answer pertinent to his words , the governours might erre , which was my onely business at that time ? if so , then it was most absurd in him to ramble from one end of the controversy to the other , with his voluntary and crude affirmations , that the pope in king henry's time was not de jure , in q. elizabeth's neither de iure nor de facto governour . may not any rebel say the same , pretend no right in the governour , and say truly , that he was not actually and de facto under him , when he had renounced his authority , and raised an army against him ? he tells us moreover upon his honest word , if we will believe him , that the king and bishops here had the supreme power under christ , to reiect the pope's authority ; that the pope's power was usurp't , &c. and then hiding his head under these thin leaves , he concludes himself perfectly safe till we make it appear that we were governours , and they faulty . so that by the doctor 's logick , a boy , though undoubtedly held the son of such a father , may not be whip't by him for disobedience , as long as the boy can call his mother whore , and deny himself to be his son ; unless the father make it first appear that he is his child . till you first renounced the authority of our supreme governour ( let it be when it will ) you were under him , and held his children and subjects ; your disobedience is most notorious , and confest and that not a meer disacceptance of his commands , but disallowance of his authority : yet as long as you can deny it , and say the roman-church ( your then-mother ) was a strumpet , and had erred in faith , she may not punish nor excommunicate you , without first making it appear you are her children . a solid piece of reason ! observe , reader , that dr. h. in all these raw affirmations of his , that not begg'd the question a jot , although he be the opponent ; 't is his privilege to say what he will , every one knows 't is his humour . in a word , let him either show that his reasons for renouncing that authority are above all degrees of probability , which was the proper answer , or else let him confess ( as he must ) that he is evidently a schismatick in rejecting an authority for so many ages acknowledg'd certain , upon slight and phantastical grounds . one piece of wit i must not omit , because i have heard more than one of dr. h's friends misled by it . the doctor affirms here ( answ p. . l. . ) that the pope's authority was first cast off by papists . 't is strange , that the same men who nominate us papists for onely acknowledging the pop's authority , should call them also papists who disacknowledge it . but perhaps he means they were roman-catholicks ; if so , then let me ask , does he mean that they were of our profession ere they renounc't it ? so was every one that turned knave or rebel , an honest man and true subject formely , else he had never turn'd so , but ever been so : must then knaves and rebels impute knavery and rebellion to honest men and true subjects , and say , it was they who first began those vices ? or does he mean perhaps that they remain'd catholicks after the renouncing it ? if his mistake be there , he may right it by taking notice , that such a renouncing is an act of schism involving heresy , by corenouncing the rule of faith. after this renouncing therefore , they were schismaticks , and hereticks , not catholicks , and whatever tenets they may be pretended ro retain still , were not now faith but opinion onely ; the sole certain ground of faith , oral tradition , being abandon'd and rejected : unless the doctor will say that they had yet catholick faith in them , who denyed all the ground of catholick faith ; and then indeed i shall not refuse to give them leave to hold them without ground , and rank them in dr. h's predicament of probablists . sect. . dr. h's plea of a weak conscience common to the prostants and any malefactour . thirteen shamefull and wilful weaknesses in answering mr. knot 's position that we may lawful'y forsake the churche's communion , if she be not infallible . mr. h. begins his third section very angrily , calling mine ( p. . ) a perfect romane-combate with a wind-mil of my own erecting , toward which he never contributed the least stone or timber . but what if i show the doctor , that he hath contributed great mill-stones and huge logges towards the making this wind-mill of his ? my affirmation was that ( schism disarm'd , p. . ) he had got a new cloak for his schism , the pretence of a weak conscience , citing for it his excusing words , that they could not subseribe to things which their conscience tells them is false , and that it is hard to say a man can lawfully subscribe in that case , though the truth be on the churche's side . hence i deduced some consequence , how his doctrine excused those malefactours and their three pretended schismaticks . in answer he calls this a manifest perversion of his most innocent expressions , because afterwards he sayes , that such a weak-conscienc't erroneous man is in several respects crimtnous , &c. i reply , i do not forbid him to speak contradictions ; for i perceive by his litle amendement he is not likely to take my friendly counsell : but let us see what those places which i related to there in the doctor gave me occasion to say , and what they contributed towards this wind-mill . his first contribution is , that there is nothing alledged by him , where he pretends conscience in not obeying us , but the very same will much better serve any malefactour ; so that his words may become their plea , and consequently , unless he gave us some distinctive sign of the goodness of his conscience above theirs , his words are justly appliable to plead their cause . his second is , that whereas onely rigorous and convincing evidence can excuse such a disobedience , and he pretends none , i ought to think his conscience erroneous , and that for pleading for it , he pleads for erroneous consciences ; and may by the same resons plead for the other malefactours . his third contribution is , that since on the one side he tells us it is hard to affirm that a man in an errour may lawfully subscribe , and on the other , leaves no grounds to convince him rationally ( for how can any man pretend to convince him , or he rationally assent to be convinced by an authority which tells him it may be mistaken ? ) this weak-conscienc'd man may consequently have a rational ground to remain in his false opinion , at least cannot be obliged to contrary belief , but thanks dr. h. heartily for pleading for his lawfull continuance in his beloved errour . or if he be scrupulous of his errour , and dr. h. afford him no perfectly-certain grounds to right it , but that ( as he sayes here , and his grounds make good ) he is sure to sin which way soever he turns ; 't is likely mr. h's good doctrine may make the poor fellow come straight home from the probability-lecture , & take a rope & hang himself . this indeed were no great favour to a weak conscience . his fourth contribution , ( cap. . par . . ) is his position of the errour ( in some case ) on the churche's side in some places in this chapter ; which very thing favours the self-conceit of every proud fellow , and gives him a fine pretence to think his erroneousness lawfull in disobeying that authority , which could not oblige him in reason to believe what herself knew not , but might be mistaken and erre in . nay more , he very putting the errour on the churche's side takes away all obligation to believe her ; and by consequence justifyes all erroneous consciences . thus is the wind-mill finish't at dr. h's proper cost and charges , although he sayes he contributed not the least stone or timber : so truly liberal & noble he is , that after such profuseness , he will not own nor acknowledge his bounty to his very adversaries . next to these faults which dr. h. hath committed in pleading for a weak conscience , follows his sin of omission , i mean his neglect to answer my seventeenth & eighteenth pages , which obliged him to speak out , and say either i or no , to two points which are horrible bull-beggers to him , wheresoever he meets them . the first is , whether all assent of the vnderstanding which comes not from perfect and demonstrative evidence , springs not from passion and vice : the second , whether he and his friends have such evidence , that our church erred , in delivering as of faith , that the pope , as successour of s. peter , was head of the church . these two points i made account were the two main hinges , on which that door turns which must shut them out of , or keep them in the church ; and therefore expected ( not that he should produce his evidence here , but ) that he should have given some answer either affirmative or negative to them . but grounds are very perillous edged tooles to meddle with , and cut the throat of errour at one slash ; which costs much hacking and hewing when a controversy is managed by debating particularities . again , the nature of grounds is to entrench so near upon the first principles , and their termes are for the most part so unquestionably evident , that they leave no elbow-room for a shuffler to bestir his mock-reason in ; which in particulars ( not so capable of scientifical proofs ) especially in testimony-skirmishe , seldom or never want . and therefore dr. h. who is of that generation of controvertists , and very prudent in it , dit wisely omit to meddle with these points ; though in that place he had ample occasion to treat of them . but to proceed ; mr. knot had affirm'd , that we may forsake the churche's communion in case she be fallible and subject to errour . dr. h. inferred hence , ( of schism p. . ) that it was lawfull ( if this were true ) to forsake communion of all but angels and saints and god in heaven : his reason was , because onely they were infallible and impeccable . to maintain the infallible certainty of faith against this man , who would bring all to probability , i gave some instances , to let him understand , that infallibility in men on earth was not so impossible a matter as he fancies : glancing also at his addition of impeccable , since the controversy there being about our tenet , which is infallibility , the mingling it with impeccability was a tacite calumny , intimating to the weaker readers that this was also out tenet , or part of it . to these dr h. pretends an answer , but so full of contradictions both to himself and common sense , that it would be tedious to enumerate them . it were not amiss first to put down our plain tenet , which ( as far as it concerns this present controversy ) is this , that since it is unworthy the wisdom and goodness of almighty god , who sent his son to save mankind , not to first lay , and then leave efficacious means for that end ; which means ( considering the nature of mankind to which they were to be apply'd ) are no other than efficacious motives , & efficacioully proposed , to make him forsake temporary and fleeting goods , and embrace intellectual & eternal ones , ( his onely felicity , ) with which the affections to the former are inconsistent : again , since these motives cannot be efficaciously proposed to the vniversality of mankind , unless faith , the doctrine of them , be certain : hence to ascertain faith , christ gave testimony to his doctrine by doing such prodigious miracles as no man did before ; and when he left us , unless he had left also some means to propose certainly those motives to future mankind , his coming had been in a manner voyd , for asmuch as concern'd posterity ; and the rational and convincing certainty of his doctrine ( and by consequence the efficacy of it ) had been terminated in those few which himself by his preaching and miracles converted . hence it was necessary the apostles should also ascertain his and their doctrine by the extraordinary testification of miracles . the multitudes of believers encreasing , the ordinary and common working of miracles began to cease ; and controversies beginning to rise between those who pretended to the law of christ , the consent of christians in all nations was now sufficient to convince that that was christ's doctrine and true , which the apostles successours told them they had received from the apostles themselves . for it was not possible so many , dispers't in several nations , should conspire to a palpablely , in a visible , practicall and known thing , cōcerning their eternal interest . they had nothing else now to doe , but to attest what they had received : christ being unanimously acknowledg'd a perfect law giver , there needed no new revelations to patch and mend his noway-defective doctrine . the company of believers multiplying daily and spreading , this attestation encreased still , and grew incomparable stronger , and the impossibility of either voluntarily lying , or involuntarily mistaking , became every day greater and greater . in this universal delivery from hand to hand , called tradition ( or , to avoid equivocation , oral tradition ) we place the impossibility of the churche's conspiring to erre in attesting things most palpable and most important ; which we call her infallibility vpon this we receive god's written word ; hence we hold our faith infallibly-certain ; that is , so true , as it cannot but be true , as far as concerns that christ & his apostles taught such doctrine : hence lastly , to come nearer home , we hold for certain and of faith that s. peter is chief of the apostles , and the pope his successour , and that the renouncers of his authority are hereticks and schismaticks , since this sole-certain rule of all faith , oral tradition , now shown to be infallible , recommended it to us as delivered from immediate fore-fathers , as from theirs , and so upwards time out of mind : which rule the first reformers in this point most manifestly renounced , when they renounced that authority . for they could not have been the first reformers , had they found it delivered by oral tradition . by this is shown first in what we place the infallibility of the church : not in the bare words of a few particular men , but in the manifest and ample attestation of such a multitude as cannot possibly conspire to tell a lie , to wit , in attesting onely that christ's doctrine , which is of a most concerning nature and of a most visible quality , was taught to a world of children by a world of fore-fathers . this clear and short explication of our tenet premised , let us see how weakly dr. h. hath proceeded in this dangerous point . his first weakness is , that he thinks mr. knot 's saying very strange , that , we might forsake the church●'s communion in case she were fallible . whereas nothing can be more rational and solid than that position . for why may not we forsake the churche's communion , if she hath no power to bind to unity in faith which makes us one of hers ? and how can she have any power to bind us to unity in faith , unless she be altogether certain first her self of that to which she would oblige others , that is , unless she be infallible in teaching attested truths ? to answer ( as hee does , reply , p. . ) she may oblige others to believe , though fallible , as long as she is not actually in errour , is the greatest piece of folly imaginable , for still the question recurres , is she infallibly certain that she is not actually in errour ? if she be , she is again infallible , if not , she cannot impose any obligation of belief . hence dr. h. may see , that unless there he some company of men on earth infallible , it is impossible there should be an obligation to vnity in faith : nay there can be no positive obligation to hold any point of faith at all , unless they conspire to do so and hang together by hap-hazzard ; that is , be no body of men , but a company of good fellows met together by chance ; and consequently there can be no church or common-wealth of believers , much less a lasting one , without this infallibility . note that the obligation here spoken of is not an obligation to act or comport ones self exteriourly , as in temporal common-wealths ; but to hold and believe ; and consequently man's nature being reason , nothing but an authority built on evidence of inerrability can rationally oblige men to assent upon that authority . so that mr. knot and i shall very readily grant all mr. h's consequence ( answ . p. . ) that if there be no infallible church , there would be no possibility for any on earth to be guilty of the sin of schism . his second weakness is , that in excusing himself for adding impeccable , he thinks to evade , by telling us ( p. ) that he conceived humane nature to be in it self equally liable to sin and errour , and so no more infallible than impeccable . suppose it were , ( which yet is not granted ) what follows for his advantage thence , unless he could manifest that all men might fall at once into any one self-same kind of sin ? are there causes layd in the world , or can there be , ( considering the nature of a world ) able to make all men conspire to cut their own throats to morrow ? if not , then in case this should happen , there would be an effect without a cause , that is there would follow a contradiction : which being impossible , it must follow likewise , that it is impossible they should be all peccable in that kind , and consequently , the doctor may learn that a multitude of men may be also impeccable in some kind of sin . now to parallel this with infallibility , as held by us : we doubt not but of this multitude called the church , some may be fallible in one thing , some in another ; but that all should conspire either to mistake or delude , so as to tell so damnable and palpable a ly , as that they had been thus tauhgt by their ancestour , if they had not , is the impossible of impossibles ; nay equally impossible as for nature to fail in the propagation of any entire species ; as for all the houses in the world to be set on fire to morrow , or for all men to die in their sleep this night ; none of which can be done without destroying nature , whose causes are placed necessarily in several circumstances , and so work with variety . yet dr. h. tells us , ( answ . p. . ) that his words are as evident a truth as could have been mentioned by him : and truly i think the reader will believe him ere we come to the end of this book . but i hast . his third weakness is , that whereas we place this infallibility in a church , that is , in a multitude of believers , he tells us , ( p. . and ) the pope , the bishop of ephesus , loadicea , &c. and many other governours have fallen into errour : but can he show me that all the governours of the church , or half of them have erred , or indeed can possibly erre in attesting as aforesaid ? if not , let him acknowledge how weak a scripturist he is , in giving it such an interpretation as impossible to be true , whiles ( answ . p. . ) he makes the text i am with you always , even to the end of the world , because secondarily spoken to the succeding governours , to stand with their errableness . hi fourth weakness is , that like those who are making a pittifull excuse for a bad cause , his unfledg'd discourse sticks between the teeth of a parenthesis , and dates not come out plain . his words are ( after he had told us , p. ) the pope and any other single man in the world might erre as well as sin ; ) that in proportion any multitude or assembly might ( the major , and so prevalent part of them ) consent in an errour , as well as in a vice . i ask , can that whole multitude consent in a palpable errour in things visible , or no ? if they can , what means that grumbling parenthesis of the maior part , and to what end or purpose was it brought , since all might erre ? if they cannot all erre in such a case , but the major part onely , then there can be some company on earth infallible , ( to wit that whole multitude ) which is the thing in question . how much more credit were it to lose a bad cause by speaking out candidly , than to strive to maintain it by such pittiful shifts ? his fifth weakness is , that whereas he affirmed onely saints and angels in heaven , and god to be infallible , and i instanced ( schism disarm'd , p. . ) in some on earth , to wit the apostles ; whom i alledged to have been infallible in penning the sacred writ , and preaching the gospel : he answers , ( answ . p. . ) that sure they are comprehended in the number of saints in beaven , for there undoubtedly they are tell me seriously , good reader , and without smiling , is not dr. h. worthy to be reckon'd the eighth wise-man ; who , when i ask him concerning men doing offices in their life-time here on earth , tells me that they are now , or were aftervards saints in heaven ? his sixth weakness is , his second answer to the same instance of mine , to wit , that it is most true that they were assisted by christ , so as they did not , nor could erre in penning the sacred writ , and preaching the gospel that is , he grants my instance brought against him to be true , and himself to be in an errour , when he said that none but those in heaven were infallible : for sure if those could not erre ( as he grants ) in doing these offices performed by them while they were on earth , then some men on earth may be infallible in some thing , to wit in things necessary for the salvation of mankind ; which is all we demand , and as much as we profess . his seventh , eighth , and ninth weaknesses are , that after he had thus granted all that was pretended , to wit their infallibleness in those two sorts of actions ; ( because he would be sure to say something to every thing , though to never so litle purpose , as his custome is ) he addes first , that they were not infallible in all sorts of things . what man in his wits ever pretended it or imagin'd , but that the apostles might count mony wrong , or be mistaken in knowing what a clock it was ? was ever such frivolous stuff heard of ? next he tells us that as they were men on earth , they were fallible . what a mysterious piece of sence is here ? he hath already confuted himself by granting that when they were men on earth , they were infallible , which was solely pretended ; & now that he may seem to impugn us , he tacitely counterfeits us to hold that their infallibility proceeds as from it's formal reason , not from the assistance of the holy ghost , but from their being men on earth , and by consequence that each man on earth is infallible ; since à quatenus ad omne valet consequentia , thirdly , whereas my words which ( answ . p. . ) hee makes head against , are onely of those two said acts , in which hee at length grants they were infallibly assisted by the confirmation of the holy ghost ; he rakes up all the apostles faults and failings before the holy ghosts descent , and thinks to elude my words and delude his reader by these more than childish evasions . his tenth weakness is , that he extends ( p. . ) by a voluntary mistake ( because he would still have something to say ) mr. knot 's words , that the church was infallible and not subject to errour , to signify , that it shall undoubtedly be preserved from falling into errour , and that not onely from this or that sort of errour , but indefinitely from all : as if the controversy between mr. knot and him were not onely about infallibility in delivering matters of faith. is not this a sincere man , who would make persons wiser than himself , seem so imprudent as to think the church infallible in judging whether the circle can be squared , whether sprights walk in s. faiths under paul's , or whether a goose-py or a shoulder of mutton be the better dish ? by dr. h's logick it must be out tenet , that the holy ghost whispers the church in the ear , to speak truth in all these and millions of other such unnecessary fooleries ; and all this absurdity must light upon us , onely from this , because mr. knot and s. w. said the church is infallible and not subject to errour , when the discourse was about matters of faith necessary for the salvation of mankind . the like non sense shuts up his eleventh paragraph as the result of the discourse before it ; so again in the twelfth and fourteenth the same mistaking weakness is that which gives all the strength to the discourse : and it is worth the readers notice , that he never impugnes our tenet of infallibility , but by such kind of forgery . his eleventh weakness is , his shuffling in his eleventh paragraph , where after he had told us very truly , that the apostles had agreed on all things needful for the church , & deposited them in each church , as their rule of fai●h ; when he drew near the point in question , to wit , whe●her the depositary ( or church ) was infallible and could not erre in delivering the right depositum , or whether she might perhaps deliver a wrong one ; he flies off , and tells us ( ans . p. . ) if they would adhere to that , there needed no sitperadded infallibility to things unnecessary . did ever mr. knot or i talk of infallibility in things unnecessary ? or is this the point disputed between catholicks and protestants ? good mr. h. speak out , and tell us whether the depositary can mistake or no in delivering needfull points : if she can , where is the certainty of our faith ? if she cannot , then some company of men on earth are infallible in delivering things necessary for salvation ; which is the point in controversy . his twelfth weakness is , that in going about to show how he can be infallibly certain of the books of scripture , he unawares recurres to our rule of faith , though he never intends to stand to it ; affirming here ( answ . p. . ) that the testimony of others founded in their several sensations being faithfully conveyed to us by undeniable tradition , are as unquestionably certain as if we had seen them ourselves , that is , as he intimates before ( l. . ) infallible ; instancing , that of this sort is the tradition of the universal primitive church , &c. where first , if this be true , i have gained my intent ; which was to show against him , that some company of men might be infallible in attesting things of faith , though not in all things , as he calumniates us to hold . next , if the tradition of the primitive church be infallible , for the reason given , i ask why the succeeding church should not enjoy the same priviledge ; since the doctrine of fore fathers being visible & practical , and so founded in the several sensations of the children , they can by witnessing transmit it to their posterity , asun questionably truly , as if the grand-children had seen what was held and practised in the grand-fathers time . nay , unless he grant this , he hath done nothing , that is , he hath not shown that he hath any certainty of the books of scripture : for if the tradition in the primitive church onely be infallible , i may be mistaken in believing the succeeding tradition in this point , since that may deceive me , for any thing i know ; if the after tradition also was infallible , then we conquer without dispute in this and all other controversies about faith , since we were found adhering to this universal testification of all our forefathers , whereas they renounc't it when they renounced the authority it recommended , and ran to other grounds , private interpretations of scripture , and odde scraps of misunderstood testimonies , and still are glad to sow together these thin figge-leaves to cover the nakedness of their deformed schism . his thirteenth weakness is , that in testifying , as above-said , he sayes the church is not considered as a society of believers indowed with any inerrable priviledge , but as a number of witnesses , &c. as if they did not first believe it themselves , ere they could conspire to deliver it to their children for true ; or as if the same persons may both be beleevers in respect of their progenitours , and witnesses in respect of their posterity . no wiser is his assertion that nothing is here contested from the authority of their judgments . for if he means , the points which they contest are not founded on their judgments , 't is most certainly true ; since ( speaking of points of faith ) they are truths revealed by god , not productions of mens heads . but if he means , their judgments went not along with their contestations , but while they testified to have received them from their ancestours , they spake contrary to their judgment ; then they all conspired to tell a ly to their posterity in things of faith , which is impossible . the fourteenth paragraph runs partly upon the same affected mistake of infallibility . i asked him ( to put in him some apprehension that a company of men on earth might be infallible , which he deny'd ) if all the protestants could be fallible in witnessing whether twenty years agoe there were protestant bishops or no. first he will neither say , i , nor no to the point ; onely he sayes , ( answ . p. . ) he beleeves not they can probably mistake in that thing ; next he tells us this is no proof that they are any way infallible in all matters of fact , without all possible mixture of errour . is it possible mr. h. should think his reader so silly , as to take such ridiculous tergiversations for a sufficient answer ? my question was whether they could erre , and conspire to tell an open ly in a thing visible as the sun at noon-day ? and dr. h. first shuffles at that , and then counterfeits that i pretend them infallible in all matters of fact whatsoever ; as in ghessing what past in the late kings priuy councel while he was living , or whether bevis of hampton fought with a dragon or no. dear reader , i must address a line or two to thee , and desire thee if thou beest dr. h's friend , to ask him whether it be the catholicks tenet , that the church is infallible in matters of faith onely , or in all things indefinitely ; as in knowing the height & number of the starres , what weather it shall be every day next yeare , &c. if he cannot show the latter to be the tenet of our church , then a●k him from s. w. whether he hath either shame or conscience in him to evade answering the point by imposing upon our church a counterfeit tenet , and which himself knows to be such , and then making it the but of his ayre-beating impugnation , repeating it so often ( though once were enough to move a blush , had not custome taken away sense ) that i am confident any candid reader will nauseate and be offended at so odious a piece of fundamental insincerity . his other weaknesses mingled with this , especially his skipping aside from the question to the fallibility of private men , shuffling about for excuses , in stead of answering , i or no , with other sleights already lay'd open , make up a mess of most excellent non-sense , call'd , in another phrase , dr. h's third section . sect. . what miserable work dr. h. makes with that plain proposition : a church that is fallible , and knows not whether it lies or no in any proposition , cannot have power to bind any to believe her . my fourth section touched at three points , ( schism disarm'd p. . ) the ground of vnity in a church , the groundlesness of schism , and of mr. h's manner of arguing to clear himself of the latter : inserting also some part of the catholick gentleman 's letter , which tended to those purposes . the first i show'd to consist in the infallibility of that authority , which justly pretends to oblige the assent of others to her proposals . hence follows the second , that no schismatical congregation , that acknowledges it self fallible , can with any face pretend to impose an obligation of belief ; nor yet excuse it self for breaking from acknowledg'd antiquity or possession , upon fallible , that is , probable grounds . the third was , that since the schism we object to the protestants is charged by us to be such as involves heresy , and by consequence the renouncing our rule of faith , it was the weakest piece of reason that ever was reason'd by a doctor of divinity , to make the summe and ground of all his answer , the denying the said rule of faith , ( our churche's infallibility ) which was in effect to confess the fact , and to prove he is no schismatick , because he is an heretick and schismatick both . for answer to these three points he referres me to his reply cap. sect. . in return to which , as far as hath not already been answered , i shall give these satisfactory reflexions upon the main points ; not attending him in each paragraph , in many of which the insipid crambe of his own self sayings is boyl'd over and over . but first he sends three or four whifflers upon the stage to trifle it , ere the tragedy of faith and it's certainty begins . his first trifle is , that the catholick gentleman calls that mr. knot 's concession , which is his conclusion from that concession . a sore quarrel ! as if he who granted the premisses , and made the inference himself , must not also grant the conclusion ; if so , then his conclusion is his concession as well as the premisses . his second trifle is , that reply p. . he pretends , all that was by him taken notice of , was the consequence between the premisses and that conclusion , which naturally inferred a third thing , that it was unlawful to forsake the communion of any fallible church ; and the catholick gentleman 's impugning his admiration at it , and confirming this main point of the controversy , he calls a digression ; whereas it is a pure shuffling in him to avoyd this question , which is fundamental , and solely important to this present controversy , concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of separating from the true church , upon pretence of being bound by her to equivocate or ly . his third trifle is , that he tells us ( repl. p. . ) he may certainly affirme how this thesis of ours [ a church that is fallible and knows not whether it lies or no in any proposition , cannot have power to bind any to beleeve what she saith , ] is no infallible truth nor deduced from any infallible principle ; whereas it is as evident a principle as any in nature , that no man can in reason oblige another to hold what himself knows not : as also that he cannot be said truly to know that , in which he knows and confesses he may be mistaken . to this the shuffler sayes nothing . his fourth trifle is , when we speak of obligation of beleef , to slip the point , and talke of obligation to act or obey ; telling us wisely here , that a prince can command obedience though he be not infallible . is it possible mr. h. must be continually obliged by his cause to such affected insincerity , as still to counterfeit the mistake of the question ? the same he repeats again p. . and sayes the governours thus oblige inferiours to obedience by force of the apostles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; whereas the question is , whether the apostles , who held that without faith ( that is , without truth ) it is impossible to please god , ever commanded us to believe that congregation , which ( being fallible ) might for any thing it or we know lead us into damnable errours . i know that a probability of the thing in it self can oblige a man to act ; as a sudden alarum of the enemies probable approach ought in prudence to rouse a general to provide for resistance ; but nothing except evidence can move to assent , nor can any pretend lawfully and rationally to oblige to it , but they who have evidence that they cannot be mistaken in what they would bind others to believe . see the judicious and learned preface to rusworth's dialogues , where this point is largely handled and fully cleared . these trifles having thus play'd their parts and whiffled a while , out step the main bangers , and lay about them at faith , it 's certainty , church , and all whatsoever can make us rationally christians . first , the former thesis , that a church which is fallible , and knows not whether it lies or no in any proposition , cannot have power to bind any to believe what it saith , which stood firm enough in it's own plain terms , is by mr h's art made straddle foure several ways , so to dispose it to a downfal ; and drawn and quarter'd with unheard of tortures , because it will not confess a falshood , of which it was not conscious . the foure distracted limbs of it , which are to be anatomiz'd particularly , are here put down by mr. h. ( p. . ) . what is meant by [ can ly . ] . by knowing or not knowing whether it lie or no. by power to bind . . by belief . an ordinary reader that mean't honestly would think these words very easy : but that is their fault to be too easy ; they must be blunder'd and made harder , otherwise the reader would find no difficulty to assent to them . but is not this merciless rigour ? the first and second ought not to have been torn from one another , being the same ; for if the church can lie hic & nunc in such a proposition attested by her , and hath no infallible certainty she doth not , then it follows that she doth lie for any thing she knows . the same cruelty is shown in dismembring and taking asunder that one notion of [ power of binding to belief ] which was the whole import of the controversy and in treating the notion of power to bind , apart from that other of belief : by this shamefull and unconscionable craft , avoiding the whole question , and applying the words , power to bind ( which now had got loose of belief ) to obligation to render exteriour obedience p. . in his paraphrase upon the words [ can lie ] he hath one passage worth all his friends especial attention ; which is , that after he had enumerated all the means he could imagine to secure a church from errour , he confesses , ( rep. p. . & . ) that that church is yet fallible , may affirm and teach false , id est ( saith he ) it is naturally possible it may , but it is not strongly probable it will. then it seems after all this adoe ( for any thing he hath said ) it is still indifferently and equally probable that it does erre , though not strongly probable it will ; that is , the faith of that church , and all that adhere to it , hang in equal scales whether it be true or no : and this solid piece of sense is produced by dr. h. in a discourse about a churche's power to bind to belief . take notice , reader , how shufflingly the doctor behaves himself in saying , it is naturally possible that church may erre , providing himself an evasion beforehand in the word ( naturally ) against any encounter . this man hath forsworn ever being positive with his reader : ask him whether supernaturally ( or by means of supernatural assistance ) it be or be not impossible she should erre ; if not , what mean't the word naturally , since he knows we hold , the church is supernaturally infallible ? if it be , to what end , after reckoning up also there supernatural means of confirming her against erring , did he tell us in the close with an id est , that she is naturally fallible ? as for the churche's knowledge whether it erre or no , he sayes , ( rep. p. . ) it may signify no more than a full persuasion and belief , cui non subest dubium , where in they neither doubt , nor apprehend reason of doubting , that what they define is truth ; though for knowledge properly so called , or assurance , cui non potest subesse falsum , it may not have attained , or pretend to have attained to it . where first , to omit his declining a positive answer , whether the church be infallible or no , with may not have attained , &c. 't is the most perfect piece of perniciousness that ever was crouded into so narrow a room , destroying at once all faith , and ground of faith , and making the church no certainer of her faith than iews , turks , and heathens of theirs ▪ for if the churche's knowledge whether she erreor no means that she hath onely a full persuasion , cui non subest dubium ; turks , heathens and iews have that , are fully persuaded and have no doubt ▪ but their faith is true , and so mr. h. hath brought christianity to a fair pass , by his rule of faith. again , passion and vice can breed in men a full persuasion that an errour is true , & such a persuasion as shall take away actual doubt ; nay the more passion a man is in , the less still he doubts . is this a congruous explication of a church's knowledge , which leaves it indifferent whether she be rationally and virtuously , or passionately and viciously thus fully persuaded ? lastly , if the churche's knowledge whether she erre or no , be onely an assurance cui potest subesse falsum , why may not there subesse dubium ; that is , if it may be false , why may not she doubt of it , or indeed why should not she be bound to doubt of it ? falshood in things concerning eternity is a dangerous rock , and ought to breed caution , ( which goes ever accompany'd with doubt ) where the security is not perfect : now how can the knowledge that it may be otherwise found a secutity that the thing is so ; that is , is not otherwise ? or what hinders her from doubting , if she sees she may be wrong ? if mr. h. reply that the church was surprised , or had not so much wit as to raise the difficulty , then indeed she may thank her circumstances , or her doltishness , not her grounds , for that her groundless assurance . for otherwise , should she call her thoughs to account , and ask herself this question , why do i assent with a full persuasion to such a thing which i see may be otherwise ? she must , if she understand the nature of a soul & morality , acknowledge it was passion & vice , not evidence of reason which made her assent ; and consequently hold her self obliged to retract that assent , and leave off to hold any point of christian doctrine , nay even that christ is god , without a perpetual doubt and fear that the contrary may be true . so perfectly weak and fundamentally pestilent is this explication of a churches knowledge by a persuasion , cui non subest dubium , yet cui potest subesse fals●m ; that is , of which the person doubts not , although the thing in it self may be false . but this keeps perfect decorum with his former assertion , that it is not strongly ( that is , it may be equally ) probable that a church will erre , though she have used all means imaginable to secure her self from errour . after his false explication of power to bind already spoken of , which he turns to an obligation to act and obey exteriourly ; he addes , as if the obligation to belief were collateral onely to our purpose , that there may farther be meant by those words , ) he ought to have said , there must be onely meant by them ) à general obligation to believe what is with due grounds of conviction proposed . but how a church uncertain of what herself holds can duly propose grounds able to convince rationally or that a confest and known fallibility in the proposer is sufficient in it self to make such a ground , he shall never show , unless he can show reason to be non-sense , and non-sense reason ; though he can talk finely , and shuffle about in general terms . i am confident the reader will think , that the former words in that proposition are very ill handled by dr. h. but the last word [ believing ] comes not off so well : death is too good for it , nothing but annihilation and total destroying it's essence must be it's merciless doom . his explication of it comes to this , ( reply p. . ) that they who are so wise as to search , must consent according to the grounds proposed as most palpable ; that is , they must believe themselves . i ask are they bound or no to believe the church , when they have but probability to the contrary ? if not , where is their submission of their judgements , where is their believing the church ? unless they be willing to submit their private opinions to her authority , how can they be said to believe her at all ? is there any easier deference than to for goe a probability upon her contrary affirmation ? or , if he say they may have rigorous and convincing evidence against her ▪ that is ▪ if he grant infallible certainty in faith can be had , then why should dr. h. take this from the church , and give it to a private fellow ? as yet therefore we have found belief , by his explication , to signify in reality no belief of the church at all : let us proceed . he tells us next , that when the person is not competent to search grounds , then ( repl. p. . ) belief may signify , a believing so far , as not to disbelieve . was ever such an explication heard of ? good reader , if thou beest dr. h's friend , trust nothing but thine own eyes in such an incredible piece of fledge heresy and atheism in the shell ; let nothing but thine own eyes satisfy there , that it is possible for one who hath the title of doctor of divinity to print and set forth a position so full fraught with absurdities of the seventeens . let us count them by the poll . first , if the measure of that belief to which the church can oblige the ruder sort , be onely to believe so far as not to disbelieve , then in reality she can oblige them to believe nothing at all , but onely to remain in an indifferency of scepticism : for he who doubts of all things , or halts between two opinions , believes so far as not to disbelieve ; since not holding the contrary to any thing , he positively disbelieves nothing . secondly , an heathen who never heard of christ , believes so far as not to disbelieve ; for how can he be said to disbelieve a thing of which he never heard ? so that dr. h's church can onely oblige her subjects to be as good believers or christians , as heathens are ; but to proceed . thirdly , to believe so far as not to disbelive , signifies in plain terms to belive nothing at all ; for he puts it not to signify a believing so far as to believe , but a believing so far as not disbelieve ; that is , he exacts no belief for the point , provided there be no disbelief against it . so that as before , p. . he made the knowledge of a church that she defin'd truly , to be no more than a not doubting of it , which can proceed from ignorance as well as knowledge : so here belief must pretended capable to bear the sense of not-believing ; provided that the not-believing be not a positive disbelief of this , or belief of the contrary . fourthly , i would gladly know of mr. h. why the same authority which has power to bind one not to disbelieve , may not also oblige to believe : if she can propose evident and convincing reasons to her children that she cannot erre , then she may without dispute oblige me to the latter ; for such motives are in their own nature able to convince the understanding , and unless she can propose such , by what ground can she withhold me from disbelieving , or holding the contrary ? vnless perhaps the doctor pretend to show , that the probable reasons for her fallibility and infallibility be so justly and equally poiz'd in the sceptick ballance , that none can say whether the pound of rushes in the one end , or the pound of strawes in the other be the weightier ware , or better worth three-halfepence . these explications with their wise appurtenances thus premised , dr. h. knits them up in these two propositions , p. . . a congregation that is fallible and hath no knowledge or assurance ( cui non potest subesse falsum ) that it is not deceived in any particular proposition , may yet have authority to make decisions , and require inferiours so far to acquiesce to their determinations , as not to disquiet the peace of the church with their contrary opinions . ( that is , no to believe at all , but onely to behave themselves quietly . ) . but for any absolute infallible belief or consent , that , no church which is not it self absolutely infallible , and which doth not infallibly know that it is infallible , hath power to require of any . where the first proposition is certainly false , if the subject be certain , that that is false which his fallible church proposes to him , and that it is a point which concerns salvation not to erre in : and senseless , if ( as dr. h. seems to suppose it may be ( the inferiours assent is no way required ; for , how can a speculative point be decided authoritatively , if the inferiour be no way bound to assent , but to acquiesce onely ? the second proposition is the granting that very point , against which he pretended to make head , to the resolution also of which his former discourse hath not in the least sort contributed . so perfectly needless and to no imaginable purpose , but onely to shuffle words together on any fashion , is his elaborate non-sense . note reader , that in his first proposition he puts not belief at all , ( which yet is the onely matter in question ) but in the latter onely ; nor dares he trust it abroad there , but well guarded with absolute and infallible : but i fear not his big words . let him know , our tenet is , that our church hath power to oblige , not to an hovering conditional belief , but to an absolute and infallible one : nor do we fear to affirm , that the faithful in the catholick church have infallible certainty of their faith , though they cannot explicate it , or give a logical account of their own thoughts . it were not amiss here to let the reader see upon this occasion , what dr. h's manner of answering is : of which his whole book is ful ; but one example once put , will make the reader easily find it's fellows . the question is , whether obligation to belief can be without infallibility : he quibbles upon each word , as if he would do strange things against it , and makes up , by his explications , this worthy proposition ; that a church , which it is ( p. . l. . ) not strongly probable that it will erre , and ( p. . l. ) properly speaking knows not whether it erre or no , may ( p. . l. . ) yet oblige men to obedience , and ( them that cannot search ) to believe ( not positively and indeed , as the reader must conceive ) but onely so far as not to disbelieve ; that is , that her self knowing nothing properly or positively , can by consequence oblige none to believe any thing properly and positively , but to obey onely . is not this a fine upshot of such an elaborate answer ? and when he hath done this , then he addes another proposition , parag . which confesses all that he stumbled at before , and which onely was in question . let us put a parallel to his manner of discourse . suppose one should affirm , that a whole apple is bigger than a half ; and maintain it , because totum est majus parte , a whole is greater then a part ; dr. h's manner of answering would work upon it in this sort . first , the word [ whole ] may signify a whole mole hill , or a whole mountain , a whole web of cloath , or a whole thred . next , the word majus , or greater , may signify greater in longitude , in latitudine , or in profundity . lastly , the word pars , may signify part of a mole hill part of a mountain , part of a web , &c. this done , he would joyn these together , which are not the things in question , ( as he did in the former of his two proposition ) and tell us , that speaking of a mole-hill and a mountain , 't is certain , that part of a mountain may not be greater than a whole mole-hill , and so likewise part of the web of cloth to wit , a whole thred , may not be greater in longitude than the whole web . then coming to the question , adde a parallel to his second proposition , and conclude in these words ; but as for an apple and it's part , speaking of the quantity belonging to a body , that is profundity or bulk , 't is granted that the whole apple is greater than the half one : which might as well have been granted at first , and have excused all this trifling . sect. . what the power of binding to beleef consists in , and how rationally our church , how irrationally the protestants pretend to such a power : together with a godly and edifying sermon of mr. h's according to his doctrine when he disputes against us . it were not amiss here , to clear this important point the better , to lay open in brief what is this power in the church to bind her sons to beleef , and in what it consists . for i doubt not but mr. h. wonders , and many judicious protestant readers may perhaps remain sollicitous to imagine , how and in what manner there can be any power to force & cōmand the soul to an interiour beleef or assent . but i hope this short hint will make them see that this power is founded upon free & rationall grounds , not a tyrannical bare command of any authority whatsoever . it is confest then , that as a body cannot be moved locally , but after a corporeal & quantitative manner , as is it's nature ; so neither can a soul , which is of it's nature rational , be moved to assent , but by resons and motives , ( whether true or false ) and were it moved otherwise , it were not moved as a thing of such a nature , that is , it would not be a rational soul . now since pure reason consists in inferring a connexion of two things or notions , because of their joynt connexion with a third in the premisses , and this also an immediate one ( for a connexion which is not immediate is in reality none at all , at least to the vnderstanding , since in that case it sees it not ) it follows , that the soul is never moved out of pure reason to any assent , but by such an immediate connexion seen , that is , by evidence , and consequently all assents which have not this originall , spring from impurity of passion , that is , from vice wherefore since it is impossible , god , who is essential sanctity , should command a vice , it follows , that as on the one side either he has left no power to oblige to assent , or if he have , it must be founded in evidence , so on the other , if there be any authority on earth which can evidence her certainty of what she sayes , that authority hath power to oblige others in vertue of the said evidence to assent to what she shall affirm , that is , to oblige them to beleef : for this is no harder a treaty , than to bind them to that to which their own nature had bound them before-hand , that is , to assent upon evidence . to apply this then to the point in hand . the church obliges her children to rest and continue in her beleef , by the same motive by which she could oblige them when they were out of her , to assent to her doctrine , so far as concerns it's having been taught by christ and his apostles . this motive is the proposal of her own authority , or of millions and millions of fathers in the catholick church , all conspiring to witness that those points of doctrine ( things visible and most concerning ) were received from their ancestours , as from their , and so ascending upwards , as from christ . the vertue by which this authority or incomparable multitude of witnesses claims to be a motive , and to have power to convince the vnderstanding and so oblige to assent to their word , that is , to beleeve , is the evidence of the treble-twisted impossibility , that this authority either would conspire in any age to attest so notorious an untruth , and so pernicious to their own , and their children's eternal bliss ; or , that they could either erre , or mistake in things so visible , or even contrive a conspiracy to embrace any one errour , considering the several countreys in which they liv'd dispers't , and consequently their several natures , obligations , inclinations , interest , and other manifoldly-varying circumstances ; or , lastly , if they would and could , ( that is , did ) attest , and so introduce an errour , that it should not be most visible and palpable in most undeniable and manifest circumstances to the whole world , being a change of things openly-evident in manifest and universal practice before , and in a matter of highest concernment . these impossibilities of erring in delivering any point of faith , render that congregation evidently infallible which sticks close to this rule , of delivering onely what she received as thus attested : the evidence of her infallibility obliges a rational nature to assent upon such an authority , that is , to beleeve ; and consequently her power to oblige beleef is as firm as this truth , that evidence obliges the vnderstanding to assent , which is reduced into this first principle , that idem est idem sibi ipsi , or that reason is reason ; since the act of reason adhering to truth , is nothing else but an assent sprung from evidence . from this short discourse follows first , that our churches binding her children to beleef is evidently natural , just , charitable , rational and necessary ; since she obliges them upon no other ground than that which in it's own force had pre-obliged their nature to assent , to wit , evidence . secondly , that no man can revolt from the faith of such an authority to any other , but through the highest degree of vice and passion ; since they would be found in this case to assent to another , not onely without evidence , but against it . thirdly , that therefore the governours of the church who proceed according to this power , may justly punish and excommunicate those who recede from her beleef founded in her authority thus evidenced ; since this recession must spring from vice , or a disorder'd affection in the will ; and vice all the world allows may be punished . fourthly , that no tyranny can possibly be imputed to our church , as long as she proceeds upon such grounds ; since she onely governs men according to their nature or reason . fifthly , that they who adhere to any other fallible congregation upon onely probable , that is , inevident grounds , against her authority thus evidenced , being therefore ( as hath been shown ) in the highest degree vicious and passionate , if they prove obstinate in it , ought upon necessity to be excommunicated , cast out of the church , and separated from the congregation of the faithfull . reason showing plainly , if no good can be done for their obstinate souls , order is to be taken that they do no hurt to the souls of others . sixthly , that all who forsake this infallible attestation of the church they were in , called oral tradition , ( as did the protestants in all points wherein they differ from us ) deserve this excommunication ; since they left a pre-acknowledged evidence , and began to dogmatize upon acknowledg'd probabilities onely ; that is , left proceeding to assent in that manner which was acknowledgedly rational , connatural and virtuous , and beginning to proceed in such a manner as is necessarily irrational unnatural , and vicious . seventhly , it follows , that a congregation which is fallible cannot , without the greatest impudence in the world , pretend to oblige rational souls to assent upon her authority ; since , if she sees she may be in the wrong hic & nunc in such a point , she can have no evidence that she is not actually deceived in it , and so wanting evidence to make good her authority , she wants whatsoever can oblige a rational soul to assent upon her authority . eighthly , it follows hence , that not onely the independents , presbyterians , &c. may justly refuse to hear the protestant church , which acknowledges her self fallible , but that they sin if they should hear her ; since in that case they would be found to assent to an authority , without evidence of the veracity of that authority . ninthly , it follows , that the protestant church acknowledging her self fallible ( and the like may be said of all fallible congregations ) cannot even oblige the independents , presbyterians , &c to behave themselves quietly within their church , and submit to their government . for in case that fallible congregation oblige her children to a subscription or declaration of their assent to her doctrine , it were a vice either to assent without evidence of authority , which is wanting to a fallible church ; or , subscribe without a real inward assent , as the doctor himself confesses : they may then resist such a command of that church , and express themselves contrary and disobedient . nay more , if that congregation be fallible , it may possibly be in a damnable errour , and some one or more , may happen to see evidently that it is in such an errour ; and many of ordinary capacity rationally doubt what the others see : now in that case , why may not the former make account it is their obligatiō to oppose that church , and let men see their soul-endangering errour , may maintain a party against her , and defy her as one who would bring souls to hell by her doctrine ? as also , why may not the latter ( rather than hazard the accepting a damnable errour ) adhere to this company of revolters , at least stand neutral between the church and them ? again , since it hath been shown they may renounce the faith of a fallible church , why may they not renounce her government ? since her faith must needs be as sacred as her government which depends on faith , and is subordinate to it ; government being chiefly to maintain faith , and such actions as proceed from faith. neither is it lawfull yet to revolt against temporal magistrates upon the score of their fallibility , in case they oblige their subjects onely to act or obey according to the civil state , because that is a government grounded onely upon natural reason , instituted for natural ends , and plainly evident it must be obey'd ; unavoydable inconveniences following upon disobedience , which force us to confess , there 's no safety for our lives or estates , without this obedience . tenthly , it follows , that dr. h's denying any company of men on earth to be infallible , and by consequence , to have power to bind to beleef , is most exquisitely pernicious , destroying at once all beleef , and leaving no obligation in the world , nay making it a sin to beleeve any article of the christian faith. for since neither scripture nor the doctrine of the primitive church ( acknowledged by dr. h. to have been built upon an infallible tradition ) can be evidenced to us , but by some authority faithfully conveying it down ever since that time ; if this authority cannot be evidenced to be infallible , no man is bound in reason to assent or believe either scripture to be god's word , or the doctrine to be christ's , upon her authority ; since there wants evidence of that authority's veracity , which can onely oblige to assent : nay more , he must needs sin in precipitating his assent without evidence to ground it on . eleventhly , dr. h. ( answ . p. . ) in another place grants that this universal attestation ( in which we found the churche's infallibility and all these deductions ) makes one as certain of a thing , as if he had seen it with his own eyes ; and again confesses himself infallibly certain of what he hath seen with his own eyes : which is as much as we either say or desire . wherefore , the good doctor doth a● once both confirm us , and contradict himself . lastly , it follows , that it is the height of frivolousness , for d. h. even to pretend excuse from obligation to beleeve our church , and assent to the doctrine of his own , without most undeniable and rigorous evidence both for the errableness of ours , and the inerrableness of the protestants church . by these brief deductions from that one evident ground of the infallibility of vniversal attestation , the prudent reader will plainly see , how consequently the catholick church proceeds to the grounds of nature and reason , & how inconsequently to both the protestant churches must necessarily goe , when they would oblige either to government , or faith : since certainty and evidence once renounced , there remains nothing to move the vnderstanding to assent rationally ; nor any thing to move it at all but passion , disorder'd affections , fear , or interest . many paradoxes seem very plausible and prety , while they are drest up in involving terms , which hide their deformity ; yet brought to grounds and to practice , show manifestly their shame . the former ( to wit grounds ) confute them by showing them contradictory ; the latter ( that is , practice ) confounds them by showing them absurd . how implicatory mr. h's doctrine of no power to bind to beleef is , and how inconsistent with christian faith , hath already been manifested by bringing it to grounds ; how absurd it is , will quickly be discerned by reducing it into practice . let us imagin then that the bells chime merrily to morning prayer , and that the whole town rings with the fame and noise that dr. h. reputed the most learned of all the protestant party ( who quite confuted the pope , and cut off the neck of rome at one blow , in a book of schism , and has lately , with a great deal of greek , lopt off and seared the hydra-head from ever growing more , in his answer to schism disarm'd ) would give them a gallant sermon whereupon , a great confluence of people coming together to receive edification , after a dirge sung in hopkins rime very pittifully in memory of the deceased book of common-prayer , up steps dr. h. repeats his text , and fals to his harangue : in which let us imagin that he exhorts them to renounce all the affections they have to all that is dear to them in this world , and place them upon a future state of eternal bliss , promised by christ to all that serve him ; in particular , let us imagin , he earnestly exhorts them with the apostle , to stand fast in the faith , and to hold even an angel from heaven accursed , if he taught the contrary ; nay telling them they ought to lose theirs and their childrens whole estates , and lay down a thousand lives , rather than for-goe their faith. this done , let us suppose him to draw towards a period , and conclude ( according to his doctrine , when he disputes against us ) in this manner : to all , this , dearly beloved , i exhort you earnestly in the lord ; yet notwithstanding , that i may speak candidly and ingenuously , and tell you the plain literall truth of our tenet , neither i , nor the church of england , whose judgment i follow , are infallibly certain of this doctrine which i bid you thus beleeve and adhere to . our ( p. . l. . . ) church , i confess , is fallible , it may affirm and teach false , both in christ's doctrine , and also in ( p. . l. &c. &c. p. . l. . ) saying which is true scripture , and which the true sense of it ; and consequently , i may perhaps have told you a fine tale all this while , with never a word of truth in it : but comfort your selves , beloved , for though it may be equally and indifferently probable it erres , yet it is not strongly probable that it will ( p. . l. . ) wherefore , dearly beloved brethren , have a full persuasion i bese●ch you ( as ( p l. . . ) our church hath ) that what she defines is the truth , when she defines against the socinians that christ is god ; although , ( p. . l. . ) properly speaking , she hath no certainty that he is so . the governours of our church may indeed lead you into damnable errours , being not infallible in faith , yet you must obey them ( p. . l. . ) by force of the apostl's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; ( here the good-women are all-to-bewonder'd , and bless themselves monstrously at the learned sound of the two greek words ) at least ( p. . l. . ) beleeve them so far as not to disbelieve them . for mistake me not , beloved , i mean no more than thus , when i bid you stand fast in the faith ; hang in suspence , dear brethren , hang in a pious suspence , and beleeve it no improbable opinion that christ is god , and that there is such a felicity as heaven : at least ( whatsoever you think in your heart ) yet ( p. . l. . ) quietly acquiesce to the determinations of our mother the church of england , so far as not disquiet the peace of our sion : although you should perhaps see that this church did idolatrously erre in making a man a god , and so give god's honour to a creature , yet i beseech you , good brethren , acquiesce very quietly & peaceably ; and although you could evidence that she was in damnable errours , and that she carried souls quietly and peaceably to hell , for want of some to resist and oppose her , yet let them goe to hell by millions for want of true faith ; still enjoy you quietly your opinion , without opposing the church , though th●s pernicious . were not this a wise and edifying sermon ? and enough to make his auditours pluck him out of the pulpit , if they beleeved him not ; or , if they beleeved him , to return home scepticks or atheists ? yet how perfectly , chiefly in express termes , partly in necessary consequences , it is his , his own words have already manifest●d : for the famous explications lately spoken of , he applies here to his church , parag . . and his rule of faith must be either certain , and so make all points of faith certain and infallible truths ; or if it be uncertain , nothing that is built upon it can be certainer than it self , and by consequence , christ's god-head must be uncertain also , and so there can be no power or motiue to oblige men to beleeve it more than the rest . sect. . the four main advantages of the catholick church wilfully misrepresented . the disproportion of dr. h's parallelling the certainty of the protestant's faith to that of k h. the eighth's being king of england . the cath. gentl. mentioned , on the by , four advantages our church had over any other , viz. antiquity , possession , persuasion of infallibility , and pledges which christ left to his church for motives of vnion speaking of the last of these , dr. h. tells us here , ( repl. p. . ) it is in vain to speak of motives to return to our . communion , to them who have not voluntarily separated , and cannot be admitted to union but upon conditions , which , without dissembling and lying , they cannot undergoe . as for the latter part of this excuse , truly , if motives of union be vain things to be proposed to them , to bring them to vnion , i must confess i know not what will be likely to doe it . they pretend to think our doctrine erroneous , our church fallible , to which therefore they deem it dissimulation and lying to subscribe : what remains then to inform them right , but to propose reasons and motives that that doctrine was true , that church infallible ; & that therefore they might lawfully subscribe with a secure conscience ? but dr. h. will not heare of motives or reasons for vnion , but sayes , 't is in vain to speak of them : that is , he professes to renounce his reason , rather than forgoethe obstinacy of his schismatical humour : yet he sayes here , that this evasion is necessarily the concluding this controversy : but why a probability to the contrary should be sufficient to oblige his reason to that his persuasion or assurance , so as there may not subesse dubium against our rule of faith , acknowledg'd infallible ( answ . p. . ) at unawares by himself , that he will never be either able or willing to show . and so for the former pretence , to wit that they separated not voluntarily , it hath already been shown ( schism disarm'd , p. . ) to be a most shameless untruth ; that , by their own occasion , they had voluntarily renounced our government , rule of faith and doctrines ; and that there wanted onely the punishment for their former voluntary faults , to wit , the churche's excommunication , warning the faithful to avoid their company . so that dr. h's plea is no other , than as if a rebel should renounce both the government and laws of the land and , being out-law'd and cut off from the communion of the good subjects for these faults , should lay all the blame on the governours and iudges , saying , no sedition nor division was made in the common-wealth , till they out-law'd him and his adherents , and warned the good subjects to live apart from them . as for those pledges left by christ to his church for motives of union , which the cath. gent. made one of our advantages , they are these : the submitting to the government of one head and pastour ; the agreeing in one rule of faith , to which all our private opinions and debates give place as to an infallible law , to decide al quarrels about faith ; the multitudes of visible exteriour practices , both in several sacraments , and also divine service performed with such magnificence of ceremonies , lastly and most especially , the coadunation of all the members of the church in eating that heavenly food , beleeved by us to be the true and real body of our blessed lord and saviour . all these and some others are so many ties and tokens , which make the sons of the catholick church take one another for fellows and brothers , that is , they are unto them so many motives of vnion : in all which he is blind , who sees not that our church hath a most visible advantage over all other . yet dr. h. assures us that 't is in vain to speak of those to him ; and why ? because his passion and disorder'd affections or interest have so throughly persuaded him , both without and against evidence , and two or three odde testimonies , with an id est in the end of them , without ever considering the impossibility that vniversal attestation should erre , have bred a kind of assurance in him , cui non subest dubium ( which is all hee requires for his own or his churche's certainty of faith , rep. p. . ) that he professes himself incapable to heare motives and reasons , and that 't is in vain to speak of them to him . what was meant by the two advantages , of antiquity and possession , was sufficiently explicated by the cath. gentl. in these words ; such antiquity or possession , without dispute or contraction from the adversary , as no king can shew for his crown , and much less any person or persons for any other thing . now what more manifest , than that we enjoy this acknowledgment of our adversaries , to have that this antiquitie and possession for many ages ; and that this acknowledgment is a particular advantage to us , since the protestants have none such from our party , but were ever charged by us of novelty , & a late upstart original , and that in this very point in debate between us ? this being plainly there exprest by the catholick gentleman to be his meaning , dr. h. first ( p. . ) shuffles off to fraternal communion : next , of a divine turn'd lawyer , he cites as an affirmation of the doctors , presumi malam fidem ex antiquiori adversarij possessione ; which apply'd means thus much , that , they being more anciently in possession , 't is to be presumed that we usurp't : so that , till he evidence that they were more anciently in possession , his law availes him nothing . in the mean time , let him consider our two advantage ; to wit , that we had a possession acknowledg'd before this present possession of theirs ; whereas their pretended possession before ours is in question and controvertible : for , mr. h. will not say , that he knows the contrary better than his church does her faith , which , at best , he confess'd before had but probability of her not erring : now then , that which is a probability onely , is in it's own nature liable to dispute , and controvertible ; since it may perhaps be shown false to morrow . their possession then , pretended to have been before ours , is not onely disacknowledg'd by us , but also in it's own nature subject to dispute : ours before theirs , acknowledg'd , and not capable of dispute . the other advantage we have is , that the pretended usurpation of the pope , being of a supremacy over the whole church and all the bishops in it , must needs in all reason be most visible to the eyes of the whole world : now , since it is certain , they could never evidence it thus visible , ( as appears by their diversities of opinions about it's introduction , to be seen in the catalogue of protestancy ) that is , they know not when it came in ; consequently , this consideration affords a certain prejudice against their former possession , and the pretence of the pope's vsurpation . for certainly , that authority which could not be usurp't but most visibly , and yet the usurpation is not most visible , was not usurp't at all , but was ever . wherefore our possession and authority is iustly presumable to have been cōtinued ever since christ's time ; since the beginning of our faith could never be clearly manifested , as many protestant authours beyond exception confess , and onely some of them , driven to that desperate task by our arguments , blindly pretend the contrary : whereas their bearing sway in this corner of the world is of confest and known original , which differences us from them by a most manifest advantage . the persuasion of infallibility ( our fourth advantage ( p. . ) there mention'd ) must necessarily be mistaken and wrong apprehended as well as it's fellows : that is now grown ordinary with mr. h. and so we must not wonder at it i have already shown , that this persuasion is the onely means to oblige the subjects of any church to vnity of belief ; nay , that there can be no rational●ty to any belief at all , where this persuasion of the churche's infallibility is not found : which being found in no congregation but that of the catholick church , she hath consequently an infinite advantage above all others in the notion ad nature of a church , which is to be a conserver of faith ; or rather indeed , it follows hence most evidently , that none other can have the true nature of a church but her self . now dr. h. in stead of telling us i , or no , whether this persuasion be of such a force as is pretended , in order to the vnity of the faithfull , flies off and sayes , this can have no influence upon them ; though it be the onely thing which gives fundamentally being to a church , as hath been shown : telling us moreover , for our further certainty , that he is sure the protestants are not so persuaded , nor ever had cōvincing grounds represented to persuade them of it ; referring me to a book of his own , called the view of infallibility . in answer , i refer him to rushworth's dialogues , and assure him that , if he be not blinded with prejudice or interest , he may see it there shown as perfectly as that two and three are five : and as for his book , i find no such worthy stuffe in these , as can invite me to think an hour well spent in perusing that brother of theirs . after this , going about to vindicate the uncertainty on the protestant's side , he runs ( p. . . ) again to their full or verily-persuasion ; but never tells us whether this full persuasion of theirs sprung from the light of pure reason , that is , evidence ; or from passion , interest and ignorance ; adding a parallel , of beleeving that king henry the eighth was king of this nation : the reasons whereof notwithstanding he accounts fallible , because the testimonies of meer men . whereas i account it most evident and demonstrable ; and promise him to have acquitted himself better than ever protestant did yet , if he can show me the thousandth part of this certainty , ( which he puts here for a parallel of the protestant's vncertainty , ) for any point in which they differ from us , that is , for any point which they have not received as handed down by tradition or attestation of fore fathers . for , never let him expect to make a rational man beleeve , that scruing or misunderstanding an odde line or two , glean'd for the nonce out of scripture or and old authour , can by any multiplication arrive to the clearness of the former ample , undeniable , uncontroulable verdict of witnesses , that king h. the eighth vas king of this nation : much lesse to that of our rule of faith , being an attestion of things infinitely more importing , which a multitude incomparably more numerous had seen visible in practice ; besides other assistant motives implanted by the apostles ( the holy ghost especially cooperating ) in the hearts of the first faithful , and still continued to this day ; which strengthen man's nature to the impossibility of erring in such an attestation . this vast advantage hath our rule of faith over this instance of k. h's reign here : yet i doubt not to affirm , that the testification of the latter renders it demonstrable ; which i thus show . this undoubted and never yet-denyed persuasion , that k. h. the eighth reigned here , imprinted in the hearts of all in england , not onely attested by all fathers in that nation , but even by innumerable multitudes in other countries , ( his foul acts making him famous , ) this persuasion , i say , is an effect , and consequently sprung from some cause : but no cause can be imaginable in reason able either to breed this strong persuasion in such a world of knowing persons , nor bribe so many attesters to a conspiracy of witnessing such a visible thing , except the being of king h. and of his reign : therefore he was , or did reign here ; otherwise , this persuasion and attestation had been effects without causes , or ( which is all one ) without proportionable causes ; which being evidently impossible , it is also evident and demonstrable that he did rule in england . now , whoever should goe about to answer the major by putting some cause as possible to be in it self proportionable , and so able to produce this strange effect , besides the existence of k. h. the eighth ; the very position would disgrace it self and the authour , when the proportions of it's efficacity came to be scann'd and apply'd to the vniversal and strange effect spoken of . again , should a man consider this ample and uncontrolled attestation of it , and all the other motives which infer it ; as king h's wives , alliances abroad , warres , acts of parliaments , embassadours in all parts , descent , apostatizing , together with the infinite multitude of conveyances , bonds , iudgments , foundations , and innumerable such other things relating to such and such a year of his reign ; and , after all these fully considered , should notwithstanding seriously express his doubt , that he could not beleeve there was ever any such man : would not all that heard him , justly think him a mad man ? if so , then surely he must have renounc't no less than rigorous evidence and demonstration , ( the onely perfect light of reason ) who can deserve justly such a censure . it was therefore rigorously evident and demonstrable , that king h. the eighth was . thirdly , if it be not evident and demonstrable , the contrary may possibly be such , ( for one side must needs be true & so , all truths being connected , in it'ts own nature demonstrable : ) but it is evidently impossible the contrary should be demonstrable , or the motives for it show'd not-concluding ; therefore they concluded demonstrably . the minor is prov'd clearly : for , first , it is not against any natural science , and consequently not possibly disprovable by natural reason ; nor yet by any authority ; for , in our case , there is an attestation for it , uncontrolled by any , either orally or by writing : wherefore there is left no means possible to goe about to confute it , or evidence the contrary ; it self therefore is most perfectly and most strongly evident and demonstrable , nay impossible to be deemed or pretended to be shown otherwise . bring not then , mr. h. this infallibly-and demonstrably-grounded instance , for a parallel of your vertible and wind-mill uncertainty ; till you can show you can produce the million'th part of that evidence and certainty : but rather be asham'd to pretend to make head against our rule of faith , ( which is of an attesting authority incomparably more numerous , more clear , and more strongly supported by all kind of imaginable assisting circumstances , than was that now explicated ) with obscure or misinterpreted scraps of dead authours cast into what mold you please by id est's , self-explications , and voluntary deductions , according to the easily-bending nature of words . that is , blush to have renounc't your reason , in renouncing evidence of authority ; to follow unreasonableness , in assenting upon ambiguous probabilities . after this , to clear himself from denying infallibility , which denial was charged , and hath been shown to take away all beleef and ground of beleef ; he tells us , ( pag. . ) it is evident , that beleef is no more than consent to the truth of any thing , and the grounds of beleef , such arguments as are sufficient to exclude doubting , to induce conviction and persuasion . but sure mr. h. forgets what he is about : for to divine beleef , which is commanded by god himself , and so cannot be sinfull , not every consent ought to serve , but a rational one , nor any conviction , but such an one as is rational , that is , grounded upon evidence of that authorities veracity , in that which she proposes to be beleeved : which how it can stand with her fallibility in the same point , is past dr. h's skil to make good , since if it be once known that she can erre in it , it can never be shown thats he does not , there being no certainer authority than her self to testify certainly when she hits , and when she failes : for i hope dr. h. will not say it must be scripture , without an interpreter of scripture , and , if so , who a more certain interpreter than her self ? if he say , she must compare her self with other churche's , he not onely grants each may erre , but even , ( repl. p. . l. . ) after recourse had to the said means , he onely puts here , pag. . l. . that it is not strongly probable that such a church will erre : so that if she can erre , she does erre , for any thing any body knows . what follows is onely a trifling defence of himself for his bad disputing . he was accused by us of a schism twisted with heresy : he defended himself , by alledging that he held not our church infallible , which he knows we charge upon the deniers as the heresy of heresies . now his excuse for this logick is , that he put ( repl. p. . ) onely a fiction of case : but 't is plain he relies upon that fiction as on a real ground , saying there expressely ( of schism , p . . ) that he needs give no more distinct answer than this , first , that they not holding the church of rome infallible , may be allow'd to make some suppositions , &c. again , he sayes he makes but one , but yet he there puts down four : so that the difficulty is onely this , to determine in whether place he deserves most to be trusted , or which of them is the child of his second thoughts . lastly , he imposes falsly upon the cath. gentl. ( repl. p. . ) that he requires him at the begenning of the dispute to grant the ( chvrch of rome infallible . whereas we onely mind him , that since he is accused of a schism link't with heresy , he ought to show that his motives bear the weight of a perfect evidence , notwithstanding the counterpoise of our rule of faith , the churche's infallibility , and not suppose this first , and then run a voluntary upon what he had granted himself gratis . thus i have given an answer to dr. h's third section of his second chapter , to which he referred me : in which i confess to have been larger than the rigour of answering required : but the point of power to oblige beleef was , as i conceived , very important , and well worth clearing ; neither do i remember to have read it in any other place fetcht from it's first grounds , that so i might refer the reader thither . i have also vindicated the cath gentl. something more particularly than i proposed to my self at first , or than was my obligation ; which was onely this , to clear those passages in him which vere coincident with mine . hereafter i fear the apprehension of my future prolixity will not let me exceed my first-intended limits . sect . . how dr. h. defends the sufficiency of his division , charged to want the three most principal sorts of schism , and solely important to the controversy . the third chapter in his reply begins with curing his division of schism , which was shown by the cath. gentl. to want two of it's best limbs , and those too most useful in this present controversy ( that , to wit , of schism from the whole church , and from authority of councils ) & also by s. w. to be pittifully maimed of the third , which was against subjection to some one superiour . his skill employ'd in plastering it comes to this , that all schism is either in inferiours against superiours , or in equals against equals ( rep. p. . ) he should have said against some one superiour , in the singular ; for his discourse in his book of schism never look't further ; which occasion'd the cath. gentleman's calling it monarchical . his first excuse for his first fault is , that it is strange to think , that that man who breaks from the whole church was not comprised in either member of his division , when certainly he is guilty of both . this it is to forget one's logick : for , let the man be where he will , our question is of the sin , schism against the whole church ; which is therefore not comprised in any one head , because it is in an higher nature sinfull , and so exceeds it . sacriledge and patricide , according to the common notions , are found indeed in every simple theft and murther : but according to their specifical differences , by which they are distinguish't from them , they exceed them , and so are not compris'd in them . this particularity then , and specialty of schismatical guilt , in breaking from the whole church , makes a man in a higher and more special manner faulty . and this is the reason why we require , that the specialty of this schism should ( as it ought ( be taken notice of , by ranking it in a special head ; which was omitted by mr. h. who talk't onely of the petty schisms against some one particular superiour , not against all in collection , nor against the whole church . and here when he is challenged of it , in stead of showing us that this greater sin is compris'd in one of those lesser heads , he privaricates from the question which is about the sin , and talks of the man ; who is compris'd in his division , for having done another sin , less than this , and not for having done this . his second excuse , or rather his continuation of the former , is the saddest piece of logick that ever was read , and begins at the wrong end . he is accused of omitting schism against the whole church , and pretends he treated it as involved in another , to wit in schism against some particular governour , and schism against charity to our equals ; which he proves in these words , ( repl. p. . ) for how can one separate from the whole church , unless he separate both from his superiours and equals too ? which indeed had been to some purpose , in case he had treated of schism against the whole church , and omitted schism against some particular superiour , or against equals , otherwise , for this purpose in hand , he must argue in a quite contrary manner , and put it thus ; how can one separate from a particular superiour , or from his equals , but he must in so doing separate from the whole catholick church ? and then the wise argument had evidently bewray'd it's weakness . in a word , either he means by superiours , some of them onely , and then he runs over boots into a contradiction , to get out of a less fault , in which he stood wet-shod ; for some of them , cannot be a●● , or the whole church : or if , by superiours , he means all ; then let him show me , that , in his book of schism , he hath treated of that which is against all the superiours of the church , in any collective sense ; if not , then let him confess , without more shuffling , that he treated not of schism against the whole church . as for his omitting schism against the authority of councils , he endeavours to clear it , first , by seeming to doubt whether councils have any authority . durum telum necessitas : in another occasion i doubt not but he would extoll to the skies those councils which deposed a pope ; though now , because he had granted them no authority , in omitting schism against them , he can shuffle up and down at a cheap rate ( repl. p. . l. . ) with , if councils have any authority ; for he is sure , no man can possibly oppose him as long as he sayes nothing positively , but keeps himself within the powerfull spell of an if. but let us see what follows , if mr. h. pleases to grant councils any authority : then he tells us , that this authority will certainly be reducible to paternal power ; meaning , of a priest , bishop , metropolitan , &c. and this both in provincial , national , and general councils . the reason he assignes for his evasion comes to this , that the of fence against the whole was consequently an offence against any one there residing . true ; but must the offence against some one governour ( of which onely he treated ) be necessarily an offence against them all , or against the whole council ? otherwise what will it avail him ; who is not charged with omitting schism against any particular governour , after having put that which is against the whole church , or the collection of many ; but , quite contrary , which putting down onely the schisms against particular governours , and omitting that which was against them as collected in a council ? did ever man's reason run counter in this manner , or his insincerity so resolutely persist never to acknowledge any lapse ? that , whereas it is as evident as noon-day , that one may dissent from any one bishop , in his grounds , and yet consent to the rest ; still he will needs prove the contrary , and that the disobedience to some one sort of paternal governour , is the disobedience to all . again , though a bishop have a kind of paternal authority over a priest , a metropolitan over a bishop , &c. and so the disobedience of these inferiours would be against paternal power ( as dr. h. calls his first head : ) yet what paternal power hath a company of bishops over a single bishop ; or a council , consisting of three patriarchs and five hundred bishops , over one single patriarch ? it is evident then , that should this patriarch rebel against the common decrees of all the rest , he could not be called a schismatick against paternal power ; and so , according to dr. h's division , would be no schismatick at all : since there is no authority there which could be said to be paternal in respect of him , himself being coequally high , that is , placed in the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy with the rest of the other patriarchs , and a father in an ecclesiastical sense over all the rest . their power therefore over him consists in the collective force of so many united ; which makes them considerable in respect of him , as a whole compared to a part . now then , since dr. h cannot even pretend to have treated of a schism against any collective power , but against an authority consisting in higher rank or degree onely ; 't is most evident to the most ordinary vnderstanding , that he omitted schism against authority of councils . after all this adoe he confesses here , ( rep. p. . ) that he treated not specially of schism against general councils ; that is , he confesses his division of schism insufficient ; which was onely objected . no , i had forgot ; he onely goes about to give reasons , why he did not treat it more specially : by which pretty expression the good reader is to be made beleeve , that he had treated of it specially , and onely omitted to handle it more specially ; whereas , he purposely and professedly waved the handling it at all in this controversy ; as is to be seen , of schism , p. . ad now , ( so exquisite is his shuffling art ) after he had labour'd to produce proofs , that he did treat of schism against councils , he brings his excuses why he did not doe it , ibid. first because councils were remedies of schism . but since they remedied them authoritatively , and with such an authority as , in comparison of any one degree of power by him treated , was as it were of an vniversal in respect of a particular : the schism against them was by consequence proportionably ( or rather improportionably ) greater ; and so deserved in all right an eminent place of it 's own in his division . next , because they are extraordinary and not standing iudicatures . i answer , they are likewise of an extraordinary authority , as hath been shown ; and therefore could not merit to be slighted by him . his third is , because this was not a constant sort of schism , but upon accidental emergencies . that is , his treatise of schism doth not absolutely forbid a man to be a schismatick in an higher sort of schism , so it happen upon occasion ; but takes care first and more specially that he be not a schismatick in one of those constant sorts of schism , though it be of far less guilt . his fourth excuse ( as i reckon them ) is , because they are now morally impossible to be had . very good : his church is accused by us of shism against general councils already past ; and dr. h. in this book entitled their defence , therefore treats not particularly of schism against them , because they are morally impossible to be had at present , and for the future : though , towards the end of the world he thinks it probable there may be one : of which divination of his i can give no better reason than this , that antichrist , who is to be then the vniversal secular governour , and by consequence , according to mr. h's , grounds , the head of god's church , or supreme in ecclesiastical affaires , will doe christianity that favour as to gather a general council . this , i say , if any , must be his meaning : for the reason given by him here , why they are now morally impossible to be had , is , because the christian world is under so many empires ; and when they are likely to be united into one towards the end of the world , unless it be under antichrist , i confess my self unable to prognosticate . his last excuse is , ( repl. p. . l. . ) because the principal sort of schism , charged by the romanists , is the casting out the bishop of rome . i answer , that we charge not the protestant with a simple schism , but a decompound one , involving also heresy in each of it's parts . first , with a schism from the whole church , in renouncing the rule and root of all our faith , vniversal oral tradition of immediate fore-fathers , and by consequence , separating themselves from the whole body of the faithful , as faithful : next , with renouncing the authority of councils , proceeding upon this ground in declaring things of faith : and lastly , with not onely disobeying , but disacknowleding the authority of the pope , recommended to us by both the former . and it seems strange that mr. h. should goe about to clear the sufficiency of his division , by recurring to our charging or not charging of schism : whereas he has not taken notice of any of these three schisms charged against him ; but onely of petty ones against the paternal power of a bishop , patriarch , &c. which may be consistent with a guiltlesness from the other three principal ones . he promised us in his answer , p. . . that he had rescued the catholick gentleman 's letter from the strangling in the birth by the printer's miscarriages ; yet gives it here a privy courteous-discourteous pinch , by putting the printer's mistake of conciliatory for conciliary , to be the cath. gentl. pleasure to call it so , pag . l. . . this done , he objects , that this conciliary authority cannot with any propriety be said to be in the dispersion of the churches . nor did the cath. gentl. say it was properly so called : it sufficeth us if it be equivalent , as doubtless it is . for a private bishop or patriarch is no otherwise a schismatick against them gathered together , than in dissenting from the joynt-expression of their votes : if then their votes be sufficiently exprest and testify'd , either by communicatory letters , or some other equally-certain way ; while they live dispersed ; why should not the opposing his consent of theirs be equally a schism , as when they are united ? but schism against this authority of theirs mr. h. sayes , ( parag . ult . ) is most properly comprised under the head of communion fraternal , treated by him chap. . . . and there called schism against mutual charity . not considering that in the church there must be unity in the vnderstandings of the faithful in a general rule of faith , as well as of their wills in mutual charity ; the former also of which belongs to them more particularly as they are sons of the church , that is , faithfull : and consequently , there may be several breaches of those two vnities ; so that certainly he must be a very proper man in the art of method , who can think that a schism or breach of the former , is most properly comprised ( as he sayes here ) under that latter : yet this method dr. h. will vindicate , as indeed he may doe any thing after his manner . see his confusion for method sake , schism disarm'd , p. . to these former objections now rehearsed , he at least pretends an answer , such as it is ; but to other exceptions sufficiently layd home to him , schism disarm'd , p. . . he thought it safest to give none at all . he was asked there , ( and i ask him here again ) why he omitted schism against the head of god's church ? he cannot avoid by saying , that this is not charg'd upon them , it being , as he here confesses , the principal schism objected , p. . l. . . will he say it is an usurpation ? let him hold a while , till he hath proved it , and in the mean time let him tell us how hainous a schism it is , to renounce it without legitimate proof . secondly , he was ask't , why , to state things indifferently , he treated not of schism against the head of the church , as abstracted from an ecclesiastical governour , ( the pope ) and a secular magistrate , ( the king , emperour , &c. ) for sure the disobeying or renouncing this head , must needs be a greater schism than that which is against those reckon'd up by him , who are all under this head. lastly , he was ask't , why he treated not at least of schism against the secular-ecclesiastical head , king , emperour , &c. and let us know what kind of schismaticks we are , for renouncing his authority in ecclesiastical matters ? his jurisdiction , according to mr. h. is supreme in such affaires : since then , the disobeying or rejecting any authority takes it's measure of faultiness from the excellency of the authority it opposes , he ought to have let us know that we were supremely & in the highest manner schismaticks , for denying the king 's ecclesiastical iurisdiction . but alas ! this aiery supremacy of kings in sacred matters is such an addle piece of ecclesiasticall authority , that though they pretend it , to avoid the pope's iurisdiction , yet ( as it appeares ) they decline to own it themselves as much as they can , upon occasions ; lest , coming to a controversial discussion , it bewray it's weakness by the absurdity of some necessary consequence or other issuing from it . iustly therefore did sch●sm disarm'd , casting up the account of mr. h's division of schism , ( p. . ) charge him to have omitted the three principal schisms against government , and those not onely principal in themselves , but also solely importing the present controversy : and onely mentioning those which were not objected , and so nothing at all concerning the question . sect. . with what success dr. h. goes about to retrench the roman patriarchy , and to vindicate ruffinus . the next question which comes to be discussed , is , of the extent of the roman patriarchy : which the cath. gentl. show'd dr. h. willing to limit , from a word in ruffinus , so that it should not be extended to all italy . that this is the question , is evident , both by bringing ruffinus his testimony upon the stage , who acknowledg'dly spoke of patriarchal iurisdiction ; as also by dr. h's words in his reply p. . l. . and again , p. . l . . to avoid the doctors blundring art , in which he is very exquisite alwayes , but in handling this question hath excell'd himself : we will clear the way towards the deciding it , by premising these few notes . first , it is agreed upon between us , that the metropolitical power is distinct from the patriarchal , and ( of schism p. . l. . . and p. . l. . . . ) of a less authority and extent . next , it is affirmed by dr. h. of schism p. . that the authority of the bishop was correspondent to the defensor civitatis ; that of the arch-bishop or metropolitan , to the president of every province ; that of a patriarch , to the li●utenant or vicarius ; and in general , that the ecclesiastical order follow'd the political . this i onely take notice of as an affirmation of his , not granting it to be universally true ; nor doth he prove it was so , otherwise than by origen's saying , it is fit it should be so . for , the councils of constantinople and chalcedon , where this was determin'd , were held long after this order in the ecclesiastical iurisdictions in constantine's time , of which he speaks here ; and so their testimonies rather prejudice it , than prove it : for had it been so universally practiced before , what need was there of ordering it by following councils ▪ these things being so ( as is most evident and undeniable ) let us see how incomparably dr. h. blunders in this question . his first and fundamental blundering is , that he would conclude against the extent of the patriarchal power , by impugning the farther extent of he metropolitical : whose authority notwithstanding he acknowledged higher , his iurisdiction larger ; as the second note shows . now , that he indeed impugned a metropolitical power onely in stead of a patriarchal , is manifested ; both because he impugnes this latter in the . parag . ordained to treat of metropolitical power onely , ( his treating of primates and patriarchs not beginning till parag . . ) as is most visible to the reader 's eyes , which dr. h. would yet delude ; as also because himself confesses it , of schism , p. . l. . so that he would conclude against the patriarchal power , which himself granted to extend to many provinces , ( of schism , p. . l. . ) by arguing against metropolitical , which himself granted to extend but to one ( of schism , p. . l. . . and . ) ; and so infer the no-farther extent of the former , out of the no-farther extent of the latter , after he had acknowledg'd the former of much farther extent than the latter was is not this a most shameful and unconscionable sleight , to mingle and jumble two authorities together for his own ends , in that very chapter where he pretended to treat of them distinctly ? his next manifold blundering is , to bring testimonies , which he tells the reader here , ( rep. p. . . ) manifestly distinguish't the province of the bishop of rome , from the province of italy ; which ( he assures us ) could not have had truth in them , if the province of the patriarch of rome extended to all italy : and yet not one word is found in any of the testimonies making mention of the patriarchy , nor yet of the province of the bishop of rome at all : nay the three first onely mention the city of rome . the first is this , as cited by himself ; ( rep p. . ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. let the house be delivered to those to whom the bishop through italy , and the city of rome should decree it . the second , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. the holy synod assembled from rome , and spain , france and italy the third , foure hundred bishops , both from great rome , and from all italy and calabria . now suppose , insisting on the grounds of mine own cause , i should onely reply that they mention'd rome in particular for eminency of authority , not contradistinction of it ; were it not a thousand times more likely on my side , there being no city particulariz'd but this in the testimonies ? for all the rest are regions or provinces . again , were the testimonies most express for the roman province ; yet if mr. h. mean't honestly , that is , to speak of the metropolitical iurisdiction onely ( as he pretended , and as the place properly required , ) then what had he concluded ? since the proving the metropolical iurisdiction less than all italy , proves not that the patriarchal reach't not much farther . but , to come home to the testimonies , that the reader may see what a strong disputant dr. h. is in his own way : i would gladly ask , who told him that the city of rome ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the city , & , great rome , as it is in the testimonies ) must needs signify so manifestly the whole province of rome ? so that , if he infer a contradistinction , and so a limitation of iurisdiction from these words ; he must conclude that neither the metropolitical nor patriarchal iurisdiction of the bishop of rome reach't beyond it's own walls : which being acknowledg'dly impossible , it is impossible these testimonies should mean a distinction of the bishop of rome's authority from italy , but an eminency of his dignity , which occasion'd his particular mentioning . thus , the very testimonies which he produced against us , will needs speak for us , notwithstanding his prompting them to the contrary . the fourth testimony ( ex provinciâ italiae , civitate mediolanensi , ex vrbe roma , quod sylvester episcopus misit ex provinciâ romanâ , civitate portuensi , &c. is indeed a fit testimony for dr. h. to blunder in , being not intelligible in the latin , and ( as he cannot but know ) very corrupt : especially being held for such in naming the bishops which met there . and were it beyond exception , yet is it very explicable to mean the pop'es metropolitical iurisdiction , never so much as naming his patriarchal . his third blundering is his self-contradiction ; a necessary evil accompanying always the defence of a bad cause . all his endeavours hitherto had been bent to limit the pope's patriarchy to a particular province of italy ; building still all the way upon the necessity that the ecclesiastical order should follow the political : yet , treating of primates and patriarchs , ( of schism , p. . ) he gives such doctrine as , upon the same grounds , must needs conclude that the said patriarchy did extend to all italy . he tells us there , that constantine the great instituted four praefecti praetorio ; two in the east , as many in the west : of the western , one at rome , another at triers . now then , let the ecclesiastical order ( as mr. h. will have it ) follow the political ; and we must have some ecclesiastical governour at rome of equally-extended and correspondent authority to the praefectus praetorio at rome , that is , to all italy at least : this could not be ( as he confesses ) metropolitical authority in the bishop of rome ; therefore a patriarchal one . the pope's patriarchy then even according to his own grounds , included all italy ; nay all the west , except that part which the pretended patriarch of france must be imagin'd upon the same grounds to have had . and since the praefect at triers was called ( of schism , p. . ) praefectus praetorio galliarum , ( as dr. h. confesses ; ) consequently to his grounds , it must follow , that the ecclesiastical power corresponding to this political must have onely france under him ; the other at rome , all the west besides . so that at unawares , though he will not grant his patriarchy to extend to the whole west , which is his due ; yet mr. h's own grounds grant the pope all but france , which is ten times more than the suburbicarian province , his former too niggardly allowance . if he reply that the patriarchal power corresponds to the vicarij onely , and not to that of the praefecti praetorio : then , besides that all his grounds of the necessary proportion of the ecclesiastical to the secular power totter , which hold not in the main subordinate magistrate , to wit the praefectus praetorio , to whom he will have no ecclesiastical dignity correspond ; besides this , i say , his foresaid testimony of origen cited for him , reply . is absolutely against him . so sad a piece of scholarship it is to cite testimonies without first laying grounds , which onely can make testimonies hang together . out of which it is evident , that all the strength of his pretended limitation of the pope's patriarchy , is finally reduced to that authority from ruffinus . now then as for ruffinus his testimony , saying that the bishop of rome was by the nicene canon authoriz'd , suburbicariarum ecclesiarum sollicitudinem gerere , this being the main business which occasion'd this debate , and gave birth to this imagin'd limitation of the pope's patriarchate , we shall take a litle pains to fetch it from it's first grounds , by showing the sense of that canon : by which will be seen how great a knave this paraphrast was whom dr. h. pretends to vindicate . the words of the council , upon which this interpreter works are these : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . to which i cannot imagin a sense more proper than this , that the bishops of egypt , lybia and pentapolis should be subject to the patriarch of alexandria , because the pope had used to hold them for so . the reason of my conjecture is , because the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quandoquidem , manifests that the words following are the reason of the decree precedent . this being so , who sees not how pittifully this discourse hangs together , that those bishops shall be under the patriarch of alexandria , seeing the pope hath under him i cannot tell what or whom ? whereas ( however our adversaries may pretend the material sense of one of the parts false , yet ) themselves must confess , that there is no difficulty in the formal coherence of the whole , if it be supposed to signify thus , that he shall have those for his subjects , because the pope is accustomed to hold them for such or to judge it so . this is yet more confirm'd , because in both languages it is evident that the latine hoc and the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot possibly refer any thing , but the thing decreed ; to wit , that the bishops named should be subject to the patriarch of alexandria . this explication holding , ( and hold it must till mr. h. can show me a better , that , is , another which shall agree better with the words , and make better sense ; which will be never ) two things follow for us : first , that it was the pope's custome to handle and judge matters belonging to the patriarchy of alexandria : next , that the council govern'd it self in this important matter by the custome of the bishop of rome : both which infer , in all probability , his higher authority , and make for us , though intended otherwise . some interpreters indeed are of opinion that this canon was intended to order the iurisdiction of the patriarchs : but this is a perfect chimerical imagination , originiz'd from the invētion of those whose hatred against the church of rome , occasion'd by their own guilt , made them willing to say any thing in prejudice of her , though without all ground either in the letter of the canon ( as hath been shown ) or in the history of the councils : for , nothing is more evident in this latter , than that there was treated in the cause of meletius bishop of licopolis ●n egypt , who refused to be subject to the patriarch of alexandria ; and therefore that canon chiefly touches th●t patriarchy , of which also the particulars are there specify'd : nothing being order'd there concerning either antio●h or the west , but that their priviledges ( that is , what by custome they had gotten ) should he conserved and continued ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . these things standing thus , no man , unless driven by the desperate condition of his cause to catch at any thing , can gather any such sense out of the words of the canon . notwithstanding , 't is granted that schismaticks commonly make this interpretation of it : whose opinions were they any thing prejudicial to our cause , ( as they are not , but most weak , being of adversaries ; ) yet they are made incomparably weaker by having ruffinus for their patron and first founder of this interpretation : who also ( to come nearer our question ) proceeding upon this former conceit , added the word suburbicarias , without all ground or show of ground ; whether out of silliness and ignorance of propriety of speech , meaning to signify by that word all the western churches under the empire of the city of rome , ( whose subjection to the pope his eyes testify'd and other schismaticks confess ; ) or out of knavery and malice , it is uncertain : this , by the way , is certain , that an irregular proceeding and miscarriage , sprung from both , may justly be expected from ruffinus . but , because this language of mine against this paraphrast may be imagin'd to have sprung from passion , by dr. h. and some of his particular friends ; who , proceeding upon their ground of uncertainty and indifferency of religion , have got a conceit that the preserving of courtesy is more worth than the preserving of souls from eternal damnation ; and that , though one who does such a mischief be a knave and a fool both , yet he cannot without incivility and scurrility be shown plainly to be either : again , because mr. h. is such a veneratour of antiquity , that he deemes any testimony , nay any one obscure word of any either old-knave or old-fool ( provided he lived but in the ancient times ) very competent to found his religion on , and worthy his vindication , so it seem for his purpose : we will see whether the character given ruffinus by other authours beyond all exception be more moderate than s. w's , & what unanswerable prejudices are producible against this paraphrast & his testification , which dr. h. here undertakes to vindicate . first s. hierom tells us , ( contra ruff. apol. . ) that ruffinus was excommunicated and cauteriz'd for heresy , to wit , origenism and pelagianism , and that by pope anastasius , as appeares both by the letter of the said pope to iohn bishop of hierusalem , as also by the same s. hierom , ( ibid ) upbraiding him , that he so fled the judgement of the city of rome , that he rather ●hose to abide the siege of the barbarians ( to wit , in aquil●ia , besieged by alaricus , whither ruffinus had retired himself ) than the sentence of a peaceable town . and again , in the same book , speaking of ruffinus his confession of his faith , which he feigned to have been approved by the bishop of italy , he asks him how italy should approve that which rome had rejected , and how the bishops should receive that which the apostolick see had condemned ? adde to these ( which makes his prejudice most notorious , and so his testimony most invalid ) that he writ his history after the entrance of alaricus into italy : that is , under the popedome of innocentius , successour of anastasius : and so had as much reason to write in prejudice of that see , as an incorrigible and obstinate heretick could have : having been excommunicated by the same see before he writ . hence it is that he never meets with any occasion to speak of the pope and church of rome , but he spits his venome , as may appear euseb . hist . eccles . l. . cap . where , speaking of pope victor , he adds of his own , in one place , one whole line , in another two in his prejudice . is not this then a fit authou● to be first alledged , afterwards vindicated by his fellow-brother and friend dr. h. who , for no less guilt , stands excommunicated by the same church ? thus much for his passion and prejudice , which make his knavery very credible : now . secondly , as for his doltish ignorance , he was the monster of that and all future ages for eminency in that talent . some instances of it may be ; that he ( in hist . eccles . euseb . l. . c. . ) makes of iames bishop of hierusalem , iames bishop of the apostles ; of the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies happy , a saint by name macarius ; of eusebius of pamphilus , heretick and arian , pamphilus catholick and martyr ; of xystus , pythagorian and pagan philosopher , xystus pope and martyr ; of chorepiscopus ( spoken of by the eighth canon of the council of nice ) the vacant place of a bishop : and such innumerable others ; that st. hierom ( ibid. ) affirmed him to be so unskilfull in either language , that he was taken for a greek by the latines , and for a latin by the grecians . must not he be a very wise man , who sticks not , first to build upon , next to vindicate so wise an authority ? yet knavery and folly are less intolerable , if practised modestly and warily : but temerity and audacity are the gallantry of ruffinus his former faults ; he practises them when and where he pleases ; and so his testimony becomes more perfectly fit for dr. h's cause . s. hierom ( ibid. ) challenges him , that he knew in his conscience , how he added , detracted , and changed things as he listed . erasmus , in his preface upon s. hilary , sayes that ruffinus took to himself , not the liberty of an interpreter , but the licence of a contaminatour of other men's writings . and ( annot. in chron. euseb . anno mmlxv . ) scaliger notes it to be his custom to omit , pervert and change the texts , as he pleased . lastly , if dr. h. yet makes account he can vindicate the sufficiency of ruffinus his authority against so many opposers ; i will adde for an upshot the words of their most famed daillé , ( against whom i am sure he will not take up cudgels ; being a person so highly commended by the lords falkland , and dighy , ) who ( l. . c. . ) characters ruffinus to be , an arrant woodden statue , a pittiful thing , one that had scar●e any reason in what he said , and yet much less dexterity in defending himself . let the reader judge then how desperate that cause must be , which drives it's patrons to rely upon such a barbarous , heretical , malicious , and silly fellow's authority ; who wanted both ordinary learning , and common honesty , the onely things which can give him any authority at all ; and this in the judgment of persons beyond all exception either of ignorance or prejudice . this miserable and ruinous testimony , upon which yet our adversaries build so much , being resolv'd into the rubbish of ruffinus his defects ; it would not be much amiss to try whether our testimonies for the pope's patriarchy over all the west be establish't upon better authority , than this which gave the ground of retrenching it to ruffinus his followers . st. basil , speaking ( basil . epist . . ) of him as patriarch , calls him the coryphaeus ( or head ) of the western churches . s. hierom makes account that , ( hier. ad marc. presb. celed . epist . . ) to be condemned with pope damasus & with the west , is the self-same thing . but , because the testimony of adversaries is freest from favour and partiality ; the satisfaction given by such is much more ample and valid . to these therefore let us have recourse ; i mean the greek schismaticks : who , though the competition between the eastern and western church provoked them to retrench the pope's patriarchat as much as they could possibly justify ; yet they freely and ingenuously grant , that it contained anciently all the provinces of italy , spain , france , germany , england , illyricum occidentale , under which were understood dalmatia , hungary , and other neighbouring provinces . our first testimony shall be that of nilus , archbishop of thessalonica ( de prim pap. ) in that very book in which he disputes against the latins . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the canon of the council of nice thinks fit that the rules of the fathers be confirmed , who have distributed to every church their priviledges ; to wit , that some nations be under the bishop of alexandria , others under the bishop of antioch , &c. and to the bishop of rome the same is given , to wit , that he govern the occidental nations . the second shal be of zonaras , a greek schismatick and commentatour , living long before nilus ; who , in his exposition of the sixth canon of the council of nice , ( the same to which ruffinus added his conceit of suburbicarian , and thence gave occasion to his imagin'd limitation of the pope's patriarchy , before spoken of ( hath these words : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. the council ordaines that the bishop of alexandria have the superintendency of egypt , libya , and pentapolis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : as the ancient custome had given to the bishop of rome , to grovern the provinces of the west . the third testimony shall be of the same zonaras , ( in concil . sard. can. ● ) which proceeds farther and grants him , over and above all the provinces of the western empire , almost all those provinces of the eastern also which lay westwardly . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . to the roman church ( saith he , writing his comment upon the fifth canon of the council of sardica ) were then subject all the western churches , to wit , those of macedonia , thessalia , illyricum , epirus , which were afterwards subjected to the church of constantinople . here thou seest , reader , three testimonies , in themselves most ample and express , of authours beyond all pretence of partiality towards us ; whose interest and passion ought rather have obliged them to detract than superadde to the pope's iurisdiction . not were they less secure from opinion of ignorance ; the quality of archbishop in one of them , and of profest writers for the greeks in both , rendering them not liable either to exception of supineness , or want of knowledge . iudge then again , how bad that cause must be , which can oblige men , rational enough in other businesses , to refuse assent to a verdict thus qualify'd , and adhere to a bare word , capable of a different ( and so unprejudicial ) signification , as coming from an authour so intolerably barbarous as this ruffinus hath been shown : or , if meant in that stricter signification , can yet claim no credit ; as being onely his word who hath been manifested , by witnesses beyond exception , to have lost his indifferency , sincerity , nay all shame and honesty together with his faith. i hope the candid reader will gather what stuff is to be expected from that treatise , de suburbicariis regionibus , which dr. h. ( repl. p. . ) is pleased to call a tract , and afford it the epithet of learned : and how wise or sincere a person lescaserius is , though styled here by dr. h. most excellent , who undertakes to vindicate this ruffinus ; but , with such weak arguments , as , were it not out of my way to confute that treatise , i would undertake to manifest they neither argue too much learning , nor any excellency at all in the study of antiquity in that point ; unless that excellency were corrupted by a passionate insincerity : though i know any thing is excellent which makes excellently well for dr. h's purpose , or does any excellent prejudice to rome . sect. . dr. h's fruitless endeavours to prove the pope ( as he calls it ) no summum genus , from the pretended denial of appeales , and the denial of names or titles , as also how weakly he argues against that demonstrably-evident authority . the pope's patriarchy being thus limited to litle more than nothing , his chief pastourship must in the next place be totally annihilated : against which mr. h. ( as the nature of schism requires ) hath so much the greater spite , by how much it is higher in authority than the patriarchy . this he doth de professo afterwards : here , on the by onely , ( of schism p. ) telling us , that there was none over the patriarchs but the emperour onely ; which he proved , because they use to gather councils . his disarmer broke the reeds of the testimonies he produced , by shewing them unable to conclude , unless they prove that the emperour did it without the pope's signifying such their desires to them ; next , that if they did it without this , they did it lawfully ; and lastly , that , were both proved , it was not necessarily consequent , that the pope had therefore no authority over the church , since there might be other acts of vniversal authority besides gathering of councils . for answer , dr. h. refers me to his reply , p. . where nothing at all is found to strengthen the two former weaknesses of his consequences : nor yet indeed the latter , since he does not undertake to show that there can be no other acts of supreme authority besides gathering of councils ; which if there can , then those acts can denominate the pope head of the church , notwithstanding the defect in the nor performance of the other ; and , by consequence , his argument of not being head of the church , from not gathering councils , is at an end . yet something he pretends here , to make good this latter defect ; to wit , that this authority of convoking councils is inseparable from the supreme power , is most characteristical of it , &c. whereas indeed this convoking of councils is no ordinary act of any standing iurisdiction or government , but an extraordinary affair , springing from some necessity or extremity ; and so , the necessity pressing , may be performed by him or them who can best provide for that extremity : which , if other circumstances agree , is most fitting to be ordered by the pope , whose universal superintendency qualifies him for both care and knowledge of the churche's wants . but if mr. h. means it is inseparable , so that it cannot be done without the pope's express and actual orders , or undertaken by any but the pope himself ; he is in a great mistake : for , it is very well known that in divers cases it is otherwise . as , suppose the see be vacant , or the pope himself be unsound in faith , be distracted , or kept in close prison ; or in case there be an anti-pope which makes the title dubious , &c. in which cases the cardinals have power to call a council , or the bishops to assemble themselves . and , in general , whensoever there is an extremity damageable to the publick , nor possible to be remedied by him to whom that duty most fittingly ( and so , rightfully ) belongs ; any one that hath sufficient power and skill , let him be patriarch , bishop , prince , or private man , not onely may , but ought apply both , as much as in him lies , to prevent the harme of the publick . 't is evident then that the notion of the actual power to gather general councils , is not the very notion of the pope's authority , nor ( as mr. h. expresses it ) characteristical of it , or inseparable from it ; since it has been shown , that the one can be without the other . to this proof from gathering councils , he proceeds to alledge some testimonies , ( reply p. ) that there was not anciently , ( besides the prince or emperour ) any supreme , or ( as the doctor strangely expresses it ) any summum genus , and that the bishop of rome was not this summum genus . it is a pleasant thing when those men will be nibbling at wit , who never knew how to manage the knack . would not supreme bishop or governour have served , without being thus unfortunately witty in calling it a summum genus ? and then to tell us , that a particular man is not a summum genus . when we learn'd logick , we were told that a summum genus was perfectly and actually included in every individual conteined under it : i hope the pope's power is not found , on this fashion , in every priest . but let us take a view of his testimonies ; which are reduced to two heads : to wit , those which would prove the pope no summum genus , from the denial of appeals to him ; and those which would conclude him no summum genus , from titles and names deny'd him . those concerning appeales which must manifest the individual person of the pope to be no summum genus , are , first , from the milevitan council , ( repl. p. . & . ) forbidding that priests should appeale to any forrein power , but onely to the african councils or their own primates : secondly , from the nicen , can. . ordaining , that they who were excommunicated by some should not be received by others : the third , from the synodical epistle of the african council to pope caelestine , in these words , we intreat you that , for the future , you will not easily admit those who are excommunicated by us , &c. to these he addes a fourth , from the . apostolick canon , that the bishops of every nation must know him that is first among them , and account him their head. i answer , that , as for the three first in general , they only forbid the appeals of priests from their bishops , &c. but leave it indifferent whether the bishops , arch-bishops , nay primates themselves may appeale to the pope : which we make account is a far greater honour to the pope , than the deciding the inferiour controversies concerning priests . so that these testimonies argues no more against the pope's authority , than it would against the supreme power of any prince or secular magistrate , if the laws of the land should forbid theeves , robbers , and such inferiours delinquents , after their condemnation by the iudges and other inferiour officers , to appeal to him . who sees not that there could never be any government , or iustice done , if every priest , though found never so guilty at home by his own immediate governours , should have liberty granted him to appeal to the supreme : living , perhaps , in another country far distant , not skilled in the immediate circumstances , which give the best light to judge of a cause : but receiving his information from letters , perhaps partial , or from heare-say ever uncertain ? again , who sees not that such an easy admittance of every ordinary delinquent's appeal is both most cumbersom , nay impossible , to be perform'd by the supreme , and very derogatory to the esteem and authority of inferiour officers , without the conservation of which all government and common-good goes to wrack ? iustly then did the church , in the nicen council and elsewhere , for these and many other reasons , ordain , that priests should make no farther appeal than to domestick iudges , the pope himself being present and consenting to it , yet without detriment to his authority : since this eases him of cumber , not discredits his power ; for it denies not the appeals even of arch-bishops and patriarchs to him : unless mr. h. will say , that every consenting upon rational grounds not to execute authory , is to disannul and abolish quite that whole authority ; for he ayms at no less in this worthy discourse of his upon the said citations . and this may suffize in answer to his three first testimonies as also to the first of these three in particular ; to wit , that they forbid him not to execute an higher strain of power in receiving appeals of bishops : and as for the making it unlawful for inferiour delinquents to appeal to him , it can onely infer necessarily the unfitness that the pope should execute that authority , not the want of authority it self . the second testimony , that they which are excommunicated by some , shall not be received by others , is the onely place in this section most likely to infer the doctor 's conclusion , that the popes is not supreme : which indeed it does most amply , if taken in it's whole latitude and extent ; but withall the doctor must confess that , if it be taken so , it utterly destroys all government , and his former testimony from the milevitan council to boot . for , if those words be universally true , then it is unlawful for a priest to appeal from his bishop to an arch-bishop , primate , or provincial council ( granted in the said testimony ; ) which takes away all authority in a superiour over the acts and decrees of an inferiour , and by consequence all government . now then , since the said testimony ( which indeed was mean't of the appeals of priests , and so is already answerd'd ) cannot serve him , unless taken in it's full extent ; nor can it be taken so whitout subverting all ground of government : it follows , that it cannot serve him at all , nor prejudice us . again , since it cannot be taken as denying appeals from subordinate to superiour governours universally : mr. h's grounds must make it conclude against us , by making it signify a denial of appeals to coequals in authority onely . wherefore , all it's force is built on this supposition , that the pope is not superiour , but coequal onely to a patriarch : so that his argument is epitomiz'd into this pithy piece of sense , as true as the first principles ( which he must suppose to make this proof valid ; ) that the pope not being head of the church , is not head of the church ; and then all is clearly evidenced . the third testimony , we entreat you that you would not easily admit those to your communion who are excommunicated by us , is so far from gain-saying the pope's power , that the very expressions of which it is fram'd are rather so many acknowlegdments of it : being onely a request , not that he would not receive their appeals or admit them at all , much less that he could not , but onely that he would not admit them easily , that is , without due and mature examination of the cause . now who sees not that an humble desire , that he would not doe it easily , intimates or supposes he had a power to doe it absolutely ? this is confirm'd by their subjoyning , as the reason of their request , not because the pope had no power to admit others , but because the council of nice had so decreed : knowing that it was a strong motive for them , and an obligation in the supreme governour to conserve the laws of the church inviolate ; unless evidence , that in these circumstances it crost the common good , licenc't him to use his extraordinary authority in that extremity , and to proceed now , not upon laws , but upon the dictates of nature , the ground and rule of all laws . so perfectly innocent to our cause are all the testimonies of weight alledged by mr. h. against it ; if they be left to themselves , and not inspired with malice by the bad meaning he will needs instill into them , against their own good nature . the fourth testimony is stil like dr. h. as he maintains a bad cause ; that is , incomparably weak and short of concluding any thing . 't is this , that the bishops of every nation must account the primate their head. what then ? is not a parish-priest head of a parish , a bishop head of his diocese , an arch-bishop head of his arch-bishoprick ; as well as a primate head of his primacy ? does it then follow , from a bishops being head of the priests in his diocese , that there is no degree of authority superiour to his ? yet this , apply'd to a primate , is all dr. h's argument to prove none higher than he . but , it is pretty to observe in what strange words he couches his inference from hence ; which ( saith he , repl. p. . ) sure infers , that the bishop of rome is not the one onely head of all bishops . observe that canting phrase , one onely head , &c his intent here manifestly was to show no degree of authority superiour to patriarchs : to prove this he alledges this testimony now agitated ; and then , because he saw it would not carry home to the mark be aymed it at , he infers warily , that the pope is not the one onely head of all bishops . by which expression he prepares an evasion beforehand , when the inconsequence of his discourse from the said testimony shall be ob●ected ; or else would persuade the unwary reader , that we hold the pope so head of the the church , as that we admit not primates to be head of the bishops under them : whereas our tenet is , that as primates are immediate heads of the metropolitans , so the pope is head or superiour over primates ; and by consequence supreme over the whole church : yet so supreme , as he leaves to subordinate governours their headship inviolate over their proper inferiours . thus much to his testimonies concerning appeals , his other manner of arguing against the pop'es supremacy or his being a summum genus is , from names and titles deny'd him . the first testimony is from decret . part . . dist . . cap. . that primae sedis episcopus non appelletur princeps sacerdotum , vel summus sacerdos ; that the bishop of the first seat ought not to be called prince of the priests , or supreme priest ( which the african council confirms with , aut aliquid eiusmodi ; ) sed tantum primae sedes episcopus , the second is from the same place , cap. . nec ●●iam romanus pontifex universalis est appellandus . the third , from the epistle of pope pelagius , nullus patriarcharum vniversalitatis vocabulo unquam utatur , &c. no patriarch must use the title of vniversal ; for if one patriarch be called vniversal , the name of patriarch is taken from all the rest . the fourth is , their thred-bare and often answered testimony of saint gregory , refusing the title of vniversal bishop . but , first , these testimonies come short of what they are intended for , in this , that none speaks of the right of iurisdiction , but onely of names and titles ; as appears by the words , appelletur , appellandus , vniversalitatis vocabulo , superbae appellationis verbum , in the testimonies : which denote no exception against any authority , but against the titular expression of it onely , which sounded proudly , and seem'd inconvenient and new at that time . secondly , it is a great weakness in understanding the nature of words , not to advert that the vogue of the world altering from plainess to complementalness , as it does stil daily , the same word may be used without fear of pride at one time , which could not at another ; nay the same thing may be fitly signify'd by some word , at some time , which cannot be signify'd by the same at another : as for example , tyrannus once was proper for a king , ruling according to law and right ; which now is not competent but to him who rules arbitrarily against both ; or rather indeed , once it signify'd a power , now it signifies a vice . thirdly , this seems to have been the case of our word vniversalis papa , at least in s. gregory's time ; when that expression , if taken in a due sense , sem'd tolerable , both by the example given in the council of chalcedon in order to pope leo , and also by eulogius patriarch of alexundria's letter , giving it to pope gregory : but 't was refused by that prudent and humble pope , because the proud patriarch of constantinople usurp't it in an illegitimate and intolerable sense . fourthly , the sense of that title in the testimonies objected being evidently this , that none could be patriarchs but himself ; as appears by pope pelagius his epistle cited here by gratian , quia si unus patriarcharum vniversalis dicatur , patriarcharum nomen caeteris derogatur ; and the like in s. gregory's expression to eulogius , when he refused it : this , i say , being evident ; and it being on the other side no less evident that our tenet concerning the pope's authority is not , that it is of such a nature as debars others subordinate degrees , and , in particular , patriarchs and bishops , to be truly what they are called ; it is likewise evident , that our meaning , when we apply it to the pope , is different quite from the signification the objectors take it in . now that the pope's authority , as held by catholicks , hinders not others to remain still patriarchs , is most plain : for , we grant him onely such an higher degree of power over patriarchs , as an arch-bishop hath over a bishop ; from which superiory over them it follows that he is supreme in god's church . as then , the placing an arch-bishop over bishops doth not un-bishop them ; so neither doth the exalting the pope's anthority above pa●●iarchal destroy the notion of a patriarch : but each of them retains their compleat limits of power in the church , notwithstanding their subordination to their superiour : and consequently , the testimonies are not a jot to the doctor 's purpose ; since they declare themselves to mean one thing , and he brings them to denote a quite different matter . fifthly , had not the testimonies declared themselves to mean otherwise than we do , yet ( to show more the miserable weakness of this testimony-gleaner ) it were no such great wonder that s. gregory ( such was his humility ) should deny to accept what was due to him . a plain instance of this may be found . . epist . . where he denyes himself even to be a priest . sixthly , whoever reads his epistles sent throughout the whole church , it is impossible but he should see that , however he deny'd the word of vniversal bishop , which sounded then proudly , yet he both practised and challenged the thing it self , that is , the papal iurisdiction , which we now mean by that word ; notwithstanding his profound humility , which made him never desire to stand upon his power , but when it was necessary . a perfect instance of this is found , epist . . ind. . where he sayes , si qua culpa , &c. if there be any fault or crime found in bishops , that every bishop is subject to the apostolical see ; but when their fault doth not exact it , ( that is , make it necessary for him to use his authority ) . that then , upon the account of humility , all were his equals . see also l. . epist . . where he puts it as undoubted , that the church of constantinople is subject to the apostolical see ; and this to be acknowledg'd by the emperour and by the bishop of constantinople himself . see another most express testimony to the same purpose , lib. . epist . to marinianus bishop of ravenna . seventhly , those words , ne● eti●m romanus pontifex vniversalis est appellandus , are not found either in the council of ca●●hage it self , or in the ancient copies , but are gratian's addition onely : wherefore they are to be understood in the sense wherein pope pelagius took th●m ; whose epistle he cites to make good those words . eighthly , equivalent terms to what we mean by those words were far more anciently given to the bishop of rome zephyrinus by te●tullian , lib. . de pudicitia ; where de calls him pontifex maximus & episcopus episcoporum . ninthly , and lastly , to put this whole business out of doubt , dr. h's own dear friend , balsamon , a greek schismatick , confesses ( and surely he knew as well as dr. h. ) that that title was forbidden , to take away the arrogancy of names ; and that for that reason many patriarchs did style themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , vile and base . see bals . in conc. carth. . cant. . where , though he mingles something of his own schism , yet thus far is clear for me , that the name or title was onely treated there , nor the thing or iurisdiction ; about which our controversy being , dr. h. ought to have brought testimonies impugning it , not a bare name onely . calculate these manifold weaknesses , kind reader , with thy understanding ; and then tell me , if it must not be a most desperately ▪ weak cause which can drive it's patrons to cast their strongest hopes upon such testimonies , which ( to omit other frailties ) declare themselves and are confest by our bitterest adversaries not to mean the thing or iurisdiction , ( the onely matter in debate , ) but the phrase of titular appellation onely : which shows plainly , that the objecter's intent was to bring the question of the solid power and authority , into the logomachy and word-skirmish of an aiery title . so that dr. h. payes his reader with the same coyn , as that hungry fellow did ; who , having satisfy'd himself with the smell of the cook 's meat , pay'd his exacting host with the sound of the money in stead of the substan●e . but now , it being firmly settled by the former frothy argument , that the pope had anciently no vniversal authority ; he proceeds to show when this strange vsurpation impower'd it self over the whole church . and this he does from paulus diaconus , de gestis romanorum , l. . who ( as he pretends ) tells us , that boniface the third , with much adoe , obtained an edict of phocas the emperour to that purpose . where , if he meanes that the name and title , before forbidden , were then first allowed by him ; what follows against us , who maintain a real power , not a verbal title ? but , if he means that the supreme iurisdiction over the whole church was then given by phocas : then , besides that this iurisdiction we dispute of is over kings and emperours , as well as others , in ecclesiastical matters , and so not likely to be given by phocas the emperour ; we must be put to imagin ( which will cost us no less then perfect madness , ●re we shall be able to doe it , ) upon the blind and bare affirmation of an obscure sentence , that an vniversal government in ecclesiastical matters over the whole christian world could be introduc't ( nay held o● faith , and to have come from christ ) without any visible effects of siding , opposing , deprecating , submitting , complaints , applauses , on the one side and the other ; together with change of ecclesiastical laws , and the temporal also as concern'd in the ecclesiastical , and millions of other particular changes included in , and dependent on these general ones ; no effect of it at all being notorius , but onely a testimony , ( or perhaps two ) in a rumour-grounded history-book . if the doctor would persuade us , that the supreme iurisdiction of rome was then introduc't , let him show effects proportionable to such a novelty of usurpation in things of highest concernment ; that is , such effects as in all reason were likely to issue out of that cause put : or otherwise , rational readers must in all reason have leave to think , that he speaks against all reason . and let him never hope to persuade any man that hath an ounce of brains in his head , though he bring twenty testimonies more valid than this , that an vniversal iurisdiction in highest matters could creep into the world with pantofles of matt on , without discovering it self in multitudes of circumstances proportionable to its visibleness and weightiness : that is , let him not hope to gul men of reason with words , to deny the light of their reason , demonstrative evidence . demonstrative , i say ; for i account it as great and firm a demonstration as any in nature , that it is impossible it should come in unattended by universal and visible changes over the face of the whole christian world : which i thus show in brief . the cause was put ; to wit , a novelty in the highest degree of government , and in highest matters . the matter to work on was put ; to wit , rational soules or men's minds , because of their diverse dispositions apt to be wrought upon diversly ; that is , to be stir'd up to diverse thoughts , to diverse passions the result of those thoughts , and diverse outward expressions the effects of those passions : and all this according to the weight and moment of the cause , which was of the highest nature imaginable . lastly , the cause was apply'd to the matter : for it is equally impossible , that an universal government should be brough in , and all not know of it , as that is should at once be and not-be ; since it cannot be introduc't universally , without signifying at least to the subjects either by writing or other carriage , that their obedience is expected . this being so , it is as evident and demonstrable that universal , most visible , and mighty commotions and changes must accompagny such a novelty of rome's usurpation , as that the effect must necessarily be , when the cause is actually causing : which none ever deny'd , or can , without denying the first principles . now , add to this , that the protestant authours themselves are in twenty minds about the times that this change came in , and that their best authours beyond exception ( of which i remember doctor whittaker is one ) confess in express terms , that the time of the romane churche's change cannot easily be told , and that they cannot tell by whom nor at what time the enemy did sow the papist's doctrine , ( as may be seen in the catalogue of protestancy , where they are cited : ) adde this i say , and it follows , that no such visible effects of it's introducing can be shown at all ; and consequently , that it was never introduc't . which as it immoveably strength●ns our title of possession , rendring it such as is not onely justly presumable , but necessarily demonstrable , to have come from christ : so it will also let the rational protestant readers see plainly what it is to which their wisest doctors would persuade them ; to wit , to renounce the clear , solid , and certain light of reason , demonstrative evidence , to follow the obscure , uncertain , and wordish dictionary stuffe of every trifling , controvertible , or ( at best ) waxen-natur'd testimony . yet the doctor 's own words are but these ; that boniface the third , with much adoe , obtained of phocas the emperour an edict for the primacy and vniversal iurisdiction of the church of rome : see paulus diac. de gestis rom. l. which still is an argument that till then it had no foundation . where first is to be noted that , of his own good will , the doctor puts in those words , with much adoe ; whereas the authour onely sayes , rogante papâ , the pope intreating it . secondly , that whereas the authour sayes , caput esse omnium ecclesiarum , in his book de gestis longobardorum , l. . c. . ( which book without controversy is his and plainly sayes , that the emperour defined that the roman church was the head of all churches ; ) our doctor dissembles this , and follows a text out of de gestis roman . which book is doubted of by learned men to be none of his , and by the very phrase seems to be a corruption of the other , and that ut esset , is put for esse ; it being an odd piece of latin to say , statuit sedem romanam ut esset caput , whereas a latinist would have said statuit , sedes ut esset . wherefore , 't is evident that the doctor 's great bragging that the story is known to all , is resolv'd into the corruption of an unauthentick text . which is most evident by the words following in both places of the said authour , quia ecclesia constantinopolitana primam se omnium ecclesiarum scribebat : which bears no sense , if the decree gave the iurisdiction ; but an excellent one , if the decree onely defined it against the wrongful challenge of the constantinopolitan church . wherefore you see that the doctors inference , which yet is an argument that til then it had no foundation , is so wretched , that the contrary ought to be deduced , tha it is an argument , the authority which phocas defined to be his , had been his before . and thus much in refutation of dr. h's defence of his three first chapters . second part . containing a refute of dr. h's first fundamental exception against the pope's authority from the pretended limitation of s. peter's provinces . sect. . dr. h's prelusory toyes answered . no obligation for catholiks to produce evidence . the infinite advantages our true possession hath , and the perfect nullity of their vainly-pretended one ; together with a most rare sample of his manner of arguing . dr . h. in his answer , p. . puts a distinction of his own endeavours ; affirming that he had fûlly answered my fourth section , & onely saying that he had answered the following ones . among these which are answered onely , my sixth section is one , which he pretends to have given satisfaction to , reply c. . sect . . and . where not a word is found in reference to that , but to my first onely , of which he was pleased to make two . this done , he proceeds , upon this mistake of his own and the printer's mis-ciphering it , to call my sixth the seventh ; and to be witty against me in his dry way , telling the reader ( as if he would let him see that s. w. could not reckon as far as eight ) that i have another seventh section : though both the errata at the end corrected that small lapse of the printer , the titles of the sections in the beginning of the book might have clear'd mr. h's head in that point , and the first section immediately going before would have told him ( had not he been pleased to mistake it , and divide it into two ) that the following ought to be the sixth . but nothing could secure . s. w. from the melancholy cavilling humour of his adversary : who is so terrible , that the printer's least oversight , and his own mistake must occasion a dry adnimadversion against s. w. and yet the jest is , he pretends nothing but courtesy and civility ; and persuades many of his passionate adherents , that he practices both in his writings . for answer then to my first seventh section ( according to dr. h. but in reality the sixth ) he refers me to his reply c. . sect . where he answers all but the ridiculous colours , ( as he says , answ . p. . ) which indeed i must say were very ridiculous , as who ever reads schism disarm'd , p. . or his own book p. . may easily see : where , after he had spoken of and acknowledg'd king henry the eighth's casting out the pope's authority , it follows in his own words , thus ; ( of schism , p. . ) first they ( the romanists ) must manifest the matter of fact , that thus it was in england : . the consequence of that fact , that it were schism , supposing those successours of s. peter were thus set over all christians by christ : that is , we must be put first to prove a thing which himself and all the world acknowledges , to wit , that king h. the eighth deny'd the pope's supremacy , next , that what god bid us doe is to be done , and that the authority instituted by christ is to be obe'yd . dr h. is therefore can-did when he acknowledges here that these passages are ridiculous ; very unconsonant to himself , when he denyes there is the least cause or ground for it in his tract , whereas his own express words , now cited , manifest●●● and lastly , extraordinarily reserv'd , in giving no other answer than this bare denial of his own express words . but , being taken tardy in his divisionary art , in which it is his cōmon custome to talke quodlibetically ; he thought it the wiser way to put up what 's past with patience , than by defending it give occasion for more mirth . but , to come to the point : that which was objected to him by me and the cath. gent. was this , that he expected catholicks should produce evidences and proofs for the pope's authority in england ; which task we disclaimed to belong to us , who stood upon possession , ( and such a possession as no king can show for his crown ) any more , than it does to an emperour or any long and-quietly-possest governour , to evidence to a known rebel and actual renouncer of his authority , that his title to the kingdome is just , ere he can either account him or punish him as rebellious . in answer , dr. h. repl. p. . first denies that he required in the place there agitated ( that is , in the beginning of his fourth chapter of schism ) any such thing of the catholicks , as to prove their pretensions : ●ut his own express words , of schism , p. . . check his bad memory ; which are these , our method now leads us to enquire impartially what evidences are producible against the church of england , whereby it may be thought liable to this guilt of schism . whence he proceeds to examine our evidences , and to solve them : which is manifestly to put himself upon the part of the respondent , the catholick on the part of the opponent ; that is , to make us bring proofs , and seem to renounce the claim of our so-qualify'd a possession by condescending to dispute it . whereas we are in all reason to stick to it till it be sufficiently disprov'd , which cannot be done otherwise than by rigorous evidence , as hath been shown ; not to dispute it as a thing dubious : since 't is evident we had the possession , and such a possession as could give us a title . this therefore we ought to plead , not to relinquish this firm ground , and to fall to quibble with him in wordish testimonies . to omit , that the evidences he produces in our name are none of ours . for , the onely evidence we produce , when we please to oppose , is the evidence of the infallibility of vniversal tradition or attestation of fore-fathers , which we build upon both for that and other points of faith : nor do we build upon scripture at all , but as interpreted by the practice of the church and the tradition now spoken of . wherefore , since dr. h. neither mentions , produces , nor solves those , that is , neither the certainty of vniversal attestation , nor the testimonies of scripture as explicable by the received doctrine of ancestours ( which latter must be done by showing that the doctrine of the church , thus attested and received , gives them not this explication ; ) 't is evident that he hath not so much as mention'd , much less produced , or solved our evidences . our doctors indeed , as private writers , undertake sometimes , ex superabundanti , to discourse from scripture upon other grounds , as grammar , history , propriety of language , &c. to show , ad hominem , our advantage over the protestants even in their own ( and to them the onely ) way : but , interpretations of scripture thus grounded are not those upon which we rely for this , or any other point of our faith. so that dr. h. by putting upon us wrong-pretended evidences , brings all the question , as is custome is , to a word-skirmish ; where he is sure men may fight like andabatae in the dark , and so he may hap to escape knocks : whereas , in the other way of evident reason , he is sure to meet with enough . at least , in that case , the controversy being onely manag'd by wit , and carried on his side who can be readiest in explicating and referring one place to another , with other like inventions ; it may be his good fortune to light on such a doltish adversary , that the doctor may make his ayre-connected discourse more plausible than the others , which is all he cares for : this being a defence and ground enough for his fallible , that is probable , faith. dr. h. defends himself , by saying ( p. . ( he mean't onely that catholicks bring christ's donation to s. peter for an argument of the pope's supremacy ; instancing against the cath. gent. in his own confession , that catholicks rely on that donation as the foundation or cornerstone of the whole build●ng . by which one may see that the doctor knows not or will not know the difference between a title and an argument . christ's donation to s. peter is our title , our manner of trnour , by which we hold the pope his successour , head pastour ; not our argument to infer that he is so . 't is part of our tenet , and the thing which we hold upon possession , to be disprov'd by them or ( if we see it fitting ) to bee prov'd by us : not our argument or proof against them , to maintain it or conclude it so , as a title then we rely and build upon it , not produce it as a proof to conclude any thing from it . and indeed i wonder any man of reason should imagin we did so : since ( if he be a scholar ) he cannot but know that we see how , to the protestants , the supposed proof would be as deniable and in it's self as obscure , as the thing he imagins we would prove by it or infer from it : which he knows every child can tell is against the nature of a medium or argument . yet poor catholick writers , from whom dr. h. has got all the learning , must be imagin'd unacquainted with that trivial toy belonging to the a , b c , of logick . next he goes about to prove our tenour of possession null : which he does most exquisitely , by telling us ( reply , p. . ) that now they are in possession , and consequently , by the force of the catholicks argument , all arguments deducible from thence are lost to him , the prescription being now on the protestant's side as before on the catholicks . where , first he manifestly calumniates the catholick tenet , calling it prescription : whereas prescription is a title to get a right in that which was known to be none of his before ; which is contrary to the profession of catholicks , who maintain their possession to have been ever from the beginning ; and never to have belong'd to any before : so that this is a trick of a cunning shuffling gamester , by changing the name to alter the state of the whole question . but , to proceed with his argument against our possession , which he pursues in these words , and there is nothing left the romanists to plead , but the original right on this side against the violence of the succeding possession . well done doctor , still ; 't is the luck of your arguments against us , that they are most proper and exquisite pleas for all malefactours . pray lend me your reasons a while , and you shall see what work they will make in the world in a short time . put case then , that a company of theeves enter into another man's house , and turning him , his wife and family out of doors , resolve to settle and nest themselves there : and , knowing the law will call them to account for turning an inhabitant out of his possession , they hire dr. h. ( of divine , turn'd lawyer ) to plead for them . the honest inhabitant pleads possession . dr. h. replyes , that at this time he hath no possession , but hath lost it and all arguments deducible from thence ; and that he hath nothing now left him to plead , but the original right against the violence of a succeeding possession : especially , if the intruding crew have been in it any long time , ( though the manner of their violent usurpation were never so visible and notorious ) then dr. h. pleads prescription in his clients behalf , and exacts of the honest man to show his original right ; which he ( his ancestours having enjoy'd it time out of mind ) not being able to manifest , the poore fellow loses his house , and the picaros carry the cause by the vertue of dr. h's argument against the possession of catholiks . the same reason would doe the same service to any quean that cuts a purse , or any knave that takes a cloak : they are at present , ( as dr. h. tells us ) in possession , and the right owner must lose cloak and purse both , according to these new laws , unless they can prove their original right , and show how they came by them : that is , they who are innocent must be treated as if they were guilty , and forced to give account how they came by what they formerly-quietly enjoy'd ; and the guilty must be treated like innocent persons , and stand secure upon their possession . to this miserable pass would the world be brought , if men should treat one another as the protestants treat us in this point ; and if they were no more sincere and carefull to look well to their estates , than they are to look to the grounds of their faith & their eternal salvation . the eager adhesion to the former makes them account this treaty foul play , if their temporal livelihoods be concern'd ; which their negligence of eternal happiness , more obscurely & far-off proposed , makes them willing to think very fair in their debates about eternity with us . to make this clearer , and withall to show how parallel dr. h's possession is to the former unjust ones , and how unapt to parallel , much less to out-vy and disannul ours , as he would have it , we will put them in the ballance of reason , and let sincerity hold the scales : premising first , that we both hold , at least dr. h. grants ( repl. p. . l. . ) in one place ( and that the more express , of the two contradictory ones , ) that prescription , in divine and ecclesiastical things , is of no force : which makes his pretended hundred years in it self useless for any thing in this controversy ; it being a government instituted as inviolable by our saviour , not alterable or alienable by humane circumstances : which appears to be granted by us both , because they pretend to prove the king's , supremacy and the equality of the apostles from scripture ; we ( when we see it fitting ) the contrary . this presupposed , let us compare our possession to their present pretended one . ours is acknowledgedly ancient ; theirs late and upstart . ours is such as no visible effects proportionable to it's weight can be shown , that is , such immediate changes in the world as may justly make it supposed an vsurpation ; theirs , manifest in such visible and violent immediate effects , and such consequences of millions of changes , as render it a palpable vsurpation . hence ours is obscure in it's original , and at most but controvertible that it ever begun : theirs , beyond all controversy , new , and of a late original . practical effects clad in all their circumstances yet remain in the world , to attest their thrusting us out of possession : no such effects alledged of our thrusting them or any else out , except two or three impertinent conjectures , the like whereof may be drawn for any absurdity : and consequently , it is much more impossible we should ever have usurp't , than that william the conquerour should have impower'd himself over england , without other manifest immediate effects or signs of his newly-introduc't supreme government there , than that there are two or three dark sentences in the apocalyps , which abstracting from antecedents and consequents , may be apply'd to it . the whole world agrees of the time and circumstāces of their possession's beginning : of ours our very adversaries doubt , and are in several minds . hence ours can justly claim to have come from christ ; that is , to be indeed a possession , and the sole possession in the matter we speak of : their present pretended possession is impossible to be presum'd for such , since every one knows when it began . wherefore our possession is so qualify'd , that , of it self , it can ground a claim , that it came from the fountain head of all ecclesiastical power , christ iesus ; not needing the assistance of another former possession to patch it up : since , no interruption of it being known , it is justly presumed to have descended from christ , without interruption , the same it is now . their present possession cannot of it self even pretend to have come from christ at all ; since it begun lately and , if taken alone , reaches not nor can pretend to reach to the time in which christ liv'd , but needs to be piec'd with a former imaginary possession antecedent to our pretented usurpation : wherefore , this present state of theirs is not capable of any plea of possession at all ; not consequently is it at all a truly-nam'd possession , in any other sense than as the having any thing , however it is come by , is call'd a possession . again , the pope's possession in england was a quiet one , without any else pretending it but himself , in opposition to him : theirs was never quietly enjoy'd at all ; catholick writers in their learned controtroversies ever pleading the pope's lawful title , and showing theirs an unlawful and rebellious usurpation : even this present book i now write attests that the debate is yet on foot , and the pleas so strong on our side , as i dare promise my self so much fruit of my endeavours , that no man living will say they have carried the cause and enjoy it quietly . lastly , ( not to mention the clear advantages it hath from the testimony of all antiquity ) our possession is demonstrated , by the force of vniversal attestation , ( acknowledged by our present adversary , at unawares , infallible ) to have come from christ ; at least they must confess that men not meanly learned pretend this , have attempted it , and answered the objections produced against it by best protestant wits and strongest champions . our possession then hath for it's coming from christ rigorous evidence , so held by us ; at least , ( as our adversaries themselves must grant ) pretence of evidence as yet uncontrolled by their party : whereas the pretended possession they enjoy at present is evidently the contrary ; to wit , not come from christ , but begun either in king henry's or q. elizabeth's dayes ; nor is it capable at all of pretending evidence for it's coming from christ , seeing it hath evidence against it's coming from christ . now then ▪ prescription here being of no force , their present pretended possession is no better than it was after their first three dayes ; and our possession so well qualify'd , theirs so ill , in order to the present matter in hand , as appers by these parallels : it follows plainly , that they can have no better a plea from their present possession , than the housebreaker , rober , or cut-purse , from the present possession ( that is , having ) of the things which they lately purloin'd or unjustly took away . it is dr. h. then , who ( repl , p. . ) would give leave to every man to catch and hold what he can ; not we , who would onely have every man hold ( till rigorous evidence be brought against his right ) those things of which he was found in immemorial , quiet and , in many other respects , so well qualify'd a possession . by this the candid reader , who pleases to scan over the former parallels , will discover how weak that cause must be , which drives it's defender to such incomparable absurdities , as to tell us that our possession and all the arguments deducible thence are now lost to us , because of their succeding possession : so making their counterfeit possession ( which indeed signifyes the bare having a thing ) preponderate ours , which hath been shown to excel it in such manifold advantages . the charitable non sense that follows i shall not think worth confuting ; after i have lay'd open our force of possession , which frees us in reason from the task of arguing , pleading , or opposing ; and their no - possession , which obliges them to produce evidences of our pretended usurpation , and not to expect them from us : this being all that was common to me and the cath. gentl. and so all that belong'd to me to vindicate . nor indeed was it needful for any to add any thing more in answer to this section . what follows is such pittiful stuff , as would under-value the worth of a piece of paper to vouchsafe it a confute : yet it deserves mentioning as a pattern of dr. h's wit , and solid manner of argu●ng against the romanists . first , although he knows , and all the world acknowledges , they cast a papal authority out of england , and not patriarchal onely : yet his dinstinguishing art must needs be brought in to blunder , as his custome is , with an if ; ( p. . . ) if the pope pretend onely to be a primate or patriarch , &c. what if he be ? why then he quotes himself to have done strange things against him in his book of schism ; where he tells us he hath evidenced , &c. and sufficiently justify'd their carriage against him : so strongly he disputes against us , and we must beleeve him ; and there ends the left leg of his trifling distinction . next follows the right , and steps in halting with another if : but if the pope's pretensions be higher , even for the supremacy it self , &c. as every one knows it was , and consequently his former words were most frivolous . now let us see what ground this foot of the distinction stands on . it follows ( saith he ) that , first , i may surely say they were neverbonae fidei possessores of that ; & secondly , that the king , by being so is supreme , &c. so that first he overthrew us onely with his own supposition , that the popes neither exercised nor claimed any power here more than patriarchal : next , by his own self-conceit that he had tickled him in that point in his evidencing book of schism : & thirdly , if the pope pretends to any supremacy , he confutes him most powerfully by onely telling him , that he may surely say he hath none . and indeed 't is most true ; for nothings is more sure , than that dr. h. may surely say voluntarily what he lists , without either sense or reason : his common custome hath now made it his proper priviledge . but now comes the last onset , which massacres all out arguments and grounds at once , threatning to remove all appearance of reason from this whole exception : which he does . by telling us , 't is manifest that when they cast the pope out , they had reasons for it . . that he must have leave to suppose those reasons were convincing . truly , so he shall have leave to suppose what he pleases ; so he will give his readers likewise leave to suppose him most weak , and his cause most pittiful , which must be maintain'd by such weak shifts as the begging leave to suppose that all is true which the patron of it shall please to say . this done , he quotes a book of the ring-leaders of his own schism , reprinted ( as he brags ) by one goldastus ( a french huguenot ) under the title of opus eximium : then he modestly commends to us again his own book of schism ; and so concludes , that he hopes it will suffice . thus hath dr. h. remov'd all appearance of our reasons , by the necessity of his having leave to suppose that theirs were convincing , and the quoting a book of his own folks , which another of the same leaven calls an excellent work . weighty proofs against us without doubt ! but , because we have open'd these evidences of his too much ; we will fold them up into logical forme , and there leave them . the doctor disputes thus , the pope being onely a patriarch , i have sufficiently justify'd what was done here in my evidencing book of schism ; therefore he hath no such authority here : the antecedent is supposed as a first principle known by the light of nature . next , he argues thus : i may surely say he hath no supremacy ; therefore he hath none . lastly , i must have leave to suppose we had convincing reasons for casting him out , and my companions think the same ; ergo i have removed all appearance of r●ason from the romanist's whole exceptions . with such slight talking as this , kind readers , dr. h. would gull souls into hell ; and ( which is the misery of miseries ) send them thither with non-sense in their heads . sect. . how dr. h. prevaricates from his formerly-pretende ! evidences . his ignorance of the way of interpreting scripture manifested in his groundless explication of the lot of apostleship , act. . for a lesser province . dr. h. in his fourth chapter of schism , to undo the pope's vniversal pastourshi● , undertakes to undo st. peter's first ; by showing that his commission was limited to the iews onely . to do which handsomly , he would limite the iurisdiction of each apostle likewise to certain provinces ; lest his particular pique against the pope's predecessour s. peter , should be too notorious , and manifest that his passion had engag'd him in a partiality against that blessed prince of the apostles . but because this doctrine of the apostles exclusive provinces , ( as he calls them , of schism , p. . ) limiting their universal iurisdiction , was so rare a novelty , that blind antiquity never so much as dream't on 't , nor any authour , that i can ●ear of , ever so much as nam'd or mention'd it before : he fetches the first root of their pedigree , their an est , from the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lot of apostleship , and iudas his proper place in hell ; which he will have signify , exclusive provinces , restraining the iurisdiction or power of each single apostle . his disarmer first show'd , then challeng'd him , ( of schism , p. . that his interpretation of the first place , for exclusive provinces , ( which was his first evidence , or rather the ground of his future evidences ) was so strong and unmoveable , that it alone resisted the whole world being evidently opposite to common sence , repugnant expressely to scripture , injuriously contrary to all antiquity , prevaricating from the translation of their own church , and lastly contradictory to himself . the cath. gent. calls the interpretations wretched and blasphemous , this was our charge , let us see now his defence . first , asham'd to father his own grounds or his own words , ( answ : p. . ) he denies that he mean't these for evidences , or ever thought on them as such . but , god be praised , his own book of schism is extant , which ( pag. . ) ends the fourth parag . by professing to offer his evidences : after which begins the fifth parag , thus , and first it is evident by scripture that s. peter was the apostle of the circumcision or iews , exclusively to the vncircumcision , &c. and no evidences from scripture pretented in the same parag . but these two miserable mistakes of it already noted ; from which , repl. p. . l. . he pretends to deduce that distinction of provinces . next , he tells us in the same place , that it needed no evidencing ; the thing being evident by it's own light , that the apostles went not all to one , but disposed themselves over all the world to several provinces . if this were his sole intent there , then why did himself professedly go about to evidence , p. . l. . what he tells us here needs no evidencing ? or , what was his meaning to labour so hard with testimonies and id ests , from the fifth parag to the twentieth , now by pretending irrefragable , now unquestionable evidences , to prove that which he tells us here is evident by it's own light , and needs no other ? but indeed that was not his intent then , but to show their iurisdictions exclusively limited , ( as shall be seen : ) though in this book of his second thoughts , preceiving it was impossible to make good his proofs or excuse his id ests , manifested by his disarmer to be so impertinent ; he prevaricates from the whole question , and relinquishes● position ( which , could he have proved it , might have do●e him some service ) for another which , though granted , does him none at all . for what hurt is it to s. peter's headship among the apostles , if some went one way , some another , to preach ? thirdly , he is terribly rigorous against s. w. in telling him , in the same place , that his seventh section is borrow●d from the cath gent. for ( besides that the cath. gent. puts onely one exception against mr. h's wrong interpret●tion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whereas s. w. put seven ) no honest man living who is true to his cause , and hath more regard to it's good than to an aiery flash of his own honour , will refuse to write to the same sence another hath writ before him , onely because himself was not the first authour or inventer of that sence ; if he sees that neither himself nor any man else could write better upon that point : which were in effect to renounce reason , because it is not originiz'd from his own invention , but proposed first by another . in this manner all catholick writers borrow all they write from the church ; striving to come as near her sence and grounds as they can possibly , and not vainly hugging self-fancied grounds of their own , as is the protestant's mode . but this shows what kind of spirit dr. h. is of ; who thinks it a disgrace to write what one deems truth , if it hap to be the doctrine or sence of another : and account it his onely vain-glorious honour to be the first broacher of new explications of scripture , and other rare inventions never before heard of of which humour of his this present point is a pittiful instance , his book of schism a perfect model , his folio-annotations on the bible ae large map ; as some more prudent friends of his own complain . fourthly , whereas he says here that my seventh section is answered repl. c. . sect. . 't is a great mistake ; the greater part of my exceptions being not so much as touched there . and surely , it had been a great providence , if going about there onely to answer the cath. gentleman's one exception , he should have answered before-hand , by a kind of prophetical foresight , all my seven . fifthly , ( to come to his reply , the pretended place for answer ) he is accused for being a bad interpreter ; and he spends the greatest part of his pains in showing himself a good grammarian , and manifesting the notion of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . which is a quite different thing . the same word may have twenty several notions in it self , but hath ordinarily but one of those as it is found in the context and syntax with other words . the significations of words are to be found in dictionaries ; the interpretation of them , as they stand in propositions , depends upon the antecedents , consequents , with all the other train of concomitant circumstances : especially upon the import of the whole , and transaction of the business or thing there spoken of . hence , the signification of the words interpreted to be sometimes down-right and proper , sometimes bow'd to a metaphor , sometimes strain'd to a catachresis , nay even sometimes taken absurdly and barbarously : so that , though the phrase or word seems oftentimes very odd in it self , if taken alone ; yet the circumstances and total import of the sense make that acception ( though never so improper ) altogether necessary . it being possible , even for the best authour , to mistake , or be careless in the right use of a word ; but absolutely impossible and a contradiction , he should not vnderstand his own meaning and intention , when he goes about to speak or write . hence is evident how litle is likely to be ever convinc't , by grammatical and critical quibbling upon the dictionary signification of a word : and how litle it conduces to the interpretation of any place , more than barely to show the possibility that the word may have , in some cases , such a signification ; both the possibility , probability , and certainty that it must have it there ; being lest to the present circumstances , and the import of the whole series of the sense . it being therefore out of question between us and granted , nay asserted and held by us , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , if taken in it self , can signify either a lot , or whatever is obtain'd by lot , whether it be office , province , an horse , a bag of money , or whatever else ; or whether it be by way of division or without : it is plain that dr. h. in showing the grammatical signification of the word in it self , hath beat the aire frivolously to no purpose . nor is his showing it to signify such a kind of lot in other places of scripture to any better end : both because , if the books be writ by several authours , it may probably have one acception in one , another in another ; and perhaps a diverse one in the same : as also , because , however the word can possibly signify a province obtained by lot , if put in due circumstances ; yet , that it can possibly have that signification here or in this place , must depend upon the present circumstances and import of that chapter , or all that belongs to that business : which circumstances not being found in any other place of scripture , the showing the signification of it in other places is litle or nothing to the signification it ought to have in this . it were good sport for t one , who is at leasure and hath nothing else to doe , to observe what havock this plain rule of interpreting scripture rightly would make with dr. h's critical folio-annotations on the bi●le . we shall onely apply it to this present place , and desire the protestant reader to peruse this chapter from vers . . to the end , where all that belongs to this business is contained ; and see whether he can find any ground , or appearance of ground , either precedent in the apostles intentions , concomitant in the transaction of the business it self , or lastly subsequent in the effect of casting lots , why the thing receiv'd by that means should be a lesser province , or that the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signify so . of their antecedent intent we have no other notice than this ( even according to the protestants own transtation , ) that they mean't to make up the number of the apostles by substituting another in the place of iudas ) not to go to a lesser province , but ) act. . v. . to witness with them the resurrection : which , though all grant it was perform'd by going several ways , yet there is no such thing there exprest , to ground or infer dr. h's following interpretation , which is all concerns us at present . again , act. . v. . the words , for he was numbred with us , signifie that they had reflections on the imperfectness of their number , and the following words , and had obtained part of this ministery , make it impossible that a lesser province should be there signify'd : for , iudas had not obtain'd a lesser province in his life-time , as dr. h. grants in many places : which is confirm'd by vers . . where it is said , that iudas , by trangression , fell from his part of this ministery and apostleship . now , speaking properly , 't is equally impossible one should fall from a condition or state he had not before , as fall locally from a place in which he actually was not before . he had therefore ( if we speak properly and according to the express words of the . verse ) that thing before , from which he fell ; that is , he had actually in his life time that part of ministery and apostleship into which s. mathias succeeded : but dr. h. grants , he had not actually before his death a lesser province , but the office of apostle onely : therefore those words can with no propriety signifie a lesser province , but the apostolical dignity onely ; and so it was the apostles intention to surrogate s. mathias onely into this dignity . next , as for the transaction of the business it self , it was onely performed by casting lots and prayer ; no circumstances imaginable , nor the least word being there favourable to this explication , or that can be pretended to favour it : if we omit , as we ought in all reason , the phrases in controversy ; for we must not prove the same thing by it's self . to come then to the effect subsequent to the casting of lots ; nothing can be invented either plainer in it's self , or more explicative of the former intention . the words are these , the lot fell upon mathias ; and the effect was , that he was numbred with the eleven apostles . relate these words to the . verse , for he ( iudas ) was numbred with us ; and to the following verses , importing thus much , that iudas fell , and , by his fall , there wanted one of the former apostolical number : upon this they cast lots , and the result of that action is exprest to be this , that he was numbred with the eleven apostles . ioyn the well ordered series of these circumstances together , which the very place it self affords and offers ; and tell me good reader , if it be likely any thing can be mean't by that into which they chose mathias , but the dignity or office of an apostle : tell me whether it be not a wretched interpretation ( as the cath. gent. call'd dit , ) onely upon a possibility that the word , taken in it's self and grammatically , or as found in other circumstances , may have such a signification ; to infer , against the whole stream of all the present circumstances , and without the least ground or shadow of ground from the place in which 't is found , that it signifies a lesser province . thus much for that place , as explicable by the right rules of interpreting scripture . now then , should we condescend to criticize upon each particular word taken in it sel ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , if taken alone , signifies either the lot , or the thing obtained by lot ; and in that place it is evident and granted to be the latter : but still 't is left to be determined by other adjoyning words , what kind of thing this was which was thus obtained . the words joyned with it are these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of this ministery and apostleship : and by these the general signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be determined ; that is , whether it signify a province , or an office . i would ask him then , first , how often he hath read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a place of ministery , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a place where an apostle was to preach ? next , i would ask him , what means the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this ? which should rather , in all right , have been 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that ministery , &c. had it related to that province which iudas had or should have had ; but , being as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this ministery , what could it mean but the present office of apostleship , which the apostles all at that time enjoy'd , from which iudas fell , and into which s. mathias succeeded ? lastly , i would gladly know of him , whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. part of this ministery or apostleship , v. . do not manifestly signify the same as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , does here , v. ( at least i am sure s. peter tells us there it does ) and whether their own translation do not render this to be an office , psal . . v. . let another take his office ? iudge then , indifferent reader , what evidences are to be expected from dr. h. whos 's first and ground-evidence here is thus manifoldly weak . magnis tamen excidit ausis ; and he hath still this honour ( which he esteems most important ) that this explication is perfectly his own , and not borrow'd from any other : which poor s. w. as he disgracefully objected to him , is glad to doe , wanting ( alas ! ) dr. h's miraculous talent of interpreting scripture so as no man living ever did before him ; i may adde , nor any wise man will ever do after him . sect. . with what weak sleights dr. h. would underprop his ruinous explication of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( iudas his place in hell ) for a lesser province : and how he produces testimonies importing an evidently-disparate interpretation for just-the-same with his . thus much for the first ground of dr. h's evidences , from those words , act. . v. . that he may take 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. part , or the lot , of this ministery and apostleship . now follows the second , and the more famous one of the two , in the same v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from which iudas ) as their own translation renders it ) by transgression fell , that he might goe to his own place . which last words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or his own place , to show there were such things as exclusive provinces , dr. h. ( of schism , p. . ) paraphrases to signify , his own or proper place or assignation for the witnessing the resurrection , and proclaiming the faith or doctrine of christ to the world : others , and among them the cath. gent. and s. w. nay even all the protestants ( as far as i can hear ) except dr. h. make account it signifies iudas his own place in hell ; and that 't is absolutely impossible it should signify in that place a leasser province , as dr. h. would have it . his first argument , that it cannot signify a place in hell , is drawn from the charitable opinion we ought to have of iudas ; accusing the cath. gent. of uncharitableness for interpreting it so , in these words , ( repl. p. . ) it was sufficient to say of iudas that which had been said , v. . . . . to set out the horrour of his fact , and his bloody death ; and that he needed not proceed to the revealing of secrets , &c. but i wonder what secret it is to say that iudas is in hell , after it had been revealed and pronounced by our saviour himself ( io. c. . v. . ) that he was the son of perdition , and he had died in despair by his own hands . but let us observe the order of dr. h's charity : ( answ . p. l. . . . . &c. ) he could not retain a favorable opinion of salvation attainable by the maintainers of the breach between us ( meaning the pope and cardinalls , who had pronounced the sentence of excommunication against his schismatical party , ) nor by the catholick converts in england ; nay , he had decreed and denounced hell and damnation to s. w. and the romish factor , for showing he had forgotten his accidence and his other toyish weaknesses ; yet he would not have us censure iudas too rashly , or judge him in hell for betraying our saviour : the likelihood of the others damnation is of no difficulty with him ; this he calls a secret ; and blames the cath. gent. for revealing it . his second argument is drawn from s. chrysostom's words upon that place , saying that s. peter insults not over iudas , calling him villain or detestable villain , but sets down the fact simply and his present vengeance . to which last words dr. h. annexes his corollary ; and to make sure work , as before he hath oft confuted us with his own surely , so now he ascertains it with his own sure : his present vengeance , that sure is it ( saith he ) which befel him in this world . a weighty argument ! as if any space of time interven'd between wicked men's death and their being in hell ; and , as if their vengeance of damnation were not ful as present as their temporal vengeance of an ill death here . i am sure the psalmist psal . . v. . in that very place which uses to be apply'd to mean mystically our saviours words of iudas , wishes they may go quick into hell : which expresses a vengeance present enough , and earlier than their vengeance in this world , to wish them in hell before they are dead . in stead of a third argument , he would persuade us in courtesy to admit a parenthesis here : his plea for this parenthesis is this , because the use of parentheses in scripture is very obvious : if then the words ( from which iudas by transgression fell ) be pounded up in a parenthesis , so as they may not at all help the signification of their neighbours , ( which is something too hard dealing , ) then he tells us his interpretation is clear and unavoydable . but , what means he when he tells us , that the parenthesis needs no more formall expression than onely by putting a comma after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? would he have it a parenthesis or no ? a parenthesis relates not to the sense of the fore-going nor following words ; but leaves the sense entire though it be omitted : what is within commas onely cannot always thus be omitted , without oftentimes maiming the sense . again , how must a comma put after iudas needs make his interpretation so clear and unavoydable ; since he knows well that many , both protestant and catholick commenters put the comma there , and yet avoyd so easily his interpretation , that they never so much as dream'd of it ? lastly , let us remember that a parenthesis leaves the words on either side as perfectly coherent in sense , as if it had never interven'd ; and then , let us see how dr. h. puts his doctrine in practice : to receive ( saith he ) the lot of his ministery and apostleship ( from which iudas by transgression fell ) to go , or that he may go to his proper place . thus he . where , to omit that he takes now the liberty of a formally exprest parenthesis , though , while he was begging it of us , he seem'd willing to be contented with a comma onely ; to omit this , i say , i would ask this candid man , who ( answ . p. . ) so like a saint professes his entire desire to speak the full truth of god , why he changes the words this ministery , &c. into his ministery and apostleship ? and , if he be loath to answer , i shall do it for him , and tell the reader he had good reasons to falsi●y it . first , because the word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this ] denotes some present thing ; and , no lesser province being ( according to his grounds ) at that time determin'd or present , but the office of an apostle onely ( which he is resolved it shal not signify , ) it was therefore good reason he should change this into his. next , the word this relates to all the words within the parenthesis , & depends upon them for it's signification ( as is evident ; ) and so destroys all his pretence to have a parenthesis there ; such a kind of reference being against it's nature . thirdly , the following words do not hang handsomly together with the precedent , unless this be chang'd into his ; therefore 't was fitting to do it . add that , to gain some sorry advantage , he changes the words of their own translation , that he might go , into , that he may go ; because the thing , according to dr. h's interpretation , being to be perform'd for the future , may go can signify futurely , which might go does not , as his antagonist will. lilly hath told him in his potential mood . such another trifling advantage he gaines ; by saying that a comma after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is already in the printed copies : had he said , in some printed copies , he had been more candid ; for the words , the printed copies , import it is so in all that are printed ; which is false , it being neither so ( to omit others ) in the printed copies of stephanus nor arias montanus , held by themselves to be the best . his fourth argument is that hell being the common place of all wicked men , it cannot fitly be exprest with such a double emphasis , as is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i answer first , that there is no double emphasis there ; the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being nothing but a plain propositive article . next , to come to the point ; as son of perdition is a name for all wicked men , yet apply'd particularly to iudas by our saviour , he being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in a peculiar and transcendent degree such : so , though hell be the common place of all wicked men , yet it is tmore properly and peculiarly his ; his particular wickedness giving him a special title to it . and lastly , who doubts but that iudas in hell hath a proper place of his own which no other damned soul hath ? so that , as dr. h. says here , that those words may very fitly be affirm'd of mathias his province ; so his , as it is not any mans else : so i say , with the same reason , that those words may very fitly be affirm'd of iudas his place in hell ; it being so his , as it is not any mans else . is not this an undaunted adversary , who dares aduenture to come into the lists of disputation , armed onely with such bull-rushes as these ? his last argument , which you must imagin his strongest , ( for art and prudence both require this order ) is this , ( repl. ) that it is not neer so proper to say , he sin'd to go to hell ; as that the other was chosen and surrogated into iudas his place , to go to preach to such a quarter of the world . true indeed ; for , if it be taken thus maimed and corruptedly as he hath rendered it , it is so far from proper , that it is absurd and non-sense . but , i would know of mr. h. where he ever found it render'd he sinned to go to hell , except onely in this present partial translation of his own . observe , good reader , the sincerity of this man : the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can signify , if taken in due circumstances , to sin ; but , as taken here joyned in construction with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from which , it is impossible to signify so , as every man sees ; for who ever heard such a phrase as to sin from a thing ? now , what does mr. h ? he leaves out the words , from which , which were necessarily conjoyn'd with the rest in construction ; and then , ( to make the phrase sound absurdly and disgracefully ) first , gives the word such and english as was impossible it should bear in that place , ( for , what sense make these words , from which iudas sinned ? next , begins the phrase at sinned , ( which word he joyns with going to hell , though in the parag . before he would have had them separated ) and says , it is not proper to say , he sinned to goe to hell ; whereas 't was onely his own sly craft , which had made it improper . so sincere was his profession of his earnest desire to speak the full truth of god , that he here purposely annihilates god's word , which is his truth , and will not let it speak out fully ; but first gagges it with a parenthesis ; next , cuts out it 's tongrue by maiming the context : whereas , he might have seen it render'd in their own translation , from which iudas by transgression fell , nay he render'd it so himself before , which will not let ignorance excuse him ; and he knew well enough that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 joyned with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies plainly departed aside , prevaricated , went aside , &c. and then the sense is no harsher than this , that he went astray from one state to go to another ; from the apostolical office to go to hell , or from being an apostle , as our saviour reprehended him , to become a devil . after this rare defence of his blasphemous , crooked , distorted interpretation of those words , ( repl , p. . ) he ends his section , praising the said interpretation for innocent , obvious , and far from wrested : and hopes that all this amassed together will vindicate it . that is , he dares not even hope that he hath produced any one thing to stand to and build upon : yet ( as the wordish side of the schools hold that quantity or divisibility may be made up of indivisibles ; ) so he thinks an accumulation of weaknesses will make his defence strong , and a great deal of non-sense , if it be amassed together , will compound good sense . thus far his reply proceeds to make good his interpretation by reason . next , in his answer he endeavours to authorize it by testimonies ; which he braggs of there ( p . ) to be just the same with the doctor 's , meaning himself . not to wrong dr. h. otherwise than by showing plainly how he wrongs himself , his own credit , and his readers eye-sight ; we will first put down his interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the very place which occasion'd this debate ; that afterwards we may show what a ●yrgopolynices humour it is in him to brag that his and those are just the same . the place is , of schism , p. . . where he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rendred by him distributions , lots , or lesser provinces ; and afterwards englishes the words themselves thus [ his own or proper place or assignation for the witnessing the resurrection , and proclaiming the faith and doctrine of christ to the world . ] a lesser province , then , or proper place to preach in , is manifestly his sense : wherefore , we must expect the self-same in the testimonies , to wit , a province or place , otherwise we can do no less than think that dr. h. would gull us to our faces . the first testimony , which he sayes ( with what truth shall be seen ) is perfectly to his sense , is from theophylact on acts . which i shall repeat , putting dr. h's own words fully , as i find them in his answer p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. he calls that his own place which mathias , so as it was just and fit should obtain : for , as iudas was a stranger to it , ever since he began to be sick of covetousness and treason , so it properly belonged to mathias ever since he shew'd himself worthy of so great an office. where we heare no news of a lesser province at all , as dr. h. would persuade us to beleeve against our eye-verdict ; but of an office , which judas had demerited by his former villanies even while he was in it , and mathias had merited by his worth and desert even before he had obtained it . now , if a lesser province be just-the-same with the office of apostle , then dr. h. hath dealt honestly with his readers , when he pretended 't was so . the ●econd testimony is introduc't with , the like again ( as indeed it is ) and borrow'd from oecumenius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. his own place he calls his suffocation , &c. or else iudas being gone , he , id est , mathias may have the place to himself , receving his episcopacy . so that episcopacy , which their own translation ( as hath been shown ) explicated to be an office , is now become just the same with a lesser province , or some determinate part of the world to preach in . the third is put thus ; so didymus ; the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , place , signifies many things ; amongst the rest , an order , a● when we say the place of a bishop , or of an elder . where ( to omit the weakness of inferring it signifies so here , from the possibility of it's signifying so in it's self , nay from it's having many significations ) mr. h. makes the order of dignitie to have just the same notion with a local distribution of place , or a lesser province : which are so not ajot-the-same , that it is as easy to maintain there can be an hirco-cervus , as that these two notions of different species can be one . the fourth troops after it's fellows in this form . so the ordinary gloss ; ut abiret in locum suum , id est , sortem apostolicam ; that he might go to his own place , id est , the apostolical lot . but , whether this apostolical lot were the office of apostles , as we hold and have proved at large ; or a lesser province , as he holds , and pretends to find it here identically exprest , nothing at all is found in this place , which the doctor notwithstanding assures us is just-the-same with the latter . this done , he triumphs over s. w. most unmercifully , animated by these his just-the-same interpretations . in a word , if he will contend that these authours give a third explication of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which neither of us had ; i grant it : but , to say it is just the same with his ( as dr. h. does here ) is so perfect a piece of abusiveness to his readers , as will be able ever hereafter to dishearten even his best friends from crediting his bare saying , though never so confident and triumphant , who would not have them credit their own eyes . were all that hath been said concerning these two mis-explications of dr. h's duly consider'd , litle would remain to let any man , who hath any tender respect to truth and god's word , plainly see , they are justly to be styled blasphemous . but , because he will acknowledge no blasphemy at all in them , wee 'l show him two . the first is a blasphemy against the honour due to god's word : for sure it can be no less , thus to make a nose of wax of those sacred oracles ; and , that he may maintain perversly a self-imagin'd conceit of his own , to detort it thus shamefully and pervert it , both without and against all circumstances found in the context , and all ground any where else , save onely in the brain which bred the chimera . a reverence , i say , and a tender respect is to be had to god's word ; not wresting it to bear testimony to every falshood imaginable , ( as it easily may , if treated on this manner , ) nor handle it in such a sort as the maintainers of paradoxes do the testimonies they cite from authours ; which they on set purpose sinisterly ( but far more ingeniously and handsomly ) mistake , by a pretty fetch to make show of a proof of their merry theses . the second is a blasphemy against the honour due to faith ; which , being in it's self certain , suffers in it's fundamentals , if occasion be given to think it such a weak thing , as either to be built upon or overthrown by such more than frivolous , less than probable , grounds , as are those distorsions of scripture now spoken of . will not atheists and heathens laugh , to see those that profess christianity object , against a point held so universally of faith , as this of the pope's headship was , such quod●ibetical trash ? and , is not faith it self by such a non-sensical debating it , ( should no profession of christianity bring better arguments than this doctor ) liable to be imagin'd , by prudent men not yet acquainted with it , an idler and more groundless story than the very tales of king oberon and robin good-fellow ? two blasphemies then , mr. h. attend your mis-interpretations ; i mean , such as catholicks hold for blasphemies : who defend faith to be a thing certain , and to have certain grounds ; as also that god's word is never to be interpreted , but with gravity and seriouness , and , as neer as is in a man's power , to the sense the context most strongly carries ; at least , not abus'd and vilify'd by fathering upon it such groundless interpretations ; nay treating it in such an irreverent fashion , that there is no position in the world so unwarrantable , absurd , false , and impious , but may , by the same method of groundless criticizing , be deduced thence : which devolves into this , that god himself , the authour of truth and the expresser of it in the holy scripture , shall , by this means , become the father of all falshoods and the authour of every groundless and non-sensical absurdity . this manner of treating scripture , then , we catholicks account in an high degree blasphemous ; nay , to open the way to all blasphemousness : and this , because we do not dogmatize upon it or affix to it any interpretation that we build faith upon , which is not warranted by the vniversal practice of the church , and our rule of faith , vniversal tradition : though we know 't is the protestant's gallantry to make it dance afther the jigging humour of their own fancies ; calling all , god's word , though never so absurd , which their own private heads , without ground or shadow of ground , imagine deducible thence ; nay more , to call it an evidence , that is , a ground sufficient to found and establish faith upon . and thus much for dr. h's blasphemous and irreverent treating both faith and scripture . sect. . how dr. h. prevaricates from his own most express words , the whole tenour of his discourse , the main scope of his most substantial chapter , and lastly from the whole question , by denying that he meant or held exclusive provinces . and how , to contrive this evasion , he contradicts himself nine times in that one point . at length we are come home close to the question it self , whether the pope be head of the church ; pretended to be evidently disproved by dr. h. in the fourth chapter of schism , by this argument : s. peter had no supremacy ; therefore his successour the pope can have none . the consequence we grant to be valid ; founding the authority of the latter upon his succeding the former : but we absolutely deny the antecedent , to wit , that s peter had no supremacy , that is , supreme power and iurisdiction in god's church . dr. h. pretends an endeavour to prove it in this his fourth chapter , offering his evidences for this negative , p. . l. . first , from s. peter's having no vniversal iurisdiction , ( from parag . . to parag . . ) secondly , ( from thence to the end of the chapter ) from his not having the power of the keyes as his peculiar●●ty and inclosure ; that is , from his not having them so as we never held him to have had them . his first argument , from s. peter's not having an vniversal iurisdiction , proceeds on this manner : that each apostle had peculiar and exclusive provinces ; pretended to be evidenced in his fifth parag . from the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , lot of apostleship , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , iudas his place in hell : ( of schism p. . ) that the iews onely were s. peter's province ; nay , that but one portion of the dispersed iews can reasonably be placed under s. peter's iurisdiction : that the gentiles were s. paul's , &c. and all this undertaken there to be evidenced by testimonies from scripture , fathers , and other authours . what hath been the success of his evidences from his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , hath already been manifested , by showing that he had neither any ground in the place it self to favour his explication of a lesser province , nor among all the many-minded commenters on scripture , so much as one authority to second it . as for his limiting s. peter's iurisdiction to the iews onely , and s. paul's to the gentiles by his pretended proofs ; his disarmer offer'd him , p. . that if , among those many testimonies he produces to prove it , there be but found any one sentence , line , word , syllable , or letter , which excludes s. peter's authority from the gentiles , more than what himself puts in of his own head , he would be content to yeeld him the whole controversy ; which he vindicated , to the very eyes of the reader , from every testimony , one by one , alledged by dr. h. in this manner stood the case then between s. w. and his adversary : it remains now to be seen what reply he tenders to so grievous , heavy , and unheard-of a charge ; and how he can colour a fault so gross , palpable , and visible to the eye of every reader . observe , good reader , i beseech thee , ( whether thou be catholick , protestāt , or of whatever other profession ) that now the very point of the controversy is in agitation : for we pretend no tenour for the pop'es supremacy , save onely that he succeeds s. peter , whom we hold to have had it : if then it be evidenced , ( as is pretended ) that s. peter had none ; the doctor hath inevitably concluded against us . reflect also , i intreat thee , on the grievousness of the charge layd by s. w. against dr. h. and make full account , ( as reason obliges thee , and i , for my part , give thee my good leave ) that there must be most open knavery and perfect voluntary insincerity on one side or other : and , when thou hast examin'd it well , ( i am a party , and so must not be a iudge ) lay thou the blame where thou shalt find the fault . neither despair that thou hast ability enough to be a cōpetent iudge in this present contest : here is no nice subtlety to be speculated , but plain words to be read : for , what plainer , than to see whether in the testimonies there be any words limiting the iurisdiction of s. peter , or whether they were onely the additions of dr. h. antecedently or subsequently to the testimonies ? but what needs any iudge to determine or decide that which dr. h. himself hath confest here in his reply and answer ? where seeing it impossible to show any one word , in all that army of testimonies which he muster'd up there , limiting s. peters iurisdiction to the iews , or excluding it from the gentiles , which yet was there pretended ; he hath recourse for his justification to the most unpardonable shift that ever was suggested by a desperate cause : viz. to deny that he mean't exclusiveness of ●urisdiction ; that is , to deny his own express words , the whole tenour of his discourse there , the main scope and intention of that chapter ' and lastly to change and alter the state and face of the whole question . this is my present charge against him , consisting of these foure branches ? which if they be proved from his own words , he is judged by his own mouth , and can hope for no pardon , but the heaviest cōdemnation imaginable from all sincere readers ; since it is impossible to imagin a fifth point from which he could prevaricate , omitted by him , and consequently , his present prevarication is in the highest degree culpable and unpardonable . first then , his own express words manifest he mean't exclusiveness of iurisdiction . for , of schism p. . he uses the very word exclusively , saying that s. peter was apostle of the iews exclusively to the gentiles : and , that this exclusiveness was meant to be of iurisdiction , is no less expressely manifested from the following page ; where it is said , that but one portion of the dispersed iews can reasonably be placed under s. peter's iurisdiction , which is seconded by his express words here also , reply p. the portion of one apostle is so his , that he hath no right to any other part , — excludes him from any farther right , &c. and sure if he have no right to preach to any other provinces , he hath no iurisdiction at all over them . secondly , the whole tenour of the discourse there manifests that he meant exclusiveness of iurisdiction . ▪ exclusiveness of jurisdiction is mentioned by him as the ground of all his ensuing dispute ; as was shown in the foregoing parag . to which we will add his other parallel expressions : the iurisdiction of that metropolis belonged to iames the iust , and not to peter : of sschism , p. . s. paul's independence on s. peter : pag. . to wit , in iurisdiction or power . no power can descend from s. peter to any other , for another great part of the christian world : p. . had he ( meaning s. peter ) any iurisdiction over the churches of asia ? p. . no other apostle could countermand s. paul's instructions , no appeal left , &c. p. . s. peter's baptizing in brittany must in all reason be extended no farther than this his line , id est , to the iews which might at that time be disperst there , &c. p. . all which render it most manifest , that he meant exclusiueness of iurisdiction and power to preach to another line or province ; if there were any tenour or connexion at all in his discourse , and that it rambled not forwards blindly , himself knew not how nor whither . thirdly and lastly , not onely the whole controversy of schism is about the limitation or illimitation , exclusiveness or not exclusiveness , of the pope's iurisdiction , and the doctor 's tenet , that this iurisdiction is limited to such an extent , & excluded from the rest of the christian world , so as he hath no power or command at all over them : but also his present chapter ( . of schism ) pretends to evidence this limitation of his , from the limitation of s. peter's ; as is most visible parag . . of the said chapter , and indeed in each parag . there , to the twentieth . so that , the import of his argument stands thus ; s. peter had no vniversal iurisdiction , thefore his successour the pope can have none . this being so , who sees not that , since the thing to be infer'd is the pope's limitation of iurisdiction , as held by the protestants , that is such a limitation as debats and excludes him from any lawfull power or right at all to intermeddle with more than is his imagin'd province ; and that this inference is built upon his succeeding a limited predecessour s. peter : who sees not , i say , that the antecedent must mean s. peter's iurisdiction was so limited to his supposed province , that he had no iurisdiction or power at all to meddle with a gentile ; but that it was against right and vnlawful for him to do so ? this therefore is an evidence beyond all shuffling to avoid it , that dr. h. in his fourth chap. of schism , intended to prove the iurisdictions of the apostles were exclusively-limited to their own provinces ; so that they lost all power to preach to another province : from which dr. h. prevaricating here , and not defending his testimonies produc't there to prove it ; it follows that he acknowledges s. w. charge to be true ; ( schism disarm'd p. . ) that , among those many testimonies he produces to prove it , there is not found any one sentence , line , syllable or letter excluding s. peter's authority from the gentiles ; save onely what the doctor puts in of his own head : as he shews there in each particular allegation . this being then dr. h's meaning , till s. w. charge of the perfect dumbness of his testimonies put second thoug●hs into his head ; let us see how he waves his own express words and manifest intentions there : which being so perfectly visible , as hath been shown , we may be sure the prevaricating from them can cost him no less than plain self contradictions . his first self-contradiction is found answ . p. . parag . . where he makes the point he was to prove to be no more but this , that the apostles went not all to one , but disposed themselves over all the world , to several provinces : by which , meaning , as he must , ( for otherwise it cannot be said to be evident by it's own light ) that one went to one place , ordinary province , or region of the world , to preach , another to another , without any relation at all to exclusiveness of iurisdiction ; we have quite lost the question : which was not whether the apostles one went one way , another another way , to preach ; but , whether s. peter , and consequently the pope his successour , had an vniversal or limited iurisdiction , extending his power to all , or excluding it from all but his pittifull province ; as was manifested before , by mr. h's express words , to have been his meaning . his second self-contradiction is found in the same place ; where he sayes that what was signify'd by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( or exclusive provinces belonging to each apostle , which was shown plainly before to be his express meaning ) is evident by it's own light , and needs no evidencing . and yet , in his book of schism , c. . parag . . he set himself very formally to offer his evidences for that point ; and prosecuted his intent , from parag . . to the . to evidence it by such clouds of testimonies , ( which he calls evidences , and some of them irrefragable and unquestionable ones ) as may very neer , if not perfectly , equal all the rest that are found in his whole book . so that , either he must cōfess he spent the most substantial part of his book to evidence that which needed no evidencing , but was evident by it's own light ; or else , ( which is the truth of the business ) that he hath chang'd the whole question here from what it was there : for there it was of exclusiue iurisdiction , and therefore very obscure , needing the pretence of many testimonies ( though dumbe ) and his own id ests and voluntarily add●d words , to make it seem evident ; here it is onely of one apostle going one way another going another to preach , which indeed needs no evidencing , nor was ever in question between us . his third self-contradiction is , that , notwithstanding his own express words , the scope of his whole chapter , the tenour of his whole discourse ; and the state of the whole question manifesting he both did and could not but mean it of exclusive iurisdiction , ( as hath been most expressely and amply shown ; ) yet he calls my acception of his words in that sense , my mistake ; answ . p. . l. . and again , p. . l. . . &c. he complains that s. w. would conclude from his words , that he would have all the apostles to have several provinces limiting their iurisdictions , & exclusive of one another's right ; which he calls there also a mistake and detortion . where the reader may see how perfectly he denies his own words of exclusive iurisdiction , and how openly he prevaricates from all the foure formerly-mention'd pretences , shown already to have been his own ; which were the strongest ries imaginable to bind any man to hold to what he hath said , who had not forsworn all respect to truth or honesty . his fourth self-contradiction is , that , though in the place now alledged he complains of me , that i would conclude from his words that the apostles had provinces exclusive of one anothers right , yet his own plain words , repl. pag. . l. . . most expressely grant it ; where , speaking of those provinces proper to each apostle , he hath these words ; so his that he hath no right to any other ; so his , as excludes him from any farther right . is not this handsom ? his fifth self contradiction is a very neat one . according to this place alledged , s. peter ●s province is so his , as excludes him from any farther right ; that is , from any right to preach to anothers province ; yet in the same , sect. p . l. . he grants it lawfull for s. peter to preach to gentiles ; that is , to those of pauls s. province . now we duller souls imagind that right & lawfulness was all one , & that no man could lawfully doe what he had no right to doe , but dr. h. confronts & counterposes these two identicall notions , by excluding him in one place from right to preach to another province , & in the other place granting the lawfulness of his preaching to another province ; which being the expresse places in which he goes about to declare his meaning in that point , manifests his tenet to be , that the apostles might lawfully do what they had no right to do , or might lawfully do against law & right , that is might do it lawfully but could not rightfully , which settles into this elegant contradiction , that they might lawfully doe it wrongfully . thus self-unkind sosia beats himself according as the change of his unconstant & phantasticall grounds puts his mind in severall shapes . his sixth self contradiction touches more particularly this point in hand of exclusive provinces ; he tels us ( of schism , p. . ) that authority and commission was given to all the apostles indefinitely and unlimitedly , not restrained by christs words to any parti●ular province ; and again ( repl. p . ) speaking of the particular assignations of s. peter to the iews & s. paul to the gentils , he affirms expressely , that it was not by any particular assignation of christ's , but by agreement amongst themselves that this assignation of provinces was made ; yet , the same author ( of schism p. . l. . maintains the direct contrary or rather contradictory positionto the forme , saying that s. paul had his assignation immediately from christ. so vtterly void of all truth is this chimera of exclusive provinces , that the author of it understands not his own meaning in it , or at least forgets what he said before concerning it when he comes into new circumstances ; or rather indeed voluntarily says any thing according as it sutes best with his occasions . hence , in the former places it fitted his turn to say that the exclusive provinces or assignation must come from their agreement not from christ ; because he was there to show their commission & authority limitted , which , as coming from christ was held by all to be unquestionably vniversal ; but in the last place , where he had undertaken to shew s. paul's independence on s. peter , it favourd more his intent to say , that he had his assignation imediately from christ ; lest s. paul should have any dependence at all on s. peter , no not euen for consenting to his assignation , his seventh self-contradiction is , that building upon the words gal. . . ( the gospel of the circumcision is committed to mee , as the gospel of the uncircumcision to peter ) for the exclusive provinces of those two apostles , he by consequence gets all the rest of the apostles leave to play , since one as he saies is excluded from any right to preach to anothers province , and there can be no more provinces or people to preach to than iews & gentiles , which are there distributed between these two apostles : nor is the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which , according to dr. h. ( repl. p. . ) signifies the agreement which was to give them exclusive provinces ) applied in the place alledged to any but s. peter & s. paul in order to the iews & the gentiles . this kinde favour not withstanding done to the rest of the apostles , he afterwards spoils , by giving them provinces too ; treating them as discourreous schoolmasters vse to treat their schollars ; that is , first giving them leave to play while the supplicant is present , but , he being gone & the circumstance changed , enjoyning them a task as labourious as had been their school exercise it self . when s. peter's vniversal iurisdiction was to be limitted , then it went currant that the iews were his peculiar province , and the said place brought to evidence it . but , this once done , he bethought himself that the power over all the iews was too much to attribute to s. peter , and that the pope might hap to grow proud to succeed a person of so ample an authoritie : wherefore finding that such and such apostles preached in such & such a place to the iews , he thought it best to call the iews there their province ; so that good s. peter ( whom all antiquitie flatterd it seems with the title of prince or head of the apostles ) hath allotted him by christs head-steward dr. h. ( of schism , p. . l. . . ) no more but one portion ( or a few miserable parishes ) of the dispersed iews to be under his iurisdiction but dr. h. takes it ill ( answ . p. ) that i laugh at him for thus treating s. peter . i answer , the most ridiculous position that ever was made seriously by any divine in the world ( as is this of exclusive provinces ) is not treated as it deserves unles it be laught at . next , he tels me that i never offer to consider the allegations by which it was made evident . i answer , sure dr. h. is a sleep , i considerd in schism disarm'd each allegation of his minutely & particularly through six whole sections , that is from p. . till p. . & offerd to yeeld him the whole controversie , if he could shew me the least word in any one of them limiting s. peter's iurisdiction to any such province ; which he dares not here accept , but denies his own words & flies from the whole question as has been shown . thirdly , he calls my words a calumny , & complains very soberly that i never relent at it . i answer that i confesse my ill nature , i never relent into retractation of my tenet upon the persuasion of contradiction . rhetorick , though oftentimes i may relent into a smile , mingled either with pitty , if i see the fault was ignorance , or else with just zeal & scorn when i see souls traind to hell by wilful frauds . lastly , he asks , upon this occasion , what contradictories may not this wonder-working faculty of s. w's reconcile ? i answer , it cannot reconcile dr. h's contradictions here , this being a task beyond miracle , but to return to his self-contradictions . his eighth is , that whereas ( repl. p. . l. . . &c. ) he would evade his own implicatory position in which he was entangled by telling us , he meant onely that s. peter's & s. paul's provinces were exclusive , when they met at the same city ; himself flatly contradicts it in his book of schism , p. . where speaking of s. peters baptizing & constituting bishops in britany , he tels us , it must in all reason be extended no farther then s. peters line , as he was apostle of the circumcision , id est ( saith hee ) to the iews that might at that time be dispersed there . in which place he manifestly makes s. peter's province exclusive in britany , where he never pretends that s. paul met him ; though before he told us that the agreement between s. peter & s. paul was onely exclusive when they met at the same city , &c. how powerfull & terrible is truth which can drive her opposers to defend themselves by such miserable and weak implications ? his ninth self-contradiction quarrels with both parts of his sixth at once ; according to the former part of which s. paul had not his province from christ's assignation , according to the later part of it he had it imediately from christ's assignation ; yet maugre both these ( repl. . par . . ) he makes s. pauls peculiar province spring onely from the iews refusing & rejecting his doctrine ; onely , i say ; for he affirms there expresly that till the iews refused & rejected it , he does not betake himself so peculiarly to the gentiles ; whence follows , in all likelihood , that if the iews had not rejected christ's doctrine , tenderd by s. paul , that apostle had never gone peculiarly to the gentils , nor by consequence should have had any peculiar or exclusive province at all . is not this a solid man ? to omit that this experiencing of more fruit among the gentiles then among the iews is that which s. w. puts for the reason of his peculiar apostleship & the appellation of apostle of the gentils ensuing thereupon . these & some others are the self-contradictions with which this adversary of mine , seing it impossible to shew one word in any testimony excluding & limiting the iurisdiction of the apostles , shuffles to & fro on all sides , that so what ever position he should be challenged with he may slip & avoyd it by shewing ( as he easily may ) that he said in another place the expresse contrary , and then when he hath done he preaches repentance or else hell & damnation to his wicked adversary for calumniating him who thus earnestly desires ( for sooth ) to speak the full truth of god ( answ . p. . ) and that so carefully , that to make sure work , for fear one part of the contradiction should not be the truth of god , he affirms both ; but i hope the reader will be aware of his shifting weakneses , & waving all his self said affirmations , his gentile non-sence , his pious formalities , will presse him home with this dilemma . either s. peter's authority was so limited by his pretended designation to one province , as he had no power to preach to another , or it was not but remaind stil illimited & vniversal , not witstanding this imagind designation ; if it remaind stil unlimited and vniversal , how can the pope's authority be concluded limited from his succeeding s. peter , if s. peter's remaind ever unlimited ? but , if his authority & iurisdiction was limited , and that this was the thing to be proved by dr. h. in his book of schism , then why does he not vindicate his testimonies from that shamefull charge layd against them particularly by s. w. that there is not one wordin them limiting the apostles iurisdictions , but what himself adds of his own head ? and why does he instead of thus vindicating them here , sometimes flatly deny the question , sometimes shuffle about to blunder a point so clear , at any rate , though it cost him no lesse then such numerous & most palpable self-contradictions , sure the knot must be great which could stand need of having wedges thus driven in point-blank oppositely on both sides to break it asunder . sect. . what multitudes of absurdities and accesse of fresh self-contradictions follow out of his newly-invented tenet of exclusivenes of iurisdiction , then onely when the apostles met in the same city . after his self-contradictions march his lesser absurdities , not so bulkie & substantiall ones as the former , yet still his , & too big to bee wielded by any man but dr. h. nor by him neither , unles the necessity of a bad cause , incumbent on him to defend , had added to him such an increase of strength as vses to proceed from desperation . but , not to take notice of them all , i will onely take that part of his reply which i find most pertinent to the point in hand , & then see what abondance of that kind of fruit it bears in his reply therefore , p. . i find these words ; i have sufficiently exprest ( tract . of schism c. . p. . ) how far this agreement extended , & how far exclusive it was ; not that it should be unlawful for peter to preach to a gentil , or for paul to a iew ; but h●at when they m●t at the same city ( as at antioch certainly they did , and at rome also i make no question ) then the one should constantly apply himself to the iews , receive disciples , form them into a church , leave them to be governed by a bishop of his assignation , and the other should doe in like manner to the gentiles . thus he very pithily : let us unfold & lay open what he has ( as his custome is ) involued here , & see what a heap of weaknesses lies sweating there , crowded up in so narrow a room . first , he brings these words here as an explanation of his meaning , that is , of the state of the question between us concerning how far these provinces were exclusive : whereas in the place cited ( of schism c. . par . . ) it is onely put as an instance of their imagin'd exclusive iurisdictions , & introduc't with an accordingly ; not purposely stating or determining the measure or extent of their agreement ; nor is there any expression found there which sounds to this purpose . secondly , this exclusivenes of iurisdiction , which before made such a loud sound , is now onely come to be such when they met at the same city ; & , by consequence , abstracting from that circumstance , s. peter had vniversal authority : which is a great largness of his towards s. peter , and i wonder whence this kindnes springs towards the pope's predecessor . thirdly , since these two apostles , as far as we hear , never met in any city after this pretended distribution of provinces save onely at rome & at antioch , it follows that , as far as dr. h. knows , s. peter's iurisdiction was universal over both iews and gentiles in all the world besides ; & at all other times except onely those short seasons in which they met together . fourthly , it follows that the pope's authority is not limited save onely where he meets s. paul or his successors , ( or perhaps , as he needs will have it , s. iohn ) and then i conceive it will be very ample . fifthly , since he grants , that both the congregations of iews & gentils were joyned in one under pope ●lement ( of schism , p. . ) that pope by consequence succeeded them both ; & so the exclusivenes of s. peter's iurisdiction , when he met s. paul , cannot possibly infer such an exclusivenes or limitation of iurisdiction in the now popes , or the popes which have been since the imagind conjunction of those congregations ▪ however h● may pretend it makes against the universal iurisdictions of those popes , who preceded clemens . thus at unawares dr. h. grants the pope as much as we desire , & yet very innocently thinks he impugns him ; or ( as himself expresses it answ . p. . ) laies the axe to the root and stocks up rome's universal pastourship . sixthly , the question being turned into exclusivenes of iurisdiction when they met in the same city onely ▪ it followes , there is not the least pretence of a testimony from scripture for this position thus stated ; for 't is no where found nor pretended to be found in scripture , that their iurisdictions were onely to be limited , in case of meeting in the same city . so that now the pretence of evidencing from scripture , which in the book of schism , made a great noise , is , by this new stating the question , or rather evading it , struck quite dumb . seventhly , it is to be observed , he has not a word in any testimony to prove their exclusive iurisdictions in rome & antioch , but onely those which affirmed that they preach't , were bishop in rome , & founded the church in both places : all which might easily be done by a promiscuous authority ; nor does he offer one word of proof to underprop his weak testimonies why it could not be thus performed . eigthly , his place , in his book of schism , which he produces for their exclusive iurisdictions , falls short of what he alledges it for , affirming onely , that when they met at the same city one should constantly apply himself to the gentiles the other to the iews . now the prudent consideration of circumstances may determine one man to doe constantly this thing , another to doe constantly another thing , without inferring that either of them lost their right to doe the other , by this constancy of action exercised upon this one . by which faltring mistake of his own words we may see , that when he alledges them now , as a sufficient expression of his tenet of exclusivenes , he onely sought to escape from & change his former question ; and to evade , by vertue of the more moderate word [ constantly ] which standing in the confines between exclusivenes & not exclusivenes , might , at a dead litf , by the midwifry of an id est , or a criticism , bring forth either signification . ninthly , the iews ( according to dr. h. ) being s. peter's province exclusively to the gentiles , & not exclusively till they met in one city ; it follows that , unles they had met , he had no exclusive province at all . hence . tenthly , since they agreed upon exclusive provinces it follows , they agreed to meet at such & such cities , else the bargain of exclusive provinces had been spoil'd ; yet t' is no where read , that ever they made any such agreement after this pretended distribution of provinces . eleventhly , put case s. peter had come to some city two or three moneths . before s. paul ( and we cannot imagin their correspondence so precise , nor their imployments other where so indifferent , but this might very easily & very often happen ) then it must follow , that that apostle had universal authority to preach to both till s. paul come , nor can we imagin him idle or negligent to doe what good he could to all . put case then that that prince of the apostles , who by one sermon converted three thousand , should by three months labour there convert twice that number of gentiles to christ's faith ; to govern whom , the whole authority over both being yet in his own hands , it is fitting he should use the said authority in ordaining & constituting deacons , priests & for the orderly governing his numerous converts ; and those too , distinct in all points from the priests of the gentiles ; for dr. h. grounds interdict them all communion . ( see sch ▪ dis . p. . ) things thus orderd , and the gentiles setled thus under s. peter , s. paul arrives at the city . then begins the hurliburly . s. peter's authority , which before extended to both nations , begins suddenly to feel the cramp & conuulsion-fits , & shrinks up to the iews onely ; & , in all probability , a very few , perchance twenty or thirty more or lesse may be imagined to live in that city s. peter's iurisdiction being thus grown exclusive in respect of the gentiles , by s. paul's coming , consequently all the gentiles formerly converted by him ( however addicted to their apostle , pastour & more then father s. peter ) must presently change their master , & doe homage to s. paul , acknowledging him their proper & now-sole-governour . the gentil priests , ordained before his coming , either may be degraded lawfully by s. paul , or else submit themselves to him , & receive the approbation of their iurisdiction from him , as the order of government requires . moreover , if s. paul had hap to be alone in the same city before , and to have converted iews , as his custome was , then the poore iews must avoyd s. paul's congregation & run to s. peter's church assoon as hee arrives . but , to proceed with our case , s. paul's occasions call him away from that city , and ere he removes dr. h. assures , that he must leave behind him a bishop of his assignation , that is , over the gentiles ; then presently we must imagin , that s. peter's iurisdiction , which had felt a kind of winter-season during s. paul's residence there , hee departing , begins to feel a happy spring , budding now & sprouting out a fresh towards the gentiles . so that now the scene of iurisdiction & government is quite changed again , according to dr. h's grounds ; and , were not s. peter a good man , he might undo all that s. paul had done , & be revenged on him for coming to the same city where he was to limit his authority . the gentiles therefore which were converted before by s. peter , assoon as s. paul is out of sight , begin to face about again , & s. peter recovers his own . to work therefore heegoes , and fals to preach christ's faith to the gentiles the second time , which before he durst not ; converts many , & having by this time got power enough to do it , being about to depart leaves a bishop of his own constituting to govern them ; so that we have now got two gentil bishops in the same city ; and , if dr. h. say there was not , he must say we are beholding to the apostles prudence & goodnes for it , not to his grounds of illimited iurisdiction when they met not , & limited , when they met in the same city , which infers they had authority to do this & many other absurdities , and by consequence his position in it self destroyes all order both of authority & government . again , when they met at the same city , in case a gentile had come to s. peter & desired to hear christ's doctrine , s. peter must refuse to teach him it , & send him to s. paul ; telling him it was beyond his power , because s. paul & he had exclusive iurisdictions when they met at the same city ; or else desiring him to stay till s. paul was gone away , or else to watch some handsome opportunity when s paul should go to the next town , & then he would doe him the favour . and the like must wee imagin in case a iew went to s. paul lastly when those two apostles preach't christ's faith publikely ( as their custome was ) then , in case s. peter had spy'd some gentiles or s. paul some iews coming to their sermon , presently ( as if some excommunicated person had come in presence ) all must be supposed to be hush't , & the sermon quasht ; else we must imagin that that apostle civilly makes a parenthesis in his discourse , desiring them to withdraw & retire to the others congregation , confessing candidly that now that his counter-apostle meets him in the same city , his iurisdiction is exclusive , & that he has no power at all to give them any notice of christ & his law , but must be forced to exclude them from his congregation . canst thou refrain smiling , reader , at such a heap of comical absurdities . but , to return to the place in his reply , the source of all these gallant consequences , & to bundle up together the other absurdities in it , which to treat diffusedly were a wearisome & ingrateful task ; what meanes , his saying here it is not unlawful to preach to anothers province , & yet saying ( repl. p. . l. . ) he had no right to doe it what means his putting here , the meeting in one city to give an exclusive and peculiar province to s. paul , whereas he had before ( according as it serv'd his turn best ) made it come from three other severall causes and some of them contradictories ; to wit , imediately from christ's assignation ; not from christ , but from agreement among themselves ; and lastly , onely from the iews rejecting & refusing him , as hath been shown from his own words before in his sixth & ninth self contradictions ? what means his putting here s. peter's exclusivenes of iurisdiction to arise from the same circumstance of meeting s. paul in the same city , & yet ( of schism , p. . ) excluding s. peter from medling with gentiles in britany , into which countrye he pretends not to shew s. paul came , much lesse met him there in the same city ? what means his stating here s. peter's iurisdiction not exclusive , that is illimited till he meets s. paul , and yet ( of schism p. . l. . . ) stating the same iurisdiction exclusive to all but one portion onely of the dispersed iews , without reference at all to s. paul's meeting or not meeting him , but to the division of places & provinces onely . lastly , what mean't he to talk of evidencing his then tenet from scripture , & yet the exclusivenes of iurisdiction onely when they met in the same city , not so much as pretended to be shown from scripture . these man fest & manifold self-contradictions & heaps of absurdities , shown from mr. h's own words , will let every rationall man see & make every sincere man acknowledge , that he cares not a pin what he saies , nor what non-sence he deludes his reader with provided he delude him civilly , courteously & gentilely ; nor what contradictions he maintains , so he can but imbosk himself handsomely in them , & hide his head from being discovered . yet he tells us ( rep. p. . ) he doubts not to reconcile all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here , at least that one who hath a greater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , may do it ; and so , fully satisfies his reader , if he will be content with pedantry in greek , instead of plain sence & truth in honest english. sect. . the question concerning his imagin'd exclusive provinces stated and cleared . a plain explication of the place , gal. . upon which hee grounds them . having thus layd open how dr. h. shuffles about to avoyd the effects of his own position ; we will proceed to examin the point it self , and lastly answer his testimonies alledged to conclude these exclusive provinces . concerning the point it self four positions are to be considerd , which may be imagind to concern it ; first , that the apostles went not all one way to preach ▪ but one or more one way , others another . the second , that all the apostles made a positive agreement to goe one or more to such or a province . the third is , that they so agreed to goe to such & such provinces , at their present parting as they agreed never to go to any other for the future . the fourth is that their iurisdiction was included within such a province , and excluded from all other imagind provinces . the first is evident & confest , but nothing at all to our question which is concerning limitation or illimitation of iurisdiction ; and who sees not how shallow this inference is ; the apostles went some one way , some another to preach , therefore s. peter is not prince of the apostles , or head of god's church ; or thus , the apostles , who confessedly had their iurisdictions vniversall from christ , thought it more discreet & fitting to goe some one way , some another , therefore their iurisdictions become limited ; which is as much as to say , that when christ gave to each vniversall iurisdiction , & sent them to teach all nations , he mean't they should all goe one way , for otherwise ( according to this manner of arguing ) had he meant they should goe severall wayes , it could not consist with that present intention of his to give them at that very time universal iurisdiction . the second , to wit that they all made a part or positive agreement to goe determinate severall wayes , or to such particular places , is very obscure , & rather related as a thing imagind or opinionated to have been , then asserted and manifested by any authentick proof . nor does it at all touch our question , which is about iurisdiction , vnles it can be proved that they made a part of exclusive o● limited iurisdiction ; of which nature not the least word o● proof has hitherto been produced , not will ever be producible for the future . the third , to wit , that they made a positive pact for each one or more to go to such determinate places & no other , is yet obscurer & lesse authentick then the former , no exact itinerary of their travells being extant , much lesse of their non-plus vltra's by pact & agreement , but all the whole busines is left to blind and inconsequent conjectures , according as they were found or obseru'd to haue preach't in one country , and not obseru'd to have done so in another , but whether persecution , a mutuall war , or conveniency of circumstances dispersed them thus , nothing is or can be concluded hence . nor , were it all granted , can any inference be grounded upon this , prejudicing our tenet , or even touching our question , which is concerning iurisdiction ; since prudent consideration of circumstances might be of force to determin the apostles to agree that such & such should stay constantly in this province , and nor preach actually in another , without any necessity of their agreeing to limit their universal iurisdiction given by christ ; and so it cannot bear any shew of inference , that they agreed to limit the power it self , ( about which our controversie is ) because they agreed to limit the exercise of that power . the fourth position , which concerns the exclusivenes of their iurisdiction from all save their own provinces , & is the onely thing which can seem to advantage mr. h. or concern our question , which is about the limitation of iurisdiction , is absolutely false & vterly groundles , not warranted by any one testimony ; first invented by mr. h's fancie , pretended to be evidenced by testimonies in his book of schism , challenged by s. w. not to have a word concerning it in any one testimony there alledged to prove it ; not ownd constantly by dr. h. in his answers , but absolutely prevaricated from & deny'd , though at the cost of so many & so grosse self-contradictions ; attended on by a troop of absurdities as hath been shown ; and lastly not coming home the question neither , as shall be seen hereafter ; for what inference is this ; each apostle was imediate overseer of his own particular province , therefore one of them was not over all the rest . the place from scripture insisted on to evidence this ( for dr. h in his answ . p. . is of late grown jealous that his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fall short of evidences ) is gal. c. . v. . . . . which i will first put down as i finde it in their own translation , then explicate it ; whether with more consonancy to all circumstances , then dr. h's , exclusive iurisdiction when they met , does , let the reader judge . the words , in the place cited , are s. paul ' s & these ; when they saw that the gospel of the uncircumcision was committed unto me as the gospel of the circumcision was to peter ( for he that wrought effectually with peter to the apostleship of the circumcision , was mighty in me towards the gentiles ) and when iames cephas & iohn who seemed to be pillars , perceived the grace which was given unto mee , they gave me & barnabas the right hand of fellowship , that we should go unto the heathen , and they unto the circumcision , onely they would that we should remember the poor , &c. this is the place upon which mr. h. builds his tenet of exclusive provinces ; with what right let this plain & connaturall explication inform the reader . our blessed lord & saviour determined the conversion of his elect both of iews & gentiles , & had already sent down his holy spirit upon his apostles in hierusalem , wher upon their zeal inciting them , & the place they were in giving them occasion , they added , by their preaching , multitudes of the iews to the new-growing church . stil the gentiles , out of iudea heard no more news , of him than the star led sages and some straggling preachers had told and were ignorant of his heavenly doctrine except what rumour might have variously and obscurely spread . he chose therefore s. paul , both for zeal ( though hitherto misled ) naturall & acquired abilities , as also his being bred among the heathens being born at tarsus in cilicia , fit & proportioned for that end . to him he appeared near damascus , enlighten'd the eyes of his minde by striking blinde those of his body , made him powerfully his , told him his errand , that he should carry his name before the gentiles : not that his comission should extend to them onely ( since the commission given by christ to each apostle is acknowledgedly universall ) but that he was by god's all-ordering providence fitted , chrosen & designed more particularly for that end . the former circumstances gave him his addiction , his addiction so qualified produced great fruit , & all these together got him the appellation of apostle of the gentiles ; particularly such indeed , but not exclusively ; it being otherwise evident all over the acts that he preach't commonly & earnestly to the iews . where he was converted , there he imediately began to preach , & so proceeded in that work , till some began to suspect him & his doctrine as not coming from christ , because he had not lived & conver'st with christ , as the other apostles had . vpon this he is forc't to come to iudea to confer his doctrine with the other apostles and receive their approbations ; which they found exact & entire , exprest by those words , nihil comulerunt , they in conference added nothing to me . s. paul having thus given account of his doctrine , & the efficacie of his preaching to the gentiles , and the apostles finding that s. peter was in like manner eminently & particularly efficacious in converting the iews in iudea ( exprest here in the . v. ) two things ensved here upon , to wit , that by giving s. paul the right hand of fellowship they acknowledged him a true apostle , or a fellow apostle ; & , at once determined , that since he thriu'd best among the gentiles & s. peter best among the iews ( the greatest harvest of which was found in iudea ) s. paul should goe ●ut of iudea to the gentiles , & take barnabas with him ; s. peter with therest remain in judea still to preach to the iews ; and this is all the busines which mr. h. would make to be an agreement to distribute exclusive provinces . the meaning then of [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the circumcision ] in the ninth verse to which s. peter was to apply himself , i take to be iudea or the iews there , not those in dispersion ; and of [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] the gentiles to be those out of iudea . now , if this be so then to omit all which hath been said formerly , dr. h's assigning s. peter ( of schism , p. . ) onely the apostleship of some of the iews in dispertion , by founding the exclusivenes of his authoritie upon this place , vanishes into it 's original nothing ; for , in case any distribution of provinces be signified here , s. peters's must be the iews at home , in iudea , not those abroad or in dispertion , if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denote here onely iudea , or the iewes in it . now the reasons for this explication of mine , are , first because the efficacie of s. peter's preaching to the circumcision had been experienced with in iudea , s. paul's over the gentiles , without iudea ; & consequently their severing themselves , being upon this account , should mean that one should stay where he had experienced such fruit , that is , in iudea , the other goe where he had found the like , that is , out of iudea . secondly , the words very well bear it ; since the iews doe not live vnited in any considerable confluence , save in iudea , nor the gentiles but out of it , which is the thing that gives a common denomination to a people . thirdly , s. paul's words , onely they would that we should remember the poore , imediately following , shew plainly the meaning is that he was designed by these words to go out of iudea , & therefore desired to remember the poor which were in iudea , as he accordingly did , rom. . v. . . but now i goe to hierusalem to minister to the saints , for it hath pleased them of macedonia & achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are in hierusalem . fourthly , the phaenomena of all the circumstances favour it . fifthly the place of theophylact cited by dr. h. ( answ . p. . ) is expresse for it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. s. paul , be●ng come to iudea , he departed thence , both because he was sent a preacher to the gentiles , and because he would not build on anothers foundation . sixthly , s. hierome upon that place is most clearly for it ; where he makes the summe of s. paul's words to be these , me misit ad gentes , illum posuit in iudea ; he sent me to the gentiles , & put or placed him in iudea . yet dr. h. from this place gives s. peter an exclusive province , to wit , the gentiles ; nor any gentiles , but those of the dispersion , out of iudea onely . this remaining of s. peter in iudea , & s. paul's remouall out of it , seemed then best for the present circumstances , but was far from signifying exclusivenes from another's province for the future ; it being well known that s. peter preacht out of judea afterwards , to wit at antioch , rome & other places ; the summe then of their determination was this that they resolved to do what was most prudent in those circumstances , to wit , that some should stay among the iews , others goe abroad among the gentiles ; which by consequence was onely to consent to do prudently , not to make a formal bargain or pact , much lesse perpetuity of such a pact ; least of all does it , even intimate the limitation of power & iurisdiction , as the question it is produced for , requires it should . again this agreement of theirs being nothing but a consenting to that which they judged by circumstances was fore-determined by gods will , consequently there was no more exclusivenes after then before their agreement , nor their subsequent agreement any farther designation ( as d. h. calls it ) in respect of s. peter & s. paul , then the antecedent designation by god almighty ; the plain text manifests this most clearly ; [ when they saw that the gospel of the circumcision was committet to me , as the gospel of the vncircumcision to peter ] where we see their judging it was already so committed is the reason why they decreed it should so remain , and that they should preach still where god had shew'd it his will , by giving such a blessing ; which superadds nothing to the former . next follows the motive why they judged that there was such a particular commission , in these words ; for he that wrought effectually with peter to the apostl●ship of the iews , was mighty in met towards the gentiles ; so that the efficacity of preaching & experience of more ample fruit was their sole motive of the one 's thus remaining , the others sending abroad ; & not an intention to limit one another's iurisdiction or assign exclusive provinces . after this follows the result of their former consideration , in these words , then they gave to us the right hand of fellowship , that we should go to the vncircumcision , &c. which expresses no more than this , that one should go one way another betake himself another , as dr. h. grants else where ( answ . p. . ) which how far it is from even touching any iurisdiction , much lesse from limiting it , every child may discern . again , to speak properly , & according to the force of the greek , their going into diverse countries was no part of the agreement , but a pure sequel arising out of convenience . for , dederunt dextras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , they gave us the right hands of communion or communication , signifies no more then that , by embracing or shaking hands , they acknowledged us to be of the true faith & of their communion , in respect of which every one sees that the going into diverse places was a meer accident ; unles we will say that s. peter would not have acknowledged his doctrine good , nor receive him into communion but upon promise that he should goe out of iudea . to omit , that both the scope of s. paul's journey , & the scripture's expressing that this was the result of it , joyntly with the consent of interpreters doe force us to this exposition of that place . again , it is impossible these words , speaking literally , & properly , should signifie an agreeing to go to seuerall provinces , both because the phrase , [ they gave the right hands of communication ] signifies an accepting & acknowledging paul & barnabas in something common to them & the rest , as was the doctrine of christ's ●aith , and could not relate to going to divers provinces , which were pretended to be particular , as also because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is no where found to signifie in the greek simply they agreed ; and lastly , because an half point in the greek copies at 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , communion or fellowship , disjoyns that precedent phrase from the following of going to such & such places . the words then , that we should go to the heathen , they to the circumcision , are a meer sequel , if we follow the rigour of the letter ; & so the whole place signifies thus much , that whereas s. paul was disturbed in his preaching , & was glad to clear his doctrine by coming to hierusalem , they gave him the right hand of fellowship acknowledging him their fellow apostle , & his doctrine entirely sincere ; that so each might fall to their work again in the same places , & in the same manner as formerly . now mr. h's disarmer , proceeding upon the grounds of this plain explication , held there was no other , that is , no new & farther designation ( as mr. h. calls it ( answ . p. ) save onely this of gods special cooperation with them in those several places , though he was far from denying that one apostle went one way , others another to preach , ( as the dr. knows well enough ) and that their determination was onely a prudential subscribing to what gods particular providence had hinted to them ; and consequently no novelty at all of designation appears here in respect of s. peter & s. paul , which was our question ; and yet dr. h. ( not vnderstanding that the subscribing to a former designation , or proceeding to act according to it , is in it self no new , or farther-designation as he calls it ) nicknames this explication of mine one litle deceit of s. w. which the catholike gent. had not attaind to . and truly t is so litle , that without the magnifying glasse of passion & prejudice , which enhances nothing to great somthings , & makes vast beames of matters slenderer then moats , it cannot at all be discernible . it shall bee d. h's honour to be the author of great deciets , & self-contradictions which neither unskilful s. w. nor the catholike gent. dare aspire to . again , were it a deciet to say , that there were no other assignation there exprest , yet d. h. is the most unfit man in the world to undecieve others in that point , who in another place holds the same point himself , to wit , that the apostles agreement and the precedent designation signifies the same thing . his words are these ( repl. p. . l. . ) the right hands of fellowsh●p , the agreement that was made betwixt them , &c. is sure the interpretation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; which if it be so , to wit , that their entrusting exprest antecedently have the same sence as their subsequent agreement , then i wonder what is become of his farther designation , since one is but the interpretation of the other , that is hath the same sence with the other . sect. ▪ the examination of five testimonies brought in recruit for his exclusive provinces ; of which the first is expressely against himself ; the next three , even in his own grounds , impertinent to our question ; and the first borrowed from the arch heretick pelagius , and falsify'd to boot . at present we have no more to do , but to answer his lately gleand testimonies , huddled together confusedly in his answ . p. . . and though , when reason is to manage the busines , we are to expect nothing but contradictions from this dr. as himself has amply inform'd us ; yet , being now got into his own element of comon-place-book testimony-parcels , we must imagin his art is at it's vertical heighth . the first is from s. ambrose on gal. . . which i shall transcribe as i finde it cited by him ; pétrum solum nominat ac sibi comparat , quia primatum ipse acceperat ad fundandam ecclesiam , se quoque pari modo electum ut primatum habeat in fundandis gentium ecclesiis . he names peter alone & compares him to himself , because he had received the primacie to found the church , and he likewise is chosen to have the primacie of founding the churches of the gentiles : where , first , if primatus signifies primacy of iurisdiction ( and unles it signifies so 't is nothing to our question , which is about iurisdiction onely ) then it is not possible to imagin a testimony more expresly for our tenet of s. peter's universal iurisdiction and greater then s. paul's , than this which he alledges against it ; saying that s. peter had the primacy to found the church , without any limitation at all mentioned confining him to this or that church ; so that , if there be any exclusivenes or shadow of exclusivenes found in that place as i see none ) then it ought in all reason be the exclusivenes of s. paul from the iews , since he is particulariz'd by it to the gentiles ; and not of s. peter from any , who is not particulariz'd here at all to any part or portion of the church , but extended to all , unles d. h. will say , that the word [ ecclesia , church ] signifies a peece of the church onely . this testimony therefore might serue to some purpose , were it brought to prove that s. peter's iurisdiction was vniversal , & s. paul's limited , but to prove s. peter's limited from words that extend it to the church , without any note of limitation at all found there , is still dr. h's old & bold trick , of gulling the reader to his face , with out either shame or conscience . secondly , the comparison between those two apostles and the ( pari modo electus ) if we will stand to the words in the testimony , make this sence as apply'd to particulars ; that , as s. paul was particularly chosen to found the gentiles church , so s. peter was in like manner particularly chosen to found the whole church , which signifies that s. peter was universal pastor , and s. paul vnder him : which is kindly done of mr. h. and deserves great thanks from us . though i wonder the sincere reader can without just resentment suffer himself to be so tamely deluded , as d. h. endeavors here , by making him beleeve that testimony of s. peter's primacy to build the church , signifies that he was onely over the iews ; and that not all these neither , but onely over one portion of them in dispersion ; nor yet that these were his exclusive or peculiar province , unless s. paul chanced to meet him in the same city . thus perfectly careless is he whether the place hee alledges be indifferent , for him or against him ( as hath been shown all over in schism disarm'd ) so he can dazle a vulgar headed reader's eyes with the glorious pretence of a father's or councill's testimony and make way to introduce it by some voluntary and boldly-promising preamble of his own as he does at present ; assuring us here ( answ . p. . l. . ) that these words of s. ambrose are plain ; but , whether plain for him , or plainly against him it matters not with him ; and that in them s. ambr. asserts all that was either his purpose or interest to affirm : as if it were either dr. h's intent or his advantage to conclude s. peter over the church without any limitation put down , that is , over the whole church , and s. paul over the gentiles onely , and so vnder him . the second testimony is from s. chrysostom , saying that s. paul demonstrates himself to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 equall to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and compares himself with peter the chief of them . thus hee . in answer . first the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 coming from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies any kind of extrinsecall honor , whether it springs from better parts , greater efficacy , more industry in preaching , or from what so ever cause and not onely from dignity of iurisdiction , it follows likewise that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 taken in it's self as indifferently appliable by circumstances to signify an equality in any of the former respects , as it is to signify an equality in the latter of iurisdiction ; and the like may be said of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , since of it self it onely signifies that s. paul compared himself to s. peter ; but , in which of the former regards this comparison was made , the generall signification of the word leaves indifferent and to be deermined by circumstances . secondly the best circumstance to judge what this word should signify in that place is the subjecta materia or place it self , of which this is the explication ; which being gal. . where there is nothing at all relating to iurisdiction but to efficatiousness in preaching to iews and gentiles , of this therefore the comparison between these two apostles must be understood ; in this respect onely must they necessarily be signified by these words to have been equally-dignified , and not in iurisdiction or governing power which is not there spoken of . thirdly , that this is the meaning of it is clearly shown by the following testimony ( which is his third ) out of theophylact , who for the most part transcribes out of and follows s. chrysostom ; 't is this , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he shows himself equall 〈◊〉 peter : which words d. h. cites , but leaves out the words imediately following , lest they should quite spoil his pretence of proving out equality of power from the other . the following words are these ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : so that the testimony taken entirely is this , he shows himself equally honored with peter , for he who had given to peter efficacy of preaching to the iews gave mee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same towards the gentiles . where nothing is or can be more evident then this , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there spoken of was the self same as was exprest by the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the self-same efficacy of preaching , which nothing concerns equality or superiority of power or command in order to government , as plain sence tells every man , and dr. h. himself grants answ . p. . l. . the fourth testimony or rather the second part of the first is still from s. amb. which , ) as the caspian sea runnes under ground a long way and then rises up again in the euxine ) sculks under a parenthesis in which the two late testimonies are found , and shows it's head again at the end of it in this form . ita tamen vt & petrus praedicaret gentibus si causa fuisset & paulus iudaeis nam vterque invenitur vtrumque fecisse ; sed tamen plena authoritas petro in iudaismi praedicatione data agnoscitur & pauli perfecta authoritas in praedicatione gentium invenitur , yet so that peter might preach to the gentiles also if there were cause , and paul to the iews ; for both of them is found to have done both : but yet the full authority is acknowledged given to peter in the preaching to the iews and paul's perfect authority is found in preaching to the gentiles . where , the first part of the testimony is expressely contrary to dr. h. this granting that each might preach to either , he denying they had right to doe so , repl. p. . and that s. peter had no iurisdiction save over one portion onely of the dispersed iews ( of schism p. . ) the second part of it which concerns plena authoritas , full authority or power , is onely meant of greater powerfulness and authoritative efficacity in preaching , not of fuller power of iurisdiction . no● can it be otherwise , either proceeding upon grounds common to us both , these words being the explication or comment upon the greater efficacity of preaching spoken of in the . v. and so are to be understood to mean that said efficacy , which none imagins to signify iurisdiction ; and particularly upon dr. h's grounds which makes no designation of provinces till the agreement exprest as he will needs have it in the . v. by their giving the right hands of fellowship ; to which this speciall efficacity of preaching , mention'd in the , . v. and it 's exposition are antecedent . again suppose it signified full power of iurisdiction yet there wants ( when they met in the same city onely ) to make it expresse for mr. h's tenet ; so that neither can it concern our question of iurisdiction ; nor , did it , could it reach home to dr. h's purpose . lastly , to render this place impossible to serve dr. h's turn , let us look answ . p. . l. . and we shall find him expressely contend that preaching or converting is nothing to the matter of iurisdiction and therefore not argumentatiue for us to infer s. peter's larger iurisdiction from his preaching to more : now then , since the authority here spoken of is onely in praedicatione , in preaching ( as the testimony it self inform us ) consequently it can neither concern our question which is about iurisdiction , nor make for his purpose , and all this follows out of his own words and his own grounds . the fifth testimony is from s. hierom ( as hee tells us ) that the churches of the iews seorsim habebantur nec his quae erant ex gentibus miscebantur , were held a part nor mingled with these of the gentiles , and that the agreement was made that s. paul should preach to the gentiles , peter iames and iohn to the iews . the latter part of this testimony is already answered and shown that this was a prudent consent to act in such sort as god's speciall concurrence had manifested to be best in those circumstances . to act , i say , not to make a formall and perpetuall pact the one province should be ( as dr. h. expresses it ( repl. p. . l. . . ) so one apostles that he hath no right to another part but is excluded from any farther right ; which includes two things besides some to go one way and some another ; to wit perpetu●ty of such a right , and exclusivenes ; neither of which are any where exprest in this testimony . as for the first part of this place concerning the severing of the iewish and gentile churches . first i answer , that i doubt not but the apostles did prudently let them vse their devotions a part as long as the iewish customes were in fresh observation , and therefore the conjuction of them in common acts of devotion would have been subject to breed offence and scandalls ; but , i deny absolutely that which can serve dr. h's turn , to wit , that they ●sed their endeavours to keep them still a part for the future , which they had done had they constituted distinct bishops over them to govern them as contradistinct provinces ; for , this would have made the breach which was onely occasionall at first and so easily by degrees alterable , passe into ecclesiasticall constitution , not easily violable , by this means keeping on foot the division : and also this carriage of the apostles would have countenanced the breach and the groundless scandall which occasion'd the breach . all therefore the apostles did was no more then as if magistrates who govern in common a city , if the citizens chance to fall at variance , some prudently comply with one side , others with the other to reduce both to unity ad amity which is far from making two litle commōwealths of them or assigning them distinct magistrates to govern them : which had they done who sees not but by taking a way the vnity of government they had establisht the division . such was evidently the apostles demeanour here , such their intentions ; to wit , as much as they could without scandalizing either party , to bring them to vnity and vniformity into one church and to vnite them in him whom they taught to be the head corner-stone , christ iesus , in whom was no distinction of iew and gentile : and surely had the distraction in the primitive church been thus cōtinued by apostolicall agreemēt to sever them as distinct provinces and constitute over them opposite-litled bishops we should both have heard news of ●ome of those bishops exprest by some testimony from antiquity to have been over iews onely or gentiles onely ; and also have heard of their reuniting after wards under one common bishop , and how the former bishops , either one or both , were dispossest or lost their place . yet not a syllable could dr. hammond find to expresse the former save his own , id est , nor to countenance the latter but his own new invented scholion , or ( as he calls it of schism p . his clew , ) to extricate the reader out of the mazes into which antient writers may lead him ; as hath been shown particularly in schism disarm'd . part. . sect. . . . secondly , to return to our testimony dr. h. prettily ioyns these two places together thus , s. hierom having affirmed on gal. . . that the iewish and gentile churches were severd , addes ( saith hee ) on this verse of c. . that they agreed that s. paul should preach to the gentiles , &c. and thence having found the word severing in the first place , he infers a severing of provinces , and introduces it with a sure . what means ( having affirmed in his comment on the first ch. he addes in his comment on the second , ) as if the second place following soe far of and spoken in a nother occasion had been an addition to the first ; all his following book is added to any line of it if this be adding . but this is another gentile gullery of the reader to his face to make him conceit by ( having affirmed he addes ) that the severing of churches exprest in the first place relates to their agreement found in the latter , which would have made some shew of a proof . but , alas , how far are these two from being added together or conjoyned ? this pretended agreement among the apostles to which the second part of the testimony relates , hapning fourteen yeares after what was recounted in the first chapter v. on which the first part of the testimony comments , as is clearly seen in the first verse of the . chapter . after fourteen years , &c. soe that the meaning of dr. h's ( having affirmed he addes ) comes to this , that , having affirmed one thing in one place he addes another thing in another , which happend fourteen years after , and indeed much longer the scandall between the iews and the gentiles having been much ancienter , and ever since the beginning of the preaching of the saith to both . thus dr. h. civily abuses his reader ; and , as long as he does it civily , s. w. must not be angry with him or if he does he must not hope to goe to heaven as dr. h. hath told him from scripture , p. . what is said hitherto is pretty but yet dr. h. vses to be kinder when he alledges testimonies and either brings such as are expressely against him , as he did lately from s. ambrose , and in many other places ; or else contradicts himself ; let us examin this a while and we shall see , hee continues his former favours to us . i slall suppose with dr. h. that he produced the former testimony of severing the said churches to prove those severall provinces both because i find the word ( sever ) which he vses in his inference no where but in that place onely ; as also , because if it were not produced for that end , i know not what it serves for at all . again , i shall suppose with him that these imagin'd lesser provinces of iews and gentiles were assign'd by apostolicall agreement , not by christ ; as he amply declares himself of schism p. . and that this agreement was that which is exprest gal. . v. . . &c. as he expresses himself in many other places of the two provinces of iews and gentiles . now then this place of s. hierom's being ( as he sayes ) upon gal. . . which concerns matters done fourteen years before this agreement , ( as the beginning of the second chap. manifests ) the result is that these severall lesser provinces , as deducible from this testimony , were fourteen years before they were . but this is a contemptible contradiction in mr. h. who aimes at higher matters . so much for the upshot of dr. h. ( having affirmed , he addes ) which signifies thus much that s. hierom. having affirmed one thing in one place , and on an occasion happening at such a season , he addes a quite disparate thing in another place a mile of , and an occasion relating to another time fourteen years after , which dr. h. preposterously adds or ioyns together , and then layes the blame on s. hierom. thus much to shew how impertinent this testimony had been , in case it were s. hierom's ; but now , if it be none of that fathers but another author's , and he two an heretick , nay in all probability the arch heretick pelag●us , and this confest by all sides both catholicks and protestants , and moreover most unlikely to be unknown to dr. h. what characters shall wee think such a writer deserves who characters himself so earnestly to desire to speak the full truth of god ( answ . p. . ) and yet quotes the most pestilent hereticks for the most orthodox fathers , and would have his readers rely for their salvation upon their rotten authority ; which is in a manner to stand to the devill 's courtesy whether he will have their souls or no. it is an ordinary thing to print in the volumes of the fathers all treatises which have hapt to be entitled theirs , let them be genuine or spurious . to discern them or take cognizance which are sophisticated , which not , belongs particularly to learned men who read the fathers for their own or others profit , lest they rely on themselves or vent to others the poison of heresy and error-tainted opinions in stead of orthodox faith ; nay indeed this , for the reason given , ought to be their first task ; but most necessarily and specially theirs who undertake to write and print controversies of religion ; the main universall importance of the employmēt engaging them to look with the perfectest care how they play their game when souls ly at stake . if the thing then be obvious , the diligence of such an author is hugely concerned to look upon what grounds he proceeds ; but , if he bee also much read in books of this nature , his candor and conscience are bound by the highest engagements god himself could impose to acknowledge either absolutely or at least dubiously that such a book is a known hereticks not a catholicks ▪ that dr. h. had so litle insight into fathers as not to know this , i cannot in his behalf suspect ; i doubt not bu● he is industrious and laborious enough , and takes as much pains in reading to as litle purpose as most men living ; and i wish his indirect dealings in other places would let my charity consist with truth to think him innocent of the latter and greater fault . however , i will not judge him my self , but i suppose his friends , who have a great opinion of his generall reading , will think it not candidly done after they consider this which follows . two commentaries on the galatians are intitled s. hierom's the one larger and acknowledged by both sides , the other briefer and acknowledged by neither ; nor is it possible that any man , who had run over the titles of the treatises which goe under s. hierom's name , should be ignorant that two such commentaries there were ; and so , had he meant honestly in citing a place out of one of them , he would have told us in which it was found , whether in the larger or in the briefer . to put down then a testimony and cite onely hier. in gal. . . without telling us in which commentaries on the gal. it was found ( when as dr. h's much reading will not permit us to think he was ignorant there was two ) joind with this observation that the testimony was not found in the larger one , but in the lesser ; not in the genuine , but in those which are acknowledg'ly spurious , consequently this sleight half citing it savours very strong of a wilfully-affected insincerity . now the exceptions of our dr. against these briefer commentaries as also all those shorter ones upon s. paul's epistles , are these , that it is manifestly shown from s augustin that they were writ by the arch heretick pelagius . for that father in his third book de peccatorum meritis & remissione c. . sayes that he had read the short commentaries of pelagius upon all the epistles of paul ; and in the same book c. . he cites some things out of the . c. of the. . cor. which are found in them . our doctors also gather manifestly pelagian opinions and positions out of the same commentaries upon rom. c. . . . . and. . vpon . . cor. . phil. . and . vpon tim. c. . nor have the protestants a better opinion of them their own much approved rivetus in his book criti●i sacri printed at geneva p. . affirms that both the difference of the stile and the opinions of them shew them to be none of s. hierom. that ambrosius catharinus thinks that pe●agius writ them , because upon the sixth and ninth ad rom. he teaches that eternall predestination is from the merits of the elect foreseen by the divine foreknowledge ; that senensis doubts not but the author of them was sick of the pelagian pestilence because upon the . c. ad rom. he calls it a madnesse to think that originall sinne was derived from adam . after this he quotes victorius and bellarmine , and sayes that the latter of them proves them out of s. augustin to be writ by the arch-heretick pelagius , thus far their own rivetus . and now , i beseech thee protestant reader , be true to thy self , and thine own soul , and see what sincere drs thou reliest on , who though when they speak freely and are not put to it in dispute they grant that these commentaries are an arch-hereticks ; yet , when they are put to it to maintain their paradoxicall faith , make s. hierom an arch-heretick , or else the arch-heretik pelagius his doctrine s. hierom and orthodox , by making those books his , so they can but glean any sorry scrap of a testimony thence to lend a dim colour to their cause , and to countenance it by a sophisticate and counterfeit authority ; nay , onely half-cite the place , to cloak the insincerity of which their own hearts are conscious ; and lastly , which is most worth noting this very testimony so miserably authorised is soe mainely rely'd on , that he can never make the ends of his discourse meet without the help of this , every foot , nor even pretend to show one word in any testimony for his tenet but by making this one of the three testimonies which must peece up that one word , as shall be seen hereafter . thus much to shew how weak this testimony is in it self had it been true , and how the dr. falsifies it's authority to gain it an undue credit ; but this is not all , the falsifying the authority of this testimony could not serve his turn , but he must falsify the words two , pretending that s. hierom added upon , gal. c. . v . that the agreement was made that s. paul should preach to the gentiles and peter iames and iohn to the iews whereas there is noe newes of any agreement exprest in that place ; for upon the words [ dextras dederunt , they gave us their right hands ] in which phrase dr. h. places the agreement there is noe comment at all found save onely this , ita nos docere debere , that paul and barnabas should teach thus and thus ; and upon the following words , relating to paul and barnabas nothing but onely this , ambo enim missi erant simul vt gentibus praedicarent for they were both sent together that they might preach to the gentiles . but whether this sending sprung from an agreement among the apostles or from the sole designation of god almighty , exprest both by his speciall cooperation with them , as also by those words , separate for me paul and barnabas , &c. the testimony alledged sayes nothing . now dr. h. building mainly upon this agreement and expresly citing this place for it where noe agreement at all is found , 't is most manifest that he hath falsified the words of the testimony aswell as it's authority . sect. . two other testimonies for the same point scan'd : the first abus'd , and yet still impertinent to his purpose ; the second , a most egregious and notorious falsification . s ▪ hierom's mind in this point of exclusive provinces . the sixth testimony is from theophylact on gal. . . recited by dr h. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. being come to iudea he departed thence , both because he was sent a preacher to the gentiles , and because he would not build on another's foundation . in answer : does hee say , hee could not build on another's foundation , or , as dr. h. expresses it reply p. . had not right to doe it ? if not , what are these words to us , who do not desire that s. paul should do imprudently , as it had been if leaving the gentiles , where himself had begun to preach with experience of so much fruit , he should apply himself to preach in iudea , where s. peter had experienc't the like fruit ; which was , in other language , to leave a place where his preaching was most needfull and most particularly fruit full , and stay in another where his preaching was needles and not so particularly fruitfull . is this any thing at all to our question of limited or unlimited iurisdiction . secondly , the words , because he was sent a preacher to the gentiles , are meant of christ's mission ( as shall presently be demonstrated ) acknowledged by dr. h. ( of schism , p. . ) to have been unlimitedly and indefinitely given to all the apostles not restrained by christ's words to any particular province , and in particular speaking of s. paul's province , repl. p. . l. . soe that the bringing this proof for lesser provinces , is perfectly frivolous and self-contradictory . thirdly , this testimony is upon , gal. . . and speakes of his coming to judea to see peter , which was more then fourteen years before his next coming thither , gal. . when this distribution of those lesser provinces by agreement are pretended to bee made . this is seen most evidently from the direct tenour of those places counting exactly the years ; i went to hierusalem to see peter , gal. . . after , i went into the regions of syria and cilicia . gal. . . after which imediately follows , then after fourteen years i went up again to hierusalem with barnabas , &c. at which time the pretended agreement was made and the right hands of fellowship given , ( as is to be seene in the following verses ) upon which he builds the assignation of those fancied provinces , ( of schism , p. . answ p. . l. . repl. p. . l . and p. . l. . &c. and in many other places soe that we see this second going up to hierusalem , when the provinces are imagin'd to be given , was fourteen years after his being in iudea mention'd in the testimony , besides the time s. paul was in syria and cilicia . this distance of time is unquestionnably the outward show of the letter ; but , howsoever it may be interpreted , this is most certain and without all controversy that it was afterwards . these things being so , what a shame then is it to bring a testimony , relating to things done long before , to prove his conceit of lesser provinces held by himself to have been assigned long after . but is this all the shame ? let us see . the testimony is put down by him in indifferent termes , being come to iudea he departed thence , &c. without any distinction when this coming was whether before , at , or after the pretended agreement ; whereas had it been known that it was at his coming onely to see peter , which hapened before that agreement , whence he deduces these lesser provinces of s. peter and s. paul , it had been manifestly discouer'd to be perfectly useles to prove that there were such lesser provinces at all . these words therefore hewarily leaves out least they should quite disgrace the rest . the testimony entirely recited is this , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. coming to iudea onely to see peter ; which former words being so few , so link't in context with the other words , and soe totally disadvantaging his pretence of lesser provinces deducible hence ( they being future , even in his own grounds , in respect of this time he came to see peter ) i shall take leave to think there was design and artifice in omitting them and producing the testimonie soe advantageously imperfect , though i hazard another excommunication in greek from the crafty alledger and abuser of it . from his answer let us go to his reply , p. . where we shall find him from falsifying in iest , fall to do it in earnest ; and that , soe openly and manifestly as is impossible either to be cloak't , with evading glosses or excused by ignorance or mistake . i commend therefore the examination of it to dr. h's friends more particularly ; even submitting my self to their censure if he be found excusable . to put all clearer i will fully transcribe from the place alledged . his seventh testimony ; where after he had told us that paul and barnabas had a province entrusted to them by giving the right hands of fellowship which he calls their agreement to do so , he undertakes to prove it beginning his fourth parag . thus . and this is the speciall importance , ( saith s. chrysostome ) of the [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but contrariwise ] the beginning of v. . as that is apposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their adding to him , v. the . iames saith he , and peter and iohn were so far from opposing any thing that he had done , from advising any thing more , from telling him any circumstance more then before he knew , that they not onely approved but commended what he had done , and , to set things the more unquestionably for the future , made this agreement with him and barnabas that whensover they should come to the same city mixt of iews and gentiles peter and iohn should betake themselves to the iewish , and paul and barnabas to the gentile part of it . and here i find the first full stop , all the rest being commas , which followd the , [ saith hee ] to wit , s. chrysostom's by which 't is evident that no well-meaning reader , who took not upon him to sift this wily author , could suspect but that all the words following that [ saith hee ] went upon s. chrysostom's account , and were alledged as his . this once premised , we will set down s. chrysostom's testimony in his own words ; and that every reader may understand it , introduce it with a short glance at the occasion of them out of scripture . s. paul , compelled by some calumnies against his doctrine , went up to hierusalem to communicate the gospell he preached to them who were of reputation , peter , iames , and iohn , who as hee affirmed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in conference added nothing to him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but contrariwise , finding his doctrine entire and perfect , and moved by seeing the grace that was given him , gave to him the right hands of fellowship ; acknowledging , by this acceptation of him for their fellow apostle , that his doctrine was sound now s. chrysostom's comment upon that place which is the testimony related to by dr. h. is this . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : what means , [ but contrariwise ] some affirm s. paul sayes that they not onely not taught him , but were taughtly him ; but i should not say so , save onely that they blamed him not , but were so far from blaming him , that they also praised him ; for praising is contrary to blaming ; and so proceeds in expressing their commendation and approbation of his doctrine throughout this whole place alledged . here , reader , thou seest what s. chrysostom makes the spec all importance of the [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but contrariwise ] to bee ; to wit that they praised him , praising being contrary to blaming . hence appears the first wilfull falsification of dr. h. who having spoken of s , paul's having a province entrusted to him by apostolicall agreement , imediately subjoyns . and this is the speciall importance , saith s. chrysostom . [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but contrariwise ] as if the commending s. paul's doctrine , in which onely s. chrysostome puts the antithesis and opposition to the blaming it , did not onely import but specially , import the intrusting him with a lesser province whereas all the speciall importance of it is onely this that dr. h. hath a speciall faculty of his own in falsifiing , and making speciall fools his credulous readers to think all his forgeries gospell because he gives them speciall fine words , and assures them he hath a speciall desire to speake the full truth of god. yet a simple falsification is too weak to defend dr. h's cause wherefore , to make sure work , he twists them into a compound forgery . in his book of schism he endeavor's to prove that these apostles had severall provinces at rome and antioch ; his disarmer show'd to the eye of the reader that he had not one word expressing that position in any testimony alledged but what he added with an , id est , of his own head : it is expected therefore that he should at least produce new ones which were expresse in his reply and answ . and , that we may see how strongly warranted his tenet is , he brings here one so home and expresse that i confesse some difficulty to answer it ; i mean the latter part of the long testimony lately recited as from s. chrysostome ; and to set the things the more unquestionably for the future , they made this agreem●nt with paul and barnabas , that , when soever they should come to the same city mixt of iews and gentiles , peter and iohn should betake them selfs to the iewish and paul and barnabas to the gentile part of it . this is expressely now and full for dr. h's tenet , not a testimony-bolt shot at rovers , or onely touching the question obscurely , as was his custome in other places . but , alas , how is the good testimony spoile'd and the alledger of it exposed to shame ; not a word of all this long rabble soe neerly importing the question is found in the author , but onely voluntarily added by the good dr. and fatherd upon s. chrysostom . no news , god knows , is there in the place it self either of setting things unquestionably for the future , nor of making an agreement , nor of , meeting in the same city , nor of iews and gentiles mixt , nor of betaking themselves to the iewish or gentile part of it , nor of any thing to that purpose ; but onely of the sufficiency of s. paul's doctrine , their approving it , praising it , and the like . so that dr. h. for want of a better author quotes himself for his own tenet , coins a pregnant and convincing testimony out of the mint of his own brain ; and then , to make it currant , stamps upon it the image and superscription of s. chrysostom . and all this out of his entire desire to speak the full truth of god. this falsification being so notorious , it were not amisse to make some brief animadversions upon it , that dr. h's art in this and many other places may be better discoverd , and the reader more perfectly undeceiu'd in the opinion of his sincerity . note first then , ere he introduces the testimony he speaks of the direct point in controversie to wit , of entrusting of provinces by apostolicall agreement . note secondly , that , this done , he brings in a quite disparate thing ; to wit , the approving and commending s. paul's doctrine . note thirdly , the fine words with which he introduces it , [ and this is the speciall importance , saith s chrysostome , of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] which , though absolutely false as hath been shown , yet , those pretty confident words of speciall importance , and the fathering it upon s. chrysostome make it seem authentickly true and passe down glibly with a cursory reader . note fourthly , how he layes out at large in the former half of the long testimony s. chrysostom's words concerning the sufficiency and laudablenesse of s. paul's doctrine , as if it were importantly concerning the having a province entrusted him , whereas it is quite concerning another matter ; which is his old trick of a busing the reader to his face , so often discover'd . note fifthly , how having alledged a testimony about s. paul's praise-worthines , which nothing at all concerns our question , and by this means got a cloak for any thing he should think good to add of his own head he proceeds with a career in s. chrysostom's name to their agreement of distinct provinces when they met at the same city ; to countenance which not a syllable is there found : yet he goes smothly from one matter to the other without the least rub so much as of an hypocolon to stop him ; by this means comprising all under the common head of ( saith hee . ) note sixthly , that , as he usher'd in his former falsification with the confident phrase of speciall importance , so here , that the reader may not distrust nor doubt but that all is reall , he ushers in his latter with un questionably ; to set all ( saith hee ) unquestionably for the future . what reader now could be soe discourteous as to suspect dr. h's integrity where as he assures him with such doubt-setling expressions as these are , and makes his bold-fac'd testimonies wear nothing but speciall and unquestionable in their serious countenances ? lastly it is to be noted that in his book of schism , he used to add these self-invented testimony-parcells with an , id est ; but since , id est , which stickled soe much before , was shamed out of countenance by schism disarm'd , now he adds what words he pleases in a smooth even tenour with the true part of the testimony , without any , id est at all ; both because the words of the father and the addition of the dr. were soe disparate that noe , id est , would possibly conioyn their sense , as also , because such distinctive notes are discernible , and so might prove tell-tales and discover his craft , which he hoped by running from the father's words to his own with a sly smothnes might remain lesse discoverable . and soe much for these seven testimonies , the flower of mr. h's second thoughts in his reply and answer , to support his tenet of exclusive provinces which schism disarm'd had ruin'd . all which have been shown so impertinent to the point they are brought to prove that he might with better reason have alledged the first verse of genesis , [ in the beginning god created the heaven and the earth ] as a testimony for his exclusive provinces ; for , though that place were impertinent to his purpose , yet it is not opposite nor contradictory to it ; whereas these said testimonies produced by him are at best impertinent to what they are intended for , and most of them directly contrary to his on-all-sides-destitute tenet . i had forgot one small testimony of dr. h's for these exclusive provinces , which hides it self soe nicely in a parenthesis that it scap't my observation . but having found it we shall not neglect to pull it out of it's hole , because it will give us some further instructions what a master of his ● ade dr. his in venting his testimony-ware with the best advantage . 't is found answ . p. . in these words when i say peter was the apostole of the circumcision exclusively to the uncircumcision ( as when eusebius hist . l. . c. . saith that he preacht in diverse nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the iews that were of the dispersion ) the meaning is evident , &c. thus hee , whereas first there is not a word to that purpose found in the place alledged . secondly , how can onely his preaching to the iews of the dispersion countenance that they were his province , since 't is known and granted that he preached also to the iews in iudea ; so that if from such a manner of expression it may be infer'd that the one is his province , by the same reason it may conclude for the other also . thirdly , observe how neatly he brings eusebius to speak on his side , i say peter was the apostle of the circumcision exclusively to the uncircumcision , as eusebius sayes he preached to the iews of the dispersion : which signifies thus much ; iust as i say s. peter was apostle of the iews of the dispersion exclusively ( in which word lies the whole question ) soe eusebius sayes that he preacht to them not naming any exclusion at all , and by consequence not saying a word to our purpose or the question in hand , it being granted that each apostle preached to any sect or nation as their occasions invited them . is not this a worthy similitude ? yet this , exprest drily as is dr. h's wily way , and the testimony touched at sleightly gulls an ordinary reader to his face and perswades him that eusebius does perfectly second dr. h's tenet of exclusive provinces . it was ob●ected to mr. h. by the cath. gent. that s. peter preached to cornelius a gentile and therefore that he was not over the iews onely or exclusively : he answers that this preaching to cornelius was before the designation of provinces , repl. p. . and therefore the argument is of no force . i reply , 't is s. hierom's argument upon , gal. c. . v. . where he moves the present question in these words . occulta hic oritur quaestio , quid igitur ? petrus si invenisset ex gentibus non eos adducebat ad fidem , &c. here ariseth ( saith hee ) an obscure question ; what if peter found any gentiles , did not he bring them to christ's faith ; or , if paul found any iews , did not he move them to the baptis . of christ , then he proceeds to solve it , by saying , that one had principale mandatum , a principall charge over iews and the other over gentiles , that either side , haberent quem sequerentur , might have one whom they might follow . all which the prudence of magistrates requires to be practised without limiting authority as hath been shown . this done he signifies their promiscuous intention to preach to both and consequently their iurisdiction ( for certainly they did not intend to doe what they had noe right to doe ) in these words , in commune verò hoc eos habuisse propositi , vt christo ex cunctis gentibus ecclesiam congregarent ; legimus enim & à s. petro gentibus baptizatum fuisse cornelium & à paulo in synagogâ iudaeorum christum saepissimè praedicatum . but in common this was both their intentions to gather a church to christ out of all nations ; for we read that both cornelius , a gentile , was baptized by peter , and also that christ was very often preached by paul in the synagogue of the iews . where , observe first , that the very question between dr. h. and mee is here moved by s. hierom , to wit , concerning the exclusivenes or not exclusivenes of these apostles iurisdictions ; or , at least ( for i imagin it impossible s. hierom should even dream of such an absurd position ) of their acting exclusively . observe secondly that since their exclusivenes consisted onely in their meeting in the same place , as dr. h. holds , there and there onely it is ( saith hee , rep. p. . l. . ) had s. hierom been acquainted with any such matter , it had been impossible not to expresse it here ; since the discourse it self necessarily directed him to it . for how could he answer a question about their exclusivenes , without saying they had such an exclusivenes when they met , if it were true that they had none at all but onely in the occasion . but , alas s. hierom and all antiquity were ignorant that there would arise in future ages such a quicksighted wit as dr. h. who could see things better a mile of then they could doe at a yard distance . oserve thirdly , that it was strange he should not answer that this particular addiction of theirs was by apostolical agreement or dr. h's farther designation , but to put it originized from another occasion . observe fourthly , that his answer insists onely upon the principale mandatum , the principall charge to apply themselves thus severally , and expresses it not as an act of distinct iurisdiction but of a prudent aeconomy , that either side haberent quem sequerentur , might have whom to follow ; to wit , in their neglecting or retaining the mosaicall institutions , as is shown there ; since , in all likely hood , one side or other would totally have declined from christ's faith had not this prudent distribution of them selves interven'd observe fifthly , that this principale mandatum in which s. hierom places this particular application of themselves was from god ; both , because none on earth had power to lay commands upon those tow apostles ; as also , because it is sufficiently intimated in the foregoing words ; me paulum misit ad gentes , illum posuit in iudaea he ( to wit god ) sent me to the gentiles , and placed him in iudaea ; which being so , it is expresse against dr. h. who holds that the commission of authority as given by god to each apostle is unlimited , of schism . p. . observe sixthly , that this speciale mandatum prejudiced nor hindred not their intentions to preach to all nations exprest by in commune verò , &c. and the following , legimus enim , &c. observe seaventhly th●● s. hierom does the same as the cath. gent. to wit , makes account that s peter's preaching to cornelius a gentile , prejudices their exclusivenes soe that if dr. h. have any thing to say against the cath. gent. in this point , let him go and wrangle first with s. hierom. oserve lastly , that s. hierom bringing this passage granted by dr. h. to have happend before his imagind agreement , as an instance against their exclusivenes , and that upon the . to the gal. the agreement is supposed to be made , shows plainly that s. hierom made account that there was noe agreement at all made in this point ; or that , if there were , things stood in the same manner after the fancied agreement as before it ; otherwise this instance of his had been to noe purpose ; being of a passage happening long before it . this testimony of s. hierom i at first intended onely to let mr. h. see that this learned father made the same argument as the cath. gent. did ; but , finding it the most expresse for our controversy that antiquity affords , ( as far as i have read ) since it proposes and solves the very question between us i thought good to let the reader see how far antiquity was from dr. h's chimericall tenet of exclusive provinces , and how perfectly for ours of the apostles still-vniversall iurisdictions ; each expression here found being either emphaticall for us , or else sounding clearly to our manifest advantage by seconding ad confirming our explication of this place and passage . sect. . dr. h's manner of arguing to prove that s. peter had no singular supremacy ( as hee styles it ) at hierusalem . nothing is so weak but falshood , which is weaknes it self , can think it worth producing to strengthen it self by ; and , as this breeds acceptance , so passion and desperation forces the unfortunate patrons of a self-ruinous cause cling to the feeblest shadows as to most substantiall proofs to underprop their weak ivy. this is seen by pitifull experience in dr. h. who is enamored on every toy , though the passage or expression be perfectly indifferent , absolutely disparate , nay some times quite opposit to him , so his strong antipathy against the pope , join'd with his smooth-sly art can make a quodlibeticall dish of it to please the palates of his partiall friends or unattentive readers . each leaf of his hitherto hath given us severall instances of this true charge yet none more evidently then this present passage now to be replied upon . he told us confidently of schism p. . that he quite took of all pretensions of s. peter to the singular supremacy there , that is , at hierusalem , where s. iames was bishop : his disarmer askt him and now asks him again what he meās by singular supremacy there ? was ever the pope's authority drest up in such an expression as this of singular supremacy : would not supremacy have served the turn , if he had a mind to be rightly understood , without such an odd epithet ? or , if he would needs give it an epithet why should it not rather universall , then singular . again , what means his adding the words [ there . ] the supremacy in debate betwixt us is neither subject to here 's nor there 's , but universall and spreading it self to all places in the whole christian world . all the singularity and particularity shown there at hierusalem was of s. iames being particular bishop of that place ; and then indeed by proving s. iames such ; he quite takes of s. peter's pretension to such a singular supremacy ; but what is this to his being chief of the apostles ? cannot one be so without being particular bishop of each see in the world ? i excepted therefore against that illphrad title of honor , [ singular supremacy ] as an ambiguous word , and apt to make the vulgar reader imagin that s. peter's universal authority is lost if any one be found singularly supreme in his own see ; and i had good reason to be iealous of it , knowing it to be one of dr h's best arts to couch himself in odd indifferent expressions which help't by some circumstances ( litle more then indifferent also ) may make the reader apt to take them in a sinister sence , and yet leave an evading hole for the dr. to say afterwards when his adversary should challenge him , that he meant otherwise thus much for his uncouth expression of [ singular supremacy ] as it was found alone in his book of schism without a comment ; here in his answ . p. . he explicates himself to mean , such a supremacy as was not common to the other tow eminent apostles ; which is as wise as the text it self , and intimates thus much , that they had each supremacy there , but that s peter's supremacy was not singular or above theirs ; which would ground this pretty contradiction to the former that none at all were supreme but all equall or if he meant not that each was supreme there in respect of the other , then what needed he add singular at all ? let him but grant us onely a supremacy in s. peter in respect of the other apostles , and we shall not desire him to add the frivolous word ( singular ) nor needed he impugn soe powerfully that expression which we never challenged nor stood upon , nay not soe much as heard of till he coin'd it . but i accept of his comment ; let it mean such a supremacy ( authority , he would have said ) as was not common to the two other eminent apostles , who does he impugn it , or , as he pretends , quite take of s. peter's pretensions to it . because ( saith hee of schism p. . ) s. iames his iurisdiction was not by peter alone entrusted unto him , but by iames and iohn together with peter : so that the argument stands thus ; s. peter cannot be higher in authority , unles he does all things alone by himself . is not this excellent ? but , what follows is superexcellent and transcendently rationall ; his disarmer shew'd his consequence naught , because an arch-bishop going to consecrate a bishop uses to take two other bishops with him , which yet argues not that the arch-bishop hath any greater authority than a bishop : soe that as it is inconsequent to say , an arch bishop does not alone entrust a bishop with a bishoprick , but takes two bishops a long with him to do it , therefore he hath noe higher authority then the bishops he takes with him ; so , it is equally inconsequent to say , s. peter did not alone entrust iames with the bishoprick of hierusalem but took peter and iohn with him , therefore he had no higher authority then peter and iohn . this consequence absolutely denied by me and an instance given to shew by parity the weaknes of it , it was his task to strengthen it here ; yet he hath the confidence to repeat it , and , in stead of sodering the incoherence of it , catches at my instance and tells me it neither does nor ever will be made appear by s. w. that s. peter was an arch bishop in respect of those two other suffragan bishops iames and iohn . did i say s. peter was an arch-bishop and the other two his suffragans ? what means then this laying out my words in such a forme ? that he had higher authority was mine and the catholike tenet which higher authority i showd not invalidated by his taking other two with him by the parity of an arch-bishops carriage in the like case , and hence denied the consequence : yet in despight of logick and the commonest rules of disputing he is resolved his consequence shall hold till i who am the defendent and am answering his argumēt prove mine own tenet and turn to be opponent , making it appear ( as he candidly expresses it ) that s. peter was an arch-bishop , and the other two his suffragans . the summe then is this dr. h. argues thus s. peter took other two with him to consecrate iames , therefore he hath noe higher authority then those he took with him ; i answer denying the consequence , and affirming that he might be higher in authority notwithstanding ; showing it by a parity ; what does our disputant ? in stead of strengthening his weak consequence he onely replies , i marry but you shall never prove nor make it appear that s. peter was higher in authority then the other two ; whereas any one , who is meanly acquainted with the most ordinary laws of disputing , knows it is his part who is here the opponent to make his consequence appear valid and concluding , mine , who am the defendant , or answerer to deny , grant or distinguish onely , not to prove my tenet or make it appear . perhaps mr. h. having got some credit for ordinary sleight pulpit sence , may still in the judgment of some preiudiced or weak understandings conserve his credit by such evasions ; but i am confident that any knowing sincere man will acknowledge that any freshman in the vniversity would be hist out of the schools , if he defended his argument noe better then the dr. hath proved his consequence . he adds a testimony out of clemens , which he sayes deserves to be consider'd ( answ . p. . . ) and it shall have it's full desert . 't is this , that peter , iames and iohn being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , honored before the rest by our lord did not contend for dignity , but those iames the first bishop of hierusalem , which testimony is very expresse that they all chose him , and did not wrangle in chosing him ; but as for dr. h's purpose , what it makes for that none but himself can tell us , where ( saith he ) the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or precedence , that peter had from christ , is common to iames and iohn also , and so no singular supremacy . the force then lies in the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or , honoured before the rest ) and in it's being spoken in the plurall number in common : i ask then and put it to dr. h's choice ; does this word sound priority or preeminence in authority and iurisdiction , or does it not , but some other priority , as of favour , gifts &c. if it does , then it makes these three apostles superior in iurisdiction to the rest and puts the rest subject to them , which dr. h. will ( iam sure ) by noe means admit nay expresly denies in this very page . if it does not , then what does it concern our question , which is about iurisdiction● for let the rest be never soe much before s. peter in all other regards , yet as long as they are not equall'd to s. peter in iurisdiction and authority , still our tenet is in tire to us and untuch't . testimonies therefore which can make against us must concern iurisdiction , and shew an equality among the apostles in that ; of which since this place cannot be understood , as hath been shown , it cannot consequently pretend to tuch us at all . again admit the honoring above the rest ; spoke in common of these three apostles , signified any iurisdiction or higher degree of authority , yet how does it appear hence that one of these three was not honoured above the other two ; since the words themselves expresse nothing to the contrary but easily permit it to be so without any violence offer'd to their sence ; cities are honored more then villages , yet it follows not from these words that all cities are of equall honor with one another . soe miserably weak is dr. h's reason , which is onely declamation pitch , that it cannot be imagin'd , unlesse a man had his strong fancy , how his best testimonies , which deserve , as he tells us , such consideration , can in any manner concern the question for which they are alledged , nor carry home to the meanest semblance or shadow of a conclusion . but to proceed ; having proved gallantly from three being honored before the rest an equality of that honor in all those three , and supposed against his own tenet that this preference of honor means iurisdiction and authority , and so that these three apostles were equall in that respect , he adds , and as such they chose and ordain'd the brother of the lord ; which , sure , is not after the manner of an arch-bishop and his suffragan bishops , where you see the upshot of all exprest in his sure-footed conclusion , which sure , &c. depends upon the ( as such ) and the ( as equall in authority , ) and that ( as such ) depends upon dr. h's invention ; no such reduplicative expression being found in the testimony : so that , as long experience hath tought us , dr. h's arguments and testimonies put to the analytick test , are resolved into his own sayngs and self confident sures , as into their first principles and the ground work of his testimonies , which are allowed onely to descant and reflect glancingly upon his own more substantiall , solid and pregnant affirmations . thus much to show how impossible it is this testimony should prejudice us ; now ( though we have better grounds then to stand need to build upon it ) in all probability it makes rather for us : for , what strange matter was it or worth taking notice of , that they should not contend for dignity about chusing him , if they were all equall in digni●y ? what soe high commendation is it in those apostles that none of them strove for preeminence of authority , if there had been unquestionably none at all belonging to any one of them ? or what novelty is it that persons of equall authority should doe things by common consent ? whereas , had some one had power to do it alone , and yet condescended to it with the joint-consent and joint-execution of others , the carriage was worth observation for the particularity of their peaceablenes , humility , mutuall confidence and brotherly charity . after this worthy testimony comes hobbling in a scripture-proof , to make good all that went before , in this form . and so also in the place to the gal. e. . v. . iames and cephas and iohn are equally dignified by s. paul and have all there the style of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , seeming to be pillars . this testimony hath two parts as it is put by mr. h. the first , that they were equally dignified by s. paul in the . v. the second , that they are all three called pillars . but as for the first look in the place and you shall find noe other note of their being equally dignified save onely that these three are named together . hath not this dr. of divinity a strange reach of reason , who can conclude men equall in authority because he finds their names in the same place ? so that , should he hap to find the king , tom fool and iohn a nokes named all together , presently his levelling logick concludes them all equally dignified . the like acutenes is shown in the second part which sounds to the same time , both being non-sence in ela. they are all called pillars , ergo , they are all equall , cries the dr. as if one pillar could not be higher then another . but he makes noe distinction between a community and an equality , nor will vouchsafe to understand that degrees are notions superadded to the common species of things ; whatever things he finds named by the same name in the plurall number , presently he makes them go a breast in the same degree of height or worth . he would make a rare man to write a book of logick for the levellers : if he ●bserves that peasants , as well as princes , agree in the common name of men , and are call'd so in the plurall , presently he concludes that peasants and princes are equally dignified the lord ma or of london and the geffer major of grims●y are equall in authority and dignity by the same reason , because they are both in the plurall called majors . nor onely this but cities , commonwealths rivers , horses , books noses , mountains , starrs , and universally all things in the world must be levell'd into an equality , because the common name in the plurall agrees to all of each kind , by dr h's paralell logick which concludes the apostles equall because they are called pillars , nay even from their being named together . is the answering such a pitifull adversary worth the losse of an hovers time , were it not that the sleight-reasond preaching-vogue , which now takes vulgar heads , had got him an opinion amongst many , and so , by means of that , not by any force of his reasons , enabled him to do mischief , unlesse his wilfull and affected weaknesses be laid open . i might hope also for some ameandment from another , but i finde him so long beaten to his slender-woven cobwebb declamation-stuffe , i despaire that all these friendly reprehensions will make him reflect upon his weak reasonings and make them stronger for the future . he was told in schism disarm'd of the same faults ; to wit , of proving the apostles equally foundation-stones , because they were all called so in the plurall ; that the apostles were all equall because that common appellation in the plurall was given to all ; that none had more power then another ( that is all had equal power ) because each sitt vpon a throne to judge , that is had power onely ; that the spirit satt without distinction , that is equally upon each , because the scripture sayes in common that it sate upon them ; that all had the holy ghost equally ( by the plowmans argument for the equality of his eggs ) because all were full of it . for these and other faults of the same strain dr. h. was reprehended by his disarmer , yet still noe amends not hopes of amends appears , in these answering books after he had been so oft told of it , nor by consequence are we to expect any other from him in his following treatises . sect. . dr. h's pretences of testimonies ( as hee calls them ) and his manifold falsification of s. chrysostome , to prove iames at hierusalem clearly superiour to s. peter . as for the point it self concerning s. iames , i am reprehended for misunderstanding dr. h. and that he endeauored not to prove s. iames his priority of dignity and authority , but onely to prove that in his see james was considered as a bishop , answ . p. . l. . . and . whereas neither any man denied him to have been bishop there , nor could it any way advantage dr. h's cause if this were ptoved ; for what follows against s. peter's being chief of the apostles that s. iames was bishop of hierusalem , and the iurisdiction of that metropolis ? hath not each catholike bishop the same now a dayes over his private diocese , and yet remains subject to the head of god's church notwithstanding ? again , if he intended not that s. iames had greater authority there , what meant his fiction of his having the principall place , and giving the sentence , that the rescript is grounded upon his sentence , &c. surely when one gives the sentence , and the others onely propose , the former must be held to have greater power in that place and those circumstances then the latter . but [ principall ] with him sounds noe priority at all , nor can he be held to any thing who hath got once the priviledge to say and unsay again as hee pleases . he was accused of making s. iames at hierusalem , superior to s. peter , which he denies p. . blaming me for misunderstanding him , yet in the p. . ere the eccho of the former words were well out of the reader 's ears , he goes about to prove and infer in expresse words from testimonies that iames in this council was clearly superior to s. peter ; which is clearly contradictory to his former words . but we are not to wonder at what is grown customary and familiar . next , he goes about to shew ( answ . p. . ) that he hath at least pretences of testimonies that s. iames had the principall place , the first of which pretences is , that he is named before peter , and unlesse this conclude our argument from s. peter's being named first must be prejudiced . i answer , our argument drawn thence for his principall place among the apostles insists upon his constantly being named first , and not once onely ; which might happen without any great mistery in it . again , what mean these words , the romanists argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , concluding his primacy from being first named . these are two quite different things . the argument from his being first named , consists in this , that in the orderly naming of the apostles his name is found first placed : whereas , the argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lies in this , not that he is first named , but that he is in these words nam'd or exprest to be the first of the apostles . his second pretence of a testimony , as he calls it , is from s. iames his giving the sentence ; and though their own translation rendred the words [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] wherefore my sentence is , by this means making it onely his iudgment in the matters , yet dr. h. tells us , he still beleeves it signifies the sentence . the first ground of this his beleef is , because 't is s. chrysostomes observation that his speaking last was founded in his being bishop of hierusalem : what then ? could not he be bishop there and speak last both , without giving the sentence ? were there noe worthier persons present , or did the thing to be concluded onely concern his see , or indeed did it concern it at all ? the rescript , the effect of this consult , being directed onely to gentiles , which were noe wayes subject to the bishoprick of hierusalem . but let us see s. chrysostomes testimony 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he was bishop of the church in hierusalem therefore he speaks last , unfortunate man ! with whom nothing succeeds , nor any testimony thrives , but either they are against him or nothing at all to his purpose , as hath been shown all over ; or when they hap to be full and expresse ( as this is ( then they come of worst of all . let him look into their own edition of s. chrysostome and dannaeus his notes upon them , printed at eton , and he shall see what is become of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore he speaks last upon which onely hee builds ; verba haec ( saith hee ) interpres non agnoscit , nec certè videntur aptè locari ; nam , quòd episcopus esset , ideò prior loqui debuit , non posterior . the interpr●ter doth not acknowledge these words , neither truly doe they seem to be fitly placed : for , in regard he was a bishop he ought in that respect to speak first not last . but 't is noe matter , dr. h. can cast a figure of hysteron proteron , make first be last , and any corrupt piece of an author become pure chrysostome and rare sence , so it do but be befriend him at a dead lift . his second worthy proof is that s. chrysostome sayes that iames 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ordains or decrees those things . as if the decree were not manifestly made by all present but by iames onely , and called there by s. chrysostome himself , p. . l. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a common decree ; yet , because he finds an expression of decreeing , common ( as he wel knows ) to all that were present , but , ( his present occasion not inviting him ) not taken notice of by s. chrysostome in that place , imediately s. iames is thence concluded the best man in the companie , the giver of the sentence , or whatever else dr. h. pleases . any thing may be aswel inferd as that which he pretends . again , i would ask dr. h. why he leaves out the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from the law , which were imediately joind in context with the former thus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he ordains those things out of the law , by this simple putting down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gaining something a better semblance for the absolutenesse of s. iames his decree . but i shall have occasion to explicate hereafter this whole place out of which dr. h. ) as his sleight manner is ) picks out a couple of words . his third proof is from s. chrysostome's setting down the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good order observed in their speaking first i will transcribe the place as i find it in that father , and afterwards let the reader see how craftily dr. h. abuses it for his purpose . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . there was no haughtines in that congregation , but good order , or ( as the interpreter renders it ) benè composita omnia , all things well composed . after peter paul speaks and no man interrupts him ; iames represses himself and do's not dissent . he was entrusted with the principality ) bishoprick ) iohn sayes nothing here , the other apostles say nothing , but keep silence and take it not ill ; soe pure from vain glory was their soul. where we see the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good order spoken of consisted in this that they did not interrupt one another in speaking , as is the custome of haughty and vainglorious persons , but any one spoke without disturbance what he had to say ; not in this , that such an one spoke first , this man the second , another last . this is euident by the place as taken in it self let us see now how mr. h. works upon it . he had already proved from his late-mentioned unauthentick testimony that s. iames had the principall place because he spoke last ; then he names the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which hee englishes , good order , in speaking , set down ( as he sayes ) by s. chrysostome ; next , he leaves out all those words which might manifest what was meant in that place by good order , to wit that there was noe haughtinesse in that congregation , that their souls were free from vainglory which should have shewn plainly that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or good order consisted onely in behaving themselves modestly and peaceably and not in the best man's speaking last . thirdly he tells us that after peter paul speaks but leaves out the following words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and noe man stops his mouth or hinders him , lest we should apprehend that the good order consisted onely in this that they did not interrupt one another in speaking , which apprehēsion would have spoile'd the drs good order of the principall man speaking last fourthly , to hinder the reader from the same right apprehension , he omitts all the words following that which related to iames , to wit iohn sayes nothing here , the other apostles say nothing , but keep silence and take it not ill , because it was impossible that keeping silence , and saying nothing , should signify good order inspeaking ; which hee pretends is meant there fifthly , by picking out of the testimony these words , after peter paul speaks and iames forbears , and interposes not , for he was entrusted with the ( bishoprick or ) principality , and there ending , he gains a rare semblance for his purpose that s. chrysostome made s. iames for good order's sake reserve himself till the last , because hee was the best man ; whereas take the whole entire testimony concerning that matter ) more then three quarters of which he omitts , ) and it is most evident to every ordinary reader 's eye that it is impossible it should signify any such matter , as hath been shown . sixthly , to come to that imperfect piece of a testimony , and mangled by him to corrupt the sence which is the soule of it , the interpreter acknowledgeth not the causall particle [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for ] upon which he builds s. iames his warines not to speak till his turn the last place . seventhly had mr. h. been soe candid as to put the words as he found them in the context , related to so particularly by himself , tom . . p. . l. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , iames flies not back or resists not , without recurring to the marginall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , interposes not , all colour had been wastht of from his sophisticated testimony , even as drest up by himself . for , what coherence make these words in dr. h's grounds , he resists not , for he was entrusted with the bishoprick , if the being a bishop they gave him the principall place , and soe made him more able to resist or dissent . add that the interpreter to whom his own side defer much render's it non resilit , he flies not back , which makes the marginall word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( to which dr. h. recurrs without giving us notice of it ) lesse authentick . in a word the whole testimony manifests onely that they demeaned themselves peaceably and quietly without contentions and proud interrupting one another ; and the particular line , pickt out by his sence-corrupting art , notes on the by , amongst other things which show'd their humble and peaceable charity , that one of these namely s. iames had a particular charge over the iewish sect , whose cause it seemd to be to observe the mosaicall law and soe it was by consequence his interest to oppose s. peter and s. paul's contrary verdict ; yet not withstanding , such was his peaceable carriage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he resists not , or as the interpreter render's it , iacobus fert & non resilit , illi erat principatus concreditus , with comes to this sence that he suffers it quietly and flies not back from their fore determination , although the charge he had seemd to engage him rather to favour the iewish party . but dr. h. by omitting all the words which could shew the true import of the place , by taking a line onely which could by additional arts give a glosse to another quite-disparate sence , by mangling that otherwise-something unfitt line by adding it after his former testimony of being bishop because he spoke last ; by introducing it with these confident words [ and yet more expressely setting down the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good order observed in their speaking ] then , by putting the maimed and corrupted testimony down thus , after peter paul speaks and iames forbears and interposes not , for he was entrusted with the principality , and lastly , by shutting up close his testimony there , lest the vigor of it should take aire by admitting in the following words ; by all these numerous evasions , i say , he makes the honest and unwary reader beleeve that s. chrysostome sets down their good order in speaking ( as hee renders it , ) to consist in this that iames having the principall place forbears till the rest have done , and speaks in the last place as his higher dignity and as the dr. expresses it a little after his being clearly superior to s. peter required where as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good order spoken of there , rather signifies noe order at all as mr. h. takes order ; but that he who had any thing to say might freely and quietly speak without feare of being proudly check't or contentiously interrupted by another . lastly i would know with what face mr. h. renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies onely good order [ good order in speaking ] since 't is plain from the testimony that s. iohn and the rest of the apostles spake nothing at all , and yet they are put there as bearing part in this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or orderly and quiet demeanour here spoken of . so that the words [ of speaking ] are added by dr. h's own imagination to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good order , and for no other end but to prove that the first should speake last . this manner of alledging testimonies may be reckon'd as another head or common-place of dr. h's wily shifts ; and consists in this , that though the whole scope and import of the testimony be against him , he touches sleightly and in passing , as it were , at two or three words of it , which taken alone and introduced with a handsome boldnes seem to sound for his purpose whereas the whole import of the place is either point-blank opposite , or quite disparate , at the best half a dozen indifferently-appliable words found in it , sometimes scarce a monosyllable , as hath been shown all over in schism disarm'd , see in particular his ample and pregnant testimony from the bare and vulgar monosyllable [ come . ] schism dis . p. . sect. . other self contradictory proofs , wilfull mistakes and wily sleights of dr. h's to maintain the same point . after this hysteron-proteron , testimony concerning iames his first-last place , we have another from s. chrysostome thus put down by mr. h. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. for thus ( speaking of s. iames ) it behoves him that is in great power or authority to leave the sharper things to others , and himself to draw his arguments from the gentler and milder topicks , and hence mr. h. infers james in this councill clearly superior to s. peter . this seems terrible ; but , to render good for evill and not to wrong dr. h. who thus baffles us with testimonies , we will make himself the rule of interpreting this place . he tells us p. . that he pretends not that any of the other apostles had any greater authority then peter , much lesse iames the bishop of hierusalem , who , as he supposes , was none of the twelve , but onely that as bishop he had the principall place even in s. peter's presence . how this equall power of all the apostles consists with s. peter having no power save over one portion of the dispersed iews onely , as dr. h. affirmed of schism p. . i will not now examin ▪ with concerns us to observe in it is onely this , that he produces not these testimonies to prove the greater power of any in this councill , but onely the principall places of iames. this being clearly his meaning , ( as it is also more particularly exprest throughout this whole tenth paragraph in the end of which this testimony is found , what mean the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 great power , in which the whole force of his testimony lies ? does 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vse to signify place , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 principall , or both of them together principal place as that is contradistinguisht from greater power ? how come then the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to signify principall place ? that he had in that place great power which the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , directly and properly signify , we willingly grant ; since we deny not his being bishop there but that he had greater , or , as dr. h. expresses it , was clearly superiour to s. peter , is both expressely contradictory to himself , and to his whole scope and intention ; which was to prove as he tells us not his greater power but principall place onely but let us grant that dr. h. hath forgot what he was about ; and that in stead of proving the principall place onely , he having light on an odd testimony which spoke expresly of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 power infers there-upon that iames was clearly superior there to s. peter , meaning in power ; let all this i say be granted and pardoned , if s. iames were superior there in power to s. peter , i suppose he was likewise superior to the rest ; ( for i fear not that dr. h. should deny his inference of all the apostles equality from their being called foundation-stones pillars and apostles in the plurall ) then i ask whither dr. h. thinks in his conscience that these apostles who had authority to constitute iames bishop there had not authority likewise to remove him , if they saw it convenient ? if they had , then they had an authority superior to s. iames even in his own see ; and , i would ask dr. h. even in his own grounds why s. peter should not be his superior still aswel as s. paul was yet superior to timothy and titus after they were fixt bishops s. iames being constituted bishop in iudea shown to have been s. peter's province ; ( i mean such province as he is pretended to have had ) as well as the gentiles , over whom timothy and titus were constituted bishops were pretended to bee s. paul's province . again wee will pardon dr. h. his affirmation that the apostles distributed their universal great province into severall lesser ones . those famous 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and yet giving s. iames here an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or province also , whom he holds here to be no apostle . or if dr. h. refuse to accept the pardon and fall to qualify thefact , then i vse my advantage and vrge him ; was s. iames independent , or was he still subject as timothy , and titus are held by himself to have been , even after they ; were bishops ? if he were independent , then he went a breast with the apostles in self authority , and had his catachrestically-nam'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , aswell as they ; but , if he remain'd still subject , then his territory being amongst the iews , and s peter being by dr. h's exclusive place of scripture nam'd apostle of the iews in the same tenour as s. paul was over the gentiles . gal. . it is given us by dr. h's grounds that in all probability he could be subject to none but to the apostle of the iews s. peter , and that in his own see , which was in s. peter's province , at lest that kind of province which he can be pretended from scripture to have had . but what should those words of dr. h's signify ( answ . p. . ) that in his see iames was considered as a bishop , and so had the principall place even in peter's presence . cannot one be a bishop , but he must sit in a council before his betters ? suppose the apostles had constituted a bishop of rochester in england , and assembled themselves there in conuncil ; must therefore the honest bishop of rochester sit before s. peter , and the rest of the apostles ? nay more , let us imagin a nationall council to bee met there , ought not the bishop of rochester give place to his metropolitan the arch-bishop of canterbury , and let him pronounce the sentence ? yet d. h. here out of his ill will to the pope's predecessour s. peter , will let s. iames do neither though he hold's him to have been no apostle . but 'ts sufficient with him that he is a bishop in that place to infer him to bee clearly superiour to all there , to have the principall place , give the sentence , and what not ? nor matters it that even according to dr. h. the others are apostles and he none , nor how high they , how low he bee in authority ; if s. peter bee in company , the private bishop shall be clearly superiour to them all ; whereas , had he been absent , s. iames had neither been thus exalted , nor the other apostles thus depres't 't was s. peter's being there which put all out of order . lastly , what means his inference of his being clearly superiour in that council ? this is the most unlikely point of all the rest ; this council ( as hath been shown ) concern'd not s. iames his particular iurisdiction , but the common good of the church , of which the apostles were overseer's ; nor did this in particular concern s. iames , who ( as dr. h. here grants ) was none of the apostles . in a word , if he contend that they let him have the principall place out of a respectfull and courteous deference upon another score , as he was our lord's brother and very ancient , let him bring authentick testimonies that they did so , and wee shall easily grant it . but what does courtesy concern power , or the right to a thing , or place . thus wee read that pope anicetus , gave s. polycarp the preeminence even in his own church , yet wee think not that his civill condescension wrong'd his iurisdiction ; though ( i know ) if dr. h. could prove so much of s. iames here , all were lost to s. peter without hopes of recovery . but if he proves his principal place by right upon the account onely of being bishop there , 't is infinitly weak , and inconsequent ; reason absolutely disclaiming any such inference ; and as for authority the very testimonies he brings to prove it are either expressely against him and contrary to his own grounds , or els unauthentick ; or , lastly , nothing at all to his purpose , as hath been shown . his next testimony that s. iames saith , with power i iudge , makes neither for him nor against us : since wee grant that each here had power , and vsed that power invoting or decreeing ; soe hath , and doth each member in parlament , which yet consists wel enough with their different degrees of power in thus voting , and decreeing ; so that , though wee read that one member did it , upon an occasion relating to him in particular , without excluding the rest , wee cannot upon that negative argument either infer that he alone did so , or pronounced the decree , unles his expression had something particular , not competent to the rest ; as for example , had it been phras'd thus . let it be enacted , bee it decreed , &c. there had been some ground that he pronounced the sentence , but his words being onely i iudge , or ( as their own translation renders it ) my sentence is , which sounds no higher strain of authority nor any thing not equally-competent to any or each of the rest , since each might without any great ambition , say , my sentence is thus , and thus , 't is impossible any reason unprejudiced can think any more deducible thence then that his particular sentence was exprest by those words . thus much for the words , following dr. h's explication of them . but to give s. chrysostome leave to explicate himself , let us hear what hee sayes . in the same homily and upon the same passage wee find these words ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he with good reason ordains those things to witt to abstain from things strangled , &c. out of the law , lest he should seem to abrogate the law : then follows , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and observe how he lets not them hear those things from the law , but from himself , saying i iudge , that is from my self , not having heard it from the law . where we have two things remarkable in this prudent cariage of s. iames , whose circumstances ( being bishop , and resident in hierusalem ) required on the one side that he should not disgust the iews his diocesans by seeming to sleight the law ; on the other side he was not to wrong christianity , by making those things necessary to be observed precisely upon this account because the law of moses prescribed them . to compose himself equally in this case without giving offence to one side , or other , s. chrysostome observes first that he ordains these things out of the law , that is , such things as were materially found in the law ; and commanded there , and so auoids the iews displeasure ; but does not ordain them formally , because they were commanded by the law , soe avoiding the wronging of christianity , but of himself who as an apostle had power to do such things : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i iudge , that is , of my self ( or own authority ) not as having heard it from the law ; that is , not as from the authority of the law of moses . this being so , the words cited by dr. h. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i iudge , that is , i say with power , is given by all reason to signify the same as the former explication now layd out at large , and of which this seems to bee onely a brief repetition . for first , why should wee imagine that s. chrysostome , should give two disparate interpretations of the same word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 taken in the self same circumstances ? next , were it not onely a repetition of the former , why is he so short in this latter explicatiō as to passe it over sleightly in these words ; nothing neither before , nor after relating to that interpretation . thirdly because the words i say with power are perfectly consonant to the other , i say it of my self , not as from the law : that is , from mine own power not from the power of the law , to which mine succeeds , and lastly because if wee look more narrowly into the place wee shall find that neither testimony is an explication of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies iudging , or ( as dr. h. will needs have it ) giving the sentence , but of the emphatical [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i ; ] which in the first place denoting a self authoritative expression of his power in opposition to the law and it's power , consequently in the latter place , where the emphasis of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is explicated by [ with power ] there is no ground imaginable why it should signify otherwise than the forme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of my self ; or , why it should have any emphaticall relation or opposition to any other authority save that of the law onely . so that there is not the slenderest appearance of s. iames his having the principall place , or giving the sentence , from the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with power more than from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of my self . this self power there spoken of relating to the law 's no power nor influence of power in thus decreeing , not to the other apostles lesser power then his as bishop . but , as his ordinary custome is , dr. h. picks out any two words , neglecting to consider the true import of the father's meaning by them , and having thus singled them out , he onely touches them sleightly with a grave carelesnes and thinks the deed is done . what follows in his . paragraph craves onely that the readers would vse their eyes to avoyd his crafts who would blind them , all i need do in answer is to quote particularly the places in which i am sure there can bee no deceit . dr. h. told us in the last line of p. . and the first of p. . in his book of schism , that the rescript was grounded upon s. iames his sentence ( which a little before he made the sentence ) quoting for it , acts . v. . my answer schism disar . p. . l. . . &c. was , that in that place there was nothing particularizing s. iames , but onely that then ( to wit , after s. peter , s. paul , and barnabas and s. iames had spoken ) it seemed good to the apostles , and elders with the whole church , &c. now if there be nothing in that verse alledged , signifying that the rescript was grounded upon s. iames his sentence for which it was brought , then 't is plain i neither misvnderstand nor mistake . to avoyd all caville i took the verse as i found it in their own translation , in which nothing was found sounding to that purpose yet all this exactest diligence avails nothing at all with an adversary , who takes liberty to say any thing , i must needs commit two faults in transcribing one verse , and yet transcribe it right too ; so that s. w. faultines is now become the text , and this text ( beloved ) is divided into two parts , the first part is a misunderstanding the second is a mistake . the first that s. w. would make him imagin the sentence was so his , as not to bee the councills ; whereas indeed s. w. made him imagin noe such thing , but onely ( as himself told me there ) that s. iames his particular sentence exprest by [ my sentence ] was the sentence . but this was antecedent to the point there treated , and here vindicated , the question there was , whether the . v. there cited , signified that the rescript was grounded upon s. iames his sentence , which was the thing he produced it for but to this point he sayes nothing , neither vindicating that signification of the verse , nor so much as putting it down : thus much for s. w. first fault of misunderstanding . the second fault is as hee courteously counterfeits is a farther mistake and that the words [ then seemd it good , &c. ] mean a subsequent determination to the dogma , or decree , if so , i wonder who was in the fault or mistook ? i pretend to prove nothing from it , and so was not in possible circumstances to mistake it he pretended to prove from it that the rescript is founded on s. james his sentence , which he says here , it signifies not , but a subsequent determination of sending men to antioch , and then when he hath done he kindly and courteously layes the blame from himself , and on s. w. telling him he hath mistaken which when hee hath done hee concludes with a gloria patri , how well hee hath qualify'd s. w. to consider whether dr. h. or hee bee wiser or honester . but in case i had mistook in calling those words [ then seemed it good , &c. ] the dogma , or decree i at lest mistake with good company ; for good s. chrysostome was expressely of my mind , who after he had commented upon the former verses he makes his transition to this in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after wards the common decree follows , and immediately produces this very verse which the dr. denyes here to signify the dogma , or decree , but onely a subsequent determination . next he tells the reader ( par . . ) that i would conclude in fauour of s. peters authority from his speaking first , &c. it had been more ingenuous to represent me in mine own language , i use not to build conclusions absolutely upon conjecturall premisses without expressing how far i build on them , as i did there schism disar . p. . by saying that in reason one should rather think , &c. nor did i rely even for thus much upon onely his speaking first , but that after such debate as had been concerning this matter v. . in reason one should rather think , it argued some greater authority , in him who should first break the ice , and interpose his iudgement , in such a solemnly pronounc'd oration as did s. peter . but dr. h. omits that which i grounded on , to wit , [ after such debate , &c. ] which add's a circumstance much encreasing the rather-probability of his greater authority ; and truly to a man not prepossest with prejudice the text it self is sufficiently fauourable as far as i pretended . and the apostles & elders came together for to consider of this matter ; and when there had been much disputing peter rose up and said vnto them , &c. now dr. h. will have his first speaking arise hence that he had been accused of preaching to cornelius a gentile , and so gives an account of his actions . but the text it self gives no countenance at all , but looks much awry upon such an evasion . s. peter's words are , men and brethren you know that a good while ago god made choice among us that the gentils by my mouth should hear the words of the gospell . where wee see that his preaching to the gentiles was a thing already known to the congregation , known long agoe , and known to have been god's will and choice , the former knowledge of which was enough to satisfy such persons , and to make s. peter's giving a new account of that action needles and to no purpose . neither indeed does it sound like an apology , nor is there any circumstance fauouring that interpretation . the occasion was about the necessity or no necessity of circumcision v. . and more immediatly their long disputing upon that matter . next the action of preaching to the gentiles is express't clearly here as needing no account but as known by them long ago to have been god's will. and lastly , pursving the same matter , and saying that god had put no difference between iews , and gentiles , he comes to the point ; now therefore why tempt yee god , &c. where the word [ therefore ] making his former discourse have an influence upon this latter of not obliging to circumcision , show's it to bee meerly a pertinent , and orderly exordium to confirm and give light to what follow'd , which this voluntary interpreter of scripture in despite of all the circumstances ( as his custome is ) will need 's have to denote s. peter's apology or iustification of him self for preaching to the gentiles ? again , were s. peter necessitated to iustify himself , how does it follow that he must therefore need 's speak first ? do even those who hold up their hand 's at the bar vse to begin with their defence , and apologize for their innocence in the first place ! no strength of reason but mr. h's could have defended it self soe confidently with such a paper-buckler , or have thought cob-webs impenetrable . iames must be first , because he spoke last , and s. peter must speak first because he was to apologize and give account of his actions . whereas s. chrysostome in act. . v. . whom dr. h. most relies upon in this place , makes his speaking first , both here , and in all other places an argument of his primacy ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . s. peter ( saith he ) as entrusted by christ with the sheepfold , and as the first of the quire always begins to speak first . what can bee more expressly destructive to dr. h's tenet , and interpretation of this place , yet ( it not belonging to me at this time to alledge testimonies , and object ) i went not far to fetch it , or seek it in remote authors , but took the first obvious testimony i met , in this very father which he chuses here for his best patron , and in that very treatise which he built upon , as most expresse , for this his altogether-unwarrantable position . nor consequently can it bee imagin'd but that dr. h. must needs see how averse s. chrysostome was from what he would make him professe , in case hee ever look't into the very author he quotes , and most relies on . sect. . how weakly dr. h. argues to prove s ▪ paul's authority equall to s. peter's . s. chrysostomes iudgment concerning s. peter's supremacy . i had granted that the conferring the honor or dignity of apostle upon s. paul was not dependent on s. peter , and that the place cited gal. . showing that he had it immediatly from christ concluded very well for that purpose , yet concluded nothing against us , who never held the contrary tenet . but , i deny'd absolutely that the dignity given was not inferior , subordinate , and in that sence dependent on s. peter , and that any such thing was deducible from that place whence dr h. pretended to prove it . now what the duty of an opponent is in these circumstances every boy in the vniversity can inform mr. h. to wit , to make good his consequence , and to manifest that the conclusion follows , out of these premises , or that place whence he pretended to deduce it . what does this dr. of divinity ? first he tells us answ . p. . that s. w. ought in any reason to have offer'd some proof for this ; ( to wit , that the power given was subordinate , or dependent on s. peter ) which he knows is most deny'd by the protestants . a secure method of disputing ? let us put it into a paral●ell , and wee shall see what a rare logician this dr. is . put case then that himself were to maintain and prove that logick were no science but an art , and should argue thus ; the end of logick is not contemplation , but action ; therefore logick is no science . his adversary ( as s. w. did ) distinguishes his consequent ; therefore 't is no speculative science , i grant it ; therefore 't is no practicall science , i deny it , i marry replyes dr. h. but you must prove one part of your own distinction , and manifest that logick is a practicall science , nay more tells him gravely ( as he tells mee here ) that , unles he can make it appear , hee cannot say it is such with any sobriety , after which learned carriage , i suppose the reader who hath onely studied logick a fortnight will imagin that the whole schools fall a hissing at my notable adversary , who speaks non-sence with such gravity and sobriety ; and acquit his antagonist from any note of insobriety , save onely his indiscretion to think the answering such an adversary worth his pains . secondly he answers , that unles the same christ that gave him this power immediatly appear to have subjected it to s. peter , as clearly , as that he gave him the power , which 't is certain appear's not , this cannot be sayd with any sobriety . where besides the relapse into the same fault of exacting his respondent should make his own distinction appear , it is worth observation how cautious the dr. is to make all sure against s. peter's primacy . it must be the same christ which must do this , lest there be juggling underhand . a weighty caution ? and he must appear full as clearly , to have subjected this power , as to have given it : extreme rigour ! or else s. w. must forfeit his sobriety for affirming it . hard measure ! in answer ; i am not afraid of all these cautions but tell him more , and stick not to assure him that it equally apperes to me , as it appears that christ is god. if he startle at this , and demand by what means i can give him such an assurance ? i reply , that the voyce of the catholick church , infallible , because ever built upon the testification of a world of immediate fathers and pastours , equally ascertain'd all who deserted not that rule for that point , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or simon the first signified not an onely-complementary but efficacious primacie in the church as it did ascertain them , or does the protestants against the socinians that the words i and my father are one signify an vnity in divine nature or the godhead : and the like i say of all other places of scripture which can be pretended to ascertain it infallibly . this voyce of the church equally , i say , ascertains one point as the other ; by which words i mean not but that the latter point concerning christ's godhead is in it self , out of the nature of the thing , of more eminent and immediate necessity for salvation then the former ; but my meaning onely is that the testification , and recommendation of it , as comming from christ is equall in the one , as in the other , being indeed the self fame . but perhaps mr. h. will deny the infallibility of immediate attestation which sometimes he grants at unawares ( answ . p. . ) and will have it equally appear by scripture . if so , then i set an anabaptist upon his back , arm'd with dr. h's own words , and let them scuffle for it . vnles the same christ ( sayes the anabaptist ) appear as clearly from scripture to have commanded the apostles to baptize little children which yet beleeve not , as to have sent them to baptize beleevers ( which 't is certain appears not ) it cannot be said with any sobriety that an infāt ought to be baptized . thus mr. h. trips up his own heels when he thought to kick at s. peter , and the anabaptist getts the upper hand . or if dr. h. runns to tradition for the certainty of one point , and denyes it's certainty for another , then he is to be askt by the anabaptist why he should in reason rely upon that authority which himself grants is taken in aly in the point of peter's primacy , and in all the other points in which catholicks differ from them ? and also s. w. must demand by what securer rule he guids him self when he affirms it hath err'd in some , and not in other points , and why it may not perhaps erre in all if it can erre in any . but why must i bee accus'd of want of sobriety , for distinguishing without making the parts of my distinction appear , and yet dr. h. who is the opponent , passe for a sober man though he says what he pleases at randome , nay more , places in his confident self affirmations the summe of his whole defence . he tells us here wee must make it appear that this power was subjected to s. peter ; but himself makes it not appear wee doe not , by any other argument then this , that he assures the reader within a parenthesis , that 't is certain it appears not , what ill luck it was that s. w. had not the forecast to say 't is certain , too for then he had sav'd his sobriety , and all had been well . thirdly , conscious to him self that all hitherto was evasion , he would seem at length for fashions sake , as it were , to touch the point ; but seems onely , after his accustomed sleight manner , in these words . thirdly the place gal. . . belongs expressely to the power after it was giv●n , and yet then he depended not on him . attend reader here is a dreadfull sentence pronounced against s. peter's supremacy ; for if , after it was given , it was no ways dependent on s. peter , all is lost to s. peter's superiority . first i know thou wonderst why , the point being so mainly important , and dr. h. having found a place of scripture to prove it from , expressely too , ( as he tells thee ) he should not be larger in it citing those expresse words , and then making invincible arguments from them . to lose his advantage in such circumstances , onely relating hastily the place , then touching it sleightly , and not prosecuting it home , nor indeed at all , but saying onely something there upon , sounds a betraying of his cause , and some preposterous fauour to his therein-befriended adversary s. w. secondly , thou mayst observe , that there are here two propositions ; one , that the place gal. . . belongs expressely to the power after it was given : the other that yet then he depended not on him . the first is pretended from the text , and expressely too . the second is left indifferent ( as his blinding manner is ) whether it be proved from the text , or by his own affirmation ; if the latter , i must put it upon this score of his 'tis certain , and so it needs no further answer ; but , if it be pretended as from scripture , it shall have audience , and thou shalt hear it examin'd . thirdly , please to take notice that the verse gal. . . which he brings to testify his tenet expressely , but , by omitting it slubberingly , bids it say nothing , is this , as i find it in their own translation . neither went i up to hierusalem to them which were apostles before me , but i went into arabia , and returned again unto damascus . and this is all : where wee hear no news of any power at all , much less expressely belonging to power ; nay more , expressely to the power after it was given , as mr. h. promised us . fourthly grant yet all this , that it belong'd expressely to the power after it was given , yet how does this place prove that the power given was not dependent on s. peter's as an inferiour degree to a superiour , which is the whole question between us ? nothing is said here but onely that s. paul preach't in arabia , &c. ere he went to the apostles before him . the place there named by him , taken in it self , without relation to the other verses , expresses nothing of power at all , but onely that s. paul went to other places ere he went up to hierusalem ; and , taken with other adjoyning verses , onely intimates this , that s. paul , having commission immediatly from christ , had authority , to preach to other places without demanding first the other apostles order , and approbation , which is both granted by us , and innocent to our cause : but whether the power given were lesse , equall , or greater then s. peter's nothing is found there at all , much lesse doth the . verse it self speak of power , still lesse doth it expressely belong to it ; least of all to power after it was given , as imdependent on s. peter , as mr. h. braggs . to make this yet plainer , the reader may please to advert that there is no catholick in the world but holds , that , if our saviour immediatly command a thing he may be obayed without asking counsell , or leave of any superiour , nay even against their contrary command , or prohibition . next , that our saviour not onely could , but did give immediate commands , and commissions to persons of different ranks ; as to the apostles , and disciples to preach to the whole world ; and to philip the deacon to goeto convert the eunuch acts. . v. ▪ . these things being so , all shadow of reason in dr. h's discoursevanishes , which would conclude s. paul independent and of equall , and not subordinate power with s. peter , because he had an immediate commission from christ , and proceeded to act according to that commission without going to ask s. peter's leave first . the disciples , having immediate order from christ , preach't the gospell , without asking leave , or receiving approbation from the apostles . were it not , now a worthy inference to parallell dr. h's and conclude that therefore the disciples were of equall authority with the apostles . but dr. h. is so wary that he speaks his non-sence , sleightly , sprinklingly , and in brief , that , that lineaments of it not being discovered , the deformity of it may not appear . and this is the most frequent with him of all the rest of his sly ricks , and in a manner naturall to his whole strain of writing . from dr. h's reason , and scripture testimonies wee come to fathers to prove that the power given was not inferiour to , or dependent on s. peter's . he appeals to s. chrysostome for this point , affirming ( as he layes it out ) of s. paul distinctly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not needing peter nor his voyce , the explication of this place is already given here in the paragraph foregoing , to which adde in particular , that if by voyce he means commission , and order to preach ; t' is clear he needed it not , having received it immediatly from christ ; if instruction of doctrine he needed not that neither , having learned it fully and perfectly from divine revelation ; what follows hence necessarily for equality of power wee see not , and dr. h. pretends here to prove it by no other argument then onely by telling us within a parenthesis that he supposes it . both the former interpretations then wee grant each of them fits the words very well , whereas his of equality of power is impossible to bee evinced from this testimony , and inconsistent even with dr. h's grounds , as shall be shown . it follows , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but being equally honourd ▪ with him ; to which the father addes in a parenthesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for i will say no more . vpon which words dr. h. exults , which ( saith he ) what it is an intimation of , i leave s. w. to conjecture . nor is s. w. nice to tell him his thoughts what s. chrysostome intimated by those words , to wit , that he could have said more with truth , but represt him self as not willing out of reverence to those apostles to make comparisons of inequality between them ; which manifests plainly that s. chrysostome in that place speakes not of power at all , or equality in that respect ; since neither was it ever heard of that s. chrysostome , or any els , no nor the most perverse protestants held s. paul above s. peter in power ; nor can it consist with dr. h's own grounds , who answ . p. . l. . disclaims professedly any such pretence that any of the other apostles had greater authority then s. peter . thus dr. h. thinking he had served s. peter and the pope a trick , by making s. chrisostome intimate that s. paul had greater authority then he ; hath at once contradicted his own grounds , and quite disanull'd his own best testimonie ; rendring it impossible to relate to power , or authority , for which he produced it , unlesse the opinion of the whole world , or ( which is firmer and more inviolable ) dr. h's . own word 's bee a mistake , asserting that no apostle had greater power then s. peter . as for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or equall honour of those two apostles it hath already been shown formerly from the father's words to signify equall honour for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same efficacity of preaching ; and , in this place , both it , and the not needing s. peter's voyce , relate onely to the sufficiency of s. paul's knowledge making s. peter's instructions needles : as appears by the words a little after , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. not as if s. paul were to learn any thing of s. peter , &c. and thus indeed the possibility of s. chrysostomes saying more of s. paul , or that he was more honour'd , and higher then s. peter may have good sense ; many holding that s. paul was higher in learning , and the greater divine . they must bee therefore testimonies expressing equality in power of government which can conclude any thing against our tenet concerning his power ; for , in other things 't is no question but that s. paul ●ad many advantages above s. peter ; as , in preaching to more nations , in writing more epistles , in greater sufferings , and many other regards , where of some be exprest . . cor. c. . again , this very verse which dr. h. would have relate to power after it was given and it's independence on s. peter , s. ambrose whose judgment i shallever preferr before mr. h's interprets in the same sence as wee take it , to wit , of independence in learning onely ; explicating s. paul's words thus , non fuisse ( dicit ) necessitatem electum se a deo pergendi ad praedecessores suos apostolos vt aliquid fortè disceret ab illis quia deus ei reuelauit perfilium suum quomodo doceret . s. paul says it was not necessary that he , being chosen by god , should go to the former apostles that he might learn any thing of them , because god had revealed to him by his son how he should teach . but , because s. chrysostome hath been pretended as his constant patron in this particular controversy therefore ( though it cannot be exacted of me who am the defendant to produce testimonies , and object ) to let the reader see how unhappy dr. h. is in the choice of his freinds i shall take liberty to manifest , and , i hope , with evidence from two or three places of that father what s. chrysostome's opinion was in this point of s. peter's higher authority amongst the apostles . i will not presse here the high titular expressions he gives s. peter , ( pan●g . in pet. & paul ) how iustly soever i might , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the leader , or captain of the apostles ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the beginning of the right faith : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : the great pronouncer of sacred things in the church , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the corypheus , or head of the apostles , &c. nor will i insist much upon my formerly-alledged testimony that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , entrusted with the sheep-fold , though i might with good reason , the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being a collective and denoting an vniversality . but , my first place ( which i rather make choice of because it relates to s. iames whom dr. h. would make clearly sue periour to s. peter in his own see ) is taken out of hom. . upon s. john : where , speaking of our saviours extraordinary affection and familiarity towards s. peter , he immediately subjoyns this interrogatory 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; if this be so how then came iames to have the episcopall seat of hierusalem ? he solves it him self thus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because he ordaind him ( s. peter ) not master of that seat , but of the whole world . here wee see the vast difference between s. iames and s. peter's iurisdictions ; one being master of that private seat at hierusalem ; the other , master of the whole world ; whence follows evidently that neither s. peter's iurisdiction is limited by any other bounds then the world it self is , and that he had iurisdiction also at hierusalem it self , not after the nature of the particular bishop there , but of an universall governour or master of the world ; unles perhaps mr. h will alledge that hierusalem is no part of the world ; for then indeed i shall not know how to reply . neither let him , as his custome is , run to the dictionaries , and lexicons to tell me that the proper signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is such a master as teaches or instructs , and so sounds no government nor iurisdiction : for he must know that that is the proper signification of the word as it is found here which the circumstances accompanying it determin it to have . to them then let us look , the same word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or master is appropriated here to s. peter in order to the whole world , as it is to s. iames in order to hierusalem ; it being exprest but once , and in construction , refer'd to both . since then , as applyd to s. iames it signifies his being bishop of hierusalem , and so expresses directly iurisdiction , and power of government , it is against all reason to say it can possibly signify another thing as apply'd to s. peter . according to this testimony then s. peter was universall bishop of the church , and of an illimited iurisdiction . but perhaps dr. h. will not allow the parenthesis in the testimony i answer i put down the testimony here as i found it in the greek context set out by themselves and printed at eton ; and , though it were left out , the sence it self putt's the opposition between s. peter's being such over the world , as s. iames was over hierusalem , which concerns commanding power , and iurisdiction . my second place is fech't from his comment on act. . where , speaking of s. peter's behaviour about the election of a new apostle he hath these words ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with good reason doth the first ( s. peter ) undertake the busines with authority as having them all delivered into his hand . what can this signify , but that he as first , and as a supreme governour had power over all the rest that were present ; and , who were those who were present ? all the rest of the apostles , and the chief of the disciples . in what other manner he as first can be said to have had all the rest within his hand , and therefore with good reason to have taken the management of that busienes authoritatively to himself , i professe i cannot in dr. h's behalf imagine ; and , am perswaded himself will confess it ( after perusall of the following testimony ) that this was s. chrysostome's meaning . the third testimony which shall be also my last ( for i deem it impossible to finde another more expresse for this , or any other point ) is taken from the same place , and spoken upon the same occasion the election of some one to bee apostles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . what then ? was it not in peter's power to elect him ? yes , it was altogether in his power , but he does it not , lest he might seem to do it out of fauour . what can be more expresse and full ? the thing to be performed was an act of the highest iurisdiction imaginable amongst the apostles , to wit , the making a new apostle . the other apostles , and chief disciples were present to the number of one hundred , and twenty ; yet s. peter had power to do this of himself in their presence nor is this exprest dubiously by the father , but as a thing certain and beyond all question , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , yes altogether , absolutely , or without doubt . nor have wee here any divers lections to diminish the authority of the words which the dr. makes a pittifull and little prevailing use of , in his lisping testimonies ; nor is it a word , or two pickt out blindly , and wrested to a quite different interpretation , as is his of discovered method , but a pithy expression of the full scope , and import of the place . nor is this perfect expression put alone , but seconded with a note , that he did it not of his own single power , lest he should bee mistaken by others to make such a one , an apostle out of favour ; which is the frequent , and ordinary carriage of every wise , and prudent governour . nor do wee pretend to any higher strain of iurisdiction in s. peter then that he could elect a new apostle by his own power which this father not onely grants , but strenuously assertes ; nor ! in our paralell tenet of the pope's authority , can we attribute to him any partic●lar act , more supreme , or more savouring of highest authority , than to constitute bishops and patriarchs in the church by himself , and of his own particular power . nor , lastly , was this testimony peep 't out for in strange places but offred me by the same author whom dr. h. most relies on , and in the same treatise which he most frequently cites . iudge then , reader , whether it bee likely or no that dr. h. considering his industrious reading this father and this treatise ( as he manifests here ) could possibly remain ignorant what was s. chrysostome's tenet in this point , and then tell me what he deserves who against his own knowledge and conscience alledges imperfectly , mangles , corrupts , and falsifies this fathers words to gain some show of his consent to his paradoxicall point of faith ; nay , makes him , by such leger de main sleights , his chiefest patron to defend it , as hath been layd open , and discover'd particularly heretofore though he could not but know that no writer extant could be more expressely against it then is this holy and learned father s. chrysostome . sect. . dr. h's successe in answering his adversaries first testimony . his insincerity in pretending our own law against the pope's authority . in his book of schism p. . dr. h. told us with authority and very confidently that certainly s. paul was noe way subordinate or dependent on s. peter , at antioch , as appears by his behaviour towards him avowed gal. . . that is , his , withstanding him to the face . discourteous s. w. who gives not a jott more credit to mr. h. wher he cries certainly , surely , irrefragably , unquestionably , expressely , distinctly , accordingly , &c. which are the nerves of his discourse , than if he had said nothing at all , would not budge into assent notwithstanding his soe confident assurance to warrant him ; and as for gal. . by which he pretended to make it appear , he reply'd schism disarm . p. . that s. cyprian , and s. austin thought otherwise , who interpreted s. peter's bearing it patiently not as an argumēt of his lesse or equall authority , but of his greatest humility ; that being higher in dignity he should suffer so mildly the reprehensions of an inferiour . the place alledged from those fathers was this : quem quamuis primum dominus elegerit , & super eum aedificaverit ecclesiam suam , tamen cum secum paulus disceptauit , non vendicavit sibi aliquid insolenter aut arroganter assumpsit vt diceret se primatum tenere & obtemperari à nouellu & posteris sibi potius opportere ; nec despexit paulum quòd ecclesi●e priùs persecutor fuisset , sed consilium veritatis admisit . whom though our lord chose to be the first of the apostles , and upon him built his church , yet , when paul contended with him , he did not challenge , and assume to him self any thing , in any insolent and proud manner , as to say he had the primacy , and so should rather be obeyed by new , and late apostles ; nor did he despise paul because he had formerly been a persecutor of the church , but admitted the counsell of truth . dr. h. preparing to answer this place ( answ . p. . ) notes first that this is the first testimony i have brought from antiquity ; as if it necessarily belong'd to me who was answering his book , and showing his allegations unable to conclude , to object testimonies also my self , and so bee opponent and defendent both ; but as it was not my task , so neither do i esteem it so rare a busines to transcribe out of books as needlesly to put my self upon that dull employment ; though i know well that annotation-men , and common● place book souls , think it the rarest thing imaginable . next , he tells us that he never doubted s. peter's primacy in the sence this holy fathers speaks , any more than of christs building his church on him , and that he gave me a testimony even now from s. ambrose which expressely avouched it i remember indeed such a testimony answ . in the margent , but i remember withall that he brought it not , nay would not let it signify s. peter's primacy in any sence over the whole church , but over the iews onely as appears by the fourlast lines of the same page . how ever wee thank him for granting here that he gaves us a testimony from s. ambrose , which expressely avoued s. peter's primacy in any sence over the church , so he will promise us , not to repent him self , and recall his grant , which he pretends to have so expressely avouched there . but alas ! what faith is to bee given , to the most formall bargain made with such copes-masters of testimonies ? he had scarce writt eight lines after this profest expresse avouching it but he quite forgets his so solemn promise , and makes the said place in s. ambrose signify a limited , and contradistinct primacy saying that by the words of s. ambrose , s. paul had a primacy amongst the gentiles as peter amongst the iews , though the place it self in reference to s. peter sayes onely that petrus primatum acceperat ad fundandam ecclesiam , peter had received the primacy to found the church . how necessary an endowment is a good memory to defend a bad cause ! thirdly he onely denyes ( as he sayes ) that this primacy gave him any power over s. paul , and that i will remember he had reason to deny it from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 equall honour given s. paul by chrysostome and theophylact. i remember indeed the words , but have quite forgot that he had any reason to deduce from those words equality of honor sprung from government or power of command , having shown from those fathers explicating themselves that it is impossible the words can beare that interpretation . fourthly , in relation to those words [ he did not vindicate any thing to himself insolently , or assume it arrogantly , as to say he had the primacy , and rather ought to bee obeyed , &c. ] dr. h. discant's with this glosse , leaving us ( saith he p. . ) to resolve that if he had claimed any obedience at all from paul by this primacy he could not have iustified it from arrogance of assuming that which did not belong to him . thus he : soe that the difference between dr. h. and mee in explicating this place stands thus ; that he makes those words non vindicauit sibi aliquid insolenter aut arroganter assump sit to signify that s. peter's praise worthines exprest consisted in his not chalenging what did not truly belong to him ; whereas , i make it consist in his not chalenging it in those circumstances , though it truly belonged to him ; he would have the words insolenter and arroganter so taken as if the pride they denoted did involve falsehood , injustice , or overweening ; whereas i contend that they signify onely in an insolent and proud manner , well exprest in our english phrase , by standing upon his point , which well consists with the truth of what he challenges and the right of what he assumes . ere i descend to manifest that this is the sence of that place , i desire the reader to review the entire testimony , in which he will do right both to my discourse , and his own memory ; and , when he hath done this , i offer him for his satisfaction these following notes . first that it had been no such great commendation of humility to say that s. peter did not usurpingly challenge what was not his right ; but rather an impudence , and an absurd haughtines to have done it ; since then the fathers intend here a particular commendation of s. peter's modesty , it must consist in this that though he might with rigour of right have stood upon his tip-toes ( as wee may say ) yet his goodnes so moderated his height that he was content with mildenes to bear an inferiour's reprehensions ; in which great vertue is shown , and , which being put , those fathers suppose that truly he was superiour . secondly , unles this bee the meaning of that place , wee have quite lost the adversative sence which yet is unavoidable ; for what sence is this , though our lord chose him to be the first , yet he did not challenge to himself more then belongs to him ; or what speciall commendation do these words import ; though king iames , was king of england yet he did not challenge , or assume to himself to bee emperour of germany ? sure it must bee an enuy of s. peter's sanctity as well , as of his dignity to diminish his praise-worthines intended here by so frivolous and incoherent an explication . thirdly , the words , non vindicauit sibi aliquid insolenter , he challenged not any thing insolently to himself , make good my explication ; for , it had been a very hard case if he could have challenged nothing at all to himself with truth according to these fathers ; no not even that which themselves had granted , the line before , to wit , that our lord had chosen him to bee the first , and had built his church upon him ; with truth therefore he might have challenged that , which out of modesty he stood not insolenty and arrogantly upon . fourthly dr. h. grants that a primacy at least in some sence is granted s. peter from this place : wherefore the redditive part of the testimony ; yet he challenged not any thing , &c. so as to say , he had the primacy , must be granted to bee true also , or rather it is the self same . neither is it possible that any man not totally possest by prejudice can imagine any other , but that in these words . though our lord chose him to bee the first , yet he said not , or alledged not that he had the primacy , or was the first , the latter part should be false unles the former were so too . firfthly , this being so , the following words in the reddi●ive part of the testimony and ought rather to be obey'd by la●er apostles , &c. must necessarily bee true too , since they follow in the same tenour of redditive sence to the adversative , and are joyned immediately by a copulative particle to the former of having the primacy . true therefore it is that he might in right expect obedience in other circumstances from s. paul ; and by consequence this primacy here spoken of was not a dry and barren one as the dr. would fancy it . sixthly the subsequent words of his not objecting to s. paul that he had been a persecutour of the church , make it yet more evident ; since he might with truth have said so , but of his goodnes would not ; since then the foregoing word 's of his having the primacy are true , and the following ones also of s. paul's having been a persecutour are true also , upon what grounds can this adversary of s peter's imagine that the midle words importing his rather right to s. paul's obedience which run on in the same even tenour with both the other should be false ? or how could he ●hink to evade by deducing from those words that the fathers left us to resolve hence , that if hee had claimed any obedience from paul by this primacy he could not have iustified it from arrogance of assuming that which did not belong to him ; nay making this the summe of his answer to that place . lastly the concluding words , [ but admitted the counsell of truth ] expressing the result of the whole busines , show that i● plainly imports an encomium of s. peter's candour ; that whē the thing objected against him was true , he maintained not his own saying by authority , but made his he●g●h of dignity , exprest there to bee most eminent , stoop to the sincere acceptation of truth ; which in a superiour and governour is a most laudable carriage , and an unparalell'd commendation . and thus dr. h. comes of in answering s. w. first testimony ; which being prest speaks more against him then was at first intended , being onely brought to show that these fathers thought that manner of carriage between s. peter and s. paul exprest gal. . rather argued s. peter's greater humility then his lesser , or equall authority . after mr. h. had endeavoured by wresting the former testimony to win s. cyprian , and s. austin to side with him against s. peter's authority he proceeds to destroy the popes authority in that apostles , even from domestick testimonies also : his own canon law approved publickly by himself as legitimate shall secretly by dr. h's inspiration play the traitour , and under mine now in these latter dayes the said authority which till now every one took it to confirme . a strange attempt , if mr. h's strength were equall to his courage . the place is cited in the decret . out of the . epist . of pope anacletus , which makes it yet more home and terrible against the now adays-popes , it begins thus : post christum a petro sacerdotalis coepit ordo , after christ the sacerdotall order began from peter and soe goes on in other expressions of that strain soe far from prejudiciall that they are very favorable ; and as for these first words , if wee look into the epistle it self , it makes s. peter the same in order to christian hierarchy , as aaron was to the leuiticall , which wee account no small honour . he addes ( saith dr. h. ) that the apostles , ipsum principem eorum esse voluerunt , would have him to bee their prince ; that is , consented he should bee such ; to which words dr. h. subjoyns in a parenthesis ( where he read this i know not ) thus dr h. takes liberty to talk ridiculously , yet should i smile at him a little he would excommunicate me again in greek , and his friends would be displeased . anacletus lived in the apostles dayes , and ( as he tell 's us in the said epistle ) was ordained by s. peter himself , yet dr. h. finds fault with this his assertion because he knows not where he read it . christ , and his apostles came not with books in their hands , but with words in their mouths , to teach the world their doctrine . therefore dr. h. should rather have scrupled where he had heard it , then where he had read it , and put the force of his exception there ; and then wee could have told him there was none in those dayes for him to hear but onely either christ or his apostles and disciples ; neither can wee doubt of his immediate conversation with them , who was ( as the same epistle expresses ) ordained by s. peter himself . these preambulatory expressions favouring soe much our cause would make one think that the same author could not bee so forgetfull , as to undo vtterly the same authority in the self same epistle , nay in the next line , after he had calld s. peter , prince of the apostles ; nor that anacletus was such a courtier as to speak those former kinde words onely for complement sake , and afterwards when it came to the point , immediately deny all : yet dr. h. expresses him here as speaking first on the one side , then on the other ; and that when on the one side he had given us the former favorable word 's , the false tokens it seems of otherwise-meant friendship , presently ( like margery's good cow which gave a good meal , and when she had done kick't it down with her foot ) on the other side , as mr. h. tells us , with equal clearnes he prevaricates from what he had pretended , and over-throws s. peter's supremacy quite . the clear words ( as he calls them ) are these , caeteri verò apostoli cum eodem pari consortio honorem , & potestatem acceperunt . but the other apostles in like consortship received honour and power with him . which he never explicates , nor applies ( as his sleighting custome is ) but puts them onely down and then triumphs upon them , as if they could not possibly bear any other interpretation . whereas , i make account every good catholick may grant these words without any difficulty , and that they make nothing at all against us . for , to say that the other apostles received pari consortio honorem , &c. in like consortship honour , and power , does not infer that they received parem honorem & potestatem equall honour , and power , but that as he had received it from christ , so they pari consortio , likewise , or in like manner as being his fellows received it to . again our tenet granting to each universall iurisdiction all over the world , grants likewise that each precisely under the notion of apostle , that is , of one sent to preach christs faith , had a like consortship of honour and power ; each of them being dignify'd with an unlimited apostleship , and iurisdiction or power to preach ; but , speaking of the apostolicall colledge as a community and soe requiring order of government , wee affirm with s. hierome that s. peter was supreme in that respect , nor is there any thing to the contrary found in this place . again , the words cum eodem appear by their placing to be better joynd with acceperunt , then with pari ; for then they should rather have been put after it , paricum eodem , &c. and soe the whole place imports thus much , that though our saviour chose s. peter to be first yet the rest of the apostles acceperunt cum eodem received with him that is , at the same time he received it , in like consortship ( that is , of apostleship ( honour and power ; which was verified , when he in a common indifferent expression after his resurrection gave them their last and unlimited apostolicall mission , euntes in vniuersum mundum praedicate euangelium omni creaturae . going into the whole world preach the gospell to every creature . by this it appears that the place may have another meaning than that which mr. h. fancies ; now that it must have another , none but anacletus him self in the same epistle shall certifie us ; who manifests himself as plain a papist in this point of the pope's supremacy as either the cath. gent. or s. w. putting down there the orderly ascent of ecclesiasticall judicatures after that of bishops being to be judged by their metropolitans he rises higher to that of primates and still higher to that of the apostolicall seat or the pope's in these words . primates tamen ( vt praefixum est ) & tunc , & nunc habere iussae sunt , ad quos post sedem apostol cam summa negotia conueniant , yet the cities are order'd to have their primates , to whom the chief busienesses ( after the apostolicall seat ) may come . and a little after , episcoporumque causae , & summorum negociorum iudiciae ( saluà apostolicae sedis authoritate ) iustissimè terminentur . and let the causes of bishops , and the judgments of the highest matters bee most , justly decided by them , the authority of the apostolicall seat remaining unprejudic'd . by these two places wee may take an estimate of dr. h. solidnes , and sincerity , who catches at the shadow of a word , or two , pari consortio , in like consortship , so waxen natur'd that they are easily capable of a diverse shap't signification ; and thence argues ad hominem , against us that our own authors , and our canon law , are clearly opposite to our doctrine ; whereas he could not but know , and see in the very same place that there was noe testimony imaginable , more expressely for us , or more prejudiciable to him then the said epistle if wee look after the meaning of the author in the entire import of it , and not what the many-senc'd or rather indeed the noe senc'd dictionary interpretation of two single words give them a possibility to signify . neither let mr. h. think to excuse him self that he argues ad hominem in alledging these words , and soe it imports not his cause at all what the epistle it self ▪ sayes , since he builds not upon it himself , nor allows it's authority ; for still , as long as 't is shown that he imposes upon that epistle and it's author a sence which he knew they never intended he can never avoyd the note of insincerity ; and by how much the thing it self is more unlikely , that the authoritie wee alledge for us should be clearly against us ( as he sayes ) or the fell same epistle contradict it self ; by soe much 't is a far more shamefull rashnes , and an affected precipitation in him to pretend it , and object it , unles upon most evident and unavoidable grounds . sect. . dr. h's trick to evade bringing some testimony to confirm his own , wee know . his two-edg'd argument to conclu●e against s. peter's supermacy both from exclusivenes and not exclusivenes of iurisdiction . in the beginning of his fifth section dr. h. who was soe rarely skillfull in the art of memory as to contradict himself neere a dozen times in one point ( as hath been shown , part. . sect. . ) is now on a suddain become master of it , and undertakes to teach'it s. w. whose memory ( alas as hee sayes is frail . ) but ere my master gives me my lesson he reprehends me first very sharply for my ill memory , calling it my predominant fault , and that railing is but my blind to keep it from being descry'd ; nay moreover , this modest man who falsifies , or corrupts every thing he medles with , is angry with me that i doe not blush . expect ( reader ) some great advantage gain'd against mee which can move this preacher of patience to this passion , who in the beginning of his book soe like a saint profess'd his readines to turn the other cheak to him who should strike him on the right . to avoid mistakes on my part , and cauills on mine adversaries i shall put down both our words , and appeal to the readers eyes his were these of schism p. thus wee know it was at antioch where s. peter converted the iews and s. paul the gentiles . and what it was which dr. h. ( in the plurall number [ wee ] as became his authority , ) knew to be thus , he exprest in the immediatly foregoing words , to wit , that whensoever those two great apostles came to the same citie , the one constantly apply'd himself to the iews , received disciples of such , formed them into a church , left them when he departed that region to bee govern'd by some bishop of his assignation , and the other in like manner did the same to the gentiles . this is that ( reader ) which dr. h. knew to have b●en thus at antioch ; this is also the place reply p. . when all els fail'd him , he stood to as a sufficient expression of his exclusive tenet of those apostles iurisdictions . now my words schism disarm p. . upon his [ thus wee knew it was at antioch , &c ] were these . that his first testimony was his own knowledge thus wee know , &c. but that he put down no testimony at all to confirm the weaker one , of his [ wee know ] which yet had been requisite , that wee might have known it too . and this was all . what railing words the dr. find's here which should make him complain so hainously , i know not , unles it were that i calld the testimony of his own knowledg , weak ; and indeed if this be railing , despaire of learning more courtesie till dr. h. by growing wiser teach me it . but my predominant fault of an ill and frail memory for which shame must make change colour is this , that i said he put no testimony at all to confirm the weaker one , of his : wee know , yet afterwards set down two testimonies of that , of which i lately , denyed any . if hee means such things as he produced for testimonies , i set down indeed the very next section not onely two , but ten of them : but , if he means such testimonies as i exprest my self to deny there , that is , such as did confirm his own thus wee know i am soe far from blushing at it , that i still make him this bold profer , that , if amongst all the following testimonies there be found any one word confirming his own thus wee know , and what it relates to , that is , making s. peter's authority exclusive to the iews , and s. paul's to the gentiles when they met at the same city but what himself adds of his own head i will yeld him the whole controversy . nor let him tell me what he fancies to bee deduced thence , but what the testimonies themselv's expresse ; the deductions are his , the words onely are the testimonies : let him show me any one exclusive word in any one testimony , and i professe before all the world that i will not onely pardon him the impertinency of the rest , but alsoe grant him all . iudge now protestant reader , who hath most cause to blush : examine well if ever thou heardst such a challenge made to any writer yet extant , and not accepted of ; and then see to what a trifler thou trustest for thy salvation ; who in steed of replying to the purpose , and showing thee those exclusive words , tells his adversary that it is a predominant fault in him to chalenge him that he had never a testimony to confirm his own : wee know ; and then , seing himself unable to show any , thinks to evade by telling his challenger , he ought to blush for his frail memory ; whereas he should rather have blam'd him for his bad understanding , and bad eyes , neither apprehending nor seeing a word in any testimony to that purpose . in answer to his pretended testimonies i noted ( schism disarm . p. . ) that they affirmed no more but the founding the church of antioch by peter , and paul , which might be done by their promiscuous endeavours without distinction much lesse exclusion of authority and iurisdiction . dr. h. answers here ; 't is true , this was possible , and if it had been true had manifestly prejudged s. peter's singular iurisdiction and clearly joynd paul socially with him . it is impossible to gett a positive word of sence from this man , first , he will never willingly use the common words which expresse the question between us , as chief in authority amongst the apostles , their head , prince , &c. but , as before he used the ambiguous phrase of s. peter's having noe singular supremacy at hierusalem , soe now he recurr's to singular iurisdiction at antioch ; which being doublesenc'd if wee take it in one , he will be sure to evade hereafter by taking it in another . secondly , let us suppose him to mean honestly , that is to intend by it , that s. peter was not higher in authority of government than s. paul , as the question determines it , let us observe how this quodlibeticall reasoner argues : his whole intent was to conclude against s. peter's authority in question from his being exclusively limited to the iews when he met with s. paul in the same citie ; and now here , though he should grant their preaching in the same city to have been promiscuous , and indifferent both to iews and gentiles , yet hee sayes it manifestly prejudges s. peter's higher authority still : nothing can come wrong to him let it be exclusive or not exclusive , still either part of the contradiction equally fitts his concluding faculty . dull aristotle ! dull schools , and vniversities who could never light on this secure method of disputing ! thirdly , let us put this manifest proof into form , and it stands staggering thus s. peter and s. paul preach't promiscuously to the antiochians , therefore s. peter had manifestly noe higher authority then s. paul. good : did not paul and titus do the same in other places , were they therefore equall in authority ? fourthly observe these words , that their promiscuous preaching clearly joyn'd paul socially , with him . here again wee must give dr. h. leave to talk impertinently , and be content not to understand him ; for if he means that he was socially joyn'd with s. peter , as his fellow-apostle , or fellow-labourer , who either doubts it or imagins that it prejudices us : but , if he means that he was equall in authority what force of reason can make these two so remote ends meet in a conclusion : he was his fellow-preacher , or preach't with him , t●e●efore he was equall in authority with him ; as if the community of things under one notion , could not stand with their inequality under another ; or as if wee were not all fellow christians , yet one notwithstanding of greater dignity and authority then another . in answer to his dumbe testimonies which affirmed onely that s. peter and s. paul taught the antiochians , and founded the church , there , i replyd shism disar . p. . that this might have been done by the promiscuous endeavors of those apostles . dr. h. undertakes here p. . to remove this might be , that is to shew it impossible that they promiscuously taught the iews and gentiles at antioch . his first argument is drawn from the inscription of the rescript , which was directed to the gentiles , separately from the iews , that they should abstain from things strangled , &c. let us not wrong the argument , but put it into form as it deserves . the rescript was directed to the gentiles , and not to the iews ; ergo s. peter and s. paul did not preach promiscuously both to iews and gentiles in antioch ; what unseen mysterious wires there are which make this antecedent and consequent hang together is beyond my ghesse , and proper to revelation : for the words in which he puts most force 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the brethren which are of the gentiles expresse onely that there were some brethren at an●ioch gentiles besides some others of another sect , but they expresse nothing at all of preaching , nor of promiscuous , or exclusive authority over either ; or if either be intimated here it must be the former of promiscuous iurisdiction over the gentiles , since the rescript was sent to them as well in the name of s. peter ( whom he will have onely over the iews there ) as of s. paul whom he places over the gentiles ; yet this he calls an evidence , introducing his second testimony thus . and besides more evidence which therefollows act . to the same matter , which as superabundant wee must imagine he omitts and chuses this impertinent proof even now related for a more irrefragable evidence than all the rest . after this follows his second proof against their promiscuous preaching out of s. hierome as hee sayes , seorsim , &c. the churches which were of the iews were held a part , nor were mixed with those which were of the gentiles . which testimony in the space of four pages he makes use of thrice ; and it deserves to bee made much of by dr. h. for it is borrowed from the arch-heretick pelagius , and falsly impos'd upon s. hierome , as hath been shown largely heretofore sect. . as for the argument he makes from it wee shall do it the right to put it into form also , which done , it stand's thus . the churches of iews and gentiles were held a part , therefore s. peter , and s. paul could not impossibly preach both to iews and gentiles , thus dr. h. undertakes to remove my might bee and shew the endeavours of the apostles at antioch impossible to have been promiscuous , by such a medium , as none can possibly imagine the necessary connexion it hath with other termes . what forther reply may by needfull to these words of the arch heretick pelagius upon another score is already given when wee treated of it formerly . sect. . how dr. h. omitts to clear himself of his falsification of scripture . his unparell●d absurdity that it was forbidden by moses his law to converse with or preach to a gentile . dr. h. unwilling that the iews and gentiles should communicate in any thing , no not even so much as in a common teacher , had these very words in his book of schism p. . wee read of s. peter and the iewish proselytes , gal. . . that they withdrew from all communion , and society with the gentile christians , upon which s. paul reprooved him publickly , &c his disarmer challenged him to have abus'd s. peter , and his iewish proselytes , and the sacred scripture too , alledging that in the text cited by him , as the place where wee read it , there is noe such word to be read as the large-senc'd all in which the dr. places the whole force of his argument one would think now that a man who had not over come those triviall considerations of shame , and dishonour should either have shown that the solely important word all was in the place which he cited expressely for it , and assirmed it was read there ; or els confesse candidly and ingenuously that hee wrong'd , or at least was mistaken in the place he alledged ; but mr. h. is of another spirit when he is challenged of falsifying any place by his self additions , seeing it a desperate or impossible task to clear himself , he either passes it by with a gravely-gentile carelesnes ; or else grows angry , & would persuade his adversary to blush when-'tis his owne turn . he never goes about to shew us 't is read there , where he promis't us it was , which was objected and so was his task to clear but instead thereof ( reply p. . ) where he undertakes to answer it , recurs to an euasion as weak & unwarrantable as the clearing his falsification had been impossible . his euasion comes to this , that since s. peter abstained from the gentile diet least he should seeme to offend against the iew●sh law , therefore since it was equally against the iewish law to converse with a gentile as to eat the gentile diet , he must certainly be supposed to abstain from other communion with them . that it was forbidden by the iewish law to converse with a gentile he proves first from the text , the iews have no dealing with the samaritans , and from the disciples marvelling that he talked with the woman . what means this dr. by this instance ? the question is of gentiles ; the samaritans were not perfectly such , nor yet perfect aliens from moses his law but rather as obstinate schismaticks and hereticks from it , whose conversation by consequence they deem'd more contagious than that of pure heathens ; who , agreeing in no common principles or point with true beleevers , were therefore lesse likely to decieve them with false glosses . ibid. his second assertion superadds to the former that the preaching to a gentile was to the iews as unlawfull as the eating any unclean meat . this he proves from s. peter's vision , where one is represented by the other ; act. . and that without that vision he durst not have come to one of another nation , and that it was unlawfull for a iew to doe so ; as is exprest v. . all communion is interdicted the iewish & gentile church at antioch , hence it is against the iudaicall law to converse with them , or preach to gentiles . hence lastly the catholike gentlemanis unhappy continually in his objections . see here , reader , a patern of the protestant manner of writing in dr. h's , which is to lay the whole force of their proof upon any harsh-sounding text & something difficult to explicate , though they know in their consciences that there are an hundred nay a thousand other texts expresly against their pretence from that one . two things then i offer in answer to this objection ; the one , that it is the most absurd position that ever blurr'd paper to affirm that the iews were forbidden by the iudaicall law to conuerse with or teach a gentile . next that , had it been so , it had neither prejudiced us , nor availed dr. h. in order to these circumstances at antioch . as for the first , there is scarce any one point imaginable so frequently contradicted in scripture as is this assertion of mr. h's . for , to begin with the law it self , leuit. . . there shall no stranger eat of the holy thing , a sojourner of the preists , or an hired servant shall not eat of the holy thing , where we see supposed that strangers , sojourners and hired servants , which might not eat the passover , that is , who were gentiles , might live amongst the iews . and in the . v. a much more difficult point is supposed , tow it , of a priests daughter marryed to a stranger . again , . kings . . . salomon prayes that all the people of the earth may hear god's name , and that god would heare that prayer of the stranger who cometh out of a farre countrey to the house at hierusalem . so farre were they from abhorring to convert & converse with gentiles as they expresse themselves zealous of both . now as for examples of their conversing with gentiles there are so many of them recorded in holy writ , that i know not where to begin to recount them . spies sent by iosvah were designed to do it , rachab the harlot , & her fathers house were saved & lived with the iews after they had taken iericho , particularly it is expressed by the sacred writer that she or herposteritie lived in israël even to the time he writ iosh. . . elias conversed nay lived in the house with the widow of sarepta , elizeus with naaman the syrian ; dauid lived with achis ; salomon conversed & made a league with hiram , . kings . . . the machabees legates conversed with the romans , and the spartiatae & themselves made a league with them without ever scrupling at it , though they chose rather to die then eat wines flesh forbidden by the law , which manifests that conversing with gentiles was not equally ( as mr. h. affirms ) forbidden by the same law as the eating unclean meats . the iews conversed with gentiles in captiuity , neither do we hear of any expression of abhominating their civil societie with them . or that they broke moses his law in so doing , or any one put to death upon that score . our saviour expresses of the pharisees that they did circuire terras & maria , goe about sea & land to make one proselyte , which was impossible to be done without both conversation & preaching . innumerable other examples might be gather'd out of scripture of their conversing with gentiles , by one who thought so manifest a point worth further clearing ; and consequently i cannot think that this folio-annotation bible man could possibly be ignorant , but that the contrary to this euading assertion of his built upon one wilfully misunderstood place , was most evident in scripture . nor was onely moses his law & the whole stream of scripture-instances opposite to this new tenet of his , but the position it self is absolutely implicatory , supposing the lawfulnes to make a proselyte ; for , how could a gentile possibly come to be of the iewish law without the conversation & instruction of some iew. in a word , dauid commanded together the strangers in the land of israël , . chron. . . and , they were found , when salomon numbered them afterwards , to amount to one hundred fify three thousand six hundred . chron . . and those able men fit to work , as appeares by v. . that is there were one hundred fiftie three thousand , six hundred strangers , besides male-infants , boyes , very old men , & the whole female sex , which in likelihood were as many as the men . let us then put them in all , as we can in reason iudge no lesse to amount to three hundred thousand . now , is it possible that any but a mad man should imagin that either there were none amongst this vast number gentiles still , since none was forced to be a proselyte , nor ( as far as i ever read ) turned out of the countrey because he would not become of the iewish law ; can any imagin there were none amongst this numerous multitude as yet a cathecumenus ( as we may say ) and learning his duty when he should become a iew ? or , grant them all to be proselytes and of moses his law already , yet , can any man without having great title to bedlam think that three hundred thousand gentiles were converted to moses his law & became proselytes without any iews very frequently both conversing with them & instructing them ; or lastly , that ( considering how strict the iews were in observing the law of moses ) this so frequent-conversation & instruction equally unlawfull according to dr. h. as eating any unclean diet , could have been used , & yet then no conscience made of it that ever we heard of ; no prohibition of that unlawfull custome , no banishing the gentiles from amongst them ; but rather making their countrey a rendevous for all to come that would ; no reprehension , no animadversion , stoning &c. used towards the practisers of this conversation with & conversion of the gentiles ; but it must be imagin'd that moses his law was publikely and frequently , & yet calmly & quietly broken ; and that , in dauids reign & the beginning of salomons , the purest times of the iewish church , rather than a protestant minister , one dr. h. should fail in vindicating his unparalleld absurdity , that the iews at antioch had no communion at all , no not even civill conversation with the gentiles their fellow-christians , because they were forbidden to do it by the iudaicall law , of which they were zealous . thus much for dr. h's absurdity of absurdities that it was forbidden by moses his law that the iews should either civilly converse with or charitably endeavour to convert a gentile . now , put the case it had been thus forbidden , & thus unlawfull , what likelyhood was there that the apprehension of that unlawfulnes should still remain at the time we speak of , so as to make the iewish christians abhor still all conversation with the gentile ones at antioch . for this vision of s. peter's , directing his endeavours to preach to the gentiles could not but be universally known both by the occasionall relating it , of which there was great necessity by reason of the scandall which that nouelty caused at first , as also by it's effects , the conversion of multitudes of gentiles which ensved thereupon . grant then that the action was accounted scandalous to all that heard it , & that this vision of s. peter's iustify'd it , & him for doing it , it cannot be imagind but that this relation of his vision was spread far & near amongst the iews with whom he conversed , specially dr. h. granting that when s. paul met him not he preacht both to iews & gentiles , he was obliged to publish the said vision as a warrātable excuse of his and the other apostles frequently preaching to the latter . again , we read that those that were scandalized at s. peter's conversing with the gentiles act. . after he had cleared himself , & related his vision exprest their full satisfaction by holding their peace & glorifying god for it v. . now then i argue , either the iews at antioch were in like disposition of minde to be scandalized , seeing s. peter converse with gentiles there , gal. . or not : if not , then there is no ground why mr. h. should thinke that the iewish christians there held it unlawfull to converse with the gentile ones ; if they held it unlawfull , then i ask again upon what groūds can dr. h. think that s. peter should not ( as he was obliged ) endeavour to satisfy them that it was god's will by declaring his vision to them also aswell as he did to the iews at hierusalem act. . or why he should conceit that the iews at antioch were so incomparably more unreasonable than the others , that whereas those at hierusalem , though at first so hott as to contend with s. peter about it act. v. . yet remaind so perfectly satisfied by s. peter's discourse as to glorifie god. v. . those at antioch should persist still obstinate & unsatisfied , & not give any credit at all to their apostle and according to mr. h. their onely governour , s. peter . moreover , ere this contest happen'd at antioch about eating the gentile diet , it was no new matter , which is that which causes scandall , but a publike & known thing that the gentiles were convers't with & preach't too , act. . v. . we read that the apostles & brethren which were in iudea heard of it , v. . that some who were of cyprus and greece preached to the grecians in antioch , v. . that when the church at hierusalem heard of it , they sent barnabas ( to them ) to antioch for the same end : so that see how the church of the iews further'd & promoted the preaching to the gentiles , so far were they from being now scandalized at it . after that , barnabas brought paul also thither , & they preach't there one whole year , v. . and more particularly to the gentiles , as dr. h. grants , at least promiscuously none ever deny'd ; nor did this year onely intervene ( sufficient time to let the iews in the same city know that the gentiles might be convers'd with & preach't to ) but many more ere the controversy about the gentile diet happen'd , as may easily be gather'd from the . chapter to the gal : it being exprest there to have been fowerteen years at least after s. paul's conversion , which is related , act. . immediately before the conversion of cornelius , act. . now , as for other particulars philip had preached to the eunuch a gentile . act. . . and in samatia , act. . . and in the same chapter v. . s. peter also with him preacht the gospell in many villages of the samarians . yet dr. h after all this publike preaching to gentiles & samaritans , avowed to be lawfull by the so long & frequent practice & doctrine of the chiefest apostles & pillars of christianitie , and ( which is worth noting ) most solemnly & openly profest & exercised at antioch in particular , will yet after all this have the iewish christians in antioch ignorant that it was lawfull to converse with or preach to a gentile ; and all this , because rather then he will yeeld to the plainest truth , there is no paradox so absurd , so non-sensicall & contradictory , but he thinks it worth his patronage , so it yeelds him the mutuall succour of any sorry evasion , when he is taken in a falsification or some other unavoidable weaknes . but , though nothing else could bridle dr. h. from such extravagancy of insincerity & weaknes , yet , i wonder much his own words could not curb him , & make him if he needs would run the maze , to do it at least with in his owne lists . his owne words which occasion●d this debate , of schism p. are these , we read of s. peter & the iewish proselytes , gal . . that they withdrew from all communion & society with the gentile christians . now , if they withdrew from all communion & society , i suppose they had & used formerly both communion & society with them ; else , how could they be said to withdraw from it ; yet this patron of protestantism from whom 't is impossible to get a word of sence or sincerity , but perpetually he both corrupts other mens sayings & contradicts his own , will have them never to have had at all , that from which he tells us they withdrew ; since they were equally zealous of moses his law , before as after the breach , by which law he assures us it was forbidden so much as to converse with a gentile . lastly , is it possible that passion should inveigle any man of reason to such a strange conceit , as to imagin that , each party being christians , they should avoid even courteous or civill commerce one with another : or , that the apostles would have countenanced by their compliance such an uncharitable carriage ? but is this all ? let us see between whom this all-communion was broke ; between two churches ; and by whom ? by s. peter & his iewish proselytes : now , since schism is formally & point blank counterpos'd to vnion & communion between churches , if all-communion be broke between those churches , it is a perfect contradiction in terms , to say there is not a schism made between them : and , since it was s. peter & his iewish proselytes who behaved themselves actively in this point , it follows by most absolute & necessary consequence , that they must be all schismaticks , and blessed s. peter their ringleader . but 't is no matter with him ; rather shall s. peter instead of being head of the church , be an head of schismaticks , than dr. h. be acknowledged a schismatick & a falsifier : and , not onely the authority but also the sanctity of that holy apostle be sacrific'd to the protestant interest , rather than so great a patron of theirs , and so saintly a falsifier shall want an evasion to soder his crack't credit . neither let dr. h. think to escape making s. peter & his iewish converts schismaticks by saying that this was a prudent managery onely ( rep. p. . ) & so iustifiable by the present circumstances ; since it is most undeniable that the breaking of all communion with another church is the extern act of schism ; & then , let him remember his own grounds layd against himself in his first chapter of schism p. . that the matter of fact onely is to be considered not the causes or motives . since eo ipso that fact is schism , nor can be iustifi'd from being such by any causes , motives , or circumstances what-soever ; now then , since the fact of breaking from all-communion which the gentile church , that is of schism from it is in expresse terms imputed to s. peter & his iewish proselytes by dr. h. i expect then what possible motive this author can pretend to alledge sufficient to excuse them from schism , whose doctrine it is in the place cited that no motive or reason was sufficient to render matter of fact of this nature excusable or iustify it from being schism , nay damnable , worse then sacriledge , idolatry , &c. as the fathers there cited by d h. avouch . the summe then of this part of dr. h's defence is , that he takes no notice at all of his falsifying by adding the onely important & large-senc't word all to the scripture , nor attempts to clear himself of it ; but , instead of doing this , he goes about to maintain his position counterfeited to be found there to wit , that iewish christians withdrew from all-communion with the gentile ones , by this argument that it was equally forbidden by moses his law to converse with or preach to a gentile , as to eate their diet . a paradox so incomparably & notoriously absurd , that it is at once both perfectly opposite to the law it self , repugnant to innumerable examples from scripture to the contrary , & the universall practice of the synagogue ; injurious to the iewish church in it's purest times , making them frequently , publikely & uncontrolledly break the law in a point ( as he saies ) equally forbidden as eating the gentile diet ; implicatory in terms , supposing once the lawfulnes of making a proselyte ; impertinent to his present purpose & circumstances were it granted ; expressely contradictory to his own words , about which the present contest was raised ; derogating from those ancient primitive christians all charity , nay even in the least and sleightest degree ; and lastly , beyond all evasion , making them perfectly schismaticks & s. peter their ring-leader ; and that , proceeding on dr. h's own grounds . nor hath he any thing to counterpo●ze this heap of absurdities of the seuenteens , but onely a misunderstood place of scripture , of which himself must be the interpreter ; which is the right protestant method , who build their faith upon any text which seems at first sight to make for them or is hard to explicate ; although universall tradition of the foregoing church , importing , involving & bringing downe to us all imaginable motives of the contrary truth evidence that interpretation to be impossible . but 't is no matter what dr. h. does or sayes ; if he can but talk any thing gentilely & sleightly , the grave negligence must supply the want of sence & truth ; especially if hee but shut upwith a victorious epiphonema , pronounced with a serious-sobersadnes ( repl p. . l. vlt. ) thus unhappy is this gentleman continually in his objections , all is well , and his sleight-sould sermon-admi●ers take that to be the rarest nectar of reason , which , if examin'd is the most sublimated quintessence of contradiction-absurdity , as hath amply been shown . now as for s. peter's words that it was unlawfull for a man that was a iew to keep company or come to one that is of ther nation , upon which onely he build his position , otherwise altogether destitute of any shadow of proof . i answer , that the scribes & such like pretenders to a preciser kinde of holines , had lately introduced many customes of their owne forging , under the notion of traditions ( of some of which they are accused by our saviour ) and obtruded them upon the consciences of the iews to be religiously observed ; especially at hierusalem the rendevous of iewish doctors , and the place where their doctrine had more immediate influence upon the mindes of of thei auditors . of those precise customes this was one , of not going to a gentiles house , or conversing with them . to this , amongst others , s. peter was inured by long education , in so much that though he heard our b. saviour with his own mouth give them commission to go to preach all over the world , in vniuersum mundum and omni creaturae , to every creature ; yet , finding employment enough amongst those of the circumcision , he never attempted it till by a vision he was immediately set upon it by almighty god , especially the obligation to his country laying a stronger ty upon him , and having received order to preach first to the iews untill they shew'd themselves unworthy , he needed a vision to tell him when that time came , & circumstances were ripe for it . in like manner we read that s. paul , though chosen particularly to preach to the gentiles , act. . . yet he affirmed , act. . that it was necessary that the words of god should first have been spoken to the iews , & did not turn to the gentiles but upon their rejecting him . by unlawfull then in this place i take not to bee mean't , not against the law of moses ; but , what their teachers and doctors , who govern'd their consciences , bore them in hand was unlawfull : in the same manner as wee now call many things unlawfull , which are not found forbidden by christ's law , but which our doctours and casuists iudge to bee unlawfull . again , wee read that though the apostles and brethren that were in iudea had heard that the gentiles had received the word of god. act. . v. . yet the second verse let ts us know of none that found fault with him save those at hierusalem onely ; and that , not meerly upon the account of going to the houses of gentiles , but of eating with them also , as the third verse expresses . but let their zeal have been never so hot to maintain this new-fangled apprehension , and let it bee never so universall to abhorre the conversation of gentiles , whiles they remain'd gentiles ; yet , it is the strangest fancy that ever entred into a rational head , to imagin that they should still retain the same uncharitable feud towards them after they were become christians and their fellow-brothers in him , in whom they were taught there was no distinction of iew nor gentile . which sounds a far greater absurdity in a christian eare , than to say that they likewise abhorr'd still the conversation of the proselytes to the law of moses after their conversion ; & that those one hundred fifty three thousand workmen who lived dispersed among the iews in salomon's time , neither converst with their neighbour iews , nor took directions how to order their labour towards the building of salomon's temple , but did their work by instinct and the guidance of the private spirit , as dr. h. interprets scripture . sectio . how dr. h. omitts to clear himself of falsifying the apostolicall constitutions , and to take notice of all the exceptions brought against that testimony in schism disarm'd . his acute manner of arguing . as also how hee brings a testimony against him in every particular to make good all his former proofs ; and by what art hee makes it speak for him . the next testimony of mr. h's which comes under examination , is taken from the writer of the apostolicall constitutions , who tells us ( according to dr. h. of schism , p. . ) that evod●us & ignatius at the same time sate bishops at antioch , one succeeding s. peter the other s. paul , one in the iew●sh , the other in the gentile congregation . now if that writer tells us no such thing , no not a word of this long rabble , is it possible dr. h. can deny himself to be a manifest & wilfull falsifier ? schism disarm'd challeng'd him upon this occasion of a manifest falsification ; and that that writer neither tells us ( as dr. h. pretended ) that they sate at the same time bishops in whichwords consists the greatest force of the testimony : nor that they succeeded the apostles , with that distinction ; nor that the iewish & gentile congregations were distinct , much lesse that those apostles iurisdictions at antioch were mutually limitted , which indeed onely concern'd his purpose ; but onely that they were ordained by the apostles , the text being onely this antiochiae euodius ordinatus est a me petro , ignatius a paulo : at antioch euodius was ordained by me peter , ignatius by paul , without the least word before or after concerning that matter ; of all these falsifications & voluntary additions schism disarm'd p. . . challenged mr. h. yet , in return he offers not one word to clear himself reply c. . sect . the place whither ( answ . p. . l. . . ) hee r●ferd mee for answer to this point ; nor to shew us that that writer tells us what he so largely promist us ; of schism p. . onely in his answer p. . he assures us that in his reply , the whole matter of euodius & ignatius is further cleared ( as if he had cleared it already ) and s. w' s elaborate misunderstandings forestall'd ; he should have said misreadings , for it was mine eyes & not mine understanding which fail'd me , if he had not added to this testimony all which made for his purpose . foure observations i shall recomend the reader to let him see that this insincerity in dr. h. was affected & voluntary . first , the words in the testmony importing their ordination , neither make against us nor touch our controversy . next , all the words added of his own head are made use of by him , & solely-important in this occasion . thirdly , that he never particulariz'd the place in the author where this testimony was to be found , which he ordinarily vses , but leaves us to look for it in a whole book , hoping we might either be weary in looking it , or misse , & so● himself in the mean time escape scot-free . lastly , he so iumbles together the two different letters ( as his comon trick is ) that no man living can make any ghesse which words are the testimonies , which his own ; and , should we pitch upon any to be the testimonies , relying upon the translation letter , in that part they sate at the same time bishops , we finde the most considerable word same put in a lesse letter , as if it were part of the citation , whereas no such word nor any thing to that sence was found in the author . and thus dr. h. ( as he professes answ . p. . speaks the full truth of god. but instead of clearing himself from being an arrant falsifier , dr. h. ( as his custome is ) attempts to sh●w himself an acute doctour ; and when it was his turn to sh●w us the pretended words in his testimony , he recurs to the defence of the position it self . and first he cries quits which the catholike gentleman who , as he tells us in a drie phrase ( repl. sect. . num . . ) casts one stone at all his buildings together . and what stone is this ? he challenged him not to have brought one word out of antiquity to prove the with drawing from all communion ( already spoken of ) to have been the cause of the division of the bishopriks in antioch & rome . this is the catholike gentleman's stone , as he calls it , which levell'd by him at such an impenetrable rock of solid reason as mr. h. rebounds upon the thrower's head with this violence . first that he manifested from antiquity in his book of schism that the church of antioch was founded by s. peter & s. paul , repl. p ▪ i answer , 't is graunted ; but what is this to the point ; since this might easily be performed by their promiscuous preaching , without exclusion of iurisdiction , or breaking of all communion between churches . secondly , that he manifested there , that there were two churches at antioch , the one of the iews the other of the gentile christians . i answ . he hath not one testimony in the whole book of schism which expresses this position nor in these later books , save onely that from the arch-heretick pelagius , already reply'd to , sect thirly that in those churches at the same time sate two distinct bishops , euodius & ignatius . i answer this is onely prou'd from his owne falsification of the testimony from the apostolicall constitutions ; not a word of the fitting together of two in those two distinct churches found either in that or any other place , as yet cited by him . thus the catholike gentleman's stone sticks yet insost reason'd dr. h. for want of solidnes in the place it light to reverberate its motion . now let us see what dr. h. who braggs so much of a hending his adversaries 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath left unreply'd upon in this his answer to schism disarm'd : in which treatise , p. . i objected all these weaknesses in this one point . first , that were it granted that two sate together it would not serve his turn a iott the more . for what would he infer hence ? that s. peter & s. paul were distinct bishops there also ? grant this too , what follows hence against the pope's authory ? i know his intent is to conclude hereupon that , therefore s. peter & s. paul had exclusive iurisdictions at antioch , therefore s. peter's iurisdiction was limited , therefore the pope had not an illimitted one : but how doth the one's presiding over iews the other over gentiles argue a limitation of that power it self , or at all necessarily touch the interior right ? ●uppose i should deny his consequence , & using dr. h's word ( repl. p. . upon a like occasion at antioch ) say that this might have been onely a prudent managery , a wise ordering designed by s. peter & s. paul ; i wonder how he would proceed with his argument & prove his consequence that it was intended for a reall not seeming counter-iurisdiction . i am sure as yet he hath not produced any thing at all to disannull this instance of his arguments in consequence , nor strengthen'd his proof against this obvious pretence that it might have been thus otherwise . again , was there not room enough in antioch ( and the like may much better be said of rome ) for two to preside & preach in ? could not they divide the city into two halves for the better convenience of their auditours coming promiscuously to hear their doctrine , but there must necessarily be a distinction of the iewish & gentile caetus , the iewish under one & the gentiles under tother , as dr. h. expresses it answ . p. . lin . vlt. ) telling us there that there could not be two bishops in rome without this distinction . further , let us suppose that the iewish christians would not mingle with the gentiles in the exercise of divine worship where there was this scandalizing diversity of their ceremonies ( for i cannot think that , holding them their fellow christians , they should be so uncharitable as to abhorre their communion as much as if they had been excommunicate , schismaticks , hereticks , or as if they had still remain'd heathen as dr. h. contends ) yet i see no impossibility that s. peter in his half of the city should some times go to iewis congregation , sometimes to the gentile ; & s. paul do the like in his ; so that still dr. h's supple bow of reason is farre from carrying home to his mark , or concluding what he purposed . nor let him object that this distinction of the city into two parts , signifies exclusion of iurisdiction when they met : it infers no more but that they acted prudently in so doing , & so as no wise man can be imagind ' willing to do otherwise ; since common sence teaches us that if two preachers come to one city & each be able to perform his office without the assistance of the other , it were the height of imprudence not to separate themselves & preach a part ; nay & to show a particular care , affection , & over sight towards their own converts , and to let them know 't was convenient they should continue rather with him wtih whom they had begun . and this shall serve for an answer to his lisping testimony out of epiphanius that s. peter & s. paul were bishops in rome . which dr. h. answ . p. . relies upon as a busines whose force it is not possible s. w. should dicert ; though neither it nor any testimony else expresse a syllable of s. peter being over ●ews onely , s. paul over gentiles , is the point to be proved by it ; but no where exprest save onely in his own falsification interdicting them all communion , & his own thus we know it was at antioch . but to return to his prudent neglects . secondly he was told , that the testimonies alledged by himself out of eusebius and origen calling ignatius the second , & out of s. ierome calling him the third , make against the sitting of those two together , his expresse & important pretence . yet he never answers these self opposed testimonies ; but instead of doing so adds two more reply p. out of simeon metaphrastes & an anonymus ancient writer , to witnes the same & confirm my objection . thirdly he was told that he will never finde s. paul was accounted a parcell-bishop in antioch that he should have a properly call'd successor there , &c. in order to which , he offers us no reply save onely his owne former weak fancy . fourthly that he undid all he had said with a testimony of theodoret , which affirm'd in expresse opposition to his former place out of the apostolicall constitutions , that ignatius was ordain'd by s. peter . to which opposite testimony instead of answering , he ( seconds it with a another reply p. . lin . vlt. ) was ever such a disputant heard of . lastly , it was objected that the apostolicall constitutions , upon which he builds , was a book excepted against by all sides ; & theodoret , who opposes it in this point , was an author beyond exception , and that therefore wee have far more reason to iudge that s. peter ordain'd ignatius also then evodius onely . whence i furthe deduce that if , in the drs. grounds , ignatius were over the gentiles , & ordain'd by s. peter , as theodoret his better author testifies , s. peter by consequence was over the gentiles also in antioch . now what reply attempts dr. h. against an objection which enervates all the whole authority he relies on & shows him baffled in his own testimonies ? not a word : yet , he tells us in greek that he attends his aduersaries 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , step by step ; though hee still auoids him then most warily , when his attendance is most necessary . nothing therefore hath mr. h. reply'd to those concerning exceptions of mine , nothing to his own testimonies in particular , though shown to have been against him . yet somthing he must say to every thing in one manner or other ; that 's resolu'd ; except it be to shew the falsifying words in a testimony where they are not found , in which case he is wisely silent his argument from these contradictory places is founded ( repl. p. ) in reconciling them and making them friends ; the difference he tells us is but seeming & he goes about to remove it ; which way of arguing , in the first place is perfectly absurd , unles he first prove the necessity of each testimonies being true , which he never attempts ; otherwise , to go about to prove a truth by reconciling falshoods , or truths with falshoods , is such a new inuention or arguing , that dr. h. hath all the right & reason in the world to get a patent of it , that none should use it without his licence . secondly , the authority of the apostolicall constitutions is acknowled'gd to be corrupt by the protestants themselves ; & , consequently , unles he vindicate first that his main testimony fetc'ht thence is true , for any thing he knows he goes about to reconcile a truth with a falshood ; at least theodorets authority standing against it , it is iustly presumed to be such , which makes dr. h's plea for his said patent stronger . thirdly is it such news that authors should be of severall opinions ? or , was there ever protestant till dr. h. who held so , even of the fathers themselves ; yet , contrary here to his own grounds , he will have none of them mistaken though they contradict one another ; he hath inuented a fancy how to reconcile their sayings , ere he knows or proves whether they were mistaken or no in an obscure matter of fact done long before their time . nor cares he what this reconcilement of contradictions costs , though it make all antiquitie blind , ●ll his new fangled cōcied or scholion which he putts down of schism p. . l. . gave light to the world , yet as long as he can by screwing & wresting make them favour his cause , he is a man of peace & contradictions shall shake hands and bee friends . but who is the vmpire to decide this contradiction-quarrell ? one , god knows whom , called ioannes malela antiochenus : and the testimony from him is found in a manuscript in oxford library : that is , we may goe look it god knows where . yet we will trust dr. h. for once in a testimony not extant , who hath deceived us so often in those which were publike & easie to be examined , and take the place as we find it by himself . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. when peter went to rome , passing by antioch the great , euodius bishop and patriarch of antioch happend ' to dy & ignatius received the bishoprick , s. peter ordaining & enthroning him . was there ever testimony imaginable more expresse against this very point in controversie and that in every particular than this he alledges as the knot of all his proof . see his booke of schism . p. . l . . where he contends from the apostolicall constitutions that euodius & ignatius sate at the same time bishops of antioch . see ioannes malela's testimony , which was to button together all the rest , and conclude the controversy [ euodius happen'd to dy & ignatius succeeded him in the bishoprick . ] see in the true testimony from the apostolicall constitutions put downe schism disarm'd p. . because dr. h. had falsify'd it , ignatius ordinatus est a paulo , ignatius was ordain'd by paul : see malela [ ignatius received the bishoprick , s. peter ordaining him . lastly see in malela's testimony bishoprick in the singular , bishop and patriarch in the singular ; whereas dr. h. all over makes it his whole design to prove bishops , two bishopricks at once in the same city . observe the word patriarch , & ask dr. h. whether he thinks in his conscience there were two patriarchs at antioch one over iews , another over gentiles , or where cā he even preten'd to have read or heard of such an absurd tenet . in a word there is scarce any proposition affirm'd by dr. h. in order to this present point , but finds here it's expresse contrary ; and yet he brings this as the upshot of all his proofs , and as that where in he mean't to make all ends meet ; introducing it here in these confident terms , ( repl. p. . l. . . ) that the seeming difference of his former testimonies is removed by io. malela antiochenus , who thus sets down the whole matter : whereas indeed the matter he sets down is wholy contrary to mr. h. does this man care a pin with what false pretences he mocks his reader & abuses his very eyes ? but was there no design in alledging this testimony , or can he make it , though quite contrary to his tenet , serve his turn for nothing ? yes ; for , there is nothing so contradictory to dr. h's doctrine in it's self , but by cooking it up hand somely he can make his advantage of it . he wedges in two parenthesisses of his own in the middle of the testimony and then all is evident : the testimony then , as by him put down , stands gaping thus ; when peter went to rome passing by antioch the great , euodius bishop & patriarch of antioch happen'd to dy , and ignatius ( who was , as was said , first constituted by s. paul over the gentiles there ) received the bishoprick ( that , i suppose , must now be of the iewish province also , over which euodius had been in his life time ) s. peter ordaining & enthroning him . now , as for the testimony it self , taken alone it is expresly against him , as hath been shown ; the onely vertue & force of it lies in the parenthesisses ; and if we examin these , the totall strength of the first lies in the words , as was said , that is , by himself , for he hath produced as yet never a testimony which says evodius was constituted by s. paul over the gentiles ; the sole force of the latter parenthesis lies in the all-conquering , i suppose , which is perfectly gratis , and without all show of any ground either in antiquitie or comon sence , as hath been largely manifested . and so by this mean's , we have gotten two other very strong testimonies to confirm his own we know ; to wit , as was said and , i suppose ; nor have we one expresse word from any testimony save from his own knowledge , his own saying , and his owne suppositions . the result is that this testimony , the upshot & knot of all the rest , is it self absolutely against him , and onely brought to countenance his parenthesisses , not with it's influence , but with it's presence ; so that his testimonies are as it were the stock upon which he ingrafts his owne sayings either in the middle by way of a parenthesis , or by means of an , id est , in antecedent or subsequent words ; sometimes with distinction , sometimes with none ; and so , it matters not with him what nature the stock it self is of , since the fruit of testifying in favour of his tenet is to be expected from the accessory scyons or spriggs ( his voluntary additions ) and so need not resemble the stock , which may be of an indifferent , perhaps contrary nature . sect . how dr. h. sleightly waves to strengthen his six testimonies shown invalid by schism disarm'd ; and , in particular , what work hee makes with a testimony from s. prosper . his six following testimonies to prove that s. peter was over iews onely at rome , and s paul over gentiles are shown ( schism disarm'd , p. . . . first not to have a word in them to that purpose , nor intimating any thing which may not aswell & much better infer a promiscuous authoritie than an exclusive one ; since they onely signify that they founded the church there , and were apostles & bishops there : secondly , he was accused there for calling those obscure testimonies evidences for the exclusive iurisdiction of these apostles one over iews the other over gentiles ; whereas , there was not one exclusive particle in any one of them , nor so much as iew or gentile named by them . thirdly , in order to this , the notion of an evidence was set down & manifested how far his twilight-testimony-proof were from the pretence of being such . fourthly , his sly gullery of the reader to his face , by endeavouring to make him beleeve that the testimonies were parallell to his owne confident affirmation that it was evident , was there layd open , & shown to be a deceit : his words ( of schism p. ) being , the same is as evident at rome , where these two apostles met again , and each of them erected & managed a church s. peter of iews , s. paul of gentiles : whereas the testimonies which he usher'd in with so many soe 's had not a word to that purpose , as was there shown . of all these weaknesses dr. h. was accused by his disarmer , in answer to which he tells me answ . p. . l. . that that wherein rome was concern'd is reviewed repl , c. . where nothing is found to that purpose , nor any where else , save onely , in the sect. . par . . where when i came to look in expectation of some return to my exceptions , i found that he onely enumerated briefly the same testimonies of his former book , his irref●agable one ( as he calls it ) from the popes ●eales , his falsification ( as shall be seen ere long ) concerning linus & clemens , which he tells us again are evidences , that they clear that part which concerned rome , and then having made this learned mock-reply that is , said over again out of his former book what had been excepted against by mee , & related us back in the margent to that very place in it which i had impugned as thus manifoldly weak he ends with these words , that sure there can be no need of farther proofs or testimonies from antiquity in this matter . that bold fac'd word sure is a sure card , and mr. h's ace of th' trumps , there is no resisting it ; when the game seems quite gone , it retrives the losse & carries all before it . my answer was that all which those testimonies intimated might have been performed by promiscuous preaching of each both to th' iews & gentiles ; the summe of his reply is onely this , that sure it cannot , i objected that those testimonies were weak & concluded nothing at all of such a distinction he answers that they are clear , are evidences , & that sure there can need no farther proof ; so that we have now got a fourth express proofe added to his wee know , i say , & i suppose , to wit his owne [ sure , ] the sure naile fasten'd by the master of the protestant assembly , dr. h. as for the testimony of s. prosper , in which he was accused to render ecclesiam gentium , the church of the nations , lest s. peter & s. paul should both have meddled with gentiles in rome , which words should they be render'd the church of the gentiles must necessarily follow , he referts me to his repl. p. . parag . . for satisfaction ; where he acquaints me with his desire that the truth of his interpretation may be consider'd by the words cited from him . the words are these , in ipsâ hierusalem lacobus , &c. iames at hierusalem , iohn at ephesus , andrew & the rest through out all asia , gentium ecclesiam sacrârunt , consecrated the church of the nations ( sayes dr. h. ) gentiles ( says s. w. ) vpon this testimony dr. h. argues thus . what nations were these ? sure of iews aswell as gentiles : then follow the grounds of this his assurance ; else hierusalem could be no part of them , no nor iohn's converts at ephesus , for they were iews , and then he concludes his mild-reasoning discourse with as mild a reprehension , that therefore the catholike gentleman did not doe well . now , as for his sure , 't is indeed a pregnant expression ; but i deny the sufficiency of the authoritie which so magisterially pronounces it ; and , for what concerns the grounds of his assurance , they are both of them found onely in his own sayings , & no where in any testimony ; my tenet , he knows , is , that all those apostles preach't promiscuously to gentiles also where soever they came . but , lest he should think me hard hearted for not beleeving his sure , i shall at least show my self far from cruelty in making him this friendly proffer , that if he can show mee any one word in any testimony yet produc't , which expresses that s. iames preach't to iews onely in hierusalem , or s. iohn to iews onely in ephesus , upon which alone he builds here that gentium cannot signifie gentiles , i will pardon him the answering this whole book ; which to doe on any fashion will i know be very laborious & shamefull to him ; but to doe it satisfactorily impossible , unles he could put out his reader 's eyes , & so hinder them from reading his corrupted & falsified citations aright . is there anything easier then to show us an exclusive particle or expression if any such thing were to be found there : but , if there be none , what an emptines , vanity & open cozenage of his reader is it to cry sure , surely , certainly , vnquestionably , and the like , when there is no other warrant to ground this assurance , save his owne weake fancy , inconsequent deductions , h●s interlac'd parenthesisses , his facing the testimonies with antecedent , peecing them with subsequent words ; whiles , in the meane time , the testimony it self must stand by & look on onely like a conditio sine quâ non , as if it were an honourable spectator to grace his personating ; and not have any efficacious influence , or act any part in the argument which bears it's title . but to come to the testimony it self : first , i would know of mr. h. how oft he hath read gentes taken alone without any additionall & determining expression to signifie both iews & gentiles ; unles it be in this sence as it probably might be in s prosper's time , that gentium ecclesia signified the christian church , in which the iews were included , yet being no considerable part of it , they needed not be exprest . next , as for the word nations which he recurs to , i would ask whether ( though those in iudea were styled the nation of the iews ) yet , whether those in dispersion at rome were called a nation or no , or rather a sect thirdly , let gentium signifie , of the nations , as he would have it , let us see how dr. h. hath advantaged his cause : for , if it be so , then the words gentium ecclesiam sacrarunt , they consecrated the church of the nations , are to be applyed to all the apostles there mention'd : now then , since nations ( as dr. h. tells us here ) is sure of iews aswel as gentiles , the testimony must run thus , iames at hierusalem consecrated the church of iews aswell as gentiles , iohn at ephesus consecrated the church of iews aswell as gentiles , andrew & the rest throughout all asia consecrated the church of the iews aswell as gentiles ; and the like of peter & paul at rome . thus dr. h. thinking to stop one hole hath made other three quite destroyes the substance of his exclusive tenet , while he went about to mend a circumstance . fourthly if he will not allow this signification of the word given & allowed by himself ( as'applyed to s peter & s. paul when it was his interest ) to be appliable to all the rest of those apostles likewise , let us see what an unreasonable beleef he exacts of his readers ; to imagine that the word gentium should dance from one signification to another as his fancy shall please to strike up a diverse tune . hence apply'd to s. iames & s iohn , it must be imagin'd to signify iews onely , because 't is against the interest of his tenet that they should open their mouths to convert a gentile at hierusalem and ephesus : but then s. andrew & the rest are not apostles of the circumcision , & so according to him must not preach to a iew in asia , presently upon this the ianus fac'd word gentium turns the other side of it's visage towards us , & represents to us gentiles onely ; yet , all this could not content dr. h. he had a minde to limit s. peter's authority when he met s. paul in the same city , which he could finde no handsomerway to doe then by making one over the iews onely , the other over onely the gentiles : no sooner had dr. h fancied this , but immediately the obedient word gentium turn'd round , & shew'd us both it's faces ; and did not now signify iews onely , nor yet gentiles onely , as fomerly but iews & gentiles both ; and yet , when this is done , it expresses nothing to the contrary , but that each preach't to both . is not this a rare disputant ? lastly , i would gladly know where he ever heard or how he came to imagin that the word gentes could signifie iews onely , as it must according to his grounds , as apply'd to s. iames at hierusalem , and s. iohn at ephesus ? reader perhaps it may cause mirth in thee to read such gottam-absurdities in a dr. of divinitie , but i assure thee it is most wearisome to me to stand laying open such weake impertinencies , nor doe i hope for any honourable triumph from the confuting such trash . sect. . dr. h's irrefragable , evidence from the pope's seals disclamed by himself , and , expressely deny'd to bee a proof . his manner of arguing by asking questions . but as the lesser lights vanish at the rising of the sun so we cannot but imagin that all the former dim testimonies of dr. h's , which gave such a twinkling uncertain light , disappear at the sight of his evidence of evidences , or his irrefregable evidence , as he calls it , from the seals of the pope's , and what say the seals of the pope , or mathew paris in their behalf ? that s. paul stands on the right hand the crosse , & s. peter on the left ; and this is produced by dr. h. as an irrefragable evidence that s. peter was over the iews at rome s. paul over the gentiles , of schism p. . l. . . but first dr. h. disclames answ . p. any such pretence from those pregnantly testifying seals , but onely that they were brought for a testimony of the church of rome's being founded by s. paul , aswell as s. peter . if so i have wrong'd mr. h. and shall ask him pardon : if not , i shall ask no further satisfaction of him save onely to leave him to the reader 's iudgments when i shall have once conuinc't him by their eyes . in his booke of schism p. . the th paragraph begins thus . the same is as evident at rome , where these two great apostles met again , and each of them erected & managed a church one of iews another of gentiles . after which position immediately follow the testimonies which should have proved it , begining thus ; so saith s. irenaeus , & more expresly epiphanius , so the inscription on their tombes , so gaius , so dionysius , so prosper ; then , after the said testimonies , immediately likewise follow these very words , and the very seals of popes are an irrefragable evidence of the same . now , what this same was , is manifest by the beginning of the th parag . to wit that s. peter was over the iews s. paul over the gentiles at rome . but 't is an ordinary evasion with him to deny his owne words . nor is this all which these seals of the popes were to evidence irrefragably ; let us trace the originall position for which it was produced , & we shall finde it , ( of schism p. . ) to be this long rable ; that whensoever those two great apostles came to the same city , the one constantly apply'd himself to the jews , received disciples of such , formed them into a church , left them when he departed that region to be governed by some bishop of his assignation , and the other in like manner did the same to the gentiles ; this is his chimericall position , which he pretended to manifest to have been at antioch in his th parag immediately following these words , and beginning with , [ thus we know it was at antioch ; ] and to have been at rome in his th beginning thus , the same is as evident at rome , ( to wit that whensoever those two great apostles came to that city to wit rome , &c. ) after this follows his proofs for the same tenet , so saith epiphanius , gaius , dionysius , &c. ] and , lastly , immediately after these follows this evidence of evidences in these words ; and the very seals of the popes are an irrefragable evidence of the same . ] now what this relative [ same ] looks back upon is most irrefragably evident to any one that can read english & understand common sence , to wit , that whensoever those two great apostles came to one city , &c. and the rest of that large position before cited , it being most palpable that he went forwards to prove that , nor ever mentioned any other new thesis till long after his irrefragable evidenc● was over past ; so that the bare pictures of s. peter & s. paul upon the seals of the popes are still an irrefragable evidence , that , whensoever those great apostles came to the same city , the one constantly apply'd himself to the iews , received disciples of such , formed them into a church , left them when he departed that region to be governed by some bishop of his assignation , and the other in like manner did the same to the gentiles . so rare a thing it is to have a strong faith against the pope . nor hath he onely prevaricated from his irrefragable evidence by denying the manifest scope of it exprest in his own words , and by mincing it to be an instance not a proof though before he called it an irrefragable evidence ; but to cover the shame of it he quite annih●lates the force of it 's other fellow-testimony evidences , answ . p. l. . . by denying them to be proofs also , but to be spoken in agreement onely with his proof out of scripture gal. . that peter was by agreement to betake himself to the iews . whereas first that place of scripture had been produced pag. . but this pregnant seal-testimony , & most of it's fel● ows p. nor is there the least shadow of relation of these places to that , as who so reads the th & th parag ▪ where they are found will manifestly see . secondly repl. p. . par . . he told us that epiphanius his words cleered the busines-concerning rome , that the other testimonies were evidences to that purparse ; and concluded that sure there can need no farther proofs , nor testimonies from antiquitie in this matter nay , he stuck so strongly to the testimony of epiphanius , answ . p. . that he maintain'd it impossible for s. w. to divert the force of it . so that the , same six testimonies & popes seals were there called evidences , clear & sole-sufficient proofs , which are here deny'd to be proofs at all , but onely things spoken in agreement . but the reason of this double dealing is evident ; for , there , he was challenged not to have one testimony from antiquity of those apostles exclusive iurisdictions , and so had then no better shift save onely to make another dumbe show of the self-same testimonies , & then crie them up for clear evidences & sole-sufficient proofs from antiquitie . here the weaknes of his pretended best , i mean his irrefragable evidence , was shown to be most silly & weak ; where upon himself modestly decries both that & it's fellow evidences of an inferior rank , & sayes that they are no proofs at all , but things spoken in agreement . nor let him say that in his reply where he called them such clear evidences & proofs , he mean't they were onely sufficient proofs that those apostles both founded the church at rome ; this was never in question between us , but granted by both sides ; neither did schism disarm'd ever challenge him to prove this ; but that they founded that church with exclusive iurisdiction over iews & gentiles . now then , since in his answer to that except on , p. . l. . . he refers to the said place in his reply , he must mean there that they are sole-sufficient proofs & clear evidences to prove exclusive iurisdiction of the one over iews at rome , the other over gentiles , unles he will confesse himself an open & manifest prevaricatour from the whole question . thirdly , since he puts down his own thesis in these words , that each of them at rome erected and managed a church , s. peter of iews s. paul of gentiles , and then immediately subjoyned his proofs in this form , so saith irenaeus , &c. it is impossible to imagin other , but that these testimonies were produced to prove the immediate foregoing thesis . fourthly , by denying these to be proofs , that s. peter was at rome over iews , s. paul over gentiles , he denies by consequence that he hath produced any proof at all for that fancie of his , except his owne blush-proof confident expression [ the same as evident at rome ] since in the th parag . the proper place to prove that point , there is nothing at all sound , but those testimonies denied by him here to be proofs , and his own now recited words : though , i must confesse , towards the latter end of the th parag . he hath a very expresse proof in these words , [ of s. peter's being over the iews at rome we make no question ] he must mean over iews onely , for otherwise it opposes not us who hold him our selves to have been over both iews & gentiles there ; so that he carries the whole question between us by saying 't is evident , and himself makes no question of it ; relying finally upon nothing but these confident raw affirmations of his own , since he denies all the testimonies he produces to be proofs of the point . lastly , seeing he sayes that these testimonies are spoken onely in agreement with some other thing , and they had no imaginable relation to a farre-of-afore-going place of scripture , as appears by my first note , & are most necessarily & manifestly related to prove the exclusive thesis it self , as is evident by my second , let us examin a litle nearer dr. h's reach of reason , and strength of logick . what mean these words that they are not produced for proofs but in agreement . i ask , have they any influence or efficacitie at all upon the conclusion or thing they are brought for , or no ? if they have , they are proofs ; if not , they are indifferent . if any thing follow out of them they infer or prove it ; if nothing , what do they there either they are for the point & then they ground a deduction to establish it and are argumēts & proofs in it's behalf ; or else they are against it , & are still proofs , though for the contrary ; or , lastly , they are in themselves indifferent , that is neither for it nor against it , and then the first chapter of genesis would have served his turn aswell as these neutrall testimonies ; yet dr. h. takes it ill here that i should offer to make any incoherence appear in his discours who never in his life knew what it was to make any notions cohere at all , save onely in a loose sermonary way , which the least puffe of declamatory aire would counterbuffe and dissipate to nothing . but the hydra head of this irrefragable evidence starts up with a numerous recruit , in the form of questions ( answer p. . l. vlt. ) is not the pope's seal ( saith dr. h. ) an evidence that paul aswell as peter had the planting the church of rome . i answer , grant it ; what follows hence ? this could have been done by their promiscuous endeavours . and is not that agreable to peter's preaching the iews and paul's to the gentiles when they met in a city where were multitudes of both ? i answer you must mean to iews onely , for 't is our tenet that each preach't to both ; and then you have been often challēged that you have not brought one syllable of proof for it but your owne word onely . nor is their founding the church agreable even to your owne words in any other sence then as agreable signifies indifferent , or not contrary to it , since the founding a church , signifies onely the thing done in common , not the particular manner of doing it , either promiscuously or exclusively which is all our question but is equally appliable to both : or rather indeed , sounding onely a common endeavour in doing it , 't is rather inclinable to a promiscuous sence ; nay , the force of the word , the church , which is to be understood of god's church at rome , evdently gives us to understand that there was but one church , not two , for otherwise he was bound to say the churches not the church . it follows immediately after his former question . and was not that the importance of the agreement gal. . . i answer there was no agreement there to any such purpose . the giving the right hand of fellowship was to acknowledge s. paul a fellow-apostle and his doctrine sincere ; the applying themselves some to iews others to gentiles was a pure sequell : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the circumcision , to which s. peter lent at that time his speciall endeavours , signified the countrey of iudea , not the iews in dispersion , all which hath been manifested most particularly heretofore , sect. . much lesse is it imported there , as dr. h. after his openly-falsifying manner pretends here , that when they met in a city where were multitudes of both they should carry themselves thus & thus ; there being no talk there of either cities or multitudes which he tells us here the agreement there imported , and then cites immediately for it gal. . . without the words . but he proceeds . and is not that an argument that peter was not the universall pastor , but that the gentiles were s. paul's province , as the iews s. peter's . not a jott good dr. your premisses are no stronger then your bare saying , which makes your inference thence weaker then water . your conciet of provinces the ground-work of all your pitifull dicourse was shown to be a groūdles fiction . nor , were there such , would it make for your purpose unles they were exclusive ; nor would it serve your intent that there was exclusivenes in the actuall endeavours of the apostles , but you must evince an exclusivenes in right ere you can pretend to limit a right : nor have you brought as yet one expresse word of any testimony to make good the least of these . again , if by universall pastour you mean one who hath iurisdiction to preach in all places of the world and to all sorts of people , as your wise argument seems to intend , you need not trouble your self , we grant each apostle to have been an universall pastour in this sence ; but , if you mean that s. peter was not higher in authoritie amongst the apostles , how does this follow though he were supposed to be limited as a particular bishop to his private province ; or , as a bishop , had a flock distinc't from s. paul's , is not even now a dayes , the pope's bishoprick limitted to the roman diocese his patriarchate to the west , and so his authority under both these notions limited exclusively and contradistinguisht from other bishops and patriarchs , and yet wee see de facto , that he is held chief bishop in the church & higher in authoritie then the rest notwithstanding . doe not our eyes and the experience of the whole world testifie this to be so ? yet were all the former absurd inventions of apostolicall provinces , their exclusivenes , s. peter over the iews onely , &c. granted ; still his utmost inference would be no stronger then this now related which the eyes of all the world gainsay ; to wit , that because others had their particular assignations , provinces , or bishopriks distinct from s. peter's , therefore s. peter could not be higher in authoritie then those others ; by which one may see that my learned adversary understands not what is mean't by the authority he impugns ; but makes account the pope cannot be head of the church , unles he be the particular & immediate bishop of every diocese in it . whereas , we hold him contradistinct from his fellow bishops , for what concerns his proper & peculiar assignation ; and onely say that he is higher then the rest in iurisdiction & power of command in things belonging to the universall good of the church . this point then should have been struck at & disputed against , not that other never held by us , that none in the church hath his particular bishoprick or assignation save the pope onely , against which onely dr. h. makes head while he makes it the utmost aym of his weak endeavours to prove s. peter a distinct bishop from s. paul , & to have had a distinct flock . sect. . dr. hammond's method in answering his disarmer's challenge , that hee could not show one expresse word limiting the apostles iurisdictions in any of those many testimonies produced by him for that end ; and how he puts three testimonies together to spell that one word . his palpahle falsification and other pittifull weaknesses , after dr. h's irrefragable evidence follow'd immediately ( of schism p. . ) and all this very agreable to the story of scripture , which ( according to the brevitie of the relations there made ) onely sets down s. peter to be the apostle of the circumcision ; and of his being so at rome we make no question vpon these words , his disarmer ( schism disarm . p . ) enumerated as many significations imported by that word onely , as were obvious , & confuted them severally , because he found the words ambiguous ; telling him that neither doth scripture onely set down s. peter as apostle of the circumcision but iames & iohn also gal. . . nor is s. peter any where exprest as apostle of onely the circumcision but expresly particularized the contrary act. . & . his answer . p. . affords us a third signification , so impossible for s. w. to imagin , as it was to foresee all the weakneses dr. h's cause could put him upon . 't is this , that the words ( onely ) is set clearly in opposition to the scripture's , making more particular relations of s. peter's preaching to the iewish caetus at rome , &c. now , had the scripture produced by him made any particular relation at all of any such matter , then indeed his [ onely ] might have been thought to mean the want of more particular relation , &c. but if in no place alledged by him there had been found the least particular relation at all either of a iewish caetus at rome , or s. peter's preaching to it particularly , or indeed so much as intimating his preaching in that city , then what ground had dr. h. given me to imagine that the restrictive particle onely was put in opposition to a more particular relation from scripture of that , of which the scripture had given me no relation at all ? is there a greater misery then to stand trifling with such a brabbler ? to omit , that , take away the former parenthesis from having any influence upon the words without it , as it ought , & then one of the significations given by me is absolutely unavoidable . but against the first signification impugned by me , he challenges my knowledge that he could not mean so without contradicting himself ; and my knowledg challenges his conscience that he cannot be ignorant how he contradicts himself frequently & purposely upon any occasion when he cannot well evade . as for the second sence i conceived that ambiguous word might bear , i repeated my challenge to him schism disarm . p. . that , if he could shew me the least syllable either in scripture or other testimonies expresly and without the help of his , id ests , and scruing deductions restraining s. peter's jurisdiction to the iews onely & excluding it from the gentiles , i would yeild him the laurell and quit the controversie . this challenge though offered him before p. . . & p. . yet he here first accepts , not for the laurell's sake , he remitts that to s. w. but upon so tempting an hope as to be at an end of controversie , which i dare say he repents he ever medled with ; yet was hee very hasty to begin with controversies voluntarily & unprovoked ; and now when he sees himself answer'd & unable to reply , the moderate man growes weary & wishes himself at an end of them , as if he thought himself , when hee begun first , so great a goliah that there could not be found in the whole army of the church a sling and a stone to hit him in the fore head . ere i come to lay open how he acquits himself of this accepted challenge , i desire the reader to consider , first , the import of it ; which is to exact onely of him to show one exclusive word exprest in order to s. peter's iurisdiction in any one of those many testimonies he produced for that end . secondly , let him candidly observe what infinite disadvantage i offer my self , & what an incomparable advantage i offer my adversary in such an unparalleld proffer and condescension ; one restrictive word for the restrictive point now in question between us , makes him and undoes mee . thirdly , let him remember how dr. h. call'd those proofs evidences for that restrictive point , the whole controversie being about the limitation or illimitation of iurisdiction ; and the totall scope of that first half of c. . to limit s. peter's to the iews onely . fourthly , hence follows that it is mainly important & most absolutely necessary that dr. h. should now lay hold of this fair occasion to lay the axe to the root of rome , as he exprest his intent answ . p. . fifthly , the conditions of the victory are the most facil that can be imagin'd ; for , what easier than to shew one exclusive particle , as onely , solely , alone , or some such like , exprest in any testimony if any such thing were there . sixthly , it is to be observed that he hath accepted of the challenge , & so stands engaged to shew some such word exprest in some testimony . seventhly he is allured to do it by the tempting hope to be at an end of controversie , as himself confesses . and lastly , unles he come of well from so condescending , & so easy a challenge already accepted of , that is , unles he show some such exclusive particle exprest in some testimony he cannot avoid manifesting himself the most shamefull writer that ever handled pen , the most pernicious ruiner of souls that ever treated controversy , the most insincereconscienc'd man that ever pretended to the name of a christian , if in treating a question about schism in which is interessed mens eternall salvation & damnation , as himself proves amply of schism c. . and the most fundamentall point thereof , as himself likewise confesses this to be , which concerns s. peter's universall iurisdiction ( answ . p. ) hee cannot produce nor pick out one expresse word to that purpose from that whole army of his testimonies which he call'd evidences , but from his own words onely ; so that all the motives imaginable conspire to ma●e dr. h. as good as his word , the hazard of his reader 's eternall damnation ; the care of his owne conscience , & of his owne credit ; the hope to be at an end of controversie , ( none of the least to him as he is caught in these present circumstances ) promise of victory , the extreme moderation & facility of the understanding , and lastly his owne acceptation here of the challenge . by this time i know the reader expects that dr. should come thundering out with a whole volly of testimonies , shewing in each of them plain words expressing his tenet , at least that he should produce some one expresse particle , limitting s. peter's authoritie without the help of his scruing deductions , as he promist his challenger ; but , he , never so much as attempts what he late pretended ; th●t is , he attempts not to show any expresse word in any testimony , but instead there of prevaricates to his old shuffling tricks , huddles together three testimonies , and fancies a shadow like allusion from one to the other , and thence adventures to infer a conclusion . what is this to our question or my challenge , it debarr'd his scruing deductions , and required some one expresse restrictive word ; he linkes three citations together to make a sleight glosse , which no one alone could do , and then deduces & concludes , which was interdicted by his self-accepted challēge . what need three testimonies , strung together , to shew one restrictive word ? or , what relation hath the pointing out to us such a word to the inferring a conclusion from three testimonies ? i desired & he promist me some one word which was express , that is , which needed no conclusion at all ; he puts me of with a conclusion onely which intimates there was never an express word . his deductions are his , the words are the testimonies ; i never challeng'd him that he could not deduce the most ivicy conclusion , from the most flinty testimony , as he did the best in all his book of schism from the bare monosyllable come ; my challenge was that his deductions were loud , his testimonies quite dumbe , without one expresse word in them to his purpose . this word which would have sav'd & gain'd dr. h. so much credit & ease i desired should be shown me ; but since he is silent in pronouncing it , he gives it for granted that he could produce none ; and so the reader & i know what to think of him , whose self-conciet dares hazard his reader 's salvation upon his owne bare unauthorized sayings , and altogether unwarrantable imaginations . now , as for his three testimonies themselves , they are the former old ones already answered over & over ; towit , that from gal. . of the imagin'd agreement for exclusive provinces , that of epiphanius saying that the two apostles were bishops in rome , and that of the arch heretick pelagius , concerning the holding a part the iewish & gentile churches . the first he can make nothing of without an ellipsis , which he makes up himself . our bargain was that he should show me some exclusive word , exprest in any one of his citations for his exclusive tenet , and the first of the three lōg letterd testimonies which by being put together were to spell this one exclusive word , is imperfect without something understood , that is , notexprest . good ! the whole force of the second from epiphanius lies in this word bishops , which yet affirms s. peter & s. paul to have been at rome ; which word is so far from being of an exclusive signification , that it is common & inclusive of both . yet ▪ he tells us here that it is expresse ; & makes it more ample by reciting it thus , that in rome peter & paul were the same persons , both apostles & bishops . what force he puts in the [ same persons ] none but himself can imagin , since none ever dream't that epiphanius spoke of two different peters & pauls whom he call'd bishops , from those he call'd in the same line & with in the same comma , apostles ▪ and , as for his last testimony 't is borrowed , frō the arch-heretick pelagius as hath been shown heretofore , sect. . moreover grant that the congregations of iews & gentiles were for a while during the heat of the scandall held a part at antioch , and some other places , yet this arch-heretick's testimony expresses not it was so at rome when the apostles met there , which was some years after that fit of iewish zeal at antioch ; and the vehemency of the scandall , by the apostles prudence , went on mitigating every day ; so as this unauthentick testimony borrow'd from the wicked pelagius , hath not one expresse word of exclusion even of the iewish caetus at rome , much lesse of the apostles were exclusively over those two caetusses ( as he terms them ) nor hath dr. h. any reason to think that all the iews of the dispersion were thus zealous , since we may gather easily ( act. . . ) that both iews & gentiles were together when s. paul preached at the synagogue at antioch in pisidia , and most expressely act. . v. . . we read that in iconium , paul & barnabas went both together into the synagogue of the iews & so spake that a great multitude both of the iews & also of the gentiles beleeved which , besides that it shows plainly the iews there thought it not against moses his law to avoid the conversation of a gentile , so it manifests likewise that they were in a disposition rather to admit converted gentiles than unconverted ( which yet we see here they did ) since the unconverted deny'd nay laught at moses his law and christ to boot , which the converted did not ; which shows that though he may have some lame pretence that the iews at antioch were too nice , yet he hath none at all , no not so much as a word , that this fastidious zeal was epidemicall , or that it was so at rome ; nor does this testimony from pelagius expresse this at all either in circumstances of time or place ; and this expresse place of scripture with it's fellows are main prejudices against it . yet dr. h. vaunts his undaunted valour , that from these three testimonies he shall adventure to infer the conclusion that s. peter's iurisdiction was restrained to the iews onely & exclusively to the gentiles . and , i question not but dr. h. is a very bold adventurer , & is not a fraid to infer the most absurd & remote positions that ever were dream't of , out of the most unconcerning & dumb testimonies all over his hook . but , it seems that even this conclusion of his which he deduces out of testimonies instead of shewing me one expresse word in them , is not of it self evidently consequent neither , but needs still further proofs & reasons to support it , which he puts thus ( answ . p. . ) for how could there be two bishops in one city , ( a thing quite contrary to all rule & practice as soon as the division betwixt iews & gentiles was taken away ) unles there were two such distinct caetus . i answer , he neither hath nor can show that the sitting of two in one city then sprung from such a division of the iewish & gentile caetus : and , if by practice , he means common practice , 't is granted ; but if he means it was never practised upon occasion , as his words [ contrary to all practice ] intimate , then i suppose one instance will suffice to destroy his universall position to wit that three paires of bishops meletius and paulinus , paulinus and flauianus , flauianus and euagrius , sate successively two together bishops of antioch . now what occasion there was for this in the apostles dayes shall quickly be shown . it follows , in proof of the one expresse-worded-conclusion , if there were two such caetus , then they that were of one caetus under one bishops , were not of the other caetus under the other bishop . i answer , 't is evident by the light of nature that one is not another , and needed no proofs ; yet , to show his skill , he gives it a double one . first , because the caetus were kept a part & impermixt . so indeed said the arch-heretick pelagius cited by dr. h. so oft , and relied on so firmly for the onely prop of his cause as to this point ; for hee can never make his unconnected ends of testimonies meet but by the mediation of this . secondly , because no bishop was to medle in another man's province . which , till the testimony from pelagius bee made authentick , touches not us ; for till then it is not prou'd these two apostles had such distinct provinces . hee proceeds : and if it be pretended that it is true in coordinate episcopaties , but holds not betwixt a bishop & his primate ( this is the first time he hath yet seem'd even to come near the question ) then the former arguments return again , that shew'd from scriptures & antiquitie that s. paul was independent from s. peter , and that s. paul had the primatū prmacy among the gentiles as peter among the iews . i reply , that my answer are full as nimble as his arguments , & return as fast as they ; telling the first of them that he haht not produc'd a word either from scripture or antiquitie showing that the power given to s. paul was not dependent on s. peter , which was the thing in question though indeed in what concerns not the question , towit , that the actuall giving the power depended not on s. peter , but was done immediately by christ , the scripture , is expresse & plain . as for his second argument 't is a flat falsification , the words ( are s. ambrose's ( which he here omits to tell us ) which as cited by himself , answer p. . in the margent . say that peter , primatum acceperat ad fundandam ecclesiam , had received the primacy to found the church ; which word church , he makes here to be the iews onely as contradinguish't from gentiles , though by the force of the very phrase it signify the whole church of christ made up of both iews & gentiles , & so is expresly contrary to him , & definitive for our tenet as is shown heretofore , sect. . his last stop-dāger is , that , though it may be that s. peter did conuert some other such as cornelius ( that is , other iews ) yet this is not argumentative for s. w. being nothing to the matter of iurisdiction , and withall but a whimpering ( may be ) in his language . where first he is resolved to pursve his so oft affected mistakes that i am to argue & prove , who ( he knows well ) undertook to answer him , & show that his arguments & testimonies prove nothing . nor did i tell him that a maybe may not serve , or is not proper for an answer : my words are plain schism disarm . p. . that he ought not bring may bees for proofs . for how can a proof conclude evidently unles the inference be necessary ? or how can the inference be necessary , unles the conclusion must be so ! and , who sees not that a may-be otherwise doth , out of the force of the terms , destroy a must be so . wherefore , as , if i were to argue for the ground of my faith , i should hold my self obliged to leave no room for a possibility to the contrary , so i am sure i cannot wrong mine adversary in expecting the same measure from him : if then dr. h. whose turn it is to dispute here ( since he produces testimonies & proofs , which he calls evidences ) will conclude any thing necessarily , his testimonies ought to infer that the matter , pretended to be proved thence must be , that is , the contrary may not be ; and then , though it be not augmētative for s. w. whose task it is not to argue ; yet it is sufficiently responsive for him to show that the contrary may be . and this is all can be exacted of me or any other defendant in rigour of logicall disputation . if i have done more in most places than i was obliged , and shown that the contrary not onely may be , but is , & very many times that it must be ; and so have wrong'd perhaps my self in taking more pains with such a trifler then needs ; i hope i have not been iniurious to my cause by showing my self a too zealous though perhaps in some circumstances an unseasonable patron of it in over acting the part of a respondent or answerer . now that conversion , ( as dr. h. sayes ) is nothing to the matter of iurisdiction ( though it concerns not me at present to define one way or other , yet ) as coming from dr. h. it is the most unbeseeming & self-contradicting position , cōfuting at once almost all his third chapter , the most substantiall part of his book ; which chapter though concerning iurisdiction ( as indeed the whole question is ) yet run's almost upon nothing else but preaching & conversion , which he tells us here is nothing to that matter . see of schism p. . the foundation of all his tenet imaginary provinces defin'd to be such an apostles proper place or assignation for the wittnessing the resurrection and proclaiming the faith or doctrine of christ to the world , that is preaching or converting , sect p . thus we know it was at antioch where s. peter converted iews , s. paul gentiles . you have been the disciples of peter & paul. see p. . they founded the church at rome ; which was done by preaching , at least it expresses not iurisdiction . see p. . s. peter was apostle of the circumcision : s. paul preach't at rome in his owne hired house . p. . that s. peters baptizing many into the faith of christ , &c. in britany must be extended no farther then his line as he is apostles of the iews . so that , there he argued from preaching or conv●rsion , to iurisdiction , which he saies here is nothing to it ; and the words he there intermingled , expressing more particularly iurisdiction , as ruling , &c are his own not his author's , except when he speaks of a particular bishop in his proper see , as of s. iohn at ephesus , which hinders not but the particular bishop of another see may be higher then he ; as wee see now a dayes that more particular bishops are subject to their metropolitain ; and so such a iurisdiction is nothing to our question , unles he first evidence it's equality with the pretended highest . sect. . how the apostles in likelihood of ●●ason behaved themselves when two of them met in the same city . dr. h's agreable testimony ( as hee calls it ) shown neither to agree with scripture , the authour hee cites to prove it , nor yet with his own grounds . thus much in answer to my wordish adversary ; now for the point it self of those apostles being both bishops in one city , to clear that more throughly , let us consider what was likely to happen out of of the nature of the thing it self joyn'd with the prudence of the apostles . the spirit confirmed twelve were sent to preach to all nations ; when , & where , was left to god's prouident disposing of circumstances apply'd to their prudence . for , the task being difficult , & they not knowing by propheticall fore-sight what place & time would for the future be alwayes most convenient ( as appears by s. paul needing a vision of a man of macedonia to direct him thiter and other times of a speciall direction of the holy ghost ) they were to govern themselves by that high prudence which amongst other gifts rain'd down upon them in pentecost . most linger'd in iudea till occasionall circumstances together with the inspiration of the holy ghost , disperst them ; some went one way , some another . amongst the rest ( to particularize in two , & come nearer our point ) s. peter & s. paul , the two most efficacious apostles , were after some years by an especiall providēce directed to rome , that christian faith might gain a more advantageous propagation by the influence that head city had over the subject world . coming thither , & , each being sufficiently able to preach a part from the other , it was very unfitting they should preach both together , but , that they should accommodate themselves in such a convenient distance that the whole city might be best summoned to christ's faith by the noise of these two apostolicall trumpets . this done , they fall to preach ; the hevenly newnes of their doctrine , the prodigiousnes of their miracles make multitudes flock to them from all parts . in the city were gentiles & iews both . nor have we any ground to imagin that god's providence was so miraculously particular , as to direct onely iews to s. peter , & onely gentiles to s. paul. equally promiscuously then they both came to each , according as chance , rumour , acquaintance , or other circumstances guided them . the apostles did not enviously deny the knowledge of c●r●sts law to any that came , but preach't it impartially to all ; equally promiscuously then they preach't each of them both to iews & gētiles . for it had been the hihgest imprudence to hazard the losse of yet weake & slenderly-mou'd souls by seeming to neglect them , and sending them away to another ; & to order their actions ere they had ownd their wills . the converts baptized by each could not but take a very particular ply & addictiō to their proper apostle & father . let us put case then that there should happen a scandall of the iewish converts vnder each against the gentiles ( which yet dr. h. no where show'd to have been at this place , rome ; nor at this time in any o●her place , ) about eating of gentile diet ; ( for that there ever was any farther quarrell between them , or that they abstain'd from all communion , is an absolute impossibility asserted onely by a plain falsification , as hath been shown . ) let us consider what effects such a scandall was likely to produce . is it imaginable that all the multitude of the gentiles under s. peter should shift sides & run to s. paul , and all the iewi●h from s. paul to s. peter ? or rather that the apostles prudence order'd things so , that , when in any assembly where some practice emergent out of the favorable conciet the iews had of moses his law , was likely to come in play , or any thing to the contrary , they would order them to keep a sunder to avoid the scandall . we finde plainly by the place lately cited that in other circumstances the iews met with perfect gentiles in the same place both at antioch in pisidia & iconium ; or , had there been such hatred between them , as not to endure one another's sight or company ( as dr. h. wildly imagins ) each might preach and celebrate to one after the other was departed , or else in severall places ; any thing is more easy to be imagin'd than that all of each side should forsake their proper apostle & more than father , to whom under god they ow'd all their hopes of heaven , or that the apostles at their first coming should post them from one to another , and not give them audience if they would ask , or leave to hear christ's law if they would learn. but , to proceed ; supposing on that each was converted by either , hence follow'd a particular addiction of their converts to their respective pastors ; and , from this addiction , a greater aptitude to be directed according to christ's law , to be instructed corrected , & governed by one rather than by the other , and by consequence a greater good to the governed ; whence it was necessary that those two apostles , living in so great a city that it was fully capable of both their endeavours , should continue their distinctive way untill their deaths . nor doth this oppose us at all , since not onely reason grants it , but our own eyes & evident experience attest it , that either of them may be immediate bishops over severall particular flocks , and yet with this it may be easily consistent that one of those may be superior in authority to the other , as we see in a bishop & an arch-bishop , an arch-bishop & a primate . hence appears that the being bishops at rome both at once , which proof the dr. most relies upon , as that whose force it is not possible to divert , neither concludes the one was over iews onely , the other over gentiles , for which hee produced it ; nor yet that one of them was not superiour to the other . but to return to my aduersary's answer . another agreable testimony of dr. h's which ( as he told us candidly before ) were not proofs , that is proved nothing , is , that the scripture affirms of s. paul that he preached at rome in his owne hired house receiving them that came vnto him . act. . . which will most fitly be apply'd to the gentiles of that city , the iews having solemnly departed from him . v. . thus he , of schism p. . i reply'd ( though such a saples trifle required none ) that there was no such word as solemnly in the testimony , upon which onely he grounds . he answers here p. . that he cited not the word solemnly from that verse as any part of the sacred text. i ask , why then did he put the word solemnly which is not found there in the same letter with , departed , which is found there , and immediately cite , v. . it was his insincere common trick i glanced at , and 't is this , that he omits the words of scripture themselves , either confounds the two letters promiscuously , or else puts his own & the scriptures words equally in the common letter , and then immediately cytes the place for it , without intimating at all , that 't is his owne deduction onely from that place , but , by the whole carriage of it , gulling the unwary reader that all is pure scripture , to which he subjoyns his insincere citation , relating us to a place where the most important words are wanting . next , he goes about to prove the solemnity of their departure from other verses in the same chapter . i ask ; what is this to the pretence that their solemne departure was found v. . which hee cited for it ? i deny'd not the solemnity of reprehension exp●est to the unbeleeving iews in other verses , but onely , that there was any solemnity of departure exprest in that verse ; for read the whole place , & we finde not a word of any resolution in them to come no more , much lesse of any resolution in s. paul not to preach to them , wheresoever he found them in other places ( which nevertheles was that which dr. h. should have show'd ) and indeed nothing but an ordination of god , that his law should be preach't to gentiles . [ first then , the words of solemn reprehension , [ the heart of this people is waxen grosse , and their ears dull of hearing ] are impossible to be apply'd to the iews which believed , as is exprest v. . we have therefore no ground hence of any solemnity of departure in order to them . secondly s. chrysostome whom he cites here for this point onely says as he puts him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , when they agreed not they departed ; that is , they not believing forsook him , where 't is plain he speaks expresly of the unbeleeving not of the beleeving , and yet plainer f●om what dr. h. puts after wards 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , those words of scripture he apply'd to them upon their unbelief . now , since s. chrysostome speaks of those to whom s. paul apply'd the words of scripture , & these are impossible to be apply'd to the iews which v. . beleeved , it is equally impossible his words should be appliable to the beleeving iews . thirdly , grant he had solemnly reprehended the innocent beleeving iews also , was it not possible for them to return after such a dismission , nor for s. paul to apply himself again to them ? nay was it not possible this might have been don even to the unbeleevers themselves ? i am sure the texts says nothing to the contrary , for to this purpose i instanced ( schism disarm . p. . ) that act. . . both paul & barnabas told the iews boldly that they would turn to the gentiles , & departed more solemnly , shaking of the dust of their feet , v. . and yet they afterwards preach't many times to the iews , as is to be seen in the acts. by which i onely could mean that this greater vehemency & solemnity of their departure hinder'd them not yet from applying themselves to the iews for the future : but my acute adversary takes it as if i expected the self-same shaking of the dust of their shoes , at rome also ; and , having given his reasons , concludes that therefore this ceremony was not now seasonable . a very seasonable and pertinent answer . now , as for the beleeving iews remaining with s. paul he answers this with if 's and expects i should produce evidence against them . is not this a gallant disputant ? when his argument is shown to be weak , he under props it with a lame if , and then tels his aduersary he must supply his turn and argue , because he ( alas ) is weary , hath already done his best , & can stretch no further . yet he grants that those iews which beleeved ( if they continued ) became a part of s. paul's caetus , and allows it possible that some gentiles might be in s. peter's , instancing himself in clemens . now , then , i would ask , if this be so , how many iews s. paul might convert & govern , and how many s. peter ? some , he says here , is no prejudice to his tenet ; i would know then what be the stints & limits of this number of heterogeneus converts , beyond which their iurisdiction might not passe ; or , why they should be so partiall as to admit some & send away others who came to them with the same desire to hear christ's doctrine . again , i would ask , what the iewish converts vnder s. paul should do in case they hap to take a toy against the gentiles for eating a peece of pork ; dr. h's grounds in this case interdicts them all communion & conversation ; according to his doctrine , s. peter must have two altogether-uncōnected churches under him , a greater one of iews a lesser of gentiles ; and s. paul , on the other side , a vast church of gentiles & a smaller kind of a chappell of iews . and thus dr. h's former agreable discourse , neither agrees with any thing els nor it self neither ; since , the same difficultie occurs here as if each apostle had preach't promiscuously & indifferently both to iews & gentiles ; since each must be over two congregations if the iews hapt to be too zealous for moses his law , aswell as in the other case of preaching to both , which he so much strove to evade ; & ●ould by no means admit . sect. . how dr. h. vindicates his falsification of s. ignatius by committing another . his formerly call'd evidences deny'd now by himself to bee proofs for the point ; but , metamorphos'd into branches of accordances , seasonable advertissements and fancies . the rare game in hunting a●●er his proofs , with the issue of that sport . schism disarm'd p. . accused dr. h of subjoyning out of his own head words most important & expresly testifying the point in hand , to a dry testimony of s. ignatius . he qualifies the fault , too great to be acknowledg'd with what truth shall be examin'd . the place it self onely related that linus was deacon to s. paul clemens to s. peter . dr. h. of schism p. . puts it thus , accordingly in ignatius ep. ad trall . we read of linus & clemens that one was s. paul's the other s. peter's deacon , both which afterwards succeeded them in the episcopall chair linus being constituted bishop of the gentile , clemens of the iewish christians there . where , note . first , that there is nothing but a simple comma at the word [ deacon ] where the testimony ends ; nor any a thing like a full point of a testimony till the words [ the iewish christians there . ] secondly , there is no other distinctive note imaginable to let us know which are testimonies , which his own words . thirdly all the art insincerity could imagin was used here to make no distinction appear : as to tell us we read what follow'd there , & never telling us how far we read it ; to iumble the two different letters confusedly together ; and to put the words , episcopall chair , bishop , gentile , iewish christians , which were not found in the testimony , in the small translating letter , and the same with the word deacon , which was found therein . fourthly , the word [ deacons ] found in the testimony , is nothing at all to our controversy , for what is it to us that s. peter had such a deacon , and s paul such another ? whereas the other words subjoined by himself are mainly important to his point . lastly , this confident affirmation of his , that linus was constituted bishop of the gentile , clemens of the iewish christians there , is no where els either found , or so much as pretended to be shown , and so it could not be imagined but that those words were part of this testimony . for who could ever think that any man should be so shamelesly insincere as to put down such concerning expressions under the shadow of a testimony , and yet those expressions authorised by nothing but his owne word , nor found any where but in his self-inuented additions . all these sleights discover plainly that there was artifice and design in the busines ; and that he slily abused his reader , by putting a testimony , which signify'd nothing , for a cloake , and then adding what he pleas'd ; hoping it might be countenanced by the grave authority of ignatius , and , by such a dexterous management , bee taken for his , at least he hop't it might passe unsuspected by his confident asserting it ; or , how ever , he hop't at least that for his last refuge he could evade by saying he mean't it not for a proof , but in agreement onely , or ( as hee prettily calls it here ) a branch of accordance ; and that 's a defence good enough for him , being as good as the nothing-proving proof was . the shadow of a buckler is the fittest to defend the shadow of a body . he is troubled that i expected this testimony should say any thing to s peter's being onely over the iews . what could i expect other ? our question is about the limitation of iurisdiction , what serve his testimonies for , or what do they there unles they can prove that ? but he say's that that conclusion was proved out of scripture ; which is a flat falsification , since he could neither show me one restrictive word in scripture to that purpose , whereas his position even now put down & pretended to be proved thence is restrictive ; nor durst he rely upon scripture alone , when he was to find us that so much desired one word , but was forced to peece it out with other two places from epiphanius & pelagius the archeretick , to omit that the testimony it self gal. . expresses nothing of any agreement for such an end , as ( sect. . ) hath been amply shown . he adds that this from ignatius is onely a branch of accordance with that . in the name of wonder where shall we look for dr. h's proofs ? there is not one testimony he hath produced out of antiquitie as yet for this point , but he falls from it when he should maintain it , & say's 't is no proof but onely spoken in agreement , or ( as here i● a quainter & gentiler phrase ) a branch of accordance , and a seasonable advertissement . come along reader let thee and i go hunt after dr. h's proofs for this point from the first starting it ; to trace it step by step , we begin with of schism , c. par . . where he say's that question of s. peter's supremacy must be managed by evidences , & so concluded either on the one side or the other ; professing there that he began to offer his evidence for the negative . let us not despair then of these evidences & proofs so solemnly promis't us , but addresse our selves for their quest . the fifth par . begins thus ; and first it is evident by scripture s. peter was the apostle of the circumcision or iews exclusively to the vncircumcision or gentiles . here we se the point to be evidenced , and from scripture . now in this par . ( which hath such a fair promising beginning ) there are two places of scripture , the famous 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both which he denies to be evidences answ . p. . but to proceed : the . par . begins with an if , proceeds with a parenthesis , agreable onely as hee there expresses it ; and so , according to him , no proof . the rest are his own words onely till we come at s. iames , and the proofs following till we come to the end of the par . are not in order to the main point , but onely to prove that iames at hierusalem was consider'd as a bishop ( which was out of question between us ) as himself declares his owne meaning answ . p. . l. . the rest of that as also the next parag . proceeds with accordingly , p. . l. . and again , accordingly ibid. lin . . according p . lin . . which show that all these were not proofs , but things spoken in agreement , or branches of accordance onely . five testimonies follow par . . in order to those two apostles planting the church at rome ; which he expresly denies to be proofs of this our point answ p. . l. . . and sayes they are spoken in agreement onely , as also the next three which are found in the beginning of the tenth , though one of them be here call'd an irrefragable evidence . but let us pursve our game . these testimonies over past , the next from scripture are introduc't with agreable , and so are meant to be in agreement onely and no proofs . the th par . begins with accordingly again , which leads in the late-ill-treated testimony from ignatius , deny'd here answ . p. . to be a proof for the pretended point , and exprest to be onely a branch of accordance lin . . the rest of the th par . is his own scho●ion onely , and pretends no proof . the two next paragraphs are nothing but his owne words relating to the former onely accordant no proofs ; and so being meerly corollary accordances or thin deductions from the other , can have no more force then their aiery parents . and if we look narrowly into them we shall finde the whole strength of the one consists in the words [ by all which it appears ] to wit , by his branches of accordance , which , hee confe●es , bear no fruit of proof : of the other in ( it 〈◊〉 manifest . ) the . & . par . are employ'd in showing s. iohn over the iews also , and not s. peter over the iews onely , and that timothy was over gentiles , but not a word that he was over gentiles onely there found . in the par . he huddles together a cōpany of his own demāds ; which , i conceive , are not things like proofs . though i confesse towards the middle of it he hath a most pregnant proof , and enough to make his honest protestant reader as glad as if he had found an hare sitting ; but , when schism disarm'd brought him nearer it , it proved to be nothing but a brown clodd . it was his most ample & most importantly-expressive scripture-testimony from the bare monosyllable come . the . par . hath no pretence of proofs ; nor yet his th , but is totally built upon his own words , [ the same may certainly be said ] and [ i● must in all reason be extended no farther ] &c. the th begins with his own suppositiou ; and is prosecuted with the old accordingly , which halesin by the arme another branch of accordance from s. prosper , which ends all that particular controversy ; the next par . that is the th begining a new busines ; that is , the donation of the keyes . all the testimonies then hitherto related are accordances onely , now what an accordance or a thing in agreement means is best known from himself , answ . p. . l. . ) that they are not proofs of the thing they agree to ; that is , have no influence to conclude or infer it to be so , whence follows that the said testimonies are in themselves indifferent to the main point , and onely appliable to it ; the sleightest manner of arguing that ever was argued by any man for such an important point , whose soul a security in his schism hath not made sleepy . but , let us see to what these indifferent & nothing-proving accordances relate and agree to ; that is , let us see what is his onely proof for his main point . he intimates to us answ . p. . l. . . and p. . l. . that of gal. . to it then let us go , as being his onely proof he stands to for this point , which therefore we have purposely reserv'd till the last . we finde it in the beginning of parag . . of schism , sleightly touched at thus . so again for the vncirc●mcision or gentile christians they were not s. peters province , but pec●liarly s. paul's , by s. peter's own confession & acknowledgment gal. . . expect reader that this onely proof of dr. h's shall come of well & be expresse for the point in question , how ever his branches of accordances have sped . to do him right i will put downe this th v. as i finde it in their owne translation ; but contrariwise when they saw that the gospell of the vncircumcision was committed unto me , as the gospell of the circumcision was unto peter . where ( and the same may be said of the following verses ) first , there is nothing at all expressing iurisdiction which is our question , but onely of preaching the gospell to them , that is of converting them ; which himself acknowledged to be nothing to the matter of iurisdiction . answ . p. . l. . . secondly , there is nothing there exprest of any exclusive power of preaching to iews onely , as he expresly pretended answ . p. . l. . from these or else the following verses . thirdly , this particular commission hath already ( sect. . ) been shown from the following verse to be nothing but god's more efficacious assistance . fourthly , here is not the least news of s. peter's own confession & acknowledgment of any thing , as he in his onely proof in big terms pretends & quotes for it immediately gal. . . unles he contend that the words ( they saw ) signifie they confest & acknowledged ; and so make seeing & saying to be all one ; which is nothing with him ; fifthly , if he pretend this is not the place or verse of the gal. which he relies on , i answer i neither finde this corrected in the errata , not v. . ( which in his answer he recurrs to chiefly ) quoted at all in his book of schism c. . for this point , but onely for s. i●mes his being named before s. peter p. . l. . and besides , the same exceptions of insufficiencie now made against this , are equally made against the other . sixthly , his according●ies begin to come in play p . l. . a litle after his citation of this verse , which manifests this to have been the place pretended for his onely proof , to which the rest accorded . lastly , this being then his solely-reliedon proof , after what a strange manner he manages it ? one would think that he should have put down the words , and either have show'd them expresse ; or else , if they were not , make his deductions from them : what does this acute-sincere man ; he omits wholy the words ; gravely and sleightly touches the false sence he hath given , them ; puts downe his owne tenet , subjoins to it the words [ s. peter's own confession and acknowledgment ] pretends them to be scripture ; & immediately cites the place , where no such words were found . was ever such a weak soul put into a body ; and yet this is the man cry'd up for the best of the protestant controvertists . thus ends the slender-sented pursuit of dr. h's proofs for this main fundamentall point of his , that s. peter was not over the gentiles . the result of which is , that all the testimonies he alledged for it are no proofs but dwindling accordances onely ; and his onely proof gal. . both impertinent & falsified . so rotten are all dr. h's branches of accordances and also the saples tree it self , whence those soon-blasted imps sprouted . but , besides the gentile expression of branch of accordance , he hath here answ . p. . two other pretty expressions of this testimony , concerning linus & clemens being s. peter's & s. paul's deacons ; the one , that 't is a seasonable advertissement ; the other , that 't is a phansy ( as he writes it ) and sayes that he who likes not the phansy should have directed his reader to some other solid way to reconcile those repugnants of story concerning linus & clemens . as if it were so necessary a thing that all repugnances in story should be reconcil'd , or that the repugnant sides must necessarily both be true ; wherefore , let him but first evidence that either part of that never-as yet-reconcil'd repugnance is certainly tru , & i will undertake to reconcile them better then dr. h. hath done in making one over iews the other over gen●iles onely . although , if one side or both be false , i must confesse it beyond my skill to reconcile truths with falshoods , or falshoods with one another . moreover , schism disarm . p. . directed him expresly to some other wayes how the fathers went about to reconcile that repugnance ; which he instead of confuting or so much as acknowledging i did , objects here that i should direct him to some other solid way ▪ and truly , i shall ever account the ancient fathers more solidly able to reconcile repugnances in story near their dayes ( were they reconcileable ( then such a weak iudgment , as mr. h's so long after . sect. . dr. h. affected ignorance of the popes authority which hee impugns , framing his objections against an immediate governour , not a mediate or svperiour . his pretended infallibility in proving s. iohn higher in dignity of place than s. peter . his speciall gift also in explicating parables , and placing the sa●nts in abraham's bosome . dr. h. of schism c. . par . . affirmed that for another great part of the christian world it is manifest that s. peter had never to do , either mediately or immediately , in the planting or governing of it , and instanced in asia pretended to be onely under s. iohn . i answer'd ( schism disarm . p. . ) that he brought nothing to prove his own it is manifest . he replies here ( answ . p. . ) that this is manifestly evinced by the testimonies annexed p. . and upon this calls me an artificer , that he is now grown into some acquaintance with me , and yet ( virtue is grown necessity with him ) he must not take it amisse ; nor shall he truly if i can give him any iust satisfaction . i desire to gain & keep every man's good will , though i will not court it by the least compliance nor kindnes to the detriment of truth . bear in memory reader this positiuely absolute t●●sts of his , that s. peter had nothing to do either mediately or immediately , &c. and if thou findest any word in any testimony produced by him , expressing this ample position , or that s. peter had nothing to do in governing them mediately ( which is the question ) save onely that he govern'd them not immediately ( which is nothing to our question ) then i give thee leave to account me an artificer or what thou wilt : but if thou findest not a word to that purpose , do thy self the right as to think dr. h. is a most notorious deluder , & beware of him as such . i shall put down all his testimonies as largely as himself did in the . par . to which he refers me . the first is from clemens alexandrinus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where appointing bishops ; the second and third are from eusebius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , where obtaining some one part , or lott . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he administred the churches there . now , in these three testimonies we finde onely that s. iohn appointed bishops in asia , which we grant that each apostle might do where ever he came over all the world ; that he obtained one certain lott or bishoprick , to wit that of ephesus , which signifies no more but that he was a particular governour there ; that he administred the churches there ; all which is competent to every metropolitan in god's church , whom yet wee see daily with our eyes to be under an higher ecclesiasticall governour , and cōsequently his churches under him are under the same governour mediately , although immediately under the inferior onely . his fourth testimony is a flat & wilfull falsification ; 't is taken from s. prosper , & put down by him thus , ioannes apud ephesum ecclesiam sacrauit , iohn at ephesus consecrated a church . whereas the place it self is gentium ecclesiam sacrauit , consecrated the church of the gentiles . now because all over this par . 't is dr. h's pretence that s. iohn was at ephesus over iews onely , and the word gentium would by no means be won to signify that , nor yet would the word [ nations ] ( as he render'd it before ) any way serve to signify onely iews , he prudently maim'd the testimony , & left out the malignant word gentium , because it could by no art be brought to favour , but vtterly defy'd & contradicted his party . a politick divine ! yet as long as this rare crafts man in the art of falsifying can but call s. w. an artificer all is well , & the good women will believe him . the testimonies for timothy under s. paul being over the gentiles in asia , are of the same strain or worse ; the first of which expresses no more but , that he undertook the care of the metropolis of ephesus , that is , was particular metropolitan of that place . the second affirms at large that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. an whole entire nation , that of asia , was entrusted to him . now s. w. imagining that an whole entire nation could not signify gentiles onely , or a part of that nation , call'd it an unpardonable blindnes to alledge this testimony for a tenet quite contrary to what it exprest ; but i am suddenly struck blind my self and caught that disease onely by seeing dr. h's blindnes . and first , i am blind for not seeing that the testimony related to timothy & not to s. paul ; whereas himself promising us in the end of his . par . to insist on s. iohn & s. paul , and after he had treated of s. iohn in the th using these very words in the . throughout all the lydian asia the faith was planted by s. paul among the gentile part and by him timothy constituted bishop there ; and then immediately introducing his testimony with so saith chrysostome , he must be blind who could think this testimony was not mean't of s. paul. add that the testimony it self speaks not of constituting a bishop , & so gave me no occasion to imagin it related to timothy's being thus constituted ; and besides , the words ( throughout all asia ) which he joyns there with s. paul , were fittest to be related to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the testimony . nor , can it be pretended to have been an affected oversight ; since i gain not the least advantage by it , it being equally strong for dr. h's weak argument whether timothy or s. paul were onely over gentiles there , for which it was produced . my second blindnes is that i could not see the obvious answer , which is that s. chrysostome puts it onely in opposition to the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , precedent ; the testimony being ) as he afterwards puts it ) that timothy was entrusted with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a church , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or rather an entire nation . now in the book of schism he omitted himself the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the former part of the testimony , & then tells me 't is obvious it was put in opposition to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so i am become blind for not seeing that which was not at all there , but left out by himself . gramercy good dr. when he say's that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not set to denote all the severall sorts of caetus in asia ; i ask , do●s it exclude any , or is it set in opposition to the iews ? if not , how can it possibly signifie the gentile part onely , for which hee produced it ? my blindnes then , reader , consists in this that i would not renounce the most common light of nature , & think that an whole & a part is the same ; nor consent to believe that the words ( an whole entire nation ) signifie one sort of people living there or part of that nation onely . in order to these late testimonies it is to be observed , first , that our tenet makes the pope over the whole church in this sence ( not that he governs each particular church immediately but ) that he is chief in authority & over those inferior bishops , metropolitans , &c. who are the immediate governours of those particular churches , and so he becomes mediately in this sence over all churches , or the whole church . secondly our parallel tenet of s. peter is not that when he was apostle he could preach in more places then another , but that he had an higher authority then the other , each of which could preach in any or all places of the world ▪ and that when he was fixt bishop , he had an influence of authority over any other apostles when they were fixt bishops in other places , not that he was immediate bishop or metropolitan of their particular bishopricks . thirdly , hence is evident that the proofs which can prejudice this point must signifie that those particular apostles , metropolitans , or bishops , had none superior to themselves , and by consequence who were mediate●y over their churches , and that it avails nothing at all nor comes to the point to prove that such & such were over such & such particular iurisdictions immediately : no more than if some writer . years hence should argue that the pope was not in the year . supreme governour in our church , because he findes at that time such a one primate in france , & another arch-bishop of toledo in spain . fourthly , it is no lesse evident that dr. h's pretence that it is manifest that s. peter had nothing to do either mediately or immediately in governing the churches of asia , from the former testimonies which exprest onely that those churches , or that country were under those apostles or bishops , without a syllable signifying that those apostles themselves were not vnder an higher apostle , and so their churches mediately subject to him ; it is evident , i say , that he hath not produc't a word to prove his position except his own , it is manifest ; and consequently it was no artificiall trick , but plain downright naturall truth to challenge him with that palpable weaknes . fiftly , his whole processe is in another respect totally impertinent & frivolous . his fundamentall intent was to limit the iurisdictions of the apostles , as such ; & to make them mutually-exclusive under that notion , by giving to each proper apostolicall provinces ; and here , proceeding to make good that his intent , he proves them limitted as they were bishops ; which is a quite different thing . for every bishop , as such , is over his own peculiar flock and particulariz'd to it ; where as that of an apostle ; being not a settled authority as the other , hath not in it's own nature any ground to be constant to such , but may be promiscuous to all . though it was not forbidden to any apostle to settle himself in some particular seat , & so become a bishop of that place . the result then of all the former testimonies is this , that dr. h. avoyd's the whole question of the mediate government of s. peter , which is the point his adversary holds , and disproves the immediate onely which wee never held , and , when he hath done , tells his readers answer p. . s. w. hath little care to consider that , wherein the difficulty consists ; when as himself never toucht the difficultie at all . but i had forgot the beginning of his . par . that s. iohn had the dignity of place before all other in christ's life time , even before s. peter himself . now i went about to parallell it by the proportion an elder brother hath to a younger , which is a precedence without iurisdiction , & so resembles dr. h's dry primacy . but the dr. ( answ . p. . ) catches my similitude by one of those feet by which it was not pretended to run , add's to it excellencie of power of his own head which was never named nor insisted on by me , and when he hath done say's that 't is an addition of my fertile fancy ; whereas i never pretended it as his words but my parallell ; nor yet put force in the superiority of iurisdiction , but in that of a dry precedency onely : neither meaning nor expressing any more by highest in dignity , than himself did by dignity of place before all others . in his answ . p. he tells us he mention'd two things of iohn . . of christ's favour to him , and this ( he say's ) is infallibly inferr'd from the title of beloved disciple . i stand not upon the thing , both because 't is unconcerning our question , & true in it self ; onely i am glad to see that dr. h. is more certain in his inferences than his church is of her faith ; since he is confident of his infallibility in those ; whereas , in this , to wit , in faith , he onely affirm's that it is not strongly probable his church will erre , repl. p. . at length , protestant reader , thou seest whether thou art to recurre for thy infallible rule of faith ; to wit , to dr. h●s inferences . the second is s. iohn's dignity of place before all others , which ( he say's ) was irrefragably concluded from the leaning in his breast at supper . here again dr. h. is irrefragable & infallible ; yet he no where reads that s. iohn thus lean'd on christ's breast more then once : nor can we imagin that our saviour taught his disciples that complementalnes as to sit constantly in their ranks at meat , seeing that in this very occasion , to wit , that very night , he forbid such carriage by his own example , and that euen at meat , luke . v. . . l●● him that is gr●atest among you be as the younger , & he that is chief as he that doth serve . for whether is greater , he that sitteth at meat or he that serveth ? is not he that sitteth at meat ? but i am among you as he that serveth . so far was our saviour from giving occasion for over weening by any constant partiality of placing them at table , that his expresse doctrine and example was to bring them to an humle indifferency , and that in serving one another , much more in sitting before or after another . but , to return to dr. h. as he is master of ceremonies to the apostles , & places them at table ; his doctrine is that s. peter had a primacy of order onely amongst the apostles without iurisdiction , which consequently could be nothing but a dry complementary precedency to walk , stand , or speak first , &c. for no greater primacy can be imagin'd , nor in higher matters , if we abstract ( as he does ) from iurisdiction . again , his doctrine is likewise that s. iohn at table had the dignity of place before all others even before s. peter himself ; so that to make his doctrine consonant , we must conceive that s. john had a primacy of order before s. peter and the rest in sitting , & s. peter had a primacy of order before the rest & s. iohn too in standing or walking a rare doctor ! 't is a wonder that he gave not iudas also a kinde of primacy before all the apostles in a third respect , to wit , in dipping with out saviour at the same time in the dish ; since the leaning on christ's breast was done no after then the dipping in the dish was , for any thing we read , both were equally accidentall , for any thing we know ( for we finde it no where exprest that our saviour plac't him or he himself there by design , ) and in this the dipping argues more dignity then the sitting , in that the sitting was onely next our saviour , but the dipping was at the same time : which would haue grounded an infal ible and irrefragable inference for dr. h. that iudas had an absolute primacy , and have served him rarely to over throw s. peter's , had it not hapt that iudas was in other respects malignant , and so it was not the drs interest to own the argument . but dr. h. proceeds . and accordingly it unavoydably follous that lazarus , being represented parabolically in abrahams bosome , is there described to be in the next place to the father of the faithfull , and it being certain that some one or more saints are next abraham , i presume we may believe christ that lazarus is capable of that place , all s. w. scruples have not the least validity in them . observe the solid logick of this man. my scruples or objections were schism disarm . p. . that if being in abrahams bosome were being in dignity of place next to the father of the faith full , it follow'd that lazarus was a bove all the patriarchs and prophets except abraham : as also , that none was in abrahams bosome except lazarus onely , since there could be no more nexts but one . instead of answering he repeats what he had said before ; onely he add's fine words to amuze his readers ( whom he supposes must be fools ) as accordingly , unavoydably , parabolitically , it being certain , i presume we may believe christ , &c. gentilely , calls my objections , scruples , & then assures the reader they have not the least validity in them . but , if we ask , where did christ ever say that lazarus was above all the patriarchs & prophets except abraham , truth would answer us that christ never said any such thing , but one dr. h. who , like a more modest kinde of david george , calls his own words . christ's , his own sayings god's word when he lists . and as for degrees of glory , which he talks of here , i wonder what would become of them if his doctrine should take place ; for since he knows well the ancient fathers constantly affirm that all the former faithfull were in the bosome of abraham , and this according to him ( as being next abraham ) signifies dignity of place before all others , it follows that all the multitude of faith full souls had each of them the dignity of place before all others ; that is , each of them was next abraham & highest ; hemming him in ( as you must conjecture ) on every side , without any more priority of order between them than the philosophers make between the right hand & the left in a round pillar . and thus much at present ( which is as much or more than such trifling non-sence deserves ) for infallible , irrefragable , according , unavoydable , parabolicall , christ-pretending , all-scruples invalidating dr. h. sect. . dr. h's falsification of falsifications , and with what multitudes of weaknesses hee attempts to take vp the busines . in his book of schism c. . par . . dr. h. demanded very confidently of the romanists what could be said in any degree probably for s. peter's universall pastorship over this asia whose seven metropoles are so early famous , being honoured with christ's epistle to the revelations . now s. w. as any ordinary reader would , imagin'd that dr. h. put some force in these latter words to prove the former , that s. peter had nothing to do with them , both because these are the onely positive words in the whole paragraph all the rest being interrogatories onely , as also because i could not ghesse what they did there else , unles it were to divert the readers eye from the question by such impertinent expressions , nor had i observed yet that dr. h. was such a strong reasoner , as to think a proof even contrary to his tenet much lesse impertinent , unworthy his method of arguing . he pretends to have mean't nothing by those words save onely that those seven were considerable parts of the universall church , as if christ wrote epistles to churches , not because they stood need , but because they were bigg ones . but let them be considerable , what then : he say's answ . p. . there is no pretence that s. peter should be said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to feed or to govern , or so much as to have medled with the administration of these churches of asia . i answer , there is the same pretence that he was mediate governor of these as of any other ; that is , was over those persons who were over those churches ; and though we hold not that he fed , govern'd , or administred those as their particular & immediate overseer , yet we make account that our saviour said thrice to s. peter , feed my sheep . iohn . . as also that the word sheep excluded none , but included those of asia also : for mr. h. i suppose , doubts not but the christians there were christs sheep aswell as the rest . how this commission to s. peter to feed christs sheep was particular to him shall be seen afterwards . part. . sect. . but now room for dr. h's falsification of falsifications , which thunders with so many volleys of power limitting expressions , as , were it charg'd with truth , would quite have batter'd down the walls of rome . it needs no more but repeating to show it notorius ; 't is this ( of schism p. . ) doth not s. paul give timothy full instructions and such as no other apostle could countermand or interpose in them , leaving no other apostle or place of application for farther directions , save onely to himself when he shall come to him , . tim. . . . here , reader , thou seest terms most restrictive of iurisdiction , & so most nay solely-important to the question ; no other apostle , could countermand , &c. no other appeall , no farther directions , onely to himself , &c. thou seest , i say , these ; and thou seest likewise the place of scripture quoted immediately for all these . now , schism disarm'd p. . show'd from their own translation that there was not one word of this long rabble in the place alledged , but the bare , barren & useles monosyllable come . is it possible now that any man should go about to cloak such a falsification , which evidence as clear as eyesight had manifested in it's most shame full nakednes ? nothing is impossible to be done in dr. h's way . he excuses himself first answ . p. . l. . because he thought it was conclusible from those words , . tim. . . . but who bad him think so , when there was never a word in the testimony or in the whole epistle but might have been said by a metropolitan to a bishop , or a bishop to any priest ; to wit , that he would order things when he came , bidding him be have himself well , &c. again , if he intended to conclude , why did he not put some expression of that his intent , that the reader might not be deluded by his quoting the place immediately after those words : this pretence therefore is most frivolous & vain . first , because his words are positive , absolute , & , as it were , commanding our assent from the authority of scripture , not exprest like an inference or conclusion ; doth not s. paul , &c. as also because they are relations of matters of fact ; and , lastly , because they who conclude from scripture , put the place first , & then deduce from it ; whereas , he quotes the place after his own words , as we use to do for words found really in scripture ; wherefore , either he intended not to conclude but to gull the honest reader that his sole important forgeries were sure scripture ; or else , if he meant to conclude , he very wisely put his conclusion before the premises , and such a conclusion as had but one unconcerning & useles word common to it & the premises . secondly , he tells us , that to say that he inferr'd the whole conclusion from the word come is one of s. w's arts whereas i charged him not for inferring thence , but for putting down those words for pure scripture . again , himself ( so good is his memory ) confesses this same thing seven or eight lines before , which he here renounces ; where having mention'd the former long rabble , he told us in expresse terms that he thought it was conclusible from s. paul's words , . tim. . . . now then , there being not one word of this pretended conclusion found in that place , save the monosyllable come , nor one exclusive particle , nor even the least ground of any , he must either infer his pretended conclusion from that or from nothing . thirdly he alledges that he thought his grounds had been visible enough being thus laid ; and then proceeds to lay them . but the iest is he never layd down any such pretended grounds at all in the book of schism where he cited that place , and so it was impossible they should be visible , being then , perhaps , not so much as in their causes . and as for these pretended grounds they are nothing but a kinde of explication of that place , that s. paul sent an whole epistle of instructions , & hoped to give him farther instructions , that he should behave himself well in his office , &c. which are all competent to any bishop in order to a priest , or to any subaltern governor in respect of an inferior ; and so hinders not but s. paul might be under another , though thus over timothy . fourthly , as for those exclusive words , no other apostle could countermand or interpose in them , leaving no appeal , no place for farther directions , onely to himself , which were objected , & so it belonged to him if he could not show them exprest there & so clear his falsified citation , at least to show them concluded & deduced thence , as . or . lines before he had promist us . but he quite prevaricates even from deducing them thence when it comes to the point , and instead of doing so & proving them from the pretended place , he repeats again the same demands bids us prove the contrary . i now demand ( saith he ) whether s. paul left any other appeal or place for farther directions save onely to himself . i answer , does the place alledged say any thing to the contrary , or is any such thing conclusible thence , as you pretended : if it be , why do not you make good your own proof from the place , & show this restrictive sence either there in expresse terms , or else by framing your conclusion from it ? why do you instead of thus doing your duty , stand asking me the same question over again ? he proceeds . whether could any other apostle by any power given him by christ countermand or interpose in them ? what need you ask that question ? you knew long ago that our answer would be affirmative that s. peter could , in case he saw it convenient for the good of god's church ; or , what is the asking this question over again to the showing that the contrary was either expresly or conclusively there , as you pretended . if any could , let him be named & his power specified , saith the dr. is not this a rare man to counterfeit himself ignorant whom we hold for head of the apostles , when as himself hath from the beginning of this chapter impugned s. peter as held such by us ! and to carry the matter as if he delay'd his proofs till he knew our answer , aswell known to him before hand , as his own name . it follows , & let the power be proved by virtue whereof he should thus act . i marry : now the dr. is secure , when all else fails he hath constantly recourse hither to hide his head . when his argument or proof is shown to bee falsify'd in the expresse terms , hee pretends to conclude thence ; and when 't is shown unable to conclude any thing , instead of proceeding to make it good or show that cōclusible from thence , which he promised , he leaves it of , as some impertinent questions , and bids his answerer take his turn & prove ; because he ( alas ) is graveld and cannot go a step further . this done he triumphs . but s. w. dares not , i am sure doth not affirm this . what dare not i , and do not i affirm ? that s. peter had power over the rest of the apoles in things cōcerning the good of the universall church . 't is my expresse tenet , which he is at present impugning ; and which i both do affirm & dare maintaine ( so prevalent is truth ) against dr h. though back't by forty more learned then himself . but this politick adversary of mine , seeing he could not argue me out of my faith , would needs fright me or persuade me from it , threat'ning me first that i dare not ; next , assuring mee that i do not affirm i● . this solid discourse premised , hee shuts up with an acclamation of victory thus : and , if it cannot be said ( as no doubt it cannot ) then where was s. peter's supreme pastorship ? where all the force of this upshot of his lies in the if , and no doubt , both of them equally addle & frivolous , since himself & all the world knows very well that we both can & do affirm & hold that s. peter was superior in authoritie to all the rest of the apostles . thus dr. hr. toyes it with his readers , hoping that the greater part of them will be arrant fools . first , putting down a company of expressions totally disanulling s. peter's authority , and immediately quoting for them , . tim. . . . next , when he is challenged of falsifying , instead of showing any word there more then the poor monosyllable come , saying , he onely mean't it was conclusible or deducible thence . and lastly , instead of concluding , proving , or deducing that iurisdiction limiting sence from those words , which at least was necessary , onely saying the same words over again , asking some questions to which he knew the answer long ago , bidding his answerer supply his turn & prove , telling us we dare not & do not affirm what his own knowledge & what his own eyes assure him we both dare & do in this very present controversy , and then concluding all with an if built upon the former , & no doubt bred in his own head & grounded upon his own fancy . is such an adversary worth the losse of an hour's time to confute ! were it not that the authority he hath got by a sleightly-connected sermon , enabling him to do some mischief amongst the more vulgar , made it necessary to lay him open plainly & to show how unsafe it is for them to let their salvations rely in the least upon so incomparably weak a controvertist . third part . containing a refute of dr. h's second fundamentall exception against the pope's authority , from the pretended equall donation of the keys to s. peter . sect. . how dr. h's shuflingly avoids either to acknowledge or d●sacknowledge the notion of an evidence given . what he means by his evidences ; and what is to be expected from catholikes in manag●ng a wit-controversy concerning scripture . his weak attempt to clear himself of prevarication , injuriousnes and calumny objected . my . section in schism disarm'd begun with putting down the true notion of an evidence ; having already shown p. . that nothing but a perfect certainty sprung from such rigorous & convincing proofs could rationally oblige the understanding to assent ; and that all assents , sprung from that , were originiz'd from passion . whence follows that the first protestants could no way rationally relinquish the authority & government of the former church they were bred in , & conclude in their thoughts that her doctrine was false , her government an usurpation , unles moved by the said light of evident & demonstrative reasons ; that is , unles they had grounds sufficient in their own nature to convince them that it was so , and could not but be so . for , surely , even in common prudence it had been the most rash action imaginable to hazard the most greeveus sin of schism , & consequently an eternity of misery to their souls upon probability onely . how great a favour dr. h. had done himself , ( who , though he begun first to write , ) yet now answ . p. . l. . expresseth a great desire to be at an end of controversie ; and how great a kindnes he had confer'd on s. w to have answer'd positively to these two points i or no , to wit whether lesse then such a rigorous evidence could iustify the renouncing an authority & possession so qualified , and whether his pretended evidences , i or no , were such , i need not much declare . the whole controversy depends upon these two hinges & will quickly finde a decisive conclusion , if these points were positively answer'd to , & vigorously pursued . now , my notion of a testimony evidence ( schism disarm . p. . ) was this , that the testimony it self must be authentick beyond dispute ; and the words alledged so directly expressing the thing to be proved that they need no additions or explications to bring them home to the matter , but are of themselves full , ample , & clear , & such as the alledger himself , were he to expresse his thoughts in the present controversy would make choice of to use . whether he likes this definition of a testimony evidence or no , he is resolu'd wee shall not know . he dares not be negative or say he dislikes it , because , what ever testimony falls short of this , falls short likewise of proving that the thing must be ; and so , concludes onely that it may be ; which being too weak a ground in the iudgment of every prudent conscientious man to hazard his soul upon , as he must if he begin to schismatize upon no better grounds , he saw it could turn to his disgrace if he deny'd the notion given , or pretended that lesse evidence would serve in a controversy about schism : nor durst he bee affirmative or approve of it , because he saw he had not produced one testimony in his whole book worth a straw , if it were brought to that test , nor worthy to bestyled an evidence . wherefore being in this perplexity , and ( as the proverb is ) holding a wolf by the ears , he recurs to his old prevarications , and instead of approving or disapproving of my description of an evidence , tells me ( answ . p. . ) what he meant by his own evidences ; to wit , that he takes evidence in the familiar vulgar notion for a testimony to prove any question of fact , either in the affirmation or the nagative . but what kinde of testimonies these must be which can serve in such a concerning discourse , whether such as i described heretofore , manifesting that the thing must be , or not be ; or probable ones , inferring onely that his affirmative or negative may be ; or whether these testimonies need be proofs at all , but branches of accordance onely , or spoken in agreement ( as almost all the testimonies he hath hitherto produced were ) he defines nothing . by his carriage in his book of schism he seems to mean these latter onely ; nor do his words here exact more then onely a testimony , not expressing any thing at all concerning the quality of this testimony , whether the authority of it must be valid , or invalid ; clear , or obscure ; expresse or dumbe ; entire , or maim'd with an ellipsis ; originally proving , o● agreable onely ; set down right , or corrupted & falsified ; an orthodox fathers or an arch-heretick's ; all is one with dr. h. still that testimony is one of his vulgarly-styl'd evidences ; and so , vulgar & half-witted souls will rely upon them in a controversy importing no lesse then their eternall salvation . in the same place of schism disarm'd dr. h. was charg'd with prevaricating from his pretended promise , instead of bringing evidence of his own , solving our pretended ones ; and that this was to sustain a different part in the dispute he first undertook ; to wit , the part of the defendant , for so we used ever to style him who solved objections . he answers , that the one possible way to testify any negative is to take a view of the places the affirmers pretend , and to shew that those places have no such force in them . obserue these canting words [ the one possible way ] so handsomly preparing for an evasion , which though more likely to signify the onely possible way ( as vnus is often taken for solus in latin ) yet he hath a glosse in readines to say he meant ' otherwise . but , because he puts not down the other possible way , corresponding to the one , we shall take it as it must in all honestly-meant probability sound , and ask him whether there was ever such a strange position heard of in the schools that there should be no possible way to testify a negative but by solving the affirmative places . are there no negative testimonies in the words ? or cannot a negative testimony testify a negative point without necessarily recurring to solve affirmatives ? wee were taught in logick to prove negatives by concluding in celarent or ferio , without being forc't necessarily to stand answering the arguments in barbara and darij for the affirmative : whereas , according to dr. h's new logick , the onely way to prove a negative point must be to solve the affirmative proofs . to omit that it shall bee shown presently how the solving affirmatives , was no one way to testify a negative . again , he was shown by schism disarm'd that this way of arguing was rather indeed to bring obscurity than evidence , for all that it can pretend is this , that the conclusion follows not out of those testimonies or premises , & therein is terminated it's force , nor doth it proceed so far as to prove or infer that the thing in it self is vntrue . indeed , if it be known first that the opponent holds his tenet upon no other grounds save onely that testimony , and that be shown plainly to be vnable to conclude , he will be obliged to relinquish his tenet so far as not to hold it any more , till he sees better ground ; yet still he is not obliged to embrace , or assent to the contrary position , if he sees no evidence for it ; but to suspend all assent one way or other ; and to think rather that perhaps his may yet have other grounds to prove it true , for any thing he knows much lesse is it proved at all that the contrary is true , though all his arguments be solved till evidence be brought for it . wherefore , as long as this is not manifested , to wit that he hath no other tenour upon which he holds his position , the thing is much further from being concluded , no not even ad hominem to be false ; for though that medium do not establish it , another may . but now , if it be manifest that the adversary builds least of all upon those places the other solves , nay nothing at all in the manner that the other thinks they are to be managed and undertakes to solve them , then the solving such testimonies sinks into the miserablest , & lowest degree of force , nay even as low as nothing . this being our present case , observe i beseech thee prudent reader the infinite weaknes of this drs discoursive facultie . he first goes about to prove our tenet false from solving . or places of scripture ; whereas that very way of arguing can infer no more , but that those places conclude not for it ; nor are places of scripture arguments that we build upon at all for our faith , as explicable by wit , in which sence he impugns them , but onely as they are explicable by universall tradition , our rule of faith . since then dr. h. not so much as pretends to solve them according to the sence which tradition gives them ( for he no where pretends to shew that the attestation & practice of immediate forefathers did not ever give them this sence ) 't is evident he hath not in this processe impugned our faith at all , seeing he impugns no tenour nor argument at all upon which we build , or hold our faith indeed , our drs undertake sometimes to argue ad hominem against them and abstracting from our rule of faith , universall tradition , fall to interpret scripture with them proceeding upon other grounds , to wit , upon private skill & learning , to shew our advantage over them in their own , and to them the onely way . if then mr. h. pretended onely to try his wit with our doctors in this place ; then ( were his way of procedure by solving testimonies allowable in reason ) i should approve of his intention , so he exprest it ; but , if he say he mean't to impugn our faith , or build his own , he can never pretend it , unles he solve , or impugn those grounds upon which wee build our faith . make account then , reader , that that which dr. h. and i are now about is nothing at all to faith , but onely an exercise of wit and private skill ; and consists in this , whether of us can make words lest without life & stark dead to our hands , by grammaticall & criticall quibbling move more dexterously & smartly towards the end we drive at ; and is all one as if lawyers should consent to abstract from custome & knowledge of ancestors , and the books of the known laws , ( as i do now from practise & tradition , the sole true foundation of faith , ) and dispute out of some pliable , or obscure passages in odde histories , and some letters written onely upon occasion , as gildas , & some such few remnants of that time in the reign of the brittains , by what laws the kingdom was then governed . again , since we build not all upon places of scripture as explicable by private learning , it belongs not to us to shew them evidently concluding for us , as thus explicated ; no more then it doth to divines to demonstrate mysteries of faith by reason , which depend upon another ground , to wit , authority . wee acquit our selves well if wee shew that , what is there , is consistent with our faith ; as divines do , if they can show mysteries consistent with and not contradictory to reason ; and wee do more then the necessity of our cause , or reason obligeth us to , if wee shew them rather sounding to our advantage as thus explicable . for , how can any man be bound in reason to show that thing sounding in his behalf , upon which neither he nor his cause relies ? whereas , it belongeth to the protestants , who rely upon scripture explicable by private wit for their faith , to prove evidently that it is for them , and bears no probability against them . in the same manner , as when catholikes go about to prove their faith from scripture as explicable by tradition , it belongs to them to shew that explication infallibly certain ; because they rely upon it as the rule of their faith . secondly , dr. h. was charged with a palpable iniuriousnes in making the answering our places of scripture the summe of his first proofs , and yet omitting our cheefest place of all . io. . . . dr. h. replies ( answ . p. . ) this is iust as doctor stapleton deales with m. calvin ; i answer , it is very likely ; for i do not doubt but dr. h. inherits his father calvin's faults , & so deserves the same reprehension . but , how dealt dr. stapleton with that good man m. calv●n ? why he call'd a text of scripture the most important place , because it was not mention'd , so sayes mr. calvin's friend , dr. h if wee will beleeve him ; but , till he proves it better then by onely saying it , wee shall take libertie to think that friendship blindes . next , he tells us he hath given some account rep. sect. . n. . why hee had done us no injury in omitting it ; and indeed , 't is onely some account ; for he tells us there sleightly no more than this , that first , by the very position of it : but , secondly , more by the occasion ; and yet more , thirdly , by the matter of the words that place is prejudged from being any more than an exhortation to s. peter to discharge his duty . but , is there no particularity in order to s. peter ? an hard case , that after thrice saing , simon son of ionas louest thou me ? more than these ? ( and there upon ) feed thou my sheep , nothing should be yet spoken in order to s. peter in particular . the some account then , which dr. h hath rendred us in the place related , is that he hath said there three things upon his own head & proved none of them ; which ( as i take it ) is to give no account at all . his answers to it in other places shall be replied to other where . thirdly , he assures us that his reason of omitting it was by him with perfect truth rendred p. . from his full persuasion that it had so very litle appearance of strength in it , and had been so often answer'd that it would not be deemed vsefull to any that hee should descend to it . let us examin a litle dr. h's perfect truth . i ask , had he reckon'd all the numerous places in controvertists where this & other texts had been answet'd , & found that this had been far ofter replied to ? if he did not , how can he affirm it , or alledge this for his excuse ? if he did ) which i confesse is a task very proper for his ( genius ) why does not he show us tables of accounts how many times the one , & how many times the other hath been vrged ? till which time , he gives us leave to beleeve that it is as incredible he hath done it , as it were ridiculous to have done it . again , me thinks rea●on should tell him , that if it were oftner answered , it was oftner vrged ; and that it had not been oftner vrged without having some more appearance of truth in it , then the rest , which yet the other part of his excuse denies . if he say , that it was vrged more prevalently ; still , it will ly at his dore that it was more worthy his taking notice of : otherwise , to excuse himself , he indites his fellow-protestan'●s of plain folly in answering that place oftner , which on the one side had very litle apperance of truth in it , and on the other side had been neither very often , nor very prevalently vrged . fourthly , he asks if there be any farther invisible reserve in that place not taken notice of by m r hart in the conference with dr. reynolds , i answer ; truly , i was not by ; nor shall i credit a relation which their own partiall scribes writ , & their own partiall selves brag they have under the disputants hands ; it is as easy to counterfeit a hand , as to counterfeit a testimony ; if there be no such reserve , then dr h. tells us he must remember the issue of that conference . and what was that ? that mr hart flew of from this text to that of luke . v . from which being ( saith he ) soon beaten by evidence ( this evidence , i conceive , was some nothing-proving branch of accordance like those evidences of dr. h's ) the poor papist , if wee will beleeve his enemies , was put to conclude in these words . yet , i know not how , me thinks i cannot be persuaded but that it maketh somewhat for peter's supremacy . words so sillily unlikely , that the very rehearsall of them is enough to disgrace the whole relation , and the alledgers themselves . nor is it lesse unlikely that m ▪ hart should flie from this place of s. iohn to that of luke . v. . to prove s. peter's supremacy ; where nothing is found but onely this , simon , simon , be hold satan hath desired to have you to sift you as wheat . i wonder now in which of these words dr. reynolds his friends will pretend mr hart placed the most force for s. peter's supremacy ; whether in the ordinary & common name simon , in satan , in sifting , or in wheat . is not this dr. a great wit to bring such unauthoriz'd & unlikely trifles for his excuse ? yet necessity ( alas ) hath no law : he tells us here he must remember this wise story ; as if it were such a necessary busines to give his reader a memorandum of a thing which he can never make good ; and is in it self the most unlikely truth and the likeliest fiction that can be imagined . thirdly dr. h. was charged of manifestly calumniating the catholikes in calling their tenet cōcerning the power of the keys a peculiarity & inclosure of s. peter he goes about to discharge his credit and conscience by shewing both from my words and the catholike tenet that s. peter had some particular power of keyes , & sayes he mean't onely that this particular power was a peculiarity & inclosure of s. peter . that the catholike tenet , & consequently mine is that he had such a particular degree of power of the keyes promised , and given him , i willingly gra●● and , had dr. h. exprest so much there , he had not been charged with calumny ; but if he exprest no such thing there , nay carried it so , as if wee had held that no apostles had the keyes but s. peter , then all the emptie wordishnes in his reply & answer will avail nothing to clear him from so grosse a fault . now , my reasons why i charged him with the said calumny are these , because of schism p. . speaking of the donation of the power of the keyes in an unlimitted & universall expression , he says of himself , that this power math. . . is promised to s. peter ; by which words consequently he must mean the power of the keyes in common ; for it is opposite to his tenet to say that any particular degree of that power was promised that apostle . this done he puts down the text of scripture , i will give unto thee the keyes , &c. and then subjoyns these words . but to him that from hence pretends this donative , & consequent power as a peculiarity & inclosure of s. peter's , these considerations will be of force to supersede his conclusion . now , what this donative and power was meant of , is sufficiently exprest before , to wit the power of the keyes in generall without any restriction or particularization . wherefore , it is most manifest from his own words that he would have made the honest reader beleeve our tenet was that the power of the keyes in generall & common was s. peter's peculiarity & inclosure . secondly , one of his considerations to supersede our conclusion ( as he calls it ) were two places of scripture , expressing onely that the keyes were given to all the apostles in common , but nothing at all that they were given equally to all ; wherefore they can no wayes impugn the inequality of s. peter's having such a power , but onely s. peter's having it alone ; since nothing can be imagin'd plainer then that the same notion of a thing may plurally agree to many , and yet in unequall degrees notwithstanding , there being almost as many instances of it , as there are things in the world . evident therefore it is that he impugned s. peter's having the power of the keyes alone , and so calumniated us in counterfeiting that to be our tenet , & impugning it as such , unles perhaps he will say hee intēded to impugn nothing at all . thirdly , what means the word [ inclusive ] is it not ( if applied to s. peter's having the power of the keyes ( as it is by him ) as plain an expression as could be invented , to signify none had that power but s. peter ? manifest therefore it is that he intended to make his reader beleeve that wee held such an absurd position , and thence erected a rare trophee of his own victory , by shewing ( as he easily might ) that all the other apostles had that power as well as he , or in common . but observe how neatly dr. h. deludes his readers in going about to clear himself of this calumny ; for instead of shewing from his own words that he signified that which wee held for s. peter's peculiarity & inclosure was onely a higher degree of that power , which had been the proper way to shew him not faulty in the said words , he prevaricates quite from that onely necessary method , and runs to shew from my words & the catholick tenet that wee grant s. peter a more particular power of the keyes ; entangling poore s. w. on all sides p . and obliging him by most powerfull arguments to grant that which he beleeves already as a point of his faith ; and , when he hath done , he insults that that particular power was s. peter's peculiarity , & inclosure ; but never goes about to shew ( which onely was his duty ) that he applied those words peculiarity & inclosure to that particular power of the keyes in his book of schism , where he was charged to have calumniated us but to the common power onely . though the question be not whether catholicks hold that s. peter had an higher degree of this power , which was his inclosure , but whether dr. h. expressed such to be our tenet in his book of schism , or rather pretended that the having the very power of the keyes it self was held by us to be his inclosure , & peculiarity , and so calumniated us in the highest degree . thus dr. h. pleads his own cause , and then concludes himself secure from being like s. w. in calumniating him with whom he came to dispute . after this answ . p. . the dr. is mistakingly apprehensive of sprights , and is troubled at the two appearanrances of the same romanist . for imposing on him two propositions which he never said , and disgraces the said appearances by asking the reader what trust is to be given to such disputers . but what said the two appearances of the same romanist ? one appearance sayes that dr. h. affirms no power of the keyes was given especially to s. peter . the other appearance sayes that hee confesses the keyes were especially promised to s. peter . he answers , the truth is , he neither said one , nor the other . one of the appearances replies . the truth is , he said both . the first of sch●sm p. . l. . . where he sayes expresly , that these , to wit , the keyes , or the words importing them , are delivered in common and equally to all & every of the eleven apostles . now i imagin'd that those words equally to all & every one is the very same , as particularly to no one . but dr. h. thinkes otherwise . ( answ . p. . l. denying that he affirmed no power of the keyes was given especially to s. peter . and yet presently l. . . saying that he af●●rmed that the power was given in common , and equally to all the apostles , which is so perfectly the self-same with the former as the very common light of nature teaches us , that they are both one , and that not especially , & commonly , are perfectly equivalent . to omit that this very position : that no power of the keyes was given especially to s. peter , is his own main nay sole tenet , he is defending in this place , which yet he sayes here , he affirms not , and complains of my foul play in disputing , for saying he holds his own tenet . the second position is found p. . l. . where he grants that this promise was made to s. peter peculiarly , and l. . where he sayes that the words importing a promise of the keyes are applied particularly to s. peter , now the applying those words is the speaking them , for they were not first spoken then afterward apply'd . to s. peter then this promise was spoken , that is , was made particularly or especially . as for his evasion , that the former of these two last places is onely mention'd by him as a color the romanist makes some use of , it hath no color at all from the place where it is found , or at least such a dim color as none but himself can discern . sect. . a promise of an higher degree of power and it's performance shown the texts mat. . and iohn . connaturally and rationally explicated . these preparative rubs being past over , and dr. h's three great faults of prevaricating , iniuriousnes , and calumny , with which he was charged , and went about to clear , still challenging him for their author , next comes the point it self , since dr. h. will needs put us upon the part of the opponent . mr. h. undertooke to solve some places of scripture which were used by our doctors for s. peter's supremacy ; where upon , i was obliged to undertake two things ; first , that our saviour promised the keyes to s. peter in particular , and after a particular manner , that is , the manner of promising them was particular in order to s. peter . secondly , that , it being worthy our saviour to perform his promise after the manner & tenour in which he promised , consequently he performed that promise to s. peter after a particular manner , that is , gave him the keyes particularly , schism disarm'd p. . . urged the first place matth. . v. . &c. which concerned the promise , and , though dr. h pretends in the end of this chapter , that he attends me in this section 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 foot by foot , yet he gave it no such at●endance in order to answering it but onely p. . . . he would needs engage me thence to confesse a point of my faith that is , that s. peter had something , or some degree of power which the rest had not , that so he might clear himself from having calumniated our tenet . since then i must be forc't to repeat again what i said there , i shall do it by arguing after this sort . these words , i will give vnto thee the keyes of the kingdome of heaven , &c. importing a promise , were spoken to s. peter after a particular manner , therefore the promise was made to s peter after a particular manner . the consequence is evident , for the promise was made by speaking it ; if then it were spoken to s. peter after a particularizing way , the promise was made to s. peter after a particular manner . the antecedent i prove thus , those words were spoken to s. peter after a manner not competible nor common to the rest of the apostles ; therefore they were spoken to s. peter after a particularizing way . the consequence is most evident , since particular , is expresly the same with not common or not competible to the rest . the antecedent is proved no lesse evidently from the whole series of the text ; where we have first a particular blessing of s. peter , sprung from a particular act of his , to wit , his confession of christ's divinity . blessed art thou ; his particular name , and , to avoyd all equivocation which might communicate that name ▪ designing whose sonne he was , simon bar-iona : my heavenly father hath revealed it vnto th●e , in particular . next follows christ's applying his words in particular here upon , and i say vnto thee ; then alluding to his particular name given him by christ himself with an emphasis and energy , thou ar● peter ( or a rock ) and upon this rock will i build my church , &c. and after all these particular designations follows the promise in the same tenour copulatively . and i will give vnto thee ( still with the same speciality ) the keyes of the kingdome of heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven . now , hence iargue . the confession of christ to be the son of god , the blessing there-upon , the name simon bar-iona , the designed allusion to that name , are not competible nor common to the rest of the apostles ; therefore , the promise-expressing words concomitant were spoken to s. peter in a way not common , or competible to the rest of the apostles . but ( to returne whence wee came ) these words are a promise of the keyes , and their power ; therefore a promise of the keyes , and their power was made to s. peter , after a manner not common , that is particular , and that upon occasions originally springing from , and constantly relating , and alluding to s. peter's particular person and particular name . and thus much for the promise . next , as for the performance of this particular promise , wee argue thus . it is worthy our saviour , not onely to perform his promise , but also to perform it after the manner , and tenour he promised . but he promised the power of the keyes to s. peter after a particular manner , ( as hath been shown ) ●●erefore he perfo●med his promise , and gave it to s. peter after a particular manner , and consequently ( which is the position wee vltimately aym at ) s. peter had the power of the keyes after a more particular manner then the other apostles . the major is evident ; because no man living would think himself reasonably dealt with if a promise were not performed to him after the manner it was made ; nay , reason would think himself deluded , to have his expectation raised ( as in prudence it would ) by such a particular manner of promising to something extraordinary , and more then common , and , when it comes to the point , to have his hopes defeated by a common , and meerly - equall performance . the minor is already proved in the foregoing paragraph . the conclusion is the position in controversy . reason therefore informs us , supposing once that the promise was made to s. peter after a particular manner that it should be performed to him after the same manner , nor need 's it any other proof from testimonies , if we once grant ( as none will deny ) that our b. saviour did what was most reasonable , and fitting . yet some of our drs , arguing ad hominem against the protestāt , make choice particularly of that place of iohn . v. . . . to infer such a performance . i proceed therefore in the way i begun , and endeavour to show two things ; first that reason gives it , secondly that the scripture favours it , that this place signifies a particularity of performance to s. peter , or a performance to him after a particular manner . the first i prove ad hominem thus , the promise being made to s. peter after a particular manner , and register'd in scripture ( as hath been shown ) it is fitting that the correspōdent performance so worthy our saviour should be exprest there likewise ; especially in the protestant grounds who grant a kind of self-perfectnes and sole-sufficiency to scripture . but , there is no other place in scripture so apt to signify a particular performance as this ( for the other places cited by dr. h. receive yee the holy ghost , & ●s my father sent me so send i you , expresse onely a common performance ) therefore in all reason wee should think that the particular performance is exprest there . the second i show thus , the particular promise had preceeded , apt in it's own nature to breed some greater expectation in s. peter . these words were apt to satisfy that expectation ; they signify'd therefore a particular performance ▪ again , the thrice particularizing him by his name , and relation , simon sonne of ionas , denotes the speaking of the following words to him particularly . but the following words , pasce oves ineas , were apt , and sufficient to instate him in the office , and give him the authority of a pastor : it was therefore given him in a particular manner to be a pastour in these words . the major is e●ident , the minor is proved . for , should any master of a family bid one of his servants in the same words feed his sheep , that servant would think him self sufficiently authorized to perform that duty . thirdly , the word amas me plus his , dost thow love me more than these , manifestly put both a particularity , and a superiority in s. peter above the other apostles in the interrogatory : therefore , the inference there-upon ; feed my sheep , in ordinary reason should signify after the same manner , and sounds as if it were put thus , dost thow love me more then these , to which s. peter assenting , our saviour may be imagin'd by the naturall sence of the words to reply , if it be so that thou lovest me more then these , then feed my sheep more then these ; or , have thou a commission to feed my sheep more then these , sence he is more likely to perform his duty better , and so more capable and worthy of a higher charge who bears a greater affection to his master . this paraphrase the words them selves seem to ground . for otherwise to what purpose was it to make an interrogation concerning a greater degree of love ? or , to what end was that particularizing , and perferring words [ more then these ] put there if they had no correspondent influence nor connexion with the inference which ensves upon it . fourthly , the verb pasce being exprest imperatively , and spoken by a lord to his servant , ought in all reason to signi●y a command , unles the concomitant words in the text force another sence upon it , which cannot be alledged here . since then every command of a lawfull superiour gives a commission to do that which he commands , and that the words expressing this command are most evidently by the circumstances in the text , in a particular manner spoken to s. peter , it follows that s. peter had by them a particular commission given him to feed christ's flock , which is the thing to be proved . fifthly , the property of the word pasce , as it is distinguished from praedicate shows that there was a kind of ordinary care commanded to s. peter , whereas by the pure apostleship he and his fellows had but an extraordinary and ( as it were ) a voyager authority ; for , an apostle might preach in many cities ; but , to be pastor he must fix himself in one citie because he could be but a particular pastor : but , s. peter having for his charge , oves & agnos , that is , all the faithfull , ●ould ●ever be out of his own iurisdiction , so that being still in his seat , he needed not fix any where ; and , that he did so was 〈◊〉 abundanti ; wherefore praedicate being spoken in generall to all he apostles ▪ pasce , to s. peter onely , & pasce having an especiall force above praedicate it follows that something was here given to s. peter by that word , especially and particularly . this is , reader , what i conceive follows gen●inly out of the texts themselves , as explicable grammatically . two things i desire both mine adversary and thee to take notice of . the one , that we are not now disputing how the many-winded commenters interpret this or that word ; but what follows out of the acknowledg'd words of the texts , as managed by grammaticall skill . nor do i pretend to evidence out of my own interpretation ( that is , animating of dead words ) neither my cause needs it , nor can my own reason suffer me to engage soe far , assuring me how seldome demonstrations are to bee expected from the tossing of meer words ; my onely intent then ( as i tould thee at first ) was to show what i conceived most connaturally and probably follow'd out of these texts , and their circumstances . nor is it sufficient for mine adversary to imagin that another explication may be invented . but ( since our contention now is , about what the words can-best bear ) he is to show that another can so connaturally agree to the same particularizing circumstances in the said texts . and , if any man living can draw an argument out of the same words , more coherent with all the circumstances there found , and more connected in it self then mine is , nay from any other text in scripture , to show that s. peter had no promise of the power of the keyes made to him in a particular manner , and no performance of that promise in the same manner , in which is founded his superiority to the other apostles , i will candidly confesse my self to have the worst in this wit-combat , and shall lay down the cudgells for the next comer . sect. . dr. h's solutions or contrary explications of those two places of scripture , sustain'd by most senceles paralogisms , and built onely upon his own sayings ; nor shown nor attempted to bee shown more naturally consequent from the texts themselves and their circumstances . against , this inference of mine from the words of these texts dr. h. never goes about to show from the force of the same words a more connaturall explication , which is the onely method to show his advantage over us in scripture ; but , in stead thereof , endeavours onely to enervate our deductions thence by some solutions gather'd here and there . now , this method of proceeding had been allowable , in case we had built our faith upon such wit originiz'd explications ; or , if in trying our acutenes with them in their own wordish way we had pretended to evidence or conclude demonstratively that this must be the sence of those places ; for then indeed any may be otherwise , which they could imagin , would have destroy'd our must be so ; and wee were bound in that case to maintain our explication against any other , not onely which the words might be pretended to favour , but what the most voluntary dreamer could fancy . but , since wee pretend not to evidence or conclude demonstratively thence , and onely intend to show out of the force of the words that our exposition is more probable , and connaturall ; he hath noe way to overcome in these circumstances , but by showing us another out of the force of the same words more probable and connaturall ; which since he never attempts to do ( as far as i can see ) 't is plain he is so far from having acquitted him self in that point that he hath not so much as gone about it ; and all the voluntary solutions and possibilities of another explication he hath produced out of his owne f●cy without endeavoring to shew them more naturall out of the force of the texts , are so little to the purpose , that they are not worth answering . yet wee shall glean them up from the places in which he hath scattered them , and give them , which is more then their due , a cursory reflection . solution . the words of the commission were delivered in common to all the apostles . of schism p . l. . reply . the delivering them in common evinces no more but that each apostle had the power of the keyes ; but , leaves it indifferent whether each had it equally or in equally ▪ since it expresses neither ; nor is there any so silly as not to see that mo●e persons may have the same thing yet one of those may have it in a more particular manner than the rest . now then , since wee have a place of scripture expressing a promise of the keyes in a particularising manner to s. peter , how can the other places of a common delivery prejudice the having them more especially ; since it abstracts from having them equally , or inequally ; and so is indifferent to and consistent with either . solution . they are delivered equally to all and every of the apostles , as is evident by the plurall style throughout that commission . of schism p . l. . . . reply . to think that a bare plurality can prove ; much less evidence an equality is such a peece of bedlam like non-sence that i wonder the silliest old wife should be gulld with such an affected peece of foolery . paul's , and pancras by this logick must be equall , because they are both in the plurall call'd churches ; nay every peece of the world's frame is a mani●est instance a●a●nst this paralogism ; since in every species in nature the particulars or individualls are plurally styled by the same word , and agree in the same generall notion , though there be hundreds , sometimes thousand degrees of inequality between them . yet this infinitely weake reasoner hath ( as i dare undertake to show ) above fourty times made this argument against us ; and to surpasse his otherwise unparaleld'self , he calls it an evidence . were it not pretty to put some parallels to this peece of logick , and make dr. h. argue thus . constables and kings are in the plurall styled magistrates . ergo ( cryes the dr. ) it is evident they are both equall ; a captaine and a generall are both plurally styld commanders ; ergo ( concludes the dr. ) it is evident they are equally such . the like argument he hath made heretofore for the equality of apostles , pillars , foundation-stones , &c. because all of each sort were named by one plurall name . pardon me then reader if i have given such a harsh character to this monstrous peece of logick i professe i know not what better name to call it by truly ; and , besides other considerations , i cannot but resent it in the behalf of man's nature which is reason , and am angry with dr. h. in his owne behalf that he hath by his passion , and interest so totally defaced it in him self as to produce that for an evidence which is so far from the least degree of probability that it is the greatest impossibility imaginable . but especially , when i see that the same person who acknowledges schism greater then sacriledge , or idolat●y , would persuade rationall souls into it by such putid non-sence , i confesse , i cannot contain my expressions from taking such liberties , as truth and iustice make lawfull , but the concernement of my cause necessary . solution . each single apostle had this power as distinctly promised to him as s. peter is pretended to have , and the words of scripture , math. . v. . are most clear for that purpose . of schism p. . reply , there is not a word there expressing any distinction in order to any other apostle , much lesse singularizing each of them distinctly as you here pretend but a common and plurall donation onely whatsoever you shall binde , &c. and , as for your syllogism by which you would evade the shamelesnes of this assertion answ . p. . by saying that you mean't onely the apostles were each of them singly to have and exercise the power of the keyes , and not all together in common , or joyn'd together in communion ; first , neither agrees with your other words , for it is one thing to say each could distinctly use that power , another thing to say as you ( of schism p. ● . l. . . ) this power was distinctly promised to each of them , and then quoting , math. . v. . as most clear for that purpose where nothing is found but a cōmon expression whatsoever yee shall binde on earth shall be bound in heaven , &c. without any distinction at all exprest . nor can such a pretended meaning stand with common sense , unles the dr. will confesse him self to have calumniated our tenet , which imputation he hath before taken such pains to avoid ; for either it is put in opposition to us , or not ; if not , what does it there , or to what end are all those testimonies brought of schism p. to second it ? if it be put in opposition to us , and yet mean onely ( as dr. h. says here ) that it was promised to all the apostles as to twelve single persons each singly to have and exercise it , and not all together in common ; then our tenet must necessarily be supposed and pretended by him to be , that no single apostle could bind or loose , but all of them together in common onely which is so manifest a calumny that himself dares not openly own it , though he slily impose it ; as he did the other about the keyes being s. peter's inclosure . yet it is as necessarily his , as the excuse given is his ; which if he disclame he acknowledges the objected fault . solution . the addressing the speech to s. peter in the singular is a token onely that peter as a single person should have power , but not , either that no others should have it too ( observe reader how the calumny he formerly would have acquitted himself of , still sticks to him ) or that the manner in which s. peter should have it should be singular to him , and so as it was not to each of them , answ . p. . reply , this is onely your own saying ; show us out of the words themselves that this is more probable , as i show'd the contrary , and then i shall acknowledge that you have animated the dead letter more artificially then i ; otherwise you have done nothing : for the question is not whether you can say so , or no ; but whether the words oblige you to say so . solution . the particularity , gives him particularly the power , but excludes not others from the same power and the same degree of power . answ . p. . reply . this is onely said again , not shown that the words gave occasion to say it , which was onely to be done . he quotes indeed drily the places of scripture , yet puts down no words , as his custome is , but talks before and after the barren and unapply'd citations what he pleases . wee take the words of the text , debate them minutely and particularly , and bring them home to the point , to show that our tenet of a more particular powre is more probable out of their native force . let him do the like and show by the same method his explication more connaturall then mine and i shall grant he won the field in this probability-skirmish . himself will not deny that s. peter had as much promis'd him as the rest when it was promis'd in common , math. . v. . the having then over and above this common promise at another distinct time and with most particularizing and distinguishing circumstances a promise of he same keyes ; most manifestly is a priviledge peculiar to s. peter , and that on which wee ground the probability of having them promis'd in a particular manner , and consequently performed in the same sort ; which wee make accoūt wee find with the like particularities io. . let the reader then observe what countenance the words , grammatically & prudentially scann'd , give to our explications and deductions , and expect what other explication , so well circumstanc'd , dr. h. can deduce of the same words taken in their own native force and energy , not what he will say upon his owne head . solution . the speciall energy of the applying the words particularly to s. peter , concludes that the ecclesiasticall power of aeconomy or stewardship in christ's house belongs to single persons , such as s. peter was , and not onely to consistories , or assemblies . of schism p. . reply . this is still your own saying without ever endeavoring to show from the words , and their circūstances , they persuade that this is the sense of them . but , let it be so that you have evinc't against the presbyterians from this place that a community must not govern but a bishop , that is , one who is superiour to that community ; who sees not how much better , and more probably it follows hence that s. peter was superior to the consistory of the apostles ( they being present when those particularizing words were spoken , whence dr. h. proves the episcopall authority over the consistory ) then it will follow that in succeeding times , and distinct circumstances , some one should be chief and over the assembly . again , the words not being expresse for his position , he can onely make a parallell deduction thence after this sort , if he will argue from the words , that the same should be observed in a bishop and his consistory afterwards , which was i deated in this first consistory of the apostles ; wherefore , since dr. h. grants no higher degree of authority in s. peter than in the rest of the apostles , he can conclude no more but this , that the presbyters are all equall in authority , as the apostles were ; that is , there ought to bee no more-highly-authoriz'd bishop over them , but onely that one of those equally-dignify'd presbyters ought to sit , talk , or walk before the rest , according to dr. h's explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by primacy of order . thus whiles the dr. disputes from this place against the presbytery , he falls into popery . as for what he tells me here that it is the interest of s. w. as well as of the protestants to mantain this point against the presbyterians who a lone can gain by the questioning it . i answer , that i love the presbyterians so well as not to wish them renounce their reason , that is , man's nature , which they must doe if they assent to what the protestants say upon a probability onely , nay a totally improbable , and rather opposit text. nor should i wish them so much hurt , as to beleeve episcopacy , unles i made account the catholick church was able to give them rigorously convincing evidence for her authority asserting it , which is impossible the protestants should do , unles they plow with our heifer , and recur to our rules of faith , universall tradition , so oft renounc'd by them for other points . observe , reader , that i had shown his explication of this place of scripture against the presbyterians to make unavoidably against thim self , schism disarm'd p. . in reply to which dangerous point ( answ . p. ▪ par . . ) he onely calls my reasons expressions of dislike to his argument against presbytery , that it is not pertinent to the question , that it hath not ( as he supposes ) any show of the least di●ficulty in it and so ends . as if my showing that our tenet follows more naturally out of the words , even as explicated thus by him self , were onely an expression of dislike , impertinent to our question , or had not , if proved , any show of the least difficulty in it ; yet he braggs at the end of this section , that he hath attended me precisely and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 step by step , though he makes when he spies danger such large skips over me . solution . the words , feed my sheep , are nothing but an ●xhortation to discharge that duty to which he was befor● commissionated . rep. p. . par . . p. . reply , had he ever a particular commission given him , correspondent to the particularizing promise , but here ? or was not the word pasce spoken imperatively by a master to his servant as apt to signify a commission as the words , goe teach all nations , were ? how then appears it from the words that this was onely an exortation ? and , if it does not , what is it more then dr. h's own saying ? solution the circumstances in the text can never work a change in the matter , an inculcated , expresse , particulariz'd explication , introduc'd with a question to quicken , and impresse it can never be converted by these accumulation● into a commission for supremacy . answ . p. . reply , first you must show that the words persuade it was onely an exhortation ; else all this and your following discourse falls to the ground . next , such particularizing circumstances to s. peter in the presence of the rest are apt in their owne nature to make him or any man living ready to apprehend that the thing promised belonged to him in a particular manner : els to what end serv'd they , would no● a common promise have sufficed if this had not been intended ? thirdly , there needed no converting the signification of the pasce from an exhortation into a commission of supremacy . the word was apt before of it self to signify a commission ; the accumulation of particularizing circumstances gave it to signify a particular commission . let the reader examin dr. h. by what force of the words he proves t' is an exhortation onely , since the words themselves are words of commission , there being nothing proper to a meer exhortation in them . and as for the drs parallell here that ( christ's praying the same prayer thrice did not make it cease to be a prayer and commence a precept , t 's soe silly as a sillier cannot be imagin'd ; since neither the words of christ's prayer are apt to be converted from a praying to a commanding signification ; nor was it likely or possible that christ should impose precepts upon his heavenly father to whom he pray'd , as he could upon s. peter , not lastly is it onely the thrice saying that wee build upon , as abstracted from all the other particularising circumstances but the thrice saying a precept , and a precept thus exprest . solution . the asking him thri●e , lovest thou me , made s. peter no doubt deem it a reproach of his thrice denying his master . answ . p. . the text saith , peter was greeved , because he said vnto him the third time , lovest thou me , which sure he would not have been , if he had looked on it as an introduction to so great a preferment . reply : dr. h. hath here at unawares bewray'd what kinde of spirit he is of ; who makes account that the getting some great preferment is a ground of more gladnes then our saviours seeming to doubt of his love to him would be occasion of sorrow . but he shall give me and all good christians ●eave to think that good s. peter was of another temper ; and that he valued the good opinion of his master , questioning so much his love to him , above the attainment of any dignity imaginable . though i must confesse dr. h's noe doubt , and sure , upon which all depends , are two sure cards , were they authoris'd by any thing besides his own words ; and , 't is a very competent answer with him to say he is sure , and there is no doubt but that s. peter gap't so much after a preferment that he car'd not , in comparison of it , what opinion his b. master had of him , in order to his loving him . again , how do the words soe put it beyond all doubt that the asking him thrice , lovest thou mee , was deemed by s. peter a reproach of his thrice deniall ; whereas the text tells us that s. peter was fully persuaded of his masters knowledge of his love , and confidently appeal'd to that knowledge , lord thou knowest all things , thou knowest that i love thee . nor have wee any ground to think that s. peter apprehended his sweet master so cruell as to upbraid a forgiven sin , especially seeing the return of so much love in the breast of his dear disciple . if dr. h. pretend that it was to excite in him a greater care of christ's flok , the words indeed give countenance to it . but then it should be ask'd what necessity was there of exciting a greater care in s. peter in particular ? had he shown him self of soe negligent a nature as to give occasion of doubt that he was not likely without this exciration to perform well this particular charge ? or rather , did not his whole carriage demonstrate the quite contrary that he was ever most zealous , vehement , and hot to prosecute any thing he went about ? what reason then there could be of a particular incitement to s. peter to perform and look well to his charge , more than to the rest without some particularity in his charge more than in the rest , passes reason to imagin ▪ the force therefore in this thrice repetition of lovest thou me in all probability and according to the words rationally explicated , wee make to bee this ; that since it is ever the method of god's sweet providence to dispose and fit the person for the charge , ere he imposes the charge it self , and the best disposition to perform any charge with exact diligence is a greater affection towards the person who imposes it , our saviour , by asking s. pe●ter thrice in that tender manner lovest thou me more then these , lovest thou me , excited and stirred up in him a greater affection , both to dispose him at present for the particularly-exprest charge of feeding his sheep , and also to minde him for the future upon what terms and conditions , and with what dear and tender expressions he had pledged vnto him the care of his flock . this explication , i say , of that thrice asking wee think most connaturall and consonant to the text , as rationally scann'd according to what is most befitting the divine wisedom ; by which rule or any other principle had dr. h. guided himself in stead of recurring to and relying upon meerly his owne fancy for his voluntary explications , i hope he would have been of the same minde too . solution . wee need seek no other performance of this promise than that which was at once afforded all the apostles together . as , suppose a generall should promise a commission this day to one , and to morowe should make the like promise to eleven more , that one being in their company , and then , upon a set day some weeks after , should se●● twelve commissions to those twelve , one for each of them , i wonder who would doubt of the exact performance of this promise to that first , or seek for any more speciall performance of it reply p. . reply : dr. h. pretends a parallell , and yet ▪ leaves all that in which the force of the parallell was to be put , taking the common and indifferent circumstance onely . first he puts the supposition that a generall should promise a commission this day to one , but he omits all that in which wee place the strength of our argument , to wit , that the generall should promise the said commission to that one in a manner of expression not competent or competible to the rest , as he did here , sounding an advantage over the rest in his desert , his confessing of christ's godhead by the revelation of his heavenly father ; with such allusion● to his name , and other particularisations , as in all prudence are apt to breed an expectation of something particular in the thing promised . he should have made his generall have promist a commission to one in this manner , and then the answer had been , that that one man so manifoldly particulariz'd , and , as it were , call'd and singled out from the rest in their owne presence , had no reason to think himself ingenuously deal't with , if his acknowled'g desert being particular , and the promise there upon so particularly directed to him , and him alone at that time , he had received an equall commission onely , that is , such a one as was common to all the by standers , and not particular at all to himself . next , dr. h's following words , suppose this generall should to morrow make the like promise to eleven more , that one being in their company , hath two equivocations in it ; the one in the words , the like promise ; by which if he means the promise of the same common thing , to wit the power of the keyes , t' is granted ; but , if he mean's ( as he ought , this being the thing in controversy , and the sence best suting with that word ) that the like promise denotes a promise made after th● same manner , and apt to breed no more nor higher expectation of the thing to be given then if it had been exprest 〈◊〉 common onely then 't is palpably false and flatly deny'd . the next equivocation lies in these words , suppose he should make a promise to eleven more ▪ that one being in their company ; by which one would think that s. peter who had it promised particularly before , had it not promised again in common now , but onely stood by at this time while it was promis'd to the other eleven . by which device he hath avoided another point in which wee put force , and left it out in his parallell ; and 't is this , that s. peter went a breast with the rest in having the common promise made to him as well as they had ; and exceeded or was preferr'd before them in this priviledge , that , over and above his common promise , hee had a promise made to him at other times particularly and in a particularizing manner , so that the drs similitude hath not so much as one foot left to hop on , that is , it resembles no part of the point as it is in question betveen us , nor touches at all the controverted difficulty , and is all one as if , going about to paint cesar , he should draw onely the rude lineaments common to all mankind , and omit all the particular proportions and colours which were proper to delineate that person . but the dr. makes up his similitude by supposing twelve commissions sent to the twelve captains , in which he would subtly have his reader suppose the commissions were equally ; for , if they were unequall it would prove iust contrary to his pretence . but what he mean's by his seal'd commissions , or how he thinks this is verified in the apostles , wee shall ere long discusse when he declares his meaning in it . dr. h's parallell having thus lamely play'd it's part , let me see if i can make another more pat , and expresse then his was . suppose then the late king of england , as head of the church there , could have made , and had been to create bishops all over england ; and had already cast his eye particularly upon some one particular person so far as to give him in particular the sir name of bishop ( as he did s. peter the name cephas , a rock ) this done , upon occasion of a particular service of his first acnowledging or confessing him king ( which wee may suppose not to have been then acknowledged ) he breaks out into those parallell expressions . happy art thou n. n. who , when others weakly doubt of my royalty dost out of a particular affection to me acknowledg me king ; and i say vnto thee , thou art bishop , and upon this bishop i wil build the church of england , and thus built it shall stand strong against all opposition ; and j will give vnto thee the power of binding & loosing and whatsoever fault against our ecclesiasticall laws , thou shalt absolve from , i will hold that person thus absolved guiltles ; and whatsoever thou shalt refuse to pardon , i will hold it unpardon'd likewise . now i appeal to dr. h's cōscience whether this person he would not in prudence judge by this carriage that he should have some thing particualr given him , and whether though the king afterwards , in a common exposition , had promis't to make him , aud the rest bishops , yet there would not remain still imprinted in his minde an expectation that he should be a bishop in a higher degree then the rest ; to wit , an arch-bishop of canterbury or yorke ? since i think it as plain in prudence that such a carriage , and such expressions should breed such an expectation , as most prudentiall actions use ordinarily to bee . therefore , it was worthy our saviour not to delude the expectation of s. peter iustly , rationally and prudently raised by his particularizing carriage , and expressions to higher hopes ; therefore , he satisfy'd it with a proportionable performance ; therefore s. peter had in higher manner and degree the power of the keyes than the rest of the apostles , which is the thing to bee evinced . and thus ends this wit-combat between me , and dr. h. in which , i hope , i have performed fully my taks , which was to shew out of the very words in the text that they sound in all probability and likelihood more favorably to my advantage . and , if dr. h. goes about to answer me , let him show out of those very words , p●udentially scann'd , that they persuade another interpretation , and not tell us of his own fancy what he is able to imagin , as he does here all over . nor let him thinke t' is sufficient to solve my deductions by showing them not to spring from those words by rigorous evidence . for , first , this is to oppose that which was never pretended ; for , i pretend not to evidence by my private wit working upon pliable natur'd words : a greater probability is pretended from the letter of the text as it lies ; how he will impugn this but by showing his more probable from the letter of the same text i confesse i know not . next , to fancy an explication which the words themselves persuade not , and so to solve my probable deduction , because another is possible in it self is very disallowable , and unreasonable ; because a meer possibility of another , destroy's not the probability of this ▪ onely a greater , or equall probability pretended , can frustrate a greater probability presumed , where the grounds of controverting exceed not probability . and-lastly , to think to prejudice our tenet or faith even by solving those places thus interpreted by privates skill , is the weakest errour of all ; since neither our faith nor my self as one of the faithfull , rely at all upon any place of scripture , as thus interpreted . this conceit therefore is noe wiser than if a man should thinke to throw mee down , or disable me from walking by taking away my stilts , and yet leaving me my leggs whereas i stand a thousand times more firm upon these , than i did upon the former . and i so totally build my faith upon the sence of the church , so litle upon places of scripture play'd upon by wit , that what dr. h. ob ects , and thinks me in chanted for holding it . ( answ . p. . ) i freely , and ingenuously confesse , to wit , that the infallibility of our church , consisting in this that she acknowledges no rule of faith save immediate attestation of forefathers , would equally have done it , and equally have ascertain'd me that s. peter was cheef of the apostles , as if our saviour had never asked s. peter three times , lovest thou me ? although , in other respects , i doubt not but that these sacred oracles of the written word are both a great confort , and ornament to the church , and very usefull to our doctors ; yet not to hammer or coine a faith out of them by the dints and impressions of wit , as the protestants imagin . sect. . d h's most wilfull and grand falsification in pretending an authour for him and concealing his words , found to bee expresly & point blank against him . his unparallell'd weaknes in dogmatizing upon the mysticall sence of another , which , almost in every point , contradicts his doctrine . after dr. h. had pretended ( of schism p. . ) that the power of the keyes was as distinctly promis't to each single apostle as to s. peter ; and , after his falsifying manner , quoted matth. . v. as most clear for that purpose , where no such distinction , or singularizing expression was found ; his discourse sprouts out into another branch of accordance in these words . and accordingly , math. . the promise is again made of twelve thrones for each apostle to sit on one , to judge , id est ( saith the dr. ) to rule or preside in the church . the cath. gent. and s. w. made account this interpretation was an odde one dr. h. answ p. . referr's us to his reply c. . sect. . and there , he sayes , the sence which s. w. never heard of , was vouched from s. augustine . but , upon view of the place , i neither finde a word of s. augustine put down to vouch it ; nor so much as a citation of any place in that father ▪ where wee may look it : onely he barely tells us that s. augustine long ago so understood it , leaving us without any direction to look for this sentence in whole volumes , where he is sure wee are not likely to finde it ; and this he calls vouching his interpretation . is not this neat ? but , i commend his wit ; he loves not be confuted , if he can help it ; which , had he told us where to finde this vouching it from s. augustine , he providently foresaw was likely to follow . by the same prudentiall method he govern's himself in the two other testimonies he addes to that of s. augustine , in these words ; to whom i may also adde hilarius pictaviensis , and the author imperfecti operis ; and this in all , without either relating us to the places , or quoting the words . but , since he is so reserved , i will take the pains to do it for him , knowing well that the reader by this time grown acquainted with the drs tricks will expect some mystery of iniquity in such aldesign'd omission . not will dr. h. suffer him to be deluded in that his expectation , being very apt to give his readers satisfaction alwaies in that point . note , reader , what is in question at this time . wee interpret this place to relate to the day of iudgment ▪ and to mean the apostles sitting upon twelve thrones to judge , the dr. interprets it of the regeneration of the world by faith in christ or the first beginning or settling of christ's church immediately , or not long after his ascension , and the holy ghost's coming ; and of the apostles sitting then upon twelve episcopall chaires , to judge ( id est saith he ) to preside in the church . now , to our testimonies . hilarius pictaviensis his interpretation of this place is found in his explication of some passages upon s. mathew . the title of that particular section is , de adventu filij hominis ad iudicium in maiestate sua , of the comming of the son of man to iudgment in his maiesty . after this follows the text which he is to interpret to mean the time of the regeneration by grace according to dr. h. put down thus , canon . cum autem venerit filius hominis in maiestate sua & omnes angeli cum eo , & reliqua . but when the son of man shall come in his maiesty , and all his angels w●th him , and the rest . this seems very ominous to dr. h's interpretation of this place for the regeneration by grace ; and to relate as expresly to the day of judgment as words can signify . but let us proceed to the authours own words , upon which dr. h builds . de iudicij tempore aduentuque commemorat quo fidelis ab infidelibus separabit , atque ab infructuosis fructuosa discernet , hoedos , viz. ab agnis , & in dextrâ & sinistrâ collocans , vnumquemque dignà aut bonitatis aut malitiae suae sede constituet . he speaks of the comming and time of iudgment , in which he will separate the faithfull from the infidells , discern the fruitfull from the vnfruitfull , to wit , the goats from the lambs , and placing them on his right hand , and his left , shall set every one in the seat of his goodnes , or wickednes . and now i appeal to the judgment of the most partiall friend of dr. h. whether this be not to renounce all shame , honesty , and conscience , respect to his readers , care of his own and other men's salvations , to name fathers as vouching his explication , so expressly opposit to it , that 't is impossib●e to invent words more fully signifying mine , more palpably contradicting his interpretation . his third testimony from author imperfecti operis upon the words sedebitis & vos &c you also shall sit upon twelve thrones , &c. afford's us first this comment ; futurum autem erat vt in die iudicij responderent iudaei , &c. it was to happen in the day of judgment that the iews would answer , lord wee did not know thee the sonne of god when thou wast clad with thy body vos respondeb●tis , &c. yee shall answer ; wee also were men as you are , &c. thus he literally . but , wee will grant that this author whoever he was ( for he is not certainly known ) more inclin'd to the mysticall sence ; and wee pardon dr. h. at present that extreme weaknes of dogmatizing not upon the literall , but mysticall sence of an interpreter , let us see whether ( though in that one point of relating to the resurrection it bee for him according to the said mysticall sence yet whether ) in all the rest it be not expressly against him , and absolutely inconsistent with his whole doctrine . his transition from the literall to the mysticall sence is this . adhuc autem audeo subtiliorem introducere sensum , & sententiam sapientis cuiusdam viri referre . but i dare be so bold as to introducere a more subtil sence , and relate the opinion of a certain wise man ; that , as the people of the iews were divided into twelve tribes secundum quasdam proprietates animorum , & diuersitates cordium , quas solus deus disce●n●re & cognoscere potest ; according to certain propenties of their minds , and diuersities of their hearts , which onely god can discern and know ; that some should be , as it were , of the tribe of ruben , others of the tribes of simeon , levi , or iuda , &c. omnes autem in quibus habitat christus , sedes sunt christi . all christians , in whom christ dwells , are the seat of chr●st - then coming to his mysticall explication of the day of judgment , he hath these words ; in sedem autem , &c. christ begun to sit in the seat of his maiesty ever since the gentiles begun to beleeve in him ; wherefore , since the time that christ sit upon the seat of his maiesty , the apostles also sit upon twelve thrones , that is , in all christians , secundum diuersita●es animorum quos supra tetigimus , according to the diversity , of minds which wee have touched before-omnis enim , &c. for every christian which receives the word of peter is the throne of peter , and peter sits in him ; so also they are they thrones of all the apostles who have received and keep in themselves the doctrine of all the apostles-sic ergo , &c. so therefore , the apostles sitting in christian thrones , distinguished into twelve parts , according to the differences of souls , judge the twelve tribes of israël , that is , all the iews . for when the words of the apostles judge the iews , also the apostles themselves seem to judge them . hence . note first that dr. h. makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signify an episcopall chaire , whereas this author , who was brought to second him , makes it signify any christian soul that receives christ's faith . note secondly , that these twelve parts of christianity , subject to the twelve episcopall chairs of the apostles , are , according to mr. h's doctrine , twelve lesser provinces , distinguish't and appointed by apostolicall consent ; whereas this author makes them onely , to be differenced by the diversity of their spirits , and souls . note thirdly that if governing and presiding in twelve episcopall chairs bee signified here ( as he pretends ) it follows that the apostles governd and presided over they knew not whom ; for these twelve parts of christianity ( according to this author ) are distinguish't secundum diuersitates animorum , according to diversities of minds , quas solus deus discernere & cognoscere potest , which onely god can discern , and know ; and this author makes here the apostles sitting upon twelve thrones , to bee their sitting in all christians ●ccording to this diversity of minds . note fourthly , that he makes the apostles sitting in them to bee their receiving the apostles doctrine ; that is , there being converted by them ; whic● dr h. told us before ( answ . p. . l. . . ) was nothing to the matter of iurisdiction . note fifthly , that their being judged by the apostles , which dr. h. makes to signify their being governed by them ; is explicated by this author to be this ; that the apostles thaught them their doctrine , and put their words in them , by which they were judged ; not that they sit in episcopall chairs , ruled , and presided , as governors preside , as the dr expresses himself , answ . p. . l. . note sixthly , that this place cannot be pretended to relate more properly ▪ and really to the time immediately after christ's resurrection than the concomitant circumstances already scann'd , really and properly signify those things they mysticall allude to ; since ●he agreeing of them to this explication is that which sustains and countenances it : seeing then it is a madnes to pretend that a christian soul is really , and properly , a throne of an apostle , that those twelve partes of christianist's whose distinction is unknown to the apostles should bee really and properly ●welve provinces to bee governed by their episcopall presiding , or that their planting ( christ's doctrine in their hearts should be really and properly to judge and preside over them ; so it is equally a madnes to pretend that the apostles life time ( and not the day of ●udgment ) is signified here really and properly ; since , the word it self not necessarily denoting it , this interpretation is onely built upon the applicablenes of the circumstant expressions ; which being all mysticall , and improper , cannot make it proper and literall but mysticall , and improper onely . thou seest then , protestant reader , to w●●t rare drs thou entrustest thy hopes of salvation , who either bring testimonies for their tenet , which is most expressively against them , when the author speaks literally ; or els dogmatize upon a mysticall sence , and pretend 't is mean't really . which method were it follow'd there is no such contradictions in the world but might be made rare truths . the testament given in mount sina would be really a woman , and ●gar , abraham's handmaid . gal. . v. . christ's doctrine would be reall corne ; preaching would be reall sowing ; men would bee in reality meere vegetables ; the good , wheat ; by bad , tares ; heaven nothing in reality but a barn ; the angels would be really reapers , and sweaty tann'd country-drudges , with sickles , rakes and forks in their hands preaching , loding into carts , driving home , and unloading into this barn mens souls by dr. h's learned metamorphosis ( far out-vying opid's ) turn'd really into meere vegetables , and so many grains of wheat . these and millions of others perhaps greater absurdities might an atheist object to christianity , and make it the most ridiculous absurdity nay the perfectest madnes that ever abus'd the world , by interpreting mysticall things really ; that is , by following dr. h's method here ; who , out of a place evidently mysticall , and so exprest by the author , deduces dogmatically as a reall truth that the promise was made for twelve reall , and properly called thrones , for each apostle to si● on one , to rule , and preside in the church in the apostles time and , were it worth the pains to looke for the omitted place in s. austin , i doubt not but wee should finde it of the same mysticall strain in some homily , or other : for he writ no comments upon s. mathew ( that i know of from whence wee may certainly expect such a literall explication . sect. . how dr. h. goes about to prove the donation of equall power from the descent of the holy ghost and from fathers , by an heap of weaknesses ; contrad●ction of his own , calumnies of our tenet ; forg●ries of his advers ary's sence and words , denying his own ; avoydings to answer , and other shuffling impertinencies . it follows in dr. h. of schism p. . in the half-side of a leaf , parenthesis , and when that promise ( to wit of twelve episcopall thrones ) was fina●ly performed in the descent of the spirit . act. . the fire that represented that spirit was divided , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sate upon every one of them , without any peculiar mark allow'd s. peter , and they were all filld ' with the holy ghost , and so this promise equally performed , as it was made , to all . observe , reader , these words particularly ; and then i an confident if thou knowst what controversy is , thou with pity me for being task to answer such a dreamer . here is not a word here which even seems to make against us but these , without any particular mark allow'd to s. peter , and the having the holy ghost equally ; neither of which are , or can be prov'd by any man living ( for who can see man's heart , or know in what degree he hath the holy ghost , but god onely ? or who can tell us now that s. peter had no peculiar mark , or greater tongue of fire , than the rest , as the wise dr. pretends and builds upon , nothing being recorded either pro , or con , concerning that impertinent curiosity . nor can these ridiculous arguments seem in the least sort to make against s. peter's higher authority , and our tenet , but by supposing dr. h's false , and weak principle to bee true , that none can be higher in authority but he must necessarily have more of the holy ghost in him . as for all the other words , they nothing at all concern our purpose , or impugn our present tenet ; since wee hold that each apostle had the promise made , had a performance of that promise , that the fiery tongues sate on every of them , &c. and , as for his saying that this promise of twelve thrones was finally performed in the descent of the holy ghost , though it be most miserably weak , ( as shall be shown ) yet it nothing at all impugns us ; inducing onely that each apostle had power in the church , which wee voluntarily grant . to answer these phantastick toyes the better , i will take the whole peece a sunder into propositions , and impugn them singly . the first proposition is , that the promise of the twelve thrones of episcopall presidency was finally performed in the descent of the spirit . observe , reader , that our question is about authority and iurisdiction ( as dr. h's chairs to rule and preside in tells thee ) and then ask dr. h. whether it was ever heard of before in this world that the coming of the holy ghost gave iurisdiction or authority to the apostles , but zeal , charity , knowledge , courage , vigor , strength , and such other gifts onely . see the scripture , luke . . tarry yee in hierusalem untill yee be endued , virtute ex alto , that is , with power , or powerfulnes , efficaciously to prosecute what they were a ready design'd and commissioated for ; not , till you have finally authority and iurisdiction given you . again , the holy ghost fell upon all the . as appears by act. . and upon multitudes both of men and women in many places and occasions afterwards , and yet , no man ever dream'd that they got by this means any authority , or iurisdiction but to show the absurdity of this conceit there needs no more but to reflect upon the drs words . he sayes that the promise of twelve thrones of presidency or ●●welve episcopall chairs ( as he expresses him self a●sw . p. . was finally performed in the descent of the spirit , if so , then the holy ghost consecrated the twelve apostles actually bishops , for the finall performan●e is the actuall giving a thing , and the thing , to be given then , is by him exprest to be twelve episcopall chairs : wherefore actually then , and not before , the apostles were made bishops , and had so many episcopall chairs given them : so pretty a foolery that laughter is it's properest confutation . but , to mend the iest , himself in other places strenously defends that the distinction of the apostles presidencies of provinces by apostolicall agreement long after the coming of the holy ghost , as appears by the place gal. . on which hee relies . and , if we should ask him how there could be twelve episcopall chairs to rule , and preside in without twelve sorts of subjects to be presided over , and ruled , that is , twelve bishopricks ; and then ask him again where those twelve distinct bishopricks were at the coming of the holy ghost , i know the good man , in stead of making good his owne argument , would be forc't to turn taile ( as he does often ) and bid us prove the contrary . the second proposition is this . the fire which represented that spirit was divided and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( saith the dr. ) sate upon each of them , who ever deny'd but that each of them had a tongue of fire , and that this tongue of fire sate upon them ? what then ! what follows hence against us . he tells us answ . p. . in these words , this i suppose an argument of some validitie that the promise being seald distinctly to every one of them was mean't ( in the making of it ) distinctly to every one of them . grant the inference , shown lately to be nothing worth , whas tenet of ours does his conclusion contradict ? onely this , that the promise of the keyes was mean't to one apostle onely or els to them altogether , or in common , so that each single apostle could not use it ; neither of which being out tenet , as he willfully counterfeits , his argument of some valedity onely impugns a calumny forg'd by himself ; and onely proves that he hath bid his last adieu to all sincerity , who newly hath pretended an endeavour to clear himself of calumny in making our tenet to be that the power of the keyes was s. peter's peculiarity , and inclosure , and yet ever since reiterates it upon all occasions with the same vigour . once more mr. h. i desire you to take notice , that wee hold , and are readie to grant , nay mantain , and ●ssert , that each particular apostle had the power of the keyes given him , and that he could use them singly ; the inequality and subordination of this power in the other apostles to a higher degree of it in s. peter is that wee assert . if yoouintend really to impugn it , bring proofs for an equality , and no subordination ; and do not thus willfully wrong your own conscience , hazard the losse of your own and other men's souls , and lastly , thas openly abuse your readers by calumniating our tenet , and calling your wise proofs arguments of validity , whereas they neither invalidate nor touch any thing which our adversary holds . the d proposition is this . there was no peculiar mark of fire allow'd to s. peter . in answ . schism . disarm . p. . call'd this proof a dumb negative , and askd him how he knew there was no particular mark allow'd s. peter , since he was not there to see , and there is noe history either sacred or profane that expres●es the contrary . now the dr. in stead of shewing us upon what grounds he affirmed this ( which properly belong'd to him ) makes this impertinent and prevaricating objection ( answ . p. . ) it seem's a negative in s. w. mouth is perfectly vocall though it be but dumb in another man's , so that the good dr. supposes that i go about to prove s. peter to have had a peculiar ma●k of fire because 't is no where heard of , so much is the most common sence above his short reach . whereas i onely ask't him why he did affirm it without knowing it ? or how he could know it having noe ground to know it ? perhaps it would clear his understanding a litle better to put his sence , and mine into syllogisme ; mine stand's thus ; no man not having ground from sense nor authority can know , and so affirm a matter of fact ; but dr. h. hath neither ground from sense nor authority that s. peter had no peculiar mark ; therefore he hath no ground to know it , nor affirm it . his can onely make this enthymene ; wee read of no peculiar mark or fire allow'd s. peter , therefore he had none . or if it be made a compleat syllogism it must be this the apostles had nothing which is not read of in scripture , but s. peter's peculiar mark of fire is not read of in scripture , therefore he had noe such mark . and then , the sillines of the major had shown the wisedom of it's author , who may conclude by the same logick as well that the apostles had no noses on their faces , since this is equally not mentioned in scripture as s. peter's peculiar mark is . next , it was ask't him why s. peter could not be head of the church but god must needs watch all occasions to manifest it by a particular miracles ? or why he could not be chief of the apostles without having a greater tongue of fire ? so that could the equality of fiery tongues bee manifested , yet , the silliest old wife that ever liv'd could not possibly stumble upon a more ridiculous proof ; but , the position it self which he affirmed , being impossible to be manifested , it surpasses all degrees of ridiculousnes , and ough● to move rather a iust indignation in any christian who understands what belongs to grounds of faith , to see it so brought to the lowest degree of contempt and disgrace as to be debated by such childish non-sence , and by one who professes him self a christian and a dr. now dr. h. against these exceptions made in schism disarm'd sayes not a word ; that is , he neither goes about to show that there was no particular mark , nor that it was to any purpose had there been one , onely he tells us ( answ . p. . ) that , thought it be a negative argument ( that is , though it prove nothing ) yet he hopes by being annex't to the affirmative probation precedent , it will not be a gagge to make that dumbe and negative also . so that he confesses it does no good at all , onely he hopes it will do no hurt to his affirmative probation ; that is , to his a●gument of some validity already spoken of ; and truly no more it does , for it remains still as arrant an affected , & willfull calumny of our tenet as ever it was . i added , that if wee may judge by exteriour actions , and may beleeve that out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks , then perhaps the dr. may receive some satisfaction in this point also that s. peter , had in more peculiar manner the holy ghost . for it was he that first burst out into that heavenly sermon wh●ch converted three thous and. first , the dr. calls this ( answ . p. . l. . . ) in a prettie odd phrase , a doubty proof , to evidence on s. peter's behalf . whereas , i onely brought it for the drs sake who good man uses to fancy any scripture-proof better then a demonstration , not for mine owne or my tenet's inte●est , having diclaimed the necessity of consequence from his being fuller of the holy ghost to his being higher in dignity schism disarm . p. . l. vlt. p. l. . . nor did i pretend it as an evidence , as the dr. calumniates , expressing both my intent and degree of reliance on it sufficiently in these moderate words ; perhaps the dr. may receive some satisfaction , &c. secondly , he sayes i bring it to evidence he know's not what , for 't is not exprest but left doubtfully betwixt his being head of the apostles , and his having some peculiar mark ▪ yet one ( he supposes ) designed to inf●r , and conclude the other whereas the intended point is expressely put down in my words now repeated by him self to wit , that s. peter had in a peculiar manner the holy ghost ; and the necessary connexion of this with his higher authority expressly disclaim'd in the place even now cited . thirdly after he had repeated my whole discourse , he subjoyn's immediately , here was one honest word the ( perhaps . ) as if our saviour's words out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh , and those others of the scripture that s. peter converted three thousand by his first sermon were all dishonest words . but , since i intended onely to give the dr. some satisfaction , of which ( knowing his humor ) i was not certain why was it not honester to expresse my self ambiguously then to cry a loud , certainy , surely , no doubt , unquestionably , irrefragably , as dr. h. does all over before his testimonies ; whereas , all is obscure , uncertain , falsified , not a word in them sounding to the purpose , as hath been shown all over this book . it may be the reader may accound dr. h. the greater wit for using such confident , and loud-crying expressions when there is so litle wooll , but i hope he will thinke s. w. the honester man for speaking withim compasse . fourthly , he sayes that the dr. ( meaning himself ) may not be satisfy'd thence that s. peter had received the holy ghost in a more particular manner , to which he addes of his own falsifying invention , or was designed head of the apostles , as if i had pretended this either as equivalent , or necessarily consequent out of the former whereas he knows i absoluty disclaimed against him any such pretence ; this done without having afforded owne word of answer or sence , he bids us farewell in these words , i shall answer it no further then by repeating . good night good dr. but to let the reader see how much stronger my [ perhaps ] is than the drs surely , i will briefly put doun the import of this late proof ad hominem ; and 't is this , that since out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks : 't is probable that s. peter had the holy ghost in his heart more abundantly or in a higher degree , since he first exprest it 's interiour motions by speaking , and speaking soe vigorously , and powerfully : now then , since , in mr. h's grounds , the receiving the holy ghost seald the commissions of the apostles , and finally performed the promise of their ruling , and presiding in the church whence he contended also that all had this promise equally performed , that is , according to him , had equally the holy ghost lest one should exceed ano●her in iurisdiction ; it follows unavoidably ad hominem it against him , that if be probable s. peter had the holy ghost in an higher degree , it is probable likewise that he had a higher rule , and presidencie in the church performed to him . the argument bearing this sence , who sees not 't is dr. h's task to let us knowe why this so early and vigorous pouring forth argued not a fuller measure of the holy ghost within ? what does he ? he calumniates me to bring this as a cl●ar evidence , putting the words , clear evidence in other letters , as if thay had bene mine ; falsifies my known pretence twice , calls the word [ perhaps ] the one honest words ; says the dr. may not be satisfie'd by the reason alledged that s. peter had received the holy ghost in a more particular manner ; and then , in stead of telling us why he may not be satisfie'd , immediately concluding that he shall not answer it further than by repeating it . thus dr. h's reason , like some sorry creature , taken tardy in a tale , first mutters , and stammers , as if it would say something or were hand-bound with some bad excuse ; but , seing it could make no coherence , at length very honestly hands down it's head , and sayes iust nothing . the fourth proposition is , and they were all filled with the holy ghost , which he tells us here , was sure no distinct argument of his . but , why it should not be as good , and sole suffi●ient a proof as this , that the fire was divided and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( as he pedantizes it ( sate on every one of them , which he called answ . p. . l. . an argument of somevalidity ▪ i had no ground in the world to imagin ; both of them equally impugning our tenet , that is , not at all . for wee equally grant that each single apostle had power giuen him , to bind , and loose , or authority in the church ( which he without any ground will have signified by the division of this fire ) as wee do that they were all filled with the holy ghost . the fifth and last proposition immediately follows the former , and is this ; and so this promise equally performed as it was made to all ; that is , all had equally the holy ghost ; and this is pretended as deduced out of the fourth ▪ saying that they were all full of it . schism disarm . p. . showd the weaknes of this arguing from fulnes to equality by the instances of our saviour & barnabas , who are both said in scripture to be full of the holy ghost , as also of the saints in heaven being full of glory , though there were an inequality between them in those respects ; and , by the parallell ridiculousnes of the plow man's silly argument , who concluded alleggs equall , and that none had more meat in it than another , because all were full . to take of these exceptions , and strengthen his feeble argument , the dr. offers nothing ; though he braggs at the end of the section that he hath attended me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 onely he tells us here p. gentily that he is not concern'd to doubt but that they which are full of the holy ghost may have it unequally if by unequally be meant the inequality of divine endowments . how he is concern'd to doubt it , shall be seen presently ; in the meane time let us reflect on his other words , and ask him what is meant by the holy ghosts abiding in the souls of the faithfull ? or by what other way he imagins him to be there than by divine endowmēts onely . i hope he thinks not that the holy ghost is hypostatically united to them or incarnate in them . an inequality then of divine endowments is all the inequa'ity which can be imagin'd in this matter ; and thefore , if any inequality prejudice dr. h's tenet he is concern'd to avoid this . now , how much it concerns dr. h's circumstances to avoid an inequality of the holy ghosts being in the apostles , is as plain as it is that it concerns him to say any thing to the question , and not talk onely in the aire . he is about to impugn s. peter's higher authority by the performance of the promise of authority , and commission made finally ( as he thinks ) by the descent of the holy ghost upon them ; wherefore , unles he prove that the holy ghost descended equally upon each , he can never argue hence against the inequality of s. peter's authority pretended by us , and so it avalis him nothing . he saw this in his book of schism , where he used these words they were all fill'd with the holy ghost , and so this promise equally performed to all . but , being shown the infinite weaknes of his arguing from fulnes , to equality he shuffles about , neither positively standing to his pretended proofby going about to make it good , nor yet granting or denying any thing positively or giving any ground to fix upon any word he says , but telling us first , in a pretty phrase , that he is not concerned to doubt of the consistance of fulnes , and inequality of the holy ghost if it bee mean't of the inequality of divine endowments , and then , when he should telle us the other part of his distinction , and of what other inequality besides that of endowments and graces , the holy ghost can be said to be in the apostles founding commission , and so concerning him to impugn and deny he shufflingly ends thus ; our question being onely of power , or commission to authority and dignity in the church , and every one having that sealed to him by the holy ghost descent upon every one , there is no remaining difficulty in the matter . where first he sayes , the question is of power , and dignity , whereas indeed it is of the equality or inequality of this dignity , not of the dignity it self , since none denyes , but that each apostle had power in the church , but that the rest had equall power to s. peter . secondly he never tells us , in what manner of the holy ghosts inexistence , besides that of divine indowments , this authority was founded . thirdly he instances onely against us , that every apostle had power ; so tacitely calumniating our tenet , again , and leaves out the word eq●ally which could onely contradict and impugn it . fourthly , that this coming of the holy ghost gave cōmission and authority is onely his owne wor●s , and proved from his own fancy ▪ and lastly when he hath used all these most miserable evasions he concludes that there is no remaining difficulty in this matt●● ; when as he hath not touch't the difficulty at all , but avoided it , with as many pitifull shift's , as a crafty insincerity could suggest to an errour harden'd soul. sect. . our argument from the text , tues petrus , urged ; his arts to avoid the least mentioning it , much lesse impugning it's force , which hee calls evacuating it . with what sleights hee prevaricates from it to the apocalyps . his skill in architecture , and miserably-weak arguing to cure his bad quiboling . dr. h. of schism p. . . alledged some testimonies out of the fathers affirming that the power of binding was conferred on all the apostles ; that the church is built upon bishops ; that all in s. peter received the keyes of the kingdomio of heaven ; & that episcopacy is the presidency of the apostles . now since dr. h. pretends to impugn our tenet by these , and these infert onely that more bishops have the power of the keyes besides s. peter ; it follows necessarily that he counterfeihed our tenet to be that none had this power but s. peter onely . hence schism disarm'd charged this either insincere or silly manner of discoursing upon him as a pittifull ingnorance , or els as malicious to pretend by objecting these that wee build not the church upon bishops in the plurall , nor allow any authority to them but to the pope onely . hee replies answ . p . that 't is apparent those words inject not the least suspition of that . i answer , 't is true indeed ; for it was , not a suspition they injected ( as he phrases it ) but plain and open evidence , see of schism p . l. . . where after the testimony had told us that the church is built upon bishops the dr. addes within a parenthesis [ in the plurall ] so placing the particular energie , and force of that place in the plurality of bishops founding the church . see again p. . l. . . &c. s. basil calls episcopacy the presidency of the apostles ; the very same ( addes the dr. ) that christ bestowd upon all , and not onely on one of them ▪ yet as long as dr. h. can deny it , and say with a gentile confidence that 't is apparent his words did not inject the least suspition of that , words shall lose their signification , and his readers ( if he can compasse it ) shall be fool'd to deny their eye sight . as for the testimonies themselves , there is not a word in them expressing that this power was in like manner entrusted to every single apostle , as well as to s. peter , ( which yet he sayes p. . l. . . &c. ) if by as well he mean's equally , as he must , if he intend to impugn our tenet ; and the other sence which answ . p. . l. . . he relies on , that from the donation to s peter , all episcopal power which in the church flows , and in which he puts force against our tenet , it as much favours , and proves it , as the being the fountain and source of all honour , and magistracy in a commonwealth , argues that that person from whom these flow is highest in dignity , and supreme in command in the same common wealth . after this he catches at an expression of mine , saying that the former testimonies rather made for us ; which moderate words though i hope the later end of my former paragraph hath sufficiently iustify'd them , yet wee must answer the impertinent carpings of our adversary , else the weak man will be apt to think that the shadow he catch't at is most substantiall , and solid . my word 's in relation to the said testimonies were these ; nay rather they make for us ; for the church being founded on apostles , and bishops , prejudices not s. peter to be the cheefest ; and , if so , then the church is built most chiefly on s. peter , which is all w●e catholicks say . now my discourse stands thus , if so , that is , if s. peter be the cheefest then the church is built more chiefly upon him , and i made account ( as i lately shew'd ) that those testimonies rather made s. peter the chiefest ; but , this peece of willfull insincerity first makes my if so , relate to , if it prejudices not , &c. and disfigures my discourse by making me say , if it prejudices not s. peter to be the chiefest , then the church is built chiefly upon him , and that i inferr from testimonies not preiudicing that the thing is true . next , he calumniates me most grossely , and manifestly answ . p. . l. . . by making me bring this for a clear evidence on my side ; whereas , my words ( schism dism . p. . ) are onely , nay rather th●y make for us ; which are so far from pretending a clear evidence from them , that they neither expresse the least reliance on them , not say positively that they make for us at all . he shall not catch mee calling toyes evidences , as is his constant guize : yet , to render his calumny more visible , he prints the words clear evidence , in a different letter , so that the honest reader would easily take them to be my words . then ▪ when he hath done , hee grows suddainly witty , an● insults over me without mercy calling mee an immortall disputer ; and truly i shall not dispaire of being immortall , if nothing be likely to kill me but dr. h's harmles blunt reason . next he tells me that i have deformed his answer to the text tu es petrus ; but in what i have deformed it he tells me not nor , indeed , was it an answer at all to us , since he not at all put our argument , much lesse impugned it . our argument stands thus , that the name peter , signifying a rock , and this name being not onely given particularly , to s. peter , but also after a particularizing manner ; in all probability s. peter was in particular manner a rock to build gods church . now the way for dr. h. to take in this wit contest about words of scripture ( according to the method already set down ) is to show out of the words , that it was not either given to s. peter in particular , and after a particularizing manner ; or els , that , though this were so , yet that there was no ground ( prudentially speaking ) to think that s. peter was in an higher degree or in a particular manner a rock than the rest . as for the first to wit the giving the name to him in particular wee argue thus from it . suppose there were twelve orators , and yet one of those twelve called antonomastically or particularly orator and were as well known by that name , and as comonly called by it , as by his own proper name ; certainly if that name were suppo●ed to be prudently appropriated to that one , it were great imprudence not to think that that person was in an higher degree an orator , than the rest . since then our ●aviour made this common appellative of rock the proper name to s. peter ( none being call'd peter but he ) and that wee cannot doubt of our saviours prudence in thus appropriating it to him , wee expect what dr. h. can show us ( not out of his own head , but ) out of plain reason working upon the words grammatically attended to ) sounding to our disadvantage so much as this sounds to our manifest advantage . as for the second , to wit the repeating the words after a particularizing manner , besides all other circumstances concerning the power of the keyes heretofore which are competent to this also , two things in particular are energeticall or of force here ; to wit that repeating the name pe●er to him [ tues petrus ] follow●d immediatly after his confession of christ's divinity ; an occasion as proper to make him confirm'd a rock in a particular manner and degree , as it would be to confirm the antonomasticall title of orator to that other parallell person upon occasion of some excellent oration made and pronounced by him . wherefore , as the repeating and confirming the name orator to him , by some eminent , and knowing governour , upon such a proper occasion , would in prudence argue that this person was in an higher proportion & degree an oratour , so the repeating this name in such a way to s. peter [ and i say vnto thee thou art peter , or a rock ] after a parallell occasion , his particular confession of christ's divinity , as much fitting him for it , ought in prudence to infer that he was in an higher degree a rock than the rest . the other thing in which a particular energie is placed is in the allusion of the words [ hanc petram ] as impossible to relate to the other apostles in the same particular manner , as it is to pretend that all their particular names were peter . this in the sence of our argument from the text [ tu es petrus ] as joyn'd with the antecedent , and subsequent circumstances in stead of solving which or showing that his opposite sence more probably or connaturally follows from the very words grammatically , or rationally explicated , dr. h ( of schism p. . ) first puts down the bare word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes that it and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are directly the same then relinquishes both the signification which the scripture and their own translation gives that word ( as shall be shown ) and shows out of an odd place in homer , that it is an ordinary stone , though he knows well that poets are the worst authors to fetch the propriety of words from , than by math. . that apply'd to a building it must needs signify a foundation-stone thence , by the apocalyps , a precious stone ; this done he fall's to deduce from the measuring a wall in the same apocalypse , and dogmatizes upon it , though he knows it is the obscurest and most mysticall part of scripture ; and then thinks he hath play'd the man , and that this rare proof is worthy to shut up finally the discourse against s. peter's supremacy , and ( as himself confesses ) the most substantiall part of ●his controversy ; now to his toyes . he assures us answ . p. . that his answer cannot misse to have this discernable efficacy in it , that there b●ing no more mean't by it , then that peter was a foundation stone , and all the other apostles being such as well as he this cannot constitute him in any superiority over them , &c. i reply : first , that pretended answer misses of being an answer to the place tu es petrus and is turn'd to be an argument from the foundation-stones in the apocalyps . why did not he show that the particularizing circumstances in the objected place had noe force in them , or were as congruously explicable some other way but in stead of doing so , ramble as far as the apocalypse , ferrying over the question thither by the mediation of homer , and such another unconnected train of removalls as was vs'd once to prove , that cooper came from king pipin . his answer therefore hath mis't to be an answer at all to that place , that is , of being all it should bee . next , how knows he no more is mean't by it than that s. peter was a foundation-stone , unles he can answer first the particularizing circumstances in the text , which entitle him to be a rock after a particular manner , or show that his contrary sence more genuinly emerges out of or a grees to the words there foūd : thirly , that the other apo●tles are such as well as s. peter , if by [ as well ] he means that the rest were so too , 't is true , but nothing against us , who hold voluntarily that the church was built upon all the apostles : but , if by [ as well ] he means equally as hee ought , this being the question between us , then wee expect he should show us out of the words that this is equally probably their sence . till he show this , our argument from the words makes still in his prejudice , and is iustly presumed to constitute s. peter in some higher degree a rock then the rest were . his reason against s. peter's superiority upon these grounds , is , that christ on●ly is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , chief corner-stone , and no other place in the foundation gives any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of power to one foundation above another , which he manifest's from the known position of foundation-stones , one by , not on the top of another . thus this apocalypticall architect . in answer , first , i ask him how he knows that this place in the apocalypse was designed to signify the order of dignity amongst the things there specified , which is in question , or onely this , that all the apostles were foundations upon which the church is built , which is graunted , till he manifest the former he can not pretend to deduce any thing from it against us . secondly 't is impossible to p●etend that it was design'd to prove any such order of dignity : for , it neither shows us which was the chief corner stone , or that the chief corner-stone was higher , bigger , or more precious then the rest . so that , if the bringing no positive signe of an higher position prejudices s. peter's superiority it prejudices christ also as much , expressing noe peculiar eminency to the head corner-stone at all more than to the rest . thirdly the corner-stone signifying some eminency of power as appears by our saviour's being call'd the head corner-stone , and this wall being-four-square apoc. . v. . it follows that there are other corners besid's that which is allow'd to our saviour , and consequently three chiefs in power over the rest of the apostles , which being against both our principles , it is manifest that the order of dignity was not intended to be here signifyed , and consequently the whole place is quite besides the drs purpose , and our question . fourthly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being directly the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as dr. h. grāts and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being in near three score places of scripture taken for a rock and so trāslated by themselves ; and in particular , in this very place in controversie mat. . v. . super hanc petram , upon this rock , &c. although the other apostles be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 foundations , yet , since none of them is exprest to be a rock but s. peter onely , nor that the church is built on any of them els as on a rock , still he hath good title in all reason to bee in a more eminent notion a foundation-stone . for the notion of a foundation-stone not cōsisting in this that it rise higher , that it be longer vpwards or shorter , but that it bee unmoveable , and the strongest bearer of the superstructure ; and , a rock in the scripture being exprest to be the best for that purpose , as appears mat. . v. . . it follows that s. peter was in a more eminent manner a foundation-stone , and that the church had a particular firmnes , and immoveablenes in being built upon him ; yet the dr. can imagin noe distinction amongst foundation-stones under that notion , as long as they lye one by , not on the top another . so wise an architect is the good man that he forgets , that to bee in a higher degree a foundation-stone is to bee in a higher degree of firmnes , but in a lower degree of position . thus reader tho seest what advantage dr. h. would gain should i delight to quible with him in his own , and onely way . but i am already weary of this wordish stuffe . next he undertakes to solve an argument which none objects but himself , and 't is this , that if s. ●eter be the first stone , and soe superiour , then the next stone ( that is the second ) must needs be superiour , to all the rest , &c. soe kinde an adversary have i that he leav's untouch't the argumente , from tu es petrus , which he pretends in this very place to answer ; and , in stead of doing so , help 's me with an argument of his own coyning from the apocaly●se not worth a straw , ad then demolishes at pleasure , and very easily what his own ayrie fancy had built . but , as i never made any such argumēt as this which he thrusts upon me , so in that which i made schism disarm . p. . from the iasper stone , i both exprest my self to do it for the doctor 's sake , and renounced all reliance upon it in these words , that catholicks who understand the grounds of their faith sleight such poor supports as a self-fancied explication of the obscurest part of scripture , schism disarm . p. . i objected , that his argument was negative , thus ; no distinction was put among the foundation-stones therefore there was none ▪ he answers that his conclusion onely ( not his proof ) was negative . therefore the words tu es petrus neither give nor affirm more of him than is given and affirmed of every of the other apostles . whereas , first he neither made any such conclusion , no not any conclusion at all against the text tu es petrus , as wee object it ; nor tak●s notice of any particularizing circumstāce in the whole place so full fraught with them ; much lesse concludes against them . and , secondly his wise proof which inferrs this worthy conclusion is no other than this , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a rock and foundation are the same . as if there could not be foundation-stones less firm then a rock , and so lesse worthy the notion and name of a foundation , or a thing fit to build on which if there be , as common sense tells us , then the notion of a rock superadded to the bare notion of foundation , and that within the limits of that common notion ; that is , it signifies a thing in an higher degree apt to sustain the building , or , which is all one , in a higher degree a foundation . next , i objected that it was a most pittifull piece of ignorance to persuade the reader from a plurality and naming twelve apostles that all were equall , he answers p. . that that was not his reasoning , but the rest of the apostles were foundation stones as well as simon ; and therefore that , that title of tu es petrus was not proof of inequality thus the dr. rowls the same stone still : for , ( to omit that he impugns not the text , tu es petrus , as found in it's own place attended by a throng of manifestly particularizing circumstances , but the bare word petrus onely , nor that neither , according to it 's particular efficacitie as it signifies a rok ) either the words [ as well as simon ] mean that the other apostles were foundations also , and then he calumniates our tenet not impugns it , since , wee never deny'd but that each of them was such ; or els , [ aswell ] signifies equally , and then i would know whether he suppose it ( that is the whole question ) gratis , or infer it ? or from what he can bee imagined to infer it there ▪ but from a plurality onely of the common appellation . ne●ther could i wrong dr. h's reasoning faculty in thinking so , whose common custome it is all over to argue for an equality from a plurality , and most expressely of schism p. . l . . . . whe●e also he calls it an evidence , and , why he should not think the self same proof , an evidence , here as well as there , or why he should omit it if he thought it such , i confesse i was so dull as not to apprehende . thirdly i objected that he had quite overthrown his own cause ; since , granting that a foundation stone , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being the same and onely s. peter having the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it follow'd on the drs grounds that he onely , and in good reason more particularly should be a foundation-stone . dr. h. replies , first , that this is a st●ange argument were it put into form . next , ( observe his kindeness ) he will not trouble him self with that ; but in stead of doing this , that is , in stead of showing my argument nothing worth , he recurr's to his owne confident sayings that t' is certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same ; which i have shown to be certainly otherwise , and that there may be foundation , and yet not a rock neither . then , building upon his owne certain , he introduces his so oft repeated conclusion , with a sure , and then all is evident , after this he puts a pretended parallell to my argument thus . t is as if i should say man , and enosh being the same and onely the sonne of seth having the name of enosh it follows on these grounds , that he onely , and , in good reason , that he more particularly should be a man , and when he hath done he findes out a way for s. w. to defend himself from not being a man ; not considering that if enosh be the onely man , it unmans dr. h. as much as s. w. but , i thanke him , i will none of his assistance ; and as for his pretended parallell i answer that when the ordinary appellative , properly signifying the speciall notion , is appropriated prudently to some one thing or person , that thing or person ought to bee esteemed as participating in a higher , and more eminent manner of that notion or nature now that enosh properly signifies the species of man i deny ; the hebrew criticks assuring us that it signifies man , not in his own nature , but as subject to miseries and afflictions , in such a manner as mortalis does in latine . whereas the word adam signifying man according to his nature , denotes also that he in a particular manner was a man , who had that name appropriated to him by god , the whole species being ingrost in him . so likewise the common name of filius hominis , sonne of man , being appropriated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to our saviour , and of orator to cicero , it argues that they had a particular right to these titles ; that is , were in a higher and more eminent degree the thing which was signify'd by those words . again the name enosh might bee in a manner accidentally imposed by his parents , and was his first name , which therefore cannot be imagin'd to have any mystery in it more then the bare conceit of his parents ; unles wee suppose his parents to have bene propheticall , and then it had an especiall reason , whereas , this name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying a rock , was imposed by our saviour ; who in each action guided himself by the highest prudence ; and imposed on s. peter in particular , nay on him having another proper appellation , sufficient to call him by , before ; all which argued a particular mystery , and designes in order to that name ; and denote him by the antonomasticall appropriation of that common word , to bee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and eminently what it signify'd by it ; to wit , a rock . hence appear's with what reason i made my fourth objection to dr. h. that he would have all the apostles call'd peter . for since it is not imaginable why our saviour should appropriate and particularize to s. peter the common appellative , rock , without some propriety in s. peter fitting for that particular name ; and that , according to dr. h. each apostle was equally ( that is without any propriety or peculiarity ) such , ( for hee makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the self-same ) it follows that our saviour had equall reason to give to each of the rest also the same name of peter ; for , there ought to be noe particularizing in any action , where there is a pure indifferency in the reason of the action . now then , since our saviour govern'd him self ever by perfect reason , he ought to have given to all the rest , the name peter , by the same reason by which he gave it to one , the reason according to dr. h. being equall . but this man who pretends to evacuate ( as he call's it ) our argument from tu es petrus , never tells us why s. peter had the name of a rock in particular , and no one of the rest ; but recurs still ( answ . p. . l. . ) to his old mistake that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are all one and therefore that all are equa●ly foundation-stones , whereas indeed ( which much strengthens our argument from the word petrus ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dot● not signify a foundation-stone but a foundation onely , and so is rendred by their own translation apoc. . v. . which abstracts , grammatically speaking , from sand , straw , wool packs , wood , rock , or whatsoever els can be competent to a foundation good , or bad . now then , since s. peter is call'd a foundation , according to him equally with the rest , and also a rock which is given to none of the rest , let him either deny that to be a rock and a foundation both is not to be in a more excellent manner a foundation , or let him grant that s. peter was such . sect. . dr. h's master peece of affected weaknes . attendance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or step by step , interpreted by his carriage to signify the neglecting to answer all that was of importance or difficulty . a review of his totall performance in answering this last section , acknowledged by himself to bee most important and fundamentall . after this professour of mysticall architecture had done dogmatizing from his foundation stones ; in the next place he falls to descant upon the measuring a wall in the same apocalypse ; gravely objecting that i make much game at his arguing thence . and truly , i still account it the most ridiculous method that ever a weak reason stumbled on , to undertake to dogmatize , that is , to build his faith and destroy his own interpretation of a mysticall part of scripture , so beyond all controversy obscure in the highest degree , that it seems to need another revelation to know the meaning of it , as great as that which first inspired it . and that 't is the most openly-pernicious folly that can be imagin'd , first to tell his readers that schism is as great a sin as sacriledge , idolatry , antichristianisme , &c. as he does ( of schism . c. . ) and then , in stead of bringing evident , convincing , and demonstrative reasons , which onely can secure the soul of any consciencious man , ( especially confessing that salvation may be had , if he had still remain'd with the obedient party ) to bring obscure mysteries , which have puzzled all the world hitherto ; of which also his own head must be the interpreter , and without manifesting first , nay doubting himself ( as shall shortly be seen ) whether the place was mean't of our question , or made for his purpose . and yet after all this calling this piece of midnight obscurity , and his cimmerian proof thence , an evidence . of schism . p. . l. . his argument is this . it b●ing there in vision apparent , that the wall of the city , id est of the church , being measured exactly , and found to be id est ( repeats the dr. ) twelve times twelve cubits , 't is evident that this mensuration assignes an equall proportion whether of power , or province to all and every of the apostles the sence of which he repeats again here answ . p. . to show the ridiculousnes of this proof schism disarm p. . ask't him , whether none of those precious stones , which equally made up this wall , be richer then the rest ? and why , if it were so , the inequality in richnes , should not more argue an inequality in dignity and authority amonst those who were represented by them , than the equall bulk can argue an equality , since the worth , dignity & value of precious stones is taken from their richnes and not from their bulk . next arguing against him in his owne way i inferr'd , that since the first stone in this wall represented s. peter , ( as appeared by dr. h's grounds allowing that apostle a primacy of order ) and was there exprest to be a iasper , the same stone whose lustre shined in our saviour apoc. . . and also in his church , apoc. . . it would have bene priz'd for a rare argument by dr. h. were he in my case , ( though sleighted by me ) that s. peter onely having the same lustre with our saviour , was like him in representation ; and so , he onely resembles him as his vicegerent , and vicar . as also , that , being the same stone the church is made of and the first of all the rest , that he is consequently the first part of the church , that is , her head . in answer to those first exceptions the dr. sayes nothing at all ; and so , is nothing punctuall in his promised attendance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is , he vindicates not his argument to be worth a rush ; for , if the lustre & richnes be more valuable , and worthy in it's self , and so more apt to expresse dignity than the bignes or bulk ; then the inequality of richnes is more significative of inequality of dignity than the equality of bulk is of an equality under the same notion of dignity : nay more , ( as he was told ) there being an equality in the bulk found amongst them all , if there be found besides an inequality in richnes , as there is amongst those stones , every lapidary , and even common sence will inform us that an inequality in dignity is unavoidable . but the good dr. who at first thought his nice argument a rare busines , seing it marr'd , and all unravell'd , as easily happens to such cobweb stuffe , sees , and acknowledges now that it was neither worth , nor capable of repairing and so grew wise and let it alone ; hoping that his readers would easily be perswaded that he had answered me perfectly and made good his argument , if he did but tell him in the end of the section , that he had attended me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 't is a rare method of answering to make two litle pedātick greek words , which a man would think had nothing in them , stop such great holes . in answer to that which concern's the iasper stone , he tells us first ( if we will beleeve him ) that i● is most proper to signify the lustre of zeal , and other gifts . but , why it should be most properly significative of those he affords not the least attempt of any reason to oppose my contrary exceptions . next , he tells me , that he can allow me ( in this sence ) to make my aduantage of it : and , seing wee must have no other signification of that particular lustre , nor yet know any reason why , i shall take his allowance , and make my advantage of it thus against him . his grounds made the coming of the holy ghost finally perform , that is , actually give authority to the apostles ; since then the holy ghost neither was nor can bee any otherwise in the hearts of the apostles than by his gifts , the allowing an advantage to s. peter above the rest in those gifts , is the allowing him an advantage over them in authority , according to the same grounds . nor can he deny but that i have gained s. peter this advantage if i make good my cōditions propos'd here by himself ; in which i shall finde no difficulty , they being both tacitly granted already . the first condition is , that i must finde mean's to assure my self that s. peter was signify'd by that iasper-stone . is not this a sincere man , and a pretty discourser , who would have me finde a thing ere it bee lost . i a●ready found that mean's ( he well knows ) in schism disarm . p. . ( which he braggs here he attends on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and that from his own words ; for , the twelve foundation-stones he grants to be the twelve apostles of schism p. now then , since himself in many places and particularly in that quoted by mee schism disarm . p. grants s. peter a primacy of order , and apoc. . . in the orderly recounting the stones the iasper is mentioned to be the first in that order ; i see no possibility for dr. h. to evade , but s. peter was mean't by the iasper . himself saw the same also ; which made him soe shufflingly wary that in stead of replying to it , which was likely to cost him no lesse than either the denying his own most expresse words , or the most expresse words of scripture , he onely tells me gentily , i must finde mean's to assure my self that s. peter was signify'd by that iasper-stone ; which he knew well i had already found , nor were they ever lost to me by any reply of his . but in stead of invalidating that my assurance ad hominem , he tells me i must finde them again the second time , and this is the signification of that mungrell phrase , to attend 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , never to take notice of his adversaries argument but bidding him find it , or repeat it over again himself . the second cōdition is , that i must finde mean's to assure myself that the lustre of the iasper exceeded the lustre of every of the other stones . this is another attendance of the same negligent strain as the former . schism disarm . p. . told him that the lustre of this stone shined in our saviour apoc. . . and also in his church , apoc. . in stead of answering which , or giving any reason why our saviour and his church should bee represented by a lesse lustrous stone than the rest the sincere man onely bids me finde it again , whereas , it remains still visibly extant in it's originall integrity and untouch't yet by dr. h. and so he knew well enough where to finde it himself without my showing him it , did ever answerer so lazily attend his adversary as dr. h. does me ? yet , if he still desire a reason of me , i shall give him this : that , in all reason wee should think ( unles hee knows something to the contrary ) that our saviour and his church deserved to be represented by the most lustrous and richest stone in the company . wherefore , the lustre of the iasper being apply'd to them , we have noe reason to imagin the contrary but rhat it had a more perfect and glorious lustre than the rest . but this is not all i aim'd to induce hence ad hominem against dr. h. my pretence was sufficiently intimated in the same place , that the lustre of the iasper was used in the apocalypse to represent persons of higher dignity and authority to wit , our saviour and his church and soe the same stone representing s. peter onely , exprest his higher dignity in a double relation , to our saviour as being like in representation , and soe onely he resembling him as his vicar , or vicegerent : to the church , as being the first part of her , that is her head , since his was the same stone she was of , and the first of all the rest . these objections i offer'd to show the dr. overthrows in his own wordish way , and in his own weak argument : to which notwi●hstanding he gives no attendance at all , nor any other solution save onely sayes on his own head , that the lustre of the iasper most properly signifies the lustre of zeal , and other gifts : but what grounds he hath to thinke that it signified noe higher worth , or dignity , as apply'd to our saviour and his church , but onely zeal , and gifts ; or why , as apply'd to s. peter ( to whom onely a mongst the apostles it is attributed ) it should not signify the same as it did in other places , he offers nothing onely he calls his sitting still when t' is his duty thus to be be stirre himself , a precise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attendance . lastly , for an upeshot , himself knows not whether this stil born argument from the equall mensuration of the wall makes for him or against him ; for , he infers onely that it assignes an equall proposition whether of power , or province to all , and every of the apostles . so that , it seems himself is in doubt whether it relates to an equality in power , or province . now then , this being so , and equality in power being the onely question between us , unles he first can show that it hath regard to power , whihc yet he no where so much as attempts , more than by saying it does so , he is utterly incapable to pretend hence that the power in all the apostles was equall . again ( to omit that his conceit of apostolicall provinces hath been shown to be perfectly chimericall and groundles ) what doth the equality of their particular province prejudice us ? since with this it may well consist , that one of those governors though equall in his private charge , may be either constituted by the supreme , or agreed upon by the rest of those twelve to be their chief , and him to whom in extraordinary occasions , and more universall affairs recourse is to be had , as to a superiour . wherefore till dr. h. afford me evidence that this mysticall place hath reference to power , or indifferently either to power , or province ( for though he bee in doubt what it signifies yet he tells us ( of schism p. . ) t' is evident , i shall take the liberty my nature allows me , to assent vnto neither ; but rather to think that it relates to the different disposition of souls , onely known to god , as his mysticall author before explicated himself in another occasion ; and , that the heavenly hierusalem shall be made up of such , some of them resenting and resembling the spirit that is the particular māner of the knowledg ; and affection of s. peter , others those of s. iohn , of s. paul , &c. which the allwise orderer , and coorderer of nature and grace saw most fitly to be signified by such , and such prescious stones , for some qualites , and properties which he best saw by analogy , commonly agreeing to both . mysteries to be venerated by an humble admiration , not to be proudly presum'd as with a literall , and grosse familiarity known or seen by our muddy and flesh-veiled eyes ; which they doe who pretend to dogmatize & bring rigorous evidence ( the onely rationall ground of faith ) from such depths of obscurity ; the most pernicious and boldest irreverence that can bee offer'd to be onely certain ground of faith ( evidence of authority ) or to the profound unscrutablenesse of those mysteries themselves . having behaved himself thus gallantly in this point of the donation of the keyes he takes his leave of us in this triumphant manner , and so much for this large . section , which i have attended on precisely and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as being most important to our busines in hand , the case of our schism fundamentally depending on the supremacy of s. peter , and consequently of his first part . where , first he makes the solving our places from scripture to be most important , which wee never built on at all for this or any other point of our faith as applicated by the private skill of drs or wits . secondly , his attendance on me , which he praises for so diligent , and precise , if examin'd is onely this ; that he hath prevaricated from his pretence & promise ; injured us in omitting our best place of scripture , and calumniated our tenet all over ; that he hath not shown us from the words that his interpretation is more connaturall , nor one equalizing word of this power to counterpoise the many particularizing terms objected by us , nor given us any other explication of those particularizing texts , save onely his conceit against the presbyterians which he pretends not to show deducible from the letter , but sayes it upon his owne fancy onely ; that hee omits to answer , or take notice of the most forcible and energeticall parts of those texts , and the most difficult arguments wee produce ad hominem against him ; that he hath not brought one authority to second his interpretation of twelve thrones for twelve episcopall chairs , though he promis'd us there ; but falsify'd and abus'd one author , pretēding him to vouch his interpretation , though most expressly and point blank against him ; injured another , by taking literally , and in a dogmaticall rigour what he exprest himself to mean mystically and yet even that mysticall explication contradicting and disgracing many parts of his doctrine in this point ; and dissemblingly concealing the words , and place where 't is found in the third author . that hee hath shuffled about most pittifully to make good his negative arguments , and his proof of equality from a bare plurality and fulnes ; that pretending to answer the place , tu es petrus , he leav's the particular and proper signification of the word , which scripture , and their one translation gives it , and all the particular circumstances in the text which accompany this word , that is , he leaves and omits so much as to mention all in which we put force from that text , and by the assistance of homer skips aside from answering that text to argue from another in the apocalypse ; that , being come thither , he brings another negative proof argues from plurality , to equality again , gives for his solution grounds for all the apostles to be call'd peter ; falls to measure a wall in the apocalypse to prove equality of power , without proving first , or knowing nay doubting himself whether it relate to power , or no , that hee omits to reply to those passages which show'd him baffled in his own argument ; and lastly , when he hath done , to let the reader see he hath used his utmost here , he praises this point as most important , and brags that he hath attended us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and precisely ; whereas he left the main passage , and all the circumstances that force was put in un attended , and untouch't ; and most miserably shuffled about , blunder'd & quibbled in all the rest . the conclvding section . reason why the disarmer proceded no further in laying open dr. h's fault . objected falsifications , clear'd ; and some of them retorted upon the objector . an unparallell'd and evidently willfull one of the drs , presented to himself and his friends in requitall . friendly counsel to the dr at parting . and now , understanding reader , what dos't thou expect further ? that i should lose my own ill employ'd time , & vex thy patience , already cloy'd , with laying open this drs weaknesses & false dealings through the rest of his book ? or rather , dos't thou not complain how unnecessary so long a refute is to such a trifler ; and candidly correct mee ( as some iudicious friends have already done ) that it had bin abundantly sufficient , and as much as he deserved , to gather together a catalogue of his manifest absurdities , and then leave him to the censure of iudicious & ingenious lovers of truth & reason ? i confesse in the tedious processe of this reply , seeing nothing worthy a man , that is , nothing which pretended a rigorous or rationall discourse , i became wholly of their minde too : yet , i had such regard to the weaknes of the multitude of readers , that i still proceeded in laying open minutely the unparalleld sillines & insincerity of their adored preaching doctor ; and the tyranny of that consideration had transported me into farther inconveniencies , so as to shew him constantly like himself to the very end of his long book , had not i been partly urged , partly necessitated to desist , and my desistance warranted by these following reasons . first , that wits & schollars , who are the flower of readers , are deterr'd & disenvited from reading books , especially controversies , if they grow to any excessive bulk : and , to those that should read such , it would be in a manner ungratefull , when nothing is to be seen but the faults of a writer laid open , which was the reason , that , to give some tincture of solidnes to my reply , & so to take of the tediousnes from knowing readers , i have taken occasion to discusse some points ( as those concerning possession , the churches power to binde to beleef , the certainty of tradition , &c. ) more largely than i was obliged out of any respect due to my antagonist himself or his sleight way of writing . secondly , i have given unexpected satisfaction before hand to more knowing persons , by laying grounds before my reply , which come home to the life of the question , & at least endeavor to clear it rationally ; which therefore i conceive would be more gratefull & profitable to them ; and on the other side ( being supererogatory to the task of a respondent ) might deserve to excuse some part of that which was ungratefull , & to them unprofitable ; nay , all of it , confes 't by dr. h. himself ( as shall be seen ) to be unnecessary . thirdly , i had acknowledg'd some beholdingnes to the catholike gentleman's letter ; & , so , had drawn upon my self an engagement to vindicate it also against dr. h's reply . by which mean's i had two books of his to refute as far as i proceeded ; to both which had i reply'd quite through , it would have made too-large a volume . fourthly , the b. of derry had , e're i had answer'd dr. h's first part , put out a refute to my appendix to schism disarm'd ; which oblig'd me to leave some room in my already big book for him , and to bestow on him some part of that my defensive task otherwise due & intended to dr. h. and so i had not room enough to prosecute all the less necessary trifles of that my long winded adversary . fifthly , the task it self of answering such kinde of sleight soul'd writers was most tedious & irksom to any one who pretends to & ayms at science ; nay most irrationall and senceles ; consisting in this , that , rigorous discourse & the immediate & evident connexion of terms ( that onely proper satisfaction to a reasonable soul ) being neglected , upon which our tenor & rule of faith , immediate tradition , is , at least , pretended to be built ; to leave this , i say , and to stand replying to every odd end of a worm-eaten record or testimony ; which , without the help of this tradition can claim no originall authority at all , much less against it ; and , for the most part , is falsify'd , unauthentick , ambiguous in terms , or non-cluding if it hap to be true , & truly-proposed , besides many other weaknesses invalidating it ; which is to neglect sence for words ; and , instead of reasoning from grounds , fall to quibbling in sounds sixthly , even in pursving this testimony way , i have shown to the eye of the reader , this drs manner of writing , so infinitely faulty & weak , so full fraught with falsifications , paralogisms , perverting both words & sence of authors , omitting words most important for us , adding others most important for himself , suborning arch-hereticks for true fathers , building upon testimonies fetch 't from those of his own side , alledging places as for him , & concealing the words found to be directly against him , shuffling a way the true point , with a gentile slines , begging , or els mistaking the question all over ; as oft calumniating our tenets & positions , runing division upon a dow-bak'd if a long way , without ever considering the if not ; talking voluntarily , to & fro , upon his own head in a preaching vein , blundering things in themselves most clear with needles distinctiōs & explications , which he uses , against their nature , to involue & confound : recurring to & dilating himself much in the generall terms , so to avoid coming to the particular point ; contradicting himself frequently , and in one point nine or ten times , flourishing all over with certainly , surely , irrrefragably , infallibly , unquestionably , accordingly , plainly , manifestly , demonstrably , undoubtedly , clearly , expresly , we know , it is manifest , id est , perfectly , unavoidably , evidently , & innumerable such other expressions , all sprung from his own fancy to give countenance to the testimonies , not from the testimonies or any force of reason to make good those expressions : to which add his sober sermon-phrases so oft repeated , of no degree of truth , no appearance of force ; i did in the simplicity of my heart verily beleeve ; i shall not deem it necessary to descend to any further proof : his playing the pedant all over in greek to amuse the good women & silly children ; those , i say , & many other faults , follies & weaknesses , i have shown to any intelligent readers eye so manifest & so frequent in him , that i could not conceive any imaginable necessity of laying him open further ; and that if he have been convinc't to behave himself so weakly & insincerely in that part of his book which himself accounts onely to have been fundamentall ; the like might iustly be expected ( without showing it by detail ) in the rest of his book , which he acknowledges to be lesse necessary ; in case we may have so good an opinion of him as to think he would treat more solidly & sincerely that which more imports & is substantiall to the question of schism , and by consequence most highly concerns mens salvations , which depend there upon . seaventhly i was disenvited by this , that , it is particularly against my inclination & temper ( whatsoever mr. h's & his friends may conceive of mee ) to stand manifesting the faultines of others , further then i can be satisfy'd it is precisely necessary ; judging it the most illiberall task that a soul which longs after science could be put upon , to be employ'd in discovering the disingenuity & weaknesses of the wrongers of truth ; and , professing with all sincerity , that i had rather candidly confess & acknowledge the virtues , & advance the fame of good writers according to the degree i finde them to deserve , than to reveal the vices & shame of bad ones ; as my favourable expressions , on the by , concerning the acutenes of the lords , faukland & digby , & the wittines of that giant for fancy , dr. donne , in my schism disarm'd , clearly testify . eightly , i was much deterr'd even from endeavouring any particular exactnes in this , much more from attempting the rest by reason of the dangers & in a manner imposibility to get my books printed here in england , and the great charge & hazard also i saw i was like to be at in sending them to france . it is very cheap & easie for them to brag of a quicker reply , to whom the presse is free , & the book sellers shop licenced , both to print & vent them openly with security & advantage : whil'st those authors , whose books , are prohibited printing in england vnder great penalties & forfeitures , after they have past the chargeable & tedious press beyond sea , may not be sold here but at the loss of forty shillings a book if the buyer pleases to prove knave , are not yet by their sillily-insulting adversaries allow'd what in reason is due for such disencouragements , hazards & delayings . ninthly , 't is a farr more secure satisfaction to candid readers to see a main part of a book answer'd cōpleatly & fully , than the whole slubberingly and imperfectly ( as i have , and shall show further , that dr. h. hath answer'd mine ) for this latter method leaves a way open to omit many things , amongst which it may happen that some are very important ; whereas , the former manner of proceeding debarrs that licentiousnes , and all pretence of that excuse ; and so makes either the cause or the writer unavoidably fall under a just suspect if it chāce to fall short of being satisfactory : but especially if that part of the book , which is thus fully reply'd to bee acknowledg'd by both sides to bee solely important , a conciser and solider way of satisfaction cannot bee imagin'd . lastly , if all those former reasons alledg'd will exuse me from performing a needles duty , dr. h. himself shall compleat my iust excuse , & confess this was needles : who in his book of schism p. . after he had finish't his sleight discourse against s. peters supremacy ( the part which i have largly reply'd to ) he adds that 't is very unnecessary to proceed to the other part of it , &c. that this is in effect the onely ground of the romanists pretensions , &c. that he thinks fit again to remind the romanist , and peremptorily to insist on this exception against s. peter's pastorship over all the rest of the apostles , and p. . that what he should add concerning the power of s. peter's successor , as such , would be perfectly , ex abundanti , more then needs , and so he desires it may be look't on by the reader . the like he repeats in his answer to schism disarm . p. . saying that my th section ( which vindicated s. peter's supremacy ) was most important to our busines in hand : that , the case of our schism fundamentally depends on that supremacy , &c. thus he . now then , i have fully reply'd to & vindicated our tenet in all that he calls fundamentall , onely necessary , our onely ground , and which he professes he peremptorily insists on , it follows that , had i done more , i had done a busines not important , nor fundamentall , nor on which they peremptorily insist ; and so , it being also unnecessarily for mee to vindicate a point , which he thinks very unnecessary to prosecute , my further endeavors had been confessedly to no end , or frivolous , if taken alone ; but , joyn'd to my former reasons , absolutely vnwise & temerarious . i omit that dr. h. neglecting to answer almost all my th section of the d part of schism disarm'd , which prov'd the protestants guilty of the materiall fact of schism ; and all my th section , which prov'd them guilty of the formall part of it ; that is , neglecting to answer all that part of my book in which i brought him to terms of reason , and which did intrinsecally , fundamentally , & substantially concern our question , and passing them over sleightly p. . after he pretended falsly that i beg the question , with telling the reader that he will leave me to skirmish with my own shadow wheras it was the hottest schirmish in the book ( as any ordinary eye may discern ) i conceive it gives mee iust occasion to neglect answering that in him , which himself confesses neither substantiall nor fundamentall . i omit also that i was often blam'd by respected and knowing friends , for losing so much pretious time , in such a worthles foolery ; which i might have employ'd much better to mine own & others advantage ; they assuring me likewise that his reply was not valued by any indifferent and iudicious persons ; nor by all on his own side but onely by a few ; who were so irrationall ( & therefore inconsiderable ) that they never examin'd any thing , but immediately took that to be in reality an answer which was call'd so : & would iudge him alwaies to have the best , who should speak the last word , whether it were sence or no. thus much to show that i had no precise necessity nor iust reason to vouchsafe dr. h. a larger reply . yet , though in doing this i spare the drs credit , i must not neglect to clear mine own , and add something more in vindication of my self from his senceles aspersions . but , indeed , in nothing can i more discredit & disgrace him than in rehearsing & clearing what he objects in this kinde . for , by this the candid reader seeing how inconsiderable the worst is he can say against mee , will discern that he had an ingenious adversary , & conclude thence that it was the power of truth , not any sleight of tricks , which thus baffled the dr. if then my greatest faults be proved innocent , my lesser ones will ( i conceive ) be held so likewise ; since it is presumable that no man will accuse another of a greater faul but upon a better ground . now the greatest vices of a writer are falsifications ; for , what credit can ever be rationally given to any writer who is once convinc't to have bely'd the author he cites , & to have falsify'd wilfully . faults of this sort he objects to me onely in two places , as far as i observe . in examining which i crave the readers exactest diligence , & decline not his most rigorous censure ; nay , if he can in reason iudge that i wilfully chang'd any thing , that is , gain'd or endeavored to gain the least possible advantage by my mistake , ( which is the onely touchstone , as it is the sole reason of falsifying ) then i give him free leave to brand me in his thoughts for infamous , and shall in requitall pardon dr. h. the long rowle of his wilfull or manifestly advantageous ones . 〈◊〉 first of these pretended falfisications is found related in his answ . p. . and also put in the title to his th section p. . to clear the reader 's understanding the better , and mine own credit totally , i will put down first the substance of the point there handled , & the substance of my answer given ; next , the circumstances amongst which my wrong transcription is found ; by which means one may easily & solidly iudge whether my oversight had any influence at all upon the point in hand ; and conclude , that , if evidently it had none , then it was onely a materiall lapse in transcribing dr. h's words , equally incident to any man living , not a formall fault . in his book of schism p. , parag . . he attempts to prove that kings have supreme power in ecclesiasticall causes . amongst his other marginall notes ayming to conclude this , in the following page we read these words ; so in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole third book is made up of iustinians . . e. the emperor's constitutions de episcopis , clericis , & sacris , concerning bishops , clergy men , & sacred offices . this is the substance , nay the totall of his objection . the substance of my answer , ●ound schism disarm'd p. . is this , that all the laws found there , must not necessarily be iustinians ; since the keepers of laws use not onely to put in their law books those constitutions themselves made , but also those they are to see observed ; amongst which are the canons & laws of the church , made before by ecclesiasticall power . this is the main & substance of my answer to that objection in generall . how weakly he reply's to this , telling us onely answ . p. . that this cannot possibly be accommondated to the matter in hand , because 't is certain ( cries the strong reasoning dr. ) he made many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concerning ecclesiasticall matters , which the authors name put to them and the persons to whom they were written ; i cannot totally omit to let the reader see by the way how pittifull this reply of his is , how nothing to the point : this being to say over again what we grant , and leaving untouch't what we object : since all this might have been done , whether those constitutions had been originally his own or no ; and , will serve for an instance how weak this dr. is in the following part of his book , were he duly call'd to account . but , this concerns not my task at present ; which is onely this , to put down substantially the question , his proof , & my reply , that it may be thence iudged whether i could possibly be said to gain any advantage by the circumstances i faultred in . the first of those circumstances is that whereas his words were iustinians constitutions de episcopis , clericis , & sacris ▪ i transcribed de episcopis , clericis , laicis . now , if he contend i transcribed one word wrong in answering his whole book , i grant it ; and , i conceive , dr. h will not presume himself exempt from the like faillings : but , if he pretend that i falsify'd or did it voluntarily , plain sence will overthrow him quit me . no man does a thing voluntarily but for some end ; and the end an insincere writer can be imagin'd to have in falsifying is to gain some advantage to his cause . if then it be most manifest that i neither did attempt nor could possibly gain thence the least advantage , nor that he himself attempts to shew i gain'd any , no man of reason but will acquit my sincerity , & accuse mine adversary for a calumniator . first then that i did not attempt any advantage thence is clear both in my words which never put either the least force in the word laicis , nor so much as mention'd it or any thing to that sence ; nor , yet , in the omission of sacris secondly , it is yet more manifest in that mine adversary never goes about to show that i made the least use of this mistake , which yet solely imported in such an objection ; but rather on the contrary calls it a meannes , saying that i am come to that meannes of changing his words ( and indeed it is a strange meannes to change them to no purpose ) and alledges onely as the cause of that meannes ( forsooth ) that i did it ( not to gain any help to defend my tenet by it ) but to get some advantage of carping at them . but , that even this is as falsly pretended as the other , the readers eye will inform him , if he please to peruse my answer ( schism disarm . p. . ) where he will see that there is not a sillable which sounds like carping at his words , but a serious answer to the point thirdly , that i could reap no profit by such a mistake appears by the very point it self apply'd to my words : for , since he denies not but i transcrib'd right , and grants that he made laws de episcopis & clericis ; of bishops and clergy men ; to what end should i omit sacris , sacred officies since he that could make laws concerning those , who were over sacred officies , could a fortiori make laws for the sacred offi●ies themselves : as himself yeelds of schism p. . l. . . and , lastly , this objection is convinced to be most senceles by this , that my answer given was equally pertinent & strong , apply'd to sacris , had it been there , as it was to episcopis & clericis , when this was left out : since it contended that law keepers use to put in their law books the constitutions & canons of the church to make them more powerfully observed & received : which equally fit 's the pretence that they made constitutio●s de sacris , as that they made them de episcopis & clericis . in a word , i confess , the infinit tediousnes of my dreaming adversary made me write the whole book in some hast , caused by my impatience to stand triffling after that manner ; and my particular hast here appears also by leaving out the particle [ & ] before [ sacris ] ( of which i wonder the dr. made not another falsification ) as well as in mis-writing that word . and , it seems , the antithesis or opposition between clericis , & , laicis , very obvious to one's mind , not particularly attentive , which seem'd warranted by my fore knowledge that iustinian ( a secular prince ) made laws concerning laymen also , made me not aware of my mistake ; and , on the other side , there was nothing in so unconcerning a change which could awaken in me an apprehension that i had erred ; which , had there been any force put particularly in that word , i should have reflected on . but i have said too much in excusing a materiall error , to which the best & wisest man living is obnoxious : materiall , i say ; since both the substance & import of the point there in hand , the perfect silence of mine adversary in applying my mistake to the said point , and his onely ( but false ) pretence that i gain'd hence advantage to cavill at them , examin'd by any readers eye , all conspire to excuse it from being formall & affected . yet , this is my great falsification ; the rest are such pittifull toies that they blush for shame in their objector's behalf assoon as they show their faces ; & instead of blaming me , accuse him of the contumeliousnes he layd to my charge in the beginning of his book . the second falsification ( found here likewise ) is this , that whereas he said that in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the whole third book is made up of iustinian's constitutions de episcopis , &c. i call it iustinian's third book . where 's the difference ? onely here , that iustinian ( as is agreed & granted by both ) writ those laws , but another collected them , so that , according to him 't is a falsification to call those laws iustinian's book , which himself both here & in the following page confesses iustinian constituted or writ , because another collected them into a sy●nopsis . alas poor man ! yet this falsification is plurally exprest with the former , & put in the title of his section as a busines of great concern . now , he never pretends that this empty chimera of a falsification , has any influence at all upon my cause or answer , onely he tells me i have ill luck : and , indeed so i have ; but 't is onely in this that i have lost my time in confuting so weak an adversary . my third falsification ( alas ) is found objected in his answ . p. . attend protestant readers , & all you that run to this drs sermons , with such a gaping admiration ! see in these two present calumnies of his how sillines & in sincerity are at fisticufs about their iust claim to him , leaving it a drawn match to which of them he more properly belongs : either qualification being in the height , they admit no comparison & so no vmpirage i shall put down the very words , the very page , & the very line , where my words & his are found ; and then leave them that love truth better then his person , to abhor such an open affector of fals-dealing ; and those that hug an airbred opinion of him above the respect due to truth & honesty , to the iust regret , which such inexcusable follies & disingenuities of their preaching dr. will cause in their partiall souls . in his book of schism p. . l. . . . . to prove that kings had a proper power to erect metropolitan's , he cited the . canon of the council of chalcedon : where ( he said ) mention was made of cities honored with letters patents from the kings , with the name & dignity of metropoles : now , the greek as put down by himself , being onely that they were honored 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies precisely [ with the name of a metropolis ] no more ; and , it being contended & proved by me out of dr. h's own friend balsamon , that they had no dignity of iurisdiction , i excepted with good reason against his rendring the single word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies onely with the name , by that double & advantageous expression of [ name & dignity . ] my exception schism disarm . p. . l. . . &c. was delivered in these words , that the council sayes onely , those cities were honored with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ the name alone ] which the dr. fluent in his expressions englishes name & dignity . now this particle [ alone ] after [ name ] he calls a falsification , insincerity , & alledges it is put in by me ; whereas , 't is most palpably manifest , i used the word [ alone ] as my own word not the councill's , and put it in opposition to his double phrase of [ name & dignity . ] and , how it is possible to correct one , who insincerely translates a single word by two different ones , without vsing the limitative particle [ onely ] or [ alone ] to restrain his extravagant interpretation , no man living can imagin . to evidence yet more clearly that i used the word [ alone ] as mine own not the councils , i was so exact as to put it down in a different letter from that in which i put [ the name ] pretended to be the councils words ; to wit , in the comon letter , in which i used to put mine own words throughout the whole book as contradistinguish't fom the words of others ( as is to be seen schism disarm . p. . l. . . ) yet all this minute wa●ines , which left no possible room for any cavill , was not sufficient to secure my sincerity , nor stave of dr. h. from his needfull , & now grown naturall insincerity ; look answ . p. . l and you shall see he changes the word [ alone ] in which he contends my falsification consists , from the roman letter in which i writ it ( and by thus writing it , ownd it for mine ) into the italic or translation letter , which signifies that i pretended it the council's word and translated it thence . and , when he hath thus changed my word , thus distinctively put , & consequently my intention , and the import or application of that particle , he calls his manifest falsification of my words , my falsification of the councils ; and grounds his cavill & calumny meerly upon his own insincere carriage ; in which i must tell him plainly he has committed a peece of most open knavery . let the dr. & his friends patdon me these plain expressions , till they show me why he that accuses another of falsifying ( which is knavery in the height ) and builds his uniust accusation onely upon the same fault committed by himself at the same time , may not with justice & modesty both be branded with that qualification , which he would thus vniustly affix upon another . my fourth falsification ( si dijs placet ) is found in the same places as the former , schism disarm . p. . i cited the council that those metropolitanes ( erected by kings ) should enjoy onely the honour ; and then alledged balsamon's words , that this honour mean't no more but that that bishoprick should be called a metropolis . now , dr. h. in his answ . p. . l. . assures his reader that [ this is another falsification ] such another as the former , you may be sure . but why good dr. ? do you go about to show that i put not down the authors words aright , but mangledly & corruptly to my onely & best advantage , as your custome is ? nothing less ; he pretends to show no such thing ; though this be the very thing we use to call a falsification . strange ! how comes this then to be a falsification when not one word is shown to be falsify'd ? why thus . balsamon ( alledges the dr. ) say's no more then this that [ some asked , or heard , or were told , &c. ] good ! use thine eyes again , reader , & see whether , schism disarm . p. . l. . . &c. in the very place to which he relates , i did not put down minutely & particularly both in greek and english those very words as told us by balsamon , with which the dr. here correc'ts me , and slily intimates to the abused reader , that i either disguised or omitted it . the testimony was this as set down by me verbatim out of balsamon : [ some desired to know what that honour mean't ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and received anwer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that except onely that this bishoprick , was called a metropolis , in all other things it was subject to the former metropolis . ] now i never pretended that balsamon told us this as his own opinion , but as the judgment of others , i quoted him as an historian , not as judge : nor can the very words put down by me [ some desired , &c. ] possibly permit such a conceit . nor , had it been my advantage ( could common sence have born it ) to have pretended this as the sentence of balsamon ; for , i ever conceived it came from persons of greater authority and supposed more knowing in those affairs , that is , from the council or some of the council , at least from persons , who perfectly understood it's meaning . for , of whom should we imagin in reason such a question was ask't , but of such persons ? or why should we think that balsamon , writing upon that council with pretence to explicate it , should intend to put down a frivolous question & an impertinent answer , and not rather a solemn question proposed by some concerned persons about the sence of that council , and satisfy'd by some iudicious persons intimately acquainted with , or of that council it self , if not of the whole council ; which is most sit , as it is most able , to interpret it 's own meaning . it had been then both impossible the words put down by my self should bear it , and also very disadvantageous to my cause to pretend balsamon spoke this of his own judgment : and consequently the irrationall & perfectly groundles aspersion of this dr. ly all at his own door , & challenge him aloud of the insincerity he objects to others . the reason he gives why this was a falsification ( forsooth ) is introduced with another [ besides ] and is still asmuch besides the purpose as the former . besides this , i say ( marke the strength of the drs words ) it is clear that this of being onely called m●tropolitans , was the punishment inflicted on them by the council , which as i said , &c. well dr. let the council mean what it please , or let my consequence hold well or ill , that is another question ; but , did i omit any word of balsamon in this present testimony ( which you pretend i falsify ) which seem'd to oppose my tenet ? did i add or change any title in favour of it ? nay did i add , detract , or change the least particle how unconcerning soever , or do you goe about to show any such thing ? how then , and with what face can you pretend i falsify'd it ? if all ill consequences or deductions be falsifications , then it is impossible , where men maintain different opinions , but one side or other must necessarily be falsifiers . since then i neither pretended not could pretend any more , but that balsamon told us what honour meant by relating the answer given to those demanders , and this is verbatim avouched in those words as put down by me , nor is my putting them down reprehensible by my very adversary , it follows ( what ever my consequence or arguing thence be ) that i am acquitted of insincerity ; and that the groundles pretence that i falsify'd is proved to be an undeniable evidence that dr. h. most willfully and weakly calumniated and , as for his endeavour to invalidate my consequence , layd out here in those pretty terms of , i say , it is clear ; as i said , &c. were time & place proper to answer it , i dare undertake to show that these bold words are the best proof he brings for it , what ever glosses he makes from the abused council . and now , kinde reader , i have acquitted my self , & shown to thine eye , that the greatest faults the most calumniating adversary could pick out of my writings are perfectly innocent : but , what worthy requitall for so much iniustice can i offer to dr. h. i could present thee , reader , with a long black scrowl of egregious & wilfull falsifications from the rest of his long book , which i have so mercifully spared ; nay , i could show thee a new brood of most enormous ones in his very book of schism , which escap't my observation when i first answered it ( so pregnant & fruitfull are his writings of such helps ) i could let thee see there , p. . how citing the novels that iustinian ordained the arch-bishop of iustiniana should have in that diocese , locum apostolicae sedis , ( as he puts it ) and then englishes it , the place or dignity of an apostolicall seat , which thus put equalls him in a manner to the dignity of any other apostolicall seat by this independency ; the false dealing man leaves out the word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of rome ] though found closely woven in the context thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the apostolicall seat of rome ; which marrs all his market , and signifies he was there in the pope's place or stead ; that is , was his vicegerent , and so subordinate & dependent on him . i could show thee , how not content to falsify thus grosely & wilfully onely in the same testimony , he doubles or rather trebles my former fault & shame ; and that , whereas the question was whether the emperor could do it dependently on the church and executing her orders , which we grant ; or independently , & without her orders , which we deny & he pretends , the dr. puts down onely that the emperor constituted this arch-bishop should have locum apostolicae sedis , the place of an ( as he falsifies it ) apostolicall seat ; but leaves out what follows immediately in the same sentence to his preiudice , & vtter overthrow , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : according to those things which were decreed by the holy pope vigilius ; which signifies that the pope made that arch-bishop his vicegerent in those countries by his decree , and that this order of the emperor was subsequent , conformable to & onely executed the former intentions & orders of the pope ; all expresly against him & for us , and therefore both those & the former words being thus important , and thus industriously singled & culled out by the dr. it is impossible but his most partiall admiter , ( if he have not absolutely renounc't his reason & resolved the slender fading thing into the drs authority ) must see & confess he was wilfully fraudulent , & intended to breed in the readers minde by the words thus maimedly & falsly put , another apprehension than the testimony it self , rightly dealt with , could have caused yet , as long as this enemy to truth & true dealing , makes zealous professions of his entire desire to speak the full truth of god , and that he did in the sincerity of his heart verily beleeve , and such like womanish demurenesses , he hopes there will be found a company so weakly simple as to give him credence , and that his moderate & bashfull language will to these good weak sighted souls be a cloack thick enough to hide or excuse his immoderately shamefull deeds . of such kinde of falsifications , reader , i could afford thee variety were it necessary ; but i have already done enough to secure thee from this drs arts , and the consequence of them , schism , as maintain'd & asserted by him . peruse my book attentively , & thou shalt observe i never call his materiall error in transcribing , a falsification ( i doubt not but i could show thee one hundred such of his for my single one were it worth the pains ) but onely when i manifest the advantage he got by such a carriage , which he never goes about to show in those he objects to mee . again , thou ●eest how easily those falsifications he pretends as mine , are clear'd ; nay shown to thine eye to be unconcerning toies or groundles willfull calumnies ; his which i objected in schism disarm'd , are left by him unclear'd , as this treatise hath from place to place shown thee and so , reader , i leave thee to thy candid thoughts , which i desire thee to employ in ruminating upon the dr. as put in this pickle ; requesting of thee in mine adversary's behalf not to be too rigorous in thy censures of him ; abate as much as the consideration of humane errablenes & frailty can suggest to a rationally-compassionate minde ; onely be not partiall in what is evidently fraudulent , and then thou shalt right truth , thy self , & mee too by one impartially ingenuous & rationall act . i have onely one word to speak to the dr. and then i take my leave . you see dr. h. it will not do ; no tricks can prevail against truth : she will conquer , and knows how to defend herself by the weakest weapon . were it not better now to give god and his church the honour due to them , and show at length your willingnes to acknowledge faults so plainly & undeniably open , than to continue your fruitles pains to show your self unretractably obstinate . nor do i impute them ( however i may seem rigorous & too plain ) originally to you : i know the necessity of your cause obliges you forcibly to rely on such uniustifiable waies i know , and your self cannot but know the same , how miserably you are glad to pervert the words , voluntarily mistake , and thus mistakingly propose to your readers , the true import and sence of your testimonies ; and to content your self with any sleight gloss , which ( not your impartiall judgment gives absolutely to be the meaning , but what ) your partiall fancy can imagin may be defended on some sleight fashion to be the meaning . see in the index what undeniable self contradictions , weaknesses absurdities , voluntary mistakes , & falsifications , your task of defending schism hath put you upon : be true to your own best interest , a sincere conscience ; be true at least to your own honour , and , neglect , for the future , the defence of that cause , which must inevitably throw you upon such rocks . the further you reply the worse it will still fare with you . for , to clear your self of these falsifications & other manifold faults satisfactorily , is impossible ; eye-sight attesting them ; not to clear your self of them is doubly disgracefull , fluttering up & down ( as your way of writing is ) entangles you more : sit still , and you will be safer . you cannot but see & acknowledge that your position of a probable faith leads directly to atheism , if follow'd , and that , since none has reason to assent further then he has reason , that is , further then the reasons given convince ; and , since no probability can possibly convince the thing is true , or , that the authority speaks true , it is impossible any man living can have any obligation in your grounds to assent that any point of faith is true , or any authority to be beleeved ; nay , if he will not renounce his nature , he ought to suspend in both these ; that is , embrace no faith at all . the necessity of holding which tenet so fundamentally pernicious to all christianity , so odious to all good christians , unavoidably follows out of your principles of schism , built upon the rejecting the onely certain rule of faith , immediate traditiō ; and the consciousnes to your self that your weak testimony-way reaches no further than probability , enforces you to own it , and aym at no higher a pitch of satisfaction , that is , none at all , for , how can probability satisfy ? look behinde you then , & see what a great deal of industry & time you have fruitlesly lost in turning over promiscuously multitudes of authors , without first studying grounds , that is , without first laying your thoughts in order , with evident deduction from and connexion with first principles . this task , onely is called knowledge , the former without this is more apt to lead to ignorance & mistake leaving onely a confusion of motley incoherēt thoughts in a mans head , impossible to be orderly rank't in the posture of knowledge , unles regulated by fore layd grounds . look before you , and you shall see many late wits , whose gallant self-understanding souls , own their nature , & rationally scorn to submit to any assent but upon rigorous & demonstrative evidence , either of the thing it self , in science , or of the authority , in faith . suffer your self to be won to the imitation of these pursvers of knowledge ; leave talking words , & begin to speak sence ; leave of to diffuse & scatter abroad your fleeting thoughts in a sermonary & preaching way , and begin to connect them into rigorous discourse , that is , instead of aiery talk , begin to iudge & know , instead of empty florish , learn to be solid . ina word aym seriously to know , that is , to assent upon evidence , and then , i am confident , our understandings will meet in a ioynt-assent , and ( i hope ) our wills in a consent & submission to the authority of that church , whose rule of faith , immediate tradition , is evidently demonstrable . this , s● , is the hearty wish of him who ( however you may apprehend him ) protests he preserves a more prompt zeal & naturall alacrity to honour & serve you in what you can iustly be concieved deserving , than he hath to discover the faults your tenets made you commit , which yet was at present his unavoidable duty , the truth of your miscariages being ioyn'd to the certainty & concernment of his cause you iniur'd by them , yovr servant , s. w. finis . the appendix vindicated against the pretended reply of dr. bramhall l d of derry . the introdvction . little remains to bee reply'd to my second adversary in substantiall and fundamentall points , either in behalf , of r. c. or s. w. if those passages in which i bring dr. h. to grounds bee duly reflected on : since , neither can my lord of derry deny but that there is now a breach made between us in the points now controverted ; nor does hee pretend demonstrative and rigorous evidence that the pop'es authority was an vsurpation , and so their renouncing it no criminall breach but a lawfull self-enfranchisement : nor lastly , does hee endeavour to shew that less , than such rigorous evidence ( that is , that probable reasons ) are sufficient ground to renounce , such an authority ; and soe strongly supported by a long possession , an vniversall delivery of immediate forefathers as come from christ , &c. or , that it was prudence to hazard a schism , & consequently their salavations upon the uncertain lottery of a probability . this was all which fundamentally concern'd this controversy ; and this is wholly omitted by his fellow mr. h. aswell as himself ; and , consequently , till they speak out directly to this point ( to do which they are ever very warily loath ) they can onely hope it from courtesy , not claim it from iustice , that they are vouchsafed any answer at all ; since , they who will not bee drawn to speak to the purpose , deserve to been neglected , and suffer'd to talk to no purpose . now , for satisfaction how little can bee said to those most concerning points , to omit other places , i refer my reader to sect. . & th of the d part of schism disarm'd left in a manner wholly unanswer'd as yet by mr. h. and to my grounds before the foregoing treatise . in answer to the title down-derry hee shows himself mystically proverbiall , and tells the amused readers , that it were strange if hee should throw a good cast who seals his bowl upon an undersong . i must confess the bp. is far the better bowler ; & that s. w. is so unexpert as not to understand what should bee mean't by sealing a bowl vpon an undersong . onely lest hee should conceit some petty victorie in having thus pos'd his adversary , hee may please to take notice that it nothing concerns him ; for the bp : is beholding for the title down-derry ( and consequently the world , for this rare bowling phrase sprung from that happy occasion ) to the merry stationer ; who without my knowledge or approbation would needs make it the post-past to his bill of fare . the iest was very proper & fatall ; but , whether courteous or no , i leave the bp. and him to scuffle for it : and address my self to a serious examin of the bishop's reply . wee have seen already that hee is a good bowler , let us see now whether hee bee an honestman . sect. . how my l d of derry omits totally to mention the second part of our charge ; and preuaricates from answering any title of the first , by cavilling groundlesly at unconcerning toyes ; giving us generall terms in stead of the particular thing ; falsifying openly the council of ephesus ; contradicting common sence ; of controvertist turning lawyer , and impugning the extent of the pope's authority , instead of the substance of it ; wilfully misrepresenting every word of our rule of faith , as put down by his adversary ; and , lastly , by plainly confessing hee will not answer our charge or objection . it was objected that the crime of schism would appear to bee iustly charged upon his church not onely with colour , but with undeniable evidence of fact ; by the very position of the case and the nature of his exceptions . meaning , that there was a manifest fact of renouncing and breaking from an authority long acknowledg'd as of christ's institution , upon exceptions short of demonstration ; that is , short of power to convince a rationall understanding ; that is , passion & not those reasons must move first the will , and by it the understanding to a conuiction ; that is , the breach or schism was criminall . now the good bishop first leaves out the second part of these words , [ the nature of his exceptions ] which concern'd himself ; and puts down onely the first part , to wit , the position of the case . whereas , wee charge them not with schism upon this single account , that they broke from a formerly-acknowledg'd authority , which is the position of the case ; but , that they broke from it without hauing evident & demonstratiue reasons and exceptions against it , but , at best , pretended probable ones onely ; that is , such as are no waies either able to oblige the understanding to assent upon them , nor sufficient grounds to renounce any authority at all , much less an authority held sacred before , & thus qualify'd . for , what a slack thing would the world bee , if probable exceptions of the subjects ( i mean , such as are held noe more than probable by the subjects themselves ) should bee held sufficient ground to disacknowledge their governour 's right , and alter the present government ? would any government in the world remain on foot three years to an end , if this method were allow'd and practised ; unles , perhaps , force preuaild over reason ? the bishop had good reason then to omit that which concern'd the nature of his own exceptions : for , though himself and his friends love extremely to talk prettily , yet they cannot endure the reasons which make up their discourse should bee brought to the test , or their validity to convince the understanding scann'd ; that is , they love not to speak out whether they bee demonstrative , or probable onely . they dare not assert the former , conscious that their best way of discoursing is onely thetoricall , topicall , and for the most part quibbling and blūdering in a wordish testimony , whence no demonstration , or ( it's proper effect ) conviction is likely to bee expected . nor yet dare they for shame confess the latter ; knowing that a probability , though never so strong , still leaves room for a may bee-otherwise ; and so can never conclude that the thing must-bee ; that is , can never , without iniury to a rationall nature , claim it's assent that the thing 〈◊〉 : for , how can any man in reason assent that the thing is so upon that motive , which very motive permits that it may not bee so ? it was not therefore dishonesty in the bishop , going about to impugn his adversary , to omit one halfe of that which hee grounded himself on ; but a great deal of prudenc● and warines , or indeed a kind of necessity . secondly proceeding upon this mistake of his own , hee wrangles with us , for calling this our chief objection against them ; as king us if stating the question and objecting bee all one ? no sure ; if wee speak rigorously : but a charge against one is often call'd , an objection . now ours against you ( which you here purposely mutilate ) is this , that you left a preacknowledg'd ecclesiasticall authority , upon fantastick exceptions , that is , unpon uncertain grounds : which objection ( if verify'd ) so euidently concludes you wilfull schismaticks , that it is impossible to bee cloak't or evaded . now the first part , which cōcerns your actuall reiecting that actuall authority , is notorious to the whole world , and confest by your selves . the second , that you did it upon uncertain grounds , your self when you are prest to it will confess also ; for , i presume , you dare not pretend to rigorous demonstration ; both , because your self would bee the first protestant that ever pretended it ; as also , because your best champions grant your faith & it's grounds but probable . and , should you pitch upon some one best reason or testimony pretended to demonstrate your point , wee should quickly make an end of the controversy , by showing it short of concluding evidently , as you well know : which makes you alwaies either disclaime , or decline that pretence ; never pitching upon any one pretended conuincing or demonstrative reason which you dare stand to , but hudling together many in a diffused discourse ; hoping that an accumulation of may-bee will persuade vulgar and half witted understandings that your tenet is certain , & must bee . thirdly , the bp. asks us who must put the case , or state the question ? telling us , that if a protestant do it , it will not bee so undeniably evident . i answer , let the least child put it ; let the whole world put it ; let themselves put it : do not all these grant & hold that k. h. deny'd the pope's supremacy ? does not all the world see that the pretended church of england stands now otherwise in order to the church of rome , than it did in h. the ths dayes ? does not the bps. of schism . c. . par . . fellow-fencer , dr. h. confess in expresse terms , and first , for the matter of fact , it is acknowledg'd that in the reign of k. h. the th , the papall power in ecclesiasticall affairs , was , both by acts of convocation of the clergy , & by statutes or acts of parliament , cast out of this kingdome ? was this power it self thus cast out before ? that is , was it not in actuall force till and at this time ? and is not this time extoll'd as that in which the reformation in this point began ? wee beg then nothing gratis , but begin our process , upon truth acknowledg'd by the whole world . our case puts nothing but this undeniable and evident matter of fact : whence wee conclude them , criminally-schismaticall , unles their exceptions against this authority's right bee such as , in their owne nature , oblige the understanding to assent that this authority was vsurpt ; onely which can iustify such a breach . so that the bishop first omits to mention the one half , of that on which wee build our charge , ( to wit , the nature of their exceptions ; ) and , when hee hath done , wilfully mistakes , and mispresents the other : persuading the unwary reader that the case wee put is involu'd in ambiguities , and may bee stated variously ; whereas 't is placed in as open a manifestation as the sun at noonday , and acknowledg'd universally . in neither of which the bishop hath approved himself too honest a man. now , let us see what hee answers to the case it self . it was put down , schism disarm . p. . thus ; that in the beginning of h. the ths reign , the church of england agreed with that of rome and all the rest of her communion , in two points , which were then and are now the bonds of vnity , betwixt all her members . one concerning faith , the other government . for faith , her rule was , that the doctrines which had been inherited from their forefathers , as the legacies of christ and his apostles , were solely to bee acknowledg'd for obligatory , and nothing in them to bee changed . for government , her principle was , that christ had made s. peter first , or chief , or prince of his apostles ; who was to bee the first mover under him in the church after his departure out of this world , &c. and , that the bishops of rome , as successours of s. peter , inherited from him this priuiledge in respect of the successours of the rest of the apostles ; and actually exercised this power in all those countries which kept communion with the church of rome , that very year wherein this unhappy separation began . it is noe lesse evident that , in the reigne of ed the th q. elizabeth and her successours , neither the former rule of vnity of faith , nor this second of vnity of government ( which is held by the first ) have had any power in that congregation , which the protestants call the english church . this is our objection against you , &c. this is our case , ioyntly put by us and by the whole world ; which the bp. calls an engine , and pretends to take a view of it . but , never did good man look soe asquint upon a thing which hee was concern'd to view , as my l d of deity does at the position of this plain case . first , hee answers , that wee would obtrude upon them the church of rome and it's dependents for the catholike church . whereas , wee neither urge any such thing in that place , nor so much as mention there the word catholik ; as is to bee seen in my words put down here by himself , p. . but onely charge them , that the church of england formerly agreed with the church of rome in these two a foresaid principles , which afterwards they renounced . in stead of answering positiuely to which , or replying i or noe , the fearfull , bishop starts a side to this needles disgression . next , hee tells us what degree of respect they owe , now to the church of rome : whereas the question is not what they owe now , but what they did or acted then ; that is , whether or no they reiected those two principles of faith and government , in which formerly they consented with her . to this the wary bp. saies nothing . after these weak evasions , hee tells us , that the court of rome had excluded two third parts of the catholick church from their communion ; that the world is greater than the city : and so runs on with his own wise sayings of the same strain , to the end of the parag . whereas , the present circumstances inuite him onely to confess or deny what they did ; and whether they renounced those two principles of vnity , or no : not to stand railing thus unseasonably upon his own head what our church did ; shee shall clear herself when due circumstances require such a discourse . again , whenas wee object that they thus broke from all those which held communion with the church of rome ; hee falls to talk against the court of rome : as if all those particular churches , which held communion with the see of rome , had well approved of nor ever abhominated their breach from those two a foresaid principles ; but the court of rome onely . did ever man look thus awry upon a point which hee aimed to reply to ; or did ever hocus-pocus strive with more nimble sleights to divert his spectatour's eyes from what hee was about : than the bp. does to draw of his readers from the point in hand ? in a word , all that can bee gather'd from him in order to this matter consists in these words [ this pretended separation : ] by which hee seems to intimate his deniall of any separation made in the a foresaid principles ; but it is so shameles and open an vntruth , that hee dares not own it in express terms ; nor yet , ( such is his shuffling ) will hee confess the contrary . i know his party sometimes endeavours to evade , by saying that our church caused the breach by excommunicating them : but , ask whether they broke from and renounced that government ( and so deserved excommunication ) ere they were thus excommunicated by it ; and , their own conscience with the whole world will answer , they did . it is that former breach of theirs , then , and reiection of that government , which denominates them schismaticks ; till they can render sufficient , that is , evident grounds why they reiected it : for , otherwise , nothing is more weak , than to imagine that governours should not declare themselves publikely and solemnly against the renouncers of their authority ; or , that a king should not proc●ame for rebells and incapable of any priuiledges from the commonwealth , those persons who already had disacknowledg'd his right , and obstinately broken it's laws . either show us , then , that our excommunication separated you from your former tenets , to wit , from holding those a foresaid principles of vnity in faith and government ; or else grāt that your selves actually separated from them both , that is , from our church . this , my lord , is the separation which uniustify'd , makes a criminall schism : excommunication is onely the punishment due to the antecedent crime . order , which consists in government being essentiall to a church if intended to continue , it follows that since christ intended his church should continue , hee constituted the order of the church , otherwise hee had not constituted a church , since a church cannot bee without that which is essentiall , to a church . wherefore , seing that which christ instituted is of faith , it follows that order of government is of faith , and so , must bee , recommended to us by the same rule that other points of faith are . hence , speaking of the two principles , one of vnity in faith , the other of vnity in government , i affirmed that the truth of the latter is included in the former , and hath it's evidence from it . must not hee now bee very quarelsome , who can wrangle with such an innocent and plain truth ? the iealous bishop first alledges , 't is done to gain the more opportunity to shuffle the latter usurpations of the pope's , into the ancient discipline of the church . not a iot , my lord : the standing to this rule , to wit , the immediate delivery of fathers to sons attestation , renders it impossible for an usurpation to enter ; nor can you , or any else instance , that any usurpation either in secular or ecclesiastical government ever came in , prerending that tenour ; or show that it ever could , as long as men adhered to that method . it must bee either upon wit explications of word in the laws , or of ambiguous peeces of antiquity , not upon this immediate delivery from hand to hand , ( in which wee place our rule of faith ) that encroachments are built . had wee , then , a mind to obtrude usurpations upon you , wee had recurr'd to testimony-proofs , ( the protestants onely method ; ) where with hath a large field to maintain a probability-skirmish of the absurdest positions imaginable : not to this rule of soe vast a multitude of eye-witnesses of visible things from age to age ; which rule is as impossible to bee crooked , as it is for a world of fathers to conspire to tell a world of children this ly , that ten years ago they held and practised what themselves and all the world besides knew they did not . his second exception is far more groundlesly quarrelsom . 't is against my making two principles ; one in doctrine , the other in discipline : whereas , euery child sees that doctrine & discipline , or faith , and government make manifestly two distinet ranks or orders ; the one relating immediately to information of the understanding or speculative holding , the other to action . but his reasons why they should bee but one are pretty : because , frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora , it is in vain to make two rules where one will serve . by which maxim , rigorously misunderstood , as 't is by him , one may dispute against the making severall laws , and severall commandments , with the like logick , and say , all the treating them with distinction is vain , because this one commandment to do well , or , to do no ill , includes all the rest . again , hee imagins , because the truth of one depends on the other , therefore they ought not to bee treated distinctly : as if it were vain or needles , to deduce consequences , or , as if mathematicians ought not to conclude any thing , but hover still in the generall principles of euclid , without making any progresse farther , because the truth of the consequences depends on those principles . are these men fit to write controversies ; who cannot , or will not , write common sence ? after hee had been thus frivolously backward , hee adds , that hee readily admits both my first & second rule , reduced into one in this subsequent form : those doctrines and that discipline , which wee inherited from our forefathers as the legacy of christ & his apostles , ought solely to bee acknowledg'd for obligatory , and nothing in them to bee changed that is substantial or essentiall . see here , reader , the right protestant method , which is , to bring the controversy , from a determinate state , to indetermination and confusion ; and , from the particular thing , to common words . wee point them out a determinate form of government , to wit , that of one supreme bishop in god's church : 't is known what it means : 't is known that the acknowledgment of that government is now , and was at the time of the breach , the bond of vnity between those churches which held that government , of which the church of england was one : 't is known they renounced this form of government , that is , that , which was and still is , to the church they formerly communicated with , a bond of vnity in discipline . again , 't is known that wee hold the voice of the church , that is , the consent of catholick fathers immediately attesting that they received this doctrine from their forefathers , infallible ; and , that none cannot bee ignorant of what their fathers teach them & bring them up in : which immediate receiving it from fathers wee call , here , inheritance . these , i say , are determinate points , manifesting themselves in their known particularities now , the bishop , instead of letting us know , i or noe , whether they broke that principle of vnity in discipline ( which 't is evident they did , by renouncing the pope's authority ) or that principle of vnity in doctrine , to wit , tradition , delivery , or handing down by immediate forefathers , ( which 't is evident they did , out of the very word , reformation , which they own & extoll ; or , instead of telling us what particular rule of faith , what particular form of government , they have introduc't into god's church in room of the former ; he refers us to platonick ideas of both , to bee found in concavo lunae ; wrapping them up in such generall terms , as hee may bee sure they shall never come to open light , lest by speaking out hee should bring himself into inconveniences . observe his words . those doctrines & that discipline which wee inherited from our forefathers , as the legacies of christ and his apostles , ought solely to bee acknowledg'd for obligatory ; and nothing in them is to bee changed , which is substantiall or essentiall . but , what and how many those doctrines are , what in particular that discipline is , what hee means by in heriting , what by forefathers , what by substantiall : none must expect in reason to know : for himself , who is the relater , does not . are those doctrines their articles ? alas , noe : those are not obligatory , their best champions reiect them at pleasure . are they contain'd in the creed onely ? hee will seem to say so sometimes , upon some urgent occasion : but then ask him , are the processions of the divine persons , the sacraments bap●ism of children , government of the church , the acknowledging there is such a thing as god's written word , or scripture , &c. obligatory ? the good man is gravelld . in fine , when you urge him home , his last refuge will bee , that all which is in god's word is obligatory : and then hee thinks himself secure ; knowing that men may wrangle with wit coniectures an hundred yeares there , ere any evidence , that is , conviction , bee brought . thus the bishop is got into a wood , and leaves you in another , and farther from knowing in particular what doctrines those are , than you were at first . again , ask him what in particular that discipline is , own'd by protestants to have come from christ and his apostles , as their legacy , ( for hee gives us no other description of it than those generall terms onely ; ) and hee is in as sad a case as hee was before . will hee say , 't is that of the secular power being head of the church , or that of bishops ? neither of these can bee : for , they acknowledge the french church for their sister protestant , and yet shee owns no such forms of government to have come from christ , but that of presbyters onely ; which they of england as much disown to have been christ's legacy . it remains , then , that the protestants have introduc't into the church , at or since the reformation , in stead of that they renounced , no particular form of government , that is , no one , that is , they have left none ; but onely pay their adherents with terms in generall , putting them of with words for realities , and names for things . again , ask him what hee means by inheriting : and hee will tell us , if hee bee urged and prest hard , ( for , till then , no protestant speaks out , ) that hee means not the succession of it from immediate forefathers and teachers ; which is our rule of faith and that which inheriting properly signifies ( this would cut the throat of reformation at one blow ; since , reformation of any point , and a former immediate delivery of it , are as inconsistent as that the same thing can both bee and not bee at once . ) but , that which hee means by inheriting is , that your title to such a tenet is to bee look't for in antiquity ; that is , in a vast library of books filld with dead words , to bee tost and explicated by witts & criticks : where hee hopes his protestant followers may not without some difficulty , find convincing evidence that his doctrine is false ; and that , rather than take so much pains , they will bee content to beleeve him and his fellows . thou seest then , reader , what thou art brought to : namely , to relinquish a rule , ( that i may omit demonstrable ) open , known , and as easy to teach thee faith , as children learne their a. b. c. ( for , such is immediate delivery of visible and practicall points by forefathers ; ) to embrace another method , soe full of perplexity , quibbling-ambiguity and difficulty , that , without running over & examining thousands of volumes , ( that is , scarce in thy whole life time ) shalt thou ever bee able to find perfect satisfaction in it , or to chuse thy faith : that is , if thou followst their method of searching for faith , and pursvest it rationally , thou may'st spend thy whole life in searching , and , in all likelihood , dy , ere thou chusest or pitchest upon any faith at all . the like quibble is in the word forefathers , hee means not by it immediate forefathers , as wee do , ( that would quite spoil their pretence of reformation ; ) but , ancient writers : and , so , hee hath pointed us out no determinate rule at all , till it bee agreed on whom those forefathers must bee , and how their expressions are to bee understood ; both which are controverted , and need a rule themselves . but the chiefest peece of tergiversation lies in those last words , that nothing is to bee changed in those legacies , which is substantiall or essentiall : that is , when soever hee and his follows have a mind to change any point , though never so sacred , nay , though the rules of faith and discipline themselves ; 't is but mincing the matter and saying they are not substantiall or essentiall , and then they are licenc't to reiect them . wee urge ; the two said principles of vnity in faith and discipline are substantiall points & essentiall to a church , if vnity it self bee essentiall to it : these your first reformers inherited from their immediate forefathers as the legacies of christ and de facto held them for such ; these youreiected and renounc't ; this fact , therefore , of thus renouncing them concludes you absolute schismaticks and hereticks , till you bring demonstrative evidence that the former government was an usurpation , the former rule fallible ; onely which evidence can iustify a fact of this nature . it is worth the readers pains to reflect once more on my l d of derry's former proposition ; and to observe , that , though white and black are not more different than hee and wee are in the sence of it , yet hee would persuade his readers hee holds the same with us : saying , that hee readily admits both my first and second rule reduced into one , in this subsequent form , &c. and then puts us down generall terms which signify nothing ; making account that any sleight connexion made of aire or words is sufficient to ty churches together , and make them one . iust as manasseh ben israel , the rabbi of the late iews , in the close of his petition , would make those who profess christ , and the iews , bee of one faith ; by an aiery generall expression , parallell to the bishops , here , that both of them expect the glory of israël to bee revealed . thus , dear protestant , reader , thou seest what thy best drs would bring thee to : to neglect sence , and the substantiall solid import of words ; and , in stead thereof , to bee content to embrace an empty cloud of generall terms , hovering uncertainly in the air of their owne fancies . in a word either the sence of your cōtracted rule is the same with that of our dilated one , or not : if not , then you have broke the rule of faith held by the former church , ( unles you will contend this rule had no sence in it but non-significant words onely ) and by consequence are flat schismaticks . but if you say 't is the same , you are reuinc't by the plain matter of fact , nay by the most undeniable force of self-evident terms : since no first principle can bee more clear than the leaving to hold what your immediate forefathers held , was not to continue to hold what was held by the same forefathers ; and that to disclame their doctrine and discipline was not to inherit it . after hee had told us that the church of england and the church of rome both maintaine this rule of faith , ( that is , indeed a different thing , but the same words ; ) hee immediately disgraces the said rule , by adding , that the question onely is , who have changed that doctrine , or this discipline ; wee , or they ? the one by substraction , the other by addition . which is as much as to say , the pretended rule is noe rule at all ; or else that wee do not agree in it , which yet hee immediately before pretended ; for , sure , that rule can bee no rule to him that follows it and yet is misled , as one of us must necessarily bee , who according to him , hold the same rule and yet different doctrines . either then there is no rule of faith at all ; or , if there bee , one of us must necessarily have receded from that rule and proceeded upon another ; ere hee could embrace'an errour , or differ from the other . it being known , then , and acknowledg'd that wee hold now the same rule as wee did immediately before their reformation , that is , the tradition of immediately forefathers ; it is evident out of the very word reformation , that they both renounced the said rule and wee continue in it . next , hee assures his reader , that the case is clear ; to wit , that wee have changed that doctrine & discipline by addition . this hee proves , by the wildest topick that ever came from a rationall head : because the apostles contracted this doctrine into a summary , that is , the creed ; and the ancient church forbad to exact any more of a christian at his baptismall profession ; whereas wee now exact more . what a piece of wit is here ? did ever protestant hold , that there is nothing of faith but the . articles in that creed ? doe not they hold that the procession of the holy ghost , the baptism of infants , the sacraments , &c. are the legacies of the apostles , and so of faith : yet , not found in that creed ? is it not of faith with them , that there is such a thing as god's words ; though it bee not in that creed ? how then follows it , that they have changed christ's doctrine by addition , who hold more points than are in that creed of the apostles ? may not wee , by the same logick , accuse the church at the time of the nicene council ; who prest the word consubstantiall , to distinguish catholicks from arians ? nay , may not wee , by the self-same argument , charge his own church , for making & pressing the profession of their . articles , in which are many things ( as hee wel knows ) not found nor pretended to bee found in the apostles creed ? what an incomparable strain of weaknes is it then , to conclude us to have changed christ's doctrine by addition ; from our obliging to more points than are found in that creed : whereas , 't is evident and acknowledg'd , that very many points were held anciently and ever , which are not put there ? and what a self contradicting absurdity is it , to alledge for a reason against us , that which makes much more against their own every way overthrown congregation ? it being then manifest that the apostles creed contains not all that is of faith ; it follows , that it was not instituted , as such , by them , or receiv'd , as such , by the ancient church . let us see then to what end it served , and how it was used by them ; the ignorance whereof puts the bp. upon all this absurdity : which hee might partly have corrected , had hee reflected on his owne words , [ baptismall profession . it is prudence in a church and in any government whatever , not to admit any to their communion or suffer them to live amongst them , till they have sufficient cognizāce that they are affected to them and not to their enemies party . hence at their baptism , ( the solemnity which admits persons into the church ) they proposed to them some such form of tenets ( which they therefore call'd a symboll or badge ) as might distinguish them from all the other sects , rife at that time , for some time , the apostles creed was sufficient for that , and to difference a christian from all others : because , at the time it was made , the rest of the world was in a manner either pagans or iews . afterwards , when other adversaries of the church , that is , hereticks , arose against points not found in that creed ; it was necessary , upon occasion , to enlarge that profession of faith or symboll , soe as to signify a detestation of , or an aversion from that heresy . either , then , the bp. must say , that no new heresy shall or can arise , against any point not found in the creed ; and then the anabaptist is iustify'd and made a member of the chimericall geryon-shap't church of england : or else hee must grant that the church , when such arise , must make new professions or symbolls to distinguish friends from those foes ; unles shee will admit promiscuously into her bowells , adversaries for friends ; a thing able to destroy any commonwealth , either ecclesiasticall or temporall . this is evident out of naturall prudence ; yet this is that which my l d d. carps at , that when new up start heresies had risen , the church should ordain such a profession of faith and cōsisting of such points , as may stop the entrance of such into the church . as then , if the reformed congregation were to baptize one now , at age , and so make him one of their company , none can doubt but it were prudence in her ( had shee any grounds to own herself to bee a church ) to ask him such questions first , as should manifest hee were not a socinian , anabaptist , or papist , but protestant-like affected , that is , propose to him a profession of faith , larger than is that of the creed , ( for each of those sects admits this , and yet differs from the protestant : ) so , it could not bee imprudent in our church , when new heresies arose , who yet admitted the creed , to propose some larger form of profession , which might discover the affection of the party ; lest perhaps shee might make a free denizon of her community , an arrant adversary , who came in cloakt and unexamind to work her all the mischief hee could . yet , this due examination before-hand , the bp. calls : changing of faith by addition ; thus perpetually goes common sence to wrack , when protestant drs goe about to iustify their schism ; and , to make the non-sence more pithy , hee calls this a clear case , that wee have thus offended by addition . again , hee tells us , to confirm this , that the generall council of ephesus did forbid all men to exact any more of a christian at his baptismall profession than the apostles creed . which is , first , a very round falsification and an open abuse of the council . for , as may bee seen , immediately before the th canon , theodorus mopsuestensis & carisius had made a wicked creed , which was brought and read before the council . after this begins the th canon , thus ; his igitur lectis , decreuit sancta , &c. these things being read , the holy synod decreed , that it should bee lawfull for no man to compose , write , or produce [ alteram fidem ] another faith ; praeter eam quae definita fuit a sanctis patribus apud nicaeam vrbem in spiritu sancto congregatis , besides that which was defined by the holy fathers gather'd in the holy ghost at the city of nice . where , wee see , the intention of the council was no other than this , that they should avoid hereticall creeds and hold to the orthodoxe one ; not to hinder an enlargment to their baptismall profession , as the bishop would persuade us . hence , his first falsification is that hee would have the words alteram fidem ( which , taken by themselves , and , most evidently , as spoken in this occasion , signify a different or contrary faith ) to mean a prohibition to exact any more of a christian at his baptismall profession : so , by the words , any more , which hee falsly imposes to serve his purpose ; making the council strike directly at the enlargment of such profession . very good ! his d is , that , to play pope pius a trick , hee assures us , the council forbids to exact any more of a christian at his baptismall profession ; whereas , there is no news there of exacting , ( but , of producing , writing , or composing false creeds ) lesse of baptismall profession . and , though the council forbide this to bee done , his qui volunt ad cog●itionem veritatis conuerti , to those who are willing to ●ee converted to the knowledge of the truth : yet , the punishments following , extended also to laymen , in those words , si vero laici fuerint , anathematiz entur , if they ( the proposers of another faith ) bee laym●n , let them bee excommunicated , makes it impossible to relate to baptism ; unles the bishop will say that , in those dayes , laymen were ministers of baptism , or exacted , ( as hee phrases it ) baptismall professions . his third falsification is , that hee pretends the council forbad to exact more than the apostles creed : whereas , the council onely forbids creeds different from that which was defin'd by the council of nice . so that , according to the bishop , the creed defined by the fathers in the council of nice , and the apostles creed , are one and the sasame creed . his fourth is , that hee pretends from the bare word [ fidem ] a baptismal profession , for no other word is found in the council to that purpose . now , the truth is , that , upon occasion of those creeds containing false doctrine , the council onely prohibits the producing or teaching any thing contrary to the doctrine anciently establish't ; as appears more plainly from that which follows concerning carisius , pari modo , &c. in like manner , if any either bishops , priests or laymen bee taken , ( sentientes aut docentes , ) holding or teaching carisius his doctrine , &c. let them bee thus or thus punisht . where you see nothing in order to exacting baptismall professions , or their enlargments , as the bp. fancies ; but of abstaining to teach false doctrines which those hereticks had proposed . ere wee leave this point , to do my l d d. right , let us construe the words of the council according to the sence hee hath given it , and it stands thus ; that the holy synod decreed it unlawfull for any [ proferre , scribere ; aut componere ] to exact , [ alteram ] any more , or a larger , [ fidem ] baptismall profession , [ praeter eam quae a sanctis patribus apud nicaeam vrbem definita fuit ] than the apostles creed . well , go thy wayes brave bp. if the next synod of protestants doe not canonize thee for an interpreter of councils , they are false to their best interests : the cause cannot but stand , if manag'd by such sincerity , wit , and learning ; as long as women prejudic'd men and fools , who examin nothing , are the greater part of readers . having gain'd such credit for his sincerity , hee presumes now hee may bee trusted upon his bare word : and then , without any either reason or authority alledged , or so much as pretended , but on his bare word onely , hee assures the reader , if hee will beleeve him , that they still professe the discipline of the ancient church , and that wee have changed it into a soveraignty of power above generall councells , &c. yet , the candid man , in his vindication , durst not affirm that this pretended power was of faith with us , or held by all ; but onely , p. . alledges , first , that it is maintaind by many ; that is , that it is an opinion onely , and then 't is not his proper task to dispute against it , our own schools and doctours can do that fast enough and afterwards p. . hee tells us , that these who give such exorbitant priviledges to pope's do it with so many cautions and reservations , that th●y signify nothing . so that the bishop , grants that some onely and not all , add this to the pope's authority ; and that this which is added signifies nothing : and yet rails at it here in high terms , as if it were a great matter deserving church-unity should bee broken for it , and claps it upon the whole church . after this hee grants s. peter to have been prince of the apostles , or first mover in the church , in a right sence , as hee styles it : yet tells us , for prevention sake , that all this extends but to a primacy of order . whereas all the world , till my ld d. came with his right sence to correct it , imagin'd , that to move did in a sence right enough , signify to act ; and so , the first mover meant the first acter . wee thought likewise that , when god was call'd primum mouens , the first mover , those words did , in a very right sence , import actiuity and influence ; not a primacy of order onely , as the acute bp. assures us : but his meaning is this , that though all the world hold that to move first , is to act first ; yet that sence of theirs shall bee absolutely wrong , and this onely right , which he and his fellows are pleased to fancie : who are so wonderfully acute , that , according to them , hee that hath onely authority to sit first in council , or some things , ( which is all they will allow s. peter and the pope ) shall , in a right sence , bee said to move first or to bee first mover . i alledged , as a thing unquestionable even by understanding protestāts , that the church of england actually agreed with the church of rome at the time of the separation , in this principle of government , that the bishops of rome , as success●urs of s. peter , inherited his priviledg●s , &c. as is to bee seen p. . by any man who can read english. now , the bishop , who hath sworn to his cause that hee will bee a constant and faithfull prevaricatour , omits the former pa●t of my proposition , and changes the busines from an evident matter of fact and acknowledged by protestants , ( viz : that the church of englands principle was actually such , and such at that time ) into the point and tenet it self , which is question'd and controverted b●tween us . his words are these , p. . thirdly h●e addeth that , [ the bishops of rome , as successours of s. i●e er , inherited his priviledges ; ] whereas hee ought to have rep●esented my words thus , that the principle agreed on by the church of england and the church of rome before the breach was such ; and th●n have told us what hee thought of it , by ●●her expressing a deniall , or ● grant . but positivenes , even in things manifest and acknowledg'd , is a thing th● bishop hates wi●h all his heart : for , were i or noe said to any point , the discourse might proceed rigo●ously upon it , which would marr all the bp voluntary talk . it follows in my words put down by him , p. . that the bishops of rome actually exercised this power ( viz : of first mover in the church ; s. peter's priviledge ) in all those countries which kept communion with the church of rome , that very year wherein this unhappy separation began mee thanks , it is not possible to avoid being absolute here . but , nothing is impossible to the bp. hee either will not speak out at all , or , if hee does , it must bee of no lower a strain than flat contradiction hee tells us , first , that it cometh much short of the truth in one respect : and why ? for the pope's ( saith hee ) exercised much more power in those countries which gave them leave , than ever s. peter pretended to . so that according to the bp. hee did not exercise s. peter's lesser power , because hee exercised a power far greater , that is hee did not exercise s. peter's power , because hee exercised s. peter's power , and much more ; which is as much as to say , totum est minus parte , and more does not contain lesse a hopefull disputant , who chuses rather to run upon such rocks , then to grant that the pope actually govern'd as supreme in those countries which were actually under him a point which it is shamefull to deny , dangerous positively to confess ; and therefore necessary to bee thus blunder'd . secondly , hee tells us , that it is much more short of that universall monarchy , which the pope did then and doth still claim . and why ? for ( saith hee ) as i have already said ( observe the strength of his discourse , his saying is proving ) two third parts of the christian world were not at that time of his communion ; meaning the greeks , armenians , &c. are moderate expressions of shamelesnes sufficient to character this man , who in every line manifests himself in the highest degree deserving them ? our position as put down even by himself was this , that the pope's did actually , then exercise this power in those countries which kept communion with the church of rome ; and the bps answer comes to this , that hee did not exercise it in those countries which kept not communion with the church of rome . but , to give the reader a satisfactory answer even to the bps impertinences , i shall let him see that the pope exercis'd his power at that time even over those countries ; as much as it can bee expected any governour can or should do over revolters , whom hee cannot otherwise reduce . as , then , a governour exercises his power over obedient subjets , by cherising them and ordering them and their affairs soe as may best conduce to their common good ; but cannot exercise it over contumacious and too potent rebells , any other way than by proclaiming them outlaws and incapable of priviledges or protection from the laws of the commonwealth : so , neither could it bee imagi●'d or expected by any rationall man that the pope , in those circumstances , though hee were supposed and granted by both sides law●ull governour ) could exercise power over them in any other way , h●n onely in i●flicting on them ecclesiasticall punishments or censures , and excommunicating or outlawing them from that commonwealth which remain'd obed en● to him ; as he bp. complainingly grant ; hee did . having thus shustled in every tittle of the sta●e of the question , hee accuses his refuter that hee comes not neer the true question at all . can there bee a more candid stating a question and free from all equivocation , than to beg●n with a known matter of fact and acknowle●ge● by bo●h sides ; and thence to conclude those acters , 〈◊〉 is , breakers , schismaticks , unles they can bring ●●ffic●ent reasons to warrant such a breach ? but , let u● exami● a lit●l● the ground of his exception . the true question ( saith hee ) is not , whether the bishop of r●me had any authority in the catholi●e church . good reader ask the bp. whether his refuter , or any catholike , or even moderate protestant , ever mou●d such a question : and , wh●ther it bee not frivolousnes and insincerity in the abstract , to impose on us such as stating of the question ; whenas every child sees , it is not barely his hav●ng any authority , but his having a supreme authority , which is question'd and deba●ed between us and the protestant ? it follows in him immediately , the pope had authority in his diocese , as a bishop , in his province , as a metropolitane , in his patriarchate as the chief of the five protopatriarchs ; and all over , as the bishop of an apostolicall church , or s. peter . where , all the former words are totally besides the purpose , nor ever made the question by us , as the bp. calumniates . but , the last words ▪ which grant the pope had authority all over , as successour of s. peter , deserve consideration and thanks too , if meant really : for , these words grant him an authority more than patriarchall ; nor a ●●y primacy onely but an authori●y all over , that is a power to act as the highest in gods church and in any part of the church , that is , an universall iurisdiction all over or over all the church , at least in some cases . now , in this consists the sustance of the papall authority ; and had they of england retain'd still practically a subjection to this authority , as thus character'd ; they had not been excommunicated upon this score onely . but , the misery is , that this our back-friend , after hee hath given us al● this fair promising language , that the pope's authority is higher than patriarchall , ( as the climax in his discourse signifies ; ) that it is all over or universall ; and lastly , that hee hath this universall authority as hee is successour of s. peter : after all this , i say , if hee been prest home to declare himself ; as before hee granted s. peter the first mover in church , and then told us that , in a right sence , it meant but a primacy of order ; so hee will tell us the same of these flattering expressions , and th●t the words [ authority ] doth not , in a right sence , signify a power to act as a governour , ( though all the world else understand it so ) but onely a right to sit , talk , or walk first : et sic vera rerum nomina amisimus . thus , my refuter hath shown that i stated the question wrong : now , let us hear him state it right . the true question ( saith hee ) is , what are the right bounds and limits of this authority : and then reckons up a company of particularities , some true , most of them co●●erning the extent of the pope's authority i●self and debated amōgst our owne canon-lawyers , some flat lies and calumnies ; as , whether the pope have power to sell palls , pardons , and indulgences , to impose pensions at his pleasure , to infringe the liberties and customes of whole nations , to deprive princes of their realms and absolve their subjects from their allegiance , &c. was ever such stuff brought by a controvertist ? or was ever man soe frontles as to make these the true state of the question between us ; that is , to pretēd that our church holds these things as of faith ? to manifest more the shallownes of my adversary ; the reader may please to take notice of the difference between the substance of the pope's authority , as held by us , and the extent of it the substance of it consists in this , that hee is head of the church , that is , first mover in it , and that hee hath authority to act in it after the nature of a first governour . this is held with us to bee of faith , and acknowledg'd unanimously by all the faithfull as come from christ and his apostles ; so that none can bee of our communion who deny it : nor is this debated at all between catholike & catholike , but between catholike and heretike onely . hence , this is held by our church as a church ; that is , as a multitude receiving it upon their rule of faith , universall attestation of immediate ancestours , as from theirs , and so upwards as from christ ; and not upon criticall debates or disputes of learnedmen . the , extent of this authority consists in determining whether this power of thus acting reaches to these and these particularities or no ; the resolution of which is founded in the deductions of divines , canon-lawyers and such like learnedmen : and , though sometimes some of those points bee held as a common opinion of the schoolmen , and ( as such ) embraced by many catholikes ; yet , not by them as faithfull , that is , as relying ●pon their ancestours , as from theirs , as from christ ; but , as relying upon the learnedmen in canon-law ; and ; implicitely , upon the reasons which they had to judge so and the generality's accepting their reasons for valid : which is as much as to say , such points are not held by a church as a church , no more than it is that there is an element of fire in concavo lunae , or that columbus found out the indies . the points , therefore , are such , that hee who holds or deems otherwise may still bee held one of the church or of the commonwealth of the faithfull : nor bee blameable for holding otherwise , if hee have better reasons for his tenet than those other learned men had for theirs , as long as hee behaves himself quietly in the said commonwealth . perhaps a parallel will clear the matter better . the acknowledgment of the former kings of england to bee supreme governours in their dominions was heretofore ( as wee may say ) a point of civill faith , nor could any bee reputed a good subject who deny'd this ; in the undifputable acknowledgment of which cōsisted the substance of their authority : but , whether they had power to raise ship money , impose subsidies , &c. alone and without a parliament , belong'd to the extent of their authority , was subject to dispute , and the proper task of lawyers ; nor consequently did it make a man an outlaw , or ( as wee may say ) a civill schismatick to disacknowledge such extents of his authority , so hee admitted the authority it self : i concieve the parallell is soe plain , that it will make it 's owne application . this being settled , as i hope it is ; so let it stand a while , till wee make another consideration . a controversy ( in the sence which our circumstances determine it ) is a dispute about faith ; and so a controvertist , as such , ought to impugn a point of f●ith ; that 〈◊〉 hee ought to i● pugn that which is held by a church as a church , or that which is held by a church upon her rule of faith hence , if the government of that church bee held of faith according to it's substance , and not held of faith according to it's extent ; hee ought to impugn it according to the substance of the said government , and not it's extent : otherwise , hee totally prevaricates from the proper office of a controvertist , not impugning faith but opinions , no● that church as a church and his adversary ; but , falsly supposing himself as it were one of that company , and to hold all the substance of it's authority , hee sides with one part of the true subjects and disputes against the other , in a point indifferent to faith , unconcerning his duty . these things , reader , observe with attention ; and then bee thine own judge , whether hee play not the mountebank with thee instead of the controvertist , who , in his former book , pretended to vindicate the church of england ( which renounced the substance of this authority ) by impugning the extent of it onely : and here , undertaking to correct his refuter and state the question rightly , first grants , in very plain but wrong mean't terms , the whole question , to wit that the pope hath authority over the whole church as successour of s. peter ; and then tells thee , that the true question is about the extent of it and what are the right limits and bounds of this authority , which kind of questions yet hee knows well enough are debated by the obedient and true members of that commonwealth whence hee is outlaw'd and which hee pretends to impugn . his th page presents the reader with a great mistake of mine : and 't is this , that i affirmed it was and is the constant beleef of the casholike world , ( by which i mean all in communion with the church of rome , whom onely i may call catholikes ) that these two principles were christ's owne ordination recorded in scrpture . whereas , hee cannot but know , that all our doctour●s de facto did and still do produce places of scripture to prove that former principle , to wit that tradition is the rule of faith , as also to prove s. peter's higher power over the apostles : nor is it new that the succession of pastours , till wee all meet in the vnity of glory , should bee christ's own ordination , and recorded there likewise : nor can i devise upon what grounds hee and his fellow-bishops of england , who hold scripture onely the rule of faith , can maintain their authority to bee iure divino , unles they hold likewise that it bee there recorded , and bee christ's ordination , that following pastours succed into the authority of their predecessours . but the pretended mistake lies here , that whereas i said the bishops of rome inherited this priviledge from s. peter , m●aning that those who are bp● of rome being s. peter's successours , inherited this power ; hee will needs take mee in a reduplicative sence , as if i spoke of the bishop of rome , as of rome : and then hee runs on , wildly and boldly challenging mee that i cannot show out of scripture that s. peter was at rome , that our own authours say s. peter might have dy'd at antioch , and the succession into his power have remain'd th●re , &c. answers soe frivolous , soe totally impertinet to the point in hand , that i wonder how any man can have the patience to read such a trifler or the folly as to think him worth heeding . to omitt that hee pick't these words , which hee impugns here , out of a paragraph following a leaf after , which totally concern'd a dangerous and fundamentall point , as shall presently bee seen ; and so , it importing him to neglect it , hee cull'd out and mistakingly glanc't at these few loose words , which hee thought by a device of his own he could best deal with , for a colour of his necessary negligence . what hee adds of the council of chalcedon hath been answer'd an hundred times over , and by mee , schism disarm . p. . . &c. nor deserves any reiteration , till hee urge it farther ; especially being soe rawly put down . onely because hee builds upon their giving equall priviledges to constantinople ▪ without manifesting what those priviledges were : wee shall take leave to think that , as rome still remain'd first in order , ( as his late words granted , and protestants confess ) notwithstanding those equall priviledges ; so , for any thing hee knows , it might still remain superiour in iurisdiction ; and , till hee evince that priviledges in that place mean't iurisdiction , to which the word will bee very loath , hee is far from bringing it to our question , or to any purpose . his next task is a very substantiall and important one , striking at the rule and root of all our faith : yet , by voluntary mistaking no less than every syllable of it , hee quickly makes clear work with it . hee was told , that wee hold our first principle by this manifest evidence , that still the latter age could not bee ignorant of what the former believed , and , as long as it adhered to that method , nothing could bee alter'd in it which the wily bp. answers , by telling us that the tradition of some particular persons or some particular churches , in particular points or opinions of an inferiour nature , which are neither soe necessary to hee known , nor firmly believed , nor so publikely and uniuersally professed , nor derived downwards from the apostolicall age by such unin●or upted succession , doth produce no such cer●a●nty either of evidence or adherence . where . first , hee knows , wee mean tradition of all the churches in communion with the see of rome , that is , of all who have not renounced this rule of immediate tradition : for all who differ from her never pretended this immedi●te delivery , for those points in which they differ from her , but receded from that rule ; as the apology for tradition hath manifested , indeed plain reason may inform us : it being impossible and self condemning , where there was an vnity before , for the beginners of a novelty to pretend their immediate fathers had taught them that which the whole world sees they did not . now , the bp. talkes of traditions of some particular persons , or some particular churches : desirous to make his readers believe wee rely on such a tradition and so defective as hee expresses ; that is , hee makes account our pretended tradition must not bee styl'd universall , unles it take in those persons and those churche also who have formerly renounced and receded from this rule of tradition . which is as much as if hee had said , a thing cannot bee absolutely white , unles it bee black too . secondly , wee speake of believing , that is , of points of faith : but , the bp. talkes of opinions , and those not concerning ones neither , but ( as hee styles them ) opinions of an inferiour nature . and then , having , by this sleight , changed faith into opinion , hee runs giddily forwards , telling us fine things concerning questionable and controverted points , of opinions in the schools , and how hard a thing it is to know which opinion is most current , &c. is not this sincerely done and strongly to the purpose ? thirdly , hee cants in these words [ so necessary to bee known . ] i ask , are they necessary or no ? if they bee not necessary , why does hee seem to grant they are , by saying onely that they are not so necessary ? but , if they bee necessary , then why does hee call them opinions onely , and that too of an inferiour nature ? can that bee necessary to bee held or known , which hath no necessary grounds to make it either held or known ? opinions have neither . fourthly , hee speaks of points not so publike●y professed : whereas , every point of faith is publike and notorious ; being writ in the hearts of the faithfull by the teaching of their parents and pastouts , sign'd by all their expressions , and seal'd by their actions : nor is there any point of faith ( for example , in which the protestant differs from us , which is not thus visible and manifesting our church now , and was then when they first broke from that doctrine of their immediate ? ●ncestours . fifthly , hee speaks of points not universally professed : that is , if any heretick , receding from immediate tradition of his fathers , shall start a novelty , & propagate it to posterity ▪ the tradition and profession of this point in the church must not bee said to bee universall , because that heretick professes and delivers otherwise : and so , socinians , by the bps argument , may assist their cause and say , it was not universally professed that christ was god , because the arians anciently profest otherwise . the like service it would do an arian or any other heretick , to alledge ( as the bp. does ) that the christian world must bee vnited , otherwise the tradition is not certain ; for , as long as that heretick has a mind to call himself and his friends christians ( which hee will ever do , ) so long hee may cheaply cavill against the authority of the whole church . but , empty words shall not serve the bps turn : let him either show us some more certain rules to know who are christians , who not , that is , some certainer rule of faith than is the immediate & practicall delivery of a world of fathers to a world of sons : o● else let him know , that all those who have receded from this immediate delivery , ( as did acknowledgd'ly , the protestants at the time of their reformation , as also the greeks , arians , &c. in those points of faith in which they differ from us ) are not truly , but improperly , call'd christians ; neither can they claim any share in tradition or expect to bee accounted fellow-deliverers of faith , who have both formerly renounced that rule and broach't now doctrines against it , which like giddy whirlpools run crossely to that constantly-and directly flowing stream . lastly , hee requires to the evidence and certainty of tradition , that it bee derived downwards from the apostles , by such an uninterrupted succession . wee are speaking of the rule of faith itself , that is , of tradition or the deriving points of faith from the apostles immediately from age to age , ( or , if hee pleases , from ten years to ten years ; and wee tell him that this rule is a manifest evidence , because 't is impossible the latter age should bee ignorant of what the foregoing age beleeved : hee runs away from tradition , or the delivering , to points delivered , and tells us they must come downwards from the apostles uninterruptedly , ere they can bee certain : whereas , this point is confest by all and avouched most by us , who place the whole certainty of faith in this uninterrupted succession . the point in question is , whether there be any certain way to bring a point downwards uninterruptedly from the apostles , but this of tradition or attestation of immediate fathers to sons ? or rather , wee may say , 't is evident from the very terms , that it could not come down uninterruptedly bur by this way : since , if it came not down , or were not ever delivered immediately , the descent of it was mediate or interrupted , and so it came not down uninterruptedly . the like voluntary mistake hee runs into , when hee calls the apostles creed a tradition : since , hee knows wee speak of the method or way of conveying points of faith downwards ; not , of the points convey'd . but , i am glad to see him acknowledge that the delivery of the apostles creed by a visible practice is an undeni●ble evidence that it came from the apostles ; if hee reflect , hee shall find that there is scarce one point of fai●h , now controverted between us and protestants , but was recommended to his first reformers by immediate forefathers as derived from the apostles , in a practice as daily visible , as is the apostles creed ; and , that the lawfulnes of invoking saincts for their intercession , the lawfulnes of images , praying for the dead , adoration of the b. sacrament , &c. and , in particular , the subjection to the pope as supream head , were as palpable in most manifest and frequent circumstances , as was that creed by being recited in churches and professed in baptism . after i had set down the first part of the matter of fact , to wit , that , at the time of the reformation , the church of england did actually agree with the church of rome in those two principles ; i added the second part of it in these words , it is noe lesse evident that , in the dayes of edward the sixth , q elizabeth and her successours , neither the former rule of vnity in faith , nor this second of vnity in government have had any power , in that congretion , which the protestants call the english church . the bp. who must not seem to understand the plainest words lest hee should bee obliged to answer them , calls this down right narration of a matter of fact my inference ; and , for answer , tells us hee holds both those rules . well shuffled my ld pray let mee cut . either you mean you hold now the sence of those rules , that is , the thing wee intend by them ; and then you must say you hold the pope's supremacy , and the tradition of immediate forefathers , both which the world knows and the very terms evince you left of to hold at your reformation : or else you must mean that you hold onely the same words taken in another sence , that is , quite another thing ; and then you have brought the point , as your custome is , to a meere logomachy , and shown yourself a downright and obstinate prevaricatour , in answering you hold those words , in stead of telling us whether you hold the thing or noe . possum-ne ego ex te exculpere hoc verum ? the principle of vnity in government to those churches in communion with the see of rome immediately before your reform , was de facto the acknowledgment of the pope's authority as head of the church ; the principle of vnity in faith was , then , de facto the ineheriring from , or , the immediate tradition of ancestours : de fac●o you agreed with those of the church of rome in those two principles ; de facto you have now renounced both those principles and hold neither of them ; therefore you have de facto broke both those bonds of vnity ; therefore de facto you are flat schismaticks . as for what follows that there is a fallacy in logick ●all'd of more interrogations than one , i answer that there is in deed such a fallacy in logick , but not in my discourse who put no interrogatory at all to him . as for the two positions which so puzzle him , the former , of s. peter's being supreme more than meerly in order , hee knows well is a point of my faith , which i am at present defe●ding against him , and have sufficiently exprest my self , p. . l. ● &c. by the words first mover ●o mean a primacy to act first in the church , and not to sit first in order onely . the latter point is handled in this treatise in its proper place . no sincerer is his . page than the former : i onely put down , p. what our tenet was , and hee calls my bare narration my second inference ; and , when hee hath done , answers it onely with voluntary railing , too silly to merit transcribing or answering . the matter of fact being declared , that actually now they of the church of england had renounced both the said principles ; it was urged next , that , his onely way to clear his church from schism is , either by disproving the former to bee the necessary rule of vnity in faith , or the latter the necessary bond of government ? for , if they : bee such principles of vnity , it follows inevitably that they , having broke them both , ( as the matter of fact evinces ) are perfect schismaticks ; since a schismatick signifies one who breaks the vnity of a church , what sayes my ld d. to this ? this seems to press very close to the soul of the question , and so deserves clearing hee clears it , by telling us wee are doubly mistaken , and that hee is resolu'd to disprove neither ; though , unles hee does this , the very position of the matter of fact doth alone call him ●chismatick . but , why is hee , in these his endeavours to vindicate his church from schism , so backwards to clear this concerning point ? why ? first , because they are the persons accused : by which method , no rebell ought to give any reason why hee did so ; because hee is accused of rebellion by his lawfull governour . very learnedly . now , the truth is wheresoever there is a contest , each side accuses the other , and each side again defends it self against the the others accusations : but , that party is properly call'd the defendant , against which accusations or objections were first put ; and that the opponēt or aunswerer which first mou'd the accusations . it being then most manifest , that you could not with any face have pretended your reform , but you must first accuse your former actuall governour of vsurpation , your former rule ▪ of faith of erroneousnes : it follows evidently , that wee were the parties first accused , that is , the defendants ; you , the accusers or opponents : for , whoever substracts himself from a former actuall governour , and accuses not that governour of something which hee alledges for his motive of rising ; that person , eo ipso , accuses himself : since then wee never accused you of breaking from our goverment till you had broke from it ; and , you could not have broke from it , without first accusing the say'd government , and objecting some reason against it , as the motive of your breaking : you must therefore oppose , and alledge those reasons , and show them sufficient ones ; else , your very fact of renouncing that former government doth unavoidable convince you of schism . next , hee tells us , that if the proof did rest on their sides , yet hee does not approve of my advice . and , i dare swear in the bps behalf that hee never spoke truer word in his life ; and will bee bound for him that hee shall never follow any advice that bids him speak home to the point or meddle with such a method as is likely to bring a speedy end to the controversy . make an heretike speak out ( saith s. augustin ) and you have h●lf-confuted him but , what reason gives hee why hee disapproves of my advise ? will hee shew us a more easy , efficacious or likely way to bring the dispute to a finall conclusion . his reason is , because , saith hee , it is not wee who have alter'd the doctrine or discipline which christ lef● in the church but they , &c. and so runs rambling forwards with his own sayings to the end of the section . all the world sees and dr. h. acknowledges you have alter'd the discipline left in the church of england in k. h's dayes ; and now you are to give a reason to iustify this alteration . you tel us you have made none . i am not ignorant of the dexterity with which you have shuffled a reserve into those words , [ which christ left in the church ] to persuade the reader the discipline of the church of england in h the ●th's d●yes was not the same which christ left to his church . but , i prest no more than that it was used then as a thing held to have been inherited from christ ▪ and that it was then and still is a bond of vnity to all ●hose that communicated in it ; and , therefore , that you now reiecting it must either shew it to bee no necessary bond of vnity , or necessarily remain convinced of destroying vnity , that , of schism . mee thinks a man who pretends to answer should either say i , or no ; they are usvally the returns wee make to questions but s austin's saying is oracle ; no speaking out , hee thanks you . hee knew well enough that either part of the contradiction own'd would have some means to go about to disprove ; which , by destroying all doubt in the case , would have destroy'd his own and the authority of all those who speak against evidence . altum silentium is all you can get from him ; onely , in the hard streight hee is driven to of either saying nothing or nothing to the purpose , hee tels you hee is not obliged to answer , because hee has not alter'd the discipline left by christ to his church of england in k. h. the th's dayes , of which my objection runs , 't is false even to ridiculousnes ; for , i cannot imagin hee fancies his authority can so much over sway the simplicity of any reader his book will meet with , as to hope to make him beleeve the church of england in his lops time had the same discipline she had in k. h's dayes . if hee mean of the discipline left by christ to the primtive times , 't is no less false and more impertinēt : first ▪ in answering of the primitive times , to an objection concerning the time of h. the . secondly , whenas i begun with an evident matter of fact , beyond alldispute , and thence grounded a progress to a decisive discourse , in skipping aside to a point mainly disputable between us , in stead of answering to that evidence , and , which is still weaker , by thinking to carry that whole matter by barely saying it . and , if the reader please now to review the bishops first section with a narrower eye , i am confident hee will percieve that ( besides that hee hath not said a word in answer to us ) above three quarters of the said section is made up of this stuff : to wit , of reuolving and repeating over his own tenets and the very question , and talking any thing upon his own authority without a syllable of proof ; and , twice or thrice , where hee pretends any , they are mere falsifications & abuses ; as hath been shown . i must request the reader , whom the love of truth may invite to seek satisfaction in perusing a book of this nature , to right himself the bp. and mee , by giving a glance back upon my words , p. . . where i affirmed that it would appear that schism was iustly charged upon his church with undeniable evidence of faith , by two things , viz : out of the very position , of the case , and out of the nature of his exceptions . how hee hath reply'd to the first , which is the position of the case , hath already been shown : to wit , that hee would not speak one positive word , i or no to a plain matter of faith ; nor bee willing to step forwards one step by answering directly to any thing which neerly concern'd the question ; but stood continually capering and flickhering up and down in the air , at the pleasure of his own fancy . as for the second thing , to wit , that it would appear out of the nature of 〈◊〉 exceptions ; i show'd that hee , in reciting my charge , had purposely omitted that as loath his exceptions should bee brought to the test of reason , or have their sufficiency examin'd . and , to let thee see that hee did this purposely , looke schism disarm'd p. . and thou shalt see the whole paragraph , which concern'd that second point , omitted , without any reply pretended . i shall therefore repeat it again here , and leave it to the bishop's second thoughts . they must remember how their forefathers , who began that which they call reformation , were themselves of this profession before their pretended reform . they ought to weigh what reasons their ancestours should have had to introduce such an alteration . they must confess themselves guilty in continuing the breach , unles they can alledge causes sufficient to have begun it , had the same ancient religion descended to these dayes . for , the constant beleef of the catholike world was , at the time of our division , and still is , that these principles are christ's own ordination , recorded in scripture , derived to us by the strongest evidences that our nature is capable of to attain assurance what was done in antiquity : evidences inviolable by any humane either poweror proof , except perfect and rigorous demonstration ; to which our adversaries doe not so much as pretend ; and , therefore , without farther dispute , remain unanswerably convicted of schism . i suppose i need not inform the reader , what service it would have done to the controversy , and how necessary it was for my ld d. to tell us , whether his reasons were rigourously evidencing or demonstrative ; or else , that less than demonstrative reasons , that is , probable ones would serve : this would quickly have decided the busines . for , nothing is easier than to show , that a wrongly pretended demonstration does not conclude evidently or convince that the thing is ; nothing easier , than to show , out of the very terms , that a probability cannot rationally convince the understanding : but , the danger of this disadvantage and the fear of this quick decision is the reason his ld. will tell us neither . thus , protestant reader , thou seest how dextrously thy bp. hath behaved himself in answering both parts of our charge against him ; and which alone fundamentally concern our question : to wit , how hee hath , by shuffling about , avoided to say a positive word to one ; and totally omitted so much as to mention the other . and this , in the bishops right sence , is call'd vindicating the church of england and replying to s. w. sect. . how my ld of derry goes about to acquit the protestants both ( a tanto ) and ( a toto ) as hee styles it : grounding his violent pr●sumptions of their innocency on contradictions both to common reason and his good friend dr. h. on his own bare word that his party are saints ; and his non-sencicall plea that those who began first to separate from our church , were , ere that , united to it . hitherto i have been somewhat larger in replying , than i intended , because the former points were fundamentally concerning and totally decisive of the question . his exceptions ( since hee dares not own them for demonstrations , ) are , consequently , in our case , trifles , toyes , and nothing to the purpose : and therefore , as they cannot challenge any at all , so i ought not to wrong my self in giving them too large an answer ; unles in those places where they touch upon a point that is more important . in the first place hee maintains , that , it many wayes acquits the protestants continuing the breach , because , not they , but the roman-catholikes themselves did make the first separation . wee will omit the perfect non-sence of this plea ; which equally acquits any villain in the world , who insists in the steps of his forefather villains . for , may not hee argue against honest men by the same logick , and say , that they are acquitted ; because , not villains , but they who were honest men formerly , begun first the villany : it being equally infallible and necessary , that hee who first turn'd naught , was , ere hee turn'd so , good before ; as it is , that hee who first separated was , ere hee separated , united to that church , that is , a roman catholike . but i have say'd enough of this , part . p. . . therefore : let us now examin his reasons , why this many wayes ( as hee sayes ) acquits them . first , hee sayes , it is a violent presumption of our guilt , that our own best friends did this . the word best might have been left out : they were ever accounted better friends who remain'd in their former faith ; and the other bps look't upon as schismaticks , by the obedient party . but yet , it might seem some kinde of argument against us , did those , who were friends in all other respects , voluntarily oppose us in this , and out of a free and unbiassed choice ; as the bp. must pretend , else hee does nothing . let us examin this then . your own good friend , dr. h. shall give you satisfaction in that point ( of schism p. ) where , speaking of this act of the clergy in renouncing the authority of the roman see , ( the palpable truth obliging him ) hee hath these words , it is easy to beleeve , that nothing but the apprehension of dangers , which hung overthem by a premunire incurred by them , could probably have inclined them to it . thus hee . the , violent presumption , then of our guilt , which you imagin concluded hence , is turn'd into a iust presumption , or rather a confest evidence , of the king 's violent cruelty and their fearfull weaknes . rare grounds doubtles , to acquit you for being led by their authority , or following their example . secondly , hee tells us that , though it do not alwaies excuse a toto , from all guilt , yet it excuses a tanto , and lessens the guilt ; to bee misled by the examples and authority of others , &c. let us examin this , as apply'd to the protestants . how could they think their example to bee follow'd or their authority to bee rely'd on , whom they confess to have done what they did out of fear , that is , out of passion , and not out of the pure verdict of reason & conscience ? again , if their example were to bee follow'd , why do not they follow it rather in repenting of their schism , and renouncing it ; as those bps did after the king's death ? since , the imminent fear , which aw'd them at the time of their fall and during the king's life , ioyn'd with their retraction after his death , of what they had done , render it a thousand times more manifest that their conscience took part with the obedient side , had they had courage enough to stand to it . moreover , sometimes , the first beginners of a fault may bee less culpable then their followers ; according to the degrees of the provocations which press upon their weaknesses . theirs wee have seen to bee no less than the expectation of death and destruction ; such was the violence of the king 's in humane cruelty , and their present disadvantageous case which expos'd them to it . your con●inuance in schism , compar'd to the motiv●s of their fault , is , in a manner , gratis ; all your reason , heretofore , of thus continuing being for your livings and interest ; and , at present , onely a vain-glorious itch to approve your selves to your party for braue fellows ; in railing against the pope and defending a chimera bom●inans in vacuo ( the church of england ) found no where save in the imaginary space of your own fancies ▪ thirdly , hee assures us , that , in this case , it doth acquit them not onely a tanto , but , a toto , from the least degree of guilt ; as long as they carefully seek after truth , and do not violate the dictates of their own conscience : and then bids mee , if i will not beleeve him , beleeve s. austin ; who sayes , that they who defend not their false opinions with pertinacity , but are ready to embrace truth and correct their errours when they finde them , are not hereticks . i answer , s. austin sayes well ; onely obstinacy makes an heretick : and so far wee beleive him . but , does s. austin say that bp. bramhall ad his fellows are not obstinate , or that they neglect not to seek , not refuse not to embrace truth found ; and , by consequence , are not hereticks and schismaticks ? the generall words of the father signify nothing to your purpose ; unles they bee apply'd to your party : and who makes the application ? the bp. himself : and upon what grounds ? upon his own bare word ; and then cries , they are totally acquited from schism : that is , hee makes an acquittance himself for himself ; writes it with his own hand , set his own seal to it , and subscribes it with his own name ; and then brings it into the court to clear himself of the whole debt , and that by his own authority . reader , trust neither side as they barely testify of themselves : but , trust what evident reason and thine own eyes tell thee . reason tells thee , 't is evident they renounc't those tenets which were the principles of vnity to the former church both in faith and government : reason tells thee , that such a fact is , in it's own nature , schismaticall ; unles they can produce sufficient motives to iustify it : reason tells thee , that noe motives less than certain , that is , demonstrative ones , can suffice to alledge for such a revolt ; which yet they never pretend to : therefore , reason tells thee and any one who understands morality and nature , as evidently as that two and three are five , that their revolt did not spring from the pure light of reason ; but , from an irrationall principle , that is ▪ from passion and vice : and , so , wee cannot but judge them obstinate and , consequently , schismaticks ; unles they can show us these sufficient , that is , demonstrative reasons to excuse their , otherwise manifestly schismaticall fact : or , if wee do , wee must renounce the light of our own reason to do them an undeserved favour . thus much in generall . now , as for this bp. in particular ; thou hast seen him shuffle up and down when hee should have answer'd to the charge objected : thou hast seen him wilfully mistake all over , to evade answering : thou hast seen him totally omit so much as to mention one half of the charge , and totally to avoid the whole import , nay , every tittle of the other . there needs nothing but thine own eyes , directed by any first section , to make all this evident to thee . 't is by these evident testimonies of thine eyes , these undeniable verdicts of thy reason , reader , by which thou must judge of these men , whether they bee carefully inquisitive after & readily embrace the truth , or rather bee obstinate schismaticks ; and not by the dark holes of their consciences ; which they assert to bee sincere by their bare sayings ouely ; obtrude them , thus weakly authoriz'd upon they easy credulity , and then tell thee thou must beleeve s. austin that they are guiltles and acquitted from schism . in the second place , i glanced at the inconsequence of his proof , that those bishops were not protestants because they persecuted protestants ; instancing in some sects of protestants , which persecuted others . hee replies : what then were watham and heath , &c. all protestants ? then , my ld ( which is onely the question between us ) your argument was naught : for , let them bee accidentally what they will , you cannot conclude them no protestants from the persecuting protestants ; as long as 't is shown and known , that those who were protestants did the same . secondly , if they were protestants , hee demands , of which sect they were ? i answer , that , as , between every species of colour which wee have names for , there are hundreds of middle degrees which have no names ; or , as , in a perpetuall motion , there are millions of unnam'd proportions sow'd all along in it's progress , to whose quantities wee can give no particular names : so , within the latitude of the name protestant or reformer and every sect of it , there are thousands of others soe petite and minute , that they have not deserved a name from the world . i see the bp. mistakes us and his own sect ; for hee makes account the protestant profession and it's subordinate sects are fixt things , which may bee defined : whereas experience teaches us , that the fellow in the fable might as easily have taken measure of the moon , to fit her right with a coat , as one can imagin one notion to fit the word protestant . 't is ever in motion , like the rowling sea , and therefore hath such an alloy of no ens in it , that it admits noe positive definition ; but , must bee described , like a privation in order to the former habit . no-papist and a reformer is the best character i can make of it . since , then , those bishops were reformers and no-papists , ( for they renounced the pope's authority which gives this denomination , & reformed in that point : ) it follows , that they were protestants , though the new-born thing was not as yet christend with any other name than that common one of reformation ▪ but , my ld. d. makes account that none can bee a protestant , unles hee hold all which the now-protestants doe : whereas , 't is against nature and reason , to expect that the protestants could at first fall into all their present negative tenets ; nemo repentè fit turpissimus . the former faults must by degrees get countenance , by growing vulgar & quotidian , an by little & little digest their shamefulnes ; ere the world could bee prepared to receive or men's minds apt and audacious enough to broach new ones . first , they renounc't one point , then another , and so forwards , till at lenghth they have arrived to quakerism ; which therefore is the full-grown fruit of the reformation . thirdly , whereas i told him , those bishops , by renouncing the pope , held the most essentiall point of their reformation , and so had in them the quintessence of a protestant : the bp. first , calls this , our reformation ; as if wee had not ever held them schismaticks , that is , separated from our church , for doing so . since , then , they went out from us , by that fact ; they left to bee of us : and , if they were not of us , how was it our reformation , in any other sence , than as the rebellion of those who were true subjects before is to bee imputed to those who remain true subjects still ? was ever common sence so abus'd ? next , hee braggs , that , then ( to wit , if renouncing the pope bee essentiall to a protestant ) the primitive church were all protestants ; which is onely sayd , and flatly false : that then , all the greci●n , russian , armenian , abyssen christians are protestants at this day ; which is onely said , again , and partly true , partly false , and that which is true onely steads him soe far , as to evince that the protestants are not the onely men but have fellow-schismaticks : and lastly , that then , they want not store of protestants even in the bosome of the roman church it self ; which ( to speak moderately ) is an impudent falshood , and a plain impossibility . for , who ere renounces the substance of the pope's authority and his being head of the church , doth , ipso facto , renounce the rule of vnity of government in our church , and , by consequence , the rule of vnity of faith , which grounds and asserts the former ; that is , such a man renounces and breaks from all the vnity of our church , and , so , becomes totally disunited from our church : now , how one , who is totally disunited and separated from the whole body of our church , can bee intimately united to her still , no understanding but the bp s can reach ; which , as mithridates could use poison for his daily food , can , without difficulty , digest contradictions , and findes them more connatural and nutritive to his cause than the solidest demonstrations . now , if my l d d. bee not yet satisfy'd with my reasons , p. . that the renouncing the pope is essentiall to protestantism ; to which yet hee is pleased to give no answer : i send him to learn it of his friend , dr. h. who ( of schism p. . l. . ) seems even to strain sence it felf to express this ; calling this disclaiming the pope's power tbe bottome upon which the foundation of reformation was laid , that is , the foundation of their foundation , their fundamentall of fundamentalls . now then , how those bishops should not bee then protestants , who held the fundamentall of fundamentalls of protestantism , passes my skill to explicate , and , as i am persuaded , my l ds , too . sect. . how my l d of derry endeavours to clear his church from schism , by bringing protestants to speak in their own cause , nay the very act or statute for which wee accuse them , as an undeniable testimony for them . likewise , how hee produces for his chief plea a position opposit both to his own and our party's acknowledgment , nay , to the very eysight of the whole world ; twisting in it self a multitude of most direct contradictions ; and , lastly , quite annihilating at once all the papists in the world . his third section pretends to make good his second grownd for dividing from the church ; which was this ; because , in the separation of england from rome , there was no now law made , but onely their ancient liberties vindicated . this i calld ( as i could do no less ) notoriously false , and impudence it self ; alledging that a law was made , in h. the th's time , and an oath invented , by which it was given the king to bee head of the church , and to have all the power which the pope did , at that time , possess in england . hee asks , if this bee the language of the roman schools ? no , my l d , it is and ought to bee the language of every sincere man who bears any respect to truth , shame , or honesty , against those who are profest and sworn enemies of all three ; in case his circumstances have put him upon the task to lay such persons open and confute them . hee appeals to any indifferent christian judge . i decline not the tribunal ; nay more , i shall bee willing to stand to the award of the most partiall protestant living , who hath but so much sincerity as to acknowledge the sun's shining at noonday , or that the same thing cannot both bee & not bee at once . but. first , hee goes about to acquit himself , by confessing that hee sayd no new law was made then ; but denying that hee said no new statute was made . wee will not wrangle with him about the words ; onely , i say , if there were something new , it was new ; and , a statute , made and approved by the king and his parliament , ( as this was , ) wee englishmen use to term a law : if then there were a new statute made ( as hee confesses , ) i concieve i have not wrong'd in the least the common language of england , to call it a new law . but , his meaning is , that king h. the th did noe new thing when hee renounced the pope's authority , but what had been done formerly ; and therefore . secondly , hee quotes fitz-herbert and my lord cook , who say , that this statute was not operative to create a new law , but declarative to restore an ancient law : that is , hee quotes two of his own party to prove hee sayd right ; and two protestants to speak in behalf of protestants . convincing proofs , doubtles against us . thirdly , hee promises to make it appear undeniably . whence , or from what authority ? from the very statute it self ; which sayes , that england is an empire , and that the king as head of the body politick , consisting of the spirituality and temporality , hath plenary power to render finall iustice for all matters . that is , hee quotes the schismaticall king himself and his schismaticall parliament , ( who made this statute , ) to speak in their own behalfs . does such a trifler deserve a reply ? who , in a dispute against us , cites the authorities of those very persons against whom wee dispute ; nay , that very act of theirs which wee are challenging to have been schismaticall : and relies upon them for undeniable testimonies . fourthly , hee alledges another statute , made in the . of king h. the th : the best hee could pick out , you may bee sure ; yet , there is not a syllable in it concerning spirituall iurisdiction ; directly , that is , not a syllable to his purpose . 't is this , the crown of england hath been so free at all times , that it hath been in no earthly subjection ; but immediately subjected to god in all things touching it's regality , and to no other ; and ought not to bee submitted to the pope . wee are disputing about spirituall iurisdiction , and whether it were due to the pope : and , the bp. brings a statute which fpeaks of the crown of england it self , as not to bee submitted to the pope , as touching it's regality ; that is , a statute which expresly speaks of temporall iurisdiction . hee tells us , that ecclesiasticall greivances are mention'd in that statute ; but sleightly omits so much as to name them , much less to urge them ; which were they worth it , wee may bee sure hee would have done with a triumph . and , besides , hee knows wee hold every good king is to take order to see ecclesiasticall grievances remedy'd , and the canons of the church observ'd : nay , hee knows ( if hee knows any thing ) our own lawyers grant that ecclesiasticall affairs sometimes fall under temporall power indirectly ; as , on the other side , temporall affairs fall indirectly under the ecclesiasticall . yet , that there is any more than this , nay even so much in this statute my l d d. hath not shown us ; and , if wee will bee judged by the words of the statute which hee cites , they look quite another way . but , what matters it what this statute sayes ? being made two years after his unlawfull marriage with anna bullon : which was the source of all his rebellion ; intended , in all likelihood , when that match was made up . as for his pretence that i conceal'd some of his particulars ; hee knows , i undertook no more than to answer the substance , and to show that such kindes of particularities were not worth alledging : as i did in this very place , and shall do again presently more amply . fifthly , hee quarrells with mee for calling his authorities , meer allegations , which hee tells us are authentick records , &c. whereas my words were onely these , ( p. . l. . ) that hee brought diverse allegations , in which the pope's pretences were not admitted , &c. now , i concieve , a record or any other authority alledged , is an allegation ; which was the word i vsed : the word [ meer ] was meerly his own fiction , to gain an occasion to cavill ; as the place now cited , where my words are found , will inform the readers eyes . these straws being stept over , with which the learned bp. thought to block up our passage ; wee come to the point it self . whether king h. the th did any more than his ancestours . my l d of d. in his vindication ; to show hee did no more or made no new law , gathers up instances from our former laws and reiterates them here , ( though sometimes hee uses a phrase louder than h●s proofs ) how the pope's were curb'd or limited in their pretences . wee answer'd , that , to limit an authority implies an admittance of it , in cases to which the restraints extend not : hee replies , that this ( meaning those laws ) was not meerly to limit an authority ; but to deny it ( p. . l. . ) yet , in the next page , hee denies not equivalent laws in france , spain , germany , italy , and , in his ( vindication ( p. . l. . . &c. ) hee affirms that the like laws may bee found in germany , poland , france , spain , italy , sicily , and , if wee will trust padre paolo , in the papacy it self . these things being put , granted , and confest , from his own words , i shall now appeal , even to the bp s best and bosom-friend , whether impudence was not a moderate character for that man's genius or humour , who should go about to pretend that king h. the th did no more in this particular , that is , renounced the pope's authority no more than his ancestour kings had done before him . for. first , this is opposite to the common notion and generall opinion of the whole world , both catholicks , protestants , puritans , and of what ever sect or sort : who ever deem'd henry the th to bee the first king of england who renounced the pope's supremacy and challenged it to himself : nor had they ever that conciet of france , spain , italy , &c. in which , notwithstanding , the bp. grants equivalent laws to the former laws of england , to which ( according to him ) k. h. superadded nothing . this particularity , i say , in k. h. the th all the world , as far as i ere heard , always held in their free and naturall thoughts : though , when they are put to it to defend a desperate cause , artifice wrongs nature and puts some of their non-plust controvertists to assert and maintain the most open absurdities . secondly , it is , in particular , against the confession and profession of his own party , the protestants ; who sing halleluiahs incessantly to this happy time , in which england was freed from the yoke of rome : which is an evident argument of their pretence , that , till now , they groan'd under this yoke ; that is , that , till now , the pope's headship was acknowledg'd here ; and , by consequence , that k. h. the th did more than his ancestours did formerly , when hee shook it of . thirdly , this position contradicts in terms their reformation in this point of the pope's supremacy , which yet rings in every man's ears and is confest by themselves : for , it is impossible and contradictory there should bee a reformation in any thing which was not otherwise before . it was , therfore , otherwise in england before k. h. the th's time , notwithstanding all these former power-limiting laws alledged by the bp. and consequently , 't is evident from the very terms , that k. h. superadded to these laws in renouncing the pope's authority ; and that the contrary position is most absurd , impossible and contradictory . fourthly , it being confest by themselves , and particularly by dr. h. ( of schism p. . ) in these very words , for the matter of fact , it is acknowledg'd that , in the reign of k. h. the th , the papall power in ecclesiasticall affairs was , both by acts of convocation of the clergy and by statutes or acts of parliament , cast out of this kingdome . this , i say , being confest ; and it being also evident in terms , that nothing can bee said to bee cast out of a place unles before it were in it : 't is likewise evident in terms , that this power was in england before , notwithstanding the former laws , cited by my l d d. then in power in this country : and , that those statutes and acts of parliament , made by k. h. which cast it out , did some new thing against that authority , that is , did create new laws , and not onely declare the old . fifthly , since , according to him , these laws made by h. the th did no more than the former laws , those former laws also must bee pretended to have cast out the pope's supremacy , and to have begun a reformation : which yet wee never heard pretended , and hee must show us when and how this authority of the pope in england twinklingly went out and in again ; otherwise it could never bee said to bee cast out a fresh in k. h's reign . sixthly , this position of his is particularly opposite , also , to the common consent of all catholike countries , ( in which notwithstanding the bp. affirms there are found equivalent laws ; ) who all look't on k. h. the th , after those pope renouncing acts , as a schismatick , and on england , both then and ever since , as schismaticall . now , that they should esteem and abhor england as schismaticall , for doing the same things themselves also did , is against common sence and impossible . seventhly , since ( iust vindication , p. . l. . ) hee quotes padre paulo , that the like laws were to bee found in the papacy it self : and 't is perfect non-sence to affirm that , in the papacy , of which the pope is both spirituall and temporall governour , hee should not bee held for head of the church : 't is most manifest that the like laws in other places , and in particular amongst our ancestours in england , did not take away from him that headship in ecclesiasticall matters ; and , by consequence , that k. h. the th , who deny'd him that headship , did something new which his ancestours had not done , and , when hee enacted this , created new law . 't is most manifest , likewise , that those like laws in the papacy are onely to distinguish the pope's spirituall power , there , from his temporall , that is , to limit it's bounds , not to deny it : and , consequently , those mutually-like laws in other countries and in england formerly , did onely limit it likewise : whence follows inevitably , that k. h's law , which totally abolish't , renounc't , and deny'd it , was of another far different strain , and new law . eightly , this position is demonstratively convinc't of falshood , by the evidēt and acknowledg'd effect : for , who sees not that , upon this new law made by k. h. england stood at another distance from rome than formerly ? for , formerly , notwithstanding all their laws , they held still the pope was head of the universall church , reverenced him as such , held this as of faith ▪ and this till the very time of the breach : whereas , after k. h's law , hee was held , by the party which adhered to that law , no head of the universall church , nor reverenc't as such ; & ( if any thing ) rather the contrary , that england was absolutely independent on him was held as of faith . is not this as evident , as that the sun shines ; and may it not , with equall modesty , bee den'yd that there ever was such a man as k. h. the th ? ninthly , this very position takes away the whole question between us , and makes both us and all the controvertists in england on both sides talk in the aire ; wrangling , pro and con , why k. h. cast out the pope's authority here : whenas , ( according to this illuminated adversary of mine ) hee had actually noe authority there , at that time , to cast out . lastly , this position is so thriving an absurdity , that , from non-sence and contradiction , it prosperously proceeds to perfect madnes and fanaticknes ; and comes to this , that there neither is nor ever was a papist country in the world . for , since 't is evident in terms , that the king and his complices , who made that pope disclaiming act , were not papists or acknowledgers of the pope's authority , after they had thus renounc't the pope's authority : again , since , according to the bp. the same laws were formerly made receiu'd , and executed in england ; it follows , that our ancestours equally renounced the pope's authority also , and so could bee no papists neither : and , lastly , since hee grants equivalent laws infrance , spain , italy , sicily , germany , poland , &c. it follows by the same reason , that those countries are not papists neither , no , not the very papacy it self . and , so , this miraculous blunderer hath totally destroy'd and annihilated all the papists in the world , with one self contradictory blast of his mouth . and now , christian reader , can i do any less , if i intend to breed a due apprehension in thee of the weaknes of his cause and falshood of this man , than appeal to thy judgment , whether any mad man , or born fool could have stumbled upon such a piece of non sence ? dos't not think my former words very moderate and very proper to character this man's way , when i said , how ridiculous , how impudent a manner of speaking is this , to force his readers to renounce their eyes & ears and all evidence ? could any man , without a visard of brass on pretend to secure men's souls from schism , ( a sin which of schism c. . themselves acknowledge as great as idolatry , ) by alledging such sublimated non-sence for a sufficient excuse or ground ; when the acknowledg'd fact of schismatizing and renting god's church , cries loudly against them : nay more , ( since less motives and reasons cannot iustify such a fact , nor a continuance of it ) to bring such an heap of contradictions , for perfect evidences and demonstrations ? pardon mee you , whose weaker or seldomer reflections on the certainty of faith , and , by consequence , of the certainty of an eternall concernment in these kind of controversies , make you think courtesy violated by such home-expressions ; which may breed a smart reflexion , and stir up a more perfect consideration in the readers mind's . examin my harshest words in the utmost rigour , as apply'd to his demerits ; and , if they exceed , hold mee for blamed ; if not , then think , ( as reason grants ) that it is equally moderate , ( but far more necessary ) to call great and wilfull faults by their right names of cosenage , impudence , &c. if they deserve them ; as 't is to call smaller lapses by theirs of a mistake or an oversight . how can it ever bee hoped that truth should bee righted ; as long as her adversaries may take the liberty to act impudently against her , and her defenders must bee afraid to tell the world their faults and to say what they do ? again , were this shameles position of this bp s some odd saying on the by , or some petty branch of his discourse , it deserv'd less animadversion : but , 't is the substantiallest part of his vindication , where hee huddles together many laws , which , de facto , consisted with the acknowledgment of the pope's authority both in england and other catholike countries , to parallell k. h's which were absolutely inconsistent with it , and to show that k. h. did no more than his ancestours and other catholikes did . so that , hee alledges this as a chief ground of their vindication , and wee shall see again afterwards an whole section built on this one particular ground . now , had hee grounded himself on a foundation of some sandy probability , it had been ( though still insufficient , yet more pardonable and ( in comparison of the other ) honourable ; or , on an aiery fancy of some odd crotchet of his own head ( as was dr. h's conciet of the apostles exclusive provinces , ) it had been to bee pittied , if sprung from weaknes , or laught at , if from wilfulnes : but , to ground his vindication , that is , to build his and his adherents security from schism and eternall damnation , on the meer vacuum of non sence and perfect cōtradiction , confutable by the contrary tenet , acknowledgment and sight of the whole worlds eyes ; is such a piece of shamelesnes that it can admit no sufficient character ; as a non ens is incapable of a definition . as for his particularities entrenching or pretended to entrench on the pope's authority , whether they were lawfully done or no , how far they extended , in what circumstances and cases they held , in what not , how the letter of those laws are to bee understood , &c. all which the bp. omits , though hee press the bare words ; it belongs to canon and secular lawyers to scuffle about them , not to mee : i hold my self to the lists of the question , and the limits of a controvertist . and , whenas hee asks mee , what lawfull iurisdiction could remain to the pope in england , where such and such laws had force ? i answer , the same that remains still to him in france , where you confess equivalent laws have force ; the same that remains to him still in spain , italy , sicily , &c. so that either you must speak out according to the grounds , and say there it not a papist country in the world , that is , not a country that acknowledges the pope head of the church ; which is to put out the eyes of the whole world , for wee see de facto that hee is acnowledg'd and exercises iurisdiction in catholike counttries or else confess that they retain still something , notwithstanding those equivalent laws , which you renounc't . this something , which they still retain more than you doe , is that which makes you schismaticks for rejecting it ; and is so far from grounding your excuse , ( for which you produce it , ) that it enhances your guilt and grounds a most iust accusation against you : that , whereas such and so many strong curbs were set by the former laws of england ( as are also in catholike countries ) to secure you from the least fear of any extravagant encroachmēts nay by which you confess here p. . they kept their priviledges inviolated , yet , your desperately-seditions humour could neither bee contented with that freedome from too much subjection which your own forefathers and all other countries then in cōmunion with you enioy'd , but you must quite extirpate the inward right it self , totally abolish and renounce the very substance of th● former ecclesiasticall government , and cast it out of the kingdome . sect. . my l d of derry's senceles plea from the church of england's succeeding the british church in her pretended exemptions from forrain iurisdiction , and the uniustifiablenes of those pretensions . the perfect weaknes of his corroboratory proof , and utter authenticknes of the welsh pueriles . the scope of his fifth chapter , as himself here acknowledges , was to show that the britannik churches were ever exempted from forrain iurisdiction for the first . ye●rs . now , his book being entitled a vindication of the ●hurch of england , to show this whole process frivolous i ask't what this belong'd to us ; unles it bee proved that their practicks were an obliging precedent to us ? to show more the impertinency of this allegation ; i deny'd , that the church of england hath any title from the britannick churches , otherwise than by the saxon christians ; who onely were our ancestours , and by whose conquests and laws all that is in the britannick world belongs and is derived to us . the bp. replies : yes , well enough ? and , why ? first ( saith hee ) wales and cornwall have not onely a locall but a personall succession ; and therefore noe man can doubt of their right to the priviledges of the britannick churches . grant it : what is this to our purpose ? how does this vindicate the church of england or take of my exception ? for , let their succession bee what it will , it follows not that the body of england ( of which our controversy is ) hath any such priviledges by descending from cornwall or wales . again , 't is evident that for these many hundred years , they acknowledg'd the pop'es authority as much as england . and lastly , 't is a clear case , they were under those which were under the pope . but , the wily bp. being ask't an hard question , to wit , whether the church of england had any title from or dependence on the britannick churches , answers quite another matter , and then tels us hee hath done well enough . secondly , hee sayes , that there is the same reason for the scots and picts , who were no more subjected to forrain iurisdiction than the britans themselves . i answer none of the picts are now extant but totally exterminated , & so no succession from them : and , as for the scots , what doe they concern the church of england's vindication , our purpose , or my question ; unles hee can show , which hee never pretends , that his church of england receives title to any thing by way of the scottish churches ? again , since they have been submitted to the pope , what avails it if they had any exemption anciently : for , they could never derive it to us , for want of continuation of succession ? yet as long as hee tells us hee does well enough , all is well . thirdly ( hee should have said first , for , the two former answer are nothing to the purpose , ) hee tells us , that , among the saxons themselves , the great kingdomes of mercia and northumberland were converted by the ancient scots , and had their religion and ordination first from them , afterwards among themselves , without any forrain dependance ; and so were as free as the britons . where , all the force lies in those words , [ without any forrain dependance ] which hee obtrudes upon us on his own credit onely , without a word of proof : or , if there bee any shadow of reason for it there , it must bee this , that ●hey were converted by the ancient scots , which himself tells us , two pages after , is nothing at all to iurisdiction . but , that which is of main importance is , that hee brings , here , no proof , that the britons and scots and picts had no forrain dependance , save his own word onely : and , the trifles hee brings afterwards are of less credit than even his own words ; as will bee seen when they come to scanning . fourthly , hee assures us , ●●at , after the conquest , throughout the rest of england , a wo●●d of british christians did still live mixt with the saxons . and how proves hee , this ? because otherwise the saxons had not been able to people the sixth part of the land. i ask , did hee measure the land , and number the saxons ? if not , how does hee know , or how can hee affirm this ? or how does hee prove the land must necessarily bee peopled , as fully as before , immediately after a conquest so universall and cruell ? our historians tell us that , to avoid their barbarous cruelty which spared none , the ancient britains retired into wales : yet hee would persuade us , both without and against all history , that a world stayd behind ; and this , not because the saxons stood in need of them ( as hee pretends , ) who as 't is known , brought their whole families with them ; but , indeed , because the bp. stood in need of them , to make good his cause . but , granting the likelihood , that some few of them remain'd still in their former homes , how can the bp. make any advantage of it ? thus : who can deny ( saith hee ) those poore conquer'd christians and their christian posterity , though mixed with saxons , the iust priviledges of their ancestours ? a compassionate man ! who speaks a great deal of tender-hearted non-sence , rather than hee will seem unmercifull , not to the ancient britons ( as hee pretends , ) but to his own cause ; which hee shows to bee good-naturd , at least , though it bee destitute of reason : for , unles hee can show , ) which yet never was pretended by any protestant or man of common sence ) that those who remain'd had yet british bishops amongst them ; or , unles hee can pretend that they remain'd not subject to the bishops of the saxons ; it is a madnes to imagin those few lay people should inherit those former supposed priviledges : for , since , all the world grants that they ( if there were any such ) became subject to the bishops of the saxons , which were subject to the pope ; all pretence of their exemption from that power to which their governours were subject is taken away : and the bp s mercifull reason is all one , as if some few englishmen by some accident remaining and settling in france , should pretend an exemption from the french laws both ecclesiasticall and temporall , and to enioy the priviledges they had while they were in england , that is , while they were under another government . but , his last reason is to the purpose and a rare one ; 't is this , that the saxon conquest gave them as good title to the priviledges , as to the lands of the britons . as if hee made account , that ecclesiastical iurisdiction is a thing of that nature as to bee won by the sword ; or that the saxons could plunder the britons of their spirituall priviledges as well as of a bag of money . but , the iest is , hee would have those priviledges at once goe into wales , with the british bishops , and stay at home in england : not considering that ecclesiasticall priviledges are things inherent in men , that is , in the ecclesiasticall governours , as enioyers or else as conservers and dispensers of them to the people ; and , in the governed , as subiect to those governours and laws ; not , in stones , woods and mountains , as hee fancies . again , whereas those priviledges originally belong to ecclesiasticall governours and are annex't unto them as such , as they are supposed to doe in the bp s case ; they cannot bee transmitted to posterity but by a succession into the authority of the former governours : wherefore , let him either show that the after bps of the church of england ever had succession of authority from or were impower'd by the british bishops ; or else let him confess that they could inherit no priviledges from them ; and , by consequence , that his pretence of it is groundles and impertinent . what is said hitherto was to show the inconsequence of deriving those priviledges from the british to ●he english church , in case the british had any such priviledge of independency , as the bishop contends : but , my second objection was , that this pretended exemption of the british church was false . my reason was , because the british bishops admitted appellation to rome at the council of sardica . in answer first , hee tells mee , that , ere i can alledge the authority of the council of sardica , i must renounce the divine institution of the papacy : and why ? for ( said hee ) that canon submitted it to the good pleasure of the fathers , and groundeth it upon the memory of s. peter , not the institution of christ . which is , first , flat falsification of the council : there being not a word in it either concerning the papall power it self , or it's institution ; but concerning appeals onely . next , since wee call that of divine institution which christ with his own mouth ordain'd ; and never any man made account or imagin'd that christ came from heaven to speak to the after pope's , and so give them a primacy ; but ▪ that hee gave it by his own mouth to s. peter , whiles hee lived here on earth : this , i say , being evidently our tenet ; and the council never touching this point at all ; what a weaknes is it to argue thence against the diuine institution of the papacy , and to abuse the council , saying , that it submitted this to the good pleasures of the fathers ? secondly , hee asks , how does it appear that the british bishops did assent to that canon ? which a little after hee calls my presumption : and truly , i shall ever think it a most iust presumption , that they , who confessedly sate in the council , assented to what was ordain'd by the council in which they sate ( as was their duty ) unles some objection bee alledged to the contrary ; as the bp brings none . thirdly , hee sayes the council of sardica was no generall council after all the eastern bishops were departed ; as they were before the making of that canon . what means hee by the eastern bishops ? the catholicks , or the arians ? the arian bishops indeed fled away , fearing the judgment of the church , as apol. . & ep . ad solitarios s. athanasius witnesses : but how shows hee that any of the . eastern bishops , were gone , ere this canon , ( which is the third in that council ) was made ? so that , my l d of derry is willing to maintain his cause , by clinging to the arians against s. athanasius and the then catholike church ( as hee does also in his foregoing treatise , p. . ) denying , with them , this to have been a generall council , because his good brother arians had run away from it , fearing their own just cōdēmnation . fourthly , hee says the canons of this council were never received in england or incorporated into the english laws . i ask , has hee read the british laws in those times ? if not , for any thing hee knows , they were incorporated into them ; and so , according to his former grounds , must descend down to the english. but , wee are mistaken in him : his meaning is onely that the aduantages and priuiledges should bee inherited from the britons , not their disadvantages or subjection : so sincere a man hee is to his cause , though partiall to common sence . lastly ( saith hee ) this canon is contradicted by the great generall council of chalcedon , which our church receiveth . yet it seems hee neitheir thought the words worth citing , nor the canon where the abrogation of the sardica canon is found worth mentioning : which argues , it is neither worth answering nor looking for i am confident hee will not find any repealing of the sardica canon exprest there : it must therefore bee his own deduction , on which hee relies ; which , till hee puts it down , cannot bee answerd . as for their church receiving the council of chalcedon ; the council may thanke their ill will to the pope , not their good will to receive councils : for any council , in which they can find any line to blunder in mistakingly against him , they receive with open arms ; but , those councils which are clear and express for him , though much ancienter ( as this of sardica was ) shall bee sure to bee rejected and held of no authority ; and , when a better excuse wants , the very running away of the guilty arians shall disannul the council and depriue it of all it's authority . hee subjoyns , there appears not the least footstep of any papall iurisdiction exercised in england by elentherius : ( i answer nor any certain footstep of any thing else in those obscure times : ) but the contrary : for , hee referd the legislative part to king lucius , and the british bishops . here you see my ld d. positive and absolute : but , look into his vindication , p. . and you shall see what authority hee relies on for this positive confidence ; viz. the epistle of eleutherius ; which , himself , conscious it was nothing worth and candid to acknowledge it there , graces with a parenthesis , in these words ( if that epistle bee not counterfeit : ) but , now wee have lost the candid conditionall [ if , ] and are grown absolute . whence wee see , that the bp. according as hee is put to it more and more to maintain his cause , is forced still to ab●te some degree of his former little sincerity : and thus , this if-not counter feited testimony is become one of his demonstrations , to clear himself and his church from schism . now , though our faith relies on immediate traditiō for it's onely and certain rule , and not upon fragments of old authours : yet , to give some instances of the pope's iurisdiction anciently in england , i alledged s. prosper , that pope celestin [ vice sua ] in his own stead sent s german to free the britons from pelagianism , and converted the scots by palladius . my l d answers , that converting and ordaining , &c. are not acts of iurisdiction : yet himself sayes here , p. . that all other right of iurisdiction doth follow the right of ordination . now what these words [ all other ] mean is evident by the words immediately foregoing , to wit , all other besides ordination and election ; by which 't is plain hee makes these two to bee rights of iurisdiction . so necessary an attendant to errour is self contradiction and non-sence . but the point is , hee leaues out those words i relied on [ vice sua , in his own stead , ] which show'd , that it belong'd to his office to do it . these words omitted , hee tells us , that hee hath little reason to beleeve either the one , or the other : that is , hee refuses to beleeve s. prosper a famous and learned father , who lived neer about the same time and was conversant with the affairs of the pelagians ; and chuses to relie rather on an old obscure authour , whence no prudent man can ground a certainty of any thing , and which , if hee would speak out , himself would say hee thought to bee counterfeit . what follows in his . page is onely his own sayings ? his folly in grounding the pope's supremacy on phocas his liberality hath been particularly answer'd by mee heretofore , par● . . sect. . whether i refer him . i found fault with him for leaving the papall power and spending his time in impugning the patriarchal● : and , i concieve it stands with very good reason to reprehend mine adversary , and call him back , when hee runs away from the whole question . first , hee observes how readily wee decline all manner of discourse concerning the pope's patriarchall power . when 't is not the question , wee do ; as any man , who understands what it is to dispute , would : but , does hee ever find that wee decline it when 't is the question ? i suppose , by this time , my largenes in handling it in this foregoing treatise , part. . sect. . hath corrected his wrong apprehension in that point . next , hee is puzzled to know the reason of this , but hee may well conjecture ( hee sayes , ) that 't is because wee find that our spirituall monar●hy , and a patriarchall dignity are inconsistent in the same subject . what insuperable difficulties the bp's sooth-saying fancy proposes ? as if it were soe hard a matter for bp. vscher to have beenat once bp. of armagch , and yet primate too of ireland ; and , as such , my lord of derry's superiour : what greater difficulty hee imagins , that a primate and an higher , ( that is , a papall ) power should joyn in one person , than there is that a primacy , that is , the highest in that continent , should bee thus linkt with an inferiour dignity in the same continent , needs a revelation from the fancy that first dream't it . lastly , hee s is shrewdly peremptory , and shuts up thus , and yet , a patriarch the pope was , and so always acknowledg'd to bee , and they cannot deny it . is not this a pleasant man to wanton it thus with a needles cruelty ; who puts us upon the rack , and will make us by force confess a truth , which himself knows every catholike in the world ever granted , held , and maintain'd ? and , what weak-iudging reader , seeing such confident expressions , would not remain astonisht at it and admire the bp. for a most terrible disputant ; who over bears his adversary with such an unresistable career of authority , and all to beats with such mighty stroaks the hissing aire ? amongst other proofs of the british liberties , ( as the bp . tells us here , ) hee produced the answer of dinoth to austin ; which hee deems soe choyce and rare a proof that hee reiterates it , and with new vigour insists on it here : gleaning those exceptions hee thought the easiest , from this treatise , my former against dr. h. and partly from the appendix to the manuall of controversy . my first exception , in this place , was , that the word pope was not then used alone to signify the bp. of rome : hee quotes bellarmin against mee , and ( so wise a man hee is ) expects that catholike writers shall bee of the same mind in all things , even in controvertible and indifferent point , that is , hee makes account there are neither catholick schools , nor that any difficulties occur in historians ; nor , to come neerer the point , that catholikes should disagree even so much as in a criticism about a word , as this is . as for the instance from the council of chalcedon , beatissimus & apostolicus vir papa , hoc nobis praecepit , i answer that , though there bee neither vrbis romae or any such like expression immediately conjoyn'd to the word papa , yet , which is equivalent , the comitant circumstances sufficiently de●ermin'd and indigitated the person ; nay , although the word papa had been totally omitted , yet the person had been perfectly known : for , these words are down in the council as spoken by boniface , sedis apostolicae vicarius , the pope's vice gerent , in answer to a demand of the council what orders hee had received from pope leo. so far then is the word papa in that place from being emphaticall or expressive of the bp . of rome , taken singly and alone ; that it was rather , rigorously speaking , a needles word as found in that place . my second exception against their being called bishops of caerleon , after the remouall of the seat to s. davids , was not put by mee in this place nor urged against him at all , but against dr. h. but , conceptum sermonem retinere quis potest ? though it concern'd not his province hee must still needs bee doing . hee had found by chance an odd testimony , ( the best minerva of a word stuff't brain ; ) and hee was with child till hee had brought it to light . nor hath hee yet any thing to take of my exception , besides one testimony of an historian , ( for sr henry's is either built on the welsh paper or on this same authour's words : ) and , on the other side , himself must confess , that it is a passage unparallell'd in history , perhaps ever since the beginning of the world , that a seat should bee translated from one place to another , as this was from caerleon to menevia ; and yet retain the title of the seat whence it was translated ; and this during the successive government of five and twenty bishops , as this testimony sayes . again , had the name caerleon been translated likewise to menevia , that is , had menevia changed it's name into caerleon , it had been more likely ; or , had caerleon's arch bishops , onely for some conveniency , resided at menevia , and the right of iurisdiction belonged still to caerleon , it might more easily bee conceived feisible : but , that the seat it self should bee translated , and menevia bee made the lawfull metropolis , and yet not own her self for such , but let a cashier'd place so long keep the title due in right to her , is highly improbable . but , the maine is , that it is most evident in history , the bp's of s. davids or menevia were called menevenses , ( as himself cannot but know , is frequent in history ; ) and so styled by their good friend , dr. h. in his appendix , p. . by ranulphus cestrensis , l. . c. . by daniel powell , a protestant , who set forth giraldus ( the bp's authour , ) in his marginall notes on itinerarium cambriae , ● . . c. . and lastly by dinoth himself , the title of whose book ( cited by pi●seus ) is defensorium iurisdictions sedis menevensis : i conceive all these testimonies will easily outweigh the bp's single one : which yet is all that secures it from being contradictory to cōfest history ; & so , 't is uterly undeserving any credit . add , that , grant the name of caerleon had been retain'd by them , so that the bishops of menevia were call'd bishops of caerleon ; yet they could not but very unhandsomely bee , called bp's of caerleon upon vske . this particular exactnes then in this expressing the locality of his bishoprick , which is found in the abbot's words , argue that the counterfeiter of this paper imagin'd this bishop still to have resided neere vske at caerleon , after the locall translation of the seat thence ; and so , still it remains an argument of it's imposture . my third exception , as hee calls it , is such that the bp. cannot , hee confesses , find the edge of it . perhaps the bluntnes lies in his apprehension , not in my exception . let us see . i objected , that s. h. spilman found no other antiquity in that welsh manuscript worth the mentioning ; and , that this shrewdly imply'd , it was made for this alone . hee asks how i know s r h. found no other antiquities in it ? and alledges , that there might bee many more , and yet not proper for a collection of ecclesiasticall councils . pray does s r h. neglect all passages which are not of this grave nature ? how came hee then to take notice of this toy ? was this single abbot either pretended to bee a council , or these words of his some authentick act of a council ? i conceive you will not conclude it was ; otherwise dr h. would not have undervalued it as inconsiderable , and a proof you could unconcernedly and easily partwith as he does in his appēdix , p . how then was it so proper for à collection of ecclesiasticall councils ? whereas the collection might have been entire and perfect , though this had been omitted . since then sr h. who adored any new reuived piece of antiquity , found nothing in this manuscript worth mentioning but this ; in all likelihood it was made for this onely . secondly , hee replies , in case there had been no other antiquity in it , would s. w. condemn his creed for a counterfeit , because it is not huddled together confusedly with some other treatise in one volume . no ; my ld : my creed is sufficiently authoriz'd to my hand , nor hath any iust exceptions against it : this poor manuscript hath nothing at all to assert it's authority , and lies under many and very suspicious exceptions . but , in case one , who holds not his creed , should bee dealt with to beleeve it onely upon these grounds , that it was found in a certain manuscript newly brought to light by one who holds the same creed ; and this manuscript not authoriz'd by any testimony asserting it to have been writ by the apostles , but onely that it might bee it was ; and against this very might bee many exceptions brought , and amongst the rest , that the style was very new and modern , and so unlikely to have been the apostles own words ; again , in case this manuscript , whence onely this creed is pretended to bee evinced , had nothing in it worth note but this very creed : that man were very weak and foolish , to beleeve his creed thus slenderly proposed or rather totally unauthoriz'd ; nor can they bee iudg'd less weak who can think such a manuscript , absolutely unauthentick and manifoldy excepted against , a fitt ground to build their assent upon to clear themselves from schism , that is , to secure themselves from , otherwise , due damnation , as themselves confess . will hee have mee reckon up again the exceptions against it ? to omit then what hath been sayd here , first , it is onely sr h's coniecture , that m. moston's manuscript was transcribed out of an ancienter copy : now , if this meer conjecture happen to fail , the wise busines is at an end . secondly sr h. who brought it to light , confesses , hee knows not when and by whom that manuscript was composed : which is as much as to say , it hath nothing to authorize it . thirdly , 't is onely sr h's conjecture , that those words were the answer of dinoth to s. austin upon that occasion . ly the same conjecture is all the ground that the famous dinoth was that abbot . ly the english found , in an interlineary manner with the welsh , in that manuscript , is evidently modern and later than k. h. the th : which altogether disgraces the pretended antiquity of that manuscript , and grounds a iust presumption of it's being forged to countenance his or his successours renouncing the pope's authority . ly the learned in welsh affirm , that both the welsh language is modern , and the spelling it is unlike to the ancient manner ; and doth manifestly and particularly resemble externs smattering , when they first learn or write that language . diuers instances of which are found in few lines , which evidences a forgery . ly , the protestants are challenged to have abus'd it in the translation ; and yet ( so brave a proof it is ) they are glad to add paraphrases to make sence of it . ly , it is not past seventeen or eighteen years , since this new piece of antiquity came to light . all which and much more to the same purpose may bee seen in the appendix to the manuall of controuersies . ly , considering the foresayd exceptions ; as also that an english line is put alwayes word by word under each welsh line , ( a method unheard of in antiquity ) as our ianua linguarum or the praxis at the end of clenard's greek grammar uses to bee ; it was in all likelihood invented ( after the form of our ●ueriles , or ianua linguarum ) by some minister , who was a schoolmaster , to teach the welsh school boy's english , and withall to instill into them a dislike of the pope : the chief and most necessary point of their cathecism in those days ; when all art was used to pervert the minds of the welsh and english , and to blot out and disgrace , ( as much as in them lay ) whatever concern'd the catholike church or it's government . ly , in case all these exceptions were waved , still the book is of no authority in the world : for , there is no difficulty , but a craf●y fellow may counterfeit a passage , & pretend it to have been found in antiquity , which may cohere so handsomly together , that no great flaw can bee found in it , nor grounded exceptiō taken against it ; yet , it follows not hence that this piece of handsome forgery must therefore bee rely'd on as authentick , unles hee can produce sufficient grounds to authorize it : viz. prove from antiquity that such a person was held to bee the authour of it ; & that this pretended saying of this authour , or the book which recommended it , was acknowledg'd by the common consent of good and learned men ( which is that which gives authority to all books ) to have come down not corrupted , ( at least in that passage ) to our times . vnles these bee shown , still such a book , however it tells it's tale handsomly , fall● short of having any authority ; since it wants all things which can ground authority . see then reader , what weak men wee have to dispute with ; who think the deed done and that they may iustly obtrude upon the easy credulity of the world any pretended scrap of antiquity ; so they can solve exceptions against it , ( which yet they will never doe ) though they bring not nor even goe about to bring the least proof to gain it authority , but totally neglect that necessary task ; nay more , confess themselves to seek in those points , as wee have seen lately , and as mr fuller tacitly grants by waving to patronize it ; who ( in his church history , cent. . part . . ) going about to rehearse this wise testimony , bid it in plain terms shift as well as it could for it's own authenticalnes . in a word , the busines comes to this , that , had there been some welsh pamphlet or ballad , made in ed. the th's dayes against the pope , found in some library in manuscript , printed & put forth by some protestant authour , and supposed by the partiall antiquary , without the least proof , extracted out of ancienter copies , presently there needs no more to authorize it , soe it bee but against the pope : that ballad shall bee confidently asserted to have been sung by the old british bards , and to have signify'd the sence of the british churches in those days and thus , protestant reader , thou seest what demonstrations thy bp's and dr's bring thee , to secure thy soul from the horrid sin of schism ; which yet ( dr. h. of schism , c. . ) they tell thee is greater than idolatry . lastly ▪ put case all had been true , yet what had they concluded ; unles they had proved likewise that this abbot , in saying so , had spoken the mind of the then catholike world ? for , no man that hath any sence in his head will undertake to defend , that , in the space of fifteen or sixteen hundred years , there cannot bee found some few who , either out of disgust , ambition , interest or ignorance , might speak or act against the pope's authority or against the most inuiolable right that can be imagined , but 't is clearly sufficient to maintain that in so saying , they pronounced not the sence of the then catholike world . have there been heresies , against almost all other points of faith arisen in severall ages ; and shall wee imagin noe possibility of opposition against that point which concerns government ? or , will it bee deem'd by any indifferent man a competent proof against true faith , to say , that such and such hereticks deny'd it ? no more ought it to bee held sufficient , that such or such persons now and then deny'd that point which concerns government ; unles such a deniall can ground an inference that god's church in that age held otherwise . if then the bp. will , first , clear his welsh copy book of all the exceptions brought against it ; next , assert and establish it's authority ; and lastly , evince that this abbot , in thus saying , spoke the thoughts of the world at that time ; hee will conclude strongly against us : and , till hee does this hee does nothing ; for , onely the beleef of a church , relying on immediate tradition , pretended and evinced , can bee possibly held able to counterpoise the tenet of a church which confessedly relies on immediate tradition possest . as for what the bp. addes concerning his corroboratory proof from the british synods , i must confess indeed that corroboratory is a very thumping and robust word ; but what does it corroborate ? does it prove that the authour of this welsh manuscript was worth a straw ? not a iot . the chief strentgh of this corrobototy proof lies in this , that all the british clergy did , in those synods , renounce all obedience to the see of rome : as hee tells us here , p. . and urges mee to answer it . i shall ; and reply , that 't is an arrant falsification at once of all historians : for , if hee means that they onely disobey'd the pope , in not conforming themselves to his commands , i grant 't is clear in all history they did so ; and so have many , who remain catholikes , done , who yet own the pope's authority it self : but , if it signifies , as his circumstances and words make it , that they renounced the pope's authority and deny'd his power to command or supremacy , 't , is absolutely false ; no such thing being debated or deny●d in those synods . yet , to corroborate this , this bp. tells us , ( in his iust vindication p. . ) that austin , s. gregory's legate , proposed three things to them ; first , that they should submit to the roman bishop : ly that they should conform to the roman customes about the obseruation of easter , and administration of baptism ; and lastly , that they should ioyn with him in preaching to the saxons . all which are pretēded to bee deny'd in those synods . whereas , again , the first pretended proposall of s. austin's is a very flat falsification of the bp's ; no such thing being there proposed : the three proposalls were concerning easter , baptism and preaching to the english , as your friend , dr. h. ( who happen'd here to bee more ingenuous ) tells you expresly out of bede ( appendix p. . l. . . ) yet the bp. cites there for this proposall and deniall , beda & omnes alij , in the margent ; that is , at once belies bede and all our historians : and , to compleat the iest ( in his vindication , p. . l. . . ) hee brags that this would strike the question dead and truly soe it hath : for , whereas the question before depended most upon the bp's own words , and partly on his sinc●rity ; nothing is more questionles now than this , that hee is a most unquestionable falsifier . now , to falsify , wee are told , signifies to corroborate , that protestant cause ; and so is no shame , but a beautifull stain and an honorable scar . again , hee assures us here from his corroboratory proof , that all the british cler●y , did r●nounce all obedience to the bp of rome , of which all our historiographers do bear witnes . you see by his many [ all 's ] what care hee hath of sincerity . whereas the right of their subjection never came into play , much less did they profess a renouncing all obedience , but onely in not conforming to the customes of another church . nor shall hee find one historiographer who affirms that they deny'd all subjection due , or disacknowledg'd the pope's headship ( though in some things they disobey'd him ) except his welsh paper , and those of his own side who presume it upon their own conjecture . and to confute his [ all ] pitseus tells us onely , that neque in maiori tonsurâ , neque in ritu baptismatis , neque in celebratione paschatis se romanae ecclesiae ullâ ratione conformare voluerunt . which shows that there was no talk there of the pope's authority , but of conforming to rites and customes . yet this the corroborating bp. there calls an evident demonstration , that i but trifle vainly against the testimony of dionothus . but , in case this british clergy which made these laws had renounced the pope's authority : let us see what cause hee had to brag of them . s. bede , l. . c. . calls them unfaithfull , naughty and detestable people . their own country man , gildas , sayes they were wolues , enemies of truth , and friends to lies , enemies of god , and not priests , marchants of mischief and not bp's , impugners of christ and not his ministers , more worthy to bee drawn to prison , than to preisthood . and the bp's dear friend , iohn fox , tell us , out of an old chronicle , ( acts l. . p. . ) that all things , whether they pleased or displeased cod , they regarded alike ; & , not onely secular men did this , but their bishops and teachers without distinction . thus my ld d. hath again corroborated the protestant cause by crying hail brethren well met , to those folks who have been proved to bee detestable fellows and enemies of god , that is , as good as atheists : of which gang if this dinoth were one , wee shall neither wish the pope such friends , nor enuy them to the protestants . and this may serue for another of the bp's demonstrations against the pope , to vindicate his church from schism , and secure his readers from damnation , ( which hee acknowledges due to that vice ; ) by their relying on such proofs , and adhering to such good company . i am not ignorant that there is a thing , call'd an answer or account to h. t 's appendix , which confuted this forged manuscript , writ by dr. h though i briefly hinted here some exceptions found in it , without taking notice of their pretended answer ; partly , because i know by long experience , that nothing but shuffling impertinences ▪ paralogisms , and falsifications are to bee expected from that authour ; and principally because i understood that the sayd appendix is patroniz'd by the same learned pen that writ it ; and those exceptions shown untouch't by the mock shirmish of his adversary . thither i refer the reader for compleat satisfaction where hee will see my bp . more fully confuted , and my present charge against the sleight accountant , most amply made good . sect. . how my ld of derry digresses from a papall authority to a patriarchall ; that is from t ? who le question . his prafest resolution not to return to it but upon conditions , and such as hee is sure no catholike can yeeld to . his waving the whole scope of his adversary's discourse : together with diverse impertinent , non sencicall and unskilfull replies . my lord of derry undertook to prove three things in his th chapter : first , that the king & church of england had sufficient authority to withdraw their obedience from the roman patriarch . ly , that they had iust grounds to do it ; and ly , that they did it with due moderation . i objected , that this was to shuffle away the whole question . for , whereas the question is of the priviledge given by christ to s. peter , and from him descended to the pope's his successours ; that is , whereas our controversy is about a papall authority , or that of the head of god's church , held by us and by themselves formerly to bee of faith , and of divine institution ; hee leaves this to talk of a patriarchall authority , not held as from christ , but of humane institution . by which sleight hee tacitly intimates that the authority actually in force in england at the time of the reformation , and then renounced , was onely patriarchall , not papall : which waves the main , if not the whole charge , and is plainly contradictory to the whole world's eyes at that time . now , what excuse brings the bishop for this fundamentall shuffling , importing no less than the avoiding the whole question ? hee tells us here p. . that when hee first undertook this subject hee cōceived the great strength of the roman sampson did lie in his patriarchate . by which words if the bp. pretends that hee intended to express himself finely , i shall grant it , but if hee sayes that hee intended to speak truly , i have so good an opinion of those of his own party , that i am confident the most partiall and simplest of them will bee too candid and too wise to beleeve him . for , how can it bee imagin'd that a bp. and so well read a man as hee is accounted to bee should bee ignorant that the reformers renounc't a papall authority and higher than patriarchall , and that a papall authority , that is a supremacy over the whole church in ecclesiasticall matters , was held immediately before the reformation or rejection of it . who knows not likewise that they stand accused by us of the fact of renouncing an authority far higher than patriarchall ? yet this bp. undertaking that subject ( that is to vindicate his church from schism in renouncing that higher authority ) pretends hee conceived that the great strength of the roman sampson lay in his patriarchate ; though hee knows the patriarchate was held but of human , that papacy of divine institution ; the patriarchate limited to some particular part within god's church , the papacy , ( which they actually renounced ) held to bee universally extended and to have no other bounds or limits but god's church ; the papacy superior , nay supreme ; the patriarchate inferior and subordinate to the former . this is the notion which both the former and present world nay themselves too had of the papacy , at least ere they rejected it ; which a man would think supperadds a great and manifold increase of strength above the other . but the sincere bp. thinks otherwise now , though in his former book hee confesses the pope had quitted the patriarchall power , that is , pretended none for these last . years , and here enlargeth it to a . which shows that dr. h. and hee are the simeon and levy of the protestant fraternity , and have the same fundamentall faults common to both . but now being taken tardy , and caught running away from the question , hee is well contented ( hee sayes ) to give over that subject , ( to wit his disgression to the patriarchate ) but yet , not but upon two conditions ; wise ones you may bee sure . observe by the way , reader , that though other disputants make account it is their duty and absolute obligation to speak to the point in hand ; in the bp. 't is a courtesy and to bee condescended to conditionally , 't is against his nature and inclination to hold to the question , and therefore wee must bribe him to it 〈◊〉 s●bscribing to the bargain hee proposes . the first condition hee requires ere hee will leave of rambling to a patriarchate , and come home to the question , is , that wee must not presume the pope is a spirituall monarch without proving it . what hee means by spirituall monarch i know not ; 't is a word without sence till it bee explicated : for , either hee means by monarch a commander in whose breast all concernments of the subjects are put , so that his will is a law to dispose of them as hee lists ; and then wee held not the pope to bee such a monarch ; for this , however it bee call'd monarch , is indeed flat tyranny : or else , hee means a monarch is the ordinary chief governour , and such wee hold the pope to bee in the church , and shall ever presume hee is so , till his subjects who actually rebell'd against his authority disprove it . wee hold on the governours side ; your first reformers were , before their separation , actually his subjects ; actually they deny'd their subjection , and rose against his government : ' this actuall rising against him , this very fact , i say , proves you rebells ; his former long-enjoy'd possession stands a proof of his right unles you evidence and demonstrate him an vsurper ; or , though none , yet that the government ought to bee abolish't . but the bp. will not hold to the question , unles wee will grant that when a subject rises against a former long possest governour , hee shall at pleasure call the governour to account , and oblige him to prove his title ere hee will acknowledge him ; and , on the other side , that the subject must bee freed from all obligation to give account of his rising against his governour , or from being bound to prove that the authority hee rebell'd against was an usurpation and unjust . good sence , but hard law ! his second condition ere hee will come to the question is , that wee must not attempt to make patriarchall priviledges to bee royall prerogatives , what hee means by royal prerogatives , i know not , there being no determinate certainty what royalty is ; the notion varying according to diuerse countries . but , hee understands perhaps that a patriarch shall not bee independēt of the king in ecclesiasticall affairs within his own patriarchate , and that this is the king's priviledge ; to which condition hee knows no catholike will ever yeeld any more than to the former ; otherwise wee must grant that s. peter could not preach at rome , if nero were a king ; not s. iames at hiernsalem without unkinging herod . yet the bp. will bee even with mee ; for , as i will not condescend to his conditions , so , on the other side , hee neither hath heretofore , nor ever will hereafter bee brought to hold to the question or speak directly to the point ; as hath been seen hitherto all along , and shall more particularly bee seen hereafter . nor will hee long defer his revenge , but puts it in execution the very next thing hee does ; being assured to have demanded such conditions , as should never bee granted ; for , whereas hee had remou'd the question from a papall authority , held of divine , to a patriarchall acknowledg'd but of human institution ; not to desert our question totally , and to give him fair law , i put the case that the papall government had been onely of human institution , it ought not to have been rejected unles the abuses had been irremediable . i urged that considering , this head was chosen , in that case , to preserve vnity in religion , and that eternall dissentions would inevitably follow upon it's rejection , and a separation of the rejecters from the rest of that common-wealth which acknowledg'd that head , therefore far weightier causes must bee expected , or greater abuses committed , ere , not onely the person , but this very government should bee abolish't . now the matter of fact being evident , and confest that the first reformers consented with all the churches in communion with the church of rome in their submitting to that authority , till they began to reject it ; that they acknowledg'd it lawfull , ere they began to disclame it as unlawfull ; that they held none at that time true christians but those who agreed , consented and submitted to that authority ; that the acknowledging this head then was , ( as it still is to us ) the principle of vnity in government for all christianity , & as such then held by them : likewise , it being equally evident & confest that they have now actually renounced that authority thus held , acknowledg'd , and submitted to by all , whom they then deemed christians , as the rule and ground of all vnity in that commonwealth : these things , i say , being so , i had good reason to put that supposition , not as our bare tenet , ( as the bp. seems to imagin ) but as the evident matter of fact , as the case stood then . one would think it were the bp's task now to show that , notwithstanding all this , the first abolishers of this authority had sufficient reasons to disannull it ; and that the abuses of the sayd authority did outweigh the right use of it , so that it might and ought have been rejected by one part of that christianity , though once establisht ; or , ( which is all one ) long accepted by their common consent , as this was de facto . what does the bp. ? hee tells us what hee and the protestants now held concerning that point , putting ( as it were ) his counter tenet to ours , sayes the pope is onely as a proclocutor in a generall assembly , was their steward , that is , not their governour , ( all contrary to the matter of fact which my case is built on ) that they nourish a more catholik-communion than wee , and such other stuff all out of his own head , without a word of proof , & then thinks the deed is done . was ever such an answer contriu'd ? the poak-full of plums was pertinent , if compar'd to ' this . but still the bishop is innocent ; t was my fault , who would not accept of the two conditions hee proposed which should have been the guerdon of his returning to the question ; that is , without the performance of which hee thinks himself not bound to speak a word to the purpose ; and so the reader must look upon him hereafter as on a man who hath got or took licence to run astray . observe , reader , in what a different manner the bp. & i treat thee . i still bring thee to evident and acknowledg'd matter of fact , or such suppositions which need onely application , and another name to bee so , according as the case stood at the time of the first breach ; whereas , the bp. brings thee his own sayings , their party's tenet for grounds and proofs : things not acknowledg'd , but disputable , nay disputed in this present debate ; that is , obscure , as far as concerns this question . and this is his solemn manner all over this treatise ; which shows that hee hates the light , his unfriendly betrayer , but truth's glory ; and , that the obscurity of ambiguities is most proper and least offensive to his errour-darkned eyes . i demanded of him whether hee would condescend to the rejection of monarchy , and to the extirpation of episcopacy for the misgovernment of princes , or abuses of prelates . hee answers that never such abuses as these were objected either to princes or prelates in england . not objected ? that 's strange ! read the court of k. iames , and the charge against king charles in westminster hall. did not the scots and puritans object popery , intolerable pride , and overburthening weak consciences to your brother bp's . can there bee greater abuses objected than these in your grounds ? or is not the design to bring in popery ( which makes such a noise in your book , as a pandera's box of all mischiefs and inconveniences ) as horrid an accusation against you , as the same inconveniences were against popery when it stood on foot in k. h's daies . i was told by a worthy grave person and whose candour i have no reason to suspect , that in a priuate discourse hee had with the late arch-bishop of canterbury in his own garden concerning the point of schism , the arch-bishop confest , upon his urging the evident matter of fact , that hee was in a schism ; upon which free confession of his , being prest again by that gentleman how hee could in conscience remain in a schism and separated from god's church , hee reply'd that it might lawfully bee done if warranted by an intention to reunite by such compliance a schismatizing congregation to the body it broke from : citing to make good his plea , a place from s. austin , in reference to some catholike bishops complying with the donatists for the same end . now , i ask , whether in case the arch-bishop had endeavoured to bring in popery , episcopacy ( held to bee of divine right ) ought therefore to bee abolisht ? if bee answer ; no , ( as i suppose his interest will prevail above his grounds to make him ) then i ask again why an inferiour actuall power , to wit , episcopacy , should not bee held to merit abolishing for popery's sake ; and introducing it so fraught with inconveniences , which popery , ( so full alas ! of grievances ) though held immediately before equally of divine institution , and of far higher authority , deserved to bee abolish't for it's own sake , as accompany'd with the sayd grievances ! secondly , the bp. tells us that they seek not extirpation of the papacy , but the reducing it to the primitive constitution : which is as good sence , as to give a manabox on the ear , and then tell him you intend not to strike him . they have already totally extirpated it in england , in such sort as all the world sees and acknowledges the pope hath not the least influence upon the english congregation , over which before hee had the greatest ; yet , they hope to bee taken for moderate men , as long as they speak courteous non-sence and tell us , they seek not to extirpate it . thus the bp. wanders from the purpose ; but still all is my fault who would not grant him his two conditions . thirdly , hee tells us that monarchy and episcopacy are of divine institution , so is not , ( saith hee ) a papall soueraignty of iurisdiction . that monarchy should bee of divine institution , i much wonder , surely the venetians and hollanders are in a sad case then , who thus continue without relenting to break one of god's commandments ; especially , their brethren , the hollanders , who renounced the monarchicall government of the king of spain . but the learned bp. hath some text or other in scripture which hee interprets onely according to grammar and dictionary-learning without ever looking into politicks , the science which concerns such points & passages ; which would have taught him that government was instituted for the good of the governed ; and , that , since human affairs are subject to perpetuall mutability and change , it happens that in some countries and some circumstances one form of government is convenient , in others another , according as it happens to bee best for the governed : which comes to this that no particular form of government is of divine institution , and constituted to endure ever , seing the end to which all government is directed , the good of the governed , is mutable and changeable . as for the next part of his third excuse that the pope's authority or headship in iurisdiction is not of divine institution , as episcopacy is ; you see 't is his old trick ; onely his own bare saying , and which is worse , saying over again the very point in dispute between us . whereas , the point which wee urge here is a plain matter of fact , that those who first renounc't the papall authority , held immediately before they renounc't it as firmly that it was divine institution , as the protestants do of episcopacy now ; and therefore ought to have renounc't it , upon the pretended pressure of inconveniencies , no more than episcopacy ought to bee abolish't upon the like inconveniences . nay more , the first reformers ere they grew newfangled and chang'd their mind , held it much more firmly ; for they held it a point of faith , and abhorr'd all them who renounc't it as schismaticks and hereticks both ; whereas the protestants acknowledge the huguenots of france for brothers , who yet deny episcopacy , which the bp. tells us upon another occasion is of divine institution . but , 't is all one with the protestants whether they renounce all christ's institutions or no ; if they do but hate rome ; they are saints and brothers . the common faction against the pope is more powerfull to unite them , than the professed and obstinate rejecting christ's ordinances , is to disunite them . as for his bravado how rarely hee could iustify his parliamentary prelacy , what weak performances it would afford were it put to triall , may bee judged from his numerous and enormous contradictions in this present treatise , bragg'd on by the protestants to bee his master peece . sect. . how my l● of derry states the whole question false , by pretending , against the plain matter of fact , that they separated onely from the court , and not from the church of rome . his grounds of separation shown insufficient in many regards ; nay confest such by himself , granting there was another remedy besides division . that the reformers have neither left any open and certain method of coming to christ's faith , nor any form of government in god's church , nor by consequence any church . his weak plea for england's independency from the council of ephesus . five palpable contradictions cluster'd together , which the bp. calls the protestants more experience than their ancestors . his sixth section pretends to vindicate his grounds of separation ; to take notice of which the bp. is violently importunate with the reader bidding him observe and wonder . nor can i doe any less , seeing such monstrous stuff throughout this whole section . it begins , we are now come to the grounds of our separation from the court of rome . and this is the first monster , which the bp's pen more fruitfull of such creatures , than africk it self , proposes to our observation . which , if it bee not as foul and uncouth an one as errour could hatch , and obstinate schism maintain , you shall pay but pence a peece to see it , and say i have abus'd you too . the charge against the protestants was this , manifested by undeniable matter of fact ; that they had rejected the acknowledgment of s. peters , and his successours , ( the pope's ) headhip over god's church ; and that they had receded from this rule of faith , that nothing is to bee adhered to , as of faith , but what was inherited , ( that is immediately delivered ) by their forefathers , as the doctrine of christ , and his apostles ? that they renounced the former is manifest by the whole worlds and their own confession ; that they renounced the latter , is no less manifest , by the same undeniable attestation ; and indeed out of the very word reformation , which signifies a not immediate delivery . it is no less evident that the acknowledgment of the former , both was at the time of the reformation , and now is the principle of vnity in government to those churches in communion with the see of rome ; that is , to all the churches they themselves communicated with , or were united to , before they broke ; for , 't is as visible as the sun at nonday , that france , spain , portugal , italy , &c. consent and center in a ioynt acknowledgment of the pope's headship , and are therefore held by protestants , puritans , and all contrary sects for papist countreys . it is evident likewise that the acknowledgment of the latter was , and is to the sayd churches the principle of vnity in faith , for they ever held the living voice of the church , that is , the immediate tradition or delivery of pastours and forefathers an infallible rule of faith ; wherefore , ' it is unavoidably consequent that the protestants dissenting from , and disagreeing in both the sayd principles , in which these then-fellow - churches consented and agreed , were and are separated from all those churches , and all that belong to those churches : and this according to the two sayd principles . again , since nothing can bee more essentiall to a church than that which is the rule , and root of vnity both in faith and government , it follows that the protestants dissenting in both and acting accordingly , that is , having separated according to both , separated and broke from the former church , consisting of those churches thus united , according to the essentialls and fundamentalls of a church ▪ now then after all this , as evident as that two ad three make five , to wave answering this true charge , that they broke by this double dissent from all those churches , and to make as though they separated from the court of rome onely and to defend themselves as breaking onely from that court , is to say , that none hold those two principles but onely the court of rome ; which ( to speak moderately ( is perfect impudence , the most proper and characteristicall expression of this bp's manner of writing ; but the blame is mine , for had i perform'd those two powerfull conditions , the bishop , had not thus ●huffled of the true charge , nor avoided thus the whole question . i shall desire the reader to consider once again the true charge , for otherwise it is impossible hee should iudge of the sufficiency or insufficiency of their grounds for separation ; as likewise to reflect that , though hee pretend here they had sufficient grounds , yet hee thinks it not safe to speak out to the point ( as i urged him heretofore ) nor tell us whether those grounds of his exceptions bee demonstrative , that is apt to infer with absolute necessity , therefore the authority was an vsurpation , and not come from christ ; or , though come from christ , yet , for those reasons , to bee rejected : nor dares hee confess that they are onely probable , yet sufficient : for , if probable reasons were sufficient to abolish an authority as an vsurpation , held , till those reasons appear'd , to have been of christ's institution ; what government in the world could stand ? nor lastly , that there is a middle sort of proof between demonstration and probability ; that is , above a may bee , yet below a must bee , which can convince sufficiently the understanding and oblige it to an assent contrary to it's former faith . these points are of too hard digestion for verb ●ll souls , and come so neer the first principles , that they would quickly end this and all controversies , should they come to bee perfectly scann'd . wherefore , as before hee totally omitted to answer those words of mine which prest him to declare himself in that point ; so , here , constant to his principles , hee absolutely declines to inform us what kinde of proofs they must bee ; onely hee calls them grounds , & sayes they are just and sufficient . his pretended grounds i reduce to three generall heads : some of them entrench upon eternity & conscience : some urge onely temporall inconveniences ; lastly , some are of a middle nature , and pretend to more knowledge of right . those of the first sort are all meer falshoods and calumnies , and equally competent for any heretick in the world to object against the church in a like occasion ; that is , are no wayes proper or serviceable to his cause . for , may not any heretick voluntarily object that the church impos'd new articles of faith upon him , when hee had a mind to beleeve or hold nothing of faith , but what agreed with his own fancy ? might not hee complain of new creeds impos'd , when the church , upon occasion of new emergent heresies , added to her publick professions some points of faith ( held so formerly ) which might distinguish her old friends from up start foes ? might not hee complain of perill of idolatry , as your brother puritans did for surplisses , and your reform'd communion-table , when hee had a mind to deny that christ was more than a man as did the arians , or to renounce any decent or rationall practice in god's church ; might not hee pretend that all hereticks and schismaticks in the world were good christians , and that the church was tyrannicall in holding them for excommunicate ? might not hee shuffle together faith with opinions , and alledge falsly , as you doe here , you were forced to approve the pope's rebellion against generall councils , and taking oaths to maintain vsurpation of the pope ; whenas , you know and confess your self , one may bee of our church , and yet neither hold the pope above the council nor accept of such oaths ( iust vindic . p. . ) again , all these exceptions you produce are the very points you pretend to dispute against us ; wherefore it depends upon the goodnes of your reasons , whether those articles pretended to bee new were indeed such , and endangering idolatry , or no ; in iudging which concerning points fancy must bee allow'd to pass no verdict onely rigour of reason , that is , demonstration , can bee presumed sufficient to render points , held formely by themselves , and their immediate forefathers as of faith , sacred and christ's doctrine , to bee obnoxious to exceptions of new , false and idolatrous . yet nothing is more evident than that you have no such reasons , for our drs have vindicated these very points against your reformers , in such a manner , that ( to speak much within compass ) the unpassionate part of the world never imagin'd you have carried the cause clearly , and conclucluded decisively against us ; which is an evidence , that you have not evidenced against us , nor demonstrated the counter authority upon which you build your contrary tenet . to omit that the evidence of our churches authority hath been pretended by our late controvertists , and as yet unreply'd upon by your party ; nay that your own best writers confess you have nothing but pro●ability wheron to ground your faith . all which shows the vanity of your pretended fear of idolatry , and new points of faith , and cōcludes your breach temerarious and irrationall . and as for your fear of separating from the communion of three parts of that which you call christendome , it shall bee shown hereafter ( sect. ) from your own side , that you had ten times more communion even with that in materiall points , when you were in our church , than you can pretend to have had since . his second sort of grounds are those which relate to temporall inconveniences , and injuries to the civill state , by reason of the pope's pretended encroachments ; against all which hee hath told us before ( p. . ) that diverse catholike countries have laws in force ; that is , that men may remain catholiks without holding , nay resisting those pretended encroachments ; and tells us here p. . that al ▪ other catholike countries maintain their priviledges inviolated . yet these pretended inconveniences hee huddles together in big terms , and puts them for a ground of their separation from our church , in which church yet hee confesses they might have continued still in union , and have stood out against them ▪ now whether many of these were abuses or just rights hee knows is disputable between canō and civil lawyers ; of which kinde of cōtroversy i neither think my self nor the bp. a competent iudge , since this kind of learning is not our proper profession . yet hee will needs have mee engage into such questions , nothing concerning our present quarell , which is about a point of faith , not a point of law . our question is whether these exceptions of his were sufficient grounds of renouncing the authority it self , and separating from the former church . that they were not , i show . first , those inconveniences hee reckons up , as extortions , vsurpations of more than belong'd to them , causing animosities between the crown and the miter , &c. though they had been true , are evidently abuses of the officer and argue no fault in the office it self of head of the church , nor that the right use of it ought therefore to bee taken away . secondly , some of those pretended abuses are his own deductions onely ; as that it is against the right ends of ecclesiasticall iurisdiction ; which hee endeavours not to show evidently out of the science of politicks , which is proper to those matters , nor any thing else of this nature ; but out of two or perhaps three matters of fact which onely inferr'd that it happen'd so sometimes ; and then by the same reason episcopacy and all the offices in the world must bee abolish't and abrogated . thirdly , that some of those pretended abuses are indeed such , and not rather just rights . hee no way proves ; for hee onely puts down that such and such things were done , but whether rightfully or no i presume hee will not think himself such a rare iuris vtriusque doctor , as to make a fit umpire to decide law quarrells of this highe'st nature ▪ and , on the other side , none is ignorant that either party had learned lawiers for them to avouch their pretences . i omit that the kings were worsted so metimes and renounc't their pretence , as in that of investitures . fourthly , the temporall laws hee cites , conclude not evidently a right ; for , it is as easy for a canon-lawier to object that the temporall laws wrong the ecclesiasticall , as it is for civill lawiers to say that the ecclesiasticall wrong theirs ; but with this disadvantage to the latter that reason gives more particular respect and charines ought to bee used in disannulling or retrenching ecclesiasticall laws , than temporall , by how much they are neerer ally'd to the church , and by consequence to the order of mankinde to beatitude . fifthly , hee abuses those pretended abuses most unconscionably ; saying , that the pope usurp't most unjustly all right , civill , ecclesiasticall , sacred , prophane , of all orders of men , kings , nobles , bishops , &c. which is such a loud-mouth'd calumnie ; such a far-stretching fiction , that it is as big as all christendome . for , by this , no man in the church was master or owner of his own kingdome , estate , house , nay not of the very bread hee eat , but by the pope's good leave . thus the bishop in a fury of schism runs himself out of breath ; nor will any thing pacify him or bring him into temper to speak a word of truth or sence , but my granting him his two conditions , that is my denying my own tenet , which i am defending . sixthly , grant all those abuses had been true ; was there no other remedy but division ? had not the secular governours the sword in their hand ? did it not ly in their power to chuse whether they would admit or no things destructive to their rights ? yes : for the bp. tells us p. . that all other catholike countries , ( which hee knows held the pope's supremacy , as well as england ) do maintain their own priviledges inviolated : and , as for england , hee tells us , in a slovenly phrase , that our ancestours were not so stupid as to sitt still , and blow their noses ; meaning that they did the same which other catholike countries did ; so that , according to himself , there was a remedy still , and a means to keep their priviledges inviolated . seventhly , put case , these temporall inconveniences had not been otherwise remediable , i conceive there is not a good christian in the world that understands what a church is , will say that ecclesiasticall communion is to bee broken for all the temporall concernments imaginable : for , first , that the well being and peace of a church cannot consist without vnity , is so evident , that the very terms would convince him of a contradiction who should deny it ; since distraction and dissention , ( the parents of dissolution and ruine ) must needs bee where there is no vnity . secondly , not onely the well being of a church , but the very being of it consists in it's vnity ; for what scholler knows not that things of this nature have no other vnity , ( nor consequently entity or being ) but that of order , that is of superiority and subordination : whence follows , that , if this order bee broken , which is done by disacknowledging the former ecclesiasticall chief magistrate , the vnity of the church is dissolu'd , that is , her entity is annihilated , that is , there is no one church , that is , there is no church . this act then of yours since it dissolu'd that which was the chief bond of vnity in the former church , was in it's own nature destructive , of a church . a mischief which out-weighs the necessity of remedying the highest temporall inconveniences imaginable . thirdly , since christ came from heaven to plant a church , and the being of a church consist in order , it follows that christ instituted the order of the church ; otherwise hee had not constituted a church ; that is , hee had not done what hee came to do : wherefore that fact which breaks the order of the church , and that in the highest manner by disacknowledging the highest magistrate in the church , is by good consequence in the highest manner against christ's institution and command , that is , in the highest manner sinfull and criminall ; and so , no temporall inconveniences can bee a competent plea for such a fact ; since no temporall inconvenience can bee a sufficient reason for a man to sin . fourthly , if the communion of a church may bee broken for temporall miscarriages it follows that all the generall councils were to no purpose ; since whensoever the observation of these generall councils hapens to bee inconvenient to the temporall state , that is , sute not with the humours of the governed , but are likely to breed combustion , the remedying the temporall ills ( according to the bp. ) ought to oversway . the consequence is evident ; for general councils cannot bee more sacred than the communion of the church , since they are the effects of it ; or rather , indeed , they have their form and essence from this communion . since then this fact of theirs as appears by the charge broke church communion , and by the bishop's plea , because of temporall inconveniences , they may for the same and with better reason break councils too , and there 's an end of all . fifthly , faith , that is , the supernaturall knowledge of god , is so essentially necessary for the salvation of mankinde , that no worldly consideration ought to ballance it . now then since faith , if not one is none ; nor can it bee preseru'd one but by some certain rule to keep it one , it follows that no temporall mischief can deserve a remedy accompany'd with the renouncing this certain rule of faith : wherefore , temporall inconveniences cannot with any face bee alledg'd by a christian who held formerly no certain rule of faith but the living voice of the present church , that is immediate tradition ( as did the first reformers ) for a plea for them to renounce the said rule of faith ; which brings faith to an uncertainty , that is , to a nullity , or no obligation of holding any thing to bee of faith . yet this former rule of faith , the first reformers renounc't , when they renounced the pope's headship recommended by that rule . sixthly , the matter of fact not onely charges you to have rejected the rules of vnity in faith and government in the church you left , and by consequence ( since both then and now you acknowledge her a true church ) broke church communion , but it is also equally evident , that your grounds since have left the church no rule of either , but have substituted opinion in stead of faith , or obscurity of grammaticall quibbling in stead of evidence of authority , and anarchy in stead of government . for , the rule of faith if the former church was so easy and certain a method of coming to christ's law that none that had reason could bee either ignorant or doubtfull of it ; what easier than children to beleeve as they were taught , and practice as they were shownd . what more impossible than for fathers to conspire to either errour or malice , in teaching their children what was most evident to them by daily practice of their whole lives to have been their immediately foregoing fathers doctrine , and was most important to their and their children's endles bliss or misery ? and , what more evident than that they who proceed upon this principle , ( as catholikes do ) will alwaies continue , and ever did to deliver & embrace what was held formerly ; that is , to conserve true faith . now in stead of this , though the protestants will tell us sometimes upon occasion that they hold to tradition and at present beleeve their immediate forefathers , yet if wee goe backward to king h. the th's time , their chain of immediate delivery is interrupted , and at an end , ( the reformation , which they own , broke that , and shows their recourse to i● a false hearted pretence ) ours goes on still : whether run they then finding themselves at a loss here , for an easy , open , and certain method of faith . why , they turn your wits a woolgathering into a wildernes of words in the scriptures : ask them for a certain method to know the true sence of it ; they 'l tell you , 't is plain , or that you need no more but a grammar and a dictionary to find out a faith ; nay less , and that common people , who neither understand what grammar nor dictionary means , may find it there , though our eyes testify that all the world is together by the ears about understanding the sence of it . ask them for a certain interpreter ; perhaps sometimes they will answer you faintly that the generall councils and fathers are one ; that is , you must run over libraries ere you can rationally embrace any faith at all ; and , if you bee so sincere to your nature , reason , as to look for certainty which books are legitimate fathers , which not ; which councils generall , authentick , and to bee beleeved , which not ? you are engag'd again to study all the school-disputes , & controversies which concern those questions . and , if you repine at the endles laboriousnes of the task , the insecurity of the method , and the uncertainty of the issue , and urge them for some other certainer , shorter , and plainer way of finding faith ; they will reply at length , and confess , as their best champions , chillingworth and faulkland do very candidly , that there is no certainty of faith , but probability onely ; which signifies that no man can rationally bee a christian , or have any obligation to beleeve any thing ; since it is both most irrationall and impossible there should bee any oblig●tion to assent upon a probability . and thus , reader , thou se est what pass they bring faith and it's vnity to ; to wit , to a perfect nullity and totall ruin . next , as for government , let us see whether they have left any vnity of that in god's church ! that which was held for god's church by them , while they continued with us were those churches onely in communion with the see of rome ; the vnity of government in this church was evident , and known to all in what it consisted , to wit , in the common acknowledment of the bishop of rome as it's head. since they left that mother , they have got new brothers , and sisters , whom before they accounted bastards and aliens : so that , god's church now , according to them , is made up of greeks , lutherans , huguenots ; perhaps socinians , presbyterians , adamites , quakers , &c. for they give no ground , nor have any certain rule of faith to discern which are of it , which not . but wee will pitch upon their acknowledg'd favourites . first the church of england holds the king the head of their church . next the huguenots , ( whom they own for dear brothers , and part of god's church ) hold neither king , nor yet bishop , but the presbyte●y onely : strange vnity which stands in terms of contradiction ! thirdly , the papists are accounted by them , lest they should spoil their own mission , part of god's church too ; and these acknowledge noe head but the pope . fourthly , the lutherans are a part of their kind hearted church ; and , amongst them , for the most part , each parish-minister is head of his church or parish , without any subordination to any higher ecclesiasticall governour . lastly the greek church is held by them another part , and it acknowledges no head but the patriarch i omit those sects who own no government at all . ( is not this now a brave vnity where there are five disparate forms of government , which stand aloof , and at arms end with one another , without any commonty to unite or connect them ? let them not toy it now , as they use , and tell us of an union of charity ; our discourse is about an vnity of government , either then let him show that god's church , as cast in this mold , has an vnity within the limits and notion of government , tha● is , any commonty to subscribe to some one sort of government either acknowledg'd to have been instituted by christ , or agreed on by common cōsent of those in this new-fashion'd church ; or else , let him confess that this church thus patch't up , has no vnity in government at all . wee will do the bishop a greater favour , and give him leave to set aside the french church and the rest , and onely reflect upon the form of government they substituted to that which they rejected ; to wit , that the king , or temporall power , should bee supreme in ecclesiasticall affairs . bee it so then , and that each particular pretended church in the world were thus govern'd , wee see that they of england under their king , would make one church ; they of holland , under their hogen moghen magistrates another ; france under it's king a third , and so all the rest of the countries in the world . many churches wee see here indeed in those grounds , and many distinct independent governours ; but where is there any vnity of government for the whole ? where is there any supreme governour , or governours to whom all are bound to submit , and conform themselves in the common concerns of the church ? or , without this , how is it possible there should bee any vnity of government or a church , that is , a thing connected , united , or made one by order , or by vnity of government ? the church is god's family ; can that bee calld a family , where mutually independent persons live in severall rooms of the house , ( that is are many families ) without any master , or mistress of the house , or some person , or persons higher than the rest , by subordination to whom they become united or made one . the church is a city , whose vnity is in it self : can that bee calld a city , where each master of a family is supreme , that is , where there are an hundred distinct supremes which stand aloof from one another without any colligation of themselves under the notion of governed ; by which means those many otherwise wholes become now parts and make up one whole , which is done by submitting to some superiour magistrate or magistrates ? the church is a christian common-wealth ; can there bee a common-wealth which can bèe calld one , if every city and town have a particular supreme governour of it's own , without owing deference to any superiour or superiours ? does not common sence inform us that in this cause each city is a particular , that is , one compleat self bounded common-wealth ? that is , that those many cities are more ones , that is , many cōmon-wealths ? wherefore either show us some one standing , ordinary form of magistracy or government to which all christendome ought to submit , and some magistrate , or magistrates , governour , or governours to whom they owe a constant obedience , ( which is impossible in your grounds ) or else acknowledge plainly that you have left no vnity of government in god's church at all , but have unravell'd all the frame and disannull'd all the being of a church , which consisted essentially in order ; and made that parts of it have no more connexion or vnity than a rope of sand . yet as long as these pittifull shufflers can but tell the abused reader in generall terms that they acknowledge the discipline left by christ and his apostles , they make account their adherents will renounce both their eyes and common sence , and bee content to follow hood-wintk't after the empty tinkling sound of these hollow and nothing signifying phrases . perhaps , the bp. will reply , that a generall council is acknowledg'd by them as of obligatory authority ; and that , therefore , there is yet a means left for vnity of government in the whole church . vpon which answer the good protestant reader thinks them humble and reasonable men . but this is indeed the greatest mockery that can bee invented . for , first , they give us no certain rule to know which is a generall council , which not , that is who are to bee call'd to that council , who not ; for once taking away a certain rule of faith , there is no certainty who are hereticks , that is , men not to bee call'd to a council as to sit in it and vote ; who good catholiks , that is , to bee call'd thither to sit and vote there . next , generall councils being onely call'd upon extremities , if the churche's vnity in government consist onely in them , it follows that the church hath actually no vnity of government but just at that pinch when a generall council is to bee call'd ; that is , it is never a church , but at that happy time onely , when it is most unhappy . but , the greatest piece of foolery is , that , they having renounc't an actuall standing authority , pretend ( to show their goodnes , ) a readines to submit to the authority of a generall council , which themselves will acknowledge with the next breath impossible to bee had ; that is , they profess themselves very humbly and heartily ready , though they have renounc't one government , yet to submit to another , which can never bee , and so is never likely to trouble or controll them . is not this a piece of hollow hearted humility . yet that such councils as they will daign to call generall are held by them impossible , dr. h. tells us reply p. . in those words , generall councils are now morally impossible to bee had , the christian world being under so many empires , and divided into so many cōmunions , that it is not visible to the eye of man , how they should bee regularly assembled ; here , reader , thou seest all n●y discourse asserted ; to wit , that god's church , as they have form'd it , is so divided into disparate parts , that , as there is no vnity of government in it now , ( for if there were , there would bee also a means to assemble a generall council ) so it is impossible there should bee any for the future according to their grounds , till some one temporall governour come to lord it ov●r the whole , or greatest part of the christian world , which in all likelihood will bee never . consider again their candour , they have renounc't the former notion of god's church , and his authority whose proper office it was to call a generall council of that whole church , as hee did often , and then profess a willingnes to submit to such a council , or a representative of their new notion'd church ; but , with the next breath , lament ( alas ) that such a generall council , or representative cannot possibly bee had , ( after themselves had taken order to hinder all means of having it ) and so they are free and need obey no body . how much better and stronger were it argued thus ; that , since it is most irrationall and unbeseeming god's providence , that his church should bee destitute of a means to remedy her extremities , that is ; of means to gather a generall council , and that there was a means to doe this before you rejected the pope's authority , and by your own confession no possibility of it since ; that therefore , you have renounced the right notion of a church , and the right government of that church . this then is our totall charge against you ; that you have broke the vnity of the former church , ( and not of the court onely , as you trifle it ) which you were in , by renouncing those principles in which consisted her vnity both in faith and government , and to which principles the whole church , you broke from , consented . thus far the matter of fact evidences . nor is it less evident that you have substituted no certain rule of faith , nor any certain or particular form of government ; which can ground an vnity , to your new fashion'd church in either respect , but , that you have turn'd evidence of authority ( the onely certain rule and root of faith ) into a drowsy probability ; and , by consequence , faith thus grounded , into opinion ; as , likewise , that you have turn'd the former government of the church into a perfect anarchy ; there being no colligation or vnity of the whole together , ty any by of government ; and that ( had not god's mercy been above your malice ) you had made the church , our hierusalem , which is built as a city at vnity with it self , ( that is which hath an vnity of government ) an heap of stones ; without , connexion , without order , and consequently without being which consisted in that order . this is your crime , in this lies your sinfull guilt of schism and heresy , that your fact and tenet is intrinsecally destructive to the very being of god's church , and that it tears and rents it peece-meal all asunder . a mischief equally pernicious to man-kind's attaining beatitude , as the renoūcing the supreme government in a kingdome or commonwealth would bee in order to their safe enjoyment of their temporall livelihoods ; and , therefore , no waies to bee ballanced or excused by alledging temporall inconveniences ; since it as far ouerpoises it's excuse as eternity of bliss does a peece of earth ; that is , infinitely . his third sort of grounds , is the weaknes of the pope's pretences , and the exemption of the britannick churches from forrain iurisdiction by the council of ephesus . for the fitst , the bp. never so much as directly mentions that in which wee place the strength of the pope's pretence , of his supreme authority , much lesse impugnes it , save onely a little on the by ( as it were ) in his sleight way : 't is this , that it was held and deliver'd by a world of immediate fathers to sons as from their fathers , & so upwards as from christ , that this authority was sacred , of christ's institution , of faith , and recommended to us by the same rule that assured us christ was god. vpon this tenure as strongly supported as nature could bear , held demonstrably evident , and so shown by us ; not yet answer'd or pretended to bee answer'd by the protestant party , wee ground this doctrine of the pope's headship , or the substance of his authority : but , i fear , the bp. either understands not our tenure , ( for , otherwise , sure hee would have nam'd it ) or else hee is impugning some canon lawier , and the extent of the pope's authority ; in stead of impugning the church , and the substance of the said authority as for his second trifle ; i have already shown ( sect. . ) that the britannick churches have no influence upon our churches descended from saxons ; nor shall hee ever show a syllable in the council of ephesus exempting them from the pope's iurisdiction , as head of the church ; however cyprus and some others are there exempted from a neighbouring superiour falsly pretending a iurisdiction over them ; but of this more shall bee said hereafter in this present section . the vnity of the church being of such importance , and the fact breaking it , by consequence so hainous , the alledging the greatest abuses imaginable are absolutely concluded insufficient excuses for such a fact ; much more , unles it bee shown , there were no other possible means to remedy them . hereupon i alledged that it was of little concernment to examine whether his complaints were true or false , since hee does not show there was no other remedy , but division . first , the bishop replies sharply . what ? is it of little concernment to examin whether the grounds bee sufficient or no ? well leap't my lord ; i speak of the inconsiderablenes of their truth , or falshood ; your l● talks of inconsiderablenes of their s●fficiency , & pretends against both plain words and conscience that i wave that . there may bee ob●ections against the abuses perhaps of all governours in the world , and these also true : but their truth does not infer their sufficiency for rejecting that very government as long as they are less considerable than good of the government it self , and that there is another cure : this it that in which i show'd your manner of arguing defective in the main , because you never prou'd nor ever shall , that there was no other remedy except division ; for , unles you put in this ( and more too ) your argument stands in this posture , true complaints against governours , whether otherwise remediable or no , are sufficient reasons to abolish that very government . at which position , if spoke out candidly , i hope you will blush : though it bee perfectly your own , cloak't a little in other , ( but equivalent ) terms . next , hee tells us it is a negative and so it belongs not to him to prove it . yes , my ld , it belongs to your party , or any one who rises against an actuall authority , either to show that that authority was none , or else that though it was a lawfull one , yet there was no other remedy for it's abuses , but a totall abolishment of it . otherwise , the very maiesty which government carries in it's notion , the vnity , peace , and a thousand blessings and conveniences which spring from that vnity , found in the common acknowledment of that authority , oversway the private credit , or any other less publike concerns , which the disobedient party can pretend to ; and render's their fact of rising , irrationall and destructive to the common , engaging them needlesly in a thousand distractions , and by consequence , hazards of ruin which attend such divisions . thirdly , hee would persuade the reader that a negative is not capable of proof , or at least not so easily capable of it ; for answer i refer him to any boy who hath been two years at the vniversities , who will inform him that negatives may witht equall evidence bee concluded in celarent & ferio as affirmatives may in barbara , and darij . lastly , the proof which hee proposes for his negative to show no other remedy , ( but dares not much stick to them ) are both equally competent to france , spain , &c who yet ( as hee tells us in the next page in contradiction to himself , here ) found other remedies to preserve their priviledges inviolated , and his pretended proofs are such pittifull ones , ( though on them is built the sufficiency of their motives ) that they evencry for mercy as soon as they show their faces . they are these that the king of england could not call the pope and his ourt to a personall account , and that the pope would not ease them upon many adresses made ? what then ? had not the king the sword in his own hands ? did it not ly in his power to right himself as hee ●isted , and to admit those pretended eneroachments onely so far as hee thought iust and fitting ? nay do not your self lay open and repeat in many places that not onely kings of england but also those of all other countries both could and did do it often , and by doing so preserve their priviledges inviolated ? how does this prove then that there was sufficient grounds of dividing from the former church , since your self confess so often it could have been remedied otherwise ? or , how is it a sufficient motive to abolish an authority for the abuses , which very pretended abuses they had power to curb and keep within compass without dividing , and so that they should not violate their priviledges ? not a word then hath the bp. brought to prove they had sufficient grounds of division , that is , that there was no other remedy : but , in stead thereof , expresly told us the contrary , and manifoldly contradicted himself . i added . and much more , if the authority bee of christ's institution no iust cause can possibly ●ee given for it's abolishment . the merry bp. laughs at this , ( as hee calls it ) kind of arguing ; which neither looks like an argument , nor was pretended by mee as such ; but as a consideration which much aggravates the charge and obliges in all reason the renouncers of this authority to look very charily to the sufficiency of the causes of th●t their division : for since it follows out of the terms , that , ere they renounced it , and by thus renouncing it left to bee catholikes , they immediately before held it as catholikes do , that is , held it as a point of faith , and of christ's institution ; and since it is evident that none ought to change his faith which hee and his ancestours immemorially embrac'd but upon evident grounds ; again , since it is evident likewise and confest that temporall motives ought not to make us break christ's commands , which is done by rejecting a government which hee instituted : two things are consequent hence to their disadvantage ; one , that their motives ought to bee rigoro sly evident and demonstrative for their renouncing it , since d●nger of damnation ensves upon their miscarriage , and this even in their own thoughts as they were lay'd in their minds when they first began to meditate a breach : the other , that the pretended causes ( especially temporall inconveniences ) for the abolishing this authority can no waies iustify the first breakers who held it formerly a point of faith , since no iust causes can bee given to renounce an authority held to bee instituted by christ ; as then it had been rationall to reply to king h. the th remaining yet a catholike , and beginning to have thoughts to abolish this authority , upon such and such temporall inconveniences that his maiesty and his ancestours had held it of divine institution and that therefore there could bee no iust cause to abolish it , so it is equally seasonable to reply to my lord of derry , who undertakes here to vindicate him by alledging the same thing , that these causes nor any else were sufficient to make them begin to break , because ere they begun the breach , they held this authority to bee of christ's institution ; and therefore it is a folly for him to think to iustify them by huddling together causes and motives , and crying them up for sufficient till hee can show they had evidence of the truth of the opposite point , greater than the pretended evidence of authority , universall tradition , which they actually had for their former tenet if a cause bee sufficient to produce an effect , and equally apply'd 'tis manifest the same effect will follow . hence , as an argument of the insufficiency of their motives of division , i alledged that all other catholike countries had the same exceptions , yet neither broke formerly , nor follow your example . hee answers , first ; few or none have sustain'd so great oppression ; which signifies , i know not well whether any have or no : or , for any thing i know , some have ; nor does hee prove the contrary otherwise than by a pleasant saying of a certain pope . any thing will serve him . next hee tells us , all other countries have not right to the cyprian priviledges , as brittain hath . and how proves hee that this country had any by that council ? is england named in the council of ephesus , which exempted cyprus from the patriarch of antioch ? no. is brittain at least ? no. how come wee then to bee particularly priviledg'd by that council . why the bp. of derry thinks so . his grounds ? because that council ordains , that no bp. should occupy a province , which was not from , the beginning under his predecessours . and how proves hee the application , that england was never anciently under the pope as head of the church ? from sr henry spelman's old-new manuscript , and two or three raggs of history , or misunderstood testimonies . are they demonstrative or rigorous evidences ? here my ld is wisely silent . will less serve than such proofs to iustify such a separation ? hee is silent again . were they a thousand times as many , are they of a weight comparable to a world of witnesses proceeding upon the grounds of immediate d●livery from hand to hand , which recommended and ascertain'd the contrary ? alas ! hee never thinks of nor considers that at all ; but very wisely puts his light grains in one end of the scales , negl ●cting to put our pounds in the other ; and then brags that his thin grains are overweight . the third particularizing motive is his own unprou'd saying , and is concluded with a boast that hee is not the onely schismatick in the world but hath brothers . is this the way to argue against us ! to call all those christians which profess the name of christ , and communicate with himself in the same guilt , and then say hee hath fellows in his schism ? hee knows wee grant them not to bee truly-call'd christians , but in the name onely and equivocally , as a painted man is styld ' a man ; if hee will show that any congregation of truly-call'd christians partakes with him in the separation from rome , let him show that these pretended christians , for those points in which they differ from us , did not renounce the onely certain rule of faith , tradition , or delivery of immediate forefathers ; or , that there is any certain and infallible rule but that . otherwise , they are cut of from the rule and root of faith , and by consequence not in a true appellation to bee call'd faithfull or christians ; otherwise , they heard not the immediately foregoing church for those points which they innovated , and so are to us no properly call'd christians , but , according to our saviours counsell as heathens and publicans : i mean those who knowingly & wilfully separated . talking voluntarily , my ld , according to the dictates of your own fancy will not serve in a rigorous controversy . first , show that those you call christians have any infallible or certain rule of faith , and so any faith , and , that they have not onely a probable and fallible groūd , that is opinion onely for their faith ; and then you shall contradict your own best and more candid writers who confess it in terms ; and do such a miracle as your ancestours never attain'd to ; nor any of wit and ingenuity attempted , seeing it impossible to bee done rationally . i alledged , in the next place , to show more their inexcusablenes and the infussiciency of their pretended motives for breaking , the example of our own country and forefathers , who had the same cause to cast the pope's supremacy of the land , yet rather proferr'd to continue in the peace of the church , than to att●mpt so destructive an innovation . the bp. replies , first , that wee should not mistake them , a●d that they still desire to live in the communion of the catholike church , &c. no , my ld , i doe not mistake you , but know very well you would bee willing and glad too , the former church should own you for hers ; i doubt not but you are apprehensive enough of what honour would accrue to you if wee would account you true catholikes ; and what disgrace you get by being accounted hereticks and schismaticks by us . but yet your desire of staying in the church is conditionall , that you may bee permitted to remain in her communion , and yet have liberty still to do and hold what you list . do you not think every rebell , that renounces both the former government and laws , loves not still to bee held a good commonwealths man , and not to bee outlaw'd or punish't , but permitted to enjoy the priviledge of the commonwealth , whose vnity hee hath broken , so hee may have his own intentions ? had iack straw , or wat tiler , after they had rebell'd , a mind to bee thought rebells , or to bee hang'd ; or , upon the governours declaring them outlaws and punishable , was it a competent plea for them to say they desir'd to remain in the peaceable communion of the commonwealth as far as the court would give them leave ? your fact , my ld , of breaking the vnity of the former church is much more evident than theirs , being visible to the eyes of the whole world ; and infinitely more hainous , since it concerns the order to eternity . after this fact so visible , so enormous ; 't is no charity nor courtesy in you , but a request of an unreasonable favour from us , to admit you into communion ; and would bee most absurd in government , most contradictory in terms ; signifying thus much that they should bee still held by us for good subjects , who profess and defend still their rebellion against the former church government ; and for the right faithfull , who have no rule of faith at all , nay pretend themselves to no more than an opinion-grounding or probability . secondly , hee tells us , our ancestours did not stupidly sit still and blow their noses , when they saw themselves thus abused ? i answer whether they blew their noses or no it matters not ; but , did they renounce the pope's authority as head of the church ? this is the thing i deny'd of them , and charge upon the bp. what saies hee to this ? hee denies it too , after hee had shuffled about a while ; ( for hee must have the liberty to take his swing ) that is , hee saies the same i do , and grants , what hee pretend's to confute . for , after hee had reckon'd up what things our ancestours had done against the pope , hee adds , as the top of the climax , that they threatned him further to make a wall of separation between him and them . which shows that this is the most they did . for , if they but threatned they did it not . but , 't is evident that you have done what they onely threatned to do , and in excuse of your doing it , you adde immediately , that you have more experience than your ancestours had . thus the bp. something candidly at present : yet , wee have seen him heretofore , in contradiction to himself here , both affirm and maintain that k. h. the th when hee renounc't the pope made no new law , but onely declar'd the ancient law of england ; which signifies that the wall of separation was not onely threaten'd but made formerly ; for the former laws were actually in force before k. h's time , nay in the very beginning of his raign , as himself confesses p. s . l. . . and wee shall see him hereafter bring an whole chapter to make good the same impudent assertion , which would put out the eyes and blot out the acknowledg'd notions of the whole world . an excellently bad cause needs an excellently good memory . now then since you have at unawares acknowledg'd so much truth as that they who had the same causes of separation which you have , yet did not separate as you do , let us reflect a little upon the reason you give of this difference . 't is this , that you have more experience than your ancestours ; but whence this greater experience springs , or out of what experiments which they had not , you gather'd this experience , you have not one word . are you wiser than they were in the art of governing as to this point ? sure your self do not beleeve it , nor can say it with modesty ; since by professing you made no new law in this matter , ( that is retain'd the old , which you receiu'd from them ) you confess you know not how to make better . were they cowards and durst not make those prouisions they saw necessary for the common good ! neither . they actually did ( say you ) exclude the pope's supremacy out of england as far as they judged it necessary for the tranquillity of the kingdome . well then , if they did as much as they judged necessary , and knew as well what was necessary as you , why did you do more , because , forsooth , you had more experience . but does this experience , furnish you with a reason sufficient to iustify your separation ! if it do , produce it ; if not , why do you alledge this more experience ? and , indeed , how come you to pretend to it ! for , since experience of necessity supposes an experiment whence 't is deriu'd , either some new thing happen'd by which this great necessity of separation which your ancestors were ignorant of came to bee discover'd to you , or else you had no more experience than they . therefore , good my ld , tell us what this new experimēt was : but , it seems you thought it either not handsom to bee owned , or not worth the owning that assigne us none at all , telling us onely in generall terms you have more experience than your ancestors had , &c. that is , in stead of producing some cause of separating which might vindicate your church from schism , to assigne an effect without a cause ; and defend it with the same plea as a man would do his rebellion , who rising against his actuall governours , and upon that score standing accused of treason , should go about to maintain it was therefore lawfull for him to rebell , because hee was wiser than the former sub●ects ; and then tell that troublesome adversary who should press him to prove this greater wisedome , that hee has more experience , and that hee is so . however , since you are resolu'd to make a secret of this rare experiment , and that , by consequence , wee are not to expect from you any grounds of your greater experience , let us see at least what it is you pretend to have more enperience of . 't is this , that their ancestors remedies were not soueraign or sufficient enough , &c. now these remedies of theirs being their rationall laws , ( as hee intimates presently after ) do but observe how , like a reeling dutchman making indentures with his legs , the bp's discourse staggers now to the one , now to the other far distant side of the contradiction . hee tells us here that the remedies , that is , laws of our ancestours were not sufficient enough ; yet maintains stoutly before that in the separation no new law was made , that is , that the same laws or remedies were formerly as then , but were not formerly sufficient ; that is , that the same thing is not as sufficient as it is . and this signifies for the bp. to have more experience than his ancestors . again , it being alledged here that the former laws were insufficient , and acknowledg'd the page before that all other catholike countries do maintain their priviledges inviolate , by means of their laws ( as i conceive and hee intimates ) which laws hee sayes , p. . are equivalent to those of england which hee pretends here not to bee sufficient ; it follows that the laws of other countries were equivalent to those of england , but those of england not equivalent to them ; or , that , though equivalent to one another , that is , of equall force , yet the one was sufficient , the others not , that is , of less force : and , thirdly , that all catholike countries did maintain their priviledges inviolate by means which did not maintain them , or by laws which were not sufficient to do it . lastly , hee tells us , p. . that the former laws deny'd the pope any authority in england , and p. . l. . that those laws were in force before the breach , that is , did actually leave him no authority in england ; and here , that those nationall laws were not sufficient remedies ; whence 't is manifestly consequent , according to him , that those laws which deny'd the pope all authority , and were actually in force , that is , actually left him none , were not sufficient remedies against the abuses of that authority , which they had quite taken a way . and this plenty of contradictions the bp's book is admirably stor'd with ; which are his demonstrations to vindicate his church from schism ; onely hee christens the monstrous things with a finer name , and calls them their greater experience . whereas , indeed , as for more experience hee brags of , god know ( poor men ) 't is onely that which eve got by eating the apple , the expeperience of evill added to that which they had formerly of good . their ancestors experienc't an happy vnity , vnanimity , vniformity and constancy in the same faith while they remain'd united to the former church ; and they since their breach have experienc't nothing but the contrary ; to wit , distractions , dissentions , vnconformity , with a perpetually-fleeting changeablenes of their tenet ; and , at last , an utter dissolution and disapparition of their mock church , built onely in the air of phantastick probabilities . in the last place i alledged , that the pretences upon which the schism was originally made were far different from those hee now takes up to defend it . for , it is well known that had the pope consented that k. h. might put away his wife and marry another , there had been no thoughts of renouncing his au●hority . which shows that at most , the scales were but equally ballanc't before , and the motives not sufficient to make them break , till this consideration cast them . a great prejudice to the sufficiency of the other reasons you alledge , which you grant , in the next page , were most certainly then obseru'd or the greatest part of them . for since they were observed then , that is , since the same causes were apply'd then , apt to work upon men's minds , those same causes had been also formerly efficacious , that is , had formerly produc't the effect of separating as well as now , had there not been now some particular disposition in the patient ; and what particular disposition can bee shown at the instant of breaking , save the king's lust , which was most manifest and evident , i confess i cannot imagin , nor ( as i am persuaded ( the bp. himself ; at least hee tells us none , but onely in generall terms sayes they had more experience than their ancestours . sect. . the first part of the protestant's moderation , exprest by my l d of derry in six peeces of non-sence and contradiction ; with an utter ruin of all order and government . his pretended undeniable principles very easily and rationally deny'd . his churche's inward charity , and the speciall externall work thereof ( as hee calls it ) her good-friday-prayer , found to bee self contradictory pretences . his moderation in calling those tenets weeds , which hee cannot digest ; and indifferent opinions , which hee will not bee obliged to hold . that according to protestant grounds 't is impossible to know any catholike church , or which sects are of it . his next head is the due moderation of the church of england in their reformation . this i called a pleasant topick ; hee answers so were the saddest subjects to democritus , i reply , the subject is indeed very sad for never was a sadder peece of logick produced by a non-plust sophister , yet withall so mirthfull , as it would move laughter even in heraclitus . the first point of their moderation , is this , that they deny not the true being to other churches , nor separate from the churches but from their accidentall errors . now , the matter of fact hath evidenced undeniably that they separated from those points which were the principles of vnitie both in faith & governmēt to the former church with which they communicated , and consequently from all the persons which held those principles ; and , had their separation been exprest in these plain terms and true language , nothing had sounded more intolerable and immoderate : wherefore my l d took order to use his own bare authority , to moderate and reform the truth of these points into pretended erroneousnes , and the concerningnes or fundamentalnes of them into an onely accidentalnes , and then all is well , and hee is presently ( if wee will beleeve his word against our owne eyes ) a moderate man ; and so are the protestans too who participate his moderation . but , if wee demand what could be essentiall to the former church if these too principles ( renounced by them ) which grounded all that was good in her , were accidentall onely ? or how he can iustly hold her a true church whose fund●mentall of fundamentalls , the root & rule of all her faith , was , as he saies here , an error ; his candid answer would shew us what common sence already informs us that nothing could be either essentiall or fundamentall to that church . and so , this pretended moderation would vanish on one side into plain non-sence , in thinking any thing could be more essentiall to a church then vni●y of faith , and government ; on the other side into meer folly and indeed cōtradiction in holding her a true church , whose grounds of both ( that is of all which should make her a true church ) are errors & lies . his church of england defines , art. . that our church erres in matters of faith ; art. . that four points of our faith are vain fictions & contradictory to god's word . the like character is given of another point art. . our highest act of deuotion , ( art. . is styled a blasphemous fiction & pernicious imposture ; and ( art. . ) that those who are cut of from the church publikely ( i conceive they mean catholikes or at least include them , whom they used to excommunicate publikely in their assemblies ) should be held as heathens and publicans . again , nothing was more uncontrollably , nay more laudably common in the mouths of their preachers , then to call the pope , antichrist ; the church of rome , the whore of babylon , idolatrous , superstitious , blasphemous , &c. and , to make up the measure of his fore fathers sins the bp. calls here those two principles of vnity both in faith & government , without which she neither hath nor can have any thing of church in her ( as hath been shown in the foregoing section ) both errors and falshoods . now , these expressions , if taken as falling from their mouths & pens , i conceive sound not over much of moderation . all the moderation consists here , that my ld of derry had a mind to break a good iest , and assure us very sadly p. . l. . that ( notwithstanding all this ) they forbear to censure us ; which signifies , first , that they do not censure at all whom they have already censured in the height ( as is manifest by their former expressions ; ) next , that though they beleeve those former expressions to be true , and that wee are indeed such , that is though they hold us for such , yet they do not censure us for such : awitty contradiction ! and lastly that though our church erre in credendis , contradict scripture blasphemously & perniciously in her doctrine , nay though her all grounding principles be flatt errors , and that she pertinaciously & unrelentingly persist in those doctrines ( as she does ) nor is ever likely to change or retract them , yet for all this she is not to be held as hereticall ( though this be the very definition of heresie ) but as a true church still , nor is to be censured to be otherwise . good charitable non-sence ! hee tells me , first , that hee speakes of forbearing to censure other churches , but i answer of communicating with them , and that therefore i err from the purpose . yet himself six lines before ( so forgetfull he is ) quotes s. cyprian for removing no man from our communion , &c. and how they should refuse to communicate with any , unles they first iudge him & censure him to deserve to be avoided , that is , naught , i must confess i know not . next , hee tells us one may in some cases very lawfully communicate with materiall idolaters , hereticks , &c. in pious offices , though not in their idolatry , heresie , &c. thus we have lost the question . who for bids them to go to visit the sick with them , or such like religious duties ? the question is whether they may communicate with them in any publike solemne act , performable by catholikes , as they are subjects of such a common wealth , from which the other is out law'd , or performable by those others , as belonging to a distinct sect ? again this position of moderation destroies all order & government both of church & state ; for , by this , out law'd persons may be traffick'r & treated with so we joyn not with them in their rebellion ; and all the whole world ( heathens too ) may be of one communion ; especially all hereticks , who all agree in some common principle of christianity with the rest . the bishop's proviso makes all the world brothers & friends , though one part should remain most obstinate enemies both to god & his church ; for still , as long as this principle holds of communicating with them in all things but their errors , god's church shall become a courteous gallimafry of all the filth hell & error could compound to deform her , and wear in her externall face a motley mask of as many colours as there are sects in the world : perhaps heathens too must make up a part of this communion , provided we abstain onely to communicate with them in their idolatry . thus they who want grounds to give nerves to their government , are forced to embrace a counterfeit kind-heartednes ; and under that plausible vizard vent much refined perniciousnes as is able at once to ruin all sence , reason , order , discipline , government , common wealth , church . thirdly he tells us that the orthodox christians did sometimes communicate with the hereticall arians . by which you see he is a kind disposition to admit even those to his communion who deny christ's divinitie . the arians were known to cloak themselves so craftily in words , that they could not for a long time be certainly discover'd ; nor is it any wonder that for a while hereticks be tolerated , untill they be both heard and a time of repentance be prescribed them . fourthly , he tells us he hath shown how the primitive catholikes communicated with the schismaticall novatians in the same publike divine offices . but he is so reserved as not to direct us where he hath shown this ; nor could an ordinary inquiry finde it out ; and in his p. . which place seems most proper for that discourse , he onely names the word [ novatians ] without proving any thing concerning them . now the novatians were simply schismaticks , and transported onely by a too rigorous zeal to a disobedience to the church in a formerly received practice ; with such as these it is lawfull to communicate , till , upon their contumacy , the church shall excommunicate them . again , as long as schismaticks & those who are erroneous in faith , are onely in via ( as we may say ) and not in termino , and hardned into an obstinacy , there is a prudentiall latitude allow'd by the church , delaying her censures as long as shee can possibly without wronging her government , as was de facto practised in england till the th of q. elizabeth : but this is not enough to prove they were admitted into communion , because they were tolerated for a certain time while there was hope they would not be obstinate , but would return , the apostle himself prescribing a time of triall , before they are to be avoided upon necessitie . but , can my l d of derry show a parallell to our case , that any renounc't the former rule of faith , immediate tradition of ancestors , the former government , and many other points recommendedy that rule , and obstinately persisted to disavow both , reviling , writing against , excommunicating , nay persecuting with loss of estates , and often times of life the professors of the thus renounced faith & government ; can he show , i say , that such were ever admitted by the church into communion ? unles he can show this , he beats the air , for this onely comes to our point . s. cyprian's case reaches not hither ; he had no reason to remove any from his communion , since he was in the wrong ; nor could hee possibly see with evidence that the immediate tradition of all those churches with whom hee communicated did avouch his tenet , for hee was the man that brought in the noveltie ; your renouncing the former rule of faith , immediate delivery of fore fathers , and the former government , with many other points recommended by that rule , is most evident , nay confest , avouched , & still maintain'd by your own obstinate selves . fifthly , hee told us that the catholikes call'd the donatists their brethren . i answer , so are catholikes bound to call the protestants now ; nay turks , heathens , and in generall all men who are yet in a capacite to attain beatitude , that is , all but the damned in hell , who are eternally hardned in enmitie against god. s. peter ( art. . v. . ) call'd the iews who crucyfy'd christ , his brethren , yet never meant by that appellation that they were good christians . sixthly , he objects that the donatists proceeding upon my principle would not acknowledge the catholikes their brethren . and what is this principle of mine ? 't is this , as put down here by himself ; that a man cannot say his own religion is true but he must say the opposite is false ; nor hold his own certain without censuring another man's . good reader , reflect a little upon this proposition he cavills at , and then take , if thou canst , the just dimensions of the unmeasurable weaknes of error and it's abettors . do not truth and certainty involve essentially in their notions an oppositenes and contrarietie to falshood & error ? does not true signifie not-false ? how is it possible then a man indued with the common light of reason can hold a thing true and yet not hold it 's opposite false ? yet this plain self evident proposition , in other terms the self-same with this , that a thing cannot both be & not be at once , is denied by the bp. nay accounted disgracefull to hold it . whereas , indeed , it is not mine nor the donatists onely , but the common principle of nature , which the silliest old wife and least boy come to the use of reason cannot but know . error prest home cannot burst out at length into less absurdities than denying the first principles . the bishop of derry having shown us how well skill'd he is in principles by renouncing that first nature-taught one , proceeds immediately to establish some principles of his own , which he calls evident & undeniable , so to confute the former . the first is , that particular churches may fall into error : where , if by errors , he means opinions onely ; 't is true : if points of faith , 't is not so undeniable as he thinks ; in case that particular church adhere firmly to her rule of faith , immediate tradition , for that point already there setled ; that is , if shee proceed as a church . if he wonder at this , i shall increase his admiration by letting him know my minde , that i see it not possible how even the pretended protestants church of england ( could it without self condemnation have owned the immediate delivery of fore fathers , and onely proceeded & stuck close to that rule ) should ever come to vary from the former protestant beleef ; for , as long as the now fathers taught their children what was held now , and the children ( without looking farther ) beleeved their fathers and taught their children as they beleeved , and so successively , it followes in terms that the posterity remote a thousand generations would still beleeve as their fathers do now . but , as their religion , built on reformation , that is , not immediate tradition , will not let them own immediate tradition for their rule of faith , so neither , did they own it , could their certainty arrive to that of our churches , strengthen'd by so many super-added assistances . his second principle is , that all errors are not essentiall or fundamentall . i answer that if by errors he means onely opinions , as he seems to say in the next paragraph , then none at all are essentiall ; but what is this to my proposition which spoke of religion not of opinions ; unles perhaps ( which is most likely & consonant to the protestant grounds ) the bishop makes account that religion and opinion are all one . but , if he means error in a matter of faith , then every such error is fundamentall and ( to answer this third principle with the same labour ) destroies the being of a church . for , since a church must necessarily have a rule of faith , otherwise she were no church , and that 't is impossible to conceive how man's nature should let her proceed so quite contrary to her principles as to hold a thing as a matter of faith , not proceeding upon her onely rule of faith , this being a flat contradiction ; again , since the rule of faith must be both certain and plain ( without which properties 'tis no rule ) it follows that an error in a matter of faith argues an erroneousnes in the rule of faith , which essentially and fundamentally concerns the being of a church . his fourth principle is that every one is bound , according to the just extent of his power , to free himself from those not essentiall errors . why so , my l d ? if those errors be not essentiall , they leave according to your own grounds , sufficient means of salvation , and the true being of a church : how prove you then that you ought to break church communion which is essentially destructive to the being of a church to remedy this , or hazard your salvation ) as you know well schism does ) when you might have rested secure ? is it an evident and undeniable principle that you ought to break that in which consists the being of a church to remedy that which you confess can consist with the being of a church ? or , is it an undeniable principle that you ought to endanger your soul where you grant there is no necessity ? say not i suppose things gratis , your friend dr. h. tells you out of the fathers how horrid a crime schism is , how vtterly unexcusable ; the undeniable evidence of fact manifests you to have broke church communion , that is to have schismatized from the former church , which you must be forced to grant unles you can show us that you still maintain the former principles of vnity both in faith and government . these are the points which you violently broke and rejected ; show either that these were not fundamentally concerning the vnity and cōsequently the entity of the former church , or else confess that you had no just cause of renouncing them , and so that you are plainly both schismatick & heretick . but 't is sufficient for your lp's pretence of moderation without so much as mentioning them in particular to say here in generall terms that the points you renounc'd were not essentiall , were accidentall , were errors , vlcers , opinions , hay & stubble , the plague , weeds , &c. and thus ends the first part of your wisely maintained moderation , as full of contradictions & absurdities as of words . the second proof of their moderation is their inward charity . i love to see charity appearing out-wardly : me thinks hanging and persecution disguize her very much , and your still clamorous noises against us , envying us even that poore happines that we are able with very much a doe to keep our heads above water and not sink utterly . he proves this in ward charity by their externall works , as he calls them their prayers for us ; he should have said , words , the former were their works , and prou'd nothing but their malice . but let us examin their prayers : they pray for us he sayes daily ; and we do the same for them ; nay more , many of ours hazard their lives daily to do good to the souls even of themselves , our enemies ; and to free them , as much as in us lies , from a beleeved danger . which shows now the greater charity ? but their speciall externall work , as he calls it , is their solemn anniversary prayer for our conversion every good friday . and this he thinks is a speciall peece of charity in their church ; being ignorant ( good man ) that this very thing is the solemn custome of our church every good friday , as is to be seen in our missall , and borrowed thence by their book of common prayer , among many other things ; but let us see whether the protestants , according to their grounds , can be sayd to pray for us at all in particular on good friday , or for our conversion , as he , forget-full of his own tenet , affirms . their prayer is this , mercifull god , who hast made all men , and hatest nothing that thou hast made , nor wouldest the death of a sinner , but rather that he should be converted and live ; have mercy upon all iews , turks , infidells , and hereticks , &c. fetch them home to thy flock , that they may be saved , &c. i ask , now , under which of these heads does he place papists , when he pretends their cōversion is here pray'd for in particular ? vnder that of hereticks ? how can this stand with his principles , who acknowledges ours a true church , that is , not hereticall ? and , lately told us , as a point of his churches moderation , that she forbears to censure others . again , they grant us to be of christ's flock , already , & in a capacy to be saved , whereas those they pray for here are supposed reducible to christ's flock , ( that is , not yet of it ) and by being thus reduced , capable of salvation ; that is , incapable of it before they be thus reduced ; none of these therefore are competent to us , nor are we prayed for there , as hereticks , if his own grounds & his own pretended moderation are to be held to by himself . much less will he say we are pray'd for there under the notion of iews , turcks , or infidels , for this were to censure us worse , nor was ever pretended by protestants . it follows then that our conversion in particular is not there pray'd for at all , but that there is such a pittifull dissonancy between the pretended church of england's doctrine & her practice , that her greatest bp's & doctors cannot make sence of one related to the other . nay more , since hee culls out this good friday , prayer for the speciall externall work of their charity towards us , and that this cannot concern us at all ( without a self contradiction ) it follows that their other externall works argue no charity at all towards us . and this is the great inward charity the bp. brags of , as a proof of their due moderation . he adds , that we excommunicate them once a year , that is the day before good-friday . i reply , that to expect a church should not excommunicate those whom she holds to be schismaticks and hereticks , is at once to be ignorant of the churches constant practice , and the common principles of government . it being equally evident , that the church in all ages tooke this course with obstinate adversaries of faith , as it is , that society in the world can subsist without putting a distinction and separating avowed enemies and rebels from true subjets & friends . if then they hold us hereticks , ( and unles they hold us such , they do not pray for us in particular as is pretended ) they ought in all reason to excommunicate ; as indeed sometimes they did some particular catholikes in their churches ; though not all our church in generall , their new started congregation was conscious to herself , that she had no such authority ; which made her also instead of those words in our good-friday prayer , ad sanctam matrem ecclesiam catholicam atque apostolicam revocare digneris , recall them to our holy mother the catholike & apostolike church , vary the grave and too authoritative phrase , ( too loud ( alas ) for her as taken in contra distinction to us ) into that dwindling , puling puritanicall expressions of one flock , the rem nant of the true israelites , one fold , under one shepheard , &c. equally pretendable ( if taken alone ) by quakers , as by them , since they include no visible marks in their notion , which can satisfy us of any distinction between the one & the other . the third proof of their moderation is , that they added nothing but took away onely from the former doctrines of the church , which he expresses by saying they pluck up the weeds , but retain all the plants of saving truths . i answer'd that to take away goodnes is the greatest evill , &c. he replies that he spake of taking away errors . no my l d , this was not the intent of your discourse there ; both because you pretended there to prove something whereas i conceive to rely on onely the cheap saying that all is erroneous you tooke away , proves nothing , but is a meere self supposition , as also because it is not a proof of moderation to take away errors , but a rigorously requisite act of iustice . your intent then was to show the moderation in your method of proceeding , which you pretended all the way long , to have been that you added no new thing but onely took away something of the old . this i glanc't at as a fond and idle pretence ; since till you prove evidently and demonstrably from your new rule of faith , that the former of immediate tradition which asserted those points denied by you did there in erre , the presumption stands against you that it was christ's doctrine which you maimed by thus detracting from it ; or , if you suppose gratis that 't was not christ's doctrine , but errors & falshoods , then it is not proper to call it moderation , but rather an act of necessary charity to root it out : i know it is an easy matter to call all weeds which your nice stomachs cannot digest ; but if that point of immediate tradition renounced by you , which onely could ascertain us that there was any such thing as christ or god's word , be a weed , i wonder what can deserve to be called a flower . what he vapours of holding what the primitive fathers iudged necessary and now catholike church does , is an emptie brag & vanishes into smoak by it self , since ( as shall shortly bee shown ) their grounds can never determin what is the catholike or universall church . in order to the same proof of his moderation , i likewise answered that he who positively denies ever adds the contrary , to what he takes away ; and that he who makes it an article that there is no purgatory , no mass , no prayer to saints , has as many articles as he who holds the contrary . he replies that he knows the contrary : instancing that they neither hold it an article of faith that there is a purgatory , nor that there is none . i ask , what kinde of things are their thirty nine articles ? are they of faith , or opinions onely ? i conceive his lp. will not say they are meere opinions , but contra-distinctive of the protestant faith from ours ; at least the good simple ministers were made beleeve so when they swore to maintain them , and unles they had certainty as strongly grounded as divine beleef for those points or articles ; how could they in reason reject the cōtrary tenets which they held by divine beleef . now the . article defines the negative to purgatory & three other points of our doctrine ; yet this ill-tutour'd child tells his old crasy mother , the church of england , that she lies & that he knows the contrary . now his reason is better then his position ; 't is this because a negative cannot be an article of faith . so that he would not have held it of faith against the manichees , that there are not two god's ; because the proposition is negative ; nor that the divells shall not be saved , nor the saints in heaven damn'd , nor that there is no salvation but through iesus-christ ; all these by the bishop's logick must cease to be articles of faith , and become indifferent and unconcerning opinions , because they are all negatives . after this he talks ramblingly again as his custome is , of theologicall opinions , indifferent opinions , &c. and then on his own kinde word assures us that these points are such , and so wipes his hands of them . his last proof of their moderation , is their preparation of minde to beleeve & practice what ever the catholike church even of this present age doth universally beleeve & practice . proofs should be visible & known ; and he brings us here for a proof a thing hid in the dark hole of their own breasts , nor ever likely to come to light but by their own sayings onely ; all other symptoms standing in opposition to it . but the greatest foolery is , that , as i told him , they first say there is no universall church ; or , if any , indeterminate , so that no body can tell which it is , and then make a hollow-hearted profession of a readines to beleeve it , and conclude themselves moderate reformers . my ld replies that then they have renounced their creed the badge of their christianitie . i answer , we doubt not but they have ; and that , as they hold onely the word church and not the thing , so they hold onely the word , the creed , and not the sence of it both in that and what other articles their fancie pleases . is it not then wisely argued , to think to confute us by bringing us to this absurditie ( as he imagins ) that then they have renounced their creed ; whereas 't is our known tenet , which we hold as undoubtedly as we do that they are out of the church . the next absurditie he brings me to upon this account , is , that then they have renounc't their reason also . as little can we doubt of this as of the former , having seen lately how you deny'd the first principles and common sense almost in every particular of this discourse ; and , even this present maner of arguing testifies how little reason your bad cause will allow you the use of . but how proves he that then they must have lost their reason ? thus ; for , if there be many particular churches wherefore not one universall church , whereof christ is the head and king. very good , my ld , but if you give us no certain rule to know what congregations are to be truly accounted churches and which not such , but hereticall , and show us no some common ty of ordinary government in the church , how will you make up of them one universall church , which may bee known for such ? this is the thing we object ( as you well know ) that you give us no such rule to know a true church by ; this is the reason why we affirm you deny an universall church , because you deny all grounds which can establish such a church . as for what i alledged that if they say there is a catholike church 't is indetermin'd , that is none knows which it is ; he answers , first , that then 't is all one as if it were not . very true , for if there be no determinate one , there is none at least to us . next , that this is a calumny , to say they know not determinately which this church is . let us examine whether it be or no. two things are requisite to the notion of an universall or catholike church . one , that the particular companies , which compound it , be indeed true churches ; that is , consisting of true beleevers , and not hereticall congregations ; without certain knowledge of which none can possibly know which is the universall church , made up of them ; the other that these particular congregations of true beleevers cling together , by mean's of order , into one entire company , to be called , when thus united , one universall church . for the first , i appeal to any candid & learned protestant , whether he ever in his life knew any of their authors who gives us a positive catalogue of which particular congregations are to he held for true churches and a part of the universall ; which no , but to be excluded from it as hereticall : or whether himself can stand to it positively upon grounds given & agreed upon by them , that such & such a congregation is without the verge of the universall church , such with in it . my self have lived in circumstances to be aswell acquainted with their doctrine as most men are ; and i profess sincerely were my life at stake & onely redeemable by the resolving this question , i could not determin absolutely upon any grounds constantly acknowledg'd by them , whether presbyterians , anabaptists , or quakers are to be excluded from the universall church , or no. and if we cannot determin of sects so neer at hand , though prest to it by our conversation & carriage to declare & express our selves distinctively , much lesse can we expect it in order to the armenians , ethiopians , iacobites , with whose customes and tenets we are so litle acquainted but alas ! how vain is it to expect from protestants such a distinctivenes of true beleevers from false , who have no grounds to make such a distinction . for what principles have they to character a true beleever ? is it to acknowledge the letter of the scripture sufficient ? all hereticks in the world almost own this ; arians & socinians who deny christ's divinity most of all . is it the true sence of it ? how shall they agree in this without some certain mean's or rule to interpret it & make them agree . must the common doctrine of the universall church interpret it ? this is the very thing we are in quest of , and ( till wee know what particular congregations are to bee held true churches ) know not yet which it is . must consent of fathers ? they have no authority but from the church in which they lived , and as declarers of her doctrine ; unles therefore we have some rule to conclude antecedently , that the church whose doctrine they taught was the true church , we are still ignorant whether they be true fathers and to be beleeved , or no. is it the private spirit ? the most frantick enthusiasts then have an equall pretence ? is it private reason ? in steps the socinian , and indeed all heresies in the world , for every one hath a private reason of his own , and can use it to his power in interpreting scripture . but my l d of derry seems to drive another way , affirming here p. . that he knows no other necessary articles of faith but the apostles creed , though other protestant authors affirm more . this then according to him must be the fundamentall rule of faith and the touch stone to try who are true beleevers , who not . the puritans therefore who deny'd one of those articles , to wit ghrists descent into hell , must be excluded quite from the universall church ; yet we see protestants communicate with them aswell nay more than with anabaptists , nor are they look't upon with a different eye from the other sects , or as more separated from the church than the rest . again , as puritans are excluded by this principle , so all that reject any thing but these twelve articles are admitted by it , as part of god's church . hence it follows that though any sect deny the government of the church by king , by bishops , by pope , by patriarch , by lay-elders , by private ministers , nay all government , the procession of the holy ghost , all the sacraments , nay all the whole scripture , except what interferes with those twelve points , are members of god's church . reader , canst thou imagin a greater blasphemy ? again , when he says the apostle's creed is onely necessary and fundamentall , he either mean's the words of the apostles creed onely , or the sence & meaning of it . if the former , the socinians and arians hold it , whom yet i conceive he thinks no part of god's church . if the latter , either the protestants or we must be excluded ( contrary to his tenet ) from the universall church ; for since points of faith are sence , and we take two articles , to wit , that of christ's descending into hell & that of the catholike church , in a different sence , it follows that we have different points of our creed , or different creeds ; and therefore either we or they must fundamentally err and be none of the universall church . where then is this determinate universall church , or how shall we finde it by the protestants principles , no certain mean's being left to determin which congregations are worthy to be call'd particular churches and so fit to compound that universall ; which not , & to be excluded from her . for the second point ; in case there were many particular churches , yet an universall signifies one universall , every universality involving an vnity ; and so , they must have some ty to vnite them , according to the natures of those particulars : now those particulars consist of men governable according to christ's law ; and so the whole must be a body united by order and government , for things of the same species or kinde cannot be otherwise exteriorly united . but i have already shown ( in the foregoing section ) that the protestants grounds have left no such order & subordination of universall government in god's church ; therefore no universall christian common-wealth , that is , no universall church . to show then this determinate universall church being the proper answer for the bishop let me see how he be haves himself in this point . first , he toyes it childishly , telling us that the protestants acknowledge not indeed a virtuall church , that is one man who is as infallible as the universall church . i answer nor wee neither : ere he calumniates the church with any such pretended tenets , let him show out of her decrees they were hers , otherwise if he will dispute against private men , let him quote his authors & fall to work . secondly , he tells us they acknowledge a representative church , that is a generall councill : with signifies nothing , unles they first determing certainly who are good christians and fitt to vote there , who hereticks & so vnfit ; that is , till they show what congregations are truly to be called churches ; and what church , made up of such and such , is to be esteemed universall ; otherwise , how can a representative of the universall church , which is a relative word , be understood to be such , unles it be first known which is the universall church it ought to represent . thirdly , he tells us they acknowledge an essentiall church . i marry , now we come to the point . expect now , reader , a determinate universall church , so particularly character'd that thou canst not fail to acknowledge it . the essentiall church , that is ( saith he ) the multitude or multitudes of beleevers . his [ that is ] seem'd to promise us some determinate mark of this church ; and he onely varies the phrase into [ beleevers ] a word equally obscure as the former , equally questionable , nay the self same question . for 't is all one to ask which is a congregation of right beleevers , as to ask which is a true church . but this is his vsuall and even thrid bare trick , with which mountebanklike he deludes his readers , and is too much inveterate in his manner of writing ever to hope to wean him of it . they can do no more than shuffle about in generall terms & hold still to indeterminate , confused , & universall expressions , who have no grounds to carry home to particular things . he concludes with telling his reader that we are in five or six severall opinions what catholike church is into which we make the last resolution of our faith . whither away my lord ? the question at present is not about the resolution of faith , nor about the formall definition of a church . but about what visible materiall persons & countries make up the church . that you cannot pitch upon these in particular i have already shown ; that we can , is as visible as the sun at noon day ; to wit those countries in communion with the see of rome . these and no other are to us parts of the uniuersall church . every ordinary fellow of your or our side can tell you what these are ; 't is as easie to do it , as to know which is a papist-country ( as you call it ) which not : and , even in those places where they live mixt with others , as in england , they are distingvishable from others by most visible marks . our rule to distinguish our flock from stragglers , is the acknowledgment of immediate tradition for the rule & root of faith ; and of the present government of our church under s. peter's successor ; who so ever renounced this government , or differ'd from us in any other point recommended by that rule , at the same time and in the same act , renounced the said ever constantly certain rule ( and , by renouncing it , their being of the church ; ) as did your selves confessedly in the reign of king henry the th and the greeks with all out casts for those points in which they differ from us . to this all catholikes agree , what ever school men dispute about the resolution of faith . show us a church thus pointed out visibly , and such evident & manifest grounds why just so many and more can be of it , or els confess you have lost the notion of an universall church , nor hold or know any . sect. . nine or ten self contradictions in one section . how hee clears our religion and condemns his own . the incoherence of the former protestans blody laws with their own principles . how hee steals by false pretence from showing a visiblety of vnity in the church , to invisible holes . the reason why the succession into s. peter's dignity should continue to the bp. of rome plentifull variety of follies , non-sence and quibbling mistakes . the sleight account hee gives of the order brother hood and fundamentalls of his church . his th section presents us with his fifth ground to iustify their separation ; and 't is this that the king and church of england did no more than all other princes & republikes of the roman communion have done in effect . this word [ in effect ] deserves a comment ; and then , if it bee candidly explicated , we shall finde it ●ignifies the whole busines , though it seeme to speak coyly & mincingly . did they ever make laws to renounce and abrogate the popes authority , and define absolutely against essentiall right ? did they ever erect an ecclesiasticall superior ( as you did the arch-bishop of canterbury ) and pretend that he was in no manner of way subordinate to the pope , but vtterly independent on him ? did any of them ever separate from the church by disacknowledging his head ship , and by consequence the rule of faith , immediate tradition , which asserted it ? not one : did not your self in your vindication p. . after your had put down the parallell acts of henry the th to other princes , when you came to the point confess that henry the th abolished the iurisdiction of the bishop of rome within his dominions , but the emperors ( with whom you run along with your parallel in other points ) did not so . did not your self here p. . where you put downe a gradation of the oppositions of the former kings to the pope tell us onely , as the highest step of it , that they threaned him further to make a wall of separation between him & them . if then they but threaned to do what k. h. ( as appears by this law which vtterly renounces the pope ) did , it follows plainly that they did nothing , and king henry did all , as farr as concerns our controversy ; which is not about extent of his authority , or in what cases he may be check't from exercising particular acts of that authority , but about the denying the very right it self , and ( which is consequent ) by denying joyintly the rule of faith , and by those denialls separating from the body of the former church , which held both . the signification then of this iuggling phrase in effect ( as apply'd to our purpose ) by his own interpretation , is this ; that other catholike countries did just nothing , and king henry the th did all . to no imaginable purpose then save onely to show his diligence in nothing the politicall wranglings between kings and popes , are all the instances produced by the bishop that catholike kings in such & such particular cases permitted not the pope to execute what he intended , unles he can deny his own words and prove that they did as much as k. henry and not threaned onely . but my ld of derry having taken a great deal of pains to gather together these notes , which ( the way being new ) he made account would come of bravely , grows much perplex't to see them all defeated at once by showing plainly that they are nothing to the purpose , and therefore both heretofore and especially at present complains much that we answer them not in particular , assuring the reader , that would our cause have born it , we had done so . was ever man so ignorant of the common laws of disputing ? needs any mory answer be given to particulars which one yeelds to , than to say he grants them ? we grant therefore all his particular instances of these contess between kings & popes , and yeeld willingly that such & such materiall facts happen'd & many more ; not entring into that dispute how far they were done iustly , how far un iustly , which is little to our purpose , since the authority it self was still acknowledg'd on both sides . what need we answer each in particular , by saying , first i grant this , next i grant the other . now the use or application he makes of them , that is , to pretend thence that they did as much as king henry the th , so to iustify him , is a particular point and , one ; and to this i have answer'd particularly , both here and also in my third section , where i have demonstrated it to be the most shameles & manifoldly contradictory absurdity , that ever bid defiance to the universall acknowledgment and ey-verdict of the whole word . vpon occasion of his alledging that all catholike countries do the same in effect against the pope as the protestants , i raised an exception of his incoherent manner of writing ; to which he thus replies p. . but what is the ground of his exception ? nothing but a contradiction . as if he made account that a contradiction is a matter of nothing , nor worth excepting against . his contradiction is this , that our doctrine concerning the pope is injurious to princes & prejudices their crowns , and yet that we hold & do the same against the pope in effect as protestants do . he would salve the contradiction , first , by alledging that papists may be injurious to princes in one respect & one time , and do them right in another respect and another time . well , my lord ; but , since the doctrine of the papists concerning the substance of the pope's authority is ever constantly the same ( for none can be papists longer then they hold it ) it knows no varitie of respectt not times , and so if it be prejudiciall in it self once 't is prejudiciall alwayes . the extent of it varies upon occasions : this consists in an indivisible & cannot alter . this substance of his authority , is the point which belongs to you to impugn , if you go to work consequently , since you are onely accused of schism for rejecting this , not for hindring him from acting in particular cases . either grant then that this tenet is not pre●udiciall to princes , being like yours , and then you contradict your former pretence , that it was ; or say that yours is prejudiciall to princes also , being the same in effect with it ; and then you have evaded indeed a contradiction , but by as great an absurdity . secondly , to show his former answer was nothing worth , he alledges that i have changed the subject of the proposition , and that he spoke not of papists , but of the pope & court of rome ; no ld , but i would not let you change the subject of the whole question . 't is a separation from all the churches in communion with rome that you stand accused of ; the undeniable fact evidences that you have broke from all those churches by renouncing those two said principles of vnity in which they agree . this is our accusation against you , and so your excuses must be apply'd to this or else they are no excuses at all . now one of your excuses is that the pope's authority is prejudiciall to princes ; and it must be mean't of the pope's authority as held universally by all those churches , else why did you separate from all those churches upon that pretence . but those churches universally ( as you say ) hold the same in effect with the protestants ( for you say you separated from the court onely : ) what needed them excuses from you to them , unles there had been a contradiction in the busines . had you opposed onely some attempts of the court of rome by your tenet , you might have remain'd still united with france , spain , &c who did ( as you confess ) the same in effect ; but now you remain disunited from catholike countries and their churches in the very tenet of the pope's authority , held by them as our eyes testify , therefore 't is evident 't was the doctrine of all those churches you lest , and would vindicate your self for leaving by pretending that doctrine injurious to princes , and by consequence you contradict your self . in order to the same point , and to let him see that those restrictions of the pope's authority avouched by the laws & practice of catholike countries concern'd not faith as the protestants renouncind the authority it self did , i told him ( schism disarm . p. . ) that the pope's did not cast out of communion those catholike divines which opposed them ; and that this argues that it is not the roman religion nor any publike tenet in their church which binds any to these rigorous assertions which the protestants condemn . he replies first thus , i know it is not the roman religion , their religion & & ours is the same . so you say , my l d to honour your selves which such good company ; but , answer seriously , are not the roman religion & yours different in this very point of the pope's supremacy , which is the thing in hands ? and do not the romanists excommunicate you and think you of another religion because you hold it ? true it is you may account them of your religion because you have no bounds but voluntary , and so can take in & put out whom you please ; but they who are bound to a certaine rule of religion , cannot do so ; because your new fashion'd tenets stand not with their rule : to what end then is this show of condiscension , to shuffle away the point ? again , if these rigorous assertions which you impugn be not their religion , some other more moderate tenet concerning the pope's authoritz is their religion ; for 't is evident that all catholike doctors defet something to the pope as a point of their religion , or as received upon their rule of faith ; why did you then reject the more moderate tenet which belongd to their religion , because some men attribute more to him by their more rigorous tenets , which you acknowledge belong not to their religion ? or how do you hope to excuse your self for rejecting the more moderate tenet of the substance of the pope's authority , by alledging that others held the extent of it too rigorously ? is this a sufficient plea for your breaking god's church ? secondly , he confesses that those rigorous assertions extending thus the pope's authority are not the generall tenet of our church . whom do you impugn then ? or to what end do you huddle together those pretended extravagancies for your vindication ? must you necessarily renounce the substance of the popes authority which was generally held by all , and so break the vnitie of the church , because there was a tenet attributing too much to him , which you confess to have been not generally held , nay generally resisted ? what logick can conclude such an act pardonable by such a plea ? thirdly , hee affirms that the pope's many times excommunicated princes , doctors and whole nations , for resisting such rigorous pretences . true , he excommunicated them , as pretending them disobedient , or infringing some ecclesiasticall right , as he might have done , for violently and unjustly putting to death some ecclesiasticall person , and in an hundred like cases : and no wonder , because as a prelate he has no other weapons to obtain his right when it is deny'd him . but did he ever excommunicate them as directly infringing the rule of faith , or did the catholike world ever looke upon them as on hereticks when thus excommunicated , as they look't upon you renouncing in terms the very authority it self ? nay did not the pope's when their passion heated by the present contest , was over , admit them into communion again , though still persisting in their unretracted opposition ? what weaker then than to think they were separated from the church for oppositing those more rigorous pretences ? or that those came down recommended by that rule of faith , as did the authority it self which you rejected , and for rejecting it be came held by all the churches of that communion for schismaticks & hereticks . fourthly , to let us see that hee will not stand to his former answer hee tells us that the pope & his court had something else to do than to enquire after the tenets of private doctors . that is , after himself had taken a great deal of pains to prove that all catholike kings , abetted by their doctors and casuists , had thus resisted the pope in these particular cases that is , that it was publikely done all over the whole church , hee alledges in the next place that onely private . doctors held it . so fruitfull is error of contradictions . fifthly , hee alledges , that perhaps those doctors lived about the time of the councells of constance & basile , and then the popes durst not meddle with them . yet many , if not most of the instances produced by him are modern , some of them , as that of portugall , in our dayes , and not past seaven years ago , another of the venetians in this very last age ; which no [ perhaps ] can make happen in the time of those councells . score up another self contradiction . what hee means by their living perhaps out of the pope's reach , none can tell . the pope's spirituall iurisdiction , by which hee acts such things , & excommunicates , reachers as far as those churches in communion with rome , as all men know , and if our bishop speak of those who lived in other places , hee changes the subject of the question , for wee speake of doctors abetting roman catholike kings & kingdomes , in such opposition . sixthly , hee asks what did the sorbon doctors of old value the court of rome s. trifle not my ld ; they ever valued the tenet of the popes supremacy as a point of faith ; what they thought of the court concerns not you , nor our question ; nor are you accused or out of the church for not over valving or not justly valuing the court , but for under-valuing the very substance of the pope's authority , and calling that an error which the rule of faith delivered us as a point of faith . in a word all your process here is convinced to be perfectly frivolous & to no purpose ; since none of these things you alledge as done by catholike countries are those for which you are excommunicate , cast out of the church , & accused for schismaticks & hereticks by us : but another far greater , not at all touched by you ; towit , the renouncing & disacknowledging the very inward right of the pope . which shows that all your allegations are nothing but laborious cobwebs , signs of a fruitles industries , but vtterly unable to support truth . i upbraided them upon occasion , for their bloody laws and bloodier execution . hee referrs me for answer , to his reply to the bishop of chalcedon . where hee makes a long-law preamble no wayes appliable to the present case ; which even by his own confession is this , whether ( though treasonable acts be punishable ) acts of religion ought for any reason be made treason , and the exercisers of them punish't as traitors meerly upon this score because they performed such acts . that this was the case , is evidenced most manifestly out of the laws themselves every where extant ; which make it treason and death to hear a confession , or to offer up the unbloody sacrifice of our saviours body , &c. and out of their own remitting this strange treason at the very last gasp , nay rewarding the persons osten , if they would renounce their tenets & accompany them to their churches . these are our manifest and undeniable proofs : what arguments does hee hring to blinde the evidences ? nothing but obscure conceits to be look't for in mens breasts , pretended fears & ielousies that all who exercised such acts of religion were traitors , & meant to kill and slay the governors , or at most some particular attemps of private persons , either true or counterfeited ; if some were true , it was , no wonder that such hert burnings & passions should happen , where people were violently forced to renounce the faith they had so zealously embraced & were bred & brought up in ; and per adventure no protestant party living under catholikes but have had the same or greater examples of the like attempts . yet i excuse not those who attempted any thing against government , nor accuse the governors for treating them as they deserved : onely that the faults of some should be so unreasonably reflected upon all , nay upon religion it self , as to make the formality of guilt consist in the performing such acts of religion , was most senceles , malicious , nay self condemning , since their own profession admits the hearning a confession to be a lawfull act of religion , and you would yet willingly hear them , if the people were not wiser then to go to such sleightly authoriz'd ghostly fathers . nor do i apprehend that you would think your selves very well dealt with if the present government because of some ●isings of some of your party against them , which they know to have been back't , promoted , & fomented by some of your lay clergy , should there upon presently make laws to hang as traitors every one of the said clergy , whom they found either hearning a confession or speaking of the church government by bishops ; a point as much condemn'd by the present government as any of our tenets was by queen elizabeth . if then you would think this very hard dealing , acknowledge others comparatively moderate , and your selves to have been most unreasonably cruell . in his p. . if hee mean as hee sayes , hee clears our religion from destroying subjection to princes , i subsume ; but , the supremacy of the pope is to us a point of faith , that is a point of religion , therefore the holding the said supremacy , is according to him ( if hee means honestly , that is , as hee speaks ) no wayes injurious to princes . if any extent of this power , pretended to bee beyond it's just limits , hath been introduced by canon-lawyers or others , let him wrangle with them about it ; our religion and rule of faith owns no such things , as is evident by the universality of catholike doctors declaring in particular cases against the pope , when it is necessary , as the lawyers in england did against the king , without prejudice to their allegiance ; which i hope characters those doctors in his eye to bee good sujects to their governors . yet he is sorry to have done us this favour , or to stand to his own words , even when they signify onely courtesy . hee alledges therefore that these instances cited by him ( of catholikes disobeying the pope in behalf of kings , ) were before these poysonous opinions were hatched , and so they do not prove that all roman catholikes at this time are loyall subjets . yet himself in his vindication p. . ( so naturall is self contradiction to him ) told us of as violent acts done against the pope in cardinall richlieu's dayes ; in portugall very lately , and in a maner the other day , in which also the portugeses were abetted by a synod of french bishops in the year one thousand six hundred fi●ty one , who were positive & very round with the pope in their behalf . these were some of his instances in this very seventh chapter ; which now ( a badd memory and self contradiction is ever a certain curse to falshood ) hee tells us were before our seditions , opinions were hatched . now what seditious opinions have been hatched or can bee pretended to have been hatched within this five years , i dare say hee is ignorant : and , lest you should think i wrong him , you shall hear him contradict himself yet once-more ( so fully does hee satisfy his reader on all sides ) & affirm here p. . that hee hopes that those seditio●s doctrines at this day are almost buried . so that spell the bishop's words together , and they sound thus much , that those pretended seditious doctrines had their birth & buriall both at once , and were entomb'd in their shell ; that is , were never hatch't at all : so cruelly if you but confront the two faces of the same ianus does hee fall together by the ears with himself , baffle & break his self divided head , & with one splay leg trip up the other . after this , hee presents the reader with a plat from of the church fancied by mee , as hee sayes ; for which greevous fault he reprehends mee ironically , telling mee that 't is pitty i had not been one of christ's councellors when hee form'd his church ; that i am sawcy with christ , what not ? now i never apprehended christ had any councellors at all when he first form'd his church , till the bishop told mee hee had , & wish't i had been one of them ; or fancied any thing at all , unles hee will say that what catholikes received from their forefathers and what with their eyes wee see left in the church still , is onely the work of my fancy : which is non-sence ; for i onely took what was delivered , as of faith , by immediate tradition , to wit that s. peter was constituted by christ prince of his apostles , and that the pope was his successor into that office ; and then show'd the admirable conveniencies , the moderation , the necessity of that form of government , how innocent if taken in it's due limits ( as held out to us by the rule of faith ) to temporall government , nay how beneficiall to the same , how absolutely necessary for and perfectly concerning the vnity in the church ; how impossible the said vnity is without it , &c. which , if it bee saucines , hee may with the same reason accuse all divinity of saucines which takes what faith hath delivered , for example that christ was incarnate , & thence proceeds to show the conveniency , necessity , &c. of the incarnation ; but the poor bp. who has busied all his life in not in quaint concieted stories & odd ends of testimonies , never had leisure to reflect , that this is the method which science takes when it proceeds a posteriori ; first building upon what it finds to have been done , by experience or other grounds , and thence proceeding to finde out the causes why or by which such things were done . in answer , the bishop pretends first that hee will take my frame in peeces ; whereas hee not so much as handles it , or looks upon it ; formine concern'd a visible ty of church vnity , his discourse reckons up out of s. paul seven particulars , all which ( except onely the common sacrament of baptism ) are invisible & latent , & some of them no wayes proper to a church . the first is , one body . well leap't again , my l d , you are to prove first we are one body , if the vnity of government ( conseru'd by all those who acknowledge the popes head ship ) be taken away by you ; but you suppose this , and then ask what can be more prodigious then for the members of the same body to war with one another ? wee were inded once one body , and as long as the mēbers remain'd worthy of that body there was no warr between them : but , as when some member becomes corrupted , the rest of the members if they do wisely , take order to cut it of , lest it infect the rest , so 't was no prodigy but reason that the members of the former church should excommunicate or cut you of , when you would needs be infected , and obstinacy had made you incurable : nay when you would needs be no longer of that body . the former body was one by having a visible head , common nerves & ligatures of government & discipline united in that head ; the life●giving blood of faith , essentiall to the faithfull as faith●full , derived to those members by the common channells or veins of immediate tradition : you separated from that head , you broke a●sunder those nerves of government , you stop't●up and interrupted those channells or veins the onely passage for divine beleef ( that is certainty grounded faith ) your task then is to show us by visible tokens , that is , by common exterior ties , that you are one body with us still , not to suppose it , and talk a line or two sleightly upon that groundles supposition . secondly , one spirit ; that is the holy ghost which hee rightly styles , the common soul of the church . but his lp must prove first that they are of the body of the church , ere they can claim to be informed by the soul of it . it is not enough to talk of the spirit , which is latent & invisible ; & quaker or adamite can pretend that at pleasure ; but you must show us visible marks that you are of that body , and so capable to have the same spirit or soul ; otherwise how will you convince to the world that you have right to that spirit . thirdly , one hope of our calling . this token is both invisible again ; and besides makes all to be of one church ; iews & all , if they but say tthey hope to go to heaven ; & who will stick to say that ? fourthly , one lord ; in order to which hee tells us wee must be friends , because wee serve the same lord dark again ! how shall wee know they serve the same lord ? because they cry lord , lord ? or because they call him lord ? their visible acts must decide that . if then wee see with our eyes that they have broke in peeces his church , & renounced the only-certain grounds of his law , they must eithers how us better symptoms of their service and restore both to their former integrity by reacknowledging them ; else wee can not account them fellow servants to this lord , but rebells & enemies against this lord & his church . fifthly one faith . but how they should have one faith with us , who differ from us in the onely certain , that is ▪ in the onely rule of faith ; as also in the sence , that is , in the thing or tenet of some articles in the creed ; or , indeed , how they can have faith at all but opinion onely , whose best authors & writers confess they have no more than probability to ground their faith , hee knows not ▪ & so sayes nothing ; and therefore is not to be beleeu'd for barely saying wee have one faith . sixthly , one baptism . as if hereticks who are out of the church could not all be baptised but hee tells us that by baptism wee fight vnder the same standard . that wee should do so because of baptism i grant indeed ; but , as hee who wears the colours of his generall , & yet deserts his army & fights against it , will find his colours or badgeso far from excusing him , that they render him more liable to the rigour of martiall law & treatable as a greater enemy ; so the badge of christianity received in baptism , is so far from being a plea for them who are out of the church or for making them esteemed one of christ's and hers , if they run away from her & take party against her , that it much more hainously enhances their accusation , and condemns you whom the undeniable matter of fact joyn'd with your acknowledgment of ours for a true church manifests most evidently to have done both . lastly , one god who is father of all , &c. by which if it be mean't that god is a father by creation or ordinary providence , them iews , pagans , & atheists are of god's church too ; if in the sence as god is fathers of christians , you must first prove that you have his church on earth for your mother , ere you can claim god in heaven for your father . but , to shew how weak a writer this bp. is let the reader peruse here my p. . & . and hee shall see our charges is that without this government , they have no common ty under that notion to vnite them into one christian common wealth ; and therefore , that having rejected that government , unles they can show us what other visible ty they have substituted to that , they cannot be shown to be christians or of christ's flock , but separates & aliens from it . wee deny them to be truly-nam'd christians for want of such a visible ty ; now the bishop , instead of showing us this , supposes all hee was to prove ; towit that they are of christ's church , and reckons up some invisible motives proposed by s. paul , to christians already acknowledg'd for such , to vnite them , not into one church ▪ ( for that was presupposed ) but into one harmony of affections . there is no doubt then , but all the seven points alledged are strong motives to vnite christians in wills ; but it is as undoubted on the other side that none of them onely pretended , ( and being invisible they can be but pretended ) is a sufficient mark to know who is a true christian , who not : nor was this s. paul's intent as appears by the quality of the persons hee writes to , who were all christians . now christians being such because of their faith , it followes that the vnity in faith is the property to christians as such , and consequently in government ( which , by reason of it's concernment , ought in all reason to bee a point of faith ) & not in charity onely , for this extends it self to infidells & all the world . since then , the bp. goes not about to show visibly their ground for vnity of faith , that is , a common rule of faith to his fellows and the rest , nor yet a common government which may show them visibly , & to us , to be of the church , and on the other side stands indited by undeniable matter of fact to have rejected those points which were & are visibly such to the church they broke from , 't is no lesse evident that hee hath not said a word to the purpose but stole it away ( as his custome is ) from the open field of the plain charge to invisible holes . in a word those proposalls of s. paul are motives why christians should be united in wills , and also why those who are not christians should be of the church , and christian common wealth , not the proper ties which make them of it ; for these must be visible , remarkable & known , as are de facto , our form of government , our rule of faith . the frame then of the church , as put by me , was thus visible ; the joynts of it recounted by the bp. out of s. paul invisible ; yet the sincere man pretends here when hee brings these invisible points to take my frame in peeces ; & to look upon it in parcells . which is to prevaricate from the whole question , and , instead of answering , to abuse & wrong his adversary . secondly , hee sayes hee will not dispute whether christ did give s. peter a principality among the apostles , so wee will be content with a principality of order ; and hee wishes i had exprest my self more clearly whether i bee for a beginning of order & vnity , or for a single head of power & iurisdiction . i answer , i contende for no such singular head ship of power , that no bishop in the church hath power but hee ; for this is known to bee the heresy which s. gregory did so stoutly impugn when hee writ against iohn of constantinople ; a principality or primacy of order i like well ; provided this order signify not , as the bp. would have it a dry order which can do nothing ; but such an order as can act & do something , according to it's degree & rank ; as the word order imports , if taken in the ecclesiasticall sence ; and as it is taken when it is appl●'d to the hierarchy , as for example to p●triarch● ▪ primates , arch bishops , bishops , &c. which ought to bee the proper sence of it in our controversy , it being about an ecclesiasticall preeminence . as for what hee tells us that the principality of power resi●es now in a generall council , besides other faults already noted , it falters in this , that generall councils are extraordinary iudicatures , and never likely to happen in the sence you take a generall council . but , our question is , whether the nature of government require not some ordinary standing , supremacy of power ever ready to over look the publike concerns , to promote the interests & conserve the peace of the christian commonwealth , by subordination to whom all the faithfull remain united in the notion of governed ; if this bee necessary , as plain reason avouches , then wee ask where you have lest this standing ordinary principality of power , since you have renounc't the pope's supremacy ? thirdly i added , and consequently to his successors . this consequence exprest in generall terms , hee tells us , hee likes well enough , and that such an head-shippe ought to continue in the church ; but hee cannot digest it that such an head ship should bee devolued to the bp. of rome : yet , what other successor s. peter had that could bee properly call'd such , ( that is such a one who succeeded him dying ) except the bp. of rome , himself will never attempt to show us . this consequence then of ours , applying in the principality of s. peter's to the bishop of rome ) which hee calls a rope of sand ) hangs together thus , that whensoever christ conferrs any power to any single person to be continued for the future good of the church , and has taken no further order for it's continuance hee is deem'd likewise to have conferd it upon those to whom according to the order of nature it is to come . now the naturall order requires that offices & dignities should be devolu'd to those who succeed those persons dying who were vested with them , in case there bee no other ordinary & convenient mean● instituted to elect or transfer it to another . that christ lest any such institute that his church should continue this dignity by election , or traverse the common method of succession , wee never read ; but on the contrary wee fide de facto that the bishops of rome in the primitive church enjoy'd a principality by succession , & not by nomination of the catholike church ; nor is it convenient but extremely preter naturall , that this principality being of perpetuall necessity ( as hee grants ) the church should remain without it at the death of every pope , till all the churches in iapan , china , india , or where ever remotely disperst in all parts of the habitable world , should bee ask't & give their consent whether the bishop of rome should still continue with this principality , or no. no other means then being layd or lest to cross this way of succession , as appears by common sence and the practice of the church , it follows that this naturall order must take place , and so the particular dignity of s. peter remain to those who succeeded him dying in his see of rome . his argument then which hee pretends parallell to mine , that such a bishop of such a see died lord c●ancellor of england , therefore all succeeding bishops of the same see must succeed him likewise in the chancellor ship of england , comes nothing home to my case ; for here is a supreme standing magistrate , to elect another & traverse succession ; the transfering that charge is easily & conveniently performable ; here are positive laws & institutes made known & accepted that a king should do this ; but , put case that there were none of all these means of electing a new person , on foot in the world , and that the chancellor ship were to be perpetuated , there would bee no doubt in that case but the naturall order would take place there also , and the successors of that bishop would succeed also into the chancellor ship . christ left ( hee tells us ) the cheif managing of his family to his spouse , that is , the church . pretty sence ! signifying thus much that the church or universality of ●hristians must govern themselves , & have no cheif governour at all ; is it not rare that the bishop should think christ's family , and his spouse or church are two distinct things ! what hee adds , that hee lest it not to any single servant further then as subservient to his spouse ; is very true ; and all governours in the world are or ought to bee subservient to the common good of the governed , as even the angells are spiritus administratorij , yet no more can the subjects command their governours , than wee can command angells . and so the chief church , & her bishop the chief governour of christ's family are for the good of the church , thouh over the church ; however my l d who looks into the sounds of words & not the meaning of them , enflames the expressions , & improves them to flanting & proud sence . hee tells us that rome may bee destroyed with an earthquake ; i answer it must be an unheard of earthquake which can swallow up the whole diocese ; for , if the city onely run that hazard , the clergy of the roman diocese yet remain who can elect to themselves a new bishop ; and no harm will succed to our cause . next , hee sayes , it may become hereticall or mahumetan ? true , so may the whole church if it had pleased god so to order causes . but that it pleases him not wee have this strong presumption , that the good of his church , so much concern'd in the perpetuity of this succession ( as hath been shown ) will crave his perpetuall assistance to that see . wee have also for pledge of this perpetuity the experience of his gratious conservation of it for sixteen hundred years , & the establishment of it at present , not giving us the least ground to think it's ruine likely . if his lp do , and that this trouble him , at least let him yeeld his obedience till that happens , and then preach liberty from rome's iurisdiction to those that shall live in that age . what hee addes concerning the churches disposing of her offices is meer folly : himself granted in the foregoing page that christ himself ( & not the church ) instituted this principality ; let him them show first that the church hath authority to change christ's institutes , ere he thus frankly presume it left to the churches disposall . next , hee tells us that betweene tyranny & anarchy there is aristocracy which was the ancient regiment of the christian church . wee blame them not for renouncing any one sort of government but all government in the church ; and alledge that there is no kinde of government which actually vnite ? god's church in one but this of the pope's headship . an aristocracy signifies a government by some cheif persons , who sitt either constantly or else often , & easily meet that the difficulties occurring in the ordinary government of the cōmonwealth may bee settled by them . was this the ordinary government of the primitive church ? had they any generall council ( which the bishop means by aristocracy , as appears by his p. . l. vlt. till constantine's time ? nay have wee had any this six handred years or indeed eight hundred last past which they will acknowledge to bee such ! or , shall wee have any for the future ? they tell us not till towards the end of the world , and that even then 't is but probable neither ( see d r h. reply p. . ) his position then comes to this , that aristocracy in a generall councill being the ecclesiasticall h●ad ( p. . l. vlt. ) or the government which vnites god's church , the said church had no head nor government at all till constantine's time ; none betweene council & council afterwards ; none at all again this six or seven hundred years past ; and lastly perhaps shall have none at all for the future . farewell church government , and many thanks to my good l d of derry & d r. h d. but i most wonder that a man of his principles could finde no middle sort of government between tyranny & anarchy but aristocracy ; is monarchy with him none at all , or none of the best , which even now hee told us was of divine institution ? you good people who depend so zealously of this new prelacy , observe how your dooctrs have either a very short memory to inform you right , or a very strong will to cheat you into the wrong . heed adds , that a primacy of order is more sufficient in this case to prevent dangers and procure advantages to the church than a supremacy of power . which signifies thus much directly in other terms , that hee who hath no power to act at all in order to the universall church or as a first , hath power to procure her more good , & prevent more harms towards her , that is , hath power to act better for that church , than hee , who has power to act , hath . and thus my friend here feasts his readers with contradictions , his whole discourse being such in it's self & wants onely to bee put into something more immediate terms of the same signification . after i had put down the necessity & yet moderatenes of the pope's authority as held of faith by us , i added , that this was the bridle our saviour put in the mouth of his church , to wield it sweetly which way hee pleased . my bp. replies that i make the church to bee the beast and the pope's office to ride upon the church . no , my lord , i styl'd the pope's office , the bridle ; do bridles use to ride upon horses ? or did your lp ever meet a bridle on horsback ? i see the bishop is a better bowler then hee is an hors-man . next , hee tells us that our saviour put his bridle not into the mouth but hand of his church . good my l d inform us ( for you chop your logick so snall & are grown so mysteriously acute that without a revelation none can understand you ) when the church holds the bridle in her hand , as you say , whom does she govern by that bridle ? do the whole multitude of beleevers hold the bridle & govern themselves ? then there are no governors at all , o●at least none distinct from the governed , which is all one . or , do some governors onely hold the bridle & weild by it the multitude of beleevers ? then returns his lp's cavill & buffets himself , that then the church is the beast ( as hee irreverently wantons it ) and those governors ride upon the beast , and the bridle gets into the mouth of the church again , for as governors are said to hold the reins or bridle , so , if wee will prosecute the metaphor into an allegory , the governed must be said to have it in their mouths , that is to be ruled & guided by it . so unfortunate is his lp that hee can neither approve himself a good controvertist , nor a tolerable guibbler ; but , while hee pretends to be solid in the former , he still runs into contradictions ; when witty in the latter hee rambles into absurdities ; and , in either performance , his own both arguments & quips light upon his own head . i represented the advantages & cōveniences this headship brought to the world when duly observed by good pope's . hee replies that i write dreaming as plato did , and look upon men not as they are but as they ought to bee . this mistake is of the same strain , onely something more voluntary . i look not my lord upon men at all in this place , but speak of the office it self ; how admirabily convenient it is if rightly performed . what men do , or how they execute it , whether well or ill concerns not a controvertist no● mee ; the point or tenet concerns mee . the personall managing this office is not of faith , and belongs not to mee but to historians & lawyers to talk of ; the office it self is of faith , fals under the sphere of controversy & is my task to defendit . what say you to the office it self , as put down here by mee . return my l d whence you stray'd ; and tell us , is not the office it self thus moderately yet substantially exprest naturally conducing to the peace , vnity , faith , discipline , & other universall conveniencies of christendome ? or is it , though thus advantageous to the whole church , to be rejected because of the abuses of particular persons ? these are the points between us ; what say you to these ? why , in the next parag . hee would have us look upon the case without an if or as a pope should bee ; no my lord , i ought not in reason to quit that method ; you & i are not disputing about mens lives , but the catholike tenet and whether the very tenet bee advantageous to the church or not . if wee leave this wee leave the whole question . yet wee must leave the question , else my lord will not proceed nor dispute ; telling us that if wee look upon the case without an if , or , as the pope should bee ( that is indeed if wee look not upon the case ) then wee shall finde the papacy as it is settled or would have been ( sayes hee ) the cause of schisms , ecclesiasticall dissentions , war amongst princes , &c. where first , if nothing follows out of my words but this disiunctive ( as it is settled , or would have been ) then it remains for any thing hee expresses , that , as it is settled , it is not apt to cause any of these inconveniences ; but onely would have been , in case some vicious attemptors had had the power to corrupt that which was actually well in the church . next , if hee speak of the papacy , as it is settled , hee must look upon it as held by the rule of faith and acknowledg'd by all romane catholikes ; otherwise if hee considers it according to what is disputable & wrangled about between catholike & catholike , hee considers it not as settled , for this is to bee not setled : nor indeed is this to speak of the papacy it self ( about which catholikes have no debates ) but of the extent of it . now , let him either evince that papacy as settled or held universally by all catholikes , is in it's own nature the cause of schisms , dissentions , warrs , &c. or grant that 't is not such , but the contrary ; as hee does here tacitly , by yeelding that if it were as it should bee it would bee faultles , and presently doubting whether it bee right settled , ( that is , as it should bee ) or no. the substance of the pope's authority being stated , i show'd all the bishop's arrows falling on his own head ; because , not with standing such disputes , it is evident that the nature and notion of one church is intirely conserved ; the papacy standing firm in those very catholike countries , which resisted the pope , and those countries governing themselves in an vnity of faith & sacraments , & correspondence like one body , as is visible ; whereas their reform or renouncing the pope has cut of england from all this communication or correspondence , and made it no part of one church greater then it self , but an headles synagogue without brother hood or order . hee replies ; neither so , nor so . how then , my lord ? why hee tells us first that the eastern southern & northern churches admit none higher then the cheifest patriarch . well , my l d , are you and they both joyntly under the government of those patriarchs , or any other common government ? if not , how are you then of one community or brotherhood as governed ? next , hee alledges that agreat part of the westerne churches have shaken of the roman yoke . grant it were so , and that those congregations were in reality churches , ( which wee deny ) yet are you united with those churches under some common christian government , joyning you & them into one christian commonwealth ? if not ( as your eyes witnes 't is not ) then how are you their brothers or of their community ? show us this visible ty of order uniting you together ; to say you are one or united to them , without showing us this extern ty , is very easy , but convinces nothing . thirdly , hee tells us that the rest of the western world which acknowledge the papacy , do it with very many reservations , cautions , and restrictions . very good , my lord ! if they onely restrain'd , they restrain'd something which they admitted , as thus restrain'd ; to wit , the substance of the pope's authority . are you at least united with them ? alas no : you are disunited from them , by totally renouncing ( and not restraining onely ) that authority which visibly united them . where then is your brother hood ? where is your order ? fourthly , hee answers , that for order , they are for it as much as wee . that you are for it & desire it ( if your grounds would let you ( wee doubt not : but have you any such order uniting you visibly to the rest of the christian world ? to say you are for it , when the question is whether you have it no , without ever attempting to show us this visible order , signifies you neither have any nor can show any ; or , that you have indeed a feeble wish for it , but not efficacious enough to make you use means to obtain it . fifthly , hee tells us , that for christian brother hood they maintain it three times larger then wee ; but he never goes about to show us any visible ty of government , uniting them into one cōmonwealth or brother hood . 't is a sufficient proof with him to say they maintain it ; that is , they call more brothers then wee do ; but , whether they are so indeed or no 't is so evident with him ( though hee knows his own fellows say the contrary , as may bee seen in rosse's view of religio●s ) that it needs no proof though it bee all the question ; sixthly , as for their being an headles synagogue , hee replies that they want no head who have christ a spirituall head. wee are demanding a visible common head or cheif governmēt of the whole church common to england with the rest , and hee relates us to christ in heaven . such an head is god amighty to all mankind , must they therefore because of this invisible relation become one cōmonvealth . again , this latter , towit , whether christ bee their spirituall head or no , is invisible & unknown , and is to bee judged by the other thus ; that , if christ have lest any vnity of goverment in his church and commanded it to bee kept , and they have taken a course to leave no such vnity , 't is evident that they have rebell'd against christ as well as his church , and so falsly pretend to have him for their spirituall head. next , hee tells us that they have a generall council for an ecclesiasticall head. which is to confess that there is no ordinary vnity of government in god's church , but extraordinary onely , when a council sits , that is , there is none de facto at present , nay morally impossible there should bee any ( as dr. h. sayes reply p. . ) and 't is a great chance when there is any , perhaps towards the end of the world , as the same dr. imaginarily ghesses ; which you must conceive will bee in antichrist's time , who ( according to their principles ) will bee the head of the church . and , lastly , that they have a gracious prince for a politicall head. whos 's inward right if it bee lost by long prescription as the whole world grants it many , it follows that they can in that case pretend to no head at all in case the successour hap to bee no protestant . but i wonder the bishop is so discourteous to his own tenet , that whereas they ever held the king to bee head of the church , or cheif in ecclesiasticall matters , hee should now deny it and put him to bee onely a politicall head , as contradistinguish't from ecclesiasticall ; that is , give him no more then france , spain , &c. vse to do to their kings , where the pope's headship is acknowledg'd . again , wee ask not how they are one amongsts themselves in england under one pretended visible head or government , but how they are one with the rest of the christian world , though having that pretended head ? is there any orderly common ty of government obliging this head to correspend with the other head ? if not , where is the vnity or common headship of the whole , church ? or how is england visibly ▪ united to it , vnder this notion ? if there bee , why should the bp envy us the happy sight of this rarity which ( & onely which ) would satisfy the point , clear his credit , & vindicate his church . his cavill that sometimes wee have two or three heads , sometimes never an head , is false & groundles ; since there can bee but one true or rightly-chosen pope , however there may bee more pretended ones ; and , till hee who is chosen bee known & euidenced to bee such , the headship or cheif government is in the cheif clergy of the chief see , whom wee call cardinalls ; unles a generall council actually sit . as secure a method for the peace & vnity of a commonwealth govern'd by an elective power , as mans wit can invent ; though ( as in all humane affairs ) the contingency of the subject admits sometimes of miscarriages , sidings & animosities . hee promises us ( to shew the vnity of protestant churches amongst themselves ) that the harmony of confessions will demonstrata to the world , that their controversies are not so many , nor of so great moment as imagining . i answer , that truly i am so far from imagining any thing concerning their differences , that i know not even what the word contreversy means ; till they give us some certain rule to settle controversies , & to tell us which controversies are of faith , which of opinion onely : but does the harmony of confessions show us ( not in the common expressions of the word , but ) in the particularity of the thing , that they have one common certain rule of faith , infallibly securing then that such points & no other were taught by christ and his apostles , or any particular sort of government , obliging them to an vnity under the notion of governed , as a common ty ? nothingless ; that is , it does less than nothing : and leaves my other objection good , that otherwise they have no more vnity then a body composed of turks , iews , hereticks , and christians ; nor does the bp. disprove it otherwise than by reckoning up again the former motives to vnity in affections out of s. paul : six of which are invisible ; and some of them equally pretendable nay actually pretended by turks , hereticks , &c. as deniable to them by him ; nor can they be in reason refused them , till hee gives us some certain rule of faith , obligingly & satisfactorily convincing that such sects in particular are to be admitted , such to bee absolutely rejected , which hee will never do without entangling himself worse than formerly . and , as for baptism , the seve●th motive ; 't is out of doubt amongst all the world , that hereticks may have true baptism , though the bp. here forgets himself , & says the contrary . at least the turks ianisaries who are children of christians , & so baptised , cannot bee refused according to his grounds to bee his brother-protestants ; this being the onely visible ty the protestants have with the three parts of the world the bp. so brags of . lastly , i alledged , that their pretended faith consisted in vnknown fundamentalls , which is a meere shist untill they exhibit a list of such points & prove them satisfactorily , that they , & onely they , are essentiall to christian communion . hee replies , they need not do it . why ? mee thinks the point seems very needfull ; yes , but the apostles have done it ( hee sayes ) to their hands in the creed . and how proves hee that the apostles intended this creed as a list of all fundamentalls ? onely ( for hee put neither before , nor yet here any other proof ) in that the primitive church ( saith hee ) hath ordained that no more should bee exacted of any , of turks , or iews in point of faith , when they were converted from paganism or iewism to christianity . and , how proves hee the primitive church exacted no more ? out of his own manifold falsification of the council of ephesus already manifested ( sect. . ) and this is the whole ground of his certainty , that those points are onely fundamentall , or that they have any list of fundamentalls , and consequently that there is any grounds of vnity in materiall points amongst the protestant churches , or that they are of the church , since the church hath in her self grounds of vnity . i omit that the learned bp. makes account turks are pagans , or to bee converted from paganism ; whereas , 't is known they acknowledge a god : and affirms that the primitive church in the council of ephesus ( for to this hee relates as appears p. . ) held in the year . order'd any thing concerning turks , which sect sprang not till the year . that is . years after . both good sport , did not the bp. cloy us with such scenes of mirth . again , when hee saies the apostles creed is a list of all fundamentalls ; either hee means the letter of the creed , and then hee grants socinians & arians to bee christians ; both which admit the letter of the creed , interpreted their own way ; and excludes the puritans from all hopes of salvation for denying a fundamentall , towit , christs descent into hell. or else , hee means the sence of the creed ; and then hee excludes the roman catholikes , whom yet in other circumstances hee acknowledges to bee of the church ; for they hold some articles found there , in another sence than do the protestants . let him then prove evidently that no points of faith were held formerly as necessary save those articles in the apostles creed ; next tell us whether hee means the letter onely or the sence of the creed ; then show us satisfactorily which is the onely true sence of it ; and , lastly , apply that piece of doctrine to particulars , and so show us which sects are of the church , which excluded , & wee shall remain very much edifyd . sect. . how the bp. of derry falsifies his adversary's words & brings a testimony against himself , attended by a direct contradiction , which hee terms , fortifying . with what incomparable art hee clears himself of another . and , how hee totally neglects the whole question & the duty of a controvertist in impugning opinions acknowledg'dly held onely by some in stead of points of faith held by the whole church . hhis eighth chapter pretends to prove the pope & the court of rome most guilty of the schism . which hee makes account hee hath done so strongly that hee needs not fortify any thing ; yet , hee will needs do a needless bufines , and goes about to fortify ( as hee calls it ) in his way not with standing . to the first argument ( saith hee ) hee denieth that the church of rome is but a sister or a mother , and not mistress to other churches . which is first flatly to falsify my words , to be seen schism disarm . p. . which never deny her to bee a mother but a sister onely ; and this is his first endeavour of needles fortifying . next , whereas the words mistress may signify two things ; to wit a person that imperiously and proudly commands ; in which acception 't is the same with domina , and correlative to serva , a slave or hire ling slave : or else a teacheress ( as i may say ) or one which instructs , and so is coincident with magistra , and correlative to discipula , a disciple or schollar ; again , it being evident both out of the council of florence ( where it is defined romanam ecclesiam esse matrem magistramque omnium ecclesiarum ) and also out of common sence that wee take it in this latter signification ; the quibbling bp. takes it in the former ; that is not as understood by us but by himself , and then impugns his own mistake citing s. bernard who exhorting pope eugenius to humility , bids him consider that the roman church , ecclesiarum matrem esse non dominam , is the mother not lady of all churches . and this is another attempt of his needles fortifying . my l d of derry may please then to understand that when wee say that the roman church is mother & mistress of other churches ; wee take the word [ mother ] as relating to her government , or power of governing , whose correlative is a sweet subjection , not a hard or rigorous slavery : and the word [ mistress ] as expressing her power of teaching . or , if the bp. bee loath to grant the word [ mistress ] taken in our sence , ( which yet hee never goes about to impugn or disprove ) let him but allow & stand to what the testimony himself brings here avouches , to wit that shee is mother of other churches , and that shee hath right to rule and teach her children as a mother should do , & 't is as much as wee desire . now , let us apply this & see how rarely the bishop hath cleared himself of schism & layd it at our do●e : hee hath brought a testimony which asserts the church of rome to bee the mother of other churches , and so of the church of england too , if shee be church ; nor does himself in this place deny her that title , but seems to grant it ; but it is manifest de facto and by their solemn ordinances & publike writings , that her good daughter the church of england tells her flatly shee will not , ought not obey her ; and thus by the bp ' s logick shee becomes acquitted of schism . which i must confess is not onely a needles but a sleeveles manner of fortifying . again , schism involves in it's notion disobedience , and the bishop in this chapter pretends to show her schismaticall , that is disobedient ; to do which hee brings us a testimony which asserts our church to bee mother of other churches ; and then concludes the mother schismaticall , because shee is disobedient to her daughter : pithy non-sence ! or , if made sence , flatly accusing their church of schism for disobeying her mother ; and this deducible cleerly from that very testimony hee brought to prove the contrary , which kind of arguing is in the bp s phrase call'd needles fortifying . his pretence of a new creed ( which was his second argument to prove us schismaticall ) made by pope pius the fourth , is already shown ( sect. . ) to bee a calumny : to which i add , that our creed is the points of our beleef or faith : since then 't is known that each point in that profession of faith put out by him , was held as of faith by the former church , ere hee thus collected them , 't is a contradiction to pretend that hee made a new creed till it be shown that any of those points there contained was not formerly of faith , and prove satisfactorily that the apostles containes all necessary points of faith , which will bee manifested at the greek calends . his third argument was because wee maintain the pope in a rebellion against a generall council . to this hee sayes i answer not a word . let us see whether it deserves a word of answer . the difference between a controvertist and a schoolman is the same as is between a church & a school controvertists therefore of severall churches defend those points & impugn the contrary ones , which are held by those churches as churches , that is , as congregations relying upon their rule of faith . either then let him show that our church holds as of faith , or as received upon her rule of faith the pope's supremacy to a generall council , else in impugning that point hee totally prevaricates from the office of a controvertist , hath done nothing which was his duty , and so merits no answer save onely this , that if hee will dispute against private opinions , hee must cite his authors , & argue against them not the church ; whose beleef is contained in the decrees of councils , and universall consent of fathers & doctors . which answer i then gave him expresly , schism disarm . p. ▪ now , to show the vanity of this third argument , let him either manifest that our church prest upon them this point of holding the pope above councils , so as to excommunicate them upon their contrary tenet ; else all pretence of our causing the schism is avoided ; for , in case it were not thus prest , his argument stands thus ; very many schoolmen & a great party among them held that opinion , where upon wee left their church ; ergo , they are most guilty of the schism . which is as senceles a paralogism as a sleepy brain could have stumbled on . for , why should any break church-communion as long as hee can keep it with conscience ? or , how is my conscience concern'd in other men's opinions as long as they permit mee to hold the contrary : now , that our church permits the contrary tenet , and denies none communion for it , himself testifies vindication p. . where hee puts down as one of the tenets of the now-french church , that generall councils are above the pope , and may depose him , &c. the bishop was conscious that hee had neglected the office of a controvertist by impugning schoolmen , lawyers , & courtiers instead of our church ; and an opinion held by many , instead of a point of faith held by all . to delude the reader , & in reality to oppose the former which belonged not to him , yet seem to strike at the latter , as hee ought , hee joyns both , however in consistent , into one ; and , being to wrangle against the pope's headship , proposes it first under this chimericall notion , the papacy ( quà talis , or , as such ) as it is maintained by many . and this hee calls laying the axe to the root of shism , though it bee as directly leuell'd a stroak at his own legs , and inflicting as deep a wound on the supports of his cause as a contradiction can give to pretended sence . for since all papists as such hold a papacy or the pope's headship of iurisdiction over the whole church , and differ in this point from protestants , it is evident that the papacy of such , is that which is held by all ; for none can be papists longer then they hold it . now then to say the papacy as such , as it is now held by many ; is the same as to say , the papacy as held by all , as held by many onely : which is in other language to legitimate an hircoceruus , and to clap together non ens and ens into the same notion . but , how does hee clear himself of this shuffling nonsence ? why first hee asks , do not some roman catholikes subject the pope to a generall council ; and others , nay the greater part of them , &c subject a generall council to the pope ? what is this to the question whether these words [ the papacy as such , as it is now maintain'd by many ] cohere in sence or no ? secondly , hee asks whether hee might not then well say [ the papacy quà talis , &c. ] no , my l d , for , it being evident that all roman catholikes hold the papacy in some sence , if you call it the papacy as such as it is held by many , pray how will you stile it as held by all ? as not such ? or the papacy with super additions ? or can all hold what some do not hold ? thirdly , hee saies , his conclusion was not against the church of rome in generall , but against the pope & court of rome , that they were guilty of the schism . for what ? for maintaining the substance of the pope's authority held by all ? then you accuse the church of rome in generall of schism , for the church in generall holds what all in her hold . or was it for this opinion of the pope above the council , and others of this strain ? how were they guilty of schism for this , unles they had deny'd you communion for holding the contrary , or prest upon you an unconscientious approbation of it , which you know they did not fool not your readers my l d ; 't was not for this tenet which you impute to the court of rome , but for that of the pope's headship or spirituall iurisdiction over all god's church , held by all catholikes and by that whole church equally then as it is now , for which you are excommunicated : and so , ought either to submit to that whole church again in that point , as formerly ; or else ( if you would deal candidly ) impugn that whole church ( and not the court onely ) thus opposite to you in that mainly-concerning point . fourthly , as hee saies although , aliquando bonus dormitat homerus , that is , sometimes honest homer takes a nodd , and though hee had stol'n a napp it had been neither felony nor treason , yet to let us see hee did not sleep , he will put his argument into form without a [ quâ talis ] which is to affect a sleepines still , or ( as our english proverb saies ) to sleep fox sleep . hee is accus'd of a contradiction & non-sence , and to clear himself hee tells us hee will now lay aside one part of the contradiction , and endeavour to make good sence of the other . now his first argument is that the court of rome is guilty of schism for preferring the pope before a generall council , to which i have already answer'd . his second , is that ours are thus guilty for making all apostolicall succession & episcopall iurisdiction come from rome onely . by which , if hee means our church as a church holds it ; ( as hee ought if hee speak like a controvertist ) 't is a most gross & false imputation , as i told him : if of the court of rome onely , then , since they neither prest it as of faith nor deny'd you communion for these points , but for another held by all ( as i lately show'd ) they cannot hence be concluded guilty nor you guiltles of schism . this argument past over , hee confesses this tenet is not generall amongst us ; i add , but points of faith are generally held , therefore this tenet is but an opinion ; and being not generall ( as hee grants ) it follows that it is onely a particular or private opinion ; as i call'd it , & his own words evince it . yet hee is loath these should be call'd private opinions because they are most common & most current : whereas , unles they come down recommended by our rule of faith , immediate tradition or the voice of the church , & so become perfectly common , generall , universall , & undoubtedly current , our church looks upon them onely as deductions of private men's reasons , nor shall i own them for other . that the former is a common tenet hee brings cardinal bellarmine to say that it is almost de fide , or a point of faith , which the good bp. sees not that it signifies it was almost reveald , or that the revelation fell an inch or two short of reaching our knowledge ; or , that god has not indeed reveald it , but yet that t was twenty to one but hee had done it . next that the council of florence seem'd to have defin'd it : now the word [ seems ] signifies i know not that ever it defin'd it at all ; or , if it defin'd it so , 't is more than i know . thirdly , that the council of lateran ( i suppose hee means not the generall council there held ) defin'd it most expresly yet the bp , here descanting upon the words of that council , sayes onely that they seem to import no less ; that is , it may bee they mean no such thing , or it may bee they mean much less . for the latter opinion ( as hee candidly here calls it ) hee tells us bellarmine declares it to bee most true , that hee cites great authors for it , saith that it seemeth ( again ) to have been the opinion of the old schoolmen ; speaking highly ( at least seemingly ) of the pope's authority . so that all is seeming , all opinion and uncertainty . now the use the bp. makes of this gear is this ; the court of rome & many with it , held an over weening opinion of their own authority , though they permitted us & whole churches to hold the contrary , therefore wee very innocently broke god's church ; or , therefore wee quite renounc't the principles of vnity in both faith & government ( as the fact witnesses you did ) because they held an erroneous op nion too much extending the latter . in a word let bellarmine & the bp. wrangle about the opinionative point , i shall not think my self concern'd , as a controvertist , to interrupt their dispute or ●oyn mine interest with either party however did i pretēd to treat a point of canon-law i might . the point of faith i undertook to defend as a controvertist , whensoever i see any opposition to that , i acknowledge it my province to secure it by my resistance . sect. . my l d of derry's vain pretence of his churches large communion . his frivolous and groundles exceptions against the council of trent . how weakly hee clears himself of calumny and how , going about to excuse his citing a testimony against himself hee brings three or four proofs to make good the accusation . hee pretended that the protestants held communion with thrice as many christians as wee do . i reply'd that if by christians hea means those who lay claim to the name of christ i neither deny'd his answer nor envy'd him his multitude ; for manichees , gnosticks , carpocratians , arians , nestorians , eutychians , and others without number , do all usurp the honour of this title . i added that i did not think hee had any solid reason to refuse communion to the worst of them . now , the bp ' s task is evidently this to give us this solid reason & show it conclusive why hee admits some of these & rejects others . but 't is against his humour to go about to prove any thing ; talking is his & an angry woman's best weapon ; and of voluntary talk he is not niggardly but deals us largess of it . first hee falls into rhetoricall exclamations against our prejudice , partiality , want of truth , charity , candour , & ingenuity words are but vapour ; let him put certainly-establish't grounds to conclude himself or any of his . sects , true christians , which may not as well infer that all those other sects are such also ; otherwise his excl●mations which sound so high in rhetorick , are very-flat noted and signify just nothing in controversy , where the concernment of the subject renders all proofs inferior to rigorous & convincing discourse , & dull & toyish . secondly , hee asks , wherein can i or all the world charge the church of england , of greece , or any of the eastern , southern , or northern christians , with any of these heresies , and then reckons up afterwards the materiall points held by the manichees , gnosticks , &c. suppose i could not ; are there no other heresies in the world but these old ones , or is it impossible that a new heresy should arise ! it was not for holding those very materiall points that i accused the church of england or the bp. as hee purposely misrepresents mee ; but this , that having no determinate certain rule of faith , they had no grounds to reject any from their communion who held some common points of christianity with them though differing in others . again , since the rule of faith protestants pretend to is the scripture , and all those hereticks recurr'd still & rely'd upon the same ( nay even the manichees upon the new testament ) it follows that these are all of the protestants communion because they have the same grounds & rule of their faith ; if the bp. reply that the letter of the scripture is not the rule of faith but the sence , hee must either show us some determinate certain way to arrive to the true sence of it , or else confess that this rule is indeterminate & uncertain , that is ( as far as it concerns us ) none at all . now , though indeed the protestants hapt not to light into all the same materiall errors as did the manichees , arians , &c. yet they agree with them in the source of all error ; that is , in having deny'd and renounc't the onely ground of faiths certainty , tradition of immediate forefathers , which alone could bring down to us security that christ was god or that there was such a thing as god's word : and so , the deniall of this is in it's consequences equally nay more pestilentiall then is the denying the materiall point it self of christ's divinity , or the asserting any other held by the worst of those hereticks ; they agree with them all therefore in the root of all errors , though the branches chance ( and they but chance ) to be diverse ; as may bee seen if you do but consider what varieties of sects are sprung in england , since your strong hand which truly did forbid the liberty of interpreting scripture is taken from you ; whereof some be as learned as yourselves , witnes the books of the socinians ; for 't is an easy matter out of affection to turn scripture to variety of errors , as was cleerly seen in luther ; who because carolostadius had publish't the absence of christ's body from the blessed sacrament before himself , found the middle tenet of compresence of both body & bread ; and so , by that base affection , saved a great part of the world , through god's providence , from a wickeder error . thirdly , hee tells us that some few eastern christians are called nestorians , others suspected of eutychianism , but most wrongfully . though indeed nothing is more right full then to call them so , as even protestants confess . but you see nature works in despite of design , and that hee hath a mind to cling in very brotherly and lovingly with the nestorians & eutychians , though hee saies hee will not ; and those tenets of theirs which in the close of his paragraph hee pretends to detest as accursed errors , here hee strokes with a ge●tle hand , assuring us they are nothing but some unvs●all expressions : as if all heresies when exprest were not expressions , and also very unvsuall & new to faith & the faithfull now their unvsuall expressions were onely these , that christ had two distinct persons , and no distinct natures ; which are nothing in the bp ' s mind ; had they deny'd christ to be god too , it had been also an unvsuall expression : but , i must confess , a very scurry and pestiferous one , as were the former . but our favourable bishop thimking it necessary to bolster up his church with a multitude , boldly pronounces what hee knows not in excuse of those hereticks , though it be contrary to the publike and best intelligence wee have from those remote countries . fourthly , hee is very piously rhetoricall & tells us , that the best is , they are either wheat or chaff of the lord's floar , b●t that our tongues must not winnow them . which is as absurd as the former . that it is best for them to be wheat , i understand very well , but that it should be best ( as hee says ) that they are either wheat or chaff , i confess i am at a loss to conceive . chaffe ps . . v. . signifies the vngodly , and mat. . v. . ( the very place which his allego●y relates to ) it is said that christ will burn the chaff ( of his floar ) in vnquenchable fire : which , mee thinks , is far from best . so miserably the bp. comes of still , w●ether hee intends to speak finely or solidly . our tongues indeed shall not winnow them , as hee says , nor do we pretend , to do so by our tongues , or voluntary talking ( that were to vsurp the method of discourse proper to himself onely ) but our reason will winnow them unles wee turn beasts & use it not ; our proofs , if they be evident , as our charge of their schismaticall breach is , will winnow them ; the rule of faith ( the voice of the church or immediate tradition ) will winnow , or rather christ hath winnow'd them by it , having already told them that if they hear not the church they are to be esteemed no better than heathens & publicans . since then 't is evident out of the terms that you heard not the church for your n●w fangled reformations , nor ground those tenets upon the voice of the church , nay according to your grounds have left no church , nor common suprem government in the church , to hear , it follows that you have indeed winnow'd your selves from amongst the wheat of christians and are as perfect chaff ( i mean those who have voluntarily broken church communion ) as publicans & heathens . now , to show how empty a brag it is that they hold communion with thrice as many christians as wee , to omit their no communion in government already spoken of sect. . let us see what communion they have with the greek church in tenets ( by the numerosity of which they hope for great advantages ) and whether the protestants or wee approach nearer them in more points held equally by both . i will collect therefore out of one of their own side , alexander ross , the tenets of the present greek church , in which they agree with us , though in his manner of expressing our tenet , hee sometimes wrongs us both . the greeks place ( saith hee ) much of their deuotion in the worship of the virgin mary , and of painted images ; in the intercession , prayers , help and merits of the saints , which they invocate in their temples . they place iustification , not in faith , but in works . the sacrifice of the mass is used for the quick and the dead . they beleeve there is a third place between that of the blessed and the damned , where they remain who deferr'd repentance till the end of their life ; if this place bee not purgatory ( adds ross ) i know not what it is nor what the souls do there . ( view of all religions p. . ) and , afterwards p. . they beleeve that the souls of the dead are better'd by the prayers of the living . they are no less for the churches authority and traditions than roman catholikes bee when the sacrament is carried through the temple the people by bowing themselves adore it , and falling on their knees kiss the earth . in all these main points ( if candidly represented ) they agree with us and differ from protestants . other things hee mentions indeed in which they differ from us both , as in denying the procession of the holy ghost , not using confirmation , observing the iewish sabbath with the l d' s day , &c. as also , some practises , not touching faith , in which they hold with the protestants , not with us ; as in administring the sacrament in both kinds , using leauened bread in the sacrament , priests marriage , there is no one point , produced by him , which our church looks upon as a point of faith in which they dissent from us and consent with the protestants except that one of denying the pope's supremacy ; for their onely not using extreme-vnction , which hee intimates signifies not that they hold it unlawfull , or deny it . iudge then candid protestant reader , of they bp ' s sincerity , who brags of his holding communion with thrice as many christians as wee do ; whereas , if wee come to examin particulars , they neither communicate in one common government , one common rule of faith , if wee may trust this authour of their own side ( since if the greeks hold the authority of the church and traditions as much as catholikes do , as hee sayes , they must hold it as their rule of faith , for so catholikes hold it ) nor yet in any one materiall point in opposition to us , save onely in denying the pope's supremacy . and how more moderate they are even in this than the greatest part of , if not all protestants , may bee learned from the bp ' s mistaken testimony , at the end of this section , as also from nilus an avowed writer of theirs for the greek church against the latine , and one of the gravest bp ' s and authours of that party , who shuts up his book concerning the pope's primacy , in these words . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the summe is this ; as long as the pope preserves order , and stands with truth , hee is not removed from the first and his proper principality , and hee is the head of the church , and chief bishop , and the successour of peter and of the rest of the apostles , and it behooves all men to obey him , and there is nothing which can detract from the honour due to him ; but if , when hee hath once strayed from the truth , hee will not return to it , hee will bee liable to the punishment of the damned . where , the reader will easily judge whether the former words sound more incliningly to the catholike or the protestant tenet ; and , as for the latter words , but if , &c. there is no catholike but will say the same . thus much then for my l d of derry's communion with the eastern church . and as for his communion with the southern , northern , & western churches , which hee thunders out so boldly as if all the world were on his side and of his religion , if examin'd 't is no better than the former ; sence his side denies immediate tradition of forefathers or the living voice of the present church to bee the rule of faith , which is to the roman church the fundamentall of fundamentalls . nor has hee any other rule of faith , that is , a plain and certain method of interpreting scripture common to him and his weakly rel●ted brethren ; so that if they hit sometimes in some points , 't is but as the planets , whichare ever wandring , hap now and then to have conjunctions , which hold not long , but pursving their unconstant course , decline and vary from one another by degrees , and are at length crost by diacentricall oppositions . the rest of this paragraph insists again upon his often answer'd saying that the creed contains all necessary points , which is grounded onely upon his falsifying the council of ephesus , as hath been shown heretofore . to my many former replies vnto this pretence i add onely this , that either it is a necessary point to believe there is such a thing as god's written word ( or the scripture ) or not : if not , then why do the protestants challenge it for their rule of faith ? is not the ground of all faith a necessary point ? but if it bee a necessary point , then all necessary points are not in the apostles creed ; for there is no news there of the scripture : nor is it known how much thereof was written when the apostles made their creed , what hee adds of our having chāged from our ancestors in opinions ; either hee means by opinions , points of faith held so by us , and then 't is calumny , and is to be solidly proued not barely said ; but , if hee mean school opinions , what hurt is done that those things should be changed which are in their own nature changeable ? hee imagins that dr. field hath prou'd some thing against us in this point , and in answer shall imagin that those of ours who have reply'd to his toyes have disproved what hee is pretended to have proved : nor am i further concern'd , unles the bp. had produced some weighty particular out of him which yet wanted answering , as hee brings none at all . after this hee will needs prove the council of trent not to have been a generall one . his exceptions that the summons were not generall , that the foure protopatriarchs were not present by themselves nor their deputies ; that there were not some present from the greater parts of all christian provinces , are already shown to bee frivolous & impertinent , till hee gives us some certain determinate notion of church , and some certain rule to know what sects in particular are of it , what excluded , as i have already manifested his ground could give none . for , otherwise , those who are excluded from or are not of the church have no right to be summon'd thither ( unles to bee call'd to the barr as delinquents ) nor to sit there , nor are to be accounted christians ; and so the summons may bee generall , all may bee there that should be there , and some may bee present from the greater part of all christian provinces , notwithstanding the neglect or absence of these aliens . hee ought then first put grounds who are good christians , & ought to bee call'd , who not ; ere hee can alledge their not being call'd as a prejudice to the council . our grounds why it was generall are these . the onely certain rule of faith and ( by consequence ) root of christianity , which can secure us of god's word or any thing else is the immediate delivery or tradition of forefathers ; those therefore & onely those who adhere to this root are to bee held truly christians of the church ; those who broke from it any time ( as did the protestants professedly , the greeks & the rest as evidently when they began to differ from us in any point ) are not properly christians , nor of the church ; therefore a representative of the church or council is intire , universall & generall , though those latter ( who are not of the church ) bee neither call'd , summon'd nor present , provided those others who adhere to this root of faith and so are indeed christians , or adherers to christ's law , be summon'd & admitted : but such was our council of trent ; therefore it was generall . now , to disprove this council to bee generall , if hee would go to work solidly , the bp. should first alledge that it was not a sufficient representative of the whole church , which must bee done by manifesting definitely and satisfactorily , who in particular are of the church , who not : nor can this bee performed otherwise than by showing some rule & root of faith & christianity better qualify'd to bee such , that is , more certain & more plain than this , which may distinguish those who are of the church from those who are not of it ; or else to convince that the greeks , protestants , lutherans , &c. when they began to differ from the roman , innovated not , but were found adhering to that immediate delivery : otherwise they must confess that all were summon'd that ought to have been summon'd , all were there or might have been there who ought to have been there , and so the council was generall . till this bee done all his big worded pretences of the absence of the whole provinces , of the greater part of christendome , want of due summons , fewnes of the members present , that the greeks are not known rebells , &c. are convinc't to bee but voluntary talk as is indeed almost all this treatise , this being his peculiar manner of discoursing ; more fit for old wives & gossips at their frivolous meetings , then for a bp. and controvertist handling matters of faith . hee sayes that the greeks though hereticks should have been lawfully heard & condemned in a generall council . what needed hearing , when themselves in the face of the whole world publikely confessed , maintained , & avowed their imputed fault : condemned they were by generall councils heretofore , though the bp's particular faculty of saying what hee lists without a word of proof will not allow them to bee such , nor yet give us some certain way to know which councils are such . or , had it been an acknowledg'd generall council and they heard & condemned there , still the b p. had an evasion in lavender ; hee laid up in store this reserve of words following , that they were never heard , or tried or condemned of heresy by any council or person that had iurisdiction over them ; and then hee is secure by talking boldy & proving nothing . his saying that though they were hereticks yet they of all others ought especially to have been summon'd : signifies thus much , that it is more necessary to a generall council that hereticks bee call'd thither , than that orthodox fathers bee so . a substantiall peece of sence & worthy consideration ! i brought a similitude of a parliament that known and condemned rebells need not bee call'd , hee will needs have it run on four feet & prosecutes it terribly : some of his best trifles i shall reckon up . first , hee saies the pope hath not that authority over a generall council as a king hath over a parliament . i answer ; i am so plain a man that i understand not what the authority of king or parliament either taken singly or one in order to the other signifies : some kings have more , some less authority ; so have parliaments ; witness those of england & france . to expect then i should know ●ow great the authority of king or parliament is by naming onely the common words is to expect that one should know how long a country is by naming it a country , or how big a mountain is by barely calling it a mountain . that these have some great bignes and those some great authority i know by their common names ; but how great i know not . words , my ld , may serve you to give , whose cause will not bear sence , but they must not serve mee to take . secondly , that the greek patriarchs are not known & condemned rebells . answer , this is onely said again , not prou'd , and so 't is sufficient to reply that they who call'd the council & all in the council held them so . again , the errors which they publikely maintain'd have been condemned by councils , & for the most part some of their own party being present . now , why those who publikly profess those errours should need a further calling to triall , or why they are not known rebells is the b p' s task to inform us . thirdly , he sayes , that the least parliament in england had more members then the council of trent . they were therefore graver and more choice persons . the church summons not parish-priests out of every great town , as the common wealth doth two burgesses out of every corporation . again , what was , it matters not ; but might not there bee a parliament of england without having the fifth part of the members found in that council , and yet bee a lawfull one too ? rub up your memory , my l d. ( you pretend to bee a piece of a lawyer ) and i beleeve you will finde an english law that sixty members is a sufficient number to make a lawfull parliament ; and before that law was made common consent & custome ( which is either equivalent or perhaps above law ) gave the same for granted . fourthly , he excepts against the super proportion'd multitude of members out of one province , which hee sayes never lawfull parliament had . i ask , if other provinces would neither send a fit number nor they had a minde to come , by what law , by what reason should it render illegitimate either parliament or council ? now , 't is certain and not deny'd by any , but that bishop's had as free liberty to come out of other provinces as out of italy had they pleased . again , the principall busines being to testify the tradition of former ages , & a small number of bishops serving for that ; and the collaterall or secundary busines being to examin the difficulties those hereticks , which were the occasion of the council , produced , that they might be confuted fully , & out of their own mouthes , which is a thing to bee performed by committees , in which learned men that were not bishops might sit , it little inferred the want of bishops . wherefore , if there were any error in the supernumerarines of bishops out of some one province , it was for some other end than for the condemnation of heresies , & so is nothing to our purpose ; unles perhaps my l d will pretend that had those catholike b p' s out of other provinces been there , they would have voted against their fellow catholikes in behalf of luther or calvin . which were a wise answer indeed . fifthly hee excepts that the council of trent is not received in france in point of discipline . what then ? why , by his parallell to a parliament hee concludes hence t was no lawfull council . which is to abuse the eyes of the whole world , who all see that france , who denies the admission of those points of discipline , acknowledges it not withstanding a generall & lawfull council , and receives it in all determinations belonging to faith , which are so essential to it as it were disacknowledg'd , were they deny'd ; though not in matters of fact , which are accidentall to it's authority , nay allow'd by the church it self ( however made & exprest generally ) to binde particular countries onely in due circumstances & according to their conveniencies . lastly , hee alledges that they were not allow'd to speak freely in the council of trent . which is a flat calumny ; and though most important to his cause could hee prove it , yet after his bold custome , 't is onely asserted by his own bare saying , by sleidan a notoriously lying author of their own side , and by a passage or two in the history of the council of trent , whereof the first is onely a ieering expression ( any thing will serve the b p. ) the other concerning the pope's creating new bp's nothing at all to his purpose ; since both these new & the other old b p' s were all of one religion & catholikes ; & so not likely to dissent in vo●ing doctrines ; which kind of votes are essentiall to a council & pertinent to our discourse , which is about doctrines not about discipline . after this hee puts down three solutions ( as hee calls them ) to our plea of the patriarchall authority . first , that britain was no part of the roman patriarchate . and this hee calls his first solution . secondly that though it had been , yet the popes have both quitted & forfeited their patriarchall power ; and , though they had not , yet it is lawfully transferred and this is his second solution . the third is , that the difference between them and us is not concerning any patriarchall authority . and this is his third solution ; which is a very really good one , & shows that the other need no reply : our charge against them being for renouncing the supreme ecclesiasticall authority of divine institution ; not a patriarchate onely , of humane institution . if further answer bee demanded , first , the greek schismaticks , our enemies , confess that england was a part of the pope's patriarchate if it bee truly called a western church ; see barlaam monachus de papae principatu , c. and part. . sect. . of the adjoyning treatise . next , it is falsely pretended that the pope's have either quitted or forfeited their patriarchall authority ; and may with equall reason bee concluded , that a bishop quits episcopall authority if hee is also a patriarch ; or that a person must leave of to be master of his own family , because hee is made king and his authority universally extended to all england . which last instance may also serve against the pretended inconsistency of the papall and patriarchall power , if it need any more answer than what hath formerly been given sect. . i omit his calumnies against the papall authority charactering it falsly as a meere unbridled tyranny . and his thrice repeated non-sence ; when hee joyns in one notion patriarchall authority : a patriarchy being a government by one , an aristocracy by many . nor is his other calumniating expression much better when hee calls the papall authority , a soveraign monarchicall royalty : since it was never pretended by catholikes that the pope is the king of the church . the notion of priest and sacrifice being relative , the failing of the one destroyes the other : since then the protestants have no sacrifice they are convinced to have no priests . this point in particular hee never touch't , but talk't a little in obscure terms of matter & form of ordination , as if it were not an easy thing to say what words they pleased , and do what actions they pleased . to this the bishop onely replies that hee over did and set down the point of sacrifice over distinctly . next , hee tells us their registers are publike offices , whether any man may repair at pleasure . whereas , our question is not of the registers in generall , but of that one particular pretended register of the right ordination of protestant bishops , kept conceal'd from the free perusall of catholikes though the circumstances ( to wit their alledging the unlawfulnes of the protestant bishops ordination ) requir'd it should bee shown . his next paragraph concerning their uncharitablenes needs not bee repeated unles it could be mended . my expedient to procure peace & vnity , which was to receive the root of christianity , a practicall infallibility in the church , hee seems willing to admit of . onely hee adds that the greater difficulty will bee what this catholike church is ; and indeed to his party 't is an insuperableone ; though to us most facil , as i have shown formerly , sect. . hee call'd the bishops of italy , the pope's parasiticall pentioners ; i reply'd , it seem'd his lordship kept a good table and had great revenews independent on any . hee answers , hee was not in passion , and that hee spoke onely against meer episcopelles ; which is to show that his passion is nothing abated yet ; by adding such unsavory phrases to his former calumny . next , hee says that , as for his self , hee never raised himself by any insinuations . i know , my l d , you are a saint : but the point is can you clear your self from calumny and prove that those bishops ( whom otherwise you calumniate ) ever used such insinuations . hee was never ( hee saies ) parasiticall pentioner to any man , nor much frequented any man's table . you are still more saint then formerly , my l d : but , can you prove that those bishops ( whom otherwise you calumniate ) are parasites , or was it ever heard of or pretended that they sit at the pope's table ? hee adds , that , if his own table bee not so good as it hath been yet contentment & a good conscience is a continuall feast . much good may it do you , my l d ; fall to , and eat heartily ; cannot you fare well & hold your tongue , but you must amongst your dainties slander your neighbours , men better then your self , by calling them parasites , episcopelles , the pope's creatures , hungry , &c. or if you do , can you expect less but that it shall be laid in your dish , to sauce your dainties ? but the point is how hee proves these worthy persons to bee hungry parasiticall pentioners , which unles hee does hee yeelds himself to bee a malitious calumniator . now , his proof of it is contained in those words , whether those bishops were not his hungry parasiticall pentioners they knew best , who know most . well argued my l d ; there 's none can overthrow such a proof , because it is impossible to know where to take hold of it . or , if any can bee taken , 't is this that the bp. of derry knows better then all the world besides . as for his pretence of his good conscience , and to free himself from being a parasite , i would entreat his lordship to examin his conscience truly , whether hee does not get his living by preaching that doctrine which hee puts in his books , the which how many notorious falsities contradictions & tergiversations they have in them may bee judged by this present work . now , if hee does , let him consider whether any like parasitism can bee found as to hazard to carry men to damnation by taking away the highest principle that can correct them and bring all faith and ground of faith to uncertainty & dispute , meerly to get his own bread ; for your other actions my l d i neither know what you do , nor think it handsom to enquire . in the close hee pretends to satisfy an exception of mine found in schism disarm'd . 't was this , that hee quoted a testimony from gerson against himself , which showed that the greeks acknowledg'd the pope's authority , by their departing from the then pope ( as gerson sayes ) with these words , wee acknowledge thy power , wee cannot satisfy your covetousnes , live by your selves . hee replies & endeavours to show that by [ power ] in that place is mean't not authority , nor iust power , but might . whereas . first the very opposition of [ power acknowledged ] to ( covetousnes which they could not satisfy ) argues that their sullen departure proceeded from their sticking at the latter , not the former , which was there acknowledg'd : now if [ might ] were signify'd by the word [ power ] in that place , the sence of the whole would stand thus ; wee separate not for want of acknowledging thy might , but for want of power to satisfy thy covetousnes , which is as good as non-sence . for , if hee had might to force them , what sence is there to say , wee depart because wee cannot satisfy your avarice , when departing could not save them ? whereas , in the other sence it runs very currently ; wee separate not for de fault of acknowledging thy authority or iust power , but , because ( however this be iust , yet ) it is impossible wee should satisfy your covetousnes . secondly , what , might or power , except that of spirituall iurisdiction , the pope can bee pretended to have then had over the greeks , appears not : it was mean't therefore of no such might , but of a rightfulnes of power . thirdly , whereas hee sayes that gerson apprehended the words in his sence , & cites the context for it , the very proof hee brings for him is against him . gersons position ( according to the bp. ) is this , that men ought not generally to be bound to the positive determinations of pope's to hold & beleeve one & the same form of government in things that do not immediately concern the truth of our faith and the gospell . after which testimony the bp. addes these words : from thence hee proceedeth to set down some different customes of the greek & latin churches , both which hee doth iustify , citing s. austin to prove that in all such things the custome of the country is to bee observed . and amongst the rest of the differences this was one that the creek church paid not such subsidies & duties as the gallican church did . thus far the bishop . where it is manifest that the lawfulnes of resisting the pope's determinations being in order to the not paying undue subsidies & taxes , the discourse there relates to the no obligation of satisfying covetousnes , and touches not at all the point of power or might , as hee will have it . let us take then gersons sence in the former , and mine of iust power in the latter , and the discourse stands thus , that though men acknowledge the rightfull power of pope's , yet they ought not generally be bound to their positive determinations in things not of faith , but belonging onely to the severall forms of government & customes in severall countries , as paying subsidies , duties , &c. and pertinently to the same sence , the greeks might bee imagined , as indeed they did , to answer . wee acknowledge thy power , or cannot deny your rightfull authority , but esteem not our selves bound to obey your determinations importing such covetous demands , contrary to the custome and priviledges of our church ; wherefore wee think our selves excused not to meddle with you at all . fourthly , the bp. sayes that it seems the pope would have exacted those subsidies & duties of the grecians , and that there upon they separated from him . which countenances all i said formerly , & implies more strongly my sence ; towit , that it was there upon ( as the bp. confesses ) that is , upon their denying subsidies , not upon their denying the rightfulnes of his power as coming under another & a cheaper notion , that they separated . fifthly , the very demanding subsidies , had there not been some preacknowledg'd power to ground & countenance such a demand , seems incredibile , & had required a more positive answer , then ( wee cannot satisfy your covetousnes ) and rather this , you have nothing at all to do with us , nor the least superiority to ground the pretence of paying you any thing at all . whereas this answer rather sayes , wee ow you indeed subjection , but not such a subjection as engages us to satisfy your encroaching demands . lastly , hee sayes gerson hence concludes that upon this consideration they might proceed to the reformation of the french churches and the liberties thereof , notwithstanding the contradiction which perhaps some of the court of rome would make , which more & more evidences that the acknowledgment of the popes iust power was retained by the greeks , and encroachments upon their liberties onely deny'd , which the french church intended to imitate ; now , 〈◊〉 cannot bee pretended with any shame that gerson and the french church mean't to disacknowledge the pope's iust power , as head of the church , nor will gersons words even now cited let it bee pretended ; for then without any ( perhaps ) not onely some ( as hee doubts ) but all in the court of rome would most certainly have contradicted it . their consideration then being parallell to that of the greeks , as the bp. grants , it follow'd that they acknowledg'd the pope's authority though they passively remain'd separate rather than humour a demand which they deem'd irrationall . thus the bishop first cited a testimony against himself , as was shown in schism disarm'd ; and would excuse it by bringing three or four proofs , each of which is against himself also ; so that as hee begun like a bowler , hee ends like one of those artificers , who going to mend one hole use to make other three . the conclvsion . the controuersy between us is rationally and plainly summ'd up in these few aphorisms . . that ( whatsoever the extent of the pope's authority bee or bee not , yet ) 't is cl ar that all roman-catholikes , that is , all communicants with the church of rome or papists ( as they call them ) hold the substance of the pope's authority ; that is , hold the pope to bee supreme ecclesiasticall governour in god's church . this is euident out of the very terms , since to acknowledge the papall authority is to bee a papist or a communicant with the church of rome . . the holding or acknowledging this authority is to all that hold it , that is to the whole church of rome , or to all those particular churches united with rome , a principle of vnity of government . this is plain likewise out of the terms ; since an acknowledgment of one supreme governour either in secular , or spirituall affairs is the ground which establishes those acknowledgers in submission to that one government ; that is , 't is to them a principle of vnity in government . . 't is euident and acknowledg'd that ( whateuer some catholikes hold besides , or not hold , yet ) all those churches in communion with the churches of rome hold firmly that whatsoever the living voice of the present church , that is , of pastours and fathers of fam●lies , shall unanimously conspire to teach and deliuer learners and children to have been recieued from their immediate fathers as taught by christ and his apostles , is to bee undoubtedly held as indeed taught by them , that is , is to bee held as a point of faith ; and that the voice of the present church thus deliuering is infallible , that is , that this deliuery from immediate forefathers as from theirs , as from christ , is an infallible and certain rule of faith , that is , is a principle of vnity in faith . this to bee the tenet of all these churches in communion with rome both sides acknowledge , and is evident hence that the body made up of these churches ever cast out from themselves all that did innouate against this tenure . . 't is manifest that all the churches in communion with rome equally held at the time of the protestant reformation in k. henry's dayes these two principles as they do now , that is , the substance of the pope's authority or that hee is supreme in god's church , and that the living voice of the present church delivering as aboue said is the infallible rule of faith this is manifested by our aduersaries impugning the former churches as holding tradition and the pope's headship ; nor was it ever pretended by friend or foe that either those churches held not those tenets then , or that they have renounc't them since . . the church of england immediately before the reformation was one of those churches which held communion with rome , ( as all the world grants ) and consequently held with the rest these two former tenets prou'd to have been the principles of vnity both in faith and government . . that body of christians or that christian common-wealth consisting of the then-church of england and other churches in communion with rome , holding christ's law upon the sayd tenure of immediate tradition and submitting to the ecclesiasticall supremacy of the pope , was a true and reall church . this is manifest by our very adversaries acknowledgment , who grant the now church of rome , even without their church , to bee a true and reall one , though holding the same principles of vnity both in faith and government . . that body consisting of the then church of england and her other fellow communicants with rome , was united or made one by means of these two principles of vnity . for the undoubted acknowledgment of one common rule of faith to bee certain is in it's own nature apt to unite those acknowledger's in faith , that is , to unite them as faithfull and consequently in all other actions springing from faith and the undoubted acknowledgment of one supreme ecclesiasticall governour gave these acknowledgers an ecclesiasticall vnity or church-communion under the notion of governed or subjects of an ecclesiasticall commonwealth . now nothing can more neerly touch a church , than the rules of faith and government , especially if the government bee of faith and recieved upon it's rule . seeing then these principles gave them some vnity , and communion as faithfull , and as belonging to an ecclesiasticall commonwealth , it must necessarily bee church vnity , and comunion which it gave them . . the protestant reformers renoun'ct both these principles . this is undeniably evident since they left of to hold the popes supreme power to act in ecclesiasticall affairs , and also to hold diverse points , which the former church immediately before the breach , had recieved from immediate pastours & fathers , as from christ . . hence follows unavoidably , that those reformers in renouncing those two principles did the fact of breaking church communion , or schismatizing . this is demonstrably consequent from the two last paragraphs , where 't is proved that those two principles made church communion , that is , caused vnity in that body which themselves acknowledge a true church ; as also that they renounced or broke those principles ; therefore they broke that which united the church , therefore they broke the vnity of the church or schismatiz'd . . this renouncing those two principles of ecclesiasticall communion , prou'd to have been an actuall breach of church vnity , was antecedent to the pope's excommunicating the protestants , and his commanding catholikes to abstain from their communion . this is known , and acknowledg'd by all the world ; nor till they were protestants by renouncing those principles could they bee excommunicated as protestants . . this actuall breach of church vnity in k. henry's , e d the th's and the beginning of q. elizabeth's reign , could not bee imputable to the subsequent excommunication , as to it's cause . 't is plain , since the effect cannot bee before the cause . . those subsequent excommunications , caused not the actuall breach or schism between us . for the antecedent renouncing those two points , shown to have been the principles of ecclesiasticall vnity , had already caused the breach , disvnion or diuision between us ; but , those between whom an actuall diuision is made are not still diuisible , that is , they who are already diuided are not now to bee diuided : whefore , however it may bee pretended , that those excommunications made those congregations , who were antecedently thus diuided , stand at farther distance from one another ; yet 't is most senceles and unworthy a man of reason to affirm that they diuided those who were already diuided ere those excommunications came . especially , since the rule of faith , and the substance of the pope's authority consist in an indiuisible , and are points of that nature , that the renouncing these is a principle of renouncing all faith and government : for , who so renounces a y rule may , nay ought , if hee go to work consequently , renounce all hee holds upon that rule , whether points of faith , or of government , nay even the letter of god's written word it self ; that is , all that christ left us , or that can concern a church . . the renouncing those two principles of the former church vnity , as it evidently disv●ited mens minds in order to faith and government ; so , if reduced into practice , it must necessarily disvnite or diuide them likewise in externall church carriage . this is clear , since our tenets are the principles of our actions , and so contrary tenets of contrary carriage . . those tenets contrary to the two principles of church vnity were de facto put in practice , by the reforming party ; and consequently , they diuided the church , both internally and externally . this is most undeniably evident ; since they preach't , writ and acted against the tradition , or delivery of the immediately foregoing church as erroneous in many points , which shee deliver'd to them as from immediate . fathers and so upwards as from christ ; and proceeded now to interpret scripture , by another rule than by the tenets , and practice of the immediately foregoing faithfull . and , as for the former government , they absolutely renounc't it's influence in england , preach't , and writ against it : nay kept congregations apart before they had the power in their hands ; and , after they had the power in their hands , punish't and put to death ( and that vpon the score of religion ) many of the maintainers of those two principles of church vnity . . hence follows that the protestants breach was a perfect and compleat fact of schism . for , it diuided the former ecclesiasticall body both internally and externally , and that , as it was an ecclesiasticall body , since those two said principles concern'd ecclesiasticall vnity . . the subsequent excommunication , of our church was therefore due , fitting and necessary . due ; for it is as due a carriage towards those who have actually renounced the principles of vnity both in faith and government , and so broken church vnity , to bee excommunicated by that body from which those renouncers thus broke , as it is towards rebells , who have renounc't both supreme government and fundamentall laws of a common-wealth , and so , diuided the temporall body , to bee denounced and proclaimed rebells by the same common-wealth . fitting , since the effect of it they most resent , which was to keep the true faithfull apart in ecclesiasticall actions from them , signify'd no more than this , that they who had broken both internally and externally from the former body should not bee treated with , in ecclesiasticall carriages , as still of it , nor bee owned for parts of that commonwealth of which already they had made , themselves no parts . lastly , necessary ; all government and good order going to wrack if opposite parties bee allow'd to treat together commonly in such actions in which their opposition must necessarily , and frequently burst out and discover it self ; which will ineuitably disgust the more prudent sort , hazzard to peruert the weaker , and breed disquiet on both sides . thus far to evidence demonstrably that the extern fact of schism was truly theirs ; which done , though it bee needless to adde any more to prove them formall schismaticks , themselves confessing that such a fact cannot bee iustifiable , by any reasons or motives whatsoever , of schism , c. . yet i shall not build upon their standing to their own words , knowing how easy a thing it is , for men who talk loosely and not with strict rigour of discourse to shuffle of their own sayings ; i shall therefore prosecute mine own intended method , and alledge that , . the very doing an extern fact , of so hainous a nature , as is breaking church vnity concludes a guilt in the acters , unles they render reasons truly sufficient to excuse their fact . this is evident , a fortiori , by parallelling this to facts of far more inferiour malice . for , who so rises against a long settled , and acknowledg'd temporall power , is concluded by that very fact of rising to bee a rebell , unles hee render sufficient reasons , why hee rose . otherwise , till those reasons appear , the good of peace , settlement , order and vnity , which hee evidently violates by his rising conclude him most irrationall , that is , sinfull , who shall go about to destroy them . the like wee experience , to bee granted by all mankind in case a son disobey or disacknowledge one for his father , who was held so formerly , nay if a schoolboy disobey a petty schoolmaster ; for , unles they give sufficient reasons of this disobedience , the order of the world , which consists in such submission of inferiours , to formerly-acknowledg'd superiours gives them for faulty for having broken , and inverted that order . how much more then the fact of breaking church vnity , since this entrenches upon an order infinitely higher , to wit mankind's order to beatitude , and in it's own nature dissolves , that is , destroyes christ's church by destroying it's vnity ; and , by consequence , his law too ; since there remaining no means to make particular churches interpret scripture the same way , each of them would follow the fancy of some man it esteems learned , and so there would bee as many faiths as particular congregations ; as wee see practic 't in luther's pretended reformation , and this last amongst us . . no reasons can bee sufficient to excuse such a fact , but such as are able to conuince that 't was better to do that fact , than not to do it . this is most evident ; since , as when reason convinces mee 't is worse , to do such a thing i am beyond all excuse irrationall , that is , faulty in doing it ; so , if i bee conuinc't that 't is , onely-equally good , i can have no reason to go about it ; for , in regard i cannot act in this case without making choice of the one particular before the other , and in this supposed case there , is no reason of making such a choice , since i am convinc't of the equality of their goodnesses , 't is clear my action in this case cannot spring from reason . 't is left then that none can act rationally nor by consequence excusably , unles convinc't that the fact is better to bee done , than not to bee done . . in this case , where the point is demonstrable , and of highest concern , no reason meerly probable , how strongly soever it bee such , can convince the understanding , that the contrary was better to bee done , but onely a manifest , and rigorous demonstration . for , though in the commoner sort of humane actions an high probability , that the thing is in it self better , bee sufficient for action , yet there are some things of a nature , so manifest to all mankind to bee universally good , that nothing , but rigorous evidence , can bee pretended a ground sufficient to oppose them . for example , that parents are to bee honored , that government is to bee in the world , that vnity of government is to bee kept up in god's church , that there ought to bee certain grounds for faith , and such like . which , since on the one side they are such as are in their own nature demonstrable , and indeed self evident ; on the other so universally beneficiall , and consequently an universall harm , or rather a deluge of inconveniences , and mischief break in if the acter against these should hap to bee in the wrong ; hee is , therefore , bound in these cases not to act till hee sees the utmost that is to bee seen concerning such affairs ; but affairs of this nature are demonstrable , or rather self evident ( as is said ) on the one side , therefore hee ought not to act , unles hee could see perfect demonstration , that 't is better to do the other : wherefore , it being evidenced most manifestly in the th section of this , vindication of my appendix , that this fact of theirs left neither , certain ground of faith , nor vnity of government in god's church , nothing but a perfect and rigorous demonstration , could bee able to convince , the understanding that 't was better to ●ct . . the protestants produce no such demonstration , that ●was better to act in this case . for , they never clos'd with severe demonstration , in any of their writings i have yet seen to evidence rigorously either , that the rule of immediate delivery was not certain , or that the pope had no supreme authority in ecclesiasticall affairs , or , lastly , that , though hee were such , yet the authority was to bee abolish't for the abuses sake ; which were necessary to bee done ere they could demonstrate it better to break church vnity . nor , indeed , does their manner of writing bear the slenderest resemblance , of rigorous demonstration : since demonstration , is not a connecting of ayre and words , but of notions and sence , and this from self evident principles even to the very intended conclusion . whereas their way of writing is onely to find out the sence of words by a dictionary kind of manner ; which sort of discourse , is the most fallible , most sleight and most subject to equivocation , that can bee imagin'd . to omit that rigorous demonstration , is pretended by our party for our rule of faith , immediate tradition , which they renounc't ; and , consequently , for whatsoever was recieved upon it ( as was the pope's authority ) as yet unanswer'd by their side . nay their own side sometimes acknowledge , our said rule of faith infallible . see schism dispatch't . p. . & p. . . 't is the most absurd , and impious folly imaginable to bring for their excuse , that they were fully persuaded the thing was to bee done or is to bee continued . for , since a full persuasion , can spring from passion or vice aswell , as from reason and virtue ( as all the world sees , and grants ) it signifies nothing in order to an excuse to say one was fully persuaded hee was to do such a thing till hee show whence hee became thus persuaded ; otherwise his persuasion , might bee a fault it self , and the occasion of his other fault in thus acting . 't is not therefore his persuasion , but the ground of his persuasion , which is to bee alledged and look't into . which , if it were reason , whence hee became thus persuaded , and that hee knew how hee came to bee persuaded ( without knowing which 't was irrational to bee persuaded at all ) then hee can render us this reason , which persuaded him ; and reason telling us evidently that no reason , less than demonstration , is in our case able to breed full persuasion , or conviction , that it was , better to act ( as hath been proved aph. . ) it follows they must give us a demonstrative reason , why 't was better to bee done , otherwise they can never iustify that persuasion , much less the fact which issued from it : but , the fact being evidently enormous , and against a present order of highest concern , and no truly evident reason appearing , why 't was better , to do that fact , 't is from it self convinc't , and concluded irrationall , precipitate and vicious . if they complain of this doctrine , as too rigorous in leaving no excuse for weak , and ignorant persons who act out of simplicity ; i reply : either their first reformers , and themselves the continuers of the breach , thought themselves ignorant in those things they went about to reform , or no. if they thought themselves ignorant , and yet attempted to make themselves iudges , 't is a plain self-condemnation , and irrationall . if they were ignorant , or in some degree ignorant and yet either thought themselves not ignorant , or in some degree less ignorant , then i ask what made them think themselves wiser than they were except their own pride : so that which way soever they turn , their fault and guilt pursve them . but , if they were indeed knowing in those things , then 't is apparent there are no truly sufficient , convincing or demonstrative reasons to bee given why they acted , since they were never able to produce any such , though urged and obliged there unto by the highest motives imaginable . whence they remain still criminall as in the former cases , and indeed much more , leaving it manifest , that neither persuasion , nor their fact which was originiz'd from it , sprung from reason in their understanding , but from passion and affection in their wills. therefore the protestants are gvilty both of materiall , and formall schism ; since 't is evident they have done both a schismaticall fact , and ovt of a schismaticall affection . finis . the post-script . if my adversaries will undertake to reply in a rigorously demonstrative way , which , as it onely is conclusive , so none but it can avail them to iustify a fact of this nature , they shall have a fair return , from their disarmer . otherwise , if they resolve to pursve their old method of talking preachingly , quotingly and quibblingly , hee can bee content to leave them to the applause of weak and half-witted readers , and to the laughter and contempt of rationall and intelligent persons . index to the treatise against dr. hammond . a , absurdtiies in dr. h. p. three til ( this page the collectour , neglected to gather them ) p. . three more . other three p. . heaps of others from p. . till p. . also p. and . two more , p. . his absurdity of absurdities that it was forbidden by moses his law to converse with or preach to a gentile , from p. . to p. . a shameless absurdity in making a testimony totally against him , speak for him by adding two parenthesis of his own in the middle . p. , , . another heap of absurditis p. , . absurdity in deducing a conclusion out of three testimonies , in stead of shewing one expresse word in any one . p. , . &c. with others of an inferiour strain . absurdities about saint john's priority in place . p. , , . another , p. . many and most grosse absurdities to avoid the clearing his inexcusable falsification of scripture p. , &c. absurd pretences , and his building on a ●silly , unauthentik and most unlikely narration . p. , . absurd nonsence in obliging us to confesse what we hold as of faith , instead of shewing us he had exprest we held so , and not calumniated our tenet . p. , , . more new absurdites . p. , . absurdity in answering by a paralel which in nothing resembled our objection . p. , . absurd nonsence . p. , , . a cluster of absurdities about his twelve thrones . p. , . &c. all over . another cluster of toyish absurdities . p. , . an whole army of absurditias mustered up , which he nicknames a perfect reply and attendance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to my most important section . p. , . abusing the reader 's eyes four severall times . p. , . also p. , , , , , , . ( with what art he does so . p. , . ) also p. , & . and in divers other places . abusing a testimony from theophylact. p. , . abusing a testimony from scripture . p. , , . abusing a testimony from anacletus . p. , . &c. abusing the jewish church and her practice in their purest times . p. . abusing the primitive christians as most uncharitable , and the apostles as abetters of their fault . p. , . abusing saint peter and his jewish prosclytes by making them all schismaticks . p. , . his other manifold abuses come under the heads of calumny , cavill , false-dealing , and others . actuall power of the pope in england at the time of the breach . p. . . the antientnesse of that actuall power , p. , . b belief , what , according to dr. h. p. , . & . what truly . ibid. blasphemy against faith , and ground of faith ; p. . another , p. . three more , p . other two , p. ; . doctor hammonds manner of dogmatizing the seed of all blasphemies p. . c. calumny against a pretended adversary who medled not with him , p. , . also , p. , . calumniating our tenets , p. , , ( twice ) , , ( twice ) , , , , . calumniating his adversary , p. calumny formerly imputed , manifested from his own words to be such , p. . . cavill groundlessly made against a petty lapse , though rectify'd in the errata , p. , . other groundlesse and senselesse cavills , p. , , , , , , , , , , ( thrice ) . false cavill that s. w. never consider'd his allegations , when as he had answerd them particularly one by one , p. . a cavill grounded upon a false pretence of his own , p. . another built upon his own falsification of his adversaries words , p. ● . certainty of faith a just ground for zeal , p. , , , . certainty and strength of tradition , p. , , , , , , , , , . challenge made formerly to ●r . h that he could not shew one expresse word for exclusive jurisdictions in any of those testimonies he produc'd to prove it . p. . this challenge how rationall and moderate in the offerer , how necessary and advantagious for the accepter . p. , . challenge acceped , ibid. but totally prevaricated from , after acceptation , p. : . changing st. hierom's words , p. . changiing my words and intention , p. , & changing the force and sence of the father's words thrice by his paraphrase or translation , p. , , . . changing the question , almost all over . changing the words of their own translation , p. . changing st , chrysostom's intention and sense by omitting some of his words , p. , . multitudes of others of this sort , especially changing the fathers and his adversary's words , `and the letter in which-they were printed to his own advantage , i omit to recount most of them fall more properly under other heads . contradictions to himself , p. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ( twice ) l. ult . , l. . , , , ( twice ) , , , ( twice ) , , , , , , , , , , . contradicting four places of his own , p. , . contradicting six other places of his own , ib. nine self contradictions shewn from p. . to p. . contradicting himself and common sense both at once , , . contradicting himself , in denying his irrefragable evidence to be intended for what his own words evince he brought it , p. , . in denying it to be a proof for the point , p. . in denying seven testimonies , which before he call'd , clear evidences , to be proofs , p. , . contradicting himself with one testimony five times , p. , . contradicting the scope of the present controversie , and of his whole fourth chapter , p. , . contradicting the whole stream of scripture , p. . , , , . contradicting his own tenet of exclusive provinces , p. . contradicting common sense , p. . , , . . contradicting himself and common sense at once , p. , . contradicting at once all the most substantial part of his book , p. , . e. evidences , able to excuse the protestants from schism , how they ought to be qualified , p. , . that they have no such evidences , p. , , . a testimony . evidence how it ought to be qualified , p. . dr. h's evidences how qualified , p. . evident demonstrably that h. the eighth was , p. , , . evident demonstrably , that the papacy was never introduc'd , p : , , . f. fact evinc'd out of histories concludes not right , p. , . falsifications of scripture , p. , , , , , , , . false and common trick in citing scripture , p. , . false pretences from scripture , , , . egregious and most wilful , falssific●tions of fathers & other authors , discoverd , p. , , , , , , , , . , , , , , . falsifications of s. ambrose reiterated , and shamelesly applyed to his own advantage , whereas it is expresly for us , p. . falsification of falsifications , p. . falsely substituting the arch-heretick pelagius his testimony for s. hieroms , p. , , . falsifying the words of the testimony , as well as the authority , p. , . falsifying his adversaries words and plain intention , p. , , , , , , , . an egregious and most notorious falsification , as it was put in his book of schism , , . a voluntary and shameful falsification left undefended , p. , , , &c. false pretences that he answered some passages , p. , , . l. . and again ; l. , . also p. , , . falsifying our pretence of evidences , p. . false stating the question , p. , , , , . and indeed almost over all the book . false pretence of a silly argument , as put by his adversary , whereas he feigned it himself , p. , . falsification objected by dr. h. cleared most evidently from p. , to p. . falsifying his adversaries manner of expression , wilfully to accuse him of a falsification , p. . . g. general councels now morally impossible , and when probable to be had according to dr. h. p. . their authority doubted of by him , p. . grounds concluding the whole controversie , p. , to . i. ignorance in logick , p. , , , , , . . . ( twice ) , . ( twice ) . ignorance in his accidence , shewn by ten several instances , p. . to p . ignorance of the signification of the common school-terms , in telling us the pope is not a summum genus , p. . affected ignorance of common sense , in impugning a name or title , instead of a thing , p. , , . in arguing from fulness to equality , p. . . in concluding from either side of the contradiction p. . . in deducing many consequences from perfectly unconcerning premises p. . . . in building upon the reconcilement of contradictory testimonies , ere he knows or goes about to prove them true p. . . in expecting the like from his adversary p. . . in arguing from plurality to equality p. . ignorance how the holy ghost is in the faithful p. , miserable ignorance in dogmatizing upon the mystical sense of testimonies p. . ▪ ▪ . . ignorance of the way of interpreting scripture p. . . . . . ignorance of the distinction between a title and an argument p. . between an interpreter and a grammarian p. . between a parenthesis and a comma , p. . between a parenthesis and a comma p. . between samaritans and gentiles , p . affected ignorance of our tenet , p. . . . . . . . our proofs , p. . of his being the opponent , i the defendant p. . pitiful ignorance in not knowing the nature of a proof , p. . most nonsensical ignorance , p. , . incertainty of faith , unable to ground a rational zeal , p , . dr. h's . churches absolute incertainty of her faith avowed by himself , p. . . incertainty of faith , how absurd and disedifying , if brought into practice , or put in a sermon , p. , . infallibility of our church , how held by us , p. , ▪ no church without infallibity , p. , . no power to binde to belief , without infallibility , ib. also p. , . denial of infallibility , pernicious to all faith , p. . k. mr. knots position vindicated , p. . . , . also p. . . m. mistaking willfully every line of my introduction , p. , , , . &c. to , his other mistakes sprung from wilfullness or weakness are too many to be reckoned up : this one instance will abundantly suffice to inform the reader what he may expect in his answering the rest and more difficult part of the book . motives of union in our church , p. . o. omitting to answer to most concerning points , p. , , , . ( four times ) , . ( other four times ) , , . omitting to reply to my answers or exceptions , and to strengthen his own weak arguments , p. , , , , , , . ( six times ) , ( thrice ) , , , . ( twice ) , . ( twice ) omitting to mention those words in my epistle to the reader , which solely imported , p. , . to answer the true import of my introduction , p. , . to answer whether his reasons be onely probable or no , p. , . to oppose our true evidence , though he pretends it , p. . to answer his adversaries challenge , that he had not one word in his many testimonies to prove his main point , but what himself put in of his own head , p. . . omitting to shew one testimony which confirmed his own , we know ; but instead of doing so , cavilling and railing at his adversary , p. , . omitting his adversaries chief words , and thence taking occasion to cavill against the rest , p. . omitting to clear himself of his falsifying scripture , p. , . and of falsifying the apostolical constitutions , p. , &c. omitting to reply to the text of s. mat. urged against him , p. , also to two important paragraphs of schism , dis . p omitting to cite the place , or even the book of three authors ; whereof those which could be found , are expresly against him , p. , to . omitting our argument from tu es petrus , though pretending he puts it , p. , , reasons why the disarmer omitted that part of dr. h's book , which himself acknowledges unnecessary , p. , , &c. opponents part belongs to the protestants , defendants to us , p. , , , , . p. patriarchy of the bishop of rome mistaken for metropolitical power , p. . it s extent weakly impugned by four testimonies , which not so much as mention it , p. . , by rufinus , , , . rather justifiedly the nicene canon pretended to oppose it , p. , . acknowledged by the greeks our adversaries to extend to all the west , p. , . power of binding to belief , what it consists in , p. , that our church rationally claims , this power , but that none else can , p. , , . possession , not to be disturbed without sufficient motives p. , this of the popes in england not to be rejected upon less reasons , than rigorously evident that it was usurpt p , , , . possession of catholicks justly pretendable to have some from christ , and so may be it self a title , but that of protestants cann ot p. , so the advantages of ours , the disadvantages of their possession , p. , . again , most amply , p , . . theirs not truly named a possession , p . prevarication from his own most expres words , the whole tenour of his discourse , the main scope of his most substantiall chapter , and lastly , from the whole question , p , , to . from performing a most advantageous challenge , accepted by himself , p . other prevarications , p. , , , , , , , , , and in many other places too numerus to be noted . proofs brought by protestants against our ground of faith , arrive not to a probability , p. , , , dr. h's proofs , which he formerly call'd evidences , metamorphos'd now into branches of accordance , agreeances and fancies , and all deny'd by himself to be proofs , except one , p. , , . that one found to be empty and ill-treated , p. , , . r. respect for mine adversaries avowed ep. to the reader . also p. , , . . s. schisms nature and definition , p. . schisms , divisions as put by dr. h. in his defence , wanting all the principall sorts of schism objected , p , . to p. . t. testimonies b●ought by dr. h. against himself , p , , , , , , . , , , , , ( thrice ) , . testimonies impertinent to the purpose , four , from appeals denyed p ▪ ▪ . , from , names and titles denyed , p from s. amb●ose , ● . . and . from s. chrysost . and theophylact. p from clemens , p. . . from s chrysost , again , p. , , also p three impertinent testimonies for s. johns being over the jews onely , p. , , his testimony from scripture for his exclusive provinces truely explicated , and that explication made good . p. , , &c. his most serviceable testimony from the arch-heretick pelagius , p. . this testimony mainly rely'd on , p. . . . . testimony from s. hierom , clearing the point of exclusive jurisdiction . p. . to . s. chrysostomes express testimony against himself , whom he cites most for him in this point , p . . three most manifest testimonies from s. chrysost . for s. peters supremacy , p. . to . testimony from s. cyprian and s. austinc , for s. peters authority , p. . to . testimony from our own canon law senselesly brought against us , p. . to . a testimony expresly against himself 〈◊〉 every tittle brought to make good all his former testimonies , p. ● . . six testimonies of 〈◊〉 shown invalid by schism disarm'd , left unmaintained by their alledger , p. . . testimonies from scripture for the promise and performance of a particular degree of authority in s. pe●●● urged p. . to his own testimony from s. hillary expresly against him , p. , a testimony produc'd as for him , which contradicts him in five particulars , p. . his testimony from scripture for twelve episcopall chairs , p. . . the testimony tu es petrus , &c. urged by us p. . . testimony from justinians novels ●oubly and notoriously falsified , p. . . w. weaknesse in producing blindly places of scripture unapplyed to any circumstance , p. , . in imputing contumeliousness to his adversary , p , , , . yet using worse himself , p. . , , . in expecting that adversaries in a scrious quarrell should spare one another , p. . in his manner of writing epist . to the reader , p. , , , in quoting saint hierom against the disarmer to his own utter overthrow , p. , , , &c. in totally mistaking the common sense of a plain epistle to the reader , p. , . &c. in arguing by ifs , p. , . thrice . also , p. , , , , , thirteen weaknesses about one point , p. , to . there are innumerable others , but i am weary . a list of their common heads may be seen , p. , . the total sum of dr. hammond's faults committed in the first part of his reply ( that is , within the compass of thirty seven leaves ) favourably reckon'd , is this . absurdities , threescore and two . abuses twenty nine : blasphemies , seven . groundless cavils , fifteen . calumnies , twelve . contradictions , seventy six false-dealings , forty four , besides his changing the words and sense of others . ignorances , great part of which are affected , fifty . omissions of his necessary duty , forty bringing testimonies for him which are against him , one and twenty . mistakes . prevarications , shufflings . weaknesses . for the most part voluntary ▪ sans nombre . index to the treatise against my lord of derry . absurdities , p. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , twice , , , , , , . absurdity in bragging of his churches large communion , p , , , , breaking church-unity inexcusable , p. . . . . . . cavills groundlesly rais'd , p. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . cavills against the council of trent answered , p. , , , , . contradictions to himself p. , ( twice ) , ( twice ) , , , , . also , p. , , ( four times ) , , , , , , ( twice ) ( twice ) , , ( twice ) , , , , , , , , other contradictions . p. , , , , , , , ( thrice ) , , . contradicting the whole world's ages , p. , , . controversy , what , p. . creed of the apostles why instituted , p. . why other creeds or professions , p. , . defendent , who properly , p , . falsification of the council of ephesus in four respects . p. , , . of his adversaries words , p. , , , , of the council of sardica , p. , , of bede , p , , of all our historians at once , p. . false pretence of our stating the question , p. . false stating the question , p , , . moderation of protestants misrepresented from p. , to . mistaking wilfully our charge , p. , . omitting to tell us whether his exceptions were demonstrative or only probable , p , . omitting one halfe of our charge , p. , . omitting to speak one positive word to the matter of fact , p. , . omitting words most reli'd on by his adversary , p , . opponent , who properly , p , . prevarication from answering and substituting common words for particular things , p. , , , , , . other prevarications , p. , , ( twice ) , , , , , , twice a most absurd and manifold prevarication , p. , , , . again , , . also , , , , prevarications from the question , p. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . succession into st. peters headship due to the bishop of rome , p. , . testimony from the council of ephesus produced by . lord d. p. , , & , from english statutes , p. , from the epistle of pope eleutherius , p. , . testimony from s. prosper rejected by him , p. , . his testimony from the welsh manuscript m●nifoldly weak , from p. , to p. . unity of faith broak by the reformers , p. , , , , , . unity of government broke by them , p. , , , , . . universal church impossible to be known by protestant grounds , from p. , to p. . the total sum of faults committed by my lord of derry in his short appendix , cast up , amount to . absurdities , twenty nine , cavils , sixteen . contradictions , forty four . false dealings , twelve . omissions of most important matters , which concerned the whole question , four . prevarications , forty two . corrections of the errata in the title l. . dispach't . epist . to the reader p. . l. . this method ib. p. . t. . oratoriall . p. . l. ult . them , being . p. . l. . i doubt not p. . l. . be otherwise . p. . l. . his award . p. . l. . ruin more . p. . l. . if christians . p. . l. . of schism . p. . l. . these positions . p . l. extern . p. . l. . chap. . p. . l. may not both . p. . l. . lawfull . p. . l. most probable . p. . l. . have had . p. . l. . this consent . p. . l. bishops . p. . l. quos . p. . l. reply p. . p. . l. in it . p. . l. bishops . p. . l. epist . p. . l. province . ib. l. fifth . p. . l. fifth p. . l. his side . p. . . the word is . p. . l. prepositive . p. . l. offer here p. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . p. . l. a pact . ib. l. a pact . p. . l. our doctors p. . l. gentilem . p. ● l. il phras'd . p. . l. hath no. p. . l● same tune . p. . l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . l. prejudiciall . p. . l. possibly . p. . : . from all othe● . ib. . hence all . p. . l. commanded togather together . p. . l. take to be p. . l. in soft-reason'd . ib. l. attending . p. . l. which he affirms . p. . l. vers . . we . ib. l. greeks . p. . l. argumentative . ib. l. fourth , p. . l. ●ad won . p. . l. here . answer . p. . ● . l. to him answ . p. . l. . . p. . l. repugnancies . p. . ● of asks . p. . l. , assents not sprung . p. . l. it would . p. . l. inclosure . p. . l. . found . p. . ● . l. rule p. l. . par . . answ . p. . ib. l. exhortation . p. . l. . preferment , rep. p. . reply . p. . l. . as our saviour did , ib. l. . expression . p. . l. . hands , reaping . ● . . l. . 〈◊〉 your . p. . l. . destroy ours , from his own . p. . l. . proportion . p. . l. . explicated , ib. l. . us three . p. . l. . ingenuous . p. . l. . grant . p. . l. . his former fault . p. . . . the bishops f●llow-sencer , dr. h. of schism , cap. . par . . confess , &c. p. . l. . sons by attestation . p. . l. . none can be . p. . l. . than that the ibid. l. . immediate . p. . l. . some such things . p. . l. . all the grounds . p. . l. . church or successour of s. peter . p . l. . these points . p. . l. . and indeed . p. . l. . manifest in . p. . l. . doth aloud . p. . l. . opponent or accaser . p. . l. ult . have afforded some . p. . l. . his church , since if he means the discipline of the church of england , &c. p. . l. ● flickering , p. . l. . by my first . p. . l. . of non-ens . p. . l. . utter unauthentickness . p. . l. . the concomitant , . l. . are put down . p. . l. . corroborate the. p. . l. . levi. p. . l. . now hold . p. . l. by any tie . p. . l. . conf●sses . p. . l. . . pag. l. . nationall laws . p. . l. . that no society . p. . l. . have it h●ld . p. . l. . and no more . p. . l. . any 〈◊〉 ib. l. . ●ontests . p. . l. . no , my lord. p. . l. . renouncing , p. . l. . these evidencies . p. . l. . in noting . p. . l. . evince , p. . l. . . applying the. p. . l. . unites god's . p. . l. . as such● p. . l. . discourse , dull . p. . l. . but there is . p. . l. . d●ametricall . p. . l. . or of the p. . l. . a patriarchall a●istocraticall authority . p. . l. . neither their . finis . sure-footing in christianity, or rational discourses on the rule of faith with short animadversions on dr. pierce's sermon : also on some passages in mr. whitby and m. stillingfleet, which concern that rule / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) sure-footing in christianity, or rational discourses on the rule of faith with short animadversions on dr. pierce's sermon : also on some passages in mr. whitby and m. stillingfleet, which concern that rule / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. [s.n.], london : . attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . table of contents at end. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng stillingfleet, edward, - . pierce, thomas, - . whitby, daniel, - . catholic church -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion sure-footing in christianity , or rational discourses on the rule of faith . with short animadversions on dr pierce's sermon ; also on some passages in mr whitby and m stillingfleet , which concern that rule . ecce nos ex patribus ad patres per manus traditam fuisse hanc sententiam demonstravimus . athanasius . by i. s. london , printed in the year . to the queen : madam , though the faith i write for be far more firmly establish't then heaven and earth themselves , ( as the worlds great master has by his own word assur'd us ) and so needs no support but its own invincible strength : yet , i am told by my reason , that nothing so clears and recommends religion to the generality , as the vertuous life and eminent devotion of them that profess it . but , where shall i seek those happiest effects and noblest arguments of truth ? if i consider them in their abstracted idea's they are invisible as angels ; too subtle and delicate for vulgar eyes . where then may i hope to meet those excellent forms vested with bodies ? if i consult the common judgment ; i expect to be sent to some hermit's cell , or the private oratory of some holy votaress ; where i may find them , indeed , embody'd ; but withal , half-bury'd : incomparable lights , but , shut up in a kind of dark lanthorn ; where they burn safely i confess , but shine to few : while those i seek , must be high and conspicuous , to send forth their beams and influences over all the vvorld ; and in that regard , courts are the properest firmament for such illustrious stars ; and courts are easily seen , but where 's the star ? in this perplexity , madam , it pleas'd the goodness of heaven to relieve me ; for , as the mention of courts brought immediately into my memory the happiness our nation is blest with by your majesty's residence among us ; so the contemplation of your exemplar life fill'd my soul with joy to have found , at last , those sublime and heroick virtues ; whose perfect conformity to the rules of catholick religion is , alone , capable to convince the certainty of its truth . such an unwearied constancy in devotion , such a degree of fervor in that constancy , cannot possibly proceed from a luke-warm probability in faith : such frequent retirements to intimate conversations with heaven , such mortifications , and contempt of court-entertainments , and ( which is yet harder ) such innocence and purity amidst the necessary admittances of them , as they all conspire to speak your soul angelical , so they clearly prove the vigorous activity of the faith that breeds them , far beyond the drowsy indifferency of a probable opinion . thus , madam , while schollars but discourse , yov live demonstrations . permit me then to use , not your bare name , but your vertues as a patronage to my endeavours ; since the motive of this my dedicatory meant these for its substance , and your temporal supremeness onely for a circumstance . others complement while they dedicate , i argue all the while : nor intend i this for a farther display of your excellent vertues ( which already are sufficiently manifest to all the vvorld ) but to breed a more serious reflexion on them in the minds of those against whom i write ; and other well-meaning , but mis-led persons . this advantage your majesty and the practical provers of catholick faith have above us speculaters , that your whole life is a continual argument for it ; while we are bound to expect seasons and wait opportunities : nor should i at this time have offer'd to appear , had not the multitude of books lately printed against catholick religion made it my plain and necessary duty with all my little power to defend it , vvhat i have endeavour'd , i most humbly lay at your majesties feet , and remain , madam , your majesties most dutiful subject and most obedient servant i. s. preface to the intelligent reader . . he is little acquainted with the paths which lead to science who knows not that the settling the first principle in any affair , is of mainest import towards satisfaction in that particular ; because if such a principle be not first settled , the whole discourse , as relying on that principle for its certainty , must needs waver and stagger . reflecting on this plainest truth and withal on the manner how very many ( i wish i might not say most ) controversies are manag'd ; that is , by debating much about diverse conclusions , but very little about the first principle in controversie , i cannot wonder if disputes come slowly to an end when few of them were ever rightly begun . another mischief and even despair of entire satisfaction springs from hence ; that , seeing all dispute supposes an agreement between the disputers in some acknowledg'd principle , i much fear , while things are carry'd on this fashion , this requisit is wanting to the catholick and protestant controvertists ; for , neither doth the protestant from his heart hold ( witness the books of their most extold champions , and even the . articles , to the contrary ) the testimonies of fathers and councils , certain and convictive ; nor even scripture alwayes as to its letter and the sence they give it , ( for they pretend infallible certainty of none of these ; ) much less does the catholick agree that private interpretations of scripture , or citations from fathers ( not speaking as witnesses of the churches belief ) are of sufficient authority to settle the true , or overthrow a false or pretended faith. yet , notwithstanding all this , each antagonist permits the other to frame his discourses upon these grounds as if he held the method were good and allowable ; which not being heartily granted by either , what satisfaction can we expect but endless and fruitless contests , for want of agreement in some acknowledg'd principle , while this method is follow'd . nay more , were it suppos'd that both sides had agreed not to reject in their disputes such a principle ; yet still , however one side might happen to foil the other so far as to make him contradict himself , yet never so as to convince his tenet of falshood , unless the process were grounded upon some first , that is , self-evident principle , by virtue of whose undoubtable certainty the discourse built on it might gain an establishment . whence also , the result of this way of discourse can be onely the credit or discredit of the authours ; and touches not at all the thing ; which , without some evident principle to establish or overthrow it , hovers in its pure neutral condition of being ( as to assent or dissent ) just a bare saying and no more . . the reason why the first principle of controversie is not more lookt into and clear'd appears to me evidently this , that our modern dissenters from the church and her faith seeing ( which is common to them with all other maintainers of errours ) that to begin with first or self-evident principles is the direct road to science , and therefore absolutely destructive of their interest , avoid as much as in them lies , the laying any such principles : and instead of this apply their whole endeavours to aiery descants upon words , by such means and arts as are never likely to give them any determinate sence ; by which craft ( the way of science , being to proceed from one piece of sence to another ) they carry the war out of the bounds of science where solid ground is to be found to fix ones fool upon , so to overthrow or be overthrown , and transfer it to a kind of spatium imaginarium of fancy and unsignifying sounds , the proper sphere for chimerical discoursers to buz confusedly and make a noise in ; where the catholick must either let them alone , and then they cry victory ; or follow them thither , and so hazard to prejudice his own cause by seeming to allow their method of discoursing . whereas indeed the catholick is forc't by their importunity exciting his charity towards the unskilfull , to show how weakly they discourse in their own shallow way . . how little faulty the catholick is in this will be quickly manifest , if we consider that ●tis against his principles and involuntary in him to take this method : for , he builds not upon those aiery skirmishes for his faith ; nor , consequently , esteems he it conquerable by such attempts : he received his faith from the present church witnessing it's delivery from the former age ; to this anchorage he sticks ; he stands on immemorial possession , nor doubts he that christ ' s doctrin is his true and proper inheritance , while brought down by the testimony of so many christian nations . as long as this foundation stands firm , quirks hurt not him ; shake this , that is , show the church essential is mistress of falshood , and he must doubt all his faith ; but yet cannot hold the protestants , for he must hold nothing . no book can secure him , when that principle which onely can secure to us books written long ago , is insecure it self . now , on the contrary , the protestant builds his faith by thus hammering it out of unsenc't characters , and is quite overthrown ( would his will give his reason leave to follow his principles ) if another more dexterously fit the words to a sence inconsistent with his . and his hopes of standing are not built ( as are the catholicks ) on the self evidence of ony thing or principle , but indeed on the inevidence or ambiguity of words and his way to manage them ; which is , to let no living authority sence thew , and so they will more easily change their shape as the ingenious contrivances of fancy molds them ; and then , if the discourse seem but a little plausible , education and interest make the vnderstanding content with very easiy satisfaction . . i am far from blaming the catholicks prudence for engaging on this manner ; i rather admire their charity towards their weaker brethren , that at the expence of so much patience and pains , such excellent wits will condescend to so laborious a talk ; less sutable both to their own genius as catholick , and to the nature of their cause . how easily might they rest secure upon immovable possession , and demand evidence and demonstration from the protestant , who denies his right to christs doctrin ? how easily might he show their reasons inconclusive ( which method was observ'd by a late learned writer mr. j. s. against that pulpit-vapour of dr. pierce ) especially by discovering the unsatisfactoriness of the method they take ? how most easily , that they have never a principle or self evident ground to begin with ; that till they settle such a first principle all their discourse is frivolous ; that their rejecting the churches living voice or tradition brings all into doubt ▪ both sayings of fathers and texts of scripture ; and hence , not to allow them the favour of disputing ad hominem from scripture or fathers , by granting them any thing certain , but putting them to prove all ; for since they are to object and bring evident reason for changing , it lies on them to make their reasons evident ; nor has any disputant right to have any thing allow'd him certain , who renounces that principle , which if renounct● ▪ all is vncertain : and , lastly , that he who denies the first principle in any science , deserves not , ●ay cannot in reason ( abstracted from circumstances ) be discourst with at all in that science , nor they in controversy . this will force them to lay some first or self-evident principle ; which cannot fail to produce these two advantages ; one to the world , that it shall get into a method of concluding something with evidence : the other to catholick religion ; for , ●twill be found impossible their reason strain'd to its utmost , can invent any other in this matter , but that of tradition . . this will clearly shorten our debates , and save the laborious transcribing and printing volumes of testimonies , by bringing conrroversy to the way of reason ; for the certainty of first authority must needs be manifested by pure reason . but who am i that i should attempt such a change in the method of controversy , or think my self a fit proposer or presser of it ? far be it from me . yet , if i mistake not , nature her self ( whom i second in this design ) is about doing that work . for , i hear catholick writers complain of the protestant ( and justly too ) that he puts him to answer what h●● been an hundred times said before ; and i am inform'd an eminent protestant now writing in behalf of dr pierce , makes the same counter-complaint of the catholick , and the dissuader begins his book with the same resentment : besides , i am sure the best wits of our nation are weary of this method , seeing t is no more but reciprocating a saw , or transcribing and re-printing what has been done before , onely in another frame ; or , if any new production be made , generally t is nothing but some note collected from some historical book unobserved by others ; which , what satisfactory evidence t is like to bring with it , is easy to be ghest . . now all this happens through not first settling and agreeing in some first principle . not onely for the reasons given in the beginning of this preface ; but also , because ( as will be shown hereafter ) without thi● the validity of any testimony from father or council cannot be weigh'd , understood , or prest with force upon the adversary . for , if these be but parts of the living voice of the church essentiall of their time , that is , of christian tradition , it will follow that till the force of tradition be evidenc't , theirs will not be clearly known . again , tradition once evidenc't wil give principles to distinguish those citations by , and to secure ( as far as is needful ) and interpret scriptures letter : whence clear victory will accrue to truth , and full satisfaction to her ingenuous seekers not that i at all doubt , but that many things in catholick writers of the testimonial strain , carry strong force of conviction with them ; but i see th●●● while the solid testimonies are not distinguisht and solely insisted on , but run mixt with others of less force , by such a mixture they weaken their own ; i see also that they want their effect upon the protestant , by reason he is not first prest to admit that evident principle on which their strength is built ; and , which once settled , they are irresistable . . the settling then the first principle in controversy being so supremely important , i have attempted it . putting this dilemma to the protestant . either controversy ( or the skill which enables us to conclude certainly what 's faith , ) is a science , or not ; if not , why do we meddle with it ; since without science or knowledge , all is meer beating the ayr and empty ignorant talking . if it be , common seuse tells us it must be grounded on some first and self-evident principle . let 's to work then , and settle this principle , that so we may have something to agree in and proceed upon ; that is , be able to discourse together . i have endeavoured to show the first principle we catholicks proceed on establisht on rational grounds , and self-evident : let the protestant either agree with us in it , or settle some other able to render his citations certain , without which they ought alledge nothing . nor is it enough for them to catch at single words , or little parcels of my discourse , ( as their way is ) but , it being connected , they must overthrow the main of it : nor that ; but they must lay some first principle of their own , else they ought affirm nothing , nor speak ; for why should any one say what he knows not , or how can he know without principles ? especially the protestant is oblig'd to do this , who cannot stand on possession , but on his reasons why he mov'd what he found settled . this principle then they are ty'd by all honest considerations to produce , and till they do so , i must frankly declare what reason tells ever intelligent man , that those many flashy books of late against catholicks , by whomsoever written , deserve not a word in answer . first discourse , showing , from the nature of rule and faith , what properties belong to the rule of faith. . as common reason gives it evident , that no satisfaction at all can be had in any point whatever without knowing first the meaning of those words which express the thing under debate , since without this the discoursers must talk of they know not what ; so the art of logick assures us that , the meaning of those words exactly known , a ready way is open'd to a clear decision of the most perplexing difficulties . for , seeing the meaning of a word includes in it self the nature of the thing as signified by that word , in regard it could not mean that thing , unless it also meant it of such a nature which constitutes that thing , so t is plain that , the meaning of the word once known perfectly , the nature of the thing , as signify'd by that word , must be known likewise . wherefore , since the nature of the thing bears along with it all those considerations and attributes which intrinsecally belong to such a nature , and excludes all those which are incompetent to the same nature , it acquaints us with what can be both said and deny'd of the thing , as far as exprest by that word . the perfect knowledge then of the meaning of the words affords us the certain solution of all questions whether affirmative or negative , and is the most compendious way to settle all controversies . let us therefore apply this method to our present purpose , and examin well what is meant by those words which express the thing we are discussing , namely the rule of faith ; and we may with good grounds expect a solid , clear , and brief satisfaction both of what is not that rule , and what is it. . to begin then with what is most evident ; seeing a rule signifies a thing which is able to regulate or guide him who uses it , it must consequently have in it all those qualities by which it is able to do that it 's proper effect ; otherwise 't is no rule , that is , 't is not apt or able to do what a rule should do . . it must then in the first place be evident as to its existence ; unto the sense , if it be to guide it ; or to the vnderstanding if it be an intellectual rule . for , how should either of these be guided by what they neither see nor know ? . whence follows that it must be evident to all those who are to be regulated by it , that there is such a thing ; otherwise it can be to them no rule ; since , being unknown , it reaches not , or affects not those persons who are to be ruled by it ; that is , reaches not those things upon which it is to do its effect ; and so , cannot rule them , or be a rule to them . . moreover , to those who can raise doubts or can have doubts raisd in them , ( that is in a manner all mankind , even the rudest vulgar ) it must be knowable that the intellectual rule they are to be regulated by , has in it self a virtue to rule or guid their understandings right ; that is , they must be capable to know that it deserves to be reli'd on as a rule . wherefore , this must either be evident by its own light , or at least easily evidenceable by other knowledges or skills presupposed in those users of reason , who are to be guided by that rule . otherwise , 't is against sense and reason to yield over ones understanding to be guided by that which he can never come to understand that it has in it any ability or power to guide him . . and , because nothing can be evident to be what in reality it is not , it follows that this thing pretending to be a rule , must also be certain in it's self , or establisht on secure grounds : for otherwise , 't is not possible that can in true sence be call'd a rule , which one may follow and yet go wrong , or be missed . the directive power then which it has must not be wavering ; wherefore also the causes which conserve it so constantly able to perform that effect must be established too to that degree as to keep it fitting to do the effect proper to its nature ; which is , to be certain in its self . . thus much is evidently gathered out of the common notion or nature of a rule ; that is , out of the genuin and proper meaning of that single word . we are next to consider the meaning of the word faith . by which we intend not to give rigorous school-definitions of either this or the former word ; but only to reflect on and make use of some attributes , predicates or properties ; which in the sence of such who intelligently use those words are apprehended to be involved in or truly appertaining to their signification . this caution given to avoid mistake or cavil , let 's enquire of what kind of nature that thing is which is meant by this word faith , and then reflect what further qualifications it requires in it's rule , that is , in the certain means which is to guide us to that knowledge called faith. . faith then in the common sence of mankind is the same with believing ; and divine faith in the sence of the generality of christians ( from whom , as being the intelligent users of that word , the true sence of it is taken ) the believing god in reveal'd truths , which necessarily imports some kind of knowledge of super●atural things . again , it being evident and held by those christians that none can come to heaven without knowing there is such a thing , or some very great good reserv'd for the next life ; nor yet without loving it , ( for none is thought to go to heaven whether he will or no ) which love , besides the knowledge that heaven is , cannot be had without knowing likewise that 't is a good incomparably greater than any in this life ; nor can these knowledges be had by mankind but by believing ; hence , belief of supernatural things , or faith is conceived necessary for the salvation of mankind . nor is this found only in the judgements the learneder faithful make concerning it by their discourse , but in the very meaning of the word faith as it imports knowledge of super●atural things . it being then granted by all and in it self most rational that some at least of the vulgar are to be saved , that is , are to have faith or knowledge of god , it follows that the rule of faith or certain means to arrive at faith must be appliable to them . . moreover , since the ruder or unskilfuller people are , the lesse capable they are of science , and none doubts but some , amongst even the rudest , may come to be saved , since we experience they have oftentimes well-meaning , virtuous and devout hearts ; the rule or means to come to faith must also be appliable to these ; that is , must be such as even the rudest may be capable to know there is such a thing . . the rule of faith therefore must be knowable as to it 's existence by natural impressions upon mens senses , affecting their souls according to the common light of understanding . for , seeing the rudest are very shallow reflecters and discoursers , and suppos'd to be utterly unacquainted with any kind of skill got by speculation or study , the knowledge of the rule of faith's existence must not need any skill or science acquir'd by study , intervening between the natural power of their understanding and it● otherwise it could not be knowable by them , 〈◊〉 be to them a rule , by parag . th . . again , seeing those who are very rude are yet capable of being put into doubts concerning their faith , either by sophistry or fai● language , and at length deserting it ; and 't is most unreasonable there should be no means lest by god sufficient to settle them ; nor can any means be sufficient if the rule of faith ( which is the best if not only means to come to the knowledge of faith ) be dissatisfactory , or impossible to be shown worthy to be rely'd on ; it follows that the rule of faith must be of such a nature as i● either by its own light evidently secure and worthy to be held a rule , and this even to the rudest who can doubt ; or else easily evidenceable to them to be such by intelligent persons who art vers'd in such reflexions , and this out of principles they are capable of , ( as was prov'd parag● the th . ) that is , requiring onely common and obvious reason not scientifical speculation to instill them . otherwise those rude persons would be left unfurnish't of due means to be sted●ast in their faith. . also , since the notion of the word faith bears , that 't is a perfection of the soul , or a virtue , and so no act of it irrational , but on the contrary , all its acts rational , and the submission of onr understandings exercisd in it rationabile obsequium , 't is evinc't that the satisfactorines of its rule , ought not onely to be evident or easily evidenceable to the rudest doubters , as we now prov'd , but also it ought to be so qualify'd , that the faithful who yet have no doubts should do rationally even while they simply or unreflectingly adhere to it , and that it should supply to their common and uncultivated reason by a natural way what it wants of reflexion : i mean , so that the common light of reason may tell them , upon solid and true principles taught them by the ordinary course of things in the world , this is to be held or followed , thongh they dive not into the grounds or particular reasons of their tenets or actions , nor can give account of them . . and , since our saviour intended those out of the church should embrace faith , and those who are to be converted are heterodox , that is , hold contradictorily to the church , in what they dissent from her ; so that if they change , they must now hold is , indead of is not , or is not instead of is ( there being no middle to hold to ) in those points in which they differ from her , and no change ought to be in reason or in a rational nature ( of which nature those heterodox are ) without true reason to change , and the change in our case is to be made not to a meer suspension , which is believing nothing , nor to a middle between is , and is not , but to a contrary or rather contradictory assent , and no assent can be● without sufficient cause of assent , nor is any sufficient in reason to put that effect or cause assent● in a thing antecedent to faith , as is the rule● of faith , but evidence ; ( for while 't is but probable , that is , while the understanding must a● yet say i know not it is so , it cannot say i know i● is so , which is no more but to say understandingly or to assent that it is so ) now the cause of our actuall assenting to the churches faith , is the rule of faith ; it follows out of the notion of rational included in the word faith , as apply'd to convettible persons , that the rule of faith must be beyond all peradventures , how high and presumed soever they be ; that is , absolutely evident to us , and consequently certain . . moreover , there being many eminent wits in the chutch vers'd in true logick & enured to sciences , and true logick and the course of science necessarily telling them that nothing can in perfect reason be held by one who penetrates difficulties , but either self-evident principles , or conclusions necessarily deduced by intrinsecal mediums from those principles , nor can they be necessarily deduced without immediate connexion or identification of the terms with the medium which infers the identity between themselves in the conclusion , and that what is not seen to be thus connected is unknown , and so , for any thing appears , may be false ; and to see a thing may be false , must needs breed some fear of being so , or doubt , if we be concerned in the truth or falsitie of that thing , and none can rationally assent or fix their judgment where there is left some doubt or wavering of judgment , and the judgement or assent of faith must be rotional ; it follows that the rule of faith , ( which is the immediate producer and cause of the assent of faith ) ought to be of that nature that it must not onely be plain to the ruder sort , but also contain in it self seeds of perfect evidence to satisfy those learned persons who shall more narrowly examin it : otherwise the best and wisest portion , and as it were the flower of mankind , which guide themselves by perfect reason , could hold nothing or have no faith ; that is the church must onely be made up of ignorant and undiscerning persons ; which would make her little better than a congregation of phanaticks . . especially the church having many adversaries skild in natural sciences , who will not stick to oppose her all they can , and conquer her too , could they take any just advantage against her ; and no greater advantage being possible to be gained or more deadly wound to be given her than to prove her faith uncertain , which is done by showing the ground of it as far as concerns our knowledge , that is the rule and means to come to faith , possible to be false ; for this at once enervates her government ▪ vilifies her sacraments , weakens all the motives to the love of heaven , which she proposes , and by consequence quite enfeebles the vigour of christian life ; or rather , this made manifest , by reason of temptations to the love of creatures perpetually and on all sides besieging us , endangers to extinguish it utterly ; and , lastly , makes christians the most ridiculous people in the world to believe such high mysteries above their reasons upon uncertain grounds : t is manifest therefore that the only safeguard and all the strength of the church and christian religion is placed in the absolute certainty of the rule of faith : t is made therefore and ordained to ascertain faith ; that it , it has in it what is fit for this end ; that is , it is of its own nature absolutely certain ; that is , absolute certainty is found in the nature and notion of the rule of faith ; or , which is all one , is signified or meant by those words thoroughly understood . . and lastly , faith being a virtue mainly conducing to bliss ( as is seen ▪ § . . ) and its influence towards bliss ( which we call its merit ) consisting in this that it makes us submit our understanding to the divine veracity and by that means adhere unwaveringly to such truths as raise us to heaven , so that the divine authority apply'd is the principal cause or motive of this submission , assent or adhesion ; and every cause producing its effect better and stronglier by how much the nearer and closer 't is apply'd , and all the application of it to us consisting in the rule of faith , whose office it is to derive down to us those doctrines christ taught and to assure us that christ said them ; and the application of a thing closely to a judging power being performed by certifying it , which makes it sink into it & become an intimate act of that power , whereas uncertainty can only admit it to swim as it were upon the surface of the soul , much after the manner of a bare proposal or simple apprehension , or at best as a probability , not having weight enough of motive to settle deep into its solid substance which is cognoscitive and so become there a fixt judgement ; it follows that the virtue of faith and its merit are incomparably advantaged by the absolute certainty of the rule of faith and very feeble and inefficacious without it . this rule then must be absolutely-certain of its own nature , that is , the notion of absolutely-certain is involv'd in the rule of faith. . summing up then the full account of our discourse hitherto it amounts to this that out of the genuine meaning of the word rule which as used by us denotes an intellectual rule , & much more out of the meaning of the word faith it is clearly evinced that the rule of faith must have these several conditions ; namely , it must be plain and self-evident as to its existence to all ( § . , , , & . ) & evidenceable as to its ruling power to enquirers even the rude vulgar ( § . . & . ) apt to settle & justify undoubting persons ( § . . ) to satisfy fully the most sceptical dissenters ( § . . ) and rational doubters ( § . . ) and to convince the most obstinate and acute adversaries , ( § . . ) built upon unmoveable grounds , that is certain in it self , ( § . . , . ) and absolutely ascertainable to us ( § . , , , . ) second discourse . showing the two first properties of the rule of faith utterly incompetent to scripture . . having attained so clear a description of the rule of faith and acquaintance with it by particular marks , we may with reason conceive good hopes of knowing it when we meet it : especially , not having a great croud from which we are to single it out , the pretenders to that title being very few ; and , indeed , but two are owned , namely tradition and scripture ; though if we look narrowly into it , the private spirit , private reason , testimonies of fathers , or whatsoever else is held the ascertainer of scriptures sence ought to have a place among the pretenders to be the rule of faith ; since t is those which are thought to give the reliers on them all the security they have of gods sence , that is , of points of faith , and so are or ought to be to them a rule of faith. . but , to speak to them in their own language who say scripture is their rule , we must premise this note , that they cannot mean by scripture the sence of it , that is , the things to be known , for those they confess are the very points of faith , of which the rule of faith is to ascertain us : when they say then that scripture is the rule of faith , they can onely mean by the word scripture , that book not yet senc't or interpreted , but as yet to be senc't ; that is , such and such characters in a book with their aptness to signifie to them assuredly gods mind , or ascertain them of their faith : for , abstracting from the sence or actual signification of those words , there is nothing imaginable left but those characters with their aptness to signifie it . this understood , let us apply now the properties of the rule of faith to scriptures letter , that we may see how they will fit . . and the first thing that occurrs is its existence or an est ; that is , whether those books pretended to be gods word bee indeed scripture , that is , written by men divinely inspired ; of which 't is most manifest the very rudest sort cannot be certain by self-evidence , nor can it be easily evidenceable to those doubters that are the ordinary sort of the vulgar by any skill they are capable of ; nor even to more curious and speculative scarchers but by so deep an inspection into the sence of it as shall discover such secrets that philosophy and human industry could never have arrived to . besides , all the seeming contradictions must be solved ere they can out of the bare nature of the letter conclude the scripture to be of gods enditing , and so worthy to be a rule ; to solve which literally , plainly and satisfactorily , the memories of so many particulars , which made them clearer to those of the age in which they were written and the matter known , must needs be so worn out by tract of time , that t is one of the most difficult tasks in the world. the scriptures letter then is not the rule of faith ( by § , , , , . of our former discourse ) as wanting self-evidence of its existence , easie evidenceableness of its ruling virtue , and power to establish and satisfie at least unlearned doubters . . secondly , were it known that there are some books left written by men divinely inspired , yet it is unknown how many those books ought to be , and which of the many controverted ones may securely be put in that catalogue , which not : which 't is most palpable that either few or at least the rude vulgar and common sort of mankind , ( especially those who are not yet faithful , but looking to come to faith , which is done by knowing the rule of faith ) can never be assured of , either by self-evidence of the things themselves , or by other skills they are already possest of . the scripture's letter then is from this head concluded defective in the forementioned properties necessarily belonging to the rule of faith. . thirdly , were the catalogue of the true books known , yet how is it self-evident or easily evidenceable to the capacities above named ( if to any ) that the very original or a perfectly true copy of these books was preserved indeficiently entire , out of which our translations were made ? can the ruder sort either know this or be assured of the skill of others by which they know it ? the former being manifestly impossible ; the later equally such ; since they have no knowledges in their heads enabling them to judge unerringly of the competency of others skill in such a particular . wherefore , scriptures letter faulters still in the primary , most necessary and essential conditions of a rule of faith. . fourthly , were it evident that the right original or true copy of it is preserved indefective , yet very few , that is , onely those who are perfect in those ancient languages , can arrive to the understanding so much ; the rest , which are in a manner all mankind , must come to the knowledge of it by translations ; and , ere they can think it is fit to be a rule , they must know it is rightly translated ; for which , because they have no skill in those languages themselves , they must rely on the translators skill : concerning whose sufficiency of understanding to be able to translate unerringly right , and honesty of will or true intention to do it , themselves , at least the rudest vulgar , are not qualified enough to jndge assuredly , that they are worthy to be securely relied on . so that we are still at a loss in this pretended rule of faith for our first and fundamental conditions . . fifthly , let us pass by all these defects , and grant it most truly translated to a tittle ( and indeed to a tittle it should be , else an errour may slip in instead of a point of faith , for any thing the bare letter can assure us ) yet the innumerable copiers before printing , and since printers and correcters of the press are still ro be relyed on : and they onely can have evidence of the right letter of scripture , who stood at their elbows attentively watching they should not erre in making it perfectly like a former copy ; and even then why might they not mistrust their own eyes and aptness to oversee ? or , were it granted these men err'd not , nor themselves in overlooking them , yet the same difficulty occurrs concerning the former printer's care if the former copy were printed , or the scriveners if manuscript , which scapes the view of our now-livers , except we will examin them again from impression to impression , or from copy to copy by others more ancient ; and still let us run as high as we will the same difficulty pursues us . to which if we add that the printers , correcters or transcribers might hap to be knaves ; and either be hereticks themselves or brib'd by hereticks , whose manner it being ever to make the letter of the scripture their weapon , they could wish no greater advantage than to have it fram'd commodious to their hand , and so would questionless endeavour it , and history assures us they did . so that we are still at the same or a greater loss in our pretended rule of faith. . lastly , were all this multitude of exceptions pardon●d , still we are as far to seek , unless those who are to be rul'd and guided by the scriptures letter to faith were certain of the true sence of it , which is found out by right interpretation . now the numerous commentators upon it and infinite disputes about the sence of it even in most concerning points , as in that of christ's divinity , beat it out so plain to us that this is not the task of the vulgar ( who yet are capable of salvation , and so of faith , and so of the rule of faith ) that 't is perfect phrenzy to deny it . , it may be alledg'd that some of these defects may be provided against by skill in history . but 't is quickly reply'd , that then none can be secure of their rule of faith , nor consequently have faith , unless skill'd in histories or knowing ●hose men to be so , and withall unbyast , whom ●hey converse with ; nay , without knowing that those men knew certainly the historians whom they rely'd on had secure grounds , and not bare hearsay for what they writ , and that they were not contradicted by others either extant or pe●ish't : now , how few of the unlearned vulgar , ●ay even of the middle sort of prudent men which make up the generality of the world , i may say , of very good scholars , can judge of these points ? and , if they cannot , how then is their faith rational or virtuous and not rather an hair-brain'd opinionative rashness to build their assent , faith and salvation upon principles they can make no judgement of ? . if necessity make some willing to reply what their judgments naturally flowing from their principles would not , that god assists his church , and therefore his providence will take care the contingencies their rule of faith , the scripture's letter , is subject to , shall be avoided ; 't is ask't , how they are certain , in their way , of such an assistance , but by the letter of the scripture ? they must first then prove that certain , ere they mention the church or god's assistance to her ; since this assistance is , in their grounds , founded upon the truth and certainty of that letter . besides , a church is a congregation of the faithful , that is , of such as have faith ; which not being possible to be had without certain means to come unto it , or the rule of faith ; it follows that the first thing that must be clear'd is the certainty of the rule of faith ; antecedently to the notions of faith , faithful or church . . if testimonies out of councils or fathers be alledg'd by them sufficient interpreters of scripture , t is reply'd that if those be needful to make a certain interpretation of scripture , or ( which is all one ) the letter of scripture certainly significative of god●s sence ; then , first , none can be capable of the rule of faith , nor consequently of faith , but those who are read in councils and fathers : nor yet , unless those authorities be held infallible in such an office ; which none but catholiks will say ; for if they can erre in such a performance , how shall we be certain they do not erre in each particular interpretation , without some other guide to establish them and secure us ; which guide must be infallible in such an affair , else the same question and doubt returns concerning it : and , if there be some other infallible guide whose constant direction secures them from erring in every particular interpretation and ascertains us of the same , let them name it , not fathers and councils to interpret scripture by . but the third and most fundamental fault is that a father , as the word is commonly us●d , and now taken by us , signifies not a doctor or learned deducer of consequences by human learning , nor a commentator upon scripture , nor a preacher or homilymaker ( for so every doctor , commentator and preacher would be a father ) but an eminent and knowing witnesser to posterity of the sence and faith of the church which he received : the notion then of church is presupposd to the knowledge of what is meant by the word father , or to the notion of a father . again , a council signifies a representative of the church , whence , 't is relative to what it represents , and so its meaning cannot be known unless that others to which it relates be first understood ; nor can it be a true and right council unless what it represents be a true church . both council therefore and father presuppose the notion of church ; church presupposes the notion of faithful ; faithful the notion of faith ; faith , of the rule of faith ; 't is most evident then that , in the way of generating faith , the knowledge of the rule of faith is antecedent to the knowledge of all these ; and so none of these cau help one , who discourses orderly and rationally , to the knowledge of the rule of faith , unless accidentally ; as it may happen a father may be a doctor or great schollar ; and so by a rational discours opening the meanings of the words ( or , which is all one , the notion or nature of the things ) give us insight to know what it is which has the properties of such a rule . in vain therefore do they strive to piece out the sufficiency of scripture's letter to be the rule of faith by those helps ; since the being of that rule is presuppos'd entire in it self before their existence , and indeed is that which gives them all the being they have . . some may reply that fundamentals are clear in scripture . but , first , a certain catalogue of fundamentals was never given and agreed to by sufficient authority ; and yet without this all goes to wrack ; since the neglecting or not-knowing which be fundamental hazards to ruine all : for the discourse grows ticklish when we talk of fundamentals ; this very word importing that any one left out or mistaken overthrows the whole end of faith to those which miscarry in it . secondly , is it a fundamental that christ is god ? if so , i ask whether this be clearer in scripture than that god has hands , feet , nostrils and passions like ours ? seeing then the appearing clearness of the scripture's letter in this later point is certain to lead vulgar heads into exceeding great errours , and that heresies are as seemingly clear in the outward face of it as fundamental truths , how mistaken a principle do they relie upon for the main hinge of their salvation , who say that fundamentals are so clear in scripture's letter to every capacity . third discourse . that the three next properties of the rule of faith are utterly incompetent to scripture . . thus much to show that the letter of scripture wants the two first and most fundamental conditions of a rule of faith ; being neither evident as to it 's existence to all , nor evidenceable as to its ruling power to unlearned enquirers . let us proceed to the third property , namely , its aptness to settle and justify those unlearned persons who rely undoubtingly upon it , such as are the meaner sort of the vulgar , who take things by course as they fall , in a natural kind of way without reflecting upon them and their reasons . . since then no man or rational creature can be justifiable either for assent or practice but by proceeding upon some principles , and such as , to his best judgment , he takes to be true ones and those principles can be but of two sorts viz. either inbred in him by the ordinary light of nature , call'd common sence , or got by some reflexion ; and that the persons we speak of are such as proceed undoubtingly , that is , without occasion to reflect ; 't is left that what can justify them must be principles of common sence . seeing then 't is both against all principles of common sence to judge that themselves have any self-assurance of the scripture's letter , knowing themselves utterly ignorant when 't was writ , by whom , how brought down , &c. and equally senceless to believe a multitude which sayes it may possibly erre in what it tells them , it follows that they are left unjustify●d , nay condemn'd by common sence in absolutely believing such a rule ; that is , condemn'd by the best judgments they are masters and capable of . this , i say , follows in case this multitude be truly dealt with , and that the teachers give them a sincere account of their own tenet . nay , should these men say they cannot erre in such a matter , by reason of their great schollership , as skill in history , languages , reading of fathers , councils , and such like , yet even then they could not afford them credit to such a degree as to build their hopes of salvation on their word , in regard those learned mens profession is not of plain sensations by their eyes and ears which the vulgars experience capacitates them to judge of , but of such high skills as unlearned men know not what to make of , and even understand not what the very words which express them mean. the best then they can do is to hope that perhaps those men may have some such strange skill , in the same manner as they trust to other tradesmen and artist●s they have heard well of or seen some of their work ; or rather not near so much ; seeing their senses give them a far better knowledge of these handycraftsmen's skill by the effects and their fitness for the use intended , than their uncultivated reason can give them of the goodness of christian doctrin and its proportion to bliss . but the main is , when they shall hear and see many several professions all pretending to scripture , yet all differ , damn and condemn one another , perhaps persecute one another and fight about religion , and themselves unable to judge which is most to be trusted ; what can common sense dictate to them but an inextricable blunder , and onely clear to them thus much that that can never be the way which many follow and yet many must needs be misled : their most vulgar reason easily telling them that there can be but one truth , that is , that all the other professors to follow scripture do notwithstanding believe and speak false . now these honest scholars of plain down right nature , & that of her lowest form too , being unable to judge which truly follow the scripture's letter ; and onely capable to know they all profess it with words and actions expressing the greatest seriousness in the world ; are to think that all equally mean to follow it to their power . whence , their common reason will tell them ( though they cannot express it in our terms , or defend it ) that meerly for want of light , that is evidence in the directive power of that rule , they all but one party ( and perhaps that too as well as the rest ) go most miserably astray . this third property then of the rule of faith , namely , to justify the undoubting vulgar , is wanting to scriptures letter . . there follows the fourth property of the rule of faith , which is that it must be able of its own nature to satisfy the most sceptical dissenters and rational doubters that the doctrin it holds forth came from christ. to make a true conceit of what may be judg'd sufficient for this end , let us reflect on the nature and temper of such dissenters and doubters , and we shall quickly discover that they are men given to stir their thoughts by much reflexion and to call them to a strict account ere they yield them over to assent : wherefore , if we suppose them true to their own thoughts and not to betray the light of their reason to some passion ( in which case their faith it self were in them a vice ) we cannot imagin that any thing under demonstration can bind and restrain those active and volatil souls from fluttering still in objections and hovering in doubts when their eternal good is concern'd : especially , when an authority is about scanning , upon whose word they are bound , after they have approv'd it , to believe unconcievable and unheard of things , above the reach of human reason & apprehension . let now any man go about to demonstrate to those great wits these points , that the scripture's letter was writ by men divinely inspir'd , that there is never a real one however there may be many seeming contradictions in it , and this to be shown out of the very letter it self ; that just this catalogue or number of books is enough for the rule of faith , and no one necessary that was lost , none be abated ; or , if so , how many ; that the originals out of which the translations were made , were entire and uncorrupted ; that the first translations were skilfully & rightly made , and afterwards deriv'd down sincere , notwithstanding the errableness of thousands of transcribers , printers , correcters , &c. and the malice of antient hereticks and jews who had it in their hands : and , lastly , that this , and this onely is the true sence of it ; to which is requisite great skill in languages to understand the meaning of words ; in grammar , to know what meaning they should generally beat according to its rules as thus construed or put together ; criticism , to know what a word doe most commonly or may possibly signify by rules 〈◊〉 nicer etymologies or acception of authours ancient or modern , by dialects of several countries , &c. history , to make known the true scope of the authour , the best interpreter of his meaning ; logick , to draw consequence● aright , and so find out the thread of the discourse , to avoid equivocation in words , by discovering which are to be taken properly , which metaphorically ; and , to apply this right , fome skill in the things themselves , that is , in nature and metaphysicks , especially that which treats of the nature of spirits , as the soul , angels , god and his attributes ; but especially in divinity both speculative and moral ; which ( by the way ) supposes faith and comes after it , and so cannot be presuppos'd to the rule of faith which precedes it . let any man , i say , go about to demonstrate all these difficult points ro those acute men and will they not smile at his endeavors ? since most of them that concern the truth of the letter are such that we want principles to go about to evidence them ; and the rest so obscure that a searching and sincere wit would still find something to reply to rationally , or at least maintain his ground of suspence with a might it not be otherwise ? and , were some one or two of these points demonstrable , yet who sees not it is a task of so long study that a great part of a man's life would be spent in a wea●isome and hopeless endeavour to come to faith by this tedious method ; which would both dis-invite to a pursuit ; and even a diligent man may in likelihood die ere he could rationally embrace any faith at all . faith then being intended for a man to lead his life by , 't is necessary it's rule and the means to come to it should be easily victorious , by reason of it's certainty and evidence , over the shock of doubts or the assaults of intellectual fears . in which the scripture's letter being defective , 't is plain that 't is far from the nature of a rule of faith. . the same discourse holds to prove that the scripture's letter is not convictive of the most obstinate and acute adversaries , which is the fifth property of the rule of faith. yet , to apprehend this more lively , let us imagin it apply'd to practice , and that some text of scripture were quoted to convince a deist in some point . he asks how you are certain that book is god's word ? you alledge the excellencies of it ; which indeed are such that eyes already enlighten'd by true faith may discern something in it above nature , and cry , digitus d●i est hîc , though not his dim sight : he answers that many parts of it are indeed very excellently good , but that the devil can transform himself into an angel of light. on the other side he requites your excellencies with many strange absurdities and heresies even by your own confession in the open letter as it lies , and most unworthy god ; as that he has hands feet and passions like ours according to which he is variable . he finds you direct text against acknowledg'd science in divers particulars , and reckons up a multitude of contradictions to his judgment . you answer that those places are understood according to human apprehension , and are indeed incompetent to god , but that there are mystical and spiritual meanings couch't in those sacred oracles , which with the help of history would reconcile those seeming contradictions . he cries , you quite abandon your pretended rule , that since you confess heresies are in the open letter taken as it lies , you must have some knowledge in your head concerning god which makes you decline the sence of the words as they lie and run to gloss them ; and demands whence you came by those tenets which oblige you to correct the plain letter ; challenging your thoughts and carriage as witnesses that that which imbu'd you antecedently with those contrary tenets , not the scripture's letter , was your true rule of faith ; in regard you frame it according to the interest of those foreheld tenets . he pressingly therefore demands whence you had those tenets or points of faith by which you guide your self in adhering or not adhering to the scripture's letter as it lies ? . if you say , from other places of scripture controlling plainly the others ; he replies , this can onely make you acknowledge scripture's letter plainly contradicts it self , and so leaves you doubtful which side to hold , as far as the bare letter carries you ; or , if it invites you to any thing , 't is to hold both sides of the contradiction . what therefore he still demands is , what it is which forelaid those judgements in you by which you were byast beyond the power of the letters indifferency to hold one side rather than ●he other ? here you are at a loss with your ●retence of the letter's authority , being gone beyond it . if then you recurr to reason and science , teaching you that god is immutable , a spirit , &c. he straight replies , then that science taught you that point whether scripture had been or no. it therefore was your rule in this , ( and the same may be said of what-ever you avail your self to interpret scriptute by ) not the letter . if you say you rely on the science or skill of your parents , forefathers , and pastours , then their skill which ascertaind them of gods sence ( not scripture's letter ) was their rule , and so is likewise yours ; for whoever relies on any precisely as skilful , relies in very deed and properly on their skill , and not on the letter their skill works upon . besides , oue not skilful himself , is a bad judge how far anothers skill extends . if you say you rely not on their skill , ( fallible perhaps in them , and obscure to you ) but on their senses enabling them to be knowing witnesses of what was delivered them , and free from the former exceptions , you are driven for your last refuge to tradition , and still desert your letter-rule . in a word , he challenges the consciousness of your most inward thoughts , whether ( however in controversies against others you quote scripture , yet ) in reading the letter for your own faith , you bring not along with you some thoughts to interpret it by , which you are resolved to hold to ; and so the scriptures letter lies before you as matter to work on , so as to preserve it significative of what you judge sound , and not to frame your judgements by ; that is , you use it as a thing ruled , not as a bule . nay more , if you look narrowly into the bottome of those thoughts , you shall discover the natural method of tradition to have at unawares setled your judgements concerning faith , and actually guiding you in the interpretation , however when your other concerns awake design in you , you protest against it , and seem perhaps to your unreflecting self to embrace and hold to the meer guidance of the letter . . again , waving the insufficiency of the scriptures letter to declare its own sence , he asks this smart question , how you are certain of the truth of the letter in this very text ; and demands your certain proof or demonstration either either for the thing , or for the certainty of the authority upon which you hold that any particular text you alledge is truly a part of the scriptures letter , and not foisted in , or some way altered in its significativeness : or , how you know by the diligence of the letter-examiners , if it be a negative proposition , that the particle not was not inserted ; if affirmative , not left out . you alledge consent of all our copies : he replies , first , that this onely argues that those ancient copies whence ours came were alike ( perhaps not so much ) but who knows or can undertake that they were not alike faulty , or alike unlike the true original ? or , that there were not some in those dayes which never came to our knowledge , different from ours in the very point between us ? in a word , that all depends on the truth of the copies immediately taken from the original , or the very next to them ; which , what they were , by whom taken , where and how preserved from time to time , how narrowly examined when they were first transcribed , and such like , is so buried in obscurity and oblivion , and so far from evidence apt to beget certain knowledge , that we must have recourse to charity to allow it our hopes , had we no other rule of faith than that bare letter . again , though human diligence did play its part , yet it is acknowledg'd ( sayes your deist ) that there are almost innumerable variae lectiones in it still controverted ; nay so many in the new testament alone observed by one man ( my lord vsher ) that he durst not print them for fear of bringing the whole book into doubt ; and , why may not there have been such formerly and now blindly determined and swallowed in each text that concerns our mainest points of faith. if you reply ( as nature will lead you ) that the faith of christ believed and taught from father to son was writ in the hearts of the faithful ; and this made them both able and willing to ( that is , actually did ) preserve the letter from errour in any passage that concerned the body of christian doctrine ; he challenges you to fly your colours , to desert your own rule , and embrace tradition , the rule of roman-catholikes ; and lastly , that you make scriptures letter the thing ruled , not the rule : yet without this recourse , no satisfactory account can possibly be render'd to a strict examiner why errour might not creep into the text in substantial points of faith as well as in less concerning passages : which devolves to this , that the scripture's letter held forth as a rule of faith can never convince an obstinate and acute adversary . fourth discourse , that the two last properties of the rule of faith are clearly incompetent to scripture . . there remain the two last conditions ; certainty in its self , and ascertainableness to us . that the later is incompetent to scripture alone or unassisted by another certain rule , that is , incompetent to it as a rule , however it may agree to it as a thing regulated or ruled , is the subject in a manner of all our foregoing discourse ; and it so depends upon the former property of the two last named , certainty in it self , that if it fails , that later is impossible . now , as for its certainty in its self or its being establish't on secure grounds , we may consider scripture's letter either materially as such and such characters , or formally as significative of a determinate sence suppos'd to be christ's ; and both of these either in its single self , or as dependent on other helps or causes on foot now in the world according to the course of things . . and , as for the meer material characters in books , 't is evident that they are of themselves as liable to be destroy'd as any thing else in nature , as burnt , torn , blotted , worn out , &c. which though it seems a remote and impertinent exception , yet to one who considers the wise dispositions of divine providence it will deserve a deep consideration . for , seeing the salvation of mankind is the end of god's making nature , the means to it should be more settled , strong and unalterable than any other piece of nature whatever ; putting then scripture's letter to be this rule , and that all its significativeness of god's sence , that is all its virtue of a rule , is lost if the material characters , its basis , be destroy'd or alter'd ; who sees not a very disorderly proceeding in laying so weak means in such immediateness to so main an end ; and concludes not thence that faith's rule ought in right reason have a better basis than such perishable and alterable elements ? . reflecting next on those material characters in complexion with the causes actually laid in the world to preserve them entire , we shall find that either those causes are material , and then themselves are also liable to continual alterations and innumerable contingencies ; or spiritual , that is , men's minds . now , these being the noblest pieces in nature , and freed in part from physical mutability by their immateriality , we may with good reason hope for a greater degree of constancy from them than from any other ; and indeed , for a perfect unalterableness from their nature , and ( this being to conceive truth ) an inerrableness , if due circumstances be observ'd ; that is , if due proposals be made to beget certain knowledge , and due care us'd to attend to such proposals : otherwise their very createdness and finitness entitle them to defectibility , besides their obnoxiousness to mutation and perpetual alteration through the alloy of their material compart . i call it due proposal when it must necessarily affect the sense , and so beget natural knowledge ; or when unequivocal terms are so immediately and orderly laid , that the conclusion must as necessarily be seen in the premises as that the same thing cannot both be and not-be at once , by a mind inur'd to reflexion and speculation ; and i call that due care , which preserves the soul in such temper as permits the objects impression to be heeded and the mind to be affected by it . . this premised we may reflect that the rule of faith as was provd ( disc. . § . , , , . ) must be obvious to men of ordinary sence , and not onely to speculators ; as also , that objects of the senses may be of two sorts ; of the the first are things in nature , or else simple vulgar actions and plain matters of fact ; which , if oft repeated and familiariz'd , are unmistakable ; and consequently the perceiver inerrable in such a matter ; of the second are such actions as are compounded and made up of an innumerable multitude of several particularities to be observed , every of which may be mistaken apart , each being a distinct little action in its single self ; such as is the transcribing a whole book , consisting of such myriads of words , single letters , and tittles , or stops , and the several actions of writing over each of these so short and cursory , that it prevents diligence and exceeds human care to keep awake and apply distinct attentions to every of these distinct actions . and yet , to do our opposers right , i doubt not but each of these failings may possibly be provided against by oft-repeated corrections of many sedulous and sober examiners set apart for that business , and that the truth of the letter of an whole book might to a very great degree , if not altogether be ascertain'd to us , were the examiners of each copy known to be very numerous , prudent and honest , and each of them testifying his single examination of it word by word ; for then the difficulty , consisting in the multiplicity and the variety , is provided against by the multitude of the preserving causes ; and their multifariousness made convictive to us by their well-testify'd consent . . to apply this discourse to the matter in hand . if we were certain there had been anciently a multitude of examiners of the scripture's letter in each copy taken from the first original or the next copies from these and so forwards , with the exact care we have defin'd , the single examinations of each and the amendment of the copy according to their examinations convincingly testify'd , and that by excommunication or heavy ecclesiastical prohibitions and mulcts it had been provided for from the beginning that none should presume to take a copy of it , and that copy be permitted to be read or seen till it were thus examined ; much might have been said for the certainty of the scripture's letter upon these men's principles : but , if no such orders or exactness was ever heard of , especially of the new testament upon the truth of whose letter they build christian faith ; if the multitudes of letters , commaes , blottings or illegibleness of the originals , like-appearance of letters and even whole words in in the book , like-sounding in the ear or fancy of the transcriber , possibility of misplacing , omitting , inserting , &c. did administer very fruitful occasions to human over●ight ; if , the more copies were taken , the more the errours were like to grow , and the farther from correcting ; if experience testifies no such exact diligence has been formerly us'd , by the diverse readings of several copies now extant , and thousands of corrections which have lately been made of the vulgar edition , the most universally currant perhaps of any other ; what can we say but that ( for any thing these principles afford ) scriptures letter may be uncertain in every tittle , not withstanding the diligence which has de facto been used to preserve it uncorrupted in the way of those who hold it the onely rule of faith ? in their way , i say , who will not have the sence of christ's doctrine writ in christians hearts the rule for the correcters of the letter to guide themselves by , but the meer letter of a forme● ( and god knows , controvertible ) copy , out of which the transcription and by which onely the examination is made . what certainty accrues to scripture's letter by the means of tradition , or the living voice of the present church in each age , is the subject of another enquiry . . now , as for the certainty of the scripture's significativeness , which is the other branch , nothing is more evident than that this is quite lost to all in the uncertainty of the letter ; and 〈◊〉 evident that 't is unattainable by the vulgar , that is the better half of mankind , since they are unfurnisht of those arts and skills , as languages , grammar , logick , history , metaphysicks , divinity &c. requisit to establish and render certain the sence they conceive the letter ought to bear ; without which they can never make such an interpretation of it but an acute scholler skill'd in those means will be able to blunder theirs , and make a seeming clearer one of his own . in a word , if we see eminent wits of the protestants and the socinians , making use of the self-same , and , as they conceive , the best advantages the letter gives them , as comparing places and such like , and availing themselves the best they can by acquir'd skills , yet differ in so main points as those of the b. trinity and christ's divinity ; what certainty can we undertakingly promise to weaker heads , that is , to the generality of mankind , less able to make such fit allusions of places to one another ; incapable of such means as should help them , which the other had and are very pertinent and proper to work upon the letter ; and , lastly , who are , for want of those , unfurnish't of any steady principles to settle their judgements and rationally determin their own interpretation certain . scripture's letter therefore is not certain in it's self , that is , has no immovably secure grounds enabling it to perform the office of the rule of faith , or to guide mankind in their way to faith with a rational assuredness . our conclusion then is this , that scripture's letter wants all the forementioned properties belonging to the rule of faith . . lest any should misconstrue my former discourse , i declare here once more that , in a great part of it , i argue ad hominem ; that is , i manifest what must follow out of the principles of those who hold the scripture's letter the rule of faith , not out of my own or catholick ones . i declare likewise that i with all reverence acknowledge such excellencies in those sacred oracles as would task the tongues both of men and angels to lay them forth . i onely contest that the scripture's letter is most improper and never intended for the rule of faith ; as is easy to be evinc't against an unobstinate adversary by this , that 't is known the apostles and their successors went not with books in their hands to preach and deliver christ's doctrin , but words in their mouths ; and that primitive antiquity learn't their faith by another method a long time before many of those books were universally spread amongst the vulgar , much less the catalogue collected and acknowledg'd ; till the revolters from that method and rule , being manifestly convinc't of novelty by it , were for●t to invent some other , and chose this of the scripture's letter for most plausible , as being held very sacred : untill , by straining it to an undue use , and , to please the people , putting it without any distinction of the person , into their hands , and leaving it to their interpretation , they have brought it ( as 't is made use of for a rule of faith ) to the vilest degree of contempt ; every silly upstart heresy fathering it self upon it. of which no nation in the world is so evident an instance as our miserable country , distracted into so many sects ( all issuing from that principle , ) so impossible to be brought under ecclesiastical government ( and even with much ado under temporal ) that 't is wonderful such proper effects , especially so sensible , burthensome , so universally spred , and so continual , should not long ago have abundantly demonstrated their proper cause , and oblig'd them to renounce that principle which is the necessary parent of such ruinous and unredressable disorders fifth discourse . showing the notion of tradition , and that all the properties of the rule of faith do clearly agree to it. . having then quite lost our labour in our last search , let us see whether we shall have better success in this second enquiry ; which is , whether we may hope to find the properties of the rule of faith meet in that which we call or all or practical tradition . by which we mean a delivery down from hand to hand ( by words , and a constant course of frequent and visible actions conformable to those words ) of the sence and faith of forefathers . . but , to make a more express conceit of tradition , that so we may more perfectly understand the nature of that which we treat of let us first soberly reflect on the manner how children learn their own and others names with whom they live , as also of the rooms and thing● they converse with ; afterwards , growing up , to exercise their trades , to write , read , or use civil or legal carriage to every one in their kinds● and , looking into the thing we shall observe that they first glean'd notions of those several objects , either meerly through impressions on their senses by the thing it self alone , or by the help of having them pointed at , or something practic'● about them at the same time they were nam'd● and afterwards learnt to repeat the same word after others , more and more intelligently by degrees , and to practice the same actions ; till a● length the former generation of teachers decaying by the course of nature , a new one i● sprung up to perfection , furnish't with all the accomplishments of the former , and continuing the same natural and civil knowledges , action● and conveniences to this age which the forme● enjoy'd ; and so forwards to succeeding generations by a natural kind of method , without needing books or new skills meerly to perform this effect of continuing and preserving the former age , as it were , alive in this . add now to this that this continuation goes not by long leaps from age to age , or from twenty years to twenty , but from year to year , nay moneth to moneth , & even less ; according as the new off-spring grows up by degrees to a capacity of understanding and practicing ; and then reflect on this whole course , and we shall see the true nature of tradition or immediate delivery , as exercis'd in civil matters and human conveniences . . we want nothing now but to apply this self-same method to spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs , and to reflect how it brings down faith by doctrin couch't in words and exprest in conformable practices ; and then we shall have gain'd a compleat and proper notion of faith-tradition , which is the tradition we speak of . . we may observe then that the children of christians first hear the sounds , afterwards by degrees get dim notions of god , christ , saviour , heaven , hell , virtue , vice , and such like ; and , according as their capacity increases , are put on to practice what they have heard , and made to do some external actions by precept and example ; which actions by their more particularizing nature ripen to a more express and familiar conceit those raw apprehensions or judgments which while they stood under bare words look't as if they hover'd in the ayr , and afar off . they are deterr'd from sins , first from lying and disobeying their parents , afterwards others , by reproaches and punishments and encourag'd to virtuous actions by rewards such as their age bears , to breed in them a conceit of the badness of sin and goodness of virtue : they are shown how to say grace , say their prayers , and made do it when they are able ; and to gain them some abstracted conceit of those actions , they are inur'd even while very infants by certain carriages unusual at other times , as holding up their hands or perhaps eyes , kneeling , keeping silence and other sober postures , to look upon such actions as extraordinary ones , when as yet they know no more of them ; which breeds a certain awe in them before-hand , preparing their minds to more reverence for the future . afterwards , growing up , they come acquainted with the creed , the ten commandments , the sacraments , some common forms of prayer and other practices of christianity , and are directed to order their lives accordingly ; the actions or carriage of the circumstant church and elder faithful guiding the younger ( notwithstanding the difficulty of the yet-undigested metaphor , in which dialect faith is delivered ) to frame their lives to several sorts of virtues by the doctrine deliver'd in words ; as faith , hope , charity , prayer , adoration , &c. and the concomitant or subservient virtues to these ; and the more intelligent , whose understandings are clear'd by study and the circumstance of conversing with the learneder sort of fore-fathers , to do out of knowledge and reflexion , what others do ( as it were ) naturally , and by meer belief or guidance of others . and this goes on by insensible degrees , till at last the teachers die , and leave in their room a new swarm of the same nature with themselves as to christian life ; that is , practising the same external actions which determin to a certain degree the sence of the words they have been inur'd to ; and ( since the practice of those actions was instill'd from their infancy , and serious ) holding consequently the principles of those actions ; that is , the same points of faith with the former age. and this goes on not by leaps from an hundred years to an hundred , or from twenty to twenty , but by half-years to half-years , nay moneths to moneths , and even less ; according as the young brood of eaglets , made to see the sun in his full glory , grow up to a capacity of having their tender eyes acquainted first with the dawning , afterwards with the common day-light of christian doctrin . . if any should be so dull as to think this looks like a speculation onely , and not to see plainly that 't is confirm'd by ten thousand experements every day ; i desire them to consider how the primitive faithful were inur'd to christianity ere the books of scripture were writ or communicated ; or how themselves ( though protestants or presbyterians ) were first imbu'd with christian principles ere they could read , and they shall finde it was meerly by this way of tradition : nay more , i dare affirm that the very presbyterians , much more the protestants , still adhere to their faith , because their parents & pastors taught them it when they were young , and not upon the evidence of scripture's letter to their own private judgement : which is manifest by this , that those who are brought up under mr. baxter are apt to follow him , others mr. pierce , and all in general hold fixedly to the doctrin of others , especially if their parents be of the same persuasion . so hard it is to beat down nature by designe , or not to follow tradition in practice , though at the same time they write and talk never so vehemently and loud against it . nay 't is easie to remark that those who were brought up protestants , while they follow'd their teachers and forefathers in the traditionary way , continu'd firmly such ; and that none declin'd from that profession until they began to use their own private judgments in interpreting scripture ; and that then they ran by whole shoals into innumerable other sects . however then they exclaim against tradition , yet 't is evident they owe to it all the union and strength they have , and to the renouncing it all their distractions and weakness . . what is said hitherto , is onely to explain the nature of tradition perfectly , and to settle a right conceit of it : which done , many objections will be render'd unnecessary either to be answerd or mention'd , as those that proceed against a kind of prophetical afflatus , which can have no force against our way , building upon perfect evidence of our best senses : but especially those which take so wrong an aym , that they dispute against res traditae , or the things deliver'd , instead of tradition it self , and thereupon accuse us for holding human traditions , or things invented by men for faith. whereas , when we speak of the rule of faith , we mean by the word tradition onely the method of publickly delivering and conveying down tenets , held to have come from christ , in the manner before declared . this note premised to avoid mistake and keep the reader 's mind more steady to the matter in hand , let us see now whether tradition have in it the nature of a rule of faith ; which is done by examining whether the fore-named properties belong to it or no. . and first , 't is already manifest from what is said , that the first property of the rule of faith , namely , that it must be evident to all as to its existence , absolutely agrees with tradition . for , tradition being the open conveyance down of practical doctrines by our best senses of discipline , that is , our eyes and ears ; and this by sounds daily heard and actions daily seen and even felt ; 't is as easily appliable to all sorts , or evident to them as to its existence , as it is to see and hear : so that it can be insinuated into or affect not onely the rudest vulgar and little . children , but in some degree even very babes , as was shown . . the second condition , which is that its ruling power should be easily evidenceable to any enquirer is thus shown to agree to tradition , let the rudest doubter come and desire to be certify'd that tradition is a rule able if follow'd , to convey down christ's doctrin to our very daies ; or to the world's end , and let these plain interrogatories be put to him . suppose all protestants in england were settled in an unanimous profession of their faith , and that their children without looking farther should believe and practice as their fathers had brought them up , would it not follow in self-evident terms that those children while they followed this method would be protestants too ? suppose these , now grown men under those parents , should have children too of their own who should behave themselves in the same manner towards their fathers by believing and practising as they taught them , without looking any farther , would it not be equally evident they would still be protestants also ? since to believe and practice thus is to be a protestant ; and , would not this method if followed carry on that doctrin still forwards from generation to generation to the very end of the world ? 't is then most easily evidenceable to the rudest capacity that this immediate delivery of tradition , as above explicated , is a certain way of deriving down christs doctrin while the world shall last . this property therefore of the rule of faith is found evidently to agree to tradition . . the third condition , which is that the rule of faith must be apt to justify unreflecting and unredoubting persons that they proceed rationally while they rely on it , is found most exactly in tradition . for the common course of human conversation makes it a madness not to believe great multitudes of knowers , if no possible consideration can awaken in our reason a doubt that they conspire to deceive us . now in the way of tradition all deliverers or immediate forefathers are knowers , as appears in those who immediately heard the apostles ; all the knowledge requisit being of what they were taught , and practic 't accordingly all their lives ; of which 't is impossible the rudest person should be ignorant , who ever had any effect of such a teaching wrought upon him . nor can any , unless their brains rove wildly or be unsettled even to the degree of madness , suspect deceit where such multitudes unanimously agree in a matter of fact , look seriously when they speak , act themselves and practice accordingly , and show in the whole course of their carriage that they hope to be sav'd themselves , and to save others whom they thus instruct , by relying on this truth that their forefathers thus taught them ; which amounts to this , that nature or common reason at unawares steals into them a solid apprehension that tradition is of a certain kind of nature ; and so , that , while fathers thus taught children , it was ever such , that is , that tradition is a certain rule of conveying down faith , which is all we study to evince at present . i may add that , nature telling them by their own experiences , that parents generally would be apt to teach their children what themselves had been taught and believ'd to be good , and true , & needfull to their eternal salvation , their natural thoughts would lead them by a downright procedure , to judge that tradition was ever in some considerable body of deliverers who stuck to it and own'd it ; and that those had true faith , or truly that doctrin which christ and the first planters of christianity taught . but of this point more hereafter . . if it be objected that this multitude of plain honest-meaning souls are as much justify'd for believing scripture . i answer , that if you mean their faith conceiv'd to be found in scripture , or a determinate sence of scripture's letter , it cannot with any show of reason be pretended that they are as much justifiable for believing any , setting aside tradition's help ; for , without this it totally depends on the inward judgments , fancies or skills of men which they are unqualify'd to judge of ; not on open verdict of senses , to wield the certainty or uncertainty of which lies clearly within the reach of their common reason . and as for scripture's letter they cannot possibly be justify'd in reason for believing even the substantial truth of it without tradition's assisting hand and preserving care . and the reason is the same ; because the common course of human experience tells them that judgments or opinions often disagree , but their plain sensations ( especially if frequently repeated ) never ; whence a jury of the plainest high-shoes would , upon the evidence of the sight of six witnesses , without more ado condemn a malefactor ; but not upon the judgments of a thousand men , if a testimony grounded on sense were not brought . now take away tradition and all ground from certain sence fails us , either for the meaning or even letter of scripture ; and all is left to men's judgments built on latent skills or fancy , or at least on sense liable to great and numerous mistakes , as hath been shown , ( disc. . § . . ) again , seeing every one apprehends the most vulgar have reason enough to believe there was such a one as k. iames and q. elizabeth , of which they are no otherwise ascertain'd but by tradition ; why are not they as much or more justify'd for believing points of faith received down by the same tenour ? whereas if you go about to pump their common reason about the authority of the statute-book or the truth of its letter , you shall find them blunder and at a ●oss , being pos'd beyond their sphere of 〈◊〉 nature by a question entrenching upon skill , to which they can never answer with a steady assuredness inwardly ; and , if they do so outwardly , 't is manifest that some passion and not their reason breeds that irrational profession . the third condition then of the rule of faith , which was to be apt to settle and justify unreflecting and undoubting vulgar , is manifestly found agreeing to tradition . . i put next the th . condition , because the proof of it evidently proves the fourth , fifth and seventh ; for , what is built on immovable grounds or certain in its self , has in it wherewith to settle and satisfy the most piercing wit● convince the most obstinate adversaries , and to ascertain us absolutely . to prove that tradition has certain and infallible grounds it may suffi●● to note , that , ( disc. . § . , , . ) it being evidently proved faith must be infallible to us , an● no less evident that it cannot be such without having infallibly-c●●tain grounds , ( since nothin● can be firmer to us than the ground it stands on now the rule of faith is its ground ; it follow evidently that this must likewise be infallib●● certain . there being then onely two ground or rules of faith owned ; namely , deliver of it down by writing , and by words an● practice , which we call oral and practical tradition , 't is left unavoydably , out of the imposibility that scripture should be infallible as rule , that tradition must be such . . though this conclusion , supposing th● truth of the propositions i assume as alread● prov'd , be sufficiently consequent to those adversaries against whom i contest at present th● certainty of tradition , in regard they do 〈◊〉 stick to grant that either scripture or tradition must be the rule of faith ; yet i foresee more will be expected from a pretender to demonstrate its certainty , and that he should frame his discourse from intrinsecal mediums . reflecting then on the nature of tradition as before explicated , we shall observe that it hath for its basis the best nature in the universe , that is , man's , the flower and end of all the rest ; and this , not according to his moral part , defectible by reason of original corruption ; nor yet his intellectuals , darkly groping in the pursuit of science by reflected thoughts or speculation , amidst the misty vapours exhal'd by his passion predominant over his rational will ; but according to those faculties in him perfectly and necessarily subject to the operations and stroaks of nature ; that is , his eyes , ears , handling , and the direct impressions of knowledge , as naturally and necessarily issuing from the affecting those senses , as it is to feel he●● , cold , pain , pleasure , or any other material quality . again , those impressions upon the sense are not made once but frequently ; and , in most , many times every day . moreover , to make these more express and apt to be taken notice of , their lives are to be fram'd by the precepts they hear and conformable examples they see ; so that faith ( i mean the substance of it , or that solid plain knowledge as far as 't is apt to cause downright christian 〈◊〉 ) comes clad in such plain matters of fact that the most stupid man living cannot possibly be ignorant of it . compare next the certainty each christian forefather has of what he has practic 't all his life with that which a sworn witness in a court has of what he saw or heard but once ; which done , multiply these thus-qualify'd witnesses till you equal the vast total of christianity , and then invent what force in nature's universe is comparable to this inerrability of tradition . and , if clear reason evinces to you that 't is far more possible to make a man not be than not to know what is rivetted into his soul by so-oft-repeated sensations ; nay if it exceed all the power of nature ( abstracting from the cases of madness and violent disease ) to blot knowledges thus fixt out of the soul of one single believer ; then 't is as clearly evinc't that sooner may all mankind perish than the regulative virtue of tradition miscarry : nay , sooner may the sinows of entire nature by overstraining crack , and she lose all her activity and motion , that is , her self , than one single part of that innumerable multitude which integrate that vast testification we call tradition can possibly be violated . the virtue then , by which tradition regulates her followers to bring down faith unerringly , is grounded on a far stronger basis than all material nature ; that is , on such a one as was fitting for supream wisdom to lay for faith , being so neer and necessary a means to bring mankind to his beatitude , which was the end of all this corporeal architecture . its followers , i say ; for i onely contest in this present part of my discourse that tradition , if follow'd , is of such a nature : whether it was alwayes thus follow'd or no belongs to another enquiry . . nor must i neglect the reminding in this place what was produc●t before ( § . . ) to show the evidenceableness of tradition's ruling power to the rudest enquirers ; it being as evident that while the next age believes and practices as the former age held and practic 't ( that is , while the rule of tradition is follow'd ) those of the later age are still of the same faith with the former , as it is that to believe the same is to believe the same . onely i am forbidden by my reason and logick to call this a proof or argument , because 't is of the nature of that first principle idem est idem sibijpsi , and onely an instance or particular of it , as these propositions are , a stone is a stone , a man is a man ; in which the two terms are as neerly laid and as fast connected as perfect identity can ciment them ; that is , so close that no medium can come between to make them capable of being argud or prov'd ; that is , 't is self-evident : and so i had no more to do but by opening the terms to explicate the proposition ; which done it was evident beyond proof . . let now the most rational doubter or most sceptical dissenter muster all the caprichoes of fancy invention can suggest , and the subtlest quirks ingeniously misus'd logick and abus'd-into-sophistry can furnish them with ; let the most obstinate and acute adversaries of faith whet their wits to that degree of sharpness as to be able to penetrate with nice distinctions between the sides of two notions , if in the least disagreeing , ( that is , onely metaphysically divisible , ) and lay open their difference ; what can they say in this case ? if they will argue against tradition , it must be out of some knowledges ; but knowledge is taken from things , and the best thing in this universe , to wit , man's nature in what he is unalterable , is engag'd for the certainty of tradition . but indeed , their proper task will be to find a solution for ; or to loose those two notions which perfect identity binds , and to blunder that truth which the noon-day-sun of self evidence discovers , and ( as it were ) writes with its most lightsome and most conspicous rayes . . these four last conditions then of the rule of faith most fully agree with tradition as well as the three first , that is , 't is self-evident to all as to it's existence , § . . and evidenceable as to it 's ruling power to any vulgar enquirer , § . . apt to settle and justify undoubting persons , § . , . to satisfy fully the most sceptical dissenters and most rational doubters , and to convince the most obstinate and acute adversaries , built upon unmoveable grounds , that is , certain in it's self and absolutely ascertainable to us , § . , , , . and these properties springing out of the very nature of the rule of faith , and being incompetent to any competitor or pretended rule , as has been shown , this main conclusion is made good , that tradition is the rule of faith . sixth discourse . endeavouring to demonstrate à priori the indefectibleness of tradition . . all this is well , may some say , in case tradition had been ever held to ; for then indeed faith had come down by such an incomparable testification that the like was never heard of . but how know we who began to desert that rule , and who ever held to it ; or that it was ever held to by any ? . now , though the carriage of protestants makes this labour needless , while i write against them ; yet i owe to my former discourse a clearing of this likewise . their carriage , i say ; for , when it is prov'd evidently that tradition is a certain rule and scripture's letter not such , they who reject the former to adhere to the later are clearly cast in their cause and condemn'd without more ado . indeed , if protestants faulted not the rule but onely pretended that men had fail'd it , they might yet delude the world with some colour that they had ever held to the doctrin of ancestours , and onely deserted us because we had deserted ancestours formerly ; but if they put the fault in the rule it self , write against it , disgrace it and recurr to another , 't is a certain sign of self-condemnation , and that they judge in their inmost thoughts that tradition or immediate delivery ever stood our friend and would overthrow them . nay , did they think they could manifest satisfactorily that we had deserted formerly the faith of our forefathers as they pretend , they had no more efficacious way to ruine us than to oppose us upon those principles laid in this former discourse ; since tradition , a little after the primitive times , at which time they pretend we fell , had not gone down many steps , and so the renouncers of it would in reason seem to them more easily discoverable by its vicinity to the apostles . besides , this rule being so own'd and stuck to by us it had been the most efficacious way ad hominem to confute and shame us even by our own principles . wherefore it is most evident they think it not their best play to offer to avail themselves by tradition , knowing 't will be their disadvantage and our gain ; that is , they in effect tacitly yield that ( if tradition be a certain rule , which we have shown self-evident ) the doctrin held by our church to be of faith came down uninterruptedly from the apostles , that is , was ever , or is christ's doctrin , however , they blind their own consciences with glances of fancy from private interpretations of god's word , and deaf their own and others ears with empty sounds rebounding witth false ecchoes from those sacred oracles . . now , though it seem an unreasonable expectation to require that a rule should not onely be able to rule those who would follow it , but also should have power to oblige the generality of those who actually do follow it not to desert it ; yet , such is the goodness of our saviour towards his church to order that the rule which brings down faith to us should , both out of the nature of man in which it is grafted , and much more by means of the doctrin it recommends , be of so wonderful an efficacy . . this point therefore of the actual indefectiveness of tradition i shall endeavour to demonstrate both à priori from proper causes , and à posteriori from a now-adayes experienc't effect . . to do the former , i say for my grounds , first , that christian doctrin was at first unanimously settled by the apostles in the hearts of the faithful disperst in great multitudes over several parts of the world . secondly , that this doctrin was firmly believed by all those faithful to be the way to heaven , and the contradicting or deserting it the way to damnation ; so that the greatest hopes and fears imaginable were by engaging the divine authority strongly apply'd to the minds of the first believers , encouraging them to the adhering to that doctrin , and deterring them from relinquishing it ; and indeed infinitly greater than any other whatever springing from any temporal consideration ; and that this was in all ages the perswasion of the faithful . thirdly , that hopes of goods and fears of harms strongly apply'd are the causes of actual will. lastly , that the thing was feisible or within their power , that is , that what they were bred to was knowable by them . this put , it follows as certainly that a great number or body of the first believers and after-faithful in each age , that is from age to age , would continue to hold themselves and teach their children as themselves had been taught , that is , would follow and stick to tradition , as it does that a cause put actually causing produces it's effect . actually , i say ; for , since the cause is put , the application put , and the patient dispos'd ( for our argument puts this to be the minds of true believers , in regard the first renouncers of tradition must have been true believers or holders of it ere they renounc't it ) it follows inevitably that the cause is put still actually causing . . i foresee some will object the indisposition of the wills of the believing parents by reason of original corruption . but , supposing i dispute against those christians who hold that christ's doctrin was intended to be an antidote for that original malice , and to keep men's wills ( already possest with it ) right , notwithstanding the poize of their corrupted nature and the temptations of their circumstances ; to say 't is apply'd universally to all several sorts and tempers , and preserves none good , is to question christ's wisdom , and to doubt whether it be fit to do the effect it was meant for . not to mind the objecter how many thousands of martyrs and holy confessors , by the power of this doctrin , overcame this inbred declivity of their wills and its disorderly inclinations to the dearest goods life or nature could bestow . a great part therefore would be virtuous , and so ( it being easie and obvious , as our former discourse proved ) would teach their children what themselves believ'd in their consciences to be christ's doctrine , or the doctrine they had been taught ; and so a body of traditionary christians would still be continu'd to the very end of the world ; nor could that rule be totally relinquisht by any stratagem of the devil or prevail'd against by the gates of hell. again , though nat●re incline men to sin or vicious appetites , yet can it incline them all to this sort of sin , that is , to teach their children what they think will damn them ? or rather does not nature most strongly carry them to the contrary ? their original corruption then is no particular inviter to this kind of sin , to teach their children pernicious falshoods , and which themselves hold such ; though themselves be otherwise liable to several sort of particular failings . . if any object the fickle nature of the will , and imagin that this exempts her from the laws of causes ; i ask them ( without engaging farther into school-disputes , which i industriously avoid ) whether good be not the proper object of the will , and so is to affect it when sufficiently apply'd or propos'd ? if so , then , since an object to affect a power is to put it in act , and the act of the power we call the will is actual volition or willing , good propos'd makes the will to will or desire that good , and consequently the known means to obtain it ; now , infinit goods and harms sufficiently propos'd are of their own nature incomparably more powerful causes to carry the will , than temporal ones . since then , when two causes are counterpos'd , the lesser , when it comes to execution , is no cause , as to the substance of that effect ( as a heavy weight , which were otherwise a cause of descending , is no such cause when overweigh●d by an heavier , as not making its scale descend at all ) it follows that there is no cause to move the wills of a world of believers to be willing to do that which they judge would lose themselves and their posterity infinit goods and bring them infinit harms , such strong and main hopes and fears being put in the counter-ballance , in case a sufficient proposal or application be not wanting . . the last attempt then of an objectour is to fault the application of spiritual and heavenly goods , and to enhance the proposals of sensible and temporal objects . but , if we reflect with how steady a pursuit and even equal to that of eye-sight or any other sense , we generally work for ends no otherwise propos'd than by undoubted authority ; as when a king prepares for an expedition against a forrain country he never saw , or a gentleman for a journey to rome and such like ; if we but call to mind how the greatest testimony in the world engages god's supremely-infallible veracity for the truth of the doctrin , it proposes , which ascertains us of those infinit goods and harms spoken of ; the best application of a motive to a truly rational power which can possibly be imagin'd ; if we but consider how those spiritual and unseen goods are made intelligible to all , in a fair measure , by most fit and obvious metaphors ; familiar and sensible , by daily practice and as it were experience of them in christian language and actions , by the venerable sacraments , by the spectable majesty of outward ceremonies , all including our spiritual last end or intimating it by their order to it ; nay , if we but contemplate even essential heaven it self made the object of our senses , to comply with our weakness , by the word 's being made flesh and dwelling amongst us , his being born , his suffering cold , hunger , persecution , banishment and other inconveniencies in his life ; his curing our diseased , comforting our afflicted , raising our dead , and other miraculous actions ; his being bound , buffetted , scourged , crown'd with thorns , and lastly crucify'd ; and all this believed to be for our sakes ; all of them objects most sensibly and palpably affecting our understandings and thence sliding movingly ( and this by their sensible nature ) into our very wills ; we shall discover that the infinit spiritual good we spoke of is become through the provident goodness of our god , both as easily appliable as the most visible and concerning civil actions working on the best sensations of our forefathers , the best and amplest authority in the world to make their sensations ours , and the whole course of our life , actions , sacraments , and all other outward shows which could be invented to make such mysteries maniable , can possibly render them ; and that , if after all this they can be conceiv'd to want any thing of the sensibleness , 't is abundantly supply'd by that deep impression which the sacred horrour of the reverence given to them makes , and the efficacious wayes to excite and and preserve that reverence . all which wayes and objects , thus easily and strongly appliable were frequently and efficaciously apply'd by the education of parents and by the discipline and oeconomy of the church , which brings those speculations to practice , was ever , and must needs reach the generality . in a word , christianity , urg'd to execution , gives its followers a new life and a new nature ; than which a nearer application cannot be imagin'd . no application therefore is wanting ; wherefore , the efficient and the matter being proper and fitted to one another , the effect must still be or continue ; that is the delivering down sincerely and carefully christian doctrin first received must still continue in some great multitude at least , and this to the end of the world . seventh discourse , an objection clear'd , and the beginning and progress of an heresy connaturally laid open . . what onely and mainly seems to prejudice our argument is , that there have actually been many hereticks or deserters of tradition . to which i answer that 't is not to be expected but some contingency should have place where an whole species in a manner is to be wrought upon . it sufficeth us that the causes to preserve faith indeficiently entire are as efficacious as those which are lay'd for the propagagation of mankind ; the virtue of faith not being to continue longer than mankind , its onely subject , does : and they will easily appear as efficacious as the other if we consider the strength of those causes before explicated , and reflect that they are effectively powerful to make multitudes daily debar themselves of those pleasures which are the causes of mankind's propagation . and , if we look into history for experience of what has past in the world since the first planting of christianity , we shall find fa● more particulars failing in propagating their kind than their faith. . i know the multitudes of hereticks which have from time to time risen makes this position seem incredible ; wherefore , that we may 〈◊〉 once both open tradition and make good ou● tenet , we will reflect how an heresy is first bred to inforce then our former argument , we mus● look on christ's church not onely as on a congregation having in their hearts those most powerful motives already spoken of , able of their own nature to carry each single heart possest by them , though left at its own liberty ; but as o● the perfectest form of a commonwealth , having within her self government and officers appointed by christ himself , and so look't upon by the faithful , to take care all those motives b● actually apply'd as much as may be to the subject layity ; and that all the sons of the church be aw'd by wholsom disciplin to conform their lives according to the doctrin they profess . yet notwithstanding , as in the civil state , maugre the laws and care of governours , it happens sometimes that some particular person turns rebel or outlaw , and associates to himself others ; so it happens sometimes in the church , that , because 't is impossible the perfection of disciplin should extend it self in so vast a multititude to every particular , some one or few persons , by neglect of applying christian motives to their souls , fall into extravagancies of spiritual pride , ambition , lust , or other vices ; and itching with desire of followers to honour and support them , they first lay hold on some accidental miscarriages , as foolish opinions or ill lives of some in the church , which they aggravate beyond all reason to justify their rebellion , and 〈◊〉 invent and propose new tenets to others ; which partly by their plausibleness , partly licentiousness , suting with the curious or passionate humour of diverse , if governours be not vigilant and prudent , draw them into the same faction with themselves ; especially , if they get the state on their sides , secure indemnity and hopes of reward draw the corrupt hearts of many to bandy with their fellow-revolters against the former church . thus a body is made ; inconsiderable in respect of the whole , which yet is engag'd by the natural care of self-preservation to make head against it . the church stands upon the uninterrupted succession of her doctrin from christ , grounded on the noon-day manifestation of the most universal and clear attestation in the world : the other's known newness makes it impossible to human nature ( though most deprau'd ) to pretend this reception from immediate forefathers ; the contrary being so evident to the whole world's eye-sight that this were to tell an openly to no imaginable purpose . they must cry therefore the church has err'd in faith , else they condemn themselves ; whence they are oblig'd at next to renounce and disgrace tradition or the living voice of the church as unfit to be a rule , which left in force would presently quash and strangle all their attempts . after this a new rule must be sought for ; either some private inspiration , or some waxen-natur●d words not yet senc't not having any certain interpreter , but fit to be plaid upon diversly by quirks of wit ; that is , apt to blunder and confound , but to clear little or nothing . their policy must be to study vapour in wordish learning , to be dextrous in criticisms and all that can conduce to the various acception of words ; and then to hook catholicks from their infallible and evident way of tradition , to combat with them at their own weapon and in their own way : in which if the catholick be so unwary or good-natur●d as to engage , and having been inur●d to more solid and sober grounds for his faith , be not perhaps so skilful in beating the air as his bird-witted opponent , presently a victory is proclaimed with the loudest trumpet of fame , and ( vanity being generally their god who place their honour in such aiery sorts of learning ) blaz'd up and down to the commendation of themselves and perversion of others . but a company which makes such a bustle cannot long want a name ; wherefore , the traditionary christian having ever enjoyd the appellation of catholick , and it being impossible their adversaries should by any design or craft after the common language of mankind , hopeless to attain the name of catholick , they are forced to content themselves ( though unwilling ) with some other new one ; which , nature , working upon their own comportment , determines to be either from their authour , as lutherans , zuingliaus ; or their new tenet , as tritheits , sacramentarians ; or some combination amongst themselves , as protestants ; or , lastly , some particular carriage , as quakers , dippers , &c. . these first adherents to the upstart novellist being clung into a body , after a while young understandings ripening to a capacity of faith , things are presently alterd ; the pretended rule of scripture's letter's self-sufficiency is immediately thrown by as useless any farther ; design hath got its end already , and the natural way of of tradition begins to take place again and recover its self ; nay the reformers themselves are forc't to crave help of it to keep their company together . children are taught that they are to believe their pastours and fathers ; and , though they are permitted to read the scripture when they come at age , yet they are told they are to guide themselves by the sence their pastours and fathers give it , which is that they ought to guide themselves by the faith of their parents and teachers in interpreting scripture ; the very way catholicks ever took in that particular : and , if any company of men though now mature to judge , presume to follow their own judgement in interpreting it , and differ from those first reformers , these if they get the power in their hands will presently fall to oblige them by force to act , that is ( if they would have them do it conscientiously , which else were to force them to sin ) to hold as they do , and persecute or punish them if they do not ; whereas they guide themselves to their best capacity by the scripture's letter which is the very rule of faith their persecutors taught them and made use of themselves when they broke from the church . which evidently shows that a new rule is introduc't ; and that it is not indeed the letter of god's word which is now thought fit to guide the readers of it to faith , but those men's interpretations of it . so that the breaking from tradition and consequently the church casts them most inevitably upon these self-contradictions . first , to reform npon pretence of the scripture's letter being the rule of faith , yet afterwards in practice to desert that rule in their carriage towards others . secondly , to disallow to others those grounds themselves proceed upon . thirdly , to pretend first the scripture's letter clear of it self without needing the church to interpret it , so to avoid condemnation from the former church ; yet afterwards , to judge the followers of it to their best power to go wrong ; that is , to confess it obscure , and to need their new churches interpretation . ly . to persecute others for taking that way , which they held ( at least pretended ) meritorious in themselves . ly . to oblige others to relinquish the sole guidance of the scriptures letter and to rule themselves by their tradition ; and yet at the same time when they write and dispute against catholicks , to impugn tradition or the doctrin of forefathers as unfitting to sence it , and abet onely the self-sufficiency of scriptures letter . and , lastly , to impute that carriage to our church as a fault which themselves practice upon their own subjects : and , which is most material , our church punishes none but such as desert the rule she recommends ; whereas they punish those under them for following too close that rule which themselves recommended and applauded , as the whole and sole bafis of their reformation . . now , what can follow hence but that their ecclesiastical subjects whom common sence cannot but make exceeding sensible of such their unreasonable carriage , in persecuting them purely for following god's word or the scripture's letter to their best power , which themselves had taught them might securely , nay ought in conscience be follow'd , let the consent of forefathers and the present church made up of mee● men say what they would , what follow 's , i say , but that exasperated beyond patience by this procedure which they will be apt to conceive to be a most senceless and self-condemning tyranny over their consciences , they will ( unless governours be vigilant , ) strive to wreak their malice against their persecutors ; and if they be numerous and powerful , endeavour to involve whole nations in war and blood ; which god of his mercy avert from our distracted country . of so main consequence it is both for church and state that men's minds be right set in the fundamental grounds of christianity ; and that the principle they build religion on be evident , that is , apt to unite their understa●dings and by it their affections ; not uncertain and vertible , which must needs lead ( if pursu'd by an earnest zeal ) to nothing but diversities in opinions about faith , thence to dissensions and feuds in the will , which upon any great pressure will be apt to break forth into actions of highest enmity ; and by the irreconcileableness of such interests , ( neither side being able to yeeld to the other in what each of rhem holds sacred , religious and conscientious ) endless and fiercest bickerings are apt to succeed , even to utter desolation ; as frequent histories too lamentably record . not that i intend the justification of those revolting sects , who having no certain grounds of controversy are both self-condemn'd by the common light of reason for disobeying a certain and known legal authority ( which god's law and plain reason commands them to submit to ) to maintain an uncertainty , that is for any thing they know an error ; and , were it a known truth they held , would be no less condemn'd by the law of god and common reason , nay out the nature of religion it self , for making rebellion and an unimpower'd sword the defence of truth which stands firm on a surer basis. i onely mind prudent considerers on the by how much it conduces to state-unity and peace that the principle of conveying faith to us be built on sensible evidence acknowledgable by all mankind , when rightly understood ; and not left to giddy interpretations of private fancies , which are apt to run so eccentrically to one another , that we can never expect they shall have any common point , where to fix and unite men's minds and afflections . . the usefulness of this parergon serves to elucidate as it were ptactically and experimentally the certainty of tradition . the particular use we make of it in this present discourse , whence we digrest into it , is to conclude ( as well as we can of things at a common view , which yet is no less certain ) that the number of the actual deserters of the natural way of tradition have been but few , to wit the first revolters , a small handfull compar'd to all christianity besides , and onely occasionally not constantly happening ; that the descendents of these revolters were taught by them to believe them in the right , in interpreting scripture , and not their own judgments ; that is , follow'd the way of tradition , however misplac't : to which if we compare the numerous contingencies both in man's nature and other circumstances , hindring propagation , every day happening , we shall find much reason to prefer the multitudes of the other before this : but if we add to this consideration the daily decay of innumerable particulars , upon whom the continuation of mankind depends , by natural or accidental deaths , and reflect on the innumerable new subjects and even whole nations into which tradition hath and does daily propagate it self , and those uninfected by new heresies for whole ages , that is without any one deserter of tradition among them ; and none of those beholding to progenitors for their faith but to externs who converted them , whereas propagating their kind can onely be by those of the same race ; we shall find that the causes laid to propagate & preserve a body of traditionary christians look far more steadily and less needing a recourse to any particular providence than those which we can discover laid for the keeping on foot a body of men. whence , if any ( as the common fashion is ) bring against the perpetuation of tradition such wildroving arguments as would equally strike at the certainty of perpetuating mankind , or continuing any species in nature , the readiest answer is to show they do so ; and then to tell them we intend not tradition should last longer than the onely species capable of faith will ; that is , longer than mankind is to stand , who onely can have it or need it . eighth discourse . endeavouring to demonstrate à posteriori the vninterruptedness of tradition hitherto . . having seen and weigh'd the strength of those causes which preserve and continue tradition on foot , and thence endeavour'd to demonstrate its indefectibleness as the proper and necessary effects of those causes ; we will now begin our discourse at the other end , and try if we can conclude the same from some proper effect ; that is , from such an effect as could onely have sprung from the actual indeficiency of tradition as its cause : that so we may show the certainty of faith's conveyance to us do●bly guarded , and on all sides evident . though indeed this seems a needless endeavour against the protestant who yeilds that those points of faith in which we agree came dow● by this way of tradition . whence , he is to be prest to answer candidly these queres . w● not the trinity , incarnation and other points 〈◊〉 which we agree held in all ages since christ by gods church ? he must yeild it , no protesta●● ever denying it ; besides that we both agree to call that god's church which held those mai● points of faith. next , he is to be askt , whether seeing those points were held ever of faith , fathers did not actually teach children so , or the former age the later . common reason will teach him they did ; which devolves into this that a protestant must confess those points came down by tradition , and that tradition hath not faild to bring them down to us . ask him next by what virtue tradition perform'd this and whether the same virtue were not powerful to bring down others as well as these had any such been ? and , when he assignes this virtue , i cannot suspect him negative in so plain a point . ask him farther ; is there not a necessary connexion and relation between such a constant cause and its formal effect ? so that , if its formal effect be those points received as delivered ever , the proper cause must be an ever-delivery , whence , we can argue from such an effect to its cause for any particular point , and consequenly for any point that is in controversie between them and us , in case it be a point we held ever deliver'd : and if so , as manifest reason evinces it , our now-held faith was taught by christ and his apostles , and our dispute is at an end . but , because i rather suspect the protestant seeing his cause and interest too deep engag'd and himself streightned by such strict connexion of terms , will fly of and deny tradition to be a necessary cause , notwithstanding its constant tenour of having wrought this its effect millions of times , or from step to step during so many ages , and will not care to alledge that all this is pure chance and contingency , i shall pursue the designe and method i at first intended . . the effect then we will pitch upon and avow to be the proper one of such a cause , is the present perswasion of traditionary-christians ( or catholicks , ) that their faith hath descended from christ and his apostles uninterruptedly , which we find most firmly rooted in their hearts . and the existence of this perswasion we affirm to be impossible without the existence of traditions ever-indeficiency to beget it . . to prove this , i lay this first principle . that age which holds her faith deliver'd thus from the apostles neither can it self have chang'd any thing in it , nor know or doubt that any age since the apostles had chang'd or innovated any thing therein . this proposition needs no proof to evidence it , but onely an explication ; for , since no man can hold contrary to his knowledge , or doubt of what he holds , nor change or innovate in the case propos'd without knowing he did so ; 't is a manifest impossibility an whole age should fall into an absurdity so inconsistent with the nature of one single man. . the second principle shall be this , no age could innovate any thing , and withal deliver that very thing to posterity as receiv●d from christ by continual succession . for , since man is a rational creature , he must have some reason or motive , good or bad , which he proposes to himself as an eud to be atchiev'd by his action ; and ( whatever his remote end is ) his immediate end in telling posterity a late invented thing was held immediately before , is to make them believe it ; wherefore , since a seen impossibility cannot be a motive to one not frantick , and that 't is evidently impossible they should make posterity believe a thing so universally known to be false as this must needs be ; because were it possible the whole age should conspire to tell such a lye , ( the whole , i say , otherwise the refusers would easily discover the cheat ) yet 't is manifestly impossible all at age to know the truth should conspire from so many several and so far distant places , in the precise time to deceive the new off-spring every moneth ripening to a capacity of such knowledges , or blot out all the monuments which would evidently undeceive their abused posterity : 't is then as impossible this principle should falter as that the foregoing age should conspire to act without a motive or that the succeeding age should believe what they know to be otherwise ; that is , should hold both sides of a contradiction in a clear matter of fact , which is utterly inconsistent with a judging or congnoscitive nature . . these principles lay'd , we we will advance to the proof of our main conclusion on this manner ; that since neither any age ( by our first principle ) could hold a new introduc't point for not-new but immediately deliver'd ; nor yet any foregoing age ( by our second ) make it be receiv'd as not-new by posterity , it follows that in no age could any doctrin changing the immediate faith of fore-fathers or new at that time , come in or be received under the notion of immediately deliver'd or not-new at that time . wherefore , since nothing can descend or come down under the notion of not-new , or deliver'd uninterruptedly , unless it first come in or be receiv'd under the notion of not-new or deliver'd uninterruptedly , nor be held by us as descended under such a notion unless it did actually descend to us under such a notion ( by the second ) it follows manifestly that , if we now hold it descended as such , it did descend as such , and consequently was received by the deliverers as such ; and ( the same reason holding equally in each age from christ , ) came down consequently from christ and his apostles . no power then or wit of man could make our faith now held to be so descended , but its having been actually so descended : that is , onely the existence of tradition's indeficiency could have effected this present persuasion of traditionary christians ( or catholicks ) that their faith descended uninterruptedly from the apostles . it being then manifest by experience that this effect or present persuasion is , ( for all catholiks hold the church never fail'd in faith , ) 't is demonstratively evident that its proper and onely cause has been put ; that is , that christian tradition has ever been held to by a body of men consisting of the predecessors to those whom we find actually thus perswaded . ninth discourse . opening the incomparable strength of the churches human authority , and the infinit advantages accrue to it by the supernatual assistances of the holy ghost . . but all this is nature may some say , and by this method an heathen may by his natural wit become a good christian. by which word nature , if the objecter means reason wrought upon by motives laid by god's special goodness to bring souls to bliss , i wonder what else is supernaturality but this which he miscalls nature ; and why reason , rectify'd by such lights and proposals as the force of nature could not have aym'd at much less effected , ought not to be said to be affected supernaturally , however those very motives be connatural to our souls : it being evident that we use even the natural power of our reason in discoursing of things above our reason ; and , on the other side to expect no constant way or common path of motives laid for the salvation of mankind , but extraordinary inspirations for each particular man , unravell's the order of god's best providence , and is the very notion of fanatickness . but to meddle with this point is out of my road otherwise than to take my rise hence to show how far christian tradition is strengthen●d above the greatest meerly-human testimony whatever : and that the church owes this strength to those motives supervening to meer nature , which we rightly call assistances of the holy ghost ; in regard they are built on perfections of will in the faithful , or on virtues , the effects properly attributed to that divine person . . ere we come to explain what advantage the church as thus divinely assisted has over her self as meerly wrought upon by human motives , we will compare first her human authority with some other vast body of testifiers which may most seem to stand in competition with her . and an eminent and acute opposer of tradition has already pointed us out a choice one ; namely , that of the mahometans for mahomet's existence : which we doubt not to have the power to convey down the truth thereof with infallible certainty to the end of the world , if follow'd ; not do we think the most sceptical protestant doubts but it has had the force to make it self be follow'd hitherto ; however at unawares their calm reason grants that to a body of turks which their passion makes them question and even deny to a church of christians . yet , i averr that the human force of tradition in the church for the descent of the main body of christs doctrin far exceeds that of the turks for mahomet's existence . . to shew this in brief i note in the first place and chiefly ; that howsoever a report may spread universally from a small beginning in the quality of a rumour , yet the force of its credibility , if it be a matter of fact , is founded on the quantity and quality of those who first saw or perceiv'd it . putting then the quality of the testifiers in both cases to be equal , so to bring our controversy to a smaller compass , and comparing onely the quantity or number of the original testifiers on both sides ; what proportion is there between that handful of men about mecha and some few other places where mahomet conquer'd and planted his doctrin , and those vast multitudes whom all the apostles , disciples , and apostolical men converted by most powerful miracles in so many distant nations in the world ? if we lay them together we shall find that few saw or felt ( that is , were witnesses of ) mahomets existence so much as once , in comparison of those who were every day imbu'd with and practic●t christian doctrine . a new consideration springs hence that 't is a thousand times easier for that single company of arabians and syrians to conspire to a ly and so deliver down to us a false mahomet , than it is for such a multitude of people in so remote countries as first suck't in christianity to conspire in the very thought of having such a conspiracy . and , lastly , it was as easie by oft repeated sensatio●s to know christian doctrin at first to that degree as to govern their actions by it ( which is all that is requisit for the generality ) it giving the principles to the daily practice of their new life as they were christians , as it was for these other witnesses to be certain of mahomet's existence ; and much easier , in regard the greater part by far of those whom we allow witnesses of mahomets existence perhaps scarce knew him by sight ; not conversing him daily or very often , as each of the primitive christians did with those points of faith they guided their lives by . . the human authority then of the church being such as exceeds she evidence of other testimonies , which yet are such that amongst all the most extravagant opiniastres none was ever found so frantick as to doubt them ; and should any do so , all sober mankind would esteem them stark mad ; which could not be done in reason unless they renounc't perfect evidence , that is , unless those testimonies were perfectly evident : this , i say , being so , some may think it superfluous and a quirk of an overstraining fancy to contend there is any greater evidence to ascertain the conveyance of our faith from christ's time to us . but , whoever reflects on the reason of those words , sic deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum vnigenitum daret , john . . or for those , nunquid de bobus cura est deo ? cor. . . nonne vos magis pluris estis volatilibus caeli ? mat. . . and such like ; or , on what metaphysicks demonstrate concerning the perfect methods and wayes of essential wisdome , will easily be convinc't that , if the salvation of mankind be the end of this material world's creation , the providences to bring about this end ought in true wisdome be so particular and so sublimely efficacious that the means laid for the preservation of any other species in nature would scarce deserve the name of a providence in comparison of the other . whence follows , that the means which are mainly influential to promote man towards bliss ( such as is faith , the rule of that life by which he tends to heaven , and the substance of his hope which gives the vigour to that life ) must be certain ( its efficacy depending on this certainty ) beyond any evidence meer nature could compass . which that great mèditater on god's law day and night well comprehended , when out of the full sight of this truth he burst out into that expression of wonderment , testimonia tua , domine , credibilia , facta suut nimis . . we will briefly touch at some of the advantages which those assistances superadded to nature give the church , and leave them to be scann'd by the leasurely thoughts of attentive considerers . . first then , we find that 't is natural to every man that his phantasms should be such as the impressions of the objects are apt to make them , his thoughts appropriated to his phantasms , and his outward expressions concerning the thing , and amongst them his words , conformable to his thoughts : so that true words and sincere actions are the proper effects of the other causes , and necessarily produc't by them if designe hinder not : which amounts to this , that 't is natural for every man to speak truth ; and that , whenever one speaks false wittingly , artifice makes him cast about to contrive a ly fittingly to the end he aims at ; whence it is that fools and drunken men , who are incapable of such artifice , use to tell the plain truth . if this be so in nature , and that grace is to perfect nature in whatever is good in it , it follows that one truly christian heart is far more fixt to veracity than others not imbu'd with those heavenly tenets ; and consequently that a multitude of such incomparably exceed , in point of testifying , the same number of others unfortify'd by christ's doctrin . . this will be clearer if we reflect upon the way by which original corruption violates frequently in execution this natural veracity ; and 't is this ; that inclining and transporting them to the undue love of creatures even to the injuring known rational orders laid in the world and most necessary for the subsistence or universal well-being of mankind ( which we call the commandments ) hence , afraid to own such an enormous procedure , they cast about to cloak it with sought pretences . the sum therefore of christianity tending to implant in the hearts of the faithful an over-powering love of supreme spiritual goods attainable in the next life , and by consequence to take off their extravagant affection to earthly things , it leaves man's natural disposition to truth free to do its effect , and renders needless that crafty way of design , onely which could byass and pervert the will from pursuing the way of nature . . compare we now the positive motives , natural and supernatural , obliging to veracity , and we find the hopes and fears which christianity proposes to make and keep men good as infinitly exceeding the natural ones as eternity does a moment , abating the intenseness of the goods and harms hop't for and fear'd , nay held firmly by all and conceited lively by many to be beyond all imaginable comparison greater than the other . yet experience tells us and none doubts but that these transitory and incomparably-less goods and harms are sufficient motives to oblige bodies of men to deliver down politick or natural matters of fact , as the existence of such former kings ( to blunder which truth there wanted not highest interests were it conceiv'd feisible ) such eclipses , wars , &c. inconcievably more powerful then must the other motives be to oblige them to veracity in such narrations on which the destroying or preserving those highest concerns depend . and what prevalency eternal motives had over temporal ones when they came to clash so neer as one must forego one hope or the other is seen by the perpetual and constant sufferings of the martyrs in all ages , and the many persecutions daily and gladly undergone every day in many places for conscience-sake . . in the natural commonwealth there are multitudes of men deputed particularly to great trusts , and some extraordinary ceremony done upon them to make them true to such trusts , nay oaths by things they highly reverence taken , not onely by those officers , but sometimes ( though rarely ) by the generality to secure their fidelity . but what proportion can those ceremonies bear being but of human institution to the sacraments of the church held to have been instituted by christ himself ; many of which are common to all christians ; some to initiate them most solemnly at first , or to rivet that initiation with a new military tessera ; some to strengthen and cure the languishing ; some to win to love by acts of greatest bounty ; others are proper to impower some as officers to oversee the common affairs of faith ; all tending to strengthen powerfully the generality not to prevaricate from the faith held ever truly received down , and particularly to oblige governours not to bely themselves or connive at others grosly belying their forefathers and betraying their depositum . . though nature teaches the rudest that they should not do to another what they would ●ot have done to themselves , yet original cor●●ption too often makes us prevaricate in pra●ice from that evident rule : and the reason because while men's affections are chiefly ●tch't on temporal goods , hence , in regard ●hey are finite , that is such that if one have ●ore another has less of them , such men are ●t enviously to deprive their partaking neigh●ours of them , that so the greatest part may ●ll to their own share : but , such an action can ever proceed from , nor thought enter into the ●ost deprau'd nature as to harm another without ●y good to himself . now , this in our case ●ust be put , if we put christian fathers mis●aching their children unreceived doctrins for ●●ceived contrary to their own knowledge . for , ●●pposing sanctity in the church , that is , that ●ultitudes in it make heaven their first love , ●nd look on spiritual goods as their main con●ern , which are of such a nature that none has ●ess for another's having more , but on the con●●ary the multitudes of virtuous persons would ●elp to encrease both virtue and glory too in ●heir fellowes and relations ; it follows , that ●ad those fathers in any age consented to mis●●ad their posterity from what themselves con●eit to be true , they should do the most extream ●arm imaginable to others , without any the ●east good to themselves ; which is perhaps im●ossible in one single man , more in a few , but ●nfinitly in a multitude , especially of good men moreover , christ's law being the law of ch●rity , which includes love of our neighbou● 't is directly opposit to the principles of christi●nity to do them an injury of so high a nature 〈◊〉 to debar them heaven and send them to hel● and all this gratis . . again , the greater the recommends any truth is , the greater is the obligation not bely our selves and it . let us weigh then 〈◊〉 recommends which christian doctrin receive from forefathers had ; either as to its serious 〈◊〉 port , that it be faithfully transmitted to other● or the universality , conceited wisdom , goo●ness , &c. of the recommenders ; and then 〈◊〉 lance it with the recommendation of any nat●ral or civil truth whatsoever , and we shall 〈◊〉 it levitate like an inconsiderable feather or 〈◊〉 in comparison of the vast poize and weig● sway with which the other descended . . nothing is by nature more deeply 〈◊〉 more universally rooted in the hearts of manki●● than a dear and tender love of their off-sprin● and a careful provision for their passing their 〈◊〉 well , that is free from miseries , with a com●tency of such goods as are held fitting for th● nature . but how much more care must cha●●ty oblige parents to have of their children , 〈◊〉 to use the means they conceive proper to bri● them everlasting and infinit bliss in heave● and to avoid them intolerable and endless mis●ries in hell ? especially , since the performing ●evaricating from that duty is of equal concern 〈◊〉 themselves ? how strange an advantage ●peradds christianity in this particular to the ●earest natural love of our selves , or of our near●●t relations who are next our selves ! . consider we next the natural care of not ●●sing one's credit , and we shall find in com●on that , the good opinion of others we call ●redit or repute is look't upon as a most necessa●● means to make men fit for human society or ●ommerce , and without which none can expect 〈◊〉 thrive in his vocation or live with comfort . ●eflecting next on the degrees of discredit , we ●nd that he who tells a lye for his own ad●antage though without any harm to others , with ●uch ado escapes some disrepute ; but if his ●yes be pernicious , he is held an arrant villain ; ●f to nearest friends and relations , still greater : ●f the mischiefs he does by his salse words or ●ealings be exceeding great ones , he is yet more ●bominable , and proportionally still as the harms , ●e induces , grow . if the motives he had to keep ●im good were very strong and efficacious , he ●s still more enormous ; and , as the strength of ●hose preservative motives encrease so is his ma●ice still enhanc't . but , if he go about all this wickedness boldly and confidently without ca●ing who knows it , especially if he back his most notorious and most pernicious lye with deepest oaths and perjuries by things most sacred , he is now conceiv'd to be arriv'd at such a pitch of wickedness , that he is no longer to be held a man , but a divel incarnate . but , how incomparably more wicked and consequently disgraceful must that man be , who believing christ's doctrin to be thus received and the means to salvation , should teach his children otherwise ! the believed mischiefs he does his nearest relations , no less than the loss of heaven and the sad gain of hell-fire for all eternity ; the motives he had not to do it , as to his own concerns , full as infinit ; his lye most notorious to all about him , and even the whole world. and , if he be a pastor , who ( besides other sacraments implying most obliging vows not to renounce his faith ) is consecrated by a particular one to preach christ's doctrin truly and to preserve his flock sound in faith to his power , then to prevaricate from this duty renders him a sacrilegious abuser of the most holy state of life , and most inviolable tye this world , as sanctify'd by our saviour , has in it . what inconcievable villany then and consequently discredit must that man seeingly undergo , who shall misteach his own fancies for doctrins deliver'd ; and how impossible is it a world of forefathers should all conspire to make so desperate and absolute a forfeit of their reputation and honesty ! 't is not possible to be summ'd up or even ghest at , being beyond all proportion . the advantage then with which christian doctrin in the mind of each , and the holy ghost in the hearts of most of the faithful , rivet and confirm this natural care of credit to the preserving tradition inviolable , is incomparable and in a manner infinit . . it would require a large volum , to unfold particularly how each virtue contributes to show the inerrable indeficiency of tradition , and how the principles of almost each science are concern'd in demonstrating its certainty : arithmetick lends her numbring and multiplying faculty to scan the vast number of testifiers ; geometry her proportions to show a kind of infinit strength of certitude in christian tradition above those attestations which breed certainty in human affairs ; logick her skill to frame and make us see the connexions it has with the principles of our understanding ; nature her laws of motion and action ; morality , her first principle that nothing is done gratis by a cognoscitive nature , and that the body of traditionary doctrin is most conformable to practical reason : historical prudence clears the impossibility of an undiscernible revolt from points to descended & held so sacred ; politicks show this to be the best way imaginable to convey down such a law as it concerns every man to be skilful in : metaphysicks engage the essences of things , and the very notion of being which fixes every truth ; so establishing the scientifical knowledges which spring from each particular nature by their first causes or reasons exempt from change or motion : divinity demonstrates it most worthy god and most conducive to bring mankind to bliss . lastly , controversy evidences the total uncertainty of any thing concerning faith if this can be uncertain , and makes use of all the rest to establish the certainty of this first principle ; and , which settled , secures scripture as far as is requisit , and all things else that can mainly concern salvation . to pursue these and many other testimonies of tradition's infallibleness is not my task at present : i shall content my self with concluding , that , as we have prov'd it self-evident that tradition if ever held to is an inerrable rule , so our four last discourses have shown its ever-indeficiency or rather indefectibleness , scientifically evident ; and as strong as nature and grace strain'd ( as we may say ) to their utmost can make it . corollaries from the former discourses . . none can pretend to have faith ( by the ordinary course of god's providence ) but the holders to tradition . 't is prov'd by our conclusion formerly deduc't , ( disc. . § . . ) that tradition is the rule of faith , that is , the ordinary way to arrive at faith. . none can with right pretend to be a church but the followers of tradition . for , since ( corol. . ) none can have faith by the ordinary course of god's providence but the holders to tradition , and a church must be a congregation of persons truly faithful , or who have true faith coming to them by ordinary means , ( as we daily experience , ) 't is manifest that none but the followers of tradition can pretend to be a true church . . none can be of the church or any church but followers of tradition . for , seeing a church is a congregation of persons who have true faith coming to them by ordinary means , and ( disc. . § . . ) tradition is this means , it follows that none are of the church or any church but they who have true faith by this means , that is , who follow the means of tradition . those who renounce tradition or immediate delivery , are ipso facto cut off from the root of faith , and cease to be truly called faithful . for seeing that is to us , or in the way of reasoning , the root of any knowledge whence that knowledge springs , and faith is no knowledge in us , ( disc. . . and corol. . ) but by relying on the rule of faith or tradition as on its principle , 't is manifest that they who renounce tradition want the root of faith , nor consequently are faithful nor of the church , but are dead branches or opiners onely . . that company of men who follow such ancestours as formerly renounc't tradition or immediate delivery are no less cut off from the root of faith. for , since ( corol. . ) those ancestours renouncing tradition formerly were by so doing cut off from the root of faith , their followers ( for how many generations soever they continue ) must be so likewise , as wanting and not daring even to pretend to that faith●causing principle of tradition or uninterrupted delivery which their forefathers had renounc't . . they who follow such ancestors as formerly had manifestly renounc't tradition ( how numerous soever ) can never claim to be a part of christian tradition or deliverers of faith. first , because ( corol. . ) they are cut off from tradition and so can be no part of it . next , because christian tradition is indeficient or uninterrupted , ( disc. , , and . ) and so none can lay claim to it who cannot lay claim to uninterruptedness ; which those we speak of cannot . the saying then of vincentius lirinensis , id teneamus quod ubique , quod semper , quod ab omnibus creditum est , and that we must follow vniuersality , antiquity , and consent , can onely be meant within the verge of those who adhere to tradition , or follow the doctrin formerly deliver'd , not of those who have broke from it ; otherwise all hereticks in the world , especially the primitive ones might claim to be part of the church . . they who pretend themselves reformers in faith , do ipso facto , manifest themselves cut off from the root of faith and the church . for since points of faith are truths , and so have no degrees in them , but are indivisible ; reformation in faith cannot mean mending faith , but putting it anew . but this presupposes tradition interrupted , wherefore reformers in faith must renounce uninterruptedness of delivery , that is , they must renounce tradition ; ( disc. . , . ) and consequently they are cut off from the root of faith. ( coroll . . ) . that body of men who adhere to tradition can evidence clearly and plainly who are truly faithful , who not . for , since ( coroll . . & . ) to those men 't is all one to renounce immediate or uninterrupted delivery , or follow those who renounc't it , as to be cut off from the root of faith ; and all one to be faithful and to rely on that principle : again , seeing 't is evident by clear matter of fact who rely and proceed upon it , who not ; that body of men who adhere to tradition can evidence clearly and plainly who are truly faithful , who not ; and ( if church-government be instituted by our saviour and so a point of faith , and so descended to us by the rule of faith ) who are of the church , who not . . none else can give any certain account who are to be held truly faithful and of the church , who not . for since without tradition both letter and sence of scripture is uncertain ( disc. . ) and subject to dispute ( as we also daily experience ) it follows that all the deniers of tradition are uncertain who have the right letter or sence of scripture ; that is , whom they are to esteem faithful ( or sit to be of the church ) whom not . again , tradition being the onely certain rule of faith , if one revolter from it may be admitted , all may , so they prosess christianity in outward talk which they will easily do : wherefore , since the denier of tradition deems some one revolter from it to be of the church , that is , himself ; he may , nay ought judge so of all the rest , provided they talk a few fine pious words of god and christ , which what hereticks but did ? . none can rationally punish the revolters from their faith but that body which adheres to radition . for since , setting aside tradition , both letter and sence of scripture is uncertain , ( disc. . ) the guilt of those revolters is also uncertain : seeing then none can even pretend to correct a fault much less punish it upon uncertain grounds , none can rationally go about to punish their revolters from faith unless it be that body which adheres to tradition ; and they can . for , in regard tradition's certainty is evident to the rudest by common sence , ( disc. . § . . ) and likewise 't is as evident to governours who revolt from it as it is to know when one dis-acknowledges and rises against a settled civil authority and the laws of the land ; 't is most manifest that the revolter hath both passion or guilt enough to be held punishable , and the christian magistrate evidence enough of his fact to go about to punish it . to avoid mistake , i declare that in this corollary i onely discourse what may or may not be done upon a church-account , what may be fit to be done upon a state-account , i am neither able to judge , nor do i meddle with it . . no company of men hang together like a body of a christian common-wealth or church but that which adheres to tradition . for , since 't is manifest that every external commonwealth or body of men hath some outward marks proper to it , by which the members of it have their coherence , or consistency and that those are certain tokens to distinguish it from any other ; and as manifest that all the marks proper to a church as such depend upon the rule of faith , ( disc. . § . . ) and their certainty on its ; and lastly , that none of the pretended rules of faith ( all of them building on scripture's letter ) are certain , ( disc. . , . ) without tradition ; it follows that no other company have any principle of distinction from others , that is either of constitution or self-preservation under the notion of church , but that which adheres to tradition . all the loud out-cry then made commonly against that body which adheres to tradition , call●d roman-catholick , for accounting it self onely the vniversal church and excluding all others is but empty noise , and her claim rational and well-grounded , till it be shown by evident discourse that the other pretenders have some other more evident and certain rule to know who are of the church who not , than this of tradition now produc't and explicated ; upon which she proceeds and by which she consists . . there is no arguing against tradition out of scripture . for , since ( as we have prov'd disc. . ) there can be no absolute certainty of scripture's letter without tradition , this must first be suppos'd certain ere the scripture's letter can be rationally held such ; and consequently ought in reason to be held vncertain while tradition is thought ●it to be argu'd against , that is , while it's certainty is doubted of . wherefore since none can argue solidly upon uncertain grounds , none ought to argue against tradition out of the letter of scripture . . none can in reason oppose the authority of the church or any church against tradition . first because in reality tradition ( rightly understood ) is the same thing materially with the living voic● and practice of the whole church essential , consisting of pastors and layity ; which is so ample that it includes all imaginable authority which can be conceiv'd to be in a church . secondly , because in the way of generating faith tradition formally taken is antecedent to , ( disc. . § . . ) and so in the way of discourse working by formal and abstracted notions its notion must be presuppos'd and its certainty establish't before the notion and certainty of faith , consequently of faithful , and consequently of church , which must necessarily be a congregation of faithful . whence they would argue very preposterously who should go about to oppose church against tradition ; this being the same as to think to establish the house by overthrowing the foundation . . none can in reason oppose the authority of fathers or councils against tradition . this is evident by the former , ( corol. . ) in regard neither of these have any authority but as representatives of the church , or eminent members of the church : nor can any determin certainly what is a father or council ( disc. . § . . ) till the notion of church , that is of faithful , that is of faith , that is of rule of faith , that is of tradition be certainly establish't . . no disacknowledgers of tradition are in due of reason but in courtesy onely to be allow'd to argue out of scripture's letter , father or council . for , since , wanting tradition they have certainty of none of those ( as was prov'd , disc. . § . . ) 't is manifest that , disacknowledging tradition , while they alledge and talk of these they alledge and talk of things themselves do not know to be certain . wherefore , 't is too great a condescendence and courtesy in catholiks to let them run forwards descanting with wordish discourses on those testimonies after their raw manner , since they might justly take their advantage against them and show they have no right to make use of principles , which their own grounds can never make good to them ; as was tertullian's smart and solid way , de praescr . haeret. c. , , , , , , . denying them the use of scripture who deny'd the church ; which would save many an aiery confus'd discourse about words , unapt to evidence any thing satisfactorily . nor can the right of an opponent to argue ad hominem licence them to claim this favour from our controvertists ; in regard we never held that scriptures letter hammer'd upon by criticisms and such pretty knacks of human learning was the ground of our faith nor the way to establish it , but onely as interpreted by the language and practice of the church ; nor consequently can we hold it capable to be prejudic't by such endeavours of private wits . though then we should allow them a copy of the letter , and consequently so far a liberty to argue ad hominem against us ; yet we never allow'd their method of arguing from it , as efficacious , either to build or evert fai●h , but our learned controvertists ever held direct contrary . whence , in case they clamour that in not following their wild method we desert scripture ( to avoid which calumny with the vulgar i conceive one reason our controvertists generally were so civil to them as to cope with them in their fleight way ) the unreasonableness of the calumny is to be made appear , which is quicklier done , not their unreasonable expectation to be satisfy'd . . no authority from any history or testimonial writing is valid against the force of tradition . for , since falshood is as easy to be writ or printed as truth , 't is evident those books can give no testimony to themselves that what they express is certainly true ; and , if we say they are abetted by the testimony of other books , the same question recurrs concerning them , in what age soever they were writ . it remains then that 't is onely the acceptation of men or sence writ in their hearts and so convey'd down from father to son that these books are true histories and not fables , which gives them any authority : but this has plainly the nature of tradition ; they have therefore no authority but by force of tradition : therefore they can have no possible force against tradition ; since , if tradition , or the conveying down from hand to hand sence writ thus universally in men's hearts , can deceive us , no such books can have any authority at all : wherefore , not the books , but the sence writ in men's hearts of the goodness and skill of the authours of those books ( upon which qualifications the truth of each passage contain'd in those books is built ) is to be alledg'd against christian tradition , since 't is that sence which authorizes those books and gives credibility to those passages , and so is stronger than any dead testimony from the books themselves . which devolves into this , that onely some great tradition or living testimony for things past , can , in point of authority , be pretended an equal match to christian tradition or competent to be alledg●d against it . . no tradition is alledg'd or alledgeable in reason against christian tradition . that none is alledg●d is evident from matter of fact : for , the adversaries of catholick tradition never pretend the consent or constant sence of great multitudes deriv'd from age to age by living voice that at such a time former tradition was relinquish't , new faith introduc't , or the old faith chang'd or abolisht ; but onely odd ends or scraps of histories or other dead testimonies , according as they light on some passage which seems favourable to them , or may be rendred interpretable that way . whence , there are almost as many minds as men about the time when any change was made ; nay , some of their best champions , dr whitaker , and mr powel , profess the time of the romish churches change cannot easily be told , and that they cannot tell by whom or at what time the enemy did sow the papists doctrin : this , i say , being so , 't is most evident they decline the pretence of any tradition against ours , and the very way of deriving down orally and practically sence writ in mens hearts by matter of fact working on their senses ; and , instead of that , recurr to pittiful shreds and fragments o● words , utterly unauthoriz'd if the tradition for that books goodness can fail : and , if catholick tradition , which in its source was so largely extended , visible and practicable by all can faulter , ten thousand times more easily may the tradition for any particular book , which in comparison of the other can be but of a very obscure original , fail and deceive us . now , that no tradition is alledgeable against us by protestants appears hence , that their immediate forefathers little more than an . years ago being catholicks ; that is , holders of their faith no novelty but uninterruptedly descended , could never conspire to deliver to them any such sence that the roman church had alter'd her faith , since they had the contrary sence writ in the tables of their hearts . nor can they have recourse to the greek church for a tradition opposit to ours for any points of faith in which they differ from us , for they will find none such . nor is the greek church progenitours to them here in england , nor by consequence can they derive traditionarily from them . . no solid argument from reason or intrinsecal principles is producible against christian tradition . for , since arguments , if solid , are taken from things or nature , and the certainty of christian tradition is built on the best nature , that is , man 's ; not according to what is alterable in it , but what is ( abstracting from disease ) absolutely unalterable ; that is , on knowledge imprinted by natural sensations ; and this knowledge strengthen'd and made most lively by the oft-repeatedness of those sensations , and the import of the things known : also , since most efficacious causes actually appli'd , that is , impossible not to do the effect , and effects impossible to be without such a cause's existence are engag'd for the ever-continuance or uninterruptedness of tradition ( as hath been shown , disc. . & . ) and the force of those preserving causes strengthen'd by the most powerful assistances of the holy ghost , ( disc. . ) or by best graces superadded to best nature ; 't is impossible any solid argument from reason should be brought against tradition . . the arguing by way of some few instances ( as the manner is ) can have no force against tradition's certainty and indefectiveness . for , seeing a pretended instance of tradition's failing is a particular action presumed to be long ago past , and particulars out of the very nature of being particulars are surrounded by a thousand individuating circumstances or rather constituted by them , that is , are plac't in the proper sphere of contingency : and that particular action is put to be long ago past , and ●o affects not our senses by experience ( in which is founded the force of instances , in regard experimental knowledge is a necessary effect of the things being such as it is known ) nor have we , or can we have without tradition , any certain knowledge ( coroll . . ) that the points of faith pretended to have miscarried or to have been alter'd then , or else the manner of expressing them , were not mistaken then or misrepresented to us now ; nor that interest ( for example ) of one party passion between both , ambiguity of words , slightness or confusedness of report grounding the historians narration , rashness of belief in him , corruption of his books since they were writ , and innumerable other chances apt to occasion mistake did not intervene ; any of which would render the instance uncertain , and the argument from it inconclusive . again , seeing we can have certainty of our own meaning of our words when we demonstrate , and also of our consequence , it follows that the way for a solid man to answer traditions pretended demonstrableness must be to show the incoherence of the terms , and not to bring some old story against it ; which were to produce uncertainty known to be such , against pretended certainty and not yet known to be other than such ; nay whos 's evidence we cannot in reason deny till we can solve the connexion of terms drawn from intrinsecal mediums , on which 't is built . . the denying tradition is a proper and necessary disposition to fanatickness . for , since no argument taken from any dead or written testimony , ( coroll . . . . ) nor living testimony of tradition , ( coroll . . . ) nor from any thing in nature , coroll . . ) that is , from any thing without us which is a second cause , is valid against tradition : it follows that tradition cannot be denied but by pretending some light or knowledge within us deriv'd from the immediate influence of the first cause . to which pretence helps its difficulty to be confuted ; in regard 't is easie to stand stiff in this tenet that they see clearly such truths by an inward light , and that therefore it were a madness to go about to confute their own manifest experience ; whereas , were arguments produc-t openly , they and their confutations might be publisht together , and the truth would lie expos'd to the scanning and decision of the indifferent part of the world , and be clear'd by a few replies if a right method of discourse be taken . wherefore , since nature will easily teach the obstinate deniers of any principle to avail themselves by the best plea they can to escape confuting , 't is manifest that nature will connaturally carry the deniers of tradition to fanatick pranciples , and that men are so long and no longer preserv'd from fanatickness than they follow tradition or the openly declar'd sence of forefathers either in our church or some other congregation . again , tradition being the way of coming to faith by the open use of our senses , the denying it must drive the deniers to deny that way , and to recurr to knowledge had some other way ; not to knowledge acquir'd by human skill , ( the knowledge of such high mysteries being confessedly more than human ) therefore to infus'd knowledge ; and this not infus'd by ordinary wayes , as preaching , teaching of forefathers and such like ( as we experience such knowledges to be infus'd into us ) for this again falls into the way of tradition ; therefore they can onely have refuge to inward light or knowledge infus'd extraordinarily or without connatural means ; to make which the common road of receiving heaven's influences is the very definition of fanatickness . . fanatick principles can have no force against tradition , though unconfutable but by it . for , since they pretend for their ground a light within imprinted on such a manner as manifests god the authour , that is , an effect which onely themselves know and are conscious of , and on the other side nothing appears why such a kind of impression is impossible , nay 't is granted possible , 't is clear none can argue against that inward light 's existence out of the nature of that inward perswasion fanaticks have , in regard 't is latent and unknown . it follows then that the way to conclude against it is to show out of evident principles the contrary to these inspiration to be truth : none therefore ( as plain matter of fact testifies ) taking the way of arguing from principles absolutely evident , or demonstrating , but catholiks or the followers of tradition , and they effecting this by virtue of tradition , disc. , , . ) it follows that they and onely they are able to confute fanaticks and conclude their inward light delusive . again , since a fanatick builds on conceited experience of divine inspiration , there is no hopes to convince his judgment without producing demonstration for the contrary ; a task onely performable in the way of tradition . which is enforc't and strengthen'd by this consideration , that the basis of tradidition is natural knowledge directly imprinted by his senses , in which knowledges he is undeceivable ; and these sensations or knowledges are daily repeated , not on one private temper but on innumerable millions conspiring in the same , that is , tradition is built on almost infinit , daily and most manifest experiences ; whereas the conceited effect of inspiration , or his strong persuasion that god speaks thus inwardly is found with consent of tenets in a few onely ; and liable to deceit by depending upon fancy , not sense ; as appears in diseased or mad persons , and the fanaticks contradicting one another though both proceeding on the same principle . without tradition's help then 't is very hard ( if not impossible ) to confute fanaticks , ( as experience also testifies by protestants being forc't to recurr to tradidion in disputes with them ) though very easy with it , or by means of it . . there is no arguing against tradition without questioning the constancy of every species in nature , that is the certainty of whole nature . for , seeing man's nature is as necessarily fit to receive the direct impressions of objects on his soul , that is natural knowledges , and as necessarily determin'd to work for a motive or reason good or bad , as fire is to heat or water to wet , and this absolutely and alwayes abstracting from disease incapacitating him to use his senses or his fancy , and both these spring out of the very substance of his nature as rational or of such a species , which original corruption hinders not ; it follows that he is as fit for those operations , and consequently will as frequently perform them as fire burn , water wet , fruit-trees bear fruit , or any other species in nature do its ptoper effect ; that is generally , and onely rarely and contingently fail , unless the authour of nature order the whole course of it worse for man than for other things , which were blasphemy to say , and contrary to experience ; since we find a course of supernaturals on foot , and that they comfort and strengthen man's true nature as hath been formerly declared . less liable then is the human species to contingency in those its natural operations than any other kind is . wherefore , seeing traditions certainty is grounded upon direct natural knowledges , and its indefectiveness on mankind's incapableness to act without some motive ; to argue against it were to question these , that is , the constancy of the best and best-supported species in nature , and a fortiori the constancy of the rest . note here , that all the arguments brought by witty reasoners against tradition are fetcht from the contingency of some one or some few particulars , whence by a wild kind of roving way they would conclude the defectibleness of the generality or of the entire species : but , because it looks too palpably inconsequent in logicall form to say , a few can err , ergo all , therefore they use to bring it in with a why not . so that all the arguers against tradition from natural reason oppose directly any constancy in the species or generality , and so are destroyers of natural certainty and of their own arguments to boot . . there is no possibility of arguing at all against tradition rightly understood , or the living voice of the catholick church with any show of reason . for , since 't is evident that scripture's copy or letter is in the whole and every tittle uncertain ( disc. , and . ) without tradition ; as also that the writings of fathers , councils , history , and of any written or dead testimony whatever , ( corol. , and . ) are utterly unauthoriz'd otherwise than by means of tradition , and that no living testimony or tradition is alledgable against the tradition we speak of or catholick tradition , ( corol. . and . ) nor any pretended instance of tradition●s failing has force but by its being faithfully convey'd down by tradition and depending on tradition for its certainty , ( corol. . ) and all arguments from natural reason are so weak that they destroy all certainty in that matter while levell'd against tradition , ( corol. . & . ) it follows , that no argument from any authority publickly appearing in the world , nor yet from intrinsecal mediums fetcht from second causes in nature can bear any show against tradition . nor yet from private effects pretended from the first cause , call'd inspiration or light of the private spirit ( corol. . ) for , ( besides what has been concluded for this point ) however this preten●e may make the first syll●●gism , yet when it comes to be prov'd , that is made appear outwardly , that the first cause inspir'd thus or thus , no extraordinary effects proper to that cause ( as miracles ) being producible , their arguing or proof is at an end , however their inward adhesion stands . there being then no other argument imaginable , but what is fetcht from authority living or dead , or else from effects or experience testifiable by those authorities , or from proper effects or causes in the ordinary course of natural things , or from extraordinary private and unseen pretended effects of the first cause ; and none of these bearing any show against tradition ; 't is evident there is no possibility of arguing against tradition rightly understood , or the living voice of the catholick church , with any show of reason . . tradition is the first principle in the way of authority as it engages for matter of fact long ago past . for , seeing that is the first principle in any knowledge into which all knowledges in that kind are resolv'd to establish their certainty , and all ptetended authorities for any matter of fact long ago past ( corol. . ) and consequently all knowledges caus'd by the means of them , are resolv'd finally into tradition and depend on it for their certainty ; it follows that tradition is the very first principle in the way of authority as it undertakes for the truth of matters of fact long ago past . . tradition , in the matter of tradition ( that is , in matter of fact before our time ) is self-evident to all those who can need the knowledge of such things , that is , to all mankind who use common reason . this is evident from the former ; for , first principles are to be self-evident to all those who are to use them and proceed upon them , which in our case is the most ordinary vulgar . . the certainty of tradition being establisht the whole body of the faithful ( by which i mean catholicks ) or the church essential , is , by relying on it , infallibly certain that it is in possession of christ's true doctrin . for , since tradition is self-evidently a certain way if followd ( disc. . § . . & . ) and both best nature and best grace in this world are engaged that it hath been and shall be ever followed . ( disc. . and . ) again , since the certainty of what faith was formerly taught must needs descend to us as matter of fact formerly past , that is whose certainty depends on authority , and tradition is the first principle in way of authority as it engages for matters of fact formerly past ( corol. . ) and self-evident to the proceeders on it ( corol. . ) that is to the body of catholicks : lastly , since christian tradition rightly understood is nothing but the living voice of the catholick church essential as delivering , 't is manifestly and manifoldly evident that that body which relies on it , that is the catholick church or ( corol. . & . ) the whole church essential , is infallibly certain that she is in secure possession of christs true doctrin . . tradition once establisht , general councils and even provincial ones , nay particular churches are infallible by proceeding upon it. for the same reason ; in regard that proceeding on it they proceed upon a certain and self-evident principle ; ( corol. . & . ) that is such a one as neither they can mistake nor it mislead them . . the roman see with its head are particularly infallible by the same means . for , in regard a more vigorous cause put at first is apt to produce a greater effect , and the coresidence , joynt-endeavours , preaching , miracles , and lastly martyrdome of the two chief apostles working upon that city which commanded the greatest part of the world were more vigorous causes to imprint christs doctrin at first and recommend it to the next age than was found any where else ; it follows that the stream of tradition in its source and first putting into motion was more particularly vigorous here than in any other see. again , since uninterrupted publicity of professing faith makes a greater visibility of faith , which is a manifest advantage to tradition , and no patriarchal see but the roman hath continued ever from the primitive times in a publick profession of christs faith , being held under by barbarians ; hence the roman see ( and inclusively their pastours and most their chief pastour ) have a particular title to infallibility built on tradition above any other see or pastour whatsoever . not to mention and dilate on the particular assistances to the clergy of that see , and most particular to its bishop , springing out of their divinely constituted office , in regard 't is a position unacknowledged by adversaries against whom i am discoursing . . tradition establisht , the church is provided of a certain and infallible rule to preserve a copy of the scripture's letter truly significative of christs sence , as far as it is coincident with the main body of christian doctrin preacht at first . for , since ●tis certain the apostles taught the same doctrin they writ , ●tis manifest the scripture●s letter was at first ( for what of it was intended to signify points of faith ) significative of faith or sence writ by miracles , preaching and practice in the hearts of the first faithful : wherefore , since the same sence that was preacht at first was preserv'd all along unalterably by tradition , ( disc. . & . ) and the same sence in mens hearts can easily guide them to correct the alteration of the outward letter , so as to preserve it significative of the sence first delivered ; therefore tradition establisht the church is provided of a certain and infallible rule to preserve a copy of the scripture's letter truly significative of christ's sence , as far as scripture is coincident with the main body of christian doctrin preacht at first . . tradition establisht the church is provided of a certain and infallible rule to interpret scripture's letter by , so as to arrive certainly at christ's sence , as far as that letter concerns the body of christian doctrin preacht at first or points requisit to salvation . for , since ( disc. . & . ) tradition preserves the first deliver'd sence alive in mens hearts sent down by way of living voice and christian practice ; and these were in the beginning evidently a most certain way of knowing the sence of the letter , ●tis evident that they are still such . wherefore tradition establisht the church is provided , &c. . tradition establish't nothing can be received by the church as h●ld from the first or ever , unless held ever . for , since ( disc. . § . . & disc. . & . & corol. , & . ) tradition is self-evidently a certain method of conveying down matters of fact as they were found , it follows that , tradition establish't , points not held ever must be convey'd down such as they were found , that is as not held ever and consequently not as held from the first or ever . . tradition establish't 't is impossible any errour against christ● s faith should bee received by the church ; that is no errour contradicting faith can be received as of faith. for , since to be received as of faith is ( disc. . & . ) to traditionary christians the same as to be received as held ever or from christs time , and ( corol. . ) no point at all , though disparate or indifferent , not-held-ever can be received as held-ever , 't is evident that much less can an erroneous point contradicting what was held ever be received as held-ever . . notwithstanding tradition , erroneous opinions and ( their proper effects ) absurd practices may creep into the church and spread there for a while . for , since , notwithstanding the certainty of tradition , the church is still , according to our saviour , a congregation made up of good and bad , and the bad will do like themselves , that is be glad to invent and propagate such principles as shall make for their own ends or for vices , that is , erroneous ones ; again , since it cannot be expected but that multitudes even of good men in the church should in using their private reasons be liable to errour in divers particular points or cases , and that the remoteness of christian principles or points of faith from the principles of particular actions or cases is apt to make the opposition between them not easily nor clearly discoverable at first , nay the ambiguity in wording them may make them appear at first sight fairly reconcilable till the terms be distinguisht and clear'd from equivocation ; 't is very evident that tradition's certainty hinders not but erroneous opinions , and ( their proper effects ) absurd practices may creep into the church and spread there for a while . . erroneous opinions can never gain any solid footing in the church . for , since ( disc. . § . . corol. . ) the church is a body of men relying on tradition or the authority of attesting forefathers , not on the authority of opinators , these opinions can never have any firmness in her by means of authority ; and , on the other side , being erroneous , they can never gain any depth of adhesion by being demonstrably true ; nor ( errour being necessarily opposit to truth ) can they even maintain their quiet posture by being evidently not opposit to faith ; it follows that neither upon the score of reason nor authority can they sink deep into the minds of the faithful ( at least the intelligent party of them ) or gain any solid footing in the church ; but are subject to be contradicted or have their verity disputed by the searching and unsatisfy'd wits of opposers . . the prudence requisit in church-government is one cause why erroneous opinions are not immediately but after some long time perhaps to be declared against by the authority of the whole church . for , since a church is a most vast and sacred common-wealth , and so of the greatest gravity and authority imaginable , she is not in prudence to engage it trivially in sleight occasions , nor rashly when the point is unevident . wherefore , seeing an erroneous opinion , while held but by few , is of sleight concern , and so onely fit to be taken notice of by inferiour officers ; when universally held is of great authority amongst the multitude ; she is in prudence to suspend till its opposition to faith be clear'd by the science of divinity , and this satisfactorily to a great part of the opinatours ; lest either she should in stead of tares pluck up wheat , or use her authority more to destruction than edification by a too hasty decision . . no erroneous opinion in divinity , if vniversal and practical , can be very long permitted in the church . for since ( corol. . ) a meer opinion can never gain the authority of a traditionary point , 't is manifest it can never subsist when it is shown to clash with any of the said points : wherefore , since it is liable to discussion , and men are naturally of different judgments and interests , and the variety and nature of worldly interest is such that if any thing makes for the interest of some 't is for that very reason against the interest of another , it will excite them to discussion and sifting its conformity or disconformity to christian principles , which is the way to clear the terms and make it appear . but , especially , seeing absurd or irrational practices are the proper effects of erroneous principles , and that our natural corruption inclines men to follow such practices till they be checkt by regard to something held sacred , that is by being shown opposit to faith ; it follows that , till this opposition be shown , they will infallibly grow on still more and more , till they come to such an height of absurdity that they need now no skill to discover them : experience teaching us that the most palpable and evident method to try the truth of any speculation is to put it into matter and bring it into practice . those irrational practices therefore must needs after some time discover themselves opposit to christian behaviour , and consequently confess the principle which begot them opposit to christian faith ; which done , it presently loses its credit , and is quasht by the incomparably more powerful force and all over-bearing authority of tradition . . erroneous opinions and the irrational practices issuing from them ( though suppos'd vniversal and of long continuance ) can never corrupt substantially the iudgments or wills of the faithful . for , since ( corol. . ) nothing not held ever or not coming from christ can possibly be accepted as held ever or coming from christ , 't is evident no erroneous opinion can come to gain the sacredness and repute of a traditionary point , nor their proper practices the esteem of christian practice ; wherefore , traditionary points being the principles which absolutely possess the judgmenrs and govern the lives of the faithful as christians , it follows that no opinion can ever be held by them but in a conciev'd subordination to traditionary points or points of faith , nor practic●t by them but with a conceivd subordination and conformity to those practices which spring from undoubtedly-known christian tenets or traditionary points . seeing then what is not held and practic●t but as conceivd subordinate to other tenets and practices must needs be less held than those others , nay not held at all otherwise than conditionally or upon supposal of such a subordination , ●tis clearly consequent that traditions certainty is so powerful an antidote that bad opinions and practices can never corrupt substantially and absolutely the judgments or wills of the faithfull . . no erroneous opinion or its proper practice is imputable to the church properly and formally taken . for , since the church , formally as such , proceeds on christian tradition , no such opinion nor consequently practice is imputable to the church properly and formally taken , but onely to some men in the church ( materially consider'd ) as left to the contingent force of their private discourses : that is , indeed , to the schools not the church . . 't is exceedingly weak and senceless to think to impugn the church by objecting to her such opinions and practices . for , since they concern her not , nor are imputable to her as church , or to her members as faithful , the wise objection can onely signify thus much , that the church has men in her who are fallible in their private discourses or school-disputes ; that is , she has men in her who are men . a heavy imputation ! . the knowledge of tradition's certainty is the first knowledge or principle in controversial divinity , that is , without which nothing is known or knowable in that science . for , since controversy or the science which establishes the certainty of faith depends on these two propositions , whatever god said is true , and god said this , the former of which is out of controversy as we now handle it with our modern dissenters , and onely the later is the subject of our debate : seeing also ( as hath been largely and manifoldly evident ) nothing can ascertain us of this but tradition , nor it unless its certainty be known , it follows that the knowledge of tradition's certainty is the first knowledge or principle in controversial divinity . . christ's promise to his church ( however comfortable to the faithful ) can bear no part in the notion of the rule of faith , nor be the first principle of a controversial divine . for , since christ's promise to his church is held as a point of faith , that is , receiv'd upon the rule of faith , that is , subsequent to that rule , 't is manifest that it can be no part of that rule nor first principle in controversy . again , the rule of faith ( disc. . § . , and . ) must be so evident as to its existence that no other knowledge must intervene between the natural power of understanding and it , and this in the meanest vulgar ; but , that christ promist his church infallibility is not thus self-evident but needs other knowledges to evidence it , unless we will make all come by inspiration . besides , if god's providence laid in second causes for tradition's indeficiency be not certain in its self , ( abstracting from christ's promise to his faithful ) tradition can never convey certainly that promise to us ; it must then be assur'd to us by scripture's letter ascertain'd onely by imagin'd diligence from copy to copy , not by tradition ; that is , that letter could not be certain its self , and so fit to ascertain others , till tradition's certainty be establish't antecedently : and , were it suppos'd a true letter , this letter ( tradition being as yet suppos'd unknown to be able to convey down certainly christs sence ) must be interpreted onely by private skills ; and so , all the churches veracity , that is , all mankinds salvation must be built on that private interpretation . private , i say ; for in that supposition , till the scripture's letter for that point be interpreted certainly truly , the churches veracity or power to interpret it truly is not yet known : which , besides the common rule that no scripture is of private interpretation , is particularly and highly faulty in this case , that it would make our fundamental of fundamentals , the certainty of our rule of faith , rely on such a private interpretation . moreover , to say tradition of the church is certain because christ promist it , puts it to be believ'd not seen ; and is the same in controversy as it is in nature to say in common , such an effect is wrought because 't is god's will ; which gives no account of that particular effect , but onely sayes something in common : wherefore , since the certainty of the rule of faith ( it being antecedent to faith ) must be seen not believ'd , a controversial divine ought to make it seen ; that is , ought to demonstrate its certainty and indeficiency by intrinsecal mediums or dependence on proper causes . it signisies therefore no more in the science of controversy to say christ promist , than in natural science to answer to every question , in stead of showing a proper cause , that god wills it ; which is a good saying for a christian , as is also the other ; but neither of them a competent principle either for philosopher or controvertist . consent of authority . to the substance of the foregoing discourses . . thus far reason : let 's see how 't is seconded by authority : and first by the scriptures . . for the self-evidence of the way to faith , or ( which is all one ) the rule of faith , see the prophet isay c. . v. . this shall be to you a direct way , so that fools cannot err in it . that is , evident to the rudest vulgar , or self-evident ; else fools might possibly err in it , in case it needed any skill of discourse and were not obvious to common sense . . now , what this self-evident rule is , is most expressively declar'd by the same prophet c. . v. . speaking of god's favour intended to the gentiles ; that is , of the law of grace . this is my covenant with them , saith the lord , my spirit which is in thee , and my words which i have put in thy mouth , shall not depart from thy mouth , and from the mouth of thy seed , and from the mouth of thy seed's seed from henceforth for ever . here we see god's promise to perpetuate christ's doctrin ; and on what manner ; that is , by oral tradition , or delivering it from father to son by word of mouth or teaching ; not by scanning a book put in their hands . we see it promist also that this tradition shall be indefectible or vninterrupted ; and , lastly , that his spirit ( or sanctity ) is both in the church , and will continue ever with her ; which being so , she must needs be supernaturally assisted by the holy ghost ( that is , incomparably above the power of nature ) to this effect of perpetuating christ's doctrin by tradition . . as pithy and home is that of the prophet ieremiah , c. . i will give my law in their bowels , and i● their hearts will i write it ; and still more that of st. paul contradistinguishing the law of grace from moses his law by this , that the later was writ in tables of stone , the former in the fleshy tables of mens hearts . both as express as can be imagined to send us for our faith to living sence in the hearts of the faithful , not to meer dead letters in a book ; that is , recommending to us tradition , which is the perfectest and naturalest way imaginable to write them there , as hath been shown . note the word hearts , which in the metaphorical expression is the principle of action ; not of mee● speculative knowledge , as is the word brain : which intimates the practical nature of tradition ; and , that it imprints christs law , and conveys it down by christian carriage and action ; not by speculative scanning the significativeness of characters in a book . note also , the word fleshy ; which signifies , that the manner of writing christ's law is through the affecting the soul by her inferiour part ( considering her as she is a virtue of understanding ; ) that is , by sensations which make strong and plain impressions in mankind according to their material part , and so force into them natural knowledge : whence , things thus imprinted are apt to settle themselves solidly and even sink deeply into the most material , gross and vulgar understandings . quite contrary to which in all regards is the way of beginning with reading , and labouring to understand certainly , letters in a book ; which , is a kind of speculation , and so belongs to the superiour part of the soul as she is understanding ; being artificial , both in the very nature of such characters , the skill in reading , and highest skills requisit to sence them with certainty . . after scripture-verdict succeed next in order those of councils . i will onely mention three in several ages , leaving multitudes of others . the first synod of lateran . we all confirm unanimously and consequently , with one heart and mouth , the tenets and sayings of the holy fathers ; adding nothing , subtracting nothing of those things which are deliver●d vs ( quae tradita sunt nobis ) by them : and we believe so as the fathers have believed , we preach so as they have tavght . the council of sardica , in its encyclical sent to all catholick bishops . we , have received this doctrin , we have been taught so , we hold this catholick tradition , faith and confession . and the seventh general council in its second act. we imbu'd with the precepts of the fathers , have so confest and do confess ; in the third , we receive and venerate the apostolical traditions of the church . and in the seventh act , giving their final determination , they , declare the grounds on which they proceed in these words . we , walking in the king's-high-way ( regiam viam incedentes ) and relying on the doctrin of our holy and divine fathers , and observing the tradition of the catholick church , define , &c. where we see general councils ( that is , the greatest authority in the catholick church ) relying on the teaching of fathers or foregoing church , and on the churches tradition as on their rule and the high-way to faith ; whence they repute catholick tradition , and faith , the same thing . we see also the amplitude of this rule , recommending to us all faith , so that nothing ought be added to it . and how empty a pretence the fathers in this council judg'd it to disallow this rule under pretext of being opposit to scripture is seen by these words in their first session . they who contemn the teachings of the holy fathers and tradition of the catholick church , and bring for their excuse and inculcate the words of arius , nestorius , eutyches , and dioscorus , saying , vnless we were sufficiently instructed out of the old and new testament , we would follow the doctrins of the fathers , of the six holy synods , and the traditions of the catholick church , let him be accursed . so that they held private instruction from scripture insufficient to build faith on , or ( which is all one ) to be a rule of faith ; also , that it was ever the common pretence of the most execrable hereticks of old to decline tradition , and pretend to sufficient light from scripture's letter ; and , lastly , that since the sence of scripture in points of faith is not attainable sufficiently , or with certainty , by the bare letter of scripture , and with certainty by tradition , and that tradition brings us down determinate sence ; tradition is to sence scripture's letter ; and so that letter no rule but by virtue of tradition ; seeing , faith being sence , and points of faith determinate sences , faith's rule must bring us to such determinate sences . . after antient councils , let us give a glance at fathers , and see what they say to this point . celestin , saint and pope to the fathers of the ephesin council ; agendum igitur nunc &c. now therefore we must act with a common endeavour to preserve things believed , and retain'd to this very time by svccession from the apostles . ireneus cap. . quid autem &c. but what if the apostles had not left us the scriptures , ought we not to follow the order of ●radition which they had deliver'd to those to whom they committed the churches . to which ordination assent many natiens of those barbarians who believe in christ , having salvation writ by the spirit in their hearts without characters and ink , and diligently keeping the ancient tradition . in the former we have it told a general council what their proper task is ; namely to keep or hold fast what was believ'd and kept ; and how ? by succession from the apostles , or from hand to hand . in the second , that the apostles when they gave bishops their charge , ordained or made it their duty to observe tradition ; that this way of tradition was sufficient to receive faith upon ; that is , sufficient to be a rule of faith without scripture ; and that de facto it did perform that office to many nations without scripture . lastly , he calls this delivery from father to son the writing it in their hearts by the spirit ; that is , the work of the holy ghost or supernatural , however it connaturally descended ; and seems to counterpose this to writing by characters or ink ; as if this were not ( so immediately at least ) the holy ghosts work ; in regard ( as plain reason tells us ) the sence of those letters , or faith , must either be had by those inward characters writ in the readers hearts by god's spirit ; and so it , not the ink writes it there ; or else by human or natural skills , which are not attributable to our sanctifier , the holy ghost . . the same father ( lib. . cap. . ) for though there be diverse tongues in the world , yet the virtue of tradition is one and the same . the preaching of the church is true and firm , in which one and the same way of salvation is shown over the whole world . here we have but one rule of faith , or way to faith , & this the preaching or living voice of the church ; which is not onely said to be true but also firm ; that is the certainty of its truth is built on solid grounds , or founded in the nature of things order'd by god's special providence to that end . to show which hath been the aim of my present endeavours . . origen is more express . . periarchôn , servetur verò &c. let the churches preaching deliver'd from the apostles by order of succession , and remaining in the church to this present be preserv'd . that onely truth is to be believ'd , which differs in nothing from the churches tradition . and . in matth. we ought not to believe otherwise than as the churches of god have deliver'd us by succession . where he directly makes tradition the rule to judge what 's sound , what not ; that is , the rule of faith. . tertullian lib. de carne christi . if thou beest but a christian , believe what is ( traditum ) deliver'd . and , speaking to an heretick ; by renouncing what thou hast believ'd thou provest that , before thou didst renounce it , what thou believedst was otherwise : it was then deliver'd otherwise : moreover , what was deliver'd , that was true , as deliver'd by those to whom it belong'd to deliver ; wherefore , renouncing what was deliver'd , thou hast renounc't what 's true. so that in this father's judgment a christian and follower of tradition are the same , and that to renounce what comes by tradition is to renounce truth ; which amounts to this , that tradition is the test of christianity , and rule of faith. also he intimates that it belongs to some to deliver , to some not ; and , if to any , to whom but those who lay claim and adhere to tradition or delivery , and are in possession of it ? not to those who are known to have broken from tradition and impugn its certainty . . athanasius ( in lib. de synodis . ) they have declar'd themselves to be vnbelievers by seeking what they have not ; all therefore that are seekers of faith are vnbelievers . they onely to whom faith comes down from their ancestors , that is , from christ by fathers , do not seek , and therefore they onely have faith. if thou comest to faith by seeking , thou wast before an vnbeliever . and , in his discourse against paulus samosatenus de incarnatione . he that searches after those things which are beyond his strength stands upon a precipice ; but he that sticks to tradition , stands out of danger . wherefore we persuade you , which also we persuade our selves , that you retain the faith deliver'd ( traditam fidem ) and avoid prophane words of novelty . i wish the protestants would seriously weigh the import of these sayings of this father , and consider what it was which sustain'd him who was a pillar of faith in his dayes ; and then , applying it , see whether it fits to catholicks or them. they would plainly discern that which they prize themselves most for , that is for taking their faith out of judgment , by finding and seeking it in the scriptures , is alone enough to show them not to be truly faithful ; that god has promised a perfectly secure way to give them true faith , that is , by believing ancestours . that they who do not so stand upon a precipice , seeking what 's beyond their power ; that is , to hammer a certain faith out of scripture's letter by their private wit. which reflected on , a little reason , enlightned by so plain and manifold experiences , will easily tell them that 't is the shallowness of their grounds , unable to satisfy rational nature , which makes so many of theirs take upon them to seek for faith , and so leave them ; and the solid secureness , connaturalness , and satisfactoriness of ours which makes few or none leave us ; and those who do , 't is easie to discover the motives of their revolting . . yet one more from this illustrious father ; as one whom by reason of his famous contrasts with the impious arians , it concern'd to be more express in inculcating and sticking to the true rule of faith. he writing to epictetus bishop of corinth . 't is to be answer'd ( saith he ) to those things , which alone of it self suffices , that those are uot of the orthodox church , and that our ancestours never held so . so that the living voice of the church , tradition , or belief of ancestours , is held by him a sole-sufficient rule of faith , and the onely answer to be given why we reject points from faith , or admit them into it ; that is , an evident reason for such a carriage ; for otherwise another answer would be requisit . . we will be shorter in the rest . clemens alexandrinus stromatôn o. as if one of a man becomes a beast , like those infected by circes poyson , so he hath forfeited his being a man-of-god and faithful to our lord , who spurns against the churches tradition , and leaps into opinions of human elections . basil against eunomius : wouldst thou have us all ▪ perswaded by thee , prefer your conceits before the tradition of faith , which perpetually hath conquer'd under so many holy men . and , speaking against two other hereticks , sabellius and arius ; let tradition bridle thee : our lord taught thus , the apostles preach't it , the fathers conserv'd it , our ancestours confirm'd it ; be content to say as thou art taught . we have it clear then that the renouncer of tradition is none of the faithful , that is cut off from the root of faith ( see corol. . ) that all is men's conceits and arbitrary opinions ( which the word heresie imports ) that is opposit to tradition . we have , lastly , the whole course of our faith's descent from christ to us ; yet not a word of descending by scripture or letters in books , but by the way of preaching and teaching , that is , oral delivery and sence writ in men's hearts . . i omit many other fathers , but i must not s. austin . ea potius credam , &c. i will rather believe ( saith he , contra epistolam fundamenti ) those things which are celebrated now by the consent of learned and unlearned ; and are confirmed throughout all nations by most grave authority . and , again ; 't is manifest that the authority of the catholick church is of force to cause faith and assurance . which ( authority ) from the best establisht seats of the apostles even to this very day , is strengthened by the series of bishops succeeding them , and by the assertion of so many nations . in both places he he makes the consent of learned and vnlearned , bishops and conspiring people , continu'd down to these dayes ( that is , the living voice of the church essential , or tradition ) the most grave authority , apt to ascertain us and cause faith ; that is , he makes tradition the rule of faith ; and builds its strength ( as we also do ) on the multitude and consent of the asserters or testifiers of its descent . also in his . epistle , the faithful ( saith he ) do possess perseveringly a rvle of faith common to little and great in the church . where every word is emphatical ; that the churches voice is the rule of faith : that this rule is common to learued and vnlearned ; that is , able to satisfie the acutest discoursers and yet understandable by the rudest vulgar : lastly , that they hold it , and that perseveringly or unshakenly ; which shews it self-evident ; else both , the unlearned at least , might come to doubt of it . ( see disc. . § . , , , . . thus much for the credit of tradition ; it s being the rule of faith , certain , and uninterrupted . but how shall we know who enjoyes this tradition , or what points have been handed down by it from the beginning ? must we not run to private expositions of scripture to be assur'd of this , or at least to libraries of books writ in all former ages to see if perhaps their authours might●have dream'd of our now difficulties , and then prophesi'd us a satisfaction so express and ample , that no cavil can avoid it ? no , we have manifest certainty of it other wayes , if we may trust the fathers . we will onely alledge two , both very antient , and great masters of controversy against the hereticks of their times . s. ireneus lib. . cap. . all those who will hear truth may at present perfectly discern ( adest perspicere ) in the church the tradition of the apostles , manifest in the whole world. that is , the doctrin of the present church ( proceeding upon or adhering to tradition ) is a manifest argument , that what it teaches now was delivered by the apostles . and tertullian contra marcionem . that is manifestly true which is first , that first which is from the beginning , that from the beginning which is from the apostles . in like manner that will manifestly appear to have been delivered by the apostles , which shall be establisht as sacred in the churches of the apostles . where first he ascends , and confounds novelty or heresie , by shewing that the priority of what they left , argues it to have been ever or from the apostles , and so true ; and then proves , and manifestly too , that that was delivered from the apostles which is found establisht ( that is held to be receiv'd , as all his former doctrine runs ) as sacred in the churches at present , which were founded by the apostles . but he is yet more express in his first book against the same heretick , nothing is to be acknowledg'd a tradition of the apostles , but what is at this present day profest ( for such ) in their churches . so that he sends us not to volumes of histories and other writers ( which if tradition can'fail , are of no authority ) to find what was the antient or primitive traditions , or what the apostles taught or delivered , but onely to the living voice of the present churches ; which had been but a weak procedure , in case their holding now a thing deliver'd were not argumentative that it was deliver'd ever ; which is the substance of my proof a posteriori , for the indefectiveness of tradition . and , least it should be imagin'd that this argument loses its force by tract of time , or the long-continuance of the church , peter chrysologus , in his . sermon , secures us from that danger . a christian mind knows not how to bring into dispute those things which are strengthen'd by tradition of the fathers , and even ( ipsis temporibus ) by time it self . to omit here that he makes it the very temper of a christian mind not to question tradition , he maintains continuance of time , to be so far from weakening the certainty of traditionary points , that it contributes to strengthen them more . and the reason is , because the churches doctrin spreads by time , and so the sway of tradition's descent is ampler ; besides that every new degree of continuance establishes its title to possession , and makes it hainouser to revolt from it . and , effects show our discourse true ; for , there were more variety of heresies , that is renouncers of tradition , in the first years after the apostles , than we read of in any years since ; nor ( that we may use a familiar instance in human tradition ) does ( i conceive ) any man living more doubt now of mahomets or iulius caesar's existence , than within an years after they liv'd . . a few notes , well weigh'd , will strengthen the force of these allegations ; which even at first sight seem to look very favourably on our cause . i mind my reader then , first , that almost every citation alledg'd is of councils or fathers speaking directly against hereticks ; that is , in such circumstances as put them to declare what fixt them catholicks , and what made the other hereticks . secondly , that though some fathers and councils speak highly of scripture , as that it contains all faith , &c. 't is first to be markt whether they speak of scripture senc't , or as yet to be senc●t ; and , if the later , by whom ; or whether any fathers say that scripture wrought upon by private interpretation and human wit is apt to ascertain faith ( or be the rule of faith ) which is the true point between the renouncers of tradition and us . thirdly , they shall observe it frequent in fathers to force hereticks to accept the sence of scripture from those who gave them the letter of scripture ; and very frequent to sence that letter ( even when dark ) by tradition ; but never to bend tradition to the outward show the scripture's letter seems to bear as interpreted by human skills ; or to say universal tradition is insufficient or uncertain , unless the scripture's letter thus interpreted came to clear or assist it . lastly , 't is impossible they should hold scripture thus interpretable the rule of faith ; it being notorious that most hereticks against whom they writ , held it theirs ; and so had they held scripture thus interpreted the rule of faith , they could not have held them hereticks , since they adher'd stiffly to that rule or root of faith , however they might err in many particular tenets . not to repeat how all the properties of the rule of faith are urterly incompetent to scripture's letter . this done , all the testimonies for scripture against tradition lose their edge . that is ( if my discourse also hold the test ) it will appear by way of fact , as it did before by argument that there is neither reason nor authority against tradition . so that i have no more to do but to show that our church at present grounds her faith on tradition as formerly ; which done it follows all the substance of my foregoing discourses is but an explication of our churches sence . . to know our churches sence in this point , we will not fetch our testimony from private authours ( as is the protestants mode when they would affix any thing upon her ) but we will attend to what her own living voice pronounc't in her late famous representative , the council of trent . where , in every session definitive of faith , it professes to follow tradition , either in most express or equivalent terms . as , session th . the holy synod clearly seeing that this truth and disciplin ( christ's doctrin ) is contain'd in the written books and traditions without writing , which received by the apostles from christ's own mouth ; or from the very apostles , the holy ghost dictating , as it were deliver'd by hands , ( per manus traditae , ) have come down to us &c. and again , also the traditions both belonging to faith and manners , as dictated orally by christ or the holy ghost and conserved by continval svcsession in the catholick church &c. session . the holy council following the iudgment aud consent of the church . ibid. § . . as the catholick church where ever diffus'd hath alwayes understood it ; for by reason of this rvle of faith according to the tradition of the apostles &c. session . it professes to follow that doctrin which christ taught , the apostles deliver'd , and the catholick church , the holy ghost suggesting , perpetually ( or interruptedly ) retain'd . session . the holy synod adhering to the holy scripture , the traditions of the apostles , and the consent of councils and fathers . session . the sound and sincere doctrin which the catholick church hath ever kept , and will ever keep to the end of the world. and , again , for so all ovr ancestovrs that ever were in the tru church of christ most openly have profest . and yet again cap. . this faith was ever in the church . so cap. . it was ever held in god's church . more such like expressions are found in the same session . but to proceed . session . chap. . the consent of all the fathers ever understood &c. chap. . the church of god never taught nor held &c. chap. . the vniversal church ever understood that &c. chap. . it was ever held in god's church chap. . it was perpetvally commended by our fathers to christian people . no catholick ever held &c. and in the same session concerning extream unction , alledging s. iames his text , it adds , by which words as the chvrch hath learned by tradition receiv'd down by hands , he teacheth &c. and can. . as the catholick church ever understood from the beginning &c. can. . which the catholick church ever observ'd from the beginning , and doth observe &c. session . chap. . the council professes to follow the iudgment and cvstome of the church . chap. . it declares that this power has perpetvally been in the church . session . that the antient faith and doctrin may be retain'd in the church . ibid. cap. . as the catholick , church ever understood and taught . chap. . according to apostolical tradition . session holy writings show it , and the tradition of the catholick church ever taught it . chap. . they are known to have been in use from the very beginning of the church . session . the holy fathers , councils and the vniversal tradition of the church have alwayes taught . and speaking of some errors , it pronounces them different from the catholick church , and from the cvstome approved since the apostles time . session . the catholick church instructed by the holy ghost , teaches out of sacred writings and the antient tradition of the church , &c. according to the use of the catholick and apostolick church [ traditam ] deliver'd from the first ( or primitive ) times of christian religion , &c. more expressions of the like strain are found in this session . and , to close up all , in their acclamation they use this form of words : this is the faith of blessed peter , this is the faith of the fathers , this is the faith of the orthodox . from which testimonies , note we . . first , that the council in every session , ( not one excepted ) where points of faith are handled , constantly professes to follow tradition . secondly , it layes claim perpetually to vninterruptedness of this tradition , as appears by the words , ever , alwayes , from the apostles times , from the beginning , from the apostles have come down by hands to us , the church hath alwayes understood , held , openly profest , taught , hath ever kept , and will ever keep , perpetually commended by our fathers , hath learned by tradition received down by hand , hath ever observed , and such like . plainly showing that this persuasion of our faith's descent uninterruptedly is deeply and unanimously rooted in the heart of the whole catholick church . which strengthens our doctrin , disc. . § . . and . ly . it makes the suggestion of the holy ghost , or sanctity in the hearts of the faithful , efficacious to perpetuate the delivery of received doctrin . see sess. . decreto de iustificatione , sess. . de ss . euchar. sacramento , and many other places . the very point i went about to explicate in my . discourse . ly . 't is observable that though it mentions the holy scriptures also with tradition , yet this is both very rarely , and when it does so it onely expresses that faith is contain'd in them ; but when it brings places of scripture to ground definitions upon , it perpetually professes to interpret them by tradition ; which is most evident both by its decreeing this in common . sess. . that none dare to interpret holy scriptures against the sence which our holy mother the church hath held and does hold ; meaning that sence in the hearts of the faithful is the rule to interpret scripture by , ( see corol. . ) as also by several instances ; sess. . § . . sess. . can. . sess. . cap. . and ( to omit others ) in that most remarkable pla●e sess. . in which after the text of s. iames●lledg'd ●lledg'd for extream unction , the council subjoins , in which words , as the church hath learn'd by apostolical tradition received down by hands , be teaches , &c. where tradition is most evidently made the rule which instructs and guides the church in interpreting scripture : and 't is observable that the council no where grounds any definition on scripture , but at the same time she grounds her interpretation of scripture on tradition ; which devolves into this that the council makes tradition her onely rule to know certainly christ's sence , or points of faith ; that is , ( in proper speaking ) the onely rule of faith. . but why then is the holy scripture made use of at all by the council , and that so solemnly ; nay , and ( which is to be noted ) constantly put before tradition ? to satisfy fully this difficulty 't is not the proper season at present ; yet , being a good point and worth clearing , i will not totally neglect it . we may observe then that when we read any book writ by an authour we much esteem , but yet such a book as requires studying , ( aristotle's for example , or some other such whom we hold scientifical , ) we sometimes hope well ( as it were ) when we apply our own industry to find out his meaning , and have a kind of respect for what we conceive to be his sence ; yet his authority takes not full hold of our understanding , by reason the way we take is not evidently convictive that this is his certain sence ; but if the point he writes on be first clear'd to us through a scientifical discourse by word of mouth , made by some interpreter vers'd in his doctrin and perfectly acquainted with his meaning , we have as it were new eyes given us to look deeply and thoroughly into his sence ; and , by this security of arriving at it , his authority ( in case we highly esteem'd it ) has now its full force upon us to strengthen our assent , according to the degree of power it had upon our understanding . now , what a well-skill'd and insighted interpreter or scientifical explicater of the point is to such an author , the same is tradition to scripture . for , this bringing down certainly christ's sence in every point of faith , it easily and securely guides us to the true meaning of scripture in those passages which concern such a point ; whereas , the wordish way of grammar and criticism being evident by principles to be ambiguous , and by experience to lead men into different sences , it can never satisfy us thoroughly that the sence we arrive at by this method is infallibly the true one or christs , and so never engages certainly the authority of god's word . and , hence it is that scripture thus interpreted is of sleight force , and at best good onely for ecclesiastical rhetorick or sermons ; where the concern is not much if the preacher misses in this particular passage so the substance of the point he preaches on , or his text , be truly christ's doctrin ; nor is scripture thus interpreted even a competent proof in the science of school-divinity , as being uncertain and so unapt to beget science ; whence , intelligent divines quoting and building on scripture are to be suppos'd to judge the sence they build on to be the churches , and so they are presum'd to go to work as faithful , or parts of ecclesia docens ; or else they lay true science first , which is ever agreeable to faith ; and so , when any text concerns a demonstrated point , they know by science what the true sence of that point must be . much less is scripture wordishly interpreted apt to build faith on ; the unwaveringness of which kind of assent must be grounded and secure in the principles which beget , it and not meerly actually such as it were by accident ; whereas interpretations thus made ( faith's principles in this case ) are liable to possible if not probable mistake . this will be clearer by a parallel made by a learned authour worth inserting , because it strengthens our discourse by a new consideration . let a critick and a skill'd carpenter read vitruvius his book of architecture , the critick has but a dim , dry and uncertain conceit of what he reads as to the truth of the thing ; but the carpenter or architect , by reason of some principles and practice he has already of those matters , understands him more thoroughly , and makes lively and firm conceits of the truth and excellency of what he writes ; such is the practical way of knowing christs sence , or tradition , to the interpreting scripture , us●d by the catholick church ; in comparison of the critical method affected by others . in a word , tradition gives us christs sence , that is , the life of the letter ascertaind to our hands , which therefore must needs move the letter , its body , naturally ; the other way takes the dead letter , and endeavours to move it artificially to counterfeit that life which it truly wants . . to apply this discourse to our matter in hand . tradition securing to us the scripture's letter truly significative of christ's sence , and also the true sence of that letter in points of faith deliver'd , ( see coroll . . & ) it follows that scripture alledged by the church relying on tradition for its rule , engages certainly and fully the very authority of the divinely inspir'd writer himself ; and gives that testimony the whole effect upon our understanding , which that sacred . writers authority deserves to have given it . no wonder then the council , proceeding upon traditionary interpretation as it constantly declares it self to do , honours scripture-testimony so as to put it before tradition or the delivery of christs doctrin from hand to hand : scripture , thus alledg'd and securd , having the same force as if the apostle or evangelist himself should sit in the council , and by way of living voice declar'd his own sence in the matter ; to whom , thus present , what deference the council would have given is obvious to be imagin'd . hence , also , the protestant may see what high esteem our church gives to gods word , truly so calld ; that is , having gods sence certainly-known to be such , in it ▪ and that 't is onely the outward letter as us'd to hammer a faith out of by wordish skills , that is , indeed , their method of interpreting it ( which , by reason of its uncertainty falls short of engaging the sacred authority of gods word ) we fleight and scorn : and most justly , since 't is the having no better way to work on scripture , which has brought scripture it self , thus us●d , to scorn and contempt ; as appears in the carriage of our bedlam of new sects in england . i expect here some mighty man of talk , but very weak speculator , should object that this is an excellent way to bring all into our churches hands . but till he can prove that both letter & sence of scripture are knowable , with such a certainty as to build on them that most firm assent call'd faith , by any other way than this of tradition , i can neither hinder my inferences nor will he ever be able to confute my discourse . . thus much to show evidently that the substance of the doctrin we have given in our former discourses , is the very sence of our church at present ; and that her present sence in this matter is agreeable to the judgment of antient fathers and councils . i have no more to do now but to show that at the very time of the breach here in england , the catholick was found adhering fast to this rule of tradition , renounc't by the protestant . this is evident by the protestants own confession ; for , as oft as you hear them alledge that england was formerly overgrown with popery , that the new light of the g●spel hath of late discovered it self , that they reform●d in faith , that the former church errd , and such like expressions which naturally must burst out from them , so oft you hear them acknowledge themselves deserters of tradition and innovators . which expressions of theirs ( by the way ) easily manifest to the most vulgar understanding who ●tis that hath renounct tradition ; whence , it being also easily evidenceable to the rudest capacity that tradition is a most certain way of bringing down faith ( disc. . § . . ) the most vulgar soul is capable of knowing which profession it is to follow . for the two former points being known , they are certain by motives within their own ken , that protestants have renounct the certain way to bring down faith ; but that we renounct tradition of old is unacknowledged by us , disputable , and onely knowable by skills they are not masters of . common sense then teaching them they must guide themselves by reasons they are capable of , and not by reasons of which they know nothing , and that god requires no more at their hands than they can do , gods goodness has provided for those weak people , out of the very confessions of tradition●s deserters , certain means to judge whether they ought to be catholicks or protestants . but , to return whence we diverted . . it is not onely the protestants own confession , but the open profession of the catholick clergy in the very nick of the breach manifests our claim and constant adherence to tradition . whose declaration , found in the synodal book , . begins thus . because by relation of publick fame , it hath lately come to our knowledge that many tenets of christian religion , hitherto received and approv●d by the publick and 〈◊〉 consent of christian nations , and brovght down by hands even from the apostles to vs , are call●d into doubt ▪ therefore , &c. where we find them stick firmly to tradition ; and , insisting on this principle , they proceed to make a profession of their faith , which they exhibit to the bishops to be given to the lord keeper ; but the state by power over-bearing the votes of the reverend convocation , and persecuting them for their constancy , the breach ensu●d . the catholick cleaving fast to his old rule tradition ; the protestants chusing a new one of scripture privately interpreted ; whose vanity a little reason makes them see , but experience perfectly find ; and relinquishing the antient rule so demonstrably self-evident , secure and solid ; by which means they became cut off from the onely certain way to know christs sence , that is from the root of faith , and consequently from the body of the church ; the guilt of which fact neither human authority , multitude , prosperity , continuance , nor yet all their voluminous wordish excuses will ever be able to efface . animadversions on dr. pierce's sermon : also , on mr. whitby and mr. stillingfleet , where they touch the way lay'd in the foregoing discourses . in three appendixes . psalm . . sagittae parvulorum factae sunt plagae eorum . anno dom. . transition to the following appendixes . i have finisht my discourse : how dexterously must be determin'd by the iudgment of my readers , and confutation from m●●e adversaries . but i account those onely my proper iudges & competent adversaries who lay their principles ere they discourse , and weigh the efficaciousness of their testimonies in the scales of reason ere they alledge them . if i find a man laying no principles of his own , but supposing them , and making account all men must admit them out of respect to him or his party , and yet bend all his endeavours to cavil at principles laid by others to ascertain and establish the groundwork of christianity ; if i find one ignorant of or resolv'd against the onely-certain method and rule of discourse , which is , that no position deserves assent unless the connexion of its terms be evident , which must either be when they are evidently connected of themselves ( of which nature ought to be all first principles ) or made evidently-connected by the interposition of some other , which we call evident-by-consequence or deduction : lastly , if i find a man wedded to parrat-talk of ayr and sounds that he thinks it a rare thing to load margents with citations , without first distinguishing them and considering what strength each ought to have according to rational principles ; i decline such an empty soul for my iudge , and sleight him as mine adversary . and lest any should impute this carriage to me for fastidiousness i offer my reason for it . for , to cavil at principles and yet go about to lay none himself , is the method of a sceptick ; and from him indeed i must suffer it , if i cannot forc● him to hold his tongue : but , that one who pretends himself a christian , that is an holder of christ's law , that is ( if he goes consequently ) a relier upon some first or self-evident principle for holding that christ said thus or thus , should be permitted to impugn principles brought to ascertain fundamentally that point , and yet himself lay none to do that effect ( as is the custome of the impugners of tradition ) is to let him behave himself like a renouncer of christianity , and to fight against any assuredness of christianity ; that is , to contradict himself and all his own positions as he is christian ; which permission is unreasonable according to maxims of common sence , and illegal by the rules of true logick . again , if the clear light of vnderstanding gives it manifest , that nothing can be seen intellectually but what is either evident by its own light or by deduction in the manner declared , t is as evident that to frame discourses in another method than this , or at least loose discourses that have no connexion involu'd in them , enabling them to bear the test of this method , can be onely to talk vncertainties , that is , of we know not what : which is unworthy a man , much more a scholler . and , lastly , since it is evident by reason that every sleight authority is not comparable to that of god's church , 't is evident likewise that reason is to weigh what is due to authorities ; and that , no authority deserves any assent further than reason gives it to deserve . now , this being so , to alledge authorities undistinguishingly , whereas there is such diversity of degrees in them that perhaps there are no two to be found perfectly alike in merit , is such a wild proceeding hand over head , such a careless saying any thing to no imaginable purpose but purely to talk , that no sober discourser can think it fit to spend time in combating such an aiery adversary . . i make it my request to my intelligent reader ( for i write to none but such ) that he would reflect back on the method i have taken in my short discouse ; and he will see that ( however my performance speeds ) i pursue the way of evidence , and aim at least at perfect science of the point in hand . he will see i take my rise at the meaning of the words rule and faith ; this known , i establish my first principles in this present matter to be these , a rule is a rule , faith is faith ; hence i proceed to discover diverse attributes necessarily connext with what is meant by those two words ; and if , to avoid witty cavil , i decline the pretence of rigorous definitions of either word , without pressing the essentialness of any of those attributes to the natures of rule and faith , i hope i shall merit both pardon and thanks from those who look for satisfaction ; for , as long as those attributes must necessarily accompany the rule of faith , i do my work without engaging into nicer disquisitions . those attributes being shown necessarily connected with the notion of rule of faith , i apply'd them to my matter in hand by means of these two propositions , bearing a necessity of truth in their very terms ; that is not the rule of faith to which attributes necessarily belonging to the rule of faith belong not ; and , that is the rule of faith to which properties belonging onely to such a rule do belong . hence i reject scripture's letter from being that rule , and assert tradition to be it . and this was enough perhaps for me to do if i onely minded opposition to those who adhere to scripture's letter for their rule , in contradistinction and opposition to traditions being such . . but , intending to avail my self and my cause by the strength of truth and reason not the weakness and passion of others , i went forwards ( having first shown it clearly self-evident that tradition was a most certain rule , if follow'd ) endeavouring to demonstrate the indefectiveness of tradition , or that it was ever follow'd ; and this i attempted by those means . i took the allow'd definition of man ( the subject of the effect i was to show , ) which was to be a rational creature . i found the proper agent or efficient to work upon him as such to be motives or reasons ; and , from the impossibility of any such motives to make him prevaricate from openly-deliver'd faith , nay the necessity of seeing he must destroy his credit without any possibility of compassing his end , i endeavour'd to conclude that faith thus descended was never prevaricated from . then , taking the way of demonstrating the same a poste●iori , i took an effect i conceiv'd impossible to be introduc't into a knowing nature without the existence of tradition's ever-indeficiency to ingraft it there , or rather to imbue souls with it naturally , and , as it were , ex traduce . . seeing by this time that my discourse , by stooping from my first principles while i apply●d them to my business , seem'd immerst in matter ; and , by the blunder of many more and more particular terms than were in the meer principle forci●ly taken in , began to look with a contingent face ( though indeed i still perch't upon the specifical natures of things , and so never flaggd below the sphere of science ) therefore to comfort the readers understanding apt to grow turbid by my approach towards practice , i consider'd tradition practically and open'd the nature of it , by reflecting connaturally how the revolt from it which we call heresy comes to be originiz'd . for the same reason i compar'd the human force of christian tradition with another vast tradition meerly human ; & then touching at some divine assistances , show'd how the author of nature had establish't the best piece of it , man's nature , by particular means exceeding her own native strength , to this effect of preserving the descent of christ's doctrin unalterable and uninterrupted ; that is , i show'd tradition most certain and most indefective , and far beyond the establishment of any other piece of natural science whatsoever . . lastly , observing that my discourse by process ( as the custom is in all discourses , however evident , if not bound to syllogistical form ) began to look dishevel'd , i added diverse corollaries ; in some of which i made many several ends of it meet in a closer frame ; in others i advanc't forwards to show that the churches vnity , power to oblige and govern her subjects as faithful , and her infallibility in the whole and several parts of her was founded in tradition ; nay that by means of tradition she enjoyes a wonderful sacredness of authority , being not onely unexpugnable but also unimpugnable without destroying all kinds of certainty ; that is , without highest nonsence in the opposer . and hence i seat tradition on her throne ; demonstrating her they the first , and consequently self-evident , principle in affairs of this nature ; and therefore that the knowledge of her certainty is the first principle in the science of controversy . . this tenour of my discourse briefly reflected on , i beg of my intelligent reader to regard it once more in the bulk , and he will see that i begin with self-evident principles ; that my principles are antecedent to authorities , and so are competent means to judge authorities by ; that i studiously avoid wordish ambiguity , which rhetorical discoursers ly open to , holding rigorously to the notion or meaning of the words ; that i lay but the meaning of two familiar words , rule and faith , for the basis of all my discourse ; that i endeavour to pursue my principles by very obvious and immediate connexions ; that all the way i attend heedfully to and build upon the natures of the things ; which , in short , devolves to this , that it may be hop't ( at least by my method ) that there needs nothing but time and industry to frame and make up in rigorous demonstrative form , that sence which i have here deliver'd in a way more sutable to the temper of the world and ease of my readers ; who may see evidence in my discourse , without being oblig'd to bend their brains to study my book with that severity as they would do an euclid . . when this is done , let my reader reflect on all the discourses concerning faith made by any protestant , and see how far they are short from ( i will not say any such performance , but ) even an attempt of evidence . first principles they lay none ; and consequently evidence of deduction cannot be expected from them : for , wanting first principles , 't is nonsence and folly to talk of deducing . again , for want of such principles , they want certainty of any text of scripture to justify it against an atheist or deist . they want self-evident principles to guide them in interpreting their vncertain letter , and so confute other sects which differ from their church ; and the method they take to do it is evidently quite of another nature than scientifical . they have nothing upon account of living teachers which ascertain sence ; so that you must to find your faith not build upon the sence of two or a few familiar words , but of an whole large book ; that is , on millions of words , and those too not onely unsenc't , but also very abstruse and mysterious . they suppose all which is antecedent to faith , that is all principles which are to induce faith and so make no provision for the grounds of christianity against heathens and atheists : the natures of things they are so far from proceeding upon , that they not so much as mind or think of them , nor i doubt fancy or value that method when set before their eyes . principles to weigh each testimony by they lay none , and so quote at randome . certainty they seek not , nor care for ; for they quote the fathers and scripture as by themselves interpreted , and yet neither hold the testimony of fathers infallible nor yet themselves in interpreting scripture ; yet plainest reason tells us , that unless the fathers or themselves were infallible hic & nunc in this saying or interpretation , they were hic & nunc fallible ; that is , all built on that testimony or interpretation is contingent and vncertain : yet of such citations no better authoriz'd , cl●d perhaps in some fine words , the books of their best champions are made up . so that they are convinc't not to study things , but words ; that is , not to be scholars or knowers , but empty talkers ; and so the effect of their endeavours can never be satisfaction to an intelligent soul , but onely tickling the ear or pleasing the fancy . . as i have shown this vngrounded proceeding of the protestants by principles , so i intend to do the same by instances : but ere i go about this undertaking , i think fit to meet with an objection obvious to many readers . 't is this ; that , 't is strange all catholicks do not take this way , it being so conclusive , as well as i. . i answer , that all truths being connected , 't is evident each truth , even for being such , is maintainable several wayes ; especially supreme ●nd very concerning ones : amongst which wayes , some are sutable to some capacities , others to others . wherefore catholick controvertists esteeming themselves debtors both sapientibus , or to those who judg of things per altissimas causas ; and insipientibus , or those who do not so nor fly higher than a prudential pitch : and the later of these being the generality ; hereupon the charity and prudence of those learned opposers of dr. pierce ( and very many others ) have thought fit to address to these by answering his testimonies particularly ; leaving me the way of reason and principles ; though in danger to receive much disadvantage by my imperfect delivery , and securer under the managery of their abler heads and pens . i declare therefore that i intend no confutation of any of those authours , nor to share in the victory of those excellent champions of truth : it being perhaps needless to the generality ( however very satisfactory to examining wits ) to confute that in common which is already confuted by retail . i write more against their way than their books . yet , if any will be so charitable as to judge my short hints to bear the force of a solid confutation , because they radically and fundamentally overthrow all their arguments and very method of arguing , if it be truth 's advantage , i shall give god thanks for it and be glad of it . but the main is , it imports not in maintaining truth what others do or do not ; but , if it be shown that catholick principles ( i mean the living voice of the catholick church , or tradition , our rule of faith ) can bear such a rigorous test of reason , and appear more lustrous and bright by so severe a trial ; and , on the contrary , that the principles of the revolters from her are so little solid , so volatil and meerly made up of fancy , that they evaporate into ayr and even shrink into nothing when set in the mid-da● beams of truth , the rules of evidence ; i desire no higher an honour to the catholick church , nor deeper discredit to her adversaries . first appendix . animadversions on the groundlesness of dr pierce's sermon . . looking about for instances of protestants books most proper to be confuted by my former doctrin , my thoughts pitcht naturally on mr whitby's , where he goes about to settle rationally his rule of faith , and on mr stillingfleet's , where he opposes the way of reason , and the certainty of tradition . but it seem'd convenient to take to task also some adversary who insisted on testimonies , and bring him to grounds ; because , in the way of reason which brings testimonies to grounds , to confute one is in a manner to confute all . dr hamond seem'd proper ; but his book is now out of vogue , if it were ever in it ; for i never heard past two or three persons speak of it : and , i am sure , the best protestant wits of our nation never valued him as a smart and efficacious writer . besides , the notes i have lately given upon the fathers testimonies , leave little in him to be reply'd to , and my discourses have left nothing at all . amongst late adversaries then , dr dentons folly seem'd so ultra crepidam , that it was not worth a serious thought ; and 't is wholly answer'd by declaring that he begins and grounds his whole book on so knavish a calumny , that , could the universality of catholicks have the same law against him , that a private protestant , though the meanest in the kingdome , might freely have , he would lose his ears for libelling . the dissuader for his plausibleness ( not for his strength of sence ) seem'd to require a larger answer than was sutable to the design of an appendix . dr pierce was of highest vogue , and short ; but he was already so doubly overthrown by two learned opposers , that it seem●d unhandsome and ignoble to strike a man when he was down ; his circumstances making him rather an object of pity than victory . yet his pulpit-alarum to excite all england to persecute catholicks was so full of malice , and so monstrously cry'd up , that i judg'd it above all others deserving to be made an example of ungrounded talk. though i shall do it with that compassion as not so much to confute him , as by laying a few notes as admonitions to him , to open his understanding and enable him to look into the force of his own citations , and so to guide himself better the next time he goes about to quote authors ; a point i doubt he as yet never thinks on . they may also give his defender ( now , as i hear , writing ) some light to strengthen his testimonies against us . i am sure they will tend to clear truth , not to blunder it ; and so all ingenuous seekers of satisfaction will thank me for them . to begin then , . the whole scope of his sermon exprest in the title of it , the primitive rule of reformation , causes my first admonition . for , since we both agree that the primitive faith is to be held to , and only differ about the certain means to come to know what that faith was ; we holding to tradition and to fathers and councils ( which are , taken properly , parts of tradition ) as certain means to know that faith ; the protestants to private interpretations of scripture , and to citations quoted on any fashion ; the way to confute us catholicks is to demonstrate the certainty of the way they take to prove their faith the same with the primitive ; otherwise , let them talk and write as long as they will , they are never the neerer their conclusion . now , if plain experience tells us the sm●ctymnuans too preacht and writ against episcopacy by quoting fathers and scripture , let dr pierce show us what his way of talking has above theirs which gives it a virtue of ascertaining or perfectly settling the understanding ; or confess theirs ( and so his too ) is fallible and frivolous . to demonstrate then against us , and so confute us , he ought rather have insisted on a derivative rule , or a rule able to derive down to them christ's faith with certainty ; so to make out their present knowledge , which alone can justifie their present or late action of reforming ; and not run afar off to a primitive rule or faith , which is nothing to the protestants , unless they can prove certainly they follow it . when d. pierce makes a sermon at court upon the certainty of such a rule , we will all become auditours , so he will promise to begin with first principles , and bring evidence of what he sayes : till then let him take heed of bragging in print of demonstrations , until he knows what the word means : that is , till he reflects how a demonstration is a proof which obliges the uudersta●ding , and considers or studies wherein the virtue by which it performs this , consists . such bold and careless talk has cost his credit dear already ; and when it comes to be scann'd by principles and science , will leave it quite bankrupt . . we have seen the end and scope of d. pierce's performance , which is , to over-leap all that concern'd him to prove , if he would conclude with certainty against us : now , the usefullest part of his whole performance , as he sayes in his dedication , are his citations , as being the evide●ce and warrant of all the rest ; which therefore ( if any thing ) deserve to be consider'd . their faults distinguish them into so many forts . of the first sort are those which are impertinent to our ( or indeed to any ) purpose , but to make a noise or vaporing show . of the second , those which are raw or unapply'd , and onely say somthing in common which never comes home to the point . of the third , those which are levell'd blindly at none knows what , or at a question unstated ; and so are shot at rovers . of the fourth , those which impugn a word for a thing ; or some circumstance or manner for the substance . of the fifth , negative testimonies . of the sixth , a private authours saying against the torrent of a contrary consent ; which , of it self , is liable to innumerable contingencies of passion , mistake or ignorance ; but , thus compar'd , signifies less than nothing . the like is to quote a schoolman or two for a point which others freely contradict . of the seventh , those which are false , and signifie not the thing they are expresly quoted for . of the eighth , those which labour of obscurity by an evidently ambiguous word . of the ninth , sayings of those on his own side . of the tenth , a few fragments of scripture , senc't by fancy . . i intend not to muster up one by one all his citations and then rank them under their respective heads , the brevity of an appendix not permitting it : but , i make this fair proffer to his vindicater or himself , that if they please to pitch upon any testimonie of his which falls not under some one ( perhaps many ) of these faulty common-places , i will yeild them all valid and conclusive , and make him publick satisfaction for the injurie . having thus given my bond for the truth y charge , and under so great a penaltie upon failure of being so , i have title to free licence to suppose my charge good , ( which will also appear shortly in common by my § . . ) and accordingly to apply my reason to consider his citations . i discourse then thus , and note . . first , that citations are of two sorts ; the one alledges the testifiers knowledge by eye-sight or infallible sense ; the other his judgment or opinion . now this later , in regard mens judgments or opinions depend on reasons , is not properly that authours testimonie , nor he a witness ( who ought to proceed upon evidence had by senses ) but a schollar or relier on his reasons ; and , so , his expressing himself in the words found in such a citation has no authority further than his reason gives him ; which reason therefore and not his saying ought to be alledg'd : in regard it was meerly by vertue of his reason he knew this ; and so the whole vertue of his authority ( which follows and goes paralel to knowledge ) consists in that reason . none therefore are properly testimonies , but those which relie on sensitive knowledge : and those are of certain authority , if the sincerity of the testator be unquestionable , and the conveyance of his sincerelymeant knowledge to us be evident ; not otherwise . ly . note secondly , that , for the reason given , citations from adversaries , and opinators signifie nothing ; also those whose words presumed to express the witnessers sence are ambiguous , or otherwise-interpretable ; or else their very letter uncertain ; as all are , if the way of tradition be held fallible . thus much in common of citations as in themselves . considering them next as made use of by d. pierce , we finde he relies on them as on his principles to conclude against us , or as he ( good man ) unfortunately calls it , demonstrate . hence . ly , they must not be negative ; for such can conclude nothing . ly , they must not be false or evidently signifying another thing than they are produc't for , nor impertinent ; for then they are in both cases quite besides the purpose . ly , they must be express and home to the point ; for , principles must need nothing but themselves ( besides the application ) to infer the conclusion pretended to spring from them . ly , they must be void of ambiguity . for , principles must be either self-evident , or at least made evident , ere they can deserve to be produc't or admitted as such . lastly , principles are sence , not sounds or characters ; and so their sence ought to be indisputable . . the first note evacuates at once all his citations from authours that concern any point between us . for he brings no certainty of any knowledge exprest to be built on sense ; that is no citation against us , which , in proper speech , deserves to be call'd a testimony . the second note particularly invalidates those of the eighth and ninth sorth . the third , those of the fifth sort . the fourth , those of the first and seventh . the fifth , those of the five first sorts , and also those of the seventh . the sixth , those of the second , third , and particularly the eighth . the last note enervates the tenth , and indeed almost all the rest . it being evident that our learned controvertists give other sences to those citations than what protestants assigne them , and maintain still those sences to be better than theirs . . in a word , seeing all testimonial authority supposes knowledge in the authour , and all knowledge is either from sense ( call'd experience ) or else from evident connexion of terms ( or reason ) and that this later knowledge is apt to make a master , that is , one fit to convince and teach another rationally by intrinsecal mediums or to cause science in him , and so is unfit for testifying : and the former kind of knowledge onely is fit to be an extrinsecal medium or apt to beget belief of the witnesses word ( in regard any person , unacquainted otherwise with the truth of the point , knows by ordinary experience and common reason that mens understandings may err , but their sences rightly circumstanc't , cannot ; ) it follows that no citation in proper speech deserves the name nor has the force or virtue of a testimony but those which are built on sence or experience . this weigh'd , reflecting on the main , i find not one ●●●ress testimony against any point of our ●aith , engaging sense ; that is , not one which merits the name of a testimony or to be esteem'd a part of tradition . that of s. austin for communicating infants has the true nature of a testimony in it , and deserv'd a more elaborate answer , had its sence been unquestionable and the words cited from the father himself ; but the sence of it being disputable ( his expositors explicating s. austin by himself in another place no● to mean oral manducation , but virtual●●●ly ●●●ly which is done by baptism ) and withall cited as a private authours sence concerning s. austin , it falls under the th , and th . head of faulty or inconclusive citations , and so is already answer'd . . this is the upshot of that famous sermon : and now i would gladly know what , in the judgment of an intelligent person who examins things by grounds , dr. pierce hath perform'd in this so highly extoll'd piece of his more than his dear brother and fellow-champion against the pope , mr. henry whistler ? onely he hath clad his little nothings in some kind of mock-rhetorick ; which , like fig-leaves , cover after a pitiful manner the nakedness of his empty discourse . yet , were even his rhetorick examin'd by the substantial rules of that art , i doubt it would come of as ill as his proofs . for 't is obvious to observe that the beginning of his sermon is a-la-mode a school-boy's theme , and that his style is far from even or spun on one thread ; instead of the thunder & lightning of strong and sententious sence astonishing and moving the auditors reason by the advantageous smartness and majesty of the expression ; he gives us a peal of ordinance charg'd with ayr , a volly of thunder-thumping bombast , able to make a solid man's reason nauseate ; and this most inartificially plac't at the very entrance of his sermon , § . . or else loud pulpit-beating invectives ▪ and railings . he makes huge account of little quirking observations out of human authours ; which have no imaginable force or purpose but to make an ostentation of the uncouthness of his reading ; the gallantry of his third paragraph . for ingenious surprizes of reason , erecting and taking the understanding , we have wordish quibbles , quirks , and paranomasias : and those most evidently ( contrary to art ) studiously and industriously affected . his con●ident sayings without proof make up half his sermon ; and his ironies and sarcasms are the sauce to make all this windy meat go down . . i will close with noting his excellent faculty in quoting scripture : to do which when the place is worth looking , as being brought to justify some passage we are about , is grave and to some purpose ; but , when no occasion or need invites , upon the naming any two or three words which hap to be in scripture , to be still quoting and tricking the margent with book , chapter and verse and relating stars or little letters , is a very empty piece of pageantrie , and most sillily pedantical . now , our dr. cannot talk of faith , but he must add ( though most unsutably to his reformers in england , to whom 't is most notorious no body deliver'd it ) which was once deliver'd to the saints , and iude . shall ascertain it . he cannot name the words , which was from the beginning , but the margent shall direct you to mat. . . the two words spending and being spent oblige him to let you know where to find them , cor. . . at the very naming help and all sufficient , ( two good honest words , which might have been spoke whether scripture had been or not ) he cannot for his heart hold , but alledges you for it , . cor. . . and will needs ( though indeed very needlesly to us ) prove himself a weak instrument by a plain text , cor. . . the obvious and common words condemn'd out of their mouths , must have a star of the first magnitude to light you to a lesser one in the margent , and that to luke . . and david's cutting of goliah's head with his own sword , a story known undoubtedly by all that were like to read his sermon , shall be secured from being thought a piece of a romance or knight-errantry by a punctual citation in the open margent , sam. . . and , to omit diverse of the like pleasant strain , lest any unbeliever should be so impious as to doubt that his theopnevst aholiab was an embroiderer , you shall see it as plain as the nose on a man's face in an express text , exod. . . . . but why insist i thus on so poor a foolery in a book i design'd for solid ? or what advantage can i gain to my cause by so sleight an animadversion ? i'answer , ●tis my temper when i see an odd action done without reason , to trace it to its original , and to search after its proper cause : and , upon consideration , i finde none so proper for this effect , as a certain kinde of humour of quoting in d. pierce and others of his brethren , so strongly possessing them , and even naturaliz'd into them , that , so they be quoting , they matter not much whether it be to purpose or not : this i have shown in the whole bead-roll of his citations ( the usefullest part ( as he sayes ) of his whole performance ) and that not one of those which he call evidences , is conclusive ; that is , worth a straw , or to purpose : but , because every one will not be capable to see it in those citations he brings for proofs , i let them see it in those his late quotations of scriptures : in which he so pittifully betraies his silly and vain humour of quoting to no imaginable end but to satisfy his customary habit or fancy ; and , as in his citations , so in these , imagins the application of them to his cause in stead of showing it , that i conceive no universitie-wit but will see in this carriage of his , that dr. pierce's head is not too scienti●ical , nor himself a fit man to to demonstrate against the papists . second appendix . animadversions , on some passages in mr. whitby . . i beg pardon of my reader for my late merriment and children's play with aiery bubbles and feathers . both d. pierce's manner of writing and his carriage towards catholicks merited this kind of return . i hope the passages in mr. whitby i have design'd to answer , will give me occasion to speak more solidly : and , that they may do so , i will pick out those which aim at some point of concernment . i have a particular respect for the person , and am sorry his growing hopefulness receiv'd a foil by his book against mr. s. c. and this though a threefold disadvantage ; the badness of his cause , the patronage of dr. pierce's malice , and his impar congressus with so learned an antagonist . . my designe leads me to take notice especially of that passage , p. . sect. . where he begins a discourse about the soveraignty of reason , and explicates ( rather than proves it ought to be so ) what is his rule and guide to faith. which , because it look't plausibly , yet was prudently neglected by mr. s c. who hearing of more eminent antagonists writing against him , judg'd it wisest to reserve himself to answer the protestanrs second and best thoughts in them , in case they were found to deserve it ; and , because on the other side the challenge was made to all the romanists in the world , and many passages in it light cross to the grounds i had laid , i took leave to consider and examin it my way . in a great part of it , especially at the beginning the discourse is rightly made ; but in other places he confounds guide with rule , power with motive , and , by straining a word in mr. s. c. beyond its necessary signification , imposes on us a false tenet which he mainly builds upon . so that i am forc't to begin my answer by putting down our true one , which gives faith and reason both their due . this done , his superstructutes on that supposition will fall of themselves . . our tenet then is that faith is the same with belief , that belief relies on authority , and divine faith or belief on the divine authority as its motive , and on the churche's as on the applier of the other to my understanding . at next , i hold that no authority deserves assent further than true reason gives it to deserve ; and , hence , the divine authority , being essential truth deserves in true reason , if possible , infinitely intense assent or adhesion to its sayings from me ; and the churches authority being found by my reason to be certain , it applies with certainty ( that is closely ) the divine authority to my understanding ; and so obliges it absolutely to believe the truths god has told , and to submit whatever reasons i may have against the object reveal'd to this all-overpowering authority of essential truth ; this being the first cause of all those things , whence my particular reasons are taken . nay , farther , hence it is that i adhere more heartily and firmly to a point of faith than to any conclusion of any science whatever ; because a more efficacious cause equally closely apply'd is apt to produce a greater effect , and no cause is or can be in 〈◊〉 reason comparable to that of the divine ver●city in the point of causing assent ; which is closely apply'd by me to the churches assurance . hence my faith is ever most rational ; because ●is 〈◊〉 rational to believe a point for which the divine veracity is engag'd , and highly rational to believe the church assuring me that it is engag●d for such and such points : nor yet is the divine authority or the church ( as mr. whitby p. . very mistakingly argues ) beholden to the judgment of my private reason for my belief of her infallibility , but on , the contrary , my private reason is beholden to them for that judgment ; seeing i therefore come to have that judgment because those , as objects , wrought upon my apprehension and imprinted a conceit of them there as they were in themselves , and so oblig'd my reason to conclude and my judgment to hold them such as they were . this rational assent establishes my faith against the assaulds of any doubts from human reasons ; resting assur'd th●● the same god who told me this , is the maker of all things else , and hath writ all created truths in the things he hath made ; whence no created ●ruth can thwart my faith unless he can contradict himself , which is impossible . hence , if i have true science i am certain to find no part of it opposit to my faith ; but , on the contrary , conformable to it , as being a child of the same parent , essential truth : if i have not true science , i ought not to think so ; nothing therefore but mine own overweening can make me miscarry . . reason having thus play●d her part in bringing me to faith , deserts me not yet while i act in it , nor i her : my acts of belief are still rational , because it was rational to believe at first , and my grounds why i then believ'd rest still unchang'd , nay are unchangeable . but yet , reason acts much differently now then ●ormerly ; before i came at faith she acted about her own objects , motives or maxims , by which she scand the authorities we spoke of : but , in acts of faith she hath nothing to do with the objects of those acts or points of faith ; she is like a dimsighted man who us'd his reason to find a trusty friend to lead him in the twi-light , and then reli'd on his guidance rationally without using his own reason at all about the way it self . to make this clearer we may distinguish two sences in the word reason ; one , as 't is taken for that natural faculty which constitutes man ; which faculty never deserts or ought to desert us in any action that is manly or virtuous , the other as 't is taken for that power wrought upon by motives under its own ken ; in the same sence we call it human reason ; by which is not meant the natural power unactuated or abstractedly , for then the word human were a ta●tology ; but reason as conversant with such objects or inform'd by such knowledges as are commonly found within the sphere of our natural condition as men , such as are those which beget science : and this leaves us when we have once found the authority now spoken of ; the objects of faith , formally speaking , being out of her reach ; nor is she ( thus understood ) the motive of our assent to the verity of the point of faith , but avthority onely . wherefore into authority onely , faith ( as such ) is resolvd finally ; though , if you go about to resolve the rationalness of assenting to the authority it self , it will light into those evident reasons , which your naturall power of reason , as yet uninform'd by faith but by motives or maxims within its own sphere , was capable to wield . . reason therefore taken for my natural power is my eye or interiour sight ; as inform'd by common principles or maxims antecedent to faith , my guid to bring me to believe authority ; and those motives or maxims are the rules to my reason , by attending to which , she hath virtue or skill to set her own thoughts right , that is to guid me in my way to faith : but , when i have once come to beleeve authority , that is , come to faith , not reason but authority is my guid ; for i follow authority and not my reason in judging what is faith , what not ; and , though the light of that naturall power never deserts me , yet reason , as rul'd by her own natural maxims , is useless to me as a guid , or those maxims as a rule ; for i apply neither of these to the mysteries of faith to scan their verity or falsity by , but purely rely upon authority , and beleeve them . authority then is my guid ; and in the infallibility of that authority , consists the power or virtue it has to guide me right , that is to regulate or rule me , as one of the faithfull , or as one who must have such certain grounds of my assent , as i may securely build my salvation on . this authority then , as it is in●allible , is also my rule in my beleeving , or the rule of my faith. this of my rule of faith in common , against adversaries of faith in common . but , with protestants , who grant christ to be god , and consequently his words or doctrine true , the onely rule and guid we need , is to lead us into the knowledge of what he said and assure it to us . we affirm then , that the catholick church is the guid we follow , and her infallibility ( consisting in tradition ) our rule of faith. hence all catholicks profess her doctrin uninterruptedly succeeding from the apostles time , and so to continue to the end of the world ; hence with one voice they lay claim to christs gracious assistance to her , in defending her from over-growing errors against faith , or heresies ; hence all profess to hear and follow her , and pledge undoubtingly even the security of their salvation , by relying on the certainty of her living voice for their tenets , and on her disciplin for the practice of their faith. and though some schoolmen make scripture a partial rule of faith , yet they can mean onely materially not formally , that is , that some part of faith is signifi'd by scripture's letter , not that scripture's letter alone is sufficient securely to signify it to private understandings so as to beget that most strong & firm assent found in divine faith ; as is evident by this , that all hold no scripture is of private interpretation ; all hold the living voice of the church and her constant practice are the best interpreters of scripture . now , faith being tenets and sence , that must be 〈◊〉 the rule of faith , which ascertains us of christs sence ; not the materiall characters which that certain interpreter we call the church works upon , and by her practicall tradition interprets . . 't is high time now to look back upon dr. pierce and his party , how justly they deal with us , and how mistakingly they discourse when they come to the grounds of their faith. . first , by the tenour of his discourse he would seem to obtrude upon us a tenet , which none but perfect mad-men could hold ; namely that we profess we have no reason why we believe the church ; which devolves to this that we must profess we have as much reason to believe an old wife's dream as our faith , since there can be no less reason than none at all . and hence he will needs assure the reader , that therefore , the enthusiastick sectaries are in part romish proselytes , &c. and indeed upon so gross a calumny layd down for his principle and a sober truth , what might he not conclude ? with equal reason he might have inferr'd that all bedlam were catholicks , and that to turn mad were to turn a romanist . but his carriage to put this upon mr. s. c. is strangely unjust ; since he knows and hints it , that he writ a book upon his declaring himself catholick , entitled , motives of his conversion ; does he think the word motives does not signify reasons , or , that to write an whole book of reasons why he adhea'd to the catholick church signifies that he renounc't all reason why he believ'd her ? . next , as for his own tenet , he layes this for his ground , that , reason alone is iudge in all cases . i will propose him one case , and 't is the existence of a trinity . to work now with your reason about this object , and see how you evince it . i doubt your best reasons will crack ere you make all ends meet . but , you mean you must have reason to believe it ; i conceive ( speaking properly ) you should rather say you must have reason to believe the authority , and authority to believe it ; for belief is as properly relative to authority as science is to an act of true reason or evidence . whence 't is as incongruous to say i must have reason to believe such a point , as to say i know such a point scientifically by authority . again , for god's love who ever deny'd they ought to have reason to believe the churches authority ; is any thing more frequent in our controvertists and divines treating of the ground of faith than large discourses concerning motives of credibility ? . thirdly , he saies that disputing with romanists whether scripture be the sole rule , he means t is so limitedly , that is between christians , who have already acknowledged scripture a rule of faith. by which i see mr whitby guides him self by sounds , though he must need ; know ( if he knows any thing of catholick ten●●● ) our sence is quite different . i beseech you , sir , deal fairly with us : is not that , speaking formally and properly , the rule of faith which gives us christs sence ; and does not that give us the sence of scripture which regulates us in the interpretation of it ? did ever catholick then hold that scripture interpreted on any fashion , much less on your fashion by private judgments or reasons regulated by grammatical skill , criticisms and such like verbal knowledges , is a rule of faith ; nay do not we constantly abhor this way as the source of heresy ? take us right then we hold not scripture's letter alone a rule , but scripture interpreted by the church ; that is , indeed , the church formally speaking ; and so you see you mistake our principle . yet upon our joint-agreement in this your discourse against us proceeds . retrive it then , you see your errour . again , you tell us scripture is your new rule , but forget quite in your discourse to tell us that your reason assures you scripture is to be the onely rule , or why it should be so ; since ( besides what i have demonstrated to the contrary in my former discourses ) 't is evident christian religion had descended many steps ere the scripture's parts were much scatter'd , much less the whole collected ; and no less clear that , that can never be a rule or way to faith , which many follow yet their thoughts straggle into many several judgments ; not in indifferent points , but in that of the trinity amongst the rest , as your self profess of the socinian , that he rejects not the trinity in the first place , because it seems a contradiction , but because 't is not clearly discover'd in scripture ; by which you see he adheres firm to your rule , and so ought to be acknowledg'd one of your church ; since , though he hap to differ in some points , yet he holds fast the rule common to both ; which is the substantiallest principle of a church as such , being the ground of all faith. and , indeed , your kindness to him here , and your tender care not to displease him , shows you have a true brotherly affection for him . though i fear he he will con you small thanks for making his principle run thus , that which is not clearly reveal●d in scripture and is coniradictory ti reason is not to be believ'd ; which seems to imply , that were it clear in scripture , yet contradictory to reason , then he would notwithstanding belive it . an over-strain of piety no socinian was ever guilty of , and i can assure you no learned catholick divine i ever heard of ever made such an act of faith. but 't is another case if it onely seems contradictory , and is not judg'd by him to be evidently such ; for then there is room left in his mind for the contrary assent of faith to settle there . . you say you prescribe not the doctrin imputed to the socinians , because it makes reason the iudge of faith , but the rule of faith. pray take pains to consider what you say . he that judges must have some principles in his head by which he is regulated in making such a judgment ; those principles then must be his rule in that action ; and , if that judgment be an adhesion to a point of faith , those principles are his rule of faith . examin now well your own thoughts , whether your principles , by which you find out certainly by interpreting scripture this is god's sence or a point of faith , be not maxims of your human reason . i am sure in disputes against us you prove and defend your faith by such skills ; as languages , history and other knowledges got by human learning ; and consequently hold it your selves upon the tenour of those skills , which therefore are your rule of faith , and not upon the bare letter . you , i know , will deny it . but i beg your second thoughts to reflect that a rule to such an effect is the immediate knowledge to the power as conversant about that effect ; and that , if another intervene , it regulates the former ; which thereupon becomes the thing ruled , not the rule . do then these skills clear the letter of scripture , that is , make known gods sence to you ? if so , since their immediate effect is to clear it , 't is impossible to deny but they are at least part of the revelation ; for revealing is clearing , and god's sence was not clearly revealed but by those means , that is by human maxims ; and so they are at least the more formal part of your rule of faith. again , i ask might you not have mistaken the true sence without those human maxims ? if so , then they , and not scripture's letter , were your rule . if not , then onely common sence is requisit to understand clearly what 's reveal'd in scripture ; and then , either your brother socinian or you want common sence , which i think you 'l scarce say . . but , will you see you still hold reason your rule , notwithstanding you cry up the written word ? find you not there expresly that god has hands , feet , nostrils and passions like ours , and this in clear terms ? why is it not then a point of faith ? you will not answer sure it is against maxims of reason ; you renounc't them formerly ( p. . ) when you had found out your new rule and onely allow'd your reason power to judge , if a point were sufficientlie reveal'd , that it is most rational to 〈◊〉 it self , though it seem to contradict or thw●●● reason . now this is sufficiently reveal'd being plainly writ in your rule of faith , and the direct letter of scripture ; why will you not then captivate your reason and believe it ? i see you do but complement with god's incomprehensible knowledge in speaking so highly of it and so humbly of your own shallow intell●ct : will you deny a point of faith so plainly reveald for your own capricho or conceit ? perhaps you 'l say 't is not clearly reveal'd because the contrary is plain in scripture too . i ask , is it as plain ? if not , it cannot overthrow the title of this to be a point of faith : if as plain , why should you not believe both ? be valiant , sir , and believe a contradiction it being clearly reveal'd . perhaps it seems but such , and then your own profession . p. . obliges you to admit it : you that can acknowledge an infinit extension of space ( when you say all the world besides does so too , sure you thought all the world was in your fancy ) may also hold materia ab aeterno , and that it is onely a part of gods nature , as ( if i mistake not ) iacob bemen does ; and then secundum hanc partum of illam will do the work , and gives a true sence to both sides of the contradiction . you should do any thing which could by any means make it seem possible , rather than question a plain divine revelation : nay , perhaps you do not think you can demonstrate the contrary to the solution i have helpt you out with , at least that your demonstration is but a seeming one ; and then i challenge your candour to own your sayings , and demand why you are not bound to use this shift and a thousand others rather than violate your avow'd rule of faith , and deny and hold against the clear letter of scripture . if you alledge you have perfect science of the contrary by metaphysicks ; then , though i expect not this from you , your science rules your rule of faith ; glossing or rather violently wresting the plain letter , and so is so absolutely your rule of faith that it controls and even baffles the other though clearly revealing : or , if to be in express terms in scripture be not to be clearly revealed , i would fain know what those words clearly revealed in scripture signifie . . perhaps you i say , that notwithstanding your new rule , reason must be your gvid still even in faith , though not your rule . but i ask , if your reason must guide you sometimes so as to deny the clear letter of scripture , since a guid in any thing must be regulated by some knowledges in that affair , by what principles or knowledges reason is to regulate it self while it guides you in that particular now in question ? by principles of faith ? how can that be in your grounds antecedently to the known sence of the scripture ? by principles of human science ? then those principles of human science give you the certain sence of the written word when it self is insufficient , and therefore are still truly your rule of faith ; and so you are forc't to fly back for refuge to the old rule , human reason , which you seemingly renounc't when you had found your new rule of the scripture . 't is evident then that some maxims of your reason are your rule and not scripture's letter . and this is what we reprehend in the socinian and you too ; that , chusing a wrong rule of faith so to avoid the church , you both gloss it as seems best to your reason regulating her self by her own , and those fallible , maxims . they by certain acute and ingenious sophistries proper to themselves , you by the more school-boy way of grammar and dictionary learning ; and so both of you make your rule the thing ruled . nor think to retort any part of this discourse upon our rule of faith ; for , this being the living voice of the church , delivers us a determinate sence of the points we are to profess , whereas yours needs skils and helps of studious reason to tell you what it would say ; ours is alive , and in the breast and actions of the faithful ; yours is dead characters , waxen-natur'd , and pliable to , the dedalean fancies of the ingenious molders of new opinions ; and so , alone , can satisfie no man as you handle it . . no wonder now , if , having no certainer a ground or rule of faith for her self , your church is shamefast of obliging others to believe her : man's nature could scarce own or permit so irrational a tyrannie . yet whether she does or does not , we must not know from your words ; which run so backwards and forwards , that none can tell which is the true face of the ianus . first p. . you seem to deny it stoutly from the carriage of your convocations and bishops , and from your own tenets : yet afterwards you seem to grant they do require a positive assent somtimes , and justifie them as not doing it upon pretence of any infallibility , but because the thing determin'd is so evident in scripture , that all denying it must be wilful . a rare discourse , and worthy a deep consideration ! pray who must be judge it is so evident in scripture as to render the dissenters guilty of flat wilfulness ? the bishops , or your church ? nothing less : in the beginning of this discourse ( p. . ) you plainly deny'd them to be judges of faith. now in your sence to be clearly reveal'd or evident in scripture , and to be of faith is all one ; so that they must not be judges of what is evident in scripture , lest by necessary consequence they become judges of faith ; and yet without having power to judge what is evident in scripture , they must have power to require assent to points as evident in scripture ; nay and punish the dissenters too : for 't is a madness for governours to require any thing of their subjects , without having rewards and punishments in their hands to make what they require to be duely observ●d . nay p. . you absolutely refus'd to admit them as guides of your faith. a moderate word and less than to be a iudge ! which signifies they may have power to require our assents in matters in which they have no power to guide us ; that is , they may have power to require us to go wrong for any thing we or they know . an excellent honour for the church of england , that her champions profess in print her supreme pastors have no power at all to guide their flock in their faith , or to it when they are out of it ! again , i would ask whether the trinity be not evident in scripture , and the socinians wilful for denying it ? why are they then so kindly dealt with ? or what could be reply'd to a socinian , answering , when his assent to the trinity were required , that he humbly submitted to scripture , that he us'd all the means he could , but discover'd it not so evident there ; and thereupon complain'd that you obtruded upon his equally-learned party your own conceit or opinion for scripture-evidences ? what therefore you alledge here , as in your churches behalf , that she requires not a positive assent upon pretence of any infallibility , more condemns her ; seeing t is most absurd and irrational that one should require any man to assent to any point or proposition whatever , as evident in scripture , without infallible certainty ( at least imagin'd and pretended ) that it is thus evident there ; for , should it happen to be otherwise , how ridiculous were his authority , how damnable and diabolical his tyrannie to oblige men to the hazard of falshoods in matters of faith , that is in matters belonging to his eternal salvation ; and in the mean time profess himself ignorant whether they be false or no. . now our church goes another way ; which ere i declare , i would let your party see , that interiour assent may be required by governours lawfully and rationally , which your principles can never make sence of . suppose a thousand witnesses from several places each of them held alwayes men of good consciences should swear in open court that they had seen such and such actions done by such a man , or that they had seen , spoken or converst with such a person , were not he mad that is a renouncor of reason or man's nature who should not believe them . you see then these witnesses have power to propose such an object as can oblige to belief ? you see the dissenters are irrational , that their act of dissenting springs from some passion or vice , and vice is punishable ; and so is the effects of that dissent , if it be in such a matter as is highly pernicious to mankind's best concerns . now our church makes account she is able to propose an authority incomparably more ample than the attestation now spoken of , for the true descent of her faith ; and judges such a proposal , founded on the eye-sight of all those witnesses , to be able to oblige to interiour assent in such a degree as to render them most highly wilful vicious and irrational who should disbelieve it ; hence ( the crime intrenching upon the order to mankind's salvation ▪ the highest concern imaginable , ) both to edify those dissenters by correcting their vice , and the circumstant faithful , by breeding a conceit in them , through the punishment of the others , of the sacredness of faith and its rule , and the hainousness of pride of understanding the ready way to all heresies , they may nay ought punish their interiour dissent : not out of an height of authority without motives , as mr. whitby conceits , but because that authority is her self such a motive to belief , that onely irrational vicious and wilfully-blind persons can recede from it by disbelief : and hence our churches procedure is rational , natural , sweet and charitable , tending to amend an enormity of will not bred from a rationally but passionate dissatisfy'd understanding . nay , mr. whitby's discourse justifies our churches procedure ; who seems to allow his church a power to require a positive assent , when the case comes to be such that the denier of it must needs be held wilfull ; and our church neither sayes nor acts otherwise . . by this discourse i would not have mr whitby imagin that i am about proving our churches infallibility in this place ; but onely showing that , holding she can evidence her authority , she goes rationally to work and consonantly to her self in requiring assent to her proposals ; whereas theirs , confessing her self fallible even in interpreting scripture , upon which all , both her faith , and authority as a church , depends , were self-condemn'd , irrational and tyrannical if she should go about to require any such interiour assent . now , though he in big words denies this to be her carriage , asking when did they ( meaning bishops , convocations or parliaments ) challenge any power over our minds and consciences , and alledges the consent of their divines for it , yet i wonder what he thinks of the oaths of allegiance and supremacy , made by a protestant parliament ; is there no obligation there to hold any thing ? yes , as strong as oath can tye it . and , which is worse , 't is more irrational to go about to bind our assents who are not of their church , than to bind their own subjects . this in practice is perform'd towards all ; but so imprincipled a procedure that their church waves it when it comes to a rational scanning in a dispute and controversy , acknowledging so their want of grounds to make it good . which shows that the authority of their church sprang from the parliament or secular state , in regard she professes her self very heartily content with external obedience , let the interiour assent goes where it will ; most unlike the church settled by the wisdome of the eternal father , and constituted the pillar and ground of truth ; who provided in the first place for the churches power to hold us to the same tenets ( which are the principles of our actions ) knowing that , unless the root of faith be sound , the actions , its branches , must needs be rotten and unconscientious ; and , that no congregation could long hold together , nor indeed longer than the plain force of the secular sword aw'd them , unless by power to evidence its authority it had power to oblige men's understandings connaturally to an unity in the same faith ; which done , all else would follow , and hence we may see confessedly in the protestant principles the reason of their present and past distractions , and divine of the future ; for , men's fancies being naturally various , and no power in her to keep them in an union , they must needs ramble into multitudes of dissenting sects ; which to strive to unite into one were to force both nature and conscience too . nature , in striving to unite their understandings in faith , without offering them evidence of authority ; conscience , in binding them to act as protestants do , whereas they are ready to stake their salvation upon it that their best reasons working upon the very rule of faith protestants recommend , obliges them to the contrary , and that to force them to act with them is to force them to sin ; so that the protestants at once profess they will not or cannot oblige their vnderstandings , and yet at the same time contend by force to oblige their wills , without , nay against their understandings . . in a word , let protestants write , talk & quote words as long as they will , plainest common sence tells them and every man who considers it , that unless they settle some undisputable method of arriving at christ's sence or faith , that is , some self-evident ( and so all-obliging ) rule of faith , the protestant church can never hope for power to reduce their dissenters , nor to hold together or govern efficaciously their own subjects ; that is , they can never hope for unity within themselves ; nor , lastly , union with them that have it , and charitably endeavour they may have it too . third appendix . animadversions on some passages in mr. stillingfleet . . the loud fame of mr. stillingfleet's book preventing its publication , and withall the report of his good parts coming from diverse judicious persons , bred in me a great impatience to see something of his other writings , that so i might have more solid ground to build my expectation on than common rumour or commendation of acquaintances . a protestant friend show'd me a little treatise of his concerning excommunication . i perus'd the beginning of it , and immediately told him mr. stillingfleet was a very ingenious person , and writ the best i ever yet saw any protestant : for he settled first his notion or the true nature of the thing , and thence attempted by intrinsecal mediums to draw immediate consequences , which show'd that his head lay right for science . but , withal , i assur'd my friend 't was impossible he could write against us , and take that method ; the nature of his cause not enduring so severe a test. his book coming forth , and bearing in its title a rational account of the grounds of protestant religion , my expectation was more erected ; and , till my self could get leasure to peruse it , i told diverse both catholicks and protestants that they might expect from mr. stillingfleet's wit the most that could be said either for the later or against the former . but , coming to over-look cursorily his infallibility of tradition , part . cap. . and the. protestants way of resolving faith , cap. . i had quite lost mr. stillingfleet ; and , instead of him , had found a dr. hammond , dr. pierce , or a dissuader ; who talk not out of nature or things , but words & imagination . i plainly discover'd there was not one proposition in those two discourses which could be a solid ground for a rational understanding ( that would be true to it self ) to settle and rely on ; and was desirous to show it , had it not been uncivil to put my sickle into another man's harvest , and crop the victory due to another's learning and industry : victory , i say ; for he that defends his cause no better , in effect yields it lost . yet i beg leave of the judicious authour of labyrinthus cantuariensis to maintain one breach where i find my self more directly assaulted ; oral tradition being the post i have taken upon me to explicate further & defend , because i conceive it the solid ground on which the church , or all catholicks both learned and unlearned , rely as faithful : however some school-men , abounding in their own sence , ground also their explication of the churches infallibility on somthing besides . . mr stillingfleet then part . chap. . § , & . sets himself to oppose oral tradition , whose infallibility he opposes to doctrinal infallibility in pope or councils . where , if by doctrinal infallibility , he means that which they have as doctors or schollers , he may reflect that no catholick makes such an infallibility proper to the church or church-governours , as such ; however it may be somtimes necessary to proceed upon it in some signal occasions . now , take away this infallibility , there is none left but the infallibility of tradition , perform'd by testifying : it being evident that we have but two wayes of ordinary knowledge ; by acts of our soul , or operations on our body ; that is , by reason and experience ; the former of which belongs to speculaters or doctors ; the second to deliverers of what was receiv'd , or , to testifiers . whence m. stillingfleet may see he stumbles at the very threshold by counterposing doctrinal infallibility to traditionary ; since that which we call ecclesia docens professes constantly to ground her self on tradition ; witness the council of trent in every session where she defines faith. . no wonder then , if grounding on this mistake , mr stillingfleet declares himself unsatisfi'd . he asks therefore whether he is bound to believe what the present church delivers to be infallible ? i understand him not : had he instead of the word infallible , put receiv'd as deliver'd ever , or infallibly true , i had ; for fallibility and infallibility belong to the knowing power or the persons that have it , not to the object ; the object being neither deceiv'd nor not deceiv'd , but we : well , but suppose he means by it deliver'd ever , or ( which is equivalent ) certainly true , for what came from christ must be so ; in that case we answer affirmatively : he asks again , on what account is he bound to believe it ? and he makes our answer to be , because the present church cannot be deceiv'd in what the church of the former age believ'd , nor that in the precedent , and so up till christ. this is indeed part of our answer : the other part is , that the church in no age could conspire against her knowledge to deceive that age immediately following in matter of fact evident in a manner to the whole world. upon this , he falls into two new demands which take up this whole paragraph . . the first is , how we can assure him the present church obliges him to believe nothing but onely what and so far as it receiv'd from the former church ? i answer , by her manifest practice ; never refusing communion to any man that could approve himself to believe all the former age did . i could here distinguish the word believe , but i refer it till i come to speak of de fide . he proceeds . what evidence can you bring to convince me both that the church alwayes observ'd this rule , and could never be deceiv'd in it ? for the later , i hope i need bring no greater evidence than this , that men in all ages had eyes , ears , and other senses , also common reason , and as much memory as to remember their own names and frequently-inculcated actions . if you disprove this , i doubt we have lost mankind , the subject we are speaking of . and , till you disprove it , neither i nor any man in his wits can doubt that this rule depending on testifying , that is sence or experience , can possibly permit men to be deceivable . the former part i shall speak to when i come to show the obligation not to vary from faith. his scruple springs hence , that he sees the roman church asserts things to be de fide in one age which were not in another , &c. that this is the common doctrin and the deniers ill-look't on . i beg leave to distinguish the words de fide ; which may either mean christian faith or points of faith taught by christ ; and then you see 't is nonsence to say they can be in one age and not in another ; for what christ has taught he has taught , and the preteritness of the thing has so fixt its existence to its proper time , that 't is not now obnoxious to variation ; quod factum est infectum fieri non potest . or , de fide may mean obligatory to be believ'd . in this later sence none ( i think ) denies things may be de fide in one age , and not in another ; in the former sence none holds it . what 's now become of your difficulty ? i believe you are in some wonderment , and think i elude it rather then answer it : i shall endeavour to unperplex you . . christianity ayms not to make us beasts but more perfectly men ; and the perfection of our manhood consists in using our reasons . since then natural consequences are apt to spring from natural principles by the operation of reason , and we cannot but think that the consequences apt to flow from supernatural principles or points of faith deliver'd down from christ ( onely which are de fide in the former sence ) are of incomparably greater excellency than natural truths , it follows that christianity or christian faith is so far from hindring the faithful from deducing out of them , that both out of their nature as supream truths or principles , and out of their high excellency they invite and prompt most strongly to it . now these points deduct out of principles of faith are of two sorts ; the former those which need no more but common sence or the ordinary natural light of reason to discover their arising thence , nor any piece of skill or science to infer them , but are seen by the bare principle of faith , or rather in it ; being indeed but a branch or part of that principle . the later are those which need , besides , the maxims of some science got by speculation to infer them . an example of the former sort is that against the monothelites of christ's having an human will ; for , common experience tells the most vulgar that every man has a principle in him impelling him to act , which we agree to call a will. such likewise are all propositions of this nature which the church uses upon occasion of some emergent heresie to explain her self and put the point of faith out of danger of being equivocated . examples of the later sort are theological conclusions ; in which a natural truth is one of the premises , joyning with the supernatural one to infer them . to omit this , as little to our purpose at present ; of the former sort the church is necessitated to make use upon occasion ; that is , when any heretick questions those , and eâdem operâ the whole point of faith it self of which they were a part . upon occasion i say ; for what concern'd its the faithful or who ever heard much noise of this proposition , christ has two wills , thus singled out and exprest apart , till the monothelite granting him but one , forc't the church , that she might preserve the main tenet of christ's having two natures , or being god and man , to maintain , publish and define that other . . to apply this then ; since none can have obligation to believe what they have not obligation to think of , and , that in some age the generality of the faithful have no occasion nor consequently obligation to minde , reflect or think on those propositions involvd in the main stock of faith , and truly parts of it , that is indeed it ; it follows that a thing may be de fide or obligatory to be believ'd in one age and not in another . perhaps mr. stillingfleet may ask how the church can have power to oblige the generality to belief of such a point . i answer , she obliges them to believe the main point of faith by virtue of tradition's being a self-evident rule , and these imply'd points by virtue of their being self-evidently-connected with those main and perpetually-us'd points , so that the vulgar can be rationally and connaturally made capable of this their obligation . whence the government of our church is still justify'd to be sweet and according to right nature , and yet forcible and efficacious to hold her subjects in a strict union . not to mention how these points also descended by a kind of tradition ; for i doubt not but the apostles had occasion in explaining faith to speak of these ; however the no necessity brought them not so much into play , but left them unreflected on by the generality . . but to return to mr. stillingfleet , who acts here like a politician and would conquer us by first dividing us , and making odious comparisons between two parties of divines . but he may please to reflect how we all hold firmly the same divinely-constituted church-government , and the same self-evident rule of faith to give our understandings the same principles as christians , and so our wills the same actions : and those are firmly rooted in all our hearts to have been recommended to us by the wisdom of the eternal father : whence 't is impossible for all the wit of man or even malice of hell to disunite us as we are faithful : as private discoursers , our different natures and circumstances must needs distinguish us . every one believes the same ; but , coming to explicate this belief , they vary according to the several degrees of perfection in their understanding powers . and yet m. stillingfleet is not aware how little we differ even as divines : for , though some speculaters attribute to the church a power of defining things not held before , yet few will say she has new revelations , or new articles of faith , & those only some lawyers who talk ultra crepidam , no divines that i know of ; and none , that christ was not a perfect law-giver ; which are necessary consequents ( or rather in a manner identical ) to the other . and , when it comes to the point , those men explain themselves that all was deliver'd faith , either explicitly or implicitly ; which i have shown to bear a very good sence , in my explication of de fide . he tells us popes and councils challenge a power to make things de fide in one age which was not in another : he speaks onely in common and proves it not : had he brought instances , it might have been better clear'd . in the mean time i have shown him how , take them right , this is both perfectly innocent and unavoidably necessary to a church . what would avail him is , if a pope and council should define a new thing , and declare they ground themselves on new lights , as did their first reformers in england . but he will finde no such fopperies in faith-definitions made by the catholick church . he tells us that this is the common doctrin maintain'd ; by which i perceive he is at an end of his argument against our church ; there being no evidenter signe of it , than to leave off assaulting her ; confound her with the schools , or some private opinaters , and then carp at these mens tenets . whereas m. stillingfleet wants not wit to know , that no sober catholick holds human deductions the rule of our faith , schoolmen definers of it , nor the schools the tribunal whence to propose it authoritatively and obligingly to the generality of the faithful ; much less a few divines , which are far from reaching the authority of the schools . yet how much of his book would need no answer , were this impertinent topick laid aside ? but well ; let schools and church be all one , that is , let every master of divinity be a bishop , what means he to conclude from the words common doctrin ? does he make account every school-doctrin must be equally in vogue , or that an opinion's being common defines it faith and condemns the other for heretical . where 's his reason ? the direct contrary follows from its being common ; and , that 't is not faith which others , though not so many , may contradict ; and he is but meanly vers't in our schools if he sees not very many publikely maintain that there are no new revelations without dreading excommunication , or being held heretical and seditious : so they grant the church power ( as they ought ) by new propositions and new but expressive words , ( yet , both the same in sence and so not new in substance ) to meet with the new blundering cavils of innovators . . yet all this while m. stillingfleet cannot see how to satisfie himself of the sence of our church as to this particular . nor ever will , while he wilfully looks the wrong way , that is , towards some particular schoolmen or divines , not towards the universality of the faithful or church . what need he counterfeit this puzzle ? did he never hear of such a thing as the council of trent ? or is it so hard to finde it ? again , does not he know all the catholick church allow more a thousand times to it than to all the schoolmen in the world ? yes very well ; how comes it then that he runs to some schoolmen , and neglects the church speaking in her representative ? because he may finde there a clear solution of his doubt , by the constant procedure of that most grave synod in its definitions : where he will hear of no such toyes as new revelations , but directly the contrary ; every session where faith was defin'd professing to build on tradition , teaching and preaching , that is , oral tradition ; ever , alwayes , from the beginning , &c. that is not - new , but the old-and - ever-faith . if you would combat our church , here you have her ; fall to work : but you find some schoolmen opining also infallibility in some other means besides tradition , and judging this tenet easilier confuted , you level your blowes at it , because the other is out of your reach ; and would make this tenet the sence of the catholick church , and so seem to oppose the church her self . you would disgrace this way of tradition as maintain'd but by a few , and those blemisht persons . how far are you wide of the truth ? 't is the way every catholick in the whole church , none excepted , holds and follows . for my part , i disavow the maintaining any point or affecting any way which is not assented to by all ; and this , not as opinion , but deeply rooted in their hearts as infallibly certain . schoolmen at liberty question personal infallibility of the pope , some grant it not to him and his roman clergy , some question that of a provincial synod ; nay some , whose books are extant and yet uncensur'd , maintain even a general council may possibly err ; but not one i have heard or read of affirms that tradition , or the living voice of the church essential , could err ; for in doing so , he call'd all his faith in question , and so ceast to be a christian. . this then being held by all ; held firmly ; and that it is absolutely infallible so that in no case it can err , the others only by some , & faintly in comparison ( as appears by the faithful's permitting them ●o be question'd ) nay , not held at all infallible but upon supposal of certain conditions to be observ'd , in which also divines differ , mr. stillingfleet and other protestant writers may see what they have to do if they will candidly impugn the catholick church , and not trifle away time in wrangling with some private opinators . i have set them a fair mark in my discourses , if they will speak to the point ; and the end of my preface has told them how to do it . if they overthrow this , all the other infallibilities now spoken of will fall with it ; if not , not onely this of universal tradition will stand , but also all the other infallibilities will in virtue of it be establisht on a firmer basis , than any who begins not with and settles the first principle in controversy could ever give them . this foundation then they must either subvert , or they may fear the papists will build such superstructures on it as will reach to heaven . it rises apace , and has advanc't many stories in a small time . . by this discourse all mr. stillingfleet's if 's which follow , have their answer ; and he will see the knot easily loos'd in distinguishing the word other ; by which if he means disparate , unconnected or unimply'd points of faith : no divines of any number or account hold they can be de novo , much less our church ; if involv'd or imply'd in the main point , he must show 't is absolutely another , and not rather a piece or part of the implying one ; as , homo est animal , is a part of homo est animal rationale . in the mean time let him consider what logick tells us , that the conclusion is in the premises , which reflexion will much unblunder his thoughts ; and withall , that 't is most unreasonable to deny the church the liberty to take asunder her own thoughts , and clear them , upon occasion ; by representing their parts distinctly or in many propositions , which were invol'd before in some one . a priviledge nature grants all mankind as a necessary conseqent to their working by abstracted notions ; this being no more than to regard or view the same thing`now on one side , then on the other . . his second chief demand is , what security is there that in no age of the church any practices should come in which were not in the precedent . i answer , our practices spring from our tenets ; if then he means ecclesiastical practices , that is , such as spring from ecclesiastical constitutions , there is no security at all ; for these are to come in anew as oft as the necessity of disciplin or government requires it : if he mean such practices , as spring from points of faith taught by christ , there is the same security no such new practices can be introduct as there is that no new christian tenets can come in . now these later practices are those we make use of in tradition , as making faith visible , being as it were its body : he must mean then of these practices to do his discourse any service ; and , so , of these he questions whether the descendents held themselves bound unalterably to observe what their forefathers did ; otherwise to know barely what they did , was not enough to make them follow it . he argues well . to smooth as many rubs as i can , that so we may have no difficulty but our main one , i would reflect on the signification of the word unalterably . for to introduce new practices consequent to the former is to propagate , enlarge , extend and so strengthen them , not to alter them ; in the same manner as to discourse consequently to a principle or tenet , is so far from altering it , that by the contexture of other truths with it , it corroborates and establishes it more unalterably its self . they must then be practices not of a subordinate but an opposit nature to christian ones which can be fear'd to alter christian practices . the question then is whether children or the succeeding age held themselves still bound not to bring in practices and tenets contrary to the doctrin and practice of the precedent age. and , the affirmative is most evident , in case they held those tenets which principled those actions , true , taught by christ , and commanded by him as the way to bring them to heaven ; and those practices consequent . if then they held the deliver●d doctrin christ's , they could not but hold themselves oblig'd not to alter it , nor consequently its practices . so that our question is restrain'd to to a narrower compass , and the onely difficulty now is whether they held the doctrin of forefathers to be the doctrin of christ , or no. . i am heartily glad so acute an adversary as mr. stillingfleet and one chosen out ( if i am inform'd right ) as a person conceiv'd the ablest to write against catholicks , has so candidly confest here , p. . that the onely thing to be prov'd in this case , is , that every age in the church and all persons in it looked upon themselves as oblig'd not to vary in any thing from the doctrin and practice of the precedent age. he offers me my choice of three wayes to prove it : i accept of the way of reason . he presses for a demonstrative medium to prove it ; yet seems to dislike our pretence to demonstrations for the ground of our faith. not to note the unconsonancy of this carriage , i shall yeild him the honour of professing he has no demonstration but onely probability for the ground of his ; and to make this serious protestation for my self , that i should esteem my self very dishonest did i assert and press on others any argument for the ground of my faith which i judge not evident , that is , demonstrative . this , i hope , will secure the honesty of my intentions , however my weakness may permit me to fail in my performance . after this he endeavours to forestal my reason for the point in these words ; they have understandings of another mould from others , who can conceive it impossible that men should not think themselves oblig'd to believe and do all just as their predecessours did . which words i desire the reader to review and note , for thence my discourse takes its rise . . what is it then that we affirm the later ages oblig'd to hold and act as their forefathers held and acted ? wearing their clothes , or building their houses ? no ; for , both , those matters of their own nature are of trivial concern , and the fashion of both depend on fancy which is too sleight a principle to oblige to a constancy . what is it then ? to manage their estates thus or thus ; no , for the inconvenience or convenience of the different wayes were perhaps held not very material , and the judging which was best depended upon prudential principles which are of their own nature variable and accommodable to circumstances , and therefore not obliging them to think and act as their forefathers did . let us proceed ? was it some piece of skill or a speculative opinion depending on the goodness or badness of the ancestors knowledge ? no : for , experience teaching that men differ in such judgments and are errable , it could never oblige posterity to believe unalterably as they did . is it then some historical passage or matter of fact , of great note , and as such apt to strike their fancy strongly , yet still such as the succeeding age was not highly concern'd whether it were true or no ; for example , that of alexander's conquest of asia to the asian and grecian off-spring of the next age after . no ; yet experience tells us the memory of this is fresh and lively ( even amongst us who are not the immediate descendents of those where he conquer'd ) though some thousands of years since . . before we go any further , let 's examin how this history comes to obtain so firm and unshaken a beleef from the whole world to this very day . and , first , he must be a very weak speculater that can think the universal and strong perswasion of this matter of fact was caus'd by books , curtius his history for example ; for , since all mankind knows naturally that falshoods may as easily be charactered in letters as truths ; 't is evidently the continu'd beleef of the thing or sence in mens hearts of it's truth , that is human tradition , which gives that book all its authority , and secures its strange contents from being held romanical ; which the very being-writ could never have done . let 's see next whence this human tradition had its force to continue hitherto so settled and unalterable a persuasion of alexanders conquests . and , looking into the thing for proper causes , that is , the best demonstrative mediums , we shall find the object it self was very universall , strange , notorious , and held of concern to the then livers ; which made their hearts and fancies full of it , and so oblig'd them to burst out into expressions of it , and relate it to their off-spring of the next age. i but , what oblig'd the off-spring to beleeve their forefathers telling it , and to act ( or talk of it again to their children ) as the fathers did ; without which obligation it could not have descended to us . regarding once more the thing , we shall discover that it was imprinted into the off-spring by the forefathers testifying what their senses had told them ; which put , common sense inform'd them the thing was infallibly-true , and as certain as if they had seen it with their own eyes . for , no reach of reason but onely extravagance of madness could have furnish't them with any imaginable motive , why the whole world should conspire to deceive them , or be decievable in their sensations . by this means the conceit of the thing or matter of fact ( as to the main , for circumstantial considerations were not so evident to all at first , and so could not be universally deliver'd as ascertain'd by sence ) was in the same degree of firmness and certainty rivetted into the hearts of next age ; and , so , there being necessarily in the rational part of the world some curious persons , whom nature her self could not but incline to an inquisitiveness of what was done formerly , and others too naturally inclin'd to tell it children who were capable of it and delighted with hearing such strange-true stories ; it went down continuing by the way of tradition to our very dayes . . but we have over-shot our mark . the question is of the obligation not to believe contrary to forefathers from age to age. and , t is already evident , that the second age after alexander was oblig'd to beleeve the first , because they saw with their eyes what was done ; but how could those in the third age be oblig'd to beleeve the second who saw it not ? to answer this , we must ask whether the third age could be certain that the second could not be deceiv'd in what the first age told them ( and the notoriousness of the thing , being no speculation but a plain matter of fact , secures that : ) or conspire to bely the second ages authority ; and , common reason satisfying them , by the circumstances , of the honesty of the persons , their consent and the disinteressedness of the position , that they could not thus conspire , even the rudest have a demonstration the second age truly testifi'd what the first said ; and so those of the third age have the first ages authority certainly apply'd to them ; and , by means of its authority , its sensations too , and perfect knowledge of the thing springing from that experimential perception ; which therefore must needs work the same effect upon the third age , as it did upon the second . and by virtue of the same argument upon the the fourth , fifth , and five hundredth , while it is known to have come down by the way of testification , and this is known by its being receiv'd in the five-hundredth age as testify'd ; for , if the second age could not tell the third it was testify'd by the first unless it had been so testify'd , the same reason i have assign'd for the impossibility of that will hold for each age to the end of the world , that is , 't will follow no age could say a former age testifyd so , unless they did so ; whence nothing can come in as testify'd by a former age , unless thus testifyd . if therefore the five-hundredth age receiv'd a thing as testify'd ( supposing the notoreity of it secur'd the thing from mistakableness ) it follow'd , demonstratively it was testify'd ; and , ( to come close to our purpose ) that the descendents in each age , to the very end of the world , had the same obligation to believe their immediate forefathers saying it was testify'd by the former , as those of the third age to believe the second , or the second the first . . who ever looks into rational nature , with even that ordinary knowledge with which the rudest person almost that lives does upon materiall natures , would discern the same necessity or obligation of continuing down by the way of testifying notorious and important matters of fact , fixt at first in the minds and fancies of an universality by the existence of the thing working on their senses , as that in a long chain of iron , one link drawn should draw all the rest ; or , that the turning the first wheel , should move a thousand distant ones depending on its motion . nor doubt i but it will be made full as evident , when rational souls come to set themselves to reflect seriously on their own nature and procedure to action ; a speculation few protestants are acquainted with ; bookishness and much reading being onely in vogue with the talking tribe amongst them . in the mean time mr. stillingfleet may see in the instance now put , that is , in the strong persuasion of alexander's victories yet continuing by tradition , that there is an obligation in one age to believe another when they proceed as witnesses ; and this , not onely of what they saw , but of what others told them they saw , and of what some affirm'd they were told by others that the age before them saw ; and so downwards ; and that , as the impulsive force is communicated from the movers hand to the farthest-distant-wheel by the application of the intermediate ones , the solid or inflexible nature of the matter obliging the next wheel to propagate its motion ; so the existence of the thing mov'd the first experimental percievers of it ; and that solid notion , which fixes every truth , was the virtue which run thorough and gave force to all the rest ; being apply'd by universal witnessing a plain matter of fact ( or others testimonies ) from each age to the other ; as great a ty to assent as human nature was capable of by natural means . for , that existence of the thing was the virtue which made this persuasion so solid and firm , besides what 's said , is seen by this ; that , were it deliver'd onely as an opinion of the things being so , its strong conveyance had not been able to elevate it beyond opinion ; for , the stronger that had been , the more perfectly it had been held opinion still . the existence then of the thing had virtue to oblige to a full persuasion the thing was so , when apply'd with certainty ; the testification of the precedent age is a certain applier of it , and undoubtable , that is obliging to belief ; therefore the next age is ( in such matters convey'd down this way ) as strongly oblig'd to believe the foregoing as reason can oblige it ; that is , by seen effects impossible to be without the existence of foregoing testifications , nor they , finally , without the existence of the thing . . i expect now what mr stillingfleet will reply to this discourse . will he say there were no causes layd to oblige the after-comers to believe the fore-goer , that alexander conquer'd asia , but that it happen'd so by chance ? what will he say then to thousand other such matters of fact , and indeed all that were done long ago ; all which must either be held obligingly this way or none ; ( see cowll . . ) besides , the causes proper to work on a rationall nature are reasons : to say then there are no causes able to make us believe alexander thus conquer'd , is to say there is no reason for it ; and ( chance being nothing but a cause unforeseen by us ) to say all believe it by chance , signifies none s●e any reason why they believe it ; which makes 〈◊〉 the world asses ; or have i not hit on the right causes ? i shall thank mr stillingfleet to help me out ; and in the mean time assure him that whatever causes he assignes , obliging poposterity , to believe ancestours in this , shall strengthen tradition . perhaps he will say , they may be oblig'd to believe such histories deliver'd , yet not deliver'd points of faith. i shall wonder at the position ; but , because i foresee he is like to recurr to this ( for he must be forc't to say either this or what 's worse ) i shall prepare against it , by parallelling the obligation to believe this deliver'd history to the obligation to believe christian faith deliver'd . . to do this more amply we will consider christ's doctrin according to the whole complexion of circumstances exprest in that common verse , quis , quid , ubi , quibus auxiliis , cur , quomodo , quando . quis ? who was the authour and subject of this faith thus to be deliver'd ; not a poor mortal , but the wisdome of the eternal father ; not an ambitious self-extolling man , but a self-humbled god , come down from his heaven to be the world's saviour and master ; every of whose words and actions were infinitely to be admir'd ; and , consequently , requiring to be had in perpetual remembrance . quid ? what thing was it which was deliver'd or testify'd ? a doctrin containing principles of the new life they were to lead as christians , and so practical , notwithstanding the majesty of its abstruseness ; a doctrin connatural and sutable to reason , man's true nature , and so apt to sink into him & not be easily relinquishable ; a doctrin which bears in its very notion to be a guid towards eternal bliss , and consequently that to forsake it is the way to eternal misery , which therefore oblig'd fathers to teach it , and children to esteem themselves bound to learn it and hold to it . lastly , a doctrin all made up of most astonishing miracle and wonder ; and , so , apt to strike a deep sence of reverence into hearts already imbu'd with it . such was the nature of the thing we call christ's doctrin , imprinted on the sensarions of the 〈◊〉 age of christians ; not a pittifull story of an alexander or caesar ; of sleight concern , wonderment or practical usefulness ; but , in comparison of the other , like a tale of a tub ; which , no hurt is done if it go in at one ear and out a● the other . . vbi ? when was this matter of fact or preaching this doctrin performed ? in all , even the remotest parts of the world , and not onely in a peece of europe and in asia ; and this openly : especially in rome the world's metropolis , whence it could easily and effectually spread into the rest . nay in the very face of tyrants ; which things gave it a perfect visibility ; and , lastly , in every private family it was taught and put in practice ; which made it beyond dispute sensible and maniable as far as it conduces to christian life . quibus auxiliis ? by what helps or means ? by most stupendious miracles , powerful preaching and heavenly living conformably to those principles ; which made those principles or faith visible and evident . not by three or four victories , imputable perhaps to chance ; at least in which nothing divine discovered it self engaged . cur ? why was this doctrin of christs taught and practic 't ? not to satisfy the vain humour of impotent ambition , but to deliver mankind from the devils slavery and-hell fire its reward , and to bring him to everlasting salvation . quomodo ? by what manner ? by writing it in the fleshy tables of the hearts of the first christians ; and , afterwards , continuing it by the way of testifying ; the most connatural way to oblige the generality to beleef of matters of fact , that nature knows . quando ? when ? in the first christians when they were now at age to judge of the miracles , and multitudes of motives spoken of ; which aw'd , overpower'd and subdu'd their understandings to a firm beleef and an high reverence to the doctrin thus attested to be gods : in the after-christians when they were yet scarce able to speak much less to judge ; and taught by nature to believe their parents . hence a lively and reverential conceit was bred in their hearts , by others serious teaching and their own practising , of the sacredness and consequently unalterableness , of that doctrin ; ere they came to that ripeness as to use their own judgment ; nay , that doctrin was so deeply naturaliz'd into them by christian life ere they came to maturity of understanding that it became unnatural and exceedingly violent for them to act and beleeve contrary to what fathers had taught . whereas the story of alexander was not proper to be told children till they were at age and fit for some kind of schollership ; and then , it was so little practical that nothing was to be acted about it , but talking of it again ; so that it lookt like a meer piece of speculation and totally unconcerning them . i add , that this delivery by attestation or teaching went on linking the former age to the later , by propagating it into new subjects , not all at one time , but from year to year , moneth to moneth , and even less ; according as the understandings and even bodies of children budded into a capacity of knowing saying or doing something which belong'd to christianity ; which still-continu'd interweaving the former age with the later , after a wonderful manner strengthens the sway of tradition , and secures it both against mistake and deceit ; neither of them having any possible place where the whole business is carry'd on by such immediate steps . . i will not repeat over again 〈◊〉 ●●conceivable advantages , but leave it to m●o stillingfleet's reflexion ; and so , proceed 〈…〉 discourse thus . if the conceited sacredness , concern , necessity , unalterableness , miraculously-attestedness , also if the visibleness , practicalness with extent to every particular , connaturalness &c. found in the notion and nature of christs doctrin or manifestly connected with it , render'd it incomparably recommendable in every respect above the story of alexander's conquests , and that plainest nature or common sense and daily experience teaches us that , by how much more a thing is recommendable or deserving to be beleev'd and practic 't , by so much more 't is obligatory to be believ'd and practic 't ; and that we find in unconcerning stories a continu'd obligation layd in nature for the children to believe parents ( else such stories could never have descended with an hearty perswasion of their truth hitherto ) it follows that incomparably and in a manner infinitely greater must the obligation be to believe christ's doctrin than alexander's or william the conquerors victories ; or any history of the like nature whatever . . i have been much longer in such a point than the matter requir'd ; it needed no more but to manifest that common sense tells us nature obliges every man to believe those he takes to be honest ; much more children fathers : ( or the next age those of the former ; ) still more , if what they tell them be no speculation depending on fancy or private judgment , but matter of fact depending onely on sense ; that is , if they tell it them as witnesses : but most of all , if they see we conspire in the same ; for then the obligation is so necessary , that i cannot conceive that from the beginning of the world there was ever found one single person so unreasonable as not to yeild to it . whence also we can show every first beginner of an heresie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or self-condemn'd ; that is , conscious to himself that out of pride or some passion he goes against evidence of authority . now , in tradition all is carry'd on this manner . so that , if the explainers of tradition have not made provision for this point , 't is because they thought there could not be found a considerer so unreasonable as to question it . yet , because mr stillingfleet puts the whole stress of his objection against . tradition in this , i shall ( to give him further satisfaction ) consider it practically . . let us conceive then that the apostles , disciples , and apostolical men , taught the first age christ's doctrin ( qualifi'd in the manner before declar'd ) and recommended it as such ( that is as sacred , unalterable , the way to bliss . taught by christ &c. ) by miracles and other supernatural means ; 't is plain they had obligation to believe christ taught it . well , they receiving it as such , that is , as christ's , and , so , unalterable ; were bound to recommend it for such to the next age. nor does mr. stillingfleet question this : but , were their children oblig'd to believe them ? while they were young t is plain they could do no other neither out of reason nor passion . but what were they oblig'd to when they were grown up to ripeness of judgement ? 't is plain , that , were that doctrin deliver'd as an invention of then forefathers , or some collection of their reason that it was christ's , it was obvious for them to make this discourse ; we have natural wit as well as our parents had , and perhaps as good circumstances to apply that wit , and why then should not we cast about and consider whether that be indeed christ's doctrin , and taught by the apostles , which they would persuade us is so ? but , in case it were deliver'd as ascertain'd by their senses , to have been taught by the apostles , what imaginable reason can they have of doubt ? can they think all their fathers and neighbours a pack of impudent knaves , that conspire to abuse their posterity purposely to damn them , or that they could be mistaken in a doctrin they were so highly concern'd to learn right , and had led their lives by ever since they were christian ? the third age succeeds , whose immediate ancestours the second age told them they had been taught and brought up thus by the first . nor have they more reason to doubt the second ages attestation of the first ages doctrin and life ( it being an unmistakable matter of fact ) than the second had the first 's ; that is , they were oblig'd to believe it . and , since each foregoing ages attestation is a plain matter of fact , it follows that each succeeding age has still equal obligation to believe the foregoing : especially in a matter carrying along with it such powerful recommends , and this out of its very nature , as that the preserving and holding to it would bring them infinit goods , and the altering it infinit harms . thus it goes on ; and while it goes on thus , that is , while this rule is follow'd , 't is self-evident no heresie could ever be . ( disc. . § . ) whence by the way , if this be the onely difficulty in tradition ; ( that is , in case the next age were oblig'd to believe the former , tradition would still be follow'd , and so it would be self-evident no heretick could be ) then it needs no proof they have such an obligation ; for 't is questionless there is an obligation for men not to be hereticks . . well , but an acute wit or great scholar arises who begins to question this way . let 's see if he have a good reason , if not he is still oblig'd . can he bring an ampler or certainer living authority for the contrary ? where shall he have it ? for all the christian world is against him , if he be the first ( and so onely ) denier of this way of tradition . will he bring demonstration against the point ? how can he against a truth ; for our case puts the point truly deliver'd , and onely enquires into the obligation of believing ancestours in such a delivery ; and he must not hope a seeming demonstration can free him from his obligation of believing ancestours . for , whence hapned it that it seem'd so to him when it was not such ? from perfection in science in that particular ? no surely ; for then he had not miscarry'd : from the imperfectness of his science ? then he ought the more to have believ'd : from precipitancy ? then he ought not have been passionate . but , perhaps he will build on dead testimony , or some book granted to be sacred . in that case i ask , how knows he with such a certainty as to build faith and his opposition to the whole church upon it ( which ought be no less than a demonstration ) that he has the right letter and sence of that book . can he demonstrate the exact conformity of its letter from copy to copy , and translation to translation , and this up to the very original ? he may as well measure the back-side of heaven . will he recur to traditions help ? tradition could onely perform this either by the way of diligent examiners continu'd along and securely testifi'd , which ( as was said ) is impossible to show ; or by continu'd sence in christian hearts , and then 't is plain if their sence preserv'd the letter rightly significative , he ought to take the sence of the letter from them too , as the fathers use to press upon ancient hereticks . 't is left then that he must pretend he will demonstrate some former age has err'd ; how i wonder ? we have excluded him scripture , the nature of the points , and authority of living men . it may be he will alledge testimonies of historians , or fathers . but , first , fathers , taken as such , are not meerly great scholars , but eminent parts of ecclesia docens or witnessers of the doctrin deliver'd ; take away then the certainty of delivery or tradition , there 's no certainty of doctrin deliver'd , nor consequently of fathers . ly , an historians testimony signifies but his own private saying , unless authoriz'd by sence writ in mens hearts or tradition . ly , are those testimonies ( and the like may be said of scripture-proofs ) evidently against the present church , or no ? if not , 't is a madness to talk of seeming testimonies against so vast and evident a one as that of the whole foregoing church . if evident , 't is inconsistent with mans nature the christian church should recommend down for true fathers and creditable historians those authours which so evidently oppose her doctrin : or , if so great an authority as the churches delivers them down for fabulous or spurious , how can their authority ever come to be undoubtable or certain ? the last refuge then of a passion-misled reason is , asham'd of her want of principles and loth to show her head , to pretend private inspirations : which therefore is the last non ultra of all heresies and the flower or most refin'd quitessence of all faith-reformation . but , miracles failing these poor creatures to shew forth the hidden divinity which they pretend possesses them , they quickly fade away ; or , if they make any further progress , 't is into phrenzy or perfect madness , as we experience in our most miserably-distracted country ; which disposition is therefore the caput mortuum , or terra damnata of heresie , and the last and most natural effect of relinquishing tradition . . by this discourse is seen that 't is impossible the following age and every person in it , unlearned and learned , should not be oblig'd to believe the foregoing delivering to them christs doctrin as receiv'd from hand to hand by way of testifying : and that this universal obligation springs out of the nature of that heavenly doctrin , and the nature of the way of conveying it downwards . 't is time now to review mr stillingfleets words against the possibility of proving this by reason , and see how lank they look : they are these , neither more nor fewer : it is hard to conceive what reason should inforce it but such as proves the impossibility of the contrary : and they have vnderstandings of another mould from others who can conceive it impossible men should not think themselves oblig'd to believe and do all just as their predecessors did . is this mr stillingfleet who in the appendix to his irenicum § . so rationally characters those for more zealous than iudicious discoursers who argue not out the very nature and constitution of a thing ; and here , in a discourse concerning the rational way of looking into a point , quite overleaps all that concerns either the nature or necessary circumstances of that thing , and talks so rawly in common , that is , not one word to that particular purpose ? observe the words , oblig'd to believe and do all ivst as their predecessors have done . what means the word all ? does he mean we hold them oblig'd to cut their beards , or wear such garters and hatbands as their fore-fathers did ? his raw words reach no farther : what means the word just ? does he think faith being planted in human , that is rational , nature will not propagate it self into consequent and subordinate tenets and practices ? all the wonder then of the impossibility of the no-obligation lies in his crafty and sophistical expressing it , which includes a fallacy of non-causa pro causa ; for , not any thing convey'd down on any fashion is held by us thus obliging to believe and act accordingly , but such a doctrin , and so convey'd as was before declared . had he put our position thus , as indeed he ought , it being the true case , children or immediate posterity taught by fathers or immediate ancestors relying on the way of sensation , that such a doctrin was taught or deliverd to be taught by god himself , as most sacred , necessary to be believ'd and practic●t by all , being the way to salvation , so that to vary from it , or hold or practise the contrary , is the way to eternal misery , are all oblig'd to believe and act as their forefathers did , and not introduce contrary doctrins and practices to those they had receiv'd ▪ had it been , i say , thus propos'd , there had been no such cause of wonderment : but all these , that is indeed all of weight in the point is quite left out . such poor shifts even the best wits must be driven to , when they would maintain a false cause . . one word to m. stillingfleet . he hath challeng'd us to make out this obligation to belief as the onely thing we are to prove in the traditionary way ; he hath offer'd us the choice of our weapon , either reason , particular testimony , or vniversal tradition : i have accepted his offer , chosen my weapon , and given here the first blow ; i hope he will not now run the field , but return an answer to my discourse in the way of reason , which i have chosen by his offer . i am sorry for his sake my reflexions here are not more elaborate , being sent to the press in loose quarters of sheets as soon as writ , more time not being allow'd me , nor i hope needful to answer such mistakes . onely i request him when he replies , to take along with him the nature of the subjecta materia , the doctrins and practises we speak of ; the nature of the manner of delivering it , and the necessary circumstances which give weight to both , as i have declar'd above ; and i promise him ( god assisting me ) a very serious reply . . ere i quite leave this matter , i desire to take the reader along with me in my quest for a reason or proper cause why so judicious a person as mr. stillingfleet could come to doubt of such an obligation in posterity to beleeve their ancestours in a matter of fact , or a matter deliver'd to have been ( not deem'd or thought , but ) done ; or ( which is equivalent being it's necessary effect ) seen or known by sense . for , i make account there is not a man in the world or ever was ( such is the goodness of rational nature given us by god ) who in his natural thoughts could ever raise such a doubt , or think he could possibly frame his thoughts to a disbelief of the contrary ; no more than any man in england ( whom speculative scepticism has not besotted and unmann'd ) can doubt of william the conquerors , harry the eighths , or mahomets existence ; much less judge the contrary ; and , it appears at first sight to be a strange distorsion or rather destruction of human nature , which can so alter it . now , looking into things , i find it to be a proper and natural effect of the protestant's temper , and indeed of all who have left the church . for their humour being to chuse every one his faith by his private judgment or wit working upon disputable words ; they wonder , and judge it very unreasonable their posterity , thus imbu'd , should be oblig'd to beleeve and act as ancestours do ; and so should i too . for , while they can never deliver it to their children as received ever , by the way of infallible sense or witnessing , but must say the former church de facto err'd and consequently that themselves might do so too , so that they can only deliver it as depending or built on their own fallible opinion in interpreting scripture ( all which is imply'd in their making scriptur's letter the rule of faith , and allowing no living interpreter able to give infallibly the sence of it ) 't is natural their posterity should 〈◊〉 hold themselves oblig'd to beleeve immediate ancestors , but use their own judgments and chuse their own faith when they come at age as well as they did ; and experience tells us they have done so in england till they have chosen fairly . and this horrid unreasonableness is the venomous source , the first defective principle , or indeed the very nature of all heresie ; imported also in the very word , which signifies choice , or chusing one's religion ; mention'd by clemens alexandrinus ( cited above p. . ) and counterpos'd by him to tradition as also by s. athanasius ( cited p. . . ) where 't is most excellently describ'd , and homely apply'd to the protestants and such others , as the reader may see . i am a bad transcriber . . i have done my main task , and so shall only touch at his next paragraph . it begins thus ; it is to no purpose to prove the impossibility of motion when i see men move , no more it is to prove no age of the church could vary from the foregoing when we can evidently prove they have done it . you argue well . but two things are requir'd ere you can see our faith varies from the former . first , to see what our church holds now , and then to see what the former church held before ; and if i see any thing you see neither well . for , while you cannot distinguish between faith and its explication , some school-men and church , i have no hopes you should see candidly what our church holds now : and , if you cannot at present see what our church holds now , how and by what method will you assure us you see what she held formerly ? the thing to be prov'd is a plain matter of fact , and you have renounc't all living attestation the common and secure way to bring it down ; and consequently fathers too ; for fathers ( speaking of them as such ) being evident witnessers , transmitters or propagates of the faith received to immediate posterity , if you question delivery or tradition ( which you do while you doubt obligation in posterity to believe ancestours ) you question whether there be any doctrin deliver'd and so any fathers : and i wonder how you can imagin any man oblig'd to believe fathers , historians or any that writ or testify'd things long ago , and yet think the next age not oblig'd to believe the former in a matter of fact done in their own dayes . how far short then are your evidences of the former churches doctrin , like to prove of being parallell to our seeing a man move with our corporeal eyes ! but you may say any thing ; or rather indeed , forc't by your bad cause , you must do so . . you call this way of ours a superficial subtilty ; i beseech you consider what you say ; is that which is wholly builds on the nature of the things ( as you see ours does ) superficial ; or yours which is meerly an aiery descant upon dead words ? what do you think controversy is ? i deal plainly with you , you may take it to be an art of talking , and i think you do so though you will not profess it ; but i take it to be a noble science ; i hold its object to be rationem reddere fidei , or to maintain question'd faith , which is chiefly done by showing the authority on which faith depends quoad nos certain . hence , all other authority depending on tradition's , i hold knowledge of its certainty the first principle in controversy ; and this being quoad nos necessarily antecedent to authority , it can onely be manifested by reasons taken from things or men's minds , naturally ; and ( if we discourse against those who grant the excellency of the first-preached doctrin ) supernaturally affected or qualify'd ; as he sees i have endeavour'd in my discourses . . so much for our way . now for yours : who sees not first how words as interpretable are its subject ; and if in the method you take to work upon them you lay one principle which deserves the name of a principle , i dare undertake to be of mr. stillingfleet's persuasion . he sees in my transition our way laid open ; either let him acknowledge it solid , or remember , having provok't us , he is challeng'd to produce something for his rule of faith , which begins with the natures of the things in hand , that is of rule and faith , and approves it self solider than ours . but 't is so impossible their cause can endure the trial of that clearing method , that i fear not either mr. stillingfleet or any protestant writer of the least prudence will dare to attempt it . . will you see one example of our superficialness and mr. stillingfleet's solidness ? he gives you both in his next words , p. . and assures the reader we would prove no alteration in the faith of the church by such an argument as would prove the world ab aeterno . how strangely wide he roves from the mark ? our argument runs thus , beginning à priori ; causes were laid in the nature of christs heavenly doctrin , and the nature of its conveyance down by testifying to make its delivery continu'd hitherto ; à posteriori thus ; we find a present effect ( the present persuasion of christians their faith descended uninterruptedly from christ ) impossible to be without such a cause's existence or its having been at first taught by christ ; whence we conclude that faith came from christ : let us parallel it then to his . finds he any such effect in the world at present apt to spring onely from the worlds eternity as its cause ; or causes laid ab aeterno in the nature of the world apt to continue it hitherto ? if he does , he must hold it was eternal ; if not , how unconsonant is his parallel ? he makes our argument run thus ; the present age sees no alteration in it , and they could not be deceiv'd in what their forefathers believ'd , nor they in theirs , and so on in infinitum ; for no men did ever see the world made , and therefore it was never made , and so eternal . in return , i must first profess there is not a tittle in it parallel to our medium ; and , at next , that i never saw in my life more absurdities coucht in so few words . for , first , he should have begun , the present age has a firm perswasion it was ever , or have alledg'd some other effect , without which 't is impossible to argue to the existence of a thing before , or a cause . ly , he wrongly supposes a belief in the former age of the worlds ever-existence , saying , they could not be deceiv'd in what their forefathers believ'd . ly , the words , nor they in theirs , falsely suppose a continuance of belief upwards of the worlds eternity . ly , he sayes not whether this belief was founded on ey-sight at first , or opinion . if the later , 't is contrary , and not parallel to our case . if the former , then he must suppose some man saw the world made ab aeterno . ly , the words , and so on in infinitum , suppose this belief did go on in infinitum ; which put , 't is beyond question , and plac't in the very terms , that the world was eternal . ly , his reason for the last words , thus , for no man did ever see the world made , is manifoldly faulty : for 't is a negative argument , and , as such , inconsequent ; since the world might have been made , whether any had seen it or not . again , the first men might have known it certainly to have been made , whether they had seen it making or no. and lastly , 't is directly contradictory to what it should parallel ; for , we agreeing with them that christ and his apostles did teach a doctrin thus qualify'd , first put its existence seen , and thence conclude the contrary could never come to be held universally ; or else , we take a present-belief of its then-existence as ever receiv'd by testifying : neither of which have any correspondence with his rambling chimerical argument ; no two pieces of which hang together with themselves or any thing else . . he sayes , he can evidence the alteration of faith. i wish he would tell us first what an evidence means ; whether a strong fancy of his own , or a demonstration , onely which can excuse him or not believing the former age attesting . his first proof is , because the scripture supposes a degeneracy in the christian church : incomparably argu'd ! why see we not the place ! does it evidently speak of faith or manners ; the universal church , or particular persons ; that is , some hereticks ? but be it in faith ; be it universal . does it suppose this degeneracy already past ( which is onely proper to your purpose ) or yet to come ? that is , does it say there must be a total apostasie in faith before the year ? alas , he had forgot this : yet for such wretched proofs as these , baptiz'd god's word , have they left the evidently-attested doctrin and the union of the former church . his next evidences are his own performances in some other parts of his book . truly the miserableness of these evidences disinvite me from thinking the other worth a serious thought : but , if perhaps there be ever a testimony among them that is not coincident with some of dr. pierce's faulty ones ; let him single it out and print it at the end of his rejoynder to this , it shall have a fair answer from me , or some other more proper . finis . the heads . first discourse . showing from the nature of rule and faith , what properties belong to the rule of faith. p. . second discourse . showing the two first properties of the rule of faith utterly incompetent to scripture . p. . third discourse . that the three next properties of the rule of faith are utterly incompetent to scripture . p. . fourth discourse . that the two last properties of the rule of faith are clearly incompetent to scripture . p. . fifth discourse . showing the notion of tradition , and that all the properties of the rule of faith do clearly agree to it. p. . sixth discourse . endeavouring to demonstrate à priori the indefectibleness of tradition . p. . seventh discourse . an objection clear'd , and the beginning and progress of an heresy connaturally laid open . p. . eighth discourse . endeavouring to demonstrate à posteriori the vninterruptedness of tradition hitherto . p. . ninth discourse . opening the incomparable strength of the churches human authority , and the infinit advantages accrue to it by the supernatural assistances of the holy ghost . p. . corollaries from the former discourses . p. . consent of authority to the substance of the foregoing discourses . p. . transition to the appendixes : p. . first appendix . animadversions on the groundlesness of dr. pierce's sermon . p. second appendix . animadversions on some passages in mr. whitby . p. . third appendix . animadversions on some passages in mr. stillingfleet . p. . the method to arrive at satisfaction in religion. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the method to arrive at satisfaction in religion. sergeant, john, - . n. n. [ ], , [ ] p. s.n., [london : ] by john sergeant. caption title. imprint from wing. dedication signed: n.n. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng christian life -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the method to arrive at satisfaction in religion . to the truly virtuous the lady t. e. that a discourse of this nature should be addrest to your ladyship , if it seems extraordinary , it ought to argue a judgment more than common in her who is chiefly entitled to the perusal of it . the generality of your sex , through the unlucky disadvantage of their education , use to rellish nothing of a harder digestion , than are the delicacies of a romance , or at best , a piece of history : nay , many of the more knowing sex who wear the repute of learned , do hardly , even in this improoving age , so advance above the sophister and the pedant , as to fancy any thing exceeds a pretty probability trick't up with flowers of rhetorick and gay language ; and , many of the greatest wits ( if those may be justly called so who profess they know nothing ) have so unmann'd themselves by scepticism , that the solidest principles in matters of this kind seem to them meer air , and the closest consequences only worth answering by loose drollery : as if the author of nature ( i fear i do these men too much right in thinking they hold any such ) had intended indeed to permit us the exercise of our man-hood in lines and numbers , but in things of infinitely high●r concern had ordered us to be 〈…〉 that is , as if christ had erected a 〈◊〉 to educate and dispose mankind towards eternal happiness ; and , 〈…〉 done , would not so much as 〈…〉 know the way to it . now , 〈…〉 your self should be held 〈◊〉 to penetrate and comprehend discourses which pretend to a severity of reason , rescuing thus your own sex , from the imputation of inability for such performances , and condemning the greatest part of ours , is indeed a wonder if we consider the generality of the world ; but none at all if we consider your self . blush not , madam , you are not singular in this : many other excellent heroinae begin to get above their dull circumstances and the vogue of the world , and own the glorious reproach of entertaining their best faculty , reason , about the most noble and most profitable subjects . the high value you have for the sacred inviolableness of catholick faith , your earnest desire to render faith lively and efficacious in your self , by making out more and more to your thoughts how absolutely certain the grounds of it are ; the confidence you have in gods goodness not to deny us a clear , easie , and short way to make manifest this certainty to our selves , and others ; these good dispositions of your will , give your excellent understanding such an attentiveness to the proofs faith stands under , that i had fail'd your expectation , and writ in a way much below you , had i taken any other than i have here done ; that is , to begin with the bottom-principles , and derive thence by a continued line of consequences my main conclusion . had i produc'd scripture-proofs , or quotations from any authority of fathers or councils to evince the point in hand , your piercing wit would have made this smart demand in behalf of my readers , that since none of those is a first principle , and so evident to all that heat them alledg'd , i ought for their satisfaction make out by evident reason , that my interpretation of scripture could not fail to hit upon the right sence , or those authorities possibly mistake or mislead ; since no authority deserves any assent farther than reason gives it to deserve : so that still i was forc'd , if i would appear before you , to take this very method i have here pursued ; that is , to suppose nothing , but prove all things that can possibly be questioned in this affair . as for the following discourse , i only say , that i could heartily wish learned writers of what judgement soever , would think fit to take the same short concluding method , and go about to settle some other ground or rule of faith ; and thence , by shewing who adhere to , who reject that rule , conclude evidently who are truly faithful , who not . the very attempting this , would perhaps more readily discover on whose side truth stands , than many books writ controver sially by way of mutual opposition ; where an obstinate adversary may at pleasure still mistake wilfully every passage to make his impugnation the easier . the maintainers of all errors are , as experience teaches , very free of opposition , but only they who have certain truth on their side will think fit to settle . it will be wonder'd at , madam , that i make no farther discovery of your person and quality ; but you have will'd the contrary . the obedience to which command , obliges me by consequence to conceal my own name , and only to put instead of it , the title of my being , madam , your ladiships most devoted honourer n. n. the method to arrive at satisfaction in religion . . since all superstructures must needs be weak whose foundation is not , surely laid ; he who desires to be satisfy'd in religion , ought to begin with searching out , and establishing the ground on which religion is built ; that is , the first principle into which the several points of faith are resolv'd , and on which their certainty , as to us , depends . . to do this , 't is to be consider'd , that a church is a congregation of faithful , and faithful are those who have true faith ; wherefore , till it be known which is the true faith , it cannot be known which is the true church . again , a council is a representative , a father , an eminent member of the church , and a witness of her doctrine ; wherefore , till it be known which is the true church , it cannot be known which is a council , or who a father . lastly , since we cannot know which is scripture , but by the testimony of those who recommend it ; and of hereticks we can have no security that they have not corrupted it in favour of their false tenets ; neither can we be secure which is scripture , till we be satisfy'd who are the truly faithful , on whose testimony we may safely relie in this affair . . wherefore , he who sincerely aims at satisfaction in religion ought first of all to find out and establish some assured means or rule by which he may be secured , which is true faith ; for , till this be done , he cannot be secure either of scripture , church , council , or father ; but having once done this , is in a ready way to judge certainly of all ; whereas if he begin with any of the other , orindeed argue from them at all , till the rule of faith be first settled , he takes a wrong method , and breaks the laws of discourse , by beginning with what is less certain , and indeed to him as yet uncertain ; and in effect , puts the conclusion before the premises ; unless he argue , ad hominem , or against the personal tenets of his adversary , which is a good way to confute , but not to satisfie . . and , because the rule of faith must be known before faith can be known , and faith before scripture , church , councils and fathers ; it appears , that to the finding out this rule no assistance of books will be requisite , for every one who needs faith , is not capable to read and understand books : there is left then only reason to use in this inquiry ; and , since people of all capacities are to be saved , much sharpness and depth of wit will not be requisite , but plain natural reason rightly directed will suffice . . this being so , the method of seeking satisfaction in religion , is become strangely both more short and easie . for , here will need no tedious turning over libraries , nor learning languages , nor endless comparing voluminous quotations , nor so much as the skill to read english , all being reduc'd to the considering one single point ( but such an one as bears all along with it ) and this too comprehensible , ( as will appear ) to a mean understanding . again , the large debating particular points in a controversial way is by this means avoided . for , when the right rule of faith is certainly known , then as certainly as there is any faith in the world , all that is received on that rule is certain , and of faith . not but that 't is of excellent use too , to cherish and strengthen the faith , especially of young believers , by shewing each particular point agreeable to right reason and christian principles , and recorded expressly in , or deduced by consequence from the divinely-inspired books . . lastly . this method is particularly suitable to the nature of sincere inquirers ; who if they want the liberty of their own native indifferency , and be aw'd by any authority whatever before that authority be made out , cannot but remain unsatisfyed , and inwardly feel they proceed not according to nature and the conduct of unbyast reason ; whereas , when the authority is once made evident , reason will cleerly inform them that it becomes their nature to assent to it . . but how will it appear that 't is so easily determinable by common reason , which is the right rule of faith ? very evidently . but first we must observe , the assent called faith , depends upon two propositi - [ what god hath said is true ] and [ god hath said this ] out of which two necessarily follows the conclusion , that this or that in particular is true . of these two we are concerned onely in the latter : for to examin why god is to be believed when he has said any thing which they call the formal motive of faith , is not a task for those who own christianity . but all we have to do is to find out what god hath said , or ( which in our case is all one ) what christ has taught ; and that , vvhatever it be vvhich acquaints us vvith this , we call the rule of faith ; as that vvhich regulates our belief concerning christs doctrine , or the principles of religion . now i affirm it may by obvious reason be discover'd vvhich this rule is ; and that by looking into the nature of it , or considering what kind of thing it ought to be ; vvhich is no more than attentively to reflect vvhat is meant by those two ordinary vvords , rule and faith . . and both of them acquaint us that the rule of faith must be the means to assure us in fallibly vvhat christ taught . for , in case a rule , though we apply it to our povver , and swerve not from it , leave us still deceivable in those points in vvhich it should regulate us ; vve need another rule to secure us that vve be not actually deceiv'd , and so this other and not the former is our rule . next , faith ( speaking of christian faith ) differs from opinion in this , that opinion may be false , but faith cannot : wherefore the rule of faith , both as 't is a rule , and as it grounds faith , doubly involves infallibility . . let us apply this to scripture and tradition , ( for setting aside the light of the private spirit grounding phanaticism , there are no more which claim to be rules of faith ) and see to which of them this notion fits ; that is , which hath truly the nature of the rule of faith . and this is perform'd by examining which of them is of its own nature , if apply'd and held to , able to assure us infallibly , that christ taught thus and thus . . and for the letter of scripture , not to insist that if it be deny'd , as many , if not all the parts of the new testament have been by some or other , or mention that those who receive the books , do often and always may doubt of almost any particular text alledged , whether some fault through malice , negligence or weakness be not crept into it ; in which cases the letter cannot evidence it self , but needs another rule to establish it . i say , not to insist upon these things , which yet are undeniable , we see by experience multitudes of sects differing from one another , and some in most fundamental points , as the trinity , and godhead of christ , yet all agreeing in the outward letter . and it is not onely uncharitable , but even impossible to imagine that none among so vast multitudes do intend to follow the letter to their power , while they all profess to reverence it as much as any , read it frequently , study it diligently , quote it constantly , and zealously defend the sense which they conceive of it , so far that many are even ready to die for it ; wherefore it cannot be suspected but they follow it to their power ; and yet 't is so far from infallibly teaching them the doctrine of christ , that , all this notwithstanding , they contradict one another , and that in most fundamental points . the bare letter then is not the rule of faith , as not being of its own nature able to assure us infallibly , though we follow it to our power , what christ has taught . i would not be mistaken to have less veneration than i ought for the divine books , whose excellence and usefulness as it is beyond man to express , so peradventure amongst men there are not many who conceit this deeper than my self ; and i am sure not one amongst those who take the confidence to charge us with such irreverent thoughts : but we are now about another question . they are the word of god , and their true sense is faith ; we are enquiring out the rule of faith ; whose office 't is not to satisfie us that we ought to believe what god has said , which none doubts of , but what it is which god has said . and i affirm , that the letter alone is not a sufficient means to assure us infallibly of this ; and the experience of so many erring thousands , is a lamentable , but convincing proof of it . . on the other side , there needs but common sense to discern , that tradition is able , if follow'd to ones power , to bring infallibly down to after ages , what christ and his apostles taught at first . for , since it means no more but delivery of faith by dayly teaching and practise of immediate forefathers to their respective children ; and it is not possible that men should be ignorant of that to which they were educated , of that which they dayly saw , and heard , and did ; let this rule be follow'd to ones power , that is , let children resolve still to believe and practise themselves what they were taught by , and practis'd with their fathers , and this from age to age ; and it is impossible but all succeeding children which follow this rule , must needs from the apostles time to the end of the world , be of the same faith which was taught at first ; for , while they do thus , there is no change ; and , if there be no change , 't is the same . tradition then , thus understood , has in it the nature of the rule of faith , as being able , if held to , to bring down infallibly what christ and his apostles taught . we have found the rule of faith , there remains to find which body of men in the world have ever , and still do follow this rule . for , those , and onely those , can be infallibly assured of what christ taught , that is , can onely have true faith : whereas all the rest , since they have but fallible grounds , or a rule for their faith , which may deceive them , cannot have right faith , but opinion onely ; which may be false , whereas faith cannot . . and first , 't is a strong presumption that those many particular churches in communion with the roman , which for that reason are called roman-catholicks , do hold their doctrine by this infallible tenure ; since they alone own tradition to be an infallible rule , whereas the deserters of that church write whole books to disgrace and vilifie it : and , since no man in his wits will go about to weaken a tenure by which he holds his estate , 't is a manifest sign that the deserters of that church hold not their faith by the tenure of tradition , but rather acknowledg by their carriage that tradition stands against them ; and that 't is their interest to renounce it , lest it should overthrow their cause ; wherefore , since tradition [ § . . ] is the only means to derive christs doctrine infallibly down to after ages , they , by renouncing it , renounce the onely means of conveying the doctrine of faith certainly to us , and are convinc'd to have no faith , but onely opinion . and not onely so , but even to oppose and go point-blank against it , since they oppose the onely-sure method by which it can with certainty come down to us . . besides , since tradition ( which i always understand as formerly explicated to be the teaching the faith of immediate forefathers by words and practise ) hath been proved the onely infallible rule of faith ; those who in the days of k. henry viii . and since have deserted it , ought to have had infallible certainty that we receded from it formerly ; for , if we did not , but still cleav'd to it , it could not chuse but preserve the true faith to us ; and if they be not sure we did not , they know not but we have the true faith ; and manifestly condemn themselves in deserting a faith , which for ought they know was the true one ; but infallible certainty that we had deserted this rule , they can have none , since they neither hold the fathers infallible , nor their own interpretation of scripture , and therefore unavoidably ship wrack themselvs upon that desperat rock ; vvhich is aggravated by this consideration , that they built not their reformation upon a zealous care of righting tradition , which we had formerly violated , nor so much as testimonial evidence ( as shall be shown presently ) that we had deserted it , but all their pretense was that we had deserted scripture ; and , because they assign no other certain means to know the sense of the holy books but the words , and those are shown to be no certain means , [ § . ] 't is plain the reformers regarded not at all the right rule of faith , but built their reformation upon a weak foundation , and incompetent to sustain such a building : whence , neither had the first reformers , nor have their followers , faith at all , but onely opinion . . on the contrary , since 't is known and agreed to by all the world , at what time all deserters of our church , of what name soever , broke from us ; as also who were the authors and abetters , and who the impugners of such new doctrines ; besides , in what places they first begun , and were thence propagated to others ; but no such thing is known of us even by our adversaries , whom it concerns to be most diligent searchers after it , seeing they are in a hundred minds about the time when , and the persons who introduc'd these pretended new doctrines of ours , which they say vary from scripture , as may be seen by their own words in several books , and amongst others , one call'd , the progeny of protestants , and this for every point in which they pretend we have innovated , 't is plain that when we charge them with deserting the known doctrine of the former church , and the rule of faith , we speak open and acknowledg'd evidence ; when they accuse us of the same , their charge is obscure and unknown even to the very accusers ; nay , plainly prov'd false by the necessity of ●he things being notorious , if it happen'd , and the constant disagreement of those who allege it , when or how it happen'd . . i say notorious ; for , since points of faith which ground all christian practise , are the most concerning truths in the world , it cannot be but the denyal of such truths must needs raise great commotions before the opposite tenets could be universally spread ; and the change of christian practise and manners which depend on those truths , must be wonderfully manifest and known to every body ; wherefore , had we been guilty of such a change , and introduc'd new tenets , and propagated them over the christian world , as is pretended , it must needs be manisestly and universally known that we did so ; neither is it possible the change should be so insensible and invisible , that our very adversaries cannot find it out ; especially this alone making their victory over us so certain and perfect . for seeing we own tradition as an in-fallible rule , we are irrecoverably overthrown , if they make out that we ever deserted it : and , surely , nothing should be more easie than to make out that , than which , if true , nothing can possibly be more notorious . . moreover , since it can not be , that multitudes of men should profess to hold point's both infinitely concerning and strangely difficult to believe , and yet own no ground upon which they hold them : if we ever , as 't is said we have , deserted tradition , vve must , till the time we took it up again , have proceeded upon some other ground or rule of faith : and , because none ever charged us with proceeding upon the letter of scripture or phanaticism , and , besides these there is no other but tradition , 't is plain we never deserted , but always stuck to tradition . . besides , 't is impossible that that body of men which claim for their rule of faith , an uninterrupted tradition from the apostles days , should not have held to that rule of faith from the beginning : for , otherwise they must have taken it up at some time or other , and by doing so , profess to the world , that nothing is to be held of faith , but what descended by an uninterrupted delivery from the beginning ; and yet at the same time acknowledg that all they then held was not so descended , but received by another rule , this of tradition or uninterrupted delivery being then newly taken up ; which is so palpable a contradiction , that , as humane nature could not fall into it : so , if it could , the very pretense would have overthrown it self , and needed no other confutation . . add to this , that none of those many sects who from time to time have deserted our church's faith and disciplin , and so becom her adversaries , ever yet pretended to assign the time when we took up this rule of tradition ; and yet a change in that on which we profess to build all the rest , must needs be of all changes the most visible , and most apt to justifie the carriage of those revolters . wherefore , 't is demonstrably evident on all sides , that , as this present body of men , call'd the roman-catholick church , does now hold to tradition , so their predecessors uninterruptedly from the apostles days did the same ; that is , did hold to it ever . and , since 't is shown before [ § . . ] that this rule , if held to , will certainly convey down the true faith unchang'd to all after ages , 't is likewise demonstrable , that they have the true faith , and are the truly faithful , or true church . . and hence by the way , is clearly seen what is meant by universal tradition , and where 't is to be look'd for and found ; which puzzles many men otherwise very judicious and sincere ; who profess a readiness , nay a duty to follow universal tradition , but they are at a loss , how we may certainly know which is it. for , since 't is evident that to compleat the notion of the universality of mankind , ( for example ) it were absurd to think we must take in brutes too , which are of an opposite nature to mankind , but 't is sufficient to include all in whom the nature of mankind is found ; so , to make up the notion of universal tradition , it were equally absurd to think we ought to take in those in whom the nature of tradition is not found , but its opposit , that is , deserters of tradition or their followers ; but 't is sufficient to include those in whom tradition is found as in its subject , that is , adherers to tradition or traditionary christians . all , therefore , that have at any time deserted the teaching and practise of the immediately foregoing church , how numerous and of what name soever they be , have no show of title to be parts of universal tradition ; and onely , they who themselves do , and whose ancestors did ever adhere to it , how few soever they seem , are the onely persons who can with any sense pretend to be those , of whom , as parts , universal tradition consists . . these men , therefore , by applying this their rule , can certainly know who have true faith , and which body of men is the true church ; likewise , that a representative of that body is a true council , and that an eminent member of it delivering down to the next age the doctrine believ'd in his , whether by expresly avouching it the churches sense , or confuting hereticks , is a true father . lastly , they can have infallible certainty both of the letter and sense of scripture , as far as concerns faith : for , if any fault which shocks their faith , whether of translator or transcriber , creep into any passage , or , if the text be indeed right , but yet ambiguous , they can rectifie the letter according to the law of god written in their hearts , and assign it a sense agreeable to the faith which they find there ; between which and that of the holy writers , they are sure there can be no disagreement , as being both inspir'd by the same unerring light. . contrariwise , those that follow not this rule , and so are out of this church , of what denomination soever , first , can have no true faith themselves : 't is possible indeed and usual that some , and not seldom , many , of the points to which they assent , are true , and the same the truly faithful assent to , yet their assent tothem is not faith ; for , faith ( speaking of christian faith ) is an assent , which cannot possibly be false ; and not only the points assented to , but the assent it self must have that distance from falshood , ( as is prov'd at large in faith vindicated ) else 't is not faith , but degenerates into a lower act , and is call'd opinion : now the strength of an assent rationally made , depends upon the strength of its grounds , and all grounds of that assent call'd faith , ( i mean such grounds as tell us what christ taught ) besides tradition , are proved ( § . . ) weak and none : without it , therefore , there can be no true faith . next , for want of that only infallible ground they cannot have certainty which is true faith , who truly faithful , which the true church , which a true council , who a true father , nor lastly , which is either the letter or sense of scripture in dogmatical passages that concern faith. and , since they have no certainty of these things , they have no right nor ought in a discourse about faith be admitted to quote any of them ; but are themselves , and the whole cause concluded in this single inquiry , who have a competent that is , an impossible to be false , or infallible rule to arrive at faith ? . the solid satisfaction , therefore , of those who inquire after true faith , is onely to be gain'd by examining who has , or who has not such a rule . this method is short and easie , and yet alone goes to the bottom . all others , till this be had , are superficial , tedious , and , for want of grounds , insignificant . finis . errata . ep. ded. p. . l. . r. of what other p. . l. . r. thing , which p. . l. ult . r. infallibility in its notion . transnatural philosophy, or, metaphysicks demonstrating the essences and operations of all beings whatever ... and shewing the perfect conformity of christian faith to right reason, and the unreasonableness of atheists ... and other sectaries : with an appendix giving a rational explication of the mystery of the most b. trinity / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) transnatural philosophy, or, metaphysicks demonstrating the essences and operations of all beings whatever ... and shewing the perfect conformity of christian faith to right reason, and the unreasonableness of atheists ... and other sectaries : with an appendix giving a rational explication of the mystery of the most b. trinity / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by the author, sold by d. brown ..., abel roper ..., and tho. metcalf ..., london : . contains marginal notes. errata: p. [ ] at end. imperfect: tightly bound, and with print show-through and loss of text. reproduction of original in the harvard university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng metaphysics -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion transnatural philosophy , or metaphysicks : demonstrating the essences and operations of all beings whatever , which gives the principles to all other sciences . and shewing the perfect conformity of christian faith to right reason , and the unreasonableness of atheists , deists , anti-trinitarians , and other sectaries . with an appendix , giving a rational explication of the mystery of the most b. trinity . by i. s. london : printed by the author , sold by d. brown at the swan and bible without temple-bar , abel roper at the black boy , fleet street , and tho. metcalf in drury-lane , . to the right honourable james , lord drummond . my lord , did i think that the present i here make your lordship needed any man's patronage to set it off , i should , instead of doing you an honour , disparage your good judgment by such an address . truth is of another kind of mettal than that rich oar which avaricious worldlings dig out of the bowels of the earth . her worth is wholly intrinsick ; nor can she owe any part of her valuableness to the face of a heroe , or a caesar , stampt upon her to make her more current and authentick ; and it would argue she wanted worth , should she beg it . 't is her prerogative never to go out of her self : nor does this restrain or imprison , but enlarge her . the whole vast extent of being is her ordinary purlew , and within the precincts of her far-stretcht jurisdiction . tho' her steps are steady and wary , yet she ranges over all nature . her unconsined progress takes it's rise , and starts from principles : sciences are her stages ; whence she makes excursions into endless and numberless conclusions . nor does she content her self , much less affect , to walk on even ground : the paths she treads are all up-hill , and she knows no resting-place in her long ascending journey , till she settles her self in the clear contemplation of the first being . these considerations will make it seem very improper for a man who professes to regard nothing but the promoting of truth , to preface his book with a dedicatory ; which , in the common opinion of the world , makes a show of courting a patronage , i do once more assure your lordship this was not my aim : for no man can patronize errour , and truth needs no man's good word or authority to abet her . not all the power of alexanders , or caesars , can make a bad proof conclude , nor hinder the consequence of a true demonstration . arguments grounded on evident principles are of such a stiff and sullen nature , that they can neither how out of respect , nor fawn out of complement , nor shake out of awe or fear . since then applications of this nature can no ways advantage my cause ; what excuse can i make to the world why i am so inconsistent with my profession ; or , why i would needs do such a needless thing as to particularize to your self what i had intended for the common good of all my learned readers ? 't is natural , my lord , for us all , when we apprehend some sinister imputation , to lay the blame on others ; and 't is honest too , when those others are really the cause or occasion of our incurring that censure . pardon me then , my lord , if , to save my self harmless , i lay the good fault at your door ; and openly declare , that 't is none but your self who has made me guilty of this odd singularity . had there been nothing in your lordship above the common , the common should have taken my book among them without any restriction . had there been no particular qualification in your lordship , which distinguisht and signaliz'd you ; my indifferency had yet remain'd undetermin'd . this specialty in your lordship , if i can with truth make out , and prove to the world , and ( under favour ) to your own face too , and that 't is of such a nature as became me to take notice of it ; my credit is acquitted , and your lordship must answer for it . i believe your lordship is not aware your self what this distinctive mark is , which could oblige a man in my station to single you out thus from your peers . i will take leave then to make my approaches to the telling the world what it is , by acquainting them first what it is not . were my talent heraldry , i would then blazon in the best colours the antiquity of ▪ your noble family ; how it came first into scotland with st. margaret the then queen . i would lay open the royal alliances of it by the marriage of the lady annabel drummond with robert the third , king of scots ; how from her , by the mother's side , descended the family of the stuarts ; who , in a long succession , raign'd in scotland , and afterwards in england too . by which means some of the royal blood of those great monarchs was deriv'd from that of the drummonds ; and , by consequence , is ally'd to that which circulates now in your lordship's veins . were i skill'd in such matters , i could with truth declare how far your lordship outstript all your equalls in those exercises in which noble gentlemen use to be train'd up ; to that degree of skill and vigour , that , whereas you came thither as a learner , you arriv'd , in a short time , to the pitch of a master . i could add , were my profession souldiery , what bravoure your lordship shew'd in war , even in the bud of your youth ; and how you durst even then look danger in the face with an undaunted courage . i could recount your travells thro' the most polite nations of europe , culling out of each all that 's commendable , and conduces to accomplish a personage of your rank ; and leaving behind you whatever was unworthy and misbecoming . i could , out of a fair experience , dilate upon your noble and civil deportment ; which claims at once a high respect , and wins the love of all that converse with you , & know you : how the native sweetness of your genius secures you from having any enemies , and the greatness of your mind from fearing them . lastly , how your friendly affability , and unpretended courtesy , is neither deprest by mean condescensions ; nor rais'd above its just level by the least disrespectful height : which make up a mixture so charming , that 't is impossible to know you , and not pay you the double duties of esteem and love. all these are very great embellishments to your high extraction , and make a great esclat in the eye of the generality of well-bred persons . but , what are all these to mee , whose sole addiction is to pursue truth , and to bend the whole intention of my mind to promote that best , and , in comparison , only valuable end , tho' the lustre of these do burnish honour , and is so conspicuous and bright in you , that it casts a shadow on others of your quality and age ; yet these were not my chief motive why i give this book a particular reference to your lordship . no , my ld. there is another piece of your character left yet untoucht , which , in my esteem , excells all these ; which is , that you are a hearty and sincere lover of truth . 't is this , 't is this , my ld. which gives you a just title and appropriation to this present of mine : 't is this , that can best satisfy the world ( as it does mee ) that your thoughts are truly great , and not detain'd in insignificant trifles , as too many of your rank are ; nor , consequently , are your affections plac'd on low and contemptible objects . 't is this that double-guilds your other heroical qualities , and sets you on the highest pinnacle of honour . there is nothing which more shocks a true-bred gentleman , than a ly , tho' it be but in puntilio's of ordinary conversation . but how exceedingly does a hearty lover of truth refine upon this common genius of a man of honour . such a person bids defiance to the whole tribe of errours , which are lies in their several wayes . a falshood in natural philosophy gives the ly to nature . a falshood or paralogism in logick gives the ly ▪ to human reason ▪ which is the true nature of all mankind . a falshood in metaphysicks gives the ly to the whole nature of being ; that is , to the whole creation ▪ and to the first being , who by his flat establisht those natures . you have not yet , my ld. taken the full dimensions of the grandeur , to which this high title , [ a lover of truth ] has rais'd you . you may please to reflect that this mistress whom you affect and court , is very neerly ally'd to heaven by the father's side ; and if you espouse her , ( for you may be sure of her chast consent , if you sincerely affect her ) you dignity and ennoble your extraction by a relation transcendently above what sublunary marriages could have given it . 't is then , to one of those greatest of men , or rather one of those paragons of mankind , that is , to a sincere lover of truth , i dedicate my book . i doubt not but i might have found diverse of those whom the populace of scribblers call patrons or mecoenasses , who , out of a vain consideration ●f being prais'd in print , would have gratefully accepted it ; had i been willing out of a mercenary humour , to prostitute truth to unqualify'd persons . but how would it have sham'd my choice , and brought my prudence and sincerity into question , to make a present of pearls to those whose thoughts are digging in the dunghil of worldly riches ; and value the barly-corns of their opulent estates , above the best ornament of their mind , knowledge . such gifts to those little-great men had been as improper as to present an atheist with a prayer-book , who would out of exteriour civility , or some other respect , seem to accept it kindly ; but afterward burn the book and laugh at the writer . yet , all this while , i do not pretend to lay any obligation at all on your lordship by this dedication ; for , had this book been publish'd without it , you would presently have made it your own by perusing it . to do which intelligently both your own natural genius , and your running thorow the course of your studies , in learned company , with such applause , has more effectually enabled you , than it would some of our old school ▪ term-doctors . such maturity of judgment in such youthful and green years . would easily enable your vigorous understanding to take in and digest the most elevated conceptions . you see then , my lord , i only give you what i could not keep from you ; and forced kindnesses deserve no thanks ; tho' i have some title to your pardon , because it was your own worth that layd this force upon me . i had , i say , just reason to apprehend your lordship would have made this book your own when you had once got it into your hands , seeing how sedulously you made a strict search for every trifle i had written ; and never desisted till you had found them ●ll , and purchast them at a dear rate : to do which , nothing but the love of truth could move you ; since there was neither in them any affectation of rhetorick , nor melodious gingle of words , nor the diverting conceits of romances ; with which those gentlemen , who dwell in the middle-story , do so contentedly entertain and please their fancies . and , if your lordship was so intently inquisitive after those pieces of mine which were less valuable , i had all the reason in the world to think you would not let my metaphysicks scape your perusal : which , if i may be allow'd to be a competent judge of my own productions , is worth them all . but , i do not altogether blame your lordship for your over-value of my poor labours , because you have it partly ex traduce . 't is hereditary to your lordship to have too good an opinion of my writings . your lordship 's noble father , who is justly accounted the most universal scholler of your nation , did formerly , tho' perfectly unknown to me , give so high and undeserved a character of them , as would make a man , tho' but indifferently modest , blush ; and tempt me to admit some thoughts of vain self complaisance , had i not been provided before hand with an antidote ; which is , a most clear demonstration , in the cloze of my metaphysicks , that all the good we have , even to the least tittle , does entirely spring from the inexhausted bounty of the world 's great governour , who works every thing in us , and by us : and , why may not this be a second excuse to the world for making your lordship this present , upon the score of gratitude ; since the greatest honour i can by this address confer on your lordship , is but a poor requital of what your lordships noble father was pleas'd to bestow on me . i shall add one word more , which , tho' it may be some comfort , and an especial honour to your lordship , yet it is a very great trouble to me : which is , that those high and most due encomiums i give your lordship as a zealous & unprecedented lover of truth , ( tho this be , in reality , one of the highest commendations rational nature is capable of ) will not yet draw upon you the least envy from any . no , my lord , never fear it ; let your pretensions to that title be never so high , you will have but few rivals and competitours . this darling of heaven [ truth ] tho' the most generous & universal benefactress to mankind , is in such disreput● with the generality of our great ones , except some few ( whom i do as highly honour for their true worth and rarity , as i contomn the rest ) that they fancy they should stoop themselves below their dignity if they mali● ▪ her the least part of their concern and knowledge , tho' imploy'd in defence of the most fundamental article of christianity , is so unpalatable to their depraved tast , that it becomes nauseous . to talk to such men of establishing any truth , or explicating faith , by rational principles , sounds to them like gibberish . they look upon manly reason as a kind of madness , as least as foppish ▪ and so strangely are their brains turn'd , that they judge those discourses which are solid and go to the bottom , to be aiery & superficial . not considering how this slight opinion they have taken of truth , leaves them wholly to the conduct of fancy , makes their life uneven , and their devotion bigottish and fanatical . i am confident that your lordship's discerning judgment will observe that this book i send you , contains in it a cure for all those distempers , if the stomachs of the patients do not turn at the medecine . you will find here multitudes both of clear and well-built truths ; & , that they are the genuin off-spring of evident principles : nor only this ; but you will discover , in my second book , the ly true and firm grounds of solid piety and devotion . that they may beget and improve in your lordship's noble soul those dispositions that will carry you steadily to eternal happiness , shall be the fervent and daily wish of my lord , your lordship 's most affectionate friend , and most humble and most faithfull servant , j. s. preface , to the sincere lovers of truth in both our learned universities . gentlemen , i. many are the high encomiums and glorious titles which have been given to metaphysicks by those who teach and profess it . they call her the queen of sciences . they tell us that , in regard all other knowledges do depend for their certainty and evidence , on her sublime maxims , she is not meerly to be called , in a common appellation with the rest , scientia , a science ; but sapientia , or wisdom ; which carries a kind of majesty in its notion above other endowments of our understanding . they pretend that she does not only demonstrate , which every petty inferiour science must , under penalty of forfeiting her name and dignity ; but moreover , that she demonstrates ex altissimis causis , by the highest mediums or reasons : in a word , they make her the soveraign of all other sciences ; and give her the prerogative of superintending over the rest ; of assigning to each of them their province ; of distributing to each of them their proper function , and the matter on which they are to work ; and of enabling them , by her supreme direction and influence , to perform what she enjoyns them ; and much more to that purpose . ii. i do not at all wonder that learned men have adorn'd metaphysicks with these and such like singular commendations : they are no more but her just due . what i admire at is , how , these things being true , and she being of so transcendent a dignity , it comes to pass that she is strangely sunk into such an undervalue and contempt in the world , that no body seems to regard her . if her influence be so universal , and her evidence so clear , who would not strive in the first place to cultivate his mind with such an unparallell'd perfection ? why are not schools and chairs erected in all learned societies meerly to teach metaphysicks , and large endowments settled to encourage the professors of it ? and yet we hear no news of any such . certainly , it she does , indeed , carry such a high hand over all other sorts of knowledge , a great metaphysician should be lookt upon as a monster of learning ; at least such an extraordinary person , that all mankind would most highly caress and value him ; whereas tho' beggery be the badge of poetry ; yet a metaphysician is in such a mean repute , that , had he no better livelihood , he might sue to be subcizer to a poetaster , and be glad to feed on his scraps . whence we may conclude that there is something very much amiss in the business ; and that either the writers of metaphysicks have not done her the right she deserves ; or else that , thro' the ignorance of the mob of half-witted readers , a general outery is made against her ; whence men have taken a toy at her , and made , a wrong apprehension of her as insipid , dry , steril and insignificant . iii. there is no doubt but scepticism also has been a great enemy , as to all other sciences , so more especially to metaphysicks ; because she is the most able to shame and confute ▪ the pretence that there is no certainty or evidence at all ▪ fancy , which being of a contrary genius , has a natural antipathy against her , is another adversary of hers ; and that a most powerful one ; for it is able to bring into the field a vast rabble of nimble-tongu'd gentlemen , arm'd cap-a-pie with flouts , iests and drollery , which of late have ( i know not how ▪ ) ●ot the reputation of wit , and noise , if finely deliver'd , has a powerful ascendent over the generality . it may be fear'd too , that voluminous school-term-men , whose productions have been onely wordish digladiations and fencing with distinctions , without any farther effect , have given , to many , occasion to think that metaphysicks is nothing but a mysterious kind of talk , to make an exteriour show of learning , and appear extraordinary ; and that to write metaphysicks , is to no more purpose than 't is to plant a nursery of bryars to enlarge a wilderness . for these men speak as high of metaphysicks as any : whence , men reflecting that these large promises vanish into smoak , and that neither principles are layd , nor any useful demonstrations or conclusions drawn thence which are found to be influential to other sciences ; it is natural for men to revenge the defeat of their high expectations , by exposing those authors , and disgracing metaphysicks it self , as chicanerie , and altogether fruitless ▪ & unable to make good what the professors of it did , in such big words , pretend . but , leaving those persons to answer for their own faults , let us see what more indifferent men have objected against metaphysicks , and what reasons they alledge for their aversion from her . iv. first then 't is objected that metaphysicks is an abstruse and crabbed kind of study , and scarce intelligible without revelation ; so that a man may break his teeth with cracking the shell ; and , when he has done , he will find never a kernel . secondly , that it is aiery , superficial , and meerly wordish ; and not handsomely worded neither , but scurvily barbarous . thirdly , that it was never yet seen how it influenc'd any other sciences at all ; as is pretended . lastly , that it has no influence at all upon men's manners , nor conduces , in the least , to make them live better . these are the faults generally imputed to metaphysicks , which we will consider in their order . premising first that i have reason to hope that whoev●● pleases to peruse attentively our ensuing metaphysicks , will see that they are already answer'd to his hand . v. the first objection is so perfectly groundless , that the direct contrary is most evident . the object of metaphysicks is our most generall notions , of ens or being : which an easy reflexion will tell us , are , of all others , the ●…t clear and evident . for , an individual 〈…〉 ( v. g. peter ) being constituted by such ● complexion of innumerable accidents as ●s found in no other thing ; hence , our knowledge of it is so confus'd , that , however we can distinguish it , as far as concerns our use , by time , place , and oft-times by some outward ●…dents ; yet the intrinsecal essence and ●●ture of that body is so intricately woven ; ●…omprizes in it the grounds of such numberless considerations we may make of it , that 't is impossible to frame any one distinct conception or notion of it . homo , has fewer ; whence it is more clear , so that we are now able to frame a definition of it , which we could not of the individuum : yet , because it comprehends in it the natures or notions of animal , vegetative , mixt , body and ens ; 't is still very confus'd , and therefore less clearly intelligible . animal is less confus'd , because it contains fewer superiour-notions or natures in it . vegetative is still less confus'd than animal ▪ for the same reason . mixt is less confus'd than vegetable ; body than mixt. and lastly , ens is the least confus'd of any of the other ; and , therefore the clearest of any o● them ; as having no superiour notion in it ●● all : whence all the composition , and , consiquently , confusion it has , is that it confound in it the notions of its own metaphysical parts which its definition [ viz. that which is capable to bee ] gives us ; which contains onely the notions of the power , and of the act ( viz. existence , ) to which it is a power : the sense● of which words is so obvious and easy , the 't is impossible the rudest vulgar should be ignorant of them . vi. still it will be objected that such abstracted words as [ power ] and [ act ] ●● unusual to mankind , and seem to hover in t● air , so that no man can make any fancy of them . and ; it must be confest they sute not with fancy at all ( for brutes have none such , ) nor ought they to sute with it ; for 't is impossible for us to have any proper or express i hantasm● of abstracted universal conceptions , because ( as they are such ) they never enter'd into our senses , nor have any being but in our understanding . but , why are not those notions or conceptions of [ power ] and [ act ] easy 〈…〉 can any man living be ignorant of the meaning of these words [ such a thing can be , or may be ? ] 't is impossible ; nor was there ever any that came to the use of ordinary knowledge , but understands them - ▪ now , the word [ can ] signifies that which we call power ; and the word [ bee , ] that which is the act of that power ; only they are put into a manner of expression● proper to abstract words . nor can this breed any difficulty : for , he who knows what it is to love , cannot but know what the noun substantive [ love ] means : nor , was ever any man who knows what [ white ] and [ round ] mean , so dull as to be pazzled in knowing the meaning of [ whiteness ] and [ roundness . ] yet the reader may observe that the main body of my metaphysicks is built on the self-evident notions or meanings of those words , power and act , or the different kinds of them . whence , were i to begin to teach a philosophy-school , i should think it best to take this method ; viz. that , after my schollers had perfectly learnt the doctrine of the ten predicaments so as to distinguish exactly our natural notions , got knowledge of the necessary laws of predicating , and how to place the terms best in order to conclude evidently , i should begin with teaching metaphysicks : not at all doubting but that any man of a good natural mother-wit , would perfectly comprehend it ; and , thence , become excellently dispos'd to demonstrate a priori , which is the most effectual and best way to attain true science ; and to branch out his knowledge of principles to an incomparably greater number of particular conclusions than he could by demonstrating a posteriori . besides , all inferiour objects would far more easily , and connaturally , open themselves to his view , after he had once taken a distant sight of them from the higher ground of their causes and principles . vii . the second objection is grounded on a gross misunderstanding of the main fundamental of all true philosophy ; which i most religiously observe in all my discourses ; and which , if neglected or not well attended to , brings every thing into wrangle and confusion ; which is , that all our abstracted conceptions , ( without which we cannot possibly apprehend , nor consequently discourse of any thing distinctly and clearly ) are of the things themselves consider'd according to such or such a respect . this is the basis of all the aristot●lian philosophy ; however there be too few that exactly attend or hold to it . for example . that great man , when he was distinguishing all our natural notions into ten several heads , call'd the second ▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the third 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quantum and quale : now these words being concretes of a thing ( or substance ) and an accident , if they be not taken formally or with a ●eduplication , for the thing as it is big , or qualify'd , would confound substance and each of those accidents , into one compound notion ; which being quite contrary to his intention , which was to distinguish them , we must conclude that he took those words , as we take our abstract words quantitas , & qualitas , in a meer formal sense , for the thing quatenus quanta , and quatenus qualis or qualify'd ; which word [ quatenus ] cuts off that precise consideration or notion from any other ; which done , their perfect distinction is evident . the objecter then , may please to reflect that we ( following the same method ) do mean , by all those abstract words , the very thing it self , consider'd or conceiv'd according to such a precise respect , and no other : so that , when we speak of power , act , essence , existence , ens , suppositum , person , bigness , quality , relation , &c. we mean still the thing , apprehended according to such a formal consideration ; nor can we , with any sense mean any thing else . whence we , building all our discourses on our natural notions , each of which is the thing it self conceiv'd thus and not otherwise , do by consequence , ground all our philosophy on the things themselves ; which being establisht in their essences by god's creative wisedom , must be acknowledg'd to be the most solid ground imaginable . wherefore there can be no show of reason in objecting to us that our discourses , thus grounded , are aiery or superficial ; whereas it is an unanswerable objection against those who build their philosophy on ideas ; which they confess not to be the things , but distinct from them . to give an instance what mistakes arise when writers do not exactly distinguish their abstracted notions , it would not be much a miss to take notice of the famous controversie between the late bp. of worster and mr. locke , which might have been prevented , had this method of distinguishing our conceptions been accurately observ'd . the former of these being worthily sollicitous , lest the mystery of the b. trinity ( which he was then explicating ) should receive any prejudice , did check at mr. lockes denying he had any clear idea of substance . now , had mr. locke declar'd himself to take the word [ substance ] to signifie the abstracted notion or conception he had of the thing , as it is distinct from that of the modes or accidents , or declar'd it to signifie the conception of a thing as it is capable of existing ▪ ( which is the first and proper notion of a created ▪ being ) he might by depuring it first of its imperfection , necessarily annex● in all creatures , have transferr'd it to god , and ●● it had been not injurious but serviceable to the explication of that mystery : ) but he , having in his eye the words of some scholas●ic●s , who fail'd of thus distinguishing it ; and , besides ▪ did not explain it literally , but call'd it in a metaphorical expression , supporter of the accidents , had good reason to say that such a notion of substance , no farther nor better explicated , was very obscure ; especially , if they made it a kind of entity supporting other feebler entities , as some of them did . ix . now , to supply their defect , and give the literal meaning of that metaphorical word [ supporting , ] the onely good sense can be made of it is clearly this. the proper and precise notion of substance as 't is distinguish from all other abstracted or inadequate notions we make of a thing or individuum , is this , that it is capable of existing ; which , as 't is thus conceiv'd , is its definition : whereas , let us define quantity , quality , relation , &c. we find that they do not at all imply in their notion , that is , in the precise signification of those words , any capacity of being at all , as did the other most expresly ; but of modifying or determining , after their several ways , the thing which is capable of being ; because in our mind we must first conceive the thing capable to bee , ere we can conceive it capable to be modify'd . since then we see accidents are , and yet out of their own precise notion are not capable to bee , they must be conceiv'd to bee , by virtue of the notion of substance , which is of its own notion , ( or as signify'd by that word ) capable of being ; whence they are said , by a metaphorical expression , to be supported in being by substance . which also is the true sense of those sayings [ accidentis essentia est inhaerentia ; accidentis existentia est inexistentia ] and such like ; which sutes with the natural notions of substance and accidents both , if bad art does not make disagreement between them . whence 't is to be noted , that this supporting here explicated , must signifie the priority and dependence one notion has to the other in our minds , or , ( which is the same ) which the thing as thus conceiv'd , has to the same thing as otherwise conceiv'd ; there being a natural order or priority of one notion to another in our mind ; and , consequently , a dependence on one another ▪ for to think there is a priority or dependence on one another in re , as two things in nature , of which one is stronger , the other feebler , ( which i doubt too many , led by the sound of words , imagin ) is most ridiculous nonsence . unity , or indivision within its self is the property of every ens , or individual thing ; and therefore it remains , as in its self , one or undivided , till our understanding comes to divide it , after its fashion , into more formal , or ( as we call them ) metaphysical parts , by her abstractive way of conceiving it by inadequate notions . for answer to the third objection , i refer my reader to the close of my last reflexion in solid philosophy asserted ; where this objection is clear'd even to the weakest understanding . x. lastly , as to the pretended uselesness of metaphysicks , i cannot but admire at the short speculation of those who object it . is it of no use to settle all the first principles of our understanding , without which ( as i have demonstrated in my non ▪ ultra ) we could know nothing ? is it of no use to acquaint us with the essences of all beings , whence proceed all the common sorts of their several operations ; and to give us , amongst the rest , the essence of man , and , consequently , shew what actions are becoming or misbecoming a being of such a nature ? is it to no use or purpose to demonstrate the immortality of the soul , a tenet upon which all religion depends ; how it will fare with her when she is separated from the body ; or what dispositions in her when the man dies will make her eternally happy , or most miserable ? is it of no use to christian life , or the good of our neighbour , to stand up for god's honour , and preserve others from the damnable tenet of atheism , by demonstrating that there is a great god who governs the world ; who is all-powerful , and infinitely iust , good , merciful , &c. is it of no use to demonstrate the existence , essence and operations of angels ; and how , by their means , and the virtue of other second causes , god's wisdom administers the world in the best and most providential manner ; and that , therefore things are not govern'd by chance , nor by the stoical fatality ? lastly , is it of no use to explicate the mystery of the most b. trinity ( and other articles of christian faith , ) so clearly , as to show they are perfectly agreeable to our natural notions , and to all the maxims of true reason ; which wipes off the scandal with which atheists , deists , and anti-trinitatians bespatter them , as perfect contradictions , and meer nonsense ; on the verity of which tenets ( as will be shown ) depend all the most effectual motives to raise mankind to heaven , and dispose them for eternal happiness ; in explicating and defending which fundamental articles of christian faith metaphysicks has the chief hand ? certainly , if these things be of no use , it may certainly be concluded , that no part of knowledge ( theology excepted , which also depends , in great part , on metaphysicks ) is useful . but , these objectors discourse as if there were no use at all to be made of any science or art whatever , but of handicrafts , agriculture , and such like : as if they had forgot there was any such thing as virtue , truth , religion , faith , soul , salvation , or even god himself , that deserves to be heeded or regarded . to obviate this calumny , i have added meditations at the end of each chapter ; to show ( as the matter would bear ) how applicable and useful the foregoing speculations ▪ are to the improvement of our mind in virtue . and i hope , i may , without immodesty , say thus much for my metaphysicks , that there never was yet any speculative piece written , that makes reason more subservient to faith , nor philosophy more serviceable to true divinity than it does . i wish the example may propogate to others . xi . but , let us suppose that all this which is plainly shewn to the reader 's eye , were false ; and that there were no other good in the study of m●… physicks , but the enriching our minds with multitudes of high & solid truths ; would not this alone be sufficient to make every considerate man apply his thoughts to that noblest science , even tho' it had no farther effects , nor any exteriour use to be made of it ? what is there of more use than the mathematicks ? and yet plutarch tells us in the life of marcellus , that plato was offended with those who did corrupt and disgrace ( as he judged ) the noble and excellent science of geometry , by making it descend to the contriving engines , in which the base and vile handy-work of man was to be employ'd : and that archimedes himself esteem'd all his inventions of engines but vile , beggerly and dross , in comparison of the speculative productions and demonstrations in that science . so much were those great souls , tho' heathens , enamour'd with the naked beauty of truth , for it 's own sake : so much did they value the interiour natural perfection of their mind , above the prospect or intuitus of any external use of it , or profit accruing by it ; which yet is so unpalatable to our sceptical age , i could wish those noble and learned gentlemen , our modern virtuoso's , would seriously consider this temper of those heroes of learning in the former world , and think it worthy their imitation . what excellent speculative productions , to the vast advancement and progress of true science , would so many great wits make in a short time , did they please to think fit to emply their thoughts in following and carrying on the way of demonstration . to do which , nothing can more powerfully invite them than to reflect that in so many years applying themselves to the way of induction , they have not been able to establish so much as one universal principle in natural philosophy , or to gain the knowledge of any one scientifical conclusion : the impossibility of which by the way of experiments has been shewn more at large towards the end of the preface to my method to science . xii . having thus defended metaphysicks against the calumnies thrown upon her , it remains to inform my reader of my conduct hitherto in pursuing the advancement of truth , the only end i aym'd at . after i had publish't my method to science , i discover'd that the chief remora which had kept back learned men in our last century , from attaining true science , was the doctrine or way of ideas ; which some very ingenious men had taken great pains to set up and improve . i observ'd that , that way had two especial patrons ; cartesius in france , and mr. john locke here in england : both of them were men of excellent parts ; so that it seemd hard to determin which of them had the advantage in wit. but , as for their productions in philosophy , if i may be allow'd to judge between them , mr. locke did in very many particulars , make far greater advancements towards science , and in many things arriv'd at it . whereas the whole fabrick of the cartesian hypothesis is aiery and fantastick ; yet so dextrously propos'd , and so prettily compacted within it self ( for i cannot at all commend it for having any connexion with principles ) that it decoyes his readers , who do not reflect that nothing is to be held true which evident principles do not warrant , into a kind of complaisant assent to his doctrine : much after the same manner as our judgment is lull'd , and our passions are carry'd along , with reading a romance ; so that we become at unawares highly concern'd ; 'till , our reason awaking out of that pleasing dream of our fancy , our deliberate iudgment recovers it self ; and we come to reflect , that it is not a true history , but a meer fiction contriv'd to amuze our imagination . xiii . these two ingenious gentlemen did , in proposing to us their ideas , take several ways in giving us account of them . that of mr. locke is the more candid , while he calls them pictures , similitudes , pourtraitures , and such like ; which plainly acknowledges , they are not the things themselves . whereas , the followers of car●sius ( who , should best know his mind ) shuffle ●etween the two sides of the contradiction , and ●eem resolv'd not to be understood . for , sometimes they directly avow they are the very things themselves conceiv'd by us , or exsting in our understanding after a spiritual manner ; and , sometimes again , they banter ●nd ridicule what themselves had granted . ●f which more hereafter . xiv . wherefore i saw that my very design did ●navoidably oblige me to offer my reasons against both those authors ; as persons who ●id not only oppose many particular truths , ●ut even obstructed and damm'd up the way ●o arrive at any truth at all , while they set ●p and introduc'd this new way of ideas , ●s the only method by which any truth in philo●●hy could be attain'd . this i had done former●● , ( in part , and briefly , ) by laying grounds to ●●nfute them in my method , where i ●rofessedly declare against the way of spiri●ual ideas in our mind ; for , as for corpo●eal ideas in our fancy , which we call phan●●sms , none ever deny'd there were such ; nor ●●n , without calling in question our constant ●xperience . mr. locke was pleas'd to object to ●e , occasionally , my own thesis or conclusi●n ; viz. that i put the things themselves to ●e in our understanding ; as if it were so self-evidently absurd that meerly to name it were enough to confute it . i request i may be represented as not having barely said so , but that i attempted to prove it by many pretended demonstrations , none of which have yet been answer'd ; this being the true case . i beg also that my tenet may be exhibited not rawly , or to the half part , but fully ; viz. that i hold that the things are in our mind spiritually , or after the manner of her objects . in which sense i believe mr. locke's discerning iudgment would agree with me ; if he would please to wean it a while from his customary addiction to his own way , and bring it to an indifferency . for i cannot depart from thinking , that the plainest signification of words gives it , that , if no thing be any way in our knowledge , ( that is , if it be not at all there ) 't is self-evident that we know nothing . besides , i think , under favour , that , if his leasure , health , and other more pressing occasions had permitted , some answer should have been given to my many arguments produced there in my second preliminary ; which i have enforced here in the th chapter of my metaphysicks ; and , moreover , shown the reason of that position , b. . ch. . sect. , , . and , indeed , without farther examination of the validity of those arguments , it will , at first sight , seem prodigious , that so many pretended demonstrations ( for they are near twenty in number ) should be offer'd for any point that is false ; and that , tho' my whole discourse , nay all my philosophical works , are professedly built on that thesis , yet not one of them ( had it been so absurd and false ) should have receiv'd an answer from such acute adversaries . xv. wherefore , setting aside the silence of my opposers , which diverse circumstances might possibly have occasion'd , i still insist upon it , and do farther alledge , that 't is absolutely impossible so many demonstrations for a falshood should be pretended , and yet the confident asserter of them should not be expos'd to open shame . did the producer of them cloak his rambling discourses in rhetorical language , plausible expressions , or tricks of wit ; perhaps he might , in such a case , ●ave scaped for some time , from being utterly confuted ; but , when he solely relies on rigid and blunt reason , or on the close connexion of terms , nothing can be easier , or ●hich more provokes others to overthrow him . there needs no more but to shew , that the connexion he pretends to lies open , or is in●oherent : for , this done , the sinows of his ●iscourse are slacken'd and enfeebl'd , and ●he arguments he so much presum'd on , lose ●ll their credit . truths are so compacted and cimented with one another , that it would be impossible his reasons should keep up their repute , when the most authentick testimonies of so many opposite truths conspire to show their senseless vanity . especially , when those arguments are pretended to be drawn from the nature of the several subjects or things , there mentioned ; v. g. from the nature of a spirit , of the soul , of her operation of knowing , of the object of knowledge , of similitudes , of the nature of relation , of our notions , and of words which are to signifi● them ; of predication or the verification o● propositions , &c. for , in such a case , each of these natures having their peculiar maxims or principles belonging to them , all which give light , and are consonant to one another , all the art of mankind could not possibly hinder such a position from being seen plainly ▪ and held , to be pure nonsence . on the other side nothing that i can see has been objecte● against this position , but that their fancy , t● which it is very unsuitable , is out of humou● at it . whereas that faculty ( it being perfectly material , and common to us , and brute● has nothing at all to do with spiritual natures or their operations ; in regard they never enter'd into our senses , nor , consequently could we have any phantasms of them ; a● yet these gentlemen seem to make their fanc● the sole judge in such matters , of which she is no more able to have any light , than a blind man is to see colours . xvi . the cartesian ideists did , indeed , oppose that thesis which a jest or too ; but ( i thank them ) never answer'd so much as one of my arguments ; as if they held that the nature of man did not consist in rationality , but meerly in risibility . the rest of their performances was railing , forging and ridiculous libelling . what success they had , may be seen in my several replies , viz. in my ideae cartesianae expensae , my nonultra , or rule of truth , and my raillery defeated by calm reason . in which their philosophy ( as they call'd it ) was shewn to be quite destitute of any principles ; their fundamental positions were confuted by plainest demonstrations ; nay , their very rule of knowing any thing , was manifestly and unanswerably prov'd to be most ridiculous nonsense . but , that which put them to silence and shame was the fair offer or civil challenge i sent them ( rule of truth , p. . , . ) to bring so much as one argument which they would vouch to be conclusive , for any one point of the cartesian doctrine , and it should conclude the whole cause : or , if that were too troublesome ; that they would barely name any principle of theirs which they conceiv'd to be the strongest or most evident of any they had , and which they judg'd was influential upon the cartesian doctrine ; and i would undertake to demonstrate that either it was , no principle ; or else that it had no force to prove any one point of their doctrine true , nor had any influence upon it . this was so direct and honest a procedure on my part , and so easy to be comply'd with , on theirs , in case they had , indeed , any one such principle ; and yet ( as appear'd of their non-acceptance of it ) so impossible to be done , or comply'd with , that every intelligent man could not but see that cartesius did only talk wittily in the air , but had not so much as one inch of firm ground on which he could build the least piece of his doctrine . xvii . hence , the more i consider'd these unaccountable things call'd ideas , the more i became dissatisfy'd with them . for , first , i could not get any light from the users of them to guess at , much less know what they are . ● saw the ideists totally build upon them , and divide them into many several sorts ; yet none of them were so kind as to acquaint us what kind or sort of things the ideas themselves were , or what was their generical notion ; without knowing which all those particular sorts of them , and , consequently , their whole book● were utterly unintelligible . the cartesian● made them several , and inconsistent things ; that is , perfectly and in many regards , chimerical . now they tell us they are the very things themselves , as conceiv'd by us . presently after , their fancy recoiling , they tell us that vicem gerunt rei , that is , that they stand instead of the things ; which signifies they are not the things . can the thing , stand for , or supply the place of it self ? or can there need any proxy for what is , it self , present to the mind ? what can any man living make of that which neither is the thing , nor is not the thing ; or rather which at once , both is the thing , and is not the thing ? shortly after , as if they meant to split an indivisible , or to nick the middle between two contradictions , they explicate their ideas to be [ quasi res ] as if it were the thing ; whereas one should rather think that , if they be not the thing , they are as if it were nothing . afterwards they assure us they are ipsissima mentis operatio , the very operation or action of the mind . now , this is neither the thing , which is the object of our understanding , ( if it knows any thing ) as they sometimes grant ; nor what stands for the object , nor so much as if it were the object ; but is relatively contradistinct or opposit to the object ; for the [ operation ] and [ that on which it operates ] are most clearly such . again , they tell us 't is a representation of the thing , but not a meer similitude of it . the latter words tell us what it is not ; and , lest we might hapto understand the former which should tell us distinctly what it is , they quibble in it , and make it ambiguous . the obvious sense of representare is to resemble ; but they have found out an odd sense it may ( as a term of art ) have in some occasions , and to amuze us , they pretend it must have it here ; which is , presentem sistere ; that is , to put or set the thing present to the mind . well then ; if it puts or makes the thing present to the mind , common sense tells us the thing it self is in the mind when 't is made present to it , or put there : and if the thing it self be there , why is it said that only vicarium rei , or quasi-res is there ? what stuff is this ! see each of those particulars at large shewn from their own express words , ideae cartesianae indicatio , from p. . to p. . xviii . mr. locke's candour and iudiciounes set him above this shuffling folly. he could not but see it would be expected from him , and was necessary , to give us some definition of an idea , since his whole essay proceeds upon ideas ; yet his acute foresight made him wary to venture upon such an impossible task ▪ wherefore he thought it best to hover aloo● , without giving us any particular or distinct character of it . accordingly he tells us ▪ b. . ch. . sect. . that he us'd the word [ idea ] to express whatever is meant by phantasm , notion , species , or what ever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . this , i must confess , is very genteelly and civilly done , to leave it to the reader 's choyce to let that word signifie as he pleas'd , or to make what he could of it ; but it had been a greater kindness to let him know distinctly in what sense himself took it ; without which it was impossible for any man to understand his following book ; no not so much as the titles of his chapters . indeed , had the sense of those words he mentions , been the self - same , and the word it self univocal , it had been indifferent which word he had pitcht upon , since they had the same signification : but when the meanings of some of them is as vastly and widely different as the two first species of ens , [ body and spirit , ] are ; in that case to declare his own indifferency which word we would use , and leave it to our choyce in which of those senses we would understand him ; does leave the readers in perplexity , and utterly in the dark , what an idea is ; and , besides , exposes him to a possible mistake of his mind every step he takes while he peruses his book . for a phantasm , which is the proper object of the fancy , is meerly material , corporeal , and common to brutes as well asto mankind : and notions which are the elements of cognition , must he above matter , and of an intellectual or spiritual nature . wherefore the confounding thus the sense of those two words , hazards to lead the author and his readers to confound corporeal & spiritual natures : which diverse complain of in this gentleman ; and my self , tho' i much honour his person , and highly esteem his excellent parts , cannot but think this is one of the greatest desiderata in his ingenious book . besides , a [ phantasm ] is not that about which the mind is employ'd , ( as notions are ; ) it being the proper object of that faculty call'd the fancy or imagination . and this is that i fear which occasions much unevenness in his discourses . sometimes he builds on notions or spiritual conceptions , taken from natural objects , as others do ; and then his productions are very solid and judicious ; sometimes again , he grounds his discourses on roving conceits suggested by witty fancy ; and then they are aiery and superficial , and impossible to be reduc'd to any solid principle . when he does the one , when the other , is noted in my reflexions on the several parts of his essay . to shew this by an instance ; it has been remark't by my self , as it has been also by others , that , in his excellent demonstration of a first being , no man can discourse more clearly or more solidly : but then , withall , 't is observable that while he does this , he lays aside his way of ideas , and argues in the same manner as one would do who had never heard of them ; or as those would go to work who oppose them . xix . not being able to gain any kind of light from the ideists themselves , what their so much magnify'd ideas should mean , or what to make of them ; i set my own thoughts to work , to find out ( if i could ) what kind of things they might be . others may be as acutely ingenious as they please : i , for my part , have but one plain dunstable way to satisfie my self and others in such a case ; which is , to consider to which of those ten heads of our natural notions ( call'd the ten predicaments ) they might belong . resting assur'd that ( till that division of all our notions be confuted ) whatever belongs to none of them , or confounds the distinction of them , is not any natural notion a● all , onely which are the solid elements of true knowledge ; and , consequently , that it is no more but a fancy . at first sight , i discern'd they must be of a spiritual nature , because they are put to be in the soul. next , that they must have a peculiar entity of their own , distinct from the soul ; because they make them to be her informers or intelligencers , which sufficiently tells us they are distinct things from the soul which they inform . i proceeded therefore , to find out the essence of this new entity , and what it consisted in . in this quest the cartesians gave me no light at all , as has been shown ; but mr. locke lent me some assistance , while he constantly characters them to be similitudes . now a thing whose essence it is to be a similitude is a monstrous chimera . for the notion of thing or entity belongs formally to substance , and has a positive or absolute sense ; and similitude or likeness belongs to relation ; which makes the heads , or notions of substance and relation to be essentially and formally the self ▪ same . a thing may indeed be related to another , or like it ; but then the thing to which the mode of relation supervenes , must be of its own nature positive , for the relation cannot be with any sense conceiv'd to be what 's related . so that this notion of an idea seem'd to me to be a meer hirco-ceruus , a positive ( or unrelative ) relative : a substance which is a relation , and a relation which is a substance ; or at once , that which is related , and that by which 't is related . which makes a babel of our inward speech by our conceptions , and is purely chimerical . xx. i was as much at a loss , to know what these ideas which they put to be similitudes , were good for , or to what use they serv'd . when we have once the materials of knowledge into our mind , our soul , by her reflexion , can work upon them and order them well enough . wherefore , all the kindness they can do us , is to give us the first notices of the thing : but this they cannot do ; because the thing it self must be in our mind , or else we cannot know that they are even similitudes ; since we cannot see they are like a thing , till we know what the thing it self is , to which they are like . otherwise we shall fall into that pretious nonsense of bayes , the conceited poetaster , in the rehearsal . [ i gad , says he , i have an excellent similitude , if i knew but what to apply it to . ] nor can there be worse sense , than to say , [ 't is like , indeed , but i know not to what 't is like . ] whence is concluded , that we must have the thing it self in our knowledge , before we can know what 's either like it , or unlike it . and if the thing it self , ( as being the original ) be in our knowledge first , what need we any ideas to make us know it , since to be in a knowing power is to be known . xxi . i am sure similitudes are of no use in metaphysicks , tho' they serve to good purpose in mathematicks ; for when we come to universal notions , such as are act , power , essence , existence and such like , those proper & express similitudes disappear ; and the ideists must either bid farewell to their ideas or resemblances , ( which will be very uncomfortable to them ; ) or they will find themselves at a great loss . for example ; i would ask them what kind of thing is this pourtraiture or idea of existence ? has it being , or has it none : if none , 't is nothing : if it be such a thing as has being in it , it cannot be known without another idea ; nor that , without another idea , and so endlesly . if it be such a thing as can be in the mind , and known there without any idea of it ; why may not other things be there too , and known by themselves , or without any idea as well as it ? what even answer is given , i am confident it will be precarious & alledg'd gratis . again , is the essence or nature of this idea of existence such that it is essentially existent , or not ? if the former , 't is a god ; whose sole perogative it is to be essential existence : if the later , then ' its nature is onely potential to existence , and not actual existence ; and then how should that which is onely potential to existence , or onely a power to bee , be a resemblance or similitude of existence it self , that is , of actual being ? many such exceptions might be brought against such ideas which are onely similitudes of things in our minds , and not the things themselves . now in our way , how impossible is it to oppose any such difficulties ? we conceive the thing inadequately , and make many abstracted notions of it ; and amongst the rest , since the thing does exist , we abstract or cut off this from other notions of it , by considering it precisely according to this respect ; and thence we come to have in our mind the true notion or nature of existence . xxii . and , hence it comes that , since amongst our natural abstracted notions which we have from bodies ( with which onely we converse ) either by direct impressions or obvious reflexion , there are some that are very imperfect , potential , and clogg'd with matter ; and others that are more universal , and defaecated from matter , such as are act , ens , essence , existent , subsistent , person , &c. those who proceed upon the way of abstracted notions of the thing , can , by discoursing upon those notions of the later sort , not onely demonstrate those beings which are of a superiour nature , to which such notions , stript of their imperfections , do agree ; as we have done in our metaphysicks : but , moreover , they become hence enabled to explicate the mysteries of christian faith , and shew their conformity to our natural notions , as we have shewn , in our appendix , that highest mystery of the b. trinity is ; which makes the principles of nature ( and art too ) bear a kind of secondary testimony to their truth . now , i would gladly know what assistance the way of ideas can afford us in such a case ; similitudes of angels , and of god , and generally of all spiritual natures , would be strange language , and the applying them to such subjects would look very extravagant . 't is this way then , i much fear , which has given occasion to many , either to deny spiritual natures , as do the atheists ; or else to apply the worst of corporeal attributes to them . rather , indeed , i may complain , that a right understanding of spiritual nature is so stifled and depraved ; that , if care be not taken , it will quickly be lost to mankind : 't is a strange step to it , or rather the utmost attempt of quite destroying and effacing it out of men's minds , when we see it openly maintain'd that god himself is spatium reale , which is the notion of quantity . for which reason i have exerted my self in my metaphysicks to demonstrate & explicate the nature of a spirit , & even to force the right conception of it , in despite of the reluctancy of fancy . xxiii . in a word , since ideas are both unintelligible , and altogether useless , & ( i fear ) ill use is made of them , contrary to the intention of their authors ; it seems but fitting that the way of ideas should be lay'd aside ; nay , that the very word [ idea ] which has got such a vogue , should be no longer heard of ; unless a good reason may be given why we should use such words as no man understands . your faithful servant , i. s. the contents . book i. of the essences of compound entities . chap. i. of power and act. § . . power and act are natural or common notions . . there are three sorts of each . . the first sort of power belongs to all things , but the first being . . and is essential to them . . hence the definition of created ens , is , [ that which is capable of being ▪ ] . this power consists in it's possibility , or non-repugnance to bee. . what metaphysical unity is . . the essences of things , antecedently to their existence , are only in the divine intellect . . how the cartesian doctrine leaves no ens in the world. . how the essences of things are in the divine understanding . . and how they are said to be eternal . . in what consists metaphysical verity . . hence the first formal truths are identical propositions . . of which there are only two sorts . . why some propositions are said to be aeternae veritatis . . the second sort of power respects not the notion of existence , but the notion of thing . . in what sense bodies are said to be compounded of this power and act. . this second power , [ matter ] is the sole ground of all mutability . . hence pure acts are immutable . . the third sort of power respects modes or accidental acts. . which , tho' not properly things , have yet analogical essences . . what metaphysical divisibility and composition are ; which give the ground to all logick . . hence there is not the least show of contradiction in the doctrine of the trinity . . nor in that of the incarnation , or other mysteries of reveal'd religion . . the difference between logical and metaphysical abstraction . . that excellent and most useful maxim , that [ there are no actual parts in any compound whatever ] , demonstrated and explicated . . the ground and reason of that solid maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum . ] . hence the cartesians destroy the notions of unum and ens. . the proper metaphysical parts of body , are the second sort of power and act ; call'd , in physicks , matter and form. . the possibility or essence of a body consists in the agreeableness of it's matter and form. . that there is no real or actual distinction in any ens whatever . . how many sorts , or common kinds , of entities are possible to be created . . [ existence ] is the ultimate act of ens. . wherefore it ought rather to be call'd actuality , than an act. . hence is demonstrated , that [ there is a god. ] advertisement . in what sense we take all the words we use throughout our whole philosophy . meditation . the method how god's providence gave us our elements of knowledge ; and ripen'd our knowledge afterwards ; what great encouragement our present acquests have given us ; and what assured hopes of success in our quest of science ; so we ground our discourses on the natures of the things , made and establisht by god's creative wisdom . chap. ii. of the essences of bodies in in common ; and of the first , or simple , bodies in particular . § . . all concrete notions do include some form , which constitutes them such . . the form of [ ens , ] is [ essence . ] . the essences of pure acts consists in actual knowledge . . yet they are potential to the act of [ existence . ] . the essence of body is chiefly taken from it's form. , yet , not only , but from the matter also . . quantitative and not quantitative are not the proper differences that constitute body and spirit . . the essence of the first matter of the cartesians cannot consist in only extension . . nor ( as mr. locke speculates ) in extension and impenetrability together . . every body is essentially a distinct part of nature . . wherefore 't is essentially ordain'd for some proper and primary operation in nature . . wherefore what sits it for this primary operation , does constitute it . . in this fitness to perform this primary operation , consists it's metaphysical bonity or goodness . . every body , is , also , essentially an instrument . . the essential difference of body is chiefly taken from it's action . . the modes or accidents which make bodies thus fit , are their essential or substantial form. . but the thing must retain that complexion of accidents for some time . . divisibility in common , cannot constitute any body . . more and less of divisibility , may . . one or two different accidents may constitute the simplest bodies . . wherefore the elements may be constituted by rarity or density . . that is , they were thus constituted at first ; tho' , perhaps , there are not any such now . . hence the cartesian first matter , which they put neither to be rare nor dense , is a chimera . meditation . what we have gain'd by our speculation hitherto . what dull unactive instruments bodies are : yet none of them is useless , but in it's degree good. the reason why we discourse of such abstract notions ; and of the many vast advantages that way yields . chap. iii. of the essences of mixt , vegetable , and animal bodies . § . . 't is scarce conceiveable there should be , now , any pure elements . . how first-mixt bodies may be conceiv'd to have been made . . the essential form of first-mixt bodies . . and their essence , or total form. . the second sort of mixt bodies . . the third sort of mixts . . the fourth sort. . what other accidents are added , to make variety of mixts and demixts . . yet rarity and density are the principal , and most intrinsecal . . hence , the corpuscularians can give no account of the intrinsecal constitution of any natural body . . of the several sorts of demixts . . the ground of sensible qualities . . of imperfect mixts . of living bodies . . of vegetables . , the primary operation of vegetables . . the form of vegetables . . the essence of animals . . the primary operation of animals . . what animal is most perfect in it's kind . . in what sense we speak here of the primary operation of meer animals . meditation . what has been prov'd here , recapitulated . the excellency of metaphysicks ; and the sublime way of discoursing , peculiar to that science . what sleight ways of discoursing are affected by some great pretenders to science . of our duty , as we are rational creatures . chap. iv. of the essence of man. § . . man is one thing , made up of soul and body . . therefore the soul and body , are , here , only potential parts of man. . therefore , neither part can operate alone . . according to that excellent maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum . ] . hence , the christian tenet of the incarnation is agreeable to right reason . . of the act or form of man , as he is man. . that both parts concur to every operation of man , as he is man. . hence every notion has a phantasm accompanying it . . of the total form of man. . what , chiefly , in both those parts , distinguishes man from all other things . . hence , all pretence of god's voluntary annexing one thing to another , is groundless and unphilosophical . . hence the mens is not the man , as cartesius fancy'd . . the soul's manner of existing and operating , here , is , in part , corporeal . . the primary operation of man , is reasoning . . the attainment of truth , is the perfection of man's understanding . . the knowledge of truth , which thus perfects man , must be evident . . hence , probability perfects no man. . nor the improvements of memory , or fancy . . hence , the promoting evident truth is the noblest action of man , as he is intellectual . . hence , errour is the greatest depravation of man's nature , as he is cognoscitive . . the essence of man is rationality . . and distinguishes him from angels and brutes . . hence [ animal rationale ] is his true definition . . in rationality are included the powers of apprehending and judging ; as also of receiving impressions from the senses . . the power of reflecting , is also an essential property of man. . the soul acquires knowledge by impressions , from outward objects , on the senses . . first proof . . second proof . . third proof . . fourth proof . . fifth proof . . sixth proof . seventh proof . . eighth proof . . that the soul cannot elicit ideas out of her self , prov'd from many heads . . that the position which makes the soul and body two things , hinders the right explication of christian faith. . and , moreover , makes every man to be a monstrous chimera . . that the pre ▪ existence of souls is a senseless conceit , and impossible . . so is the pythagorean transmigration . . that 't is a folly to ask how the soul and body ( which they fancy two things ) come to be united . meditation . what immediate steps we have taken in our rational progress hitherto . why it was fitting such a creature as man should be made . by what connatural means god's infinite wisdom contriv'd that soul and body should make up one thing . the condition of our soul , here , laid open . what incredible inconveniencies and absurdities arise from putting the soul and body to be two things . chap. v. of the constitution and dissolution of individual bodies . § . . that only individuals are properly things . . and therefore only individual essences are properly essences . . yet , we can discourse more clearly of the common essences , than we can of the individual ones . . there go more accidents to constitute the individuum , than there go to constitute the common essences . . the individual complexion of accidents is the most perfect act next to that of existence . . hence 't is demonstrated that to give existence is above the power of natural causes , and only peculiar to god. . there must be some instant in which the individual thing first begins to bee. . this complexion of accidents is essential to the new-made individuum . . therefore it is the essential or substantial form of the individual compound . . those accidents that accrue afterwards are accidental . . to be an individuum , some degree of constancy , permanency , or stability , is requir'd . . which existence , supervening , does establish . the twisting the results of so many causes into one individuum , argues the design of an all-comprehending providence . . this complexion of accidents can never be eradicated while the individuum continues . . and gives the compound a different genius , and natural propension . . existence can with no show of reason be pretended to be the principle of individuation . . the distinction between the notion of a subsistent thing or a suppositum ; and the notion of an individual ens , clearly manifested . . how , and when the individuality is lost . . the first rule how to know this . . the second rule . . the third rule . . hence simple division of the matter , or quantity , in living bodies , does not change the individuum . . much less in man. . when 't is chang'd in simple bodies . . when in first-mixt bodies . . when in demixts . . when in homogeneous mixts . . when in very heterogeneous , or organical bodies . . two contradistinct natures may compound one thing . . the divine and humane natures may si●●sist in the same suppositum . . notwithstanding , those natures and their properties must remain unmingled ; and not confounded , as some eutvchians imagin'd . . yet , all the actions and padions must be attributed to the suppositum ; tho' according to such a nature ; contrary to what nestorius fancy'd . . hence , lastly , there is no show of contradiction that god should be three according to the respect of person ; and yet not-three , but one , according to the respect of nature or essence . . a large explication of some grounds , very useful to take off all shadow of contradiction from divers chief mysteries of christian faith ; and to show how consonant they are to the most exact rules of right reason . meditation . how impossible it is for us to know perfectly all that belongs to our own individuum . by what wonderful and untraceable ways god's providence has brought about our individuation ; and gives us all our knowledge , and other endowments . how little our best performances contributed to the acquisition of them ; and , how little reason the most knowing and most virtuous man living has to be proud of the most laudable actions god has done by him . that we ought to comply with the designs of our creatour by pursuing the end of our nature ; and by what means this may be best accomplisht . chap. vi. some preliminaries fore-lay'd , in order to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. § . . we cannot but have different conceptions of the essence of man. . and , consequently , of every operation of his , a● he is man. . we are , therefore , to examine whether there be any thing in man according to his soul , which is above quantity or matter . . there are three distinct operations of man , as he is intellective . . the notion of [ ens ] or [ thing ] is indifferent to actual being and not-being : . every form must denominate the subject , in which it is , such as the form it self is . . a notion may either be consider'd [ subjectively ] or [ objectively . ] . every object of our knowledge must either be the thing it self in , the mind , or something that 's like it . . notions , ( understood objectively , ) are the things themselves , as they are in the mind ; and not meer similitudes of them ; prov'd unanswerably . . prov'd no less unaswerably , by the concession of the ideists themselves , that the thing it self must thus be in the mind . . in what sense that saying , [ every like is not the same ] is verify'd . . every inadequate notion , we have of the thing , is of the whole thing confusedly and materially ; tho' it be only of one metaphysical part , or considerability of it , distinctly and formally . . a third unanswerable proof , that the thing must be in the mind when we know it . . the author's reason why he builds on this thesis . the reasons why some others are backwards in assenting to it . . notwithstanding , the immortality of the soul may be demonstrated , tho' this thesis were wav'd . chap. vii . of the immateriality , and , consequently , the immortality of man's soul . § . . first leading demonstration . because her operations , and objects are receiv'd in her after an indivisible manner . . dem. ii. because her capacity is infinite . . dem. iii. because she has other natures in her without altering her own . . dem. iv. because they are in her , not as intrinfecal modes affecting her ; but as distinct from her : contrary to the nature of material subjects . . dem. v. because the contrary thesis is opposite to the natural notions of all mankind . . [ existence ] is the only absolute notion we have , and all the rest are respective . . dem. vi. because she has in her the notion of [ existence ] which is every way indivisible . . dem. vii . because she has actual respects in her . . this demonstration enforced . . dem. viii . because she has in her the notions or natures of vast quantities ; which are impossible to be there themselves as they are in matter ; n●● yet any material similitudes of them . . dem. ix . because the parts of motion are perfectly distinct and determinate in the soul ; which are utterly undistinguisht and indeterminate as they are in material subjects . . dem. . because the soul has past and future parts of time present in her at once . . dem. xi . because the soul can tye together as many singulars as she pleases , in the notion of one number ; of which ( generally ) the fancy can have no material resemblance . . dem. xii . because sensible qualities , tho' innumerable , and contrary to one another , are in the soul , without disordering her in the least . . dem. xiii . because the said qualities , as in her , do not fight and expel one another ; as they must , were their subject made of matter . . dem. xiv . because innumerable multitudes of various and large figures are in the soul at once . . dem. xv. because the soul has in her universal notions . . dem. xvi . because the thing is , in and by the soul , divided into such parts as material division cannot reach . . dem. xvii . because that kind of composition , which the soul makes afterwards of these thus-divided parts , is impossible to be perform'd by a material agent . . hence is seen the reason why angels do not thus compound and divide ; and , consequently , they know the whole thing intuitively . . dem. xviii . because what is meant by the copula [ is , ] which we use in all our affirmative iudgments , cannot be so much as shadow'd or represented by a material similitude . . dem. xix . because the connexion of the conclusion with right premisses , is above the force of all nature , or matter , and impossible to be solv'd or broken. . dem. xx. because all the notions the soul has , are most concise , and exact , even to an indivisible . . dem. xxi . because the soul is a pure act , and therefore immaterial . : dem. xxii . because the soul gives a kind of being to non-entities and chimeraes , which can have no existence in nature . : how some do mistake the nature of the indivisibility attributed to the soul. . the proper and true sense in which a spirit is said to be indivisible . . that 't is consonant to the nature of the subject that the soul should contain corporeal nature , and it 's modes , indivisibly . . in what sense we are to take the word [ instantaneous ] , when we say the operations of pure spirits are such . . last demonstration , concluding the whole point ; that our soul , it heing so manifestly and manifoldly demonstrated to be immaterial , is necessarily immortal . meditation . in discoursing of our soul , we must transcend our senses and corporeal phantasms ; and avail our selves only by reflexion on those operations which are proper to it . 't is to be fear'd , the chief origin of atheism is in men's wills , it being so easie to satisfie their understandings . what duties are incumbent on us , who know and acknowledge our soul to be immortal . our former demonstrations of that great and most concerning truth summ'd up , and recapitulated . of what vast importance it is to lay 〈…〉 heart this preliminary truth to all religion . book ii. of pure acts . chap. i. of the soul separated , and angels . § . . the soul , does , at her separation , receive some change , according to the manner of her existing , and her suppositality : . the means how this is done , illustrated . . yet the same individual nature remains in her . . all the knowledges and ( unretracted ) affections the soul had here , remain still in her . . each soul , when separated , knows all created truths . . how this is very possible . . hence , every separated soul knows all time , and place . . hence her operations are not measur'd by time ; they and their subject being of a superiour nature . . hence , she will be eternally miserable , unless she knows the first cause , god. . hence also , she is naturally unchangeable . . hence too , as soon as separated , she knows all the thoughts and affections , words and actions of her past life . . whence follows the particular judgment , which determines her lot at the hour of death . . hence is understood how the book of conscience will be laid open at the last day . . and how infants are connaturally sav'd by baptism . . hence ana-baptism is impious and unnatural . . the foregoing principles show how much more easie it is for the saints and angels in heaven to know our actions and necessities . . the practical iudgments , or affections , do carry the soul to the attainment of the good she most lov'd here , in case it be attainable in the future state. . the best intellectual good , or the sight of god is attainable in the next life , if the soul be dispos'd for it . . therefore to work up our christian principles to such good dispositions , ought to be the whole employ of our life here . . this good disposition is charity , or the love of god above all things . . hence all the means and motives laid by our b. saviour , tend only to breed and cultivate in our souls this predominant affection for heaven . . hence religion is the way of breeding up souls in such a manner as may dispose them f●… eternal bliss . . from the same principles is demonstrated , that , to depart hence with a contrary disposition , 〈…〉 a first affection for any creature , will torment the soul , when separated , with most unspeakable grief and anguish . . the state of separation elevates the soul to a●… incomparably higher perfection of existence , ( sh●… being then a pure act ) than she had here . . wherefore , it does , consequently , elevate the activity of all her powers ; and particularly the acts of her will , her affections , to an unconceiveable intenseness and vehemency , above what she had while in the body . . hence the poena damni in wicked souls fo●… the loss of the sight of god ; and also the loss of th●… temporal false good they here doted on , is unspeakable ; and plunges them in a hell of misery . their sad condition describ'd . . hence 't is evident that god damns no man ▪ but that the sinner , while he hugs and cherishes 〈…〉 his thoughts those inordinate affections for creatures , on which , by his own deliberate choice , 〈…〉 had set his first love ; does connaturally kindl●… and foment , all the while , hell-fire in his own soul ▪ to which god contributes no farther , but by conserving the wisest course of the world , that prope●… causes should have their effects ; which he has 〈…〉 reason to alter for their sakes . . the knowing , then , all truths speculatively , doe●… not alter the predominant affection for creatures . as the tree falls , so it lies . . hence , one enormous actual sin , unrepented renders a separated soul liable to eternal damnation . . that the state of separation does not alter the first affection of souls , farther demonstrated . . hence sin does not formally consist in the falsity of the practical iudgment , or affection ; but , in the disproportion and inordinateness of it . . ' from the former principles it follows that all those several kinds of knowledges we had here , will be elevated to an unmeasurable excess in the state of separation . . hence also , all the virtuous affections , which good souls had here for friends , relations and acquaintances , will remain in the next life ; and make them ardently wish and pray for their salvation . . that each particular deduced here , is demonstrable by the principles laid formerly : shown , by repeating those principles . . wherefore , there is not the least thought , word or action , good or bad , which we ever had or did , in this life , but will have it's consequent and proper effect , adjusted and proportion'd to it , in the next . meditation . the admirable nature of a soul , when separated , and become a pure spirit , display'd . that there is no comparison between our soul's condition here , and that in the state of separation : meer humane science , when at the height , was too short and impotent to raise mankind to those dispositions that fit him for true happiness : the necessity of divine revelation farther shown . that the christian life is most comfortable ; and the un-christian life most full of anxiety . the unexpressible transports of joy which holy souls experience at their first entring into bliss . chap. ii. of the existence , essence , knowledge , distinction and action of angels . § . . the order of the universe requires that there should be different kinds of beings . . and , much more that there should be pure acts , or angels . . especially , since the angelical natures are capable of existing . . and , that , otherwise , there could be no immediate cause of motion . . as is also demonstrated from the nature of all causality . . every more perfect ens includes in it the nature of the less-perfect , as it is an ens. . and , therefore pure acts or spirits , contain in them , the nature of body . . which , since it cannot be done by way of quantity , they must contain them by the way of knowledge . . therefore the very natures or essences of bodies are in a spiritual understanding ; and not ideas or similitudes of them only . . this doctrine being grounded on that logical maxim , [ all differences are nothing but more and less of the generical notion ; ] the consideration of that thesis is recommended to the reader . . this holds equally in a soul too , when she comes to be a pure act. . angels , being pure acts , are immutable . . the distinction of angels is taken from being more or less cognoscitive after their manner . . this is not to be understood of the extent of their knowledge ; but , of the intenseness or penetrativeness of it . . hence , as far as reason carries us , is taken the distinction of the three hierarchies , and nine quires of angels . . the different manners by which angels and human souls come to have all their knowledge . . that those angels have nobler essences , whose each act of knowledge has for it's object a greater portion of the universe . . which fits them to super-intend the administration of a larger province . . how consonant this is to those passages of holy scripture , which speak of such operations of angels . . an angel cannot operate upon another angel , so as to change it . . wherefore , all it 's external operations , which work a change in another thing , can only be upon bodies . . an angel can thus operate upon material beings , or bodies . . that we only intend to evince here the an est of this operation of an angel , and not the manner how it is perform'd . . yet no one angel has an unlimited power to operate thus on all bodies whatever . . an angel can move or change those bodies which are within the sphere of it's activity , in an imperceptible time. . hence the wonderful effects , recorded in holy writ to have been done by angels , are consonant to metaphysical principles . . that the ordinary ministring spirits , or angel-guardians of particular persons , are the lowest sort of angels . . but the greater and weightier affairs ure manag'd and transacted by archangels . . the lower angels receiv'd intellectual light from god by means of the superiour ones , in the very instant they were created . . in what manner the good angels perform the will of their maker , without new instructions . . that god makes use of holy angels to procure our good ; and of bad ones to afflict and punish mankind , as his divine wisdom sees fitting . meditation . by what means metaphysicks has rais'd our thought● above the sordid mass of matter , to contemplat● the angelical nature . the surpassing excellency of their intellectual essences decypher'd . how faith has antecedently enlighten'd our reason ; and that 't is our duty to explicate and defend it against the empty flourishes of the drollich renouncers of faith and reason both . what gratitude , love and veneration we owe to those blessed ministring spirits ; and what benefit we shal● reap by keeping up a spiritual communion with them , by following their good inspirations . yet , that we ought to honour them so , as to remember they are only our fellow servants ; tho' highly dignify'd by our common master . book iii. of the most pure actuality of being , the adorable deity . of the existence , essence , and attributes of god. § . . that there must be something which is a most pure actuality of being ; demonstrated . . dem. ii. from the acknowledg'd potentiality of being ; necessarily annext , or rather essential to all creatures . . dem. iii. because what is not , cannot act. . dem : iv. because actual being ( or existence ) is the noblest effect imaginable . . dem. v. because no power can produce an effect which is contradictory to what it self is , or , to it 's own nature . . the foresaid proofs summ'd up in one , and enforc'd . . this actuality of being gave being to all other things . . the objection of the atheists propos'd ; viz. that the world was ever . . first answer . that this does not solve our demonstration . . second answer . that 't is a meer voluntary assertion ; neither prov'd ; nor attempted to be prov'd ; nor possible to be prov'd . . third answer . farther shewing , that our argument is not toucht ; and reducing it to an identical proposition . . fourth answer . this pretence , or voluntary assertion , is shown to be an absolute impossibility . . fifth answer . that the putting an infinite antecedent time , ( which , in their supposition , is absolutely necessary , ) is a plain contradiction . . sixth answer . that the very notion of the word [ infinite ] apply'd to our case , shews also , that 't is a manifest contradiction . . the putting a finite number of causes , giving being to one another circularly , is as absurd and contradictory as the former . . the notion of [ ens ] is different from that of [ existence ] ; and , consequently [ essence ] from [ existence . ] . philosophers must discourse of the first being , by such notions as they have . . the notion of [ existence ] is the most actual of any we have . . and , therefore , the fittest to express a pure actuality of being ; and given us by god himself . . every abstract word includes comprehensively the whole nature of the form or act it signifies , without any limitation . . therefore it 's limitation either proceeds from the subject , or from the causes that determine it . . wherefore god's essence being existence ●● self , is absolutely unlimited , or actually infinite . . therefore god is but one . . hence polytheism , or the putting many gods , is a most senseless absurdity , and a plain contradiction . . hence the christian doctrine is divine ; the dawning of which chaced away that universal darkness ; in despite of all opposition , humane power , wit , or learning could make . , [ existence ] is the whole perfection of every thing that exists . . much more , when it is essential , and actually infinite . . therefore the divine existence , or the deity , includes or concenters all imaginable perfections in it's self . . therefore god is infinitely perfect in all intellectual and moral attributes . . therefore god is a spirit . . and no ways corporeal . . therefore 't is an indignity to the divine nature to apply any such predicates to him as belong to bodies . . hence also he is immutable . . and a self-subsistent being . . also his essence is most simple or uncompounded . . and his duration eternal . . whence it ought not to be explicated by a correspondency to our time. . hence also , god is immense . . 't is highly derogatory to this attribute , to explicate it by commensuration to an infinite space . . lastly , the divine nature is , of it's self , infinitely knowable , or intelligible . . of what comfort this may be to some humble and pious souls . . that the author . confines himself , here , to metaphysical mediums . . notwithstanding all that 's said , no notion or word we have , is univocally , ( or in the same sense ) apply'd to god and to creatures . . wherefore all the words we use , when we speak of god , are , in some sort , metaphorical . . because each of them signifies some one notion , or some one perfection ; whereas the divine nature is the plenitude of all being , and all perfections , center'd in one most simple formality : . hence even the names of our best virtues , are not , in every regard , properly spoken of god. . nor , omnipotent , creatour , or such like : all our language having some tang of imperfection annext to it . . nor yet , negative words , as immense , infinite , immaterial , &c. . no priority or posteriority , either real , or made by our reason conceiving some ground for it in the thing , can be attributed to god. . notwithstanding all these are with some impropriety spoken of god , yet all of them ( but the last ) are truly said of him. . the solid ground of mystick theology . . hence is concluded , that all the names or words we have , whether they be affirmative or negative , do fall short of reaching the divine essence . meditation . how , by considering the visible things of this world , we have arriv'd at the knowledge of the invisible things of god ; his essence , and attributes . that these have been demonstratively deduc'd ; and this , with an evidence beyond that of the mathematicks . that this will redound to our greater disadvantage , if we live not accordingly . this knowledge of god obliges us to the duties following ; viz. of most profound adoration , and respectful attention when we address to him in prayer ; of a firm belief of what he has reveal'd . of endeavouring to dispose our selves to receive farther influences of his grace ; and to hope with full assurance that he will most certainly give us all we are capable or dispos'd to receive : of trembling at his iustice , if we wilfully break his commands , or carelesly run on sn sin : of hoping unwaveringly we shall obtain his pardon , if we sincerely repent . of resignation , in all sinister contingencies , to the infinitely wise disposition of his providence in the government of his world. especially , to love him , who is our only happiness and true good , as we ought ; both for what he is in himself , and for what he is to us. lastly , to the duty of imitating his holy moral attributes ; which is the most effectual means to perfect us in all sorts of virtue . book iv. of the several operations of things ; and of the manner ( in common ) how the first being administers his world. § . . all action springs immediately from the existence of the cause . . and the acting in such a manner , from the thing 's being of such a nature . . therefore the power of operating thus or thus is refunded into the essence of the thing . . therefore all causality is the imparting to the patient somewhat that was , some way or other , in the agent or the cause . . hence motion only applies the natural agent to the patient . . the first operation among bodies is division . . the next operations are impulse and attraction . . the reason of which operations is not to be fetch'd from physicks , but from metaphysicks . . nor , in metaphysicks , from the matter , or form. . but from the essence or nature of the common modification of body , quantity . . this disputable point fully clear'd . . hence is seen , particularly , the reason of attraction . . every impulse , does , at first , condense ; and every attraction , at first , does rarify . . all these operations are either perform'd by local motion , or concomitantly with it . . all motion comes , at first , from the angelical nature . . every part of motion is a new effect . . and therefore it requires a continual influx of some moving cause . . this moving cause is some chief angel , which rarefies the matter in the solar bodies . . angels are pre-mov'd , and directed by god to move matter , in such a manner as is most sutable to his eternal decrees . . the first-mov'd bodies do determine and continue the motion of the others . . hence angels , and the bodies which they move , do , as second causes , determine the individuation of all new-made bodies . . but 't is evidently beyond their power to give existence . . which , therefore , is peculiar to god ; . as 't is also to conserve them in being . and to give to a nobler essence a nobler existence . . for the same reason a spiritual form will be given to matter , connaturally dispos'd for it . . the same holds in supernatural gifts , which also ( abstracting from miracle ) are carry'd on by dispositions . . hence god is not the cause of any defect ; much less of sin . . that all the foremention'd sorts of operations do spring from the respective essences . . that god does all that 's good , in all ; and ; in what manner , and by what means . meditation . that god's ordinary providence carries on the course of nature by proper causes still producing proper effects , demonstrated : and confirm'd , because , otherwise , mankind could not possibly have any science ; nor know how to behave themselves , or what to do in their practice and ordinary actions . the same great truth demonstrated a posteriori●… ▪ hence , the course of god's workmanship , ( the fabrick of nature , ) is close and indissoluble . the epicurean tenet that the world is govern'd by chance , shown most absurd and senseless . what chance truly is . how groundlessly some christian philosophers , ( the ideists ) do in part violate this method of god's ordinary providence ; demonstrated . the witty folly of stoical fatality confuted and exploded . the application of this doctrine to our own duties . a rational explication of the mystery of the most blessed trinity . trans-natural philosophy : or , metaphysicks . book i. of the essences of compound entities . chap. i. of power and act. . all mankind must necessarily have the notions of power and act , or know what those words mean. for , since all mankind do , in their common language , use to say that such a thing which was not before , can be or exist ; as also that fire can be made of wood , that water can be made hot , and such like ; and this in innumerable occasions ; and , 't is evident , that the word [ can ] does , in those speeches , signifie the power to exist , be made of wood , be made hot , &c. and the other words do signify the acts which answer to those powers ; and , by reason of which , when they come to have those acts , they are truly said to be actually such as the words which correspond to those powers do import . also , since all mankind have in their minds the meaning of those words which themselves do intelligently use ; and the meaning of any word i● the same with that which we cali their noti●● exprest by that word , which notion we have in our minds when we use that word ; it follows evidently , that all mankind must necessarily have the notions of power and act , o● know what those words mean. . hence is gathered that there are three so●●● of power and act : for , since we can truly say that such 〈◊〉 thing , newly generated , was 〈◊〉 and now is ; and 't is most self evident that could not be which had not a possibility , or power to be ; 't is manifest that the thing had a possibility , or power to be ; that i● had a power to that act , call'd existence . agai● since we see that thing call'd wood turn'd in●● that thing call'd fire ; we are hence forced 〈◊〉 have the notion of a power in the former thing to become this later thing ; that is a power 〈◊〉 the notion of [ thing ] or [ substance : ] which is clearly distinct from the power to [ existence ▪ lastly , since we see that existent things , ( v. 〈◊〉 bodies , ) tho' unchang'd as to the notion of thing , have a power to be many ways alter'd or otherwise than they were , either inwardly or outwardly ; v. g. to be bigger , hot , related ; as also to act , or suffer ; to be in a different time or place ; to be situated , or outwardly habited thus or thus ; it is no less evident that there is another sort of power in the thing or individuum , tho' remaining the same thing , or unchang'd as to the notion of thing , to have those accidental acts , or modes , in it , or else apply'd to it ; which kind of power is most evidently different from the other two . wherefore 't is manifest that there are three sorts of power . one , which the whole thing has to that act call'd existence : a second , which the thing , according to some part of it , as it were ( which we call matter ) has to be another thing : a third , which the thing existing has to it 's accidental acts , or to the modes or manners how it is . . the first sort of power belongs to all things whatever , but the first self-existent being . for , since the very notion of all things but the first self-existent being , imports that they are such as have not actual being or existence of themselves , or ●…om their own essence or nature ; and therefore ( not being able to give it to themselves ) ●…ey must receive it from another ; and yet 't is no ●…s manifest they could have had being given them by that other , or by the first being ; because they now actually have it , and a ●…hing cannot actually receive that which it has no power , or possibility , to receive ; it follow●… that this power to have actual being or existence , must belong to all things which we call creatures ; that is to all but the first self-existent being . . this power of existing which belongs t●… to all creatures is also essenti●… to them . for , since we cannot have a formal notion of nothing ; nor of a thing under the precise notion of ens , but we must conceiv●… it constituted such by some formal cause or other , proper to it's nature ; which form●… constituent of ens we call it's essence ; and essence speaks something that concerns be●… one way or other , and involves it in its signification ; and the essence of creatures does n●… include actual being in its notion , because 〈…〉 § . . they have it from another ; it follo●… that the essence of all entia or things whate●… that are created , or of all creatures , cons●… meerly in their potentiality or power to have actual being ; which we call their possibility . . corollary i. hence the proper definition 〈…〉 created ens in common , 〈…〉 that which has a power to ex●… or , that which is capable existing . i mean as far as can bear an exact definition which i say , because th●… which we use here for a genus , and whi●… we are forced to use in such very comm●… notions , is a transcendent , and not a proper genus , which has always a notion a determinate sense , and is capable to be divided by more or less of the generical notion as by it's intrinsecal differences ; neither of which is found in the words [ that which ] which we are necessitated here to put instead of a genus . . this power to the act of existence , which ( as was now shown is essential to all created beings ) consists in this that it's nature is such that it has no repugnance , chimericalnes , or ground of contradiction in it's notion . for , since an [ impossibility ] and a [ contradiction ] are in effect the same , and differ only in this that impossibility regards only the incapacity any ●…ing has to exist in re , and contradiction the ●…capacity it has to exist in the understanding , because 't is opposite to the nature of ens , which is it's adequate object . and , since all effects are possible to god which do not imply a contradiction ; and those effects that do so are therefore impossible to him , because ( contradictions and lies being the height of folly ) they are diametrically opposite to god's wis●…m , by which they are , ( if at all ) to have existence given them : it follows that the power which creatures have to exist or be created , ( which we call their possibility ) consists only in ●…his , that there is no repugnance , chimeri●…lnes or ground of contradiction in their natures ; only which renders them impossible . . hence is seen , why [ unum ] is said to be a property of ens ; and in what the unity of every entity consists . for , since nothing in common can exist , or ( which is the same ) is an ens ; but , to be an ens or capable of existing , it must be determinately this ; and , to be determinately this , includes to be different from all others under the notion of ens : also , since to be no one , signifies to be none ; and therefore to be no one ens is to be no ens ; hence , nothing is capable of existing ▪ or an ens unless it is determinate under the notion of ens ; or , not two entities but determinately this , and therefore distinct under that notion from all others ; that is , unless it be indivisum in se and divisum a quolibet al●… under the precise notion of ens ; which is the very notion of unum . . the essences of things antecedently to their actual being or existence , can only ▪ be in the divine intellect ▪ for , since they cannot be themselves actually , until they have that act which is the formal cause of their being , viz. existence , given them ; because a meer possibility or power to be , which is all that creatures have from their own nature , cannot give or denominate them to be actually : it follows that all the existence ( nay possibility of existence , or essence ) they have , antecedently to their being or existing in nature , is only in god , or in the divine understanding . . corollary ii. hence is demonstrated from the altissimae causae , that is , from the supreme reasons or mediums in metaphysicks , viz. from the nature of ens and unum , that the cartesians leave no natural ens in the world , while they put them to be made up of innumerable particles of their first matter , each of which could exist alone independently on the other , and so each of them was an ens. whence follows that each natural body , it being made up of many of them , is truly and properly multa entia ; that is divisum in se under the notion of ens ; and , consequently , not unum ; and therefore not an ens , or a non-ens . . corollary iii. hence is deduced how the essences of all things are said to be in the divine understanding . by which it cannot be meant , that , as they are in god they are so many actually distinct formalities which he views there and contemplates ; for this would put a formal dictinction of many limited beings in god ; and , withall , that , the object , in some priority , anteceding the knowledge of it , he owes his knowledge , in some degree , to the essences of creatures . wherefore , 't is , literally speaking , no more but that god being infinitely wise , and being by his wisdom to make a world , the best order of which is to consist of such and such particular essences put in actual being ; hence his knowledge antecedes both their essences and existences , and is terminated in them as the effects of his creative wisdom . or it may be said that their essence ( by § . . ) consisting in their possibility of being ; they are said to be in him , because he gives being to nothing but what 's possible to be and fit for the best order of the world ; and not to what 's unfitting , impossible ▪ and contradictory ; which being the highest strain of folly , cannot be said o● thought of infinite wisdom . . corollary v. hence also is understood why the essences of things are said to be eternal , viz. ● they are in god , in whom is the whole plenitude ●● being . for , otherwise , the essences of all things , of themselves , and as they are in themselves , ( bodies especially ) are mutable ▪ for , since no body in nature is capable of existence , nor consequently , has any essence , but individuals ; and we see many individual bodies corrupted and others generated of them ; and since we know certainly that the rest of them ( they having ▪ all of them a power to be alteril , nay to become other things ) are liable to the same fate ; 't is evident that the essences of all the individuals in nature do perish with them ; and that , as in themselves , they are generable and corruptible ; that is temporary , and far from eternal . again , since the essences of pure spirits or angels , they being created , are indifferent to being and not-being ; there is no repugnance , ( however they cannot be corrupted by the operation of natural causes , as bodies can ) why , for any thing they have from themselves , they may not cease to be as well as bodies may . . in this possibility , or non-repugnance to existence , which is essential to all creatures , consists also the metaphysical verity of things . for , since a contradiction , which is grounded on the impossibility of the thing , is the greatest of untruths : which put , all we could say concerning any thing may be false : again , since all we can truly say concerning any thing must be taken from the nature of that thing , ( for otherwise we should discourse ●…ther of nothing , or of another thing , and not of it ; ) and therefore if the nature of that thing be contradictory , repugnant and chimerical , all we could say of it must necessarily be false : it follows on the contrary , and for the same reason , that all the truths we can have , when we speak or discourse of any thing , must be grounded on it's possibility or non-repugnancy . but we call that the metaphysical verity of a thing on which is fundamentally grounded all the formal and particular truths we have , or can have , concerning that thing ; therefore this possibility , or non-repugnancy to existence , which is found in all creatures , and is essential to them , is that in which consists their metaphysical verity . . corollary vi. hence , the first formal truths or propositions , o● ( which is the same ) our very first principles , are those which speak the metaphysical verity of the thing , or that it is it's self and no other ; which cannot be exprest otherwise than by identioal propositions ; as every attentive reflecter , who will attempt to do it any other way , must be forced to acknowledge , . corollary vii . those first principles can only be of two sorts ▪ one of them is taken from the essence , nature or notion of the thing ; v. g. every thing is what it is , a man is a man , quantity is quantity , idem est idem sibi ipsi , aequal● est aequale sibi , &c. the other from it ▪ existence : v. g. what is , is ; 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once ▪ existence is existence ; self-existence is self-existence , &c. the use and necessity of which seemingly dry and insignificant propositions is shown at large in my method to science , b. . less . . and , in my solid philosophy asserted , reflexion . and more at large in my non-ultra . . cor●ll●ry viii . hence also is seen , how ▪ and in what good sense , some propositions are said to be aeternae veritatis ; viz. à parte post , ( as the schools phrase it ) or so that they can never cease to be true. for , since no proposition can be at all , or any where , but in such knowing substances , as working by abstracted notions , do frame a subject and predicate by conceiving the thing diversly ; and compounding again those notions into a proposition . also , since this manner of knowing a thing by abstract , partial and inadequate notions can only be found in the soul of man , which gleans her knowledge by piece-meal from various impressions on the senses ; and not in angels , which comprehend the whole thing at once by simple intuition , much less in god. hence , the soul ( as will be prov'd ) being immortal , all the affections or modes , consistent with her nature ( as all true propositions are ) must likewise continue and remain in her for ever ; since neither can there be any reason on the subject's side , why they should decay or perish : nor on the objects , because god has unalterably fixt the essences of things , from which all true propositions are taken , and on which they are grounded . whence those propositions must be eternally true , meaning by those words , à parte post ; nor can they be so , à parte ante , because the soul , their only subject , is not such her self . . the second sort of power , which is the power to the notion of [ thing ] as it is found in nature , must have such an act corresponding to it as determines the power to be this or that thing in nature . for , since the notion of [ thing ] is very common , and the power to be a thing adds to it still more indetermination ; and , what 's common to all , and indeterminate to any thing , cannot particularize , or constitute this or that thing ; and only this or that thing , and not thing in common , or what 's indeterminate to every thing , can exist in nature : it follows , that either there must be no particular bodies in nature , that is no one body , or ( which is the same ) no body at all in the whole world ; or else it must be granted that there must be such an act corresponding to this sort of power , which so determines it as to constitute this or that body in particular . which second sort of act is call'd by the schools the substantial or essential form ; and this second sort of power , which answers to that act , and is determin'd by it , is call'd ma●ter . . hence those things which include in their natures this second sort of power and its correspondent act , which use to be call'd matter and form , are said to be compounded of them ; because such a kind of thing involves in it self , and consequently , causes in us , and verifies the conceptions of somewhat according to which that thing is indeterminate , and somewhat according to which it is determinate under the notion of thing or ens , which two considerations do comprehend all that can be conceiv'd belonging to the nature of such a kind of thing , as to that notion precisely : which kind of compound thing we call a body . . this second sort of power called . [ matter ] is the sole ground of all change and mutability . for , since whatever thing is determinate , is fixt by that which formally determines it , to be that thing it is and no other ; 't is manifest that from the nature of that act or form , which , by determining the matter , makes that thing be what it is , no change into another can proceed . wherefore , since ( by § . , . ) there can be nothing else conceivable belonging to such a particular thing , or body , but its power to be such a thing , and its act which determines that power and formally constitutes it such a thing , that is , the matter and the form ; and from the act or form , as far as is on it's part , no mutability , or change from what that act made it , ●…n proceed ; it follows necessarily that all change and mutability under the notion of thing must proceed from the power or matter . again , since all accidental acts , or modes , do no less , in their way , determine and constitute the thing to be actually such as that accident is apt to make it , ( or to be after such a manner ) as well as the essential act or form did determine and constitute it to be this thing and no other thing ; and that their whole notion or nature is terminated in their making it actually such ; it follows that from those accidental acts , or those modes , precisely , nothing can have any ground to be alter'd , or to have another mode or accident . wherefore , all change and mutability , whether substantial or accidental , can be refunded into nothing but meerly into the power , or matter , as it 's only ground ▪ . corollary ix . hence is demonstrated , that if there can be any pure acts which have no power or matter in them , ( as will be shown hereafter there can ) such a● are angels and souls separated , they must be naturally immutable , both substantially and accidentally . see method to science b. . l. . thesis . and raillery defeated from § . . to § . . . the third sort of power is that which the thing● consisting of matter and form , and having , over and above , it 's ultimate act of existing , has to the modes or accidental acts belonging to it ; as was mention'd § . . and shown particularly in my method● b. . less . . . tho' these accidental acts , or modes , ( a● is shown above coroll . iii. and in my method , b. . less , . § . , . ) are not things in the first and proper signification of the word [ thing , ] but only in a secondary improper and analogical sense ; yet they have , notwithstanding , their improper and analogie● essences ; ( as has also every abstract notion of ▪ conception we have of the thing ) and , consequently , their nature is sixt to be what it is and no other . whence they have also their improper ( but yet real ) metaphysical verity , and first principles peculiar to their natures , as well as things , properly so call'd , or substances have . so that whoever , in discoursing of quantity , ● . g. or action , makes quantity ( by consequence ) 〈…〉 to be quantity , or action not to be action , but destroys the nature of those modes , is as evidently convicted of contradiction as if he had destroy'd the nature of a man , or an animal , or any other substance ; and had made them , by consequence , not to be what they are , as all false discoursers do . . hence is clearly seen what is meant by metaphysical divisibility and composition ; and that they are not ●●ch as are found between thing ●●d thing in re ; for this kind of composition and division would destroy the unity and verity of the thing ; be●…es that such a composition is proper to artificial things , and is contrary to the constitu●… of natural entities ; natural composition 〈…〉 was shown , § . , . ) being made by the ●…eting of the matter and form in one such ●… , or one body . that composition and divisibility then which we call metaphysical , is of the parts ( as it were ) of the thing as it is in ●our understanding ; or , of the thing as concelv'd by us thus , and the same thing as concelv'd by us otherwise . for out of our conception , or understanding , there is no actual distinction of matter and form , of substance and accidents , &c. tho' there is ground in the thing , as it is the object of our imperfect pitch of understanding , not able to comprehend all that may be thought of it at once , why we thus frame abstract , partial and inadequate conceptions of it , or ( which is the same ) why we thus divide or distinguish it . and , hence it comes , that , since there can be no contradiction , ( nor consequently impossibility ) unless we ▪ affirm and deny in the same respect ; therefore as there is no contradiction , in such a case , in our understanding , because these respects there are diverse ; so there is no impossibility in nature , but the thing may be chang'd , distinguisht , acted upon , or act , according to some of those respects or conceptions ; and yet be not-chang'd , not-act or suffer according to others of them ▪ as will be seen by instances hereafter . . corollary x. this doctrine , particularly this last clause , were the words ens or substance , nature , suppositum , person , existence , and subsistence , exactly distinguisht , and distinctly understood , will be signally useful to defeat almost all the arguments , drawn from reason , by the deists ; and if well reflected on , clears many objection● brought against the b. trinity , by the soci●ians , and other anti-trinitarians , opposing the christian tenet of the unity of the divine nature in three persons ; and to confute , ( as far as it impugns that tenet it self ) that treatise , entituled , [ a letter to the reverend the clergy of both universities , concerning the trinity and the athanasian creed . ] which tho' it seems to be the utmost effort of those parties , and has a very plausible appearance to those who either are not well skill'd in , or do not well reflect on the laws of predication and the use of humane language in parallel cases ; yet it is easie to show , that that piece of wit and fancy is utterly void of art and good sense ; and that the christian thesis it self , if rightly represented , is perfectly consonant to the nature of the subject , ( the deity ) and to right reason ; and that there is no more show of contradiction that that most simple being should verifie sending and being sent , generating and being generated , and such like , tho' they be opposites ; than it is that the same infinite being , when god knows himself , ( which themselves grant ) should , notwithstanding it 's most perfect simplicity , verifie that he is the knower and thing known ; which are as much relatively opposite as are any of the others . lastly , it may be shown very evidently , that all the while they oppose the doctrine of the trinity , those witty gentlemen do quite mistake the whole question , by confounding what the deity is in it's self , abstracting from any order to our conceptions , or rather , as it is above our conceptions , ( according to which consideration we cannot think or speak of it at all ; ) with what god is as conceiv'd by us ; or what , as he is the object of our understanding , his infinite essence obliges us truly to conceive and affirm of him. all which may perhaps , particularly and at large be shown hereafter . . corol. vi. the same doctrine clears the mystery of the incarnation from the least semblance of contradiction ; and shows how not only possible , but consonant to right reason it is , that the humanity of our b. saviour may be assum'd by the second person of the b. trinity , and yet not be assum'd by either of the other persons . as also how that person may supply to it , or be united to it immediately according to the subsistence or personality ; and yet not be thus united to it formally according to it's nature or essence . and the same may be said of the same doctrine in order to some other revealed mysteries of christian faith , which i here , forbear to mention . . corollary vi. hence is clearly discern'd ▪ what is the difference between logical and metaphysical abstraction ; and that logical abstraction is of the generical or specifical ( that is , of more common ) notions from the inferio●● ones ; which is done by taking from these later that precise consideration iu which they agree , leaving out those in which they disagree ; that is , by taking meerly what belongs to the genus or generical notion ; and leaving out , or abstracting from the differences . whereas metaphysical abstraction regards only this , that the notion , nature or essence of the one is not the precise notion , nature or essence of the other ; or that both the one and the other are different respects or considerations of the thing ; tho' they do , both of them , stand upon the same level , and neither of them be higher or lower in the way of predication , or in the extent of their notion , than the other . in which later sense of the word [ abstraction ] we use to say that our soul works , or knows things , by abstract or inadequate notions . . from what is said above , 't is manifest that there can be no actual parts in any ens whatever ; whether we conceive it under the notion of ens ; or of such an ens , call'd body ; or , as affected with such an intrinsecal mode or accident , v. g. quantity , or any of the rest . for , since to distinguish cannot belong to the power , ( it being of it self , or of it's own nature , utterly indistinct or indetermi●●te ; ) it follows that to distinguish must properly and only belong to the act. wherefore in case those parts were distinct actually , they must have distinct acts ; and by consequence , the power or subject must be made distinct by having those distinct acts in it ; that is , the subjects must be more under that notion . therefore unum being the property of ens , in what sense soever the word [ ens ] be taken , ( as is shown § . . ) there would , in that case , be no unity , nor consequently entity , under any notion , left in the world. to explicate this more ●…y , and show it particularly : in case the first ●●rt of power call'd ens , and it's act [ existence , ] ●●d each of them it 's proper act which constitutes a thing , and so were two things , nothing in the world that exists would be one thing , ●or consequently , ( unum being the property of ens ) a thing , or any thing . also , if the second fort of power [ matter , ] and it 's act or form that constitutes body , were two things ; there would be no one thing of that sort , or no one body ; and , consequently , there would be no body in nature . and , since , ( as will be prov'd hereafter , l. . § . . ) the complexion of accidents is the essential form which constitutes body , were those accidents distinct things from the matter , and the matter from them ; or , were they distinct things from one another , and , therefore , each of them were capable of existing alone , or properly entia ; there would be no one , or no individual body in the world ; but every such thing would be a multitude or many , and perhaps innumerable . or , were the parts that compound quantity , ( or , which is the same , the parts of body as precisely having quantity in them ) actually distinct , as many schoolmen hold ; then , each of them ( as was lately prov'd ) must have a distinct act of that sort to make them distinct actually ; whence they would be in that case diverse quanta , or things having divers quantities in them : wherefore , it being demonstrable , that quantitas est divisibilis in semper divisibilia , there could be no quantum , or thing of that kind in the world but would contain many lesser quantums in it ; and therefore there could be no one , or no quantum ; and , consequently , no thing that had quantity in it , found in nature . add , that those pretended distinct actual parts , must be distinguisht ( by § . . ) from others by some act ▪ and yet most of them could have no act i● them to distinguish them from their comparts ▪ for the second power [ matter , ] has no act at all in it's notion to distinguish it actually from it'● proper form ; and the forms themselves , whether essential or accidental , are meer distinguishers ; and have nothing in their nature or notion by which they can be said to receive an act , and , so , become the thing distinguished . wherefore 't is most demonstrable by metaphysical mediums , that there can be no actual parts in any compound whatever . wherefore , all the parts they are said to have , ( whether they be physical or metaphysical , ) are potential only ; or ( to speak more properly ) there is nothing but one whole actual ens , which has a power to be divided into many , either in re , or in intellectu . . corollary viii . whence is clearly demonstrated the reason of that useful maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum . ] for that which acts or suffers must actually bee ; wherefore , since no part actually is , but only the whole ; it follows , that only the whole or the suppositum can be said in proper speech to act and suffer and not any part ; or , ( which is the same ) the whole according to such a part. which agrces perfectly with the sense and language of mankind ; who , if a man strikes another with his hand upon the cheek , use to say , [ he struck him , ] where , tho' he [ he ] and [ him ] signifie the whole suppositum ; yet they clearly mean that [ he ] according to such a part only , call'd the hand , struck him ; and that the other , according to such a part , call'd the cheek , was struck ; and that neither of them did strike , or was struck , according to any other part. . hence is still more evidently demonstrated against the cartesians , that , since they put all the things in nature to be made up of the particles of their three elements ▪ each of which , seeing it can exist alone , must be an actually-distinct thi●● from all the rest ; they leave nothing in nature which is truly one ens ; that is , ( unum being a property of ens ) they leave no natural e●● in the world , except each of those particles may be thought to be such ; which yet , accordi●● to their doctrine , cannot be said . for , ●in●● they must admit diverse things in nature call'd bodies , and those things that compound an e●● or unum in nature , cannot each of them b● an ens or unum it self ; common sense telling us most evidently , that divers of such components would make the compound multa e●tia , or divisum in se , under the notion of ens ▪ and not an ens or unum , which must be indivisum in se : hence follows , that , for want of skill in metaphysicks , they leave nothing in nature which is truly one natural-body or one ens ▪ but a kind of heap or aggregate of ma●● ▪ 't is to no purpose to object the distinction of ens completum and incompletum ; for every e●● is compleat under the notion of ens , or thing which is capable of existing alone ; as each of those particles is which they club into one ch●merical ens. nor can they evade , by saying ▪ that the entia in nature are compounded , and those particles are uncompounded , or perfectly simple : for , since each of those particles is distinct from the rest , it must have something in it that ●● common to them all , which we call the matter ; and also somewhat by which it is distinguisht from all the other particles , which we call it's ●ct or form. whence follows , that every one of those particles , even the very least , has all the composition that can be requir'd to make it ●●uly and properly a corporeal ens , or a body , ●specially since it is capable of existing alone , or without needing the help of any other : and therefore , none of those entities they put to be compounded of these , is truly an ens or unum ; ●u● a medly or aggregate of many entities ; ●●●t is , 't is non unum , as being divisum in se ac●●●ding to the notion of ens ; or , which is the ●●me , being a non ens or chimera . . hence is demonstrated , that ( speaking of ●●dies ) the proper constitution ●● composition belonging to an ●●s or thing , as such , is that second sort of power and act. for , ●oth of these bearing in their notion some respect to the thing as it is an ens ; and , neither of them having in them the notion of a whole ens , since neither of them ●●one is capable of existing ; it follows , that their proper nature is to be parts of ens , ●nd therefore 't is proper to that whole ens to be ●ompounded of them. again , since as was lately ●●own , no natural ens can be made up of more ●ompleat entities , each of which have both ●●wer and act in them ; because in that case , that compound ens would be non-unum , and therefore non-ens ; it follows necessarily , that they must be compounded of power and act ; neither of which singly , or alone , can have that composition in them , which is requisite to make them such entia . . in the consistency , compossibility or agreeableness of the act and power with one another , found in corporeal substances , consists the possibility or essence of all the bodies in nature . for , while the power is dsterminable by such an act , and the act is determinative of such a power , they are connaturally fitted to one another , or apt to be joyn'd in order to compound an ens , as proper parts to such a whole . which frees the compound from chimericalness , repugnancy , and incompossibility of it's constituent parts ; because neither of them is actually an ens , and yet they are apt to joyn in one ens ; whence it becomes fit for creative wisdom to give to such a kind of compound , actual being , or existence . . hence is clearly demonstrated , that there ▪ is no real and actual distinction found in any one single thing whatever in re , but only what is made by the understanding , or what 's found in the distinct notions we frame of it ▪ which springs from the metaphysical divisibility of the thing , or ( which is the same ) from it's power to ground different conceptions in u● ▪ for , since what 's divisible , is , for that very regard , one ; ( for , were it more , it would be divided to our hand , and not divisible ) it follows , that what 's thus divisible by our understanding , is necessitated , out of the very terms to be on● in it's self before our understanding came to divide it . whence 't is evinced most evidently , that before this operation of our understanding thus divided it , by making different abstracted conceptions of it , the thing ( tho' having it's matter , form , existence , and all it's accidents in it ) was in it's self , or as it was in nature , truly one thing ; or one ens ; and that all these particulars , now enumerated , are nothing but meerly our different conceptions , considerations , or notions of it ; taking those words objectively ; that is , indeed , the very same thing it self as diversly conceiv'd , consider'd , or apprehended . so that the thing gives us the ground of verification , and our understanding the formal distinction , exprest by the abstractive or distinctive particle [ as ; ] to answer the signification of which word , nothing is found in the thing as it is in re , or i● nature . . from what has been discourst above concerning power and act , 't is demonstrable how many common sorts or kinds of entia can be in the universe , or are possible to be created . for , since nothing is capable to have existence given it but what 's determinate , that is , this or that ; and the meer power to be a thing , ( call'd matter ) is utterly ●●determinate ; and act is the only determiner of ●●tentiality or power ; and therefore can also have determination by virtue of it's own nature ; or rather bears determination in it's very notion : it follows that there can only be two sorts of things possible to be created , viz. those which are compounded of power and act , that is , of matter and form , which we call bodies ; a●… pure acts , which have no power or matter i● them , which we call angels , or spirits . . hence 't is inferr'd , that existence i● the most formal , and , consequen●ly , the ultimate act of all othe●… whatever ; and all others pot●●tial in respect of it . for , sin●● it has been shown , § . , , and . that the essences of all creatures , whether they be p●… acts , or compounded of act and power , do consist in a possibility or power to exist ; and much more , the improper essences of their accidents ●● modes , which have of themselves not so much as a power to exist at all , but by means ●● the ens or substance , on which both their essen●… and existence does immediately depend ; it follows that existence is the most formal and ultimate act , as supervening to all created essenc●… imaginable ; and that all other acts , compar●… to it , are but potential , or , as it were , dispositi●● to it . wherefore when angels are call'd p●… acts , 't is to be understood , that they are pure ●● free from that second sort of power , call'd matter ▪ notwithstanding which , the essences of those p●… acts , are but potential in respect of that first and purest act , existence . . corollary viii . wherefore [ existence ] ●● more properly call'd [ actualit● ] than [ act ; ] as having no ki●… of potentiality to any farther act ; but is the perfect quintessence ( as it were ) of act ●● self , without the least alloy or mixture o● power ; as becomes the immediate effect of god , our creatour , who is essentially an infinite actuality of being , or ( which is the same ) self-existent ; as will be demonstrated hereafter . . wherefore , since it has been demonstrated , ● . . that the very essence of all created beings consists in the meer possibility or power to have existence , and therefore they have not actual being from themselves ; it follows , that they must have it from another ; to whom , consequently , existence is essential ; that is , from the first being , or from god. there is therefore a god. but of this in my third book . advertisement . i desire it may be remarkt once for all , that by the words power , act , matter , form , existence , and the same may be said of all the words i shall use hereafter through this whole treatise , ●●r those i have publisht formerly , i do not mean ▪ idea's ] or [ similitudes , ] or any other conceits , found out , or made by my own , or any other man's wit or fancy ; but the very real thing it self , ( of which , and not of similitudes we intend ●● speak , ) conceiv'd by us according to such ●●spects or considerations grounded on it , and ●●ly found in it : without which no solid dis●…rse can possibly be made ; as is shown in my ●●thod , b. . l. . and is demonstrated at large in my solid philosophy asserted , preliminary first and second ; and in my other writings . meditation on the foregoing chapter . 't is time , my soul , to turn thy thoughts upon thy self ; and to reflect what advancement of knowledge thou hast gain'd by those easiest , most common , and most familiar notions of power and act. but first , consider , how provident thy generous maker has been for thee , as soon as then wast deliver'd out of the dark womb of nothing ; and how he has assisted and nourisht thee up in thy helpless infancy . thy nature was to be capable of knowledge ; and therefore , only knowledge was the connatural food , which could give thee growth and strength , and ripen thee to perfection . how wretched then and miserable hadst thou been , had not he , like a loving father , taken care thou shouldst not live perpetually in a dungeon of spiritual darkness and comfortless ignorance ? to this end ●e planted thee amongst an infinite variety of thy fellow-creatures , bodily substances ; which play'd continually about thee with such motions as were agreeable to their several constitutions . these , being the manufacture of an infinitely wise creatour , could not but retain in them the manifest prints of the wisdom of their divine artificer ; which made ●●●m fit instruments to inform thy empty understanding , and to instruct thy rudeness . but , alas ! th●y could not reach or affect thy nature , which was spiritual . all their operations were perform'd by local motion ; which being ▪ quantitative and divisible , could not be receiv'd in thy spiritual and indivisible essence . this had render'd thee , consider'd according to thy peculiar nature , ( hadst thou been a distinct thing from all bodies whatever ) insensible of their smartest impulses ▪ and incapable of knowing any thing by their most vigorous impressions : nor hadst thou , as being one of the lowest class of knowing substances , any right or title to have actual knowledge infus'd into thee gratis , at first ; as had thy elder-brothers by creation , th● angels . in this forlorn condition wast thou found in the first instant thou camest into this material world ; viz. only capable of knowledge , and utterly unable , of thy self , to gain any , or help thy self in the least : for a meer power which was undetermin'd to all , or any act of knowledge , could not , alone , enable thee to produce any particular act , which is necessarily this , and determinate . but it belongs to essential and infinite goodness not to leave his poor indigent creatures destitute , but to take order they should have ( as far as consists with the best order of the world ) all the perfection their nature is capable to receive . wherefore his providence wisely order'd thou shouldst have a material compart ▪ link'd so intimately to thee as to compound with thee one ens , or suppositum ; and thence partake of the actions and sufferings of one another . by which means , impressions made by outward objects , scattering about their minutest particles , upon some very sensible part of thy body ( with which part thou wast immediately united as the form with it's proper matter ) might at the same time aff●… thee also according to thy peculiar nature , that i● knowingly ; and imbue thy yet-ignorant-understanding power with tinctures of their several n●tures . these first rough-draughts of knowledge wer● indeed very rude , scanty and l●mited ; being ( as it were ) an imperfect view of the things on one side only ; and rather glances th●● a full sight of them ; for they gave thee no more light at one time , than of some one of those m●ny respects or notions the thing was able to i●-part to thee ; and , withall , being the immediat● effects of objects made of matter , ( the parent o● all undistinctness or confusion ) they were far fro● exact . to supply which defect , and make amen● for this disadvantage , thy creatour endow'd th●● with a faculty of reflecting ; which enabled th●● to refine , separate , and range into distinction and order those raw and tumultuary impressions ; and ▪ moreover , fur●isht thee with a comparing power ; which , by iudging and discoursing , could connect and compound those narrow abstracted notions with one another , and , by degrees , give thee a broader prospect of the thing ; and , in time , improve thy knowledge to that pitch which is suteable to thy condition here . the entire comprehension of all things being reserv'd to thy future state , when thou shalt be got out of thy non-age , and thy eagle-sight be no longer blinded with the screen of thy body . do not repine , that thou canst not , at first , readily and fully comprehend any thing , but ar● forced to gain a distant and shy acquaintanc● with them , by those conceptions of them in part only , which our dull senses afforded thee . not ●he least of them , but , if well husbanded and im●●●v'd , will lead thee to far-distant truths , and ve●y large and strange discoveries . thy reasoning power had been useless and in vain , and thou hadst wanted , all the while thou livest here , that employ●●nt which most properly belongs to a man , ( thy reasoning or discoursing ) had not the world's governour thus parcell'd out to thy low understanding the book of creatures . he gives thee at thy entrance into nature's school , the first rudiments ●● elements , thy ordinary notions ; which are , ●s it were , the letters or alphabet of all our knowledge ; with which , like little children of the lowest form , we are first to get acquaintance . apply thy self to these at first ; endeavour to learn their distinct characters , and what their force is ; er● t●●● comest to spell them into syllables , by com●●●nding them into judgments ; or to put those syllables together , to make up entire words , by ●●●ming discourses concerning them . not doubting but that , by this methodical and industrious applic●tion of thy faculties , thou wilt come at length to read this book of creatures currently ; at least as ●uch of it as can concern thee to know in thy condition here . think not that even the least of those elements of knowledge , ( thy vulgar and nature-taught notions , ) is barren ●●d fruitless . consider , how , by ●●●eriencing , that bodies work on ●●● compound or suppositum , thou ●●●est to know that they actually are ; and therefore , that they had a power to be ; as likewise that they had a power to be chang'd into others , and to be affected after various modes or manners and then reflect , how much light thou hast gain'● hitherto by viewing attentively , and discoursing consequently , of those most ordinary and most obvious notions , power and act ; which seem'd at first sight , so steril , insipid and insignificant . these two , joyn'd with a few others , already known without speculation , and fully as evid●●● as themselves , have demonstrated to thee , how , and what , and where , our essence was ere it ha● existence given it . what are the essential part● of all bodies in common . which are the first principles that fix and rivet all inferiour truth● in thy understanding ; and how the● descend from the father of lights , god's essential wisdom . they instruct thee , by looking into their natures , ●● notions , from whence it is that all change a●● mutability proceeds ; a principle , which draws m●ny great and important truths after it . they sh●● thee clearly , what , and how many , several sorts of things could possibly have been created . they inform thee what kind of division is made by thy acute understanding ; which the subtillest agents in nature , tho' assisted by the most exact chymical art , could never have reacht ; and how thou compoundest again those thus-divided parts to fram● iudgments and discourses . they have given th●● evident knowledge , that there are no actual parts in any ens whatever . a truth most useful to the attainment of very many of thy future knowledges . they have preserv'd thee from falling into the precipices of divers f●ndamental errors , by embracing which great wits have miscarry'd . they have , moreover , taught thee how absolutely pure that act call'd existence is ; and that it is above the power of any created cause to confer that soveraign gift on themselves , or others : which leads thee a fair step towards the knowledge of the first being ; to know whom perfectly is thy eternal happiness . and , are all these acquisitions worth nothing ? add , that thou know'st not yet what multitudes of high and most important truths do hitherto lie hid , involv'd in these few now mention'd ; and in some others , here omitted . all which spring originally from the bare notions of power and act , joyn'd with some others ally'd to them , and connected with them . awake then , my soul , from thy desponding leth●rgy , and exert thy industry by the well-assured hopes of gaining ●●mense degrees of knowledge by studying and improving the vast ●●ock of thy other notions ; that is , indeed , the things diversly conceiv'd by thee , and therefore in thee . it will comfort thy labour , to find so much good , and to have reapt such benefit by two of them only ; and those two , as it may seem , none of the fruitfullest . such beginnings are hopeful , and give thee earnest of a successful progress . only be sure thou ●●st not relinquish the works made by the hand of thy all-wise creatour , in which he has stampt all natural and acquir'd truths ; nor strivest foolishly to create to thy self new things , and new worlds , by thy own shallow wit ; and to ground truth on the mock-creatures , made by thy own fantastick ●magination . that faculty was intended to be a servant to thee , to reach thee the materials thou ●●st need of . take heed then that her brisk and gay genius do not make her presume to domineer over her mistress , or inveigle her to follow her desultory vagaries . expect substantial and real truth , no where but in the things whose essences the god of truth has made and establisht ; and then thou mayst be confident thy iudgments and discourses will be well-grounded and solid , not airy and fantastical imaginations : which , tho they flatter thee with fine appearances , counterfeiting evidence ; will certainly prove most obscure , leave thee in the dark , and be found to be no more but airy bubbles , when thoy come to be graspt by the strict hand , or palma contracta , of connected discourse or exact reason . chap. ii. of the essences of bodies in in common ; and of the first or simple bodies in particular . . every notion that is not abstract but concrete , must have some form , or formal cause by which it is constituted such . this is self-evident ; for we call that a concrete notion , which is compounded of the subject which has such a form in it , and the form which is had by it ; and which , by being in it , makes and denominates it to be this kind of concrete in particular . . wherefore the notion of ens , it being not an abstract but a concrete , is constituted by it's essence , as it 's form , or formal cause , which makes it to be an ens or thing . for , since the word [ essence ] imports somewhat that belongs intrinsically to being ; and yet is not the notion of actual being , or existence in nature ; consequently , it can only signifie a capacity of being , or the form of that which is capable of being ; that is , ( by ch. . § . . ) of ens. wherefore , as that which is white is made formally such by having that mode , or accidental act , in it call'd whiteness ; and that which is round becomes formally such by having rotundity in it ; so every ens or thing is formally constituted such , by having that formality in it call'd essence . . the essences of those things call'd pure acts or spirits , consists in their actual knowledge . for , since , being pure acts , they have no power ●● matter in them ; their essence cannot consist in a power to have what is natural to them , as knowledge is ; therefore their essences must consist in actual knowledge of what is due to their natures to know . again , if their essences did consist only in a power to know ; it being evident , that whatever is reduced from the state of potentiality , or power , to that of actuality or act , is intrinsecally chang'd ; and all change or mutability proceeds from matter , ( as is prov'd , ch. i. § . . ) and pure acts are therefore call'd pure , because they have none of that power call'd matter in them ; it follows necessarily , that the essence of all intelligences or intellectual things , can only consist in actual knowledge . . notwithstanding that actual knowledge is essential to pure acts , this hinders not but that they have a potentiality to that first sort of act call'd existence , which , ( as is shown ; ch. . § . . and . ) is common and essential to all creatures . for , since to know is to have the thing in it intellectually ; and the notion of ens or thing ( speaking of created things ) abstracts from existence ; it follows that the knowledge of those things to which existence is accidental , consists with the power to existence ; especially , since all knowledge , even of the existence of other things , ( as will be shown , ch. . ) consists in being those things as other , or as distinct from the knower . wherefore , tho' angels , by actual knowledge , are those other things with their existences intellectually ; yet they being in them as others , they are still left indifferent in their proper natures to exist or not exist . . the essence of body , or of such an ens as consists of matter and form , is chiefly taken from it's proper act , or it's form. for , since what distinguishes a thing from , all others , does , consequently make it this , and no other ; and matter being of it self perfectly indeterminate , cannot distinguish or determine a thing to be of this kind , much less to be this individuum ; it follows , that the essence of all bodies , and consequently of body in common , is chiefly taken from the form or act. . yet the compleat essence of body is not only taken from the form , but also from the matter , which , together with the form , compounds the nature of body . for , since that constitutes the notion of that species of ens , call'd body , which distinguishes it essentially from the other species of ens , call'd pure acts or spirits ; and the not-being a pure act , is that which distinguishes it from those entities , which are pure acts ; and the not-being a pure act , does also , out of the force of the very terms , import , that it has power or matter mixt with it : it follows , that body is essentially distinguisht from spirit , by it's being compounded of power and act , or matter and form , and , consequently , not by the form only . again , since essence speaks the total form of any ens , as humanitas does of homo , or petreitas of peter ; and not meerly that partial form , which , with th● other part , call'd matter , compounds body ; it must necessarily import an act of that whole compound ; and , consequently , include a respect to to the matter also , and not to the form only ; as is evident from the word [ corporeity ] , which signifies th● total form or essence of body . . hence divisible and indivisible , taken as they signifie quantitative and not-quantitative , are not the proper differences which constitute the first kinds of ens , [ body ] and [ spirit ] ; but the metaphysical divisibility and indivisibility into matter and form ; as ( besides the reasons here given ) is clearly demonstrated in my method to science , b. . less . . § . . and . in which lesson , if i do not flatter my self , that most useful doctrine of assigning proper and intrinsecal differences , and of dividing any genus by such , is more solidly establisht , and more clearly and largely deliver'd than has been hitherto . the knowledge of which is so necessary , that , without this , 't is impossible to keep our notions distinct , or preserve them from interfering and being confusedly jumbled : which must forcibly , in a high manner , obstruct the way to that clear and distinct knowledge , call'd science . . corollary i. hence those philosophers are convicted of a vast errour in one of the first principles of nature , who make the essence of their first body to consist in nothing but extension . for , since ( as has been evidently demonstrated in the place now cited , § . . and ▪ ) all proper and intrinsecal differences can be nothing but more or less of the notion divided ; if extension be the essential constitutive of that matter of theirs , which ( it not being pretended to be a spiritual substance ) must be some kind of body ; then difference in extension , or more and less of extension , must essentially constitute distinct things under the notion of body , or distinct bodies : by which doctrine , no man living , nor perhaps any body in nature , while it continually sends out it's particles or effluviums , would be the same body , or the same thing , one single moment : which quite destroys the stability of things ; and would alter all or most of the actions , comportments , duties , and even all the discourse of mankind ; since , ere they could speak or think of any thing , it would no longer be the same thing but another ; in regard it is perpetually otherwise than it was according to it's extension , which is , ( as they hold ) it 's essential constitutive . nor will it avail the cartesians to say , that this holds in every simple body , such as are their three elements , but not in a mixt body . for no mixt is , according to them , any thing but an aggr●…gate of many , and not one body ; and so the subject of our discourse is alter'd ; while we speak of one , they of a multitude . none of their mixts being one thing , as is shown , ideae cartesianae expensae , from pag. . to pag. . . corollary ii. hence our modern ideists ar●… equally faulty , while they make the essence of body to consist in extension and impenetrability , ( which they nick-name solidity ; ) for they leave out the matter as not worth considering , which ▪ ( as was shown , § . . ) is part of the essen●… of body . besides , they reflect not th●… those notions , which are meerly quantitative , cannot be the total form of any en●… nor consequently the essence of that en● , call'd body . to show farther the essential distinction of bodies , i advance these following positions . . every particular body in the world is essentially , a distinct part of nature . for , since the whole complex of bodies call'd the universe , or the world , does essentially consist of a multitude of things , which are of many distinct natures , as of it's parts ; and their essence , as they are parts of nature , does consist in their compounding or making up this aggregate or whole ; and all those parts are such things as we call bodies ; it fol●●ws that every body in the world is essentially such a [ thing ] by it's being a distinct part in nature . . wherefore every body is also essentially ordain'd for some distinct , pro●● , and primary operation in nature . for , since the course of nature does essentially consist in the motion of a great variety of things , which are agents and patients in respect of one another ; and those things are bodies ; which , being distinct in their individual essences , must consequently ( every ●hing acting as it is ) have also some distinct o●●●●tion primarily and properly belonging to them , 〈◊〉 proceeding from them ; that is , such as could 〈◊〉 proceed from any other body : it follows , that ●●●●y body is essentially ordain'd for some distinct , proper and primary operation in nature . . wherefore , whatever fits the matter for the performance of this primary operation , does essentially constitute such a thing in nature or such a body . for , since the course of nature consists in mo●●●● ▪ carry'd on with that regu●●●●y ▪ and exact order , that ( * every distinct thing acting as it is ; that is , after a distinct but certain manner , ) proper effects should still be produced by proper causes ; were there any body or part of nature which had no effect at all , ( or which comes to the same ) no proper effect ; such a body would be in vain and useless , or good for nothing . wherefore , since it is imposs●… that infinite wisdom , which created and gove●… the world , should make any thing that is in v●… and good for nothing ; it follows , that every thin●… and every body in nature , is constituted such 〈…〉 part of it , or such a body by the aptness it h●… to perform its proper or primary operation ; a●… therefore , whatever fits the matter for the p●●formance of this primary operation , does essentially constitute such a thing in nature , or 〈…〉 a body . . corollary iii. hence is seen in what co●sists the metaphysical bon●… or goodness of every body , which is one of the properties of it as it is an ens 〈…〉 thing ; viz. that it is use●… for some effect or other t●… proceeds from it as 't is such 〈…〉 ens ; or for such an operation as is prope●… and peculiar to it . whence those cartesi●… who deny bodies to be causes of any effect in nature , no , not so much as instrument●… ones ; but only to be occasions , which themselves say , are no causes ; and , consequently , do put them to have no operation ; do , by making them good for nothing , take away their metaphysical bonity ; and , bonum being a property of ens , by consequence , their entity also . moreover , . every body in nature is essentially an instrument . for , since the definition of an instrumental cause , is that it can no otherwise act than as it is acted upon or mov'd by another ; and no body can actually move of it 〈…〉 but has only a power to be mov'd by ano●…r ; because it is far from being a pure act , ●…ich is essentially in act according to it's nature ; but , having matter in it , which is a power 〈…〉 the notion of thing , it is a fortiori only po●…ial in order to it's operation , which is subse●…nt to the notion of thing . wherefore every ●…dy is only an instrument put into motion ( immediately ) by angels or intelligences , which are pure acts ; in such a manner as best conduces to ●●complish the intention of the world 's supreme ●overnour . . the essential difference of body is chiefly 〈…〉 from the action it is or●…n'd for in nature , and not 〈…〉 it's power to be acted on or ●…'d by another . for , since ●…t which constitutes any essence 〈…〉 be the most formal , and ( as it were ) the ●…st noble consideration found in the thing : and act , ( let it be never so imperfect ) is far ●ore formal and more noble than the power which corresponds to that act : it follows that the essential difference constituting body must chiefly ●…ring from it's activeness , which belongs to body 〈…〉 ●t has the nature of act or form in it ; and not ●…om it 's passiveness , or aptness to be operated upon by others , which it has from the matter . . those accidents or modes which do make a body fit for it's primary operation in nature , do constirute it 〈…〉 distinct body , or , are it 's essential form. for , since nothing is requir'd to make one body essentially distinct from another , but to make 〈…〉 a distinct part of the universe ; and that which makes it a distinct agent in nature , does also make it a distinct part of the universe ; and that which fits it for a distinct and peculiar operation , makes it a distinct natural agent ; and the modes or accidents ( as will be shown in 〈…〉 several sorts of bodies ) make it a distinct age●… ▪ it follows , that those modes or aocidents th●… make it fit for it's primary operation are 〈…〉 essential form. . the suppositum or individual body must retain that complexion of accidents with some constancy , or fo● some time , according as it's constitution requires ; and not 〈…〉 transitu only , or by way of continu'd motion . for , otherwise we could never pitch upon any thing in nature ▪ so as to be able to say , it is this or that thing ▪ if it's intrinsecal constitution were perpetually fleeting . besides , a thing , is that which is capable of existence ; and actually has it when it is a part of nature ; and existence has some steadiness and permanency in it's notion : whereas , in case individual bodies did possess those accidents only in a transitory succession , we could never assign any the least time in which it could be said to be this or that thing at all ; nor ▪ consequently , ( since nothing can exist , which is not either this or that , ) to be at all . whence follows , that accidents are not entia , or capable of existing without any subject : since the complexion of those accidents , which , with the matter , make the thing fit for it's primary operation , is the form ; that is , but one part of the ●hing . besides , they are no more but modes or manners , how the thing is , as all cartesians hold ; which is consistent , in sense , with the doctrine of the aristotelians , who make them to be affections or determinations of the matter . now the ●otions of ens , res , substance or thing , is to be ●…able of existing ; wherefore that definition ●…nnot possibly agree to any other notion ; and , ●…refore , those modes or accidents , cannot be 〈…〉 themselves capable of existence : again , how 〈…〉 it conceivable , that the mode , or manner , can be ●●thout that of which it is a mode ? especially , ●…ce in the definition of every mode or accident ▪ the thing of which it is a manner , is con●…ated or included . lastly , if accidents were ●…ble of existing alone , or entia ; then , since ●…ry body has many , and some of them innu●…able such modes in them , that ens which has 〈…〉 could not be said to be unum , nor , consequently an ens ; which would leave neither any ●nity , nor , by consequence , any entity in all nature . . no body can exist in nature if it have ●o other form in it but meer divisibility in common . for , since ●…thing can exist but what is ●…rminately this or that ; and ●hat is common to all , is inde●…minate to every individuum ; and , therefore , cannot determine it to be this or that in particular : it follows , that divisibility in common cannot fit or determine any body in nature to exist . . more and less of divisibility , which 〈…〉 the immediate and first di●…rences of divisibility in commo● determine it's notion ; and may consequently , ( taken within som● determinate degree ) fit the matter to recei●● existence . for , since all that is requisite to ma●…a thing capable of existence , is to determ●…it and make it distinct from others ; and m●… and less of divisibility , ( that is , rarity and de●…sity ) so they be in some particular degree , an● belong to their subjects with some constancy do make their subjects thus distinct from on● another : it follows , that such rarity and density may render the matter capable of exis●ence . . one or two different modes or accide●● which are intrinsecal to the su●ject , ( so they be determinate● ▪ such , within such a degree may suffice to make the first an● simplest bodies essentially distinct. for , as it has been prov'd , and will be more amply shown hereafter , that the complexion of accidents , which make a body fit for it's primary operation , is the essential form to all mixt bodies ; of which perhap● ▪ all nature does now consist : so it is cons●…nant to reason , that the simplest and first bodies , which , by being such , cannot have such a numerous complexion in them , should be constituted by some one or a few modes ; or be distinguisht from other simple bodies , by it , and it 's opposite . . wherefore the essences of the first and 〈…〉 simple bodies of all , which we call the four elements , are constituted by the first and most ●●mple differences of divisible 〈…〉 or body in common ; viz. 〈…〉 their being , to a certain degree , more and 〈…〉 divisible ; that is , by their being rare and ●…se . this is evident from the very terms ; 〈…〉 these determine . the indifferency of the mat●… ; and distinguish the subjects from one ano●●er ; and withall suffice to render them capa●… of performing the primary ●…ration proper to them . for * 〈…〉 first operation in nature is ●…l motion or division , by which mixt bodies 〈…〉 consequently all nature is made : where●… since density renders the dense body able 〈…〉 divide the rare one , and rarity make the ●…re one apt to be divided by the dense ; they ●●● exactly and perfectly fitted , each in it's kind , ●o accomplish the primary operation in nature ; which is also theirs : they being as yet consider'd ●t the only agents and patients : add , that ra●ity and density are intrinsecal to them ; as is evi●●nt , because their notions cannot be thought 〈…〉 belong to any of the six last predicaments , ●hich are all extrinsecal . . corollary iv. whether those simplest bodies do now exist in themselves , or as in their own nature ; that is , out of the compounds , or no , is not easie to be demonstrated . what i conceive , is , that earth , air and water , ( which were created in th●… beginning of the world , ) did really exi●… separate , before motion , which caus'd mixture , was set on work : also , that the degree of rarity and density they had at fir●… was the true standard of their nature ; an●… most exactly so proportion'd and fitted ( whe●… that most active divider , fire , call'd 〈…〉 the scripture [ light ] was made the first day , ) as to be mingled variously in such a manner as was perfectly best for the forming th●… world , and for carrying on the series ●…●● it afterwards most connaturally . but i cannot be positive , that since motion , and th●… course of nature was universally set 〈…〉 playing , the elements are now found p●… and unmixt ; by reason of the continu●… turmoil of bodies pressing ' upon one another ; for this forces them to mingle an●… remingle with one another ; and ( by * the motions of pulsus and tractus ) thrusting one another before them , or , ( by the continuity of quantity ) drawing ▪ them after them , hinders them from preserving steadily any determinate degree of rarity and density . . corollary v. hence , 't is farther demonstrated against the new philosophers , ( as before from the notion of quantity , as it i● extension , so now ) from th● same quantity as . 't is divisibility , that 't is impossible anything should exist , ( as they put their first matter to have done ) which is neither more nor less divisible ; that is , neither rare nor dense . for , sinee what is in no degree divisible , is in no particular manner , or no way divisible , and what 's in no manner or no way divisible , is not divisible at all ; 't is a plain contradiction to put it at once to be divisible , and yet no way ( that neither more nor less , easily or hardly ) divisible ; that is , to put it to be divisible , and yet to be neither rare nor dense . again , since in that supposition , divisibility must be the essential form of that simple body they call the first matter ; and , to be meerly divisible , and neither more nor less such , or neither rare nor dense , is common to all things that are divisible ; and what 's common to all cannot constitute or determine it to be this , or of this kind ; and ▪ nothing can exist but what 's determinately this or that : it follows , that either what 's indeterminate it self must formally make it 's subject , ( their first matter ) to be determinate , which is a contradiction ; or else their first matter , tho' remaining still indeterminate , is capable to exist ; which is equally impossible . for 't is to be noted , that these men , neither put rarity nor density , ( which are qualities ) in their first matter ; but hold that all modes , but bare extension , are made by the mingling their three elements , after their first matter was created and put in motion . meditation . and now , my soul , let us cast up our accompt● and compute what degrees of knowledge ●● have gain'd while we run over this second stage of our travelling thoughts . we have gone , indeed , but slowly forwards ; but the smalness of our advance is recompenced by our making our selves masters of our ground every step we have taken . we have gain'd a clear light what essences are , which puzzles so many speculaters ; and in what consist the essences of the two most general kinds of things , body and spirit we have seen what dull lumpish things , all ( eve● the best of ) bodies are : which unthinking and unelevated worldlings do so blindly admire ; and that the most subtil of them , being unable of themselves to stir or move , are but unwieldy sluggs in comparison of the activity of a subsistent spirit , which sets them all on work . we have discern'd clearly , that all this material world is but a vast shop of instruments ; which are to be manag'd and wielded regularly and artificially by the iourneymen of it ▪ ● great artificer and first mover , to bring about hi● infinitely-wise ends. we see that not one , no n●… the very least of them , is useless and in vain ; b●… that they perform such operations , and cause such effects , as are sutable to their respective natures ▪ and , thence , we come to see the reason why their all ▪ wise creatour , viewing his great workmanship , no● perfectly form'd and compleated , did declare , that all things he had made were exceedingly good ; which they could not be , were any of them useless and good for nothing . we have discover'd what it is that determines the common matter of the corporeal universe ; what shapes the parts of matter into distinct things , and so sits it for existence , 〈◊〉 have found how much of determination suffices ●● make the simplest bodies ; which will lead its ●o the knowledge of what farther degrees of it are ●●quisite for those which are more and more mixt , 〈◊〉 compounded . lastly , we have avoided many great errours about the primordial constitution of entities ; and we know certainly the terms and conditions which grounds their title to existence , or ●…ders them capable to be actually . all this we ●●●e got ; and , yet , contrary to our acquisitions in 〈◊〉 material world , we have lost nothing at all ●● getting it . and , which abundantly perfects our satisfaction , we foresee , by what we have attain'd already , that we have a comfortable prospect , and are in a fair way of improving our growing stock ; and of making large accessions to it , without ha●arding the least diminution of it , while we drive ●●● gainful trade of getting the true riches of our mind , knowledge , or trafficking for science . perhaps , some inconsiderate readers , who reflect 〈◊〉 , that knowledge of truth is the natural perfection of their soul , will think it ●…t worth so much pains ; but will ●…gh at us for drawing our consequences with such nice care , and ●inning out our speculations into ●●ch subtil threads : they will ask 〈◊〉 , what are we the better for know●… a few insipid common notions ; or the wiser , for dwelling so long upon them ? but these m●… reflect not what incredible and most useful consequences are deduced in the mathematicks , by att●●tive descants on those three common notions 〈◊〉 length , breadth and thickness , variously consider 〈◊〉 if mathematicians , by considering , studying , 〈◊〉 poring , so many years , on one single mode or accid●… of that ens , call'd body , ( viz. quantity , ) arriv●… such wonderful conclusions ; certainly we may b●… for far more excellent and more noble producti●● by studying the nature of ens , or of body in common ; without which , the other being but a m●… or manner of it , could have no being or entity all ; nor , consequently , any notion or intelligibili●● they consider not that all science , which is a distinct and clear knowledge of things , must h●… for , it 's immediate object , some abstract notio● for if it be complex , or involves more not●… than one ; we must either take the complex n●… in pieces , that is , we must make diverse abstract notions of it , and consider each of them apart ; 〈◊〉 else , ( as experience will teach us , if we set our selves to discourse of two notions at once ) we can●… possibly know either of them clearly , but only at t●… best , blindly and confusedly . again , they mista●… us , if they think we intended to terminate our discourse in those common notions ; we take them 〈◊〉 in our way , and we are forced to do so , if 〈◊〉 intend to discourse solidly ; as every man , who kn●… what a demonstration a priori means , must 〈◊〉 see and acknowledge . lastly , they reflect not 〈◊〉 the considering the most common notions of 〈◊〉 thing enlarges the soul ; and that , tho' those 〈◊〉 abstract conceptions be but a very small part , a partial , and very inadequate notion of the wh●… individual thing ; yet , that shortness is abundantly re●●mpenced by the largeness of their extent . he that knows distinctly the notion or nature of quantity , knows the whole world , and each particular body in it , as far as they are quantitative . in like ●…nner , he who has the exact knowledge of ens , ●…nce , act , power , &c. knows the whole crea●… , and every particular part of it , as far as they ●…ve in them what grounds the notions of ens , essence , power , act , divisibility , composition , &c. ●…t what , is all this , if we add the vast trains of ●lear consequences , enriching our mind with innumerable truths ; many of which are neer as universal 〈◊〉 these notions themselves were . let us permit 〈◊〉 those men of fancy to slubber over their know●… of things by their confused methods of talking 〈◊〉 random ; and pursue the way to science , which right nature , and the rules of exact art , have ●…ablisht to our hands . chap. iii. of the essences of mixt , vegetable ▪ and animal bodies . . there are not in nature , ( as far as we can judge ) at this time , any perfectly simp●… bodies , or pure elements . for since , to perfect the forming of the world at first , it was requisite that there should be a thoro●… mixture of those simplest bodies ▪ or elements , which were made in the beginning : and , fin● there are many pregnant reasons , which are very hard to solve , that at the flood or universal deluge , the whole body of the earth , and all it's parts , were still more confusedly blended together with the other bodies , which were themselves mixts or rather demixts before . again , since it is hard to conceive , ( the course of nature , which consists in motion , still continuing ) how those simple bodies should re-gain their original purity , and not rather mingle still 〈…〉 and more ; it may , i think , be concluded hence and from what has been alledged , chap. . cordlary iv. that there are not now in the world an● pure elements or unmixt bodies . . to pursue the thread of my discourse : when two very minute bodies , of different natures , of which one is rare , the other dense , do cling together ; which , by being of the smallest size , are not easie to be divided or separated from one another by others , they being too big to come between their parts , and so divide them ; they may be reasonably conceiv'd to constitute a first-mixt body . for , since , by their constant adhesion , they do not act or operate as two , but conjoyntly , or as one ; 〈…〉 follows that they have a peculiar modify'd operation of their own , distinct from that which other of those elements had produced in case it had existed alone . wherefore , since every part 〈…〉 nature is then a distinct thing , when it has a ●…ct operation ; 't is consequent , that these were at first , or in the beginning , distinct entities ; which kind of things we call mixt or compounded ; and , this being the simplest or least sort of mixture , first-mixt bodies . . wherefore the essential form of those first-mixt-bodies , was the complexion of those two primary qualities , rarity and density ; since 't is evident , that the having those two in it , does distinguish them from simple bodies or elements which have but one of them ; that is , ( at that time , ) distinguisht them from all others . . therefore the essence or total form of those first-mixt bodies consists of power and act ; or in this , that they have matter in them , determin'd by such a form ; viz. by the complexion of those two accidents . . the next sort of mixt bodies , is , that they have three , or all , of the elements in them . for , all proper and intrinsecal differences being nothing but more and less ; and the elements , having each of them , a distinct degree of rarity or density in them ; it follows , that these are evidently more-mixt than the others were , which had but only two elements , and their particular degrees of rarity and density , in their composition . whence , 't is easie , by what 's discourst here , § . . and . to discover in what their essential ( or partial ) form , and their essence , which is their total form , consists . . the next or third sort of mixt bodies , ( if it be not in some sort the same ) is , when the compound possesses with some stability and constancy , an incomparably greater proportion of some one of those elements above the rest . for 't is manifest , that there are in nature many sorts of those things which we call fire , air , earth and water ; in all which , some one of those particular elements does so much abound , that we cannot well discern , at first sight , any mixture of the others ; tho' 't is evident to our reflex thoughts there is ; and even to our sight , when art comes to separate them ; tho' our rude and first impressions make us commonly give them their name from the exceedingly - predominant element . . the next or fourth sort of mixts , which , perhaps , are ( in proper speech ) the first sort of demixt or decompounded bodias , is , when they have more or fewer of the former sorts of mixts variously united in them ; whose 〈…〉 is the complexion of those qualities , found in those several mixts . and , their essence consists in this , that their matter is determin'd by the complexion of those mixt accidents ; which giving them , as constant agents , the power of operating thus ; or , after a distinct manner from the former ; do , by consequence , principally concur to make them distinct parts of nature ; that is , distinct things , or bodies . i say , principally , for 't is to be observ'd , that ●●st . many other accidents , besides those most intrinsecal ones of rarity and density ; ( either single , or mingled ) do concur to the essential constitution of most mixts and demixts . for , since mixture is made first by the division of the simple , and afterwards of first-mixt-bodies ; at and division makes more of one ; the parts of those divided bodies ( the ways of nature's operation being manifold and various ) must necessarily be diverse in number ; and , consequently , ( each divided part being determinate ) in bigness , figure , and situation ; which , the potential parts of the elements , before division , ( each of them being homogeneous or uniform , ) were not . whence follows , that most of the mixt , and all of the demixt bodies , besides their different degrees of rarity and density , must also have in them great variety of the bulk , figure and situation of their parts : which , every thing operating as it is , must needs make them operate diversely ; and , consequently , these are parts of their essential form ; and therefore , ( their consistency , or constancy of being such , suppos'd ) must constitute them distinct agents in nature , of distinct bodies . . notwithstanding that these last-named accidents do thus concur , yet 't is chiefly their rarity and density which gives those mixts and demixts that nature in which consists their most intrinsecal temperature and constitution . for , since rarity and density are those primary qualities , the partaking of which , within some certain degree , did constitute the simple bodies ; and all the mixt bodies are essentially compounded of simple ones ; those two first qualities must needs be more intrinsecal to them than are those others which ac●ru'd to them by the division of matter ; tho they also concur , each in his way , to determine the matter , so that the mixt or compounds may have different operations in nature , and , thence , become distinct things , or distinct mixt bodies . conformably to what aristotle asserts , lib. physic . . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. of all the affections , or determinations of matter , density and rarity are the principal , or the beginning and origin of all others . . corollary i. hence all the followers of democritus , whether epioureans , cartesians , or others , who put no parts of their matter to be distinguisht by rarity and density , which , as is prov'd , are most intrinsecal ; and affirm , that they have only in them these two accidents , extension and figure ; the former of which being common to them all , cannot without wronging clear reason , distinguish them ; and , the later of them , it being only the termination of quantity , is rather extrinsecal , or belonging to the surface of the bodies : and is evidently impossible to give the body , which has it , it 's inward constitution ; hence , they cannot possibly give any account of the most intrinsecal or essential constitution and distinction of their mixts and demixts ; nor , consequently , of what it is in which the essence of any particular body , which must certainly be most intrinsecal to it , does consist . . of this last sort of demixts , are all minerals , gems , coral , clay , marl , all the several sorts of earths , and such like . which are differenced by the proportion , size and figures of their rare and dense particles ; and not a little by the situation , or manner of their texture : whence they come to be more or less solid or compacted , light , heavy , clammy , friable , porous , pellucid , fusible , malleable , &c. to treat of which particularly , and reduce them into their proper causes , belongs to physicks or natural philosophy . nor is it very hard to do this , were true principles of nature taken up at first , and pursu'd home by immediate consequences . . the same accidents , and particularly the figure and situation of parts , give bodies their different manner of affecting our senses . for , 't is not hard to show , that all colour , and it 's several kinds , are chiefly produced by these ; as also , the qualities of odoriferous , stinking , sweet , sharp , sowr , rough , smooth bodies . tho' sound , and it's varieties , spring from the greater or lesser tension , thickness , or smart force of the instrument that makes the different motions of the air. . corollary ii. if the duration of those bodies be transitory and unconstant in comparison of others that seem of the same sort , they are call'd in a common appellation , imperfect mixts ; such as are , winds , snow , hail , smoak , mists , meteors , &c. and therefore , wanting that constancy , ( an argument of their not being well united ) they are , less properly entia or things , than the perfect mixts are ; as is shown , ch. . § . . and , perhaps , they are no more but aggregates of more distinct bodies lighting together casually ; or approximated to one another , and sticking together , by virtue of some physical quality , for some short time ; which is not enough to make those compounds to be constant and distinct agents in nature , or distinct and perfect natural bodies . . when the parts of a demixt are exexceedingly different in their several temperaments ; and withall , one of them ( the common causes of the world setting them on work ) is apt to move another , that body is said to be living . for , since the notion of life is a principle of self-motion ; and there are no actual parts in any compound ; ( whence we say , all actions and passions are of the suppositum ; ) it follows , that the action or motion of each of those parts , is the action or the motion of the whole thing , tho' consider'd particularly according to such a part of it . hence , such a thing , one part of which moves another , is truly said to move it self , or to be living . . the simplest , lowest and ignoblest sort of living or self-moving things , are those which are meer vegetables : for , since all proper differences are more and less of the generical notion ; and life is self-motion , that is , one sort of motion ; and to move swiftly and slowly is to move more or less ; it follows , that vel●city and tardity are the first differences of all motions ; of which , to move it self , is one ; and , consequently , that , to perform their primary operation more quickly and more slowly , does essentially distinguish living things , as they are living . wherefore , since experience shows , and it will be more clearly manifested hereafter , that vegetables or plants do more slowly , and more dully , go about their primary operation than other self-moving things , v. g. brutes or men do : it follows , that those bodies we call vegetables or plants , are the simplest , lowest and ignoblest of self-moving of living things . . the primary operation of meer vegetables is to nourish the compound , for , since ( as any attentive speculater may observe ) every thing is ordain'd to preserve it's own unity and entity , as much as it can ; this preserving it self is most natural , and intrinsecal to it ; and therefore not a secondary , but it 's primary action . wherefore , those individual vegetables , which have a power in them to concoct their proper juice or sap , and so make it fit aliment for them , which is the preserving themselves from withering or decay ; must be ordain'd , in the first place , or primarily , to perform this operation . especially , since whatever other , or secondary sorts of actions they may be useful for in nature , will be better accomplish'd by their being first nourisht duly , and as they ought ; which , by perfecting them in being , does make them more-perfect agents . . wherefore the form of vegetables , is that complexion of accidents , as fits the vegetable for that operation ; and it 's essence consists in this , that the matter of it's parts has such a complexion of those modes or accidents in it as sits one of them to work upon , or move , another in order to the nourishment and preservation of the whole . . those living bodies whose parts are more●oving-one-another , or with more velocity , in order to their primary operation ; that is , upon the least excitation from external causes , are therefore a higher and perfecter ●ort of vegetables , or something more than meer vegetables . these we call animal , or sensitive ; because , upon impressions on those parts call'd the senses , they proceed to action . . the primary operation of animals , is to pursue such food as is agreeable ●o their natures ; as is shown , § . . of meer vegetables : and the reason given there holds equally for both . . whence , that meer animal is most perfect , that moves it self to acquire such food as is agreeable to it's nature ; that is , such as ●akes it's fancy ( which is the principal faculty that sets on work all the rest ) calm or indifferent . by which means it becomes applicable to more motions . add , that ●●ch food as is violent , or extremely distant from 〈◊〉 constitution , and therefore is disproportion'd to the pitch of it's nature , does make it's operations deprav'd , and to some degree preter●●tural ; as we experience in our selves , when ●e eat any thing too hot or too cold for our constitution ; which disorders our tempera●ure , or [ as we use to say ] distempers it , or ●akes us sick. note , that we discourse here of what is the primary operation of individual bodie● ▪ as to themselves . what farther , or more remote effects they are intended or order'd for by the governor of the world , belongs to another question , and will be treated of towards the end of this book . advertisement . these discourses suppose it prov'd th●● rare and dense , or more and less divisible , are the first differences of bodies as they are in n●ture , or as they are the subjects of natural operations ; which has been already demonstrated here , chap. . § . , , . as also in my method to science , book i. lesson . § . , . and solid philosophy , reflexion . § . , , . meditation . thus we have deduced the first difference of bodies from the more and less divisibility of them , consider'd as givi●g the ground to all natural action , and passion ; and have found th●● they are of two sorts ; viz. rare or dense ; whence also the several kinds of those first bodies can only be taken from their having more or less degrees ( i mean , such as are very distant and notorious ) of those two primary qualities ; in which therefore , the form or act , which supposing it's power or matter ) does chiefly give them their essence , consists . moreover , we have shown , how from actual division , which is the first operation in nature , there naturally and necessarily arise other modes or accidents ; viz. the number , bigness , figure and situation of the several parts of those first bodies ; the variety of which , woven together after a different manner , and cohering with some durableness , does compound all mixt and demixt bodies . we have seen ( in common ) that those accidents do make them fit to produce their proper effects , or to perform their primary operation ; which constitutes them distinct parts and agents in nature ; and , therefore , distinct things . whence follows , that the complexion of accidents is ●eally that which we call their essential or substantial form : and that , by this doctrine , an intelligible account is given of those forms , so much talkt of , and so little understood ; that lame account which the schools give of them , making them as obscure as an occult faculty ; neither giving any grounded reason by what connatural means they come into the matter ; how they determine it ultimately for existence , by making it distinct from all others , or this and that individuum ; nor , lastly , how they fit it for some proper or primary operation ; which considerations are requisite and sufficient to give it the nature or notion of an ens or thing , while we were doing this , we have , at the same time , laid grounds for the pursuing orderly the knowledge of secondary and sensible qualities , about which the greatest part of physicks is employ'd ; and to distinguish the essences of all things in the world , under what sort or kind soever they are rankt . which shows , how the architectonick science of metaphysicks ( as becomes her highest stati●● and dignity ) does superintend the inferiour science of physicks , and consequently the rest ; prescribing them what they are to do , by assigning them their proper objects ; as also , by enlightning them , and establishing the truths they deduce , by her most general , most evident , and most certain maxims ; which , tho' they be deductions in metaphysicks , are principles to them . for , her manner of considering the objects of all other sciences is far exa●ted above the inferiour manners , according to which subordinate sciences treat of them ; nor does she regard any quality , operation , bulk , figure , motion ; &c. otherwise than under that soveraign respect as they c●●duce to constitute and establish the essences of thing● by determining the common power or matter to such a particular nature as is different from all others ▪ which makes it capable of existing , or an 〈…〉 we have avoided the precipices of some very fundemental errours , highly prejudicial to the intrinse●● constirution and distinction of essences , and consequently , to the knowledge of the things themselves ; without settling well the grounds of which first , 't is impossible to have true science of any thing whatever ; or to know what a thing is . all this we have endeavoured , and we hope , perform'd by an immediate and orderly connexion of 〈…〉 natural notions ; deducing still our consequences in 〈…〉 frame so closely compacted , that each foregoing knowledge ( setting aside the corollaries ) naturally leads 〈…〉 the following ones . a method unusual to the generality of philosophers ; and yet . so proper and effectual to assert and establish truth ; that , however , ●… may not please such men and their readers ; yet it ●●ght not to deter us from pursuing a way so evidently , of it 's own nature , conclusive and decisive , and withall so proper to science ; how lamely soever we travel in it : whereas dishevell'd , ill-knit and unprincipled discourses , however witty and pleasing to the dotage of ●●r fancy , have not the least semblance of concluding evidently , or establishing solidly , any one truth . in a word , having seen in what consists the essence of meer animals , which is part of our selves , we have made way to the contemplation of our own nature , which is , ●ver and above , rational : which therefore ought to challenge from us 〈…〉 most attentive reflexion ; that , ●…ng to a distinct and clear knowledge of what i● our true essence or nature , and what the primary operation for the performance of which the god of nature intended us ; we may not deviate from it ; 〈…〉 labour for our own true good ; pursue that best●…isht food , which connaturally nourishes our soul , in it's way ; and comply with the best intentions and end of our creation . chap. iv. of the essence of man. . man is one thing , made up , or compounded , of a corporeal and a spiritual part which we call body and soul ▪ for , were the body and soul i● man two distinct things , those two things , they being of such different natures , could not possibly have any coalition , nor any kind of union 〈…〉 as to make up one compound , more than can 〈…〉 angel and a brute : nor could they be in 〈…〉 manner , or according to any mode of which w● have a notion , cemented together . not according to that mode or accident call'd quantity ; the unity of which kind of parts is continuity ; because the spiritual part , the soul , is not quantitative , nor can it be thus continu'd or joyn'd to the body . nor , consequently , according to the notion of quality : for , first , quality supposes t●… thing , which it qualifies , already constituted and only superadds some perfection or imperfecti●… to it's nature . secondly , because all the qualities of one of those parts are corporeal ones , a●… all the qualities of the other part are spiritual that is , they are quantitati●s and not-quantitativ● which can no more unite than a body and a sp●… could . nor , according to relation , or to spe●… more properly , according to the things themselves , as they are consider'd to be relata , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . : for this notion is of the thing it self , as it gives us the ground or reason of our relating or comparing it to another in such a respect ; which presupposes the things , and is so far from giving us a ground of conceiving them to be one that it obliges us to conceive them as ( some way or other ) two ; and , moreover , relatively opposite to one another ; and opposition cannot be the formal reason of unity . and , if we take the word [ relation ] not fundamentally , but formally , for the very act of referring ; 't is clearly a spiritual mode , peculiarly belonging to one part of man , ( the soul ; ) and , therefore , for the reason lately given , it cannot unite both those parts together . nor can they be united according to any of the four last predicaments ; for these , ( as is shown in my method ) can only belong to bodies . nor lastly , can those parts , were they two things , be united according to action and passion , ( in which the cartesians ●●ce this union ; ) for these ( besides their being extrinsecal considerations ) do most evidently presuppose the whole thing , or suppositum , ( only which acts o● suffers ) constituted ; and therefore cannot be the formal cause or reason of constituting that whole , or compounding those parts together ; but are the exercise of that essence and 〈…〉 existence , already constituted such . it is left ●●en , that those two parts can only be united , 〈…〉 make one compound , according to the first predicament , or according to the notion of ens , thing , or substance . but , to be united , or ( which ●…the same ) made one , precisely under the notion or respect of thing , is , out of the force of the very words , to be one thing : therefore this compound of soul and body , call'd man , is truly and necessarily one thing . . therefore , the soul and body in man , are only potential parts of that compound ; and neither of them , while in the compound , is actual . for , it has been already demonstrated ( ch. . § . . ) that there can be no actual parts in any compound whatever . moreover , were they actual while in the compound , each of them would have it's o●● act there ; and , consequently , it 's own essence ▪ and this not only distinctly from the other , but independently of it ; since every act in the line of substance , ( as both these parts are ) determines the substance to be this , fits it for existence , and makes it capable to subsist alone ; wherefore each of those parts , when separated , would retain it's act and essence ; and exist , or actually remain , such as it was ; whereas 't is manifest , that a human body , does not exist , or remain , so much as a sensitive or vegetative thing , but becomes a mee● dead carkass . . therefore , neither part , while in the compound , can act or operate al●… for , 't is demonstrable , that [ wh●… ever acts must be actually ; ] b●… in our case , neither part is actua●… but are both of them only potential , by § . . whe●… fore 't is manifest , that neither part can work al●… but concomitantly with the other ; that is , in all 〈…〉 operations of man , as he is man , 't is the w●… compound , or that ens , thing , substantia pri●… or supp●s●●um , which only can act , or oper●… s●nce it only is actually . . corollary i. hence is seen on what evident ground that most useful and solid maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum , ] ( which all seem to admit , but few , i fear , duly reflect on , ) is built ; viz. on those most evident truths , [ nothing can act but what is it self in act , or is actually ; ] or [ nothing can act in such a manner , unless it bee such ] , and [ no parts in any compound , singly consider'd , are actually . ] with which , notwithstanding , it well consists , that the whole may act , more chiefly and peculiarly , according to this part , than to that ; as we also experience not only in man , but in every compound whatever . . corollary ii. how useful this doctrine is to explicate the incarnation ; or the subsistence of two natures in one divine person , and the different operations of christ , our saviour , as he is god and man , will easily appear to reflecters ; and will more fully be seen , when we shall have occasion to show the conformity which that fundamental article of christian faith has to the principles of true philosophy . . tho' the peculiar , and immediate form or act of that part , call'd , the seat of knowledge , be that spiritual part we call the soul ; yet the act or form of man , as he is man , is the said spiritual part , together with that complexion of accidents in his body , which contribute to fit him for his primary operation . for , since man is one thing ▪ which has in it both a corporeal and a spiritual nature , ( § . . ) and every thing acts as it is ; his operation peculiar to him as he is man , must also be corporeo-spiritual ; and , consequently , his total ▪ form , which constitutes him such an individual acter , must likewise partake of both those natures . . corollary iii. hence , in every operation of man ▪ as he is man , the operations peculiar to the soul cannot be produced without the immediate concurrence of the fancy or imagination ; and by the remote assistance of the complexion of those accidents by which he is constituted an animal , and comes to be imaginative . . corollary iv. hence every notion or conception we have , has a phantasm accompanying it ; either simple or compounded , lively or obscure , express or confus'd , proper or metaphorical . the distinction or variety of which is taken from the different manner of the action of the object , the different manner of reception in that part call'd the seat of knowledge ; or from the reflexion of the man himself , framing and ordering those phantasms as he finds most convenient . . hence , this total form which constitutes man , must also distinguish him from all other sorts of things ; that is , from all meer bodies , and from all pure spirits , or angels . for , otherwise , it could not be the peculiar act of that compound ▪ if it did not give him a distinct essence from all other species , or sorts of things ; which it could not do , were it either meerly corporeal , or meerly spiritual . . that which chiefly distinguishes man essentially , according to his corporeal part , from all other bodies ; is , that he has some such part in his body , ( call'd by us ▪ the seat of knowledge ) which is a fit instrument to assist the soul to work comparatively , by representing divers distinct things at once . which property it has from it's being in the highest manner sensitive ; so as to be apt to receive the several impressions with an exact distinction ; and also to receive , retain , or exhibit more or many of them , at once . whence , that part requires it should have a spiritual power in it to work thus actually ; as is shown , solid philosophy asserted , preliminary iv. § . . to § . . that which chiefly distinguishes him according to his spiritual part , is , that that power , being but a part of the compound , or of the whole ens , cannot , while it is such , connaturally act after the manner of a pure spirit ; but dependently on the body , and by means of the impressions on it . whence , it works by abstract or inadequate notions , and not comprehensively ; and withall , by observing the pace of the body's , or the fancy's motion ; which is perform'd leasurely or successively : neither of which can agree to a p●… spirit or an angel. . corollary v. hence all pretence of god's voluntary annexing knowledge to a corporeal being , or to matter not thus fitted for it , and therefore not requiring it , or connaturally dispos'd for it , is against god's wise est administration of the world by previous and proper dispositions . besides , 't is a pure voluntary assertion , without any kind of ground in nature , and utterly unphilosophical ; as is shown , ideae cartesianae ▪ indicatio . § . , . &c. and solid philosophy , reflexion . § . , , . . corollary vi. hence the mens is not the man , nor an actual part of him , or a thing ; but a potential part only . nor , consequently , could it receive impressions of pretended idea's , or be connaturally affected with them , unless it were identify'd with the body : that is , 't is the suppositum , or the whole man that can receive them , tho' peculiarly according to such a part. . corollary vi. notwithstanding that man has evidently a spiritual part in him ; yet his manner of existing in this state is formally corporeal , and only virtually spiritual . for , since his spiritual operations here do follow the slow pace of the motion of the fancy , and are not instantaneous or simultaneous , as will be shown the manner of operating proper to a spirit is ; and the manner of operating follows , and observes , the manner of existing ; 't is evident , that the manner of existing which man has here , is corporeal , and not spiritual . whence , if we regard physical , or ( which are built on them ) logical considerations , he is such a body ; and placed directly under the notion of corpus : but , if we regard metaphysical principles , which abstract from motion and corporeal considerations , and all the manners of them ; and consider him precisely under the notion of ens ; then , he is consider'd as joyntly constituted of both these parts ; of which the spiritual part , and the aforesaid complexion of bodily accidents , which dispos'd the matter for such a form , and clubs to his primary operation , is his formal act ; and , together with the matter , does compound that ens call'd man. . from what has been deduc'd , chap. . § . , . 't is evinced , that the primary operation ▪ of man , as he is man , is reasoning , or discoursing rationally . for , since that is the primary operation of all vegetable and animal things , by which they are conserv'd , perfected , and nourish● agreeably to their respective natures , so as to attain the good , or the end , for which they were immediately ordain'd by nature ; and the natural good of man , is that which improves , betters , and ( as it were ) nourishes his better part , the soul ; to which the body is only subservient , subordinate , and a means to procure and promote it's good : and , that which most perfects the soul , which is of an intellectual nature , is the acquiring and increasing of knowledge ; which , during the whose course of our lives , is done by reasoning , or deducing new knowledges out of fore-going ones ; it follows , that ratiocination or reasoning i● the primary and proper operation of man. and , accordingly , we shall find by an easie reflexion , that , when we arrive at the knowledge of any new ( especially very concerning ) objects , by exact or evident reasoning , the soul finds it's self improv'd , dilated , and nourisht according to it's nature , and we use to acknowledge that our desire , or ( as it were ) hunger , or natural appetite of truth , is then satisfy'd . so , that as the pursuit of food is the primary operation of a meer animal ; so the pursuit of knowledge ( which can only be perform'd by reasoning ) is the primary operation of man. . hence follows , that this knowledge , which gives nourishment , growth , and strength to the soul , according to her nature , must be knowledge of truths . for , first , falshoods cannot , in true speech , be known , because they are contrary and destructive to the nature of ens , ( which is the adequate object of the understanding ; and has for it's property , intelligibility ) and confound it with non ens. next , all falshoods , are either formally or virtually , contradictions ; as is shown , method to science , b. . l●ss . . § . . whence , contradictions cannot unite to the knowing nature of the soul , or be receiv'd in it's judging power ; but are directly opposite to her nature , and ( as it were ) poison to her ; and therefore cannot nourish or improve her , but tend to pervert and destroy her spiritually . . this knowledge must also be evident , or beyond probability . for , otherwise , 't is not properly knowledge : nor can we be truly said to ●…now a thing to bee , if we see it may not bee ; it being against a first principle ; and a proof which is no more than probable , cannot make us see that the thing may not bee , or necessarily is ; for an evident proof can do no more . . corollary vii . whence , what has but a probable proof cannot sink into , or cling to , her knowing nature ; or improve and nourish it ; nor so much as be receiv'd in it at all as 't is knowing ; but as 't is unknowing , or ignorant , either of true principles , or of right deduction . . corollary viii , hence also what only affects and dilates the memory , or fancy , or serves to excite the passions ; ( as , skill in languages , eloquence , wit , and such like ; ) is not , properly , connatural food for the knowing nature of the soul ; tho' they may be very useful to express her knowledge ; or be a means to gain knowledge from those authors who writ in other languages : or lastly , for her recreation ; which is not properly the food of the soul , but a kind of sauce to that food . . corollary ix . hence , to endeavour the promoting the evident knowledge of ▪ truths , especially of those which are of the highest concern , is the most manly , most noble , and most universally beneficial action that can possibly be perform'd by man● as having for it's object the most general good of mankind that can be imagin'd : and which ( if it be of sacred or revealed truths ) has a direct tendency to bring him to his last end , and dispose him for eternal happiness . . corollary x. hence , all errour , it being ▪ when reduced to it's true and proper original , a contradiction ▪ is a deprauation of the soul ; and , if it be such an errour as is opposite to those truths which guide her towards her true last end , it tends of it's own nature , to ruin and destroy her spiritually : and , would actually do so , if the poison of it were not rebated and render'd ineffectual by the antidote of a sincere and good intention ; that is , such a one as springs from some truth of a high nature : which , well imprinted , cultivated , and become practical in that well-meaning soul , directs and strongly addicts her to the pursuit of that which is her chief good , eternal happiness . . from what has been demonstrated , § . ▪ it is evident , that the essence of man , is rationality , or the power of reasoning . for , as was prov'd above , ( ch. . § . . . and is evident of it self , that is the essence of every thing from which immediately proceeds the power to perform it's primary operation for which it was ordain'd and made : but , the act of reasoning , ( which by § . , is his primary operation ) proceeds immediately from the power of reasoning ; therefore the power of reasoning , or rationality , ●● the essence of man. . moreover , rationality , does perfectly distinguish man from all other sorts of things , whether they be bo●…s or spirits . for matter , tho' 〈…〉 parts be never so artificially ●…d together , can never make knowledge ; and therefore no meer body can ▪ know or reason . and , it distinguishes him also from all other sorts of spiritual natures ; that is ; from pure spirits , or angels ; in regard , that these having no matter or quantity in them , their operations ●re therefore unsuccessive or instantaneous ; because there cannot be part after part , ( which is the notion of succession ) in that which has no parts at all . whereas in the act of reasoning , the whole suppositum , which has in it both soul and body , being that which operates ; hence , every such act , it being accompany'd with the act of the fancy , which is corporeal , is thence necessitated to be successive ; both because no corporeal ▪ motion can be in an instant ; as also , because no two parts of such a motion can possibly ▪ be together ; for this would make it unsuccessive . . corollary xi . hence is demonstrated , that ▪ [ animal rationale ] is a true and proper definition of man : because it both explains , or gives us his true essence ; and also distinguishes mankind from all other kinds or sorts of things . . in this essence of man , [ rationality ] are included the power of simply apprehending or conceiving ; and the power of iudging ; especially the power of seeing the first principles to be true and self ▪ evident . for , since in that compleat act of reasoning , which is formally o● equivalently a syllogism , there are necessarily included iudgments ; because we cannot hold a conclusion , inferr'd by our reason , to be true , unless we first iudge the premisses to be such ; nor , that it follows from those premisses , unless we iudge that identical proposition , on which is grounded the force of the consequence , to be both true and self-evident : again , since in every iudgment are included those notions or simple apprehensions , call'd the subject , copula , and predicate ; which are the immediate parts of the proposition we judge of , and the remote materials of all our discoursings or reasonings : it follows , that , tho' the powers of apprehending and iudging be not formally the power of reasoning ▪ yet they are included in it , as integral parts constituting it , or presuppos'd to it . . for the same reason , the power of re●…ing the particles or effluvi●… emitted from outward objects , and transmitting them at ●●rst to the brain , or the seat of knowledge , is a necessary requisite , or previous disposition , to rationality . for , since we cannot discourse without iudging ; nor iudge , without propositions , which are the objects of judging ; nor have propositions in us , without having simple apprehensions or notions ; ●hich are the parts of a proposition , of which it ●…sists : nor , lastly , can we ( as will be prov'd ●…ortly ) have notions but by receiving impressions on the senses from outward objects , and ●…nce on the brain or seat of knowledge ; by affecting which they do , consequently , or after it's manner , affect the soul , ( which immediately in●…ms that part and is identify'd with it , ) and thence imbues her with those notions : it follows , that the power of receiving those particles by the senses , and transmitting them to the seat of knowledge , is a necessary prerequisite to rationality , and an essential property of man. . the power of reflecting on our notions , had at first , by means of the senses , is also an essential property of man. for , daily experience tells us , that reflexion makes the notions and thoughts of all mankind , in what business whatever , more lively and express ; it preserves men from mistakes and miscarriages ; and makes all their judgments and actions orderly , steady , and prudent . nor , could men of art , or scholars , without reflexion , ( which , when us'd with a sedulo●… application , we call study ) range all their notions with exact distinction under gene●… heads ; without doing which , all their discourse might be confus'd , and interfere , or ramble from one notion to another ; nor could they so firmly ▪ and certainly , hold to the same point , or to the same subject of their discourse . nor , could they divide those notions by proper differences , nor define them right ; much less , lay them together , or connect them orderly ; without which 't is manifest , no evident ratiocination can 〈…〉 made , nor any true science be possibly attain'd ▪ . 't is most connatural to the state of th●… soul while in the body , that s●… should acquire her first eleme●… of knowing , or notions , by mea●… of bodily instruments , and 〈…〉 have them infus'd into her 〈…〉 first , or innate : this is evident from divers considerations . . first , because the soul had her being 〈…〉 first , by reason that some part of the body was dispos'd , and therefore naturally requir'd to have such a form ; nor can any other reason be assign'd , why ordinary providence , or god as he is the author of nature , puts a soul into each embryo ; much less such a soul into such an embryo when it is fit to receive it . wherefore , 't is agreeable to the same wise course of nature , th●… her operations , which follow her being , should likewise observe the same method , or depend o●… those previous operations or impressions on the body , causing such or such dispositions in it . . secondly , we find in the body fit organs and instruments to receive those impressions from objects , and convey them to the brain ; which therefore had been useless and to no end , did they not work that effect , and convey them thither . . thirdly , since it has been demonstrated here , § . . that this compound of soul and body , call'd man , is ●…e thing ; and , therefore , that ●…e soul is primarily , and immediately , identify'd , 〈…〉 entitatively united with some chief corporeal ●… ; which , by the wise contrivance of an animal body , is apt to influence all the rest ; that 〈…〉 to some part in the brain , where the animal ●…ts chiefly reside , and whenee all their motion begins : it follows necessarily , that as that corporeal part is affected after it's manner ; ( that is materially , or as material things are wrought ●…on by one another ; ) so , the soul , which makes ●…e thing with it , as the form does with the matter , should also , at the same time , and by the same ●…ns , become affected after it's manner ; that 〈…〉 spiritually , or , ( to some degree ) knowingly ; ●… , which is the same , should have direct spiri●…l impressions made upon her : which are those ●e call notions or simple apprehensions ; which ●re the first rude draughts , and the materials of ●ll our knowledges . . fourthly , we find by evident reflexion that when outward corpor●… things , that are sensible , are objected to us , with which 〈…〉 were before unacquainted , we have immediately new notions of it : but we do not find by o●… best reflexion , that any idea or notion of suc●… a thing was in us antecedently , and only excited 〈…〉 new . . fifthly , we find also by evident reflexion that our notion ( or idea ) is d●… and dull , if the impression fro●… without do but slightly affect 〈…〉 or imperfectly exhibit the object . wherefore , the degree of clearness or obscurity in the i●…pression , does make a correspondent degree 〈…〉 clearness or obscurity in the ( idea or ) notion it argues , likewise , that the substance of the notion is made by the substance of the impression ; a●… consequently , that our notions themselves 〈…〉 caus'd by impressions from without , and are 〈…〉 innate . for , otherwise , since a less clear impression might serve to excite this idea rather tha●… another ; the idea in the soul , having there , ( ●…qually ) it 's native brightness , independently on t●… body ; it would , when once excited , appear 〈…〉 it's full lustre ; the contrary to which we ●…perience whenever the impression is imperfect . . sixthly , the objects , or things to be kno●… are without us ; and , by sendi●… out their effluviums , which 〈…〉 minute particles of the same nature , are apt to affect our senses , and to p●…trate , or be transmitted to , that most sensi●… part call'd the seat of knowledge . wherefo●… ( as was prov'd ) man being one thing ; and , consequently , the soul being immediately united with the body as the form to that noblest part ; and , all passions or receptions , having for their subject the suppositum , or the whole compound ; it follows that , when that part is affected , the whole , and consequently the soul , must be affected or wrought upon at the same time . especially , since the very essence of man fundamentally consists in the substantial union or identity in the notion of ens of those two parts . whence , follows , that every impression being receiv'd according to the manner or nature of the receiver ; ●…nd , the receiver here , consisting of two diversnatur'd parts , one of which is corporeal , the other spiritual ; consequently , when the corporeal part is affected after it's manner , or has the nature of that object in it corporeally ; the spiritual part , or the soul , will be affected , or have the nature of that object in it spiritually , that is , knowingly : or , which is the same , there will be a notion or simple apprehension of the nature of that object directly imprinted in it , as far as the sense , or senses , exhibit that object . of which , see preliminary iv. § . , . . seventhly , there being no actual parts in any compound whatever , ( by ch. . § . . ) the condition of the soul , while 't is a part of that compound thing , man , is only potential ; and far different from that of a pure act , or an angel ; which , because it has no organs or means to acquire any new knowledge from outward objects , has , therefore , all the knowledge , that can be due to it's nature , given it in the first instant of it's being ; that is , all it's knowledge is innate . whereas , the soul , being h●… in a state of potentiality ; and , besides , the m●…ner of existing which she has here , being 〈…〉 some sort corporeal , ( by § . . ) this potentiality ●…hers is to be reduced to act , or her power 〈…〉 knowing is to be brought to actual knowledge by degrees but , were her notions innate , sh●… would have her knowledge by the same connatural way , and after the same manner , by which angels have theirs ; which confounds the nature of those two vastly different kinds of being●… man , and angel ; contrary to all the ma●…ims of sound philosophy . . lastly , if all the ideas or notions be innat● and there can be no reason why some should be so , and othe● not , since the soul is equally capable of all as of some only ; then , since to be actually in a knowing power , is to actuate or inform that power , that is , to render that power actually knowing ; it would follow , that the sou● in that case , having in her all those notions of which her nature is capable , ( that is , all notions whatever ) she would either know all things while she is here ; or else she would have , while here , innumerable ideas or materials of knowledge , which never come to be excited , and so are perfectly useless . which makes the immediate act of the first being , which infus'd them , frustraneous , and to no purpose . for , their own principles must force them to confess , those ideas which shall never be excited , cannot , in that case , either serve for reasoning , contemplation , nor outward action ; and therefore the imbuing the mind with them here , is preposterous , su●…ous , and to no end . . 't is equally groundless and unphiloso●…cal , in many regards , to affirm , 〈…〉 the soul has a power to eli●… or produce such ideas in her ●… ▪ upon occasion of such an im●…ssion made on the senses . for , ●… , the reasons given above , i mean those ●…hich have been produced , § . , , , . ) ●… ▪ ( in a manner equally ) disprove such ideas , ●…se which are properly innate . secondly , 〈…〉 impossible to show by , their grounds , any natural connexion between that impression on the ●…ve , and the production of such or such an 〈…〉 nor , as far as i can see , do they so much 〈…〉 pretend to show how this effect does , ex na●…a rei , spring from that cause . for 't is con●… ▪ that the stroke on the nerve , and the idea which starts up when it is made there , are utterly unlike one another : by which lame account , any kind of impression , provided it be unlike , may occasion the production of any idea whatever ; and therefore there would be no reason why 〈…〉 particular impression , more than another , made 〈…〉 the body , should concur any way , ( no , not so much as a sutable occasion ) : to the production of any particular idea at all . thirdly , hence , they make this impression on the nerve to be only an occasion , that is a kind of conditio sine quâ non , and not any sort of cause ; contrary to the whole intention and end of all philosophy ; which is to refund effects into their proper causes . fourthly , they put the soul , which is of an indivisible nature , to act upon it self , and to be the sole cause of such an idea ; which is against divers principles confining upon self-evidence , and easily reducible to it . such as are . [ nothing that is meerly i● power to such an effect can reduce st self to act. nothing indetermin'd can produce a determinate effect . nothing can change it self . an indivisible entity cannot work upon it self . a thing in rest cannot move it self . ] or , in a word , the whole course of causes ▪ consisting in this , that one thing which is in act it self , is to work upon another which is in power to receive that act , is , by this extravagant doctrine , made needless , absurd and incoherent . . corollary xii . from what 's deduc't above , it follows , that that position of the cartesians , which makes the soul and body in man to be duae res , or two things , does not seem to sute well with christian faith. for , since cartesius does therefore make them two things , because he finds them to be of different natures ; 't is evident , that he does not distinguish between the notion of the thing , which has the nature in it ; and of the nature , which is in the thing , or is had by it : whence follows , that whereever , and whenever , there are those two distinct natures , there must also be two distinct things : but , the second person of the trinity will ever retain the humanity of christ , and the humanity of christ will ever consist of the corporeal and spiritual natures call'd soul and body ▪ therefore there will ever be , according to this doctrine , two distinct things in the humanity of christ-again , since these two natures in christ's humanity ( which they call two things ) are individually or numerically such ; and an individual thing , is the same as a suppositum ; the followers of this doctrine must hold there are two suppositums in christ , according to his humanity : wherefore , since 't is a fundamental of christian faith , that there is also in christ the divine suppositum ; they must be forced to put three suppositums in christ ▪ god and man ; which is strange language in christianity . nor will it avail them to alledge , that the divine personality , by assuming humane nature , s●pplies the subsistence of both those natures ; for this takes not away the distinction of the two natures in the humanity ; wherefore , if whereever there are two natures , there must be two things , and those ( in our case ) individually such ; of force there will remain two individual things ; that is ; two supposita in christ's humane nature ; and , consequently , three in all . whence , since verum vero non contradicit , the christian tenet of but one suppositum in christ being true ; the cartesian doctrine , that the soul and body in man are two things , because they are of such different natures , must needs be false ; and our main tenet , that the soul and body in man do make but one thing , is both evident to reason , and consonant to faith , and to the creed of st. athanasius . . corollary xiii . hence also it follows from this thesis of the cartesians , that every individual man in the world is a perfect chimera , nay a more monstrous one than a hircoceruus , a centaur , or any other we use to instance in . for , since all created beings are either pure acts ▪ or compounded of power and act , that is matter and form , by ch. . § . . and the word [ thing ] signifies , [ what 's capable of existing , ] and therefore two things must be capable of diverse existences ; and if they exist actually , must actually have two existences : it follows , that the soul and body , even in this state they have here , must have actually two diverse existences . again , since their nature , the one being corporeal , the other incorporeal , are far more distant and more vastly different than a goat and a stag , or any other natures amongst bodies ; to clap two such things , thus actually distinct under the notion of thing , and existing thus distinct , into one species call'd man , makes all the individuals under that species to be chimerical ; nay greater chimera's than is a compound made of any two things in nature which are of divers corporeal species , and exist actually by distinct existences ; as a stone and a tree , a horse and an eagle , a lizard and a herring , &c. nor is at all to purpose , to alledge they are a compound thing , for this is contrary to many evident truths ; since it has been demonstrated , ch. . § . . that there are no actual parts in any compound whatever : nor can the parts of ens joyn to make one thing otherwise than as one of them is determinable , potential , or has the notion of matter ; the other determinative of the other , as it 's form : lastly , that unum , or one thing , would be divisum in se , which is against the nature of ens. nor is it to purpose to alledge they are united by their acting together ; for this only makes them coacters , ( such as the principal cause and the instrument uses to be ) and not one thing ; as is clearly shown , preliminary v. § . . besides , they must be one thing ere they can act as one thing ; which ( as is there shown ) makes the alledging this for a reason , very preposterous . . corollary xiv . from what 's deduced above 't is demonstrated against that every-way-groundless opinion of the pre-existence of souls . since , the form of an ens being but a part of that thing it belongs to , and a part of a thing not being the thing it self , or the whole thing ; and only the thing it self being capable of existance ; the soul , which is the form of man , cannot possibly exist till it informs the matter ; and , with it , makes up that thing call'd man. . corollary xv. hence that foppish opinion of the transmigration of souls is confuted . since , the form is not received but in matter fitted to receive it , or dispos'd for it ; and , with it , compounding one thing which shall have a primary operation sutable to the nature of such a compound ; which kind of disposition can no where be found but in humane bodies ; otherwise , every meer animal , and vegetable , might require , and therefore have a rational soul , in them ; which put , there could neither need any transmigration ; nor could it be , without having two souls in one body , or two forms in the same matter , which would make every such compound a chimera . whence , i am forced to declare , that those who talk of god's annexing reason to the matter of a brute , bid fair for the tenet of a pythagorean transmigration ; for , to what other end can the starting such a question , or such a wild supposition tend ? . corollary xvi . hence is farther shown , that to those who ask , how the soul and body come to be united ? the properest answer is , they were never disunited , or two . a farther reason , how they come to be one may be gather'd out of the following meditation . meditation . by this time , my soul , we have rais'd our selves by immediate steps , from the material world , our underling and god's footstool , till we are come within ken of our own nature . nor can we think we have err'd in that noble and necessary quest : there have been no meandrian turnings and windings in our rational progress , which is the way we have taken . we started first from the simplest and ( as we may say ) embryo-notions of power and act , which belong to every created being . we proceeded next to that sort of power and act , which compounds the changeable nature of body . we went on to take a view of the essences of the most uncompounded bodies , and those of their simpler mixts and demixts , till we arriv'd at those most compounded ones which are organical ; such as are vegetables and animals ; divers parts of which seem to have distinct natures and operations of their own : but they only seem to have them ; for out of the compound , they can perform no such operations at all ; because those parts being only potential , or in power to be things , they are hence , of themselves , not actually things , nor capable of being ; nor consequently , of acting . so that 't is the compound only that acts according to such a part , which is somewhat of it ; because it only is , or is in act. lastly , we have shewn the establishment of the essence of an animal ; and that its primary operation , for which it was ordain'd , is ( like it self ) meerly sensitive or material . but must the climax of being , stop in that lowest degree of entity , base matter ? no surely . for , how should the alpha of all being be the omega of it too , if there were nothing created here but such a stupid and senseless nature as body ; which is utterly unable to ascend to him , or raise it self towards him , and chuse him for its last end , and final good ; and yet , how should meer matter rise to that vastly higher story of being , call'd spiritual ; or , how should it arrive to a next neighbourhood with an angel ? they seem rather contradictory , and in the highest manner opposite . the one is of its own nature divifible , the other indivisible . the one is a pure act , the other is meerly potential , being made of matter , which depresses it's compart , while here , to a potential state also . the order of beings , which is the product of god's creative wisdom , could not but be contriv'd with all the beauty of the most exact harmony ; which consists in fitting one thing to another . it must then arise by immediate degrees , otherwise it would not be compacted but shatter'd ▪ and , it had been too great a leap , and had left too wide a chasm in the frame of the creation , to ascend , or rather skip from meer matter to a pure spirit , but what cannot infinite wisdom contrive , without either perverting or straining the proportions of order , or violating the natures of body , or spirit either ? wherefore to make the contexture of beings close and not intersticed by flaws , gaps , or incoherences ; divine providence , which disposes all things sweetly , order'd there should be some dispositions in matter , which requir'd to be indu'd with such a form as was beyond the power of matter to produce , 〈◊〉 have educed out of it ; viz. such as was of a spiritual nature , tho' of the lowest size ; to perform with its assistance , operations beyond the power of matter to compass alone ; that is , with a faculty of reasoning , which partakes , in some sort , ●●th natures ; or , with a power both of knowing , 〈◊〉 also of succession in acquiring , or using that knowledge . those dispositions being laid in matter , 〈◊〉 ●●llow'd necessarily that a form of a spiritual na●●re would be in it : for , to an infinite being , stream●…enerously his gifts from his exuberant source of ●…ss , there needs no more to receive , and have , the effects of his bounty , but to be dispos'd for them , or naturally require them ; especially , when that disposition , or requiringness of a farther perfection was laid by himself . he saw that to link matter to a spiritual nature orderly and connaturally , it was requisite the former should be rais'd to its highest pitch of perfection ; and the later deprest , while ●ere , below what was due to a pure spirit ; that so the supremum infimi ( as was fit to build up methodically the great work of the creation , ) might immediately confine upon , and thence be joyn'd to the inflmum supremi . he contriv'd then that some part of the brain , which was the quintessence and flower of animality , ( call'd by us , the seat of knowledge ) should be capable of serving for a more excellent operation than matter alone could perform ; that so it might become his wisdom and goodness , as he is author of nature , to endow it with a nobler form than the heard of other animals could deserve ; and thence produce that more elevated operation . i say , as author of nature . for , as the matter of wood , ultimately dispos'd by increasing degrees of glowing heat to become fire , not only has given it the form which makes it such an element , or such a determinate thing ; but also , at the same instant , by the steady and ever ready emanation of god's superabundant goodness , it has an existence given it , though this latter effect exceeds the power of all creatures together to bestow it : so , in the same manner , as soon as the said dispositions in the brain of an embryo are grown up to their due perfection ; the same goodness , and for the same reason , infuses into it a rational soul , though it was beyond the power of all natural agents to produce it . thus came we into this material world. thus were we compounded of the top of corporeal nature , and the bottom or lowest size of the spiritual ; minuisti cum paulo minùs ab angelis . thus was man constituted the horizon of the two opposite hemispheres of meer matter , and pure spirits ; confining upon , and by nature neer akin to both . whence he becomes capable to ascend to , and even ●● transcend , the dignity of the highest angels ; or to be debas'd below the vilenes of the most contemptible brute . nothing is so high , but , through god's assistance , we may not aspire to ; nor any thing so low and filthy into which we may not plunge our selves ; according as we follow the conduct of angelical reason , or brutish passion . let us then , my soul , know our own dignity ; but yet , let us not overween . matter is indeed , in us , exalted and superindu'd with a spiritul power ; yet we are , for all that , at present , but a part of this material world ; and our condition , while here , is ( at least , at first ) meerly passive , and ever subject to change and alteration . thy self art liable to receive impressions from natural agents : nor is this intended by thy creator to debase thee and keep thee down , but to improve , and perfect thee . thou hadst no title , being but a part , to be a subsistent knowing thing , considering thee in thy single self ; and therefore , couldst not claim to have actual knowledge given thee at thy creation : thou art then to acquire it by the operations of our fellow-creatures , or rather useful servants , bodies ; which play about us perpetually , and by their subtillest particles , which they perpetually send forth , affect our senses . we had our being at first by bodily dispositions ; and therefore 't is no disparagement to us , by the same means , to have those materials , which give and continue to us our operations . let us not listen then to those mistakers , who would perswade us that we are two things , while we are here . such conceits spring from fancy unable to reach the true nature of unity and entity ▪ the notion of ens comprises in its spacious extent , both corporeal and spiritual nature ; wherefore there is room enough , in that comprehensive conception , to comprise both natures in one thing ; provided those parts can be adapted and fitted , to make up one compound , as we have seen they are . let us ask all nature , and our own thoughts reflecting upon it ; and they will tell us this is done by the proportion and sutableness the one part of an ens has to the other , as power , and act , or matter and form ; which are the proper parts of all things here below ; that is , by the capacity which the material , potential and indetermin'd part has to be determin'd or actuated by the form ; and ▪ the correspondent virtue , which the form , or act , has to actuate and determine the matter , when 't is fitly dispos'd for it . by which determination it becomes this and no other , in which consists its unity ; whence it is made capable of receiving existence ; which is the same as to make them one thing . consider what innumrrable errors have spawn'd from the ignorance of this one great truth , which gives us the right knowledge of our selves . first ▪ those men fancy thee to be a kind of distinct spiritual thing ; whence , since thou art individually such , and the very notion of an individual thing , is [ what is capable to exist ] they must attribute to thee the having a peculiar existence of thy own ; whence , thou canst not , by this tenet , be the form of thy own , or of any body , but an assistant , or extrin●●cal form ; that is a subsistent spirit , or an angel ▪ next , because they cannot conceive how an operation of body , which is divisible , should be receiv'd in an indivisible subject , they are forced to deny that any impression from outward objects convey'd by our senses to the brain , can affect thee , or give thee knowledge ; and , therefore , they make those necessary assistants , assign'd thee by nature , nay , our own inferiour faculties too , to be altogether useless for th●● end. hence , they will needs endow thee with 〈◊〉 power to give thy self knowledge , by thy producing ▪ within thy self , little spiritual mirrours , call 〈◊〉 ideas : not reflecting that whatever is of its self only a power to have any thing or mode , or has only a power of knowing , cannot possibly reduce its self t● act , or give its self what it has not ; and that , what 's indetermin'd to every particular mode , cannot of it self produce determinate ones : since from meer indifferency to all , no one particular effect can proceed . for this reason , finding no similitude or resemblance between those spiritual effects and corporeal causes , they substitute , instead of such causes , stupid and unactive occasions , which have no influence or causality at all ; by which means they break ●●●●der the chain of causes and effects ; by which the well-compacted frame of nature hangs together , and the steady course of god's ordinary ▪ providence at●●git a fine usque ad finem fortiter , & dispon●t om●… suaviter : not considering also that this closely●… order of causes and effects is that which gives consistency and coherence to all our discourses , and 〈◊〉 the only ground of all demonstration ; and , cons●●●●ently , of all the science mankind has , or can 〈◊〉 . whence also it comes that , puzzled with their 〈◊〉 ill-lay'd principles how to find any contexture between those natural effects and causes , they are given to have frequent , and in a manner constant recourse to the gratuitous pretence that god wills this or that ; without so much as attempting to demonstrate that god does indeed will such particular ●…ects , or showing any necessity why he should do 〈◊〉 or that it becomes god's wisdom , in the ordina●… administration of nature , to set aside the opera●●●●s of second causes , for which they are essentially ordain'd ; and , at every turn , to act immediately by himself . these , and many other most absurd doctrines ( every great errour being fruit●… of false consequences ) they are thrown upon through their not reflecting on this grand truth , that man being one thing , consisting of a corporeal and spiritual compart , hence ( as was said ) the impressions sent from outward objects by means of the senses to that material , most sensitive , and most noble part of the brain , ( where the fancy resides ) call'd , the seat of knowledge , which part is immediately inform'd by the soul ; do , by reason that the soul and body , as matter and form , make ●p one thing , affect also the said form or soul , at the same time , after her manner , or according to her nature ; ( that is , to some degree knowingly ; ) by imprinting or stamping upon her direct conceptions , notions , or simple apprehensions of somewhat , or some mode of the thing : on which fast rudiments of knowledge , duly reflected on , well distinguish'd , and aptly connected by our discoursing faculty all our science is built . what other important truths occur in this chapter , affording matter for our farther contemplation , is les● to our more leisurely consideration , chap. v. of the constitution and dissolution of individual bodies . . hitherto , of the constituting the generical and specifical kinds of bodies ; which , they being but common , that is partial or inadequate , notions of ens or thing , are therefore no otherwise entia , but only in a secondary and improper sense of that word , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as aristotle calls them ; because , regarding them under this common and abstracted consideration , they are not capable of existing , which is the definition of ens. we come next to treat of individual entities , call'd , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is , primarily and properly substances or things ; because , consisting of matter ultimately determin'd to such and such particulars , they only , ( as being wholes , or intire things , ) are of themselves , or by the merits of their own notion , capable of existing , or entia : whereas the former are not at all things , but as they are metaphysical parts of the things truly so call'd ; abstracted from one another , by our conceiving them singly , or aparted from their fellow-parts ; and therefore , ( since the parts cannot exist out of the whole ) they are incapable of existing but in these later , and by virtue of them. wherefore , . hence follows , that the generical and specifical essences , of which we have hitherto treated , are not properly essences , in the first and primary acceptation of that word . for , since the notion of ens , is properly , that which is capable of existing ; and essence is that which properly constitutes ens ; it follows , that that which does not constitute it's subject capable of existing , is not , in proper speech , an essence . wherefore , since neither corpus , mixtum , vivens , animal nor homo , taken ( as those words signifie them ) in common , are capable of existing , but the particulars or individ●ums of each of those kinds ; 't is consequent , that , as none of these is properly an ens , but only the individuums of each of those common sorts ; so , neither is that which constitutes any of them properly to be call'd an essence , but that only which constitutes the individual thing . again , since an individuum ( v. g. peter ) contains in it self all those common notions ; and so , that what answers to the definitions of each of them is included in him , and verify'd of him ; it follows , that they are , all of them , ( as was said ) metaphysical parts of peter , or parts of his essence ; and that he is a whole in respect of the● ▪ wherefore , since ( as was said ) a part cannot exist but in the whole ; none of these can exist but in their individuals , nor is ( of it's self ) properly an ens or thing : nor , consequently , ( since essence is the formal constitutive of ens , or o● that which is capable of being , ) are their essence in proper speech , essences . in a word [ ens ] signifies what 's capable of existing ; which none of those common essences , ( staying in them ) is or can be ; for , were they such , they must necessarily make the concretes , which are their subjects , to be thus capable of existing ; which , ▪ ●is most evident they do not ; seeing nothing in common does , or can exist , but only particulars . . corollary i. this notwithstanding , we can discourse as clearly of those improper essences , nay , far more clearly and evidently , than we can of those proper ones . for , since those improper and analogical essences , are , each of them , some one inadequate or abstracted conception which we make of the whole thing ; v. g. the essence or nature of such a quantity , figure , time , place , situation , &c. and ( our soul , as will be seen hereafter , being indivisible ) they , by being in our conception are there indivisibly , that is , most dsstinctly , such : hence , they are apt to render our discourses , which are conversant about such most distinct objects , most distinct and clear also . whereas , on the other side , the essences properly so called which constitute the individuums , do involve many of those improper essences in their constitution ; which must needs make those thus-compounded objects confus'd ; and , thence , less clearly intelligible . it follows then manifestly , that we can discourse more clearly of those improper essences or natures , which abstract from their subject , and from the rest of their fellow-modes ; than we can of the proper essences that constitute the whole individuum ; of which ( as was said ) rhe other are but metaphysical parts , which are blended ( in some sort ) confusedly to compound or make up that whole . . that complexion of accidents which constitutes the essence of the individuum , must be far greater than that which constitutes the generical or the specisical natures ▪ for , since these later are but parts of the individual essence ; there is necessarily requir'd more parts to constitute the essence of the individuum , which in respect of them , has the nature of the whole . again , since there are found under every common notion or nature great multitudes of individuums , each of which must be distinct from all the others ; there , must necessarily be a far greater complexion of accidents to distinguish these , by their various complication , from one another , than was requisite to distinguish and constitute the common natures ; the common kinds of things being , in comparison of them , but a very few . . that complexion of accidents which constitutes individual bodies , must be the most perfect act they can have , except that of existence . for , since 't is the nature of power , ( taken in a physical sense ) or of matter , to be common to all , it can distinguish no two of them from one another : on the other side , it being hence evident , that 't is the nature of act , and of it only , to distinguish ; nor can there be a greater distinction , than to make each subject to be this , and ●● other ; it follows hence , that the complexion of accidents which constitutes individuums , and which imparts this formal effect to each of them , is the greatest distinguisher , or , ( which is the same ) the most perfect act second-causes can give . and that this is a less perfect act than existence is evident ; because the utmost it can do is to make it's subject , this thing , or this ens ; that is , to make it capable of existing ; and , consequently , tho' it be most actual in the , direct line of ens , yet it has the nature of ● power in respect of existence ; which is therefore the ultimate actuality , or most perfect act imaginable next to that of a deity , and most resembling it . . corollary ii. hence is evidently demonstrated against the atheists , that 't is above all the power of natural causes , and only peculiar to god , to give the last actuality of existence . for , since , as appears by our former discourses , all that natural causes can do , is , by motion , to mingle the first bodies , which have more or less of quantity in them , ( that is , which are rare or dense ; ) from the diversity of which action , follows their various size , number , proportion , figure , situation , &c. and these do make the several complexions of accidents which constitute all the individuums in nature ; and , in none of those effects is found the notion of existence , much less of a new existence , ( which yet belongs to every individual when it is first made , ) as will easily be discern'd by any reflecter , who considers the notion or essence of those several modes , and compares them to the notion or nature of existence : it follows manifestly , that the last actuality of existence cannot be given by natural causes , but must come from some cause above nature ; that is , from the author of nature , or from that supreme essentially-existing cause , god whence is demonstrated , a posteriori , th●● there is a god. . there must be some instant , in which the individuum becomes another thing or of another kind . for , 〈…〉 't is a manifest contradiction to say , that any thing can , for any one instant , much less for any part of time , be , at once , what it lately was , and what it newly is ; or be at once it's-self and ●… ▪ it's self , but another : 't is demonstrable that there must be some instant , in which it first becomes ▪ this individuum , ( or of this kind ) and ceases to be another , or of another kind . . this complexion of accidents , which determines the matter to be this , and no other , in the first instant of it's being , must necessarily ●● essential to the individuum newly made . for , since meer accidents do advene to the thing already made this ▪ and , therefore , do presuppose it according to some priority or other ; and there can be no priority ▪ ( no , not even that of nature or reason ) of the ●…ng to that which constitutes it ; because that which constitutes it , as being it 's formal cause , 〈…〉 priority of nature to it , as the cause has to 〈…〉 effect : it follows , that that complexion of accidents which determines the matter to be this 〈…〉 no other , in the first instant of it's being , ●…st necessarily be essential to the things or individuums newly made . . therefore , this complexion of accidents ●ow spoken of , is , the essential 〈…〉 substantial form of the new●ade compound or individuum . that it is the form of it is evident ; because the whole notion 〈…〉 the form or act , is nothing 〈…〉 but to be the distinguisher of the confused or undistinguisht potentiality of the matter ; or to be the determiner of it's indifferency to this or that , ( which , in the schools language , is to inform it ; ) and by doing thus , to be the constituter of the individuum : and , that this complexion of accidents does these essects , is manifest ; because it is suppos'd to be peculiar to the individuum it constitutes , and found in no other . lastly , that this complexion of accidents , or form , is essential 〈…〉 it's proper individuum is shown , § . . . for the same reason , whatever modes or accidents do accrue to the ens or individuum afterwards , are accidental to it ; whether they concern it's quantity , or the accession or diminution of the matter ; that is , it 's growth and decay ; or it's qualities which perfect it ; or the relations it acquires to other individuums ; and much more what denominations soever come to it from any of the last predicaments ; because all these do adven● , or are superadded to the ens already essentially constituted ; and are , as it were , engrafted on that stock of being , and do not constitute it . . all individuums must have some degree of constancy and permanency i● their notion . for , since all natural motion is for some end , to the attaining which it is a kind of way or tendency ; and the way or means is not the end ; and , consequently , motion is not the end of motion ; it follows , that the end of motion must be something that has some kind of rest , fixure , and constancy in its nature . wherefore , since the end of that natural motion which determines the power or matter to be this , and no other , is to produce the individuum ; it follows . that the individuum or ens produc'd by that motion , must not be perpetually-changing , or continually successive , as that motion was , but must have some degree of permanency in it . add , that were not this so , we could never say with truth , that any thing is what it is ; nor , indeed , that it is ; nor , could we act or discourse about it ; since ere we could speak , act , or think ; the. thing would be chang'd and vanisht . nor would the notion of substance consist in an indivisible ; nor be distinct from that of quantity . nor would the accidents have any being ; there being in that case no determinate thing to which they could belong , or by means of which they might bee , or which they might modify . . existence supervening to the notion 〈…〉 nature of ens , does add also 〈…〉 the ens or substance , some degree of stability and constancy . ●or , since motion . , consider'd ●ormally according to it's precise and abstracted notion , does only import , that no two parts , that is nothing of it , is at once ; but that some ●arts of it are not now , but past ; others , are not ●… , but to come ; it is manifest to any acute con●●derer , that motion , according to it 's own precise notion , or taken as abstracted from it's subject which is moved , and from the other accidents ●hich are found in it , and in the conti●…ous bodies through which it moves , is nothing 〈…〉 but a continu'd flux of certain not beings ; ●hich it sows ( as it were ) all along through it's ●…hole progress ; of which therefore it seems formally to consist . wherefore , since existence ( in what kind soever ) is diametrically opposite to not ▪ being ; it follows , that as motion gives a fleeting inconstancy to the subject it affects ; so existence does , of it 's own nature , give to the ens or substance , it 's proper subject , a certain degree of stability and constancy ; and some degree of permanency in retaining the same essence ; as far as the nature of the subject , and the best order of the world , design'd by it's all-wise governour , sees fitting . . corollary iii. hence , our steady reflexion upon what has been hitherto deduced , will inform us , that this determination of matter , as to certain lesser and greater degrees , which constitute the superiour and inferiour kinds of things ; and , especially this ultimate determination of it by such a complexion of accidents as is incommunicable to any other , and constitutes and fixes the essence of the individuums , as is shown , § . . is absolutely necessary for all created things ; as rendring them apt or fit to exist , which is the main work of nature , and the only means to continue the succession of creatures . whence it is not carry'd on by a temerarious or fortuitous conduct ; but is like the artificial twisting together of many scatter'd ends , and tying them into one firm knot ; or the summing up the many scenes and interludes , or the windings and turnings of variously-operating causes ▪ in one harmonious close at the last act. all which clearly argues a form'd design , and an all comprehending providence in the giver of being ; sweetly and surely disposing his creatures to this ultimate determination to be this , or to a capacity of receiving existence . . corollary iv. this complexion of accidents being incommunicable to any other individuum , and withal essential to it , can never be eradicated while the compound continues . this is in a manner self-evident . for , this complexion being the essential form which constitutes the compound ; it follows , that the compound must remain constituted , or continue , while that which makes it such is in it ; in the same manner as rotundity being the formal cause why a ▪ thing is round , that thing must continue to be round while rotundity is in it . . corollary v. this complexion of accidents gives each individuum , and sometimes the whole species , a different genius and propension . thus every single man has from his conception , some peculiarity of temperament , genius , humour , or inclination , distinct from that of all others ; which tho' art , education , reflexion and circumstances may alter , for the better or the worse ; yet nothing can so totally efface or extinguish it , but the root of that peculiar propension will stick fast rivetted in his selfish individuality . thus original sin is transfus'd from adam , and engrafted in the primigenial constitution of each of his descendents ▪ [ in peccatis concepit me mater mea , psal. . ] inclining men more or less to this or that sort of sin , according as their individual temperature determines their propension . and , tho' god's all-powerful grace and careful christian discipline may restrain it's promptitude from breaking out into enormous outward actions ; yet no man but feels it too deeply rooted in his nature to be ever extirpated ; so that even the greatest saints may with grief cry out , quis me liberabit a corpore mortis hujus ? thus , every individual seed ▪ tho' it be of the same kind , has a peculiar temperament and complexion of its own ; which tho' we cannot discern while we view it in little ; yet in evidently discovers it self in the individual shrub or tree which springs from it , when grown up ; in which we may then observe thousands of diversities from other individuums of the same kind ; tho' they be planted in the same soyl , water'd by the same rain , and equally quicken'd and warm'd by the same sun : a certain argument that all those varieties amongst such vegetables , were included intrinsecally in the primordial and individual constitution and temperament of each of those single seeds , and did spring thence originally . . from what 's said above 't is evidently demonstrated , that there can be no show of reason , why existence should be the principle of individuation . for , since what 's nothing cannot exist ; that only which is an ens , or ( which is the same ) an individuum , can be capable of existence . wherefore , there must be conceived first , ( in priority of nature ) an ens , thing or individuum constituted , e're we can conceive there can be any subject fit to receive existence ; and , consequently existence , which presupposes the individuum constituted , cannot be the principle that constitutes it . again , since nothing that is common to more individuals ( v. g. a man or horse is common ) cannot exist , but only what is determinately this or that , ( v. g. this individual man or this horse , &c. ) 't is most evident that the matter must be made or determin'd to be this or that ; that is , it must be constituted such an individuum , ere it can possibly be capable to exist . wherefore , existence is subsequent to the constitution of the individuum , and , so , cannot be the principle by which it is constituted . lastly , the power does ex naturâ rei antecede the act ; otherwise it would follow , that that is which cannot be ; which is against an identical proposition , and a manifest contradiction . whence , seeing ( as was lately shown ) only individuums , which are this or that in particular , can bee , or have a power to bee ; they must first be suppos'd to be determin'd by natural causes , ere existence , which is their proper act can supervene , or put them in the state or condition of being actually , or extra causas . the literal meaning of which philosophical phrase , consonantly to the doctrine now delivered , is this ; that while that action , call'd the determination of the potentiality and indifferency of the matter , was yet on foot and not compleated or brought to perfection , the ens or individuum was not as yet otherwise than in fieri , ( as the schools call it ) or yet a doing or making ; that is , within the power of those determining causes ; but , as soon as that action is brought to perfection , there results thence , as the ultimate terminus or end of that determination , an individuum , capable to be put extra causas , or put out of subjection or dependence on those natural efficients ; which now had done working , having perform'd all that belong'd to them to do . at which very instant the never-failing goodness of the first being , gives actually to the individuum , thus render'd capable of being , that most perfect actuality we call existence , by which ▪ it is formally put in a condition of being extra causas ; or no longer immediately dependent on them , but on god only . . corollary vi. from this stability , which the thing has from it's individuality and from it's being existent , results another formal conception of ens , call'd it's subsistence , or being of it's self , or from the merits of it's own notion or nature ; and also , the being that by which only it's nature and modes have being . whence it comes that some define ens to be , [ id quod subsistit in se & substat accidentibus : ] which is something more than the bare meaning or notion of the word [ ens ] imports , which only speaks a capacity of existing . the word [ thing ] taken in this sense , or under this consideration , is commonly call'd a substratum , subjectum , suppositum , or the quod both of the nature and it's accidents ; for both these , in respect of it are but quo res est ; or that by which it is constituted such , either substantially or accidentally . that this notion is formally distinct from the notion of an ens or individuum is most evident ; for these regard no more but that the matter be ultimately determin'd to be this , and thence becomes capable of existing : but , that what 's thus capable to exist , or actually exists , does exist of it self , without the assistance of another ; and , thence , gives the nature and the accidents that accrue to it , to have being , or to bee , ( whence it has properly the notion of a suppositum ) is too clearly distinct from the other to need proving . and , that the notion of subsistence is different from that of existence is no less manifest ; because the formal , or rather total effect of existence , being only to make the thing bee actually , or to put it extra causas , is clearly different from the notion of subsisting by it self , or sustaining the modes and the nature too . and , indeed , if we regard it attentively , the notion of a subsistent thing , or a suppositum , is subsequent to the notion of thing or ens , and superadds a new consideration to it ; both as it regards it's standing by it's self , and also , that the nature and accidents do all stand in their being by means of it . whence the notion of a subsister , or a suppositum , ( or , in intelligent things , of a person ) seems to include all the perfections , and to have all the advantages an ens , or individuum , is capable of : tho' sometimes the notions of ens , being , existing , and subsisting , are , for want of due reflexion , carelesly confounded . . from what has been discourst above , ch. . and in this present chapter , it will not be hard to determine when the individuality of the several bodies in natureare chang'd 〈…〉 lost. there can be no doubt but that this happens when those bodies can no longer retain that primogenial complexion of accidents which make the individuum fit to perform that primary operation , peculiar to it self , as 't is distinct from all other indiviuums . but the difficulty is how we can ever come to know that ; those individuating complexions of the accidents being so many , and mingled with such a peculiar , accurate and singular niceness , that , 't is impossible we should ever come to know or comprehend them exactly and distinctly . but , i hope this difficulty that seems at first sight so insuperable , will upon examination appear to be none at all . to clear it then , i lay these few positions . . first , we may observe , and plain experience will inform our ordinary reflexion , that ( speaking of mixts ) no individual of any kind , when it ceases to be , or , is corrupted , is chang'd into another individuum of the same kind , v. g. no individual stone , tree , horse , or man , is thus chang'd meerly into another individual stone , tree , horse or man : for , were this so , then , indeed , the difficulty would be insoluble . . secondly , hence follows immediately , that the individual nature is never chang'd alone , but the specifical nature always , and oft-times the generical too , is chang'd likewise . . thirdly , that 't is very easie to know the difference between the primary operations of such bodies as differ specifically or generically , ( as is shown above , ch. . and . ) and thence to discern when the species or genus , and , consequently , the individuum is chang'd . the reason why the change of those former , induces a change in this later , is , because all the superiour notions are essential to the individuum ; as logic demonstrates , and common sense informs us peter cannot be this man , unless he be a man ; nor can man be this sort of animal , ( which is essential to it , or rather part of it's very definition ) unless he be an animal ; nor can animal be this sort of living thing , unless it be living , &c. whence follows , that whenever the individuum is render'd incapable of performing the primary operation of it's species or genus under which it is rankt , the individuality is a fortiori perisht and chang'd . for , every individuum is nothing but one of that kind , or higher notion , under which 't is comprehended : and , how can it be said to be one of that kind , when that kind it self ( as far as concerns it ) is chang'd and gone ! . hence , neither the specifick nature , nor the individuation of vegetables or animals is lost , when a branch or a limb is cut off ; provided that mixture and organization of parts be not destroy'd which enables them to digest the nourishing juice or aliment , requisite to preserve the compound , which is it's primary operation . . hence the individuality of man , as man , ●●ot chang'd , whatever limbs ●…loses , unless those parts be corrupted , or totally disabled , that are necessary for ratiocination ; which is the primary operation of his species , man. . hence the individuality of a simple body or element ( if there be any such now ) would be alter'd , if the degree of rarity and density be so notably chang'd , that a vastly different operation follows from it ; and that the subject which is thought to succeed , does enjoy that degree , not meerly successively , or in transitu , but with some kind of constancy , or for some time ; so that it will not be immediately reduced to it's former state by natural causes . for , in this case , that degree alters the species it self of the simple body , ( as is shown , ch. . § . . ) and , consequently , the individuation . . hence the individuality of first-mixt bodies is lost , when they are dissolv'd into simple bodies ; because this changes the specifick nature of a mixt. see ch : . § . , , . . hence , demixts are individually chang'd when the proportion of the first-mixts is alter'd to a high degree , and continues so with some constancy . see ch. . § . , . . simple division , if perfectly such , takes away the individual unity in homogeneous bodies . for , since to divide is to make more of o●● ▪ and what divides the thing or individuum , as 't is an ens divides it as 't is un●● , and therefore takes away it's unity ; and , on the other side , since homogeneous bodies are such that each part of them does , according to it's pitch , perform the same kind of primary operation ; it follows , that meer division , if it be perfected , takes away the individual unity . again , since neither part of the divided body is by division annihilated ; each of them , after division ●s capable of existence ; and , consequently , they being made two , ( at least , ) by division , they become duo entia ; and , since they can and do exist . two individuums . . yet meer division does not necessarily alter the divided individuum , essentially , if it be very heterogeneous ●● organical . for , since the former individuum is in that case , ( if not always ) under such a species a● is constituted by such a complexion of accidents as fits it for it's primary operation ; and the individuum has , moreover , a peculiar complexion of it's own ; both which being essential to them , they must , consequently , continue essentially the same while the same formal constituent remains , because it is still capable to perform the substance of it's former operation : it follows , that the former individuum and species too must continue , unless the division is such that it destroys the said complexion , which ( as was shown , ch. . § . . and here § . . ) is their essential form. wherefore the former individuum is , in these , only chang'd accidentally ; that is , ●oses only some virtuality or potentiality of it's matter , some part of it's quantity , or some qualities immediately affecting that part which is taken from it ; none of which are essential to it ; and these accidents which the matter of that part had formerly , being sufficient to determine the matter of which a new individuum is made ; that matter is so dispos'd before-hand , that there needed little but to put it out of the condition of being any longer a port , to fit it for existence . . two contra-distinct natures may very connaturally , if things be well order'd , compound one individual ens or one thing : and , therefore , the soul and body may make up that one thing call'd a man. for there can be no doubt but that things of the most opposite natures can and do perfectly agree in the common generical notion of thing , and , that , therefore , all their disagreement , opposition and inconsistency , does spring from their differences ; or , ( that we may bring the discourse from logical to metaphysical language , from the act : ) from which only , and not from the power , all distinction ( and , consequently , contradistinction ) comes . wherefore , when there are not two distinct substantial acts in the compound , ( as there is in hirco-ceruus and other chimera's ) nothing can hinder their coalition into one thing . on the other side , since there can be no difficulty for the proper parts of any compound to make up one whole ; and it has been shown , ( chap. . § . , . ) that the proper parts of a compound ens , as such , are power and act ; 't is clear that there are not more contradistinct acts in such an ens. wherefore , if the matter or power , on the body's side , can by the author of nature be so dispos'd as to require a form of a spiritual nature ; the bodily part will thence become the proper matter of that compound ens ; and that spiritual nature will be the proper act or form of such a body ; and this verè & essentialiter , as the council of vienna has defin'd ; and so , both together will friendly conspire to make up that one ent , call'd a man. the main difficulty then objected is quite taken away and superseded : for , since only two substantial acts can distinguish and multiply entia or things ; and here is but one act determining the power or matter to this entity , and , consequently , to unity under the notion of thing ; 't is demonstrable by a metaphysical argument , as it was ( ch. . § . . ) by a logical one , that man , made up , according to this doctrine , of soul and body , is most truly and properly one thing , as much as any other natural compound whatever , and not two things . this discourse supposes there can be some disp●●●ion in a body , requiring a form which is not educible out of the power , or matter , by natural causes . of which , see ch. . especially § . . and the preliminary there cited . . there is no show of impossibility , why the divine and the human nature may not join in one suppositum ; or rather , why the human nature may not subsist in a divine person . for , since an infinite being , as the divine nature i● , has eminently in it's self all the perfections belonging to being ; of which , ( as was shown above , coroll . . ) subsistence or standing alone by it's own virtue , is one ; and , consequently , it can supply by it self immediately any such perfection , so it does not induce any imperfection in god , only which can render it impossible ; it follows , that humane nature may be made to subsist in a divine suppositum , provided it draws not after it any imperfection or unbecomingness unworthy of god ; which cannot be said in this case . for , to communicate or impart it's subsistence or personality to another is most agreeable to an infinite goodness , when his wisdom sees it most fit and most necessary for the good of a very considerable portion of the creation . nor does this put the least degree of potentiality or imperfection in the divine nature , or makes it a potential part , or an informing form ; but it supposes the humane nature constituted , and only supplies it's subsistence or personality ; 't is evident then , that this neither alters nor depresses the divine nature from it's highe●● dignity of being still , in it self , a pure actuality , but is rather agreeable to that attribute ; since it only exalts humane nature , by thus assuming it , or uniting it to a divine person hypostatically , ( that is according to the notion of suppositum ) to which , of it's self , it could not otherwise aspire . to do which , also , ( the wisest and best ends of the incarnation being well reflected on ) is , as divines show , no way derogatory , but in every respect agreeable to the divine attributes and all the objections that the antient greeks and modern adversaries can bring to show ●● foolish and misbecoming god , seem grounded on this , that god is infinitely great , ( which makes the greatest esclat in their fancy ) without considering at the same time that he is equally , that is , infinitely good . which resembles those men'● way of arguing , who are only sollicitous of magnifying god's power and his will , without considering his wisdom ; which ( according to our manner of conceiving ) determines the exercise of those other attributes . . notwithstanding this hypostatick union of those two natures in christ , each nature retains it's own distinction , essence , properties and attributes . for , ●●●ce this union of these two ●●tures in one suppositum or person , supposes those natures distinctly and essentially constituted ; and the giving them meerly to subsist , super●●●es to the nature already constituted , and therefore can be no part of it's essential constitutive ; consequently , it neither alters the divine nature , no● affects the humane nature at all by making 〈…〉 subsist such as it is ; which is a notion evidently extraneòus to the notion of the nature , and ●ifferent from it . wherefore , each of those natures remains in it's own precise essential bounds ; and not mingled or confounded with the other , as some eutychians fondly imagin'd . . yet all the actions and passions of this subsistent thing , to which soever of those natures they properly ●●long , are justly attributed to christ , god and man. for , ●ince the suppositum of those two natures are but one , and that suppositum is christ's ; and all actions and passions belong to the suppositum , and are attributed to it ; 't is consequent , that the actions of this diverse-natur'd suppositum do belong to christ who has those distinct natures in him. moreover , since every thing do●● connaturally act and suffer as it is ; and christ , he having two natures or essences in one suppositum , is truly god and man ; it follows , against nestorius , that all the actions of christ are divine-human , or theandrical . with which yet well consists that some actions and sufferings may belong to his suppositum according to , or by reason of the one nature , and not by reason of the other . . hence also , there can be no show of contradiction in saying the divine nature is three according to the notion of subsistence , and yet but one according to the notion of essence . for , since , as has been shown here , § . . the respect or notion of subsistence is quite different from the respect of essence ; and there can be no contradiction where opposites are affirm'd and deny'd of the same according to a different respect : it follows , that neither can there be any show of contradiction in saying the divine nature is three according to the precise notion or respect of subsistence , and yet not-three but one only in respect of the notion of essence . . advertisement . for the clearer understanding some parts of these late discourses , and to render some terms we have us'd more distinctly intelligible , i take leave to re-min'd my reader here of what i have frequently inculcated in my former books , viz. first , that all our knowledge , which is solid , is of the thing ; and taken from the thing : secondly , that we cannot know the thing clearly and distinctly any other way than by having several partial or inadequate conceptions of it ; which therefore are knowledges of the thing in part only . thirdly , that hence when ever we speak of act , power , essence , ens , form , matter , existence , subsistence , quantity , quality , or of any other intrinsecal mode ; we neither can , nor ought , mean any other by those words , but the thing , according as it is the object of those several abstracted notions or considerations we make of it ; and , which are verify'd of it : and , consequently , ( since all verification is made by the copula [ est ] , which signifies identity ) which are truly it. fourthly , hence , when we speak of metaphysical parts of the thing , according to the meer notion of thing , we mean that they are parts of the thing metaphysically consider'd ; or as it is the object that verifies , or has in it , what answers to those conceptions or notions which do properly belong to ens or be●●g ; because the supreme science , metaphysicks , does only , or chiefly , regard or concern her self with such notions as belong to being ●● it's proper object . in the same manner as the notions of length , breadth , and thickness which belong to quantity as it abstracts from natural motion , are the parts , or partial conceptions of bodies , or of that thing , call'd body , consider'd mathematically ; and those notions which regard quantity , as affecting t●● thing in order to natural action or passion , ( ●●● rarity , density , divisibility , &c. ) are parts , ●● partial conceptions of body , physically consider'd ▪ as likewise are matter and form , for the same reason , if taken under the same consideration of grounding natural action or passion : for , as they meerly relate to being , or , as they are consider'd precisely as parts or partial conceptions of ens , they belong to metaphysicks , and are there call'd power and act. fifthly , hence , the ens or thi●● ( properly so call'd , ) that is the individuum , ●● call'd by us a whole ; because all those partial conceptions , ( objectively consider'd ) are contain'd and involv'd in the individuum , an● are verify'd of it , as is shown above ; which being only inadequate in respect to the whole thing they are hence said to be only parts of it ; and it a whole in respect of them . sixthly , tho' the● be only different conceptions of the same thing yet thus aparted and abstracted by our understanding , we can discourse of each of them singly , as if they were so many distinct essences or ●●stinct things ; tho' in re they be but one thing variously conceiv'd . and , thence , we can consider , what , or how great a complexion of a●●dents is requisite to constitute the essences of ●●● of those superiour or inadequate notions ; an● what is requir'd to constitute another ; as is se●● ch. , , . hence , also , we can truly say , that one of them is not another ; viz. formally or distinctly taken ; tho' materially or as in ●● they are but one and the same thing ; in the same manner as we can say , the hand is not the foot ; which are integral parts of a man , and not ●●stinct things from the man materially , but ●…fy'd with him in re . seventhly , hence ●… , we can say with truth , that the thing ●●y be chang'd according to one of these con●…tions or respects , and not-chang'd according ●● another : that the determination to be this , ●…de ( immediately ) by second causes ; the ●istence not , but given by god : that a thing , ●●●ording to the precise notion of essence or ●●ture , may be two ; and yet not-two , but one ●●●ording to the notion of suppositum ; or may ●● three as to it's suppofitality or personality , and ●● but one according to it's essence or nature . ●● which sayings are properly verify'd , because ●●●●●●●mation and negation are only made in ●● mind , where one of those notions is not the 〈◊〉 ; or ( which is the same ) where the thing ●● ●●●ceiv'd thus , is not the thing as conceiv'd ●●herwise : and the same , is , of the things 〈◊〉 united or assum'd according to the no●●●● of person , and yet not-united according to ●●● notion of essence . lastly , 't is to be noted , ●●● as [ conception , apprehension , proposition , dis●●●● , &c. ] are metaphorical expressions tran●… from corporeal to spiritual natures , by 〈…〉 of some analogy , proportion or resem●… to those other ; so , likewise , are those ●…ds , [ substratum , suppositum , subjectum , inhe●… , accident , ] and such like : and the literal meaning of those words is this ; that , as those things which cannot subsist or stand by themselves , or by virtue of any firmness of their own , ●● re , or in nature , must , and use to be under●●●● and sustain'd by another , which is more substantial ( as we use to say ) or more strong than they ; so , neither in our mind , can the notion of mode , manner , or accident stand alone , unless we conceive some thing of which it is a mode , or speaks the manner how it is ; or some thing to which it advenes , or is superadded ; whereas , on the other side , we have the notion of being or thing without apprehending such a transcendental relation to the mode or manner how it is : whence the notion of thing has a kind of priority in our minds to the accidents or modes , under the consideration of standing in our intellect without them ; and the notions of the modes or accidents has a kind of posteriorily in our mind , and a dependence on them for their being these ; because the former has being , one way or other , in it's notion ; the others , as length , whiteness , roundness , & ● . have in their notion no express signification of being at all . whence , i cannot but think mr. locke should not have apply'd his ingenio●● raillery of supporting and underpropping ; and of an elephant supporting the earth , and a tortoise the elephant , to those authors who were forced to use those words ; in case they did not take those expressions in that gross and too-literal sense : and i conceive he might with equal justice have apply'd them against grammarians , who tell us , that a noun substantive can stand by it's self ; a●● a noun adjective , cannot without it's elephant and tortoise ( the substantive ) to support it . meditation . we have seen formerly in what consisted our essence , as we are of that species , call'd mankind . this was a fair step towards the knowing our individual self ; which we have here , to ●●r power , attempted . but , alas ! how lamely and imperfectly have ●e reacht it ? we experienc'd no great difficulty to find our way amongst so many common kinds of things , tho' ▪ in a manner , strangers to us ; but we have lost our selves at home . a few abstracted modes twisted together ●…y by nature , did oft ▪ times satisfie our enquiry , ●●ile we discours'd of the former ; but , when we came to consider that numerous complexion of them , only which can serve to constitute our individual body , ●●d to distinguish our single self from every other particular thing , whether of our own or of any other kind , we are at an utter loss , and seem bewilder'd ●●● pathless wood ! such a concourse of various ac●●ents , and ( as it were ) thrums-ends of being , are requisite to weave our particular texture , so to make up this thing which we are ; that , to endeavour to comprehend them all , seems the same as to go about to fathom at once a great part of nature ; and , in stead of enlightning us , stuns our understanding . our primigenial composition , in the last minute of our embryo-state , which was the first instant of our being this man , is so admirably deli●ate , and the stamina of it so finely spun by the most wise contrivance of the author of nature , that we may break our eye-balls by bending our sight ●re we can gain a glimpse of it . nor can the help of microscopes , which , as modern virtuoso's tell us , can show tho outward shape of the tree in it's seed , discover to us those imperceptible particles , their natures , mixture , order , proportion , situation , &c. that make up the individual composition of our body , which gave the particular degree of excellency and nobleness to our soul. dull artificers must see all the parts of the matter they are to work upon ; that , so , they may measure , proportion , and place them ; but the architect of the world needs no reflected rays of his own sun to discern them , but sees them by the creative light of his own wisdom , ( or rather by seeing them , makes them , ) tho' they be meer darkness to us . non est occultatum os meum a te quod fecisti in occulto . & substantia mea in inferioribus terrae . imperfectum meum viderunt oculi tui ; and every part of all thy creature in libro duo scribuntur , ps. . but , alas ! who can read so abstruse a manuscript , much less the original from which 't is copy'd . let us then vail our over-weoning pride ; bewail our ignorance , and lament with the eagle-sighted evangelist , that no man is found worthy or able to open the folded and sealed book , even of created nature ; nor read the contents of it , wrapt up in the shady leaves of an incomprehensible providence . but how large a field of contemplation is open'd to us , when we come to consider the infinite number of causes which were order'd to make this complexion of accidents that constituted this body of ours , and distinguisht it from all others in the first instant of our being ? what mathematicks could contrive , what mathematician can explicate , how all those crooked and mutually-crossing lines of sundry kinds , in which those causes mov'd , shohld meet in our individuation as in their center ? how much more wonderful will it be to reflect , that each of those numberless causes had also their causes fore-lay'd ; and they others before them ; and so upwards to the first framing of the world ? and yet , our reason assures us ▪ that none of these later or immediate causes , nor , consequently , our self , their product , could ●ver have been , had not this long pedigree of causes , as ancient as the beginning of time , successively anteceded ; determining matter to this individual body of ours ▪ which requir'd the infusion of such a particular soul , whence we became what we are . blind matter could never have seen her direct way to such a steady end : rash and heedless chance could never have cost senseless matter into such an orderly and wellcomplicated frame . be ever prais'd that adorable providence , which has design'd so large a portion of the creation to run in a direct track for the production of so mean a thing , so poor an atome of being ▪ ●● our selves , and our contemporary individuu●ns ▪ ●re . yet we have by this discourse gain'd a clear sight of what in common makes our individuation , and in what it consists , tho' the detail of it's particular ingredients be hid from us : we have learnt too that nothing but an all-comprehending wisdom and providence , which has plac'd us , tho' remotely , yet surely , in the rank of effects from the first constitution of the world , could have ripen'd nature so as to make us spring out of the seeds of our causes in our proper season . how unreasonable then and how short-sighted is our pride , which would persuade mankind , that any particular acquir'd endowments of dignity , progeny , beauty , or parts , particularly that the knowledge , in which some may excel others , do belong to our selves or our individuums , or essentially distinguish us from those of our own kind , who have not been so fortunate , or so blest by providence as we have been . i have done this , and i have done the other , thinks the proud boaster ; god has done this and the other by me , says the humble and wise christian. nay , if we reflect well , we shall find that we fall short of being even common instruments : for , those owe only their motion and direction to the principal cause ; but we owe our being too to him , who makes use of us to bring about his infinitely-wise designs . none of those endowments , productions , or acquisitions are to be attributed to us as us. our substantial individuation anteceded those ornamental accessories ; for we must be this , ere we could thus act , or be thus qualify'd . nay , there is not one of those superadded accidents , whether intrinsecal or extrinsecal , that furbisht up our individuum , and fitted it to act for the ends of the world 's great governour , but requir'd as vast a chain of precedent causes as our individuum it self . our nurses show'd us one fine thing after another ; which , that we might pick and glean notions out of them by our senses , we look'd wistly upon , and long'd to handle them . we put them to our mouths , and knockt them against other things , as if we had a mind to know how they tasted or sounded . and , after we had perus'd them so long till we had suckt all the knowledge out of them they could afford us ; we straight grew weary of them , threw them away , and cry'd for some new thing we had never seen before ; which we us'd in the same manner as we did the former , to enlarge our little stock of simple apprehsnsions , which are the elements of our natural knowledge . then they began to name the things they show'd us ; and by , their continual tattle , they fram'd our tongues , and instructed our lisping vocal organs to imitate them ; and so taught us by degrees to prattle and ask for those things we needed . growing up , we came by little and little , to compound those simple thoughts or notions , which we had acquir'd , into iudgments ; and were deliver'd over from our natural instructers to the discipline of schoolmasters ; and , in process of time , we began to converse with the learned part of the world by their books and verbal discourses ; whence we become tinctur'd with their thoughts concerning the several natures of things , and the rules of art , 〈…〉 which we stor'd up in the repository of our memory .. when we were thus furnisht with fit matter , and some forms of discoursing , new occasions and circumstances joyn'd those previous and preparatory knowledges , with which we were pre●…u'd , to our present thoughts ; which dispositions had ( even to every single particular ) been fore●aid in us thro' the whole course of our former life ; ●nd , working in us according to our natural genius , 〈…〉 our individual pitch of rationality , were the adequate cause of that peculiar turn of writing and discoursing , in which we differ from other scholars . now , each of those assistants of ours which contributed to this effect were , themselves , individuums too ; and , consequently , had as far-fetcht , and as ancient a descent of causes , to make them be what they are , as our selves had : and the same may be said of those circumstances , by which those several informations come to be apply'd from time to time to our knowing faculty ; which , how little , for the most part , they are in our power to foresee , lay or prevent , every reflecter knows . so , that , that maxim of the stoicks , [ agimur , non agimus ] seems in a manner ( tho' not in their sense ) appliable to the wisest of us . we do all of us act indeed , by our natural powers , which were given us by our good maker at first ; yet those meer powers could not have exerted themselves into action at all , nor have been useful to us , unless order had been taken , by the same goodness , to determine them to perform this or that action in particular , or to act after such a manner ; and this by a course of causes impossible to be laid , or carry'd on by any in by the same great governour of the world. when i set my self to speculate or write , do i know before hand what new thoughts i shall have , or what ●● former thoughts will dictate to me ? not one j●● . the present circumstances do , indeed set those thought i had got on work , and level them at such an object : but the disposal of them rationally depends ●● millions of unseen causes , preordain'd to bring ●● about ; which 't is impossible for us to recollect , or ●● give any account of them . whence , [ a joue principium ] is but a scanty acknowledgement of our intire dependence on god for every step our soul takes towards knowledge ; ( and the same discourse holds as to our acquiring virtue : ) and only beseems some heathen , who had but half-lights of a deity . the progress and conduct of every act of ours , towards both it's immediate , and it 's ultimate , end and perfection , do , all of them , spring from the giver of every good and perfect gift , as well as the beginning of it . this soveraign cause , is , as well in natural as supernatural effects , principium , rector , dux , semita , terminus idem . nay , every least manner of action , as far as it is good ( as well as the action it self ) is not only determin'd but proportion'd to it's proper end by his universal superintendency . therefore right reason and true philosophy , as well as st. paul's sublime faith and divinity , do oblige us to catechize and ask our selves , quid ●abes quod non accepisti ? quod si accepisti , quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis ? 't is vain and false philosophy then , and not the true one , which begets that ( miscall'd ) science , which does inflare , or puff ●●●n up with a self-assuming pride . philosophy were ●●● philosophy , did it not bring us to true science ; ●●● science would not be science , did it not refund ●●●●cts into their genuine causes ; and , consequently , ●●●ry action of ours ( as far as it is good and not defective ) into that supreme and first cause in whom we live , move , and have our being . hence , also ▪ is seen how powerfully true science conduces to ●ake men virtuous ; for , by seeing thus evidently ●●r total dependence on god , and how little we ●●● do of our selves , it reads us a solid and most effectual lecture of profound humility ; which is the ground of all virtue , and the basis of all our spiritual building . at least , ( i say ) we have thro' god's assistance , gain'd by our former discourse , a certain , tho' something confus'd knowledge of what we are as to our particulars ; and a clear discernment of what kind we are ; viz an intelligent and rational being . let us follow then , and comply with what we undoubtedly know : let us not degenerate from our nature , and then we may be sure we shall not wrong our creation , nor offend our great creatour . let us cultivate ●●● reason ; and extirpate it's enemy , passion . let us love truth , our best natural perfection ; and pursue it by making use of those means which are most proper to attain it . to do this as we ought , let us not precipitate our assent rashly ; but warily , and wisely suspend , till self-evidence of our principles , and evidence of our deductions appear ; only which can secure our steps from stumbling into errour . while we take this way , we may hope in the same good providence which has led us on hitherto , to grow fit to comprehend higher truths ; till we ascend by those gradual approaches , as by the step● of jacob's ladder , to reach heaven ; and attain the blissful ssght of him who is truth it self ; which only can satisfie fully our inquisitive and infinitely capacious understanding . chap. vi. some preliminaries fore-lay'd in order to demonstrate the immortality of the soul . . tho' man be but one thing , as was prov'd , chap. . § . . and ch. . § . . ●●r we cannot but make diverse conceptions of him as he is man , according to those different na●●●es or parts found in him , call'd ●●●l and body . this needs no farther proof , it being granted by all ; insomuch as some will ●●eds make them two distinct things . and is ●●●her prov'd . for , since , as has been demon●●rated above , the soul is the form ( or act ) of the body ; and we cannot but have different notions or conceptions of act and power ; it follows , that we cannot but have different notions or conceptions of the soul and the body . . preliminary ii. whence follows , that we may , and must have different notions , or conceptions , of every operation of man , as ●● is man. for , since every man , tho' one thing , yet has two different natures in him , of which he consists ; and every thing is that of which it consists ; and operates or acts as it is ; it follows , that every operation of man , as well as himself , is of vastly different natures and partakes of both ; and , consequently , we can , and are oblig'd , to have diverse conceptions of every such operation , for the same reason for which we must have diverse conceptions of those natures themselves : that is , we can find somewhat in such operations that is proper or peculiar to one of those natures , and not proper or peculiar to the other . hence i proceed closer to my main thesis , to be demonstrated in my next chapter , viz. . if we can find by evident reflexion , that there is somewhat in the operations which man has according his soul that is above the nature of matter ; or , above quantity , which is the common affection of all corporeal nature ; and , therefore , that is indivisible , or ( which is the same ) indissoluble or incorruptible ; it must follow demonstratively , that then , that part of man call'd his soul , is immaterial , incorruptible , or immortal . in order to demonstrate which , we proceed with our preliminaries . . preliminary iii. there are three distinct operations of man according to his soul , as 't is intellective or knowing ; viz. simple apprehension , iudging , and discoursing . this i think , is granted by all , and is easily prov'd . for , we must first , lay hold of that which we are to work upon ; or take into out mind that of which we are to iudge or discourse , ( that is , have a notion of it ) ; for , otherwise , we should iudge and discourse of we know not what ▪ wherefore that operation call'd simple apprehension , or the having the notion of the thing in our mind , is clearly antecedent to the other two ; and , consequently , distinct from them . again , [ discoursing ] does clearly presuppose some iudgments already had , and assented to , ere we can deduce any thing out of them by discourse ; since we must necessarily iudge our premisses true , ere we can hope to derive their truth to another proposition , or deduce any thing ▪ out of them by our reason ; which manifests a perfect distinction between the operations of discoursing and iudging . 't is therefore evident , that there are three distinct operations of man according to that part call'd the soul , as 't is intellective or knowing ; call'd simple apprehension , iudging and discoursing . . preliminary iv. the notion of ( created ) ens or thing abstracts from , or is indifferent to existence and non-existence ; and ( a fortieri ) to all manner of existence , corporeal or spiritual , in re or in intellectu , and therefore it is capable of either . the first part is evident from the very sense of the word : for in the signification of the word which expresses any created being , as peter , michael , a stone , a man , &c. we find nothing at all of being or not-being , either exprest or imply'd : again , we can truly say of any individuum , ( which is properly a thing ) v. g. of peter , that he is newly dead , or of wood , that 't is turn'd into fire ; which signifies , that those things call'd [ peter ] and [ wood ] were before , and now are not ; which could not with truth be said , unless those things were indifferent to being and not-being , or capable of either . . preliminary v. the form cannot be in the subject , but it must make it formally of his own nature : v. g. rotundity cannot be in any subject , but it must make it round ; nor can any quantity or quality , v. g. the quantity of a yard , or whiteness , be in a thing , but they must make it a yard long , and white , as the nature of that quantity and colour is . this is self-evident ; for to be a yard long or white , is to have such a length or such a colour in it . nor , for the same reason can any particular nature be in any thing , but it must make that thing be of such a nature . . preliminary vi. a notion or conception may either be consider'd subjectively ; as it is an operation of the mind , affecting it , and receiv'd in it as in it's subject ; or objectively , as that about which the mind , when it has that notion , is employ'd , as it 's object , or the thing known . this is a manner self-evident . for , an operation of a knowing power cannot be , but there must be something known ; nor can a thing be known without an actual knowledge of it . . preliminary vii . whatever is known by the soul , or is the object of our knowledge , must either it self be in the soul , or else some similitude or representation of it . this also is in a manner self-evident . for , in case neither it self , nor any thing like it be there when we know it , 't is impossible to imagine any reason why our knowledge should be of it rather than of another thing distinct from i● ; which must necessarily confound all our knowledges whatever . again , since the power of knowing is of it self indifferent to the knowing this or another ; 't is impossible to conceive how this indifferent power should be determin'd to know this rather than another , unless either this object be it self in that knowing power , that is , in the mind ; or something that resembles or represents it . . preliminary viii . notions taken objectively , are the things themselves , existing in our mind intellectually , and not the similitude , or representation of them only . this may be presum'd to be an establisht maxim , having been prov'd by so many demonstrations in my second preliminary in solid philosophy asserted , none of which have been hitherto answer'd by the modern ideists , tho' nothing more nearly concern'd them . notwithstanding , i shall add this farther proof of it . words are meant to express that which is in our mind ; that is , to express our conceptions or notions ▪ taken objectively , which therefore ( thus taken ) are the thing meant . but that which is meant by the words , is the thing it self ; therefore that which is in our notion , or the object of it , is the thing it self . to prove the minor , let us put this proposition , [ there is a similitude of the thing it self in our mind ; ] and then reflect , that since we understand what 's meant by all th●se words , we have a notion of each of those words in our minds . hence i argue ; therefore there is in our notion not only what 's meant by the word similitude ] , but also what 's meant by the words , [ the thing it self ; ] for those words are parts of the proposition . but what is meant by the words [ the thing it self ] cannot be any other but the very thing conceived by us ; therefore the very thing is in our notion or conception when we intelligently speak that proposition . this is farther enforced , because in this proposition , what 's meant by the words [ the thing it self ] is relatively oppos'd to the similitude or representation of the thing , as is evident to every reflecter : therefore , what 's meant by the words [ the thing it self ] cannot possibly be the same that is meant by the word [ similitude ] , which is formally opposite to it . whence those who deny the thing is in our minds , do at the same time unawares , confess it is there ; since they put what 's meant by [ thing it self , ] over and above what 's meant by the word [ similitude ] to be there . nor were these words [ the thing it self ] ever us'd by mankind , ( especially when they speak dogmatically ) to signifie a similitude of the thing . lastly , if we have only similitudes of what 's meant by our words ; then since , ( as they will have it ) the words [ thing it self ] signifie only a similitude of the thing ; by the same reason , the word [ similitude ] , which is found also in that proposition , must mean a similitude of a similitude ; of which who can make any sense ? . but to put this out of all doubt by argu●… unanswerably from their own concession ; let us abstract any particular notion of the thing from the rest , and we shall see clearly , that every similitude consists in the unity or identity of some form or act ( whether essential o● accidental ) which is found in the things said to be alike . for example : if two things be alike in quantity , or length , v. g. each of them a yard ; all mankind will say , that the same length or the same quantity is ●…nd in each of them . if two walls be alike 〈…〉 colour , or both of them white ; we truly say they are of the same colour . if two sons be alike ●● their relation to one common father , they ●● truly said to have the same relation , or to be 〈…〉 of them sons . if two things be perfectly 〈…〉 in - figure , v. g. both of them triangular , we truly affirm they are of the same figure . if alike in nature , ( v. g. manhood ) they are truly said to be of the same nature . for , since we consider them under such a precise notion , and no other , and they do not at all differ under that notion ; this discourse is as self-evident , as 't is , that a ●●rd is a yard , that whiteness is whiteness , a 〈…〉 is a son , a triangle is a triangle , or a man ●● a man. and , in case these , or any other , hap not to be the same , 't is because they fall short of being perfectly alike under that consideration or respect , or that some other respect is mingled with it . hence i argue : since our soul works by abstracted notions , and conceives the thing now under one notion or respect , now under another ; and 't is granted that our soul has ▪ ● likeness to the thing , as far as she conceives it ▪ or has a notion of it ; and , by having such a likeness of it , she must ( by § . . ) be truly denominated like it ; it follows with equal evidence as it did in the former instances here mentioned , that there is also an unity , identity , or sameness in the mind with the thing , ( as far as 't is conceiv'd ; ) which , according to it 's proper and natural manner of existing , is without us ; and that the thing without us , as far as 't is thus inadequately and precisely conceiv'd , is the same with the thing existing in our conception or notion . whence follows , ( by the same evidence ) that our mind ▪ consider'd precisely as knowing the thing ; and , by knowing it , being like it ; is the same with the thing known , or truly ( after an intellectual manner ) that thing . by which we may see how true , tho' scandalous to men of fancy , that saying of aristotle is , that [ anima intelligendo fit omnia : ) and why he adds the word [ quodammodo ] to hint to us the different manner of being it has in the understanding from that which it has in re . . corollary i. hence we may collect , that that saying , [ every like is not the same ] , is only true when the things are not perfectly alike , but are unlike to ▪ one another in some other respect or consideration ; and that it cannot be meant that they are not the same under that respect in which they are perfectly alike ; this being , as was shown , contrary to the sentiment and language of all mankind . now , 't is impossible , that being ( as is granted ) alike , they should not be perfectly alike when we speak of them ( as we here do ) according to some one precise respect ; every respect or notion we have being indivisible , and shut up concisely within it's own bounds ; so that it cannot admit any unlikeness in another respect , every inadequate notion ( as ours are ) being but one single respect of the thing . wherefore the meaning of that saying is generally this , that it does not follow they are the same thing , or the same according to the notion of thing , because they are alike according to the respect or notion of some mode or accident , which is not the notion of thing , but another ; which we easily grant without the least prejudice to our argument ▪ which proceeds upon likeness in such a precis● respect and no other ; ( which therefore cannot but be a perfect likeness ) and thence infers an identity or unity in that respect only . . corollary ii. this identity which our abstracted notion or conception has to the thing in part , hinders not , but forces , that the whole thing is in our mind intellectually , tho' our conception be but of one abstracted considerability found in it : only the whole is there but confusedly , as that to which that metaphysical part belongs ; and that part distinctly , as the peculiar object of our inadequate conception of it . in the same manner , as when we see or touch one part of a man , v. g. his face or hand , we truly say we see or touch that man , or him ; which words signifie the whole man. for , since the word [ part ] must mean a part of something , that is of the whole to which it relates ; [ a part of the whole , ] signifies the same as [ the whole in part. ] again , since ( as was demonstrated , ch. . § . . ) there are no actual parts in any compound whatever ; and , therefore , all operations of our minds , as well as all actions and passions in nature , are of the suppositum , or subject , and exercis'd upon other suppositums , or subjects , when we know them : hence , to know some part of the thing is to know the whole thing materially , tho' it be only one part of it formally , expressly , and distinctly . whence is seen how solid our way of philosophizing is ; being entirely built on the thing it self , whose essence is establisht by the first being ▪ and not on any fantastick similitude of it , elicited by our soul , or coyn'd by our fancy . . it were not amiss for the more perfect satisfaction of every reader , who is even of an ordinary capacity to borrow here one of those demonstrations from my second preliminary aforesaid , it being at once clearly convictive and very easie. 't is this , [ we can never know the thing certainly by a resemblance of it , unless we know certainly that that pretended resemblance is like it , or truly resembles it : nor can we possibly know with certainty that it resembles it , but by comparing the resemblance with the thing , as we do all ▪ copies with their originals , and all originals with their prototypes . nor can we thus compare them together , without having the thing too , as well as the resemblance , in our comparing power ; that is , in our mind , or understanding . the thing it self then must be in our mind , to be there compar'd with the resemblance of it ; or otherwise , the resemblance or similitude can never be known to be ●ike the thing ; and , so , can never make us certainly know it , nor do us any good. and , if the thing be there , what needs a similitude of it to know it ; since to be in a knowing power is to be known . i am to expect it will be apprehended and objected that i much wrong my cause by putting so much stress upon the thing 's being really in the understanding as an object , it being so hard to be conceiv'd , or unlikely to be granted but by a very few . to which i answer : . first , that this tenet is the basis of all philosophy in the world that is solid , and that , besides my many demonstrations in the place lately cited , and some here also , which evince it , innumerable others may be added to make good that thesis ; divers of which may perhaps occur hereafter . the reasons why many witty men are so prejudic'd against this tenet , are chiefly three . first , because they do not distinguish between those different questions [ an est ] , and [ quid o● [ quomodo est . ] and thence , because they cannot comprehend what the nature of a spiritual operation is , or conceive how this is done ; they will needs conclude it is not done at all , or cannot be done . but how void of common reason this inference is , is obvious to every ordinary reflecter . when we see a thing a-far off , we know , that it is , tho' we know not yet what is is . the rudest vulgar knows that there are sun , moon , and stars ; but they are utterly ignorant what they are . again , we all of us know most certainly , that the loadstone attracts iron ; and that we move our hands and feet , &c. but very few of these all do perfectly comprehend how this is done . now , 't is only the [ an est ] of the things being in our mind , or [ that it is there ] which is in question here ; for 't is only this which we strive to evince , and not the [ quid est ] of that spiritual operation , or how this is perform'd ; which perhaps is beyond any man's skill in this state. the second reason is , because they do not distinguish between the indivisible or spiritual manner of existing which things have in the soul and the proper manner of existing they have i● themselves , as they are out of it : whereas , ( by § . . ) what 's meant by the word [ thing ] , or the notion of it , abstracts from both , is indifferent to both , and consequently , can have both ▪ or either of them . and , 't is also evident hence , that 't is granted by all who hold a first being , that the essences of all things , ( and amongst them , of bodies ) and consequently those things themselves , were , and are in the divine intellect after a spiritual manner ; and yet they exist in themselves after a manner quite different from the other . whence , it being only asserted by us , that they are in our mind after a spiritual manner , their objection is wholly grounded on their confounding those two manners of being , which are most vastly , and indeed contradictorily different . nor have they any way to confute our assertion but by producing some metaphysical arguments to evince that things cannot possibly have two such manners of being ; which we are confident they can never do . on the contrary , we cannot but judge we have unanswerably demonstrated our affirmative , that they can have such different manners of existing , and actually have them . the third reason of their dissatisfaction is , that such objecters do not guide their thoughts by regarding the connexion of terms in propositions or discourses ; in which , and by which only , truth is clearly and certainly to be found ; but by customary . impressions on the fancy , begetting dive●s phantasms there ; which being taken from material or corporeal objects , must needs be very unsutable to spiritual operations ; nor , consequently ▪ can they any more enable us to judge of spiritual natures , unassisted by reflexion and reason connecting our notions , than a blind man is able to judge of colours . let then these gentlemen correct their thoughts as to these three faults , and they will quickly see what a puzzle they will be at to frame any objection against this thesis that will hang together ; and , on the other side , what a struggle it will cost them to solve , with any show of reason , the connexion of the terms which gives force to those demonstrations that pretend to evince this great and most important truth . . my second answer to those who dislike my making use of , and relying upon , such an abstruse point , is , that many , if not most of my following demonstrations will equally conclude the immateriality of the soul , even according to the opinion of those who hold that only similitudes of the thing are in our understanding when we know it , as they will , according to our thesis , that the thing it self is after a spiritual manner there . wherefore , since ( by § . . ) knowledge must necessarily be perform'd by one of those ways or by the other , it will far more conduce to the evincing this main and fundamental point , by showing that my demonstrations do conclude , which soever of these hypotheses my readers hap to embrace . i add , that having thorowly study'd that point , which some men think is so abstruse , and seeing evidently , to the very best of my judgment , that no objecter ever did this ; and withall , that that point is demonstrable , nay already demonstrated ; and that no objection can , with true reason , be brought against it ; hence i conceiv'd that i ought not to lose the just advantages which that true thesis gave me to conclude such a grand position as is the immortality of the soul , ( on the truth of which all religion fundamentally depends ) meerly because many dislike it , but neither well know , nor can give any good reason why ; as none i have yet heard of ever gave any ▪ chap. vii . of the immateriality , and , consequently , the immortality of man's soul . . that subject is evidently immaterial , which works , is affected , or has objects in her after an immaterial manner ; that is , after such a manner as is impossible to be found in material or quantitative things . but such is that subject call'd man's soul , in respect of her operations , and of the objects in her : therefore the soul is immaterial . the major is evident ; for , were the subject divisible , or had quantitative parts , whatever mode or object affects it or is received in it , must be receiv'd in some part , or other , of that divisible subject ; for , if it be in no part of it , it would not affect it at all . and if it effects or be received in some part of that divisible subject , it must be divisible , and , consequently extended , as that part is which receiv'd it . the minor , which proves the contrary , is hence demonstrated ; because it is * perfect nonsense to think that knowledge , which is the proper operation of the soul , is of such a nature as can be measur'd by any material extension . this will be farther demonstrated by innumerable arguments . and , first , by those drawn from the nature of knowledge in common . . demonstration ii. if the knowledge which the soul has were in her after a divisible , material , or quantitative manner , and , consequently her self were divisible and quantitative ; then , the extent of that quantity being finite , the more knowledge she gains , the nearer she would approach to being full ; and so , be less able to hold or contain mor● . whereas , on the contrary , we find by experience , that the more knowledge the soul has in her already , she is so far from becoming fuller , that her capacity is by that means enlarg●d , and she is enabled to take in still more and more . but this is directly against the nature of a material , that is , a divisible or quantitative capacity that is finite , as is most manifest ; since the least quantity takes up some space , or room , of this finite container ; and , so , still lessens the capacity of holding as much as it could before . therefore , the soul is of a quite contrary , or rather contradictory nature to the capacities of quantitative or material subjects , and by consequence she is evidently immaterial . . demonstration iii. that which has innumerable other natures in her , without altering or destroying it's own natural constitution , is evidently immaterial . but the soul has innumerable other natures in her , ( by preliminary . and . ) without altering or destroying her own ; there●●●● the soul is immaterial . the major is evident , ●ecause many new peculiar natures or complex●●ns of accidents , advening to the constitution of the former material thing , must needs affect it accordingly , and give it as many new modifications and determinations as there are accidents i● it : since , these ( by prelim. . ) must each of them impart to the subject it 's formal effect , and as much alter it's nature , as water does wine , or aloes does honey ; much more when multitudes of these complexions of accidents are jumbled together , they would scarce leave to that material entity any remnant or show of it's former self ; but quite pervert , efface and de●roy it's proper temperament or constitution . again , those various complications of accidents must make the soul , were she material , to be of so many several kinds , and consequently to be many corporeal individuums ; which would make her the most monstrous chimera imaginable ; and destroy her unity and entity both . nay , since all those notions which are ( taking them objectively ) those natures and modes , do ( ●s will be demonstrated hereafter ) remain still in the soul , many of which are contrary and in●●nsistent ; and , must impart to her , were she material , their formal effect ; or make and denominate her such as their several natures are : whence she would be at once rare and dense , hot and cold , ( and this too in the highest , and also in the lowest degree ) long and short , and of all different quantities ; black and white , and of all different colours , moist and dry ; round , square , triangular , and of all figures ; nay , at once virtuous , and vicious ; knowing and ignorant ; since she has the notions or natures of all these in her . the minor is prov'd , ( by § . , , ▪ ) where it was demonstrated that by having notions of the things according to all these modes , she has these modes themselves in her : which how impossible it is they should be all at once in a material subject , common sense shows every man. . demonstration iv. hence 't is clearly evinced , that none of those things , natures , or modes , which the soul has in her by knowing them , is an intrinsecal affection , mode or determination of the soul it self , as are her faculties , thoughts , judgments , discourses , affections , and such like , which do properly belong to her own nature . whence follows , that when they are in the soul by her knowing them , they are there tanquam aliud , as another , or as distinct from her : and therefore , that [ knowing ] is the becoming another thing , as 't is distinct from the knower ; which , ( tho' , perhaps few reflect on it ) is no more in true sense , than what we familiarly say , that 't is an object of the knowing power , or the thing known ; for the words [ object ] , and [ thing known ] , do import a relative opposition , and consequently distinction from the knower as such . how this piece of doctrine may ( in part ) conduce to the explication of the most b. trinity , may appear in due season ; by showiag , that the opposition and distinction according to the notion of relation , does not hinder , but rather , in our case , induce the unity of nature in the knower and thing known . . demonstration v. that tenet must necessarily be false which is contrary to the natural notions and language of all mankind ; not excepting even atheists themselves , who deny spiritual beings . but such is the tenet of the soul's materiality : therefore that tenet must necessarily be false . the major is prov'd ; because all our knowledge , and all the truths we have naturally , are built on our natural notions as on their ground . the minor is thus manifested : it is nonsense according to the natural sentiments and language of all mankind , to ask of any particular knowledge , ( for example , of our knowledge that two and three make five ) how big , or of what quantity or extension it is ; v. g. whether it be an inch , or a yard long , whether it be thus broad or thick : as also , whether it be rare or dense ? whether it be as hard as a stone , or as soft as butter ? what figure it is of ? whether square , round , cylindrical or octogone ? whether it be white or black , or of some middle colours ? whether it be diaphanous or opacous ? whether it sends out effluviums or particles of it's own nature , or no ? what kind of place will fit it ? whether the parts it has do stand erect , or lean sloping , or lie flat ? how we are to act upon it by another body's smart impulse , shattering it's parts asunder , or pressing them close , or tearing them off by little and little ? &c. now 't is such nonsense to all sober mankind , tho' never so sceptical , to ask such questions , that it looks like meer gibberish , or the playing at cross-purposes ; and would make the asker , if he do it seriously , be held a mad-man ; whereas yet it would not be thought at all absurd to ask , at least many of these , concerning any material being whatever . 't is given us then and granted by the free and ingenuous acknowledgement of all mankind , guiding themselves by their nature-taught notions , that this operation of our soul , call'd knowledge , which is most natural to her , ( and , consequently , that her nature it self , ) is vastly different from that of material or quantitative beings , that is , immaterial . . thus far of knowledge in common . what light is afforded us to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul from all her several sorts of operations mention'd ch. . § . . will be seen hereafter . we proceed now to examine the several objects of the soul's first operation , or her several sorts of notions ; which are comprehended in those ten general heads call'd ten predicaments . these notions are adequately divided into two general kinds , viz. absolute and respective : i say , adequately , it being impossible for us to have any conception which is not either the one or the other . of these , the modes or accidents , which take up the nine last predicaments , are , all of them respective to the thing or substance , which they one way or other modifie ; because we cannot conceive a mode or manner which modifies nothing ; ( which is the literal sense of that saying of the schools , [ accidentis essentia est inhaerentia ; ] ) and the notion of thing , or as the schools call it substance , being that which is capable of being , or , which is the same , a power to existence : it follows , that the notion of thing relates to its act , existence ; and that the ens or substance , which is capable to be , or is the power to be , does respect it as such . whence follows , that existence has no respect at all , in the line of ens , to any other notion whatever that perfects it , there being none more actual than it self is ; nor has it any reference or order to any thing but to god , our creatour ; who is the immediate cause of it ; on whom only it depends , and whom only , of all our natural notions , for it's indivisibility , simplicity , and actuality , it most resembles . from which discourse 't is clearly seen , that existence or actual being is the only absolute notion we have , and that all the rest , either immediately ( as ens ) or mediately , ( as the modes of ens or accidents ) are respective to it. to begin then with the only absolute notion ; [ existence ] , i argue thus . . demonstration vi. that subject is indivisible or immaterial that has objects in her which are every way indivisible , ( by § . . ) . but , the soul , when she has in her the abstract notion of existence , has an object in her which is every way indivisible : therefore the soul it self is indivisible or immaterial . that the soul has the notion of existence in her , is evident by experience ; for we know , nay cannot but know , that we have the notion of what 's meant by the word [ is ; ] since without this we could neither affirm nor deny . and , 't is farther demonstrable , because the soul has no notion at all in it but t●●o ' it , or in order to it : for the ens or thing , with all it's complexion of modes in it , which constitute the individuum , is no more formally but a meer power to existence ; and every power is nothing but a kind of order , degree , or step towards it's act ; nay , 't is so confus'd a notion , staying in the notion of meer power , that 't is no way distinctly intelligible without some order to the act , from which all distinct knowledge in our mind , proceeds . and , that the notion of this most distinct and most perfect act , call'd [ existence ] , is every way indivisible , is evident ▪ for , it cannot be divisible quantitatively , or physically , ( that is materially ; ) since all such division is done by way of local motion , that is , by degrees , or part after part ; whereas there are no degrees , or part after part in the notion of meet existence . we no sooner alter the actual being of a thing , but we destroy it , and make it not-bee ? nor is there any middling or gradual passage from the one to the other ; it being impossible a thing should half-be , half-not-be , or ( which is the same ) neither be , nor not bee . again , even in material things , existence presupposes all the matter , quantity , and the complexion of all the modes which constituted the individuum , nay , it presupposes too all the motions that anteceded and terminated the precedent operation of natural agents , which caus'd the perfect determination of the matter , or power to be this thing , which fitted it for existence , and fixt the thing in actual being , as is shown above , ch. . § . . nor is the notion or nature of existence divisible metaphysically , by our framing different conceptions of it as we do of other objects ; for , being in it's self most simple , 't is impossible it should afford us ground to make different notions of it ; as appears by this , that no wit of man can invent or assign a genus or a difference for it , nor consequently resolve it into metaphysical parts by defining it : therefore the notion of existence is every way indivisible ; and , consequently it 's subject , the soul , is also indivisible and immaterial . . we come now to consider those notions which are respective : which directs us in the first place to re●●ect what a respect ( in common ) means , or is ; and whether it can be any material thing or mode of thing ; or can be represented by a material similitude . a respect then is an order , reference , or a kind of alliance which one thing or mode has to another . now who sees not that such a thing as respect is not to be found , nor has any place in material nature ? there are nothing in the material world but such and such individual bodies ; each of which has it's own distinct complexion of accidents , by which it is aparted and distinguisht from all others ; is independent on them , and enjoys it 's proper existence and subsistence . each stands on it's own bottom , without having any thing to do with any other . whence comes then this general nature ( as it w●re ) of being respective to others , which we observe is found in all the notions which belong to all the last nine predicaments ? it is certain , that all our notions ( except that of existence ) are of this respective nature , as appears by all their definitions . the modes or accidents do respect the thing or substance , as a kind of form , which makes it be such , or of such ● manner , as they are apt to determine and denominate it ; and the thing is capable to exist , and so respects existence as it's act or perfection : but tho' we run over the whole beadroll of individuums in the world , we find nothing in any of them which answers to the word respect . each thing is what it is ; and it's accidents or modes are the accidents of that thing , and of no other ; or respect no other thing but that which is their proper subject : and there are in nature nothing but particular substances and their accidents ; nor have we ( except the absolute notion of existence ) any other natural notions . there is indeed found in them what grounds , or gives the reason why they should be referr'd to another or respect it , when they are put together in a comparing power . but where is this reasoning faculty , or comparing power found in matter , by which we consider , build upon , and make use of this ground or reason ; or , which is attentive to lay hold of this reason why it ought to be referr'd , and make things actually respect one another ; and thence actually denominate them genera or species , predicate or subject , inherent , that is , dependent for their being , or independent , which we call subsistent : this notion of actual respect then is not to be found in any of the lordships , territories , or purlews of material nature . hence i argue . . that subject which has affections or determinations in her which are no where found in matter , is immaterial : but the soul is the subject of such operations or affections , ( viz. actual respects . ) therefore the soul is immaterial . . demonstration viii . we come now to quantity , and we discourse thus . we have clearly a notion of a yard , or of a mile , &c. and have truly in our mind the meaning of those words , and the meaning of them is a real yard , and a real mile , and not a similitude of them only . we can also define a yard and a mile ; and , therefore , since a definition tells us the essence of a thing , we have , consequently , in our souls the essence or nature of those determinate quantities ; whence the essence or nature of those quantities must be in our minds first , otherwise we should define we know not what . wherefore , since ( by ch. ● . . ) the form denominates and makes a thing such as it self is ; when the nature of a yard or mile is in the soul , it must make our soul a yard or a mile long , if this were done after the manner of things made of matter : whence , o●● soul would be extended a vast way out of our body . nay , since she has some kind of notion of the immense expansion of the heavens ; and by reflexion multiplying it , ( as she easily may ) ▪ can also have a notion of a million of times more , she would stretch her self to a kind of ubiquity . but , waving the thesis of the thing 's being really in our minds as an object when she knows it , and allowing or supposing that when we know it , there is only a similitude or resemblance of it there ; i would ask ▪ what can there be in matter that can resemble a yard , after the manner we find in material or corporeal things , unless it self be , some way or other , a yard long. it must be some sort of quantity that can do this ; for otherwise it is quite different from it , and so can no way resemble it ; and , if it be some quantity , and yet it self be not a yard long , it must necessarily be either more than a yard , or less than a yard : and how can that which is more than a yard or less than a yard , represent this precise and distinct quantity of a yard ; which would not be it self , were it never so little either more or less than it is . as certain then as it is ▪ that a yard is a yard , or is it self , so certain it is that nothing does or can resemble it materially , but another yard ; which ( as is lately seen ) is in our case most absurd and impossible . i remember i prest this demonstration in the year . against a very civil and ingenious gentleman , who was a scholar of mr. hobbs's ; he reply'd , that the least quantity imaginable might represent the greatest ; instancing in the scale of miles in maps . i answer'd , that ' ere we can say , [ this very little quantity shall stand for a very great one , ] or , this inch shall stand for five or ten miles , we must have the exact and full notions of inch and mile , in our minds antecedently ; otherwise we could never proportion them ; nor could we even understand what the scale of miles meant , if we had not in our understanding what is meant by the word [ mile , ] that is , a real mile ; for , ( as is here prov'd ) even the similitudes of a mile must be such . and so the question returns , and we are but where we were . 't is most evident then , that we cannot possibly have in our minds either the nature or the similitude of a mile , after the manner it is found in matter . wherefore , it is in us , quite otherwise , that is , immaterially . and , since it has not this manner of being from the things which are without us , ( for there it is divisibly or extendedly ) it follows necessarily , that it has it from it's new subject , the soul ; and , consequently , that the soul , which imparts to the nature of quantity such an indivisible manner of being , is it self immaterial . . demonstration ix . from that kind of continu'd quantity , now spoken of , which is permanent , we come to consider that other sort of continu'd quantity , which is successive , call'd motion . this succession or motion , tho' it has it's degrees of slowness or vel●city ; yet , while it endures , as it is in matter or nature , it flows or goes on in one even undistinguisht tenour , without any butts or bounds terminating it here or there . now , for instance , let 's consider this regular motion of the heavens , or of the sun , call'd time ; and we shall find , that we have notions of such parts of it , call'd an hour , a day , a year , an age , &c. distinct from any other quantity of it , as much as we have of any two individual things which are most perfectly distinguisht in nature . wherefore , since this motion , call'd time , as it is in material nature , has no such actual distinction of it's parts ; plainest reason assures us , that it has another different manner of being , as it is in the soul , than it has in matter ; for , in matter , it's parts were only potential , and utterly undistinguisht ; but in the soul they are all actual , and most exactly distinguisht . wherefore , since the manner of being they have in nature , is confessedly material ; it follows , that that contradistinct manner of being they have in the soul must forcibly be immaterial ; and , consequently , the soul it 's self , which gives them that vastly distinct manner of being , must necessarily it self be immaterial also . . demonstration x. divers other demonstrations might be drawn from the same head : i shall select ▪ one . no two parts of time , ( or of any other kind of motion ) as it is in re , or in material nature , can be present at once without a manifest contradiction ; for it would make some successive quantity to be simultaneous or unsuccessive ; but , in the mind many , and great portions of time are at once present : for we could not work interiously , or discourse of a day , v. g. or a year , by dividing , multiplying or proportioning their parts , if those parts were not all at once in our minds ; which , since , as was shown , they could not be as they are in material nature , they must therefore be there immaterially ; and , consequently , our mind , their subject , is immaterial . which is enforced by this , that both past and future parts of time exist in the soul when she has a notion of them ; whereas 't is direct contradiction to say they can actually exist in re or in matter : add , that our soul comprizes as much of time as she pleases in one notion , as a day , a year , &c. which remains there as steadily , and grounds all her notions about it as firmly , as if it were the most stable thing in nature . so that the very notion of succession is in the soul permanently , or unsuccessively ; which is directly contrary to it's nature as it passes in the material world. . demonstration xi . the same may be said of discrete quantity or number . there is nothing in nature but individuals , each of which is properly an ens , and consequently , unum ; and therefore , if we put a multitude , the unity they had in nature is lost ; since one cannot be many ; nor many , one ; and this is all the unity we find among individual beings as they are in matter , or out of the soul. now , when the soul takes many or more of these together ; she bundles up even those incommunicable , actual , and perfectly distinct individuums , at her pleasure ; and tho' they were never so many , she p●●ches upon what quantity of them she lists to take notice of , and gives even their singularit●●s a new sort of unity in her notion , which nature never gave them ; and calls this notion which comprizes them all three , ten , or a hundr●● , or what she pleas●s . which since it depends on her choice how many she will take of them , 't is evident , that this union was not given them by the being which they had in material nature . or out of the soul , where they were altogether distinct , and one of them has nothing to say to the other . and , let it be noted , that this union is not made , as universal notions are , by abstraction , or our leaving out the particular considerations belonging to the species or inferiour notion , and only taking in one common consideration found in them all , there being a fair ground in nature to consider them on that fashion ; but this colligation of many into one number is a kind of union of those whole individuums in despite of the multitude of their singularities ; and a reducing those things which are ultimately determin'd , distinct and stand aloof from one another , as they are in material nature , to a close unity ; compacted so indivisibly and indissolubly , that the least part added or detracted , that unity is specifically alter'd , and presently becomes another kind of number . lastly , which makes this point yet more evident ; we can have a material resemblance in our fancy of four , five , or some small number of natural things ; and have in our heads a kind of picture of them ( as it were ) standing all on a row. but 't is impossible for us to have such a lively , and exactly-just picture of a hundred , a thousand , a million , &c. so as to see clearly there is not one more or less ; and yet we experience that we can have most clear , distinct , and exact notions of these , as well as we can have of two or three ; nor do we look upon those great numbers by the eye of our understanding , as a confused heap or multitude , as it happens when we see a great croud of men standing together ; but with a clear and perfect discernment that they are just so many , not one more or less ; and this as easily as we can know four or five . since then , in the way of matter , nothing can resemble a thousand but a thousand , ( for the resembler must be some sort of number , otherwise it is not at all like it ; and , neither one more nor less ; that it is must it self be a thousand ) it follows , that the distinct and exact notions we have of very great numbers , is immaterial ; and , consequently , the soul , their subject , is such also . . demonstration xii . come we now to these notions which belong to the head of quality ; which , because they are innumerable , we will instance in two of them , sensible qualities , and figure . as for the first of these , if when we have the notion of a sensible quality , v. g. dry or moist , the thing or body thus affected be in our mind , and consequently the nature of those qualities , we have gain'd our point , and prov'd , it is in us immaterially , it being evidently impossible a thing should have two material manners of existing . nor can these qualities be there by some material representation or resemblance ; for what can resemble ▪ dryness or moistness ? whatever it be , it must be some other sensible quality ; for , otherwise , it would be utterly unlike it ; and the same would happen , were it a sensible quality belonging to some other sense than that of the touch , v. g. were it whiteness or fragrancy , which belong to the sight and smell . 't is evident then , that nothing but dryness it self can represent dryness materially . wherefore , it must either be said , that dryness it self is in the soul immaterially , or not at all ; and yet , that we have i● , in us , we are satisfi'd , in regard we have it in our notion , and can discourse of dryness it self . again , if dryness , moistness , and all other sensible qualities be in the soul materially when she knows them ; then , as they did in material nature affect their other material subject , according to the peculiar genius of each , ( by ch. . § . . ) so they must affect the soul too after the same manner , and make her materially dry and moist . and , moreover , since no notions are ever blotted out of the soul , she would also be at once , moist and dry , hot and cold , white , black , blue , green , and of all colours , rough and smooth , fragrant and stinking , diaphanous and opacous ; and imb●'d with a thousand other contrary qualities ; which finee they could not be all of them agreeable to any material nature , ( each of them having a peculiar constitution of it's own ) they must needs disorder , distemper , and corrupt it ; the effects of which the man must necessarily experience , if the most frincipal part of him , the soul , were made of matter ; and they would render the compound affected with many diseases : whereas yet none ever found himself in the least distemper'd , griev'd or pain'd ▪ by having in his mind the notions of all these opposite qualities , and ill-agreeing dispositions . . demonstration xiii . this is farther enforced , because , were the soul ( which is confest to be our knowing power ) material , all these opposite qualities , when they are in that power , or known , must be perpetually fighting , contrasting and expelling one another out of their subject ; at least they would refract one another's nature , and make it otherwise than it was , to some degree ; as they do in material things , or bodies . whereas we experience that they ami●ably cohabit in the soul ; and are so far from ( ●●pelling one another out of the knowing power , that they draw their contraries into it ; and each ●●tters one another as an object , and makes it more distinctly knowable ; according to that ●●●axim , contraria juxta se posita magis elucescunt . wherefore , since to put those sensible qualities ●ither themselves to be in our mind after the manner they are in matter , or as material similitudes of them , is in every respect such incon●●stent nonsense ; they must be in our soul im●aterially ; or ( which is the same ) our soul is ●n immaterial subject . . demonstration xiv . the same is demonstrated ( if possible ) more evidently from the notion of figure . for the soul has in her the figures of all things that ever enter'd into the senses , and can frame to her self millions of others ; nor is any thing that is once in her ( as will be prov'd ) ever blotted out of her , but ( while she is in this state and cannot work without the body ) they are reposited there habitually as it were , nor can be brought actually into play till re-excited . hence i argue thus : were these numberless figures in her materially , then each of them ( by prel . . ) must make the soul , their subject , such as themselves are ; wherefore the soul would be at once round ▪ square , triangular , quadrate , chiliagone , c●nical , cylindrical , &c. nay , but an inch long ▪ and yet at the same time as long as a yard , or a mile ; she having in her the natures or notions of all these . whence also , ( besides the manifest impossibility of such a position , ) those figures , interfering with one another , would , all of them , be defaced and blunder'd , and leave nothing but one confus'd and indeterminate figure , of which we could never have any notion : whereas yet 't is evident by experience that we have a clear and distinct notion of each of them ; and can judge and discourse about each of them as exactly as if we had none but that one figure in our mind . if it be reply'd by the atheists , that our soul being material , these figures may be in several parts of her ; besides the incredibility that the soul should have so many thousand several apartments in her , and that one of them should just light into that one part , and no other hit upon the same place and so confound that former ; we may , moreover , reflect that each of those figures are not represented to our mind in a small imperceptible extension , but in a very visible or large appearance ; and therefore , when there are so many thousands of them , their quantity , so often multiply'd , would be extended to a vast space beyond our body , as was shown above § . . wherefore it is concluded , that 't is absolutely impossible those figures , thus clearly and distinctly known , should be in our soul materially , or quantitatively , or as such qualities are in matter ; and that , therefore the soul , their subject , is necessarily immaterial . . demonstration xv. we experience that we 〈…〉 in us ▪ universal notions , or ●…er notions of an universal , 〈…〉 of man , body or ens in com●… ; and the same may be said of the summum genus of every accident or mode , viz. quantity , quality , &c. 〈…〉 their respective species . we find we can dis●…rse , nay write whole treatises of each of ●…ose universals , as such ; nay more , that each 〈…〉 them has a kind of unity belonging to it self , which it had not in nature , or matter , where ●ere is found nothing but individuums constituted and determin'd by such a complexion of accidents ; none of which are found in universals , which are indetermin'd and abstract from them all . therefore this manner of existence which universals ▪ have in the soul , is contrary to the nature of existing in matter ; and , consequently , both they and the soul , by which , and in which , universals have this manner of existence , are immaterial . . demonstration xvi . the same is clearly demonstrated from the soul's manner of working by abstract notions . for example , we can frame divers abstract notions or conceptions of the self-same individual thing ; v. g. a stone ; which we can consider as extended , hard , rough , cold , moist , heavy , round , &c. and thence have the abstract notions of quantity , hardness , roundness , &c. now , that which is signify'd by each of those words being materially the thing it self , ( in regard they have of their own nature no being , nor are capable of being of themselves alone ) and yet none of them being the whole thing ; it follows , that the thing , by being thus diversely conceiv'd , becomes evidently , some way or other , divided by our mind , or as it is there : for one of those parts after it is thus separated or divided by the mind is not , in the mind , another , since ▪ they are deny'd of one another : quantity is not weight , nor is roundness , roughness ; and the same may be said of all the rest . hence i argue . it is evident , that there is some kind of division of that whole thing made in our mind , when the thing is thus abstractedly , partially or inadequately conceiv'd : but this division is not made after a quantitative or material manner ; for those parts of body which are divided materially , do , after the division is made , exist apart in nature , and become so many wholes , as is manifest in a lump of earth or lead ; whereas these parts , thus separated by the soul , cannot exist at all but in the whole and by it's existence , having none of their own . therefore , this division made by the soul , conceiving the thing by piece-meal , is made after a manner not competent to material parts , or a material divider : wherefore , this manner of division , and , consequently , the soul , that made it , and is the subject in which 't is made , is of an immaterial nature . . demonstration xvii . this leads us to the second operation of our understanding , iudging ; which compounds again ▪ those thus-divided parts . iudging then is an actual referring or comparing the predicate to the subject , in order to see the truth or falshood in propositions ; which referring ( when either done interiourly in the mind , or exprest in words ) we call predicating ; whence also we ●…sely refer those predicates , which , as they 〈…〉 our minds , are diversely referrable to the s●…ect ; as is seen in the predicables of porphyrius . b●● this referring actually one notion or thing ●…other cannot be perform'd by matter , ( as is ●…'d above , § . , . ) where we argu'd from 〈…〉 notion of respect in common . again , all o●● predication is a composition , and such a one as answers to the division lately made , ( which it ●…upposes ) and therefore is of the same nature ●… ▪ but , that division ( as is prov'd § . . ) could not be made by a material agent ; nor , consequently , could this composition which answers ●o it , and is of the same nature , be made by such an agent . therefore the soul , in which this composition is made , is immaterial . of this metaphysical composition and division , see chap. . ● . . . corollary i. hence is clearly seen the reason why angels do not thus divide and compound , when they know , but all passes in them by simple and simultaneous intuition , viz. because they have no abstracted conceptions ; as having no senses which receive different impressions from outward objects , as we have ; and therefore they cannot frame iudgments , as we do , by connecting notions or predicating . whence , they must either not know at all , which is against the nature of an intelligence or intellectual creature , which is a pure act ; or else they must know the whole thing at once intuitively . . demonstration xviii . but to come nearer that operation of our soul call'd iudging . all our affirmative judgments are ( as logick shows ) made by the copula [ is , ] which connects the two terms : but 't is impossible to conceive that what is meant by [ is ] should be represented by a material resemblance ▪ a painter may delineate caesar but 't is impossible to pourtray by particles of matter , tho' never so artificially laid together , that caesar [ is ] or [ was , ] he may paint him fighting , and ( putting that action had ever been ) it would signifie he was once , because what acts , is : but , what pencil , or what colours , can ever signifie that that action ever [ was ? ] this must come from an intelligent mind , which , having the notion of [ existence ] in it , consented it should be signify'd by [ is , ] or [ was ; ] or else it must ever remain unknown , tho' apelles had set himself to resemble it . the most delicate subtilty of parts can no more avail here than if it had been drawn in those of the largest size ; actual being , as we experience , abstracts from , or is indifferent to greatness and littleness ; and all the materials which a painter uses are indifferent to being and not-being , and are equally apt to re●●●sent things that are , as things that are not . ●dd , that whatever is pourtray'd by matter , must have part after part , or one part out of another ; whereas the notion of existence , or that which is signify'd by the word [ is , ] is every way indivisible , and has no parts at all , as is shown , demonstration . . demonstration xix . the same is ( perhaps ) more forcibly demonstrated from the third operation of our mind , discourse , or ratiocination . for first , this consists of propositions and judgments , and therefore is prov'd , dem. . and . ) not to be perform●ble by matter . secondly , discourse is the deducing a conclusion , from the connexion which the two extremes in the premisses have with a third ; which kind of connexion is call●d inference , deduction , p●●ving , argumentation , ratiocination ; and , if the medium be proper , demonstration . discourse then being evidently such a connexion of propositions , i ask , in what soil or territory in nature do propositions grow ? not in material nature ; since no division or composition of those kind of metaphysical parts , of which propositions consist can be made in matter , or performed by a material divider or compounder , as has been lately shown . again , to what material cement , or connecting virtue , conceiveable in bodies , can this close coherence , which ( if the terms be proper and rightly order'd , is absolutely indissoluble ) owe it's origine ? nor to quantity , whose coherence is continuity ; for this is by a great force dissoluble , whereas the connexion we speak of is above all material force ; nor can all the strength or nerves of natural causes , strain'd to exert their utmost efforts , not that of canons shattering the hardest-walls , or of powder riuing asunder the most impenetrable rocks , be able to solve a good argument , or tear in pieces the connexion of it's terms . nor can their indissolubleness be owing to some tenacious or glutinous quality . nor are those parts of a conclusive discourse hook'd or clung together by means of their figure , as epicurus pretended of his atomes : nor any way but by the reason of the sequel or consequence , which ( as has been demonstrated in my method , b. . l. . § . . ) is built on a self-evident or identical proposition ; which first truth is so invincibly strong , that sooner may all material nature crumble to dust , and be reduced to a chaos , than such a proposition can be solv'd or made false . wherefore this connexion of notions found in our judgments which are true , is of a strength above all matter or quantity ; and of a more stable , and , consequently , of a superiour nature to all material beings : whence follows , ( that both it , and the subject in which it is , the soul , ) are immaterial . . demonstration xx. the same is evidently deduced hence , that all the notions in the soul are most determinately such to an indivisible ; even tho' they be of things which in their own nature , as they stand in matter , are indeterminate . for example : there ●●●● body in material nature which is exactly ●● mathematically square , round or triangular , ●● reason of the perpetual turmoil of natural causes acting and re-acting ; which , making impressions upon one another , are perpetually 〈◊〉 their surfaces or figures : nay , tho' art ●oes it't utmost to assist nature by drawing fi●●●●● with the most exact instruments , yet a 〈◊〉 microscope will tell us , that there will be 〈◊〉 extancies , cavities and irregularities , which 〈◊〉 not with the figures which are in our 〈◊〉 : whence were they not more accurately ●●●●●ated in our minds than they can be drawn ●● matter , all our mathematical demonstrations , which proceed upon their being such to an ●ndivisible , would be render'd incondusive . from whence it comes , that we fancy to our selves ●●●ts in lines , and instants in time , which are ●● indivisibles . nay , 't is evident , that all no●… whatever do admit of no degrees , but are indivisibly such as we conceive them ; and are 〈◊〉 to numbers , in which the least addition ●● detraction alters it quite , and makes it ano●… ▪ which appears hence , because every least 〈◊〉 in any of them , if known by us , is a ●●w respect , or a new consideration , that is , a ●●w notion . whence is concluded , that the ●●ject , our soul , which gives these modes an ●●●●visible being in her self , which they had not ●● matter , is also it self of an indivisible and immaterial nature . . demonstration xxi . hence is demonstrated , that the soul is of her own nature a pure act ; it being the property of the act to determine , and of the power or matter to cause indetermination and conf●sion ; whence follows , that that which determines most perfectly , or to an indivisible , has no matter at all in it ; but is of it 's own peculiar nature ; and , consider'd according to her self only , a pure act , and therefore immaterial . . demonstration xxii . numberless are the demonstrations , and ( to the shame of atheists be it spoken ) as many as the soul has particular acts or objects , to evince her immateriality , and consequently , her immortality . i have rather hinted a few of them here , than endeavour'd to enumerate them all , or pursue them home , as they might deserve . only i hope , that the grounds i have laid , and the way i have taken in my proofs , may exci●● some others to add many other demonstrations , ( as occasion invites ) and enforce these i have here touch'd upon , to a fuller and clearer eviction of this preliminary point to all religion . i shall only add this last demonstration . we have notions in our minds of indivisibles , of negations , privations , of non-ens , of chimera's , of chrystal mountains , a golden earth , and innumerable such , which we can frame to our selves at pleasure . we are most certain , all these are in our minds , as objects of our simple apprehensions because we know , and have in us the meanings of those words which signifie them ; as also , because we can , by our iudgment , admit some of them as possible , and reject others as impossible ; which we could not do , unless we had the natures ( as it were ) of each of them in our understanding before we come to judge of them ; otherwise we should admit and reject we know not what , nor why ; which we are sure we do not . nay , we can by a reflex act , have a notion of their formalities as distinct from , or superadded to the subjects they are conceiv'd to affect : now none of these , ( formally conceiv'd ) can , with any shew of sense , have any being in nature or matter , some of them being formally non-entities , others chimerical , which is in a manner the same . therefore this distinct being they have in our mind , as objects of our simple apprehension , is most incontestably immaterial ; and therefore their subject , the soul , is such also . to clear the meaning of some words we have us'd , and to meet with some objections , i thought fit to subjoyn these following notes . . note i. i fear that when we say , the soul is of an indivisible nature , some readers who are not well vers'd in metaphysicks , should be apt to apprehend that we take the word [ indivisible , ] in a mathematical sense , and mean she is indivisible as a point is ; or so little , that there is not space enough for the least possible divider to come between the parts of it , and , so divide it : and hence they may imagine it inconceiveable , that all these several notions or natures of things which are in our knowledge , and so many innumerable operations should all be compriz'd and transacted in so narrow a room as is a point , or a quantitative indivisible . but the thing is quite otherwise . those kind of indivisibles , call'd points , and such like , have no positive being in nature ; but , because we must conceive a finite line , whose every part ( it being some quantity ) is divisible , has an end ; hence , this end , or ( as we may call it ) no-fartherness of quantity is no quantity , and therefore ( quantity being divisibility ) it is not quantitative , nor divisible , but indivisible . now , those ends or not-beings of quantity we call points or surfaces , according to the respective quantities which they are conceiv'd to terminate . so likewise continuative indivisibles , which some do imagine in quantity , and suppose them to be in the midst of all quantitative beings , can mean no more in any good sense , but that , let us divide any continu'd quantity where we please ; the parts , when divided , becoming so many wholes , will , for the same reason , be each of them terminated , as that greater whole was ; whence some conceit , that these result , as it were , from that division ; only they change their office , and are become terminative now , whereas they were before continuative ; and that they were potentially in that former whole before , and are only of late discluded . for , because we call this sort of quantity continu'd , it being the genius of such mis-speculaters , whenever they are at a plunge , to invent some new entity to do the job , they cannot apprehend how quantitative parts should cohere , but by this cement of continuative indivisibles . not considering that 't is the nature , entity , or unity peculiar to quantity , to be continu'd of it's self : for , it 's essence being divisibility , and what 's divisible , or has only a power to be divided quantitatively , ( or a power to be made more according to the respect of quantity ) not being actually thus divided ; and , what 's not actually thus divided , or made more , is ( out of the force of the terms ) actually one according to the notion of quantity , which kind of quantitative unity we call continuity , to contra-distinguish it from discrete quantity , the parts of which are actually and really divided and separated , and only ty'd into one number by the operation or consideration of the mind , as is shewn above : hence , whatever bodies have quantity in them , are by it , as by the formal cause , quantitatively one , or continu'd , without any other assistance . another reason , or rather the main errour which led those schoolmen into that groundless conceit , was their fan●ying that there are actual parts in every compound ▪ particularly in quantity ; the contrary to which is demonstrated , ch. . § . . no wonder then , such a fundamental truth in metaphysicks being violated , those gentlemen have faln into these absurd tenets about indivisibles ; especially being apt to conceit , that whenever we have a diverse conception or notion in our mind , there is a new entity in re answering to it adequately ; even tho' sometimes the object of that conception be purely a non-ens . . note ii. when therefore we say , that an angel or a soul is indivisible , however we are forced to use a negative manner of expression , because we have no proper notion of a spiritual substance ; we do not intend to express by that word a meer negation , as we did in those indivisibles call'd points ; but the most positive being that can be , next to that of god himself . which i show thus . ens , and all other common notions , ( as is demonstrated in my method to science , b. . l. . ) is divided by more and less of the common notion of ens ; or ▪ by being more capable of being or existing . thus far logick ; which teaches us how to divide our general notions by proper , or intrinsecal differences : the supreme science of metaphysicks , which treats of the essence of things , takes up the thesis , and pursues it thus . the essence or nature of body , consisting of power and act , or matter and form , has , consequently , in it's bowels a ground of . separability of one from the other , or of dissolution and destruction of that compound ens ; whenee it is less capable of being , as having a constant capacity of not-being woven into it's very nature : whereas , the other species of ens , [ spirit , ] being of it's own peculiar nature , or as 't is contradistinguisht from body , a pure act , without any power in it to become another ens , that is , without matter in it ; has , on the contrary , no composition in it , nor power , by means of which it might come to lose it's act or form ; and , therefore , it is of it 's own nature indissoluble , ●ncorruptible , and immortal . the very terms evincing , that what has no composition in it as to it's entity , is of it's own nature incapable of dissolution as to it 's entity ; that is , ( not mathematically indivisible , as our former note shew'd , but ) metaphysically or entitatively indivisible ; and therefore not obnoxious to lose it's unity or entity . wherefore , the best , most positive , and most proper notion we can have of a spiritual being , is , that it is a pure act , which has an incomparably greater capacity of being than body has ; and consequently it is of a superiour and far more noble nature in the line of ens. whence follows , that it comprehends eminently in it self the whole inferiour nature of body ; and , being a pure act essentially , and consequently essentially active , ( or rather acting ) it has a power or virtue in it , ( if nothing hinders it's proceeding to action ) to order , dispose of or alter that inferiour and meerly passive ens , [ material nature , ] as it pleases . . note iii. the spiritual nature of the soul then transcending in it's essence this corporeal world , made of the perishable rubbish of base matter ; and , thence , containing in it self after a manner proper to it's own nature , that is intellectually or indivisibly , ( taking this word as explain'd above ) all the natures , powers , modes , operations , existence , duration , succession , &c. that ever did or can belong to material nature : there can be no wonder that all these ( as we have shown in our several demonstrations ) are compriz'd , and can exist in the soul 's spiritual nature , as in a higher orb of being ; comprehending , after it's manner , all that can be in the lower and narrower one of body . nor can it shock any considerate man , that the operations proper to the soul should be inexplicable according to physical principles , or transcend the notions of bodily substances , and their modes , which we receive by means of the senses and the phantasms they imprint , which makes them so unsuitable to fancy ; and yet i am sure this is all that the impugners of this doctrine have to build upon or object : for ▪ not one objection drawn from a metaphysical medium did they ever produce ; tho' nothing is more evident , than 't is , that only these can have any force against us , or do them any service . . note iv. as my first and second note show ▪ how grosly those short-sighted speculaters do mistake , while they conceit that the essence of the soul is indivisible after the manner of a mathematical point ; so they fall into a parallel errour , by misunderstanding me , when i say , that all the operations of a spiritual nature are perform'd in an instant . for , they imagine , that i mean by the word [ instant , ] an indivisible of that successive motion , call'd time ; whence their fancy is stunn'd , and they are at a strange wonderment to conceive how so many several acts , following ( as it were ) and depending on one another , can be begun and ended in one such instant . whereas , tho' i use the word , partly , ( arguing ad h●minem ) because they do so ; partly , because 't is hard to find another word to signifie the opposite to succession ; yet i mean there by the word [ instant ] such an indivisible duration , as is directly contradictory to the whole nature of quantitative succession , and corresponds ( if that improper word , which signifies a kind of commensuration , may be here allow'd ) to all the successive motion bodies ever had , or can have ; nay , which eminently comprehends it all , under the notion of duration , ( as was shown lately ) as the essence of a spirit , being of a superiour nature , does ( as was shown lately ) eminently comprehend in it self the essence of body under the notion of ens or being . nay , it seems to differ from eternity ( which is the duration proper to god , and which in an inferiour degree it resembles ) only in this , that it does not include impossibility of not-being ; for it centers in it self ●● the differences of time , past , present and fu●●●● by comprehending them all , and therefore is call'd aeuiternity . wherefore ; when i say that all the spiritual operations of a spirit are in ●…stant , i only mean , that they have such a duration as befits a pure act , which being devoid ●● matter , and , consequently of quantity , can have no successiveness in it . whence , pursuing ●…sely , and keeping strictly to the reflex notions i ●ave of spiritual nature as contradistinguisht from that which is material or corporeal , and from , the duration proper to each of them , i must beg leave to recede , in this particular , from s●me philosophers and divines of most celebrated ●ame , and greatest eminency ; and to declare , that i cannot at all conceive what a first and se●…h instant in the duration of a pure act , ( or a spirit ) can signifie . for , since their duration has no parts after parts , as the successive duration of bodies has , if it endures or is at all , it has it's whole duration ; and , so , all second and third instants are insignificant , and seem to have their origin from an imaginary correspondence to a mathematical instant of time ; which mistake we have lately rectify'd . and , seeing succession , in what ever thing or mode of thing it is , must signifie part after part , which ( as both logick and metaphysicks demonstrate , ) is the very notion of quantity ; whoever puts succession , or part after part , in any modes belonging to a pure act , or a spirit , does put those modes , and , consequently , it 's subject , to be quantitative or material ; that is , he puts a pure act to be no pure act , which is a contradiction . . from the foregoing demonstrations , that the soul is immaterial , our grand conclusion is demonstratively evinc'd , that man's soul is immortal . first , because , being immaterial , she is a pure act in the line of being ; whence she has no composition in her under the notion of ens ; only which can render her capable of dissolution or losing her unity ; and , consequently , her entity . secondly , because matter is the only power to become a new ens ; and , consequently , the only principle of corruption or mortality , that is , of mutation according to the notion of entity , as has been demonstrated , ch. . § . . lastly , because for what reason bodies are corruptible , viz. because , they are compounded of matter and form ; for the same reason , the soul being immaterial , or a pure act , is incorruptible or immortal . so that we may as well deny that bodies can be corrupted , as affirm , that the soul can die or cease to be ; either by her own nature , she having no ground of losing her being , in her own intrinsecal constitution ; nor by the operation of all natural causes ; because all their action has passion answering to it , which cannot be produced , when there wants the only passive principle , matter . she can then only lose her existence by the omnip●●ence of her great creatour working mirac●●ously ; nor , can it be , that it should work this ; unless it be agreeable to his other divine attributes ; and it has been as yet never shown by any , that annihilation can consist with them ; but , on the contrary , it has been shown by us , that it is hi●hly . repugnant to them . see raillery de●… ▪ from pag. . to pag. . meditation . at length , my soul , after a tedious iourney of thy thoughts , travelling thro' all the vast reg●●● of those inferiour essences of ●odies , thou hast arriv'd at thy self ▪ thy individuation , which g●●● thee thy particular degree of rationality , is , in this state , best learn'd ▪ from thy material compart ; to whose pre-existent size and pitch thou wast adjusted ; but thy peculiar nature it self , can only be known from the genius of ●● interiour operations as they proceed from thee , and are proper to thee . but , ●ow , or by what vehicle , came the knowledge of those operations into thy understanding ? they are , as has been shown at large , immaterial , and of a contrary nature to quantitative beings ; whence , they could not enter by the senses , nor be imprinted as those natural notions were which were directly stampt in thee . nothing therefore but thy own reflexion , comparing thy operations with those of bodies ; and seeing these to be of a quite contrary genius to those , could give thee this knowledge of thy self . which shews that the first lesson to be learn'd by all those speculaters who study thee , is , that they m●●● abstract from fancy , and lay aside , and transcend all the objects of our senses and all corporeal phantasms ; otherwise they can never reach thy indivisible essence ; tke want of knowing which preliminary rule has made so many unskilful thinkers degrade their own soul from the dignity which the author of ▪ nature has given it ; and to apprehend it to be material or mortal . 't is only the connexion of notions , ( the proper act of the comparing power ▪ call'd reason ) in which all formal truth consists , which could elevate thy thoughts above th●se baser objects , and bring thee to frame a iust conception of thy self . our body cannot see it 's own face but by reflexion from a looking-glass ; nor canst thou gain knowledge of thy immaterial essence ▪ but by the spiritual mirrour of thy own understanding ; which reflects thee upon thy self , by considering the nature of thy own interiour acts , and how they differ from those which are produced by bodily substances . nothing is easier to discern than 't is , that all corporeal operations are perform'd part-after part , and therefore have parts or quantity in them ▪ nor is any consideration more facil and obvious than to conclude thence that their subjects are , of their own nature , dissoluble , perishable , and ( if they be living things ) mortal . and , i may presume , ●● have seen demonstrations enow alledg'd to manifest , that the operations of our soul , and of all the objects , as they are in her when she knows them , and , consequently , our soul her self , which is their subject , is of a quite contrary , or rather contradictory nature ; and , therefore , is incorporeal , immaterial , unquantitative , indissoluble and immortal . nay , ●●● sh●wn , § . . that the natural notions of all 〈…〉 who use even common r●●●●xion , does in a manner imbue ●● with this sentiment . which ren●ers the atheists void o●…ll exc●se ; and give● us just occasion to fear that 't is perversity of will , and not weakness of understanding , which makes them disacknowledge it . they w●●●d ▪ live like libertines and at large , or , as the ●…ure expresses it , like sons of belial , sine jugo ; ●… , placing all their affections on the pleasures or ●…ts of this life , they are loath to think there 〈…〉 be any future state , in which they should be 〈◊〉 to an account . the goodness of rational nature which their creatour had given them , could not but 〈…〉 and upbraid them that they had deprav'd that n●●●●e , and wrong'd the best order of the world by ●…centious debaucheries . wherefore , their thoughts , ( ●● st. paul says ) thus accusing themselves by the ●…inct of the law writ in their hearts , they endea●●●●'d to stifle all those truths which could put them 〈◊〉 an apprehension of a future reckoning ; and thence ●●ey willingly entertain'd the opinion , that there being 〈…〉 survivency of the soul , death would seal an ●●●esty for all their extravagancies , and cancel all ●… , debts . and , for the same reason , they were ●●th to think there was a god who govern'd the ●●●ld ; lest , being just , he should severely punish them 〈…〉 abusing the nature he had given them , and for ●…olating the universal law of the world which he 〈…〉 establisht . but , leaving those poor miscreants as objects of 〈…〉 pity , after we have charitably ●●de●vour'd , to our best power , to ●…ctifie and convince their reason ; et us , ( which most concerns us ) look home to our selves ; and take care that we ▪ to whom god has given the knowledge ( or belief ) that our soul is immo●●al , be not beaten with as many stripes as they ; if we neglect to guide our lives according to that principle which we profess and acknowledge to be true ; the● which , if it be a truth , 't is self-evident , that nothing can more highly , or more nearly concern as ▪ the more evident it is , the more indispensable obligation it lays upon us to follow it in our practice and the more inexcusable we shall be if we neglect that duty . our own clear reason has shown as , that our soul , it being of a spiritual nature , or ● pure act , is superiour , and , in the heraldry ●● being , of a far nobler extraction than is all t●● great heap of rubbish , matter ; and , therefore , i● of more intrinsick worth than all this visible worl● not an operation of thine , not an object that is ●● thy knowing power , but , if well reflected on , info●● us clearly of this great and most important tr●● how unreasonable then , and unnatural would it ●● in us not to bestow our chief , if not only car● , ●● provide for the eternal welfare of our soul , which ●● so precious in it self ; and so neerly ally'd to us , t●● 't is a part , and by far the best part of this thing ●● are , call'd man : what will it profit a man ( say●● who is the eternal wisdom ) to gain the who●● world and lose his own soul ? how senseless ●● foolish must we appear in the sight of god and ●● angels ●o prefer the conveniencies of this mome●tary life , ( for all time , could we live while it l●st is but a moment to the endless duration of a spir●● before the m●ans to live eternally happy in the o●●●● how vile , to enslave our affections here to riches , ●●●●o●eal pleasures , or airy honour , which are so in●●itely below us , being indeed nothing but shining clay , well figur'd and colour'd earth , and articulate air ; which are , perhaps the basest of all material beings ? what generous heart , if not infatuated even to madness , would so debase his dignity as to subject himself , and all his dearest concerns , to his underling or slave ; and such a slave as will certainly ruin him by his over-kind condescendency ? knowledge and virtue are the only true , and the ●●●t perfections of our soul , while she is in the way to her last end : whence we may be certain they ●●● agreeable to her nature . the increase in these gives her growth and strength ; and , consequently must advance her towards the right end for which nature ordain'd her : whereas , what 's made of this corruptible trash , matter , must needs depress ●er high-born nature , and disgrace her extraction . ●●deed , those material creatures , may , by our sober ●se of them , serve as drudges , to assist our other comp●rt , the body , with necessary conveniencies . they may also be a means to raise the soul to the knowledge of her self and her great maker ; but , ●f we affect them farther than as they are subservient to those laudable ends , we shall put the order of the creation out of it's frame ; and ( irrational love , especially if excessive , being a perfect slavery ) we shall invert the gradual series of beings of which the world consists , turn the climax of causes with the ●eels upwards , and make our soul servilely truckle to those despicable things which were made to do her homage . lest our fancy not much assisting our memory in things above us , we may forget what we lately demonstrated , of how surpassing an excellency and how refin'd a perfection of being our soul is , above this dross of matter , of which our bodies are ●neaded ; let us review once more the product of some of our most attentive and deliberate thoughts . we have seen it clearly demonstrated , that our soul's capacity , ( which is of knowledge ) contrary to the nature of material containers , is infinite ; whence she is so far from being fill'd by the accession of such objects as this material world can afford her ; that even now , while here , they serve but to enlarge her said capacity ; that is , to encrease ●er thirst of knowing still more : from which follows , that in her future state , when she is all mind , and constantly , and most eagerly attentive , and addicted to her only ▪ natural perfection , knowledge ; she will , being then a pure act , and operating accordingly , strain her incredible activity to attain the sight of the first cause of all things , and to know what he is in himself ; and thence must remain ever in a vehement longing and tormenting dissatisfaction , unless she attain that only soul-satiating contemplation of him who is infinite truth and the first cause of all those created effects , the knowledge of which transported her with such an insatiable desire of seeing him . we have seen , that as the purest and most refined gold cannot incorporate with dust , the natures or qualities of corporeal beings , when in thy knowing power , cannot mingle with thy purer and nobler essence ; nor , ( as proper and connatural affections do use ) alter it or bring it to their nature ▪ but they stand aloof from it ; and , tho' they be in thee , yet they keep their distance ; and , contrary to the genius of corporeal modes , they are there ●s objects , that is , as other things , or as distinct from thee . we have shown , that by our apprehending what [ existence ] , or actual being , is , ( which 't is evident we do , since we know the meaning of those words ) thou hast the nature of existence in thy knowledge , that is , in thy self ; which is impossible to be shadow'd or represented but only in a spiritual mirrour ; nay , by having what 's meant by the word [ existence , ] in thee , which abstracts from all limited or particular manners or degrees of it , thou hast in thee the nature of existence in common , or in it's whole latitude , unconfin'd to this or that subject ; which demonstrates that thy nature is capable to comprehend the whole creation ; and to see clearly even that soveraign being it self , whose nature is unconfin'd or infinite existence . we have seen by thy framing respects of one thing to another , that thou hast in thee a power of ordering them ; and , consequently , the nature of that order it self ; whereas there is nothing in the material world but so many singulars ; each of which is ultimately determin'd by it's individuating principles ; and , therefore , is independent and absolute in it self , without the least reference or actual respect to one another . we have seen clearly demonstrated , that thy ess●●ce is superiour in the line of being to the whole ●●ture of continu'd quantity , tho' stretcht out to the vast expansion of the heavens , and even as far as the world's surface ; and that thy knowing power is able to fathom it all , without straining it's capacity beyond it's reach . we have seen also how it is capacious enough to contain the whole nature of discrete quantity , tho' it fills all those boundless rooms in the long row of number , algebraically repeated . all those short items of particular times and places , summ'd up into one total are compriz'd , and writ in short hand , in thy indivisible essence . the whole progress of motion and time , and it 's untraceable antiquity from the first winding up the clock of nature till it's line is run out at the world's last period , when the sick tapour of dying nature , and the eye of the world , ( the sun ) shall begin to wink , and become bloodshot , till 't is darken'd and extinguisht ; all this long race of time , i say , is far too short to be commensurated with thy essence and duration . the former sort of quantity is but as it were a point , the later but an instant , when resum'd after an indivisible manner in thy comprehensive being . all the permanent parts of the one are in thee without the least extension or distance , and all the succeeding parts of the other , whether past or future , when vested with thy manner of being , amount but to one still-present now. nor can this seem incredible to any christian ; since we all hold that spiritual natures are capable of seeing god's essence as in it self ; which ( as is undeniable ) infinitely surmounts all the whole machine of this material world. we have seen that all physical qualities do enjoy , when in thee , another manner of being ; and affect thee , their subject , after a quite different way from what they had when they were in material nature . the most opposite ones , which are perpetually contrasting , and restlessly striving to expell one another ; do , by thy soveraign power , remain at peace in thy steady essence ; which is of 〈…〉 high a dignity to be mov'd , or disturb'd , by their petty quarrels . we have seen that thy abstracting . power can ●…de these lower beings more subtilly than can the operation of fire , or any chymistry of nature assisted by art ; and can take in pieces their very essences , and the essences of their several modes , by cutting them into their metaphysical parts ; which are too delicate for our bodily sight , tho' assisted with the best microscopes , to discern or make observations how they differ : each of which parts too ( tho' naturally impartible ) have a distinct being given by thee ; and can be wrought upon by thy understanding , as if they were so many wholes ; and this , with that most perfect distinction , that they do not in the least interfere , in thee , tho' they ●●● all of them confusedly blended as they stand in rude and unpolisht matter . we have seen , how , by the cement of existence , exprest by the short monosyllable [ is , ] thou dost ▪ i● thy comparing power , ( the laboratory where truths are fram'd ) re-connect those thus-divided parts into propositions ; and this , with an union so close , that 't is ▪ absolutely indissoluble by the utmost force of all the causes in nature . nay , that thy spiritual essence can in some manner , create , by giving a kind of being in thee , to not-beings or nothings . in a word , we have seen , that all the whole material world , and every part of it that ever came to thy knowledge , do enjoy a new sort of being in thee ; and such a one as is contradictorily opposite to the being they had in their material state. all these high prerogatives , dilating thy essence and duration to a kind of infinity above this narrow world , we have found clearly to be no more but thy just due ; however unreflecting atheists , whose groveling souls , immerst in matter , cannot , or will not , raise themselves above fancy , do use their misemploy'd foolish wit , ( as the world calls it ) to devest themselves of their own dignity , and , like so many worst feloes de se , by maintaining their soul is mortal , do give themselves to be guilty of eternal death ; or , ( which is worse than death ) of annihilation , by granting their souls incapable of surviving . but let us , to whom the providence of our good make● has indulg'd these clear informations , make o●● right use of them . since these are great truths ▪ let truth have it's due effects . 't is so gross at errour , that it is below confute , to imagine , that any truth is an idle and fruitless speculati●● ▪ the knowledge of truth in particular things , does ▪ of it's own nature , tend to direct our outward actions ; and universal truths ( such as these are ) do naturally conduce to enlarge our soul , raise ●● to high contemplation , and to breed in us conformable affections . since then we have the best ●…rance clear demonstration can give us , that this material world is below our essence , 't is most fit we should esteem it to be also below our most serious thoughts and our best affections . let us ●●ancipate our selves then from the slavish adoration , with which worldlings devote themselves to that dull and senseless idol . and , seeing evident reason has perfectly convinced us there is no shadow of likelihood that our soul is mortal ; let us bend all ●●● carefullest endeavours to provide she may be happy in her eternal state , when she comes to be ●●●●●dg'd from her terrene habitation , and has got clear of her body , and this world , nay , is got above it ; which is the only true wisdom . to the consideration of which state of hers we advance in our next discourse . transnatural philosophy : or , metaphysicks . book ii. of pure acts . viz. of the soul separated , and angels . chap. i. of the state of the soul separated from the body ; and , what dispositions in her when the man dies , will make her eternally happy or miserable . . the soul does , at her separation , receive from god , as he is the author of nature , some change , according to her existence , and her subsistence or suppositality . for , since in her former state of union with her body , she was the form of that body , and therefore ( form and matter being the parts of every compound ens ) only a part of man ▪ and a part of an ens is not an ens or individuum ; nor ▪ consequently , capable of existing ; much less of subsisting , which ( as is shown above , b. . chap. . § . . ) superadds some perfection to the notion of existence : it follows , that , seeing the same soul , when separated from the body , ( she being ( by book . chap. . ) immortal ) does exist , and also subsist , in regard she sustains her own nature ; and , as will be prov'd shortly , her modes too ; she must be made apt to exist and subsist , which she was not while in her former state ; that is , she must be chang'd according to those considerations or respects ; and made an existent and subsistent thing , and consequently a kind of suppositum . and that it belongs to god , as he is the first cause , to give the soul this highest perfection of being , is hence demonstrated . for it belongs to an infinite actuality , or an infinite goodness , to give to his creatures all the goodness and natural perfections they are capable to receive ; especially such as the very nature he has given them makes them require : now 't is evident , that the nature of the soul ( she being immortal ) is capable of , and requires still to exist ; and also to subsist and be a suppositum ; because she had , while in the body , power to have in her , as in their subject , ( that is , to sustain or be the suppositum of ) innumerable accidents , notions or knowledges , which , they being spiritual or indivisible , could not be received in a divisible subject , the corporeal part of man ; and , therefore , could only be peculiarly in her. whence it follows that , since 〈◊〉 ordain'd the dissolution of the man , or the 〈◊〉 separation from the body , and had also m●de the soul immortal , it became his goodness to give her , when separated , existence , which her immortal nature requir'd ; and also the power of subsisting , and of being the subject , or suppositum of those accidents . ● ▪ how this is done we may learn by this pa●…el . a quantitative thing , v. g. stone , has many potential parts in it ; some of one colour or figure , some of another : now , none of those parts , taken singly , can exist or ●ub●●st while they were parts , but only the whole thing call'd a stone ; for only that was a distinct individual thing , which only is capable of existing . but , because this whole thing had a power to be divided ( or had potential parts in it ) , ●●● so was apt to be made more actual wholes , or , 〈…〉 ings : hence each part , when thus divided , ●…ade a distinct whole ens , has immediately its ●●●●icular existence given it by god. and , be●…se some of those parts , while in the whole , 〈◊〉 some different modifications in it , which another part had not ; whence it was independent on any other part , as to the sustaining such accidents ; and , consequently it has a power to ●●●●ain them , when it should come to be made a whole ; therefore it has given it to subsist independently on the former whole , or any other part of it ; and to be a suppositum to sustain those accidents . much more are those perfections of being ●●turally due to the soul , which is of an immortal nature . . notwitstanding , each soul , when separated continues the same individual soul which it was in the body ▪ first , because in the body she was the chief essential part of the man : and essence abstract , from existence , and , consequently from subsistence and suppositality ▪ so that her being chang'd according to suppositality , or in some manner according to existence , does not alter her particular essence or nature . secondly , she had her individuality from the individual dispositions in the embryo , which determine the matter so as to require that such an individual form ( or soul ) and no other , should be infus'd ▪ thirdly , she had her determinate or individual pitch of spirituality or cognoscitiveness , given her at the instant in which she was first infus'd ▪ nor could it be taken away by the succeeding accidents of knowledge afterwards ; both because they superven'd to her individual nature or degree of cognoscitiveness ; as also because they were not contrary , but agreeable to such a nature . again , were this true reason wav'd , yet , since in this mortal state the soul gains notions or knowledge , by means of her senses , from every circumstance the man is in ; and 't is impossible any two men , should be all their lives in the self-same circumstances ; 't is impossible ( abati●● their constitutions individually different ) that my soul should have the self-same complexion of spiritual modes of knowledge , and consequent affections , in this world , which another soul has ; which sufficiently distinguishes her from every other particular soul , or ( which is the same ) individuat● her as she is a soul. wherefore this change of the soul , at her ●…ration , amounts to no more but to take from 〈◊〉 the imperfection of being a part , and to ●…fer upon her the priviledge of a whole ens ; which is given to every new individuum in nature that is made such by division or meer separation . . nothing which was once in the soul in this ●…e , ( excepting false judge●…nts ) is blotted out of her in 〈◊〉 state of separation . for , 〈◊〉 whatever is naturally ex●…d out of any subject is driven ●●●ce by ▪ it's contrary ; and con●●●es ( by ch. . § . . ) do not ●…l one another out of the ●…d , but fix one another better there ; 't is evi●●nt that from this head , or from the objects which are in the soul , nothing whatever that 〈◊〉 once in the soul is effaced out of her , but ●…ains there for ever . again , since the pecu●… nature of the soul is not material or divisi●… ; but , when she is separated , she is a pure act ; ●…re can be no ground , from the subject's side , ●●at notions or knowledges should be worn out , 〈◊〉 decay by reason of the alterableness or fading genius of the subject , or her incapacity to retain ●…m still : whatever knowledge therefore was 〈◊〉 in the soul will be ever there . and the ●…son why in this state they come not into ●●●y , when we would use them , but seem forgotten , is , because the phantasms , ( without which the soul cannot operate , ) being the smallest particles of matter , are either perisht , or else lost in a wilderness of innumerable others , so that they are not still ready at hand to re-excite our knowledge of them , or make us remember them . . every separated soul which had any one notion in her while here , does know all created truths as soon as she is out of the body . for , since * , as has been demonstrated , the knowing of a great number of finite truths do not , to any degree , tend to fill the capacity of the soul , but enlarge and enable it to know still much more ; there can be no difficulty , on the subjects side , why she should not know all created truths , they being finite both in their nature and in their number . on the other side , since our notions are the ground of truth ; and all truths , tho' they be never so many , are connected ; and this by the identifying particle [ is , ] which shows they are after some manner i● one another : nay , ( which alone suffices ) since it has been fully demonstrated , ( method to science , book . ch. . § . . beginning at § . . ) that every soul separate that knows any one natural truth , does know all nature at once in the first instant of her separation ; it is evinced , that there can be as little difficulty on the part of the objects to be known as there was on the subjects side . whence follows , that every soul separated which had here any one notion in her , especially ( as she must ) of her own , or the man's existence , does know all truths as soon as she is out of the body . . to satisfie those , who , led by fancy , and customary impressions from material objects , do make them the rule and measure to judge of spiritual natures ; and thence are very backward to assent to a truth which seems so paradoxical and impossible ; i take leave to recommend to their serious consideration a far stranger point , which yet all christians hold , viz. that a holy soul , when separate , is capable of seeing clearly the divine essence it self ; in comparison of which , all created beings are but a s●if●e , or rather a meer nothing . . hence follows , that every separated soul comprehends all time and place . ●●r , since those innumerable natural objects , which ●he then knows , are in distinct times and places ; nay , are the very things whose extension and succession do make all place and time ; it is impossible but that , having those things in her knowledge , she must comprehend those times and places , which are modes of those things ; and , consequently , parts of the entire notion of those things themselves ; that is , she must comprehend all time or place . . corollary i. hence is demonstrated how great an errour it is , and against the nature of a pure act ; to put the duration of pure spirits to be in some sort successive ; and that their operations , and consequently their existence , are measureable by the differences of time , [ before and after , ] whereas they comprehend all time , and are of such a nature as far transcends it , . therefore such a soul cannot but naturally have an ardent longing to know the nature of the first cause that made and order'd those things . for , since 't is essential to the soul to be cognoscitive ; and , consequently , the whole bent ( and only good ) of her nature , in that state , is to have all the knowledge she can , and must wish ; and the knowledge of the effects does naturally , and also vehemently excite and enflame those who are wholly addicted to knowledge , ( as the soul naturally is in that state ) to know the cause which created them of nothing , and rang'd them in that most beautiful order : nay , since they do not know those things as they ought , without knowing them a priori in their first cause ; and how , and by what virtue , he created them . again , since ( as was often prov'd ) the knowledge of all created truths , they being finite , cannot in the least fill or satisfie the natural desire of the soul ; and therefore only the knowledge of an infinite truth can satiate and content her ; and she cannot but vehemently long to enjoy that , which only can satisfie a propension so ●adicated in her nature : it follows from all these heads , that the knowledge of all created truths do serve only to increase her thirst , and to enflame her desire more ardently and impatiently , to know the nature or essence of that infinite and glorious source of all being , the first cause ; from which issued all those admirable effects , and which she now sees is the object only worthy of her knowledge : whence she must look upon her self as utterly lost and un●one , and remain eternally miserable if she falls short of that only soul-satisfying sight . . from the § . § . , and . it follows necessarily , that a soul , when separated , is naturally , while separated , unchangeable . for , ( besides other reasons ) the notion of created ens is adequately divided by indivisible and divisible , as by its differences , which are contradictories ; nor is there any thing in the species but the notion of the genus ( in which they agree ) and the notion of the difference by which they disagree , and this ( in our case ) contradictorily : hence it follows , that whatever is affirm'd of one of the species besides the generical notion , the contradictory to it must be affirm'd of the other species ; wherefore , as truly and certainly as we can affirm of one of the species , body , that it is quantitative , divisible , has part after part , and that its operations are perform'd successively one after another , &c. so truly can we affirm of the other species , spirit , that it is unquantitative , indivisible , has not part after part , and is not successive in its operations ; in regard none of these relate to the genus . but what has no successiveness in it , cannot be otherwise than it was before , or chang'd ; therefore the soul , while it is a pure spirit , is naturally unchangeable . . from the same § . . 't is demonstrated , without needing any farther proof , that the soul , when separated , knows , and cannot but know all the words , actions , thoughts and affections of her whole fore-past life , finding those later in her self ; she her self being then her own first , immediate , and ever-present object ; and the former in the course of causes , and in the circumstances there mention'd . also that she cannot but know the natural actions , thoughts , &c. of others , since these also were effects , and had their causes ; and so were knowable by her as well as the others . lastly , that she must a fortiori know what good or bad dispositions were in her self when she dy'd , they being now modes or accidents of her self ; nor is it possible that a creature that has knowledge and will in it , should not ( even in this dull state ) know what it self chiefly wishes and desires . . corollary . hence is understood how the particular iudgment , determining the soul's future condition , is made at the hour of death ; and how she comes to hope or despair of eternal hap piness , according as she sees her self fit or unfit for it ; whence she becomes determin'd to her final lot : which fitness or unfitness is , in the old language of the christian church , call'd , merit or demerit ; which are the same as disposition or indisposition for bliss ; only differing in an extrinsecal denomination , taken from god's having promis'd and threaten'd the happy or unhappy consequences of good or bad actions . . corollary ii. hence also is understood how the book of conscience will be laid open at the last day ; when god shall reveal abscondita tenebrarum , or ( as the sybill expresses it ) cunctaq , cunctorum cunctis arcana patebunt ; and this after a more clear and solemn manner than meer nature could have perform'd . ▪ corallary iii. hence also we may see why , and how , infants are connaturally sav'd by baptism , as by the most general and genuine means . for , they carry no dispositions out of the body , but affections to the mother's dug , to lie soft and warm , and such like ; which being meerly natural , or rather animal , were too weak and too base to put any thing in them , which might raise them in their future state towards heaven . but , when they come into the region of light , and know all things ; amongst the rest , that they were baptiz'd in christ's name , and that that external action , ( the impressions , and consequently the notions of which remain yet in their soul ) was particularly done upon them , and was ordain'd as a supernatural means by him , acting as a supernatural agent , for their salvation , or to addict them to him , and make them his ; immediately , that sacrament , ( as others also do ) working its effect ex vi institutionis christi , gives them other thoughts , and higher aims than meer nature could have done ; makes them conceive actual hope and love of their good god and saviour ; and so disposes or fits them , at the same instant , for heaven . . corollary iv. hence we may discover how unnatural , as well as impious a heresy ana-baptism is ; in debarring their infants from the most certain means , in the course of god's supernatural providence , to bring them to heaven , in case they die before they come to use their deliberate reason in chusing their last end. but i am here only to lay certain and evident grounds to confute errors , and not to pursue them . . corollary v. lastly , hence is seen how far more easie it is for the saints and angels in heaven , to hear our petitions , either put up to our common lord , or desiring the assistance of their prayen ● as also to know our necessities our amendment , the repe●tance of a sinner , for which as our saviour says , they have a particul●… ioy ; tho' such happy spirits know th●… things after a far clearer and nobler manner than natural knowers do ; viz. not i● ignoble effects , but in the best manner à pr●ori , or in the first cause ; by seeing his d●vine essence , in whom we do all live , m●… and have our being . . the practical iudgment , or affection of the soul , ( as experience teaches ) does more sway the operations of it , and carry it towards the attainment of what it wishes , than the greatest speculative knowledge of any good whatever . for , since we have two operative faculties of the soul , understanding and will , and the understanding , as contradistinguisht from the will , has for it's proper act or effect , only a speculative knowledge or iudgment of the truth of the thing , abstracting from this consideration , whether it be our good or no ; and goes no farther ; but when our consideration , by a close and frequent converse with the object , and a more thorow-penetration of it's agreeableness , or how good it is to us , lays this agreeableness to ●…art , and conceits it to be our interest to have ●… ▪ there are immediately produced in us affections , or ( which is the same ) practical iudgments , ●…pelling us to act for it or pursue it , which are ●…cts of the will : hence , 't is only these practical judgments , and not speculative ones , which move us to the pursuit and attainment of any ●…ood ; whether that object be our true good , 〈…〉 no. . intellectual goods , tho' infinite , or the seeing him who is infinite truth , are immediately attain'd by the soul , when separated , if she be dispos'd with a perfect affection or love for it . for , since the soul is of an intellectual nature , and such that she is not capable to be satiated or fill'd with finite truths , how great or many soever they be ; and , therefore , she is , by her nature , ordain'd to see an infinit truth ; nor can her speculative knowledge of all created truths , breed any hindrance ; but by giving her more light of the excellency of that divine object , is rather ( if no sinister affection detain her ) ordain'd to beget in her a high affection for it ; nor , in the case here put , does any sinister practical judgment , or any such affection detain her from it , in regard it is here suppos'd that she has an affection for it ; so that not only the whole bent of her unperverted nature , but also the whole propension of her voluntary affections , gain'd here by frequent and most deliberate acts , have addicted her to know or see that blissful object : wherefore , all imaginable dispositions being put on her part , to see this infinit truth , it will be seen and known by the soul in case it be of its own nature intelligible , which 't is most evident it is . for , since all unintelligibleness , or obscurity of any object springs from the confusedness and indetermination found in it , which arises from the power or matter ; and all distinctness , and by consequence , greater intelligibility , from the act ; and god , or infinit truth , is an infinitely pure and most simple actuality ; or purus candor aeternae lucis , and therefore of his own nature infinitely intelligible ; and consequently , will be actually known , so there be no indisposition , blemish or impurity in the spiritual eye of the understanding which is to know it ; or , ( which is the same ) some inordinate affection for some created or false good makin● it addict its squinting eye towards it. it follow● hence that , since extrinsecal application has no place here , or rather this perfect affection being the very , and only , application of one spirit to another ; all imaginable causes are put for such an effect , or , for such a soul 's seeing god ; and consequently the effect it self , or the beatifical vision must follow . . coroll . vii . hence the whole employ of our lives here ought to be this , viz. to take care we do not set our affections inordinately on temporal or false goods ; which ( being fleeting ) do perish , and leave us empty in our future never-dying state ; but wisely to wean our selves from affecting them excessively ; and withal to gain predominant practical judgments or affections for eternal goods , which will never leave us ; and , withall , will fill and satisfy our boundless wishes in the other world ; or , which is the same , make us eternally happy . . cor. viii . hence is shown that only love of god above all things can dispose us for heaven , or ( which is the same ) make us held worthy , or deserve such an infinit reward ; which is promist us by god's goodness , upon our putting that good disposition . . coroll . ix . hence all the law and the prophets , all the whole body of christian doctrin , all christ's instructive words , exemplary actions and affective sufferings ; all church-government , sacraments , teaching , preaching , mortification , reading holy books , perusing the lives of the b. saints and martyrs ; nay , all our keeping festivals , and all ceremonious actions of what kind soever , ( if righ●ly understood and made use of ) are of no worth or efficacy towards our salvation , farther than they may ●end immediately or remotely to breed and advance in souls this ultimate and effectual disposition to bliss , perfect charity , or the love of god above all things ; whence will follow of course , the love of our neighbour as our selves ; and eternal happiness , as the reward of both . . corollary x. hence , religion is the art of breeding up souls in such a manner as may dispose them for eternal happiness . this is evident , because all the maxims , means , motives , and methods of true religion do , either immediately or remotely , tend to that end. . on the contrary , and for the same reason , those unhappy souls , which , at their separation , have their first affection placed on some false or temporary good , ( v. g. on aiery honour , ambitious greatness , corporeal pleasure , or sordid riches ) will , as soon as they are out of the body , be in a state of intolerable grief and most horrid torment . for , as is already prov'd , § . . they can never obtain their true last end , ( to which nature does now give them most violent propensions ) because they want the disposition proper for it ; or rather , by not loving it as they ought , but having chosen another false end in stead of it , and loving that above all things , that is above it , they are utterly indispos'd for it ; which disposes or entitles them to that eternal pain call'd poena damni , or damnation , which is the loss of ever seeing god. nor yet can they get or enjoy those temporary or false goods , which they did here , and must now unchangeably , ( or for ever ) chiefly , if not only dote upon : the loss of which affects them with that tormenting grief , call'd poena sensûs , or the pain which arises from the want of an ill-chosen temporary last end. so that they have lost , and are left destitute of all they can possibly wish ; they have their wills crost in every thing , and this for all eternity ; which fills their whole soul with most unspeakable and unconceiveable anguish . . the state of separation elevates the soul to an incomparable , and , in a manner , an infinite perfection of existence above that which she had in the body . for , as was prov'd lately , she is now a pure act , knows all created things , comprehends time and place , perfectly sees all her former thoughts and actions , and this all at once : nay , when separated , she is capable ( if due dispositions be put ) to see the divine essence , which none can see and live . . therefore all her modes or accidents , and particularly the affections she had here , are elevated in a vast proportion , as far as the state of separation can heighten them ; that is , to an unconceiveable degree of intenseness . for , her modes are only her knowledges and her affections ; how vastly her knowledge is increast and extended , is already prov'd ; and her affections , which spring from her knowledge , and are proportion'd to them , must necessarily be increast accordingly ; and this out of the force and nature of her separated state. so that , put case the affections she had here for a temporary good , was ( as we say ) ad unum , and the love she had for her eternal good was ad centum ; and that the state of separation rais'd that affection ut mille , ( which , as appears by these grounds , is but a weak expression ) it would follow , that the soul , when separated , would be found loving her eternal good a hundred thousand times more than she lov'd that temporary one ; which would make her fly with a most ravishing transport to be united with her chief good , if that temporary affection does not indispose her . . wherefore , those wretched souls which part from the body with love of created and temporal goods above the increated , infinite , and eternal one ; especially those , who , by supernatural light had a higher knowledge of god than nature could have given them ; must necessarily , by means of the elevation of their affections in their separate state , have their torments increast to a hell of misery . for , since the state of separation exalts the soul , and , consequently , the knowledges and affections she had in the body , to an incompatable pitch above what they were here ; and every thing operates as it is : it follows , that the pain and sorrow they have for the loss ▪ of what they thus affected , and on which they had set their whole hearts ; must in a manner infinitely exceed any sorrow they could possibly have had in this life . besides , they have this surcharge of torture , that their contrary , and ever unre●●actable and irreconcileable judgments tear the soul in pieces , ( as it were ) within her self ; and make her become her own torment . the natural love of her true ▪ last end , ( and much ●ore if it were formerly known also supernaturally ) carries her with a violent bent towards that which , he sees now is her only-true happiness ; and , at the same time , the far stronger torrent of her affections , for that false last end , which she had here , with a full deliberation and long-frequented practice , made choice of and pursu'd for her summum bonum , hurries her with a madness of transport , and an impetuosity equal to the inconceiveable activity she is now endow'd with , to enjoy them ; tho' at the same time she sees them impossible to be had , and withall most base , vile , and below her nature , if they were had ; and yet as base as they are , she must , as her condition now is , ever affectionately hug the thoughts and wish of them ; tho' she sees this affection for them is her torment , and the true cause of all her endless misery . add , that they have , and must have , these racking convulsions of their mind all at once ; without hopes of the least intermission for all eternity . lastly , those souls comprehending now all time and place , their affections work accordingly ; so that ▪ whereas in this life they confin'd their wishes to enjoy those false goods in some one time or place , or some one circumstance ; they now long vehemently to enjoy all of them which are sutable to such an affection , in every part of time and every particular ▪ place ; nay , they wish to subordinate all the whole creation to attain that false last end , which they had unfortunately chosen , and must now for ever dote upon . which being impossible , as the course of causes now stand , it follows , that every creature in the world crosses them and is their torment ; according to that saying , pugnabit orbis terrarum contra insensatos . so that their whole never-ending life ( if it may be call'd so ) is wholly made up of distracting madness , furious rage , self-racking contrary wishes , tearing their own bowels ; heart-gnawing regret ; shameful confusion ; fruitless repentance ; black desperation ; cursings of themselves and all creatures ; blasphemings of the holy saints , and of their dread creatour and just judge , god , blessed for evermore . or , as our b. saviour , in accommodation to our greatest griefs here , moderately expresses it , weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth . the gnawing worm of helpless remorse ●ever dies there ; nor is the vehement fire of these violent and contrary affections ever quenched . quis poterit habitare cum igne devorante — quis habitabit cum ardoribus sempiternis ! isaiae , cap. . . . hence is seen , that god damns no man. for , since ( by § . . ) inordinate affection for creatures addicts the soul to a wrong last end ; and , at the same time , by doing so , does in●●pose her for her true happiness , the sight of god , which she cannot , when separated , but naturally desire and long for ; and these inordinate affections , if unretracted here , do still remain in the soul , ( by § . . ) and , when separated , she is unchangeable in that state ; and , consequently sees she must for ever despair of ●●taining her true good , she being impure and in●ispos'd for it ; and also of ever getting that false good , upon which she had here set her chief affection ; because it is impossible , according to the circumstances of things , in the other life ; and that hence she becomes incapacitated of having any kind of good she can desire , but has her desire and wish crost in every thing ; and the perpetual crossing her voluntary and natural wishes in every thing , especially in what 's of infinite concern to her , must naturally cause in such a soul extreme grief , torment and desperation : and this tormenting grief is enhanced by the intenseness and vehemency of her acts , when she is a pure spirit ; with which the greatest and most violent grief in this life bears no proportion . lastly , since it has been clearly shown , that all these dismal effects , which induce and make up that wretched state we call damnation , do ( as is here shown ) spring originally , as from their sole cause from her having , by her own free choice , pitch● her first affections upon some created or false good ; and all the other bad consequences do follow out of the very nature of a spirit , thus affected or indispos'd : it is manifest , that god damns no man ; but that while a sinner hugs and cherishes inordinate affections for creatures in his breast , he is all the while connaturally kindling , and adding fuel to hell-fire in his own soul ; to which effect of damnation god contributes no otherwise than by preserving the natures of things , and carrying on the course of causes according to those natures ; which wisest method he has no reason to alter miraculously for their sakes who have preferr'd a creature before him. . it may be objected , that these affections for creatures were passions , which either spring from the body , or from the circumstances of the former world ; and , therefore , they do not remain , in a state where neither of them have any influence upon the soul. i answer , first , that these are not passions in our future state , as that word imports motion ; but they are far worse , viz. the termini or effects of the most steadily fixt and worst passion ; which we call resolvedness in ill , or willfulness : and this can , and must remain in a soul determin'd to a wrong last end ; she having , tho' no motion of the spirits , or passion , a power in her call'd a will , of it 's own nature indeed , determinable to good and bad , but by her state of separation fixt unchangeably in that determination which she dy'd with . secondly , tho' those passions did indeed spring here from our material compart , the body ; yet they did not stay in that part , but affected , by means of material impressions , the soul ; and were ●●t in her by a deliberate and serious pitching her chief affections on them ; nay , perhaps rivetted there by long-continu'd habits ; and therefore they must still remain in her for ever , unless they had been retracted while she was in a changeable condition in this life . . corollary xi . hence , one actual sin of a high nature , and done with perfect deliberation , of which the man dies unrepentant , will make the soul miscarry eternally ; such as are self-murther , being kill'd in a duel for a puntilio , and such like . . it may be said , that the knowledge of all truths will rectifie and alter the soul as soon as she is separated , in regard that she sees then clearly the vileness and perniciousness of placing her affection on a wrong last end. 't is answer'd : first , that the soul , as soon as separated , knows all truths only speculatively ; but that the practical judgments or affections which had prepossest her , ( as has been prov'd , § . . ) do more sway with her than all her speculative knowledge ; which her choice did not give her , but nature forced into her . secondly , there could be no cause which was competent to alter her : not her separation ; for the whole effect of that action is to divide the potential parts of a compound ; that is , to take from them the state of potentiality , and make them ( if they can exist separate ) actual wholes ; actual parts , as it has been demonstrated , being impossible . wherefore death , being only the separation of the soul and body , terminates it's agency in making them two of one , and has no influence upon changing them . nor does their state of separation , or their remaining or becoming separate , alter their natures or their modes ; for this consists in the soul 's existing now a pure act ; which has nothing to do with taking away what she had ; but only , taking her as it found her , to elevate her , such as she was , and , consequently , those knowledges and affections she actually had , to a higher perfection in the line of ens , or to give her to exist after a nobler manner than she did formerly . lastly , were this so , the order of the world would be quite perverted ; for , in that case , the wickedest livers would have equal priviledge and benefit in the next world , as the greatest saints ; since , each of them , ( as is presuppos'd to our question ) knowing all things as soon as separated , their wickedness would be corrected , and effaced ; which takes away all the dread of hell , evacuates all the motives to good life , and even destroys the notion of virtue and vice , punishment and reward ; and , consequently , god's attribute of justice . . corollary xii . hence is seen , that sin does not consist meerly in the falshood of our speculative judgments , but in the disproportion of our practical judgments or affections for a temporary good , above the degree of affection it has for eternal goods . for , it may be a truth , that the objects of sin were agreeable to the man in this mortal state , especially taking him as thus circumstanced , which made him apply his thoughts only to them ; and by that means he came to conceit strongly the good he found in them ; and so by oft-repeated acts he came to beget in his soul ( unattentive and unapply'd to other goods which were incomparably greater ) vast practical iudgments , impelling him to act for them , and pursue them ; or , which is the same , by a long converse with them , he got a strong addiction to them , and most ardent affection for them : but the reason why he came to fall into such pernicious sin , was because he did not to the same degree apply his thoughts to eternal goods , nor so carefully and studiously consider the incomparable excellency of them , as he did the trifling good of the others . which had he done , ( as he ought ) it would have bred in him such solidly-grounded and strong iudgments and affections for heaven , that it would have corrected ( either wholly or to a high degree ) the affections to creatures . the falshood then which may have accompany'd the practical judgments of a sinful soul , will be corrected in the state of separation ; because she knows then all created truths ; and truth and falshood , ( they being contradictions , and therefore opposite to the notion of being , the only object of our understanding ) cannot consist together in an intellectual substance ; but the predominancy or over-proportion of the practical judgment or affection to creatures ; ( whether it proceed from falshood , or , as it does generally , and perhaps always from a more frequent and more hearty application of the soul to creatures , ) does , and must , ever remain in her ; and withall the consequent sad effects mention'd , in case the man dies with those bad prevalent judgments unretracted . . hence all those knowledges , whether physical , moral , mathematical , metaphysical , theological , or of what kind soever they be , in which the man had particularly cultivated his soul here , will , in the state of separation , be elevated to a very deep , or proportionable penetration of the objects of those sciences in the state of separation ; whence a peculiar accidental satisfaction is , by the design of nature , apt to accrue to every such well-employ'd soul whatever . but , with this distinction that those souls which are good , besides what natural means gives them , will have a particular content or accidental joy in seeing the supreme reasons for the truth of those respective sciences in the first cause ; whereas in the wicked they only serve to ex●… a more vehement thirst of seeing the highest grounds of their truth in the first truth it self , ●●● original author of all being ; which avails ●●●m nothing but to increase their grief and torment . . from the same principles , 't is clearly deduced , that all the virtuous and 〈…〉 affections which good ●●●●● had for friends , relations ●●● acquaintances in this world , 〈◊〉 remain in them after death ; ●●● that too , in a higher mea●●●● and affect them more heart●● than they did here . whence ●●ey cordially wish and pray for 〈…〉 progress in the way to true ●●●piness . they are glad when 〈…〉 do well ; are sorry , ( if their 〈◊〉 would permit it ) when we sin ; at least , have ●…cidental joy than they would have had , if 〈…〉 liv'd virtuously . which propension , 〈…〉 natural or acquir'd here , is exceeding●● enhanced by true charity ; in which best of ●…ues they do now abound more than we are 〈◊〉 to conceive . they take it kindly that we 〈◊〉 for the consummation of their bliss , and ●●● the coming of christ's kingdom , when the new hierusalem , the church militant and triumphant , joyn'd in one body , shall , without the least spot or wrinkle of vice or imperfection , and adorn'd with the lustrous gems of the purest virtues , descend from heaven like a bride to meet her spouse and saviour . they require our devout wishes with their powerful prayers . particularly , they rejoyce at any good of ours to which themselves have been instrumental . the same joy have all those b. saints , apostles , martyrs , confessors , virgins , and with them the holy angels also , when we keep their festivals , to the end that we may honour their virtues , follow their instructions , imitate their holy lives , obsequiously comply with their good inspirations , repent our sins , and improve in virtue . the same do those good souls , departed in an inferiour ●●gree of grace , who ( as most hold ) need our prayers and oblations . they are glad , and have ease and refreshment , by knowing that we have not forgot them , ( as worldlings do , who love for petty ends ) but that we dutifully and charitably remember to pray for their deliverance and final happiness . by which doctrine we see how that article of our creed , the communion of saints is explicated , maintain'd and shown agreeable to reason by metaphysical principles . nay , even the damned in hell retain a natural affec●●●● for their surviving friends and relations ; as appears by dives his request to abraham , that he would send to warn his brethren to beware ●● coming into his place of torment . . it may be thought that all these particu●●rs are said gratis , because , to avoid prolixity , i have not apply'd each of them to it 's proper ●inciples . but if it shall please any ●●ponent to challenge me with ●●y flaw in this discourse , or ●●etend to show , that they are ●●t well-grounded , i shall not ●●ubt but to demonstrate them from the prin●●●les already fore-laid and fore-prov'd , viz. that our soul is immortal ; that , when out of the ●ody she is a pure act , and of a superiour nature 〈◊〉 body : that in that state she knows all natural 〈◊〉 , and is unchangeable : that she remains 〈…〉 the same affections which she had in her 〈…〉 were unretracted when the man died ; 〈…〉 that they are most exceedingly heighten'd 〈…〉 state of separation : lastly , that those ●…violent affections , and unretractable in that 〈…〉 have conformable effects issuing from them 〈…〉 ●eavenly joy , hellish sorrow , or penally●…●●ded hope . . corollary xii . from this whole discourse is naturally and necessarily deduc'd this corollary as a summary of all that has been said hitherto ; that , there is not the least tittle of our whole life in which we act as men , or with perfect deliberation of our reason , which is indifferent ; or that passes unregarded by the world 's infinitely-wise and just governour ; but that every such word , action , thought , gesture , look or wish we ever had , and dy'd without altering it , will have ( according as it is well or ill intended ) effects , in the other world conformable to it's nature , and to the degree of it's goodness or badness ; and that , each of them will receive , with most just and exact proportion , reward or punishment , by the course of natural and supernatural causes ; laid and appointed by god's infinite wisdom for the eternal salvation of those who love him , and the eternal confusion and perdition of his enemies . meditation . where art thou now , my soul , after thou hast abandon'd and flitted from thy terrene habitation , and into what strange ultramundane region art thou flown in an instant ? the whole earth ▪ nay , all material nature , seems a contemptible atome , when thou look'st down upon it from the transcendent height of being , to which the wisdom and goodness of thy creatour , who promotes all his creatures to those perfections they art ▪ capable of , has rais'd thee . i see thy knowledge ▪ that is , thy essence , stretcht out boyond the vast expansion of this material world's circumference , and our firmament bespangled with those starry bodies which it contains ; or , rather , i see them all center'd ●… spiritual and indivisible . essence , as in a 〈…〉 orb of being . thou seest now at one 〈…〉 the whole sphere of time sweeping along 〈…〉 ●●● thee ; or , rather , thou comprizest it all in 〈…〉 〈◊〉 natural thought : and canst now 〈…〉 more ease comprehend it 's whole race , than 〈…〉 couldst , while here , resume th●se fleeting parts 〈…〉 ( v. g. an hour or a day , ) in t one steady 〈…〉 in which they were all present and perma●●nt at once . the whole bulk of quantity is in 〈…〉 more noble being , without extension , and the ●●ng course of motion , without succession . but the extent of thy actual knowledge , is nothing in comparison of thy clear penetration of those great , 〈…〉 various , and numberless objects , which are now ●…nted to thy view . what was here misty and ●●●dy , is now , the screen of matter ( the ground ●● ll confusedness and obscurity ) being taken away , 〈…〉 brightly intelligible with noon-day evidence . 〈…〉 clearly , that , if thou hast in this world but ●●●prehended or laid hold of any one piece of the 〈…〉 link in the chain of causes , which weaves 〈…〉 one orderly loom all natural truths ; thou ●●●est into thee the whole length of that line 〈…〉 the first birth of the world till it expires in●● eternity : or rather those truths are so innext ●…e another by the closest texture of identity , 〈…〉 if thou admittest any one of them , all the rest 〈…〉 ●roud themselves into thy capacious , tho' space●… understanding . ●…ow shall we then frame any ●●● conception of the difference ●…en thy former and this future state ? or , by what parallel ●hall we illustrate it ? shall we compare it to the condition of a child in the womb on the one side , and of a perfect man grown up to rip● knowledge on the other ? indeed , this world is but as it were our second womb ; nature is deliver'd of thee ; and thou art born a pure spirit when the man di●s . or , shall we compare these two states to those of a man , first shut up in a dark tower ; who can see no objects about him but when presented before five dim glasses placed in it's walls ; but afterwards , when the tower by some chance is thrown down , and the man preserv'd unhurt ; then he can freely range with his sight all over the large prospect about him ; and discover , at once , the various scenes of all the vast circumstant region , of which he could before take but a scant , obscure and leasurely survey ! both those are but lame comparisons , and far from parallelling the excess , which this new state of thine has above thy former one . thy capacity in thy purely-spiritual condition does infinitely , that is , beyond proportion , go beyond that thou hadst in the body , when it was at it's best : whereas thy capacity in the other two states , ( that pretended to parallel this ) being both of them finite , are very easily proportion'd : wherefore we will leave this consideration to be seriously and at leasure meditated on by those truly wise souls , who think it their ▪ highest concern to reflect on their future state ; and what happy or dismal consequences attend it ▪ according to the good or bad dispositions they contract here , and carry with them hence . that we may gratefully and humbly acknowledge to whom we owe this clear knowledge of our true last end , the attaining which is our only , and eternal happiness ; let us consider how far natural reason carry'd those heathen philosophers who were the greatest masters of human science in their ●●●es , and where it stopt . the 〈◊〉 intelligent followers of aristo●●● do gather from his principles this ●●●●sonant discourse . the goods of 〈◊〉 body are preferrable to those ●● fortune ; and the goods of the 〈◊〉 to those of the body : wherefore happiness ●●st consist in something that in the best manner ●●●ects that part of man call'd the soul. now , the powers of the soul are the understanding and t●● will : of which the understanding is the no●●●● ; because the will is naturally ordain'd to be ●●●●ed and govern'd by the understanding ; and 〈◊〉 act of the will , which the previous reason 〈◊〉 understanding does not dictate and warrant ▪ ●●llfulness ; which is justly held the greatest ●●perfection imaginable . happiness therefore 〈…〉 be sought for in the best perfection of the understanding . farther , the understanding is but a ●●●wer , and act is better than power ; for it includes 〈◊〉 , and adds to it the acting or exercise of it ; ●●●ch is the immediate end for which the power was ●●●n'd ; therefore happiness must consist in some 〈◊〉 perfect act , of the understanding . wherefore , 〈◊〉 power and it's acts taking their degree of per●●●● from the clearness of the sight , and from the ●●●llency of the object about which they are em●●● ; and the primum ens being the most excellent object ; it follows , that the beatitude of man does 〈◊〉 in the actual and clear knowledge of the first being ; which in christian language , is the seeing god face to face , or in the beatifical vision . thus far their speculative thoughts rais'd them ▪ but there were other necessary truths requisite er● man could be happy , which were below their short reach . as , first , that this contemplation of the first being must also be most durable , or never ▪ interrupted , that is everlasting ; without which , the attaining it could be no happiness ; since the being depriv'd of so soveraign and excellent an object , after having enjoy'd it , and known the goodness of it by experience , must needs make them more miserable than they had been , had they not known it at all . secondly , it must be propos'd to them as a state that is attainable , and therefore is to be hoped for . for , let it be never so gallant a thing in it self , yet unless we could hope to come at it and enjoy it , what is it to us , or how can it possibly be our happiness ? thirdly , for want of holding this blissful state attainable , and thence making us entertain some hope of enjoying it , we can never come to love it heartily ; much less place our chief affection on it , or bend our best endeavours to pursue , or gain it . what man has a hearty desire to climb to the moon ? and why not ? because he judges it impossible , and beyond his hope . or what virtuoso had ever an effectual love or wish to dig to the center of the earth , to make curious observations of the rarities found there ? and why , but because 't is hopeless and impossible ? wherefore , without holding the possibility of the thing , 't is impossible to aim at it or intend it . nay , it must be more than meerly possible ; it must be hopeful too , or have some degree of likelihood that 't is within our power ●● compass it ▪ otherwise none but a frantick man c●● be mov'd heartily to pursue it , much less to take off our principal affection from temporal goods , ( the ●…ableness of which , in some sort , to our na●… we experience ) and to place them on eternal 〈…〉 which we are not assur'd we can ever come to ●… : and yet , without this predominant affe●… for our true happiness , we cannot ( as has 〈…〉 demonstrated ) be dispos'd for it , or ever en●… . behold here the utmost to which meer natural reason could raise souls immerst in matter ? behold 〈…〉 most vigorous efforts of humane knowledge , ●…isted by superiour light had from revelation ; 〈…〉 how it falls short in three most necessary , and 〈…〉 proper dispositions , addicting souls and fitting 〈…〉 connaturally for the sight of god , our only ●…itude ! no wonder then , the wisest among the ●…ed heathens , tho' deum cognoverunt , non ●…n sicut deum honoraverunt . no wonder , if ●…fible pleasures , worldly interest , and consuetudo ●…li , did easily draw them , to run along with the ●… ; no wonder , present temporal goods did ●…ross ▪ all their choicest affections ; and left them ●…ne for unseen , future , and unhop'd for eter●… happiness in the sight of god. but 't is the ●…der of wonders , that those deists , who hold their 〈…〉 survives , and that it 's true bliss is to be plac'd 〈…〉 that beatifical vision , can , after so many thousand ●…riences how short nature falls of elevating us ●…m at it , should still maintain that there is no ●…d of revelation , and supernatural assistances ; 〈…〉 so wilfully blind , as not to see and acknowledge 〈…〉 excellency of christianity ; and how far it sur●… the deepest search and highest reach of ●atural knowledge and human philosophy . for their sakes especially , and to make this truth sink deeper into the minds of all our readers , we will give this point a second review . all mankind have , and ever had , in their thoughts the notion of being happy , since they all know the meaning of the word [ happiness , ] and that it means perfect satisfaction , or the having all they could desire . 't is what every man covets , either immediately or ultimately , in all his wishes ; and pursues in all his actions . but some sought for this happiness in some temporal good of this world , as honour , greatness , corporeal pleasure , riches , &c. each of them vainly flatter'd themselves , that , that darling object of their affection once obtain'd , they should be satisfy'd , and could wish no more . but , alas ! all of them did by their carriage confess , that after their most successful acquisitions , they still remain'd as empty , hungry , and dissatisfy'd as formerly . alexander , after all his fortunate victories , weeps that there are no more worlds to conquer ; unus pellaeo iuveni non sufficit orbis , &c. one world suffic'd not the pellaean king ; th' unhappy youth sweats in that narrow ring . the miser , after he has hoarded up immense banks of money , is still covetous of laying up more : crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia cre●cit . besides he is rack'd with care of securing it ; and at length he dies despairing , that he cannot carry along with him his shining idol , which he had here so devoutly ador'd . wanton lais , when age had crippled her feet and wrinkled her face , and made her un●it for pleasure , laments that her holiday trim ●● short imaginary happiness was but the prologue to ●…eal and never to be released misery . and the 〈…〉 may be said of all the other worldlings , who 〈…〉 their happiness in some temporal good. some 〈…〉 few philosophers ( as we show'd above ) did in●… by their reason gain some glimpse of what 〈…〉 man 's true happiness : but it was no more 〈…〉 ● flash of light , which disappear'd and dy'd 〈…〉 soon as their actual speculation was over : they 〈…〉 laid fast hold of it ; apply'd their will to it 〈…〉 true good , rais'd their hope to it , nor lov'd 〈…〉 pursu'd it above all things ; so that all their ●…wledge of it ended in an idle talk , or airy ●…m . but , oh! the incomparable philosophy re●…d to us by the wisdom of the eternal father ! ●…eanest scholler of that divine master , can tell ●● n●w , that our true happiness is not plac'd in the ●…isition er enjoyment of any goods of this life , ●…n a never-ending contemplation of god's es●… in the next . nor does revelation only assure 〈…〉 where happiness is to be found and hoped for ; 〈…〉 it acquaints us , moreover , with all the methods 〈…〉 ways how to attain it . it gives us gratis , 〈…〉 assures to us , by well-attested miracles , the truth ●…ose sublime theses ; which directs the reason of ●…lators , to show them agreeable to natural princi●… viz. to the nature of a soul , and her affections ; 〈…〉 the ground whence they spring , to the nature of ●…re act , an infinite being , and of beatitude it 〈…〉 for the seeing clearly how consonant and ●…formable those high mysteries are to natural ●… , does comfort faith in those faithful ; and 〈…〉 unbelievers to an opinion they are true , since they are ( if rightly explicated ) no way repugnant , 〈…〉 perfectly agreeable to those verities , which nature ●eaches us in gross , and art demonstrates . perhaps , the last corollary of the precedent chapter may give some readers frightful apprehensions , that a christian life is melancholly and full of anxiety . indeed to those rechlest souls ▪ who are resolv'd to mind and pursue nothing but idle toyes , and think nothing worth their affection but fleeting and perishable goods , all discourse of perfecting the soul as much as is possible , ( in which consists her compleat satisfaction or happiness ) must needs be irksome and tedious : but to those wiser souls , who think the attaining or falling short of eternal bliss is their main concern , and most worthy their consideration , it will appear quite otherwise . what greater joy , since we know we must die , and that our soul survives for ever , than to know where our soul shall go to be eternally happy ? what more solid comfort than ▪ not only to have assurance what is our true last end or felicity , but to know also the certain way to attain it ; and that that way is easie ? for what can be easier , or more sutable to the whole propension of our nature , than to love that above all things , which is infinitely worthy of our whole affection for it's own sake ; and , withall such , that the loving it will make us eternally happy ? what easier than to have a good intention to pursue our own happiness , and to do nothing that can make us lose it ; and , by losing in undo our selves ? nothing can endanger our falling short of it , but that sottish nonsense , and ri●icul●us madness , of preferring a wretched , indigent , empty , perishable creature , before our great and infinitely good creatour . miserable then , and justly most miserable they , who , thro' neglect of considering what god ▪ is in himself , and what he is to be to us , 〈…〉 for some momentary and trifling content , give 〈…〉 the reins of their reason to embrace such an ●…avagant , pernicious and blasphemous folly ! nor let our daily failings deter us . the rich ●…-house of most efficacious motives left to us in 〈…〉 christian church , and propos'd by her , will , if 〈…〉 regard them , and listen to them , very easily ●…rve us from such a wicked slighting of our 〈…〉 god , our father , redeemer , sanctifier , and 〈…〉 bountiful benefactor , as to prefer a poor crea●… a thing next to nothing , before his every way ●…nitely perfect deity . now , that point secur'd , 〈…〉 by-affections are already in some sort subordinate 〈…〉 prevalent affection for our eternal and spiri●… good ; and therefore , may easily , if care be taken , ●…ally subdu'd to that soveraign and predominant 〈…〉 of heaven ; especially , when death comes , ●●ich sets all these worldly baubles in a true light , 〈…〉 shows them in their own fading colours , it will 〈…〉 ●e at all hard to shake off those weak fetters : ●●e sacraments usually received at that season , re●…ing the soul ; and the assistance of a prudent ●●iritual guide , directing our whole intention for ●…even , and erecting our hope to obtain it immedi●…y . now , when the soul is thus perfectly set ●…ut , our whole work is at an end for time and ●…ity ; and our glorious reward waits ready for us . ●…deed , the purifying our souls to this refined de●… must cost us some labour ; but how unreasonable 〈…〉 to think , that to enter certainly and immediately 〈…〉 endless happiness , is not worth some pains●…ing ? especially , if we consider , that worldlings ●…d libertines , tho' they put on a iolly countenance ●…idst their false pleasures here , do suffer far more vexation by giving up the reins to their unruly pass●… , than it costs pious souls to curb and keep them subject to reason ! nor is our indulgent heavenly father mortally offended at every petty failing of o●●s ipse cognovit ●igmentum nostrum , recordatus est quoniam pulvis sumus , ps. . . he excuses s●●● of them for their indeliberateness ; others , because our ghostly enemy surpriz'd our short foresight by his wily ambushes : others of them are so weaken'd by a firm and sincere resolution to avoid and detest them ▪ that upon our first recollecting our christian principles ▪ they are in a moment retracted ; or rather , they never sunk into the substance of our will , but only swam superficially in our fancy . lastly , altho' ( which his mercy forbid ) we should hap to fall into some grievous offence ; there needs no more but heartily to retract our fault , and to apply to our all-powerf●l advocate in heaven , with full hope in his merits and intercession ; and the syngrapha , or black-bill our condemnation is immediately cancell'd ; the di●● being abundantly paid by his infinitely superoga●… death and passion . these plain truths being dul● consider'd , what life can be so sweet and full 〈…〉 spiritual joy as that of a well-meaning christi●… who sincerely regards his own true interest , eter●… happiness ? and , on the contrary , what life so u●… comfortable as theirs , who hold their soul survi●… and must never return to enjoy her too-much belo●… objects ; and yet had no prospect , whether she must go●… what will become of her for all eternity . but , oh! what tongue of m●… or angels can express the ravishin● transports of joy which those happy souls feel when they are first admitted to the glorious sight of that infinite ●… being , in whom all goods that our boundless 〈…〉 can grasp at , are center'd and emparadis'd ? 〈…〉 my low conceits , you blessed spirits , to lisp out , 〈…〉 least , some faint resemblance of their amazing ●…ie , that so , i may excite my self and my readers ●…rdent love of that blissful state. but i ask ●…bles ▪ for not even your selves , tho' you expe●… it , are able to declare it ; and , tho' you could 〈…〉 it , yet our rudeness could not understand the ●…age of your celestial country , untravell'd by us ●…ls , and remov'd by a vast chasm from our ter●… habitation . that b. apostle , who was rapt to ●…hird heavens , checks all such bold attempts , by ●…g us , that non licet homini loqui , that is , 〈…〉 impossible for a man to speak those unuttera●… arcana verba ; tho' perhaps that signal favour 〈…〉 him at that season , was infinitely short of the ●…ical vision it self . 't is enough , that the same 〈…〉 cor. . . has told us , that eye has not 〈…〉 nor ear heard , nor has it ascended into the ●…t of man to conceive what god has prepar'd 〈…〉 those who love him . 't is enough , that the ●…nal wisdom himself has assur'd us , ( luk. . . ) ●…st comprehensive words , strain'd to the highest ●…osis , and redoubled with a still-increasing energy , 〈…〉 good ( or full ) measure , prest close down , ●…haken together to make the vessel hold more , ●…eapt up till it runs over , shall they give into 〈…〉 bosom . nothing will be defalkt from the ●…t satisfaction we shall experience when we come ●…ve our rich reward , by antecedent and over●…g expectation ; as it happens in our false ●…s here ; which we do oft-times , or rather always ●…ncy . it will be inconceiveably beyond all we ●…ld imagine ; insomuch , that tho' we had spent our whole life in sharpest tortures here for heaven's sake , we shall be astonisht and amaz'd at the infinite over-proportion which such unspeakable and eternally secure bliss bears to such slight and momentary sufferings . bright fountain of eternal light , whose ever-noon-day rays no night darkens , no gloud ( but that of sin ) eclipses . give us grace to sink deep and fix steadily in our mind this most solid , most clear , and most important truth ; that , as to live for ever in a dark dungeon would be highly disastrous to our bodily sight , and the seeing the chearful rays of the day , is the only true perfection , comfort , and satisfaction of our corporeal eye : so , when our soul , now separate , comes to be altogether one intellectual eye ; her falling short for ever of seeing thy divine essence , ( her only true light , for which , as her last end , she was created ) will certainly plunge her in a dismal hell of torment and misery ; since nothing but the clear sight of thy glorious being can be able to give her true and eternal happiness ; in whose face is the fullness of joy , and at thy right hand pleafures for evermore , psalm . . chap. ii. of the existence , knowledge , distinction , and action of angels . . the order of things requires that there should be different kinds of entitles , arising gradually to higher perfection under the notion of ens. for , since , were all things of the same pitch of perfection , or all of one sort , the creation would look like a confused multitude , or ( as it were ) a heap of things , and quite destitute of order ; which , by placing them in due ranks of superiority and inferiority , makes up this harmony which beautifies the world. again , since there can be no distinction , nor , consequently , any ground of order under the notion of ens , but it must be made by intrinsecal differences , or such as are found within the precincts of that line ; that is , ( as is demon●●rated in my method to science , b. i. l. . ●● . . . &c. ) by partaking more and less of that common notion ; and , what has more of it , ●ontains what has less , and superadds to it ; and , ●●●●quently , is more perfect under that notion 〈◊〉 the other ; which several or distinct degrees ●f perfection , when they come to be excessive , ●o constitute divers sorts , kinds or species of it ▪ ●●s ; therefore , evident , out of the order of the world , which is the workmanship of the first being ; and is also logically demonstrated , that 't is requisite there should be different kinds of things , arising gradually to higher perfection under the notion of ens. this is seen almost to our eye in the predicamental scale of substance ; where we find the several kinds of ens gradually descending in one of the collateral lines , as to the extent of their notion ; but increasing or ascending as to their degrees of perfection ; v. g. body , mixt , vegetable , sensitive , rational . which orderly distinction is not invented by us , ( as are the imaginary lines in the heavens put by astronomers , ) but copy'd from nature . . hence follows immediately and necessarily without proof , that there ought , à fortiori , to be pure acts , or angels , created , unless they be incapable of being ; that is , chimerical , or non-entia . otherwise the order of entities had been maim'd and imperfect in its principal or most noble part. . the angelical essence is capable of having existence given it . for , since the reason why individual bodies have title to have existence given them , is , because , by their peculiar complexion of accidents , they are become distinct from all others , or determinate under the notion of such an ens , o● body ; and this distinction or determination springs from it's act or form ; and , consequently , the act , which gives determinations to all others , cannot but be determinate it self ; a forti●●● , the nature or essence of a pure act bears in it's notion , that it is of it 's own nature , or essentially , determinate in the line of ens ; and more capable of existence than any other sort of ens whatever . again , since ( as was shown , book i. ●● . . § . . ) the essence of all einite entities consists in their possibility or non-repugnance to existence ; and , there can be no shadow of impossibility , but much more reason , that the nature of a pure act should exist , than that bodies should , that have matter or power in them , which i● of it self the principle of indetermination and confusion ; in regard this indetermination makes bodies less fit for existence ; or rather , did not the act determine the power , or matter , utterly unfit . wherefore , seeing it belongs to the first being to give to his creatures what they are capable of ; especially when it consists with the best order of the world , as is shown § . . this does : it follows , that he has given to that nature or essence which is a pure act , that is , to the angelical nature , to exist ; and , consequently , angels are . which is farther demon●●rated by the following medium , showing that , otherwise , there had wanted a proper or immediate ●●●se of motion . . every thing acts it is : wherefore imperfect agents do produce first that part of the effect which is imperfect , and thence proceed to what 's 〈◊〉 perfect ; as we see all natu●●● agents do : but , perfect agents , and most especially , that agent which is 〈◊〉 perfect , produces first that effect which is most perfect , or most like ▪ it self . wherefore the first and immediate effect produced by god is existence , it being the most perfect of any thing found in creatures . to proceed , since nothing is more preposterous , and contrary to reason , than to order that which is most perfect , as a means to produce that which is less-perfect , it follows that god's wisdom does not order existence , which , ( as being most actual ) is most perfect of any thing found in creatures ; it does not , i say , order it , as a means to cause any thing that is less perfect , than it self is . wherefore , whatever less perfect effect is produced by god , ( as motion is ) it must either have been caus'd by him , because it is necessarily concomitant to existence , or else necessarily consequent to it : but motion is neither necessarily concomitant nor consequent to existence : for , let us put diverse bodies to be created in rest , ( as they must be in the first instant they were created , ere motion began ) they would have ▪ in that case , all that is requisite to existence ; nor would motion follow meerly upon their being put to exist . therefore , some other cause is requisite to produce the first motion of bodies . which since it can neither be a body , as is granted , and indeed , in a manner self-evident ; nor god , as was now proved ; nor a separated soul , for this presupposes the motion of bodies to her being ; it must be some other cause distinct from all these : but no other cause is imaginable or possible to be assign'd , but some creature which is a pure act , or an angel. therefore , as certain as it is , that there is motion ▪ so certain it is that angels are . nay , so impossible it is , that motion can be concomitant to the first existence of bodies , that 't is a contradiction they should be together in duration , or at once ; for , existence , it having ●● parts , is indivisible in duration , or without part after part ; whereas 't is essential to motion to be part after part , or successive . so that 't is equally contradictory , that existence should not be all at once , as 't is , that motion should be all at once , so far is the later from being consequent or concomitant to the former . . this is farther demonstrated from the nature of causality , by this argument . no effect can proceed immediately from a cause which is of a nature diametrically opposite to such an effect . v. g. not-being cannot produce being ; light cannot produce darkness ; not can that which is essentially ●●● immediately produce cold. but motion , which is essentially successive , or ( which is the same ) perpetually changing , is diametrically opposite to the nature of god whose essence is unchangeable existence : therefore motion cannot be produced by god as it's immediate cause . wherefore , since by our former discourse , the ●●● motion of bodies could not have been immediately produced , either by any meer body , ●o● by a human soul , nor yet by god ; it is 〈◊〉 that it could only be caus'd by a pure act , ●● an angel. see method to science , pag. . ●●●●●s . ideae cartesianae , p. . § . . and rail●●● defeated , § . . where this demonstration is ●● large put down , and prest home . what i ●●●tend for here , is , that the contrary tenet ●●erthrows all likeness of the cause and effect , ●●d all causality ; and therefore all connexion of proper causes with their proper effects , and vice versâ ; that is , it quite destroys all possibility of science and demonstration . notwithstanding , 't is granted , that god is the mediate , remote , or principal cause of motion ; as giving second causes both the power to move bodies , and pre-moving or determining them to move them . . every more perfect ens contains or includes in it the nature of the less perfect . thus , ( as was said ) the nature of a mixt or compound body ( having diverse elements in it ; and therefore having more of the nature of body than a simple body , or any one element has ) includes in it the nature or essence of a simple body . thus , and for the same reason , a vegetative mixt , has more of the nature of a mixt in it , than a meerly-mixt , such as are pebbles , clay , gold , or such like . thus sensitive things include in them the nature of a vegetable ; and every rational animal includes in it the nature of a meer sensitive thing or an animal . all which are evident ; because the perfecter ens has in it the notion or nature of the imperfecter , and superadds something to it . so that to deny the force of this demonstration , or the truth it demonstrates , is the same folly as to deny , that what has more in it of any kind does not contain in it what 's less of the same kind ; or that , what 's a whole ( in respect of the other ) is not more than a part of it , or , ( which is the same ) that a whole does not contain or include it's parts . and that they include them essentsally , is most evident to all logicians , and granted by all ; while they acknowledge those later or less perfect notions to be essentially predicated of the former , in regard they superadd to them nothing that 's positive . . wherefore , for the same reason , every pure act , spirit , or angel , includes in it self , one way or other , the whole nature of body . for , since ens is adequately divided into pure acts , or spirit and into those entities whose essences are alloy'd with power and potentiality , ( as are bodies , which are compounded of matter and form ; ) and these two species are constituted , as by it's intrinsecal differences , by partaking ●●●e and less of ens , their genus ; and that which is more in any kind or respect , includes what 's less in the same respect ; as a yard in quantity contains an inch , which is less under that notion , or a lesser quantity . hence , it follows demonstratively , that the self-same discourse must equally hold in the species of ens , as it does in those of quantity now mention'd ; or in the species of any other genus ; and , consequently , that a pure act , or spirit , must include some way or other , the whole nature of body , which has less of the nature of ens in it , than had the other . . wherefore the very essences of all natural bodies are really and truly contain'd in the knowledge of an angel , and not their ideas or similitudes only . for , since it is granted , that angels , they being pure acts , are of an indivisible nature or void of quantity ; the essences of bodies , which by § . . are one way or other , contain'd or included in an angel , cannot be included in it quantitatively ; after the manner a vessel contains liqu●ur , or as a bigger box contains a lesser . wherefore , it must be said , that those lesser essences of body are contain'd in the superiour essence of an angel indivisibly ; or after the manner of a spirit , that is , knowingly , or as objects of their knowing power ; which was the point to be demonstrated . . wherefore , he who denies , that the very essences of bodies are in the understanding of an angel , or , in any spiritual nature , and affirms , that only the similitudes of them are there ; may , as well say , the essences or natures of simple bodies are not in mixts ; or that the essences of meer vegetatives are not in sensitive things or animals ; or that the essence of an animal is not really in a rational thing or a man , but likenesses only ; which is both against the sentiments of all logicians in the world , who do acknowledge that the former are essential predicates of the later , ( and not accidental ones ; ) which could not with truth be said , unless the essences themselves , from which the denomination of [ essential ] is taken , were really in them : nay , it is moreover , against the definitions of these later , in which those former are found . i add , against the sense of all mankind too , who reflect upon what they say . whence , those ideists , who hold the contrary opinion , are desir'd to take notice that our argument here is drawn from the notion of the thing , as it is a thing or ●●●tance ; and from the nature of the species of ●● , as such ; and not from the qualities or relations of them , from whence their likeness or un●●●ness is taken . which clinches the force of our demonstration drawn from logick and metaphysicks , and will forestall and defeat all the op●●ion that can be made against it . . corollary i. our foregoing discourses being chiefly built on that piece of doctrine in my method , b. i. l. , § . . that all intrinsecal or essential differences in any predicament , or under whatever notion , are nothing else but more and less of that notion ; therefore , since so much stress is put upon this thesis , i beg of my readers to peruse attentively the third chapter of my method to science ; my ideae cartesianae expensae , pag. , , . and raillery defeated , § . . where this position is at large explicated and defended against the mistakes of my opposers . which i do the rather request , because , however it may seem new , yet i dare affirm , that , besides it 's being perfectly demonstrable , no one rule in logick is more useful to keep our notions distinct , or to frame right definitions , or to discourse solidly or exactly . . corollary ii. what 's deduc'd here of the very essences of things being intellectually , or as objects , in the understanding of an angel does for the same reason hold in every spiritual or cognoscitive nature ; and consequently , in the soul , whether in the body , or separated ▪ the argument being grounded on the nature of a spirit ; and it 's being superiour to the nature of body . . corollary iii. for the same reason what has been discourst before of the immutability of a soul , while separated , and of her final or eternal state , ( springing from her choice of a wrong last end , if unretracted before death ) may , mutatis m●tandis , be apply'd to an angel , without needing repetition , or farther enlarging upon it . . since the essence or nature of an angel is to be after such a manner cognoscitive , the distinction of angels must consist in their being more or less thus cognoscitive this is already demonstrated ; because , by the doctrine lately given , all the intrinsecal , or essential differences , under whatever kind or notion , are nothing but more or less of the common notion , or the partaking of it unequally . . yet this degree of cognoscitiveness , which ●●●●itutes distinct angels , must understood of the intenseness ● their knowledge , or the penetrativeness of their knowing po●● . for , since every pure act ●●is shown above , and particu●●● raillery defeated , p. , . ) ●●ws all things ; it cannot be understood of the extent of their knowledge , or that one of them knows a greater number of things than another ; it must therefore be meant , ●● one of them knows things more perfectly , ●●● clearly , thorowly , or deeply , than another ●●● . which , as may be seen in my ideae cartesianae , p. , . may spring from two causes . o● ▪ because , eorum aliqui magis perspica●i intel●●● acie praediti sunt quàm alii ; which seems ●● be most essential to them . the other , because by their seeing better the first cause it self , they must better , and withal more solidly and ●●●ndedly , know those effects that spring ●●●m that supreme cause . . corollary iv. from this greater or lesser excess of knowledge , as thus explicated , as far as natural reason carries us , are taken the diverse orders of angels . all farther or more particular disquisition concerning the three hierarchies , and nine quires of angels , is left to divines , gathering them from holy writ and the antient mysticks . a philosopher must step no farther than he can tread sure upon his own firm grounds . . corollary v. from our discourse about human souls and angels will be seen in what different manner , and by what means , an angel , and a humane soul , when separate , come to know all things . the later , by notions , caus'd at first by impressions on the senses , and improv'd into iudgments and discourses . the former , by knowledge , not acquir'd , but innate . the first and immediate objects of both of them is themselves or their own essence : whence a soul , in regard it's body ( and , consequently , the determination of the degree of rationality it had ) grew , as it were , out of natural causes ; knows all things , as first connected with her self , then with one another in the well-linkt chain of those causes ; in which there can be no flaw or interruption . but an angel knows all things , by transcending from one ens or one degree of entity to another , and this intuitively ; that is , an angel by knowing it self , knows what place it bears in the order of angels or spirits : and , since it could not know it 's own particular pitch or individuality , but by knowing how high or low it is in the order of angelical beings ; nor could this be known but by knowing the whole order , because in an order which is contriv'd after the best manner , each part is proportion'd in exact symmetry to the rest : hence , the knowledge of that whole order , and consequently of each part of it , or each entity in the whole creation , is due to it's nature ; and , therefore is given it . as for the knowledge of corporeal nature , 't is below them both , and therefore both of them comprehends it knowingly , as is deduced above . lastly , the soul gains her knowledge by abstract or inadequate notions , and by discourse ; whereas an angel knows at once the whole entities , and all that belongs to them ; and this , not by discourse or reflex thoughts ; but by a direct , penetrative and comprehensive intuition . . there is , besides those differences amongst angels mention'd , § . . . and c●roll . v. another , arising from the several degrees or rather manners of that cognoscitiveness which is essential to them , viz. that some of them know more things by one operation or act of knowledge , or , as it were , by one thought , than another does ; which happens because the object of each thought which some of them have , is more universal than are the objects of those thoughts that others have parallels of which may be found among our several sorts of knowers or philosophers here . some treat of such particular sorts of quantities or figures ; others , of quantity or figure in their whole latitude , or i● common . some philosophers have for the objects of their knowledge such a sort of ens ; as minerals , or such a species of birds or beasts : others , raise their thoughts to contemplate body or ens in their whole extent , as do metaphysicians . but , with this difference , which renders them unparallel , that our science is employ'd about abstract notions of the thing ; that is , about the thing consider'd in such an abstracted or common respect , without descending to the under-kinds or to the individuums under it ; whereas , the intuitive knowledge of an angel , as not being made by way of abstract or inadequate conceptions , comprehends in one act , or at once , the individualities of all those things , ( from which we abstract one common notion ) and all that belongs to them . whence , when we said ▪ that the generical notion , common to all angels , is to be cognoscitive , it is to be understood of an intuitive cognoscitiveness , or such a one as we have describ'd above ; by which they are distinguisht from the inferiour or narrower degree of knowingness peculiar to the soul in this state ; and even , in some respect , as she is found in her state of separation . . the same is evinced by reason . for , since the object speci●ies the act , and the excellency of the act argues a more excellent faculty or power , and consequently , a more excellent degree of the essence or nature of the acter ; and , since bonum , ( i add [ verum , ] this being the best and most connatural good of a knowing creature ) quò communius eò divinius ! it follows , that the essence of those angels are more excellent and noble , who have a more comprehensive and larger knowledge of more universal objects , at once , or by one act ; whence it comes that ( since reflexion or deliberation can have no place in pure acts , but are contrary to their nature ) they are fitted for the overseeing more-common goods , or to preside over the spiritual good of provinces , kingdoms , or great nations of people . . corollary vii . that which gives greater force to this doctrine , is the consonancy it has to the sacred scripture : where , ( daniel , ch. . ) we read of the angel of the kingdom of persia , withstanding that particular angel ( in likelihood gabriel ) who presided over the iews ; till michael , who was higher in dignity than the former , being chief patron and defender of the jewish church then , as he is held to be of the christian church now , over-power'd his inclination by his more soveraign influence . where also we read of the angel who was prince or super-intendent over the greeks ; divers of which sort , if not all , were archangels : whereas 't is generally held , and is consonant to reason , that the angel-guardians of particular or individual persons are of the lowest , and least-cognoscitive , quire of meer angels . thus far concerning the essence and internall operations of angels ; we proceed now to their external operation , or their action upon other things . . an angel cannot operate upon another angel , so as to make it otherwise than it was . for , since that operation must work some new effect in it ; and this requires some passive principle , in the subject , rendring it mutable , which principle we call matter : and angels , they being pure acts , have not that sort of power call'd matter in them ; it follows , that an angel cannot thus operate upon another angel ; nor , for the same reason , upon a soul , while 't is separate . . wherefore , all such external operation of an angel can be only upon bodies . for , since an angel can neither thus operate upon , that is , alter another angel , nor a separated soul , because they are pure acts ; much less god , who is an infinitely pure act , and essentially immutable ; and there is no other subject imaginable ; it follows , that the external operation of angels must either be exercis'd on bodies , or on nothing . . an angel can operate upon material entititles , or on body . for , since the being of an angel is superiour to the nature of body ; and , consequently , it 's faculty or power of acting is superiour to whatever is in body that can resist it's activity : also , since ▪ being a pure act , it 's nature is active . wherefore , seeing , on the other side , matter is easily , or rather essentially passive ; and there can want no application of such an agent to such a patient , because an angel has the natures or essences , nay , the existences of bodies , and all that can belong to them , intimately joyn'd to their understanding by knowledge of them : 't is evident that there are all the requisites imaginable put for their operating upon body , and producing some effect in it , which was not in it before ; that is , of changing it . wherefore , an angel has power to operate this upon body or material nature . nor is there any disproportion between the motion which the angel works in bodies , and such an immediate cause , as was shown , § . . is between god and such an effect ; since , as has been shown , method to science , b. i. l. . § . . motion , according to it 's precise nature , or as it superadds to it's subject , is as it were made up of non-entities , or next to nothing ; and every created being , as to what it has of it self , is such : all the essential ▪ distinction between creatures , and consequently their formal constitution being only such and such limitations of being ; or more and less , that is , thus much and no more of entity . . advertisement . let it be noted , that what 〈…〉 intend to evince here , is con●…'d to the question an est ; or , ●…o demonstrate that angels have power to move bodily nature ; ●…od not to show how , or in what ●…articular manner , they work this effect . to clear which point , requires a perfect and penetrative knowledge of the angelical nature ; which is perhaps unattainable by us in this state. . notwithstanding what 's said , no one angel has an unlimited power to move , or change , all the bodies in the world. for , since the natures of spirit and body are constituted by their partaking more and less of ens ; and , more and less do manisestly signifie , only degrees of the nature of ens in common , from whence their power over another is taken , and on which it is entirely and adequately grounded ; and what exceeds another only in some degree , does only exceed it finitely , limitedly , and in some proportion : it follows , that however the whole ▪ angelical nature , or some considerable part of it , may have power to work upon , or alter , the whole mass of material beings ; yet a single angel , being but one individual of it , and , consequently , inconsiderable in comparison of the whole , tho' it may change some part or parts of it ; yet , it 's activity , ( which consists in it's addiction to do that effect , or in it's act of voliti●● , and not in it's bare knowledge of it ) is stinted to a certain proportion of matter ; according to the greater or lesser excellency of it's essence ; from which it's activity springs , and to which it goes parallel . . an angel can easily , and in an impercepti●… time , order and alter that quantity of matter , or those bodies that are within the bounds of it ▪ activity ; which generally speaking , are only those which it superintends ; an●… also those material causes , which are requisite as fit instruments for holy angels , to do men good or protect them ; or for bad angels to do them harm or punish them ; as sutes best with god's mercy or ●ustice . for , since all motion proceeds from angels as second causes ; and that , by knowing all nature intuitively , their knowledge reaches not only to the subject or patient which is to be alter'd , but to every imaginable circumstance , either belonging to the said patient , or to those material agents , which being apply'd , are proper to work upon them : it follows , that this , alone , must needs wonderfully facilitate the effect . again , since those acts of the angel's will , which were the efficient causes of altering those bodies , were , of themselves ▪ instantaneous : it follows , that tho' the nature of the patient , which is material or quantitative , would not permit the effect or change to be put , by a ●…ite power , in an instant ; yet all imaginable requisites do concur to produce in it such , or as little , a time as the perfect subjection of the patient can bear , and as the activity of the agent , which acts , on it's part instantaneously , requires ; that is ▪ in a very imperceptible time. and accordingly , ( cor. . v. , . ) the holy scripture tells us , that the change of those bodies which survive at the resurrection , from a corruptible to an incorruptible condition , ( the ●…rangest change matter can possibly bear ! ) will be made in a moment , in the twinkling of an eye , that is , in the least time we are able to conceive . . corollary viii . whence , it being so consonant to the natures of things , viz. to the activity of angels , and to the passiveness of matter , our meer naturalists need not wonder , that the prophet habbacuc was carried so suddenly ( dan. . . ) by an angel , impetu spiritus sui , as the scripture expresses it to daniel in the lion's den at babylon , ( a place unknown to the prophet , and therefore very far off , ) so quickly ; which can scarce be conceiv'd possible to be done so suddenly , without strangely disordering , and even killing him , without taking from the air all power of resistence . nor need it be wonder'd at , that a light shone so suddenly in st. peter's prison ; nor that his chains fell off , and that the iron-gate open'd to them of it's own accord , ( act. . ) nor that all the guards were stupify'd with a dead sleep . nor that angels so suddenly make to themselves a body of air to appear in ▪ and as suddenly disappear again ; nor , at many other such like effects , related in holy writ . none of these , i say , ought to appear wonderful to any solid philosopher who attends to his principles , and true reason . for , since the motion of bodie ( and therefore all action ) springs from angels as the immediate causes ; their activity upon bodily substances , so inferiour t● them , must needs be very soveraign and powerful . nor is there any thing in th● whole discourse , or in any of these an● such like particular actions , which does not subsist upon solid grounds , and is not built upon , and is consonant to , evident principles of reason . . corollary ix . from what has been deduced formerly , we may collect , as most agreeable to rational principles , that those angels , or ministring spirits , who , by their office are to work upon matter ; and are , with good reason , hold to be those of the lowest quire ; and , particularly , the angel guardians , should , at the general resurrection be employ'd in changing the mass of pre-existent matter ( for we cannot think creation begins a-new when the world is near an end ) into human bodies ; fitted according to the respective dispositions of the holy and the wicked souls ; as is seen , ( mat. . ) where the harvest is said to be the resurrection , and the angels the reapers , gathering the good seed to be eternally preserv'd ; and the tares to be burnt : we may hence also ▪ clearly gather , that the chief overseeing that grand affair belongs to the superiour influence of an arch-angel ; signify'd metaphorically , ( thessal . . . ) by the voice of an archangel , and his trumpet , blowing to summon the dead to appear before christ's dread tribunal . which , understood literally , is the putting them , or making them to appear in their distinct ranks according to their several merits or demerits , that christ may judge them by discriminating the sheep from the goats ; that is , by beatifying the former , and establishing them in sanctity , and , the reward of it , glory ; and the later ( as the nature of their state requires ) unchangeably in sin , and consequently , damnation ; as is emphatically exprest in our saviours words , ( apoc. . . ) he that is unjust , let him be unjust still ; and he that is filthy , let him be filthy still ; and he that is righteous , let him be righteous still ; and he that is holy , let him be holy still . which final sentence forbids and precludes to the damned , all hope of change , or fruitful repentance ; and fixes them unalterably , and for ever in their sinful state , and consequently in eternal death , which is the reward , and connatural effect or fruit of sin. whence also we see the reason of that severe saying , ex inferno nulla redemptio ; and why their bad and unchangeable affections , which so strongly detain them there , are called rudentes inferni , pet. ▪ . . corollary x. for the reason given above , all the affairs of very high moment are said to be done by an archangel . thus michael made head against lucifer , and subdu'd him . thus gabriel , the archangel , was the messenger of the incarnation . nor can it be doubted but the head of those angels which gave the law on mount sina , as is written , acts . . and v. . was of the same dignity : nor that those intelligences which give and continue motion to the matter of ours , and of all the other , suns , ( if that opinion may be allow'd which holds all the fixed stars to be so many corpora per se lucentia , or so many suns ) are all of them of the same high excellency ; since upon that motion , given by them , every single action of all the bodies throughout the vast regions , which those luminaries do enlighten and influence , does wholly depend . . from the unchangeable nature of a pure act , or an angel , which we have demonstrated above , 't is evidently deduced , that whatever intellectual light the inferiour angels , did ( as was most requisit and fit ) receive from the superiour ones , was imparted to them as soon as they were , or was co-aeve to their being . this is evident from the immutability of a pure spirit , and needs no farther proof ; since , if they had any thing a-new , they must have been chang'd . . 't is likewise evident , that , since every angel did comprehend all material nature , and consequently , every least circumstance of it ; they did from the very creation , ( as far as was on their part ) stand over ready and bent with their will to act upon matter , in such precise junctures , and in that very manner , in which , and according to which , they knew they were by the divine appointment , to exert their active power ; without needing any new motive , or any new change fitting or disposing them to act hic & nunc . this follows manifestly from the same principle . wherefore the resistance of one angel to another , and such like expressions , neither ought , nor need , be so interpreted as to a gue their ignorance of what they were to do , defeat of their intentions , or opposition to one anothers will ; but in the plain obvious sense , as when we use to say , [ i had gone about such a business , but that such causes made me see it was impracticable , or imprudent to attempt it ; or , i could not come till it had done raining . ] so that it was a natural opposition , ( as it were ) and not a moral on ; which is between the good angels . for example : the angel of the princ● of persia had a desire to do the persians all the good he could , ( it being his province and duty ) which was to keep the iews there still ; by which means the persians might better learn the knowledge of the true god. and the angel of the iews desir'd to deliver them from captivity , that so they might serve god and observe the law better in their own country . these were the particular inclinations of each of them , all other considerations being abstracted or set aside . god had prefixt a determinate time of their deliverance , and of comforting daniel in the interim . both of them knew god's will and submitted to it . yet the angel of persia acting for his province , and detaining the iews till the prefixt time came , was the reason why the jewish angel could not , till that time came , act for their deliverance : whereas , had there been another state of things , and had not he obviated the particular propension of the jewish angel , he had sooner assisted them , and come to daniel . . from the nature and genius of good and bad angels , and from this consideration , that god's wisdom makes use of the properest instruments to perform his will , we may conclude , that , as he orders the good angels to protect , guide and inspire pious souls , and procure their good ; so he sends , and orders , bad and malignant spirits , his executioners , to inflict punishments on misdeservers ; to do which , their inveterate malice to mankind gives them most eager propensions . as appears in the disasters which befel iob ; and may also be collected from psalm . . prov. . . iudges . . and kings . . and divers other texts . meditation . let us now , my soul , look down upon those low and despicable essences , from which we took our rise ; and we shall see to what an unexpected height we have climb'd . our steps , were , indeed , all the way immediate ; yet , it has cost us some panting labour ere we could mount to the superiour region of beings . we have transcended our own essence , and wound our selves up by the connected chain of our reason , twisted of our natural notions , as high as the lower story of heaven ; and gain'd some acquaintance with those winged inhabitants of it , the angels ; the contemplation of whose essences does confine next upon that of the adorable deity it self . we behold , with admiration , those bright beings ; whose understandings are guilded and beautify'd with pure rays of intellectual light ; streaming , together with their essence , from the inexhausted source and luminary of all knowledge , essential truth . nay , we can , moreover , take a steady view of their eminent nature without those astonishing extasies , which so surpris'd daniel , esdras , and the eagle-ey'd evangelist himself . and , notwithstanding , we see them all over bespangled with the most glittering truths ; yet our eyes , tho' weak , are not dazled , nor our thoughts distracted with fear and horrour , as were those others to whom they appear'd . but 't is , because we see them at distance thro' the dull optick of our natural speculation ; not neer at hand , nor clad in those majestick resemblances , which they put on when they were to represent the great king of glory , whose embassadors they were . our reason has ascertain'd us that there may and must be such things as pure acts or angels : that being in the climax of entities , superiour to bodies ; they do , therefore , include and comprehend in themselves , after their manner , ( that is , knowingly , ) the very essences of bodies , their underlings . that , being depur'd from that passive principle , matter , and , withall , being the immediate cause of all motion , and , consequently , of all action , in the material world ; their nature , is in the highest manner , active ; whence , they come necessarily to be endow'd with a power to work upon corporeal nature , which is essentially passive ; and this with an incredible celerity : also , that being free from the alloy of matter , the principle of all mutability , they are , of their own nature , unchangeable . we have gain'd certain light , how they are to be distinguished into their several ranks or kinds ; and that those lower sorts of them , which are employ'd in the managing material nature , and procuring the good of mankind , ( for whose sake the corporeal world was made , ) have , as is most sitting , larger or narrower provinces assign'd them ; according to the dignity and excellency of their essences , to which their power of acting is proportion'd . we have seen how consonant to reason those passages of the holy scriptures are , which deliver to us narratively many actions done , and effects produced , by those administring angels ; and how we are to understand divers places there , in which sacred writers accommodate themselves to our rude fancies . tho' god's wisdom has laid means for our natural knowledges in the works of the creation , yet 't is below the dignity of those heaven-inspir'd oracles , to teach us literally such truths as belong to philosophy ; or to give reasons for every particular they mention : 't is unworthy the majesty and authority of the divine spirit that endited them , to instruct us scientifically ; as if no credit or belief were to be given to his word , signify'd to us by such authentick instruments writ by his immediate commission 't is favour enough that he has been pleas'd to give us some conclusions , or acquaint us with some theses of a higher nature , and to ascertain their truth by engaging his infallible veracity ; and , that by means of our industrious study he bestows upon us the inferiour and more familiar light of scientifical knowledge , to explicate those truths , by showing their agreeableness to evident principles of nature ; which the same god of truth has also taught us , tho' not so immediately ; that so , we may comfort faith and make it more lively and operative in our selves , and others , as also , defend it against opposers , and confute by solid discourses the fantastick raillery of ignorant unbelievers ; who chuse rather to mistrust their own natural notions than assent to any thing that sutes not with their imagination ; and are ready to renounce the best productions of their reason reflecting upon principles , than to allow any thing to faith ; tho' the same reason informs them , by a thousand instances , that nothing is more unreasonable than such a restiff humoursomeness . so certain it is , that no man can be an adversary to faith , but he must , withal , be an enemy to true science . if any man complains , he is injur'd by this censure , i 'll candidly tell him how he may clear himself : let him leave off his witty talk and loose drollery ; and , laying , first his principles , draw thence , by connected discourses , his conclusions . this method will have force upon humane nature ; whereas , when truth is enquir'd after , raillery satisfies no man of sense , nor pleases any but gigglers . but , alas ! their weak cause forbids them any such manly procedure . the very attempting it will convince themselves , if candid , that 't is impossible and impracticable ; and , make them confess , ( at least by their carriage and ill performance ) that they never follow'd the wise conduct of true reason , but were deluded by the folly of their imagination . but what gratitude , what acknowledgments do we owe to those blessed spirits , for their ever-watchful care over us ; for preventing our heedlesness and want of foresight from falling into a thousand mischances ; for keeping us in all our ways , ( psal. . . ) for inspiring us with good thoughts , and pitching their tents about us , to defend us from the assaults and fiery darts of our ghostly enemy ? what respect ought we to show towards them for the excellency rf their nature , and their high station in the created universe ? what veneration for their purest sanctity , and for the glory they enjoy by being attendants in god's empyreal court , and their seeing daily the unvail'd and blissful face of our father who is heaven ? mat. . . let us then present them with our humble thanks for their sollicitons care of us , and their offering up the incense of our prayers in their golden censor at the throne of grace , rev. . , , . our good god , who has commanded us to honour our father and mother , and our magistrates , and to be grateful to our benefactors , whom , as second causes , he has order'd to be instrumental to our good ; will not be offended that we honour his holy angels , whom he has appointed to assist us in a more soveraign manner , both temporally and spiritually ; and who have a greater power over the world , and all material nature than alexanders or caesars . who can reflect upon those words told us by the mouth of our saviour himself , that the angels do rejoice at the repentance of a sinner , and not admire at such a disinteressed goodness and charity towards us poor mortals ; and love , honour , and thank them for it . common morality and nature enjoyn us these duties ; and what 's agreeable to the laws of right nature or reason can never be opposite to christianity , which establishes and not dissolves those laws . tho' they need not , nor require those duties at our hands , yet we do nevertheless owe them . tho' they do neither more or less assist us , whether we apply to them or neglect them ; yet our obligation is not the less , but rather more for their love to us , and such a love as is not at all selfish . there is not such a distance between the church militant and triumphant , as to render a mutual and spiritual commerce between them impracticable . we are all of us fellow servants of the same common lord , and have the same head , christ jesus . nor can distance at all hinder the communication of spiritual natures , which are above the limited nature of quantity . they are truly and in a better manner present with us while we are in their thoughts , which is all the presence of which spiritual natures are capable ; and we are really united spiritually with them , when we have the same pious affections with them . they frequently conversed with mankind under visible apparitions in the time of moses his law : and , tho' better ordinary means be now allow'd , and therefore such extraordinary favours need not be so frequent ; yet this is no reason to neglect an invisible or spiritual communication with them : especially , since it is our interest and benefit to caltivate it , by considering their happy state , their obedience to the divine will , and their diligent and charitable concern for us . they are as pure in their morals from sin , as they are in their naturals from matter ; and they purifie and spiritualize our souls , while our understandings and wills are employ'd in thinking on such holy and pure objects . our soul takes a tincture , and a kind of nature , as it is moral , from the objects it affectionately converses with . that soul which is oft thus thinking of earthly things is earthly ; of corporeal pleasures , is brutish ; of empty honour , is aiery and vain ; of god , is divine ; and for the same reason , the soul which thus affectionately applies it's thoughts and affections to angels , or converses with them spiritually , ( cum sancto sanctus eris , ) is angelical . only , let us be sure we honour them for their masters sake , and that we do not venerate them so that the honour done to them , does interfere with that supreme honour due by a thousand titles to their and our infinitely perfect god and creatour : to treat of whose adorable majesty we consecrate our next endeavours . transnatural philosophy : or , metaphysicks . book iii. of the most pure actuality of being , the adorable deity . chap. i. of the existence , essence ▪ and attributes of god. § . . there must be something whose dem. i. essence is a most pure actuality of being , without any potentiality whatever . for , since names are invented to signifie the natures of the things we ●…ceive ; and none of the names ●f those beings which we call creatures , whether they be angels , men , or bodies , ( as michael , peter , a stone , a tree , &c. ) do imply actual being , or existence , in their signification : it follows , that they abstract from and are indifferent to existing and not-existing ; or , are a meer power or potentiality to that act call'd existence . but , from a meer power , potentiality , or indifferency , nothing can follow , or issue ; much less such a noble effect as actual being . wherefore , were there not some other thing which has no potentiality or indifferency to existing , but has of it's own nature actual being , neither it self , nor any other thing , could ever have been actually . but we know certainly , that our selves , and many other things are ; therefore , as sure as it is , that any thing is , and that we know the meaning of the words which we intelligently use , and by which we intend to express our conceptions ; ( which 't is self-evident we do , since without doing this we could be sure of nothing we say , ) so certain and evident it is , that there must be something whose nature or essence it is to have no potentiality or indifferency to being ; and , consequently , which is , of it's self , a most p●r● actuality of being . . dem. ii. nothing is more evident than that actual being is not contain'd in the notion , nature o● essence of some of those beings call'd creatures ; for we experience that such and such trees ▪ animals , &c. sometimes ar● sometimes are not ; whence we can with truth predicate or say of them , according to the notion of thing , and using the same word which signifies the same individual thing , ( in respect of those several times ) that they are existent , or not-existent ; which we could not do were it their nature or essence to be existent ; for in that case , this proposition , [ peter is not-existent , ] would be the same as [ peter is not peter , ] which is against an identical proposition ▪ and the greatest of falshoods ; whereas all mankind grants that these propositions , [ such a man , animal , or tree , now are not , ] may be certain truths . hence i ▪ subsume ; but we find no more of actual being in the meaning of those words , gabriel , michael , or any other finite being we can imagine , than there is in these , a stone , a tree , b●…cephalus , or any other thing which we see is corrupted , and therefore we truly say of it , that it is not : wherefore not one of those finite beings we call creatures , have actual being in their essence or nature . therefore all we can say of them , in order to being , is , that they can be , or have a power to be actually . but that which ●● a meer power to any act cannot give it self 〈…〉 act ; for then water , which ▪ has a power ●…e hot , might make it self hot ; and every thing in nature might give ▪ it self whatever ●…al or accidental acts the matter or power 〈…〉 bear ; that is , every body in nature might 〈…〉 it self any thing . wherefore , since none ●…ose potential beings could exist of them●…s , or by virtue of their own nature or es●…e ; it follows necessarily , that there must ●…ome other being whose nature and essence 〈…〉 is to have no potentiality to being in it , or ( which is the same ) which is a pure actuality of ●…ng . . dem. iii. were there any thing , whether body , man , angel , or whatever higher being we can imagine , that were of it's own nature only a potentiality of being or a power to bee , and yet gave it self to be actually ; it must be conceiv'd , in priority of reason , as yet not to have that being which it gave it self : but 't is a flat contradiction to conceive that what has not being , or is not , should act or produce being in it self . therefore there must have ever been a pure actuality of being . . dem. iv. this is enforced , because actual being is the noblest effect that can be imagin'd , and far more excellent than a power to bee , as it is contra-distinguisht to being actually ; as appears hence , that the power to any form is but a kind of disposition , order , or ( as it were ) a means , or way , to that form or act to which 't is a power ; or rather , the form , is the end that disposition was order'd for , and to which that way led . whence , in case a power or potentiality of being should give it self actual being , it would act beyond the virtue of such a power ; that is beyond it's self ; and , therefore , would do what it cannot do ; which is a direct contradiction . . dem. v. no cause can produce an effect contradictory to it's own nature or essence : but , if a power , which is essentially indeterminate , should give it's self it 's form or act which is essentially determinate , that cause would work contradictorily to it's nature ; which would destroy all causality , and all order of natural operation . therefore , what is it self but a power to be , can never make it self be actually . . so that from the plain obvious notions of power and act , this great conclusion is by a metaphysical medium , that is , ab altissimis causis , most evidently demonstrated ; that , since from a potentiality or power of being no actual being could have been produc'd : hence , had all beings been potential , nothing could ever have been ; and therefore , there must necessarily be some being whose nature or essence is pure actuality of being ! which as will be shown , is the notion of the first being , or the deity . . hence follows , that this actuality of being did create or give being to all other things . for , since it has been demonstrated here that none of their essences has actual being in their natures , but were potential to that act call'd existence ; nor , con●…ntly could give themselves to be actually ; 〈…〉 the very terms evince , that all things that a●e ▪ must either have actual being in their natures , or not have actual being in their natures : 〈…〉 follows evidently that they must either have ●…d actual being given them ( or have been ●reated ) by that self-existent thing , that has actual being in it's nature , or is essentially an actuality of being ; or else they must have had actual being given them by nothing . . against this demonstration for the existence of some first being , ( or beings , ) some may object , that there has been an infinite number of things antecedent to one another , without any possibility of conceiving a first ; none of which things were meerly potential in order to being , but all of them were actually in their proper seasons ; and therefore they might give actual being to those things that still succeeded . to which i answer . . first , that this does not solve the argument , but objects against the conclusion ; than which nothing is more unfair in discoursing . for this untoward method allows him who is the respondent , to prevaricate from his duty , and turn opponent : which confounds those two offices , and perverts all the laws of reasoning or discoursing . . secondly , which is yet much worse , it opposes the conclusion by a meer voluntary assertion ; neither demonstrated , nor ( as we peremptorily challenge them ) possible to bear even any show of a demonstration . whereas , against a pretended demonstration , ( even in case this aukward method of discoursing were allowable , as it is not ) nothing under a pretended demonstration has right to be alledg'd . probabilities , in such a case , being insignificant and incompetent to be put in the ballance . . thirdly , that the argument is not solv'd , 〈…〉 evident ; for , it manifestly proceeds upon what of it's own nature , or essentially , is potential to being , or actual being ; and , ( as is seen , § . . . ) the demonstration is , in part , grounded upon the necessity that one side of the contradiction must be true. now , it must be confest by themselves , that ma●y of these actual causes , which they pretend ●id all along give actual being to others , ( viz. many bodies ) were not of their own nature , or essentially existent ; for , had they been such essentially , they had not needed , nor could they receive existence from others , since they had it of themselves , nor could they ever not have been ; ●…e contrary to all which we experience , since we see many of them generated , and others corrupted . and , had the predicate [ existent ] , been essential to any of them ; then , since essential predicates are always predicated of their subjects [ existent ] could always with truth be predicated of peter or every individual entity ; which put , we could never say , with truth , that peter , or 〈…〉 other thing which once was , and is now corrupted , is not existent , or is not ; which common sense , and the very notion of the word [ was ] or [ fuit , ] makes it self-evident we can do . lastly , to clinch the truth of this point , 't is an identical proposition , and one of the first truths , that [ every thing is what it is , or , is it's self . ] wherefore , in case [ existent ] were an essential predicate of any of those corruptible or finite things ; then , since what 's essential to any thing does ( at least as a necessary and intrinsecal part ) constitute it , and what wants it's essence is not that thing , or is not it's self ; it would be against an identical proposition , ( on which the metaphysical verity , that is , all the truth we can imagine depends , ) if those things which they put to be the successive causes of actual being should at any time not be ; which yet experience tells us , do sometime cease to be , or are not . as certain , then , as an identical proposition is true ; so certain it is , that the natures of all finite things are no more but only capable of being ; that is , potential and indifferent to being and not-being ; and , therefore , that they had no being from any finite cause ; but from some infinite first cause , ( or causes , ) which is essentially actual being , or a pure actuality of being . . fourthly , their assertion , relying on the supposition of an infinite number of successive causes , is utterly overthrown , by proving , that an infinite number is absolutely impossible ; which i thus show out of the nature of the subject about which we are discoursing , [ number . ] for , all number , even tho' infinite , is compounded , made up , or consists of units or ones ; so that , as twenty is twenty ones ; and a million , is a million of ones , so an infinite number is infinite ones ; nor can it ( as it has the notion of number ) consist of any thing else . nor can themselves find any thing in it's composition but ones . regarding then the subject of our discourse , this infinite collection of ones , we can find or imagine nothing in it , by which it can be conceiv'd to grow up , or rather become , infinite , but one still successively following the foregoing ones . wherefore it must become formally infinite by some one added to , or taken with the rest ; there being in it nothing else ( as was said ) imaginable , by which it could formally o● integrally become infinite : but 't is an absolute impossibility , that a number , or multitude , ( if that word rather please them ) should become infinite by the accession of some one ; therefore an infinite number is absolutely impossible . i do remember , that when i prest this argument against a very ingenious atheist ; he , to shift it o● , reply'd , that no man has or can have any notion of an infinite number . i answer'd , that th●● condemns themselves , for recurring to such a position that no man can tell what the words ●… . i added , that this was a strong argument against them , that the position it self was chimerical ; and convinces them of being baffled in their cause , by their running to such a thesis as was confessedly unintelligible either by themselves or their adversary . next , i assur'd him , that , waving this , we could very easily have a notion or simple apprehension of what the word [ infinite ] means , ( as is clearly shown , solid philosophy asserted , reflexion ix . ) otherwise we could not speak or discourse of it either pro or con . but when we come to joyn it in a proposition with existent , and say , [ an infinite number is , ●t has been ; ] then , indeed , our understanding i● puzzled , and at an utter loss to make sense of it ; and no wonder , since it implies a contradiction ; which , being against the nature of ens , i● altogether unintelligible . his next answer , was , that my argument proceeded upon a false supposition : for , there could be no agent to calculate it ; or add one to one , till it became infinite , i reply'd , those very agents himself puts to have produced still a new one all along , did add those successive ones in re , tho' no man's arithmetick comprehended them all by summing up their total in his understanding . besides , this drops the whole question , and flies off to a new point . for the question is not , whether an agent or calculator can do this ; but , whether the nature of the subject ▪ [ viz. an infinite number , which is made up of nothing but ones , ] does not bear it , nay force it , that it must become infinite by one added to one ; and therefore , by the accession of s●●● one to the finite number presuppos'd . to which essential or intrinsical nature of the thing , or subject , ( from which only we argue ) the want of an agent is accidental and extrinsical . thus philosophers hold there is some least si●● of bodies or minima naturalia , which are to farther divisible actually , because there is no agent little enough to come between the sides of it and divide it farther ; and yet the same men hold , that , since quantitas est divisibilis , i● semper divisibilia , it is , notwithstanding , of it 's own nature , farther divisible . . fifthly , to beat them from this evasion , that there wants an agent , let us see what the necessity of not admitting a plain contradiction will work with them . i argue then , thus ; those infinite ▪ agents which they say do , and eve● did communicate actual being to the following ones , must ( since this was done by way 〈…〉 motion , ) require infinite time to perform this 〈…〉 but such an infinite antecedent time is absolutely impossible to have been ; therefore their ●…n position falls to the ground . to prove , 〈…〉 there could not have been an infinite time , ●…gue thus by way of dilemma , which is a 〈…〉 conclusive method , when the two sides of ●…e contradictory , and can have no third , or ●…dle between them . if there has been an infi●… time , there must have been either an infinite number of hours antecedently , or not ▪ an-infinite number of hours , but a finite number of them ●… . if only a finite number , then that whole ●…e was finite , and therefore had a beginning , ●…ould have been ever . if , they say , an infi●… number of hours have anteceded , or ( lest ●…ey should quarrel with the word number , ) an ●…ite multitude of them , or , ( which is the same 〈…〉 the subjects part , ) a motion correspondent to 〈…〉 infinite multitude of hours ; then , in this multitude of antecedent hours , either there has ●…en some one hour distant from this hour which ●…s now , by infinite ones ; or no one hour di●…nt from this present hour by infinite ones . let them take which side they please , for one of them they must take or allow , they being con●●●dictories . if they say , there has been no one hour distant from this present hour by infinite ●…s , then , since in this infinite multitude of ●…ours there is nothing but ones , for ( multa ●…ans multa una , and can mean nothing else ) 〈…〉 the whole collection of hours which they pretend to be infinite is clearly finite , there being nothing in it which is infinitely distant . again , if none of them be distant from this present hour by infinite ones , then all of them are distant by finite ones ; and so , again , the collection of antecedent hours must have been finite . and , if they chuse to take the other side , and say , there has been some one hour which is distant from this present by infinite ones , then they manifestly put an infinite time , or a time which has no end , and yet has two ends ; viz. that one hour terminating it long ago , and this present hour terminating it now : that is , they put an infinite which is finite , or not-infinite , which is a direct contradiction . . lastly , to confute this infinity , whether of antecedent causes or of parts of time , there needs no more but to reflect upon the plain meaning of the word [ infinite ▪ ] and it will tell us , that an infinite in any kind must include all that belongs to that kind ; so that there can be nothing of that kind out of it , nor any accession to it , or new particulars of that kind which it does not comprehend . for , if the supposed infinity did not include them all , it fell , so far , short ; and any shortness is directly opposite to the notion of infinity . nothing being more evident than that the words [ not-all , ] do signifie the same as [ only some , ] and therefore , that notion , in whatever kind , that does not extend it self to all of that kind , is limited to some , and therefore is not-infinite in that kind : since then we see new hours daily accrue to antecedent time , and new agents added to the former ▪ ●●● of causes , which can , with no sense , be 〈…〉 to be comprehended in the antecedent collection of them ; 't is manifestly against our common notions , and common sense , to pre●… that the multitude of antecedent causes , and ●●●ts of time ( or motion ) have been actually infinite . wherefore , all these antecedent causes ●●d some first , or a beginning of their being , which they could not have had of themselves , had their natures been only potential to being , or meerly capable to be . therefore , there must ●●ve ever been something , or some first cause , which of it's own nature or essence , is an actually of being . that there can be but one such ●…entially actual being , ( tho' it may be ga●●●●ed even hence ) will be more exactly prov'd ●●●●after . ●● ▪ nothing can be weaker than to alledge , th●● there was only a finite number of causes which gave being circularly to one another . for , this would make each of them only potential to being , in ●●ard they receiv'd it from others ; ●●● yet at the same time actually ●●●●g , because they communica●●● it to another : nay , to give being to themselves : for , if b is because a is ; and c is , because b is ; and a is because c is , it will fol●… that a is because a is . that maxim , [ causa c●●sae est causa causati , ] what restriction soever it may have in other cases , has here it's full fo●●e ; because the cause . does here give the 〈…〉 and adequate effect to it's self ; the noti●… existence ( the act which is given ) being every way indivisible ; and , therefore , all of ●● must be given , or not at all . i have been more large in refuting this pre●ence of an endless or infinite antecedent succession of motion and natural causes , it being the chief asylum of the atheists . we return now to our arguments . . lemma i. the notion we have of ens or thing is different from the notion of existence . this has been demonstrated , b. . ch. . § . . where it is shown , that the notion of essence , which constitutes every finite ens , consists in a potentiality or a meer possibility , of existing ; whereas existence is the act that answers to that power , and so is vastly distinguish● or different from it ; the power , and it 's proper act being counterpos'd to one another . add , that this has also been demonstrated here , § . . . lemma ii. we cannot think or speak of the first being , tho' suppos'd infinite , but by making use of such natural notions and words as we have . this is self-evident ; since none can think or speak with thoughts or words which he has not . . lemma iii. amongst all our natural notions , that of [ existence ] is mo●● actual ; and being pure from all potentiality in the line of being , it is deservedly call'd an actuality , or the very formal and whole , and sole nature of act , in that line . this has ●… demonstrated , b. . ch. : § . , . ●o 〈…〉 the reader is referred . ●… . of all our natural notions ( that ●… ) that of existence is the ●…perest and best we can use 〈…〉 we speak of a pure actu●…y of being , or a deity . this ●…prov'd § . , . and is evident ●●●m the terms . for since ens 〈…〉 who le latitude abstracts 〈…〉 corporeal nature , which has that power call'd ●… ; and is clearly antecedent to the third 〈…〉 of power , since a capacity of being it self , ●●● antecede a capacity of sustaining or giving 〈…〉 to accidents ; and therefore , the poten●… which ens has to it's act is more noble , 〈…〉 exalted , and more defaecated ( as it were ) 〈…〉 those baser and narrower sorts of power than a●y other : wherefore , since existence is the ultimate act of ens in it's whole latitude ; it ●ollows , that it is the most abstracted or purest sort ●● act in the line of being ; and , therefore , is ●…incident with the notion of pure actuality of ●… , which is the best positive notion we can 〈…〉 of a deity . and , accordingly , the true , ●… ▪ ( as will be demonstrated shortly ) the only ●od , himself , who could best express to us 〈…〉 ow● divine essence , when moses , ( exod. . ●… ) desir'd to know by what name ( which sig●… his essence ) he should call him , when he ●●ould come to speak from him to the children of israel , answer'd him , ego sum qui sum , i am who am , or i am he who is ; and bid him tell t●●m that he who is has sent me unto you : which ●…inly signifies , that all other things have only a potentiality or possibility of existing or being actually ; and that 't is proper and peculiar to god's nature or essence ( which the name is to express ) to be actually or exist : and that if any thing else has being or exists , it partakes or borrows it's being from him who only ●● ▪ or whose essence is that pure actuality of being call'd existence . so that the main ground of our metaphysicks , particularly that which discourses of the adorable deity , is , in the main , the same sense , given to our hands by god himself ; which we dilate , and on which we descant by our reason . . lemma iv : every abstract word , which signifies meerly any form or act , includes in it's notion the whole nature of the act imported by that word , without any limitation . for , let us take knowledge , virtue , whiteness , or any other such abstract word , we shall find that none of them either express , hint , or connotate [ thus much , or such a portion or degree of those acts. ] wherefore , those abstract words involve in them the whole nature of those acts , that is , without limitation . moreover , were there ( per impossibile ) suppos'd infinite things which had knowledge , virtue , or whiteness in them , they would all partake of the nature of those acts , and yet it would not be exhausted ; which shows the word signifies those acts without limitation . . lemma v. therefore the limitation of all acts must either proceed from the subject it affects , which being a particular or determinate ens , makes it this and no other ; or else from the causes which determin'd the act to such or such a degree of it . hence i argue . . therefore god's existence , which is his essence , is unlimited , and actually infinite . for , since his existence includes the whole nature of existence by lem. iv. nor is it , as it is found in him , an act corresponding to a potential essence , as it is in creatures ; this being against the nature of a pure actuality ; but is his proper name which imports his essence ; neither is his existence limited by any subject , in regard every subject is a power to receive advening acts , which is against the nature of that essence which is purely actual : hence it follows , that it is it 's own subject , or self-subsistent . nor , lastly , can ● be limited by the operation of any cause which gave him that act : he being the first cause ; and , incapable to receive anything , in regard this implies passiveness and potentiality : it ●ollows then , that his existence is absolutely unlimi●ed , and ( it being a pure actuality ) actually infinite . . therefore the deity is but one . for , ●ere there two infinite existences , ●ach of them must necessarily ●●ve something ▪ which the other ●● not ; otherwise , they would ●re nothing to distinguish them or make them more , they being in all respects the same . therefore if there were two gods , this would limit both of them , and make neither of them to be infinite ; therefore there can be but one infinite existence , or one god. again , were there two self-existences , they would agree in that common notion ; and the differences that constitute them within that notion must be more and less of that common notion , [ infinite existence , ] as has been often prov'd : which is perfect nonsense ; infinity being beyond all degrees , and incapable of them . besides , differences are necessarily more actual than the common notion they divide ; but no notion can be more actual than existence , much less than self-existence , which is a pure actulity ; therefore , since self-existence can admit no differences to divide it , 't is impossible it should be more than one. to proceed : . corol. i. hence nothing could be so extravagantly foolish and void of common sense , as the polytheism of the antient heathens : for , by making more gods , they did by consequence , make them all to be finite ; and , therefore none of their essences to be actual being , but potential in order to existence . whence , since they could not ( having no more of their own natures , but only a power to bee , ) give actual being to themselves , they must either have it from another whose essence is existence , and therefore i● infinite , and one ; or they could not bee ●● all , but be ( as they really were ) meer chimera's : and hence it came , that they ma●● all the attributes of their imaginary gods to be limited and imperfect ; they represented them as subject to squabbles among themselves , and liable to a thousand natural and moral defects : which obliged the wiser sort amongst them , asham'd of their nonsensical and foppish superstition , that they might in some measure keep up the repute of their pretended religion , have recourse to our tenet of one soveraign being ; and to alledge , that they meant no more by the rabble of their other gods , but that they were so many attributes , or several considerations of god's divine providence , overseeing such and such parts of the world , or performing such or such operations . nor were there many of them , who were firm in their holding a first being ; nor any of them clear in their apprehension of his nature ; and none of them who placed their eternal felicity in seeing his divine essence ; nor held this was attainable by them after this life ; nor , who erected their thoughts to the hope of enjoying that blissful sight ; for want of which hope , they could not raise their affection to him above all things , which we have shown , book . ch. . § . . § . . is the only disposition which could bring them to the true end of their nature , eternal happiness . not to speak of those besotted heathens , who made gods of senseless creatures , tho' inferiour to themselves , and despicable even to ridiculousness . . coroll . ii. hence the deists , if they be not as much besotted as those very heathens themselves , cannot but acknowledge and admire the wisdom of the heavenly doctrine taught us by our divine master iesus christ , which by calm reason , good life , joyn'd with astonishing miracles , without any external force , has chaced and banisht out of the world this epidemical phrenzy , which had possessed all mankind , but the small nation of the iews ; and will make them see withall how necessary divine revelation was ; since human wit and learning , which was , amongst many of those heathens , at the height , could neither enable them to rectifie themselves , nor make them capable of attaining their summum bonum ; nor cure mankind of that universal dotage of polytheism ; nor uphold it self against the light which christianity brought into the world ; but that , whereever it dawn'd , the shades of errour concerning the true deity immediately vanisht and disappear'd . certainly , whoever considers what a prodigious change , concerning the worship of the true god , christianity has wrought in a vast part of the world , and is still spreading it self ; and by what methods it has prevail'd to the utter extirpation of idolatry , must be wilfully blind if he does not clearly see , that digitus dei est hic , and that it's doctrine is truly divine . . lem. vi. existence is the whole perfection of every thing that exists . for , ●nce whatever is in any thing besides existence , ( which is the l●st actuality in the line of being ) must be potential in respect of it . again , since whatever is actually ( a forti●ri ) can be , otherwise it would be a contradiction a thing can be while it is ; whereas , 't is a first principle , that a thing cannot but be while ●● is ; it follows evidently , that when a power of being , or ( which is the same ) an ens , is actuated , nothing is lost of it but the privation of act which power seems to imply ; but , all that is positive in it , ( or is that we call ratio entis ) 〈◊〉 remains under a better state ; whence , power , is eminently included in existence ; and , as it were , swallow'd up in it , as in a greater or higher perfection in ▪ the line of being , which involves in it the lesser or lower . . lem. vii . much more an existence , which is also the essence of the thing , and ●● most actual and withal infinite , includes in it actually and for●ally , all the perfections that can be conceiv'd to belong to ens in it's whole latitude . this is evident , since 〈◊〉 comprehends in it all that can belong to 〈◊〉 , which constitutes ens in it's largest signification . . wherefore the divine essence , or the deity , ●●cludes in it all perfections ima●●nable which can any way belong to ens , and this infinitely ; ●●d , therefore , is infinitely-perfect . for , since we call that perfect in any kind , to which nothing is wanting , or which has all in it that can be imagin'd in that kind : it follows , that the divine essence , which comprizes in it all the perfections that can belong to ens in it's largest sense , and all that can belong to existence in an unlimited signification , is infinitely perfect in all reg●…s that can belong to ens , or which have e●●●●● in them . ● therefore god is infinitely perfect in all intellectual and moral attributes ; that is , he is infinitely knowing , wise , good , merciful , powerful , veracious , free , &c. and this in the most perfect manner , as becomes a pure actuality of being ; since all these have something of perfection in their notion . . therefore , he is of a spiritual nature ; as being not only a pure act , as other spirits are , but a pure actuality of being ; which infinitely exceeds their nature , which was potential in respect of existence . . therefore , for the same reason he is not corporeal . for this includes both the first , second , and third sort of potentiality mention'd at the beginning ; each of which is diametrically opposite to the nature of pure actuality . . therefore , 't is a strange degrading of the divine nature to apply to god any corporeal attributes ; such as are place , space , motion , &c. which are quite opposite to an incorporeal being . . therefore , the divine essence is also immutable . for , this implies a potentiality , or power to be chang'd , which is inconsistent with a pure actuality . . therefore god is also a self-subsistent being . for , since his essence is actual being , and withall , infinite in being , ( which compre●ends the whole nature of be●●g ; ) that which supports it in being must have no being . . therefore the divine essence must be also most simple or uncompounded . for , it can have no logical composition of genus and difference ; because the genus is essentially that which has more of it 's kind under it ; and , there cannot be more , where ( as is demonstrated , § . . ) there is but one. nor can it admit any difference ; for ●tis the essence of the difference to make one thing differ from another ; and , in our case , there can be no other , where there is but one. nor can there be in god that logical composition of accidents , with their subject ; for , the subject is potential in respect of the accidents , or modes , which affect or actuate it . nor can there be in god physical composition of the second sort of power with it's act , call'd matter and form ; because he is incorporeal , and pure actuality . nor can this pure actuality of being , call'd self-existence , be compounded metaphysically ; for even our low created existence is indivisible , and can have no metaphysical parts ; and , therefore , can have no metaphysical divisibility or composition in it . wherefore , all the distinction of god's essential attributes does spring wholly from the shortness and imperfection of our understanding , which is not able to reach or fathom the whole extent of his every-way-infinitely-perfect essence , but is forc'd to conceive them by diverse acts of ours . . wherefore god's duration has nothing in it of preterit and future , but is one present indivisible on his part , and therefore he is eternal . for , since it is the highest of impossibility that self-existence should not exist ; his essence equally includes , nay speaks or formally signifies and expresses , to have been formerly , and to be futurely , as it does to be now . wherefore , since 't is not possible to imagine any instant in which god has not his whole essence , and this ( as far as is on his part ) indivisibly ; it follows , that in every instant , ( only which is present in our time ) he has his to-have-been , and tobe-hereafter , as much as he has to be-at-present ; but this kind of ever-present , ever-standing and unchangeably-steady duration , includes in it self all the differences of our time , ( as was now prov'd ) and therefore oomprehends all time , ( even tho' it were infinite ) indivisibly , or without succession of any thing in god , that is , it is one e●er-permanent , present , now : wherefore , since this manner of enduring is infinitely above that of our ●●●e , which is part after part , fleeting , and divisible ; and we call that sort of duration which infinitely exceeds our time , [ eternity , ] and god has this duration ; it follows evidently , that god is eternal . . coroll . iii. wherefore 't is highly derogatory from god's attribute of eternity . to make it consist in a kind of correspondency to our time ; for this puts his duration , which is essential to him , to have parts , or a capacity to be longer or shorter . whereas , we ought to reflect , that there can be no possible proportion between being and moving , ( especially a being so actual and permanent as is the divine existenee ; ) the one being essentially divisible , the other essentially , and in every regard , indivisible . all comparison , and consequently proportion , can only be conceiv'd between those things which are of the same kind , or have the same common notion : whereas being and moving , do diffet toto genere ; the one , being the last formality in the line of ens ; the other only an accident , or modus entis ; and are fo far from being of the same kind , or more and less of it , and therefore capable of bearing any proportion to one another ; that , the one ( as was said ) being most divisible , the other most indivisible , they are contradictories ; that is , beyond all degrees ( only which ground proportion ) opposite to one another . . hence also god's essence is immense , or beyond all possibility of being measurable . which attribute consists in this , that his unlimited and indivisible existence comprizes or resumes in it's self ( and this after an indivisible manner , or in a way beyond the the nature of quantity ) the whole nature of bodily extension and space , even tho' it were suppos'd infinite ; as his duration , which is the same indivisible existence , comprehends all corporeal motion or time , even tho' time were infinite . again , as angels are no otherwise in place but by operating on bodies , which are in place ; so god is no otherwise in his creatures ( at least immediately ) but by giving and conserving them in being , which is his peculiar and immediate operation , and every way indivisible . whence god , being in each of his creatures , and in the very least of them , and this wholly and indivisibly , by giving them this soveraign indivisible effect , being ; and , of his own nature , able to communicate being to them , even in case they could be suppos'd to be infinite ; is neither as in himself , nor as in them ▪ after a divisible , quantitative , extended , coextended , or measurable manner ; and therefore he is absolutely immense , or beyond all possibility of being subject to be measur'd . . whence , 't is no less derogatory from god's attribute of immensity to explicate it so as to consist in a kind of commensuration to an infinite incom●●bensible inanc ; for this makes god's essence diffus'd , and con●●quently of a quantitative nature ; which makes acute readers apt to suspect that 't is meant to be no better than a more sub●●le sort of body ; or , at least , some act or form of a body ; and therefore , but a compart with it . fancy is but a bad adviser , even in ordinary points of philosophy ; but incredibly worse , when we are to explicase his nature and essential attributes , whose essence is self-existence and most pure actuality of being . existence ( even amongst us ) abstracts from all motion , time , quantity , and all other considerations belonging to corporeal , and even spiritual natures ; and being indivisible , and signifying meer actuality of being , is inexplicable by any of them ; much less god's existence , which is infinitely above ours . we will close this discourse concerning god's attributes , by adding one more , which i have not observ'd to have been mention'd by meta●hysicians , or divines either . . from what 's deduced above , 't is demonstrated , that the divine essence is infinitely intelligible , or ( of it 's own nature ) easie to be known or seen . for , since we experience , that the unknowableness or obscurity of any object , springs from the nature of potentiality , or some kind of power in it ; which , it being indeterminate , breeds confusion ; and all the distinct and clear knowableness it has , arises from it's act ; which , by determining the power , renders that object distinct from all others , and therefore clearly perceptible or intelligible : it follows , that since the divine nature is infinitely more actual than any thing found in creatures , it being a most pure actuality ; and it 's essence being existence it self , ( the notion of which is so self-evident to all mankind , that 't is impossible to be defin'd or made clearer by any explication imaginable , ) it must necessarily be , of it 's own nature , infinitely intelligible , or most capable to be seen or known , even by the rudest understanding of the silliest soul when separate ; whose will , when it leaves this world , is duly dispos'd for it . . coroll . iv. this last thesis will to a great degree comfort the theological virtue of hope , which is to erect our souls to heaven . for ; doubtless , some virtuous humble souls , when they come to consider and seriously reflect on the sublime and infinitely glorious majesty of our great god , who , in altis habitat & humilia respicit in coelo & in terrâ ; in comparison of whose exalted height , all the whole world , nay all the greatest angels and purest saints in heaven are as nothing ; may be apt to admit the temptation of some despondency , and fear that 't is above the capacity of any created intellect , ever to behold his dazlingly ▪ bright essence . nay , even some great divines seem to have had the same apprehensions , when they invented a quality call'd lumen gloriae , to dispose and elevate the eye of the mind , and fit it for the beatifical vision ; by which , ( glory being the sight of god , and the end , or summum bonum of our nature , ) they make the light of glory , which is the end , the means to it self ; and withal to no purpose . god has made our soul intellective , and capable to see infinite truth , that is , himself ; and sanctifying grace , or the love of god above all things , has already elevated that natural faculty above what meer nature could have rais'd it to , and god's essence is infinitely intelligible ; and can any power and object be more fitted to one another ? can there be any difficulty that essential truth , which is so luminously and radiantly bright and clear , should be seen by a power which was made to see truth ? but most especially , when an over-powering and ardent affection and love of it , has directed , apply'd and addicted the eye of the soul to behold that object . let not then such an irrational sollicitude trouble any pious soul : 't is unworthy infinite goodness to be backwards to communicate himself to his creatures , when they are thus fitly dispos'd to receive his ever-ready influence : let our only care be to purifie our intellectual eye , and purge our soul from hankering affections after unworthy objects ; which draw our squinting sight awry , and dim and darken it . this once secur'd , nothing is more evident than that god will not hide his blissful face from us one moment , when we are arriv'd into the region of light. nor is there any other eye-bright requisite for the beatifical vision , but this purity of heart ; if we may believe the promise of our good saviour ▪ beati mundi corde quoniam ipsi deum videbunt ▪ blessed are the pure in heart , for they shall see god , mat. . . innumerable are the demonstrations which may be brought from divers sciences , to prove the existence of a deity , and most of the divine attributes ; on which i do not here insist , or mention them . 't is a subject copious enough to fill whole volumes ; nor is any scientifical conclusion in all nature half so evident , or voucht by so many pregnant and unanswerable arguments : against which the atheist ( as far as i have observ'd ) offers not to alledge any one demonstration ; but only raises difficulties and objections , not from connected reason , but roving fancy : yet i judg'd it sufficient for me here , ( that i might keep within the bounds of my own province ) to produce only such metaphysical mediums as follow out of the forelaid doctrine : for , besides , that such arguments as are fetcht from the most common , and therefore most evident , notions , ( which we use to call altissimae causae , ) are more cogent to gain assent ; a few proofs , nay any one demonstration , such proofs being evidently conclusive , is as convictive as thousands ; especially , if it be pursu'd to first principles , and maintain'd against the objections and evasions of the adverse party , by showing their vanity and insignificancy . that those i have brought here are such , and thus maintain'd , i shall not be afraid to affirm ; nor civilly to challenge the atheists to show they are inconclusive or defective . . from the former doctrine , assisted by ●…ght logick , 't is demonstrable , 〈…〉 no notion , nor , consequent●… , word we have , can be uni●…cably spoken of god , as he is 〈…〉 himself , and of creatures . for , ●…ce all distinct notions which constitute any nature this , and , consequently , all such denomination , come from the form , or the act ; it would follow , that some such act is univocally common to god and creatures ; which has been ●●own to be most absurd ; the former being the highest and purest actuality of being , or self-existence ; the later having no existence at all in it's nature or notion . again , were there any such notion common to god and creatures , that common notion would be restrain'd by it's proper difference to particularize or constitute the deity ; which puts in god the composition of genus and difference ; and , withall , some potentiality , which is essentially annext to every gene●●cal or common notion . wherefore no notion or word we have can be univocally predicated of god and creatures . . wherefore all the notions we have of god , and the words we use when we speak of him , are metaphorical : for , since no word spoken of god and creatures are univocal , or spoken in the same sense , they , must , when said of him and them , be meant in different senses . ▪ wherefore , since , when spoken of creatures , they express our natural notions which we had from the creatures themselves , and therefore are proper ; it follows , that the sense they are taken in , when they are transferr'd thence to god , is in some sort improper or metaphorical . . this is farther confirm'd , because god , consider'd as in himself , is a pure actuality of being , eminently including in it self the whole plenitude of ens ; and , consequently , the objects of all our notions , and infinitely more ; whereas we have no word that signifies more than some one notion . again , since the word [ existence , ] which of all our natural notions seems most proper , does signifie only such a formality or act ; but does not signifie that that act subsists , much less , that it is self-subsistent , as god is ; it cannot properly signifie god , who is a self-subsistent existence . . hence the names of our best virtues are metaphorically said of god. for , were they properly said of god , there would be some notion univocal to god and creatures , contrary to what was prov'd , §§ . . . besides , we had the notions of those virtues first from creatures ; therefore , the first signification of those words which express them , was what we observ'd in them ; and we transferr'd them to god , because he produces such like effects as we had remark'd those men did who were endow'd with those virtues . . hence follows also , that god , as in himself , is not without some impropriety denominated , omnipotent , ●●●-knowing , &c. because power , and knowledge , which are included in those words , are with some impropriety spoken of god , and not properly and univocally . and , tho' creatour , lord , and such like are thought by some to be extrinsecal denominations ; and therefore , refund no imperfection upon god , if spoken of him ; yet , ●…s not so : for relations are intrinsecal denominations ; and , as us'd amongst us , ( which gives them their first signification ) they signifie either ●…ty of nature , or some coordination in acting or suffering , ( as is shown at large , method to sci●… , b. i. less● . ) and it cannot agree to god to have any order to his creatures , or coordination with them , as is shown there , § . . . lastly , negative notions , such as are immense , infinite , immaterial , and ●●n like , seem to have the fairest ●…le to be properly said of god ; in regard they distinguish him from all other beings , or from 〈…〉 creatures . but , neither are these notions 〈…〉 from all impropriety ; for we use these words as differences , to distinguish the several sorts of things ; which implies , there is some generical notion , common to both sorts , which is thus divided or distinguisht by those differences , ●●g ▪ when we say creatures are finite , and god 〈…〉 infinite , these differencing notions do suppose there is some univocal notion common to both , which is thus distinguisht or differenc'd . but this puts in god's essence a composition of genus and difference ; and ( the generical notion being essentially potential in respect of it's differences , and they actual in respect of it , ) is utterly against the nature of pure actuality of being , which is god's essence . therefore , neither are these words or notions of ours , with due propriety to be attributed to god , as he is in himself . . moreover , from our former principles it follows , that there can no priority or posteriority , either rei or rationis be put in god ; much less any such respects as have the least show of inducing the want of any thing belonging to being for one instant or signum , as some call it : for , this is altogether repugnant to the notion of purest actuality of being , or the godhead . nor yet of formal or virtual distinction in his essence ; for this is against god's perfect simplicity ; and withal implies some negation , which is an imperfection . nor is either of these positions against the mystery of the b. trinity rightly explain'd ; where the notion of origin , principiation , pr●cession , &c. do debar both these priorities , and imply , nay , necessitate , perfect ▪ simultaneousness . much less can any such words be attributed to god , as savour , in the least of the notions of any thing in him which is cause or effect : nor , lastly , which is next akin to it , which induces the dependence of god's knowledge , or of the decrees of his will , on creatures , whether existent or possible . which ●● unworthy the all-ordering providence of the first cause , which prevents all such considerations . . notwithstanding what 's said , all the metaphorical words mention'd , §§ . , . nay all those which frequently occurr in holy writ , and are designedly made use of there in accommodation ●o the rude understandings of the vulgar , are true , and truly said of god , tho' they have some , and ●ivers of them a great degree of impropriety in them . for , since we know , that god is infi●●tely above the rank of his creatures , and that they are as nothing in comparison of his sublime ●ssence , which is in every regard most perfect ; s●ch users of those words do intend ▪ while they ●●e them , to depure and strip them of whatever is ●●perfect in their signification ; and do only ●●●an to apply them to god , as far as they sure ●●me notion of ours which by analogy , has ●●●e perfection resembling what 's in him. for ●xample : in regard we call such persons wise , ●●●● , good , merciful , &c. from whom we have ●●serv'd such effects proceed as are proper to ●●ese virtues ; therefore , holding ( as we do ) ●●●t the same effects proceed from god , we do ●● this reason denominate him , or apply such attributes to him as we gave to such virtuous persons : and therefore those propositions are most true , because he does , indeed , and that with an incomparably more excellent manner , produce the same effects ; which was the reason of our transferring those notions to him. yet , all the while we abstracted from the manner how those virtues are in god ; in regard this being utterly unknown to us , could not enter into our intention when we thus transferr'd them ; our intention or meaning , and our notion being the same thing . again , since , when our saviour is call'd a lamb or a lion , ( which , being taken from animals , are some of the worst and more ignoble sort of metaphors ) by reason of his meekness and courage , these spiritual qualities are the only consideration we intend or mean when we apply those words to him ; and therefore those propositions are exactly true , because our meaning or notion signify'd by those words was only such : much more is he truly ●aid to be good , iust , wise , &c. which are by far less metaphorical , and less unlike him than are the other . . to clear this point more fully , and withal to show , that mystical theology ( which some apprehend to be nothing but e●statick fancy ) proceeds upon solid grounds , viz. metaphysicks , assisted by logick , i discourse thus . let us take two perfections , which some conceive to be formally in god , viz. mercy and iustice. reflecting upon the meaning of those two words , we shall find that we have two forms or acts in our mind , whereof one is not the other ; for a man may be iust and not merciful , or merciful and not iust. if then these two forms , thus distinct be in god , then we must put formal distinction in god , which is repugnant to the perfect simplicity of a pure and indivisible actuality . besides , by reason of the formal distinction of those two notions as they are conceiv'd by us , we are debarr'd from saying , that one of them is the other , or that mercy is iustice ; whereas , regarding them as they are in god , we not only may , but must say , his mercy is his iustice ; because there is but one most simple formality in god , which gives him the denomination of merciful and iust. 't is plain then , that these two virtues cannot be in god , as they are thus formally distinct , or two , as our notions represent them ; nor , consequently , at all , unless they be compriz'd in some formality which eminently contains them both , and may be said to be formally in god. casting then our thoughts about , we find in god another attribute , call'd goodness , which includes ●ustice and mercy both ; for a good man must necessarily be both iust and merciful too . but is this form or act , we call goodness formally in god ? let us see . we find another attribute ●n god call'd wisdom , which is formally distinct from the notion of goodness , and goodness from it ; for every good man is not wise , nor is every wise man good. wherefore , neither of these can be formally in god ; nor , consequently , can either of them be predicated properly of god , according to those disti●ct notions we have of them ; for this again would put formal distinction in god , which is a high imperfection . but , perhaps , wisdom and goodness are found in some third notion which is formally in god. let us see . we find in god , entity or being , and both these have ( as all other perfections also have ) entity in them ; and the same ens or thing may have both these in it ; and if it fails of having them when as it ought to have them , it falls so far short , or is imperfect under the notion of ens. let 's go on , and ask : is our notion of ens predicated with propriety of god ? no certainly : for the notion of an ens amongst us is distinct from the notion of existent ; and , we truly say of those we call entia or things , that they sometimes exist , and sometimes not-exist . whence our notion of ens , not having actual being in it , can only be this , that it has a power to be , which is so far from being properly said of god whose essence is a pure actuality of being , that 't is diametrically opposite to it . is our notion of existence at least with propriety said of god ? no , neither : for , [ existence ] amongst us signifies only the act of the thing , or somewhat of it , but it does not signifie the exister ; which yet god most properly is . but , being once come to existence , we are at the top , and the highest , purest and best of of all our human notions , and can go no farther . . whence is clearly deduced , that there is no notion we have , or word we use , which , in propriety of speech , may not be deny'd of god , because his infinitely simple , and yet all perfect existence , includes them all in one all-comprehending formality . and this is the ground , and indeed , the sum of mystick theology , which teaches us , that we truly understand nothing of the divine nature as it is in it self . wherefore , when they would speak of his attributes , they are forced to use the words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , supra quam bonus , suprr quam infinitus ; and call him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that of which all things are said , ( meaning , that he is the ple●itude of being , ) all things deny'd , because of the ineffable excellency of his self-existent being ; and in this they agree with us ; so that they tell us , nihil de deo a nobis proprie pronunciatur quod ejus proprietatem assequatur , neque secundum privationem , ●t immortalis , & similia ; neque secundum positionem , ut vita , unum , &c. the ground then of mystick theology is good and solid , if the descant upon that ground be but as it ought . in this they differ from metaphysicians ; that these , as becomes philosophers , make use of their best natural notions , and improve and compound them to express the divine excellencies ; and content themselves with speaking of god as well as they can : acknowledging , in the mean time , with all profound submission , that neither our thoughts can think , or our words express him with propriety as he is in himself : whereas the mysticks would speak of god , as he is in himself , if they could ; but seeing they cannot , they fly to negative expressions as their best refuge ; but finding that these also fall short , they acknowledge the impropriety of these too ; and by this means set the divine essence in that sublime height , by acknowledging none of our words ●or thoughts can reach him. meditation . thus by studying attentively the book of creatures , and reflecting heedfully on those natural notions they gave us , which were the most sublime , and most defaecated from matter , we have transcended nature it self , and all the lower orbs of finite beings ; and have soar'd up to their great creatour and divine original . nay , we have gain'd some distant glimmerings of his essence it self , and of all his glorious attributes . an object worthy the contemplation of our best thoughts ; ( oh , may they ever fix and dwell there ! ) in comparison of which , our highest speculations are but meer trash , and the whole emyclopaedia of all human sciences but empty descants on subjects which are next to nothing . so certain a truth it is , that if we regard the true end of our nature , we were neither born to love , nor to know , any thing but him , or in order to him. we have discover'd , under penalty of admitting a contradiction , ( that is , most evidently ) that , since there can be no notions belonging to being , but either power to be and actual being ; therefore , the essences of all beings we can imagine must either of their own nature , have actual being in them , or not have it ; and that , if they have it not , they must necessarily be only potential to that act we call existence , that is , they can have of themselves , only a power to be ; and the plainest light if reason assures us , that what is , of it 's own nature , only a power to be , can neither make it self , nor others to be actually . whence follows unavoidably , that unless there had been ever some self-being , ●● something whose very essence it was to exist , neither it self , nor any thing else , could have been actually ; and that , therefore , as certain as it is , that any thing now is , so certain it is that there is , and has ever been , such a first being to whom it is essential to exist , or a god. since then existence , or actual being , was his essence or nature ; and , consequently , he was existence it self , nor , ( he being the first ens ) could there be any thing that could limit this existence ; it follows , that this essence of his ( his existence ) was absolutely unlimited , or infinite ; and , consequently , that it did contain in it , after an eminent manner , ( as became a pure actuality of being , ) all that could be comprehended in the spacious extent of being it self ; whence , he has all the perfections ●● him that have entity or being in them , ( defects , such as are sin , and other privations , are not such ) and this in an infinite manner ; and , so , he is infinitely perfect . whence follow● , that his essence includes all those divine attributes of infinitely wise , good , iust , merciful , veracious , powerful , &c. and this in such a manner , that they are all concenter'd indivisibly in this one simplest formality of his purest actuality of being , his self-existence . all these , and divers other most important truths have been demonstrated here ( to the honour of our maker , and the confusion of the impugners of a deity be it spoken ) with an evidence as far beyond that of the mathematicks , as the notions of power and act , which are transcendents , and therefore most clear , ( of which we have made use , and on which our whole discourse is grounded ) are more evident than is the nature of quantity , the object of the mathematicks ; which an ordinary reflexion will show us , is to a very excessive degree . for , what frequent disputes have there been , and still continue undecided , amongst bad speculaters ( who will needs frame notions out of their fancy and wit which nature never gave them ) about the nature of quantity ? whereas , on the other side , who ever did , or could , raise any dispute concerning the notion of the word [ is , ] or [ can be , ] which express the act and power we speak of ? besides , mathematicians give us definitions , or , at least , explications , of their lines , figures , angles , &c. which confesses , that such notions may be made clearer ; whereas not all the wit of mankind can give us either definitions or explications of [ is ] or [ can be , ] or make them clearer than they are of themselves : and , whoever attempts it , will see , that instead of clearing them , by defining or explicating them , he wil blunder them , and make them more obscure , by being forced to use such words to explain them as are far more obscure than what he went about to explain . which amounts to this , that the notions of power and act , cannot possibly be made more evident , and , therefore , that they are self-evident ; which cannot be said of any one notion the mathematicians use , since the knowledge of them all depends ●● the knowledge of the nature of quantity , and this , as we experience , is liable to dispute ; which it could not be , were it self-evident , as are those others ●● make use of : to be employ'd about such self-evident notions is the prerogative of the noblest science of metaphysicks : these , and some ●●her such , are the altissimae causae , from which she draws her most evident demonstrations . to these self-evident notions , and to her first principles , ●●de up of such , she reduces the evidence and truth of her sublime discourses ; which none of the other sciences , her underlings , can ever pretend to , with●●● using her assistance . and , lastly , from such notions and such principles , ( her proper object being ●●s as such , and those notions as do properly apper●●●● to being ) she demonstrates a first being , and 〈◊〉 his infinite attributes . this , proceeding upon her principles , and assisted by right logick , we have perform'd to some degree , weakly indeed , but yet sufficiently to convince atheists ; if , laying aside their ●●ving fancies , they will but use their common reason : i hope also this will give hint to future philosophers of better parts and more leasurely and quiet circumstances , how they may carry on successfully what ●● have sleightly begun . but , what are we , my soul , or others who read 〈◊〉 , the better for these clear informations of our understanding , if they make no impression on our wills , ●●● improve us in virtue and christian life ? or , rather , are ●● not much worse for our speculative knowledge , if it remains in 〈◊〉 still fruitless , and buds not forth into conformable actions ? certainly , that man is far worse than a sceptical atheist , who is assur'd there is a god , and lives as if there were none . wherefore , since we are ascertain'd of these most concerning truths by as great an evidence as humane nature is capable of ; let us next consider , what affections it ought deservedly to excite in our will , and what duties it enjoyns us in our practice . to to which end , let us ask our selves these few questions . what profound adoration do we owe to so soveraign a majesty ; before whom the angels tremble , and with lowest prostrations acknowledge themselves impure and as nothing in his sight ? with what reverence and purity of heart ought we to approach his divine presence , and appear before him when we put up o●r petitions to him in prayer ? or , who can be so wickedly unmannerly , as to admit voluntary distractions , when he is fixing his eye upon such ● glorious object ? what short-sighted mortal dares presume so upon his own shallow wit , as to question the truth of those high mysteries and refuse assent to them , tho' he has means to assure him , that god who is essentially veracious ●as reveal'd them ; meerly , because they sute and colour not with his dull and low fancies ? is not this , in effect , to give truth it self the lye ? and how can they expect such an affront will not be resented by an infinite majesty ? what an encouragement is it to well-meaning christians , to make them endeavour to dispose themselves by frequenting ▪ holy thoughts and pious ▪ ex●…ises , and also to raise and com●… their hope ; that they shall 〈…〉 such means , assuredly attain to ●…ver-ending happiness ? what can m●re cheer our drooping thoughts th●n to know , that god is over●…ingly bountiful and good , 〈…〉 essentially self-determin'd to give to every cre●t●re all the good they are capable of , or dispos'd 〈…〉 receive ? not the least good thought we think , 〈…〉 the least good wish of our will , not the least good intention we mean , nor the least good action we perform , but it works in us ( thro' the blessing of the same goodness ) a farther degree of sanctity ; and has it 's proportionable reward laid 〈…〉 in heaven . how careful then and sollicitous ought we to be , lest , by our uncomplying slothfulness , ●● neglect of duties , we give the least way to temptations , or run back in virtue , quench the irradiations ●● his holy spirit , and put an obstacle to the ef●●●ence of his boundless generosity ; which stands ever ready to promote us to all those degrees of virtue which we heartily and affectionately wish , and with ● humble confidence in the same goodness pray for . nay , when the former world , by reason of original corruption wanted efficacious means to dispose mankind for heaven , the same goodness did take that concern into his own hand ; and , did , by his providence ripen the world for higher knowledges , and dispos'd them by their inquisitiveness what was man 's summum bonum , and their dissatisfactions about it , for that fulness of time , in which his wisdom saw it seasonable and fit to send them a divine master to teach them such a heavenly doctriu● , as rude nature was till then incapable to conceive ●● aim at . how does it over-awe and terrifie our corrupt and inconstant nature to know he is infinitely iust ; and will infallibly punish severely every transgression of his dread command● , nay , every idle word , according to the degree of it's demerit ? can any man hope to byass a iudge , whose impartiality and uprightness is essential to him ? or , what obstinate sinner d●r●● hope to contrast with an angry and iust god , wh● is arm'd with omnipotence ! and yet , what sinner , tho' never so enormous ▪ can despair of pardon , if he heartily repents ▪ and humbly asks it ; when he reflects , and con●●ders , that both faith and evident reason do assure him , that god is infinitely mercifull ? we do scarcely allow that man to be good-natur'd or merciful , nay , we look upon him as hard-hearted and cruel , who will not forgive him that has offended him , if he be heartily sorry for his fault and begs his pardon : and is it not then , a kind of blasphemy to conceit , that ou● god , whose mercy is infinite , and withall , essential to him , should have less goodness , generosity and mercy , than a wretched , narrow-hearted and p●evish mortal ? oh , what a sure anchor of hope is this divine attribute to poor sinners , wh● fear the eternal wrack of their soul , and are sinking and almost overwhelm'd with despair ? ●hat an encouragement and invitation both to weak ●…d to wicked souls , to repent of their sins hearti●… and apply to the throne of grace ; where they ●re sure not to fail of obtaining pardon , if with hum●●mble confidence and sincere penitence they 〈…〉 it ? what christian who acknowledges that god is ●nfinitely wise , and therefore has ●…d the order of the world after the wisest and best manner , can be un●…gn'd when crosses happen , and 〈…〉 success of temporal affairs go not ●…rding to his wish ? how unrea●…ble is it to expect from an all●…e universal governour that he ●…ld pervert the best order of the ●…tion , or consent that all the world should be worse for the sake of one inconsider●ble atome of it . every generous man thinks it 〈…〉 fitting to suffer inconveniencies , nay to hazard his life for the common good of his own country , what an odious selfishness is it then to repine at suffe●…g much more for the common good of the universe ? especially , since the resign'd sufferer will gain ●●comparably greater advantages by thus entircly submitting to providence , and humbling himself under ●● omnipotent hand of god , than he can possibly ●…e from the enjoying that temporal good for which he was so passionately concerned . what hypocrite can hope to disguise his base intentions and doubling wiles ; or to . ●ood-wink him who is essentially all-seeing ? or what more powerful motive to make false●earted pretenders to virtue and honesty , leave off their foolish insincerity ; and to take care that their thoughts and actions be all of a piece ? lastly , what christian heart can be so insensible of god's noble kindness and bounty as not to love god with the whole bent of his will , who desires no more of us to make us eternally happy , but that we would pursue our own true interest , and love above all things our eternal happiness , himself ? who is ready to pardon all our sins at the first asking , if we heartily , sincerely and penitently ask it ? who is ready to help its forward every step we take in virtue , if we be but willing to help our selves , and humbly beg his assistance . how can that man pretend to love any thing , who loves not him in whom are all things ? or to love himself , if he loves not his own only true happiness ? these most efficacious motives to the best virtues the consideration of the divine attributes does plentifully afford us , besides what the imitation of his moral attributes give us ; which will make us perfect as he is perfect , and by transforming us into his likeness here , raise us to be perfectly like him , and , in some sort , deifie us hereafter . cum apparuerit , similes erimus ; quoniam videbimus , eum sicuti est . ioan. ep. . ch. . v. . transnatural philosophy : or , metaphysicks . book iv. of the several operations of things ; and of the manner ( in common ) how the first being administers his world. . all power of operating or acting springs immediately from the ●●●stence of the thing ; or ( which is the same ) from the thing as it exists . for , since the essence , precisely consider'd , i● only a power to exist ; and what is only a power to exist , is not ; and no operation can proceed from what , according to it 's own precise nature or notion , is not . it follows , that all power of operating or acting must proceed from the existence of the thing , or from the-thing as it exists . . therefore , the power of operating thus or thus particularly , or from which it has such or such a power of operating , springs from the thing as it is such , or such ; or , as it is this or that sort of thing . this is evident from the former , additis addendis . besides , were not this so , every thing might do any thing , which is against our constant experience . . therefore all power of operating , as 't is such an operation , proceeds from the essence of the thing . because the essence is that which constitutes it formally such or such a sort of thing . . therefore all causality whatever is the imparting or communicating something , or somewhat , that is in the cause . for , since every effect is determinate , that is , such o● such ; and , is made such by such an operation ; and the operation is such , because ( by § . . ) i● proceeds from such an essen●● it follows , that the operation carries forwa●● that respect , or formality , by which the caus● was denominated such , and imparts or communicates it to the effect or to the subject on which it works ; so that the power of imparting it , 〈…〉 't is such , or of determining it , is taken from 〈…〉 essence , which is such it self ; and the power ●… actually imparting it , which we call it's efficiency , springs from the existence ; which ( as it were ) stamps or imprints somewhat which is found in the essence , upon the patient ; according to that maxim , operatio sequitur esse . . hence motion , according to it 's common notion precisely , serves only to apply closely the agent to the patient ; this is evident , because it has been now demonstrated , that the whole power or virtue of the cause , enabling it to make the effect such , or to make it actually any effect at all , is taken from the essence and the existence . . the first operation among bodies is divi●… ▪ for , since quantity is the ●…t common affection of all bodies , that is , of body in common ; that operation on bodies must be the first that works upon quantity as quantity . wherefore , since it has been demonstrated , that quantity ( as it is in nature , or grounds natural action and passion ) is divisibility , or a power to be divided ; that natural operation , or action , must be the first which puts in act that power of being divided , or is exercis'd upon divisibility as such . but this ( as appears from the very terms ) is division . therefore the first operation among bodies is division . foreover , since it is not probable there should be now-adays any other bodies but mixts ; and mixture could only be made by division of the ●●rer bodies made by dense ones ; it follows , that 〈…〉 this regard also the first operation of one body upon another must be division . . the next immediate operations of one body upon another , are those two simple motions , call'd pulsus and tractus ; or impulse and attraction : for , since , when one body acts upon another , it must either divide that other , or not-divide it ; and division evidently produces the former effect , and impulse and attraction the later ; 't is manifest , that the next , or rather ( they being contradictorily distinct , ) the only remaining immediate operations of one body on another are impulse and attraction ; neither of which ( as is evident ) do divide the body they work upon . again , since all operation of one body upon another is perform'd by local motion ; and all simple , or meer motion must either be towards or fromwards the other body ; and therefore , in case it do not divide it , must tend to drive it before it , or draw it after it : 't is manifest that these two operations of impulse and attraction are the only-remaining immediate operations of one body on another . . the reason of these two operations cannot be fetcht from physical principles , but from metaphysicks . for , since the reason of this attraction cannot be any physical quality , such as are glutinousness , tenaciousness , &c. because these are found only in a few bodies , whereas these operations have their effect on all : nor can the operation of impulse be refunded into the primary qualities either of rarity and density ; in regard we find they have equal effect on rare bodies as on dense ones ; ●uch less , for the same reason , can this proceed from any occult qualities , ( as they call them ) by virtue of which , some one body flies from another ●…t of antipathy , or out of sympathy follows it , ●…s happens in some particular bodies , ) because , 〈…〉 was said , this happens in all bodies whatever : 〈…〉 is manifest , that the true cause of these operations must be fetcht from a higher cause than any physical principles can reach ; and , therefore , it must be fetcht from metaphysicks . . nor can they proceed from the metaphysical notion or natures of matter and form. for both those notions are terminated in compounding an individual body , and rendring it capable of exist●… or an ens ; and therefore they formally and ●…perly respect being only : which is a different ●●ct from that in question . . wherefore the true reason of these two operations must be drawn , as from it's ground , from the common essence of the first affection of natural entities or bodies , which is quantity . for , since these operations of impel●… and attracting , are , as experience teaches 〈…〉 common to all bodies , or to body in com●… ; they must be refunded in the most common ●…tion that can belong to body ; that is , from 〈…〉 quantity . and , since they cannot proceed 〈…〉 those particular modifications of quantity , 〈…〉 as are all physical qualities ; nor yet from 〈…〉 matter and form which compound those bo●… ; they must necessarily be refunded into the essence it self of quantity in common ; or into such properties , of it as are most neerly ally'd to it's essence ; or , rather , are diverse respects or considerations of it . . to clear this point more fully , i discourse thus . ens , and consequently , unum , are transcendents , and , are apply'd to all the te● predicaments , or common heads of our natural notions : and yet so , that they are properly , or in their first signification , predicated only of substance or thing ; and of the rest , improperly , analogically or secondarily ; as is demonstrated , method to science , b. . less . . §§ . . and . and is even known by the goodness of nature , and the common use of human language , to the rude vulgar ; as is shown there , § . . &c. pag. . however , they have their analogical essences ; and , as their notions are distinct , so we can discourse of each of them as distinctly , as we can of distinct substances , and perhaps more . moreover , these words [ ens ] and [ unum , ] are spoken of no two of those heads univocally , or in the same signification : for , were it so , en● would be a proper genus to those two , and so those two ought to be put in one and the same predicament ; which is against common sense ; as will appear to any meanest considerer who reflects on the distinction of the predicaments , and the vast difference of their respective notions and , who sees not how impossible it is that the meaning of unum or one , according to action , place or habit , should have the same common notion with one according to substance , quality , relation , or any of the others ? these grounds laid , the question now is , what is the analogical entity or unity peculiar and proper to quantity as distinct from the rest ? what we affirm i● ▪ that since we see that those entities which are not actually divided , are only capable to be divided ; and this by reason of their quantity , and not of their substance , quality , or any other respect ; therefore the notion or essence of quantity is divisibility . and let it be noted , that we speak not here of quantity according to a mathematical consideration , but according to a physical one ; or as it is the cause of natural action or passion , and affects it's subject accordingly . now divisibility , or a capacity to be divided , excludes being actually divided already : wherefore since what 's actually divided is made more according to it's quantity , or more quanta , what 's only divisible , is , eo ipso , one in quantity . wherefore , since , if any two bodies in nature were discontinu'd , they would be actually divided according to the notion of quantity ; it follows , that the unity , peculiar to quantity is continuity . wherefore , all the bodies in the world , having quantity in them , must have divisibility in them which is the essence of quantity ; and , consequently , they must have continuity in them , which is its proper unity : which shows , that all quantitative things having essentially continuity ▪ in them , or , which is the same , coherence of their parts ; it follows , that they must as necessarily cohere , as it is , that what has coherence of parts in it , it's parts must cohere ; or which is the same , what coheres , does cohere . and yet what a puzzle has ●● cost diverse great wits to find out a reason for the coherence of the parts of quantity ; while they sought in physical causes where it was not to be found , and not in metaphysicks , which discoursing of the essences of things , demonstrates it ab altissimis causis , and gives it ascertain'd to their hands ? for the self-same reason , all vacuum within the world , which is evidently discontinuity of quantity , or a chasm or interruption of it , is demonstrated impossible and contradictory ; and amounts to these propositions , when resolv'd into it's proper principles , viz. continuity is not continuity ; quantity is not quantity : quantitative unity is quantitative plurality , &c. when the natures or essences of things are not attended to , and thence become violated , the genuine consequences of such discourses must necessarily be open contradictions . in vain then do ingenious men endeavour to torture nature by suckers in pumps , and such inventions , to find out a vacuum . the essences of every thing , and of every mode of thing , are establisht by the first being ; and sooner may all nature be torn into atomes , than they can cease to be what they are . to proceed , . hence is shown the reason also of attraction ; and why , when one body is mov'd fromwards another , that other must follow ; otherwise ▪ ( except in the case to be mention'd , § . . ) that other would become discontinu'd ; which , a● was said , involves a contradiction . and , from the same ground follows the necessity of some impulse , when one is mov'd towards another . for quantity or divisibility cannot be in a subject ●…hout rendring it divisible : nor could it be ●…isible , unless it 's potential parts were out of , ●…d not within one another , which we call pe●…rated ; that so there might be space enough 〈…〉 the dividing body to come between it's parts ; 〈…〉 which division formally consists : nor could 〈…〉 be , if the parts of quantity were penetrated , 〈…〉 not-extended . whence follows , that it must , 〈…〉 the motion continues , be impell'd or driven ●…wards . . notwithstanding , every impulse does , to 〈…〉 degree , condense the impell'd body ; and ●…ry attraction does to some de●…e rarifie that which is attra●… ; at least at first . for , since ●…re can be no action in nature ●…hout it 's proper or formal ●…ect ; or can any agent work ●…on body , but according to such or such a pre●…se respect , in which 't is passive ; and there are manifestly two operations or actions in nature , ●…ll'd impelling and attracting ; and these have their formal effects upon quantity ; and all effects upon quantity must either be upon the essence of it , as has been shown , from § . . to § . . 〈…〉 else according to its differences , that is , on bo●… , as they are more or less divisible ; or , as they 〈…〉 rare or dense : it follows , that whenever any ●…p●llent or attracting body acts upon another , 〈…〉 will first compress and condense its parts , or di●… , and rarifie them ; till the motion being ●ommunicated through the whole , it drives forwards or draws after it the whole intire body it works upon . that the effect of impulse and attraction are formally on quantity , or on body as it is quantitative , and not as it is substance , or affected with any other mode , is demonstrated in the appendix to my method to science , § . . . all these operations are either perform'd by local motion , or concomitantly with it . for , division , or the sliding of the parts of the dividing body between the parts of the body divided , ( which is formally division , ) is most manifestly local motion . also , the imp●lling another body before it , or drawing them after it , is clearly to make them change place , or move locally : and the same must be said of rarefaction and condensation ; which dilate the body so as to take up a greater place , or shrink ▪ it into a lesser ; which is , in some degree , to chang●● place . . all motion comes at first from the angelical nature . this has been demonstrated , b. . ch. . §§ . , . and method to science , pag. . thesis iv. ideae cartefianae , p. . § . . and raillery defeated , § . . in which places this demonstration is maintain'd and enforced . and it is further shown agreeable to reason . for , since on the one side , all action in nature ( abating the formality of connotating or respecting the agent ) is the same as motion , and therefore must proceed from some act , or such a thing as has the nature of act in it ; and angels are pure acts ; and , consequently , more able to act than bodies are ; they are , therefore , in this regard , fit agents to produce action or motion ; especially , since ( as is seen ●… . ch. . § . . ) they contain all body , and , con●…ently , every mode or virtue of body in them . 〈…〉 the other side , since motion in its precise na●… , or ▪ as distinguisht from its subject , is the 〈…〉 approaching to non-entity and non-existence 〈…〉 any notion we have , ( as is shown in my me●… , b. . less . . § . . ) and , for that reason ▪ ●…ot proceed immediately from god , who is es●…l existence ; it follows , that tho' it be such 〈…〉 imperfect effect , it may yet proceed congru●…y enough from an angel ; who , he being a ●…r● , and as such , having no prerogative in ●…s regard over his fellow-creatures ; has no●… , ( as o● himself ) or non-existence , in●… in his very being , which fit him in every ●…rd to be the most proper immediate cause of ●…tion . lastly , 't is a most senseless opinion , to think ●…at god , as the cartesians hold , gives all created ●●●●es their being , and endows them with facul●… and powers to perform such or such operati●…s , and yet will not permit them to perform them , ●…t does all the lowest and meanest effects immediately by himself ; which is at once derogatory 〈…〉 god 's supreme majesty , and makes those ●ow●rs themselves useless , frustaneous , and ●…d for nothing ; which is against the metaphy●…al ▪ bonity or goodness , which is a property of ●…eir entity ; as has been shown , b. . ch. . 〈…〉 , , . . all motion is a perpetual novelty , or a ●ontinu'd new effect . for , since ●o succeeding part of motion is , while the foregoing ones are ●…ssing ; nor can , possibly , be any of those parts which went before ; it follows that each of them is made a-new , or is a new effect . . therefore motion requires a continual influx of the moving cause . for , since no part of motion can be of it self ; and every part of it is a distinct or new effect ; also , since to move a thing thus far is not to move it farther ; and the same reason holds all along thorow the whole course of motion : it must needs require continually either a new cause , or a continually new effort of the same moving cause , to produce its continuance , otherwise it might cease in any part of it's flux , were it not still helpt forward . . this continuance of motion is perform'd by the operation of some chief angel incessantly rarefying the matter of the solar bodies ; and consequently , darting out it's rays of light , or fire , to those bulks of matter which are within it's influence . for , since this continual rarefaction forces the preceeding particles or rays to fly forwards to make place for the succeeding ones ; and this with a quickness proportionable to the penetrativeness or tenuity of those particles which is inconceiveably such ; and these affecting and piercing , by degrees , more solid bodies , do set all their several parts a playing , according to their respective natures , from which must necessarily ensue the several motions of division , impulse , attraction , and consequently of rarefaction and condensation , which are the parents of all other more particular operations ; from which , as even experience tells us , do proceed all the effects in nature : it follows , that this continual rarefaction of the solar matter is the cause of the ●…tinuance of all our motion . as experience 〈…〉 say , ) also teaches us in the change of the sea●…s of the year ; whence common reason as●…res us , that should that angelical operation ●…se for some considerable time , all the earth ●…ould be nothing but a frozen , unactive and un●oveable mass. . angels are pre-mov'd by the first being to ●ove the material world , even to the least atome or circumstance of it , in such a manner as 〈…〉 most agreeable to his eternal ●…d immutable decrees . for , ●…ce it belongs to infinite wis●… to administer the whole ●…eation , or the universality of his creatures , ●…ording to the wisest and best manner ; and t●● managery of the material world is carry'd ●● by motion ; and motion is effected by angels ●● its immediate causes ; and angels are intelligent beings , which act by knowledge , ●…d are premov'd or determin'd to act by motives ; and the best motives to make faithful servants ●ct , is to know their master's will ; nor could ●●ey know his will , or his most hidden and in●…able decrees by which they were to square ●…ir actions , unless god had some way or other ●●nifested them : it follows , that these mani●…tions of his divine pleasure are the proper motives to them to move and order all material ●ature as he had decreed . which , ( this order ●f the world being the best , ) reaches to the ●ost minute parts and least circumstances of ●… . . the first or chief bodies , thus mov'd by angels , do in their manner premove , that is , determine and continue the motion given them at first by the angelical nature . for , since an instrument is movens motum , or such a thing as being mov'd by another has a power to produce immediately the effect it is design'd for ; and 't is evident from what 's said above , that bodies have a power in them to divide , impel , attract , and thence to rarifie and condense others , as immediate agents ; 't is manifest , that by the first of these effects , the bulk , figure , situation , and consequently the mixture or texture of the component parts of the other bodies , which they do thus move are made ; and from the other motions their intrinsecal temperament , or the rarity and density of those parts proceeds : all which being determinate effects , proceeding from bodies as their immediate movers ; 't is evident , that this determination and continuance of motion springs immediately from the motion of the next precedent body , which by its motion premoves , and determines the motion of the following ones . . hence , angels , and the bodies they move , do , as second causes , immediately determine the individuation of all bodies whatever . for , since the complexion of accidents is the essential form , which by distinguishing it from all others , does constitute every individual body , by making it to be determinately or individually this , as has has been ●…ov'd , b. . ch. . and , consequently , renders 〈…〉 capable of existence , or an ens ; and this ●omplexion of accidents is chiefly caus'd by the ●utting together rare and dense parts in such a ●roportion ; and the bulk , figure and situation ●f those parts do concur also , and help in their way , to form it into such a constant or coherent ●…s , and to distinguish it from others ; and all these are immediately produced by the operations mention'd in the foregoing § . which are caus'd by angels as moving bodies , and by the bodies themselves , as the instrument of intelligences , or ●● moved by them : 't is evinced , that angels and bodies , as second causes , are the immediate determiners of the individuation of all new-made bodies whatever . . 't is beyond the power of those second causes to give existen●e to the least body in nature . for , since by § . . the nature or quality of the operation follows from the nature or quality of the agent , and ( as will be seen shortly ) is finally refunded into the essence of the cause whence it springs ; and none of those things call'd bodies , nor yet angels which move them , have existence in their essence , but are meerly capable of being , and , as far as is of themselves , may not-be ; it follows , that however they may by their operation impart to the new-made ens , motion , rarity , density , or other such effects as either were essential to them or sprung out of their essence ; yet they could never communicate to them existence , this being extrinsecal and accidental to them , and of an excellency incomparably above or beyond their essence , as much as the notion of act or actual being is above that of meer power , or possibility of being , which is beyond all proportion . . therefore it can belong only to god , the first cause , to give actual being or existence , because only his nature is essentially existent . . therefore for the same reason it belongs to him , and to him only , to conserve them in being . for , since the reason , ( as far as is on his part ) why his goodness gave them being at first , was because they were determinate entia or individua ; and only capable of being , and wanted it ; and they are still , for every moment afterwards , entia or capable of being , and , as far as is of themselves , may , for every moment , not-be ; it follows , that for the same reason for which he gave them being at first , it belongs to him still to conserve it . and that none else can support them in being is hence evident ; because all creatures ( they being of their own nature meerly capable to be ) do want a support themselves : besides that actual being , even when creatures have it , is extrinsecal to their essences , from which only the nature or quality of the effect proceeds , by §§ . , , . . for the same reason , if the thing be nobler , that is , fit for more , or nobler operations , a nobler existence must be given it , else a contradiction would follow , viz. ●… that thing would be otherwise than it should be , ●…d consequently , otherwise than 't is capable to be ; which is a contradiction . . for the same reason , if matter , rais'd to it's highest pitch , come to ●● so dispos'd , that it requires 〈…〉 form of a higher , or spiritual , nature , that capacity is supply'd by the first being , according to the exigency of that matter ; and a form of a spiritual nature , or a soul , will be in it . and , because matter and form compound an ens , o● a thing capable of existence ; therefore , at the same instant , an existence suitable to b●th ●●ose natures , ( that is , corporeo-spiritual ) will ( by § . . ) be given it by god's redundant goodness and steady emanation of being . . for the same reason also , even in spiritual and supernatural endowments , those who are dispos'd by an ardent desire of them , a●d apply to the giver of them by fervent and frequent acts of : their will , relying with per●●ct confidence on his ungrudging bounty , may be infallibly sure to receive them . which is the greatest comfort and encouragement to weak and well-meaning souls ; and , debars rechless and wicked sinners from all hope of excuse ; since there had needed no more to make them virtuous saints , than only to have ask'd it with humility , faith , and perseverance . . for the same reason , god , who is self-existence , and therefore infinitely perfect , cannot be the cause of any defect ; whether it be natural , or moral which we call sin ; but such defects are refunded into the incapacity of creatures that were to receive these farther perfections , or into their defectiveness in operating ; much less can he be the cause of the greatest , or rather total defect , [ not-being . ] . hence is seen , that all the several sorts of operations that are , have been , or can be , are finally refunded into the essences of the things that operate . for the operation must be such as the power to operate is , nor can be at all without it ; for , otherwise , a thing might do what it has no power to do ; that is , might do what it cannot do . and the power of acting is such as the essence is ; and among creatures , springs from it as it root , being a property of it . to show this particularly : the operation of attraction , is grounded on the unity ( that is the essence ) of quantity , which is continuity . the operation of impulse springs from the impenetrability of quantitative parts , which is either the nature of divisibility , ( or quantity ) or else next a kin to it ; as is shown above , § . . the operations of rarefaction and condensation , ( by § . . ) clearly arise from the former ; and therefore from the essence of the same cause on which those former operations were grounded . the first motion or action of all bodies , and the continuance of ●●●m , is refunded into the essence of angels ; which , on the one side , being pure acts , are the ●●est agents to be the origin of action , which ● done by motion : on the other side , having no●●●ng of actual being or existence in their na●●●e , they can only produce that inferiour effect , ●●●d motion , in such beings as are below them ▪ ●●stly , the operation of creating , or giving actual being , springs peculiarly from the essence of the first being , which is self-existence . by which is seen , ( without need of particularizing ) ●●w wisely the first being administers his world , by reserving to himself to be the imme●●●e cause of the noblest effect , and most resem●●ng him [ existence ; ] and appointing his underlings and journeymen the angels to move every part of the material world according to their respective natures . by which means the well-compacted frame and course of nature hangs together by the indissoluble connexion of proper causes with their proper effects . and , ●●ce all the exact knowledge , or science , we have , is built on this ; his creative wisdom does by this means give knowledge to those cogno●●ive creatures , which because they are not ●ure acts , and , consequently , have not knowledge due to them by their creation ; are to ac●●re it here from natural objects affecting their ●oul by means of their senses , and by reflexion on the notions they imprint . . from what has been prov'd hitherto , it has been demonstrated , how our great and wise god does all that is good , or has being in it , in all things . for , they have their essences from the ideas in his divine understanding ; and their existences by his peculiar and immediate act of creation : he still conserves their essence in being , by the same continued action ; and , at the same time , all their faculties and powers , by which they act on one another . he puts them forwards to exercise those several faculties , and actually to produce their operations on one another , according to their natures , by motion which is given them by his chief officers in administring the world , angels ; and continues their motions and operations by their incessant perpetuating of that motion . so that both their essences , their actual being , their power to act , their exercise of that power ; and , consequently , whatever belongs to the action it self , as far as it is positive , or has entity and goodness in it , ( and , amongst the rest , the determination of our will to what 's good and virtuous ) do all of them entirely depend on god , and are deriv'd from him. — ip●● honor & gloria in saecula saeculorum . amen . meditation . the essences of things , which give all bodies their several sorts of operation being esta●…t by god ; and vacuum being own impossible from the conti●●ity of quantity , which is it's ●●d of unity , or entity ; it fol●●●s , that all the bodies of the ●aterial world do immediately con●● upon , or touch one another ; ●● ▪ therefore being set on work , ●pusht forward by motion , which i● given and continu'd to them by the angelical nature , they must necessarily affect , or work upon , one another ; and this according to their respective essences ; or , ( as we express it in philosophical language ) proper causes must still produce proper effects . and , seeing this reason holds in all bodies whatever , since the creation was finisht and natural causes begun to move in a regular order ; ●●sequently the whole course of nature ( to show and ●●plain which is the work of a natural philosopher ) ●●sists in the production of such effects as are proper ●d suteable to the genius of their causes . thus is the providence of our great god , ad●inistring the world after the wisest ●anner , demonstrated a priori . and , that this way of governing the material world does most become his divine wisdom appears hence , that ( as was lately said ) all our acquir'd wisdom in natural things , or all our science , is entirely grounded on our knowing this connexion of such causes with such effects ; insomuch , that all mankind would be a pack of ignorant fools , if the consequence of these later from the former were not certainly establisht ; since , in that case , they could never know what things they were to make use of , to compass any effect they intended ; nor know what to eschew , and what to pursue : no proportion of any means to the end being possible to be known , in case such determinate causes were not apt to produce such determinate and proper effects ; or , ( which is the same ) if every thing did not act as it is , but that any thing might do , or not do , any thing . nor is this connected tenour of managing the material world by proper causes and effects less evident a posteriori . for , let us pitch our thought upon any one effect done at present ; and , let it be the greatest , or the most inconsiderable one , ( as it may seem to us ; ) for this alters not the case : plainest reason will tell us , that either it had some cause , or it had none . if it had none , and yet is ; it must have been self-existent : which is both against experience , for we see it lately produced ; and against our reason too ; because to be self-existent is an incommunicable attribute of the deity . if it had a cause , then that cause was either indifferent to produce this or any other effect ; in which ca●e it could produce nothing ; since ex indifferenti nihil sequitur : besides , every effect ( whether it be a thing , or a mode of thing ) is determinate ; for whatever is produc'd , ●s , and whatever is is determinate , since nothing in common can be ; and an indeterminate cause cannot produce an determinate effect ; for in that supposition it would work contradictorily to it's self . it must then be determinately apt , or proper , to produce this kind of effect , and no other . this effect was therefore put because there was such a determinate or proper cause to produce it . this seen , let us make the same discourse concerning that which was the proper cause , as we did now concerning its effect now mention'd ; and so , of all the antecedent causes in the world , since time first started into motion . each of them existed , or was , in it's season ; none of them could exist of themselves ; therefore each of them had a cause ; and that , by our former discourse , a determinate or proper one . nothing therefore is , or can be , more demonstrable , nor more immediately reducible to self-evidence , than it is , that the whole course of nature is carry'd on by proper causes and proper effects . this consideration made that great aristotelian , and truly christian philosopher , boetius , begin his devout rapture in these words , [ o , qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas ! ] the whole current of our reason runs upon this ground , and proceeds every step in this beaten track , that every cause produces such effects as are agreeable and proper to its peculiar nature ; and this perpetually , or thro' the whole course of the world. for were the line of causality interrupted by chasms and interstices , our reason would be at an utter loss . this it was also which made that divine writer , the author of ecclesiasticus , speaking of the manner in which the world is administer'd by the divine wisdom , deliver his comprehensive thoughts in these emphatical words , [ attingit a fine in finem fortiter , & disponit omnia suaviter : it reaches from the beginning to the end , ( or carries it quite thorow ) strongly ; for , what stronger than the infractile chain of causality , establisht on this great and self-evident truth , that nothing can make it self , or ( which is the same ) nothing that is only potential , or meerly in power to work an effect , can reduce it self to act , as to that effect ? or , what disposition more sweet , or farther from offering violence to the nature of any cause , than 't is to order that it should work connaturally , or act as it is ? notwithstanding the greatest and clearest truths can never want enemies while there is errour in the world ; nor will there ever want errour , as long as men , either carelessly or wilfully , decline the only paths that lead to truth ; which are , to bottom their discourse at first on evident principles ; and to connect orderly those notions which god , as author of nature , has given us by his creatures . this wisest conduct of the divine providence has two capital enemies : the one is the epicurean sect , and their followers ; who put all effects to light by chance , and , therefore , make chance to be god's competitour in governing the world. the other is the stoicks , who set up their more ingenious , but equally senseless doctrine of fatality . the former of these are sufficiently confuted by their laying never a principle ; but , instead of them , advancing the wildest ▪ suppositions that witty folly could ever have stumbled upon , viz. an infinite vacuum ; that is , an infinite nothing : an infinite number of atomes , of infinitely-various figures falling downwards perpetually ; only many of them , lest they should never ●ver-take their fellows , took a toy , crab-like , to move sideways ; by which means clinging in accidentally with those that mov'd downwards perpendicularly , they make several sorts of bodies ; and , in process of time , of those several bodies compound earth , stars , or whatever their fancy pleases . not me of these principles they undertake to evidence ; but grosly suppose , and kindly grant them to themselves . tho' i dare undertake , that a hundred clearest demonstrations may be brought against them , taking them all together ; tho' one of them might suffice to sweep down , at one brush , that whole cobweb scheme . but these men best confute themselves . chance bears in it's notion inconstancy ; and is quite opposite to a continual and settled method . i ask then , is it by chance that those atomes were self-existent , as they pretend ? is it by chance , that they were originally , or of themselves , of so many various figures ; whence they became apt to link so commodiously with one another for such an end ? was it by chance , that they , or at least the main body of them mov'd downwards , and not upwards , and this perpendicularly ? from what determinate points in that nothing which they call vacuum , do they measure or rate the perpendicularity of this motion of theirs ? was it by chance , that multitudes of them were so carefully wise as to run aside ; lest , otherwise , not overtaking their fellows , ( for there can be no reason imaginable why one of them in a vacuum should move faster than another ) all this frame of nature , which they fancy , should be at an end ? what made them move at all ? or what ail'd them that they could not lie still , when nothing impell'd them ? certainly , this was a strange chance that was so constant , and withal as wisely contriv'd for epicurus his purpose as the best design could order it . but the truth is , they were only laid thus in epicurus his own fancy ; nor could he make any thing hang together , but by posturing them in order to an end ; now this is the plain notion of design ; which , since it could not proceed from meer matter , sprung from his own invention ; which he , to compleat the nonsense of his voluntary hypothesis , nicknames chance . this point so neerly concerning the honour of the worlds great governour , it may seem strange that some christian philosophers should retain some hankering after an opinion which is diametrically opposite to providence . i cannot think the learned and pious gassendus , while he receiv'd the hypothesis of epicurus , and oppos'd aristotle , ( whom he did not understand , but apprehended some modern sch●olmen gave us his true sense ; ) i say , i do not think he did believe what he writ , ( much less that he held any thing happen'd otherwise than by god's providential determination ) but that he advanced that scheme of philosophy as a trial of skill , and to show his great wit ; which it must be confest had few equals . cartesius had begun that vast and bold exploit of contriving how the world should be made ; and it bred an emulation in gassendns not to be behind him in such a daring and noble projection : besides , it was pardonable in an author not to regard whe●hen the philosophy he took to were true or no , who had the misfortune to be sceptically inclin'd , and profest nihil sciri . but , i was heartily troubled ●o find , by discoursing with an eminent writer , who ●ad deserv'd well of the world for his elaborate book against atheism ; that tho' he acknowledg'd the order of causes in the main , he did notwithstanding hold that chance had the chief hand in many particulars . to rectifie his mistake , i scribbled two sheets of paper , and read to him . whether they had any effect upon him , or hindred him from publishing any of that nature , ( for i perceiv'd he was then writing ) i have not light to know . only i know this , that 't is my duty to use my best endeavour to vindicate the providence of our maker , and his wisdom in the ordinary administration of the world ; and to show , that he is the adequate and sole governour of it , even to the least creature , or the least imperceptible atome . to come closer then ; i ask , what is this thing they call chance ? i hear a word indeed , which makes such a sound in my ear , and i perceive too that those who patronize it , have a blind apprehension that it is a [ thing , ] for they put it to act , and produce effects ; which [ nothing ] cannot do . and yet , what kind of thing can it be ? is it a body , or a spirit ? if a spirit , is it a created one or an angel , or is it increated ? if a body , where dwells it in this habitable world ? is it a simple body , or a compound one ? is it intelligent , or not-intelligent ? again , by what virtue or power does it work it's effects , and how ? to none of these , i am sure , a pertinent answer can ever be given ; and yet it will haunt men's fancies , and bear a great part in their discourses , tho' not very many have a distinct conception of what they mean by that word . truth is , 't is a strange error in many weak speculaters that they are apt not only to fancy every new conception of ours to be a new thing , but also that now and then they take meer words to be real things . notwithstanding all that's here said , the word [ chance ] must have some signification ; and my self must allow it , ( nay all mankind must do the same , since we do all of us use it , ) and yet i do not , in holding this , recede at all from my former doctrine . to look narrowly then into the meaning of this word , i find , that all the words we have , or can have , must either signifie our natural notions , or artificial ones ; as also , that [ chance ] must express some natural notion , because the vulgar use it ; and 't is the common usage of the word which gives it it's signification . let us see th●n in what sense the vulgar , so they be but moderately intelligent , do use that word , and what they can mean by it . a servant le ts fall a glass , and breaks it ; a tyle falls from a house and kills one who walks by in the street ; a man climbing a ladder falls down and breaks his neck ▪ now all these are said to be done [ by chance . ] but does any of these , who say so , hold , that there was no cause at all , which made the glass , the tyle , or the man fall . no certainly ; for every man of common sense holds , that no effect can be without a cause , and will deny that a tyle or a glass did move themselves . their meaning then is , and they tell you they did not fore-see , or fore-know , that any of these would fall , being attentive to some other object or business : chance then is an unadverted or unforeseen cause ; for had they foreseen that such causes , taking them all together would have brought those disasters , it had been willfulness and design in them , to have come in the way of such misohievous causes ; and design is opposite to the notion of chance : in this sense then christianity allows us to say , the chance , or an unforeseen cause wrought these effect ●● but , since nothing is unforeseen to god , who laid and order'd all those causes ; what is chance to us , is providence if we regard him ; nor is there any thing , distinct from him , call'd chance , which has the least h●nd in administring the world , but he is the only adequate governor of it . 't is not without some loathness i am forced to take notice , that some of our modern ideists ; ( tho' i hope with a good intention ) do violate this connected course of causes and effects , in which god's ordinary providence consists . whoever ( as do the cartesians ) make all second causes which have powers or faculties given them to work such effects , to be useless as to those effects , even as instruments : whoever puts on the creature 's side , only occasions , which they say are no causes , for every act of knowledge mankind has , and perhaps for every effect in nature : whoever puts determinate ideas to be produced by indeterminate , and therefore improper causes , as the soul was before she did elicit them ( as they pretend ) of her self : whoever puts such idea's annext voluntarily to such motions which were not at all like them , or no causes of them ; alledging gratis that god wills it : whoever maintains the annexing of one thing ▪ or mode of thing , to another otherwise than by being the proper cause of it , does fall into the same ill-grounded errour of interrupting the course of god's ordinary providence by second causes , and destroys the laws of causality : as has been over and over demonstrated , in my ideae cartesianae , indicatio tertia , from § . . to § . . and in my solid philosophy asserted , reflexion . § : . and . it will run in the fancies of some less intelligent intelligent readers , who take things at the first rebound , and pass a peremptory iudgment on what they understand but by halves ; that this settled order of providence i here assert , does introduce a kind of fatality into the world. now , if by the word [ fatum ] they mean what is spoken or decreed by god , i must own the position , and stand to it as clearly demonstrated above : which leads me to the other sort of the opposers of providenoe ; i mean those who maintain a stoical fatality ; a tenet widely different from our thesis , or rather perfectly contradictory to it . for ours proceeds upon a continued connexion of natural causes with consequent effects which are suteable and agreeable to their natures : theirs regards no influence of any causes at all ; but is built on the force of this contradiction , [ either such a thing will be , or will not be . ] wherefore , say they , since it inevitably follows , that both of these cannot be true , and yet one of them must be true ; 't is a folly to endeavour to avoid any harm , or to pursue any good , since out of the force of not-admitting contradiction , what will be , will be . but this , tho' the wittier of the two , is a pure folly ; since , as common experience tells us , and common sense assures us , nothing is done , but by means of causes , nor not-done , but because there wanted causes able to do it : but they fancy to themselves by the words [ will be , ] and [ will not be , ] there is a certain kind of self-existence , or non-self-existenee in the futurity of events . whereas none of them has , or can have , any existence , or non-existence at all , but as they stand under determinate natural causes , ●r no causes . whence , we , who know this to be so , are bound in prudence to endeavour , as much as lies in us , to put those causes , if we would have the effect follow . they forget too , that we our selves are part of the rank of causes ; and that the using our own reason in chusing and applying those other causes , is the supreme superintendent cause , and the very best of all the rest . they reflect not also , that since future effects are not ; neither of those propositions they put and rely on , has any truth in it at all ; nor has the futurity of it any certainty , but as it stands under determinate or proper causes which will produce that effect , from which only it has title to the name of future . so that the proposition , [ such a thing will be or is future ] is an imprudent saying , and not be spoke by any man of sense , unless he sees the causes will certainly make it be . these discoursers do therefore argue from a logical impossibility , found only in our mind , considering the nature of ens , and that it excludes non-ens out of it's notion ; to a physical one , which is wholly grounded on the nature of causes . lastly , this thesis is manifestly convicted of folly , by the consent of all mankind , and even of themselves too , who do all of them lay means for the effects they aim at . nor could the world continue or subsist if this whimsical doctrine stands ; as by applying it to a harvest next year , the using ways for trade and traffick , or for defending our country , and a thousand such particulars , does manifestly appear : for either success will follow or not follow ; whither we endeavour or not endeavour to lay means for such effects ; which consideration will also help to cure those weak discoursers who so perplex their thought about predestination : all which depend on the same principles ; and can disrellish no man , unless he be offended , that god is the first cause , and that good comes to us from him by second causes laid in the best order imaginable . but in how different a manner does our way of philosophy discourse of god's ordinary providence from that of those other philosophers , and particularly from that of the ideists ! it puts no blind suppositions nor conceits taken from fancy ; but is entirely built on principles , and such principles as are either self-evident , or so neerely remov'd from them , that they are easily reducible thither , viz. [ every thing acts as it is ; and therefore is a proper cause to the effect it produces . distinct essences have distinct powers ; and , those powers , when pusht forwards by motion must actually work on their immediate patients ; and this , according to the nature of their several essences . every thing , except the first cause , is an effect ; and , as no effect can be without something to effect it , so no determinate , or such an effect , can be , without a determinate , or proper cause . ] thus is the course of god's providence in administring the world , shown to be ( a● becomes the all-wise contriver of it , ) orderly , steady , coherent , and all of a piece . from these footsteps of the divine wisdom imprinted on creatures , we gain all our science ; either proceeding a priori from proper causes to their proper effects , or a posteriori from proper effects to their proper causes ; only which ways of discoursing can beget true science . whence the cartesians who decline that method ; and , contrary to all logick and common sense , ( which oblige us to argue from what 's better known , to what 's unknown or less known ) instead of proving their theses from the nature of things , do introduce arbitrary and voluntary reasons for effects ; and to palliate their ignorance , pretend that god wills such or such an effect should follow , which will of his they neither prove nor can prove , nor go about to prove : and when their arguments are destitute of connexion , they put god to annex one thing to another , as their necessity , when they are at a non-plus , requires ; such men i say , who affect this way frequently , and advance many wild and unprov'd suppositions at their pleasure gratis , are hence convicted to be no philosophers ; but to obstruct the common road to science ; and seem to bid defiance to all principles , connexion , and common logick ; sham all philosophy and science too ; and set up in their stead , a gentile farce of witty , groundless , and unconnected talk. but to leave them and return to our own doctrine , and the consequences of it ; hence , with an easie reflexion , may be gather'd , how all truths are necessarily in one another , as links in the same chain of causes ; and , therefore , may all be seen at once by the soul , when she comes to enjoy the priviledge of a pure act , is above time , and no longer ty'd to the slow motion of corporeal phantasms in performing ●er operations . having thus laid open the deviations of other mistaking speculaters , let us , my soul , recommended to our self , and to our readers to take heed lest we run counter in our practice to the truth we which have evinced and establisht . since then all nature and evident reason consent to tell us , that every essence has such an operation as is peculiar and prop●r to it 's nature , and our essence is rationality ; let not us be guilty of that worst singularity , to act contrary to our essence , and degenerate from our nature by acting ▪ irrationally , and this in the highest degrce . the chief powers of our rational being are our understanding and our will. the primary operation of the first is to see or know truth , and that of the later is to pursue good : and metaphysicks has demonstrated to us clearly , that nothing but the knowledge of an infinite truth can satisfie the one , and the possession of an infinite good satiate the other ; as also that neither of these can possibly be had save only in the unveiled sight of the first-being , the glorious and glorifying deity . let it then be our not only principal , but ( in comparison ) only care to cultivate those dispositions of our will , which we have demonstrated to be the only steps by which we may ascend to eternal happiness ; and to r●●t out th●se inordinate affections for creatures , which indispose us for heaven ; and , consequently , after they have turmoil'd and vext us here , must render us , after this short life , eternally most miserable : to this end , let us make that use of our understanding , as , by due consideration , to advance these speculative knowledges we ●…ve gain'd here , into conformable practical iudgments , or virtuous affections . which , as it was the chief intention of the author , so it shall be ●●s prayer it may work that best effect upon his readers . a rational explication of the mystery of the most blessed trinity . the preface . . having , as i hop't , settled the way of exact reasoning in my method to science ; and reduced the notions , of which we make use in more sublime subjects , to a distinctness in my metaphysicks ; i cast about to find out some particular point , to which , as a proper instance , i might apply my speculative productions ; and , thence , manifest that they were not high-flown fancies , as some incompetent readers may imagine , but solid and useful truths . nor could there need any long enquiry to make my thoughts come to a determination . i had , to my great trouble , observ'd how rudely the mystery of the most b. trinity had been attackt of late by some witty and fanciful gentlemen ; and had received information also , that the boasts of their wonderful performances by the way of reason , had given great advantages to deists and atheists ; who , siding with them , did thence take occasion to ridicule christianity , whose prime fundamental , was ( as they pretended ) a piece of pure nonsense . i saw very clearly , that all their objections proceeded upon most gross mistakes ; and ( which i am loath to say ) from unskillfulness in logick , or the rules of right reasoning ; and from perfect ignorance in metaphysicks : the former of which , by distinguishing exactly our several notions or respects , is to give us light to know what is truly a contradiction , what not ; and the other , instructs us how we are to discourse of the first being and his attributes . the principles and deductions in which sciences being in so high a degree evident , i could not but discover clearly , and therefore , ( the weight of the circumstance requiring it , ) i dare confidently declare , and offer to maintain , that all their objections against that mystery are not only perfectly groundless , but when they come to be sifted and examin'd by those tests of true reason , extreamly weak even to childishness . . and , indeed , they deliver those objections of theirs in so sleight a manner , as if themselves made account they writ to none but half-witted readers ; who stand ready to give up their assent , upon every pretty and plausible saying that surprizes their ignorance , or pleases their fancy . ●or , not so much as one principle do they lay ; ●or observe any steady tenour in deducing any determinate conclusion . nay , they do not so much as distinguish exactly those notions which belong to the subject in dispute , much less define them ; nor state the question liquidly and clearly ; but fall to work hastily , propose the point crudely , and descant upon it superficially , confusedly , and ●amblingly ; only they take care to use some little wit in the expression : as if they presum'd , that either there are no praecognoscenda , requisite to explicate or determine such a sublime point ; or else , that every ordinary reader knows them by ●nstinct , already . now what man of sense can they hope to satisfie by such a shallow way of discoursing ; much less the learned divines of the universities , to whom they take the boldness to address their pamphlets . certainly , when the thesis is of so soveraign a nature , we ought , if ever , proceed with all the accuracy imaginable . nor does only the intrinsick merit and weight of the subject in hand demand this of them , but also the care of their own reputation obliges them to it . . for the point it self is of that vast concern , that either it must ( in case it be true ) render the deniers of it most ungrateful , impious and blasphemous , in degrading our infinite god , blessed for evermore , who , to save mankind , so mercifully condescended to take our nature upon him , into the abject condition of a meer creature , made of nothing , and therefore next to nothing ; or else , if it be , ( as they pretend ) false , it must lay the horrible blemish of being idolatrous in the highest degree , upon the christian church for so many ages : nay , farther , it must unchurch her absolutely , and make her no better than a synagogue of sathan ; since she builds the main body of all her faith on the profession of christ's divinity ; whom she adores daily and most devoutly ; and this , not with a relative but a terminative divine worship ; nay makes him the alpha and omega , the first beginning and last end of all things . whence follows , that the most loose lati●ndinarian cannot , with any show of sense , clap both these two parties , ours , and theirs , i●to one compound christian church . 't is true , we do both of us acknowledge the word [ christ ; ] but the thing we mean by that word or the sense of it , as it is taken by us both respectively , is as infinitely distant as is the meaning of those words [ god ] and a [ meer man , ] or those of a creatour and a creature ; and certainly , faith , signifying our tene●s , is not a meer sound , but sense . i say not this to widen any breaches , which i have been ever ready and zealous to close and heal ; but to let the anti-trinitarians see how vast a division they have made in the christian church ; or rather , how absolutely they have by schism and heresie cut off themselves from it : and no balm of charity , or surgery of discipline , are able to cure such wide wounds , or re-unite such members to the body , which are not only separated from a vital communication with it , but mortify'd by obstinacy . for the true church of christ acknowledges no other means , nor any other name under heaven , by which she hopes for salvation , but that of iesus christ , god - and-man ; which these men do utterly re●●unce and abominate . . i am not to doubt , but divers of those gentlemen who impugn this article of christian faith ●●ant well ; nothing being more contrary to my genius , than to pass judgment upon men's intentions when i see not their hearts . wherefore , i am to hope , that since they have appeal'd to the way of reason , they will submit the tryal and decision of their cause to the umpire themselves have chosen . which if they please to do , i dare assure my readers it will be impossible the controversie should hover , or be long depending . i have set them a sample what method they may take , if they sincerely and impartially aim at truth . to this end , i lay my principles ; which i will vouch and maintain to be evident , and far from gratuitous suppositions . i state the question ; i clear the words , of which we are to make use , from ambiguity ; and , by this means , i make a clear stage for both parties : let them do the same , and it will be impossible that endless wrangle should defeat the expectation of our readers , or the victory of truth hang long in suspense . . if any blame me for being too exact : first , i am not asham'd to declare , that it was my full intention to bend my utmost endeavours to settle this point so unanswerably , as far as it depends on the way of reason , that the opposition against it may never rise again to pester and divide the church , nor prejudice the eternal salvation of mankind . next , i must own , that it is uneasie to me , when i am to maintain any truth , not to lay my principles first , and take care they be evident : and , unless i do this , i am still dissatisfied with my self ; and afraid lest some plausible fancy should lead me astray from the truth , and make me stumble into some errour . the greatest wits and most learned scholars living are liable to fall , if they want these supports ; which , and only which , can enable our reason to take firm steps , and keep it on it's leggs upright . whence if be a fault , i hope it is a good one : at least , i have been since my riper years , so enur'd to it , that i must confess i cannot help it ; nor would i , if i could . . indeed , were there none that impugn'd reveal'd faith , it would be needless in that case to be at the expence of so much time and pains to defend it . it would argue a quarrelsome and vapouring humour , in any man , to begin a polemical contest when none oppos'd him ; and in a bravado to arm himself cap-a-pee , and bid defiance to all the world when he has never an enemy . in such a happy state of the church , christian faith would descend peaceably and undisturbedly , there being none who oppos'd it ; and all disputes about it would be superseded , or rather prevented . but , when ( as is our unhappy condition ) witty and acute men do exert their utmost efforts , and employ all the skill , art and learning they are masters of , to overthrow the most fundamental articles of christian faith ; and others make use of their errours and objections , to subvert the whole body of reveal'd religion ; and pretend to maintain that the most sacred truths which god himself has told us , are perfect nonsense , lies and contradictions ; 't is a most necessary duty in us to make use of the maxims of right reason to confute their paralogisms , and to apply the most solid and deep principles of true ●…rning , to baffle the attempts of that vain and ●…allow philosophy , which they make us of to ●…ack those divine oracles . none can show ●●●t faith is not contradictory to reason , ( which is ●hat's objected ) but by using those knowledges which show it is conformable to it . and , since faith cannot explicate faith ; it must either be explicated , that is , ( in our case ) defended by the clear principles of reflecting reason , ( or by true philosophy ; ) or it cannot , by the way of reason , be defended at all . . each single word in which faith was deliver'd , must , indeed , have been clearly intelligible to the faithful , and enable them to know what it is they are to believe . but a believer and an explicater are very distinct things . the former has no more to do but to submit to an authority which he either knows or judges will not deceive him ; pretending no skill or knowledge , more than to understand the bare signification of the words in which faith is conceiv'd ; but an explicater is to use all the skill and art he has to show the points of faith agreeable to such other truths as indifferent mankind admits ; at least , such as he can , by dint of reason , force his adversary to grant ; that , so , he may comfort and strengthen faith , and make it more lively and operative in the hearts of the more intelligent believers ; and withall , defend it from being opposite to right reason , against the cavils of unbelievers who impugn it upon that score . but the main advantage which an explicater of faith , who follows the principles of true reason , or true philosophy , will gain by this exact way of discoursing , is this ; that , let him settle his principles first , and show them to be evident ; let him state the question clearly , and explain the meaning of the terms or words , which concern that question , or are made use of in discoursing of it ; and then applying them to the point in hand , show it's consonancy to those principles ; ( all which i shall here endeavour ; ) and , when he has done this , let him peremptorily challenge his adversary to take the same decisive method to prove his negative tenet ; and it will quickly appear , that the maintainer of falshood ( his cause not bearing such a test ) will either decline this only-satisfactory manner of discourse ; in which case , he will , in effect , plainly confess that what he maintains is not true ; or , if he happens to be so adventurous as to attempt it , his principles will easily be seen to be so unlike what they pretended to be , and so unworthy that name , that all men of sense will quickly discern that his cause has only superficial fancy , and not true and solid reason to support it . sect . i. preliminaries fore-lay'd , as principles , to the explication of this mystery . § . . pr●● . i. clearness being the most necessary qualification of all others for an explication , we are first to reflect , that all our clear and distinct knowledges of any thing whatever depend on this principle , that our soul works by abstracted or inadequate conceptions ; which she frames , or ●as , of the whole thing . this is granted , i think , by all men of learning ; and is , in a manner self-evident . for , let us take any whole thing , v. g. an orange ; and we may find that we make many several conceptions of it , viz. that it is round , yellow , heavy , juicy , &c. which tho' they all belong intrinsecally to that one thing , and therefore we mean them all confusedly when we name that thing ; yet , we cannot discourse clearly and distinctly of any one of them , while we conceive them as ioyn'd with great multitudes of others , no , not so much as with one of those others . for , how can we know that object distinctly which is not distinct it self , as being not yet distinguisht . now , 't is only our understanding that distinguishes it into those distinct parts or inadequate conceptions of it . wherefore , we cannot discourse of any thing clearly , or distinctly , until we have first represented it to our minds with such a distinction , by making many distinct , abstracted , or inadequate notions of it . . prel . ii. having found or made those inadequate conceptions , we are next to discourse consequently of each of those considerations of the thing , without mingling them with others . for to what end should we distinguish our notions in order to discourse clearly , if we do not keep them distinct ; but , by confounding them afterwards , distract our thoughts , and draw them ( in despite both of nature and art ) into different considerations at once ; which must needs hinder us from seeing any one of them clearly ? whence all the most exact discoursers do carefully observe and follow this rule . for , the mathematicians treat of bodies as long , ( or of lines ) without considering them , at the same time , as broad ; and of their breadth , without considering them as deep , or according to all the three dimensions ; tho' , in nature , no one of them is found without all the rest : and , in case they did otherwise , their discourses could never proceed endways , nor be clear and evident ; being , indeed , in that case , nothing but a meer ramble from one question to another , while they speak sometimes of one , sometimes of another notion or subject . . prel . iii. therefore , when we affirm and deny , according to different abstract notions , there can be no show of a contradiction . for these abstract notions being different respects , according to which we conceive the thing diversely ; and , the weakest logician , and every man of common sense , being so wise as to know that there cannot possibly be any contradiction unless we affirm and deny , according to the same respect ; ●…hing can be more weak than to pretend , 〈…〉 in such a case , there is the least show of a ●…tradiction . . prel . iv. hence one of those respects or consi●●●ations of the thing may be deny'd of the other ; 〈…〉 which is equivalent , ( all our predications when we speak true , being of the thing ) the thing ●● consider'd according to one of those respects , ●ay be deny'd of it self consider'd according to another respect . v. g. the same man may be both a father and a son ; but that same man as ●● is a father , is not that man as he is a son. otherwise ( the abstractive particle [ as ] cutting ●● that precise respect from all others ) it would ●●llow , that the notions of father and son are the ●ry self-same notion or respect . whence we ●●e oblig'd to affirm , that that man as he is a father , is some way different from himself as he ●●● son , or according to some notion or respect , viz. that of relation : tho' he be still the same according to the notion of ens or thing , that is ▪ the same man. . prel . v. tho' the truth of the propositions , or points of faith are made known to us by supernatural means , or by revelation ; yet , each single word , in which they were deliver'd or preacht at first , must be such as was in use then and there , to signifie our natural notions . this is very evident : because , unless faith had been deliver'd o● preacht to the first faithful in such language a● every one understood , or , as suted with their natural notions , the hearers having as yet no notions but what were natural , could not have understood what had been told them , nor could have known what it was they were to believe . by [ natural notions ] i mean those which we have by direct impressions on the senses ; or by such reflexion as the generality of mankind naturally have . tho' this be true , and faith was thus de●●ver'd at first , yet it does not follow that an explicater may not be allow'd to use some words of art ; since he writes to learned men. . prel . vi. hence , those words being proper to express men's natural notions , which they had from creatures , to signifie which they were agreed on , and us'd by mankind in that place ; it follows , that when we apply them to the divine nature , they must be , in some sort , metaphorical , or transferr'd thence to god. this is equally evident as the former . for , since their sense and meaning which men impos'd on them at first , and , in which they us'd them all along , was some created being or perfection ; 't is manifest , that that was their first or proper signification ; and , consequently , if they apply'd them to god afterwards , ( without which , as was shown we could not speak of god at all , nor know any thing of him ) they must necessarily be transferr'd from creatures to god ; which is to be metaphorical . . prel . vii . yet , when divines apply such words to god , whom they hold to be infinitely perfect ; they cannot be thought to intend to transfer them to him , together with the imperfection found in creatures which is annext to their first signification ; and , consequently , ( intention and meaning being the same sense , ) they cannot mean to apply them otherwise than as devested of their imperfections : so that the meaning or signification of those words , thus apply'd , debars all those imperfections from being any ●art of our notion , when we thus apply them . ●uch are the imperfections of corporeity , and 〈…〉 notions which arise from matter , or belong 〈…〉 it : as also all limitedness ; which , tho' essen●ial to creatures , is repugnant to the divine nature . . prelim. viii . hence all such words , thus understood , notwithstanding their metaphoricalness , are truly said of god. for , since by § . . we do not intend to transfer to god what is imperfect in the notion or meaning of these words , but only what signifies some perfection ; ●nd all perfection must be truly attributed to him who is infinitely perfect ; it follows , that all such words , thus understood , are truely apply'd to the divine nature . thus , when our saviour christ ●● call'd , [ the lamb of god , ] or , [ the lyon of the tribe of iudah , ] we do not take or understand those words under any other notion signify'd by [ lamb ] or [ lion , ] than under those of meekness and fortitude . thus , when metaphysicians apply to god , mercy , justice , power , wisdom , &c. which , as found in our understanding , are distinct formalities , of which one is not the other ; they , being well aware that the divine nature is one most simple formality , which includes and verif●es all those attributes , do therefore strip them of that limitation or imperfection when they apply them to god ; and do not intend to signifie they are thus distinct in god as they are in our understanding ; but they only mean that such effects do proceed from god as do proceed from a just , mer●iful , powerful or wise man ; which is most cer●ainly true. which rule , and reason , obtains in all other metaphorical expressions , or in all our words whatever , us'd by us when we speak of god. . prel . ix . for the same reason all words which , amongst us , conno●ate motion , as all active verbs and verbals do , must be understood of the action formally as terminated , or of the terminus of an action , and must be explicated and understood to mean [ is . ] for , since god is a pure actuality of being , and his essence is self-existence ; nothing can be more opposite to his very essence , than is the notion of motion , which essentially imports both potentiality and change ; as consequently ; does our natural notion of action that goes along with it . wherefore , all notions that import that a thing is in fieri , must be remov'd from god as far as is possible , and only those notions that signifie it is in facto esse , can with any sense , be apply'd to that sovereign being . now , this abstraction from motion can mean nothing but [ being , ] one way or other , or it cannot be transferr'd to god , ( by prelim. vii . ) wherefore , when we say the son proceeds from the father , it can only in rigour mean [ est a patre . ] the properest meaning of which word , is , that god is in his divine knowledge as his own object . and for the same reason , all verbs signifying the time past or future are to be remov'd from god , and only those which signifie the present time can be apply'd to him : for , since whatever is in divinis , or is intrinsecal to god , is eternally such ; we shall put past and future , which are differences of time , in eternity . but , above all , those words that import or hi●t efficiency are the most unfit to be transferr'd to god ; for , since efficiency is impossible to be conceiv'd without an effect , it puts something in god which is effected or caus'd ; nor can such a word 〈…〉 notion be depur'd from it's most gross imperfection as other notions may . nor will that weak distinction of formal and virtual efficiency in di●inis serve the turn ; for this is the same as to say god is virtually imperfect , or , that some notion we have of god , and is verify'd by him , is virtually an effect ; that is , virtually not self existent ; and , consequently , virtually not god , but a creature . indeed , our homely language ; and low notions , do oblige us to use such words as , amongst us , do signifie action ; but they are all to be understood , cum grano salis , as is here declar'd . nor ought it to be objected , that these active words cannot signifie a terminus put , or that the thing is done ●●stantaneously , which some may think is against the notion of action ; for creation is granted to be an action , yet it is never , for so much as for one instant , in fieri , or a doing , being in one instant in fecto esse , or done . . prel . x. for which reason , that we may avoid all hint of agency , which ( since whatever acts , must act or do something , which is it's effect ) does necessarily induce efficiency ; a word or notion directly opposite to whatever is in god who is self existent ; we shall , in our explication , make use of the inexistency of the divine nature known , in it's self as a knower of it , after the manner of a form , as it were ; which is both peculiar to a spiritual nature , and has nothing in it of that gross imperfection , to which our natural notion of action is liable , which , amongst us is always accompanied with motion : whereas , the other implies no imperfection at all either in the knower or the thing known . for even amongst us , the object , ( v. g. an animal ) loses nothing , nor is less perfect , for being known by us ; but is in it's self , the same unchang'd being it was . or rather , intelligibility being one of the properties of ens , by being naturally known or understood , it becomes by this means ( in some sense ) actual ; whereas , before it was only intelligible , that is , potential in that respect . nor are we the worse by knowing it , or having the object thus in our knowing power , but evidently better , in regard all actual knowledge is our natural perfection . add , that this way of inexisting does not necessarily induce any passiveness in the subject in which the object thus inexists . for angels and souls separate have ( as has been demonstrated ) all created being in them intellectually ; and yet are not , in reality , passive by receiving them , having no passive principle , or matter , in them . thus the essences of all creatures did inexist in the divine understanding from eternity : yet none will say , this infers any passiveness in god. indeed while our soul is in this state , she , as being the form of the body , is thence in some sort passive , because the suppositum , the man , is such ; but when she is a pure spirit , her knowledges are not then beat into her ( as it were ) by so many dints of the object , but are in her purely by the formal inexistence of all created truths in one another . by which is s●en , that , for the object known to be thus in the knower after the manner of a form , argues no imperfection in either of them ; and therefore is with good reason transferrible to god. perhaps some may think , that the subject is , in this case , a kind of matter in respect of the form ; and that this argues imperfection . but they err in the whole business ; a ●orm that aduenes to a material subject , and intrinsecally determines it , as modes or accidents do , does indeed induce imperfection , for it smells rank of materiality or corporeity ; but it is quite otherwise here . for modes or accidents have no being but by means of their subject , whereas the things which are known by us , have their own proper existence out of our soul , notwithstanding the intellectual manner of being they have in it . their essences , and that which is in them , are ●ngrafted on her nobler stock of being , not as an intrinsecal part of its peculiar nature ; to which they owe their being , but as another thing , or as distinct from it ; so that both the peculiar essences of the one and the other , are the same essentially and intrinsecally ; tho' the being of the soul is enlarged and perfected by having another being tackt to it , as an extrinsecal form , or by her being or becoming another ; in which ( as aristotle , and evident reflexion , tells us ) all knowledge consists . there is a conceit current amongst many philosophers , that every spiritual operation is an action ; and hence they may mean to transfer such a spiritual action to god ; but they are in a great errour . indeed , our formal iudging and discoursing may be call'd actions , because they are found in our soul while in the body ; and have succession in them , being accompanied by the motion of the phantasms , without which the soul in this state cannot operate ; but pure acts , have no such leasurely progress of their thoughts ; nor do they compound or divide their notions as we do here , but all their knowledge is by simple intuition , which has nothing of succession or motion in it ; and therefore , this sort of spiritual operation only , is that which can be apply'd to god ; the other , which is part after part , being in some respect quantitative or corporeal , that i● , most imperfect . now , if we take away the state of motion , there is no notion left us but that of being . whence all knowledge that is purely-spiritual must be explicated by being , or the inexistence of the object in the knower , as a kind of form which makes the knower be that thing which is known , ( in case the knower be a created being , ) because 't is the form , which , according to our natural notions , constitutes a thing in being such or such . whence such an operation sutes not with our natural notion of action , which does necessarily ( at least ) connotate motion ; but is better exprest by a neuter-active verb , such as are stupeo , ardeo , and such like ; which signifie , that the affection of amazement or burning is in me as a kind of accidental form ; for 't is in this manner the words , [ i know ] signifie that the object is in my knowledge ; and therefore , such a kind of inexistence of the object in the knower , may without scruple be transferr'd to god ; for 't is our greatest spiritual perfection , and indeed the very notion of knowing ; so that whoever denies this to be in the divine nature , must at the same time deny him to be knowing . for these reasons , i do judge , that in explicating this mystery , we ought to decline the using any notions that imply or cannotate agency and action , and to make use of those which have ●●e conception of a form , which constitutes the to be such or such . a farther reason may be , because essence , self-existence , subsistence , personality , which we must necessarily attribute to god , ( and , indeed , all abstract words whatever ) have that manner of signification . . prel . xi . because , in discoursing of this mystery we shall only make use of such notions as belong to the common heads of substance and relation , ( or rather , speaking of it as in god , of relatum esse ) 't is our duty to set these two kinds of notions in as clear a light as we can . to begin then with substance . a natural thing or ens , call'd also an individuum , or substantia prima , ( only which do exist in nature , and , consequently , from which only we have all our natural notions ) does give us these distinct or abstracted conceptions of it . to take them in order , and consider , in the first place , what 's most potential and imperfect in a thing ; we can conceive , that ( it being mutable ) there can another natural thing be made of it ; and therefore , that it has in it somewhat by which it has a power to become another thing ; which power we call matter : for we call that matter , of which any thing is made . now , this meer power to be a thing , cannot be held , by virtue of that sole notion , to be a thing ; since nothing is that which it is only a power to be ; and if it be not , as thus conceiv'd , a thing , it cannot be conceiv'd to have any accident , mode , or ( which is the same ) determination of thing in it , which are subsequent to the notion of thing , for all these are apt to determine the thing , which is against the notion of a meer power , which is utterly indeterminate : hence is seen clearly why aristotle gave this exact description of this matter , or power to be , [ viz. that which is , nec quid , nec quantum , nec qu●le , neque aliquid aliud eorum quibus ens determinatur . ] proceeding still forwards ; we may conceive this individual thing , according to that in it , which so determines this power call'd matter , as to individuate it ; or so distinguish it as to make it this , and no other : which we have shown in our metaphysicks is perform'd by such a complexion of accidents as is found no where but in it ; which therefore is it's substantial or essential form ; whence it becomes properly , or in the first sense of that word a thing , or as logicians call it , an individuum . and , because nothing in common can exist , but only what 's thus ultimately determin'd , it is justly conceiv'd to be capable of existing , or possible to be , which is to be an ens , or to have in it the nature or notion of what we call by that word . the next consideration that occurs to us in the order of our natural notions is the act of that power , viz. [ existence , or actual being ; ] whence we denominate it existent ; of which state , ( as it were ) of ens we can only say this , ( for to define existence is impossible ) that 't is then put extra causas , meaning by those words [ causa naturales . ] for , while the operation of these causes was yet determining , or , ( as we may say ) molding or shaping the matter ; so long the ens or individuum was potential , in fieri , or within the power of those causes ; but when they had once brought that determination to perfection by distinguishing it from all others , or making it this , and had by that means fitted it for existence ; they having now done their best , had no more to do ; but the first being puts the last hand to ●…ir imperfect workmanship , and gives it to 〈…〉 or be actually ; whence it is now said to be ●…ra causas naturales , and only under god's ●●wer ; who as the first ens , and a pure actua●…y of being , gives and conserves to all his creatures their existence , or makes them be actually . but still , the bare notion of [ existent , ] does not express or signifie that that thing does exist [ alone , ] or without the assistance of another . for the quantitative parts in an element , the natural parts in a mixt , the metaphysical parts , ( or , as we call them , secundae substantiae , ) in an individual brute or man , lastly , the modes or accidents do all of them , some way or other , exist ; for who can say that the whole exists , and yet the parts of which that whole consists , do not at ●●● exist ? 't is most evident then , that we do still want another notion , and another word to conceive and express a farther perfection in the line of substance , than meer existence affords us , viz. the notion of existing [ alone , ] which none of the other , tho' some way existent , had ; for parts cannot exist , but in the whole , nor accidents but in the substance . now this more-perfect notion , which is yet wanting to couceive it existing alone , we call subsistence ; with which formality when the thing is once endow'd , it is justly conceiv'd to have all the perfection in the line of being , which our natural notions can attribure to it . and hence it is truly conceiv'd to have a power to make others , ( whether parts or modes ) to exist ; which otherwise , or without dependence on this subsister , or reference to it , ( that is meerly by virtue of their own notion , ) could not be conceiv'd to be at all . now the thing as it is subsistent , is that which learned men agree to c●●● a suppositum ; and which , if it be an intellige●● being , our common language , in correspondency to our natural notion , calls a person ▪ that the natural notion of subsistent and person ▪ are distinct from ▪ that of [ existent , ] is evident from the vulgar and unanimous use of those words . for , let an honest country-fellow be ask'd how many things , or how many persons , are in such à room ; he will not reckon parts or the model ; but the whole things , and the intelligent animals , ( which only do properly exist of themselves , or alone , that is , which subsist . ) and yet they will , if put to it , acknowledge that both those parts and those modes do some way exist ; wherefore , 't is evident , that he meant to reckon only those which subsist , or exist alone , and not what he thought did exist by means of another . so that 't is plain , he has naturally in his mind the distinction of existent and subsistent ; tho' , if you ask him to give an account of this distinction between them , he will be at a plunge ; as he would be also , were he put to give an account of the distinction of moist , dry , hard , &c. for reflexion on his natural notions , or distinguishing them formally , is not his talent : and yet he knows after his rude manner , what he means by those words , and that there is a distinction between those qualities . of what exceeding use this distinguishing our notions exactly is in philosophy , both to discourse clearly , and to bring the mystical and less-intelligible language of the schools to a literal and natural sense , is left to the judgment and reflexion of learned men : what use we shall make of it in this present appendix will be ●… hereafter . in the mean time , applying this ●…scourse to prelim. ii , iii , and iv. it is hence ●…ident , that if the notion of subsistent be diffe●●nt from the notions or respects of ens , essence , ●●d existence ; there can be no show of contra●●ction that the same thing is one according to 〈…〉 nature , or it's existence , and yet be not-on● , ●●t three , according to the notion or respect of ●…sistence or personality ; because the respect is d●●…erse ; as also why the second person may ●e united or one in respect of the personality , and ●●t not-one , but two , according the respect of ●●'s nature or essence . . prelim. xii . as for our natural notion of [ relation , ] it adds no new perfection to the thing ●elated , and what 's in it ; but 't is the very thing it self in our understanding ; as it gives our ●ind the reason or ground of relating it , or re●●●●ing it to another . for example : the relation of likeness between two things that are white , is nothing but those very things as they have whiteness in them ; which our mind com●aring according to that precise respect , and con●●dering one ▪ of them in order to the other , apprehends there is such a relation between them ; ●●d , accordingly , denominates them alike . thus the relation of equality between two things , each ●● which is a yard long , is nothing but the things which have that quantity in them , common to ●oth ; which our referring power , comparing one of them to the other , gains thence a relative notion of equality between them , and denominates them equal . thus the relation of identity in nature between two men , is nothing but those very natures , compar'd as aforesaid ; whence we truly conceive there is a relation of identity between them . which will better appear by this , that if we ask what is the formal reason why one of those things are said to be alike , equal , or the same with the other ; the proper and natural answer would be , because they are both of them white , a yard long , or a man ; which shows , that the [ ratio , ] as the schools call it , or essence of relation is intrinsecal to the thing it self , and , in reality , it. . prel . xiii . hence , tho' the act of our understanding is necessary to the referring those correlates actually ; yet the formal notion [ or ratio ] of those relations themselves is entirely taken from what 's in those subjects that are related ; nor does that act of ours enter into the relation it self , or bear any part in it . this is very evident ; because 't is not the act of the understanding , comparing those things , which is denominated alike , equal , or the same ; but the things themselves which are compar'd , or are the objects of that act. whence the act it self is no part of the relation , but is extrinsecal to the precise notion of it . as farther appears hence , that relation is one of those notions which are call'd accidental modes or accidents , whose whole being ( such as it is ) is to affect the substance in their several ways , and denominate them such as they do formally make them : since then relation does not affect or denominate the act of the understanding , but the things which that act compares ; and , as has been often demonstrated , the accidents or modes are really the same with the thing which they modifie ; it follows , that relation is the thing it self in our minds ▪ conceiv'd consider'd , as bearing in it a respectiveness , or ●ther as referrible to another . to penetrate this bet●… , we will put a kind of parrallel in the predica●…nt of quality . a pint is the same quantity whereever it is : yet put the same pint of water 〈…〉 a round glass it will be round ; in a square ●lass , and it will be of a square figure . yet , both these figures are identify'd with the same quantity , and the same substance of the water , whose modes they are ; and 't is only the containers and their difference , which gives them this different denomination . so whiteness in those subjects , which are white , is apprehended and denominated by an absolute name , and they are both call'd white ; but put two such subjects with whiteness in them , in our mind , which is a comparing kind of container , or a comparing power , and they come thence to be apprehended by a relative notion , and denominated by a relative word [ alike . ] so that the things themselves do give themselves this relative notion and denomination of being alike ; taking them as in such a container as our mind is , which is apt to consider them in order to one another , or refer them actually . these things consider'd , no man of reason can imagine , that , tho' we use the common word [ relation , ] because it passes amongst learned men , ( as we do other abstract words ) therefore it means something hovering in the air ( as it were ) without a subject , like a kind of idea platonica ; or that it can be any thing but the very thing it self which is related . and hence it is that that most solid and acute distinguisher of our natural notions , aristotle , rather chuses to make use of the concretes ; and , as he call'd the foregoing predicaments , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so he names relation , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , the thing● related , or as having in them the ground of verifying a respect to another ; as i have noted in my fifth preliminary to solid philosophy asserted . . prel . xiv . 't is impossible to conceive a real relation , without a correlate answering to it , in case it be grounded on action and passion , or on the unity of the form ; nor to conceive such correlates , without conceiving some kind of particularity or difference between them . there needs no more to evince this , but only to reflect on the word [ ad , ] which gives us the notion of relation ; and , withall , imports a rapport or respect to that , which ( as is evident by it's contraposition ) is , in some sense or other , distinct from it , or another . . prelim. xv. the essence of god not only being self-existence , but whatever is an intrinsecal attribute of him being eternally such ; it follows , that the word [ is ] not only gives us the true sense of what 's predicated of god , ( as is shown , prelim. ix . ) but it must also signifie , [ is eternally ; ] there being no temporary or accidental predications of any thing that is in the deity . wherefore , we must in the truest sense , mean in all such speeches , that god eternally ( that is , from all eternity , and to all eternity ) is knowing and loving , himself ; is generating his son ; is generated ; is proceeding from father and son , &c. so that the word [ is ] signifies here the most absolute necessity of his being eternally so as those predicates import ; and not contingently only , as the same word [ is ] does often signifie when we predicate or speak of creatures . which 〈…〉 at first amuse the fancy , but ( as i hope ) af●●●wards upon due reflexion , it will rectifie the ●…dgment of some anti-trinitarians ; who weak●… apprehending there can be no pre-existence but 〈…〉 of time , imagine we put some instant when 〈…〉 son did not exist ; and that , after he had got existence , the father ceas'd afterwards to communicate it to him any longer , but left him to stand done , as sons do here when their fathers die , o● disregard them ; and many other such fool●●ies , with which they delude the ignorant : which ( as will be shown ) are abhorr'd by us , and most absurd in a discourse concerning the deity , and therefore most ridiculously objected by them . sect . ii. the state of the question . the divine nature , which is the subject of our present discourse , may be consider'd two manner of ways . one is , as to what god is in himself , as the mysticks treat of him ; in which sense he abstracts from all our natural notions , because he transcends them ; and therefore he is altogether unconceiveable and unnameable by us in this state ; and only intelligible by the angels and saints in heaven ; to whose intellectual eye , purify'd from all sinful affections , and dispos'd by perfect charity , he reveals his blissful and glorious face , to be seen by a clear and simple intuition . the other way is to consider him as he is the object of our natural notions ; which , having first ( as is said above ) refin'd them from their imperfection , we transfer to him ; and , thence , become enabled in some sort to speak and discourse of him , truly , ( tho' with some impropriety , ) in our low and homely language . . since then 't is manifest that we cannot speak or discourse of , much less explicate , what we cannot conceive , or of which we cannot have any notion ; 't is evident , that the divinity being the subject of our intended discourse , is to be consider'd and taken according to the later manner , and not according to the former , in our discourses concerning it . this premis'd , since faith ( by prelim. v. ) is deliver'd to us in words expressing our natural notions , the true state of the question is this ; whether the divine nature , conceiv'd by us according to such notions as we had from creatures , which being depur'd first from their imperfections , we apply to god ; does not oblige us , as we affirm of him that he is just , merciful , wise , &c. so , with equal reason and truth , to affirm that he is one according to his nature and essence ; and withal , three according to another notion or respect , which we fitly call [ person ? ] to set this question , and our ensuing explication in a clearer light , we will divide this entire question into five distinct or particular ones , viz. first , whether it be not agreeable to rational principles taken from our natural notions , to affirm that the divine nature does verify some one notion that is common ; and some others that are distinct or particulars , to which that common notion is apply'd ? secondly , whether these particulars are not three , and no more ? thirdly , whether those three particulars are not most fitly call'd [ persons ? ] fourthly , whether those three persons , be not most fitly to be call'd , father , son , and h. spirit . fifthly , and lastly , whether the divine nature , notwithstanding this plurality of persons , is not still perfectly and equally one in nature ; or , rather more , ( that is , under more respects , ) one in it's self , than it would have been in case this plurality of persons had been secluded . now , if it shall appear by our explication , that the affirmative of all these is consonant to reason working upon our natural notions stript of their imperfections , and , as such , transferr'd to god ; i hope it will satisfie dissenters , comfort the faith of those who believe already , and convince every intelligent reader , that nothing can with true reason be objected against this divine mystery . sect . iii. the terms or words , of which we make use in this explication , clear'd from ambiguity . . by the word [ god ] is meant a most actual and self-subsistent being ; infinite in his nature and all it's attributes . . by the words [ divine nature ] we understand the same infinitely perfect being . but we are to mind the reader once more of that which cannot be too often inculcated , viz. that in all creatures ( for example in man ) there is found what answers to diverse notions in the line of substance ; of which one is more perfect ( or imperfect ) than another . for , an individual man , conceiv'd precisely under the superiour notions of ens , corpus , mixtum , vivens , animal and homo , signifies only some common and inadequate notion of him ; whence nothing in common being able to exist ; but only singulars , as peter , paul , &c. hence all those former are imperfect in the line of ens , which signifies capable of existing : yet , even these singular or individual entities , tho' we should allow them in some sort to exist , have not thence all the completion or perfection imaginable in that line ; for a thing may be capable to exist , and yet not capable to exist alone , or without the support of another , which we call subsisting . to be subsistent then , ( which in intelligent things we call to be a person , ) being the most perfect notion of ens , must be attributed to the divine essence or nature ; ( tho' the word [ essence ] does not express it , but rather signifies a●ter the manner of a kind of meer form : ) otherwise the divine nature would be conceiv'd to want something , which according to our natural notions is the utmost perfection in the line of being ; which is impossible to be thought or said of god. who is infinitely perfect in being . . by the word [ father , ] i mean one particular , who communicates the nature of which himself is , to another particular : and by [ son , ] him to whom that nature is thus communicated ; but that he does or does not communicate the same individual nature , or that he is before his son in time , and other considerations arising from matter , spring from the imperfection and limitedness of creatures , and therefore they are not to be transferr'd to god : nor are they essential to the notions of father and son ; as will be plain to any man , who reflects , that if ( per impossible ) a man did communicate his individual nature to another , and that other had it thus communicated from him , and this instantaneously ; he would not , in that supposition , be therefore less a father , but more perfectly such , because the nature communicated is more perfectly the same . nor do [ sooner ] or [ later ] [ instantaneous ] or [ not-instantaneous ] , enter into the precise notion of father , and son ; as appears from the definition of generation ; which abstracts from all those considerations . moreover , 't is most evident , that in such a case , the person who communicates his individual nature , and he to whom 't is communicated , would have , hence , some very neer relation to one another ; and what imaginable relation could it be but that of father and son ? . i take the word [ generation ] in the sense of that exact and received definition , viz. [ processio viventis a vivente , tanquam a principio conjuncto , in similitudinem naturae , ] which i shall show is perfectly verify'd in the procession of the eternal word . all other considerations are extrinsecal and forrein to the notion of generation , as may be gather'd from § . . and , therefore do not belong to it's precise notion , but spring from the imperfection of creatures ; nor , consequently , as such , ought they be transferr'd to god. . the word [ person ] signifies perseity , ( as some schoolmen explicate it ; ) or what 's so subsistent of it self , or by the merits of it's own notion or expression , that it needs no other formal notion to compleat it , nor word to express it better . the etymology of that word ( if such a consideration , and not rather the common use of it only , be much to be regarded ) seems to be this ; that as we say a speech is dissona , when it varies from another in sense , and consona when it agrees to it : so a thing is call'd persona , when it thorowly or perfectly sounds or speaks the notion of ens ; or expresses the utmost completion of a thing under the notion of an intelligent being . see § . . . [ subsistent ] and [ suppositum ] signifie the same , and are appliable to all beings whatever , whether they be intelligent ( that is persons ) or no ; and express their last completion in the line of ens in their several kinds . the notion of the former seems more to respect it's self , or it 's own absoluteness in the line of being . the notion of the later regards the nature , or the accidents , ●hich it sustains in our mind , or as conceiv'd by ●… . the literal meaning of which kind of say●ng , is , that , we making diverse conceptions of ●he same thing , the formal conception of the ●●ture , or of it's modes , is not that formal conception of a thing existing [ alone , ] without needing any other farther notion in our mind , or any other word , to mean or signifie it's standing thus alone or without dependency on any other created noti●● to compleat or make out that full sense . notwithstanding that the notions of [ subsistent ] ●nd [ suppositum ] do bear such a nice distinction ; ●●● , in regard that which sustains another , must 〈…〉 supposed able to subsist of it self ; hence they ●… , not without reason , promiscuously used . the explication of the rest of those words of which we shall have occasion to make use , will , i conceive , come in more seasonably in their ●roper places . sect . iv. that the divine nature does verifie some one notion that is ( some way ) . common ; and some others that are particulars . . since all explications ( as well as arguments ) are to be taken from the nature of the thing , 〈…〉 from the subject to be explicated ; as being , in ●●ality , nothing else but the unfolding that nature , and the laying open what , with a deep inspection , we discover to be included in it , or to belong to it intrinsecally ; and , since the nature of god , is , at present , the subject of our discourse ; or that which we are to explicate ; our question being , whether god is not truly one in nature or essence , and three according to the notion of person ? hence , 't is most fittirg we should take our rise , and ground our discourse , from the divine nature it self , consider'd as it is conceiv'd by us according to our natural notions , as is declar'd above . . and , because many attributes are held to belong to the divine nature ; therefore to make our explication more facil and succinct , we will pitch upon one or two attributes , or predicates , which are granted by all to belong to god's nature ; viz. that it is spiritual , or that god is an infinitely perfect spirit . . moreover , seeing all we know of spiritual natures , or the first and most obvious , and , withall , the most true conception we have of them ▪ is , that they are such beings as have understanding and will ; and therefore , that they do know and love such objects as are proportion'd to their pitch , or agreeable to their natures ; we are thereupon to build our explication on these two operations proper to our soul , and to other created spiritual natures ; and thence transfer ●hem to god ; which we may safely do without danger of putting any imperfection in god , in regard those attributes are the greatest perfection of spiritual natures , and even essential to them ; so that we need no more but only abstract from them the limitedness or finiteness necessarily annex● to all creatures , and conceive god to be infinite under these considerations , as is declar'd prel . vii . . farther , because that knowledge and love are imperfect which are exercis'd about unworthy objects ; and those are most perfect , which are employ'd about the best and noblest objects that can be imagin'd ; and only the divine nature is the most excellent object : it follows , that , since no notion that is imperfect is to be attributed to god ; therefore the knowledge and love which we attribute to him must be the knowledge and love of the best of all objects , himself ; and thence we must affirm , without the least fear of injuring the divine nature , that [ god knows and loves himself , ] because to deny him this , would make the divine nature most highly imperfect ; nay more imperfect than created spiritual natures are ; especially if they are pure acts. . moreover , this knowledge and love of himself , is ( as it were ) the primary operation of the deity , as it is a spirit : wherefore , since the primary operation of all creatures we converse with has been prov'd to be that which constitutes their essences ; we cannot but judge , that , considering god according to our natural notions , this knowledge and love of himself , is , in that regard , most essential to god as he is a spirit . . this fundamental principle then being laid as the groundwork of all our ensuing explication ; since ( by prelim. ii. ) and as plain reason tells us , we are to discourse consequently of those true notions we have of god , so they imply no imperfection ; we are to consider next what genuine consequences do follow from this position . . it follows , then , hence immediately , that the divine nature does verifie the notions of knower and thing known , lover and thing loved ; and that there is in the divine nature that which answers to those distinct notions ; nay , which obliges us to say they are distinct. for , . 't is impossible to conceive , that the notions of knower and thing known , ( and the same is to said of lover and thing loved ) should be the same notion ; and not contradistinct , and ( some way ) opposite to one another . first , because plain sense manifests they are counterpos'd . next , the art of logick , which is entirely grounded on our natural notions , and perfectly distinguishes them , informs us certainly that there is a relative opposition , and , consequently , an unavoidable distinction between them . thirdly , the thing known and lov'd do evidently import the object of knowledge and love ; and , what 's objected cannot but be distinct , or ( some way ) other from that to which 't is objected . fourthly , they being clearly relatives , the very meaning of the word [ ad , ] which formally expresses all relation , must forcibly signifie there is some sort of distinction between them . lastly , they are correlatives ; which can have no sense but this , that they mutually respect one another . now that knower and thing known should mutually respect one another , and yet there should not be ( in some sense ) one and another , is perfect nonsense and meer contradiction . . hence follows , that there must be some kind of distinction in the divine nature it self ; since predicates that do necessarily bear distinction in their very notion are truly verify'd of it : nor can distinction be in any thing , but it must make it , some way or other , distinct. . nor can this distinction proceed from the imperfection of our understanding , as it does when we distinguish other divine attributes ; but it proceeds from the soveraign perfection of the divine nature it self , which is to know and love himself : nor does our understanding in conceiving this , deform our true conception of the deity but the true conception of the deity it self does thus inform our understanding , and obliges us to affirm thus of it . . hence this distinction , which those words , [ god knows and loves himself , ] do put in the divine nature , is real : not only because the divine self-knowledge does verifie it ; but also , because it is not grounded on our weak manner of conceiving it , but , as was shown , §§ . . . on the perfection of god's essence . . hence , as we transfer to god the notions of justice , mercy , power , wisdom , &c. which we find in creatures , by observing such effects proceeding from him as use to proceed from such like perfections in us , or among us ; so with the same , and far better reason we may transfer to him the notions of knowing and loving himself ; and , consequently , of distinction between those relative notions of knower and known which are in him , and objectively him , by priel . . . . to understand this more clearly , we may reflect that the names of those virtues which we transfer to god do not in their notion import that one of them is not another ; nor hinder but they may all be compriz'd in one eminently perfect attribute . i believe , that i have shown , ( solid philosophy asserted , reflection xv. ) that all virtues , even amongst us , are comprehended in that one notion , [ right reason ] working on such or such objects , in such and such occasions . much more easily may they all be center'd in that one most perfect formality of god's essence : whence all the distinction of those attributes as they are in god , must necessarily be refunded into our manner of conceiving them by diverse acts , or abstracted conceptions . but now , when we conceive that god knows himself , ( and the same may be said of his loving himself ) the business is quite otherwise . for the very notion of [ self-knowledge ] does essentially import distinction of knower and known . even knowledge , amongst ▪ us , does essentially signifie , that the thing known is in our knowledge as another , or as distinct from the soul as knowing it ; as is shown in the book now cited , prelim. ii. §§ . . . and particularly , § . . and reason gives it must be so ; since when i know a tree , the nature of a tree which is in my mind intellectually , is not there as either my essence , nor as any intrinsecal mode of me , as is manifest ; it must therefore necessarily be there as distinct from me , or as another . nay , when our soul knows her self , she must , some way or other , be distinct from her self by that knowledge ; for it cannot with any sense be deny'd , but that she is in that case , her own object ; and that , therefore , for that very regard , she must be distinguisht , some way , from her self as knowing that object , as is shown , prelim. iv. nor is this any imperfection in a created spirit , to have her objects in her when she knows them , as other , or as distinct from her : for 't is the very notion or nature of knowledge , which if we take away from her , we must at the same time take away her knowing power , and her spirituality , and put her to be made of matter ; it being the property of matter and of material things to have nothing in them but such modes which are intrinsecal to their subject , and determine it's potentiality . nay more , 't is the highest perfection of a spiritual nature to have things in it , which are different from it ; as is demonstrated in my metaphysicks , book ii. ch. . §§ . , , , . whence , there being no imperfection in this notion , but rather it being the best perfection of a spiritual nature , we ought with far better reason than any other , transfer it to god ; and to say , that god , by knowing himself , is ( in some sense or other ) in himself as another , or that he is distinct from himself , as he is a knower , as is seen prel . iv. . to finish this point , we may reflect , that we may more easily be mis-led by fancying those other attributes to be distinct in god ; because , according to our manner of conceiving they are diverse from one another , and very many of them ; but in our case there are but two single attributes , viz. self-knowing and self-loving , and yet each of those single attributes imports distinction and aliety , ( if i may use that word ) in it 's own particular notion . which shows plainly , that the distinction here spoken of , does not arise out of the number of those diverse attributes , or from our distinct acts of conceiving them abstractedly ; but from each of those single and intrinsecal natures or notions of self-knowing and of self-loving ; which , unless we should impiously degrade the divine nature from being spiritual , we must be forced to attribute to him ; and consequently , some distinction , as these words do most evidently import . . hence is farther manifested , that since god knows and loves himself , there is in the divine nature some one notion that is common , and some others that are particulars . for it is evident , that knower , and known , lover , and loved , are all distinct notions from one another , and therefore particulars ; as also that the word [ god ] is predicated , and verify'd of each of them . for , since all true predication or verification is made by the identifying particle [ est , ] 't is consequent , that the divine nature is in them all , and really them : and therefore , since the single word [ god ] is but one notion , and truly said of them all , it must be granted to be common to them all . . and because this common notion [ god ] cannot but most properly signifie the divine being , which is infinite in perfection ; and to be a suppositum , ( by sect. . § . . ) is to be compleat or perfect in the notion of ens : therefore , the notion of a suppositum cannot but be attributed to that common notion [ god. ] wherefore that notion is not only common , but also a suppositum ; there is then a common suppositum in god , which is predicated of the particulars truly attributed to him ; and , as has been prov'd , identify'd with him. . in this notion of the common suppositum , the generality of the jews , the wiser heathens , and all those who deny a trinity , understood the word [ god ; ] and perhaps our selves too , when there is not in our prayers or discourse any particular reference to any of the persons . . wherefore this common suppositum may not unfitly be call'd the absolute notion of god , and those particulars the relative notions of the same divine essence ; because they meerly spring from those relations . . whence , because the common suppositum , exprest by the word [ god , ] is held , by all who use that word to be infinite in all those attributes , which we have demonstrated in the third book of our metaphysicks , to belong to the first being , viz. infinitely wise , just , good , powerful , &c. as also eternal , and self-existent ; it follows , that all or each of those particulars , which are predicated of the word [ god , ] and therefore are identify'd with him , must also be granted to have all those infinite perfections in them , which are attributed to him ; since [ god , ] who includes all those attributes is predicated ( or identify'd ) with them all ; as is deliver'd accordingly in the creed of st. athanasius . . the difficulty is , how we can with truth , and our due regard to god , who is essentially a most pure actuality of being , make him a genus or a species , common to more which have the notion of inferiours in respect of him. for true metaphysicks admits no composition in god of genus and difference , as is seen , book iii. § . . to clear this , we are to consider all those several manners of predicating , given us by porphyrius , and allow'd by all the learned world , call'd the five predicables . now the notions of genus and species , which are made by logical abstraction , are indeterminate and potential in respect of the inferiour notions ; and the things , ( that is , they , as thus consider'd ) are substantiae secundae , which reach not to the notion of individuum , or substantia prima , only which are properly entia or capable of existing ; much less do they reach to the notion of existence , or actual being . this being so , it would be most absurd to transfer such notions to god who is pure existence . nor can we predicate any thing of him as a difference , which determines the foresaid potentiality of the others ; for in that which is essentially pure actual being , there can be no farther determination made ; since this is done by the act , and nothing can be more actual than pure actuality of being it self . . wherefore , setting these three predicables aside , there remain those manners of predicating call'd proprium and accidens . now , i conceive , that it argues no imperfection for the common suppositum to be predicated of those particulars , according to this last manner . for first , this is not abstracted from inferiours , or common to them as a potential notion determin'd by differences : again , to be thus predicated it is not requir'd that the predicate be an accident it self , or found in any of the heads of those modes , which are contr●●istinguisht from substance ; but the predicate here may it self be a substante , provided it does not per se , or essentially and formally belong to the subject . v. g. when we say , [ a cup is golden , or ( which is the same ) gold ; a spoon is gold ; a ring is gold ▪ ] the predicate [ gold ] apply'd to the cup , spoon , and ring , is a substance ; and , in some sense common to them all ; not as a potential notion , determin'd by differences , is common to it's inferiours , and essential to them ; but , because it does not essentially belong to gold to be apply'd to such a figure , therefore it is accidental or not - essential to it ; and hence it is said to be predicated of them accidentally . now in this manner the common suppositum [ god ] is predicated of knowing , known , and the other particulars without any show of imperfection . i do not say , that knowing , &c. are accidental to god , as it is to things of the said figures to be gold. i abstract from the matter , and take only the bare manner of predicating ; which is , not to be said or predicated as a superiour of inferiours , to which it's potentiality is determin'd by differences , but as one substantial notion , determin'd already as to it 's own nature , is predicated of another , which is either ( according to it's notion ) substantial ; or formally belonging to another head ; as those figures are in respect of gold , and the absolute notion of the divine essence , according to the distinction of our natural notions , is to that of relation in common . . or , if we invert the order of those propositions , and say , [ god is known , knowing , &c. ] and so make the notion of god the common subject in those speeches in which the relative ones are predicated ; then they may be truly said to be predicated of him according to the predicable of proprium . which soever of those ways we take , no imperfection will be refunded upon god , nor any potentiality transfer'd to his most pure actuality ; which is the chief danger to be avoided in our predications concerning the divine nature . sect . v. that these particulars , are three , and no more . . since then this common or absolute suppositum , call'd god , is justly held to be infinite in being ; it follows , that he has all the positive perfections in the line of ens or substance that can be imagin'd , and possesses them all indivisibly in one most actual formality of being ; whence 't is impossible to apprehend there should be any distinction or plurality at all in god , as he is thus conceiv'd , or under that precise notion of meerly being ; since under that notion he is indivisibly one ; which farther appears hence , that even our ordinary notion of [ existence ] is indivisible ; much more must it be such when it is infinite . wherefore , it being no less evidently shown , sect. . that there are some particular notions , or some sort of plurality , truly and rightly transferr'd to god , and verify'd of him : this must necessarily spring from our conceiving god under some other notion ( or some notion that belongs to another head or predicament ) than that of substance or meer being ; and , withall , from such a one as does not carry , along with it , when 't is transferr'd to him , any imperfection to the divine nature . . nor need we look far to find what kind of notion this is . we can no sooner consider , that god knows and loves himself , ( which is the ground of all our explication , and , as it were , the text on which our reason descants ) but we must forcibly and immediately discover , that this distinction in god must be taken from that head of our notions , call'd [ relation . ] for the knower cannot be a knower of nothing , but of some thing or some object , which is known by him : nor can that thing or object be actually known , but there must be some thing which is a knower of it ; which shows those notions are perfectly relative to one another . . wherefore all the distinction and operation , which ( as has been shown ) is verify'd to be in the divine nature , and all the distinction of the particulars we lately spoke of , must be taken from the relations , according to which the divine nature is referr'd to its self ; and not formally and immediately from god ' s essence , which belongs formally to the line of substance . . nor need we fear to attribute distinct and ( some way ) opposite predicates to god , and , consequently affirm that there is some kind of distinction and opposition in him ; since the distinction necessarily imply'd in that natural notion we transfer to him , does attribute to him the highest perfection of his nature as 't is spiritual ; and is not apply'd to him according to the notion of ens or being ; but , according to another respect or notion , which is different from it ; and ( as is shown , prel . x. and xi . ) does not induce or require any distinction formally of the essence it self ; nay , when ( as will be shown , sect. viii . § . . ) that very opposition , notwithstanding it forces some kind of plurality , does no less necessarily infer a more perfect unity , ( if possible ) in the divine nature , at least an unity in more respects , than could have been conceiv'd had there not been that kind of distinction and opposition . nor yet can any doubt of the truth of this thesis , which puts distinct and opposite notions in god ; since his nature verifies those distinct notions , and obliges us to affirm them of him , or attribute them to him. . since then these particulars , which ( as is shown , §§ . . and ) we truly attribute to god , must entirely be taken from the foresaid relations ; 't is consequent , that the number of them also must be taken from the number of those relations . . and , 't is clearly agreeable to reason , that in those of the former sort , there must be relation on both sides ; which must , consequently , constitute , or rather infers , two particulars . for , 't is very evident from § . . and , indeed , is obvious to common sense , that ( in our case ) there is a mutual relation between the knower and thing known ; as is exprest by those very words ; nor can we express them otherwise , while we must affirm that god knows himself . as will yet better appear , sect. vii . § . . . which is hence confirm'd , because as god is essentially infinitely - intellective or rather intelligent ; so he must also be infinitely - intelligible , or rather actually known ; otherwise there would want an adequate object of the divine understanding , which would also infer he is not infinitely intelligent . . these relations are grounded materially and ●eally on the divine essence it self , consider'd , according to it 's own notion , or as it is conceiv'd ●o be absolute ; since 't is his essence it self , exprest by the word [ god , ] which knows and is known , conceiv'd as apt to ground those relations ; as it evidently is ; and not his essence as it is conceiv'd relatively : for a relation cannot be the immediate reason or ground of another relation ; otherwise there might be processi●s in infinitum . but the main reason why this cannot be , is , because it is not the relation it self which is referr'd , but the thing ; and relation must necessarily be in th●se things which are related . . wherefore , however the divine lover , when god loves himself , cannot but have a relation to the thing loved , because love proceeds from the goodness of the object , and it's agreeableness to it 's ( that is to god's ) nature ; yet there is no mutual relation from the thing loved to the lover , or to the love of it . for the greatest good and perfection of an intelligent or knowing nature is truth ; and truth does formally consist in this , that the object is so in the understanding , as it is in it's self , which is in our case , that the divine object known is in the divine knowledge , or truly conceiv'd by it : whence love proceeds formally , properly and immediately , from both according to their relative notions by which they are distinguisht , and not from the absolute notion which is common to them both . wherefore , since by § . . no relation can be grounded on another relation , and in case there were a mutual relation to the lover , it must proceed or be grounded on the relations of knower and known ; it follows , that there can only be three relations ; and , consequently , ( by §§ . . and . as will be shown , ) but three particulars in the deity ; nor can any more be attributed to it , according to our best reason directed by true principles , and proceeding upon our natural notions : that the common suppositum does not infer a fourth particular , will be seen , sect. vi. § . . corollary . since divine love proceeds from this that the object is so in the knower as it is in it self , which is the formal notion of truth : hence , 't is seen , how much our love ought to be set on truth , which is the natural perfection of our mind ; how like god those noble souls are whose chief affection is addicted to truth , especially divine truths : on the other side , how ignoble , and unlike god those mean and depraved souls are who disregard truth , and think the care of promoting it is below their empty temporary greatness . sect . vi. that these three particulars are most fitly called persons . . the next question is , what natural notion of ours does most properly fit those three particulars , which we have been obliged to put in the divine nature ; and what word of ours does most fitly , and in the common usage of it , express that notion . for , since we have granted in our fifth preliminary , that christian faith was deliver'd at first in such language as exprest our natural notions ; that is , in such as was usual in those times and places , and intelligible by the generality in their respective circumstances ; it cannot be deny'd but that we stand engag'd to show that our explication must likewise observe the same rule , as to those words which we pretend do signifie the point of faith it self , as exprest in our catechisms and creeds . . to perform this as we ought , we will consider first of what notion or nature those particulars must be conceiv'd to be ; and because we have no natural notion but either of substance , or it 's modes ; it follows , that those three particulars we speak of , must either be particular according to the first sort of notion [ substance ; ] or else according to some of the later . wherefore , to clear this point , and determine under which of these notions they are particulariz'd , we are to consider what it is that is thus particulariz'd ; and our former discourse shows , that it is the common suppositum , or that which is that absolute notion , we call [ god , ] which is here particulariz'd , or has these particulars in it . and , indeed , there needs no more but these words , [ god knows and loves himself , ] to evince this : for it is , hence , as evident as plain words can make any thing , that 't is god who is the knower , thing known , and lover ; which notions give us , or rather are those very particulars we speak of : now , since the word [ god ] cannot be thought to belong to , or be with any sense , referr'd to any other of those heads then that of substance or being , ( whence as consider'd in an absolute and not in a relative sense , he is call'd the first being , ) hence 't is god , conceiv'd under the notion of being or substance , which is particulariz'd . and , though god be not particulariz'd substantially , or according to the manner substances are particulariz'd amongst us , which is that the common abstracted , indeterminate or potential notions of the genus , or species , be divided and determin'd under the notion of ens , by means of essential or intrinsecal differences , and so make more entia , ( for this , as was said lately , cannot be said of the pure actuality and unity of the divine nature ; ) yet he may be particulariz'd by reason of the relative conceptions verify'd of him , which we have shown do not induce any imperfection at all : yet , as it is only the common suppositum or god , ( taking that word in an absolute sense ) which is related , so it is only what 's signify'd by god , ( or the primum ens , ) which is the thing particulariz'd . this being then manifest , and particulars under the notion of substance , being most necessarily held to be particular , supposita , and , if they be intelligent , [ persons ; ] it follows that these three particulars , or , suppositums in god are fitly and properly to be call'd three divine persons . and , he who will deny any part of this discourse stands obliged to show either , that there are not three particulars in the divine nature ; or , that it is not the divine nature under the notion of substance , which is the thing related , and thence particulariz'd ; or that particulars under the notion of substance , are not to be call'd in true speech , suppositums ; and , if they be intelligent , in a vulgar word , persons . he must also assign some other notion under which we are to conceive them ; and invent some other name , suteing with our natural notions , by which we may call them . and , lastly , he stands bound to answer the reasons i have brought in my foregoing explication for each of those points . none of which , if he pleases to go to work like a scholler , and not act a banterer and droll , he can . i am sure , ever be able to perform . . this being so plain , i am sorry i must declare , that i am much dissatisfy'd that any christian writer , speaking of the b. trinity , should assert that the word [ person ] is now become a term of art : whereas we have no word more proper or more usual to express a particular subsistent being that is withall intelligent , than the word [ person ] is . for , let us ask all mankind , and even the rudest vulgar , how many persons there are in such a place ? they will candidly reckon up to us only the men and women , and not the stools , chairs , or irrational animals ; nor can any man imagine , either that they answer'd thus through any skill or art they had acquir'd ; or that they meant to express any artificial conception of ours , or any thing made by an artificer ; but that they intended to signifie by that word , meer natural things , with which we were well acquainted and daily converst ; and that they , in thus answering , us'd the ordinary speech of all mankind , who spoke and understood the same language . again , when 't is said , [ it is now become a term of art , ] what means the word [ now ? ] is it us'd by christians now in any other sense than it was us'd by s. athanasius , years ago ; or by the christian church both then , before , and ever since ? or do our catechisms now-a-days teach us artificial conceits ? for only these are fit to be exprest by terms of art. i would hope that learned man had a better meaning than those words seem to have , and that i am deceiv'd in him ; however , i thought fit to take notice of it lest it should deceive others . . nor ought it be objected , that the word [ person ] is not found in scripture . 't is a necessary liberty the christian church ever took to declare the faith which she had in her heart , by more-emphatical words , to keep her thoughts and tenets from being misunderstood ; provided those words express more fully and clearly the same sense , as is found in the holy scripture ; as appears in the word [ consubstantial ] made use of in the nicene creed ; tho' it be no more found in scripture than the word [ person ] is . . yet , tho' we must put three persons in god , does not therefore follow that there are tria ●●● or three things in him. for the proper ●otion of ens , amongst us , is that which is ca●●le of existence ; whence , tho' we should de●ite that notion from the potentiality signify'd ●● the word [ capable , ] which would cost us ●●me straining the signification of words ; yet ●● cannot conceive three entities in god without conceiving there are three existences , or ●●ther self-existences , in him ; which 't is impos●●ble there should be : for [ self-existence ] necessarily implies [ infinite in being ; ] and there can be ●o more but one infinite in the same kind ; as has been demonstrated in our metaphysicks : nor can it be said that there may be three relative existences in god ; the notion of [ existence ] being the most absolute , and most irrespective or unrelative that can be imagin'd . add , that the formal constituent of ens is essence : wherefore , ●f we put three entia in god , we must also put three divine essences in him : of which , since each must be infinite , we shall be obliged to put three infinites under the same notion : which , seeing each must be distinct from the other ; and therefore must , to distinguish them , have some●hing in it which the other had not ; they would , consequently , limit one another ; and , so , none of them would be infinite . whence , it was not amiss , which an acute school divine put in his publick theses ; viz. in deo sunt tres entes , non tria entia : ignoscant grammatici , perpendant th●ologi . . but , to give a farther reason , why these three particulars in god cannot be said to b● three things or entia , and yet must be call●● three persons ; and , withall to set this pre●●●● point in a clearer light , i discourse thus . the common notion of ens or substance is divided and subdivided , descending downwards by ●●trinsecal differences , till we come at the foot of the scala predicamentalis , or the lowest notions call'd by logicians individuums : which are constituted and distinguish● by such a complexion of accidents , as is found in no other ; whence it becomes this , that is , a substantia prima , which only is properly a thing ; in which the matter being thus ultimately determin'd , 't is hence made capable of being , that is , an ens. whereas , the former , which were common notions , are not , by virtue of those common or universal natures , or as thus exprest by a general word , capable of existing or entia , ( since nothing in common can exist ) and therefore must either exist in the substantia prim● , or suppositum , as metaphysical parts ( or inadequate conceptions ) of it , or not at all . wherefore the individuum includes all those common notions in it self as parts of it's essence ; whence they are all predicated essentially of it . nor can our natural notion of ens , be devested of this imperfection that it is compounded of such metaphysical parts , which are superiour and inferiour in respect of one another . whence that notion cannot fitly be transferr'd to god , in whose most simple essence there can be no compositions ; no , not even that call'd metaphysical . moreover , were this wav'd , yet the notion of ens being essentially that which has a power to ●● ▪ it can never forego that potentiality , nor , con●●●uently , be transferr'd to god. for , were ●●● potentiality of being abstracted from it , it ●ould either signifie nothing that any way relates ●o being at all ; or else it would signifie actual ●eing or existence . now existence may indeed be most fitly apply'd to god ; but in that case , ●●●●e the notion of ens and existence are as widely different as power and act , it would not be the notion of [ ens , ] which is apply'd , but another very different notion , viz. that of existence . wherefore , tho' we call god an ens , when the question is not precisely ( as here it is ) about the perfection or imperfection of our notion or expression ; yet , in our case , where we nicely examine what natural notions of ours are properly fit to be transferr'd to him ; it is manifest , that both by reason of it's metaphysical composition , and also of it's potentiality , it is utterly incompetent to be apply'd to god ; since in both respects it carries along with it an unavoidable imperfection ; and , consequently , much less can we say there are in god three things , or tria entia . the word [ substance ] is with much more reason transferr'd to god , because it formally imports a distinct notion from accidents , and a sustainer of them in being ; whence it is in a manner the same notion as a suppositum or subsister . . on the other side , taking these words according to their most formal signification , the notion of the words [ person ] and [ subsistent ] , with which later , the common use among learned men , does now confound [ suppositum , ] does neither speak potentiality , nor composition , but barely signifies the ultimate completion in the line of rational being , or independency on any other created thing of notion for their existing : and thence they have a just title to be transferrible to the divine nature . and hence it is , that the distinction of those three particulars , which the divine essence verisies , ought not to be taken from the manner in which things in the line of substance use to be distinguisht , that is , by intrinsecal differences ; nor ought the common suppositum be apprehended to be distinguisht or particulariz'd by such a gross way ▪ yet , ( as was shown ) distinguisht it must be , and there is no other way , nor any other notion , according to which it can be conceiv'd to be particulariz'd or distinguisht , but that of relation ; the formal notion of which is ad aliquid , ( or , some way or other ) ad aliud ; by which too we have seen god's knowing and loving himself obliges us to distinguish him : whence follows , that the divine nature is distinguisht relatiuely . nor does this notion multiply the common nature essentially , as did the former way which distinguisht the common notion by essential differences : both because the relation by prelim. x. and xi . is not distinguisht from the divine essence it self which is the reason and ground of referring it diversely ; as also , because it springs from a most high perfection in god as he is a spirit ; i add , and terminates also in a high perfection under the notion of being , viz. in that of personality or person . in a word , 't is the divine essence which is distinguisht or particulariz'd , there being nothing else in god to be distinguisht : yet it is not distinguisht essentially or according to the precise notion of essence or being , but relatively ; because it is infinite in being , and so can be , in that absolute re●●ct , but one. . for the same reason , i avoid using the word ▪ ●●dividuum , ] tho' i do not blame others that do . ●erhaps i am too scrupulous in it , yet i cannot ●●t think 't is something liable to exception , at ●ast comparatively . my reasons are : first , 't is ●●o logical and artificial ; and , consequently , tho' it has got , i know not how , out of the schools into the language of some well-bred men to say , [ 't is the same individual man , ] yet , for all that , it is not the vulgar speech , nor so natural . secondly , because it is made particularly such by it's difference too , ( viz. by the complexion of it's accidents ; ) and , subsuming under the specifick notion , 't is only a negation of the superiour notions , and signifies the same as ungenerical or unspecifical . whereas , the word [ person ] has a positive signification , nor has any reference to the genus and species , as is seen in angels : and , moreover , it directly imports the highest perfection in the line of [ substance ; ] and therefore it is fitly transferrible to god. again , the word [ individuum ] being a logical term , is more subject to wrangle . for artists being the imposers , and ( as it were ) creators of the words which themselves use ; and such men seldom agreeing in their thoughts and meanings ; nor consenting universally that such a word shall stand for such a meaning or notion ; it happens that some of them do take the word in one sense others in another ; and very frequently ampliate or restrain the signification of it at pleasure . hence perpetual , and ( if this inconvenience be not remedy'd by clear definitions of such words ) eternal dissentions must needs ensue . and , indeed , most of the li●ig●●● disputes and controversies among learned m●● ( in case the contesters be sincere and disintere●●ed do arise from this defect now mention'd . fro● which mischief the words us'd by the general●● to express our natural notions , are free ; for we find by experience that the vulgar understand one another very well and easily ; nor are subject to perpetual word-skirmishes in their common conversation , as the others are . . nor can it be inferr'd from this explication ▪ that , by the same reason , there would be a trinity of persons in angels and souls separated when they know and love themselves . for self-knowledge formally consisting in this , that the thing known does inexist in it's own knowing power as an object , or after an intellectual manner ; and the existence , and consequently , inexistence of all creatures being extrinsecal o● acoidental to them , ( as being given them by another ) and not essential to them , or their very essence , as it is in god ▪ it being one of his peculiar attributes : hence i● follows , that the relation of knower and known is in them accidental to them , as being grounded on what 's accidental to their essences ; and consequently , by prelim. x. is identify'd with the object accidentally only : whence it can make only an accidental distinction in them , and not a distinction in their substance , or a distinction of that most perfect ▪ substantial notion , [ person ; ] as , for the contrary reason , it must make in god. add , that god's self-knowledge is properly and perfectly essential to him as he is an infinite spirit ; and ( as it were ) his primary operation ; by which ( according to our manner of conceiving ) he is constituted such ; or rather , 〈…〉 e●●ence , as he is a spirit , does consist in it ▪ ●●ereas , in angels and souls , the knowing the ●…le extent of entity and even god himself , 〈…〉 the primary operation for which nature in●●nded them ; and to know themselves was only 〈◊〉 means or first-step to bring them to the ●nowledge of all other things , and thence of god : and therefore self-knowledge is far from being their primary operation ; or that , by respect ●o ▪ which their essence was constituted ; nor , consequently , can it distinguish their substance , as it does and must in god. . nor , lastly , can it be thought , that the common suppositum , having all perfections that can ●● in the line of being , and therefore , amongst the rest , personality , in it , does constitute a fourth person ; for since god , or the common suppositum , as has been shown , is common to the three relative persons , or in them all , it carries along with it all the perfections of the divinity , and among the rest the personality too , and communicates it to the relative persons , as it does all the other positive or absolute perfections in the godhead . whence they have all of them to subsist or absolutely to be persons from the godhead , or the common suppositum ; and that they are different persons comes wholly and solely from their distinct relations , as was prov'd above . so that there is no show that the common suppositum can make a fourth or distinct person ; since what 's common to all , or each , cannot be particular or contradistinguisht to any ; nor is there any opposition of the common person to the relative ones ; both because it has an absolute and not a relative notion ▪ as also , because it is so far from being opposite , that it is coincident with them all or with each of them . sect . vii . that this distinction of three persons puts no imperfection in the divine nature ; and that they are most-●itly call'd , the father , son , and holy spirit . . god being the author of order and not of confusion , 't is most worthy his divine nature , and most consonant to true reason , that there should be some order amongst those thre● divine persons , and some solid ground for that order . and , since all order amongst more , must begin from some one , or some first ; it follows , that there must be some one amongst them , which is the first or beginning of that order ; and that therefore the notion of the word [ beginning , ] must be transferr'd to god , or be peculiar to some one of those persons who is god ; provided it can be done without attributing to him any imperfection : which waving our proofs brought hereafter to the contrary ) is even hence incredible it should ; ●ince , as was now shown , and will farther appear , it is absolutely necessary there should be some first , or some beginning amongst them ; and , certainly , there can be no absolute necessity to attribute any imperfection to god. . and , that it ought to be so , this plain reason farther evinces ; because , since we cannot name them all at once ; we must , in recounting them , forcibly name some one of them first : nor could we give any good reason why we did this , unless there were some consideration in that person it self , which oblig'd us to it ; otherwise we must be forced to say we did it without reason , or nam'd them at random . . it remains then to show which of the three persons is the first ; to give the reason why we put him first ; and , in what sense , he is a first , or principium , in that order . . reflecting then on those relations of known and knowing , we find that the f●rmer of these , the divine essence , as known , has the nature or notion of an object ; and the later , ( there being no potentiality in god ) the nature of actual knowledge ▪ and that our natural notions ascertain us that the knowledge proceeds from the object ; for this is that which determines the indifferency of our knowing power by informing it , and produces the act of knowledge ; or , as the schools phrase it , specifies it . whence , abstracting this way of producing knowledge in us from all potentiality and causality , ( as is most ●it , ) and only applying to god what 's essential to the notion of an object ; ( in the being of which in our understanding , knowledge does necessarily consist , ) we must rationally conceive and affirm , that the divine nature as knowledge , or as knowing himself , does pr●ceed from the divine nature as an object , or as known : and that therefore this later is the origin , principium , or first of those three persons ; and divine knowledge , the second ; it being evident , that love , which proceeds from the goodness of the object in our knowledge , and , therefore , in this order of our natural notions , necessarily presupposes the other two , is with good reason to be accounted the third . . for , in regard there can be no adequate or proper object of the divine understanding , but the divine essence it self , and that all others do fall infinitely short of being worthy of it ; hence , it is equally argumentative to say , that his knowledge as it is divine , proceeds from the divine essence as an object ; as it is , that our knowledge of nature does proceed from nasural objects ; since , according to our most natural and necessary notions , it as unavoidably follows , that god's knowledge is therefore divine , because the object of it is god ; as it follows that our knowledge is therefore natural because the object of it is of natural notions ; or mathematical , because it has for it's object those notions which are mathematical ; nay , it would be perfect nonsense to affirm the contrary , or assign any other reason for it . so evidently consonant it is to true reason , and to our natural notions , to affirm that the knowledge , even tho' divine , does proceed from the divine object ; or , which is the same , that the divine nature as an object is the first that we can possibly conceive in the order of those notions which we use when we say , [ god knows and loves himself ; ] or is the beginning and origin of divine knowledge , and , consequently , of divine love. . to explicate this yet more fully , and to clear our natural notion of knowing , let us reflect on that passage of st. austin at the end of his confessions , [ nos ista quae fecisti videmus quia sunt : tu autem quia vides ea , sunt . ] we see , ( or know ) the things which thou hast made , because they are ; but when thou seest them , thy seeing them makes them bee . these last words show that when any created being proceeds from god , his understanding does begin that a●fair , and by knowing it , makes them bee , or creates them ; but , in all other cases , our knowledge comes from the being of the object . 't is then this nature of knowledge , thus explicated , which is our natural notion of it , and which is proper to our soul as it is spiritual . wherefore we must either transfer this to god , and say that his knowledge comes from the object ; or else ( having no other notion of it ) we can never understand the meaning of those words , [ god knows himself , ] nor , consequently affirm that he does so . certainly , nothing can be plainer than 't is , that we cannot conceive this knowledge to be of god , but because the object of it is god. wherefore , 't is even hence most evident , that the procession of the knowledge begins from the object , or is originiz'd by it ; so that the knower , as such , has nothing but what he has from that which is known . whence follows , that this priority of order , spoken of above , must be a priority of origin , and has the notion of principiation to what 's principiated or proceeds from it : nor does this kind of priority put any imperfection , or less perfection in the divine nature as knowing , more than it does in the same nature as known ; because it is equally essential to the divine nature to be knowing as 't is to be known ; and consequently , 't is impossible to conceive that one of the correlates , considering them purely as related , ( as is our case ) should more depend on the other , than that the other should depend on it. lastly , since , as appears by the words , [ god knows himself , ] both the correlates are god , in whom is all perfection imaginable ; 't is impossible , that either god as known , or as knower , should be in any sort imperfect , notwithstanding the priority of origin between them ; since this priority arises out of that most perfect notion of knowing , which necessitates , that the knowledge must proceed , or be originiz'd from the object known ; as has been shown , § . . . but to put it past contest , that , notwithstanding we must be forced to allow that knowledge is thus originiz'd from the object , yet there is not less perfection in one than in the other , we lay this position ; viz. that the deity being infinitely perfect , where ever the deity is , there must also be all the perfections imaginable . since then , when we say , [ god knows himself , ] both the knower and thing known are god ; there is found in each of them all the absolute attributes which belong to the deity , with the connotate of [ infinite ] annext to them ; that is , all imaginable perfections are both in the one and the other . moreover , amongst those attributes , self-existence is one ; if , indeed , it may be call'd an attribute , and not rather , ( as metaphysicks demonstrate ) according to our manner of conceiving , the very essence of god ; whence all ▪ his divine attributes ( according to our way of discoursing ) spring . since then self-existence is found in both , and the notion of self-existence bars all imperfection or dependence in being , and all the ●orts of other priorities but that of origin ; 't is impossible to conceive that either of them should be imperfect , or dependent on the other . again , since it is equally essential to god to be known , as it is to know ; and god cannot be known without a knower ; if this method of objecting were allowable where both are infinite , we might with equal reason say , that the first person , who is the divine object known , depends on the second , as that the second , who is divine knowledge , depends on the first . 't is a common maxim , that relationes mutuo se ponunt & auferunt ; and yet neither of them is said to be dependent on the other ; since mutual dependence as to the same common notion is direct nonsence . but the main point is , that this principiation or origination does not formally respect the deity it self , or the common suppositum , any more in one than in the other ; but only , the deity as related ; that is , the divine personalities ; wherefore , the relation , ( by prelim. x. xi . ) not being really distinguisht from , but identify'd with , the ground of referring ; cannot , out of their formal notion , add any new perfection unto it ; especially , since the common suppositum , exprest by the absolute word [ god , ] which is the ground of all the divine relations , has in it the whole perfection of them all. . from this discourse we see how the trinity is in the unity , because the ground of all these relations , that is , the relations themselves ; and , consequently , all the three persons , which are constituted by those relations , are in that one deity , or in the unity of the godhead : and , withall , how the unity of the godhead is in the trinity of persons , because one and the same divine nature is in them all ; as is evident from these very terms ; [ god knows and loves himself . ] which , tho' mysterious to the rude and unelevated conceptions of vulgar discoursers , is , notwithstanding , ( as has been shown ) if we take each single consideration of it asunder by our abstractive or natural way of conceiving , and discourse upon each of them distinctly , or as thus aparted , is perfectly consonant to reason working upon our natural notions . . we come next to consider by what names this first and second person , the divine nature known and knower are to be call'd . in order to which we lay these positions , viz. that god , who is in them both , is living , ( or rather essentially life ; ) and , consequently , those two persons in whom the godhead is , must be living also . next , knowledge cannot be otherwise conceiv'd but to come , or ( as we use to say ) pr●ceed from the object ; and therefore the second person must proceed from the first . thirdly , the divinity communicates it's own nature to the knower , as appears by the words [ knows himself . ] and also by reason ; for , otherwise , we could not say , [ it is known , ] if it were not in the knowledge or c●njoyn'd with it spiritually or intellectually . now , if we spell these necessary truths together , all which are imply'd in these words , [ god knows himself , ] we shall find they compound , and ( not barely imply , but ) fully express that the definition of a son is appropriated to the second person , viz. that he is a living person proceeding from a living person , whose nature is of the same kind as the others , and is conjoyn'd with him , or remains in him ; ] whence follows , that his correlate must properly and necessarily be call'd a father ; and lastly , that the procession of him from his father can therefore have no other notion , or word which we have , that can ●it it , but that of generation . . hence it is , that knowledge is appropriated to the second person the son ; for which reason he particularly took our flesh upon him , and came to be our master , and to instruct us in his holy law. hence he is call'd sapientia patris , or verbum , because knowing does intellectually speak or express the divine nature known by him ; as our conception or verbum mentis does the thing , or truth , we conceive . hence , he is truly said to be deus de deo , lumen de lumine , deus verus de deo vero : because the common suppositum , the godhead , is in both ; and the divine nature as he is precisely a knower is originiz'd from it self , as it 's own object . hence , lastly , because of the common nature in both , and the proceeding of one from the other , he is call'd imago patris , figura substantiae ejus , &c. all which , and many other such expressions are exactly verify'd by the principles here laid , and our consonant deductions from them . . since then the notion of father and son a●e truly attributed to the common suppositum exprest by the absolute word [ god ; ] it is not only fitting but necessary , that those notions should be the most perfectly such , as is possible to be imagin'd . wherefore , since sons amongst us , do proceed from their fathers according to specifical likeness in nature ; it is most becoming god's infinite perfection , and his most ultimately determih'd essence ; that is , indeed the most perfect unity of the godhead it self , that his coeternal son should proceed from his eternal father according to the most perfect identity of nature that can be conceiv'd ; that is , according to the self-same numerical nature . wherefore this divine procession ought not to be explicated by analogy to the specifical nature of man , and it 's being common to more individuals : for the species does necessarily imply some potentiality , tho' the genus does more ; and is determinable ( as was said ) by differences which are intrin●●cal in the line of ens ; and , therefore , ( as was prov'd ) do constitute formally more entia , that is , more things which have diverse essences ; all which is inconsistent with the divine nature : nor ought any composition of such superiour ( or potential ) notions be transferr'd to god. and much less , since the common suppositum , ( however it be predicated of more particulars in the manner explicated above , ) has in it self , by virtue of it's own infinite self-existence , the utmost perfection in the line of substance ; and is , by reason of it's purest actuality , more perfectly one singular absolute being , than any suppositum or individuum is or can be amongst us creatures . . and the same , partly for the same reason , is , ( mutatis mutandis ) to be said of the third particular verify'd of god , or of the third person of the most b. trinity . for , since it must be granted , that god loves himself , and the word [ himself , ] in the predicate of that proposition , signifies the same as the word [ god , ] which is the subject of it ; 't is as evident , that the divine nature loving is the same with the divine nature loved , as it is that god is god. but , besides , that this is evident from the very terms , or the plain sense of words , there is another very peculiar reason springing out of the particular nature of love , which according to our natural and vulgar notions , ( by which we are here to guide our selves ) signifies to be spiritually unitive of the lover to the thing loved . our common unstudy'd thoughts and language gives this to be true : if two friends love one another dearly , all mankind uses to say , they are all one ; and our b. saviour prays to his heavenly father that he and his disciples may be one , as himself and his father are one ; that is , by mutual love ; it being impossible those words can there bear any other signification . . we have seen above , that divine love , which is the third person , proceeds from the goodness of the divine object , or from the divine essence known , ( that is , the father ) in his own divine knowledge , in which consists essential truth ; that this truth is therefore god's greatest good ; because this infinite truth is the best perfection of his nature as it is intelligent or spiritual : that , because it does thus proceed from the divine object in the divine knowledge , this third person does , therefore , proceed from the father and the son immediately and formally according to their distinct personalities or relations ; and that , therefore , because no relation can be grounded on another relation , but can only refer what 's absolute , there can be no reciprocal , opposite or distinct relation of the divine object-known to the lover ; nor , consequently , any occasion of conceiving a fourth person : it remains now to show , that since love ( by § . . ) imports a spiritual union or conjunction of the lover with that which it loves ; therefore , from the very notion of the word [ conjoyn'd , ] there must be some distinction between those which are thus ioyn'd-together : since , what 's in every respect one and the same , cannot , without injury to common sense , be said to be conjoyn'd with it self in any respect , that is , conjoyn'd at all . but in what manner does this third person proceed from the other two ? not according to likeness ( or identity ) of nature , as did the son : but it presupposes this likeness , conformity , agreeableness or identity of nature in the object as known , and in the knower as knowing it ; for , in this consists that greatest good call'd truth , which is the object of love ; and 't is against all our natural notions to conceive actual love of a thing not suppos'd to bee : wherefore this similitude of nature is not the formal motive , nor the manner by which divine love proceeds ; but only this , that the other two persons according to their distinction of knower and known , ( in which consists divine truth ) do integrate , as it were , that bonum dei , or good , which is the adequate object of the divine will. the son , therefore , proceeds from his father , by having communicated to him the same form , ( as it were ) or the divine nature as an object which formally constitutes him a knower of it , and thence , a son ; the b. spirit proceeds from the two other persons as they are a good to the divine nature ; which it affects , spiritually clings to , or embraces ; and so becomes or is actually united or one with it . the former ( according to our weak manner of conceiving ) proceeds as coming from the object communicating it self to it ; the later , by it's being drawn , as it were , by the object and ●…oving it self - forwards to , ( or rather , in reality , ha●ing actually ) an union with it . the former , by ●ay of informing , or being in the divine under●●anding ; the later , by enamouring the divine will to pursue what is conceiv'd to be out of the lover as such ; or rather , in our case , to enjoy it actually . which expression tho' most beseeming a pure actuality of being , yet it debars not the distinction between the good enjoy'd and the enjoyer of it , but obliges us to conceive them as thus distinct. . having thus declar'd the particularity or distinction of the three divine persons , in order to one another , it is seasonable to manifest , in the ●ext place , what names and what effects are peculiarly to be attributed to each of them , as they relate to us . whence , it may appear , that as our explication is agreeable to right reason , so it is no less consonant to holy scripture , and to the sense and language of the christian church . to mention a few chief ones , will hint to us the ●est . . since then being is the first , in order , of all our natural notions , so that we cannot conceive any thing to be communicated , or to deserve love unless it is : hence the notion of the divine being , is justly conceiv'd to be appropriated to ▪ the first person , who is the beginning and origin of the rest , and communicates it to the son ; whence proceeds , ( as was now said ) the b. spirit who is divine love. hence , also , since every thing acts as it is , he is said to be author and cause of all created being , or the creatour of all things . hence also he is said to be the father of all his creatures , ( in a natural , but less proper sense ) because he gives us our being ; and in a more especial manner , since his only son , by taking our nature upon him , made himself , in some sort , our brother : as also , in a civil sense ; because it belongs to fathers to provide for their children , as his heavenly providence does for all his creatures . not to speak how he is a father in a spiritual sense , as we are re-generated by his grace , given us freely for the merits , and by the means of his eternal son whom he sent amongst us to that end . . what peculiar attributes are appropriated to the son , is declard above , § . . i only remark here , that when he is call'd verbum , the word , by a metaphor taken from our verbum mentis , that is , our conception or notion of an object in our knowing power ; we must take heed we do not understand , by those words , that imperfect form of speaking truth interiourly , which is found in mental propositions , which affirm , or deny ; for even in angels and separated souls ( as has been demonstrated ) knowledge is above all ▪ composition of several notions , of which propositions are made ; but it must be meant , that the divine object , in which is essentially all the metaphysical verity both of god and of all creatures , is most expressly in him as he is the knower of it ; that is , indeed , in the very divine essence ; in which the most actual , that is , the most bright , and most universal truth , is communicated to him from the father , and is most exactly in him. we must take heed also , that when he is call'd imago patris , and such like , some cartesian or other ideist , catching at the word , do not make ●im a meer picture or similitude of his father ; ●…d that he has not therefore the very divine created essence , or the divine nature in him , ●…t only some created similitude of it . i must ●…nfess this sutes well enough with the doctrine ideas in our mind , which are spiritual pour●…itures or resemblances of the things we know , ●…d not the things themselves : but that it sutes ●…ither with reason or faith , they can never show ●…s ; for how can meer fancies agree with such sublime realities ; or erroneous foundations support the truth of faith in the opinion of doub●…ers , by giving consonant and genuine explications of it . . the third person , divine love , is call'd 〈…〉 comforter , or strengthener , because nothing more gives our souls such strength to resist the assaults of our spiritual enemies , break thorow ●ll difficulties , and press forwards vigorously to at●ain our true end , eternal happiness , which is ●he sight of god , than does an ardent love of ●im ; which , ( every thing acting as it is ) is the ●●culiar gift of the holy ghost ; who , is , not only by his common essence , ( as are also the rest , ) but also by the particularity of his person , divine love . for the same reason , he is call'd a spi●itual unction ; because it was customary to anoint ●hose with oil , who were to exert their strength 〈…〉 any encounter or exercise , to give their limbs greater force and agility . for the same reason , he is call'd [ fire , ] which in an ordinary metaphor is apply'd to an ardent love ; and thence he came down in tongues of fire ; because fire is the most active and purest body we have ; and in regard love does enflame the spirits to pursue the good we affectionately long for . for this reason also , he is call'd our spiritual life ; because life consists in self-moving ; and nothing moves us so efficaciously as love , which is the proper act of the will , that faculty that sets all our inferiour powers on work . and for the same reason , he is called particularly the spirit ; because as the animal spirits in the body give us all our natural motion , so divine love , his peculiar name ; and nature , gives us all our supernatural tendency to heaven ; so that no external or interiour actions we perform do avail us , or bring us the least step nearer our true end , eternal happiness , unless either out of an immediate or remote intention , it be done out of that regard or intuitus . another reason why he is call'd [ spirit , ] which properly signifies breath , is , because breath and life are in common speech equivalent : [ while i breath , ] and [ while i live , ] having the same signification ; as have also to expire and to die. lastly , since heavenly love , which divines call sanctifying grace , is our supernatural life , which ( as was said ) the peculiar influence of the third person does ( as it were ) inspire or breath into our souls ; hence , he is , from this effect , by a specifical appellation , call'd the holy ghost or holy spirit . for , none can think he is call'd spirit , meerly because he is of a spiritual nature , since this is an attribute of the godhead , and therefore common to all the three persons ; nor , because he proceeds from the father and the son by a kind of imaginary action call'd spiration ; of which i must , for my part , confess i can make no conception , nor how it comes to be transferr'd to god. . i may perhaps incurr some . censure for denying the procession of the holy ghost , is to be explicated by spiration , of which word many great men have made use . the best way to clear my self from affecting singularity , is to give my reasons why i dislike it , and submit them to the judgment of our peers . first , faith ( as was shewn preliminary v. ) must have been deliver'd in such language as is apt to signify our natural notions . secondly , hence , tho' it may be allowed to learned men , in explicating this mystery , to make use , upon occasion , of some term of art which is current in schools ; yet is it utterly disallowable , to use any which has not for its sense , some natural notion of mankind ; otherwise it will blunder the explication instead of clearing it . thirdly , it is agreed , and most consonant to reason , that no notion taken from material beings ought to be transferr'd to god , but by the intervention of spiritual ones , to which they are metaphosically apply'd ; in regard he is of a spiritual , and not of a corporeal nature . fourthly , there can be no spiritual notion that respects the internal nature of a spirit , but being , knowledge , will , and the objects of these too last , which determin their internal operations . fifthly , there is none of all these that seems proper to signify the procession of divine love , by spiration . not being ! for that , if compleat , stayes in its self , as being the most absolute notion : nor can it respect any other notion conceivable in god otherwise than as an object . not knowledge , for that is an immanent act , and is compleated in this , that the object be such in the knower , as it is in its self ; whereas spiration has a notion of something transitive to another . sixthly , it has too much of action in it's formal notion , which may hazard to breed a conceit of efficiency and effect . and , lastly , because , as apply'd here to signifie a procession from father and son , it can have no one notion in it , and therefore it has none . for , since the holy ghost does proceed from them according to their personalities ; that is , from the divine essence as known , and as the knower of it ; and there can be no one notion common to thing known and knower , which are so widely different , being toto genere disparate and contradistinct , but being ; my dulness cannot comprehend what one notion the word [ spiration ] can signifie ; since it cannot be univocally apply'd to both ; nor how it sutes with our natural notions we have of spiritual natures ; nor in what manner , or for what reason it is transferr'd to god : which makes me doubt that meerly the word [ spiritus ] apply'd particularly to the holy ghost , was the best ground of this recourse to spiration , and not the notion of any virtue , or operation which nature has given us of a spiritual being . notwithstanding , i doubt not but these great divines had some good meaning in it , tho' it colours not with my thoughts : nay , that they meant the same in substance which i do , tho' perhaps i do more nicely ●ift the propriety of words in handling such a delicate point , than they did . and the same , i doubt not , may be said of all those learned writers who have of late explicated this mystery variously : of which the anti-trinitarians do very frivolously make great brags , and hope to get some advantage by it . i say , very frivolously : for , the article of faith it self abstracts from all explications , and stands firm on it's own grounds , divine revelation ; tho' both they , i , and others , should all of us fall short in explicating it right in every particular . thus much concerning the names and peculiar attributes of the three persons , and the congruous reasons why we apply such attributes to each . . notwithstanding all that is said above , concerning these appropriations in the performing different effects , belonging to the particular notion , and ( as it were ) genius of each person , as such ; whenever god does any thing ad extra , or produces any effect in his creatures , the whole trinity concurs to that action . for , since nothing can work but it must have the being or essence proper to it's self ; nor act , unless it have a will , the notion of which is to be the principle of acting ; nor can an infinitely perfect being act , without knowing what , and how to act ; both the eternal father , son , and spirit , must all concur to every such action . but 't is otherwise in that which passes ad intra , or within the deity it self , because of their relative distinction and opposition to one another . for , ( if i may be allow'd to repeat so oft what is of most importance ) god , precisely as the divine object , or as known , begets divine knowledge ; and the divine essence in the divine knowledge , which is essential truth , and the most proper and best perfection or good of a spiritual nature , is that adequate object from which divine love proceeds . hence it is , that since god's essence is self-existence , which is infinitely actual , and infinitely intelligible , or rather , infinitely known ; it is proper to say , that the godhead self-exists by the father , knows it self by the son who is divine knowledge , and loves it self by the holy ghost who is divine love. nor can any thing be more agreeable to reason than that it should be so , in case ( as we ought ) we will exalt god infinitely above his creatures : for , since creatures do exist by an existence which is accidental to them , whence it comes that their powers by which they operate are in the line of quality , or are accidents ; it is therefore most fitting , that god , in whom there is nothing that is accidental , but the most refined or sublim'd notion of substance , should exercise his own essence upon himself ; and therefore should have a substantial notion that is a person , by and in which that particular to which is specially appropriated divine essence should exist ; and , instead of powers which are accidents , should have particular substances or persons , by which he knows and loves himself . and therefore , as is said above , god self-exists or is by the person of the father , knows himself by the person of the son , and loves himself by the person of the holy ghost . sect . viii . that , notwithstanding this plurality of persons , the divine essence is not less perfectly simple in it's self ; or rather , 't is more , ( or in more respects , ) one , than it would have been had there not been this plurality of persons . . what the opposers of the b. trinity most pretend to fear , is , that this tenet does prejudice the unity of the godhead . now , tho' it has been already sufficiently prov'd , that this has not the least show of difficulty to a considering man ; yet , it were not amiss , for their farther satisfaction , to give this point a farther clearing , tho' it wrong the method of discoursing by making repetitions ; in which i sometimes indulge my self , to inculcate it better to my readers , by their seeing the coherence of this doctrine in divers and several occasions . for 't is not every man's talent to carry along with him every link in the chain of a connected discourse , without needing to be re-minded of it . . but first , i complain that these objecters confound themselves by not distinguishing clearly their own conceptions ; and , therefore , neither we nor themselves , know well what it is they would be at . let us try then if we can unravel their thoughts , which they have taken such pains to perplex . can they deny that god knows and loves himself ? 't is certain they will not ; for this makes god less perfect than a creature : tho' , as far as i see they never think of it , or what consequences follow from it ; notwithstanding ( as was shown ) this is the ground-work on which all true explication of this mystery is built . can they deny , that , this granted , ( as it must be ) we are forced to affirm that god is the knower , and object known ; as also the lover and thing loved ? the very words fly in their faces , and tell them they deny that which is perfectly equivalent to what they have granted . will they deny that the godhead is one and the same under all the notions , ( whatever they are ) which is signifi'd by all those relative and contradistinct names or words ? 't is equally against common sense , unless they will say , that by the word [ himself ] is not meant [ god , ] which is self-evident . can they say , that knower and known , lover and loved , are not distinct , and ( in some sort ) opposite notions ? all mankind will laugh at them , and every junior sophister who ever heard of the predicament of relation will hiss them . can they say that the deity does not verifie those distinct notions , or that we say false when we attribute them to god ? themselves will not affirm it . can they say , that , tho' god verifies them , yet there is no distinction at all in god ? this is pure nonsense . for , first , these distinct notions or attributes are not extrinsecal denominations , but most intrinsecal and even essential to god ; to know and love himself being the perfection of his spiritual nature , and one of his chiefest attributes . next , if those notions do most formally import distinction , and there be in god that which verifies them , there is what verifies distinction , in god. may they not then with equal reason say , that gold verifies the notions of yellow , and heavy , yet there is no yellowness or weightiness in gold ? can they say , that tho' there be distinction ▪ in god , yet it does not any way or under any respect , make god distinct ? this were to call self - evidence in question , and arraign first principles . for is it not self-known that a form , or abstract notion cannot be in any thing , but it must make and denominate it such as it self is ; and may they not as well say that whiteness may be in a wall and yet not make it white , or humanity in a thing and not make it a man , as that distinction is in a thing and yet not make it distinct ? can they find any thing in god besides substance to distinguish ; that is , will they put any thing in god that ●s an accident , or ( which is the same ) that is not-self-existent ? 't is imp●●●ble to pretend it . can they say , that distinction of the substance , does not particularize it , or ●ake distinct substances ? how can they ? distinction , whereever it is , must make something or other distinct ; and this according to the nature of the thing it distinguishes : and therefore if there be only substance for it to affect , it must put distinct or particular substances ; and this as evidently , as if a quantitative thing be distinguisht it must make distinct or more quanta . will they say these distinct substances , they being spiritual or intelligent , are not to be ●all'd [ persons ? ] they would do well to let us know their reason , and withal to assign us some other name by which three such substances ought more properly be called . i wish then we knew where their difficulty pinches : for , otherwise , it would half persuade an uncharitable man that their reason ails nothing when it knows not whereabouts it is hurt ; whence would follow , that 't is only their will which is ill at ease . but , i rather think they are blunder'd by not - distinguishing their notions exactly , and not proceeding upon them orderly : or perhaps , as men led by imagination use , they fancy there must be a just parallel between corporeal and spiritual natures ▪ and ( which is worse ) between a finite and an infinite being , and that they must fit one another exactly as two tallies do ; and , if they find they do not sute in every regard , their phantastick guide has lost his way , and complains sadly of the perplexity , in which nothing but his own rashness or unskillfulness has plung'd him . . to breed a conceit in their easie and weak proselytes that the doctrine of the trinity is injurious to the unity and p●●●ection of the godhead , they amuze them with several objections which nothing but the dota●●● of fancy could suggest . v. g. they 'll alledge , that if the son has the divine essence from the father , then the father pre-exists , and therefore the son cannot be eternal . by which 't is manifest , that those men apprehend there is no prae-istence but that of time ; nay , they conceit that eternity it self is a long flux of time , or something like it , whereas 't is a duration of a quite contradictory nature to it ; whereupon the grossness of their fancy is presently startled and stunn'd ; and their ignorance of such preliminary truths does presently furnish them with this , as it may with a thousand other such wild objections . to meet with them i desire them to reflect , that as there could not be any instant in which god was not ; so neither could any instant be conceiv'd in which he had not all his perfections , and amongst them that of knowing and loving himself ; and , consequently , in which his divine essence as an object known did not communicate it self to the divine knower of it . they may please to reflect too , that there are even amongst us many things before one another , nay , even as causes and effects , which are not so much as for one instant before one another in time. for example : bodies are therefore passive because they have matter in them ; they are passive thus , or divisible , because they have quantity in them ; and corruptible because they are divisible ; nay , 't is also , in proper speech true that the following ones proceed from those that are foregoing as their causes ; and yet they have passiveness , quantity , divisibility , corruptibility , nay , extension , measurability , proportionability , &c. in them all at one time ; nay , they are all so perfectly contemporaries , that there is not so much as one instant in which body has one of these and not all of them . whence , for much better reason may the son proceed from the father tho' they be both coeternal . they will reply , that all these effects proceed from formal causes , which may be conceiv'd not to pre-exist before one another . and i reply , that in this present explication all the divine processions are put to be by the manner of form , and not of action or efficiency ; and i much fear that their transferring action to god in their thoughts , which implies motion , drew them into this misconceit of priority after the manner of a kind of imaginary time. according to the way of discoursing which i take the divine object inexists in the divine knowledge ; which , according to our natural notions is call'd informing it . i have produced many demonstrations both in the second preliminary to solid philosophy asserted , and others ( b. i. ch. . ) in my metaphysicks , to show that our knowledge can be only made by this , that the object it self is in our understanding or informs it , when we know ; and that every particular knowledge we have is specify'd , nay individually determin'd to be this , by the object ; and must proceed from it both as to its being at all , and also as to it 's being this. and i dare affirm , that let witty men beat their brains till they are weary , they will never make any other sense of what it is to know , than this , that the object inexists in the knowiag power as another thing , or as some way distinct from the knower . moreover , this notion of knowing abstracts from sooner or later , eternal or not-eternal ; and therefore may , in this regard , be sitly apply'd to god , who knows himself eternally ; and because ( as has been often said ) this knowledge comes from the divine object from all eternity ; hence it is , and must be also said to proceed or be originiz'd from it from all eternity : since he formally becomes a knower by means of that object-known . this is all the priority christian divines acknowledge . this abstracts even in us creatures ( i mean in souls separated and angels , who in the first instant know themselves ) from all other kinds of priority . whence 't is very weak to infer hence , that the father is prae-existent , as if there were any imaginable instant in eternity , in which the father was , and the son was not ; or that the son for that reason , is not self existent ; since , besides the want of such a priority as they fancy and build their objection upon it , all the absolute attributes of the deity , and amongst them self-existence , and eternity too , are communicated to him by , and in , the divine essence known , or from the father . s. another bugbear to their fancy , ( for 't is that and not true reason that gives the ground to all their objections ) is this ; that , by our discourse , god the father must communicate his essence , and his whole essence to the son ; which they think is sufficiently overthrown by meerly asking , [ how should both have the same thing ? especially , how should he have it still who has already communicated it , or parted with it all ? ] and this looks very plausibly to those poor ignorant souls who never reflected on spiritual natures , but think we must discourse of them in the same manner as we do of bodies ; whereas , they being of contradistinct na●ures , the quite contrary follows . for the first , ●iz . that the divine essence is communicated , or that as known , ( that is , as it is by a relative name call'd the father ) it communicates it self , let us see how it agrees with other divine attributes , and with such acknowledg'd perfections as we find in creatures . goodness bears in it's notion , ( and experience teaches us the same ) that it is naturally communicative of what it has . since then we ascribe infinite goodness to god , and make it to be essential to him ; it follows that he is infinitely communicative of the nature or essence which he has , or rather he is actually and eternally ( for he was eternally good ) communicating it and this infinitely . which how it can be verify'd , or how his exuberant goodness could have an adequate object , unless he did communicate himself infinitely in the manner abovesaid , is past the wit of man to imagine ; since all communication of being to created things , or suppositums , tho' they were never so excellent , or so many , ( their natures and their number being both of them finite ) is infinitely short of his infinite bounty or goodness . . again , fecundity bears in it's natural notion a very high perfection . we may observe , that all living creatures , when grown up to a consummate pitch in their respective natures , are fruitful or prolifick ; that is , are apt to produce another of their own kind . and spiritual natures , when they come to know , are said to conceive , and our knowledges are call'd [ conceptions , ] tho' few reflect on the word , or the analogy it bears to the verbum in the divine mind , or to the procession of the son ; only our conceptions of natural objects , are imperfe●● and never arrive at their utmost perfection till 〈…〉 see them in the first cause . since then these ar● some kind of perfection in their several ways , 〈…〉 most consonant to reason that we should transfe● the notion of fecundity too to god ; to whom , ●● being infinitely perfect , we ought to ascribe all sorts of perfection , after they are stript from the imperfections , and from their limitedness which necessarily accompanies all finite beings , as has been often said above . . as for his communicating his whole divine essence , whence in discourse with no small man among the deists , i have heard it inferr'd , that if the father communicates his whole essence , and all it's attributes to the son , he can leave nothing at all for himself ; it is evident that this objection proceeds from most profound and most gross ignorance of spiritual natures . a master may communicate all his knowledge to his scholler , or to such a degree as to make him as learned as himself : does it follow thence , that he has empty'd or disfurnisht himself of his whole stock of learning , and is become now an ignorant dunce ? but speaking of objects , which is more to the point : even material objects lose nothing at all by being known . suppose i could penetrate so ●horowly the individuating complexion of accidents of such a body in nature , so that i comprehended every minute consideration that could possibly belong to it ; would that body be ever the worse or diminisht in it self , because it is wholly known or understood ? i desire those weak reasoners to consider that as spiritual natures are above quantity , so they do not follow the rules of material beings , nor in discoursing of them ought we to take our measures ●…om such predicates or sayings as we use when ●e speak of bodies . rather , [ divisible ] and [ indi●…sible ] which are their differences that constitute ●…em , being contradictories ; whatever conceptions ●…e make of the one , the quite opposite must be made of the other , excepting only the notion of the common genus [ ens ] in which , and which only , they do bo●h of them agree . nothing at all is defalkt from them by their communicating themselves ; nor do they lose any thing even by actiag upon bodies . the nerves of an angel are not over-strain'd , nor their spirits spent by changing or altering them : nor are spiritual objects impair'd by their being thus communicated . but 't is prodigiously weak to object this in our case , where the discourse is of god's knowing himself , and where it is granted that he does so ; unless those gentlemen think that the word [ himself , ] in that speech , does not signifie [ god ; ] or else they conceit that god is the worse by knowing himself ; that is , the worse for being infinitely perfect ; for in such nonsense as this , all their objections against the most b. trinity , when driven home to their principles , will be found to terminate . . tho' i cannot but judge that enough has been said , both here , and indeed in divers places of this treatise , to assert and manifest , that , notwithstanding this distinction or plurality of persons , there is not the least show of prejudicing the unity of the godhead ; yet it were not amiss to add one consideration more , which will much surprise the anti-trinitarians , and be lookt upon by them as a most strange paradox : which is , that the unity of the godhead is so far from being violated by a trinity of persons , that it is in divers regards better strengthen'd by that position . to show which i premise this lemma ; that that unity is best which is every manner of way such , and not that which is not so : whence follows that such a compleat unity in all regards ought to be ascrib'd to the godhead . wherefore , since it has been by so many demonstrations ( quoted and related to above ) prov'd , i hope beyond all possibility of confute , that knowledge consists in this , that the nature known , ( even tho' it be of a material or corporeal thing , which is of a contrary nature to that of the knower ) must , out of the very notion of being kn●wn , be one and the same in the knower as it is in it self : likewise , since our natural notions do assure us , that love is spiritually unitive of the lover with the thing loved ; and these ways of making the divine nature one with it self , are clearly different from that of being an infinite actuality of being , whence we deduced god's metaphysical unity in our third book of our transnatural philosophy ; it follows necessarily that the deity had not been in so many respects one , had he not ( per impossible ) known and lov'd himself , that is , had there not been a trinity of persons , by which only he could be said to know and love himself , as has been abundantly deduced . wherefore , since it belongs to the divine unity , to be infinitely , and , consequently , every way such ; even out of this very consideration , secluding all others , there ought to be admitted a trinity of persons . sect . ix . the substance of the foregoing explication , recapitulated . . to sum up the precedent explication in short . since god knows and loves himself , there is in the divine nature what does verifie both knower and known , lover and loved . wherefore since each of these pairs of notions , they being relatively opposite , have unavoidably some distinction in them ; and being verify'd of god are in the divine nature , there is necessarily some distinction in the divine nature . again , since these notions , which are verify'd of god , and therefore ( since they cannot be thought to be extrinsecal denominations ) are really in him , are distinct , and not common notions to many ; but each of them singular in it's self ; they must be particulars , to which the word [ god ] is common , and ( in some manner or other ) predicated of them all : there are therefore in god , ( in some sense or other ) distinct particulars : as appears farther , because this predication is made by the copula [ est , ] which identifies those particulars with the common predicate , ( god ; ) that is , signifies these distinct particulars are intrinsecal to the divine nature , and not apply'd to it outwardly by our false or untoward manner of conceiving it , but spring out of the very nature of the thing ( or divine nature ) truly conceiv'd . also , since what 's meant by the word [ god , ] must be conceiv'd to have all perfections in it in the line of being , of which to be subsistent , or a suppositum , is one ; we must be forced to say , that what 's meant by the word [ god ] is not only common in respect of those others , but also that 't is a common suppositum ; and , that it is the common suppositum which is verify'd of all those particulars . and , since it cannot be verify'd or predicated of them as a genus or species , because these do necessarily include indetermination and potentiality , which are inconsistent with god's purest actuality ; therefore it must be predicated of them after such a manner as is not generical or specifical , but in such a way as a notion which is in one line is predicated of such notions as are conceiv'd to be formally in another . . these particulars can be but three , tho' there seems to be two conjugations ( as it were ) of mutually opposite relations . because divine love ought to proceed from the greatest good that can be conceiv'd to belong or be connatural to god as he is of a spiritual nature ; viz. the knowledge of infinite truth ; or , ( which is the same ) from infinite or divine truth known in the divine knowledge ; which amounts to this , that divine love proceeds from the two other particulars formally according to their relations . whence no correlation can be from those other persons to divine love which thus proceeds from them ; because relation is grounded on that which it refers or relates : it being then evident , that whatever is the ground of relation , or related , must be some absolute notion , and not such a one as is relative ; it follows , that there cannot be any correlation where the immediate ground is a relative it self . . these three distinct particulars , verify'd of god , and therefore truly in the divine nature , are properly to be called persons ; because , ●here being no accidents in god , there is no●hing in the divine nature to be distinguish'd or ●articulariz'd but his substance ; and particulars ●n an intelligent substance , are properly called per●ons . there are therefore three persons in god. amongst which , since knowledge formally proceeds from an object of the same nature in both the knower and thing known ; and to communicate a living nature to another living particular , is to generate ; hence this procession is truly call'd generation ; and therefore the divine object known , from which divine knowledge thus proceeds , is truly ( tho' in a spiritual sense ) call'd a father , and the divine knowledge a son ; and the former of these is the first by way of origin ; because knowledge must be conceiv'd to proceed from the object ; and not the object , or thing to proceed from the knowledge , unless that knowledge makes it to be , or creates it , as the divine wisdom does creatures . the third person is properly call'd divine love , because love proceeds from that which is our greatest and most connatural good , perfectly and expresly known , or ( as we phrase it ) conceited , ( or fully conceiv'd ) to be such . now the greatest good of god who is of a spiritual nature , is essential truth , which ( as was said ) consists in this , that god knows himself ; or ( which is the same ) that the divine object is in the divine knower : by which is seen how and why the holy ghost , who is divine love , proceeds from both the father and the son. . wherefore , since , as appears by those oftrecited words on which we build our explication , the common suppositum , exprest by the word [ god ] has in it all the perfections that can be imagin'd , and this infinitely ; hence all the three persons having the common suppositum , or the godhead , in them , are coeternal , co-omnipotent , &c. and in every respect co-equal , as is exprest in ihe creed of st. athanasius . whence all objections of their being before one another for some time , or some instant , as also of dependence on one another ; and all distinction in nature , or imagin'd plurality of gods ; are diametrically opposite to the doctrine of the trinity . lastly , hence all pretended arguments taken from fancy ( for , from true reason none at all can be drawn ) are , by the respective parts of this explication , shewn to be frivolous , and either answer'd , or else forestall'd and prevented . . if the anti-trinitarians have any objections in their quiver , i have set them here a fair mark , at which they may level them . they may see here , that i do not wrap my discourse in ambiguity of words ; but i distinguish my notions as exactly as is possible , and draw my conclusions consequently : nor have i any deductions which are nor grounded on principles . but i foresee that they will not be able to raise any opposition which is not built on faneies , taken from material beings , which are too grofs to be made use of when we are discoursing of god , and altogether unfit to be transferr'd , in their rude sense , to so sublime a majesty ; or else that they are occasion'd by perfect ignorance of spiritual natures and their operations . the main distinction between which and bodies is this , that , whereas bodies being divisible entitites , can have nothing in them ( matter supposed ) but their own accidents or modes , which determine the matter thus or thus , and thence , make it this or the other individuum , so that a corporeal suppositum or thing can have nothing in it but its own nature , and its own intrinsical modes which have no being but its : a spiritual being , ( which is so far superiour to it , that it is constituted by its difference , [ indivisible ] which is of a ( contradictory nature to it , ) can , therefore , by its proper operation , [ knowing , ] have all other essences or natures in it besides its own , and engraft them ( as it were ) on its stoek of being ; and in such a different manner from the former , that , as they are in it , they are no part , or proper mode , of the spiritual nature it self , nor any intrinsical accidents of it ; but they are there formally as others , or as distinct from it ; nor are they dependent on the spiritual nature that knows them , for their being , as were the corporeal modes on their subject ; but they have a proper being of their own out of the understanding , and independently on it . so likewise when they have an act of love , they have a propension , tendency , or panting after the object of that love , and an endeavour to be conjoyn'd and united to it by way of attainment or fruition of the good they conceive to be in it : whence 't is plain that they are carry'd to it as it is another , or as 't is distinct from themselves . so that even when an angel , or a soul , knows and loves its self , they must , in some respect or other , be distinct from themselves , as they are the object of that knowledge and love ; as the very word [ object ] does evidence ; and as manifestly appears from the antithesis between knower and known , lover and loved . only , because ( as was shown above ) in creatures , which are not self-beings , this knowledge , ( and consequently love ) are accidental to them , in regard that even their existence ( which this knowledge and love presupposes ) is extrinsical and accidental to their essence ; therefore this distinction which self-knowledge and self-love makes in them , and which is the immediate ground of those relations , cannot make distinction in their substance : whereas in god , in whose essence there can be no accidents , nor any thing accidental , but purely substance ; self-knowledge and self-love must necessarily distinguish , and , consequently , particularize the substance ; and hence particulars of a substance which is intelligent , being , in proper speech , call'd persons , it obliges us to put a trinity of persons in the same divine nature , or in the unity of the godhead . . perhaps it may be objected , that i am inconsistent with my self , while i say , that there are no accidents in god ; and therefore only his substance is particulariz'd ▪ whence we infer plurality of persons ; and yet , we put relation in god which is an accident . i answer , ( that ) as appears by our state of the question , we do not put relations in god , as he is in himself , but only as he is conceiv'd by us ; and that , as we conceive him according to our natural notions , it is impossible to conceive , or speak of him otherwise . to the objection 't is reply'd , that we do not transfer the notion of relation to god without stripping it first of its imperfection which is to inhere in god as in its subject , or as a mode of it ; which implies potentiality in the subject , and dependence on it in the form. we have already shown that relation , ( meerly as relation ) does add no perfection or imperfection to that on which 't is grounded , and which has an absolute notion : as likeness between two things that are white , adds in neither of them the least perfection or imperfection to their absolute notion ; that is , it makes neither of them more or less white . wherefore the relations in god are as essential to him as is the knowing and loving himself , which grounds these relations . nor is this peculiar in the relative notions we apply to god ; for mercy , justice , goodness , &c. and the rest of such attributes are qualities in us , and exprest as such ; and yet they are essential to the deity ; and have their natures which they had as accidents , dignify'd to be several inadequate conceptions of the divine essence it self . sect . x. of what vast importance and most efficacious influence the belief of the blessed trinity is to christian life , and to the raising our thoughts and affections towards heaven . . i doubt not but the anti-trinitarians will complain sadly of the christian church as barbarously uncharitable , for cutting off from the body of their society , excommunicating and delivering over to satan so many well-meaning persons who embrace their sentiment . they will ask why the denying a tenet , which is meerly speculative , should be so hainously taken and severely resented ? they will be apt to liken church-governours to those hot-headed school-divines who all-to-be-heretick those who will not allow their opinion . they will pretend that , as long as men do sincerely worship the only true god , and keep his commandments ( which they will profess they do from their hearts hold and intend ) no more can in reason be requir'd . is not this enough , will they say , for salvation ? must the seamless coat of christ be torn and shatter'd to pieces , charity and church-communion be violated in the height , for the sake of a speculative tenet ; which , however it may please some , can sute with the fancies of very few ; perhaps none , if they would but lay aside their customary belief , which education and not judgment has given them ; and set themselves seriously to reflect how uncouth it is to their reason , and how utterly unuseful , ineffectual , and of no influence at all , it is to good life , piety , and virtuous action . thus they will plead for their impious doctrine , and schismatical fact ; and their apology will be receiv'd with applause , by all the latitudinarian party . for nothing is so cheap , and costs so little , and withal is so necessary for those who are destitute of solid reasons , as 't is to affect and have recourse to godly cant , . in answer , first , we will speak to the persons , and their guilt or innocence ; then to the point it self . we ask then those rabbies of the anti-trinitarians , who taught them that piece of doctrine , which they proceed upon as if it were a a self-evident principle , that the way to determine what we are to believe , what not , is to begin our enquiry by scanning the articles of faith themselves , by our common and obvious reason ; and to make this the test of what we are to accept , what to reject . for , first , they cannot but see ●hat this takes away the very notion of faith out ●f the hearts of mankind . i suppose by [ reason ] ●hey mean evident reason , for otherwise they ●ust grant that this rule of theirs is uncertain , ●nd therefore can be no rule at all . and , if they will not believe but upon evident reason , then 't is science ; and so farwell all faith. secondly , if they say they intend only to evidence the opposite tenet to be false , and not any point of faith to be true ; we are but where we were . for , where the tenets in question are contradictories , as 't is here ; he that evidences the trinity of persons in the godhead to be false , does , with the same labour , and at the same time , evidence the unity of person in the same godhead to be true : since then this later is a point of faith with them , they must still grant that , by evidencing this , they turn faith into science . thirdly , this tenet , amongst others , was held by themselves , e're they renounc'd it , to have come to them by divine revelation ; wherefore , they are convinced , by recurring to this new rule of humane reason , to bid adieu to all divine revelation ; and , so , they fall in with the deists ; for , why should one point of faith be received upon their rule of humane reason , and not all. fourthly , they are false to their own rule , and their own pretence ; and therefore are not to be credited , nor without some straining of charity , to be excus'd as to their having sincere intentions . an evident proof can be no other but a clear demonstration , and to this i have not observ'd they ever so much as pretended . 't is easie to call any pretty probable proof an evidence , so it be but sutable to fancy : but demonstration carries something that is manly , decisive and victorious in its notion ; to which therefore 't is dangerous for plausible and probable discoursers to pretend . a true demonstration must be built on principles that are evident , and finally reducible to self-evidence : so must the consequence of it too , and the medium must be such as is most necessarily connected with the two extremes . what i affirm then is , that they have not produc'd so much as one demonstration , ( however they would have it ●hought they have , ) though they cautiously mince it in the expression . if they have any such let us see it , let us hear of it . i will grant them that any one , which is truly such , will conclude the point , and carry the cause . they have seen my explication , what grounds i proceed upon , and what principles i build on . wherefore , to make short work of it , i send them a flat challenge to produce this one demonstration of theirs against this mystery . half a sheet of paper will conclude the whole controversie , as far as it depends on the way of humane reason ; to which they have appeal'd from divine revelation , and from the iudgment and doctrine of the christian church . if they be sincere , they will put it to the tryal ; if they refuse , they give themselves to be guilty of persisting voluntarily in an errour , and manifest that they took up this pretence of evident reason for a stale to draw after them the ignorant and unstable ; but that they do not think it their interest to stand to the rule themselves have espoused . fifthly , by renouncing this fundamental of christian faith , they have , by consequence , invalidated all christian faith , by denying the certainty of the ground of all faith. for this was held by the christian church upon some ground ; which , by their recession as to this point , they have renounc'd ; and by consequence , have brought all christian faith into a groundless uncertainty . lastly , by their denial of this article , they accuse the christian church of being idolatrous , in the most fundamental article of her faith , and in the greatest part of her worship , in adoring so constantly , heartily and devoutly , a man for god , and a creature for the dread creatour . . to summe up then this whole discourse . if the taking away the notion of all faith , and turning it into science . if to renounce , by consesequence , divine revelation , which none but deists professedly oppose . if the injury done to humane reason , ( besides the misapplying it ) and the fourbe put upon weak souls , in setting up for evident reasoners , without offering so much as one argument which is in true speech evident , or conclusive ; if the undermining the ground on which all faith is built , as to our knowledge of it . lastly , if the accusing their former superiours , the church-governours , so many venerable , learned , and holy fathers of the c●urch , and even so many general and provincial councils ; nay , the christian church it self , of most gross idolatry , blasphemy and prophaneness , may be thought sufficient provocation and plea for the governours of the christian church to excommunicate and declare , that they ( who were by their office the depositaries to whom the preserving of christ's faith was committed , ) would have no more to do with such men who had voluntarily gone out from the church ; and who , should they be permitted still to remain in her , would hazard to infect with their contagious doctrine and practice the sounder faithful . if these things , i say , be manifestly so , then the church and her governours are acquitted , and the blame and guilt lie evidently at their doors : this is the true point to be decided . which , i believe every man of common sense , were they of the jury , would quickly determin , without needing to go from the bar to debate it , or consider of it . . but this is not all that may be alledg'd against them ; there seems moreover , to be imply'd in their discourses , that the most perfect law and most elevating principles of christianity are no better than that most imperfect state of the law of nature , which rais'd men to no higher a pitch than that of meer moral honesty ; in which divers of the antient heathens excell'd many christians . what necessity was there , in such a case , that christ our saviour should come amongst us , take such pains in preaching and working miracles , suffering a most cruel death on the cross , rising again from the dead , ascending into heaven , and sending his h. spirit , & c ? certainly , it had been very preposterous to have laid so many supernatural , extraordinary and prodigious means , to compass such an end , as was within the power of nature , without miraculous or supernatural assistance , to atchieve . . this shews their sleight opinion of the christian law. the nature of it's principles and the efficacy of the motives it proposes ; which was intended by god's wisdom to purifie in the best manner the hearts of the faithful , and to raise them to the love of heaven by the most powerful means infinite goodness and mercy could contrive . to apprehend better how highly god's revelation of ●●e b. trinity conduces to mankind's salvation , and ●o cultivate our minds with theological virtues , which are the only dispositions to attain it ; let us consider how god's revealing himself to us , as to those attributes of mercy , justice , goodness , omnipotence , holiness , &c. did and does promote virtue , in the church , and thence estimate what large accessions the belief of the b. trinity does superadd to them . if god had not been represented to us , and believ'd by us to be iust , what sinner would not have run on in sin , presuming he was unconcern'd in sublunary actions , and would never call him to account for his sins ? or , if he held him severely iust and not merciful , what poor creature , conscious to himself how often he had grievously offended him , would not despair of pardon , think all was irrecoverably lost , and thence run forwards headlong in sinning ; wanting encouragement , or hope of any favour , in case he should return , and repent ? who would at all love him , if he did not think him good ; believe in him if he were not veracious ; or trust in him if he were not faithful and powerful ? or , lastly , who would care to lead a holy life , if he deem'd that god was not holy himself ? so that all sorts of the best virtues , faith , hope , and charity , would be banisht out of the thoughts of all mankind , if god had not reveal'd himself to them under the notions of these several ●ivine attributes . . let us now consider what incomparably higher advances in virtue the doctrine of the b. trinity , and all the train of innumerable and most powerful motives which depend on it , as on their principle , do superadd to the former now mention'd , all tending , of their own nature ; to pur● our souls , and to raise them to the highest pitch o● perfection . they are so many , and each of them so pregnant , that i must content my self to select only a few , and leave them to be meditated on at leasure . what man , who believes that god the father sent his only son , coequal and coeternal with himself , to take our nature upon him , to teach us the true way to heaven ; to suffer hardships , persecutions , blasphemous revilings ▪ nay , to be buffetted , scourg'd , crown'd with thorns , and suffer such a cruel and ignominious death on the cross ; and all this to pay the ransom for our sins , and rescue poor wretched mankind out of the jaws of hell and eternal death ; and by this means to court our love , that by loving him we might be happy : what man , i say , can seriously and thorowly reflect on this , and not to be transported with admiration and love of so infinite a goodness ? what soul ▪ tho' never so wicked and senseless , who , with a full consideration , lays this to heart , will not melt with love at such a transcendent mercy to a sinful world ? who can chuse but be astonisht , even to an extasie , at such a generous goodness ? who can be so ungrateful as wilfully to offend and disoblige so kind a benefactor ? who will not tremble at the iustice of so pure a god , and reflect on the hatred he bears to sin , who punisht it so severely in his own son , who had taken upon him to bear the curse of it ? what heart would not break in the midst of all temptations , rather than crucifie again so dear a saviour ? who would stick to pardon an enemy for his sake , who had not only pardon'd us while we were his enemies ; but , moreover , heapt all the ●●●●est benefits of his mercy upon us , even while we were such , tho' it cost him so dear ? who would not love and hope in such an indulgent father who so tenderly lov'd us ; and a suffering god who , at the infinite expence of his most precious blood , redeem'd us ; and in both of them , who to crown all their favours , sent the holy ghost , god , coequal with themselves , to sanctifie with a thousand blessed effects the hearts of the faithful , to strengthen them in afflictions and temptations , to inspire them with charity , the source of all heavenly virtues , to the end of the world ; and to dwell spiritually in our hearts for ever ? . here are motives of another kind of size than either the law of nature , or the empty elements of the mosaick law could afford us , or even give us a glimpse of ; here are means of raising souls effectually to love of heaven , in comparison of which all the rest are flat and dull , and , in comparison , trifles , or rather meer nothing . yet these men who would bereave the world of these , by denying the mystery of the b. trinity on which all these are grounded , expect they should be kindly treated as brethren ; while they , for their whimsies of fancy , bereave all the faithful in god's church of these highest spiritual advantages ; which every sensible man cannot but see would both dispose them strongly for heaven ; and bring to salvation innumerably - more souls ; and advance those who do go thither , to higher degrees of bliss , and make them more glorious stars in the firmament of the heavenly hierusalem . what i wonder at , is , that these gentlemen do not plant their batteries against the belief of the b. trinity , upon the incredibility of such wonderful condescensions and ( as they might pretend ) debasements of th● deity , than against the speculative truth of the point it self . none of those prodigious mercies but transcend our f●ncy , whence all their other arguments are drawn , ( for which reason the greeks esteem'd christianity foolishness , ) and therefore might afford them more plausible arguments than any they have brought hitherto . had they employ'd their talent in impugning the trinity upon that score , and ply'd that topick , i must confess i had been to seek for any other answer , than to alledge , that god is infinite , in all his attributes ; which he had not been , at least we could not so well have known it , had not he given us such testimonies of his mercy , goodness , justice , &c. as are beyond all that we are able to conceive . wherefore , since what 's beyond what we are able to conceive is justly held mysterious to us , all the mysteries of our faith , if things be well consider'd , and driven up to their first root or principle , do spring from god's infinity in this or some such regard . even the mystery of the b. trinity , which chiefly consists in this , that the same numerical nature is in three distinct persons , is grounned on this , that his nature being infinite is but one , as is shown above , b. . and the same may be said of all the rest of those articles of our faith which we account mysteries . wherefore , i would recommend it to the author of christianity not mysterious , that he would bless us w●th a treatise to show us how to comprehend infinity ; how to define it , or give us it 's full dimensions ; for all we know of it hitherto is to distinguish it's notion from [ finite , ] by a negation ; but to make a true conception of it's entire positive perfection we fall infinitely short . let ●im then either do this , or else , as long as god , ●e author of our faith , is unconceiveable by us , or ●nfinite , so long that faith it self , the product of his infinite being , and his other attributes , ( especially those which concern his own essence ) ●ill still be impossible to be comprehended by us ; and so , christianity will still remain mysterious , let him scrib●le his plausibe conceits as long as he pleases . but , to proceed with showing the demerit of those scarce-half-quarter christians . . let us next consider what powerful authority and majesty it must give to the whole doctrine of christianity , and to every particular of it ; what veneration and esteem to the holy sacraments instituted by christ ; to every sentence which is recorded in the holy scripture to have been spoken by our b. saviour ; and to every action said to have been done by him ; to believe that it was god himself who came down from heaven to teach us that doctrine , institute those sacraments ( from which institution they have all their efficacy ) who spoke those words of eternal life , and did those actions in his own person . infinite are the particular motives of this nature , and beyond any man's power to recount and lay open at large as he ought ; all of them ●ending to rectifie our irregular passions , to arm us against temptations , and sanctifie our souls by raising them to a firm faith , a stedfast hope and ardent charity ; the only dispositions which can fit mankind for eternal happiness . were all these particulars laid open and dilated upon , to their full energy , in affective sermons , ( as they are daily , to a great measure , ) in the christian church ; what transports of heavenly love , and affectionate devotion must they needs make in the hearts of the hearers , to th● end of the world ; what innumerable pio● thoughts must they excite ; how many actions o● all sorts of virtue must they produce ? not to speak how vigorously it must move people of all sorts to the imitation of those heroick virtues , which the life and practice of a god made man sets before their eyes , for patterns by which they ought to frame their christian conversation ; the very notions of which , confronted with the contrary demeanour of frail sinners , is of force to shame them into repentance and amendment of their lives . . now , the main efficacy and powerfulness of all these highest motives to true sanctity depends on the belief of three divine persons in the unity of the godhead . take this away , god the father could not send his son who was also god ; nor could god , in his own person , come amongst us , to teach and instruct us by his word and example ; nor die and suffer for our sins ; nor arise again for our justification ; nor ascend into heaven , to draw our hearts and affections after him , &c. let , now , the deniers of a trinity , put a meer man , ( however endow'd ) instead of a god ; and common sense will tell themselves , and every considering man , how feeble , languid , and ineffectual all these motives to holy life had been , in comparison of what they would be if all these most endearing obligations had been laid upon us immediately by god himself . and , can they then expect the christian church governours can do less than deny them the right hand of fellowship and communion , who , in matters of the highest concern , do thus prejudice the common spiritual good of that community ? . if the authors of the letter concerning the ●inity and the athanasian creed , be sincere in their profession , that they intend no more but to get light and information to promote their eternal hap●●●●ss , i desire they would please to ask themselves ●●ese questions , and let their own consciences answer them . did not god intend that the law of grace should put souls in the purest and best state that can be , next to that of glory in heaven which immediately succeeds it ; and , consequently , that it has the best means in it that can be to promote the eternal happiness of mankind ? next , is not the belief that god sent his only son to die for our sins , that god the son did die for us , and in his proper person taught us his heavenly doctrine , and led such a most perfect life amongst us for our example ; and the many other tenets and motives consequent from these ; i say , are not these better means of eternal salvation , and more effectual to raise our thoughts to an affectionate love of him , to trust in his mercy , to follow his dectrine , and imitate his holy life , than if a meer man , a creature , and therefore infinitely short of his divine majesty , had been sent for that purpose ? now , if they grant these , then they must acknowledge , that the doctrine of the trinity , upon which all these advantages are grounded , being the best means , or rather the principle , on which these best means for virtue are built , must be acknowledg'd to be true. i am far from thinking that ignorance is the genuine mother of devotion : much less , that errour , especially so shameless an errour , as is nothing but nonsense and contradiction ; nay , such an idolatrous errour as gives divine honour to a creature , should be so great a friend to piety , and devotion , and so effectual and proper ( as we have seen this is ) to beget in souls such purity of heart , as is apt to cultivate them with all sorts of the best virtues , and raise them so effectually to heaven ; nay , incomparably more effectually than the contrary tenet , if ( as they hold ) it be true , could possibly effect . i have not time at present to pursue the confutation of that pamphlet : but , if any farther reply shall be judg'd needful than what mr. frankland has already given it , my endeavours shall be ready to defend so great a fundamental of christian faith. in the mean time , i shall presume that whoever peruses attentively this present explication , shall find that all their objections are either defeated or prevented . i only remark , that all their opposition is built either upon their ignorance of a spiritual nature ; or else on their not distinguishing exactly the notions or meanings of the words of which they make use ; which i have done as accurately as i could possibly in my method to science , and in my preliminaries here . for , 't is very easie to observe , that they confound the notion of substance or being with that of relation ; positive with relative ; nature with suppositum . they quarrel with the word [ person , ] which is a plain natural notion ; and yet themselves do not tell us what it should mean ; as if they who oppose it were not also oblig'd to acquaint the reader what it is , or signifies , as well as we ; since otherwise , they must confess they oppose they know not what . they build mainly on that weak topick that some divines have differ'd about their explications of it ; ●s if every thesis whatever did not abstract from ●ll explications . the tenet it self was antece●ent , and the explications superven'd ; and therefore the article it self is still but where it was , and stands firm upon its proper basis , divine revelation , though they , i , and all other explicators in the world were never so faulty . but my appendix grows too bulky , and 't is time to close it . sect . last . that the anti-trinitarians cannot satisfie any man of common sense . . but what shall the unlearned vulgar do in the mean time ? on the one side they see the opposers of the trinity do bear themselves high , in pretending evidence against it ; and that they offer many plausible and seeming reasons , which they are not able to solve ; and the replies of learned men are perhaps too speculative for those of their pitch . how , then , and in what manner , ought they to bear themselves ? their reason is startled and dissatisfied ; and consequently , their conscience ; when it is confidently pretended , and offer'd to be prov'd , that the embracing this tenet obliges them to acknowledge more gods than one ; which both sides grant to be perfect idolatry . i answer , and offer to them these considerations . . and , first , i would ask them of what religion or profession they were when they first read those books , or listen'd to those discourses which startled them in the belief of a trinity ▪ had they any faith at all before , or were they mere infidels , or seekers : if they had any faith ; then they had some ground for that faith , and held that ground certain , as the ground of faith ought to be ; and then they stand oblig'd by evident reason , either to see that ground invalidated and overthrown , or to continue where they are . now , this opposing the point it self by way of pretended reason does not at all combat their ground of believing thus , but brings foreign objections against the particular article , which is a kind of conclusion from that ground ; that is , it lets the principle alone , and attacques the conclusion , which is manifestly an indirect way of proceeding , and withal foolish : for , if the principle stands , what 's bulit on that principle will stand too , let objections say what they please . besides grounds and principles , have something of solid in their meen and notion ; and ought always ( and generally do ) subsist upon settled iudgment , and right reason ; whereas objections are almost always the product of fancy , which is a volatil , roving and unsettled faculty , ever wayward , humours●me , and unsatisfied ; and of so unconstant a nature it self , that 't is incapable of settling any principle at all . . again , a very ordinary experience in the world will teach them ▪ that lawyers plead very plausible for contrary causes , and sometimes preachers for contrary opinions ; so that it is not every seeming . reason which we cannot readily answer , though it may look very plausible , that ought to shock us , or make us entertain an ill opinion of our principle it self . but , it must be such a solid reason as may be held more evident than the principle was on which they , and the body or community they were in , had built their former faith ; otherwise it cannot with any sense be held able to cope or contrast with it , much less to overthrow it . . they ought , i say , in such a case , to consider that they were formerly in a christian community , or in some church , and were actually members of that body , from which they must separate ; and so be guilty of a very criminal schism , if they divide themselves by apostacy from it : which makes it plain to the meanest capacity , that the reasons which are oppos'd , ought to be most evident , and most cogent . this ought to make them cautious and wary in admitting such objections for true reasons ; lest , if they hap to be prov'd false , they run themselves desperately into such a dangerou● precipice . wherefore they must be certain those reasons were indeed most evident , ( which we call demonstrative ) and not only probable , by resting on which they hazard such a mi●chief to their souls . plainest reason tells them , that no truth in the world could remain long settled , nor any government continue long on foot , if the subjects , or inferiours , may be allowed upon every probable reason , to break from the whole body , and rebel against superiours and governours . now , not to mention that they can never bring any such proof , as can in the esteem of a vulgar understanding be held conclusive , or demonstrative ; it is evident by the carriage of the rabbi●s of those dissenters , that they never did even pretend to bring any demonstrative proof against the trinity . for did they ever lay any self-evident principles , or build on them , as those to which those proofs are finally reducible ? 't is unheard of ; and yet without these , 't is impossible there can be any true evidence , or demonstration . for , whatever pretends to be evident , must either be evident of it self , or be made evident by something that is moro evident than it self is ; which must either run on endlesly , or terminate at length in something that is self-evident . a demonstration , if truly such , and clearly propos'd . obliges all humane nature to assent to it , if they be unprejudic'd . if they can pretend they have any such demonstrative argument that the doctrine of the trinity is such nonsense , and so impious , why do they not produce it , stand to it , show the principle it is grounded on , and the connexion it has with that principle . one such argument would decide the cause , and put an end to the whole controversie . but , alas ! they dare not so much as say , ( i am sure they never did ) that they have any such kind of argument . they never concern themselves with examining the qualification of arguments , or what proofs conclude , what not ; but content themselves to talk rawly , prettily , and plausibly . 't is not their design to convince men of learning , but to over-reach and work upon the weakness of the ignorant . whence follows that , since no proof can be even pretended competent to break church-communion , but such as is evidenty conclusive , or demonstrative , and they neither produce , nor profess to bring any sue● , their reasons ought not to weigh with any man of sense , so as to make him , for their sake , hazard the guilt of schism . . they ought to consider next , when they have left the particular church in which they were , and in which there are church-governours , and a great body of christians with whom they do joyn in faith , prayer , sacraments , discipline , and other spiritual duties ; with what church-governours , and what body of men they will joyn in prayer , and such devout offices . can a few men scatter'd here and there , who sculk in corners , do not own themselves openly , nor barefacedly protest and preach against this doctrine , which ( if false ) is so manifestly idolatrous ; can , i say , such a rope of sand , such an unconnected multitude , who thus let god's honour go to wrack , have the face , or the least show of a church ? with whom then will these new proselytes joyn hemselves in prayet , sacraments , church-government , and other such concerns ? this is so shameful to their pretended church , that though 't is against all conscience and sense , they are content to joyn in prayer and other religious duties with our churches , ( though themselves must hold them most abominably idolatrous ) rather than make a ridiculous show of their own party alone . perhaps too , interest and indemnity are two powerful motives to induce them to this brotherly compliance and correspondence : for such men do not use to be guilty of such a zeal for god's honour , or for their own persuasion , as to hazard martyrdom , no not the less of any temporal advantages for god's or truth 's sake . they are cast in a new mold from that of other good christians , and approach to the deists , as in other prudent methods , so in this . . if those unstable and dissatisfy'd men say they are not able to judge whether the reasons they bring are conclusive or no ; they plainly confess they hanker after them out of the bewitching humour of singularity , and novelty ; since they consent to alter their former faith upon such reasons as they know not whether they be good or bad , solid or aiery , fit to be yeilded to or no : that is in plain terms , they have an inclination to that party , but yet they do not well know why . if they alledge that their reasons seem more easie to them than those brought by others : i answer , first , that easiness is not a sign of truth . the highest truths , especially those belonging to spiritual natures , are the hardest to conceive , and yet not a jot the less true. 't is easier to conceive god to be a body , and perform all his actions by motion , as we do ours ; and yet it is so far from true , that it is a damnable errour , and destroys the nature of the deity . or rather it is a vast prejudice against all their arguments , and their very way of arguing : for , tho' each single word , in which faith was deliver'd , was easie , so that the then believers could have a right apprehension , or notion of what was taught them ; yet , when the point comes to be canvast by disputation , and reasons produc'd pro and con , and that the point is of what passes in the divine nature , which is not only spiritual , but infinite ; 't is a certain sign , that , if the reasons either party produces be easie to vulgar fancies ; 't is , i say , a most certain sign , that they are merely superficial , and do not reach the nature of so abstruse a mystery , or so high a subject . . they may also be made sensible how impossible it is , that bishops of the eastern and western churches should meet together in the first council of nice ; ( who by their station must needs know the sentiment of the then christian church ; ) and there decree and subscribe to the doctrine of the trinity , and propose a formal creed , what every man ought to believe in that article . those bishops could not be thought to act herein against their conscience ; nor could any ever impeach their sanctity , so as to make them such a pack of villains as wilfully to damn themselves , and all those souls they had influence over , by defining that a creature was truly god. add , that neither could they be ignorant of the doctrine and practice of the foregoing church from christ's time . their session was not much more than years after the birth of our saviour ; allowing then about years for our saviour's life-time , and ( more or less ) for the apostles lives after his death , and for the lives of those bishops e're they met ; it was easie for their great grand-fathers ; nay , divers of their grand-fathers , and also for the grand-fathers of many in that age , to have liv'd in the times of the apostles ; and it was utterly incredible there should be such a change in faith , so universally and far spread , and none know who first introduced it , and were the chiefest instruments in propagating it ; and a thousand times harder to conceive that it should not be vigorously oppos'd till arius his time . besides , their devotions , and adoration of christ could not but go along with their faith ; and who can without madness imagine , that an universal change of such a practice in so high a point as the joyning a false god with a true one , a creature with a creatour , in their adoration , could possibly creep into the world and diffuse itself over the church , and yet should never be observ'd and oppos'd , when it first appear'd . . moreover , since these doubters were brought up amongst christians , they cannot but know how highly faith , hope , and charity , which were ever held the best-of supernatural virtues , are necessary to promote souls in holiness , raise their thoughts and affections vigorously to heaven , and thence conduce to their salvation . wherefore , by our former discourse , they must needs see how those virtues are enfeebled , and the best motives to erect their souls to heaven are made flat and insignificant ( in comparison ) by the denying this mystery : and , consequently , since errour can never be a friend to piety , that that tenet is true. nay , they must be conscious to themselves , that , by denying it , they bereave themselves of the most effectual means to elevate their souls to hope and love of heaven , which is the only disposition that can bring them thither . those well-meaning men are born in hand by their deluders , that , by dis-believing the b. trinity , it is but one point they deny ; but that they may , and do , nevertheless , stand right in all the rest . but they are abus'd . whoever denies the trinity , does , by consequence , deny all other tenets , and enervates all the motives that are peculiar to christianity as such , or as it superadds to the law of nature and that of moses ; as might easily be shown in every article of our creed , ( were it seasonable to make so long an excursion , ) and how it is , one way or other , influenced by this. it will be objected , that there were as great saints in either of the former laws as in this last ; such as e●●●● , daniel , moses , elias , david , &c. i answer that there were great saints no doubt , now and then , under those former states of the church : ●●t i deny that that sanctity was owing to the ●gena elementa , or ordinary efficacy and doctrine ●● those laws ; but that they had those elevated ●egrees and high strains of holiness which appears in their actions and writings , by extraordinary means ; viz. either from the prophets who were divinely inspir'd ; or else from partiiular supernatural providences , ( not unfrequent in those days ) and not meerly from the state of the mosaical or of the natural law. their best dispositions for heaven was their faith and hope in a messiah to come , which how dim and dark that was , in comparison of what god has reveal'd to the world after his resurrection and coming of the h. ghost , every divine knows . i grant , indeed , that the anti-trinitarians keep up some faint show of devotion , by pretending a creature was sent to teach the world , and die , suffer , &c. but , i say withall , that the force and energy of all these motives and means , depending on , and going parallel to the dignity of the person , especially his dying for our sins ; it does consequently fall short of the efficacy it might have , as far as does the majesty and worthiness of an infinite god and creatour , to the vileness and worthlesness ( in comparison ) of a finite creature . . those unstable doubters may be advertis'd , that tho' they be not able to weigh the force of the arguments which both sides produce , yet god's goodness has not left them destitute of means , suitable to their pitch , to preserve them from being deluded , if they will but use them ; which is , to consider the authority which the writers of one party and the other ought to have in the●● esteem . now , there are two particulars to 〈◊〉 consider'd in learned authors , viz. their n●●ber and their weight . as for the first of these their number , the anti-trinitarians must confess that taking the whole extent of the church , and this thro' so many centuries , there have been innumerable multitudes of bishops and priests , famous for their knowledge and sanctity ; and , considering the number of christian universities , ten thousand doctors of divinity , and men eminent for learning , for one of theirs ; who , for their morals , were many of them reputed saints , and none of them held impious or careless of their salvation . all this incredible multitude of knowing and virtuous persons , have held , ador'd and glorify'd the h. trinity of persons in the unity of the godhead ; and lookt-upon it as a most fundamental article of all christian faith. so that in number the anti-trinitarians cannot pretend their learned men bear any proportion to ours . as for the weight of their authority , it depends on their knowledge and their honesty . allowing then both parties to be equal as to their honesty and sincerity , and considering only their knowledge : tho' those unlearned persons i speak to at present , ( they not being professors of knowledge themselves , ) cannot be qualify'd to judge directly , which party is more knowing ; yet they are capable of so much sense as to reflect , that if the learned men who deny a trinity be comparatively so very few in number , they must be superabundant in weight , that is , exceedingly more knowing than the christian party was : for , otherwise , the vast over-proportion in number , must , in such men's esteem , necessa●●ly sink the ballance to the christian's side : na●●re having given them so much sense as to see ●vidently , that where the quality is equal in both , the quantity must clearly carry the advantage ▪ now , what one man of those very few ( comparatively ) which they can pretend to , can they name , who has been such a monster of learning in comparison of this innumerable multitude of christian bishops , fathers , and profest doctors , that they are all to be held dunces in comparison of him ? what are the productions , where are the books that prodigious man has writ , which have rais'd him to that transcendent reputation in the world , that all our doctors , who have been by indifferent men ( to say no more ) held to be men very eminent for their learning , ought , all of them to be accounted block beads , if compar'd with his peerless parts ? none such was ever heard of ; and i believe themselves will not think it for the interest of their credit to name any such . wherefore , it is obvious for any man of ordinary prudence to discern that the weight of the authority of their learned men is far from being considerable ; and thence conclude , that the vast number of our learned bishops , professors , and doctors , ought , in their esteem , to outweigh , beyond any comparison , the adverse party . . if they have , or ever had , any such paragon of learning to produce , let them approve him to be such by bringing some one demonstration of his against our doctrine of the b. trinity . one single demonstration , as i told them above , deduc't from undeniable principles , stood to , and maintain'd by reducing it to evident grounds , would do the whole business , and save much pro●fusion of ink-shed . but , alas ! they are , an● have been so far from bringing any , that i could never discern they ever aym'd at it , or so much as knew what a demonstration meant . their utmost ambition is to give their sleight discourses a glossy outward appearance , ( for superficial talk best takes with weak people ) and if they can but make it look probable by alluding texts , or sprucing it up with a little smooth rhetorick , and such baubles as nonsense needs to adorn and recommend it , they think their work is done , and they have perform'd wonders . . this leads us to their pretence , that scripture is clearly for them ; that is , that they brag they hit on the right sense of it better than the christian party ; and , it must be allow'd , that they have a peculiar dexterity in giving a plausible turn to the plainest texts , by study'd allusions of one place to another ; which , especially , if it be new , and not observ'd formerly , is able to delude the ignorant . but an easie antidote will secure any man of an ordinary size of wit from being infected with this quaint stratagem . it were easie to show that he must be a man of universal learning who is qualify'd to be a consummate interpreter of the several places of scripture , as they profess themselves to be . he must be well verst in the oriental languages , an excellent critick , a great chronologist , well acquainted with the sense of antiquity , and even of their customs , their proverbs , phrases or manners of speaking ; he must be a good logician to observe the tenour or connexion of the context , and thence able to discern whether the alluded places ●… taken in the same precise sense ; without which ●he allusion of them to one another is ridiculous , ●mproper and insignificant . he must be a good natural philosopher and metaphysician , otherwise those passages which speak of spiritual natures , ●f understood literally , will lead them into most dangerous mistakes . lastly , he must be a good speculative divine , to consider the drift and nature of reveal'd faith , and the end why it was told us ; and thence the proportion those means have to compass that end ; a point particularly useful for pastors who are to guide souls in the paths that lead to heaven , and breed them up so as to attain eternal happiness , &c. now , it is manifest , that those vulgar understandings , to whom we address this discourse , are not capable of any of these ; nor , consequently , can they determine who has these qualifications , or follows these rules exactly : yet , there is none of them so ignorant , but he knows very certainly , that no man can compass an end without the means to it : nor , can be able to compass it better without having better means . let then the right interpretation of scripture be the end aym'd at ; the means to perform this , or atchieve this end , must either be supernatural or natural ; and unless they can show their advantage in one of these means , they cannot pretend to persuade any man of common sense to believe them . to the former of these means they do not pretend ; and , if they did , they must show some supernatural outward sign to justifie their claim : for , otherwise , since no man can see what passes within their souls , none can have any reason to believe they have any such . if they say , they have better natural means , it will lie upon them to pro●… it ; and how will they evince it , or make it 〈…〉 that they are so singularly furnisht with tho●● natural or human means as to out strip so clearly and surpass the innumerable multitudes of christian doctors and professors in many learn●● universities , and for so many ages . our men have been professors of the sacred languages , they have spent many years in perusing the fathers and ancient commentators , they are most exact criticks , nay , so far as to have writ divers volumes on that subject . they have been held eminent in logick , and in all sorts of philosophy and divinity , &c. and the same may be said of whatever other humane skill , art or science , the others can pretend to . how then will the anti-trinitarians make it appear , that they have better natural means of interpreting scripture than the christian church and her members have had , and still have ? and , if they cannot make out they have better means for interpreting scripture , what man will be so sottish as to believe them they better interpret it , meerly because they say they do ? for 't is here supposed , those unlearned persons are not qualify'd to judge of the allegations on both sides , which are made pro and con . . lest it should be pretended , as some deists do , that the apostles out of over-respect to their master would needs make him a god ; and , to make that tenet current sense , invented a trinity of persons , of which each should be god ; or , ( as the arians and socinians say ) that the christian church introduced it sinee ; to beat down this calumny , those unlearned and credulous men may ask them , how this could be , since both many learned jews , and even some wiser heathens acknowledg'd a trinity in god : as to ●he jews , it is shown at large from their own authors , in that excellent treatise , entituled , a short and easie method with the deists , with a second part to the iews , from pag. . to . and as for the heathens , i hapt to reside some time at amsterdam in the year . where i converst very frequently with christophorus sandii sandius , the famous modern writer for the arians . of whom , by the way , to give the reader some account . he was a man of a quick conceit , and nimble wit ; his talent lay in catching at little expressions , snatcht out of authors here and here , and improving them dexterously to his advantage ; but otherwise he seem'd quite destitute of logick , or any other philosophical science . hence , he was a very weak reasoner , a rash concluder , and incapable of arguing from any principles , which he quite disregarded and sleighted . what concerns my purpose is , that he show'd me divers citations which he had pickt up out of heathen authors , in which they own'd a trinity ; and would needs pretend that the christian church had borrow'd ( forsooth ) that tenet , among other superstitions , from the heathens . i told him , that this made against himself , and rather argu●d that all mankind , who reflected deeply upon the essence of a spiritual nature , especially if they held it to be infinite , had some rude sentiments of a trinity ; or perhaps , that some few iews might have it from some persons that were englighten'd after a special manner , and that the heathens had it ●●om them. i wish my recommendation might prevail with some learned man of our universities , where they have plentiful libraries , to confute that book of his ; in compiling which , i could discern by his discourse , he had been assisted by his whole party , inspecting libraries in divers countries , and picking out what they could find to their advantage . i believe they will find it wants no insincerity ; a judicious friend of mine , whom i intreated to peruse it , having ( as he told me ) discover'd much foul play in divers places . . the same unlearned readers may also be admonisht that they ought not to read , or at least heed such books ; lest wading too rashly out of their depth , they come to sink . for , since such books pretend to show , that the tenet of the trinity is full of contradictions , and such readers are not skill'd , nor are able to know , how many requisites do go to a contradiction ; it is manifest they wrong their reason by over-weening , or taking upon them to judge of a point of which they are ignorant what the very terms mean. . yet , if they have good mother-wits , they may be made to a great degree capable of discerning the folly and false reasoning of such sleight discoursers . it will not be hard to make such men see there can be no contradiction unless we affirm and deny in the same respect . v. g. that there is no contradiction to say , that a table is three according to the notion or respect of such a figure call'd a corner , or three-corner'd ; and yet is but one according to that respect , call'd a table , or but one table : or , that a man who is a father , a son , and a husband may be three according to that respect or notion call'd relation , or have three relations in him , and yet , be but one , according to the notion of thing , or but one man. which done , let but the several notions or respects that belong to this mystery be distinguish'd ; ( by confounding which those men do pretend to show it contradictious ; ) and a little instruction will let them see plainly , that , at least many of their objections , if not all , are merely frivolous and insignificant . . to make this sink better into their apprehension , it were not amiss to instance in some one paragraph of the aforesaid letter , concerning the trinity and athanasian creed . wee 'll take one of the shortest , but withall the pithiest and shrewdest in their way of arguing . 't is found , p. . col. . in these words , [ if the father is an infinite all-perfect being ; and , if the son is distinct from the father ; he must , if he be a god , be a distinct infinite all-perfect being ; for the same being can be no way distinct from its self : and , certainly , two distinct all-perfect beings are two distinct gods . ] how currently and smoothly this glides over the fancy : yet , when examin'd , and brought to the test , it will appear by and by , that 't is so incomparably weak and silly , that 't is scarce possible to croud more nonsence into so narrow a room . which i show thus . . 't is acknowledg'd , the father is an infinite all-perfect being ; for he has the divine nature in him , which is infinitely perfect , or truly god. he proceeds . [ and if the son is distinct from the father . ] in what sense , i beseech him , or according to what notion or respect do we hold he is distinct ? in that of being ? not one man in god's church ever said it . what we hold and maintain is , that he is only distinct from him according to that notion or respect calld , relation ▪ and what man so stupid as not to see that what differs only in relation , may be the same many or the same being still ? a man is marry'd , and has never a child ; and then he is a [ man ] but is [ not a father ] afterwards , he has a son , and then he is a father ; and yet he is the same man , or the same being he was : though , to be a father , and not to be a father , abstractedly conceiv'd , be contradictories . it follows , [ and therefore , he must if he be a god , be a distinct all perfect being . ] and why must this follow , when the distinction affects the godhead , only according to that respect called relation ; and not according to that respect called essence , or according to the godhead it self , or the divine nature . 't is strange that these men cannot reflect that , when we say , [ god knows himself ] , or , which is the same , [ god ●i known by himself ] what 's mean't by knower , and known , do formally signifie the relation ; and the word [ god , ] and which is the same , [ himself ] do signifie the godhead , or the same infinite all-perfect being in both. but the reason he gives for this consequence , exprest in the words , [ for the same being can be no ways distinct from it self ] is such a most profound piece of ignorance , that 't is unparallell'd . indeed , a being can be no ways distinct from it self , under the notion of being ; for this were to be the same being , and not to be the same being ; but that it can be no ways ( as he says ) distinct from it self , but it must have a different being , is against our common notions , the common language , and the common sense of all mankind . a child is the same thing , or the same being , when it is grown up to be a man ; wherefore this same being which is now a perfect , or ●ipe man , is now distinct from its self , according to its quantity , which is one way of being distinct from its former self . the same man was yesterday in health , and now is sick ; and therefore he is distinct , or different from himself according to those qualities ; which is another way . he was before no father , and now is a father ; therefore he is distnct from his former self , according to the notion or respect of relation , which is a third way ; and yet , all this while , he is the self-same in respect of his be●ng . innumerable are the particular ways , endless are the instances that might be given , how the same thing , or being , might differ from its self in some other respect than that of being , and therefore must still remain the same being . wherefore this universal thesis that [ the same being can no ways be distinct from its self ] is confutable by the dullest sophister who ever heard of , and understood the ten predicaments , which are the common heads that contain all the several notions . respects , or considerations which we may make of the same thing , or the same being . but these gentlemen discourse as if there were but one predicament , viz. that of substance , or being , and they have either cashier'd or else had , for hast , quite forgot the other nine . and is such a shallow pamphlet , a fit present for the learned divines of the universities ! . let us put a parallel to this discourse . imagine then peter were both a father and a son , in respect of his different correlates ; these gentlemen will undertake to prove plainly , that he must therefore be two men thus . [ if this father be a rational creature , and the notion of son be distinct from that of father ; then peter , if he be a man , must be a distinct rational creature , for the same being can be no ways distinct from it self , and certainly two distinct rational creatures are two men. ] the parallel is his own discourse put in the very tenour he laid it . only we put the [ notion ] or respect of son to be distinct from that of father , because we speak of them ( as we ought ) precisely and formally according to such or such respects ; and not materially ; for , so consider'd , they are all identify'd with the deity ; whence , st. austin in his books de trinitate , when he names deus , adds immediately id est , trinitas ; and these men know well that 't is our constant profession , that the trinity is no otherwise to be worshipt than in the unity of the godhead . . thus these gentlemen by their new no-logick , have prov'd peter to be two men , and to have two individual natures in him , because he has two different relations ; which kind of respect call'd relations , since ( if we take the whole extent of that notion and all the particulars under it ) we acquire and lose a hundred times a day in one kind or other , no one being in nature would be constantly the same , but must be perpetually multiply'd into the lord knows how many beings or things . . but the main point is , that our question is not whether the same thing can be any way distinct from it's self ; ●ut , whether the same thing may not , and does not , ground and verify many conceptions or respects of divers kinds ; as is shown in my first preliminary ; and , whether it does hence follow , that if we affirm that it is one according to one of those respects , and yet three according to another of those respects , there can be , in that case , any show of a contradiction , which is the affirming and denying of it according to the same respect . this , is the true point , which these objectors never touch nor heed ; but , instead of distinguishing those several respects , they jumble them all together confusedly ; and then , when they have thus shuffled away the true question , they pretend to decide that which they have not toucht , ( perhaps never thought of it , ) by an untoward and aukwa●d way of arguing by ifs ; of which we have here no less than three in four lines . . my last advice to those dissatisfy'd gentlemen , is , than they would be so true to their own reason , as not to fancy themselves competent iudges of what they cannot but know they are not able to decide ; no● undertake to sound depths which are beyond the length of their short line ; nor be inveigled to apprehend that those most sublime points that concern what passes within the deity it self , must ( when it comes to be debated or explicated ) be as plain and familiar to every ordinary understanding as a piece of a romance . 't is the greatest policy of those men , in gaining proselytes , to spread about their pamphlets among the vulgar , and to persuade them that what 's true must needs be easie , ( as to which flam every man who has study'd the mathematicks is able to undeceive them ) and so make them iudges of the controversie ; which is very gratifying to original sin , and to our innate pride , the effect of it . and , if once they can bring them to swallow this bait , and embrace this erroneous principle of over-weening , they are sure they are caught . for , then , they have no more to do but to propose to them some pretty superficial tri●●es , which if examin'd by true principles , have not a grain of sense in them ; and yet , being suteable to the pitch of weak understandings , are very plausible and taking , and they presently hold themselves well appay'd . by this means also they are brought to undervalue and contemn all learned discourses which go the bottom of the subject in hand ; because they are not at the first sight so easily intelligible to their low capacities . thus i have endeavour'd both to satisfie learned readers , how this most holy and fundamental article of christian faith is explicable , according to true principles of reason working upon our natural notions ; and also to establish the unlearned from the delusions of those , who , while they oppose it , renounce faith and reason both . which done , i have no more to do but to recommend them to god the father who created , and preserves us ; to god the son who redeem'd and enlightens us ; and to god the holy spirit who sanctifies and comforts us . to all whom , as being one god , blessed for evermore , be ascrib'd all honour and glory . finis . errata . ep. ded. p. . l. . these does , p. . l. . only true , pref. p. . l. . if she , p. . l. . by their , p , . l. . judiciousness . book , p. . l. . alter'd , p. . l. . bodies , l. . dele at , p. . l. . form or act , p. . l. . in the margin , thence , p. . l. . is it , p. . l. . eum , p. . l. . can exist , p. . l. . individuums , p. . l. . in the margin , such a nature , p. . l , . being there , p. . l. . tuo scribuntur , p. . l. . is in a manner , p. . l. . in the margin , chap. . p. . l. . it in , p. . l. . encyclopaedia , p. . l. . similes ei , p. . l. . refunded into , p. . l. . could be , p. . l. . that chance , p. . l. . particular supposita , p. . l. , . depute , p. . l. . as does . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e power and act are natural or common notions . that there are three sorts of each . that the first sort of power belongs to all things but the first being . and is essential to them . hence the definition of created ens is , that which is capable of being . that this power consists in ▪ it's possibility , or non-repugnance to being . what metaphysieal unity is . the essences of things are , antecedently to their existence , in the divine intellect . hence the cartesian doctrine leaves no ens in the world . how the essences of things are in the divine understanding . and how they are said to be eternal . in what consists metaphysical verity . hence the first formal truths a●e identical propositions . of which there are only two sorts . why some propositions are said to be aeternae veritatis . the second sort of power respects not the notion of existence , but the notion of thing . in what sence bodies are said to be compounded of this power , and its act. this second power , matter , is the sole ground of all mutability . hence pure acts are immutable . the third sort of power respects accidental acts. which , tho' not properly things , have yet analogical essences . what metaphysical divisibility and composition are . which clears objections against the b. trinity , and against the mystery of the incarnation also . the difference between logical and metaphysical abstraction . that excellent and useful maxim , that [ there are no actual parts in any compound whatever ] defended and explicated . the ground and reason of that maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum . ] hence the cartesians destroy the notions of unum and ens ▪ the proper metaphysical partt of body , are matter and form. the possibility or essence of a body consists in the agreeableness of its matter and form. that there is no real or actual distinction in ●n any ens whatsoever . how many sorts of entities are possible to be created . existence is the ultimate act of ens. wherefore existence is rather to be call'd actuality , than act. that there is a god. the method , how god's providence gave us our elements of knowledge . and ripen'd our knowledge afterwards . what encouragement our present acquests have given us . what assured hopes we have of success in our quest of science , if we ground our discourse on the natures of the things made by the first being . all concrete notious include some form that constitutes them such . the form of ens is essence . the essences of pure acts consists in actual knowledge . yet they are potential to the act of existence . the essence of body is c●●●●ly taken from its form. yet not only , but from the matter also . quantitative and not-quantitative , are not the proper differences that constitute body and spirit . the essence of the first matter of the cartesians cannot consist in only extension . nor in extension and impenetrability together . every body is essentially a distinct part of nature . wherefore 't is ordain'd for some proper and primary operation in nature . wherefore , whatever fits ▪ it for this primary operation , constitutes it . * see b. . med. last . in this fitness to perform its primary operation consists it's metaphysical goodness . every body is essentially an instrument . the essential difference of body is chiefly taken from it's action . the modes or accidents that make bodies thus fit , are it 's essential form. but the thing must retain that complexion of accidents for some time . divisibility in common cannot constitute any body . more and less of divisibility , may . one or two different accidents may constitute the simplest bodies . wherefore the elements are constituted by density and rarity . * see b. . §. . the elements were thus constituted at first ; tho' perhaps there are not any such now . * see b. . §. . hence the cartesian , first matter , which they put neither to be rare nor dense , is a chimera . what we have gain'd by our speculation hitherto . the reason why we discourse of abstract notions ; and of the vast advantage it yields . it can scarce be imagin'd that there are now any pure elements , farther prov'd . how first-mixt bodies may be conceiv'd to be made . the essential form of first-mixt bodies . and their essences . the second sort of mixt bodies . the third sort of mixts . the fourth sort of mixts . what other accidents are superadded to make variety of mixts and demixts . yet rarity and density are the principal and most intrinsecal . hence the corpuscularians can give no account of the intrinsecal constitution of any natural body . of the several sorts of demixts . the ground of sensible qualities . of imperfect mixts . of living bodies . of vegetables . the primary operation of vegetables . the form of vegetables . the essences of animals . their primary operation . what animal is most perfect in it's kind . what has been prov'd hitherto , recapitulated . the excellency of metaphysicks ; and the sublime way of discoursing , peculiar to it . what sleight ways of discoursing some others affect . what is our duty , as we are rational creatures . man is one thing made up of soul and body . therefore the soul and body are , here , only potential parts . therefore neither part can operate alone . which ground● that excellent maxim , [ actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum ] hence the christian tenet of the incarnation , is agreeable to right reason . of the form or act of man , as he is man. both ●arts concurr to every operation of man , as he is man. hence , every notion has a phantasm accompanying it . of the total form of man. what chiefly , in both these parts , distinguishes man from all other things . hence all pretence of god voluntary annexing , is unphilosophical and groundless . hence the mens is not the man. the soul's manner of existing and operating , here , is , in part , corporeal . the primary operation of man is reasoning . the attainment of truth is the perfection of man's understanding . the knowledge of truth , which thus perf●cts man , must be evident . probability perfects no man. nor the improving his memory or fancy . the promoting evident truth is the noblest action of man. hence errour is the greatest depravation of man's nature . the essence of man is rationality . and distinguishes him from angels and brutes . hence [ animal rationale ] is his true definition . in rationality are included the powers of apprehending and judging . as also the power of receiving simple apprehensions , by impressions from objects ▪ transmitted them to the brain . the power of reflecting is also an essential property of man. the soul acquires knowledge by impressions from objects , on their senses . first proof . second proof . third proof . fourth proof . fifth proof . sixth proof . seventh proof . eighth proof . that the soul cannot elicit ideas out of her self , from many heads . that the position , which makes the soul and body two things , hinders the right explication of christian faith. this tenet makes overy man to be a monstrous chimera . that the pre-existence of souls is a senseless conceit , and impossible . so is the pythagorean transmigration . that 't is a folly to ask , how the soul and body came to be united . the rational progress , and immediate steps of our thoughts hitherto . why it was necessary such a creature as man should be made . by what means god's infinite wisdom contriv'd the union of the soul and body in one thing . the condition of our soul here , laid open . how the coalition of the soul and body into one ens , agrees with principles of reason . what errors and absurditics have sprung out of the contrary opinion . that only individuals are properly things . and , therefore only individual essences are properly essences . yet we can discourse more clearly of the common essences than we can of the individual ones . there go more accidents to constitute the individuum , than there goes to constitute the common essences . thts complexion of accidents is the most perfect act next ▪ c● that of existence . hence 't is demonstrated , that to give existence is above the power of natural causes , and peculiar to god. there must be some instant in which the individual first begins to be . this complexion of accidents is essential to the new individuum . therefore it is the essential or substantial form of the individual compound . those accidents that accrue afterwards are accidentals , to be an individuum , some degree of constancy , permanency or stability is requir'd . which existence , supervening , does establish . the twisting the results of so many various causes into one individuum , argues the design of an all-comprehending ▪ providence . this complexion of accidents can never be eradicated , while the individuum continues . and gives the compound a different genius and natural propension . existence can with no shew of reason be pretended to be the principle of individuation . the distinction between the notions of a subsistent thing , or a suppositum , and the notion of an individual ens , clearly manifested . how and when the individuality is ●… . the first rule how to know this . the second rule . the third rule . hence every simple division of the matter in living things , changes not the individuation . much less in man. when the individuation is lost in simple bodies . when in first-mixt bodies . when in demixts . when in homogeneous bodies . when , in very heterogeneous or organical bodies . two contradistinct natures may compound one thing . and the human na ture may subsist in the divine suppositum . yet those natures and their properties will remain unmingled ; and not confounded , as some eutychians imagin'd . yet , all the actions and passions must be attributed to the suppositum , tho' according to such in nature ; contrary to what nestorius fancy'd . hence , lastly , there is no shew of contradiction that god should be three according the notion of [ person ] , and yet but one , according to the respect of his essence or nature . a large explication of some grounds , very useful to take o●f all shadow of contradiction from divers chief mysteries of christian faith ; and to show how consonant they are to the most exact rules of right reason . how impossible it is to know perfectly all that belongs to our individuality . by what wonderful and untraceable ways god's providence has brought about our individuation . and has given us all our knowledge , and other endowments . how little our best performance contributed to the acquisition of them . and how little the most knowing or best man has to be proud of the most estimable actions god has done by him . that we ought to comply with the designs of our great cretour ; and , by what means this may be best accomplisht . . preliminary we cannot but have different conceptions of the parts of man. and , consequently of every operation of his , as he is man. that we must examin , whether there be anything in man , according to his soul , which is above quantity or matter . that there are three distinct operations of man as he is intellective . the notion of [ ens ] or [ thing ] is indifferent to actual being , or not-being . every form that is in any subject , must denominate it to be formally such as it self is . a notion may either be consider'd subjectively , or objectively . every object of our knowledge must either be the thing it self , ās in the mind , or something that is like it . that notions , undrrstood objectively , are the things themselves , as in the mind ; and not meer similitudes of them ; prov'd unanswerably . prov'd unanswerably by the concession of the ideists themselves , that the thing it self must be in th● mind . in what sense , [ every [ like ] is not the same , ] is verify'd . hence , every inadequate notion we have of the thing , is of the whole thing confusedly and materially ; tho' it be only of one metaphysical part , or considerability of it , distinctly and formally . a third unanswerable proof , that the thing it self must be in our mind when we know it . the author's reason why he builds upon this thesis , that the thing it self is in the soul when she knows it . the reasons why some others are backward to assent to it . notwithstanding , the immortality of the soul may be evinced , tho● this thesis were wav'd . §. . demonstration dem. i. because her operations and objects are receiv'd in her after an indivisible manner . * see solid philosophy asserted , reflexion . s. . dem. ii. because th● capacity of the soul is infinite . demon. iii. because she has other natures in her , without altering her own . demon. iv. from her having things and modes in her as others ; or as not belonging to her own nature . demon. v. because the contrary thesis is opposite to the natural notions of all mankind . existence is the absolute notion ; and all the rest ●re respective . dem. vi. because she has the no tion of [ existence ] in her , which is every way indivisible . that the soul has actual respects in her . this demonstration enforced . dem. viii . because she has the notions or natures of vast quantities in her ; which 't is impossible they should be there themselves , as they are in matter ; or any material resemblances of them . dem. ix . because the parts of motion are perfectly distinct and determinate in the soul , which are utterly undistinguisht as they are in material nature . dem. x. because the soul has in her past and future parts of time present at once . dem. xi . because the soul can tye together as many singulars as she pleases , in the notion of one number ; of which the fancy has no material resemblance . dem. xii . because sensible qualities , tho' innumerable , and contrary to one another , are in the soul without disordering her in the least . dem. xiii . because those sensible qualities do not fight and expel one another ; as they must , were their subject made of matter . dem xiv . because innumerable multitudes of various and large figures are in the soul at once . demon. xv. because the soul has in her universal notions . dem. xvi . b●the thing is in and by the soul divided in-into such parts , as material division cannot reach demon. xvii . because the composition the soul makes afterwards of these thus-divided parts is impossible to be perform'd by a material agent . hence is seen the reason why angels do not thus compound and divide . demon. xviii . because what is meant by the copula [ it , ] which is us'd in all our affirmative judgments , cannot possibly be so much as shadow'd or represented by any material similitude . de●●● . xix . because the connexion of the ●●●clusion with right premisses is ●●●e the force of all nature or ●atter , and im●●●●le to b● solv'd ●● broken. demon. xx. because all the notions the soul has , are concise and exact , even to an indivisible . demon. xxi . because the soul is a pure act , and therefore immaterial . demon. xxii . because the soul gives a kind of being to non-entities and chimeraes , which can have no existence in nature . how some do mistake the nature of the indivisibility attributed to the soul. the proper and true sense in which a spirit is said to be indivisible . that 't is consonant to the nature of the subject that the soul should contain corporeal nature , and it 's modes , indivisibly . in what sense we are to take the word [ instantaneous , ] when we say the operations of pure spirits are such . last demonstration , concluding the whole point ; that our soul , it being so manifestly and manifoldly demonst●a●ed to be immaterial , is necessarily immortal . that the nature of our spiritual part , the soul , can only be known by reflexion ; and , therefore , in discoursing of it we must t●ansc●nd our senses , and corporeal phantasms . the unreasonableness of atheists . what obligations are incumbent on us , who know and acknowledge our soul to be immortal . our former demonstrations for the immortality of our soul , summ'd up , and recapitulated . the most important use we ought to make ▪ of this doctrin , that our soul is immortal . notes for div a -e the soul , at her separation , receives some change , according to her manner of existing , and suppositality . the manner how this is done illustrated . yet the same individual nature remains in her . all the modes or accidenti , v. g. all the knowledges and affections , she had while here , do ▪ remain still in her . each soul , when separated , knows all created truths . * b. . ch. . §. . how this is very possible . hence every separated soul comprehends all time and place . hence her operations are not measur'd by time ; they and their subject being of a superiour nature . hence she will be eternally miserable , unless she knows the first cause , god. hence also , she is naturally unchangeable . hence too , as soon as separated , she knows all the thoughts and affections , words and actions of her past life . whence follows the particular judgment , which determines her lot at the hour of death . hence is understood how the book of conscience will be laid open at the last day . and how infants are connaturally sav'd by baptism . hence ana-baptism is impious and unnatural . the foregoing principles show how much more easie it is for the saints and angels in heaven , to know our actions and necessities . the practical iudgments , or affections , to carry the soul to the attainment of the good she most lov'd here , in case it be attainable in the future state. the best intellectual good , or the sight of god is attainable in the n●xt life , if the soul be dispos'd for it . therefore to work up our christian principles to such good dispositions , ought to be the whole employ of our life here . this good disposition is charity , or the love of god above all things . h●nce all the means and motives lay'd by our b : saviour , ●●nd only to breed and promote in us this predominant a●f●●ction for heaven . the definition of true religion . from the same principle is demonstrated , that , to depart ●h●nce with a contrary disposition , or a first affection for any creature , will torment the soul , with most unspeable grief and anguish . the state of separation elevates the soul to an incomparably higher perfection of existence , ( she being then a pure act ) than she had here . wherefore , it does , consequently elevate the activity of all her powers ; and particularly the acts of her will , her affections , to an unconceiveable intenseness and vehemency , above what she had while in the body . hence , the poena damni for the loss of the sight of god , and the poena sensus , for the loss of the temporal false . good she here d●ted on , in a wicked soul , are unspeakable , and plunge her in a hell of misery . their sad condition describ'd . god damns no man. the knowing all truths speculatively in the state of separation , does not alter the predominant affection for creatures . as the tree falls so it lies . hence , one enormous actual sin , unrepented , renders a soul liable to eternal damnation . that the state of separation does not alter the first affection of souls , farther demonstrated . hence sin does not formally consist in the falsity of the practical iudgment or affection ; but , in the disproportion and inordinateness of it : from the former principles it follows that all those several kinds of knowledges we had here , will be elevated to an unmeasurable excess in the state of separation . hence also , all the virtuous affections , which good souls had here for friends , relations and acquaintances will remain in the next life ; and make them ardently wish and pray for their salvation . that each particular deduced here , is demonstrable by the principles laid formerly : shown , by repeating those principles . wherefore , there is not the least th●ught , word or action , good or bad , which we ever had or did , in this life , but will have it ▪ ● corsequent and proper effect , adjusted and proportion'd to it , in the next . the admirable excellency of a soul when separated and become a pure spirit , display'd . that there is no comparison between our souls condition here , and the state of separation . that meer humane science , when at the height , was too short and impotent to raise mankind to those dispositions that fit him for true happiness . the necessity of divine revelation farther shown . that the christian life , is most comfortable , and the unchristian most full of anxiety . the unexpressible joy of holy souls at their first entring into bliss . the order of the universe requires that there should be different kinds of beings . and much more , that there should be pure acts or angels . especially since the angelical nature is capable of existence . and that otherwise there could be no immediate cause of motion . as is also demonstrated from the nature of all causality . every more perfect ens includes in it the nature of the less perfect . and therefore pure acts contain in them the nature of body . which , since it cannot be done by the manner of quantity , they must contain them by the way of knowledge . therefore the very essences of bodies are in a spiritual understanding , and not idea's or similitudes only . this doctrine being built on that logical maxim , [ all differences are more and less of the generical notion , ] the consideration of that thesis is recommended to the reader . this holds equally in the soul , which is of a spiritual nature . angels , being pure acts , are immutable . the distinction of angels is taken from their being more or less cognoscitive , after their manner . this is not to be understood of the greater extent of their knowledge , but of the intenseness , or penetrativeness of it . hence , as far as reason carries us , is taken the distinction of the three hierarchies , and nine quires of angels . the different manner by which angels and human souls come to have all their knowledge . these angels have a nobler essence , whose each act of knowledge has for it's object a greater portion of the universe . which makes them fit to superintend the administration of a larger province . how consonant this is to those passages of the holy scripture , which speak of such operations of angels . an angel cannot operate upon another angel so as to change it . wherefore , all it 's external operation , so as to work a change in another thing , can only be upon bodies . an angel can thus operate upon material entities , or bodies . that we only intend to evince here the an est of the operation of an angel , and not the manner how it is perform'd . yet no one angel has an unlimited power to operate thus on all bodies whatevee . an angel can move or change those bodies which are within the sphere of it's activity , in an imperceptible time. hence the wonderful effects , recorded in holy writ to have been done by angels , are consonant to metaphysical principles . that the ordinary ministring spirits or the guardian angels of particular persons are the lowest sort of angels . but the greater and weightier affairs are transacted by archangels . ● the lower angels receiv'd intellectual light from the superiour in the same instant they were created . in what manner the good angels perform the will of their maker without new instructions . that god makes use of holy angels to procure our good ; and of bad ones to afflict and punish mankind , as his divine wisdom sees fitting . by what means metaphysicks has rais'd our thoughts above the sordid mass of matter , to contemplate the a●gelical nature . the surpassing excellency of their intellectual essences decipher'd . how faith has antecedently enlightned our reason ; and that 't is our duty to explicate and defend it against the empty flourishes of the drollish renouncers of faith and reason both . what gratitude , love and veneration we owe to those blessed ministring spirits . what benefit we shall reap by keeping up a spiritual communication with them . yet , to honour them so , as still to remember they are only our fellow-servants , tho' highly dignify'd by our common master . notes for div a -e that there must be something which is a most pure actuality of being , demonstrated . from the acknowledg'd potentiality of being , necessarily and manifestly annext , or rather essential to creatures . because what is not , cannot act. because actual being is the noblest effect imaginable . because no power can produce an effect , which is contradictory to what it is it self , or to its own nature . the foresaid demonstration summ'd up , and enforc'd . this actuality of being , gave being to all other things . the objection of the atheists propos'd , viz : that the world was ever answer i. that this does not solve our demonstration . ans. ii. that 't is a meer voluntary assertion , never yet prov'd nor attempted to be prov'd , nor possible to be prov'd . ans. iii. farther showing that our argument is not toucht ; and is reducible to an identical proposition . ans. iv. that this pretence , or voluntary assertion is shown to be an absolute impossibility . ans. v. that the putting an infinite time , which in their supposition is absolutely necessary , is a plain contradiction . ans. vi. that the very notion of the word [ infinite ] apply'd to our case , is a plain contradiction . the position of a finite number of causes , giving being to one another circularly , is as ill nonsense as the former . the notion of [ ens ] is different from that of [ existent ; ] and , consequently , essence from existence . philosophers must discourse of the first being by sueh natural notions as they have . the notion of [ existence ] is the most actual of any we hav● . and theref●r● the fitt●st to 〈…〉 a pure actua●●ty of being ; ●●d glven us by god himself . every abstract word comprehends the whole nature of the form or act it signifies , without any limitation . therefore it 's limitation proceeds either from the subject , or from the causes that determine it . hence god's essence it self , is absolutely unlimited , or actually infinite ; therefore god is but one . hence polytheism was a most senseless absurdity , and a flat contradiction . hence christian doctrine is prov'd to be divine ; the dawning of which chas'd away that universal darkness ; notwithstanding all the opposition human power , wit , and learning could make . existence is the whole perfection of every thing that exists . much more , when it is essential , and actually infinite . therefore the divine existence , or the deity , includes or concenters all imaginable perfections in it's nature . therefore 〈◊〉 is i●… in ●● intellctual an● moral attributes . therefore god is a spirit . therefore , he is not corporeal . therefore 't is an indignity to the divine nature to apply such predicates to it as belong to body . hence also he is immutable . an● a self-subsistent being . for the same reason the divine essence is most simple or uncompounded . and his duration eternal . and , therefore , not to be explicated by a correspondency to our time. hence god is also immense . whence , 't is derogatory to that attribute to explicate it by commensuration to an infinite space . lastly , the divine essence , is , of it 's own nature , infinitely intellible ▪ what comfort this is to pious , humble , and weak souls . that the author confines himself here to metaphysical mediums . notwithstanding all that 's said , no notion or word we have , is univocally , ( or in the same sense ) apply'd to god and to creatures . wherefore all the words we use , when we speak of god , are , in some sort , metaphorical . because each of them signifies some one perfection or notion ; whereas god is the plenitude of all being , and all perfections , center'd in one most simple formality . hence even the names of our best virtues , are not , in every regard , properly spoken of god. nor omnipotent , creatour , or such like ; all our language having some tang of imperfection annext to it . nor yet negative notions , as immense , infine , immaterial , &c. no priority or posteriority , either real ▪ or made by our reason , conceiving the least ground for it in the thing , can be attributed to god. notwithstanding that all these are with some impropriety spoken of god , yet all of them but the last are truly said of him. the solid ground of mystick theology . hence is concluded , that all the notions and words we have , whether affirmative or negative , do full short of the divine nature . how by considering the visible things of this world , we are come to know the invisible things of god his essence , and attributes . how demonstratively this has been deduced . and this with an evidence beyond that of the mathematicks . that this evident knowledge of god will redound to our disadvantage if we live not accordingly . that this knowledge obliges us to the duties of most profound adoration and attention , when we appear before him in prayer . to a firm belief of what he has reveal'd . to endeavour to dispose our selves to receive farther influences of his grace : and to an unwavering hope , that he will most certainly give us all we are capabls of , or dispos'd for . to tremble at his iustice , if we wilfully break his commands . and to hope of pardon if we sincerely repent . to resignation , in all sinist●r contingencies , to the infinitely-wise disposition of god's providence in his government of the world. to sincerity , and unpretended virtue , and honesty . especially , to love god , who is our true good , and only happiness , as we ought ; both for what he is in himself , and what he is to us . the imitation of god's moral attributes , are , also , a most effectual means to perfect us in all sorts of virtue . notes for div a -e all action springs immediately from the existence of the cause . and the acting in such a manner , springs from the things being of such a nature or essence . therefore the power of operation , as 't is such , is refunded into the essence . therefore all causality is the imparting somewhat to the patient which was , some way or other , in the cause or agent . hence motion , only applies the agent to the patient . the first operation among bodies is division . the next operations are impulse and attraction . the reason of which operations cannot be fetcht from physical principles , but from metaphysicks . 〈…〉 in metaphy●… from the ●…tter and ●…m . 〈…〉 from the es●… or nature of 〈…〉 common modifi●…on of matter , ●…antity . this disputable point fully clear'd . hence is seen particularly the reason of attraction . every impulse does at first condense ; and every attraction , rarefies . all these operations are either perform'd by local motion , or concomitantly with it . all motion comes at first from the angelical nature . every part of motion is a new effect . therefore it requires a continual influx of the moving cause . this moving cause is some chief angel rarefying the matter of the solar bodies . angels are pre-mov'd or directed by god to move matter , as i● most sutable to his eternal decrees . the first mov'd bodies do determine and continue the motion of the rest . hence angels , and the bodies they move , do , as second causes , determine the individuation of all new-made bodies . but 't is beyond their power to give existence . which therefore is peculiar only to god. as also to conserve things in being . and to give to a nobler essence a nobler existence . for the same reason a spiritual form will be given to matter connaturally disspos'd for it . the same holds also in supernatural gifts , which , are also carried on by dispositions . hence god is not the cause of any defect , much less of sin , or not-being . how all these sorts of operations do spring from the respective essences . that god does all that 's good in all ; and in what manner , and by what means . that god's ordinary providence carries on the course of nature by proper causes , still producing proper effects , demonstrated , à priori . con●irm'd , because , otherwise mankind could not possibly have any science ; nor know what to do in their ordinary actions . the same great truth demonstrated a posteriori . hence the course of god's work manship , the fabrick of nature , is close and indissoluble . the epicurean tenet of chance governing the world is most absurd and senseless . what chance truly is . how groundlessly some christian philosophers , the ideists , do , in part , violate this best method of god's ordinary providence , now demonstrated . the folly of the stoical fatality confuted and exploded . the application of this doctrine to ou● own duties . five catholick letters concerning the means of knowing with absolute certainty what faith now held was taught by jesus christ written by j. sergeant upon occasion of a conference between dr. stillingfleet and mr. peter gooden. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) five catholick letters concerning the means of knowing with absolute certainty what faith now held was taught by jesus christ written by j. sergeant upon occasion of a conference between dr. stillingfleet and mr. peter gooden. sergeant, john, - . stillingfleet, edward, - . gooden, peter, d. . , [ ], , , [ ], , [ ], p. printed and sold by mat. turner, london : . title page lacking. facsimile t.p. used as chief source of information. pts. each part has also separate t.p. pt. . a letter to the d. of p. in answer to the arguing part of his first letter to mr. g. london : printed by henry hills, --pt. . the second catholick letter ... london : printed and sold by matthew turner, --pt. . the third catholick letter ... / by s.j. london : printed and sold by matthew turner, --pt. . the fourth catholick letter ... / by john sergeant. london : printed and sold by matthew turner, --pt. . the fifth catholick letter ... / by john sergeant. london : printed and sold by matthew turner. reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- apologetic works. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter to the d. of p. in answer to the arguing part of his first letter to mr. g. published with allowance . london , printed by henry hills , printer to the king 's most excellent majesty , for his houshold and chappel . . a letter to the d. of p. in answer to the arguing part of his first letter . . that you may not take it unkindly the arguing part of your letter to mr. g. should pass unregarded , i have been prevail'd upon to accept of his commission to hold his cards , while he is not in circumstances to play out his game himself . but can assure you beforehand , since matter of fact is clearing by other hands more proper , i mean to confine my self to matter of right ; and so shall give you the least and most excusable trouble that can be , a short one . . your letter tells us , that the conference was for the sake of a gentleman , who i heard desir'd to be satisfi'd that protestants are absolutely certain of what they believe , and made account you could satisfie him , and profess'd , if you could not , he would quit your communion . and you take care to inform us ( p. . ) that he was satisfi'd , and declar'd immediately after the conference , that he was much more confirm'd in the communion of your church by it , and resolv'd to continue in it . but could you not have afforded to inform us likewise by what he was satisfi'd ? for there is many a man who would be as glad , and is as much concern'd to be satisfi'd in that point as that gentleman ; and he would not have been a jot the less confirm'd or the less resolv'd , if his neighbor had been confirm'd and resolv'd with him . i cannot for my life imagin why you should make a secret of a thing , which , besides your own and your churches honor , concerns the salvation of thousands and thousands to know . . your letter i perceive would shift it off to mr. g. whom you desire ( p. . ) to prove that protestants have no absolute certainty , &c. of this proposal there will be occasion to say more by and by . at the present i pray you consider how you deal with those souls who rely on you . if you should move them to trust their estates with a man of your naming , of whom you would give no other satisfaction that he were able to manage them , and faithful , and responsible , but only to bid those who doubted , prove the contrary ; i fancy there would need all the credit you have to hinder the motion from appearing very strange : and yet you have the confidence to make them one as much stranger as their souls are more worth than their mony : for you would have them hazard their souls where they are not safe , for any care you take to satisfie them that they are . why , suppose mr. g. could not prove that protestants are not certain , are they therefore certain ? has peter twenty pounds in his purse , because paul cannot prove he has not ? or , ever the more title to an estate , because an adversary may have the ill luck to be non-suited ? must not every body speak for himself one day , and bring in his own account , which will pass or not pass as it is or is not faulty in it self , whether any fault have been found in it before or no ? and will not the happiness or misery of their souls for ever depend on that account ? can you suffer them to run that terrible hazard , without making them able to justifie their accounts themselves , and furnishing them with assurance that they can , and with no more to say but that they hop'd dr. st. would make his party good with mr. g. ? that things so precious to god as souls should be of no more value with those who set up for ministers of the gospel ! that their great and only care , as far as i see , should be to make a shew , and pass for some body here , let every one take his chance hereafter ! besides , truth is therefore truth , because 't is built on intrinsecal grounds which prove it to be such ; and not on private mens abilities , or their saying this or that ; wherefore till those grounds be produc'd , it cannot be with reason held truth : and dr. st. is more particularly oblig'd to make good he has such grounds , having had such ill fortune formerly with the principles to which he undertook to reduce protestant faith , as appears by the account given of them in error non-plust . . but , leaving these matters to be answer'd where we must all answer why we have believ'd so and so ; pray let us have fair play in the mean time . let every one bear his own burthen , and you not think to discharge your self by throwing your load on another man's shoulders . you affirm there is absolute certainty on the protestants side and 't is for him to prove it who affirms it . if you do it but half so well as mr. g. can , and has , the infallibility which he asserts , you will earn thanks from one side , and admiration from the other . but it is for you to do it : to trick off proving the contrary upon your adversary , is to own that proving is a thing which agrees not with your constitution , and in which your heart misgives you . . yet even so you were uneasie still , and would not venture what mr. g. could do , as slightly as you think , or would have others think of him . you know well enough , that to prove protestants have no absolute certainty of their faith , is no hard task even for a weak man : you know any man may find it confess'd to his hand by protestants . and therefore you had reason to bethink your self of an expedient to trick it off again from that point , and put mr. g. to prove , that protestants have no absolute certainty as to the rule of their faith , viz. the scripture . the merits of this cause too i think will return hereafter more fitly ; in this place i mind only the art. pray , was not the very first question at the conference , whether protestants are absolutely certain that they hold now the same tenets in faith , and all that our saviour taught to his apostles ? and your answer that they are ? did our saviour teach , and do protestants believe no more , than that the book so call'd is scripture ? is certainty of this more , and certainty of this book all one ? and was not the question plainly of the certainty of this , and of all this more ? here is then an enquiry after one thing plainly turn'd off to another . yes ; but this was one of the two things which the whole conference depended upon . as if the whole conference did not depend on that thing which was to be made manifest by the conference , viz. the absolute certainty of protestant faith. mr. g. indeed did himself ask some questions about your certainty of your rule ; questions , whose course it was wisely done to cut off , before they had question'd away your certainty of faith. for , after they had caus'd it to be admitted , that the certainty of scripture is from tradition , there was no refusing to admit that tradition causes certainty , and makes faith as certain as scripture . and then it would have prov'd something difficult to satisfie even a willing man , that the faith is certain which is opposit to a faith come down by tradition . but it was seen whereto it would come , and thought fit to break off in time , and not let the conference proceed too far . in the mean time absolute certainty of scripture was not the point of the conference , nor is it the point of concern . besides that 't is agreed on all hands , men are sav'd by believing and practising what christ taught , not barely by believing scripture is scripture : and salvation is the thing that imports us in these disputes , and 't were well that nothing else were minded by disputers . but it imported you it seems both to shift off proving from your self , and to stifle any further talk of the certainty of protestant faith , and keep us from looking that way by fixing our eyes on another object . and this is all you do ; but with so much art , that i verily think many a reader is persuaded you are talking all the while to the purpose . the truth is , you have reason to carry it as you do ; for it is good to avoid undertaking what cannot be perform'd : and you cannot , and i believe know you cannot make out , that protestants are absolutely certain , that they now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles , as you affirm'd in your answer to mr. g's first question . and this i thought it imported to tell you plainly and publickly , that it might be in your hands to pin the controversie-basket , and bring all catholics to your church ; where i will answer you will be sure to find us , if you make us sure we shall find this certainty there when we come . . in the mean time why has not mr. g. done already as much as should be done ? it is plain , that where churches differ in faith , infallible faith in one , cannot stand with certain faith in the other . wherefore if mr. g. have fix'd infallibility in his own church , he has remov'd certainty from all that differ from her . let us then take and sift mr. g's argument , even as you put it , who had not , i suppose , partiality enough for him , to make it better than it was . you put it thus , p. , . . all traditionary christians believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so up to the time of our blessed saviour ; and if they follow this rule , they can never err in faith , therefore are infallible . and you ( mr. g. ) prov'd they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . and now , that there may be no mistake , let us take each proposition by it self . . the first is , [ all traditionary christians believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so up to the time of our blessed saviour . ] you have nothing to say to this , i hope : for since traditionary christians are those who proceed upon tradition , and tradition signifies immediate delivery , it follows , that unless they believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so upwards , they cease to be traditionary christians , by proceeding not upon an immediate , but an interrupted delivery , or some other principle . and so there is no denying this proposition , but by affirming that traditionary christians are not traditionary christians . . the second proposition is this . [ and if they follow this rule , they can never err in faith. ] this is palpably self-evident : for , to follow this rule is to believe still the same to day which they did yesterday : and so , if they did this from christ's time , and so forwards , they must still continue to believe , to the end of the world , the self-same that christ and his apostles taught ; and , therefore , cannot err in faith , unless those authors of our faith did : which that they did not , is not to be prov'd to christians . . there follows this inference : [ therefore they are infallible . ] this is no less plainly self-evident . for these words [ they can never err in faith ] in the antecedent , and [ they are infallible ] in the consequent , are most manifestly the self-same in sense , and perfectly equivalent . . the fourth and last ( which according to you , aim'd to prove , that they could not innovate ) is this . [ they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . ] and this is no less unexceptionable than its fellows . for , if they knew not they alter'd faith , when they alter'd it , they had forgot what they believ'd the day before . if they alter'd it wittingly , excuse them from malice who can ; who , believing , as all who proceed upon tradition do , that tradition is the certain means to convey the doctrin of christ , would notwithstanding alter the doctrin convey'd to them by tradition . pray what ails this argument ? and what wants it , save bare application , to conclude what was intended as fully and as rigorously as you can desire ? and , pray , what need was there to apply it to the roman church , and say she follow'd tradition , to you who deny it not either of the roman or greek church ? as every thing is true , and every thing clear ; who now besides your self would have thought of an evasion from it ? and yet you venture at one , such as it is . . you tell us then , ( p. . ) that you thought the best way to shew the vanity of this rare demonstration , was to produce an instance of such as follow'd tradition , and yet mr. g. could not deny to have err'd , and that was of the greek church , &c. you had e'en as good have said , what mr. g. says is true , but yet he does not say true for all that . for to pitch upon nothing for false , is , in disputes , to own that every thing is true . the best way , say you ? i should have thought it every jot as good a way to have said nothing when one has nothing to say . but yet the world is oblig'd to you for letting them know what scholars knew before , that protestants think it the best way to answer catholic arguments , to give them no answer at all : for you are not to be told that this instance of yours is not an answer to mr. g-'s argument , but a new argument against him of your own , which undoubtedly you might have produc'd as well as my lord falkland , if you had been , as my lord falkland was , arguing . but it is your turn now to answer . and must you be minded of what every smatterer in logic knows , that an answerer is confin'd to his concedo , his nego , and distinguo , as the propositions which he is to speak to , are true , false or ambiguous ? he may deny the inference too , if he find more or other terms in the conclusion than in the premises . but these are his bounds ; and answering turns babbling , when they are exceeded . must you be minded that the business must be stopt before it come to the conclusion , and that otherwise there is no speaking against it ? for you know that if the premisses be right , and the inference good , the conclusion must be as necessarily true , as it is that the same thing cannot be , and not be at once ; that is , must be more certain than that england , for example , shall not crumble into atoms , or be swallow'd up in the sea to morrow : for this , and a thousand such things may happen to all material nature ; that a contradiction should prove true , cannot . and 't is perfect contradiction that terms which cohere in the premises , by being the same with a third , should not cohere with one another in the conclusion . must you be minded that an arguer is to prove his conclusion , and an answerer to shew he does not , by assigning where and how he fails ? do you do any such matter ? do you so much as go about it ? and would you have what you say pass for an answer ? pray consider the case : the church of rome is infallible , says mr. g. : she is not , say you . he brings his argument , and you your instance against it . what are people the wiser now ? and which shall they be for ; the argument or the instance ? they have reason to think well of the argument , because you have no fault to find with it ; and they may think as they please of the instance . you would not , i suppose , have them believe you both , and think the church of rome for your sake fallible , and , for his , infallible at once . pray what assistance do you afford them to determin either way ? and what do you more than e'en leave them to draw cuts , and venture their souls as handy-dandy shall decide , for you or mr. g. ? 't is true , when zeno would needs be paradoxing against the possibility of motion , his vanity was not ill ridicul'd by the walking of diogenes before him . for 't was palpably and ridiculously vain to talk against motion with a tongue , that must needs move to talk against it . and there may be vanity too in our case , for ought i know : but where shall it be lodg'd ? why more with mr. g's . argument than your instance ? why is it more vain to pretend to prove infallibility , upon which depend the hopes which millions and millions have of a blessed eternity , and which is prov'd by arguments , to which you think it your best way not to attempt to answer , than it is to except against a conclusion , against the premises whereof there lies no exception ? that is , to find fault with a sum total , and find none in the particulars , or the casting up : for a conclusion is a kind of sum total of the premises . but it is infinitely more vain to talk against one infallibility , unless you will set up another . for , if there be no means , by which men may be secur'd , that the ways they take to arrive at their greatest and only good will not deceive them , it cannot be expected they will take all the pains that are necessary to compass that good , which for ought they can tell , they may not compass with all their pains . 't is a pleasant thing in you to talk of the vanity of mr. g's . demonstration , when , by seeking to take infallibility out of the world , you are making the whole creation vain . for all material nature was made for rational nature , and rational nature requires rational satisfaction in all its proceedings , and most of all in the pursuit of happiness : and what rational satisfaction can there be , if there may be deceit in whatever can be propos'd for satisfaction ? in short , the result of your instance , whatever was the aim , it is to amuse and confound people , and hinder them perhaps from seeing what otherwise would be clear ; but it shews them nothing , nor can ; for that argument of yours is not at all of a shewing nature . . 't is , at best , but an argument ( as they call it ) ad hominem ; which you know are of the worst sort of arguments . they serve for nothing but to stop an adversaries mouth , or shame him , if he cannot answer without contradicting himself ; but are of no use towards the discovery of truth . for a thing is not the more or less true , because such a man's tongue is ty'd up for speaking against it . but is it so much as an argument ad hominem ? as all the little force of the topic consists in the obligation which a man may have to grant or deny what it supposes he does , it affords no argument at all against the man who has no such obligation . and pray where does it appear that mr. g. is oblig'd not to deny that the greek church has err'd in matters of faith ? and how can you , of all men , suppose he is ? you , who in your rational account ( p. . ) quote these words from peter lombard ; the difference between the greeks and latins , is in words and not in sense : name thomas à iesu , and azorius , and tell us of other roman catholic authors , of the same judgment , whom i suppose you could name . pray , how comes mr. g. to lye under an obligation , from which men of reputation in his own communion are exempt ? and what a wise argument ad hominem have you made against him , whom your self have furnish'd with an argument ad hominem to confute it when he pleases ? in fine , he goes to work like a scholar , puts his premises , and infers his conclusion , which you know cannot but be true , if there be no fault in his premises : and 't is for you to find one when you can . you put nothing to shew how the inference you make should be true , but barely assume , without proof , that he cannot deny it ( p. . ) : as if truth depended on his denying or affirming , and that what people say or think , made things true or false . and even , for so much , you are at his courtesie : if he be not the better natur'd , and will crossly affirm or deny in the wrong place , you and your argument are left in the lurch . in a word , one may see he aim'd at truth , who takes at least the way to it : what you aim'd at , you best know ; but no body shall ever discover what is , or is not true , by your method . . but that you may not complain , your cock is not suffer'd to fight , let us see what your instance will do . you put it thus , ( p. . ) the greek church went upon tradition from father to son , as much as ever the roman did . and i desir'd to know of mr. g. whether the greek church notwithstanding did not err in matters of faith ; and , if it did , then a church holding to tradition was not infallible . how ! if it did ? why then it is apparent if it did not , your argument holds not . and will you assume that the greek church errs , who believe she does not ? will you take a premise to infer a conclusion , upon which the salvation of people depends , which premise your self in your own heart think is not true ? can you deal thus with their souls , who pin them upon you , perswade them of what you are not perswaded your self , and offer them a securiy for their eternity , in which your own judgment tells you there is a flaw ? for you have declar'd your self upon this matter in your rational account , and taken great pains to clear the greek church , at least upon the article of the holy ghost , in which consists their main difference with the latins , and to which the other two you mention were added , i suppose , for fashion sake . i know you there propose to free that church from the charge of heresie . but pray what difference betwixt heresie and error in matter of faith ? unless you will trifle about obstinacy , and such collateral considerations ; which neither concern us here , nor were any part of your defence there . i see too that you word it here conditionally , and with reference to mr. g's . answer : as if his answer made or marr'd , and the greek church did or did not err , as he says , i , or no. whatever mr. g. may say , or you have said , unless the greek church actually does err , your instance is no instance of a church that goes upon tradition and errs ; and your inference that then a church holding to tradition was not infallible , is wondrous pertinently inferr'd from the example of a church that errs not . pray take it well that i intreat you by all the care you have of your own soul , and should have of others , to manage disputes about faith a little otherwise , and not propose arguments , in which you must needs think your self there is no force . for there is plainly none in this , if the greek church does not err ; and you at least think she does not . i am sure 't is what i would not do my self for all the world. . but to proceed to mr. g's . answer , ( p. . ) it was say you , that the greek church follow'd tradition , till the arians left that rule and took up a new one , &c. and why has he not answer'd well ? you assum'd that the greek church err'd while it went upon tradition ; if you did not , you said nothing ; for , that a church may follow tradition at one time , and leave it at another , is no news . 't is the case of all erring churches which ever follow'd tradition at all . mr. g's reply then that tradition was follow'd till another rule was taken up , denies that tradition and error were found together , as you contended , in the greek church . and pray what more direct or more full answer can there be to an argument , than to deny the premises ? as slightly as you would seem to think of him , he understood disputing better than to start aside into an exception against your conclusion , but answers fair and home by denying the assumption from which you infer it ; which now he has done , you know it rests with you to prove it ; and yet you never think on 't , as far as i see ; but , as if you had no more to do , fall a complaining against mr. g. for speaking of the arians , and not of the present greek church ; and against his copy , for leaving out the inference which you drew . in doing which , if he did so , he did you no small kindness ; there being no premises to draw the inference from , as has been shewn above ; or if any , such as put you to contradict your own doctrin ere any thing could follow from them . . as for the omission of the inference , i know not how it happen'd , nor mean to meddle with matter of fact. but i see they had reason , who observ'd before me , that 't is a thing of no manner of consequence , i verily think , in your own judgment . unless you think the age we live in so dull , that , without much hammering it into their heads , it cannot be perceiv'd , that if a church has err'd which held to tradition , a church may err which holds to tradition . or , unless you think it of mighty consequence to have an inference stand in the relation which fell with the premises at the conference . mr. g. took them away by his denial , and you must begin again , and bring something from whence you may draw an inference , if you will needs have an inference ; for an inference cannot be drawn from nothing . pray divert us not perpetually from minding what we are about ; but remember the question now is , whether the greek church held to tradition and err'd at once ? and bethink your self , if you please of a medium , which will infer that point for you ; for mr. g. you see denies it . . from his mentioning the arians you take occasi-to speak big , and bear us in hand he was hard put to it , and sought an occasion , and affirm ( p. . ) you could get no answer at all to the case of the present greek church . as if his answer pincht on the arians , and were not as full to the present as past greek church . it goes on this , that those who err in faith , let them be who they will , and the error what it will , and in what time and place you will , all leave tradition . whether the case of the present greek church be the same with the arians , is matter of fact , with which mr. g. did well not to meddle ; it is for you to make it out , if you will make good your argument . modern or ancient heresie is all one to his answer , which is applicable to all heresie : and you complain of the want of an answer when you have one . pray , if a man should put an objection to you about an animal , for example , and you answer it of all animals , would you think it just in him to quarrel with you for not mentioning the rational or irrational in particular ? and yet this is your quarrel to mr. g. all your magnificent talk ( p. . ) of undeniably true , granted by mr. g. known to every one , &c. as apt as i see it is to make a reader believe your instance is notoriously true , and against which mr. g. has nothing to say , cannot make me , or any man of reason , who examins the point , believe he has any reason to say more , till you do . he has answer'd directly , and positively deny'd , that error and tradition can be found together in the greek church , or any other , modern or ancient . there it sticks , and you may drive it on farther ( it being your own argument ) if you please . only when you tell us ( p. . ) that the present greek church in all its differences with the roman , still pleaded tradition , and adher'd to it , i wish you had told us whether you speak of differences in matter of faith , or no. for differences may be occasion'd by matters of faith , which are not differences in faith. if you do not , you support your instance very strongly , and prove the consistence of tradition with error in faith very learnedly , from differences which belong not to faith. if you do , as nature itches after strange sights , i long to see by what differences , or any thing else , it can be made out , that an erring church can still plead tradition , and adhere to it . not but that for pleading much may be , there are such confident doings in the world. as certain as it is , that the religion in england now , is not the same which it was before henry the eighth , i think there is confidence enough in england to plead tradition for it . 't is but finding some expression in an ancient writer , not couch'd with prophetical foresight enough to avoid being understood , as some will desire it should , and it will serve turn to pretend to antiquity , and bear the name of tradition . so i suspect you take it your self , when you say the arians insisted on tradition : for sure you do not think in earnest , that doctrin contrary to consubstantiality , was taught by christ , and believ'd from father to son till the council of nice . this , or some such thing may perhaps have been pleaded ; but for adhering to tradition , your servant . for , pray , did christ teach any error ? when a father believ'd what christ taught him , and the son what the father believ'd , did not the son too believe what christ taught ? run it on to the last son that shall be born in the world , must not every one believe what christ taught , if every one believ'd what his father believ'd ? and will you go about to persuade us , that there actually is a company of men in the world who adher'd to this method , all sons believing always as their fathers did , whereof the first believ'd as christ taught , and who notwithstanding err'd in matters of faith ? they would thank you for making this out , who would be glad that christ taught error and were not god. but it is not plainer that two and three make five , than it is that this cannot be . and yet you would top it upon us , and bear us in hand it is not only true , but apparent in the greek church , and known to every body who knows any thing of it . the comfort is , there is nothing for all these assertions but your word ; in which , where you stick not to pass it for an arrant impossibility , i for my part do not think there is absolute certainty . . i see not what there remains more , but to bear in mind where we are . at the conference , instead of answering mr. g's argument , you would needs make one of your own , which was in short ; the greek church goes upon tradition and errs , therefore another church may err which goes upon tradition . there was no need to trouble the greek church for the matter : it had been altogether as methodical , and as much to purpose , to have instanc'd in the latin church it self , and never gon further ; and shorter , to have spar'd instancing too , and have said without more ado , mr. g 's conclusion is not true : for you do no more , till you make it appear , that the church you pitch upon for an instance , do's indeed adhere to tradition and err . but , because this had been too open , and people would have sooner perceiv'd that it had been to say , i know not how to answer mr. g 's argument , but will notwithstanding stand to it , that his conclusion is false , you thought the best way to divert the reader 's attention from what 's before him , was to travel into greece ; and yet when you come there , do no more than if you had stay'd at home : for you barely say there is both tradition and error in the greek church , and you might have said as much of the latin ; or , without mentioning either , have said , tho' mr. g. has prov'd a traditionary church cannot err , i say it can and has . all is but saying till you come to proving : only to make a formal shew with an antecedent and a conclusion , you say it with the ceremony of an argument ; of which since mr. g. deny'd the antecedent , he had no more to do till you prov'd it . . so it stood at the conference , and so it stands still , and for ought i see , is like to stand : for tho' you have writ two letters since , there appears no word of proof in either , or sign that you do so much as think on it : you only say your instance over again , and would have the face you set upon it , and great words you give it , make it pass for plain and undeniable , when all the while it is plainly impossible , and actually deny'd . mr. g. i hope , will bide by his answer , because it is a good one , true in it self , and direct to the point : for it denies just what you assum'd , that the greek church stood upon tradition , and fell at the same time into error . and speaking as you do , or should do , of error in matter of faith , euclid never made any thing plainer than it is , that where ever error comes in , tradition goes out . of necessity therefore , if the present greek church have adher'd to tradition , it has not err'd : if it have err'd , it has not adher'd to tradition . which of the two is the case , neither concerns mr. g. nor can he dispute it without following bad example , that is , falling to argue now it is his part to answer . you would pass it upon us , that the greek church has err'd without swerving from tradition ; and you must either make it out , or acknowledge you have made much ado about nothing : for your instance is no instance , till it appears to be true ; till you do it , there is no work for mr. g. at the close ( p. . ) you desire mr. g. to make good two things , and tell us why you desire it , and what will follow if he accept or decline your motion . i neither understand how your proposals follow from your reasons , nor your consequences from your proposals : but think it no more worth losing time upon : them , than you thought it worth boasting of the victory . the first is , that we [ protestants ] have no absolute certainty as to the rule of our faith , viz. the scripture ; altho' we have a larger and firmer tradition for it , viz. the consent of all christian churches , than you [ catholics ] can have for the points of faith in difference between us . . i can tell you a better reason for this proposal than any you give . there was no avoiding to own absolute certainty to a man who talk'd of quitting your communion without it . but you knew well enough that your absolute certainty would be thwittled into sufficient certainty , and sufficient certainty into no certainty at last ; and had your wits about you when you thought of this proposal : for it is in effect to say , this certainty of faith is a troublesom matter , and not for my turn ; let us go to something else , leave faith and pass to scripture ; of which you , mr. g. shall prove we have no absolute certainty : for , if i should go about to prove we have , i foresee , that while i am seeking harbor in my larger and firmer tradition , i shall venture to split upon your infallibility , to contradict my th principle for the faith of protestants , and full at unawares into the snares laid for me in error nonplust , from p. to p. , which i have no mind to come near . but whatever reasons you had to make this proposal , i see none that mr. g. has to accept it . do you prove , if you please , that you have absolute certainty ; you , who bear those in hand who consult you , that you have ; and absolute certainty too of that of which you profess'd your self absolutely certain , viz. that you now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles ; which by your own confession there , is the true point . for you know very well , one is not certain of his faith by being certain of scripture : your self take all who dissent from yours , to have not only an vncertain , but a wrong faith , else why do you dissent from them ? and yet they have all as much certainty of scripture as you . the truth is , if you were prest to make out your absolute certainty even of scripture in your way , you would perhaps find a hard task of it , for all your appeal to tradition . but it was not the point for which the conference was , nor ought it be the point here , neither ought mr. g. to meddle with it , and you trust much to his good nature to propose it : for , besides that all the thanks he would have for his pains , would be to have the arguments against your certainty , turn'd against the certainty of scripture one day , as if he did not believe scripture certain : you would have him undertake a matter in which he has no concern , to save you from an undertaking in which you are deeply concern'd , but with which you know not how to go thorow ; which is a very reasonable request . in a word , it is for you either to make manifest now , what you should have made manifest at the conference , viz. that protestants have absolute certainty , not only of the scripture , which they call their rule , but of the faith which they pretend to have from that rule ; or else to suffer another thing to be manifest , viz. that i said true when i said you cannot do it ; and thither i am sure it will come . . however , i am glad to hear any talk from you of absolute certainty , even tho' it be but talk : 't is a great stranger , as coming from your quarters , and has a friendly and an accommodating look , and therefore for both regards deserves a hearty welcome . for this very profession makes a fair approach towards the doctrin of infallibility , or rather 't is the self-same with it ; it being against common sense to say you judge your self absolutely certain of any thing , if at the same time you judge you may be deceiv'd in thus judging . but i accept the omen that you seem to grant you are thus absolutely certain , or infallible , by virtue of tradition ; for this makes tradition to be an infallible ascertainer in some things at least ; and , so , unless some special difficulty be found in other things that light into the same channel , it must needs bring them down infallibly too . now i cannot for my heart discern what great difficulty there can be 'to remember all along the yesterdays faith , or to be willing to be guided and instructed by their yesterdays fathers , teachers and pastors ; especially the sense of the points ( to omit many other means ) being determin'd by open and daily practice . yet i a little fear all this your seeming kindness for tradition , is only for your own interest ; and that , because you were necessitated to make use of it to abet scripture's letter , you allow it in that regard , these high complements ; but in other things , particularly in conveying down a body of christian faith ( which is incomparably more easie ) it will presently become useless and good for nothing . in the former exigency you esteem it a worthy rule , but in the later duty , a rule worthy — . now to let the reader plainly see that it was meer force , and not inclination , which oblig'd you to grant an absolute certainty in tradition conveying down scriptures letter , we will examin what you allow'd it when you laid your principles , and so spoke your own free thoughts unconstrain'd by any adversary : your fifteenth principle is put down ( p. . ) in error nonplust , and that part of it that concerns this present point , is thus reflected upon by your adversary ( p. , . ) [ again , tho all this were true , and that the scriptures were own'd as containing in them the whole will of god so plainly reveal'd , that no sober enquirer can miss of what 's necessary to salvation , and that therefore there needed no church to explain them : yet 't is a strange consequence , that therefore there can be no necessity of any infallible society of men to attest them , or to witness that the letter of scripture is right . this is so far from following out of the former part of dr. st's . discourse , that the contrary ought to follow ; or , from prejudicing his own pretence , that it conduces exceedingly to it . for certainly his sober enquirer would less be in doubt to miss of what 's necessary to salvation in case the letter , on which all depends , be well attested , than if it be not ; and most certainly an infallible society of men can better attest that letter than a fallible one : and those writings can with better shew of reason be own'd to contain in them the will of god , if their letter be attested beyond possibility of being wrong , than if left in a possibility of being such ; for if the letter be wrong , all is wrong in this case . — ] as manifest then as 't is , that to be absolutely certain of any thing , is not to be fallibly certain of it ; that is , as manifest as 't is , that to be absolutely certain of a thing , is to be infallibly certain of it ; so manifest it is , that you there contradict your self here , and , that , however you may endeavour to come off , you allow not heartily , nor without some regret and reluctancy , an absolute certainty to tradition , even in attesting scripture's letter . . in these words of yours ( p. ) [ as to the rule of our faith ] give me leave to reflect on the word [ ovr , ] and thence to ask you , who are yov ? a question which i ask not of your name or sirname , but of your judgment ( as you call it ) of discretion . are you a socinian , an arian , a sabellian , an eutychian , &c. or what are you ? are you a whole , or a half , or a quarter-nine-and-thirty-article man ? do you take them for snares , or fences , and when for the one , and when for the other , and wherefore ? these words [ the rule of ovr faith ] make you all these at once ; for all these profess unanimously scripture's letter is their rule of faith. mr. g. when he came to your house , imagin'd he was to treat with a protestant , or something like it , and to have learn'd from you what absolute certainty you would assign for your , ( that is , protestant ) faith ; and you give him only a generical latitudinarian rule , common to all the heresies in the world. the project of the comprehension-bill was a trifle to this : it brings into one fold all the most enormous straglers that have been since christ's time , nay wolves , and sheep and all . it blends into one mass the most heterogeneous and hitherto irreconcilable sects . nay , it miraculously makes light and darkness very consistent , and christ and belial very good friends . for your own credit sake then distinguish your kind of protestants ( if you be indeed one of that church ) from that infamous rabble of stigmatiz'd hereticks ; and let us know what is the proper difference that restrains that notion of a common rule to your particular , as such a kind of protestant , and shew us that specifical rule to be absolutely certain . i say , such a kind ; for even the word protestant too is a subaltern genus , and has divers species , and 't is doubted by many , who are no papists , under which species you are to be rankt . but , why should i vex you with putting you upon manifest impossibilities ? for the letter being the common rule to them all , and , as daily experience shews us , variously explicable , that which particularizes it to belong specially to this or that sect , as its proper rule , can be only this , [ according as my self , and those of my iudgment understand or interpret it . ] the difference then constituting your protestant rule , as distinguisht from that of those most abominable heresies , can only be [ as my own iudgment , or others of my side , thus or thus interpret scripture's letter ] and wriggle which way you please , there it will and must end at last . go to work then , distinguish your self by your ground of faith , and then make out this your proper rule to be absolutely certain or infallible ; and then , who will not laugh at you for attempting it , and assuming that to your self , which you deny to god's church , and preferring your self as to the gift of understanding scripture right , before the whole body of those many and learned churches in communion with rome ? nay , and before the socinians too ; without so much as pretending to make out to the world , that you have better means , either natural or supernatural , to interpret those sacred oracles , than had the others . . my last exception is , that you pretend the letter of scripture is a rule of faith for your people , which not one in a million , even of your own protestants relies on ; or ever thinks of relying on , in order to make choice of their faith , or determining what to hold . this pretence of yours looks so like a meer jest , that i cannot perswade my self you are in earnest , when you advance such a paradox . for , 't is manifest that while your protestants are under age , and not yet at years of discretion to judge , they simply believe their fathers and teachers ; that is , they follow the way of tradition , however misplac'd . and , when they come to maturity , pray tell us truly , how many of your sober enquirers have you met with in your life , who endeavour to abstract from all the prejudices they have imbib'd in their minority , and , reducing their inclin'd thoughts to an equal balance of indifferency , do with a wise jealousie , lest this popish way of believing immediate fathers and pastors should delude them , as it has done the whole world formerly , resolve to examin the book of scripture it self , read it attentively , pray daily and fervently , that god's spirit would discover to them , whether what they have learn'd hither to be true or no , and what is ; and , in a word , use all the fallible means ( for you allow them no other ) which your sober enquirers are to make use of to find out their faith ? i doubt , if you would please to answer sincerely , you would seriously confess you scarce ever met with such a one in your life ; that is , never met with any one who rely'd upon scripture's letter practically for his rule of faith , whatever you may have taught them to talk by rote . can any man of reason imagin , that all the reformed in denmark or sueden ( to omit others ) did light to be so unanimously of one religion meerly by means of reading your letter-rule , and your sober enquiry ? or can any be so blind , as not to see , that 't is the following the natural way of tradition , or childrens believing fathers ( that is , indeed , of education ) that such multitudes in several places , continue still of the same perswasion ; and that you consequently owe to this way , which you so decry in catholics , that any considerable number of you do voluntarily hang together at all ? and that those principles of yours , which you take up for a shew , when you write against catholics , would , if put in practice , in a short time crumble to atoms all the churches in the world ? perhaps , indeed , when your protestants come at age , they may receive some confirmation from their fathers and preachers , quoting scripture-places against what catholics hold , or what they shall please to say they hold ; and by the same means come to believe a trinity , the godhead of christ , christ's body being absent in the sacrament , and such like ; but do the hearers and learners make it their business to use all careful disquisition ( for a slubbering superficial diligence will not serve the turn in matters of such high concern ) whether the catholics , and those great scripturists , who deny those other points , do not give more congruous explications of those places than their own preachers do ? unless they do this , or something equivalent , 't is manifest the letter of scripture is not their rule , but honest tradition . and that they do no such thing , is hence very apparent , that they rest easily satisfi'd , and well appaid with their parson's interpretation of scripture , they presently accept it for right and good , and readily swallow that sense , which some learned men , of their own judgment , assign it , without thinking themselves oblig'd to observe your method of sober enquiry . you may rail against the council of trent , as you will , for forbidding any to interpret scripture against the sense which the church holds ; but 't is no more than what your hearers perpetually practise , and the preachers too ( for all their fair words ) expect from them . and i much doubt even your self ( tho' your principles are the most pernicious for taking matters out of the churche's , and putting them into private hands , of any protestant i ever yet read ) would not take it very well if some parishioner of yours , presuming upon his prayers for direction , &c. should tell you that you err'd in interpreting scripture , and that the sense he gave it , was sound and right faith , yours wrong and heretical ; and i would be glad to know what you would say to him , according to your principles , if he should hap to stand out against you , that he understands scripture to be plainly against a trinity and christ's divinity , as iohn biddle did against the minister of his parish , and the whole church of england to boot . 't is plain you ought to cherish and commend him for standing firm to his rule ; but i am much afraid you would be out of humor with him , and esteem your self affronted . you may pretend what you please of high expressions given by antiquity , of scripture's incomparable excellency , and sufficiency for the ends it was intended for , which we do not deny to it ; but i dare say , even your self do's not think , that either the ancient faithful , or the modern reformers , meant that any of the ecclesia credens , or believing church , should have the liberty to interpret scripture against the ecclesia docens , or teaching church , i. e. pastors ; or coyn a faith out of it , contrary to the present or former congregation of which he was a member . . the sum is ; 't is evident hence , that tradition of your fathers and teachers , and not scriptures letter , is indeed your rule ; that by it you interpret scripture ; which then only is call'd your rule , and made use of as such , when you are disputing against us ; because having thus set it up , to avoid and counterbalance the authority of the former church you left , you make account your own private interpretation of it may come to be thought argumentative against the great body of those churches from whose communion you departed ; and yet you judge no private parishioner should claim the same priviledge against you , without affronting your great learning , and pastoral authority . but i much wonder you should still venture to call scripture's letter a rule of faith , having been beaten from that tenet so pitifully in error nonplust , from pag. . to pag. . where i believe you may observe divers particulars requisit to be clear'd e're the letter can be in all regards absolutely certain , which the consent of all christian churches will never reach to by their meer authority , unless you will allow the sense of christ's doctrin descending by tradition , did preserve the copy substantially right and intire . . your pretended rule of faith then , being in reality the same that is challeng'd by all the heretics in the world , viz. scripture's letter interpreted by your selves ; i will let you see in this following short discourse , how far it is from being absolutely certain . i. god has left us some way to know surely what christ and his apostles taught . ii. therefore this way must be such , that they who take it , shall arrive by it at the end it was intended for ; that is , know surely what christ and his apostles taught . iii. scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not that way ; for we experience presbyterians and socinians ( for example ) both take that way , yet differ in such high fundamentals , as the trinity , and the godhead of christ. iv. therefore scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not the way left by god to know surely what christ and his apostles taught , or surely to arrive at right faith. v. therefore they who take only that way , cannot by it arrive surely at right faith , since 't is impossible to arrive at the end , without the means or way that leads to it . . i do not expect any answer to this discourse , as short as it is , and as plain and as nearly as it touches your copyhold ; it may be serv'd as mr. g's argument is , turn'd off so so with an instance , if there be one at hand ; or , with what always is at hand , an irony or scornful jest , your readiest ; and , in truth , most useful servants : but you must be excus'd from finding any proposition or inference to deny , or any thing , save the conclusion it self : which , tho' it will not be fairly avoided , i cannot hope should be fairly admitted , unless i could hope that men would be more in love with truth than their credit . till truth be taken a little more to heart , catholic arguments will and must always be faulty ; but they are the most unluckily and crosly faulty of any in the world ; faulty still in the wrong place . when fault is found in other arguments , it is always found in the premisses ; in these , 't is found in the conclusion : in which , notwithstanding , all who know any thing of a conclusion , know there can be no fault , if there be none in the premisses . indeed , they shew that to be true which men cannot endure should be true ; and that is their great and unpardonable fault . that you may not think i talk in the air , i declare openly , that you cannot answer this discourse , unless you will call some unconcerning return an answer ; and i engage my self to shew the proposition true , and the inference good , which you shall pitch upon to deny ; and the distinction , if you will make any , not to purpose . the truth is , i engage for no great matter ; for i know beforehand you can no more answer now , than you could to error nonplust , or can prove an absolute certainty in protestant faith. . to return now to mr. g. the second thing which you desire him to make good , is , that the tradition from father to son is an infallible conveyance of matters of faith , notwithstanding the greek church is charged by him with error , which adher'd to tradition . that is , you desire him to prove over again , what you tell us your self he has prov'd once already : for you tell us ( p. . ) , he prov'd , that they [ traditionary christians ] could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . pray , when it is prov'd , that the conveyance of faith by tradition , excludes the possibility of change in faith , save by forgetfulness or malice , is it not prov'd , that , where there could be neither forgetfulness nor malice , there could be no change in faith ? you do not , i suppose , desire he should prove , that men had always memories , or that christians were never malicious enough to damn themselves and posterity wittingly ; and yet it can stick no where else : if it can , said mr. g. assign where . now you know very well , that a conveyance which makes it impossible that faith should ever be chang'd , is an infallible conveyance ; and the very thing is prov'd which you desire should be prov'd . what reason has mr. g. to prove it a second time ? and what reason have you to desire it ? if proof would content you , you have it already ; but a second cannot hope to content you better than the first , unless it be worse . . yes , but you would have him prove , notwithstanding the greek church , &c. ( p. . ) notwithstanding ? why , do you think it is with arguments as with writs , where the want of a non obstante spoils all ? when a truth is once prov'd , is it not prov'd , notwithstanding all objections ? and will any notwithstanding unprove it again ? will your notwithstanding shew us there was a time in which men were not men , nor acted like men ? will it shew us , that a thing which cannot possibly be chang'd , may yet possibly remain not the same ? will it shew us , that a cause can be without its effect , or an effect without its cause ? will it shew us , that a thing can be and not be at once ? unless it can do such feats as these , you may keep your notwithstanding to your self , for any service it will do you here : for all the notwithstandings in the world cannot hinder a thing which is true , from being true ; nor the proof which proves it to be true , from being a proof . mr. g 's proof shews , that tradition from father to son is an infallible conveyance of faith , as plainly , as that men are men : and would you persuade us with the rhetorick of your notwithstanding , that we do not see what we see ? tho' you had brought twenty of them instead of one , we could see nothing by them ▪ but that you had a good fancy ; for they shew us nothing of the object , nor offer at it . you shew us not how the operations of human nature should be suspended in our present case , nor any thing which should or could suspend them , but would have us believe men were prodigiously forgetful or malicious , purely for the sake of an imagination of yours . i pray rub up afresh your old logical notions , and reflect whether it were ever heard of in university disputes , that when an argument is advanc'd , the defendant is allow'd to make objections against it ; and instead of answering , bid the arguer prove his conclusions to be true , notwithstanding all his objections ? consider how perfectly this confounds the offices of the disputant and defendent , and makes all regular discourse impossible . consider how this new method of yours destroys the very possibility of ever concluding any thing , that is , the very faculty of reasoning ; for objections being generally multipliable without end , if all of them must be solv'd e're any argument concludes , nothing will be concluded , nor any conclusion admitted : and so a long so farewel to rational nature . consider that truth is built on its own intrinsecal grounds , and not on the solving objections . for your own credits sake then with learned men and logicians , do not seek to evade with notwithstandings , but answer fairly and squarely to the argument as it lies : consider , that who has found the cause , has found the effect . mr. g. has found us a cause of infallible conveyance , and therefore has shew'd us an infallible conveyance . you pretend , that tho' there was the cause , there was not the effect ; and this 't is known beforehand cannot be , and you knew it as well as any body : but you knew likewise there was no saving your stakes without playing a new game ; and therefore , give you your due , did all that could be done , in trying to divert our sight from a matter plain before us , and amuse us us with a matter of fact , which you are sure will be obscure enough , by that time it is handled long enough . the terms you put , viz. tradition , error , and the greek church , must needs bring into dispute , whether such and so many quotations , or some one or two men disclaiming their tenet to be a novelty , be a proof of tradition from father to son ; whether the error be any error ; and whether , and for how much , an error in faith , and how much of it belongs to divinity ; whether the greek church be ingag'd by a citation from a greek author ; of two that be cited , one against another , which shall be preferr'd , and thought to speak the sense of his church ; and which is a latiniz'd , which a frank grecian . and who shall see through the mists which these disputes will raise ? more too will fall in in process of time : there will be wrangling about the sense of words , the propriety of phrases , the preference of readings , and twenty such important quarrels ; which will tire out every body , and satisfie no body . in short , you saw that if you could perswade people not to think the church of rome infallible , till all be said , which will occur to be said of the greek church , you are safe enough ; for doomsday will come before that day . till then you may carry it with a shew of erudition , because there must be abundance of greek cited . and this is all which can come of your instance ; and i wish it were not all you had in your eye . . in the mean time you have not answer'd mr. g. because you have found no fault in any proposition , or in the inference of his argument ; and therefore it rests with you to answer it . he has answer'd you ; because he has found this fault with your instance , which you make your antecedent , that it is not true ; and that the greek church did not at once err in faith , and adhere to tradition : and therefore it rests again with you to prove it ; and yet while you are debtor both ways , you call upon him to pay . ere we part , take this along with you , that the debt which you are precisely bound to satisfie , first is to answer his argument , and till you do this , you can claim no right to object or argue . i am sir your humble servant . the second catholick letter ; or , reflections on the reflecters defence of dr. stillingfleet's first letter to mr. g. against the answer to the arguing part of it . published with allowance . london , printed , and sold by matthew turner at the lamb in high-holbourn . . to the reader . perhaps it has scarce been seen hitherto , that all our polemical contests were reduc'd within so narrow a compass . my first letter insisted chiefly on two short discourses : whereof the one undertook to shew the nullity of the rule of faith , claim'd by dr. st. and his protestants . the other the absolute certainty of the catholic rule ; and the whole controversie was , in short , about the certainty or uncertainty of christian faith. both of those discourses were presum'd by us to be conclusive ; and so we offer'd a fair advantage to our adversary , if he could shew clearly any of our propositions was false , or their connexion slack . hence i had good hopes that reply of mine would have brought our controversie very near an end , had dr. st's return been suitable to our attempts . especially , it had brought the business to a crisis , had he been pleas'd to shew the absolute certainty of his rule , or of his faith , as grounded on that rule , which was justly expected . but error nonplust has already convinc'd the world , that the bringing any dispute to principles or grounds , agrees not with their constitution who have none . while our expectations were thus rais'd , no news could we hear of dr. st. an answer comes out from another hand ; not very obliging to him in my opinion , whether he were or were not preacquainted with it : for if he were ( and 't is hard to imagine that a piece writ in his defence had not both his direction , inspection , and approbation ) people will suspect he foresaw what would come of it , and was glad the shame should fall on another ; and that he has but little kindness for his friend , whom he suffers to write on this manner . if he were not , they will suspect his friends have as little kindness for him , and less regard , who manage his cause without his privity . however it be , the answer affords no work for a replier , but the most ungrateful one in the world ; to be perpetually telling men of their faults , without the least hopes of doing them good , or contributing to their amendment ; they being of such a nature , that they are our adversaries most necessary supports in their unlucky circumstances . and indeed , the whole piece seems to have no other design , but to bring the dispute into a wrangle . yet this profit may be hoped , that every moderate iudgment will see by the very methods we take , which side desires and sincerely endeavours that truth may appear . it would be much a greater , if dr. st. or whom he pleases to employ , would plainly shew the * absolute certainty which he says they have ; or else plainly confess they have it not . but this is not to be hoped . yet i entreat the reader , because i distrust my own credit , to sollicit him ( if he thinks it not too dangerous for him ) to do the one or the other ; and in doing it , to use as much reason as he will , and as little laughing as he can . we are sufficiently satisfy'd of his faculty of risibility , and would be glad to see a touch or two of his rationality . reflections on dr. st's reflecters defence addrest to himself . . i enquire not , sir , since it concerns me not to know , why you would needs become a party , or rather an advocate in a cause , depending between dr. st. and another . if it were desir'd of you , you are to be excus'd , so you perform well what you undertook ; that is , to defend the dr. especially his logick , and his absolute certainty ; but if you had nothing to draw you in , besides the weight of what you had to say , i think you might very well have kept out . you begin like a man of art , with prepossessing your reader against your adversary , and in favour of your self : and so would have me pass for a pleasant , artificial , deluding companion ; and your self for a man , godly even to scruple , and who cannot barely repeat the metaphor ( of holding ones cards ) without * asking pardon . the reader will find , by your writing , to which of us your former character is most like . in the mean time , i own the confidence of talking of self-evidence , and absolute certainty , and infallibility ; and bless the mercy of god , for making me of a communion , in which that language is proper ; and humbly pray him to preserve me from the face ( if i must not say confidence ) of setting up for a guide without them . for , between a blind guide , and one who sees not his way , i think the difference is not great . much good may your modesty do you ; your obscurity ; your vncertainty and fallibility . if your conscience perswade you these are the best qualifications of christan doctrin , and best security which god would provide for the souls of men , mine would sooner use twenty metaphors , than perswade people to venture their eternity upon them . but , at worst , it is no greater fault in me sure , than in * dr. st. to talk of absolute certainty . unless he perhaps repent , and would be content an unfortunate word inconsiderately blurted out , should be retracted for him by another , which 't is not so handsome to retract himself ; whereas i , like a man of confidence , meant what i said , and stand to it ; and can have no good opinion of those modest men , that say and unsay , as sutes with the occasion . . to fall to our business , your discourse has three parts . the first reflects on what i said of turning proof over from your protestants to catholicks : the second pretends to answer my argument ; and the third , mr. g's . some gleanings in your language there are besides ; but this is the main crop. upon the first point , since proof does or does not belong to protestants , there is nothing more to be said to purpose , but either to shew that proof does not belong to them , or to bring it if it does . but let us see how you handle the matter . . i had exprest my self to grieve and wonder there should be so little value for souls among your party , as to send men to the tribunal of god , without furnishing them with assurance that they can justifie their accounts themselves . but if ( say you ) they may be assured they can give up a good account , may they not be assur'd that they have the grace of god , and of their iustification and salvation ? and then what becomes of the council of trent ? of what account do you speak , i beseech you ? if , as i did , of an account of faith , i hope you will not perswade us a man cannot know why he believes , without knowing whether he be in the state of grace , or sure of his salvation ; and therefore , i hope you will not persist to think it hard to conceive how the bare assurance of the truth of what is taught , should enable a man to justifie his account , without an assurance of grace too ; since his very assurance of the truth which he believes is a iustification of his account , for believing it . if you speak of an account of our whole lives , it becomes you huge well to talk of my confidence , who have your self the confidence to turn things against the plain scope of my discourse , against my plain words , and ( i much fear ) against your own knowledge . for where the only question was of the certainty of protestant faith , or ( which is all one ) of christian faith , upon your protestant grounds : an account why your protestants believe , who cannot tell whether christ taught it , was the only account that belongs to that question . but what needs more ? are not you , i too , fully perswaded , while we are writing this very controversie , that we maintain the truth of our faith by such arguments as can justifie us not to have fail'd of that duty ; and if we do so , cannot both us justifie our selves in that particular , and all who assent upon them , to god as well as man ? and cannot either of us bring a solid argument to prove that christ taught what we hold , without being assur'd before-hand we are in the state of grace , and shall be sav'd ? or , is this any thing to the council of trent , as you pretend ? what paltring is this then , to pretend , that no controvertist can bring a proof that concludes christ taught such a doctrin , and so justifies them that adhere to the truth it evinces ; for fear ( forsooth ) of making men sure of their iustification and salvation , and of contradicting the council of trent . a pretty fetch , to excuse your selves from bringing any arguments worth a straw to justifie your followers , for believing upon them ! alas ! you have store enough of them ; but out of pure conscience ( we must think ) dare not produce them , for fear of enabling your people to justifie themselves for not believing rashly ; or for fear of making them sure of their salvation . . i had alledg'd farther , that till protestants produce the grounds which prove their faith to be true , it cannot with reason be held truth . you put my discourse first in my words , only leaving out those which did not please you , and then disguise it in your own , and laugh at it for being too plainly true : for plain truth , it seems , is a ridiculous thing with you ; and you are of opinion , that the more plain it is , that you ought to bring your proofs , the less you are oblig'd to bring them . thence you start aside to tell us , that the vulgar catholic has less certainty than the vulgar protestant ; because the one has only the word of his priest , the other has the word of his minister and the word of god in scripture besides . do you think catholic priests are at liberty to tell the vulgar what faith they please , as your ministers may interpret scripture as seems best to their judgment of discretion ! when you cannot but know , they dare not teach them any faith , but what the church holds ; nor does the church hold any but upon tradition ? again , you do well to say your people have it in scripture , or in a book ; for they have it no where else . and you know the vulgar socinians and presbyterians , and all the rest , have it as much there , as your vulgar protestants , notwithstanding all you have said , or can say ; and then , i suppose , you do not think they truly have the word of god on their side , unless you think the word of god says different things to different hearers . when you prove that you and your ministers have any certain means of making it out , that the sense , which by their explaining and catechising they put upon the written characters , is truly god's meaning , you will do something , make many converts , and my self one among the rest : till then , to possess your vulgar protestants with a conceit of having the word of god , is meerly to delude them . sure you wanted a common-place to furnish out your paragraph , or else writ it in a dream . for , * to tell me , that truth can depend no more upon the saying of a romish priest , than of an english minister , when i tell you , it depends not on any private man's sayings , is not a reply of a man well awake . in two words , bring you proofs , say i ; the saying , that is , the no-proof of a minister , is as good as the no-proof of a priest , say you ; and the short and the long is ; no proof , i thank you . . but two things , say you , follow from my position , which you fear i will not grant . the first is , that if we cannot with reason hold a truth till the intrinsical grounds of it be produc'd , we cannot with reason hold any thing for a truth , namely , because the church of rome hath determined it ; for her determination is no intrinsical ground of the truth , but only an outward testimony or declaration of it ; and then what 's become either of her infallibility or authority to command our faith ! as slips of honest ignorance deserve compassion and instruction , and i do not know this to be any more , i will be so charitable , as to set you right . authority , amongst those who already admit it for true , has force to prove that to be truth , which depends on it , and will conclude against those who allow its veracity , if it be shewn to be engag'd against them . but it has not this effect upon human nature by its proper power as 't is meer authority ; but , because intrinsical mediums justifie it to be worthy to be rely'd on . whence , let that authority come into dispute , it will lose it's credit , unless it can be prov'd by such mediums to deserve what it pretends to . and , hence , you see we go about to demonstrate the infallibility of the church's human authority , in deriving down christian faith. to clear this farther , i advance this fundamental position ; viz. no authority deserves any assent farther than reason gives it to deserve : and , therefore , without abating any thing of our respect , we may affirm , that the authority of the whole catholick church would be no greater than that of an old woman , ( or one of your sober enquirers ) were there no more reason to be given for believing the former , than there is for believing the later . and consonantly to this doctrin , we declare to you , that , when dr. st. comes to argue , either out of authority of writers , or instances depending on their authority , against tradition ; he shall be prest to make out by intrinsical mediums they are absolutely certain ; or they shall deservedly be look'd upon and contemn'd as inconclusive . by this time , i hope , you see that all truths are built on intrinsical mediums ; and , that whereas you apprehended they would overthrow our church's testimony or authority , such mediums ( in case we produce them ) are the best means to establish it , and give it force upon our selves and others : as also , how it comes that the church can oblige to belief : which is not by a dry commanding our faith , as you apprehend ; but by having its human authority so solidly grounded upon reason , that it self becomes a motive able to beget , according to the best maxims of rational nature , such an assent in us , to this matter of fact , that christ and his apostles taught such doctrins . but , what a put off is this ? we say truth is not therefore truth , because of mens bare sayings or authority ; and therefore demand your proofs from intrinsical mediums , ( for thither it must come , e're it be known for truth ) to make out what you pretend ; your answer , in effect , is , you are afraid to do it , lest you should destroy our church's infallibility and authority . how much is our church in your debt , that the care of her makes you careless of those souls in your own church , to whom you owe this satisfaction . . the second thing you fear i will not grant , is , a iudgment of discretion to common people , with which they may discern the intrinsical grounds of truth . you gave your self at first the character of a scrupulous man ; and i see by this , you have a mind to maintain it . you know , that those who write and print , can have no design their books should not be read ; and you know those that read , will and must judge of what they do read ; and yet your scrupulosity can fear i will not allow the common people to judge of the intrinsical grounds of truth , who take pains they may judge , put it into their power to judge , and out of my own , and so cannot hinder them , tho' i would . indeed , i think it no great sign of a judgment of discretion , to pretend to discern the truth of faith , by lights that do not shew it to be true ; and , upon such a judgment i wish and labour people should not venture their souls . but i disallow no other iudgment of discretion ; full well knowing , that the more judgment a man has , and the more he uses it , the sooner and better he will discern , that the doctrin of christ cannot be securely learnt from those of your and dr. st's principles . but , why all this ? or , how come i to stand in your way ? do i hinder you from shewing protestants that they are certain of their faith ? they allow a judgment of discretion , if it stick there , whether i do or no. but you cannot gratifie catholics with proof , it seems , because they are against judgment of discretion ; nor protestants , because they are for it ; that is , in plain terms , you will not prove the certainty of your faith at all . you conclude very conformably , that i * have set us all on even ground : yes , most mathematically even : for i set absolute certainty on the one side , and vncertainty on the other ; and this , in your language , is even ground . . your next paragraph says , i fall upon the certainty of protestant faith ; which i hope easily to overthrow . the reader cannot but apprehend now , that i am making arguments against it , of which you know very well i did not think . where do i fall upon this matter ! why , i said , suppose mr. g. could not prove protestants are certain , are they therefore certain ? the meaning of which words is clearly this , that the certainty of protestant faith must depend on their own proofs for it , not on any man 's being able or not able to prove the contrary , which is what dr. st. would have put upon us . so that ( to avoid proving , which was demanded ) you put upon me the direct contrary to what i affirm'd , viz. that the certainty of protestant faith does depend upon our not proving they have none ; whereas i contend it does not depend upon it . what shifts are you put to , that you may escape this dangerous business of proving your faith certain . well , but did i say true , or no ? you trouble not your head with such impertinent thoughts , but fall to prophesie what i imagin'd . this ( say you ) he first imagins , that all the certainty of our faith is this , that papists cannot prove it to be uncertain , and that then i make sport with my own imagination . better and better ! not to take notice of your shuffling in , that papists cannot prove protestants are not certain , which i am very far from imagining ; because i said our not-proving the contrary , is no certainty to protestants , he will have me imagin it is their certainty ; nay , all their certainty : when he knows i am aware , and confess they pretend to scripture for it ; and , p. . urg'd them to make out they had absolute certainty by it. the rest is , to tell me i play , and you will be serious : and your way of being serious , when you have chosen to fall upon this question , whether protestants become certain by our not proving them uncertain , is , without saying a word to it , to skip to another paragraph of mine . . where i had said , that any man may find it confest to his hand , by protestants , that they have no absolute certainty of their faith : for which i cited dr. tillotson . and you tell me first , that dr. tillotson is an excellent man ; and so he is ; for he excells even your self ( which requires a great talent in your way of handling controversie ) in all your arts. next , to take your turn in imagining , you imagin single dr. tillotson too many for all the traditionary catholicks to answer his rule of faith. and i imagin , that dr. tillotson knows the contrary : for i have been inform'd , dr. tillotson had the offer of an answer , from a traditionary catholic long ago , upon condition he would contribute his credit to get it printed : which he thought not sit to do . since i perceive you do not know an answer when you see it , unless the word [ answer ] be in the title-page , i will not tell you it is answer'd already , tho' i believe i can make it good : but i will venture a fair wager with you , it will be answer'd , in his own formal way , every jot as soon as reason against railery . lastly , you deny that this confession that protestants have no certainty ( no absolute certainty , if it please you ) of their faith , is to be found in the pages cited , or any other part of dr. tillotson's book . if you do not understand english , i cannot help it ; but any one that does , may find in the last of the pages cited . as far as silence gives consent , it is own'd by dr. tillotson himself : for it was laid before him by reason against railery , and with him it has lain these fifteen years ; and yet you would perswade us you see it not , nor i neither , if i may be believ'd against my self . . your rhetorick , sir , is very great , if it will do you this piece of service ; but let us hear it however . i had said to dr. st. p. . you seem to grant you are thus absolutely-certain or infallible , by vertue of tradition . upon which theme you thus declame . how ? confess we have no certainty ( no absolute certainty , i beseech you again ) and yet seem to grant we are infallible , and that too by vertue of tradition . — some people had need of good memories . as if it were so strange a thing for protestants to contradict one another , or the same man himself ; or , that there needed memory to observe what passes every day . by the favour of your exclamations , dr. st. did say at the conference , that they are absolutely certain , that they now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles , — by the divine revelations contained in the writings of the new testament ; and of those revelations by the vniversal testimony of the christian church . and in his first letter he did desire mr. g. to prove that they have no absolute certainty as to the rule of their faith , altho' they have a larger and firmer tradition for it than we can have for the points of faith in difference . and dr. tillotson did say in his rule of faith , p. . we are not infallibly certain that any book ( speaking of scripture ) is so ancient as it pretends to be , or that it was written by him whose name it bears ; or , that this is the sence of such and such passages in it : it is possible all this may be otherwise . now , if one of those writers do not seem to grant that they are absolutely certain , ( or infallible ) and that too by vertue of tradition , and the other confess , that they have no absolute certainty of their faith , english is no intelligible language in england . if you think this a contradiction , you may talk with your excellent men about it , and let me alone ; till you can shew i talk against my self by relating barely what others say . must my memory be blam'd , when their judgments are in fault ? for a contradiction it is , if absolutely certain and infallible be the same ; which i both prov'd formerly , and it will come into play again e're long . however i only said they seem'd to grant , &c. for the tenet of faiths vncertainty , if i may speak what i think , is hearty in them ; it 's absolute certainty is but seeming ; and surely , 't is lawful to say he seems to hold it , who in print avows it , whether he do indeed hold it or no. . from hence you pass to a company of traditionary gentlemen ; with whom if you have business , i have none , and think yours cannot be very great , since you take this time to dispatch it . you may dispatch with me , if you please , first ; and say what you will to them afterwards . dr. tillotson , you say , in his rule of faith , p. . &c. said great matters of them , and if i find them wrong'd , i have the liberty to vindicate them . i know you would invent twenty impertinent tasks for me , so i would but forget the point in hand , and excuse you from proving . but how careless are you of what you say . one of those authors was occasionally vindicated in the letter of thanks , and the notorious abuse of him , made good against that dr's excuse , in reason against railery , p. . to p. . and were it seasonable , perhaps we should find the others abus'd too , or wilfully misunderstood . but , what is this to our present business ? at last , you conclude with a seasonable warning , as you call it ; that , if any protestant shall begin to plead infallibility by vertue of tradition , it will behove catholicks in time to seek cut a new one . why so , i beseech you ! this is as much as to say , that , as soon as protestants take a fancy to any thing that belongs to catholicks , it is their own , and catholicks must presently yield it up . your reason is , because when both parties pretend alike to infallibility and tradition , neither of these can be any longer a fit medium to prove which is in the right . what will be when both pretend alike , we shall see when the time comes . but , why must they , or how can they pretend alike ? can tradition infallibly deliver contrary things ? why should tradition be a medium less fit to determine between catholick and protestant , which of them has right to infallibility , when both pretend to it by tradition , than a deed to determine between peter and paul , which has right to the estate , which both claim by the same deed ? do their contrary pretences hinder it from being seen whether the deed be for peter or paul ; or tradition for catholicks or protestants ? or do you think a protestant , to get tradition on his side , has no more to do , but to pretend to it . at this rate , scripture cannot be a fit medium for you , because all hereticks pretend to it , and alike too . but it seems , that with you , when two pretend , one with right , the other without it , they both pretend alike , or with equal title . of which it was , indeed , seasonable to warn us ; for neither we , ( nor any man well in his wits ) would have hit on it of our selves . thus much in return to your present excursion . but what 's become of your proof all this while ? instead of bringing that , you tell me , i fall upon protestant certainty , of which there was not the least shew ; that i speak against my self ; that dr. tillotson is an excellent man , that he did not confess , &c. out of which rambling talk we are to conclude , that your protestant proof needs not appear ; but to make us amends for this constant neglect , you will needs give us a seasonable warning ; and that 's worth all the proof in the world. . yet we shall have this proof , i hope , in the next paragraph : for you give me notice then , when your certainty ( absolute certainty , i pray you again for dr. stillingfleet's sake ) is once prov'd , no more is needful to confute our infallibility , and that you are not afraid to undertake making it good , even all that i here call upon you to prove . and you do not raise our expectations sure only to defeat them . yet it bodes ill , that you would have the word [ absolutely ] left out a while : a motion which would make a jealous man suspect you had a design to palm a certainty upon us which will prove no-certainty . but you are absolute master of your own proofs , and may put in and put out what you please . i , for my part , cannot consent to leave that word out ; because it is not fair to alter a word of dr. st's ; nor possible , tho' it were fair . for you and i cannot make him not have said what he has said ; and , tho' we should agree to suppress that word amongst our selves , it will still be found in his two letters , do what we can . but , now we are thus far onward , 't is pity to break for a single word ; and to give you your due , you begin to deal here very fair with us . we manifest , say you . very well : now the business is on the hinges again ; and here is not only proof , but manifest proof coming . but what is it which you manifest ? why , the certainty you have of scripture ; and that , after the same manner as we do our ▪ rule or scripture , i know not which you mean. but , i see you need a good memory too as well as your neighbours : for you do not remember that absolute certainty of scripture is not the point to be prov'd , tho' i told you so in the very page you cite . i wav'd that point , not to be more severe than needs and put protestants upon a task which i told them withal they would find a hard one ; but from which , while we both agree that scripture is certain , i was willing to excuse them . again , you forget that just before you wonder'd at me for saying , you seem to grant you are thus absolutely certain or infallible by vertue of tradition ; and now you say , you manifest your certainty in the same manner as we do ; and sure you do not forget , that our manner of manifesting is by tradition . but , to lose no more time about that which is not the point , pray how do you prove that which is ▪ . why , you think you do sufficiently prove the certainty of every article of your faith , when you shew it to be solidly grounded on god's word ; and , this being shewn , wonderful things will follow . in the mean time you speak oracle , and have all the reason in the world to think that you prove sufficiently , when you solidly shew : neither did you need to mince it with sufficiently , for 't is very absolutely certain you do prove when you solidly shew or prove ; and this you might have said with less ceremony if you had been pleas'd : for we can see well enough , that when there is proof , there is proof ; tho' our expectation had not been screw'd up with your professions of courage to undertake , or shews to perform . this is just to invite your company , say grace to them , tell them you think you treat them sufficiently , when you set solid meat on the board ; and , all this done , send them hungry away . pray , when will that when of yours be ? when will the day come , in which you will shew your faith to be solidly-grounded on the word of god ? every article , as you word it , ( to bring it , i suppose , to your solid endless way of quoting and criticizing ) is too much at present . we are not got so far yet : it will be time to talk of this or that article , when this or that article is in question . at present , you are to shew , if you can , that you have any means , unless you take ours to ground any article solidly on the word of god. you are to shew your interpretation of it is absolutely certain , and that god's word means as you teach it does . otherwise your confident talking will not hinder us from seeing that you wretchedly delude your followers ; while you are your selves truly vncertain , whether any thing you teach them be true , and conscious that you are so . . and yet , tho' you have served us thus , you have a fetch to lay the blame upon me , for being harder to you than the laws of disputation are . i will have them , he says , prove two things more : first , that they are absolutely certain of all this. by the way , i take for granted , that by all this , you mean all which dr. st. affirm'd , which was all of which i desir'd proof . and secondly , not only this , but of all that more which our saviour taught his apostles . of this charge i own the first half . i did demand proof of absolute certainty , and that for all this ; and shall persist to demand it , till you shew me the disputation-law-book , which allows a disputant to say what he pleases , and chuse whether he will prove it or no when he has done . dr. stillingfleet did affirm , that you are absolutely certain ; and , absolutely certain that you now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ & his apostles . and of all this , all the laws of disputation that i ever read or heard of , warrant me to demand proof : and you shall permit me to believe there was something in the wind , besides those laws , which makes you decline to give it . i had been logician good enough , if you had known how to have prov'd . yes , but i make absolutely-certain and infallible all one . i make them all one ! why , all mankind made them so before i was born . take all the men who pretend to absolute certainty , and all the ways by which they pretend ; authority , demonstration , sense , experience , or what you will ; and see whether all mankind agree not , that when there is room for deceit , there is no absolute certainty ; and let a man pretend to be absolutely certain as much as he will , if he be , or may be deceiv'd , he will be but laught at for his pains , and not thought absolutely certain by any man in the world , no not by your reflecting self . and yet you would perswade us i break the laws of disputation by understanding that word as every body else does . certainly , you would make a pleasant law-maker for disputation : for when you have forbid us to understand words as others do , we could dispute no longer , nor so much as converse ; for there would be no knowing one anothers meaning . . but if i take that word ill , how must i do to take it well ? not to mistake a second time , i would be glad to know how your self take it , who to be sure take it right . but this you keep to your self ; and you have reason , if by absolutely certain you mean not absolutely certain , which i suspect is the true case ; and must be , unless you would have it mean nothing . otherwise , why might not we know what you will let it mean , if you will not let it mean what i and every body else think it does . since you leave me to my self , i shall , at the hazard of incurring again the penalties of your laws of disputation , venture to think that he , who will not suffer those who are absolutely certain to be infallible , will have them fallible ; that is , deceivable in that whereof they are absolutely certain ; and for ought they can tell , actually deceiv'd . and then he will have protestants believe that their religion is the same that is taught by christ , stand firm , and draw over to it as many as they can , and vex and persecute their neighbours whom they cannot ; prefer it before the unity of the church , and keep up differences in religion with as much jealous concern , as if the wall of division in the church were the only safe fence of the nation ; in a word , stake their souls and eternity upon it : when , all the while , he cannot absolutely tell whether it be true or no ; nay , knows he cannot . let him honestly tell protestants so ; and if they will venture persecution , and schism , and salvation on those terms , the fault is their own , and he has wash'd his hands : otherwise , he deludes them shamefully . if they waver , and stand upon security , they are told , they are absolutely certain , and this confirms them ; for it is as good security as heart can wish : but , when it comes to be sifted , it appears they may be deceiv'd for all their security ; and their absolutely-certain religion proves to be such as perhaps is arrantly false . in short , they have a bare sound to rely upon for their souls . call their security absolutely certain , and 't is good protestant doctrin ; but call it infallible , ( which is the same ) and 't is rank popery , and your protestants will none of it . and so , they may if they will , and must if they will continue to be of your principles , be content with sounds : but , if they will stand upon security from deceit , they must look for it where it is to be had : with all they can get here , it remains they may be deceiv'd . . the second-half of your charge is purely your own invention , and as pleasant an invention as ever roving fancy suggested . absolute certainty of protestant faith was turn'd by dr. st. to absolute certainty of scripture . since then , protestants believe more than that scripture is scripture , i said , they were to prove their absolute certainty of the more which they believ'd besides . you have taken such extraordinary pains to mistake me , as plainly as i exprest my self , that you fancy i would have them say they are thus certain of those points which they deny to be in scripture , and think them to be added by the council of trent , and which , therefore , they believe not . and these points you understand to be the more of which i demanded proof ; and so by your power in reflection , to desire proof of what they do believe , is to desire proof of what they do not believe : absolute certainty of what is their faith , is absolute certainty of what is not their faith ; and their not-faith is their more-faith . ridiculous folly ! to pretend we expected protestants should prove to us such points as they deny'd , and our selves held ; whence they could need no proof to us ; and if they needed any to others , it was certainly our proper duty , not theirs , to produce them . many , when they are hard put to it , have wav'd the consideration of shame , but 't is a sad thing utterly to renounce common sence too . yet , what is it you will not do ? what absurd pretences not lay hold of , rather than be brought to this odious and dangerous thing call'd proving ? you reflect out your paragraph with the h. scripture , the good men , who penn'd it , with the primitive church , and primitive creeds , and the council of trent , and this you call reflecting on my letter . . yet you set a good face on 't at p●r●ing , and tell us , you decline no proof that is incumbent on you ; as if it were not incumbent on you to prove what you say . you add , that we see by this time — as if there were any thing to be seen in all your reflections , but that they decline all proof , and that with the most aukward shifts in the world , as , because the council of trent had made a declaration concerning grace , p. . because a minister is as good a man as a priest , p. . because the infallibility and authority of the church of rome might run a risque , p. . because catholicks and protestants hit it not about judgment of discretion , ibid. because dr. tillotson is an excellent man , p. . because we will not dispense with the word [ absolute ] which was dr. st's , but will needs take it in its natural sense , and not admit of your no-sense of it , ibid. these and many other such weighty reflections have been our chief entertainment ; and yet your scrupulous modesty has the confidence to say you decline no proof that is incumbent on you , when you have incumb'd all the while , if that be the word , on nothing but throwing out baits to draw us from your incumbent proof , to other matters . you talk indeed of proof at last ; and that which you say of it , is , that you prove when you prove . moreover , you blame me for desiring proof of two things more ; whereof one is the very thing your selves have made the point to be prov'd , and the other i never desir'd you to prove at all . with this stuff you face it out , that you prove scripture to be the word of god ; which , if one should put you to it , you cannot ; and every article of your faith by the scripture ( common words , which every heretick may and does use ) ; when i have been all this while solliciting with all the earnestness i can , to know which way you can prove any article with absolute certainty by scripture ; and you will not tell me , and i am sure , cannot . though you have the confidence to say you do it , yet every body may perceive you know you cannot . for your very next words are , thus we prove we have sufficient certainty of our whole faith ; which is to say , you decline dr. st's absolute certainty , nor know of any way to prove more than sufficient certainty . and this sufficient certainty of yours may be no-certainty : for there goes no more to make a thing sufficient , than to make a man content with it . a yard of cloth will make a sufficient garment for him who is content to go half naked ; and a table without meat is a sufficient meal for him who is contented to fast . and so , as long as you can prevail with your protestants to be content without certainty , you can prove they have certainty abundantly sufficient , because no-certainty will suffice . marry , if they will insist upon having at least this sufficient certainty which you promise , i know not how you will do without weights and scales to weigh out your certainty , according to several mens exigencies , and make down-weight sufficient , except they will take your word ; for you have no more to give them even for so much : but , for absolute true certainty , the only certainty of which dr. stillingfleet spake and i demanded proof , they must absolutely excuse you . poor protestants , to be thus us'd ! that empty words and solemn outsides , and confident noise , should be offer'd to them for truth , and , which is more deplorable , pass upon them ! that they should not yet perceive they are but the stratagems of those no-principled men , who impose on them , and secretly laugh at them for their easiness ; and yet reflect not that they must answer one day with their souls , for suffering themselves to be so impos'd upon . . from your proving talent you pass to your answering talent ; and will try to answer a discourse of mine , in which there are but * five propositions . the first , [ god has left us some way to know surely what christ and his apostles taught . ] this you grant to be a certain truth : and so there is one step of our journey made . i think you grant the second too , not that you positively say i or no ; for that is too precise & dull a method for a man of your parts : but as plain truth seems always ridiculous to you ; you laugh at it for a foolish inference , because 't is so visibly in the antecedent . you are not aware i perceive , that your raillery is complement . to be contain'd in the antecedent , which you make the fault , is the praise of an inference ; without which it would indeed be good for nothing , or rather not be at all . for which way can an inference be drawn from an antecedent , in which it was not to be drawn ? would you have us draw wine out of an empty cask , or beer out of a jarr of oyl . again , the more we know the thing is where we would draw it , the surer our draught . but you seem to be so little acquainted with antecedents & inferences , that 't is no wonder ; by making them your sport , you make your self the sport of those who do understand them . in the mean time your laughing is owning that the inference is contain'd in the antecedent , and therefore certain , as you before own'd the antecedent was . and so we are another step onwards ; and might so forwards without stopping longer , if you could have let my proposition alone . but , you must needs be wording on 't your own way , to shew that either you did not understand it , or that you had a mind to inform us how neatly and dexterously you could change and pervert words , as well as answer . my words were : therefore this way must be such that they who take it , shall arrive by it at the end it was intended for ; that is , know surely what christ and his apostles taught . your words which you pretend equivalent to mine , are these : * [ if god has left us a way to know , then by that way we may know . ] pray sir , do you take my sence , or say what i do ? is shall know and may know all one ? i say that they who take the way left by god shall , that is , cannot chuse but know ; as he cannot chuse but draw a straight line , who draws it by a straight rule ; and he cannot chuse but come to london who goes on the right way thither : if either could miss , provided they draw by the rule , and travel on in the road ; the rule of the one is not straight , nor the way of the other right . and , so , i make account that the way to know the faith of christ , is not a right way , if those who take it can fail to know their faith ; and therefore not the way left by god. you barely say , we may know with which it consists we may not know ; and , so , you make us a way in which they who travel may be always out of the way ; which is well enough for a way of your making ; but it is certainly no way of god's making ; for it is plainly no way . but leaving this little tryal of your skill ; that which you say to my proposition ( unfalsifyed ) if you say any thing is , that 't is , indeed a little too visibly , but yet true , and so we may go on . . you preface to the third proposition with asking , who i dispute against ? and why if i would be thought to dispute against you , i do not use such and such terms ? two very pleasant questions ! your own and my title page tell as many as see them that i am disputing against d. of paul's ; and yet you stand enquiring after the secret again , to ask why i do not use terms to your mind , is to ask why the defendant does not go to the plaintiff to draw his answer . you shall excuse me from being beholding to you , if you please ; till you have a better knack at making arguments , for your self , you shall make none for me , by my consent . but , where lyes the quarrel ? you do not sure expect i should write to your liking ; and if you think i speak not against you , and your party , you need not trouble your self with what i say . what does not touch you , cannot hurt you ; so you may say concedo totum , and rest secure by being unconcern'd . yet you speak at last , and not till then , to purpose ; when you bear the reader in hand i pack the cards , and you will play fair ; 't is that must carry the cause , or nothing . to get the readers affection on his side much imports him , who has nothing but such little rhetorical tricks to trust to . . but , as if i had not the gift of prophesy to foresee with what a kind of man i should have to do , i happen'd to propose first what i intended to prove , before i went about to prove it , which i thought was the clearest way . you at a venture take what comes first , and tho' you saw it was my conclusion which i inferr'd from the following proposition , will needs speak to it before you speak to the premises . this has so blunder'd all things , that the reader will not easily perceive what we are doing . i shall thefore , ( as you should have done ) mind only the proof here , and reserve the inference till we come to the place where i made it . i put then to be prov'd that [ scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgements is not that way ] viz. the way left by god ; and for my proof that [ we experience presbyterians and socinians , for example , both take that way [ of private interpretation ] viz. and yet differ in such high fundamentals as the trinity and godhead of christ. ] . you , before you answer , would have it thought you might ridicule me in my own language . never spare me , good sir , nor balk your mirth for me if i give a just occasion : but where lies the jest ? why , i quarrell'd with dr. st. for bringing an instance , and now bring one my self : if this be all , i shall be tempted to be merry in my turn . i told dr. st. he might undoubtedly have produc't his instance if he had been arguing , but minded him that his turn was then to answer , and that his instance was not an answer , but a new argument . and yet this is not plain enough for you to see that i faulted not the instance , but the unseasonable argument , as i should any other in such circumstances ; and you would have it ridiculous in me who am arguing to do what i only excepted against , because he was not arguing ; and freely acknowledg'd he might do , if he had been to argue . sure you were in a pleasant humour , when you thought of turning me into ridicule , because your self understood not where the stress lay , tho' it were never so plainly told you . but to let this pass , as you say , with your causelesly gleeking reflections upon scripture and tradition , what say you to the proof i bring ? . why , the force of my argument ( say you ) is this : if any men can be found who wrest or misinterpret scripture , then can it not be the way to know what christ and his apostles taught . one thing after another , if it please you . talk of the force of my argument as much as you will , but , e're you leave the proposition before you , of the presbyterians and socinians , 't is but fair to grant or deny it . i must intreat you too to leave translating my arguments . they are new yet , and need no mending ; when they do , i will be better satisfied of your skill in the trade , before i become your customer . by your next words , rallying against the validity of the consequence , i guess you grant the antecedent ; and so , that care being over , we have nothing but the consequence to mind . the dispute would fall in more properly under the next proposition which infers the consequent ; but now i am here , i will hear what you say , before i pass farther . you say then , that indeed this argument proves nothing , but that i have no good opinion of the scripture . will this venomous cant never be left ? i think the scripture too good and too sacred to be abus'd by wrong interpretations , and labour to preserve it from them : you labour to keep it expos'd to that abuse ; pray , which of us two have a better opinion and more reverence for the scripture ? you proceed : must a rule be no good rule , because some who use it misunderstand it and abuse it ? what may you mean by this ? i take my ruler , and draw a line by it ; does the straightness or crookedness of this line depend upon my vnderstanding ? what is 't then you call misunderstanding a rule ? if you make the letter of scripture the rule , and so private interpreting the vsing it , or drawing the line , and the sense the line drawn ; unriddle to us , if you can , how the sense drawn from the letter can any more fail to be true , than the line drawn by the rule to be straight ; and which way that sense can be misunderstood ; and how the rule can be a good rule if it be us'd , and the sense to which it is a rule be misunderstood ? or , do you mean perhaps that 't is with the scripture as with a grammar-rule ; where he who understands not what 't is for a nominative case and a verb to agree , may make false construction , and yet the rule be a good rule . tho' you should go thither for your notion of a rule , we should be but where we were . for , as the grammar-rule , let it be never so ill understood , will make good construction in case it be us'd ; so the scripture-rule , if it be , as you put it , us'd , must needs produce right sense . but the truth is , a grammar-rule is not a rule till it be understood ; for he who understands not what 't is for cases and verbs to agree , has no rule to make them agree : and , then , if you will make the letter of scripture such a rule , you will make the letter first understood to be the rule of understanding it , and people misunderstand what they understand , and the misunderstood rule be a rule , which is only a rule by being understood . in short , turn it which way you will , you will ( to borrow an expression ) be much beholden to the reader to make sense of what you say . . you question on ; must a way be a wrong way , because some that take it will not keep it ? riddle my riddle again . pray , who are or can be those some who take it and will not keep it ? as long as they take it , they keep it , i think ; and they keep it not against their wills sure . he who has no will to keep it , may when he pleases go out of it , but then he does no longer take it , and is none of the some of whom the question speaks , ( for they all take it ) and so we have nothing to do with him . when all is done , the will here is to no more purpose than the vnderstanding before : for he who takes the way , shall certainly arrive at his journeys end , let him will what he pleases , and the way must needs be a wrong way if he do not . 't is great pity you are not in the right ; you would save more men than the benefit of their clergy : for the thief in a cart , upon the way to tyburn , would never come there if willing not to keep that way would keep him from it . but by affirming that some take the way who yet will not keep it , you affirm that some do and do not take it . and so dr. st. is well holp up with a reflecter , who imagins we are talking of one , who only takes the way at first , and afterwards leaves it ; whereas 't is plain , the argument proceeds of such as make the way their choice , and persist to follow no other to their lifes end. . lastly , you tell us , that till it be prov'd god has left such a way or rule , as no man can possibly err out of it , mistake it , or abuse it , &c. for you must permit me to stop by the way , i am too short breath'd to run over the long period at a loose . but , let you alone to make all sure : you are safe enough if all must go on your side , till some body prove to you that no man can err out of the way left by god , mistake or abuse it ; that is , till some body prove that ways are prisons out of which there is no escaping ; or that the man cannot possibly fall into errour who is out of the way to truth . as many as leave the catholick church , leave the way left by god ; and you , like a right pleasant man , would have it prov'd , that the thing cannot possibly be done which we see is done by millions ; and would have us , who say , they all do err and mistake , prove they cannot . all this while i a little suspect you mean otherwise than you say ; and that by your words , errour , and mistake , and abuse of the way , you understand missing the end of the way , truth . but let us see what you will make of it : what would you have prov'd next ? why that it is not enough that god has left us such a way or rule , as men may understand and observe if they be not wanting to themselves . what do you call being wanting to themselves ? i understand how a man that will not travel , or leaves a right and takes a wrong way , is wanting to himself : but he who puts himself upon the way , continues on in it , and changes not his road , is not wanting to himself in any thing i can imagin , which belongs to the way : and the way of this traveller i maintain against you , has not enough to be a way , if it barely may , and yet may not , bring him to his journeys end. what will this come to at last ? why , till these things be prov'd , it will not follow , that the scripture's letter , in the sense you have own'd it , is not the way , tho' not only presbyterians and socinians , but the greater number of mankind should own it , and yet differ about fundamental points contain'd in it . what you call the sense which you own of the letter of scripture , will come by and by . but will not that follow which you say here will not ? will it not follow , that the way by which a man that goes in it comes to errour , is not the way to truth ? will it not follow , that he who at his journeys end finds himself at york , did not go the way to london ? pray , what 's the way to a place ? is it not that passage that he who has past it , finds himself at that place ? and so the way to know the doctrin of christ and his apostles , is it not the means which he who has us'd knows that doctrin ? why then , since presbyterians and socinians both interpret by their private judgments , and one side knows not the doctrin of christ , it follows as unavoidably , that the way of private interpretation is no sure way to know it , as that he who has gone through the strand , and finds himself at charing cross , has not gone the way to moorfields ; that is , as certainly as that a way is a way or means to bring a man to such a place . . what do you talk then of erring for , and mistaking and abusing the way ? or what do you mean ? 't is true , those erring men do mistake the true way , and for that reason err . but they mistake not the way which you say is the true way . they do interpret by their private judgment , and so take , not mistake it ; use , not abuse it . sure you mean that they mistake the doctrin of christ ; and , so , by mistaking the way , you very wisely understand mistaking the end. and then , what a man are you to contend their way is a way , and a sure way too , to bring them to the knowledge of christ's doctrin , when they pursue it and are not brought to that knowledge ? and what eyes have you who perceive not that therefore it cannot be a sure way ? again , to what purpose do you tell us that men may understand and observe ( as if observing concern'd our question of knowing ) if they be not wanting to themselves ? when they who take a right way , not only may , but must , and cannot possibly fail of coming whither it leads , any more than the man who goes down the strand , of coming to charing-cross ; and when men have no more to do with a way , but to travel in it ; and so cannot be wanting to themselves , in that respect if they do . of the same batch is your misunderstanding and not keeping the way . as if they who interpret by their private judgments did not keep the way of interpreting by private judgments . and tho' their understandings be none of the best when they take that for the sure way to understand by , yet that very misunderstanding is their understanding it to be the way ; and so they , even in your opinion , misunderstand not the way , however they misunderstand by it . in fine , you amuse us with a company of vvords , which have a sound ; but either no sense at all , or none to purpose : and it remains , that , because a way must bring every one that takes it to the end of that way ; and private interpretation does not bring socinians to the sure knowledge of christs doctrine , which is the end ; that , therefore private interpretation of scripture is not a way to know that doctrine surely . . and yet you can bear us in hand that this follows no more than it follows that because we see men misinterpret and break good laws daily , therefore those laws are vnintelligible , or cannot be kept , and must be thought insufficient to shew them what the law-giver expects from them . what breaking and keeping the laws is brought in for , you best know that bring them in . our discourse is only about knowing the doctrin of faith , and not at all about living up to it ; and so has nothing to do with those who know , but will not keep the laws , as is the case of most malefactors . but you end your discourse well i must needs say , and very sutably to all the rest , with an instance directly against your self . you see that laws left to private interpretation are , by all mankind , judg'd insufficient , and publick interpreters therefore set up every where ; and , from the parity with them which are insufficient , you conclude the letter of scripture is not insufficient . any body but your self would have made another use of this instance . as god can write much plainer than men , when he thinks fit , and has more care of their salvation than they of their temporal concerns ; another man would have concluded that god did not intend their salvation should depend on the privately-interpretable letter of the divine law , which he left less plain than men made the letter of humane laws . but you , it seems , had a mind to make your discourse all of a piece . the best is , 't is now ended , & we are free to pass on to the fourth proposition . to which , because the force of exceptions against an inference before it be inferr'd appears not so well , i reserve what you say against it , while i put it only to be prov'd . . it is this , therefore scriptures letter interpretable by private iudgments is not the way left by god to know surely what christ and his apostles taught , or surely to arrive at right faith. and now i must look to my self , for you pour out here your distinguishing talent upon me . if , say you , by scripture's letter , he means unsensed characters , then i confess scriptures letter cannot be the rule or way . there is one branch of your distinction ; and so the other , unless you will talk non-sense , must needs be , scripture's letter , meaning sensed characters , can be or is the rule . your words are , yet if he can think it reasonable to allow as much to the scripture as he expects we should allow to this letter of his , that it contains good sence exprest in words significant and intelligible ; we deny his assumption that scripture's letter is not this way . as you have this art , among the rest , to talk unintelligibly , when you have a mind to 't , in very plain english , i wish some body would tell me for you , whether you take scripture's letter in this period for unsensed or sensed characters ; for truly i cannot tell my self . by the terms you put [ intelligible ] and [ significant ] one would guess you mean unsensed characters ; for [ intelligible ] imports what may be understood , but is not yet ; and [ significant ] what may be perceived by the sign , whether it be or no. and then you have made a fair hand of it with your fair dealing , who distinguish the word [ letter ] into characters unsensed and characters unsensed ; and grant it to be a rule in one of the two same meanings , and deny it in the other . but you shall talk sense for me , and mean characters sensed ; and then le ts see how much you have mended the matter . a character sensed signifies a character with the sense joined to it : the sense of the characters of scripture is the sense of god , and the sense of god is that which we are to believe . and , so , scripture-characters sensed ; signify faith it self in conjunction with those characters . now faith is the end to which we are looking for a way to carry us . to tell us then that scripture's letters taken for sensed characters is this way , is to tell us that the end is the way to it self ; that the means to get faith is to have it first ; that , when we know it , we know it ; that , when we are at our journeys end , we are in the direct road to it , and such fine things , which would tempt a man not very fond of disputing , to leave it off and betake himself to some other business : for how can you or any think fit to vex poor controversy all your life , when your very sense proves non-sense ? and yet it is not that you have not serv'd a prentiship long enough in the mystery : but the best shoemaker in the world cannot make a good shoe of bad leather . . yet , as you are not a man to be discourag'd with ill success , you are at your distinctions again ; and tell us that , if by these words , interpretable by private judgments , i mean the scripture any way interpretable , as any private man may possibly wrest the words to make them comply with his own sentiments , or through ignorance , and laziness , and neglect of such helps and means as are fit to be us'd , may misunderstand them , i must have a very bad conscience , &c. as if the question were about my conscience . but you would say , i suppose that scripture , so meant , is not the way , and i say it is not too . pray , what conscience is yours , if mine be bad when i say as you do ? but if my meaning be , that scripture as it may be understood by a private man of a competent iudgment , using such helps as are proper , is not the way , you again deny my assumption . because it would render the discourse unintelligibly confus'd to repeat so many lines at every turn , i shall , with your good leave ; say in short , good and bad judgments ; understanding by the bad all the qualifications of the first branch , and all of your second by the good. i take you then to say that scripture's letter , as interpretable by bad judgments is not the way ; but , as interpretable by good judgments is the way . by this account three parts in four of mankind at a modest computation , have no vvay . for so many bad judgments there are at least . but , the main point is , while we are enquiring which the way is which god has left , pray what have we to do with the iudgments of men ? can they make or unmake it ? or does it depend on them to be or not be the way he left , as they happen to be different ? it is a vvay only so long as good judgments travel in it , and ceases to be a vvay assoon as bad judgments come upon it . a way , i think , is a vvay whether it be beaten by the lusty or the lame , the pur-blind or the well-sighted . and , so if the letter of scripture , interpretable by private judgments , be the way which god has left us , 't is not the goodness or badness of private judgments which can make it not the way . wherefore , tho' you have chopt upon a distinction for which we are beholden to you , for we might chance else not to have minded there are good and bad judgments in the world ; yet your distinction unluckily has no relation at all to the question . nevertheless , it serves for talk and show , and bids fair to draw us from thinking what 't is we are about , to wrangling about how much brains go to a competent iudgment , how much pains to diligence , and such very useful disputes : which , if you had any , was in likelihood your design . for sure you cannot but see your self , that your distinction is no more to our purpose than news from hungary or the morea . . again , your first branch says that bad judgments may misunderstand the letter of scripture , and that it is not the way to such ; which i think is to say , that it is not the way for that reason ; for you do not , and i suppose , will not say that they may not understand it right , if luck serve , let them be never so bad ; but , because they may misunderstand it , therefore it is not the way . why then the very reason you give why it is not the way in your first branch , bars you from making it a way in your second . for all you say of your competent and assisted judgment , is , that they may understand it right ; which is not denying , if it be not owning , they may likewise understand it wrong . and then , you may unriddle to us when you can , how the bad judgment , which may misunderstand it , makes it no way , and the good makes it a way , which may misunderstand it too . you are strangely partial to good iudgments , to make the possibility to misunderstand scripture's letter exclude the bad and admit the good ; and the possibility to understand it right , include the good and shut out the bad. thus men have , or have not a way as they find favour with you , and as you like their judgments . as far as i see , your favour is all in all . for , since you make the letter of scripture a way to good , but not to bad judgments , there is no knowing when it is and when it is not the way , till we know which must pass for good , and which for bad judgments : and so nothing can come of it till we have a test to try them . now , i am much afraid that your own judgment is , like bayes his play , your only test ; and that you make account all goes right as long as people think as you do . marry , if they chance to deviate from you , they lose their iudgments , or their diligence , or their proper helps , or something , and stop up their way with their own faults . there is no doing here without scales again to weigh out the brains which go to a competent iudgment , the pains which go to diligence , and the rest . otherwise , we have lost scripture ; and , for our comfort , get your word instead of it . for , if scripture interpretable by a competent judgment be our way , and yours be a competent judgment ( which no doubt you suppose as your first principle ) 't is a plain case that your iudgment is our way ; which in truth is the sum of all . so long as we will believe as you would have us , we shall have the most magnificent words in the world , for our souls . we shall all have competent iudgments from nature , and proper helps from grace . we shall ( as many as will stand upon 't ) have absolute certainty , nay infinitely greater certainty than reason can afford , the word of god. but , all is to be understood with the condition annext of trusting you for all . otherwise we have neither diligence , nor iudgment , nor helps , nor certainty , nor word of god , nor any thing in the world but your word ; who yet cannot for your life make any three words you say hang handsomely together . . but i have stray'd after your will-of-the-wisp till i have almost lost sight of our point . the question is , whether scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments be the way left by god. i maintain it is not ; and prove it , because men who take that way err . for , i thought it needed no proving , that the way left by god is not the way to errour . you distinguish twice ; first the letter into sensed and vns●nsed characters ; that is , if you make there any distinction at all . now the proposition is of the letter interpretable , that is , not yet interpreted , or which has not yet the sense put to it , and so is yet unsensed . when you then distinguish the letter interpretable , into sensed and vnsensed , you make a distinction , whereof one branch is not comprehended in the notion to be divided . 't is just the same as to distinguish learned men into learned and vnlearned ; or men into negroes and horses . your second distinction is , of iudgments , into competent and incompetent , which is twin to the former . i vouch't for proof the presbyterians and socinians ; men of very competent judgments ; and who are neither ignorant , nor lazy , nor negligent , nor baulk any means or helps , which they judge can enable them to understand the letter , or that you have , except that , for a spiritual guide ( which , i suppose , is one of the helps ) they in likelihood use the assistance of some body of their own , not of your perswasion . but if one of your protestant guides be a proper help to your protestant , a socinian sure is proper to a socinian . in short , they fall under none of your ill qualifications , and when i speak of competent and qualify'd judgments , you distinguish the competent into some which are competent , and some which are not competent ; and , again , the qualify'd , into those which are , and those which are not qualify'd . the sum is this , i ask whether the vnsensed letter be the way ; and you answer , the sensed letter is ; that is , the end is part of the way to the end. i propose you competent iudgments , and ask if the letter be a way to them , and you reply , it is not a way to the incompetent . and so you , who , good squeamish gentleman , fall into a scruple at the very name of cards , can play at cross-purposes all along very freely , even when souls are at stake . i desire you to remember that i speak of a way , which they who take , shall , and that surely , arrive at christ's faith. you talk of a way by which men so and so qualify'd , may arrive at it . as if may be were any thing to shall and must be ; or the qualifications of travellers any thing to the way . i * foretold i should have nothing but an unconcerning return for an answer : and you have made me , tho' against my will , prophesie ; not bating so much of my prediction as the scornful iest. for there is the mountain and the mouse , and reading a lecture in logick to verifie it . . you conclude with an argument against my conclusion : you , i say , who are answering , and have nothing to do with arguing . but , what would we have ? men who are uneasie will alwaies be shifting places . all our earnest sollicitations could not wring one argument out of you when it was your turn to prove ; and now 't is your turn to answer , you thrust your arguments upon us unbidden . nor is there any keeping you from falling into the same fault with your suppositions , that dr. st. did with his instance . you suppose then . that the scripture is god's word . and so do i too , provided you mean the true sense of it . for a false sense , whatever you think , is , in my judgment , not god's word . . that it was written to be understood . undoubtedly ; but not by every one , barely by means of the letter . all books are written to be understood : grammar , for children to understand construction ; mathematical books for those who will understand mathematicks ; and yet those books without masters will make but few grammarians or mathematicians . . that it is written for the instruction of private men. yes , but not for the only , or sufficient means of their instruction , barely by the letter . . that they are concern'd to understand it . yes again ; and as much concern'd not to misunderstand it . . that they may believe and live as it directs . they not onely may , but ought . but , pray remember , that it directs no believing or living according to a false sense . . that they have means left them of god for the vnderstanding of it , so far as it is of necessary concernment to them . yes , and that absolutely certain means , the publick interpretation of the church or tradition . . and that , using those means as they ought they may understand it . never mince it with may ; they shall and certainly shall understand it who use those means . from all you conclude at last . and thus it is to them the way to know surely what christ and his apostles taught as necessary to their salvation . how ! the way to those who use those means ! why this is just as i say . but what becomes of those who use not those means ? 't was ill forgot when your hand was in at supposing , not to suppose in amongst the rest , that private interpretation is the means lest by god for understanding scripture . for , if publick interpretation be those means , as it needs must , since i have prov'd that private is not ; the scripture plainly is no way to those who only rely on the private means to understand it . and your protestants are much beholding to your argument which shews that scripture , interpreted , as they interpret it , by private iudgment , is no way to them . and i were very unreasonable if i should take offence at your challenge , which bids me shew , when i can , that your suppositions are vnreasonable or false . not i , believe me ; for i should be very cross-natur'd to fall out with a man who takes my part . . thus you have try'd * as you call it , to answer my argument ; and have succeeded ( even in your own judgment , i guess ) very sorrily . for had you been confident of your performance against it as it is , you would never have thought of changing it , as you do here p. . men who have put by a thrust are not sollicitous to instruct their adversary how he should have thrust . and yet you will needs be teaching me , how i should have done to have made sure work ; that is , to have been sure to hit your buckler . i mean not to lose time on your argument . it were ridiculous for me to amuse my self with what never was nor will be said by any but your self . no body else would have left out the principal consideration , using the rule , and , so , coming to right faith by using it . as if a rule would make a line of it self , tho' no body draw by it : and a way bring to the journeys end ; even those who travel not in it . in a word , your argument has all the faults of your answer in short ; and onely shews you can speak from the purpose more solemnly and methodically , by way of syllogism . . after you had thus nobly acquitted your self in answering my short discourse , you proceed in the same method to answer mr. g's argument for the infallibility of the catholick church . which , e're i come to examin , i must first say something to your preliminaries . . you doubt whether i think it needs any proof that the church of rome is infallible . to those who reflect on the force of a vast human testimony , attesting notorious matter of fact , and what assent it claims from human nature in parallel occasions , i do indeed judge it does not so much need proof as reflection . but , why should i think it needs no proof against you ; who , we see plainly , have interpreted your selves out of your natural sentiments ? your reason , sir , because i say 't is in vain to talk against one infallibility , without setting up another . now it * has been demonstrated to you , and never yet answered , that infallibility and certainty are the same ; and nature tells us , that all discourse supposes something certain , otherwise it may run on endlesly , and so nothing can ever come to be concluded . how is it possible then to discourse against infallibility , or any thing else , without setting up and proceeding upon something that is certain , or infallibly true ? by your constant jesting whenever infallibility comes in the way , you discover your anger against it , because you know you can produce nothing that is truly certain , to ground your faith. notwithstanding the vulgar use to say commonly , [ i am infallibly certain of such a thing ] yet none laughs at them or thinks them extravagant : and must we be afraid to use the same language in our controversie , because your ears are so tender , or rather your grounds so soft , they cannot bear it ? if you will needs declare against infallible certainty , be but so candid as to say still you are fallibly certain , and see how your readers will smile at your folly : and yet you ought to own one or the other , if you be certain at all ; for there can be no third or middle sort of certainty , which is neither fallible or infallible . pray speak to this point , and let 's have a little reason from you at least , and not perpetual rambling and shuffling . how can you justifie your selves , that you are not deserters of human nature , by affirming ( or at least supposing ) there is no infallibility ( that is , true certainty ) to be found amongst men ? betrayers of christian faith , while you leave it all capable to be a lye ; nay , maintain the full sense of that wicked position [ all christian faith is possible to be false ] in discourses directly fram'd for that set-purpose ! blasphemers of god's providence , in declaring and asserting that he has left less certain grounds for faith , and consequently for the salvation of mankind , for which the world was created , and god himself dy'd , than he has for other things of a trifling importance ! will it expiate for those crimes , to talk cantingly here of an infallible and living god , and his giving us his word by men endu'd with an infallible spirit ; sayings fit to take the good women that are much pleas'd with godly talk in a sermon , but frivolous in our controversie ! who ever question'd that god was living or infallible ; or that he has left us an infallible word ? the only question is , whether you can settle for others , or have your self , any absolutely-certain way to know the sence of that word which this infallible god has left us . you tell us indeed 't is plainly written : but that 's the question still , and the point we deny ; and for which we are continually demanding your proof , and such a one as may confute our daily experience , assuring us , that 't is not plain to private iudgments . yet this only important point , you only name , then slide over it and retreat to your old refuge , that weak insignificant pretence of sufficient certainty , ( by which , i suppose , you mean a certainty that is neither infallible nor fallible ) and tell your people , if they will take your word against their own experience , the plainness of it ( for 't is that must give them this security ) secures them from being dangerously deceiv'd ; then , as 't is but fitting , follow again of course [ in things necessary to salvation ] and [ using the proper helps ] which ( as we shall see anon ) will cost one's life to peruse ; and this you tell us , encourages them to take pains to be well assur'd of the truth . fine words , i must confess , if they had any sense ! is it such a rare encouragement to take pains to be well assur'd their faith is true , when you tell them , that after all their pains they can never be satisfied , but it may be false ; that is , they can never be satisfy'd that it is true ? but , when all 's done , and the certainty of your grounds fail you , your last refuge is , that the same infallible god who has given the means , has assur'd his blessing to them that diligently use them . but this begs the question : for , if the rule you follow be not the means ordain'd by god to arrive at faith , you have neither the right means , nor can you be assur'd of any blessing by using them ; unless you can prove god has promis'd his assistance to those that use not the means he appointed ; or will certainly direct those to the right place who take the wrong way to it . next , you fall into a wonderment to hear me talk of mens being discourag'd — for want of an infallible guide . and i wonder you should hear me talk what i never spoke . not one syllable was there of a guide : all my discourse was about an infallible rule . but the truth is , you are sick of any discourse that sifts the uncertainty of your rule ; and therefore car'd not what new pretence you started , nor whether it were a false or true one , so you could but get the dispute transferr'd to another subject . yet , upon this false pretence you run on with your raillery to the end of the section . . but , at last you have found infallibility in tradition , after you have been sent from place to place to seek it . pray , sir , who sent you ? we , with whom you are discoursing , never directed you to any other , but to that of tradition : and you know well , and every reader sees , we are treating of no infallibility , but only that . yet you triumph mightily , you have found a thing which was proffer'd to you unsought : and found it at last , which was both propos'd to you and urg'd upon you at first . what an everlasting trifler are you , to confess to your reader you have been running after butterflies all this while , and could not once turn your eye to the question which was just before you , nay prest upon you ! well , but what are my * words ? [ the certainty of scripture is from tradition . ] do you deny this ? no , you positively assert it , first letter , p. . let 's proceed . [ therefore there is no refusing to admit , that tradition causes certainty . ] do you deny this ? how can you without destroying the certainty of your own rule [ scripture ] which depends upon it , and withal contradicting your self ? i added , [ and makes faith as certain as scripture . ] can you deny this ? that is , will you affirm the same virtue does not work the same effect if the matter be capable ? let 's see now how you answer . yet it may be this certainty comes not up to infallibility . yes , it does ; for the certainty here spoken of was absolute certainty , as was twice insisted on immediately before , from your own words , p. . and i * prov'd it was the same with infallibility which you have never disprov'd ; and so , unless you give a better answer , your own acknowledgment that tradition causes absolute certainty , forces you to grant we are infallibly certain of our faith. but say * you , the tradition for scripture was more vniversal : suppose it so , was not tradition for doctrin large enough to cause absolute certainty ! or , are not ten millions of attesters as able to cause absolute certainty as twenty ? pray , consider a little the vertue of witnessing authority , and the force it has upon human nature . when the number comes to that pitch , that it is seen to be impossible they should all be deceiv'd in the thing they unanimously attest , or conspire to deceive us , their testimony has its full effect upon us , and begets in us that firm and unalterable assent we call absolute certainty ; and the addition of myriads more adds nothing to the substance of that assent , since it was wrought without it . but the main is , you quite misunderstand the nature of a long successive testimony . let ten thousand men witness what two or three , who were the original attestors of a thing , said at first , and twenty thousand more witness in the next age what those ten thousand told them , and so forwards , yet ( taking them precisely as witnesses ) they amount to no more , in order to prove the truth of that thing , than the credit of those two or three first witnesses goes . 't is the first source of a testimony , which gives the succeeding ones all their weight to prove the thing that is witnest to be true : 't is that from which the largeness and firmness of a testimony , brought to evince the truth of any thing , is to be measured or calculated . since then the stream of tradition for doctrin had for its source innumerable multitudes of those christians in the first age , in many places of the world , who heard the apostles preach it , and saw them settle the practice of it in the respective churches ; but the original testifiers that such a book was writ by such or such an apostle or evangelist , were very few in comparison , sometimes perhaps not past two or three : it cannot with any shew of sense be pretended , that the tradition for the several books of scripture is in any degree comparable in either regard to the tradition for doctrin . your next answer is , that this vniversal tradition is no more but human testimony , and that can be no ground for infallibility which excludes all possibility of errour . pray why not ! if things were so order'd ( as indeed they are that the testifiers could neither be deceiv'd in the doctrin , being bred and brought up to it ; nor conspire to deceive us , in telling the world in any age that the new doctrin they had invented was immediately delivered ; then it was not possible any errour could come in , under the notion of a doctrin delivered from the beginning . but is not your tradition for scripture human testimony too ? and if that can be erroneous , may not all christian faith by your principles be perhaps a company of lying stories ? you must be forc'd by your own words here to confess it ; but i dare say , your parishioners , should you openly avow it , would hate you for the blasphemy . you would tell them , i doubt not , as you do us , that moral certainty is enough to stand on such a foundation : that is , such a certainty as may deceive you , and , by a necessary consequence , may haste to overturn the whole fabrick of christian faith. in the mean time let 's see how manifestly you contradict dr. st. when you should defend him . he avow'd * absolute certainty for the book of scripture , and this upon the foundation of tradition ; and you tell us here tradition can ground but moral certainty : now all the world , till you writ , counter distinguisht absolute and moral certainty , which you jumble in one . but distinct they ever were , are , and shall be ; for the word [ moral ] signifies a diminution or imperfection of certainty , and [ absolute ] plainly expresses the perfection of it : whence 't is evident , that either you contradict dr. st. ( perhaps not without his private order ) or he himself . we shall have all words shortly lose their signification , for no other reason , but to give you room to shift this way and that , when you are too close prest with reason . . now , since dr. st. had granted , that tradition is absolutely certain for scripture , and i had prov'd that absolute certainty was the same with infallibility , what should hinder me from inferring , that unless some special difficulty be found in other things that light into the same channel , it must bring them down infallibly too ? your gifts of interpretation expounds these words of mine thus : these other things are things unwritten in that holy book . i do assure you , sir , you are mightily mistaken . i never told you yet that all faith was not contain'd in scripture explicitly or implicitly . what i meant was , that the whole body of christs doctrin ; ( and not only that such a book was scripture , ) nay the self-same doctrin of faith that is contain'd in scripture , comes down by tradition , or the churche's testimony . but with this difference , ( as to the manner of it , ) among others , that the church that testifies it , having the sense of it in her breast , can explain her meaning so as to put it out of all question to learners , doubters and enquirers ; which the scripture cannot . whence we need not fish for our faith in the channel of tyber , as your great wit tells us ; st. peter's ship , ( the church ) that caught so many fishes at first , ( the body of primitive christians , who were the first deliverers of christ's doctrin , ) hath stor'd up provision enough for the succession of faith to the worlds end . there we find it to our hands . 't is your sober enquirers who fish for it among dead unsensed characters , and in the lake of geneva ; from whence to save the labour of going thither , you and your friends are deriving a great channel to run into thames , over-swell it's banks , and drown all the churches . lacus lemanus is your tyber , geneva your rome , and iohn calvin ( the prime of your new apostles ) your st. peter . . all this is but prelude : but , now comes mr. g's argument , and therefore we are to expect now , however you but trifled hitherto , more pertinent & close discourse . the first proposition was this : all traditionary christians believe the same to day they did yesterday , & so up to the time of our b. saviour . this you seem to deny in regard they may perhaps be so call'd from their adhereing to a tradition which reaches not so high as our saviours time , but only pretends to it , whither we only pretend to it or no will be seen hereafter , when the fourth proposition comes to be examin'd . in the mean time pray jumble not two questions which are distinct , and ought to be kept so . the whole business here is about the use or sense of the word [ traditionary ] & how we both take it in our present controversy . now that we both agree in the notion of [ tradition , ] whence [ traditionary ] is deriv'd , is evident by this , that we lay claim to such a tradition as reaches to christ , and go about to prove it ; you deny our claim , and endeavour to disprove it : but 't is evident you deny the same thing to us which we lay claim to ; otherwise we should not talk of the same thing , and so should not understand one another , nor could discourse together ; wherefore 't is manifest we both agree in the notion or meaning of that word , however we disagree in the application of it to the persons . nor do we pretend in the least , what you would put upon us here , to inferr hence that this body of christians that now adheres to it , did always so ; but only contend , that if they did not ever adhere to it , they must have deserted it and taken up another rule , and so , cease to be true claimers of a tradition from christ , or traditionary christians . moreover , we judge we have right to lay claim to it , till we be driven out of it by a former and better title ; since we were in possession of this rule at the time of the reformation , or held all our faith upon that tenure . . the second proposition is this : if they follow this rule they can never err in faith. whence follows the third ; [ and therefore they are infallible . ] your answer sir , to this . can they adhere still to what was deliver'd , and yet err in faith , if what was still deliver'd , was christ's doctrin . your answer is ; his friend tells us this is palpably self-evident . and does not his adversary confess it too ? do not your self acknowledge it in your st , and d. pages , and say you must lay by your reason , turn romanist , and renounce your private iudgment , if you did not grant it . and can the reader , so well acquainted with your shuffles , judge it less than palpably self-evident , which your humour , so restiff to grant any thing , tho' never so clearly prov'd , is forc't to yield to . lastly , does his friend only tell you 't is self-evident ? does not he prove it to be as evident as 't is that the same is the same with it self ? and is not such a thing evident by its own light , or out of the very terms , that is , self-evident ? pray , sir , when i prove any thing , let the reader know i did so ; and do not thus constantly pretend still that i only said so , or told you so . a pretty stratagem to avoid speaking to my proofs ; but how honest let the reader judge . . but , say you , unless this tradition be longer than it is yet prov'd to be , they may follow it , and err all along in following it . no doubt of it ; if it fall short of reaching up to christs , we may follow it , and err by following it , as all hereticks do in following their novel traditions . that ( yet ) is a very pretty word ; for it puts the reader into a conceit that we have produc't nothing from the beginning of the world , to the very time of your writing , to prove our tradition reaches to our saviours dayes ; and yet , if we challenge you that we have prov'd it in the very next words of our argument , you can make your escape , by saying , that you are not yet come to speak to that point , and that you meant no more . who would think there should be such vertue in a petty monosyllable , as at once to disgrace us , and save you harmless ! the second answer to this point is , let it ( the tradition spoken of ) be never so long , yet if they follow it not , they may err . very good ! the arguers words are , if they follow this rule they cannot err in faith ; which implies , that , if they do not , they may err : and you say the self-same over again , with an ayr of opposition , and there 's an answer for us now . as if to conform to your adversaries words were to confute him , any thing will serve , rather than say nothing . . the fourth proposition brought to prove that this tradition we lay claim to , does indeed reach to christ and his apostles , is this , they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . and here lies the main stress of the controversy between us ; for you have granted here , page . . that were this rule follow'd , they must still enjoy the same faith christ and his apostles taught ; and this discourse is brought to shew they did follow it . we are to expect then that your choicest engines must be set on work to baffle a proof , which , if it holds ; brings such dangerous consequences after it , and indeed concludes the whole controversy . your first attempt is in plain terms most evident , & a most unconscionable falsification . after you had ( p. . ) recited this fourth proposition , you immediately add . our author undertakes to make this out more clearly , & therefore we will hear what he saith for our better information . p. . he asks , did christ teach any errours ? and so you go on reciting that whole argument , which proves , that if the first fathers believ'd what christ taught , and the succeeding sons all along believ'd what their fathers did , the last-born son in the world believ'd the same that christ taught . pray , sir , play fair above-board . you have directly falsify'd that whole discourse , by pretending here that the words you cite were to make out that fourth proposition clearly , ( viz. that we could not innovate in faith &c. ) whereas the truth of that fourth proposition was made out by me nine pages before ( viz. p. . ) and the discourse you mention here , as intended to make it out , is found p. , . and levell'd at a quite different business : viz. that a church could not adhere to tradition , and at the same time erre , as you pretended we must grant of the greek church . clear your credit when you can , i charge it upon you as a voluntary insincerity : but you shall never clear it unless by putting out your reader 's eyes , or perswading him not to use them . so that it seems let us bring what arguments we will , you need do no more when they are too hard to answer , but apply them to a wrong point they were never mean't to prove , and then 't is easy to shew manifestly they are frivolous and good for nothing . in the mean time , who sees not that your cause as well as your credit is run a ground and like to split , when you are put to such shifts ! i wonder how this gross fault could escape dr. st's acute sight , if he perus'd and review'd your reflexions . . your second answer , or rather cavill , is , that you could make as fine sport with the word [ notwithstanding ] as i did , but that , it seems , it spoils your gravity . yet you can dispence with that formal humour very easily , as oft as a hard point presses you , especially when you are put to proving : nor are we now to learn that you can laugh at a feather , when you have nothing of more weight to say . but , where lies the jest ? i never excepted against the word , but the misapplying it by dr. st. who , when he was at a loss to give an answer to mr. g's demonstration , very learnedly and advisedly thought it best to deny the conclusion , object an argument of his own against it , and then bid the opponent prove his thesis ( which he had prov'd already ) notwithstanding his argument . when you find me thus untowardly making use of that , or any other , word , you are at liberty to except against me . in the mean time put this in the number of your reflections , that when a man pretends to make sport when there is no occasion , he but discovers his own folly. but the point is , can you make good his logick in this irregular proceeding ? this is what we expected from a writer that undertakes to defend him . but the task is so insuperable , that neither your wonderful learning , nor dr. st. himself , nor all the world to help him can ever be able to do it ; unless he can make the schools renounce all rules of art , and mankind their reason . but what were my words that were so mirthful ? why , i deny'd that a body of men could adhere to tradition , and notwithstanding erre . is here any occasion of fine sport ? or , cannot i use a plain word in the context of my discourse falling in naturally , because he had misus'd it unskillfully and inartificially ? i see by this sliding over it so gentilely , this is all the answer i am to expect to my , , , , d. and th . pages ; where such errours against all methods of dispute are charg'd upon the dr. as would banckrupt any mans credit who had not a large stock of it laid in beforehand . and all the favour his best friends can do him to excuse his person , is to refund it upon his cause . . but , tho' it was granted that discourse of mine cited by you pag. . was so evident , that it was both vnreasonable and absurd to deny it , yet it must not scape without some animadversion . a fault there must be in it , that 's decree'd ; and what should that fault be , but that good one of being too evident . and this , as was shewn formerly , is one of the new tricks taken up to evade answering . when our arguments are too clear to be baffled by any ( even plausible ) reason , being next to self-evident , or easily reducible to it , to save us the labour you reduce it thither your self , but first vilely deform'd , that it may become a fit subject for your jesting way of confuting . we will grant him ( say you ) it is impossible to prove that men have err'd notwithstanding they never err'd . very excellent ! but do you not grant much more ; viz. that it is impossible they should adhere to our rule , and yet erre ? you do , and , in doing so , you grant the whole substance of my discourse . and so let them laugh that win . i am sure you have lost by this forc't confession , that tradiction is a certain rule , and that i have prov'd it evidently . which no man will grant of your rule that is in his wits , nor can the wit of all the men in the world ever prove it to be such as you have yielded ours to be . . the same disingenuity often repeated gives all the force to your next sect. for , . * you pretend we but suppose it hitherto , that these traditionary christians adhere undecliningly to a tradition descending really , and invariably from christ and his apostles , &c. how ! only suppos'd hitherto ! was it not prov'd , and not barely suppos'd in the fourth proposition , and made good by me , p. . if you will not come up to it , but stand hovering , fencing , jesting , falsifying ▪ and capering about by the way , must we be blam'd as barely supposing it hitherto ? . you falsify our words : for who ever said a supposition is self-evident , which every one sees , while 't is barely a supposition , is not evident at all . why quote you not the page where we say this ? because you would not be caught . . you falsify again without care of credit or regard to your reader , in affirming , that from this self-evident supposition i necessarily conclude thus ; suppose traditionary christians neither did nor could erre , it is certain they neither did nor could erre . but why again no place quoted ! because you had again falsify'd it , and durst not hazard discovery . . i perceive , your play here ( p. . ) is to disjoint our discourse , and jumble all the pieces of it confusedly together ; and , so , it must be my work to rectify what you had so industriously unravell'd . since then mr. g. had made use of these words [ traditionary christians ] their sense was first to be explain'd , and therefore i * declar'd that the meaning of them was , such christians as proceeded upon an immediate delivery not only at present , or since the council of trent , or some hundreds of years before , as you put upon us , p. . but upwards till christ's time ; and all the advantage i gain'd thence was that in case they did not adhere to it all along , it would follow that the pretended traditionary christians ( our selves ) were not really such , and so the subject of our dispute would be lost , and we should receive a perfect foil . could any thing be clearer or more candid ? yet , how many shuffles , and baffling jests , you have been pleas'd to bestow on us instead of admitting so clear a proposition ; to how many wrong ends you have apply'd it , never thought on by us , we have already seen . for the truth is , you are so horribly afraid of any connected discourse , that you dare not so much as suffer it to peep out , but it alarums your jealousie ; no , not the very signification of the single words to be distinctly known , or the most evident proposition , tho' it be indifferent to either cause , to be admitted . now let 's see what you say to it ; you make it amount to this : suppose traditionary christians neither did nor could err , * it is certain they neither did nor could err . which you call my necessary conclusion from my self-evident supposition . you improve mightily , sir , in your talent of insincerity . our entire discourse runs thus , if we must needs put it into form for you . those who adhere to tradition all along from the beginning , neither did nor could err in faith , ( otherwise they would not be adherents to tradition or traditionary christians ) . but this body of christians , call'd the roman catholick church , does now , and did from time to time adhere to tradition . therefore this body of christians , call'd the roman catholick church , neither did or could err in faith. this is mr. g's argument : the major is granted by * your self . the proof of the minor is contain'd in mr. g's fourth proposition , which i have shown to be valid in my first letter , p. . and the discussion of it is now under hand . the conclusion is in greatest danger , lest you should , according to the new true-protestant logick , deny it again , and bring some instance against it ; otherwise , since it follows evidently , it will shift well enough for it self . this , i say , is our intire discourse ; all the rest is your flashy drollery , your ever faithful friend , when you are perplext how to answer . . the argument then for the perpetuity of our tradition from christ's time , runs thus . they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or , out of malice , alter it . to enforce this argument , i discours'd * thus . you do not , i suppose , desire we should prove that men had alwaies memories , or that christians were never malicious enough to damn themselves and their posterities wittingly ; and yet , it can stick no where else . yet you are such a bold undertaker , that you will needs prove they may be both thus forgetful and thus malicious . a hard task one would think ; especially since the argument proceeds upon forgetting and altering what they remembred and held yesterday . your first reason to prove they might be thus forgetful , is ; because otherwise it is hard to say why the pen-men of the scripture should have been at the needless pains to write it . let 's apply this to the argument , and your discourse is this . 't is hard to say that christians could have remembred their yesterday's faith , had not scripture been writ . now , pray sir , be serious , and tell us , do you think there is any danger , or even possibility of this among the very protestants in england , tho' they had never a bible to read to morrow ? how many of them read not so much as a chapter in three or four days , how many not in a much longer time ; nay , how few of them read all their faith there in a year , or even in their whole life ; and yet they retain the memory not only of their yesterdays , but last years faith ? what a weakness is this , to suppose miracles must be done for no other end , but that you may answer our argument ? the reasons why scripture was writ , you might have read in st. paul to timothy ; where there is no such thing as to make men remember their yesterdays faith , nor that scripture is of necessity at all ; but only that 't is profitable for many uses there enumerated . your second argument to confute our demonstration , is a text , pet. . . by which you will convince us , mens memories are not alwaies so faithful : you must mean to remember their yesterdays faith ; for this degree of memory only the argument insists on . but what says that b. apostle ? i will endeavour , that you may be able , after my decease , to have these things alwaies in remembrance . now , there is not so much as one word in the whole chapter concerning the remembring or forgetting their faith , much less the faith they held yesterday ; or leaving their faith in writing for that purpose , but only ( faith suppos'd ) of remembring his particular exhortations to good life ; and , by thus inculcating them , to stir them up ( as 't is said , v. . ) to christian virtue , and leaving such things in writing to that end . now , such spiritual and moral instructions are both easily intelligible , especially , since he had taught the same to them formerly ; and man 's natural corruption making even good men apt to slide back from the high degree of perfection in which they had been educated ; no doubt a letter left by that holy apostle , now near his death , as he there tells them , would strike them more feelingly , and excite them more effectually to pursue that course of holy life , in which he had instructed them . what miserable stuff is this ? would not faith have an excellent basis , did it depend on scripture interpreted by your private judgments . when this one instance manifests , you have the boldness to quote scripture for any thing , tho' never so disparate and unconcerning , and then blasphemously nick-name it god's word , when 't is nothing at all to the purpose . but , i beseech you , sir , let 's have the return of one scholar to another . if our argument lye too open , or the connexion in it be too slack , speak to it as you ought ; but think not your private interpretations a competent solution to demonstrations . if such wretched answers may serve the turn , the schools and universities may shut up shop , and reasoning bid adieu to the world : every fop will find a text he can hook in , nor will he fail of interpreting it blindly to his own purpose , when he is gravell'd with an argument ; and of calling it god's word when he has done . who will not see you are sinking , when you catch at such straws and weak twigs to keep you above water . . by this time the reader will be satisfy'd , that notwithstanding all you have answer'd , men had memory enough not to forget their yesterdays faith : next , you go about to prove christians may be malicious enough to alter it . may not christians ( say you , p. . ) through malice and wickedness , be as careless of preserving the faith , as in maintaining holiness in themselves or their posterity , when they know that sin is as damnable as errour ? be judge your self . do not many of your congregation ( and the like may be said of all sects ) sin often , and yet few or none of them desert their faith once ? the reasons why the parallel holds not , are these . . sins are generally private ; at least , men do for the most part endeavour and hope to conceal their faults , for fear of shame and discredit . but the change of faith must be profest and open ; otherwise it alters not the case ; and posterity will still believe on , according as things appear outwardly . . sinners are seldome malicious to that degree , as to resolve firmly to persist so to the end of their lives ; but generally fall out of frailty , and intend and hope to repent . and so this very thing will oblige them still to hold to their former faith , which ( as experience tells them ) furnishes sinners with means of repentance . . man's nature being inclin'd to truth , scarce one man tells a lye , but hopes to cloak it . but here , when they deliver another faith for the same that was held yesterday , every man must know his neighbour to be an abominable shameless lyar ; and , the concern being so sacred , must hold himself and all his fellow-alterers the wickedst men living ▪ unless it be said they went conscientiously upon some other ground than tradition ; for to pretend to be sav'd by tenets held upon no ground at all , is absolutely impossible to consist with rational nature . but 't is impossible they should take up another ground : because if they could not innovate in faith , they could not innovate in that upon which they held all their faith. nor could they be certain , but all their former faith might be renounc'd , if a new rule of faith were taken up . to hear of which , could not consist with the temper of christians , to bear a loss for all their faith. besides , men are more tenacious of their principles , especially if they have gain'd a vast credit by their long continuance , than they are to relinquish all they have receiv'd upon those principles . again , tradition is the authority of the whole ecclesia docens , the chiefest part of ( i might say the ecclesia credens too ) witnessing the deliver'd faith ; which is so vast a body , that it could never ( were there nothing but its own interest ) permit it self to be thought to have attested a lye hitherto : add , that none could be competent judges what was fit to be a rule of faith , but they who were so concern'd both in duty and interest , tradition should not be set aside . which considerations clearly evince an universal change in the rule of faith ; and this over the whole body of believers is absolutely impracticable . lastly , there must be some great time between their discarding tradition and espousing a new rule ; during which time , we must imagin the whole church ( except perhaps some few that discourse it first ) would be made up of seekers ; some hovering one way , some another ; in which case they would as yet have no faith , and consequently there could be no church . 't is left then , that if they could innovate in faith , they must pretend to tradition still when they had evidently deserted it ; that is , they must profess to hold the yesterdays faith , when all the world must see , and every man 's own heart must tell him the contrary : which is the highest impossibility . luther alter'd , calvin alter'd , so did many others ; but none of them had the face to say they still adher'd to tradition , or the faith deliver'd immediately before , and that they had not alter'd . . men fall into sins through temptations , and temptations are various , according to mens tempers and circumstances ; whence it happens , that one falls into one sort of sin , others into another , as things light . but 't is impossible there should have been causes laid in the world , so universal , as to reach a whole body of men consisting of so many millions of different countries , tempers , and circumstances , so as to impel them effectually to fall into the same individual sort of sin , and this such a horrid and shameful one , viz. the altering the faith they hop'd to be sav'd by , and this so suddenly . the nature of the thing shows evidently 't is above chance ; and the very interest of the world would forbid such a conspiracy , were there neither religion , conscience , nor common humanity in it . their very passions , disaffections , and enmity to one another , would make them disagree in carrying on such a wicked project : their natural tempers , abstracting from their common propension to truth , and the care of preserving their credits utterly lost by speaking such open and pernicious falshoods , would render them apt , out of a meer antipathy of humour , to oppose one another ; and all this , supposing there were no goodness at all in the world ; to suppose which , evacuates all christian motives , and their efficacy , and makes our dear saviour preach and dye in vain ; especially , since there never wanted , no , not even in the worst times , a fair degree of disciplin to apply those motives . nay , state-interest , or the quarrels of princes , would make them glad to take hence an advantage against their emulous neighbours ; and to think it the best policy to lay hold on such an occasion , to fight in behalf of faith and common honesty , against a pack of shameless lyars , and deserters both of religion and human nature , who car'd not what became of their own salvation , or that of others . lastly , th●se causes thwarting the universal alteration of faith , while christians proceeded on the former rule of tradition ; and full as much hindring the taking up a new rule in opposition to the testimony of the universal church ; as there could be no cause to make men conspire to alter the yesterdays faith , so christian motives , which contain the greatest hopes and fears imaginable , the hopes of never-ending bliss , and fears of eternal and intolerable misery , which were believ'd and apply'd to the generality of christians , could not , on the contrary side , but influence them most powerfully to preserve unchanged and inviolate both the rule and the faith. 't is as certain then , that a very great body of adherers to tradition , and consequently to the first deliver'd faith , would still remain on foot in the world , as that effects could not be without proper causes , or that motives , which are the proper causes to work upon rational nature , will produce their effect : i mean such motives as engage their very nature . add , that such a change must needs have been publickly known ; and , so , have excited the pens , tongues , interests ( perhaps swords too ) of the traditionary and innovating party one against another , at the time of the change ; as we see has happen'd in our late alterations or reformations . yet no such thing was ever mentioned in history ; or come to us by tradition ; or any thing alledg'd , but some differences amongst particular spectators , and their adherents siding with them ; which amounts to nothing comparable to that universal and most memorable concussion , such a vast change as this we speak of , must needs have made in the whole body of the church . . summing up then this discourse , 't is manifest you have no way to answer our argument , but by supposing there was a time ( the lord knows when ) in which there were no considerable body of men in the world , either good christians , honest men , or valuing their credit ; but only a company of brutish , godless , lying ruffians , without the least degree of grace or shame in them . unfortunate confuter ! aristotle lookt upon things as they were ; plato on things as they should be ; but , to make a show of an answer to our argument , you would have your readers look upon the christian world , as it neither is , was , should be , or can be . . but you object . what if all sons did not understand aright all that fathers had taught them ! answer . if all did not , most of the intelligent and pastours , who were of greater authority than those , some less-understanding persons , and ty'd by their duty and office to instruct their ignorance , would and could easily do it , when the doctrin , open practice and disciplin of the christian church was settled , and made it both so obligatory and so easie . . what if some sons were so negligent as to take no care either to remember or teach what they had been taught by their fathers ? answ. if only some were so , then those who were diligent to do this , would reprehend them , and see to have things amended , and those careless persons , especially if pastours , reduc'd to their duty ; there being orders on foot in the world to oblige them to it . besides , 't is an unheard-of negligence , not to know or remember the next day the faith they held the day before ; nor did it require that care you pretend to retain the remembrance of it four and twenty hours . . what if some , through ambition , vain-glory and popularity , set a broach new doctrines , and taught them for apostolical tradition ? answ. if only some were so , then those others , who were good men , and free from those vices , would set themselves to oppose them , make known their false pretences , and lay open their novelties : both reason assuring us , that good men use not to be so stupidly careless in such sacred concerns ; and history informing us they were ever very zealously vigilant to oppose hereticks , when ever they began to vent their pestilent , doctrins . . what if others , to save themselves from persecution , conceal'd part , and corrupted more of the doctrin of christ by their own traditions , taken not from christ , but from their forefathers , iews or gentiles ? then those who were out of persecution , or valu'd it not so much as they did their conscience , would oppose their unchristian proceedings : then the fathers , doctors , and pastours of the church would reveal what they had conceal'd , restore what they had corrupted , and manifest that their pretences and subterfuges were false , and that the doctrin they subintroduc'd , had not descended by the open channel of the christian church's tradition . . what if some through a blind zeal , ignorant devotion , superstitious , rigour , and vain credulity , added many things to the doctrin of christ ; which by degrees grew into more general esteem , till at last they were own'd , and impos'd as necessary to be believ'd and practised ? answ. if they belong'd to faith , they could not come in , while the rule of tradition was adher'd to , as has been prov'd and granted : tho' perhaps some points involv'd in the main body of faith , yet so particularly or universally known , might , on emergent occasions , be singled out , defin'd and more specially recommended than formerly ; without any detriment to the faith received , but rather to the advantage and farther explication of it . and , as for unwarrantable practices , as they belong not to faith , so they do not concern our present business . . what if errour any of these ways brought forth , grew , multiply'd , spread , obtain'd most power , and drove out all that held the naked truth out of all those countries where it came ; of which all histories furnish us with instances . answ. but does any history tell you this errour spread over the whole church , without your supposing the question that such or such a tenet is an errour which you pretend such ; which is above the skill of historians to decide ; and is only to be determin'd by examining first who have , who have not a certain rule of faith. besides , errour in faith never yet appeared , even though abetted by great men in the church , but it was oppos'd ; and truth grew clearer by the opposition made to it ; and tho' for a while it grew under the shadow of some particular state , yet no history ever recorded , that all the states of christendom ever joyn'd to protect it . . well , but what are all these rambling questions to our argument , which insists on the impossibility of altering the yesterdays faith , but either out of want of memory , or out of malice ? apply them to this , and they lose all their force , how plausibly soever a witty man , that talks at rovers , supposes all to be errour , which the revolting party held , and never considers the nature of christian mankind and their circumstances , may descant upon it : for what paradox is there , tho' never so ridiculous , that wit discoursing thus wildly and at randome , cannot make plausible ? our general objection then against * your whole paragraph is this , that you never apply your several what ifs ? to our argument . besides , that you pretend in the beginning of it that you will shew other reasons of such an alteration , which are neither forgetfulness nor malice ; and yet most of those you here assign are defects of goodness , which implies some degree of malice , and some of them , the highest malice that can be . . but ( say you ) we must seek out a new medium to prove our church infallible , for this already brought , proves only she does not err so long as she holds to tradition ; but still she may err , if she leaves it ; wherefore we must prove she cannot leave tradition , or else she is not infallible , and so we are but where we were . and do not you see this is already prov'd to your hand ? for ( not to repeat the many reasons produc't for this point , sect. . ) innovation and tradition being formerly and diametrically opposite , what proves she could not innovate , proves also that she could not leave tradition ; for this were to innovate . and this , our argument you see has already prov'd ; nor is the force of that proof weaken'd by any thing you have hitherto said . i wonder you should dissemble a thing so obvious , and run forwards upon that affected inadvertence of yours , as if it were a business unthought of by us before , and requir'd a new medium , whereas it is the very thing our argument chiefly aims at : and for which , we had of our own accord , without any one's bidding , made provision for before hand . . your next sect. p. . would perswade us rather to prove our church free from errour , which ( say you ) is a much easier task , if she be so , than to prove her self infallible . very good ! your wise advice amounts to this , that you would have us prove our conclusion without beginning with our premises , or principles . if this be yours and dr. st's logick , 't is a very preposterous one ; and can only be made good by a figure call'd hysteron proteron , or cart before horse . though i must confess it keeps decorum , and is perfectly of the same hue with all your logick hitherto . please then to know that all our faith may be errour , if the testimony of the church , ( our rule ) may be erroneous : and , if it cannot , nothing we hold of faith can be so . again , what mean you by our proving her free from errour ? your meaning is , we should only prove she embraces no errour now ; but what provision would this make for her not falling perhaps into errour to morrow ? we ought then to prove ( and so ought you too of your rule ) that if we adhere to it , it can at no time permit us to err ; which could not be if at any time it might be deceiv'd it self , or leave us deceiv'd while we follow it . besides , if it were granted fallible or liable to errour , by what more evident light , or greater and clearer testimony could we guide our selves to know when it did actually err , when not in deriving down christs doctrine ? or by what more certain way could we be directed to arrive at christ's sence . if there were any such , it and not tradition ought to be our rule . we return you then your counsel back with many thanks , for it neither suits in any degree with logick , common sense , our own , or any other principles . but however it suites better with your convenience , than these crabbed demonstrations : for you tell us one single instance of her erring is enough to answer all the arguments can be brought for her infallibility . sure you have a mind to convince all schollars that read your books , you never heard of logick in your life : or else you would endeavour to baffle the whole art of discoursing , because you foresee 't is like to baffle you . an instance may perhaps make an objection against the conclusion taking it single for a meer proposition and not as standing under proof ; but arguments are answer'd by finding defects in the premises or the consequence . you might have seen ( to use your own words ) better logick read to the d. of p. in my pag. and . where 't is shewn you , that if the premises be right , and the inference good , the conclusion must be as necessarily true , as that the same thing cannot be , and not be at once : yet , you take no notice of it , but still run on obstinately to confute all the schools and universities that ever writ or taught logick from the beginning of the world , to the time of his and your writing . the truth is , you are sick of the argument , and would shift it off on any fashion . bring what instances you please ; but first you are to answer our argument , and next , to see the authority that qualifies your instance for an argument , be above morally certain ; otherwise it will be beyond the power of any logick to make it conclude : for the force of that maxim on which the conclusiveness of any argument is built , is far beyond any moral certainty ; nor let dr. st. think to stand arguing still ad hominem ; but let him be sure his instance infers the truth of his conclusion , when it comes to be put to the test of a syllogism . this we will expect from him ; since it is the right of the respondent to deny any thing that is not driven up to evidence ; and by that test we will judge of your instance and other arguments , if you have any that you will vouch to be demonstrative , that is , conclusive . . you seem so kind as not to undertake to prove that an erring church adheres to tradition , if it be true apostolical tradition , and that it adheres to it wholly and solely . i a little wonder at this ; for if you mean not by tradition such a one as is built on living voice and practice , you ran quite away from the point ; if such a one ; you quit your own rule , by requiring men should adhere to the other wholly and solely , and admit that a church adhering to such a tradition is not an erring church . i inferr : therefore , till you answer our argument which proves that our tradition could not be interrupted by any innovation , you cannot with reason deny but ours is such . you think infallibility a kind of barr against our mutual agreement ; as if there were any hopes or even possibility men's minds should center , unless it be in something that is absolutely certain or evident . shew us something else endu'd with such an evidence as is able to oblige human nature to an universal acceptation and conviction , and then blame us for maintaining infallibility . till then pray , excuse us for making such provision for faith , as sets it beyond possibility of falsehood . you drop some insignificant exceptions after the shower of your shrewd ( invisible ) reasons . as that our * argument must prove that no man that hath been taught the faith can ever err from it ; and yet still withall , confess that a church , following tradition now , may leave it afterwards . this were an incoherence with a witness : but how do you shew our argument must prove this absurd position ! onely with saying it here over and over again , without the least attempt to shew from our words or doctrine , this pretended necessity , that we must both contradict our selves so grossely , and besides go against our daily experience . i do assure the reader we have no where either such words or sense , and that 't is meerly a false sham or some weak deduction of yours , for want of some better thing to say . our tenet is that , tho' not one single man can erre while he adheres to our rule , yet even some particular churches may leave off adhering to tradition , and so err in faith. onely we say that the main body of the church consisting of all particular churches that compound christianity , being supported by motives of adhering to the former faith , so prevalent , and universal , and apply'd to a very vast multitude of them , cannot conspire to relinquish this rule , go against and disgrace their own testimony , nor consequently err in faith. the word [ all ] indeed , and [ they ] in each proposition are distributive , and appliable to each single man ; but do you find the least word in any of them , that sayes that single men or great multitudes may not out of malice alter faith ? where find you that ! or that they cannot desert the rule , and by consequence their faith. pray , be not so liberal of our concessions , without shewing somthing under our hands for it . . but you sum up your solution of our demonstration with an admirable grace , or rather you give us the very quintessence of your answer to it in these few words . the church of rome says all have broke the rule of tradition but she onely , and proves it , by saying that she holds the same to day she did yesterday , and so up to our b. saviours time . you proceed . we call again for a proof of this . she tells us , if she follow'd this rule she could never err in faith. but did she follow this rule ? she says she did ; and if you will not believe her , there 's an end . how smart and victorious this looks ? but the best is , 't is wholly built on some few of your own wilfull falsifications . pray , where did we ever bring these words , [ if she followed this rule , &c. ] for a proof that she holds the same to day which she did yesterday . or where did we prove we follow'd this rule only with iffs ? but why are you so shy to quote the pages or paragraphs where we bring these absurd proofs ? because you would be at liberty to say any thing and yet not expose your credit . and 't is worth noting , that you point out the page in other occasions very diligently ; but , when you have a mind to falsify , 't is still supprest . 't is observable too that this insincerity of yours here is of such advantage to you , that it gains the whole cause . for , if we prove this main point no better but with iffs , & that our argument has no force but by standing to your kindness in believing what our church says , then there 's an end indeed ; for nothing can be more evident , than , 't is that in that supposition , we are utterly routed , & our whole cause quite defeated . now i would entreat the reader ( for you are resolv'd neither to use your eyes nor honesty , lest they should too openly accuse you ) that he will once more review our argument , as 't is put down by dr. st. himself , first letter , p. . and . and made good by me , p. . and . and he will see clearly , the first half of it was to prove , that if they follow'd this rule , viz. of believing the same to day they did yesterday , they could never err in faith , or were infallible : and the other part [ and they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it ] was brought to prove they did ever follow that rule . for since nothing but innovation can break the chain of tradition , whoever proves they could not innovate , proves directly they could not recede from tradition . nay , 't was confest by dr. st. himself , when he was as yet in better circumstances , ( first letter , p. . l. . ) that we prov'd our church could not innovate , by the medium now mention'd . yet you have the confidence to tell the reader , she only says she follows this rule ; and if you will not believe her , there 's an end : whereas you ought in candour to have said , they prov'd she follow'd , and could not but follow this rule ; but i cannot answer their argument , and there 's an end. see what you have brought upon your self , and how fatal it is to your pretended answer , that as you * began your reply to this th . proposition with a most wicked falsification , so you close it up here with a double one , and those too of so large a size , that were they true , they had carry'd all before them . your intermediate endeavours are many of them of the same kind ; the rest mistakes , ( and generally wilful ones ) which i thought at first to have reckon'd up ; but they thicken'd so upon me , that i saw it would be tedious to count them , and so gave it over . but your excuse for this insincere carriage is , that you do no more than all writers use to do , who have had the bad luck to defend an ill cause , and come to be prest with close truth . all they can do , when they are not able to give a good acount of themselves , is , to bend all their study and seek about for shifts , how they may give no account . and the d. of p. and you are of this prudent generation . i say once again , 't is your chief study how to shift ; and long study of any thing , with frequent practice , makes a man excellent at it ; & every man loves most to do that he is excellent at ; and so we are to expect it . to convince the reader whether i wrong you or no , put you your arguments for the absolute certainty of your rule in conveying to us christ's sense , and for your following it , as close and home as you can possibly ; and see whether i do not answer it directly , fairly & squarely , without any of these shifting excursions or falsifications : and let our different carriage be the test to distinguish the candid asserters of truth , from the insincere abetters of errour . . after i had shew'd that scripture privately interpreted could not be a rule of faith , the nature and method of our dispute led me into an enquiry what was in reality your rule , as you are such a kind of protestant ; and , to this end i discours't thus ; that scripture was a generical rule , common to you and all heresies in the world ; and , that your specifical rule must be [ as my self and those of my iudgment understand or interpret it . ] and can there be any thing more evident ? do not they all strive to lay claim to the letter of scripture for their rule , as well as you ? do not they all , as much as you , rely upon it , and avail themselves by quoting it still , and endeavouring to shew it favourable to their respective tenets ? plain experience informs us and every one , they all do this , and that too , with an ardour and earnestness equal to yours , as far as we can discern . in this then you all agree ; and therefore 't is beyond all dispute , scripture is your common or generical rule , if we may believe your carriage and profession . now let 's see what 't is you disagree in . and 't is manifest you disagree in the sense of scripture ; otherwise , the sense of scripture being god's sense or your faith , you would be of the same faith ; which cannot be pretended , since you contradict them , and they you , in matters belonging to faith ; and what 's the way to arrive at the sense of scripture ? certainly the interpreting it ; for interpretation signifies in proper speech the giving or assigning to words their sense ; and do not you accept that sense of scripture for your faith which your private judgment interpreting it , conceives to be truly its meaning ; and they , in like manner , as they apprehend it , ought to be interpreted ? is it not for this very end you so cry up your judgment of discretion , and that you are not to submit to the decrees of councils or consent of fathers , farther than you conceive them agreeable to the word of god ? does not dr. st. profess openly , that his sober enquirer may understand the explicit sense of implicit points that are doubtful ( such as all main points of faith are ) without the church's help , ( second letter , p. . ) that is , without any publick interpreter ? and , will you after this deny that scripture is your general rule in which you agree with all hereticks ; and your specifical , peculiar or proper rule , in which you differ from them , and they from one another , is scripture , as interpreted by your selves ? the thing is plain , let 's see what you say to it . you , with a very dexterous artifice , grant and not grant it , as we shall see anon : and tell us , . that scripture is and ought to be common to all hereticks , tho' they miserably abuse it . pray , sir , use my words ; i said , a common rule to them and you ; and , can that be truly a rule , which they direct themselves by and yet warp into errour ? you tell us indeed they miserably abuse it ; and the socinians will say the same of you , while you pretend to prove thence christ is god. and how shall this quarrel be decided ? for 't is hitherto a drawn match between you , while you fight with that ambidextrous weapon , scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments . the point still sticks : how can an indifferent man , seeking for faith by your rule , be satisfy'd they abuse it more than you ? must not you be oblig'd to shew him some clearer light than they have , and that this light justifies you for judging thus harshly of them , that they are such miserable abusers of scripture ? and , if you do not , must he not in true reason judge 't is pretended by you gratis ; as also , that you are highly uncharitable , to charge them downright with so hainous a crime ? 't is that farther degree of light in you that must justifie you for these pretences , which we would gladly see ; for , whatever it is , 't is that which distinguishes you from them , and sets you up to be right vsers of scripture ; that is , it gives you the right sense of it , or your faith ; and so it must difference you essentially from them in your grounds or rule . 't is this light , i say , we would be at ; why is it so shy to shew its face ? . tho' 't is hard to conceive how they can be said to abuse scripture who follow it to their power ; yet , since you will have it allow'd you gratis , does not their pretended miserable abuse of scripture consist in misinterpreting it ? certainly , you must say it does . and if so , then your right interpretation of it , or your taking it in a right sense , is that in which your right vse of it consists : wherefore your own interpretation of it , is , beyond all evasion , that which differences you from them ; and so 't is your peculiar or specifical rule of faith. . do those hereticks who thus miserably abuse it , do this out of wilfulness , that is , do they indeed understand it right , but pretend they do not ; or do they use their endeavour to understand it , and yet hap to abuse it by misunderstanding it ? if the former , then again you must tell us gratis , and ought to make it out to an indifferent man seeking for faith , that the socinians ( and all the erring sects ) are the most wickedly insincere , and the most blasphemous men in the world , nay , the greatest hypocrites to boot ; to know certainly by scripture that christ is god , and yet knowingly impugn his divinity , voluntarily abuse scripture they seem so highly to venerate , and pretend conscience all the while : and yet none but you have such horrid apprehensions of them : and as for my self , seeing how they decline no adversary at the alledging and comparing places , how sedulously they make scripture their study , and in all appearance adhere to the letter ; i verily believe they follow it to their power , but fall into errour through their misfortune of espousing a wrong rule . and if you still say they are thus voluntarily insincere , i desire to know of you by what outward signs can an indifferent man judge you and your party are not as insincere as they , or perhaps more ? acquaint us , i say , for what other reason you say this , but because they frame another sense of scripture than you do , that is , interpret it differently from you ? if you can give no other than your own interpretation is the only light you have to judge them hereticks , or to determine what 's heresie ; and by consequence to judge what 's true faith ; and so 't is unavoidably your rule of faith , of which more by and by . but , if you say they follow it to their power , and yet err in faith , then the fault not being in them , for not following their rule , their fault must be ( as it is yours ) their adhering to a rule which secures not men , tho' doing their best to understand it , from falling into heresie ; that is , it consists in their pitching upon that for their rule , which is indeed no rule at all . . your rule then equally patronizing true faith and heresie , i had reason to affirm , that it inferr'd those blasphemous propositions , as to make light and darkness very consistent , and christ and belial very good friends . now , this being my charge , it was manifestly your duty to shew it does not patronize true faith and heresie , and by doing so , induce those horrid blasphemies ; and to make out , that only true faith can be grounded on scripture privately interpreted ; and therefore , that i had impeach'd it wrongfully . but this was too hard a point to meddle with . instead of doing this , and clearing your self from blasphemy , which was directly incumbent on you , you tell the reader , with a great garb of gravity , that i speak blasphemy my self , blasphemy against god and his holy word ; when i only mention it while i am charging you with it . and hereupon , like a right good man , you fall to talk godly , and out of your pure charity will needs bestow upon me the benediction of your hearty prayer , that god would give me repentance unto life . indeed , had i said that christ and belial could ever be reconcil'd , or advanc'd any position that imply'd it , as yours does , i confess , i must have been guilty of a horrid blasphemy . but , not knowing how to clear your self , for owning no rule but such a one as equally patronizes truth and falshood , and therefore , by a necessary consequence , infers those blasphemies ; you very demurely put on a godly countenance , and betake your self very charitably to your hearty prayers . as much as to say , in good truth , sir , i cannot answer you , nor shew i have any rule , but what serves for errour as well as truth ; but yet if that may excuse me , i will be content in lieu of it , to pray for you with all my heart . is not this pleasant ? . thus much for your rule as 't is common to you and all hereticks . what 's your particular rule ? here . you take it ill that we will needs know what 's your rule better than your selves do ; and we take it as ill of you , that you would have us believe you before our own evident reason . we know you cannot defend such an insignificant rule as your own interpretations ; and therefore are forc'd to disown it , when we press you to give a good account of it ; with which may very well consist , that you proceed upon it when the danger is remote . . you assure us plain scripture is your rule ; that is , ( as appears by your discourse here ) your rule as you are such a kind of protestant . pray , will you explain and unriddle to us this most obscure word [ plain ] in what kind of points , to whom , and by what kind of light , is scripture taken as your rule , plain ? and let 's have something more than a blind word to work on . experience tells us scripture is not plain , even in the highest points of faith , since so many follow it , and yet go astray . again , if it be so plain , all your useful helps are needless ; and lastly , scripture conceiv'd by you to be plain , which is your particular rule , can never be made out to be absolutely certain ; for the socinians too proceed upon scripture , plain to them , as their rule , and yet err ; which evinces 't is not so plain as to convince and certainly enlighten human reason attending to it : an evident argument , that both the one and the other do but fancy it plain , but that , in reality , 't is plain to neither . . you declare , that the interpretation of it by any sect of people , romanists or others , is extrinsical to it , and no constitutive difference of it . that the interpretation of romanists is not the particular rule of your protestants , all the world knew before ; which makes it frivolous to tell us so here . nor do we challenge you , or pretend , that the interpretation of any other sect is your rule ; for we told you , that the interpretation of each sect , respectively , was its particular rule . 't is your own interpretation we said was your rule ; instead of granting or denying which , you shuffle about , and talk of the interpretation of romanists , and other sects . but , if ( which is strangely exprest ) in other sects you include your own too , 't is all one to my discourse . for , whether you regard the interpretation of your own sect , or make account , that as each individual angel is a distinct species , so each individual interpreter among you is a distinct sect , still scripture , as interpretable by your selves , is your particular rule , and not extrinsical to it . for let me ask you once more , is not the sense of scripture your faith ? and , is not that essentially your particular rule of faith , that gives you your particular faith ? and , must i mind you again , that it is the very essence ( as i may say ) or nature of interpretation to give you the sense of the words of scripture , which in our case is your faith. wriggle then still which way you please , you can never avoid , but your own interpretation of scripture is your particular rule ; taking you either for a whole sect , an individual , or both. . at length , as a man in danger when he is follow'd close at the heels , and ready to be caught , takes a desperate leap , tho' he hazards himself a mischief ; you venture boldly to declare what is your particular rule , as differenced from both romanists , and other hereticks and sectaries ; viz. scripture plainly delivering a sense own'd and declar'd by the primitive church of christ in the three creeds , four first general councils , and harmony of the fathers . after which you add , this , i hope , is plain dealing , and no wriggling ; and here we take up our stand , let him endeavour to draw us whither he can . never fear it , sir , you are out of danger of being drawn any whither . ten thousand cart-ropes will not go round you , and we must be at least twenty years in fastening them . but let 's examin this your particular rule . . i ask , whether , since differences use to be essential , these words , [ own'd and declar'd by the primitive church , &c. ] which are found in the difference of your rule from that of others , be at all essential , or not : if not essential , since , if you be orthodox , you ought to have a rule essentially distinct from that of hereticks and sectaries , what is this essentially-different rule of yours ; for 't is this we are enquiring after ? if you say 't is essential ; then scripture had not all the due power to regulate you as to your faith , without their additional light : and , by consequence , scripture is not your only and intire rule , as you ever pretended hitherto ; since these are part of it . when you say your rule is scripture , plainly delivering a sense , &c. i suppose you must mean such a particular sense as is of faith with you : and can any more be requir'd to your particular rule than scripture plainly delivering your particular faith ? certainly you will not say it . for , there is the divine authority in the scripture , which is the formal motive of divine faith. there is plainness , which gives it a directive vertue , and qualifies it for a rule ; and the clear light of this plain rule must shine bright upon the particular tenets you hold , for 't is to shine there , and no where else . which once put , what can all the other , esteem'd by you but human authorities , serve for ? can they add weight to the divine authority , or clear that to us which is already so plain by scripture ? . pray be candid , and tell us , after a thing is plain in scripture , are you to value a straw , what either primitive church , creeds , or fathers say ? i dare say you will grant you are not . wherefore , all these are utterly useless , unless they be pretended to give you some light to interpret scripture . but this cannot be neither ; both because you tell us here plain scripture is your rule , and it would not be plain , but obscure , if it needed an explainer : besides , you put this as a constitutive difference of your rule , and yet deny'd that any interpretation of scripture is such , but extrinsical to it . 't is then a great mystery still , how these human authorities affect your general rule , or influence your faith already had by plain scripture , or to what end they serve but for a show only . . the lutherans proceed upon all these as much as you , and yet hold a reall presence of christ's very body in the sacrament , as much as we do . so that this does not difference you in your grounds or rule from all other sects ; for sure you will not deny that to be a sect , that holds an errour , which dr. st. has taken such pains to prove is idolatry . my last question shall be , whether your sober enquirers are not to come to their particular faith , by this their particular rule of faith ? and , since 't is evident they must , we would know next how many of them are to arrive at any faith at all ? for it will take up many years to examin and compare all the fathers , and be sure of their harmony with one another , and with the scripture too . nay , the duration of the world will be too short to compass that satisfaction , if we may believe the * bishop of downs , who assures us , that out of the fathers succeeding the primitive times , both sides eternally and inconfutably shall bring sayings for themselves respectively . can any man living make sense of such stuff , or ever come at his faith by such a rule ? . for this last reason chiefly , i affirm'd , that not one protestant in a million follow'd dr. st's rule , but honestly follow'd the tradition of their own church , pastours or fathers ; that is , believ'd as they had been educated . to the first part of this assertion you say little , but that if there be any fault , 't is the fault of the people only . but if this peculiar rule of yours , which takes in the seeing your sense of scripture own'd and declar'd by the primitive church , four first general councils , and the harmony of the fathers , be to be followed e're you can come at your faith ; i doubt the fault will prove to be in the rule . for very few persons have learning , fewer leisure enough , and none of them security of having any faith by this method ; unless you could ensure their salvation by inspiring those who are ignorant with competent learning to understand all the fathers and their harmony ; and withal , by letting them good long leases of their lives ; which i am of opinion you cannot . the second part , that they follow'd the method of tradition , puts you in a marvelvellous jocund humour ; and , as if you had forgot your way ( a thing not unusual with you ) you ask , all amaz'd , where are we now ? in the church of rome e're we are aware of it : we are all good roman-catholicks on a sudden , we are become an infallible church , &c. and away you run with the jest , laughing and giggling as if you had found a mare 's nest. surcease your fears , good sir , you are not a jot the nearer being catholicks for following your own tradition . it reaches no farther than iohn calvin , martin luther , or some such reforming heroe ; and there it ends and stops in a flat novelty . whereas catholicks abhor a tradition that has any known beginning , or takes a name from any particular author , or has any original but christ , his apostles , and the church in the very first age , who were the original deliverers of it to the next , and so to the succeeding ones . pray sir , what 's become of your jest ? all i said , was , that you * followed the way of tradition , however misplac'd ; i prov'd it by reasons and instances ; you hint some , omit others , and pervert the rest . you tell us , 't is all scriptural tradition . but we will trust our eyes and experience before your bare word . we see some taught before they can read ; we see them catechiz'd in churches , and they repeat and believe what 's there told them , tho' scripture be not quoted for the distinct passages . we see them read the scripture afterwards ; but we see withal not one in thousands trusts his own judgment of discretion for the sense of it ; but , without reluctancy or jealousie , accepts that which his pastours assign to it ; especially in spiritual points , or mysteries of faith , about which we are chiefly discoursing . but do not your self incline to admit ( as much as we can expect from a man that affects not too much candour ) that very thing you so laugh at here . i affirm'd , that not one in a million thinks of relying on your rule of faith , in order to make choice of their faith , &c. this you answer with hems and hahs : tho' i fear — yet i hope he is out in his account — i am apt to think they are more attentive — yet be it as he would have it , &c. now , since they must either have their faith by reliance on their pastours and preachers , delivering it to them , and educating them in it , that is , by some kind of tradition ; or else by relying on scripture ; * and your self seems to doubt , or rather in a manner grants it , that they have it not the later way ; you must at least doubt that they have it by the way of tradition . but your fancy was so big with your empty jest , that you had forgot what you had allow'd but a little before . . thus , sir , i have trac'd you punctually step by step ; not ( as is your constant use ) pickt out a few words scatter'd here and there : which you thought you might most commodiously pervert : wherefore i have reason to expect the same exact measure from you . the sum of your answer is manifestly this . shuffles and wilful mistakes without number ; evasions endless ; falsifications frequent ; godly talk frivolous ; jests groundless ; and all these brought in still to stop gaps when your reason was nonplust . be pleas'd to leave off your affected insincerities ; otherwise i must be forc't to expose them yet farther ; than which there can be no task more ungrateful imposed upon your servant , j. s. errata . page . l. . read both of u● . p. . l. ult . find it in . p. . l. notice there . p. . l. . go forwards . p. . l. . secret. again , p. . l. . as i had not . p. . l. . is it a way . ibid. l. . upon it ? p. . l. . your reason is , because . p. . l. . may hap . p. . l. . gift . ibid. l. . prince of . p. . l. . it . whether . p. . l. . a most . p. . l. . adherers . p. . l. . to be at a loss . ibid. l. ult . discover'd it . p. . l. . speculaters . p. . l. . yet not so explicitly or . p. . l. . formally and. p. . l. . other , then . the third catholick letter in ansvver to the arguing part of doctor stillingfleet's second letter to mr. g. by i. s. published with allowance . london , printed , and sold by matthew turner at the lamb in high-holbourn . . the third catholick letter , &c. sir , . i come now to take a view of your second letter , with my eye , as in the former , fixt only upon what i think you mean for argument . whether you give us just your first words at the conference ; or second thoughts since ; whether no troublesome part of mr. g's discourse be left out ; in short , whatever belongs to matter of fact , shall be out of my prospect , which shall be bounded by what you think fit to open to it . you acquaint us here ( pag. . ) that you put two questions . . how does it appear that the church of rome is infallible in the sense and meaning of tradition ? . is this tradition a rule of faith distinct from scripture ? and you complain of mr. g. that his copy makes you ask a very wise question . viz. how does it appear that the church of rome is infallible in tradition . why this question should be ironically call'd a very wise one , i cannot imagin . i am sure it is very pertinent to the intention of your dispute , and directly points at one of the chief subjects of the conference . but you shall have your will ; tho' i beleive it will appear mr. g's question made better provision for your credit in point of wisdom than you have done for your self . . for , your second was in truth a very needless question ; because both your self and all your auditours , if they ever heard any thing of this kind of controversy , knew beforehand without needing to ask , that the tradition we lay claim to , pretends to derive down the intire body of christ's doctrin , and not only the books of scripture , of which ( p. . ) you very learnedly seem to counterfeit your self ignorant . and this is the first part of your distinguishing the plain sense of this word [ tradition ] as held by mr. g. by this question you tell us ( p. . ) you intended to put a difference between the tradition held by us [ protestants ] and the tradition disputed . for the first meaning of the word [ tradition ] which you grant , you put the vniniversal testimony of the christian church , as to the books of scripture . the second and deny'd meaning you contra distinguish from the former in these words . but if by tradition be understood either some necessary articles of faith not contain'd in scripture , or a power in the church to make unnecessary to become necessary , this i deny'd , &c. certainly , sir , you have a logick of your own so peculiarly fitted to your designes , that no man living but your self ever us'd it . i ever thought , and apprehended i had all the world on my side for thinking so , that all differences or distinctions were to be opposites , and to divide the common genus , or the notion that was to be distinguish't ; and , therefore , since the first sense of the word [ tradition ] was tradition for books of scripture , which is your tenet ; i verily expected the opposit sense of it should have been tradition for doctrines , which is ours ; and that , as the former was tradition for christ's words , so the latter should be tradition for christ's sense . but while i was vainly imagining the second sense of the word would be tradition for faith , instead of that i found nothing but such articles , and such a power . did ever any mortal man think or pretend that tradition was an article , or a power , any more than that it was a horse shoe ? did your self when you granted the latin and greek churches follow'd tradition , intend to signify that they follow'd articles and powers ? the summ then of your learned distinction is in plain terms this : tradition is two-fold : one is a tradition for books ; the other is no tradition at all , but only articles and power . had it not been better then to have accepted of mr. g's civility , and have answer'd to the purpose , rather than out of a pique to his copy , and a desire to make it stand in need to be corrected , thus to pervert common sense , and out of a too zealous care not to forfeit your wisdome , to commit such an illogical absurdity ? but sense and logick , tho' they be plain and honest true friends , yet i must own that , like the queens old courtiers , they may appear scandalous companions to a man of your more polite and modish education . however , i dare answer for you , it was not ignorance of their worth , but an unlucky necessity , which made you introduce in their room two new questions to while away the time and escape the true one , which you had no mind to meet close and grapple with . yet perhaps you may have better luck in your first question ; let us see : by your first question then , and your explication of your design of it immediately after , 't is easy to discern that you again quite mistake the end and use , and consequently the nature of tradition ; which is a very inauspicious beginning , and puts us out of hopes you should ever discourse pertinently of it , since you go about to impugn you know not what . for tradition does not bring us down set forms of words onely , as you imagin , viz. ( as you instance p. . ) christ was the son of god , under which you say well a heretical sense may ly : but it derives down to us the very sense of those words , and all the rest of christ's doctrine ; there being found in tradition all the ways and means to signify and express the determinate meaning and sense of forefathers that can possibly be imagin'd . for , they not only deliver the propositions of faith in such or so many words , as you apprehend ; but , they signify to their children the very tenets they have in their hearts , in such expressions as best sutes with the occasion , according as their different methods of explaining themselves may lead them . you may upon reflexion observe it passes thus in your self when you instruct people in their faith : in which circumstance , you do not ty your self up to rigorous forms of words made to your hands , but take your liberty to deliver your self in any manner that you judge will make your meaning be best understood . the same method is taken by the pastours of the church ( and the fathers of families too according to their pitch and station . ) they catechize their children ; they preach upon the texts proper to such points ; they dilate themselves in their discourse , with a full design to make their sense be perfectly comprehended ; they reply to the difficulties of those who are not yet perfectly instructed , or well satisfied ; and accommodate themselves to all their exigencies . lastly , they lead their christian lives , and breed up others to do the same , by those principles : and , experience as well as reason tells us , that nothing gives the determinate sense of words which express tenets , more distinctly than does perpetual practice , and living conformably to what 's signified by those words . the want of which requisits in the letter of scripture , which can give no answer to any difficulty , nor vary any expression to make its meaning more intelligible , nor live , and by example make the reader live according to such a sense , shews clearly , that , taking it alone and unassisted by the churche's tradition ( determining and ascertaining it's meaning in dogmatical points ) it cannot in any proper speech be call'd a rule of faith. . if , notwithstanding what has been said , this discourse should still seem to you more a speculation than a real truth ( which yet i judge impossible ) : pray reflect how your self would go about to instruct your own children in your faith ; and you will easily find by experience , when 't is brought home to your own case , how connatural this way is to clear to them your sense , in what you would have them believe . do not your self use the same method ? do you only deliver to them certain forms of speech , without endeavouring , by all the possible means you can invent , to imprint the true sense ( that i may use your own instance ) of these words [ christ is the son of god ] in their souls ; and to make it still clearer to them , as their budding capacities grow riper and riper ? do you not experience they come by degrees to understand you too ; and that you have at length transfus'd into them the sense of the tenet you had in your own breast ? do not you practically instil into them , that they ought to pray to christ ; and exercise their faith , hope and charity towards him while they are praying ? do not you tell them they are to give divine reverence to christ ; without stinting them , or making them scruple , lest they give too much , or commit idolatry , by giving that to a creature , which is only due to the true god ? and does not this practise , beyond all possibility of mistake , insinuate into them , that he is equally to be ador'd with god the father , or coequal to him ; and , so , not a creature , but very god of very god ? i doubt not but you do all this ; at least , i am sure , if you do it not , you do not your duty : nor do i doubt but your children come at length to understand you too , and , by understanding you , become of the same religion . and can you imagine , that men were not men in all ages , but ( in the blind times of popery forsooth ! ) degenerated into parrots , and learn'd to prate set-words , without minding their sense ? or , that christians were not alwayes christians , and endeavour'd to imbue under-growing posterity with the meaning of the tenets they profest ; and hop't to be sav'd by their propagating them to those whom they were bound to see instructed in faith ? or , lastly , can you conceive there can be any means invented by man's wit , to make known and propagate the sense of words that express points of faith , which is not in the highest measure found in tradition ? if you cannot , ( as i am sure you cannot ) then you must withal either confess , that tradition brings down the sense of christ's law , and not the bare words or sounds only ; or , you must advance this monstrous paradox , that there is no possible way in the whole world for mankind to communicate their thoughts and meanings to one another in such points ; the contrary to which you experience dayly in your self and others . and , were this so , then , to what end were catechisms , sermons and controversies about such subjects ? to what end all instructions , conferences , and explications of them by the pastours ? again , if you grant these ( as you must ) to be the best expedients to transmit down the sense of christ's words , that is , our faith ; how can you hold scripture's letter the rule of faith : which , taken as counterdistinguish't to tradition , wants all those most effectual means of discovering to us it's meaning . certainly , that must be the rule of faith that is best qualify'd to give us our faith ; and that must be best qualify'd to give us our faith , which has the best means to give us christ's sense ; and not that which wants all the best means to produce such an effect . on the other side , supposing christ's doctrine once settled in the body of the church , how can you deny tradition , thus abundantly furnisht with the best means imaginable to deliver down the first-taught doctrine , to be such a rule ; seeing no more is requir'd to be a rule of faith , but to be qualify'd with a power to acquaint us who live at this distance with the true sense of what was deliver'd by the founders of the church in the beginning , without danger of losing it by the way ; which cannot be imagin'd as long as tradition is held to , the same believ'd to day which was held yesterday , or that the immediately succeeding fathers still deliver'd the same doctrin . to do which there wanted no power , as has been lately shewn to the full ; nor will to use that power ; being oblig'd to it by the greatest penalties god himself could inflict , the damning themselves and their posterity . . but , say you ( pag. . ) if the church may explain the sense and meaning of tradition , so as to oblige men to believe that by virtue of such explication , which they were not oblig'd to before , then 't is impossible the infallibility of tradition should ly in a constant tradition from father to son ; for they have no power to oblige to any more than they received . ] how plausibly and smoothly this discourse runs , and how shrewdly it seems to conclude ? would any well-meaning reader imagin that it were perfect non-sense all the while , and wholly built on your own liberality , giving us another sort of tradition which is no tradition ? this malignant word [ tradition ] must not be taken in its right sense , that 's resolv'd , for then it would grow too troublesom ; but , take it in any other sense , that is , mistake it , and then have at it . for when you speak of explaining the sense and meaning of tradition , you do not take tradition , as , you know well , we do , and as the word plainly imports ; for the delivery of doctrin , but for doctrins delivered ; and so again , we have once more lost the question . for , what can these words mean ? if the church may explain the sense and meaning of tradition ; that is , of the method of conveying down christs doctrin ? the method of delivery is the very signification of that doctrin from age to age , and how can one explain the sense and meaning of a signification of christ's sense , when it 's self is that very explication of it ? this gives me occasion to reflect how oddly you have hamper'd our tradition hitherto instead of handling it . p. . you seem to doubt by your [ if no more were meant , &c. ] whether it does not mean tradition for the books of scripture ; and , this you knew well enough before , was none of our tradition in dispute here ; which , as may be seen by mr. g's demonstration put down by your self , first letter p. . and . is confest to be tradition for matters of faith or doctrin : now in this new sense you give us there of tradition , you kindly * grant it ; for 't is your own , not that which we here mean by that word . next comes * another [ if ] and makes it seem to signify * articles and power . and this is no tradition at all ; neither ours , nor yours , nor any body's : for , neither those articles nor that power you speak of p. . are or can be the delivery of christ's doctrin from day to day ; for that speaks such a method of bringing down things , not the things brought down . and this you very gravely deny . and so you may , with my good leave , either deny or expunge , or condemn it to what doom you please ; for certainly it comes with a felonious intention , to draw the reader out of his road into a labyrinth of non-sense , and then robb him of his reason . again , p. . you make it a delivery of bare words , at best , with a general ( impossible ) sense , and perhaps a heretical one too , into the bargain ; whereas you cannot but know tradition , as we mean it , is a delivery of the sense of christian tenets , and this a particular sense too ; and such a one as cannot possibly be heretical , while this rule is adher'd to ; unless the first-taught faith were heretical , which is blasphemy to imagin . and , here again p. . you make tradition or delivery to mean the point delivered , and would have us give you the signification and explication of that which is it's self the signification and explication of christ's faith ; and this too , the * very best that can be imagin'd . is it possible to deform tradition more untowardly , or wrest it into more misconstructions than has been done already ? after a serious manner , certainly , 't is impossible : but drollery is now to act its part : and to cheer your spirits , which droop't under the difficulty of answering the argument for tradition , you put your self in masquerade ; and would make the relation of perhaps two or three , it may be , partial friends of yours , concerning mr. g's discourse about you , a perfect parallel to our rule of faith ; and that , if they can mistake or misrepresent , down goes tradition . which amounts to this , that sooner may all the christian fathers in any age , consisting of many millions , and those disperst in far-distant parts of the world , be mistaken in their faith , which it imported them no less than their salvation to know ; sooner may all of them conspire to deliver to their children another doctrin than that which they held the way to heaven ; than that a very few of your own party should , to gratify you , tell you a false story , or aggravate ; tho' all of them were , besides , profest adversaries to the person against whom they witnest ; and , indeed , witnesses in their own common cause . i beseech you , sir , tho' you be never so much to seek for a solid answer , yet speak at least plausible things , and do not thus expose your credit while you affect to play the wit. poor tradition , what has it done to be thus misrepresented ! did it deserve no better for bringing down the book of scripture , but to be expos'd in so many aukward vizards , when it was to come upon the stage , and not once suffer'd to shew it's true face , but still travestee'd into another form , and put in all shapes but its own ? this carriage of yours is enough to make the reader think you apprehend it to be some terrible gorgons head , or some basilisk ; and , that the very sight of it , unless it came thus muffled up , would undo you . at least he will suspect from such an untoward broken scene , that the dramma is not like to be regular : indeed you shift too often , and to catch and confute you i must travel thro' the whole compass ; for no sooner can a man steer one way , but your discourse , like the wind , whips straight into another quarter ; and about we must tack , or we must not make forwards at all . but i will insist no more at present on this dexterity of yours ; you will afford your friends many fresh instances of it , through the whole course of this letter hereafter . onely i must note your forgetfulness , or what else may i call it ? for you took the notion of tradition very right , first letter ( p. . ) where you alledg'd you had a larger and firmer tradition for scripture than we had for us : you did not there , take tradition of that book , for the book delivered ; for then that book had been the delivery of its self ; and yet that book had as good title to be it's own tradition , as you had to make the points delivered by our tradition to be the tradition or delivery of those points . you granted too in the same place that the latin and greek churches proceeded upon it ; and , by granting this , confest there were as many attesters went to make it up as there were men , ( at least intelligent men ) in the compass of the many vast nations which those two churches included : how come you then so much to forget your self as to parallel it here to the pittiful attestation of three or four possibly prejudic't relaters . but the reason of this self-contradicting and extravagant representation of tradition is clear ; it was your interest to take it right there , and the same reason prevail'd with you to take it wrong here . . but i am weary of fencing with shadows , when i can take any occasion that leads me to treat of what 's substantial . mistake me not , 't is not your discourse that obliges me to it ; it had been a sufficient answer to that , to let the reader see you purposely mistook the nature of tradition , to divert and perplex his thoughts , and there let it rest . yet , because your taking tradition wrong , for the doctrines deliver'd , good use may be drawn from it , i shall , for the benefit of the reader , not decline speaking to what you object . you make account ( p. . & . ) the tradition of the church deliver'd the point of the ` reall presence , & of christ's being the son of god , in general words onely . which , waving what has been alledg'd in my d. and d. sect. i judg for divers other reasons to be impossible . for , besides that , if the forefathers deliver'd onely the words , they taught their children ( against the supposition ) no faith in these points , for faith has sense in it , and is not faith if it have none , being in that case no true iudgment or truth ; who knows not that words were instituted and intended by mankind to signify something ; and , therefore , 't is inconsistent with the nature of the same mankind , when at age , especially the wiser sort , not to hold some sense or other to be signify'd by those words ; and with the nature of christians , not to instruct those whom they are to educate in faith , with that sense ; as also with the nature of those who are to be instructed , not to desire to know the sense of the tenets they are to believe . but , that sense cannot be a general one , that is , common to all the several tenets now sound among us ( for it will not be general if it exclude any one ) it must therefore abstract from all particulars , and be applicable to every one . now there is no such generical notion or sense which can be abstracted from christ's body , which is living , and a piece of bread , unless this , that they are both quantitative or mixt bodies ; to believe which would make a very extravagant point of faith ; much less can such an abstraction be made from christ's reall living body , and some supernatural gifts or qualities , either in the bread , or wrought in our souls by means of our receiving the eucharist ; for a substance and a quality differ toto genere ( as the logicians express it ) that is , belong to different commonest heads , which have no genus above them , or that can abstract from them . least of all can any such common notion be abstracted from the natural or true son of god , and a meer man ; no more than there can from god and a creature . whence follows most evidently , that , since the faithful must necessarily have always had some meaning of those words in their hearts , and a general sense of them is impossible , they must have ever had particular notions of those words , determining their sense to the one signification , or the other ; that is , either to mean christ's real body , or not his real body ; a true and essential godhead , or a meer creature . my second reason is , because faith is ordain'd to work through charity , or to stir up devour affections in us ; whence , as the distance is infinite in both cases , between one of those senses and the other , there being god on one side , on the other a creature ; so the affections of the soul wrought in us by our faith , must either oblige us to pay an infinite veneration to a creature if christ's real body ( and consequently god ) be not there , or if christ be not god ; which is the greatest deviation from true religion that is possible ; or else , to be highly irreverent , and to want the most efficacious motive that can be imagin'd to excite and elevate our devotion , if he be there , or christ be indeed god. nor can any middle disposition be invented that can make the acts of the soul hover between it's tendency towards an infinite and finite being , or between an infinite and finite reverence . i dare confidently conclude then , and dare avow it to be demonstrable out of the nature of mankind , that either the one or the other determinate sense of those words must have been held in all ages , ever since the apostles time , by the generality of the foregoing faithful ; more or less expresly , as those respective points , broke out more or less into christian action ; which their duty could not but prompt and oblige them to deliver to their children as occasion served ; and consequently , that that particular sense , and not onely ( as you fancy ) the general words , must have descended by tradition . . next , my position is , that , taking the word [ tradition ] for points descending by tradition , as you will needs have it , the church has power and authority to explain the sense and meaning of them , and to oblige others to believe her ; and yet , that this hinders not the infallibility of tradition from consisting in holding the same to day that was deliver'd yesterday , &c. this is the difficulty , i conceive , that so much troubles you . to clear which , you may please to reflect on what you know already by experience ; that , let any man advance a single tenet , and afterwards , upon occasion , set himself to explicate at large the sense of that proposition ; 't is plain , there will be found in that large explication many particular propositions ; not adequately the same , but in part different from that which he went about thus elaborately and distinctly to explain ; of which perhaps even himself was not aware while he did not reflect ; not being yet invited to make it clearer , or dilate on it . and yet he held , even at first , the sense ( and not only the words ) nay the whole sense of that main tenet or sentence ; tho' he saw not distinctly every single proposition contain'd in it , till he became oblig'd to scan and study his own undistinguisht , but true , thoughts concerning it . the same may be said of every sermon and it's text , supposing it be rigorously held to ; and no more be attended to but to explain it's intrinsick and full meaning . in which case , the preacher sticks not to assure his auditory , that what he has preach't to them all the while , is gods word ; and to press them to regard it as such , as far as his small authority over them can reach . and , had he more , in case he did verily judge his explication of that text was genuin , and , consequently , christ's true sense ; he would questionless esteem himself bound to make use of that authority to his utmost , to edify them with the explicit belief of each particular contain'd in so excellent a truth . this being so , why should not the same priviledge be granted to the church and her pastours to explicate , upon due occasion , the sense of christ's faith , in many particular propositions involv'd in the main tenet , ( even tho' we should suppose them to be not heard of , perhaps not distinctly thought of , before ) which is allow'd to every private man , and any ordinary preacher ? and , if those governours of the church be , by their office , conservers of christs law , and see that these propositions , newly singled out , are included , in any point of faith receiv'd upon their rule ; why ought they not , out of their duty and zeal to preserve christ's faith intire , both define these points , and also use their authority to oblige the faithful to accept them as such ; or , if they disaccept them and express themselves against them , to exclude them from their communion ? . but still , say you , these particular points came not down by tradition , nor were deliver'd as held yesterday , and so upwards till christ's time ; for they were not held at all before they were defin'd or declar'd . i distinguish : these propositions were held ever and descended ever as they were involv'd in the intire point ; in the bowels of which , the sense of those others were found : but , as singled out in such and such particularizing manners of expression , they were ( perhaps ) not held ever . i say , not held ever formerly , at least not universally . which is the true reason why some private writers , nay possibly some great men , might ( out of a dutiful fear not to add to faith ) have doubted of them , or disaccepted them , perhaps oppos'd them ; till the collective church , or some great body of them , who are able to look more intelligently into those points , declar'd and unfolded the sense of the main article , in which they were hitherto enwrapt : for , besides that it is their peculiar office , and ( as it were ) trade , to look deeper into the sense of the several points of faith , then others do ; 't is very rational to conceive , that those tenets were found more particularly explicated in some parts of the body of the church than in others ; which makes it difficult to affirm any particular point defin'd since christ's time , was not in many places of the church held ever , tho' it was not in all ; nor made as yet any great noise , being as yet neither oppos'd , ( which alarum'd the church to reflect heedfully upon it ; ) nor so powerfully recommended , which oblig'd the faithful more briskly and manifestly to own it . what difficulty or disagreeableness to the connatural course of things there is in all this , i cannot imagin ; nor , i am confident , your self ; unless your thoughts , startling at the unwelcom conclusion , should recoil back to your former mistake , that only words came down by tradition ; or that christ's sense was never in the breast of the diffusive church ( his spouse , and the pillar and ground of truth ) and in the understandings of her pastours ; which takes all faith out of the world , and destroys the very essence of a church : or , lastly , that many particular ( or rather partial ) propositions are not included in the total sense of every main tenet , and disclos'd by a full explication of it ; whence it comes to be discover'd to be a part of it , that is , in part it. . i am sorry you will needs give me occasion to interrupt such discourses , as tend to the clearing some truth , to defend tradition against your reproachful mistakes ; with which , in defiance to all sense , i had almost said against your own conscience too , you have loaded it . but these are some of your extrinsecal arguments , which , for want of better , jealousy of your cause and reputation prevails with you still to make use of ; and , so , you will triumph mightily if they be past over unconfuted . you attempt , p. . to play your politick game , and to conquer us by dividing us in our rule of faith ; tho' it cost your credit very dear to effect it . to this end , running on in your former mistake of the plain word [ tradition ] and that it means points and articles , you tell us sadly that this denying to the church of rome power to explain tradition takes off from its power & authority . that it resolves all into meer humane faith — meer natural reason — that the utmost it can amount to , is resolving faith into a logical demonstration . then follows the holy cant. and is this the faith christians are to be sav'd by ? what grace of god , what assistance of the holy spirit are necessary to such a faith as this ? but for this i refer you to the haeresis blacloana . you should have added [ where dr. tillotson , and my self have the honour to be brought in for writing so catholickly ] . truly sir , you have given us a very pretty period ; in which many of your modish qualifications vy for the precedency , and 't is hard to determin which has most title to it . nay , p. . you tell mr. g. that our grounds overthrow the church's authority in matters of faith , and proceed upon pelagian principles . your charge , sir , is very grievous and heavy ; and therefore , unless the evidence you bring to prove it , be answerable , you will manifest your self to proceed upon a new christian ( in truth , an old unchristian ) principle ; but , which suits it seems with your humour , and is requisite to your cause , calumniare fortiter — i need not tell you whose it was . . to stop your mouth therefore once for all concerning haeresis blacloana , know that that book , tho' printed in a catholick country , could not be licenc't ; but came out surreptitiously , without any printers name at it , or any other then a fictitious name of the author . know that it was sent to rome , and was compar'd there with the doctrin of tradition which it impugn'd . and yet it was not found that this doctrine either overthrew the churches authority in matters of faith , nor that there was any pelagianism in it : otherwise those books which were accus'd of it , and defended tradition to the height , had not escap't their censure . this shews how shallow this exception of yours is , and to what mean shifts you are reduc't , since you can quote a squabbling book of one roman-catholick against another about tradition , in stead of answering the argument for it . an ill-natur'd man might ( you know very well ) name authors of another communion , not too well thought and spoken of by eminent persons of their own side , and written against too by others . yet i shall not be so like some i know , to turn a dispute into a wrangle ; but shall apply my self to shew how far the doctrine of tradition is from deserving to be charg'd with such injurious reflexions . . but before i go farther , i must take notice of your quoting f. warner here , p. . and your appealing to him , where you put haeresis blacloana in the margent : by which you seem to hint , that he is the author of that book , and an adversary to the doctrin of tradition ; even so far as to judg it not sound in faith : for , no less aversion could make you very much question whether f. w. would absolve any man who professed to embrace catholick faith on mr. g's . grounds . but , as that very reverend person declares , he never saw that book till some of them were presented him bound , so himself has forestal'd your little policies , aiming to set us at variance in our tenets , in his anti-haman p. . [ we catholicks have faith , because we believe firmly those truths that god has reveal'd , because he reveal'd them to the church : which , as a faithful witness , gives hitherto , and will give to the end of the world testimony to that revelation . and we cannot be hereticks because we never take the liberty to chuse our selves , or admit what others chuse ; but we take bona fide what is deliver'd us , reveal'd by the greatest authority imaginable , on earth , which is that of the catholick church . ] he proceeds : [ here then is the tenure of our faith. the father sent his only begotten son , consubstantial to himself , into the world ; and what he heard of his father he made known to us , io. . . the father and son sent the h. ghost ; and hee did not speak of himself , but what he heard , that he spoke , io. . . the holy ghost sent the apostles , and they declared unto us what they had seen and heard , io. . . the apostles sent the highest and lowest prelates in the church ; and the rule by which they fram'd their decrees was , let nothing be alter'd in the depositum , let no innovation be admitted in what 's deliver'd : quod traditum est non innovetur : ] but he more expresly yet declares himself no adversary to this way ibid. p. . your friend mr. g. b. had call'd this way of proving doctrines , that they had them from their fathers , they from theirs , a new method of proving popish doctrines ; and receives for answer these words . you discover your ignorance , in saying that method was new , or that arnaud invented it : mr. thomas white had it before arnaud : mr. fisher a iesuite , before t. w. bellarmin before him ; & st. austin , st. stephen pope , & tertullian before them all . where you see he both allows this very method we take , as practis'd by modern controvertists of note ; nay , by some of his own order too , whom he is far from disapproving ; and by antient fathers also , whom he highly venerates . your petty project thus defeated , i shall endeavour to open your eyes , if they be not ( which god grant they be not ) wilfully shut . . the asserters of tradition observing , that the adversaries they had to deal with admitted christ's doctrin to be divine , held it the most compendious way to put a speedier end to all controversies , ( which experience taught them were otherwise liable to be spun out into a voluminous length ) and the most efficacious method to conclude all the heterodox , of what denomination soever , to prove , that the doctrin held now by the catholick church was christ's , or the self-same that was taught at first by himself and his apostles . it was bootless for them to attempt to prove this by texts of scripture , manag'd by their private wits ; for , the truth of our faith depending on christ's teaching it , if it were not absolutely certain christ taught it , it could not be evinc't with absolute certainty to be true. now , the same experience inform'd them , that no interpretation of scripture , made by private judgments , ( of themselves , or others ) could arrive to such a pitch of certainty ; and , consequently , would leave faith under the scandalous ignominy of being possibly , and , perhaps actually false . it was to as little purpose to alledge against such adversaries the divine assistance to the church , or christs promise of infallibility to it , as you very weakly object to mr. g. ( p. . ) as not once asserted by him . for , tho' this was believ'd by the faithful , yet it was disown'd by all those heterodox ; and , being it self a point of faith , it seem'd improper to be produc't for a rule of faith. besides , how should they prove this divine assistance ? if by scripture interpreted by their private judgments ; these not being absolutely certain , it would have weaken'd the establishment of that grand article , which to the faithful was a kind of principle to all the rest , in regard that upon the certainty of it , the security they had of all the other articles was to depend . if , by the divine authority of the church it self , it was not so easie to defend that method not to run round in a circle ; whereas all regular discourse ought to proceed straight forwards . these considerations oblig'd them to set themselves to make out by natural mediums , that the human authority of such a great body , as was that of the church , was absolutely certain , or infallible , in conveying down many visible and notorious matters of fact ; and , among the rest , ( or rather far above the rest , the subject being practical , and of infinite concern ) that such and such a doctrin was first taught to the age contiguous to the apostles , and continued ever since . by this means they resolv'd the doctrin of the present church into that of christ , and his authority ; and , consequently , ( these being suppos'd by both parties to be divine ) into the divine authority , granted by all to be the formal motive of divine faith. . this is the true state of that affair . and now , i beseech you , learned sir , where 's the polagianism ? where is the least ground , or shadow of ground , for all these bugbear words and false accusations , which , to make them sink deeper into the reader 's belief , and create a more perfect abhorrence of our tenet , come mask't here under an affected shew of godliness ? all hold their faith relies on the divine ( or christs ) authority , into which they finally resolve it : and all catholicks hold grace necessary to believe the mysteries of divine faith ; tho' all , perhaps , do not judge grace needful to believe upon human authority , this matter of fact , viz. that christ taught it . yet my self in * faith vindicated , seeing that the admitting this truth would oblige the heterodox to relinquish their ill-chosen tenets , and return to the church , against which they had a strong aversion ; did there declare my particular sentiment , that god's grace and some assistance of the holy ghost was requir'd , to make them willing to see the force even of this natural demonstration , so much against their humour and interest . is it pelagianism to conclude , that human motives , which are preliminaries to faith , and on which the assuredness of faith it self depends , as to us , are truly certain ? and , might you not with as much reason say the same , if one should maintain the absolute certainty of our senses , which is one of those preliminaries ? how strangely do you misrepresent every thing you are to meddle with ! how constantly do you make your voluntary mistake of every point serve for a confutation of it ! 't is confest , & ever was , that the human authority of the church , or tradition , begets only human faith , as its immediate effect ; but , by bringing it up to christ , it leads us to what 's divine ; yet not by its own force , but by vertue of the supposition agreed upon , that christ's doctrin is such . is it pelagianism to say , we must use our reason to come to faith ; or , do you pretend all the world must be the worst of phanaticks , and use none ? or , does it trouble you , we offer to justifie , that the reasons we bring to make good that preliminary , which , in our way of discoursing , is to introduce faith , are not such as may deceive us ? and that we do not confess they are fallible , or may deceive us , as you grant of your interpretations of scripture , which ground your belief ? no surely , we shall not quit the certainty we have , because you have none . for if it be not certain such doctrines are indeed christ's , who is our law-giver , we cannot be sure they are true ; their truth depending on his authority ; and , would you have us for fear of pelagianism confess all our faith may perhaps be but a story ? but , into what an unadvisedness does your anger transport you , to run the weapon through your own side to do us a mischief ? you bore us in hand ( first letter p. . ) that you had a larger and firmer tradition for scripture than we have for what we pretend to . yet , this tradition could cause no more but human faith ; for i do not think you will say you had divine faith , before you were got to your rule of divine faith. by your discourse then your self are an arrant pelagian too : perhaps worse than we , because you pretend to a larger and firmer ( human ) tradition than you say we have ; nay , you pretend it to be absolutely certain too , which is a dangerous point indeed . pray , have a care what you do ; for , you are upon the very brink of pelagianism . the knowing you have the true books of scripture , is a most necessary preliminary to your faith ; for , without knowing that , you cannot pretend to have any faith at all ; and , if it be pelagianism in us to hold such preliminaries absolutely certain , i fear the danger may come to reach you too . yet you have one way , and but one , to escape that damnable heresy ; which is , that you do not go about to demonstrate the absolute certainty of your tradition , as we do of ours . that , that is the very venom of pelagianism . but , take comfort , sir , my life for yours , you will never fall so abominably into the mire as to demonstrate or conclude any thing : ( for , what idaea soever you may frame of it , we mean no more by demonstrating , but plain honest concluding . ) your way of discoursing does not look as if it intended to conclude or demonstrate . 't is so wholly ( pass for as great a man as you will ) made up of mistakes , misrepresentations , petty cavils , witty shifts , untoward explications of your own words , constant prevarications , and many more such neat dexterities , that whatever fault it may through human frailty , provok't by powerful necessity , be liable to , i dare pawn my life it will never be guilty of that hainous crime of demonstrating or concluding any thing ; no , not the absolute certainty of your firmer tradition . and , yet , unless you can prove or conclude 't is thus certain , 't is a riddle to us , how can you either hold or say 't is such . pray , be not offended , if on this occasion i ask you a plain downright question . is it not equally blamable to falsify your adversaries tenet perpetually , as 't is to falsify his words ? nay , is it not worse , being less liable to discovery , and so more certainly and more perniciously injurious ? and can any thing excuse you from being thus faulty , but ignorance of our tenet ? i fear that plea will utterly sail you too , and leave you expos'd to the censure of every sincere reader , when i shew him to his eye that you could not but know all this before . for , in error non-plust p. . sect. . you must needs have read the quite contrary doctrine , and how those who maintain tradition do resolve their faith. [ there is no necessity then of proving this infallibility ( viz. of the church ) meerly by scripture interpreted by virtue of this infallibility . nor do the faithful or the church commit a circle in believing that the church is infallible , upon tradition . for , — they believe onely the supernatural infallibility built on the assistance of the holy ghost , that is on the church's sanctity ; and , this is prov'd by the human authority of the church to have been held ever from the beginning ; and the force of the human testimony of the church is prov'd by maxims of meer reason ] the same is more at large deliver'd in the foregoing section , and in divers other places . now , this book was writ against your self ; and , so , 't is as hardly conceiveable you should never have read it , as 't is unconceiveable how you should ever answer it : and , if you did read it , what was become of your sincerity when you counterfeited your ignorance of our tenet ? all is resolv'd ( say you , here , p. . ) into meer human faith , which is the unavoidable consequence of the doctrin of oral tradition . how shrewdly positive you are in your sayings , how modest and meek in your proofs ! nothing can be more manifest from our constantly avow'd doctrin , and your own opposing it too , than 't is , that tradition resolves all into christ's and the apostles teaching : and , pray , do you hold that christ is a meer man , or that the believing him is a meer human faith , or that the doctrin taught by him and them is meerly human ? if this be indeed your tenet , i am sorry i knew it not before ; for then i should have thought fit to begin with other principles to confute you : and , i pray god , by your impugning known truths , you may never need e'm . i see i had reason to alledge in faith vindicated , that the grace of god was requisit to make men assent to a natural conclusion when it came very cross to their interest : for , it appears too plain 't is exceedingly needful to assist you here in a meer point of common morality ; which is , to enable you not to speak and represent things directly contrary to your own knowledge . and , i am sorry i must tell you , and too evidently prove it , that the greatest part of your writings against catholicks , when the point is to be manag'd by reason , is ( in a manner ) made up of such study'd insincerities . you give us another instance of this indisposition of your will , p. . where you tell us mr. m. says , that the first thing which was propos'd , and indeed the onely subject mr. g. had any purpose to discourse on was , whether protestants had a ground of absolute certainty for their faith or not ? this you do not deny ; but turn it off to a quite different business ; and then slide from that to another , till you had wheel'd about the question from what was intended to the point you thought best serv'd your turn to shuffle in . here ( say you ) the faith spoken of is that faith whereby we are christians . how ? are protestants and christians then convertible terms or synonyma's ? are there not many sorts of christians which are not protestants ? and is it not plain , and not contradicted by your self , that it was demanded , whether ( your ) protestants had a ground of absolute certainty for their ( that is protestant ) faith ? does not the word [ their ] signify theirs as distinct from all other sorts of christians ? and is it come now to signify theirs simply as christians , or as conjoyn'd with all the rest ? this is too open dodging to pass upon the reader . 't is granted , you hold many of the same christian points which catholicks do ; but 't is deny'd , you can as you are protestants ( i mean still such protestants as are of your principles ) hold them to be absolutely certain , or hold them upon such grounds as are able to support that firm and unalterable assent , call'd faith : the grounds proper to your protestants being ( as was shewn in my former letter , sect. . ) to hold them upon the letter interpreted by your selves . of which letter , by virtue of your principles , you can have no absolute certainty ( as shall be shewn hereafter ; ) and of that letter interpreted by your private iudgments , much less . in a word , either you speak of points held by protestants , which you pretend to be all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles ; and then you are distinguisht not onely from those christians call'd catholicks , but from socinians , lutherans , and ( to omit others ) calvinists too , if you be one of those that hold episcopacy to be of divine right : or else you mean the assent , given to those points of protestant faith , on their pretended rule ; and then , you must shew your assent is more absolutely certain than that of the three last , and divers others who dissent from you in their tenets , and yet go upon the same rule ; and make it out to us , that , tho' it be both theirs and yours , yet still ' t is yours in particular , or peculiarly yours , as you are such protestants . . your next prevarication is much worse . after you had shov'd protestant faith into christian faith , you throw it a barr and a half further off by virtue of an id est . absolute certainty of the christian faith : i. e. ( say you ) of the grounds on which we believe the scripture to contain the word of god , or all things necessary to be believ'd by us in order to salvation . this id est , like pacolets wooden horse , has a charm to transfer us from one pole to the other in an instant . by virtue of its all-powerful magick , christian faith is made to be the same with the grounds on which we believe the scripture to contain the word of god ; so that , according to you , faith is the same with your grounds for scripture's being your ground ; that is , faith is made the same with the grounds for your ground of faith. what a medley of sense is this , and how many folds have we here involving one another ! christian faith is divine , these grounds and the faith built on them is human , being the testimony of men : are these two the same notion ? had i a mind to be quarrelsome , how easily , how justly too , might i retort your former calumny against tradition ; and object that this way of yours resolves all into meer human faith , meer natural reason , that it makes god's grace and assistance of the holy ghost unnecessary to faith ; and then ask , is this the faith christians are to be sav'd by ? and reckon up twenty other absurdities springing from this ill-grounded position . but i am now to trace your transferring faculty . in your first letter p. . you speak onely of absolute certainty as to the rule of your faith , viz. the scripture ; but here the case is alter'd ; and certainty of scripture is turn'd into certainty of the grounds on which we believe the scripture to contain the word of god. these slippery doings , and not any reasons you bring , make you inconfutable ; for , we must set upon the proteus in all his shapes ere we can bind him . the question is not , whether scripture contains the word of god , that is , his sense , or our faith , but ( which we cannot mind you of too often , for all will be too little to make you take notice of it ) how the sense contain'd there can be got out thence , or be signify'd to us with absolute certainty , even in the very highest points of christian faith , and what grounds you have to bring about this effect : for , you can profess no absolute certainty of any one point , till you have made it out with absolute certainty , that the sense , you pretend contain'd in scripture is it 's genuin meaning . this is your true task , if you would prove the absolute certainty of your protestant faith , or your faith as depending on your principles . but of this we hear not a syllable . . and i beseech you , to what end is it to tell us you are speaking of your rule or ground of faith , if it carry you not thorow to any one particular ; no , not those points which are most fundamental , and so most necessary for the salvation of mankind ? since , notwithstanding you have your rule , you are still as far to seek as before in all a rule should be good for ? remember , the question and mr. t 's expectation was about the absolute certainty of protestant faith , by vertue of your rule or ground ; and , therefore , if your rule does not reach to absolute certainty of the main points of faith at least , you are still at a loss both for your faith , and for a ground of your faith. yet this , conscious of it's failure , you seem unwilling to stand to , by still sliding silently over it , or slipping by it when it lies just in your way . for , you tell us , pag. . that your faith rests on the word of god as its absolute ground of certainty . which by the way is another little shuffle ; for you should have said absolutely-certain ground , not absolute ground of certainty . but let that pass , and let the horse-mill go for the mill-horse . you proceed . but the particular ▪ * certainty as to this or that doctrine , depends on the evidence that it is contain'd in scripture . you ought to have said , if you would make your faith so certain as you pretended [ we are absolutely certain such and such particular points are contain'd there ] otherwise your general ground comes not up to the question , nor does your faith any service at all , since it leaves it still vncertain ; of which more hereafter . especially , since you pretended , or rather declar'd openly , p. . that you now held all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles : which profession reaches to all the points of faith , and not onely to your ground of faith. i must confess you render'd that profession insignificant , and cancell'd the obligation as soon as you had made it , in the explication of those words immediately following ; which makes those hearty expressions [ absolutely certain of all the same doctrin ] amount to no more , but that you resolve your faith into scripture . we must , i see , deal with you as those who have a pretence in court do with great courtiers ; who lose their repute with them as ill-bred , and unmannerly , if they will needs take them at their word , and do not distinguish between what 's spoken and what 's meant . your answer was very honest and direct [ we are absolutely certain we now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles . the comment is this , [ i fram'd my answer on purpose to shew that our faith is not to be resolv'd into what christ taught , any otherwise than as it is convey'd to us by the writings of the apostles & evangelists . ] whereas , if there be so much as one word of [ writing or evangelists ] even hinted in your answer it self ( unless the word taught meant writ , which cannot be because we never read that christ writ any books ) or the least semblance of reason , for making this skewing explication , but to shuffle off your too large concession , i will confess my self too shallow to fathom the profound depth of your inscrutable sense . resolve then your faith , in god's name , into what you will , so you but shew us an absolutely certain connexion , between the points resolved , and the rule into which you profess to resolve it : otherwise 't is no resolution of faith , if the continued chain of motives winding it up to the first truth , or god's infinite veracity , hangs slack . such incoherence serves not for faith , which must be indissolubly connected to the formal motive of all our faith ; else the resolution of it may be shatter'd , and broke to pieces by the way , ere we come there . which if it may , then the resolution is no resolution , for that speaks connexion of the motives ; and , faith thus resolv'd may perhaps all be false , and so is no faith. 't is your work then to shew in particular , when you come to it , and at present in general , that your rule gives you absolute certainty of the points of faith , more than it does the socinian , who have the same rule , and profess to follow it as much as you do for your heart , and yet erre enormously . nay , in effect they take the same method too to interpret scripture which you do ; for , tho' you give good words to the consent of former ages , yet your grounds do not allow it absolute certainty in bringing down doctrin or interpreting scripture ; and less than such a certainty , and in such things , signifies nothing in our case . and 't is either by your rule and method , you can arrive thus certainly at the sense of scripture , or by nothing . if you could once with absolute certainty convince the socinians of obstinacy against a clear truth by your rule , or method , or both together ; i mean , if you could make it clear to them that your rule of faith , cannot possibly bear any other sense , so that the indifferent part of the world judg'd them wilful adherers to a false interpretation , or that you could silence them , and put them to open shame for adhering to it , you would do somthing ▪ otherwise , your starting aside still from the absolute certainty of the points , even tho' p. . you pretended to be absolutely certain you hold them all , and talking to us of nothing but a general ground , is meer shuffling ; and shews plainly you meant not really in that answer of yours to mr. g's first question , where you spoke of all the doctrin ; which includes every particular point ; so that by all it seems you meant none . 't is very paradoxical to see you distinguish here ( p. ) between the doctrin taught by christ , and that which was taught by the apostles . the reason why you do it , is to insinuate into our readers that we derive the source of our tradition from christ's teaching orally ( as the iews affirm of moses delivering an unwritten law ) else to what purpose this distinction ? the tradition we lay claim to has no such obscure original ; it takes it's ●ife from the whole body of primitive christians in the apostles days , dispers't in great multitudes over the world , and settled in the knowledge of his faith by means of their preaching . so that tradition starts into motion from a most publick , and notorious matter of fact , viz. that the apostles taught the first christians such a faith. to what imaginable purpose then was this frivolous distinction brought in ? you knew this was our tenet ; and we knew well your rule was scripture . what needed then this shuffling paraphrase ? by tradition , you know we mean a testimony for doctrin receiv'd . if the source be weak , or that the body of the witnessers of it's delivery at first , and successively afterwards , was smal , the tradition is , consequently , weak in proportion ; if great , it was stronger still , according as the multitude of the attesters was more numerous , and their credibleness more unexceptionable . well , but admit your faith be not resolv'd into what christ taught by his own mouth , but what the apostles taught us from him , why must you necessarily resolve your faith into their writings only ? did the apostles when they went to convert the world go with books in their hands , or words in their mouths ? or were those words a jot less sacred when it came from their mouths , than when they put them in a book ? or , lastly , does any command from christ appear to write the book of scripture , or any revelation before hand that it was to be a rule of faith to the future church ? no such matter : and the accidental occasions of it's writing at first , and it's acceptation afterwards , bar any such pretences ? on the other side , their grand commission was not scribite , but only predicate evangelium . yet , you can slubber this over without taking notice of it , and carry it as if the apostles teaching mean't writing only , and that they taught the world no more than they writ . sure you do not mean the apostles took texts out of their own books , and preacht sermons upon then as you do now . why must it be quite forgotten then , and buried in silence , that they taught any thing by word of mouth or preacht the gospel publickly ? allow that to be equally sacred as what is writ , and to be embrac't if well attested , and blame the attestation , and tradition as it may be found to deserve ; but still , when you would put your own tenet as distinguish 't from ours , be so kind as to put ours too ; and do not stand talking to us , and fooling your readers , with the rabbies pretended tradition from moses his mouth : no more like ours than an apple is like an oyster . again , this resolution of your faith gives every one absolute certainty of his faith , who believes he has absolute certainty of scripture's letter , and that it contains the word of god. and yet experience tells us that whole bodys of learned men believe all this , and yet differ ( that is , one side errs ) in the highest mysteries of christian faith. whence follows , that both sides , by this doctrin , are absolutely certain of their faith ; one side ( for example ) is absolutely certain there is a trinity , and that christ is god ; the other , that there is no trinity , and that christ is not god. this seems but a very odd account of the certainty of protestant faith. . but you refine upon your self , in your answer to the d question . p. . it was ask't there [ by what certain rule do you know that the new testament which we now have , does contain all the divine revelations of christ , and his apostles ? this question evidently aims at two things : viz. first whether some books writ by the apostles were not lost ; ( as appears by those words which we now have : ) for if they were , then , being penn'd by men divinely inspir'd , they must necessarily contain some divine revelations in them too , as well as did the other ; and then how does it appear there were not more or other revelations , contain'd in them than were contain'd in the books now extant ? the other is , that you know well very many hold that diverse divine revelations were deliver'd down by tradition , and not all by writing . let 's see now how your answer sutes with this question . by the vniversal testimony ( say you ) of the christian church from the apostles times downwards . this reply , if pertinent to that question , must mean that this vniversal testimony ascertains us , that the scriptures we have now , contains all the divine revelations . but , when you come to explain your self , it comes to no more but that , the testimony of the apostolical , and the succeeding churches did by degrees make men fix upon the certain canon of the new testament . what a flight have you taken on a sudden ! where will you pitch when you light ? i am sure not on the place where you took wing , and where you ought to have stay'd . for , what is their testimony for the books we now have , to the books which have or may have prerish't and to their containing some other divine revelations ? or , what is the fixing upon the certain canon of the books to the difficulty , whether some divine revelations did not descend by tradition without writing ? do the apostolical or succeeding churches testify either of these ? or , do you so much as pretend they do ? not a syllable of this do you say or take notice of ▪ and , so , not a syllable have you answer'd to his question . which was not about the canon of scripture , or how you would resolve your faith , with which you keep such a pother over and over ; but , whether the new testament we have now , contain'd all the divine revelations ? if you explicate scripture no better for your faith , than you do your own words here , you will questionless make a very extraordinary piece of work of it . your answers come now and then pretty home , the smartness of the questions obliging you to it ; but , your explications of them immediately after , seem purposely fram'd that we should not take you at your word in your answers . . that answer then prevaricating from the whole question , mr. g. endeavour'd to press for a pertinent return to what was demanded ; and therefore puts his fourth question thus . was that vniversal testimony an infallible rule to assure us certainly down to our time , that the new testament contain'd all the divine revelations of christ and his apostles ? your answer was . the vniversal testimony of the christian church concerning the book of scripture and the doctrin contain'd therein , is a sufficient ground to make us certain of all matters necessary to our salvation . . here are many things worth our admiration . in the first letter p. . this universal testimony was onely to ascertain the scripture . in the answer to the third question here , 't is onely to assure us that the new testament contains all the divine revelations : but , here it is to certify us of the doctrine too contain'd in it : which , if you mean as your words seem to sound , is all we require in our tradition-rule . there may be some other subtle meaning lying yet coucht in those words , which time may discover ; tho' we cannot yet , till he that made the lock bring the key . again , 't is ask't if it be an infallible rule ? t is answered , t is a sufficient ground . t is ask't , whether this testimony assures us certainly the new testament contains all the divine revelations ? t is answer'd , it makes us certain of all matters necessary to our salvation : which is clearly intended for a diminishing expression , and argues some fear of undertaking for all the divine revelations being contain'd there , or all the doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles , as was pretended p. . one would verily imagin by this unsutable answer , that dr. st. and mr. g. were playing at cross-purposes , the answer is so wide from the question , at least that there is some indirect design lies lurking ; it being so opposite to the wayes of honest nature . when one asks a positive question , all mankind expects a positive answer to the very words as they ly , i , or no : or , if the words be ambiguous , 't is the duty of the answerer to desire to be satisfied of the meaning of the asker , if present , ere he answers ; without which , in that case , 't is impossible to reply pertinently . but , it is not your temper nor interest to use such clear and open candour . for , you saw that great multitudes had the letter thus secur'd to them , yet had not absolute certainty that all the divine revelations are contain'd in it ; therefore by adding [ and the doctrin contain'd therein ] you had some faint hopes you might be safe . again , you saw well , that , should you grant universal testimony to be an infallible rule , you would hazard to grant too much to tradition , and all the learned jests you have broke upon us for asserting infallibility would fly back upon your self : therefore grant it you durst not . nor , yet durst you deny it to be an infallible rule ; for then ( since one of the two it must forcibly be ) you must affirm it to be a fallible rule : and then the common sence of all mankind ( mr. t. amongst the rest ) would be justly scandaliz'd at the non sense : for an intellectual ground that may perhaps let sink into falsity , and overturn what 's built on it , deserves not the name of a ground ; and a rule which may perhaps mislead me when i follow it , is in reality no rule : besides , should you declare 't is a fallible rule , men would wonder with what sense you could pretend that a fallible testimony ( nay , which you confess to be such ) can make you absolutely certain of the thing it attests : it being the same as to profess i grant they may all be deceiv'd in what they tell me , yet i am absolutely certain , by their very testimony , that what they tell me is true. what could you do then in that perplexity , being neither in condition to allow infallibility , nor avow fallibility ; and standing gor'd with both the horns of the dilemma or contradiction ? why , you were forc't to call in your constant and dear friend [ sufficient certainty ] to help you out at a dead plunge . for , this is able to do more than miracle ; this can divide an indivisible , and put a middle betwixt two contradictories ; by shewing the world a certainty , that is neither infallible nor fallible , but between both , or mixt of both ; we may imagin , half the one , half the other . lastly , fearing that you would be driven at length ( as you must ) to bring your rule home to particular points , and knowing t●e socinians , and other late-sprung heretical congregations ( whom you ought to acknowledge christian churches , since they hold stiffly to that which you maintain here is the onely rule of christian faith ) deny'd many of those , which you hold divine revelations , to be contain'd in scripture ; nay , on the contrary , hold they are excluded thence ; and that the opposit● tenets are contain'd there ; therefore you very prudently and warily chang'd [ all the divine revelations ] which were the words of the question , into [ all matters necessary for our salvation ▪ ] providing thus a security for their souls at least , tho' you could not for their errours ; and a kind of excuse for the incertainty of your rule , which permitted the followers of it to run astray ; and withal , a retreat for your self . in all which dexterous alterations , as this due commendation must be allow'd you , to have acted very wisely and politickly ; so it must be absolutely deny'd you have given any answer at all to the question . the words which you would obtrude upon us for an answer , carry indeed a pretty shew , and shift it off with much cunning ; but when we come to look into their sense , with an eye directed to the question , they squint aside to quite other matters ; and the whole reply , in a manner , is made up of different notions from what was ask't . nor can i liken the replies you generally make to our questions , or the explications you make of your own answers , to any thing better than to that mock exposition of the first verse in genesis , which luther made for your friend zuinglius's iinterpretation of hoc est corpus meum . deus ( god ) that is a cuckow ; creavit ( created ) that is , devoured ; coelum & terram ( heaven and earth ) that is a hedge sparrow with bones , and feathers and all . . you put a pretty similitude indeed to illustrate your own tenet ; but in reference to our main question , the absolute certainty of your kind of protestant faith by your grounds , 't is so far from running on four legs , that it is in many regards , lame on the right , ( and indeed onely ) foot it ought to stand on , and ( which is worse ) is perhaps against your self . you resemble the holy scripture to a purse full of gold and silver ; left by a father , and entrusted to executours ; who tell his son , this is all his father left him ; and , if they deal truly with him , do certainly deliver all it contains . this the primitive church , christ's executours , did , by delivering us the scripture ; and assuring us all divine truths , which respect mans salvation , were contain'd there in the lump ; among which , some were gold points , some sylver points ; but , having the purse of scripture , we have the one as well as the other , and , consequently , all matters necessary to our salvation , these being of greatest moment . thus stands the similitude , for , run it cannot ; and the summ of it ( as far as i apprehend it ) amounts to this ; that , because scripture contains all , and protestants have scripture , therefore , they have all . a strange kind of discourse ! as if , because they have it in a book , therefore , they have it in their minds or souls , in which , and , no where else , faith is to reside . and as if a man , were a jot the more learned , for having purchast aristotles works , and reading , and not understanding them . . i could except against divers particulars , presum'd on , in this similitude ; as , that you have any absolute certainty of your having the whole scripture that was writ , or , that it contains all divine revelations ; or , that you have the right copy , to every material particle in it , that may signify faith , that is , indeed , right scripture , &c. ( or the right purse , &c. but , i am more concern'd for some plausible insinuations in this similitude , which may hazard to corrupt the reader 's judgment . for , however , you decline and avoid it , yet the generality of readers , whenever they hear any speech of the certainty of the grounds of their faith , they immediately apprehend they are to be certain of the particular points of their faith by vertue of those grounds . and , 't is a common errour in many , of an indifferent good judgment , ( i wish it did not sway with some who pass for great schollars ) that , when a thing easily sinks into their apprehension , they are apt to conceit it to be a truth . when , therefore they hear of a purse , which is a thing very easy to open , ( it being no more but pulling two strings which use to run very glib ; ) and , that scripture is in many regards , here compar'd to a purse ; they are presently inclin'd to fancy , that , scripture's sense is as easy to be come at , as 't is to take money out of a purse : 't is but plucking those easily following strings , and the deed is done . but , alas ! here lies all the difficulty . the arians , novatians , socinians , &c. have all of them this purse , yet are never the richer ; but , for want of skill to open it , and get the gold and silver thence , they go away empty , or worse . now , certainly , those high points , viz. a trinity , christ's divinity ; the real presence , &c. should deserve to be reckon'd amongst the golden ones ; and , therefore , should be as most valuable , so most easily attainable ; being of the highest import for the church , or the body of christianity . yet , 't is granted the socinians err in the two first of those points , for all their acuteness and wit. i except next against the resembling the contents of it to gold and silver ; which certainly enrich those who are possessours of such a purse : whereas , those sects lay claim to that purse too with equal title , yet , coming to open it by their interpretation , they take the dross of errour for the pure gold of truth , and soul-poysoning heresies for means of salvation . had i a mind to set up a similitude-mender , and , that you will needs have it a purse , i should beg your leave to put it thus : suppose that purse's mouth were tyed up with a knot of such a mysterious contrivance , that none could open it ( i mean still , as to the understanding the mysteries of our faith ) but those who knew the mind of the bequeather ; and , that the church , to which it was left as a legacy , had knowledge of his mind , and so could open it ; while others tortur'd their wits with little tricks and inventions , turning and winding the ambiguous folds of it , some one way , some another ; and yet entangled their own thoughts , more and more , while they went about to unty the knots that so perplex't them . . this is the true case . you make account containing does all the business ; whereas , 't is nothing at all to our purpose , which is ( in the final intention of it ) about the absolute certainty of your faith ; unless we have equal assurance that you can get out thence what 's contain'd there , as you pretend to have , that 't is contain'd . now , it cannot be deny'd , but the primitive church was imbu'd with christ's sense by the preaching of the apostles and their immediate successours ; and so had a sure and proper way to interpret scripture ; and , while this sense was still deliver'd down , they could not fail of an absolutely certain rule to understand it right . but , there steps up now one heretick , then another , opposing himself to the sense of the church ; and , relying on the dextery of his own wit , will needs find out contrivances how to open the scripture's meaning by wayes of his private skill : but falls into multitudes of errours , finding no way to unfold the deeply-mysterious book ; having refus'd to make use of the right means , viz. christ's sense descending in the church by tradition . whence , notwithstanding all his little arts and boasting presumption like the fox in the fable , vas lambit , pultem non attingit . . mistake me not : i do not mean scriptures letter is not clear in such passages as concern common morality , or the ten commandments ; with the sense of which every one is imbu'd by the light of nature . nor in matters of fact , such as were most of those marks or signs to know the messias by , foretold us by the prophets ; our saviour's doing such and such miracles , his going beyond iordan , &c. nor in parables explain'd by himself , and such like . but , in dogmatical points or tenets , which are spiritual , and oftentimes profound mysteries , ( and , of these , by the way , i desire still to be understood , when i speak of the certainty of the letter or sense of scripture , for with other passages i meddle not ) as the tenet of a trinity , christ's god-head , the real presence of his body in the sacrament ; and such like ; which have a vast influence upon christian life ; either immediately , or else in a higher nature , being ( as it were ) principles to many other articles of faith , which depend on their truth : one would verily think , i say , that such as these should be some of your golden points , or else there were none at all contain'd in your purse : yet , we experience , that even in such as these , your rule is not intelligible enough to keep the followers of it from erring . so that , let your purse have never so golden and silver a lining , you are never the richer , unless you can come at it , or can certainly distinguish the pure gold of truth from the impure dross of errour . your similitude then comes not home to your purpose , nor shews that you have therefore all your faith , or all divine revelations , because you have a book which you judge contains them . let 's see now if it does not make against you . you put the doctrin ( or points ) of faith to be the gold and silver contain'd in the purse ; and , consequently that must be the purse into which that doctrin of faith was put by christ our saviour ; and this was evidently the heads , and hearts of the faithful . for the points of faith , being so many divine truths , are onely contain'd in men's minds properly ; and , words being , by their very definition , but signes of what is in our minds , truths are no more really in a book , than wine is really in a bush which signifies it . since then those truths were onely in the breast of christ originally , and , after him , in that of the apostles ; and their thoughts could not be communicated , nor consequently the gold and silver deliver'd to the legatees , otherwise than by signifying it , which can onely be done by one of these ways , by living voice and practice , or by writing ; that is by tradition or scripture , neither of these can with any sense be liken'd to the purse it self , into which the money is to be put , or answer comparatively to it ; but they are both of them wayes , means or methods of putting these heavenly riches into it's proper purse , the souls of the faithful . of these two ways our saviour chose the first ; which was teaching his doctrin orally , for he writ nothing ; and by doing thus , told us it was the better : for , it had been against his infinit wisdom to chuse the worser way for himself to make use of , and leave the better to his servants . nor , did his servants , the apostles , affect the way of writing , so as to use it onely ; but , on the contrary , they made use of this oral way of preaching constantly , and that of writing ( for the most part at least , if not altogether ) occasionally . they converted the present church by their preaching ; they comforted the future church by leaving many most edifying words , and actions of our blessed saviour , written ; which being particulars , and not breaking out openly into christian practice , might otherwise in likelihood , ( at least to a great degree ) have been lost to succeeding generations ; besides the abetment their writings give to faith it self , when certainly interpreted , and rightly understood . so that , according to this discourse of yours we should either have never a purse to put points of faith in , for you take no notice of the souls of the faithful into which they are properly put , and in which onely they are in reality contain'd : or , if you will needs call that a purse which contains them meerly as a sign does the thing signify'd , or as that which may signify to us our faith , you must put two purses : tradition and scripture : and then the onely question is , out of which purse , we can with more certainty get it . that is , whether a living container , which can give us perfect light of it's sense by * all the best ways imaginable ; or the dead letter , which , as experience demonstrates , can neither clear it's sense to private understandings ; nor , if we doubt of it's meaning , and had a mind to ask it , could either hear or reply , much less pertinently , and appositely speak to the asker as oft as he had occasion to press still for satisfaction . again , the written instrument or means of putting this heaven-stampt coyn in our souls , is an ignoble instrument in comparison ; being in reality , as to it 's material part , or taken as abstracted from the sacred sense which is signify'd by it , nothing but ink thus figur'd on paper . whereas , the material part of the other is the most noble that can be found under heaven it self : viz. the church which all christians must acknowledge to be the spouse of christ , the pillar and ground of truth , and consisting of the living temples of the holy ghost ; that , for whose edification the scripture was writ ; and , so , holds proportion with it as the means does with the end , which is in a manner infinit . nay , that , for which all the material world was created , and the oeconomy of it still carry'd on , from the first beginning of time to it's last period . lastly , that for whose sake god himself was made man , and dy'd a most cruel death on a cross. so that 't is unconceivable , that it can enter into the thoughts of any intelligent man who believes this to be the due character of the church , there should be any competition betwixt the letter of scripture and it ; or that it can possibly be doubted to which of them ( all things consider'd ) we ought to attribute most in looking after faith. but , to return to your similitude . the sum of it is this : that the gold and silver you speak of , being the doctrin of faith ; not the scripture , but the heads , and hearts of the faithful , ( that is , of the church ) does really and indeed contain it ; and , consequently , this onely can with any propriety be compar'd to a purse . that , both tradition and scripture are to be liken'd to the several ways of putting the heavenly treasure of faith , into this purse , or faith into the souls of the faithful . lastly , that taking them as containing them , as signes do the things signify'd , it is not their containing this treasure does us any good , but the delivering it out to us ; no more than a man is better for having a trunk full of money so circumstanc't that he could never come at it : and , that , between these two ways of coming at this treasure , or their delivering it out to us there is no comparison , whether we regard the intelligibleness , or providential establishment of those respective instruments in order to such an end. so that your similitude , how prettily soever it look't at first , hath one misfortune very common to such fine useless toys , that is , to be good for nothing ; for it neither comes up to the question , nor sutes with your own tenet . . but ere we part from this point , it were not amiss to examin a little that cautious expression of yours [ all things necessary for salvation ] into which you change that bold assertion that you are absolutely certain you now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles . i ask you then , what do you mean by those words [ necessary for salvation ] which mince the matter so warily ? do you think christ taught any unnecessary points , or did a needless action ! sure you will not say it . and yet my self will grant too , and agree with you that fewer means than the knowledge of all christ taught , may suffice for the salvation of some particular persons . what follows then , but , that , since they are all necessary for some body , and yet not all necessary for every particular person , more of them are necessary for one man than for another , and all of them necessary for the body of the church : whose pastours are to instruct their children in them , and apply the efficacy of them to their souls , as their capacities admit , and exigencies require . for , tho' some few may be saved without the knowledge of such & such points , ( slender motives being enough for their circumstances , ) yet multitudes of others may require incomparably more effectual means , to buoy them up from the world , and raise them to heaven ; and so , they would certainly miscarry for want of them . particularly , the points now mention'd , are of such a high and general influence , that , without these , the devotion of a very great portion of the church , would be enfeebled , many of the souls that want them be lost eternally , and others be but dim stars in the glorious firmament of heaven , in comparison of what they might have been , had their minds been cultivated with such elevating considerations . and , can the church , which god has entrusted with those souls , think that 't is agreeable to his will , his flock should either dy , or fall short of the full growth they might have had in the plentiful pastorage he had provided for them ? it rests then for you , either to shew those points not necessary for the generality , and that your grounds are sufficient to give men , both as able and as willing ( for ought appears ) to understand scripture right as your self is , absolute certainty of them ( which is to confute experience , and dispute against your own knowledge , ) or else to confess ingenuously you have no absolute certainty of even the highest fundamentals , and most necessary points for the salvation of mankind . . thus much to shew that your rule gives you no absolute certainty of all such matters as are necessary for your salvation , with reference to the points of faith ; to certify which , experience assures us it does not reach . now , should we speak of the assent of faith , the short discourse , p. , . of my former letter , demonstrates clearly you can have no absolute certainty of any one , and so cannot with reason affirm your faith is true ; since , wanting absolute certainty that christ taught it , it may be false . the same point has been prest upon you in faith vindicated , reason against raillery , errour non-plust , and diverse other books : yet tho' it was the most important objection that is or can be imagin'd , as plucking up by the roots all your faith , and destroying it from it's very foundation ; no return could ever yet be obtain'd , nor candid reason produc't , but onely a put-off with sufficient certainty , and such dow-bak't words ; without being able or even endeavouring , to shew that grounds less than absolutely certain can possibly be thus sufficient for the nature , the ends and vses of faith. but 't is high time to return to our disputants . . against this pretended answer of yours , you introduce mr. m. suggesting several things . first , as to difference of translations . to which you reply . doth mr. m. think our faith is to be resolv'd into the original texts ? what he thinks , you know better than you would seem to do . he cannot but think , if he may believe you , that you resolve your faith into the letter of scripture . he cannot but think that by these words you mean the right letter ; for , otherwise , it would not be scripture : nor can he think , or you either , it can be the right letter , unless it have a right translation , and this , from a true copy ; nor that any copy can be true , unless conformable to the true original . and , if there can be any failure in any of these , nay , if you have not absolute certainty of all these , you cannot have ( by your grounds ) any absolute certainty of your faith : for , if the letter be wrong , all is wrong that is built on it : and it may be wrong , for ought you know , notwithstanding the testimony of all christian churches relying on this way of attesting the truth of the letter . for , you can never shew that all those churches consented to apply their utmost diligence to examine and attest all the several translations , made in their respective languages ; or witnest that they came from the true original ; or took the most exquisit care that was possible , to see that the translaters and the copiers did their duty . which , had they held the letter to be their onely rule of faith , and , consequently , that all faith , that is , the very being of the present and future church , and their own salvation too , depended on the scripture , they were obliged in conscience , and under the highest sin , above all things in the world , to have done ; and this , with the exactest care imaginable : your grounds then , notwithstanding all you have said or alledged hitherto to ensure the letter , make no provision for the absolute certainty of the written-rule , nor consequently of your faith. . but what becomes then ( say you ) of the vulgar latin translation ? i answer , in our grounds no harm at all : for the canon of the books comes down by the testimony of all christian churches that are truly christian ; and the doctrin of christ , transfus'd into the hearts of the succeeding faithful ever since the beginning , both taught them how , and oblig'd them to correct the copy in those particular texts that concern'd faith , if any errour through the carelesness , unattentiveness or malice of the translaters or transcribers at any time had crept in . by the same means as you can now adays correct the copy in those texts , that ought to express some point of morality , in case it were corrupted , and deviated from christian manners ; viz. by vertue of the sense of that practical tenet you were imbu'd with formerly ; & this , even tho' you had no other copy or text to amend it by : insomuch that , how good an opinion so ever you had of the copy , translater , printer or correcter of the press ; yet , for all that , you would conclude they had err'd , and the letter was faulty , rather than forgo the doctrin so firmly rivetted in your heart by the constant teaching and practice of the christian world . as for other particular texts of an inferiour concern , they could be best corrected by multitudes of other ancient copies ( the churches care still going along ) in which too the greatest care that was possible to rectify it's errours was taken by the council of trent , that so it might be as exact as human diligence could well render it . a thing , as far as my memory reaches , never order'd or very much regarded by any council formerly . . but i foresee , your method of confuting ( which is to muster up extrinsecall objections not at all to the purpose ) will naturally lead you to discredit this way of correcting scripture's letter in passages belonging to faith , as singular or new ; this being the same your friend g. b. objected to the way of tradition it self ; as may be seen above , sect. . such piddling exceptions , drest up prettily in gay language , go a great way , and make a fine shew in your controversies ; and , which is a benefit of most advantage to you , excuse you from bringing any intrinsecal arguments ; tho' these onely are such as conclude any thing , and tho' you are bound by your precise duty to produce such : wherefore , to ward this blow , i shall alledge the judgment of that learned , and excellent personage , sir thomas more , our first modern english controvertist ; who , writing , not against you in defence of our grounds , but to another catholick divine , expresses candidly his sentiment in these words . [ ego certe hoc persuadeo mihi , idque ( ut opinor ) vere ; quicquid ad fidem astruendam faciat , non esse a quovis melius versum , quam ab ipsis apostolis perscriptum . ideoque fit ut , quoties in latinis codicibus occurrat quidquam quod aut contra fidem aut mores facere videatur ; scripturarum interpretes aut ex aliis alibi verbis quid illud sibi velit dubium expiscentur ; aut ad vivum evangelium fidei , quod per universam ecclesiam in corda fidelium infusum est ; quod etiam , priusquam scriberetur a quoquam , apostolis a christo , ab apostolis vniverso mundo praedicatum est , dubios ejusmodi sermones applicent , atque ad inflexibilem veritatis regulam examinent : ad quam si non satis adaptare queant , aut sese non intelligere , aut mendosum esse codicem , non dubitent . ] this is my iudgment , and ( as i conceive ) a true one ; that whatever ( text ) is useful to build faith on , was not better translated by any than it was writ by the apostles themselves . and therefore , as oft as any thing occurs in the latin-books , that seems to make against faith or good manners , the interpreters of scripture , either gather from other words in other places what that doubt should mean ; or they compare those doubtful sayings to the living gospel of faith , which was infus'd into the hearts of the faithful , throughout the vniversal church ; & which , before any man writ it , was preach't by christ to the apostles , and by the apostles to the whole world ; & examine them by the inflexible rule of faith ; with which if they cannot make it square , they conclude , that either they do not understand it , or the book is faulty ] where he passes by the former way with a sleight word [ expiscentur ] fish out the sense ; but insists on the latter way of preserving the copy sincere , as certain and proper . . i must not pretermit your objection p. . that the ancient christian church never knew any thing concerning this method of resolving faith into meer oral tradition . i would desire you to add [ practical ] to oral ; at least to conceive it to be understood all the way , that being our true and constantly-avow'd tenet . but , did the antient church , in reality , never know any thing of this way ? t is wonderful you should not understand they meant the same as we do , unless they speak the self-same words , and make the same discourses we do now . did not they all hold , that who taught any thing contrary to the doctrin delivered down by the church , was a heretick ? did any of them say that the churche's tradition of a doctrin , as christs , was liable to errour ? did any of them hold that it was lawful for your sober enquirer to rely on his private interpretation of the scripture , and relinquish the sense of the church , which is the true point ? not one . 't is one thing to say they oft quoted scripture against hereticks , who had rejected the authority of the church , ( even the council of trent does so ; ) another , to say they had no firmer ground for their faith , but their own private iudgments of it's sense . t is one thing to give it high commendations for it's excellency , divine doctrin , usefulness and sufficiency for the ends for which it was ordained by god : 't is another , to say that , in those places which relate to spiritual points and high mysteries of our faith , it is so clear , that , private fancies can with absolute certainty fix upon it's true sense , and , on that , ground their faith. t is one thing to say sometimes , 't is plain and evident , when they are arguing against hereticks : this is a thing not unusual even among us , when we are disputing , and have an opinion that what we alledge is manifest ; and those fathers or councils which insisted on it , had good reason to have that opinion of what they alledg'd , having the doctrin of faith , ( scripture's best interpreter ▪ ) in their hearts : besides , when there is full assurance of it's sense , who doubts but it is of a vast authority too ; being in that case the same as if the apostle or christ himself were there , and spoke his mind in the point under debate . whence they confuted hereticks with defining from scripture ; upon the assurance that they had the true sense of it another way , than the heretick had by his private interpretations . but , 't is another thing to say , that , as manag'd by private judgments , working on the bare letter , or relying on fallible interpreters , it is so unavoidably convictive , beyond all possibility of giving it another plausible sense , that all mankind must think him a renouncer of the clear light of reason , or stark blind with passion and interest , and abhorr him as such , who shall interpret it after another manner . and such the rule of faith must be , otherwise , none could with conscience think or say any heretick is obstinate , nor any man ( no not the church it self ) condemn him , much less abhorr him for being , such , as was ever her custome . all the former perfections we as heartily , fully , and constantly ascribe to scripture as any protestant in the world : nay , we say moreover , that this want of clearness which unqualifies it for being a rule , springs from a very high perfection in it ; viz. it 's deep sense ; onely this one , of giving every particular man , who by his private judgment interprets it , such assurance of its sense as is competent to ground his faith on , we cannot grant ; this being no less contrary to common reason , than 't is even to experience also . to return then to your objection . you see sect. . that the antient fathers were not such strangers to this method of tradition we follow and explicate . and , you might have observ'd many others both nam'd and cited , surefooting p. . to . what matters it that they did not express that our tenet , or dilate upon it in such terms as we do now ; so they taught others to hold to what was deliver'd , and not to rely on their own private interpretations of scripture against the present churches doctrin ? since in doing this , they held the substance of that which we have since more diffusely explain'd , and reduc't our discourses to more methodical and formal resolutions of faith , which were not so much in fashion in former ages . besides , you are not to be told we both have & could alledge fathers enow for our tenet , and the obligation to hold to the doctrin deliver'd from fathers , that is to tradition ; and how smartly and unanswerably they prest it against hereticks , as a certain determiner of the controversies between the catholicks and them. on the other side , how often they complain'd of the vncertainty of the scripture interpreted by private men , as grounding all heresies ; by reason of the mysterious obscurity of the letter , and its liableness to be misinterpreted and misunderstood ? whereas , it was never heard that the rule of tradition taken in the sense , in which we hold it ( viz. for a delivery of a practical doctrin , publickly preach't to great multitudes at first , practised by them , and held , and recommended as divine , and the way to salvation ) did ever give rise to any heresy , and impossible it should . which one reflexion to a considerate man , is sufficient to conclude the whole present controversy about the rule of faith. . from the qualities requisit to make scripture's letter a rule of your faith , we come to consider the quantity it ought to have , or the number of books ; which you tell us p. . mr. m. suggested . in order to which , i have onely two things to ask you . . whether , as i said formerly , you have any unanimous consent of the christian church , that there was never a book lost that was writ by some who were divinely inspir'd ; and , consequently , did contain some divine revelations ? or , if you cannot prove but there was , how do you know but those divine revelations , which that book or books contain'd , were not different from , or to be superadded to those , contain'd in the canon we have now ? if you cannot prove these two points , then 't is manifest you cannot prove with absolute certainty , that the books wee have now , contain'd all the divine revelations . . you insist onely on this universal testimony for the canonical books of the new testament ; but , i would know whether this testimony reaches to each chapter and every verse of those chapters , nay , each material word in those verses ? if it does not , as you neither say , nor with any reason can say ( for 't is hard to prove the former , & impossible to prove the later but by our rule ) then you are as far from your faith as ever ; unless you bring some other testimony that is absolutely certain , to assure you that such and such a verse , which you would quote and rely on for such and such a point of faith , nay , the main and most significant word in that verse is true scripture : which , i am sure you cannot : for , what testimony else can be invented to do this , if the other , which was of the whole christian church , cannot reach it ? is there any possible way to ascertain this , but by our doctrin-rule ? upon this occasion , pray inform me with what reason you could reflect so severely pag. . on the church of rome ; for not receiving the epistle to the hebrews in st. hierom's time , assoon as other churches ; and , not on the greek churches , ( which you use to prefer before the latin ) who , in the same father's time , refus'd to admit the apocalypse ? the accepting or not accepting such books , even according to your own doctrin , depended on their being satisfied of the evidence produced for their apostolical authority ; and so was an act of prudence , antecedent to the judgment or determination of any church , whether greek or latin. but , so unreasonable is your pique against the church of rome , that she cannot act prudently without forfeiting her infallibility . tho' , another man would have acknowledg'd , it was rather a very commendable cautiousness in the latin & greek church too , not to admit into such a sacred roll , books that were not yet clearly prov'd to be authentickly such ; than a blameable lapse , or so hainous a crime , that for committing it , she must needs lose all her title to christ's promis'd assistance . . this gives me occasion to ask you what becomes of your rule , and , consequently , of your faith all that while ? if the letter of the canonical books , that is , of the whole canon of the new testament be your rule , and those books were part of this canon , they must necessarily be part of your rule too ; whence it follows that your rule was not intire , but deficient for some hundreds of years , till the whole canon was collected and acknowledg'd . i see you do but complement with the primitive church of the first years ; and , that you onely cry it up to avoid the unkindness , which the succeeding ages shew to your cause ; for , by your doctrine , you cannot but hold that the ages which follow'd it , are to be prefer'd : since these had your intire rule , the others wanted some parts of it ; and sometimes held but three parts of it , half of it , or less , ( and so , by your principles , were but three quarters or half christians ) according as the several pieces came by degrees to be acknowledg'd , and universally accepted . i doubt mr. m's discourse about the number of books , more perplexes you , than your are willing to make shew of . for , pray , how many of these books go to make up your rule of faith ? if any one , or some few , then you should not have stood upon the canon we have now ; that is , all the apostolical books , or scripture in general . if all the canonical writings be your rule , then perhaps the primitive christians had but half their faith , or less ; it may be none at all , because , wanting yet those other books , they wanted necessary places to compare those texts with they already had ; which is a great part of your method to find out your faith in scripture . pray , satisfy us about this exact number of books , and how many will just serve the turn ; and , make something cohere ; for , i cannot for my heart as yet find any thing that does . you talk to us of a purse , and say it must be full ; but , when we come to look at it more narrowly , it appears to have been for some time but half a purse , and wanted one side of it , at least had a great hole in it : so that you put us into an apprehension , that many of the gold and silver points might have dropt out of it in the time of the primitive church ; by which church notwithstanding , and no other , in our disputes about faith , you seem heartily willing to be judg'd . but , let us examin a little the consent of all ( your ) christian churches for scripture , you make such brags of . in the first place marches and leads the van , your christian church of the noble arch-heretick marciou ; who blotted out of the canon the epistle to the (a) hebrews , that to titus , and both those to timothy ; who admitted onely st. luke's gospel to be divine , and (b) rejected all the epistles of st. paul , as an apostate from the law. in the next rank , go abreast those three famous christian churches of ebion , valentinus , and cerinthus : of which (c) the first admitted onely st. matthews gospel ; the (d) second , onely st. iohn's ; and the third , onely st. mark 's . after them , come others , mentioned by st. hierom and epiphanius , who in a manner brought all into doubt ; especially if faith depended in those days on the comparing of places ; for , they held that diverse things both in the old testament and the new , were not inspir'd by god , but writ by a human spirit . i need not acquaint you , that luther , brentius & chemnitius , did revive the old doubts about the epistle to the hebrews and the apocalypse , of later dayes . nor need it be recounted how many orthodox christian churches did not accept diverse books formerly . and , tho' afterwards , as you say well , they came by degrees to fix on the certain canon of the new testament , yet i am apt to judge that this was not perform'd by immediate testimony : for , the witnesses were long ago dead , and their grand-fathers too , who could attest that such a book was indeed , to their knowledge , written by such an apostle or evangelist . it descended then by oral tradition in those respective churches . whence , as that tradition was not so practical , so it was restrain'd to some few in each church , and was withal , very narrow at first in comparison of our tradition for christ's doctrin ; which was , in a manner , universally and publickly preach't and practis'd . now the strength of a tradition , and the largeness of it are to be taken from the largeness of the first attestation ; and all that after-ages can do , when they attest such things , is to witness that they received it from some others ; but so , that the tradition was still narrower as it came nearer the fountain ; which very much weakens it . by what other lights the church guided her self in her accepting such and such books for canonical scripture , belongs to another place . your tradition then was not universal for scripture in the first years , and its original attestation was weak in comparison of that which was for doctrin . . i have little to say to your explicit or implicit points contain'd in scripture : for , i see they are both equally to no purpose , while but contain'd there , till you bring us a rule to interpret the letter with absolute certainty . if any ought to be explicitely there , none can have so good a title to it as those high and most fundamental articles spoken of so often ; yet we see there are no places producible for them , but may have other senses given them ; and bear ( as experience shews us ) not yet ended , and , for ought we know , endless disputes among your sober enquirers attending to your rule . onely i a little wonder you should say 't is sufficient for your purpose , that all doctrin of faith necessary to salvation are contain'd in ( the letter of ) scripture , either explicitly or implicitly . if they be necessary to salvation , they must be necessary to be believ'd or known to be there ; for they must save men by believing them , and acting according to that belief , or no way ; and , if they be onely implicitly there , they are as yet unknown , or not believ'd : so that , according to you , that is a point necessary to salvation , which does not at all conduce to it . but , i wonder more at the happiness of your sober enquirer to whom , you affirm and stand to it stoutly , those implicit points will become explicit without the help of the church ; and yet you call it assuming , in the church of rome , to do the same , or declare the sense of such articles . certainly , this sober enquirer is your special darling , and favourit . he , tho' a private person , can discover those explicit points ; and i suppose may declare them too , to as many as he pleases ; for how can he in charity do less ? but alas ! the silly insignificant church , can do nothing at all ; she must submit to the wondrous gifts , you have bestow'd upon the rabble , and her governors and pastors be accounted tyrants if they shall dare to encroach upon their high prerogatives , or presume to share in their priviledges of being able to unfold or know the explicit meaning of scripture-texts : for , in case they can know this , and this knowledge be good for the faithful ( as it is , being as you say necessary to salvation ) 't is without question they may declare them , or make them known to others : nay , and use their authority too ( if you will vouchsafe to allow them any ) to edify the faithful by making this knowledge sink into them . nor can it prejudice their reason , that the church obliges them to believe them ; for this is no more than obliging them to act according to reason ; which tells them that , since they must either trust themselves or their pastours in such things , and the pastours must be incomparably better qualify'd than themselves are , for the discovering of such mysterious truths , and withall appointed by god to teach them ; 't is far more rational to submit to their judgments in such things , than to use their own . but , indeed , you have reason to stand up for your sober enquirer ; for all ring-leaders of any heresy , or faction against the church , took this very method in their proceedings . the spirit of pride , which possest them , principled them with these rational and peaceable maxims , that they had authority to judge their judges , teach their teachers , direct their guides , and that their own wit excell'd that of all the world before them . but , when a faction was form'd into a good lusty body , the scripture-rule was laid aside again ; so that 't is doubtful whether we have had ever a sober enquirer since , as was shewn in my first letter sect. . . you desire to see this power of the church in scripture in express terms ; and we tell you we need not let you see it in scripture at all : for tradition , & even common sense , tells us , that the church has power to feed , and instruct her flock ; and enlighten them in what she knows , and they are ignorant of . if you demand how the roman church came by this knowledge of making implicit points explicit ? i answer , by tradition , giving her the sense of christ's whole law , and each intire point of it ; and by the light of nature purify'd by supernatural knowledges antecedently ; as also by her application , when occasion required , to reflect upon , and penetrate deeply into that sense ; which enables her to explicate her own thoughts ( or the points of faith ) more clearly now ; which she had indeed before , but did not so distinctly look into them , or set her self to explain them . but pray , what express scripture has your sober enquirer for his power to make the implicit points explicit ? you reckon up diverse agreeablenesses p. . why this should be ; but not one word of express scripture do you pretend to for it . and if himself pretend to any such power , besides that it will look a little odd that god should take more care of private men than of his church , let him either shew us he has better means natural or supernatural to do this , than the church has , or he discovers his pride and folly both to pretend to it . you say p. . that the church of rome has no where declar'd in council it has any such power ; viz. to declare explicitly points imply'd in scripture . but , first , you may please to know it has made such a declaration sect. . where it defines that it belongs to the church , judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione scripturarum , to judge of the true sense , and interpretation of scripture ; next , it , accordingly , proceeds upon this power , as i shall manifest by three several instances . one sess. . cap. . where it explains those texts , luc. . io. . and cor. . to be meant of being truly christ's body ; and declares thence that the church was ever perswaded of the doctrin of transubstantiation . another , sess. . cap. . where it declares the text , cor. . let a man examin himself , &c. to be understood by the custome ( or practice ) of the church , of , sacramental confession , necessary to be us'd before receiving the sacrament by all those who are conscious to themselves of mortal sin . the third , sess. . cap. . where it interprets that text of s. iames cap. . to be by apostolical tradition understood of the sacrament of extreme vnction . which places you do not judge so much as implicitly to contain that sense , but hold that they contain another thing . how the churches declaring explicitly points descending by tradition , makes no new articles of faith , is discours't above , sect. , , , . by which , you may see that mr. g. and mr. m. whom ( pag. . ) you will needs set at variance , are , notwithstanding , very good friends . for , if the church knew the the sense which is contain'd in that place , before ; the doctrin is old , tho' the declaring it to be signifi'd by that particular text , be perhaps new. i say perhaps ; for , in some signal passages , much in use in the churches preaching , catechisms and practise ; i doubt not but that , not only the particular doctrin , but also that 't is signifi'd by such a text , comes down by tradition in the ecclesia docens . notwithstanding the agreeableness of these two positions , you triumph mightily here p. . that , thus mr. m. has answer'd mr. g 's demonstration . as much as to say , i know not for my life what to say to it my self , and therefore , would gladly shift it off upon any body , so i could handsomely rid my hands of it . thus , you make ( for you can make any thing by your method of mistaking every thing ) the council of trent clash with the church of rome ( a hard task one would think ! ) by pretending to interpret scripture according to the unanimous sense of the fathers ; which you judge contradicts the making known , and obliging men to believe that explicitly now , which they were not oblig'd to by any precedent sense or explication . what mean the words [ men ] and [ they ] if they signify all men , and intend to signify that no man knew those imply'd points before , but all might hap to contradict them , you mistake our tenet : for , we judge it absolutely impossible that none of the fathers should reflect more attentively on the full sense of the points deliver'd , or look into their own thoughts as faithful ; and , therefore , it was much more impossible they should unanimously contradict those points . and , unless they did so , the council of trent , and the church of rome may , by the grace of god , very well correspond in their doctrin for all your mistake . for the intention of the fathers in that decree ( sess. . ) was to repress the insolency of hereticks wresting the scripture to their own private sentiments [ contrary to the sense of the church , or the unanimous consent of the fathers . ] and how this is directly contrary to this power of obliging to believe somthing , as in scripture , explicitly now , which was not so known before , is unconceivable ; unless you will prove that that explicit sense is directly contrary to the unanimous consent of the fathers or the church , which you will never do . but , t is a trivial exploit to make mr. m. clash with mr. g. or the church of rome with the council of trent ; you can make that very church clash with her self — suis et ipsa roma — and that openly and professedly too : nay , which is most wonderful , fall out with her self about her own prerogatives . for , you tell us p. . that tho' it has assum'd this power now spoken of , yet it still disown'd it . now to assume a power , is to challenge it ; and to disown it , is to renounce it ; which hang together much alter the rate of all your discourse hitherto . this church of rome is a most monstrous kind of creature : it goes backwards , and forwards , blows and sups , declares for and against , and all at once : but we must imagin her to be such onely as she stands pourtray'd in dr. st's fancy . . your main stratagem to elude all this discourse , remains yet to be more fully detected , tho' it has been occasionally toucht at diverse times formerly . t is this , that you are now upon the general ground of faith , and not the particular acts of it , or the particular certainty as to this or that doctrine . and you seem to have reason for it too , because the main point in dispute was , whether protestants could shew any ground of absolute certainty for their faith. and this you think justifies you for hovering in the ayr , and onely talking of your scripture-rule in common , without lighting on or applying it to any one particular point contain'd in that rule . but this will avail you nothing . for , first ; neither does our discourse pinch upon any one particular point , but upon the uncertainty of your faith in general , or on all your points of faith at once as built on your ground . so that , 't is the pretended ground of your faith we are disputing against all the while , and not any one particular tenet . we bring , indeed , instances now and then of some particular articles ; but , 't is to shew that , if your ground has not power to ascertain absolutely those most fundamental points , it has power to ascertain none ; and , so , is no ground of faith at all . secondly , a pretended ground cannot be known or acknowledg'd to be a real and firm ground , till we see it grounds somthing , it 's notion plainly imports a relation to the superstructure ; and you may as well prove a man a father without proving he has a child , as prove any thing to be a ground without proving such and such points to be grounded on it ; and this ( in our case ) with absolute certainty . pray , take that along with you still , otherwise you turn your back to the question , and run away from it in the open field . t is tedious and mortifying beyond measure to hear you still talking , and pretending you have an absolutely certain ground for faith , and yet never see you , so much as once , endeavouring to shew how it 's ascertaining virtue affects the articles you build upon it ; and that this particular sense of scripture in each respective point has such a close , and necessary connexion with the letter on which 't is built , as to give absolute certainty of it to all that are competent judges of the sense of words . which the experience of all ages since christ confutes , and our own eyes witness to be false in the socinians and others . thirdly , your self confest once upon a time that you are absolutely certain you now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles . now , this candid expression would make any honest well-meaning man verily believe that you meant you had been absolutely certain of every particular christian doctrin , by vertue of your ground or rule . but your incomparable dexterity quite and clean over-reach't us . for , when you came to explain your self there , it amounted to no more but that your faith was resolv'd into scripture ( that is , that you pretended to scripture ) which contains all , or as you told us p. . that you were absolutely certain you hold all , because you hold all , not in your soul or mind ( where points of faith are to be held ) but in a kind of purse as it were ; as one is said , when he holds a book in his hand , to hold all that is in it : being possest of which , tho' you cannot come at it's sense ( which is little better than if it were lock't up in a trunk ) you are in possession of all christian faith notwithstanding , and hold very firmly ( in that sense ) all that was taught by christ and his apostles . fourthly , hence you have not perform'd what you undertook , viz. to shew that protestants had any absolutely certain ground of their faith. for , 't is not enough to point out a book , and cry out aloud t is your ground , but you must shew , that 't is indeed such a ground . now a ground or rule bears in it's notion evidence to those who are to use it , and to know other things by it's direction ; nay more , clear evidence : for , as all certainty must have some kind of evidence to create it in us , so this effect of absolute certainty can have no less than clear evidence for it's cause . but , you may as easily prove mankind has no eyes to see with , as go about to shew that the letter of scripture is thus clear in order to the discovery of right faith , even in the highest and most concerning points of our christian belief . fifthly , t is pleasant to observe what a rare resolution of your faith you give us p. . our faith ( say you ) is resolv'd into the scripture as the word of god , and whatever is built on the word of god , is absolutely certain . you must , indeed , having deserted the tradition of the church , either pretend to scripture , or nothing ; unless you will confess your selves to be pure phanaticks or pagans : and it looks mighty plausibly to say , that whatever is built on the word of god is absolutely certain ; for 't is a great truth . but the only point is still , are you absolutely-certain by your grounds , that your faith is indeed built on the word of god ? you say , indeed , scripture is your ground , you pretend to it as your ground , perhaps you think it so too ; and , 't is not about your saying , pretending or thinking it to be such , that we dispute with you ; for we should not scruple to grant you all this without any dispute at all : but does your saying , pretending or thinking prove it to be so really , and indeed ? all heresies in the world do as much as this comes to , and yet are no less heresies than if they did none of this . t is your proving it to be your ground ( and that an absolutely certain one too ) which we would be at ; but , we justly complain you flinch from the onely thing in dispute and perpetually balk us . we tell you once more , ( and we cannot repeat it too often ) there is a necessary connexion between the ground and the building ; for , 't is not a building if it have no ground , nor the ground of a building if nothing be built on it . you are then to shew us absolute certainty of this necessary connexion between the scripture and your faith , or you do nothing but talk at random . but , alas ! you have not the confidence to make out this , or produce your reasons to conelude this ground and this building have such a necessary relation ; and i must tell you plainly , you can never do it . for , pray , tell me , may not the socinians , and indeed all hereticks that ever arose in the church , say , pretend , and ( perhaps ) think the same that you do ? nay , do not they all alledge the same ? do not they all profess to resolve theit faith ( i mean their abominable errours ) into the written word ? do not they pretend it for their ground , and , that they build their prophane tenets on it ; & lastly , avow as stoutly as you do for your heart , that whatever is built on gods word , is absolutely certain ? will you allow these pleas argumentative for them , or , that their wicked errours are therefore true faith and absolutely certain , because they alledge all this ! and can you be so unreasonable as to expect we should pass that for a good argument , or a conclusive reason to prove you have absolute certainty for your faith , which your self disallows , when 't is alledg'd for them ; nay , which you must disallow and declare against , unless you will patronize all their heresies ? pray , lay your hand on your heart , and consider ( i am sure , 't is more your own good , than mine , you should ) into what a lamentable , or rather chimerical condition god's church is reduc't by your resolution of your faith here , and the account you give of it . the pillar and ground of truth , is reduc't by you into a confused chaos of incoherent errours ; christ's immaculate spouse is associated with all the adulterate synagogues of sathan ; lastly , faith as to it's certainty is in no better a condition than heresy , and heresy is upon even ground with faith. i have a better opinion of the church of england , than to believe her most learned and genuin members , will own such a resolution of her faith , as will make the socinians , and all other hereticks in the world their fellow-christians and brothers ; as they must be forced to do , if they own no other resolution of it than all those pestilent sects unanimously profess . i see mr. g had good reason to ask you in his th . question , what churches you accounted christian churches ? for , i much fear , by your discourse and principles , you exclude none : nor ought you , so they heartily hold the same gound of faith with you ; for then all their vnchristian tenets are to pass for material errours , not formal heresies : they hold all true faith in the purse still , tho' they mistake the coyn and mettal ; and that 's enough , in all conscience , for such a church as that you are about rearing or dawbing up . you pass a complement indeed upon the four first general councils , and that you reject all such doctrins as were condemn'd by them ; which use to be words of course in your controversies ; as [ your humble servant ] and such like , are in our common conversation : but , when you are once got out of the circumstance of pretending to hold to some antiquity , that so you may set a better face on it , when you oppose the papists ; when that job is over , they are but fallible congregations , and so perhaps were deceiv'd in all they defin'd against the arians , eutychians , &c. especially , if one of your sober enquirers comes to fancy otherwise ; and , no doubt , there were many such even in those dayes . and , then comes the st . article of q. elizabeth's symbol , and knocks them down all at once with a declaration that their decrees have neither strength nor authority , unless it may be declar'd , that they be taken out of holy scripture ; and so all is with a turn of ones hand brought back to the same point again , and , farewell councils : your self , and any one of your sober enquirers , are at full liberty still to judge of them by your scripture-rule ; and the resolution of your faith is establish't by that article ( at least as you make use of it ) to be the same with that which is made , and profest by all the vile hereticks in the world . for , as dr. burnet sayes very candidly in his answer to the method of oonverting protestants , p. . and , no doubt upon your principles , if any man , after his strictest enquiries , is still perswaded that a council , has decreed against the true meaning of the scriptures , in a point necessary to salvation , then he must prefer god to man , and follow the sounder tho' it should prove to be the lesser party : and , if any company or synod of protestants have decree'd any thing contrary to this , in so far they have departed from the protestant principles . ] where we see he gives every sober enquirer leave to judge of councils , even tho' general ones , for he excepts none ; and himself shews them the way , by judging & censuring the councils of his own church . . another scruple yet remains incumbent on you to clear ; which is , that , by your putting it upon mr. g. to prove you have not absolute certainty as to the rule of your faith , and by your innate antipathy against infallibility , 't is very dubious whether your self do indeed hold the tradition of all christian churches absolutely certain , even for the scripture ; however to save your credit , you then pretended it , fearing your denying it might disedify mr. t. since then you ly under a shrewd suspicion , that you do not deal really with him , and the rest of your readers , in this forc't profession ; it would become you , in your reply , both to shew why you allow that testimony to be absolutely certain , and yet are such an enemy to infallibility ; since common sense tells us , no man can judge himself absolutely certain of a thing , if he judges he may at the same time be deceiv'd in it ; and , withal , that you may give more satisfaction to your readers herein , than an empty and scarce credible acknowledgment of it , when you were in untoward circumstances ; pray , go to work like a schollar , and demonstrate to us by way of solid reason , working upon the nature of the thing ( for no argument meerly probable will suffice to prove a testimony absolutely certain ) how , and by what vertue this tradition of all christian churches comes to be thus absolutely certain for the letter of the scripture ; as you see we endeavour to demonstrate the absolute cettainty of our tradition for doctrin , there cannot be a worthier point to exert your self in , nor a greater service done to your rule ; nor a better way to clear your self to the incredulous part of the world , than to perform this : for one knows not whence meer words , and outward professions may proceed ; but , solid and convincing reasons can come onely from a heart possest wiih the truth of what is profest . go to work then , and bless us with the sight of this truly learned and iudicious performance , and , while your hand is in , please to shew us too , that , the absolute certainty of this universal testimony reaches to prove your rule intire ; that is , reaches to prove no part of the written word was lost : nay , that it reaches to the particular verses , and the most substantial words in those verses , as well as to the main books ; and lastly , to translations also and transcriptions ; as you ought to do in case they be ( as indeed they are ) of equal concern , in our circumstances , as the books themselves . or , if you deny they are equally important ; and , maintain that this absolute certainty may be had of your rule , without the same certainty for these ; then please to give us your reasons for it , and shew how faith can be absolutely certain , tho' the letter on which it depends , may perhaps have been maim'd or corrupted by any of these miscarriages . or , if you think fit to say you have absolute certainty of your faith , tho' you have not absolute certainty for it's rule ; then , confess candidly and ingenuously your faith is absolutely-speaking vncertain ; and , to make good that rare christian tenet , fall to work and confute utterly that positive book [ faith vindicated ] which undertakes to produce a multitude of demonstrations to prove that faith cannot possibly be false ; and , withal , please to inform us to what end you maintain your rule of faith to be absolutely certain , if it do not make your faith thus certain too , or what that certainty serves for . any thing would content us , so you would once leave fluttering , and hovering in common words : either tell us plainly all faith is uncertain , or come at length to some firm bottom , on which we may with absolute certainty ground the truth of it , and raise it above some plausible likelihood . but , we remonstrate against your putting us off with the old sham [ sufficient certainty ] unless you particularize to us what kind of certainty you hold , and make out 't is sufficient for the nature , the ends and vses of faith , and the obligations issuing from it , and incumbent on the prosessours of it . if you refuse to condescend to these fair proposals , all the world must think you onely temporiz'd with mr. t. and the occasion ; and that you have not that zeal for your rule of faith ( whose grand interest 't is these things should be made out ) as you pretend . once more i tell you , that , if all this will not move you to this every way necessary undertaking , i must then plainly challenge you , that it is your necessary and precise duty , in this very circumstance , as you are a controvertist ; and , as i am concern'd with you under that notion , i must demand it of you . . i know not well whether it be worth the while to justify mr. m. for calling your answer to mr. g's th . question trifling ; or whether it be necessary , after so ample a discovery , that all the rest of them , taking them in the sense you explicated them , deserv'd no better character . you were ask't onely the meaning of your words , [ christian church ] but you had a mind to be liberal , and give more than was ask't , the meaning of [ vniversal testimony ] too : and to tell us , that , by vniversal testimony , you mean vniversal consent . that is to say , by vniversal testimony , you mean vniversal testimony : for , all agree or consent in the testimony , if it be vniversal . then , to the precise question , you answer , that , by the christian church , you mean all christian churches ; which is to say , that , by the christian church , you mean the christian church ; for all the parts make the whole ; so that , instead of an explication , you give us the same thing over again , and almost in the same words . and , pray , who 's the wiser for such an answer ? yet , tho' it be impertinent , and nothing to the purpose , 't is at least true , and evident by its self , without needing to make it a question : if you would please to afford us such evidences , when 't is to purpose , you would highly oblige us . certainly , a considering reader cannot but think you are very unhappy in explicating your self ; for , either your explications run quite away from your answer , which you are to explicate , and are a mile wide of them ; or they come too close to them , and are the self-same said over again , and almost in the same words . but , can any one think so excellent a wit , as yours , is justly reputed , should expose himself so manifestly , without some latent design ? t is incredible : let us take a view then of mr. g's th . question ; being the words christian church may be taken in several latitudes by persons of different religions , i desire to know what that christian church is , &c. here we see plainly , that the main of the question was , what churches were accounted by you christian , or how that word [ christian ] was to be explicated ; and , you give him for explication the self-same word again , and in effect tell him , that by christian is meant christian ; and that 's all he can get from you. and , you did prudently ; for , had you come to distinguish which congregation was christian , which not , you must have secluded all hereticks , which your principles could not do ; for your ground of faith here is most manifestly common to all of them ; and so you would have lain open to the disrepute of having and professing a brotherhead with all those excrementitious out-casts ; and your pretended rule ( notwithstanding it s other many divine excellencies ) had appear'd to be utterly unqualifi'd with clearness and firmness enough to be call'd a rule or ground . to avoid this , and in consonancy to your principles , you take all their testimonies in for scripture , and pretend it strengthens it . so it may perhaps as to the books : but , you know how the church complain'd of the hereticks for corrupting the letter of scripture , to make it favourable for them ; and , therefore , for any thing you know , they cry'd up the books , because they had fitted them for their own purpose . whence , tho' the testimony for the books should be stronger by their concurrence , yet the credit of the letter , in the respective places that oppose those hereticks , is weaker for their allowing them , because they admitted them as consistent with their tenets ; otherwise , they would have rejected them , as they did others upon that score . and , what advantage can you gain by the former towards the proving your ground of faith absolutely certain , if you be not equally certain of the later ? surely none at all : for , 't is not the whole book in the lump that can be produc't to prove faith , or confute heresy , but particular texts ; and , if these and the mainly significant words in them , be not absolutely certain , what becomes of the absolute certainty of your rule , or your faith ? nay , i am not fully satisfied that their concurrent testimony does strengthen the certainty of even so much as the books . for , i observe that our judges suspect the testimony of honest men , and misdoubt the justness of the cause , if known knights of the post are call'd in to corroborate their evidence . but , you have prudent maxims of your own which are beyond the reach of lawyers . . you endeavour to come a little closer to the point p. . and set your self to prove that scripture is your rule of faith ; ay , that it is : in order to which , you advance this proposition , that certainly all that believe it to be the word of god , must take it for a rule of faith. these two confident words , [ certainly ] and [ must ] are very efficacious to perswade those who will take it upon your word ; nay they are so magisterial , that they impose a kind of necessity upon them of believing all is as you say , or else of denying your authority , which would break friendship . but , if they will not , but happen to be so uncivil as to require proofs for it , they quite lose their force ; and , which is worse , such positive assertions make people expect very strong arguments to answer and make good such confident affirmations ; else it hazards credit , to pretend great things and bring little or no proof . how you will justify those big words , we shall see shortly . in the mean time let us ask you , how you come to be thus certain of it ? is there no more requisit to a rule , but to be the word of god ? or , did you never read in errour non-plust , long ago , p. , , . the answer now given you to this pretence , in the confutation of your th . principle ; in which you endeavour to establish scripture to be a rule ? or , can you so much forget your self , and your duty to reply to it , as to discourse still thus crudely , with the same confidence as if you had never read or heard of such a book , or any thing alledg'd there to the contrary ? if we must needs mind you of it so often , take these few words along with you now at least ; and till you have reply'd to them , and others such which are there alledg'd , i beseech you let us be tir'd no more with such talk , as serves onely to amuse , but can never edify or convince . [ to be writ by men divinely inspir'd , to be divine , infallible , and the word of god , signifies no more but that they ( the scriptures ) are perfectly holy and true in themselves , and beneficial to mankind in some way or other ; and , this is the farthest these words will carry : but , that they are of themselves of sufficient clearness to give sincerely endeavouring persons such security of their faith while they rely on them as cannot consist with errour ( which is requisit to the rule of faith ) these words signif●y not . they may be most holy , they may be most true in themselves , they may be exceedingly useful , or beneficial to mankind , and yet not endow'd with this property ; which yet the rule of faith must have . ] and , pag. . [ what then dr. st. is to do , is to produce conclusive reasons to evince that the letter of scripture has such a perspicuity , and other perfections belonging to such a rule , as must ground that most firm , and unalterable , and ( if rightly grounded ) inerrable assent call'd christian faith. ] we see here the question rightly stated , and the point that sticks ; now let 's see whether your proof does so much as touch it , or in the least mention it . . the argument you make choice of , ( i suppose it is your best , the matter in hand being of highest consequence ) to prove that all who believe scripture to be the word of god must take it for a rule of faith , is this . [ for , since the reason of our believing is because god has reveal'd , whatever god has reveal'd must be believ'd , and a book containing in it such divine revelations must be the rule of our faith. i. e. by it we are to judge what we are bound to believe as divine revelations . ] what a wild medly is here , instead of a reason ! here are four propositions involv'd . the first , is this ; the reason of our believing is because god has reveal'd ; and this is granted : onely you may note that we are equally bound to believe what god has reveal'd by the church's testimony as by writing , if it be equally clear it was thus reveal'd ; nay , more by the former than by the later , in case that way of ascertaining the divine revelation be more clear than this : nor does your first proposition deny this , but rather asserts it . the second , this , [ whatever god has reveal'd must be believ'd . ] and this is pretended for an inference , but alas , 't is nothing less . for , how does it follow that because the reason of our believing is god's revealing , therefore we are bound to believe what god has reveal'd , whether we know it or no ? all then that can be said of it is , that 't is pious non-sense , unless you add to it that we have also certain grounds god has indeed reveal'd it : for , otherwise , besides the danger of erring our selves in matters of the highest moment ( and this unalterably too , in regard we entertain that errour as recommended by the divine revelation ) we shall moreover hazard to entitle god's infinit veracity to a falsehood , and make truth it self the authour of lies . the third , that [ a book , containing in it such revelations must be the rule of our faith ] is absolutely deny'd . for a book may contain in it divine revelations , and i may not know certainly it does contain them : or , i may know certainly by very good testimony it does contain them , yet not know certainly it does contain them all : or , i may know it does contain them all , yet perhaps not be able to know any one of those divine revelations in particular , which are contain'd there ; for example , if it be in a language i understand not : or , tho' i do understand the language , yet by reason of it's mysterious sublimity , and deep sense , and thence obscurity and ambiguity in many passages relating to spiritual matters , and the chief articles of our christian profession , i cannot be assur'd with absolute certainty which is the right sense of it ; and therefore ( considering me as in the way to faith , & that my assent depends necessarily on the truth of some preliminary which is the object of pure reason ) i might not , nay cannot , with any true reason , firmly assent to what i see may be an errour ; nor hazard my salvation upon an vncertain ground , and on which i know great multitudes have already ship-wrackt . the fourth [ by it we are to judge what we are bound to believe as divine revelations ) runs upon the same strain ; for you are to shew us how by it i am to judge my self bound to believe any thing at all as a divine revelation , that is , as taught by christ , with a firm and vnalterable assent , ( such as faith is ) till i am certain it is so , by being ascertain'd he taught it . this is the true , this is the main point ; which you slide over still as smoothly as a non-plust commentator does over hard texts , that puzzle him to explicate . i say once more , 't is the main if not onely point : for , till you have made out this , you can never prove that scripture ( taken alone ) is a ground of faith at all , much less an absolutely certain ground ; and , least of all , your ground in particular . and therefore you said very true when you lamented p. . you were in a hard case : for tho' ( say you ) there is an absolute certainty , and this certainty lies in vniversal tradition , and we can shew this vniversal tradition , yet we cannot shew the ground of our certainty . for , you cannot shew universal tradition for every particular text that concerns faith without our tradition - rule for doctrin ; nor absolute certainty you have the true sense , tho' you had that certainty for the letter , without which 't is not your ground at all . a certainty there is , but not by vertue of your grounds , and so 't is none of your certainty , nor your ground neither . whereas then you confess here that , if you cannot shew the true ground of your certainty you deserve to be either pity'd or begg'd , you say very true : for we do from our hearts pity you , let who will take the tother part . we pity you to see such excellent wits , who , had they a good cause , would be honourably victorious , forc't by the patronage of a bad one to employ their talents in shifting about for by-paths to avoid meeting the question in the face . we pity you for your being necessitated to impose upon your well-meaning readers with your specious pretences of gods word , instead of shewing them with absolute certainty ( on your grounds ) that you have the true sense of it in any one passage relating to the controverted points ; without which you cannot with honesty pretend it gods word as to those points . and , if that kind of begging may do you any good , we shall earnestly and heartily beg of god's infinite mercy to give you hearts to seek truth , and candidly acknowledge it when found . . i had almost forgot your id est , which connects your third and last proposition together [ — must be the rule of our faith , id est ( say you ) by it we are to judge what we are bound to believe as divine revelations . these id est's , which should be us'd to clear things , are still so made use of that they are the main engines to confound them . let your id est then say what it please , i must tell you plainly , you quite mistake the meaning of the word rule ; it speaks rectitude , and that such an evident one as preserves those who regulate themselves by it from obliquity or deviation , that is , in our case , from errour . you ought then to have said — the rule of our faith , id est , by which , while we follow it , we shall be absolutely secur'd from erring in faith , for the primary effect of a rule is to give faith that prerequisit ▪ quality as elevates it to the dignity of such a kind of assent , and raises it above that dwindling , feeble , alterable assent call'd opinion . but you will needs , ( to avoid coming neer so dangerous a rock ) take it for a kind of quantitative measure , nor for a qualifying principle : whereas , indeed , 't is not the what or how much we are to believe , which is now our question ; but , the that we ought to believe any thing at all ; or that you can by your grounds have any faith at all for want of this absolute certainty , which you pretend to ; 't is this i say , which is the true subject of our present debate . for tho' we both held the same quantity or number of points to a tittle , yet it might be faith in one of us , and but opinion in the other ; nay perhaps opinion in both , if both of us wanted certain grounds to evince they were christs doctrin , which is the formal motive of our faith. it belongs then to a rule to ascertain both the that we are to believe , and the what ; but the former office of it is antecedent and principal , the later collateral , and secondary : common sense telling us that we ought first to determin whether there is any faith at all , e're we come to debate what points are of faith , what not . these fast-and-loose doings make me , when ever i meet with an id est , still expect it means [ aliud est ] and that , like your other explications of your self , it is brought in to divert our eyes to another object instead of keeping them still fixt upon the same . . enough has been said , i am sure too much ever to be answer'd , to prove that scripture alone as interterpreted by any private mans judgment , wants the chief property of a rule of faith , viz. such a clearness as is able to give all sorts of people , or the generality of christians ( be they never so sober enquirers ) absolute assurance of it's sense , even in the highest mysteries of our faith , without needing the church's help . nor , will you ever be able to produce the consent of all christian churches affirming that it has this property . wherefore , when it is call'd a rule by some of the antients , it must be taken ( as mr. m. * sayes ) with the interpretation of the church adjoyn'd ; which , having the living sense of christ's law in her heart , can animate the dead letter , and preserve it from explications any way prejudicial to the faith received . and , thus indeed , it may be call'd a rule of faith ; because , as 't is thus understood , it cannot lead any into errour , but , * is of good use to abett truth by it's divine authority . in which sense councils proceed upon it often , and sometimes call it a rule . and , i remember the famous launoy , when we were discoursing once about tradition shew'd me a little book of his , in which , he goes about to prove , that councils had frequently defin'd against hereticks out of scripture . on which occasion i ask't him , if he judg'd those councils fram'd their definitions by the sense they had of the letter by their own human skill ; or by the sense of the church , which they had by tradition : he answer'd , undoubtedly by the later ; and that there would be no end of disputing with hereticks , had they taken the former way . by which we may discern that still tradition was in proper speech their rule , even when they alledg'd scripture . other , call scripture sometimes a rule , because it contains faith ; in which sense even some catholicks call it a partial rule because part of christ's doctrin is contain'd in it , the other part descending by tradition : which acceptation of the word [ rule ] is yet less proper ; because ( as has been prov'd ) it may be contain'd there , and yet we be never the neerer knowing our faith meerly by virtue of scripture's containing it . but no catholick ever said that every sober enquirer may find out all necessary points of faith in scripture without the churches help . a doctrin , which you declare p. . you are far from being asham'd of . and yet , let me tell you sir , you will never find this position of yours as it lies [ without the churches help : ] in the universal tradition of all christian churches ; and , unless you find this , you will never prove they held it a rule in the genuin and proper signification in which we take that word ; ( and tho' they shou'd call it a rule , in either of the former senses lately mention'd , they impugn not us at all , who grant the same . . you will needs run out of the way , p. . to talk of a iudge of controversies ; but the best is , you acknowledge you do go thus astray , by acknowledging 't is another distinct controversy ; and yet , tho' you acknowledge this , you still run on with it , that is , you still wander from the point . you triumph mightily p. . that it is impossible for us to bring such an unanimous consent of all christian churches for our infallible iudge — or our infallibility , as protestants bring for their rule . as for the later , where were your thoughts , sir , while you thus bad adieu to the plainest rules of discourse ? cannot we go about to demonstrate the infallibility of a human testimony by natural mediums , but , instead of answering it , you must object against our conclusion , and bid us bring the consent of all churches to abett that , which neither depends , nor is pretended to depend , on authority , but on meer reason ? cannot one say two and three make five , but he must be presently bobb'd in the mouth that he cannot shew the consent of all christian churches for it ; and that , unless he does this , let it be never so evident , 't is not true ? t is very pleasant to reflect how brisk you are still with this consent of all churches ; ( i suppose because 't is a topick very seldom heard of in your controversies ) tho' as has been shewn over and over , 't is not a jot to your purpose , nor avails any thing to the evincing you have an absolutely-certain ground of your faith. and , if we have an infallible rule , or such a rule as permits not those to be deceiv'd that follow it , can there be any thing more rational than to hold by consequence , that there is an infallible iudge , or that our church can judge unerringly in matters belonging to faith ? the word iudge onely signifying that that person or persons , are in authority , or are authoritative deciders , to preserve the integrity of faith , and the peace of the church . so that , supposing church-governours or bishops , and that those sacred concerns are to be provided for , plain reason demonstrates to us this too as well as the other , without needing the consent of all christian churches ; tho' you need not to be told this does not want neither ; unless you think that all the general councils that defin'd against hereticks , imagin'd they might perhaps be in an errour all the while ; and the heretick , whom they condemn'd , in the right . your * appeal to all the churches of the christian world for your rule , has a plausible appearance , but vanishes into air when one comes to grasp it . how often must it be repeated that you have as yet produc't no rule at all for your faith ? for you have neither prov'd that scripture's letter , as to every substantial word that concerns faith , is absolutely-certain ; nor that it has in it the nature of a rule ; nor that , 't is your rule , more than 't is to all the hereticks in the world ; nor that your assent to any point upon that rule , as made use of by you , ( for want of connexion between the points to be believ'd , and the rule on which they are believ'd , ) can have the nature of true faith in it . if talking big would do the deed , you would indeed do wonders ; but let your reasons be proportionable ; otherwise , strong words and faint blows are but very ill-matcht . now , i must declare plainly i cannot see the least semblance of so much as one solid proof in this whole treatise of yours . if there be , confute me by shewing it , and maintaining it to be such . you explain you own tenet over and over till one is weary of readding it , and half asham'd so often to answer it . you talk much of god's word ; that we are bound to believe it , that it contains god's will , and all things necessary to salvation ; and , twenty such fine things ; which bear a godly sound , and would do well in a sermon where all goes down glib , there being none to contradict you ; but , are very dull and flat in controversy . on the contrary , not one argument have you even offer'd at , to prove you have absolute certainty of the rule or ground of your faith , but have faln short in every one of those considerations ; both as to the notions of certainty , ground , rule , faith ; and that 't is your ground , your rule , and your faith. . a rule to any thing , if we take that word in a proper sense as we do in our modern controversies , is the immediate light to direct us in order to our knowing that thing . for , in case it be not immediate , but some other thing intervenes that is needful to direct us , and by whose rectitude we frame our thoughts as to that affair , and that it renders the other capable to direct us ; that other becomes presently the thing ruled , and not the rule : in regard it wanted the rectitude of another thing to direct it , that so it might be fit to direct us . wherefore the interpretation of scripture being more immediate to the knowing the sense of it's words , ( that is to the knowing our faith ) than is the letter , for it is manifest that all who have the letter have not right faith unless they make a right interpretation of it ; hence mr. m. had reason to object , that the christian church did not agree that every man is to interpret scripture for himself , or to build his faith upon his own private interpretation of it : nor ought you to be offended at his position , in regard you told us before p. . & . a heretical sense may ly under these general words [ christ is the son of god ] and different senses may be couch't under these , christ is really in the eucharist ; and so , ( even according to your self ) 't is the interpretation or the assigning the sense to those words which makes true faith or heresy . wherefore , 't is plain that your own interpretation of scripture is , in true speech , your rule ; for that is a more immediate direction to give you the sense of scripture than is the letter ; which is antecedent , and presuppos'd to the interpretation , as it 's matter or object . nor had you your faith tho' you had the letter , till you had interpreted it . and , besides , the proper and immediate effect of interpretation , is to give the sense of words , and 't is the sense of scripture which is your faith , and so your own private interpretation is unavoidably your rule . if then you will vouch , as you do all over , that the universal consent of all christian churches gave you your rule , it must attest your way of interpreting scripture too , by private judgments ; nay , it must moreover attest that way to be absolutely certain ; otherwise you can never shew how your kind of protestant faith , no better grounded , can be absolutely certain ; and this , as to all the doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles ; for both which you very unadvisedly undertook when you were at a pinch ; hoping , i suppose , to shift it off again with one of your transferring expedients , or some squinting [ id est ] . to what purpose is it then to tell us here p. . how a man ( one of your sober enquirers i suppose ) is to behave himself , where the texts or places are doubtful . for , unless the consent of all christian churches bring us down by their universal testimony that those methods are to be taken , and that they are absolutely certain means for all that use them to interpret scripture right , or come at the true sense of it , you are still as incapable as ever of shewing us absolute certainty for your faith , or that you have any faith at all by those means . nay , i much mistake you if your principles will allow these means , no not even the testimony which brings down to us the sense of the primitive church ( upon which you here pass a complement ) to be more than fallible . if you do , you admit our rule : if you do not , i would advise you to prepare your reasons to convince the world how a fallible authority can prove that what is built on it is absolutely certain . however , you set the best colour upon these fallible means you can ; telling us , your sober enquirer is to make use of the best helps , the best and most reasonable means , &c. tho' they are such that in likelihood it will take up his whole life time , ere he can use and peruse them all , so as to compass sincerely this satisfaction ; nay 't is ten to one he will dy a seeker : and then he will have enquir'd very soberly , to go to the next world to ask the way to heaven . i wonder how many of the church of england , or even of geneva , made use of all these means ere they finally pitch't upon their faith : i much doubt — vel duo , vel nemo — few or none . and we would know of you whether any of those means , or all together , are absolutely certain . if none , you are still where you were . if you say any or all , you will fight against experience ; for many who use all these means do notwithstanding differ . you would insinuate by the words , [ doubtful places ] that the points your sober enquirers doubt of , are but unnecessary , sleight , or disputable ; but alas ! they are the highest mysteries of our christian faith ; and if they must take such pains , as to compare scripture and expositors , and the sense of the primitive church ( which will require perusing attentively a pretty library ) ere they can accept these for points of faith , what satisfaction is to be expected in all that christ and his apostles taught , by your rule , which asks such laborious study to understand it's sense in these ; or by your method , which is both endless , & when all is done vncertain ? . of how different a judgment the primitive church was , let a chief pillar of it , st. athanasius inform us ( lib. de synodis arimini & seleuciae ) where he blames some clergy-men of his time for going about enquiring what they were to believe , in these words , si credidissent , nunquam , quasi fidem non haberent , de fide quaesivissent . — sese infideles esse declaraverunt , cum id quaerant quod non habent . if they had believ'd , they had never enquir'd , as if they did want faith. — they have declar'd themselves to be vnbelievers by their enquiring after what they have not . so , that , it seems all your sober enquirers are ( according to this fathers judgment ) infidels , or vnbelievers . observe here the vast distance between your principles and those of this holy father and most learned controvertist . nothing but seeking and enquiry ( with the epithet of sober to grace it a little ) will serve your turn ; but , he tells us , on the quite contrary , that , if wee seek , or enquire , we have no faith at all : which , in plain english , signifies thus much ; you judge that to be the onely way to faith , which , he judges a plain argument of having none . you are all for seeking for your faith in scripture ; he , for taking what is already found to our hand some other way , w ch . must be by tradition . one thing i should much wonder at , did not i know your private-spirited principles ; 't is this , why amongst other means you assign for your sober enquirer to make use of , you do not put the iudgment of the present church ( let it be your own if you please ) for one ? i should think the faith of the church had more weight in it , than all the rest put together , if you do indeed hold it a true church ; and 't is far more easy to know its sense , where it has thought fit to explicate it's self clearly . the finding the sense of commentatours , and the places compar'd , and of primitive antiquity , costs infinit trouble ; whereas , there is no difficulty to know the sense of the present church , speaking to you by living voice , and consonant practise . i should think too , 't is most agreeable to the order of the world , the unity of the church , and the maxims of government ( if you will allow any such to a church ) that people should follow the doctrin of their teachers , be led by their pastours , and obey their superiours ; rather than be left to their own private fancies , in matters of such concern , that , if they clash with them in their judgment , it hazards to break all those sacred orders , by which the world subsists . let me ask you one thing , ere we leave this point . is your sober enquirer bound to use these means for his satisfaction in doubtful points , or not ? you say expresly here , that , he is bound to do this ; and , so i suppose you will be disatisfi'd with him , if he falls short of this duty . i ask next , did mr. t. use all these means in a doubtful point , to compass a rational satisfaction ? how should he , when he was satisfi'd , and confirm'd , and resolv'd in so little time . yet , for all your contrary doctrin here , you are well satisfi'd with him , nay , you undertake p. . to satisfy the world that mr. t. had sufficient grounds for what he then said ; which was , that , he was much more confirm'd in the communion of our ( the protestant ) church , and resolv'd to continue in it , pray , sir , was he a sober enquirer or no ? if he was , did he in two hours time , that mr. g. and you were disputing , use the means you say your sober enquirer is bound to make use of in doubtful cases ; as his was , if he dealt sincerely with mr. g. and did not play booty ? did he in two or three hours time , pray , meditate , compare scripture , and expositours upon it , use the help of spiritual guides , & the sense of the primitive church , which , are but some of the means you prescribe p. . he made prodigious hast , if he did use those means : how comes he then to be so satisfi'd , nay , so resolv'd , without using those means ; and so worthy of your patronage , if he did not what you say here , he was bound to do ? these are mysteries , which must be veil'd from the eyes of the vulgar , & prophane . nor is there any way to reconcile these contradictions , but to understand you with this clavis ; that , you say any thing that seems to serve your turn , when you are disputing against us , and disclaim it again when the circumstance is alter'd ; and that , as you pretended that for your rule of faith , which not one in a thousand follow ; so you pretend those methods must be taken , to understand your rule right to the end we may not be deceiv'd by it , which , neither are taken by any , nay , need not be taken at all , tho' you told us here men were bound to take them ; the believing your word that your answer was competent ( * which was indeed none ) acquitted his obligation , and atton'd for his rashness . this , this alone , was so meritorious , that , it was equivalent to prayer , meditation , comparing scripture , and expositours upon it , the help of spiritual guides , and the sense of the primitive church , which , you declare here , such as he were bound to consult for their satisfaction in faith. by which i guess your test to distinguish a sober from a rash enquirer , is , whether he will rely on your word or skill for his security of heaven . if he will , he is of your sober sort without more ado ; and , need not trouble himself with those painfull methods : if he will not , he must go through them all , or be rash. the truth is , you play sure ; and may safely defy any man living ever to enquire himself soberly out of your communion : for , whoever begins , shall be sure to dy before he have enquir'd half way . . at length , to my great comfort ( for 't is tedious to find no reasons to speak to , but still to be employ'd in confuting mistakes ) i am come to the last task , that , as far as i can discern , will belong to my province . towards the end of pag. . your discourse ayms to establish your kind of iudgment of discretion ; which makes such a noise in your books , and of late rings out of the pulpit too . you make way to it thus , if we have the consent of all christian churches against the onely pretended infallible iudge , we have their consent likewise that every man is to judge for his own salvation . your argument , such as it is , stands thus , by the consent of all christian churches , there is no infallible iudge , therefore , every man must judge for himself . it seems then nothing will content you now but infallibility ; and , if that be not to be had , every one may set up for himself in the iudging profession . why , suppose the governours of our church , when you left her , or of your own church either , were fallible ; are you grown so nice on a sudden , and your conscience so tender in embracing any thing less than infallibly-certain , for faith , that fallibility will not serve your turn , which hitherto , you so contentedly hugg'd and ador'd , and so wittily derided any certainty above it ? suppose they had but your sufficient certainty , or great likelyhoods , fair probabilities , or such like , for their interpretations of scripture ; must they therefore lose their power of iudging in that particular , because they are bishops ? or , forfeit the dignity of pastours and leaders , because they are not infallible ? you have such an a king tooth at the churches intermeddling in faith-matters , no not so much as to help her children in the most necessary points ( p. . . ) so they be doubtful , that neither profes't infallibility nor acknowledg'd fallibility will put you in good humour with church-governours ; but out they must , and your sober enquirer starts up in their stead . for he must judge whether they tell him right or no , when all 's done ; i suppose by the light scripture gives him , as he is to judge of the veracity of general councils ; and so we are got into the giddy whirl-pool of a circle . he must learn the sense of scripture by them , and yet trust himself interpreting scripture , not them , for the sense of it ? 't is pitty but he had a blew apron on , and a tub to hold forth in what heavenly light he had gain'd , by interpreting scripture after the method you have shewn him . t is true , if there were no absolute certainty in the way to faith ( and i believe you hold none in your church ) every man must shift for himself as well as he may ; yet still even in that case , he is bound to do that which shall appear best , and come up as neer to certainty as he can . and can he in any reason think his own enquiry will bring him to more certainty , than the pastors of his church , who had been sober enquirers too themselves , and understood the means you assign to make that enquiry , perhaps a thousand times better than himself ? if he thinks them better qualify'd than himself for interpreting scripture , he sins against the light of reason , not to trust them rather than himself : for they have , in that supposition , more knowledge than he ; t is left then , that he is to judge himself to be better qualify'd than his church , her bishops and all his pastors are for that work : and , upon this brisk self-conceit , the book of scripture flies open on a sudden , discloses it's sense , and discovers to him his faith. certainly , such a man is likely to have a very reverend esteem of his church , her bishops and pastors ; and yet , your principles would have all men such . indeed , you would have your sober enquirers , pray and meditate . but , it should seem they are to pray , amongst other things , god would give them the grace not to obey or believe their pastors so much as themselves in necessary points ; ( i hope you hold the tenet of a trinity , christ's god-head , and such other points , such ) which otherwise their honest natural reason , conscious to it self of it's own ignorance , will very much tempt them to do ; and to meditate on god's great mercy , in giving them greater abilities and better assistance than he does to his church ; for they are very ungrateful if they forget so signal and extravagant a favour . but , let us see what is to be meant by an infallible iudge ; for you do not particularize your acception of those words ; nor let your reader see what judge , how , or for what reason we hold him infallible . . if you mean by [ iudge ] an authoritative decider of controversies about faith ( as was said above ) and that ( which is what we hold ) his verdict is infallible by proceeding upon an infallible rule , you must either pretend the christian church never permitted church-governours to exercise their authority in deciding matters of faith ; or else that it never held they had an infallible rule to go by . and i believe your utmost attempts will fall so far short of producing any such consent of universal tradition for either , that it will be directly against you in both ; and you must have a strange opinion of the decrees of general councils , in such cases , if you apprehend they held either of those self-condemning tenets . and yet i cannot tell , but i have made my self too large a promise concerning this universal consent of all christian churches being for us or not against us in this particular : for i remember now , that , when you were to state the notion of tradition , you took in the consent of all former hereticks to make your tradition for scripture larger and firmer than ours is against you , * * and to make your argument stronger by their concurrent testimony ; and i see a glimmering light already , which will grow very clear ere long , you take in the same infamous gang to bear witness against our infallibility ; and what a case is the catholick church in then ? we can never expect those obstinate revolters from that church or those churches which were then in communion with rome , will ever acknowledge the governours had a just authority to declare against them as hereticks ( for they were all of them , to a man , true-blew sober enquirers ) or that those governours proceeded upon an infallible rule ; for this were to cut their own throats , and acknowledge themselves hereticks ; a mortification not to be submitted to by much contumacious spirits . now all these by your principles are to be accounted christian churches , and are call'd so very currently , and very frequently by you ( p. . . . and in many other places ) without any distinction at all . and so we are reduc'd to a very pretty condition , according to the admirable mould in which you have new-cast the church . for , unless all those hereticks of old , any lutherans , calvinists , and all the inferiour subdivisions of faith reformers , vouchsafe to give their concurrent testimony to the infallibility of the roman catholick church ( which condemn'd them all ; and , as appears by the council of trent throughout , by the same rule of tradition ) she is to have no infallibility at all allow'd her ; her old rule too is condemn'd by them for a false light , because it condemn'd them , and their new-light ; nor consequently can she be an infallible iudge in faith-controversies . this is a very hard law ; yet your severe discourses allow us no better quarter . you alledge that the eastern churches utterly deny the roman churche's infalliblely , tho' they be of very different denominations . you mean ( i suppose ) amongst the rest , the nestorians , eutychians , and such kind of good folks . and can you without blushing avail your self of such concurrent testimonies against the body communicating with the roman , and her infallible rule , whose ancestors were condemn'd by that very body to which the present roman-catholick church uninterruptedly succeeds ; and were cast out of the church for receding from the christian doctrine , held even then upon that very rule ? . but what have we to do with any of your pretended christian churches , whether eastern , or not-eastern , modern , or antient ; many or few ? or , what have you to do with them either , if you would , as becomes a controvertist , speak home to us . you know already we place the infallibility of our church in delivering , defining and iudging of faith-controversies , in the absolutely certain rule of tradition . all therefore that have adher'd to tradition as their rule , must allow to her this inerrableness , while she adheres to it , else they must condemn themselves . and those pretended churches which have deserted tradition , can never , for many reasons , be of any competent authority against the roman-catholick . for , having no certain rule , they can have no sure ground of what they believe or alledge against her : and , besides , being her enemies , and condemn'd by her , and that by vertue of this very rule they carp at , common equity tells every man 't is not a pin matter what such men say of that rule , or that church either , whether those men live east , west , north , or south . i perceive by your far-stretcht words here p. . [ all the churches of the christian world , all the eastern churches tho' of very different denominations , that you imagin the force of an authority depends meerly on the number of the witnesses ; whereas we make account it depends much more on their weight ; that is , on their knowledge , and on their sincerity , or indifferency of their wills , as to the person or affair concerning which they are to witness : and fallible congregations , which are both out-casts , and enemies , have for each of those regards , no weight at all . . you have another fetch yet left to prejudice the reader against our tenet . for , you often make mention of our infallibility , the roman , or the roman churches infallibility , and ( as appears p. . and ) of the infallibility of the particular church of rome ; whereas the question , and our true tenet , is , of those many particular churches communicating with the roman ; so that you seem desirous to convince us you are resolv'd never to speak to any point sincerely or represent it ingenuously . for this sleight , tho' it seems trivial , insinuates into your readers , that we hold the very spot of rome is the precise , and adequate mold in which infallibility is cast . please then to remember , and pray let it be the last time we tell you of it , that it is her following the * self-evidently certain rule of tradition , in which as a controvertist i do , in this dispute , place her infallibility . that , being thus absolutely certain of her faith , we can prove she is qualify'd to be an infallible iudge of faith. that every bishop is a iudge of faith-controversies in proportion to his sphere , and the highest bishop above them all : but still , the last resort or test of their final obliging to belief ( for any one may oblige his diocesans to silence for peace's sake ) is with reference to the body of the church ; and the infallibility of the church is refunded into the certainty of her rule ; and there it rests . hence , conscious to your selves of the want of such an infallible rule , you dare pretend to no infallible iudge , but are forc't to leave every particular man to his private iudgment of discretion ; tho' you experience it shatters your church , no better principled , into thousands of sects . in a word , in the way of our controversy , all discourse ought to begin originally , and end finally in an absolutely certain rule of faith ; that is , in such a rule as influences our tenets with the same certainty . we are sure we have such a rule , and , so , we are sure we have true faith ; and we are sure you can have no certainty that you have true faith , because true faith requires absolute certainty , and , therefore , an infallible rule , which you renounce . this is the main point between us , on which depends all the rest , whether it relates to an infallible church or infallible iudge . look it then in the face ; spare it not , but level your whole quiver of reasons at this mark . unless you do this , you do but trifle ; you beat the bush , and scatter leaves , but spring nothing . while this infallible rule remains unconfuted , you must confess there may , and ought to be an infallible iudge ; and your iudgment of discretion is convinced to be a meer libertinage , forcibly granted to all , for want of principles in your selves to ground them certainly in their faith , keep them steady in it , and reduce them to it when they deviate . . to come closer , and take a more distinct view of this iudgment of discretion , i will acquaint you how far and in what i allow it , how far and in what i reject it . i grant that every man is to judge for his own salvation , and to endeavour by his reason to find the way to right faith. i grant with you that all mankind agrees in it ; and therefore wonder at your self-contradiction to make us disagree to it , who certainly are some part of mankind . i grant that , otherwise , 't is to no purpose to go about to make converts : i add , nor for you , and me , to write controversies . i grant that every man is to judge of the best way to salvation , and of all the controversies between us and you ; and especially of the true grounds of faith ; and to be well satisfy'd who proceeds on a certain rule , who not ; and that the contrary tenet is as ridiculous as what 's most , unless your putting upon us , against your daily experience , such a sottishness as to hold it . i add , that , since every man is to judge of his grounds , therefore the rule of faith must be such as needs not much learning and reading , * but must ly level to every man's natural light of understanding ; as the nature of testifying authority , and it's certainty does . i will grant you moreover , that to deprive mankind of this priviledge of judging thus , is to debarr him of the light and use of his reason , when 't is most needful for him ; that is , when it should direct him how to find out the way to his eternal happiness , and , avoid the paths that lead him to eternal misery . but , i utterly deny , that therefore , he ought to think it discretion to hammer out his faith by the dints of his private and unelevated reason , from words that are of so deep , and mysterious a sense ; and this , after he has experienced that multitudes of other men , as wise or wiser than himself , and ( for ought he can discern ) very sincere too , do their best to understand them right ; and yet , as appears by their contradicting one another in matters of highest importance , one of those great , and learned parties , does erre most dangerously ; i deny that his discretion can lead him to judge that god's providence has left no absolutely certain way to faith , it being of so vast a concern , and highest necessity : or that it can command him to assent firmly and unalterably to any tenet as a truth , nay , profess it to be such , even with the laying down his life to attest it ; and yet that , notwithstanding , it may be a lye , for any thing can be known by the grounds he goes upon . and , therefore , i deny that , in case faith depends on some authority bringing it from christ ( without certainty of which none can be certain 't is true at all ) that authority should be fallible in that affair , and perhaps deceive him while he trusts it , or relies on it : or , in case it depends on some other means ( viz. scripture's letter , and his own interpretation of it ) that means should not certainly bring him to the end , if he makes use of it to the best of his power : i deny it to be discretion to think himself capable to judge he has absolute certainty of the intire books of scripture , even to such particular words or verses he builds on , but by our tradition for doctrine ; as likewise of their translations and transcriptions all along ; and , of the copies being taken at first from the true original ; whence i deny he can with true reason judge his faith true ; since a fault in any of these may make it false . i deny that he can with any discretion judge that the ways you prescribe p. . for your sober enquirer to understand the letter of scripture right , and so come at true faith , ( viz. comparing scripture and expositours upon it , help of spiritual guides ( who confess they may all be deceiv d , and so may mislead him ) and knowing the sense of the primitive church , &c. ) are the means left by god for men to arrive at faith and salvation ; since to do this , he sees so many volumns must be read over , compar'd , and well-weigh'd , that in all likelihood , a hundred parts of mankind for one ( i may say a thousand ) would dy e're they could make a certain choyce which side to take in dubious points ; and to add to his discomfort , those points which of all other , are of highest concern , as are the trinity , christ's godhead , the real presence of christ's body in the sacrament , the efficacy of god's grace , and such like , are the most dubious ; as being most controverted by the pretenders to the scripture-rule . i deny he can with any discretion , when he comes to receive satisfaction of the absolute certainty of his faith , suffer himself to be fobb'd off with telling him there is absolute certainty of such a book which contains it ; when common sense tells him he is as far as ever from having such a certainty of his faith , unless he has the same certainty he interprets that book right ; and does not err perniciously by misunderstanding the sense of it in those important articles : especially , since your selves , tho' it be against your own interest , are forc't to confess other great and learned bodies had most grievously misunderstood its meaning , who had both the same letter , and the same means to look into it that he has , & all that your grounds afford him . i deny , he can with the least discretion judge it possible that all christian fathers could forget to day what they held yesterday ; or that they should , if they remember'd it , knowingly resolve to damn themselves and posterity , by teaching them a wrong faith ; or , that they could conspire to do so if they would ; and consequently , that he ought not , if he acts discreetly , judge , that this rule of tradition is an absolutely , or infallibly-certain conveyer of christ's faith down to our dayes . whence , i deny that he can with the least grain of discretion refuse to communicate with those who proceed on such an evidently certain rule , and are found in possession of their faith upon that secure tenure ; and adhere to those others who declare against any infallible rule ; that is , who confess the means they have to know any one particular point of faith or ( which is all one ) any faith at all , is fallible ; that their guides may perhaps all mislead them , and their rule permit the followers of it to err. you see now how we allow them the use of their reason , and judgment of discretion , till it brings them to find a certain authority ; and , when they have once found that , the same iudgment of discretion , which shew'd them that authority was absolutely certain , obliges them to trust it , when it tells them what is christ's faith ; without using their private judgment any longer , about the particular points themselves , thus ascertain'd to them , but submitting to it. in doing which , yet , they do not at all relinquish their reason , but , follow and exercise it . for , nothing is more rational than to submit to an authority which my reason has told me is absolutely certain , in things which the same reason assures me can no other wayes be known certainly but by that authority . . now , let us consider the iudgment of discretion , as understood by you , of which your sober enquirer makes use to find out his faith. 't is onely employ'd about searching out the sense of scripture's letter by fallible means ; which he can never hope will preserve him certainly from errour , let him do his very best ; since he is told , even by your selves , that great bodies of very learned men , and acute scripturists do follow the same rule , and yet erre in the highest articles of our belief ; nay , he sees himself , by daily experience , how many sects follow that for their rule , yet vastly differ . whence , instead of judging discreetly , he commits the most absurd indiscretion in the world , to hazard his salvation upon his own interpretation of scripture ; when , at the same time , he is told by those very men who propose to him this rule , that there is no absolute security ( neither by his own industry , nor his churche's veracity ) from erring in that interpretation . and , not onely this , but he sees or may see , if he will soberly enquire , what certain grounds are propos'd by others ; and yet suffers his reason , and the truth to be run down with the noisy hubbubs against popery ; and , either out of a blameable weakness , or , perhaps out of an inexcusable obstinacy , rejects those grounds , or disregards the looking into them . i say again , inexcusable : for , the very nature of faith tells him , that , 't is an vnalterable assent , and , that it cannot possibly be a ly ; whence , common sense will tell him , 't is not to be hoped for amongst those who confess that all the knowledge they have of each particular point of faith , ( that is of any faith ) is fallible ; and , onely likely to be had amongst those who own and maintain their grounds cannot deceive them ; so that , such a man , if he ever came to a due reflexion upon what most concerns him , sins against the light of reason , in many regards ; and , what you call iudgment of discretion is convinc't to be the most vnjudicious indiscretion imaginable : and , your sober enquirer , who builds all his hopes of salvation upon such a iudgment , proves himself ( the weight of the concern being duly consider'd ) to be the most rash and hair-brain'd opiniastre , and the most credulously blind , that ever submitted and prostituted his rational faculty ( with which god has endow'd him , and will require a strict account of him , how he has us'd it ) to a most groundless and improbable conjecture . disregarding all authority out of his presumption on his own skill , or that he is more in god's favour than the whole church ; and , i much fear , out of a spiritual pride , and self-conceit , that he can find out all necessary faith well enough of himself , without being beholding to any church at all ; or , ( as you instruct him here p. . and declare openly and avowedly you are not asham'd of it ) without the churches help . which , is the very first principle , nay , the quintessence of all heresy ; fanaticism in the egg , perfect enthusiasm when hatch't , and downright atheism when fledge . finis . the fourth catholick letter in answer to dr. stillingfleet's sermon , preach't at guild-hall , november th . . entituled , scripture & tradition compared , addrest to his auditory . by iohn sergeant . published with allowance . london printed , and sold by matthew turner at the lamb in high-holbourn . . to the reader . perhaps the smart expressions and plausible methods that dr. st. so affects in his late discourse concerning the nature and grounds of the certainty of faith , in which he pretends to answer the catholick letters , may have rais'd expectation in many indifferent men , and triumph in some of his partial admirers ; wherefore , to stay the appetites of the former , and give some check to the over-weening of the later : i thought it fitting to say somthing here by way of preface , to give our readers a short account of his main performances in that discourse , till i come to publish a compleat answer to the whole . what i affirm of it , and undertake to make good , is ; . that he so strangely prevaricates from the whole business we are about , that he even forgets we are writing controversy ; and would turn the polemical contest in which we are engag'd , into a dispute of school-divinity ; bearing the reader in hand , that we are treating of faith , as formally divine , and of all the intrinsical requisites to it , as it is such ; tho' none of them be controverted between us , and some of them are perhaps onely knowable by god himself . the meanest reflecter may discern how impossible 't is for the dr , my self , or any man living , to put such particulars as these into our proofs , or arguments ; and how unpardonable an absurdity 't is to alledge them in our circumstances . the very nature ( i say ) of controversy , obliges and restrains us both to speak of faith precisely according to what is controverted between the contending parties ; and the nature of our present contest , which is about an absolutely-certain rule to know this matter of fact , that christ and his apostles did teach the doctrines we profess , determines us both to speak of divine faith precisely as it stands under such a rule , recommending our faith to us , as deliver'd by christ , and proving it to be his genuin doctrin . . that , whatever the big letters in his title pretend , he neither shews from the nature of faith , as it lies under our consideration , that it does not need the perfect certainty we require ; nor that the certainty he assignes to make us adhere to it as true , is not perfect uncertainty ; since he does not bottom it on the firm ground of the things themselves without us , in which creative wisdome has imprinted all truths ; but , on our own aiery apprehensions , or undoubting perswasions ; which must necessarily be unsteady , when the knowledge of those things does not fix them . particularly ( which more closely touches our present controversy ) the certainty he substitutes to that advanc't by us , which excludes deception , is impossible to be manifested by outward arguments to others , being only his own interiour satisfaction or opinion ; which , as it is invisible , so it may , in disputes , be , with just reason ; rejected by any man at his pleasure . lastly , whereas he pretends to lay grounds for the absolute c●●tainty of faith , he shall never be able to shew he has laid any one ground thus certain ( which is what he pretended ) worthy the name of a ground , for the only point in debate ; viz. that christ and his apostles taught thus or thus ; but instead thereof , such feeble foundations , as leave christian faith , whose truth depends necessarily upon the truth of christ's teaching it , in the opprobrious and scandalous condition of being possibly ( or perhaps ) false . in a word , he was to shew the absolute certainty of his grounds of faith , and he so handles the matter , that one would think , instead of shewing them , he were shewing there was no such certainty requisit , and so none needs to be shewn . the rest of his answer consists , generally , of impertinent excursions , disingenuous cavils , witty avoidances of any rub that should hinder his discourse from sliding on smoothly . his mistakes ( whether sincere or affected the reader is to judge ) are numberless , his scornful jests frequent , and either meer trifles , or built upon chimaeraes of his own invention . all which deliver'd in poignant and smart language , give a pretty tang of gayity and briskness to his discourses , and counterfeit a kind of liveliness of reason ; when as i dare avouch , and shall make it good , he has not one single argument that is pertinent and sincere in the whole course of his answer . i pass by his omissions , which are both very many , and most important ; as likewise how he does not take his adversaries discourse end-wayes , as i did his ; nor gives the due force to his arguments ; but skips up and down , here and there , skimming off the superficial part of them by playing upon his words , without regarding the full sense ; that so he might make a more plausible mock-shew of an answer . lastly , his evasions , as is the natural progress of non-plust errour , are still worse and worse , and are confuted by being detected . 't is easy to discern by his expressions he is much piqu'd and out of humour ; nor can i blame him ; for 't is too severe a tryal of patience , for a man of his great abilities and authority , to be so closely prest to shew his grounds why he holds it true ( or which is the same , impossible to be false ) that the faith he pretends to , was indeed christs doctrine , and to find himself utterly unfurnish't with any means to perform it . but i have reason to hope there will need no more to let the reader see that all that glisters in the drs. writtings is not gold , but his carriage in this sermon of his which i now come to examine ; and to make him judge , that , if he hath dealt so delusively with his auditors when he spoke out of the pulpit in god's name , he will scarce behave himself more sincerely towards me , when he speaks in his own . the fourth catholick letter . gentlemen , § . when controversies are preach't out of pulpits , every well-meaning hearer is apt to conceit , that what sounds thence is to be receiv'd as a voice from heaven : too great a disadvantage to be admitted by a person concern'd , who judges he is able to shew 't is but a false eccho : especially , when he sees this forestalling the world by a sermon , is a meer preparation to turn the question quite off the hinges ; and , withal , as the preface intimates , to bring it from the handling one single point , which bears all the rest along with it , to the debating of many ; none of which can be decided , till that be first clear'd . hence i esteem'd it not only a justice to my self , but a christian duty to others , to address my defence to you , his auditory ; who ( i fear ) were led into errours by many particulars in that sermon , relating to our controversy . i have reason to hope this discourse will keep your thoughts impartial ; which done , i will desire no other umpire of our contest , at present , but your selves . § . . it being the chief and most precise duty of a controvertist to secure the truth of christian faith , and this not being possible to be done , without proving it true that christ or his apostles taught it : hence , it has ever been my endeavour to establish that fundamental verity in the first place , by settling some method that might secure it with a perfect or absolute certainty . nature tells us , an end cannot be compassed without a a means enabling us to attain it ; whence , the first thing to be examin'd is , what that means is , that is to give us this certainty . your common reason assures you , that what 's [ true ] cannot possibly be false ; and the common sentiment of all christians , and the very notion of faith it self , has , i doubt not , imbu'd you with this apprehension , that your faith cannot but be true ; nor does any thing sound more harsh to a christian ear than to affirm that all christian faith may perhaps be but a lying story ; which yet 't is unavoidable it may be , if it may not be true that 't is christ's doctrine . § . . you will wonder perhaps , when i acquaint you this is my greatest quarrel with dr. st. and others of his principles , that they make all christian faith possible to be false . dr. tillotson , with whom he agrees , and whose rule of faith he approves , maintains there , that there is no absolute security to be had from our being deciev'd in judging we have the right letter , or right sense of the holy scripture , or that they were writ by those divinely-inspired persons ; but that , notwithstanding all the certainty we can have of those particulars , * it is possible all this may be otherwise . this i say , as appears by my preface to the second catholick letter , and by my discourses quite through all the three , is our grand contest , under which all our other differences subsume . but this dr. st. was so prudent as to conceal from you , lest it should shock all his well-meaning hearers ; and i do assure you , and shall shew it , that , in those matters which he thought it expedient to let you know , he so misrepresents every thing , that he has both deluded you , injur'd the truth , and quite dropt the question . whether he is to make satisfaction to truth and to you , or i to him , is to be determin'd by the evidence i bring to make good my charge . to state the question then . § . . as to the holy scriptures , my very principles oblige me to declare that what i attribute to them , is , first , that they have all those excellencies which dr. st. yields them , and one more which he does not ; of which hereafter . secondly , that they are profitable to all the ends st. paul writing to timothy ascribes to them ; and that in such a high measure , that i do from my heart grant them to be so great an instrument of our salvation , that the church had been at an incredible loss without them ; & that not near half the number of christian souls would have been sav'd , had it not pleas'd god to leave to the church such a powerful means to instruct them in a virtuous life , and raise them up to it . thirdly , that , when they are animated with the sense of the divinely-inspired writers by a certain interpretation , they are very useful to confute hereticks ; and that , thus interpreted , they are with much profit made use of , to that end , by fathers and councils . fourthly , that , tho' they were written on several occasions , it was not without the design of god's good providence ; which orders all our actions to the bringing about his best ends , however they be occasional to us ; much more an affair so mainly important to the churches improvement . fifthly , that there was also a peculiar providence in preserving the letter from any material corruption ; and , that the second causes by which this providence exerted it self , was the most obligatory care of the church to whom those sacred oracles were committed , and the knowledge she ever had of christ's doctrin . thly , that the sense of scripture is so sublime in spiritual points and high mysteries of faith , which are above nature , and could only be known to the world by divine revelation , that no men by their private judgments , much less all sorts of men coming to faith ( and therefore unelevated and unenlighten'd by it ) can arrive at the knowledge of it's sense by the letter in those difficult texts , with such an unerring certainty as is requisit for that most firm , rational and unalterable assent , call'd faith ; and , therefore , that in these , they need the help of the church : whereas in other passages that are historical , moral , &c. where the subject matter is more obvious to ordinary reason , they are either clear of themselves , or may be clear'd , as much as is necessary , by the learning of the more knowing faithful . for the same reason i hold , that scripture , thus privately interpreted , is not convictive of hereticks , who have imbib'd a contrary sentiment to that of the divine enditer ; because those men admit no certain interpreter of those difficult places . and , this want of clearness in such texts , i do not take to be a privative imperfection ; but , on the contrary , to argue a very high perfection in scripture ; viz. as vincentius lirinensis has told us years ago , commonitor , cap. . it 's deep sense ; whence 't is rather to be call'd properly , a disproportion of that sense to the low conceptions of private iudgments looking after faith ; or an obscurity , relatively to such persons , than an absolute one : since the faithful , who are instructed in that sense , are both capable to understand it right , and moreover to discover still more and more excellent truths in it . thly , that for this reason , i cannot hold the letter of scripture privately interpreted the rule of faith , or a means for people of every capacity , looking after faith , to know the sense of it in those dogmatical articles ; with such a certainty , as was shewn above to be necessary for a ground of faith ; nor can i allow that the truth of christian faith ought to be built upon such a sandy foundation as are those private interpretations . and , therefore , that there needs some other rule to ascertain people of all sorts what is christ's true doctrin in those points . moreover , i make account the experience of all ages since christ's time abets my position . every heretick , and all his followers , relying on his private interpretations of scripture for his wicked blasphemies ; as the socinians do now , who are ( as far as we can discern ) sincere and exact followers of that rule , or vsers of that means ; and yet , fall short of christ's genuin doctrine , denying his godhead , and the mystery of the b. trinity ▪ a plain argument that that cannot be the way to truth , which such vast multitudes have follow'd , and yet have been led into errour , unless we knew them all to be wilfully sincere , or strangely negligent ; which we can neither know , nor have reason to think . and , as experience has shewn this to every mans eye , so neither is it my sentiment onely . the same * lirinensis telling us , that by reason of the scripture's depth , as many opinions as there are men seem possible to be drawn thence . where he ascribes the obscurity of the letter not meerly to the fault of the persons , nor the hardness of the words , in which the sense is deliver'd , but to the profoundness of the sense it self ; reason and experience both informing us , that , where the matter is above the readers capacity , tho' the words be never so plain , yet the doctrine is not easily comprehended without some who is already skill'd in that sense . § . . as for tradition ; the very sound of the word may perhaps give you some prejudice against it , because our saviour reprehended the jews for some unwarrantable traditions of theirs . this obliges me to give you a true character of our tenet concerning it , and to make known to you particularly what [ tradition ] means , as we understand it in our controversies ; which dr. st. ( tho' he knows it ) will never do ; but , on the contrary , ( as shall be seen ) misrepresents it all along very disingenuously in every particular . what we hold of it then , is , first , that the apostles , by their preaching during the whole time of their lives , settled the self-same christian doctrin in the minds of the generality of the faithful , dispersed in several countries ; and not only at large and particularly explicated it , and fixt it by their heavenly preaching , but riveted it ( as we may say ) by miracles ; founded churches , and constituted disciplin ; by means of which , and their own example , they establish't them in the practice of that doctrin . lastly , they recommended the continuing it as the means of salvation ; and , consequently , that the swerving from it themselves , or neglecting to educate their children in it , was the assured way to eternal misery to them and their posterity . dly , that this vast multitude unanimously settled in the same faith is that which we make the first source of tradition ; which had no more to do but to attest to the next age what the first had receiv'd and practis'd ; nor could they forget a doctrin which was so recommended , and according to which they had led their christian lives so long : nor could true faith ( the parent of all other virtues ) which was in their hearts , no nor even the natural love to themselves and their children , permit them all to be so wicked as to decline from it voluntarily , or neglect to educate the others in it ; however , it was to be expected there would be now and then a failure in some particulars , deserting the former doctrin , and drawing proselytes after them . dly , that , the same reason holds for the continuate delivery of the same doctrin by the second age to the third , and so still forwards ; the most powerful motives god himself could propose being laid to oblige christians not to deviate from it in the least , or be careless to recommend it . and those motives too a thousand times more lively imprinted and apprehended by the heaven-instructed faithful , than they were by any in the former ages of the world , before christ. thly , that by [ tradition ] then is meant , the testimony of the whole foregoing age of christians to the next age , of what had been deliver'd , and explain'd to them by their living voice and practice . or , taking tradition ( as it ought to be ) for oral and practical both , 't is , a continu'd education of undergrowing posterity in the principles and practice of their immediate predecessours . thly , that hence 't is evident beyond needing proof , that this rule cannot ( on it's part ) deceive us . for , putting that it was still follow'd , or , that posterity still believ d and practis'd as their immediate fore-fathers did , who at first believ'd and practis'd as the apostles had instructed them ; 't is manifest the last age of the world must have the same faith that the first age of christianity had . whence follows evidently that no errour could possibly come in at any time unless this rule of tradition had been deserted . thly , that tradition , thus understood , ( and we never understood it otherwise ) being the living voice and practice of the church in the immediate age before , is applicable to all even of the lowest capacity ; as we experience , to some degree , in the instructions by pastours even now adays . and , since it delivers it's sense ( which , in those that have follow'd that rule , has been even now shewn to be christ's doctrin ) by preaching ▪ catechizing , explaining , daily practising , and all the ways imaginable to make it understood , 't is also an absolutely-clear conveyer of christ's doctrin downwards . add that , should it's sense be at any time misapprehended , the church and her pastours can explain their own meaning , pertinently to the askers , doubter's or mistaker's exigencies ; which a letter in a book cannot . thly , that the chief care of the church was to inculcate to the faithful , and preserve inviolate the chief points of the christian faith ; and , therefore , that tradition did most particularly exert it's self in teaching and transmitting those . thly , 't is not to be deny'd but scriptural tradition went along with this other we have explain'd . for the church having the same sense in her breast which the first writers had , were , consequently , the best interpreters of it ; which was one reason why the fathers and councils often made use of it to confute hereticks , and comfort the faithful by it's concurrence . but , when they were to convert any to faith , it was never heard , they took such a method as to put the bible in his hand , and bid him look for his faith there ; telling him 't was plain even in the highest points , that were dubious or controverted , to every capacity . thly , that , hence , scripture , * without the churches help , was never held by them anciently , nor can with reason be held by us now to be the rule of faith , in the sense we use that word ; that is , to be a means or way for all who are coming to faith , to arrive unerringly at it . lastly , we hold that the sense of scripture's letter , in those sublime points , surpasses the apprehensions of private men coming to faith ; and , so , the letter alone cannot be an assured ground to build the truth of christian faith upon : whence follows that tradition ( which is plain and easy ) and only it , can be in proper speech the rule of faith. § . . this then is the true state of the question between us . this is our true tenet , both concerning scripture and tradition , and what are the points to be ascertain'd by them . now , let us see how the sermon represents us , and whether your admired preacher does so much as touch any one of these particulars . § . . in the first place you may please to take notice that he never lets you know , or so much as suspect that the main contest between him and me is about the absolute certainty , or uncertainty of christian faith , his wicked doctrin , in that point , oblig'd me to write a * whole treatise formerly in vindication of christianity from such an intolerable scandal ; which i apply'd , in the cloze of it , against himself and dr. tillotson . had he let you know this , he prudently foresaw your zeal for christianity ( your best concern ) would have given you a just prejudice against his sermon , and the preacher too ; and the very conceit all christians have of the truth of their faith , would have made you abhor a discourse out of a pulpit , maintaining it might possibly be a ly. as for particulars . § . . first , he talks of a stedfastness , and a firm and well-settled resolution to adhere to that faith which christ himself deliver'd . but , ought you not to be assur'd first that he did indeed deliver it ? or are you to adhere to it as his , whether you are certain 't is his or no ? or is a resolution , to hold stedfastly to what you judge is the faith of christ , well-settled , if that faith of yours , the basis of your spiritual building and ground of that resolution , be not well-settled it self , but may sink into false-hood ? this is the true point you are to look after ; and , till you have perfect satisfaction from him in this , wisely to consider , that pious talk without solid grounds to support their truth , is but painting the out-side of a sepulcher . the tinkling cymball of a little rhetorick , and shews of much reading , may go far with persons whom such flourishes can prevail upon to forgo their reason ; but he had but a very small respect for you , if he hop't you were so easy to be play'd upon with the wind of a little articulate ayr . § . . it was very possible , he says , for them to have mistaken or misremember'd what was at first deliver'd : whom does he mean by [ them ] what by [ first delivery ] ? does he mean the vniversality of christians in the first age , or any succeeding one ? or that those great bodies settled in their faith , form'd into church-government , and kept up to their christian duties by disciplin , could thus mistake or misremember the former teaching and practice , which was a plain matter of fact ? this is the only tradition we ever spoke of , or went about to defend . none doubts , but that , when some single apostle was preaching in some places at first , the thoughts of the hearers were as yet raw , and the things that were told them were so strange , that they did not immediately sink deep into the conceptions of the generality . but , it was otherwise , when in tract of time that doctrin was farther spread , more often inculcated , and more clearly explain'd ; and well-instructed pastours constituted , to teach it more expressly , and put them forwards to practise it . he mistake● then and misrepresents the whole nature of our tradition ; and by antedating it , sights against it , before it could have a being . and , as this errour runs through all his discourses , and weak inferences out of scripture ; so the laying it open once for all , is a full confutation of them all at once . add , that he never consider'd whether , when those several churches err'd , or were in hazard to err , they did so by following even that particular tradition , or preaching of such or such an apostle ; or , whether they came to err by deserting it . if the later , the tradition was not faulty , but they who deserted it ; yet , how different soever these two points are , the one making for that particular tradition , the other against it , he never thinks of distinguishing them , or letting the reader know when the tradition was in fault , and when the persons ; but runs on in common words , as if he had no design , or determinate prospect whither he was going . i am sure it is not at all towards the true question , nor against us. § . . but , tho' all his reflexions from the several pieces of scripture are quite besides the purpose , yet his candid and solid way of managing his own mistakes , and how he wire-draws every thing to make it seem fit , deserves our particular observation . he tells us , speaking of the church of corinth , that they ( which signifies the whole church ) had like to have lost all their faith ; whereas the text only sayes [ some among you . ] and , is it such a wonder that some among many should hap to be imperfectly instructed , fantastical or refractory to their teachers . but his partiality is most remarkable . when he was forc't to be beholding to the churches testimony of doctrine ( which is our tradition ) to abet the scripture ; he could tell us then , this is very different from the case of particular persons in some churches , who might mistake or forget what was taught ; but ( sayes he ) — the churches themselves could not agree to approve on errour in the gospel contrary to the faith deliver'd to them . so that there it was a very different case ; but here it seems the case is not different at all , but the very same . for [ some among you ] are enlarg'd to signify that church it self ; and whereas the only point those some deny'd , was the resurrection of the dead , to let you see how utterly insignificant a thing tradition is that can do no good at all , he extends it to signify [ all their faith ] hoping i suppose any thing would pass upon you , so 't were spoke out of a pulpit ; 't is told you there , all 's gods word ; and he presumes you will be so civil to god almighty , and so kind to himself as to accept it for such , and swallow it for pure truth . § . . i am oblig'd to him for allowing , that the testimony of every christian church did shew the concurrence of all the apostles , as to the doctrine contain'd in the several gospels . for then , i hope , they may be able to shew to the next age ( and so forwards ) the concurrent doctrine of the first , which establishes the original of our tradition to be absolutely certain . he discourses well ( p. . ) and he ends better ; that the memory of the apostles doctrin was so fresh in their minds , that it was in effect the consent of all the apostles who had taught them . and yet better ; that the concurrent testimony of all the apostolical churches could not let them agree to approve an errour in the gospels , contrary to the faith deliver'd to them . this is very extraordinary kind and no less solid . for , . these words , [ could not agree to approve a contrary doctrine ] makes their testimony infallible . . this discourse makes the acceptation of the truth of the gospels , that is of their sense , depend on vnwritten tradition . we cannot doubt but that doctrine was full as fresh in their memories , when they were grown older , and were to transmit it to the next age after the apostles decease , as it was before ; unless they lost the memory of it , by discoursing of it more while they taught it to others , & by practising it longer themselves . . as little can it be doubted but the doctrine and practise of the first age , was as fresh in the minds of the second age , since they led their christian lives by it ; for it was equally intelligible , and of equal concern still to them to learn and teach it , as it was to the first . lastly , that this being so , the testimony of that body , even now adays , that adheres to tradition , * is in effect , the consent of all the apostles that taught it at first . observe , gentlemen , that this is the only time dr. st. has so much as touch 't upon our tradition ; and that he is so far from impugning or confuting it , that he , in some part directly , in others by necessary consequence , acknowledges it's force , and strongly abets it . but , it was not out of good will ; he was intent in that place upon making good the truth of the gospels ; and , assoon as he has made use of it to serve a present turn , he immediately discards it as good for little or nothing , or nothing to the particular purpose he had lately allow'd , the testifying christs doctrine . § . . for the very next page , he reckons up three things , for which , the common tradition of the apostolical churches were useful after the decease of the apostles . but not a word of their vsefulness to testify to others what they had learnt from those masters of christianity . no sooner were the apostles dead , and that first age had , by their concurrent testimony of the doctrine they had receiv'd from them , given credit to the truth of the written gospels ; but immediately the whole christian world had lost their memory of that doctrine on a sudden , and the grace to preserve and propagate it . one would think by this wild discourse of his , that both common natural parts , and all degrees of ordinary honesty had been preserv'd to them miraculously thitherto , meerly to recommend the truth of the gospels ; and , that assoon as that was done , and the apostles were dead , the author of nature and grace suspended or rather subtracted for ever all his influence , & left them a tabula rasa ( without either memory or goodness ) to learn their faith a new out of scripture . § . . and , hence it is that he rallies upon universal testimony or tradition as if it were some sleight story of a few tatling gossips , or of those who heard what some say , that others told them , who had it from such , &c. whereas had he said as he ought to have said , what the whole first age of christians witnest to the next age , that they had heard , seen , and practic 't ; and the whole next age to the third , and so forwards , with an obligation still to transmit it , equal to that the first age had to believe it , there had been no place left for his ridiculous raillery . but his constant method is this ; he endeavours to put you out of conceit with tradition , by concealing every thing that might give you a true conceit what tradition is , and what we mean by it . § . . the argument or instance he brings to prove that the authority of tradition was mightily sunk in the second century , is , if possible , ten thousand times worse , one would verily think , from those big words , he would prove that all the christians of the first age had conspir'd to tell a ly to the second , concerning christ's doctrin . but , this mountainous expectation came off with a poor little mouse , the relation of one single man , papias , of what an apostle had told him ; which he being a good honest soul , gain'd credit with diverse . tho' , as for his wit , dr. st's author , eusebius , tells us he was a man of a mean capacity , and scarce understood the meaning of what was spoken , i wonder the dr. blush't not to put such a slur upon his auditory , as to compare the publick authority of the whole christian world , and the universal testimony of god's church , to the private story of one weak man ; or to pretend hence that if he were mistaken , the authority of tradition mightily sinks and fails ; whereas 't is only his own credit that falls into that disaster by making such a senseless argument . yet , this is the best , and , as far as i can find , the only one he has brought to prove directly the first age of christians had bely'd christ's doctrin to the second ; and that because one man of a mean capacity mistook , we may stand in doubt of our assurance whether all the learneder faithfull , nay all the pastours and bishops in the church , had capacity enough to know an open matter of fact , viz. what had been taught and practis'd publickly every day by a world of fore-fathers , or the integrity not to deceive us . § . . of the same stamp is his alledging that st. luke's reason why he writ his gospel , was to give theophilus certainty of those things wherein he had been instructed . the subject of our enquiry is about the high points of christian belief : does the dr. think then that theophilus was not a christian , or had no certain knowledg of his faith , ere st. luke writ ? or , that the apostles did not instruct people in those main articles ? or that st. luke's writing those points in short ( for those points we speak of take up a very inconsiderable part of his gospel ) could make him know it better , and with more certainty than their preaching it at large ? with what sense can any of this be pretended ? the apostles did miracles to attest their doctrin : did st. luke , do any to attest the true sense of all he writ in those points ? again , what did his gospel contain ? only those dogmatical points controverted from time to time between the sons of the church , and her deserters ; of which , and none but which , we speak ? alas ! these are the least part of his gospel , and make but a small appearance in it . he relates our saviour's genealogy , temptation , fasting , miracles , parables , his sending his apostles and disciples , his exhortations to repentance and good life , the manner of his entring into ierusalem , his instituting the last supper , the particulars of his being apprehended , accus'd , condemn'd , and crucify'd . lastly , his burial , resurrection , apparitions and ascension . these are laid out in that gospel at large , together with many excellent sayings of our blessed saviour related verbatim . and these , as they were never pretended by us to be the object of tradition ; so , tho' spoken of frequently ( and perhaps variously ) amongst christians , were impossible ever to be perfectly remember'd by the generality , unless put in a book ; and therefore st. luke gives theophilus ( and others ) the certain and particular knowledge of all these passages by writing : and dr. st. confesses the same ( p. . ) and that his aym and intention was to give an account of the life and actions of christ , but not a word that his writing was to give theophilus certainty or a clearer knowledge of those main articles , to ascertain which tradition is pretended by us to be the most proper means . § . . now let 's see how many notorious prevarications and faults he has fallen into in this one instance . . our whole controversy is about the certainty of those sublime points of christian faith ; which he conceals , and confounds them with a multitude of particular passages . . he intimates our tradition is to ascertain all that 's contain'd in st. luke's gospel . whereas , he knows well , we rely upon no tradition but what 's in some degree practical , which those particulars are not ; unless it be those , of which we keep anniversary solemnities . . he is so angry at tradition , that he pretends the very oral tradition or preaching of the gospel by the apostles , needed something to strengthen and confirm it . lastly , he makes our tradition to begin with the first preaching of the apostles ; whereas , it dates it 's original from the first age of christianity ; already perfectly instructed by them , during all their lives , and settled into ecclesiastical order and discipline at their decease . § . . he seems at length to come neerer the point , and affirms , that the writings of the apostles , when matters of doctrin came to be contested , were the infallible rule whereby they were to judge which was the true and genuin doctrin of christ ; and , which is yet better , that they were intended by the holy ghost , to be a standing rule , whereby the church was to judge which was the true and genuin doctrine of christ. i am glad with all my heart , to hear him speak of the church being a judge of controversies ; or , that he allows her any hand in ascertaining and proposing faith. i ever understood him hitherto , that every sober enquirer was to judge of the sense of scripture for himself ; that it was plain to him even in the highest points ; and , that if , in any contested or dubious articles , the letter of scripture did not declare it explicitly , his sober enquirer could * by parity of reason render any implicit point explicit , * without the church's help ; tho' this was the most difficult task as to the penetrating the sense of scripture that is possible , and far beyond the understanding what 's there explicitly . he told us too in his second letter , p. , . that , because there is no infallible iudge — every man is to iudge for himself ; and this by scripture , his rule . but , here the case is alter'd , and the church is to judge of christ's doctrin by scripture . i can allow honest retractions without upbraiding them ; and am contented that the church should judge by scripture , both when she is to edify her children , and in contests with hereticks , as to all those points contain'd there ; and , i think the only difficulty in that particular is , by what means she came to be absolutely-certain of it's sense . let him add then but one word more , and say that by the letter of scripture she so judg'd of faith , that she could not be in an errour , or mistaken all the while , and then christian faith is absolutely-certain , and my greatest care is over . and , if he does not that , what is the future church , after the apostles deaths , the better for scripture's being an infallible rule , if she and her children partake not the benefit of that infallibility some way or other , by being perfectly secur'd from erring in faith ? is it not all one as to the intent of knowing assuredly we have the faith taught by christ , whether we have an infallible rule or no , if , when we have done our best , we may still stray from her faith ? or , why is not a rule that is not absolutely-certain , so i have absolute certainty i am directed by it , as good for that purpose , as an absolutely-certain rule with no absolute certainty that i do indeed go according to it . to speak to his proposition : whether the church and the faithful in contests with hereticks avail'd her self of scripture's letter , to gain absolute-certainty of it's sense , in those main tenets ; or brought the sense ( which she had another way ) along with her , shall be decided if he pleases , by st. austin , whom he cites here , p. . § . . he will prove scripture a rule from the general reason of it's writing ; and prove this general reason from a testimony of irenaeus , which speaks of the gospel as abstracted from being preach't and written ; and who doubts but as such it is infallibly true . he seems to build much upon the words [ that it might be a foundation and pillar of our faith. ] be it what it will in it self , the point is , how does it build faith in us ? by it 's meer letter , descanted upon by private iudgments , or , interpreted by the church ? the later he denies ; the former , all our most earnest pressing and intreating could never bring him , nor his reflecter to go about to make out ; and he wayes it totally through this whole sermon . let him then but shew that he has absolute-certainty of scripture's sense , in those tenets of christian-faith , by any method his principles will allow him , and his sermon should have past for me without controul . that 's the main point , whereas all here is quite besides it . as for those words from s. irenaeus he could have quoted the very same words ( in a manner ) from a better author ( even the holy scripture ) calling the church , the pillar and ground of truth ; but that he lik't not the application of them to the church . it seems he can neglect his rule , and make no more reckoning of it than he did of the oral tradition , or preaching of the apostles , when it stands in his way , of comes cross to his purpose . § . . it has been manifested above , that his discourses from the writing of the gospels and epistles are all guilty of the same fault , and antedate our tradition ; and his inferences thence , as levell'd against our tenet , are weaker than water . he makes tradition any thing what he pleases , and will have it do every thing , tho' it was never intended for it , nor ever pretended by us it was able to do it . one while it must bring down the * decrees of councils . another while it must convey * long disputes about divers points ; and the resolution of them ; and this totidem verbis , otherwise the apostles sense might have been lost . it must secure people from being * remov'd from christ's gospel to another ; whereas no man ever held that the galatians were remov'd from christ's gospel by following even the particular tradition or preaching of that apostle ; nor that any particular men , nay churches , might not be remov'd from it even into heathenism , or iudaism , if they deserted it . he expects too , it should secure men from * danger of being deceiv'd ; whereas , supposing them once well-instructed in faith ( and 't is suppos'd to our tradition the church was so ) 't is * self-evident they can never be deceiv'd while they hold to that certain rule ; because that is to hold the same they were instructed in at first . but if all were not well instructed at first , as 't is impossible they should , then they might be deceiv'd , either by deserting tradition , or even by holding to such a tradition ; if , for want of perfect instruction in that raw and unsettled state of christianity , that which they held at first was not perfectly christ's doctrine . nay , he would have it keep even hereticks from * defection , hypocrisie , lying and deceiving : which were a rare tradition indeed , to do such kindnesses , and work such good effects upon those who had deserted it , and would not make use of it ; at least , he would have it keep people from weakness and folly ; which the common assistances of nature and grace will do , after the generality is well settled in that doctrine . for , when all the question is , what the apostles preach't , 't is a madness and folly both to believe some few men , before the universal testimony of the christian church . but he will have tradition still do all the mischiefs imaginable , and writing do all the good ; forgetting , i suppose , that there are some things in st. paul's writings , * which the vnlearned and vnstable wrest , as they do also the other scriptures , to their own destruction . all this while , what is this to the tradition we assert , which begun afterwards ? § . . from these impertinent premises , he infers as impertinent a conclusion , viz. that , * what was deliver'd in scripture contains a compleat rule of the true and genuin faith , as it was at first deliver'd to the church . now , that what 's signify'd by scripture is the same the apostles signify'd by their preaching , is plain sense , and never deny'd ; and , so he needed not have made all this clutter to prove it . but plain sense will do him no service , whose best play 't is to blunder and confound every thing ; let us see then what it is that will. his first words [ what they have therein delivered ] can mean nothing but the sense of scripture ; for that is the thing signify'd or deliver'd by the letter ; and both sides confess , that the sense of scripture is christ's faith. if then we spell his words together , they plainly amount to this , that christ's faith contains a compleat rule of the true and genuin faith , as it was deliver'd at first to the church , that is , faith it self contains a compleat rule to it's self . make sence of this who can . the best i can make of it is , that the conclusion keeps decorum with the premises ; and that he has mighty well imploy'd his labour to keep such a huge pother to infer such a worthy point . § . . i have nothing to do with his objecting some of our writers , but shall come to his * second reason , drawn from the notorious vncertainty of meer tradition ; and that never was any trial made of it but it fail'd , even when it had the greatest advantages . expect gentlemen , by those high and mighty words , he will bring most convincing arguments , to prove that the universal testimony of the church in delivering down those high points of faith is notoriously vncertain , and fail'd in every age , nay , the very first , for then it had the greatest advantages ; the christians having then fresh memories , and being then infallible , since they could not agree to approve false doctrin , as himself told us p. , . for my part i am of his mind , and never knew any other tradition have advantages comparable to what christian tradition had for transmitting the doctrine of faith ; and if he lets you know what those advantages of christian tradition were , and shews them unable to oblige the church to convey christ's doctrin down , he will gain his point : but , if he prevaricates from this necessary duty , he abuses you with fine luke-warm words to no purpose . i do assure you before hand , tho' he talks here of advantages , he has not in his whole sermon mention'd , much less ingenuously inform'd you of any one advantage christian tradition has ; but industriously conceal'd every particular that gives it force . yet , who sees not that without doing this , 't is impossible to impugn it , or deal fairly with his auditory ; for how should you judge of the comparison , without a clear sight of the things compar'd ? § . . he did very prudently , not to insist on the falling of tradition in the law of nature ; for . he must have shewn it fail'd them , and not they fail'd it by deserting it ; which could only be done by proving that had they continu'd to follow it , they could have stray'd into polytheism ; which he can never do , it being evidently impossible . . that , to make good the parallel , he must have prov'd it had as ample an original ( which gives a vast force to testifying authority ) as christian tradition had ; which is equally impossible ; for it had for its source but one single man , adam . . that there were not more powerful motives , nor greater assistances of grace to continue the christian doctrine under the law of grace , than there were under that most imperfect law of nature ; nor more exact discipline in the church of christ , than there was in that loose state : which had been hard points , and altogether impossible even to attempt with any shew of reason . he did very wisely too to wave the opinion of the millenaries , the time of easter and the communicating of infants . for he both knows that every apostolical tradition ( had this last been suppos'd such ) is not necessarily an article of faith ; as also that none of these ( nor yet their contrary ) was a point of christian doctrine preach't and settled unanimously over the world by the apostles . he made account he had a better game to play , by shewing how * tradition fail'd in delivering down the apostles creed . but he might , had he pleas'd , as well have left out that as the others ; for * none of the explainers of tradition ever held or said it was to bring down set form of words , which requir'd application of memory and repetition of them in order ; but only the sense of the first age ( which was christ's true faith ) instill'd after a connatural way by education ; and apt to be exprest in different words , according to different circumces . § . . were it granted him , that * things written ( supposing the letter could be prov'd to be still continu'd absolutely certain ) had the advantage , as to the certainty of conveyance , above things meerly committed to memory and tradition ; yet he is where he was . the point between us still sticks ; that is , whether meer words , expressing in short such sublime spiritual tenets , as are most of the chief articles of christian religion , are so clear to private judgments , nay , to all ( even the vulgar ) that are looking for faith , that they can have that perfect assurance of their true sense , as to build that never-to-be-alter'd assent , call'd faith , upon their understanding them . this is the summ of our difficulty ; this is what we most insist upon , and are perpetually pressing him to shew the security of the method he takes to give us this certainty : i do not mean the certainty of the letter ( about which he keeps such ado ) but of the sense of it in such points , if he thinks any one of them so necessary , that the generality cannot be sav'd without the knowledge of it . this is it , which most imports you to know , if you value the having such grounds for your faith , as ought in true reason to perswade you 't is true that it was taught by christ , or that you are not perhaps dociend , and in an errour all this while . but , not one word of this in the whole sermon . * he argues from god's making choice of writing , when he deliver'd the ten commandments . what means he , or how can he apply this to our question ? are the ten commandments , which are plain honest nature , of as deep and mysterious a sense , as the high points we speak of ? are they so hard to be understood , that writing is not a clear conveyer of god's sense in such matters ? does he hear a great part of the world at variance about the meaning of the ten commandments , as multitudes of hereticks have been wrangling with the church ever since christ's time , about the sense of scripture in those dogmatical points ? were the texts which contain those points as plain to all mankind as the ten commandments are , or as are generally the historical and moral parts of scripture , i should frankly declare , that scripture might in that supposition be a rule of faith , as to the points contained in it ; and that there would be no need of the church for our simply believing , but only to confirm our faith , explain it more throughly , when any part of it , imply'd in some main point , is deny'd ; apply it to our consciences by her preaching , and keep us up to the doctrin it delivers by her government and discipline . so that our controversy-preacher , who has never hit the point hitherto , doubly misses it here in his representing tradition , as held by us needful to supply the defect of clearness in moral passages , that are plain enough of themselves ; and that 't is to bring down set-forms of words , ( which is not its business ) whatever it be those words express . and this shews his mistake in his * second proof ; viz. the restoring the knowledge of the law written by a written book ; which was a way most proper for that end. whence , for the same reason , if there were any deviation from the christian doctrin , which , as contradistinguish't to that other , was writ in the living tables of the hearts of the faithful , the best way of preserving or restoring that , was by the sence writ in the heart of the church at first by the preaching of the apostles , and continu'd ever since , in the manner we have describ'd and prov'd . § . . but , the dr. is got into a track of mistaking , and he cannot get out of it . he brings for his third argument our b. saviour's advice to the iews to search the scriptures . the business was , to know whether he was the true messias ; and the prophecies relating to the messias were matters of fact , or else moral ; and therefore proportion'd to the understanding of the searchers ; and plain enough , so they apply'd but industry & diligence to find them out . are your mysteries of christian faith such ? or , must weak unelevated understandings therefore presume to penetrate the meaning of the scripture in texts of so deep a sense as those mysteries are , because the jews were exhorted to do it , in a matter within the sphere of their capacity ? again , the tradition of the iews was very strong , that a messias should come ; but that this was the person , there was no tradition at all . this was therefore either to be made known by his miracles done to attest it , or to be found out by the applying of diverse particulars to him , and by seeing they all concurr'd in him . and did ever any of us pretend , that tradition was to bring down such particulars ? if he says we did , he must shew where ! if he confesses we did not , he must confess withal , his text and discourse here is nothing to the purpose . he turns it off from the admonition of searching the scriptures to know the true messias , to the knowing whether he were a temporal prince ; whereas the tradition of his kingdom 's being purely spiritual , was neither vniversally held , taught , nor deliver'd at first by the first founders of that law , nor settled in the hearts of the synagogue , or the universality of the jews in the beginning , as christ's doctrin was by the unanimous preaching of the apostles in the hearts of such a numerous multitude as was the christian church of the first age. which being evidently so , what reason was there our saviour should refer them to such a slight , or rather no-tradition , and not to the written prophecies , in which he was foretold ? or , what consequence can be drawn hence to the prejudice of christian tradition , which , and which only , we defend ; and which ( as was fitting ) is so strongly supported , that it is impossible to find a parallel to equal or come nigh it . and unless this be done , all his arguments against it stand thus , a lesser force cannot do an effect , therefore a greater cannot . an odd piece of logick , but suitable to all the rest . § . . his fourth reason represents tradition to be meerly verbal , and not practical . that it ( alone ) is to bring down particular matters of fact , or historical passages ; nay , the speculative whimsies of the old heathen phylosophers . none of which was ever pretended ; and , so , all his discourse runs upon his old and oft-repeated errour in the true meaning of tradition . § . . the reasons he gives for the certainty of the books of scripture , we allow to a tittle ; and we add to them one , over and above , which is better than them all ; viz. the obligation and care of the church ; which , as she ever held the scriptures to contain the same doctrin which was preach't to her at first by christ's order , and that it was a most incomparable instrument for the edification of her children , the abetment of faith , the salvation of mankind , nay , an instruction to her self too in thousands of most excellent , most useful , and most enlightning passages ; so she could not but look upon her self as most highly oblig'd to preserve the letter from any material alteration ; and yet more particularly , in case any hereticks went about to corrupt it in any texts ( nay , coma's or pointings ) that concerned the main articles of christianity , which they sometimes attempted ; the doctrin of christ in her breast , could easily direct them to set the text right again , and that with absolute certainty . nor does any say , or so much as suppose any book of scripture is indeed lost , as he hints , p. . only , upon his saying , that * the scripture we have now , contains all the divine revelations ; i us'd the right of a disputant , and put him to make good what he says , and to prove he has the absolute certainty he pretended to , that no book was lost , without which he could have no such certainty those pieces of scripture we have now , did contain all the divine revelations ; which , by his grounds , denying any certainty but what might admit of deceit , i was sure he was not able to perform . § . . nor do i at all doubt of the influence of divine grace , or of the internal satisfaction which good souls , who are already faithful , ( or as st. thomas of aquin cited by him , expresses himself , have the habit of faith , by which they have a right iudgment of those things which are agreeable to that vertue ) receive concerning scripture and christ's doctrin ; or that they confirm men more than demonstration does . arguments have the nature of preliminaries to faith , or searches after it ; but the inward satisfaction that that heavenly doctrin rectifies and purifies the soul , and levels it directly towards the attainment of it's last blissful end , has the nature of a kind of experience , and , as it were , possession and enjoyment of what humane arguments , previous to faith , had been looking after , and contending for . i suppose , gentlemen , the dr. brought in this discourse to prepare your minds , by a shew of piety , to rest appay'd with any slight reason that falls short of concluding , and breed in you a prejudice against the necessity of his producing any such arguments , as place christian faith above possibility of falshood . but , he is as much out of the way here as he was in all the rest ; for , notwithstanding god's grace , and this internal satisfaction , which is proper to good souls who are believers already , the church and her pastours must be furnish'd with solid and unanswerable reasons , to satisfie perfectly those , both of the lowest and most acute capacity , who are looking after faith , that the doctrin she professes was taught by christ ; and , to evince and defend its truth , in that particular , against the most subtile adversaries ; which cannot be done , unless the reasons which we , as controvertists , bring , set it above possibility of falshood , that christ taught it . we cannot put god's grace and our internal satisfaction into syllogisms when we are disputing . nor does god intend by his grace to prejudice the true nature himself has given us , which is reason ; but to perfect and elevate it . 't is against reason , that in preliminaries to faith , which are the objects of natural reason , those who are capable to penetrate the force of reasons , should assent beyond the motive ; for , as far as it is beyond the motive , 't is without any motive ; that is , without any reason ; and , therefore ( whatever often happens through the imperfection of creatures ) such an irrational assent could never have been intended by god. whence , as it belongs to infinite goodness to give those who sincerely seek for truth , the grace to embrace it ; so it belongs to infinite wisdom to lay such means to arrive at truth , ( that is , in our case , such a rule of faith ) as both evince it 's truth to those who are capable , according to the most exact methods of true reason ; and withal , perfectly * secure those from errour who follow that rule , let them be as weak as they will. if then we are bound to embrace christian faith as a truth , and profess it to be so , it must be indeed such ; and therefore the grounds left us by god must be of that nature , as to prove or conclude it to be such : and , if dr. st. have no such grounds that what he holds is really christ's doctrin , he ought not to handle or preach controversie ; since he must necessarily disgrace and weaken christian faith , when he is to credit and establish it . nay , he ought not to pretend he has that most firm , and most strongly-supported assent , call'd faith , which depends necessarily on the certainty that it was taught by christ , but candidly yield he has opinion only in that point ; not an vnalterable belief it is true , but only a good conceit or hope that it is so , or may be so : too weak a prop to sustain it's truth , as it leans on christ or his apostles , having taught it ; or to settle the basis of all our spiritual life . § . . and now let 's apply this discourse to his ground or rule , by means of which he is to be thus assur'd , or able to assure you of the truth of those controverted points , which you hear so warmly disputed in the world ; and which it so much imports you to be satisfy'd in . 't is scripture's letter ( in texts that are thought to relate to those points ) as understood or interpreted by himself , or any other private judgment . what he has then to do , is to make out with absolute certainty , that this method of arriving at the knowledge of christ's true doctrin , as to those points , cannot be deceitful and erroneous . otherwise , 't is unavoidable , his faith , and all christian faith , no better grounded , may be false , and , by consequence , is not true. he will tell you twenty fine stories , and give you many pretty words of it's being sufficiently certain , morally certain , that it has such assurance as men accept for other matters , &c. but ask him smartly and closely , if any of these certainties or assurances are impossible to be false , and he must not , nor will deny it : for , should he say it , he must pretend he could not be deceiv'd in his understanding those texts right , which he could not do without professing infallibility in that particular . observe , i beseech you , where the stress of the whole question lyes . 't is in this , whether this ground or method of his to be assur'd of faith , is able to prove it to have been truly and indeed taught by christ , so as it was not possible it should be otherwise . by this test , if you examin the very good-grounds for the certainty of his protestant faith , which he promises you here in his preface , you will find evidently he only gives you very good words instead of very good grounds ; and that , whatever he produces , whether he quotes or argues , he will never vouch them to be so certain , but deceit and errour may possibly consist with them . he will complain , that 't is an unreasonable expectation , because the nature of the things will not bear it . and what 's this , but to tell you in other terms , that there neither is any absolute certainty of faith , nor can be any : which bids fair for atheism , unless interest satisfies the will , and by it the reason . by his speaking there of the main points in controversie between us , i perceive he is running from the whole business in hand , and seeking to shelter himself , and hide his head in a wilderness . but he shall not shift the question thus , and fall to ramble into endless disputes . himself confest ( second letter , p. . ) our question was about the general grounds of our faith , and not the particular certainty as to this or that doctrin , and i joyn'd issue with him upon the same . to run to particular points while that 's a settling , is to put the conclusions before the premises ; and , to go about to ascertain things depending intirely on a method or rule , without ascertaining that method or rule first , is to begin at the wrong end , and make the cart draw the horse . § . . i owe him yet an answer to st. austin . he alledges that father ( p. . ) whose testimony says only , that the gospels are to be look't upon as christ's own hand-writing , and that he directed the order and manner of the evangelist's writing ; which only signifies they were divinely inspir'd in both : which none denies ; nor has this any influence upon the point in hand . he could have quoted you other places out of him , if he had pleas'd , which come up to it fully ; and i shall supply his backwardness with doing it my self . quaerendi dubitatio , &c. ( * says that learned and holy father ) the doubt of enquiry ought not to exceed the bounds of catholick faith. and , because many hereticks use to draw the exposition of the divine scriptures to their own opinion , which is against the faith of the catholick disciplin ; therefore — ante tractationem hujus libri catholica fides explicanda est . before the handling this book , the catholick faith is to be explained . where dr. st's sober enquirer is curb'd and restrain'd in his licentious search of his faith in scripture , by the catholick faith , had ( it seems ) some other way ; for , were his faith to be had meerly by searching scripture for it , with what sense ought he to be restrain'd , while he was in the way to faith : to restrain one who is in the right way , is to hinder him from going right , or perhaps to put him out of his way . again , tho' those heretical opinions were both against the true sense of scripture , and against tradition too ; yet , had he held scripture the rule , he should rather have said they were against the true signification of scripture's letter , than against the faith of the catholick discipline . besides , if catholick faith was to be explain'd before they came to handle scripture , how was scripture the rule for all to come to faith , when as faith was to be had ( nay , well understood by the explanation of it ) antecedently , lest they might otherwise fall into heresie ? and , in another place , speaking of a false pointing of the letter , made by the arians , to abet their heresie , he confutes them thus ; * ( sed hoc — but this is to be refuted by the rule of faith , by which we are instructed before-hand in the equality of the trinity . had this rule of faith been held by him to be the letter of scripture , he would have had recourse to some exacter copy , correcting their faulty one ; and , so have born up still to that rule : but 't is evident he does not thus . he makes then the sense of the church or tradition the rule , both to know our faith , and also to correct the faultiness of the letter . whether this sutes better with the drs. principles or ours , is left to your selves or any man of reason to judg and determine . § . . thus comes off this famous sermon which makes such a noise , for a confutation of the traditionary doctrin . the sum of it is , . the dr. takes no notice of the main question betwixt us , which is about the absolute-certainty that our faith is truly christian or taught by christ , nor attempts to shew his is thus certain ; but preaches to you stedfastness and a well-setled resolution to continue in it , yet avoids the giving you any grounds to make you stedfast and well-setled in that resolution . . he conceals every advantage christian tradition has , or is pretended to have ; that is , he would perswade you to hate it , before you see it , and to compare it to scripture before you know what kind of thing it is ; which is yet worse , he shews you another thing for it , and through all his discourse pretends 'tis it , which is nothing at all to it , but utterly unlike it ; viz. particular traditions , both before and after that vniversal tradition ( only which we defend ) was setled . . he fixes a false date upon the beginning of the tradition we speak of , that the vast source of it , which ( with the circumstances annext ) was able to continue the current strong , and the derivation of christ's doctrin both certain and perpetual , might not be reflected on . to deform it the more , he makes it meerly verbal , as if it were nothing but the telling some dry story , by surpressing it's practicalness , in which consists it's chiefest vertue . . he hides from your consideration all the most incomparable , and most powerful motives which enforce its continuance , and oblige the church never to forsake the first deliver'd doctrin . . he never regards , even in those particular traditions , whether they fail'd the persons , or the persons fail'd them ; but supposes still the tradition was in all the fault , without attempting to shew it . . he would have you imagin the church in the first age ( consisting of pastors and people ) lost all their memory and grace too , assoon as ever the apostles were dead , lest it should be held able and willing to testify christ's doctrine to the next age , which by parity would establish it a rule for all succeeding ages to the end of the world. . he mingles known opinions , and which he holds himself not to have been universally deliver'd at first , with points which we all hold to have been first deliver'd . then , as to the matter of object of tradition , which , and only which we pretend it is to bring down with absolute certainty , and deliver clearly ( viz. the dogmatical or controverted articles of christian faith , which are practical ) he never mentions it at all with any distinction , but tumbles and confounds it with all things imaginable for which it was never pretended ; and puts upon tradition a hundred abus'd tasks as never thought of by us , so improper , & oft times impossible in themselves ; as , the deriving down the ten commandments , creeds , decrees of councils , set forms of words , an infinity of particular passages not at all practical , nay , whole epistles and gospels , schemes of doctrin taught by heathen philosophers ; messages which use to be sent by long letters ; historical narrations or actions ; and in a word , every thing he could invent but the right one ( viz. those controverted points of faith ) tho' it lay just before him : the very nature of controversy , which we are about , determining our discourses to those points , and nothing else : this is his general view of scripture and tradition , as to the way of conveying down matters of faith. he means a general view , which misrepresents and blinds your sight of it in every particular : in a word , there is much of reading , conduct and wit in his sermon ; but wholly misemploy'd to speak as handsomely as he could to no purpose , and to miss the whole point in question with a great deal of plausibility . in which , amongst his other great abilities , justly acknowledg'd to be excellent , consists his most considerable talent and dexterity . § . . so he ends his sermon with good advice to you to follow christ's heavenly doctrin in your lives and conversations . which , as he worthily presses upon you , so i shall heartily pray that god would vouchsafe you his grace to follow it . i am far from blaming his or any one's preaching the wholsome moral doctrines of christianity , and laying it home to men's consciences : but i ought not , if concern'd , to suffer , that , when he pretends to speak to your understandings , and establish you in faith , he should bubble his auditory with forty impertinent pretences , injurious to his candid adversaries and to truth , as well as to your selves ; please and delude your fancies with a great shew of his reading , and little conjectural reflexions tack't prettily together ; and , in the mean time , send you away empty of knowing any ground which may render you , or any , absolutely certain , that what you hold is indeed christ's doctrin ; that is , any ground of perfect security ; that is , cannot but be indeed his doctrin ; without being which it ought not be held true. whereas yet , 't is only this certainty which can give his or any other sermon it 's full force and energy . your servant in christ , j. s. advertisement , the d. & d. catholick letters , are to be sold by m. turner at the lamb in high-holbourn . the fifth catholick letter in reply to dr. stillingfleet's ( pretended ) answer to about the fortieth part of i. s's catholick letters , addrest to all impartial readers . by iohn sergeant . published with allowance . london , printed , and sold by matthew turner , at the lamb in high-holborn , . the preface . addrest to the most partial of dr. stillingfleet's friends . gentlemen , when a person is incomparably qualify'd above all others in any particular ; men use to look upon him as a pattern in that kind . i will not say dr st. has manifested himself to be such an exemplar in every respect that can be an ingredient of an ill controvertist . this is yet to be shewn ; and pretence without proof signifies nothing : only i may justly fear that , while you are reading my reply to his answer ( as he calls it ) to my catholick letters , you may be apt to judge that i am rather framing an idea of what human weakness maintaining an insupportably-ill cause may be obnoxious to , than giving a iust character of his performances ; and that , 't is absolutely impossible that a man of his parts should be guilty of such and so many incredible failings . i acknowledge with all due respect to him , his great endowments ; and am heartily glad , in truth 's behalf , i am engag'd with an adversary to whom no personal insufficiency can be objected . nothing could make the victory come more clear to the cause i am defending ; and the more dr st. is rais'd above the common levell of writers , the more evidently it will appear that nothing but the pure force of truth could drive a man of his abilities to such unparallel'd shifts and subterfuges , to palliate that errour the patronage of which he had so unfortunately espous'd . nor is it to be wonder'd at , that even the best wit in the world should be baffled while it maintains such a cause : for , were it some errour of an ordinary size that he defended , or were the truth which he opposes of a trivial importance , rhetorick and misus'd wit might perhaps bear it down , and gain a seeming victory over it : but when the sole point is , whether even what we all hold to have been the faith taught by christ , may for ought any man living knows , be perhaps none of his ; and so , a falshood and a lying story ; 't is not to be imagin'd that any tricks of human skill can prevail against a point of that sacred concern . it belongs to the wisdom of our good god , to settle those things most firmly , which are of the greatest weight ; and therefore the certainty we are to have that christ was indeed the author of the faith we profess , being such an incomparable good , and the basis of all our spiritual building , must be by far more unremovably establisht , and more surely plac't above a tottering contingency , than the strongest pillars of this material world ; whence , all attempts to undermine , and weaken this certainty ( which as shall be seen is the chief endeavour of dr st. ) must be proportionably weak and ruinous . to give you a map of his main performances taken from his book in short , and prov'd upon him in this reply . first , whereas 't is the principal duty of a controvertist ( especially , writing about the grounds of faith ) to justify , that is to prove faith to be true ; the dr is so far from doing , or allowing this good office to be done to faith , that he maintains the direct contrary . nay , he will not grant so much honour to any particular point of faith ( and our whole faith is made up of such particulars ) as to let it enjoy even his own kind of absolute certainty , tho' that falls short of proving any thing to be above possibility of falshood or ( which is the same ) true ; but says over and over in perfectly equivalent terms that the sense which himself , or any man ( or church either ) has of scripture in particular points , may not be the true sense of it ; that is , may not be christ's doctrin ; which if it be not , it may not be true ; and is it possible that what may not be true , can at the same time be true ; that is , is it possible that truth may not be its self . secondly , we are writing controversy , and consequently treating of faith precisely according to a particular consideration belonging to it , which is , by what way 't is with absolute certainty derivable from christ. this has been repeated and eccho'd to him over and over even to surfeit . this was the scope and occasion of the conference . this is exprest in my short discourse against his way of having certainty of christ's doctrin ; and clearly aim'd at in mr g's demonstration . nay , this has been told him fifteen years ago in errour non-plust , p. . where i in these plainest words thus stated the question . [ it being then agreed amongst us all that what christ and his apostles taught is god's word , or his will , and the means to salvation ; all that is to be done by us as to matters of faith , is to know with absolute certainty what was the first-taught doctrin , or christ's sense ; and whatever can thus assure us of that , is deservedly call'd , the rule of faith. ] yet , tho' we should trumpet this into his ears every moment , he is still deaf , and never takes notice of it , or regards it in his whole reply ; nay , he diverts from it with all the hast he can make , when our express words force him to it . to do this with the greater formality and solemnity , he entitles his book , [ a discourse concerning the nature and grounds of the certainty of faith. ] which expression is so large , that it leaves it indifferent for him , under that head , either to treat of faith as 't is in its self , viz. as 't is divine ; or of faith as 't is controverted between us ; that is of our faith as 't is ascertainable to us to be christ's true doctrin . and , that we may see this was done by design , when he comes to determine the sense of those equivocal words , he pitches upon that meaning of them which is quite beside our purpose , and nothing at all to our question : viz. upon christ's faith as 't is divine ; which is not disputed but agreed to be such ; and this , whether the faith comes to our knowledge by tradition attesting it ; or by an absolutely certain interpretation of scripture ; and the sole question is , whether the tradition of the church or the letter of scripture interpreted by any way his principles afford us , be the more certain and more clear way to give us christ's sense , or ( which is the same ) our faith. how untoward a procedure is it then , to stand quoting our school-divines against me , whenas the objects of controversy and of school-divinity are so vastly different : the one treating of faith as made known to the world at first by divine-revelation ; the other , of the way to know now what was at first divinely reveal'd , by human motives inducing men to the acceptation of it of for the same doctrin . hence , also , when he was to bring arguments which should evince , by his principles , that the faith held now is the same that was reveal'd at first , to avoid that impossible task , he falls unseasonably to alledge god's grace and invisible moral qualifications : which , tho' absolutely requisit in many regards to faith as 't is formally divine ; yet are they most improper to be alledg'd in controversy against an adversary , for a proof that what he holds is the first-taught doctrine ; since only god himself can know whether the alledger or any man else has those supernatural means or no. to put a stop once for all to this impertinent topick , and to shew how he trifles while he quotes our school-divines , i alledge first , that the plain state of the question lately given , which runs through our whole controversy , has forestall'd all he can object from them ; unless he can shew that they stated the question , and treated of faith under the same consideration , as we do in our controversy ; which i am certain he cannot instance in so much as any one of them : and in case they do not state it after the same manner we do in our controversy , with what sense can it be pretended that i contradict them , or they me , whenas we do not speak of the same point , and a contradiction must be ad idem ? secondly , our divines bring motives of credibility to prove christian faith to be divine and true ; such as are miracles , the conversion of the world , the sufferings of the martyrs , &c. very good ▪ would dr st. reply , these might prove the faith profest in those times to be true : but you have alter'd that faith since , and therefore you are to prove that the faith you profess now is the same which was of old . so that , out of the very nature of our circumstances , this is the only point between us , and the main business of our controversy about the rule of faith , or the ground that can justify its invariable conveyance downwards ; for , this being made out by us , all the rest is admitted . thirdly , hence both the protestants and we agree , that that is to be called the rule of faith * by which the knowledge of christ's doctrin is convey'd certainly down to us at the distance of so many ages from the time of its first delivery . does any of our school-divines take the words [ rule of faith ] in this sense ? not one . they content themselves with what serves for their purpose , and call that a rule of faith which barely contains faith. fourthly , our only point being to know assuredly the former faith by a certain conveyer , how must this be made out to those who are enquiring what is christ's true doctrin ? must we bid them rely on their private interpretations of scripture ? no surely ; for this is the way proper to all hereticks . must we bring them the publick interpretation of it by the church ? this might do the deed so we could manifest this by some knowledges those candidates are already possess'd of , and did admit . must we then , at the first dash , alledge the publick interpretation of the church divinely assisted ? what effect can this have upon those who do not yet hold that tenet ; and , consequently , how can this be a proper argument to convince them ? it remains then that we can only begin with their unelevated reason , by alledging the church's human-authority or tradition ( the most vast and best-qualify'd testimony to convey down a notorious matter of fact , of infinite . concern , that ever was since the world was created ) for a certain conveyer of faith from the time that those motives of credibility , proving the then ▪ faith to be divine , were on foot . and , if so , why not with the same labour , and for the same reasons , to bring it down from the very beginning of the church ? and if we must alledge it , are we not oblig'd , as disputants , to bring such arguments , to prove that authority certain , as do conclude that point ? if they do not , what are they good for in a controversy , or what signifies a proof that concludes nothing ? this is the sum of my procedure and my reasons for it in short ; which are abundantly sufficient to shew to any man of sense , that , while the doctor objects our school-divines to one in my circumstances , his hand is all the while in the wrong box , as will more at large be shewn hereafter . he might have seen cited by me in my clypeus septemplex , two writers of great eminency , viz. father fisher , the most learned controvertist of his age here in england ; and a modern author , dominicus de sancta trinitate , whose book was printed at rome it self , and appprov'd by the magister sacri palatii , who ( to omit divers others ) do abet each particular branch of my doctrin ; which renders insignificant all his pretence of my singularity , and my opposition to the catholick controvertists . but to leave off this necessary digression and proceed . as our doctor has shuffled off the whole question by taking the word [ faith ] as treated of by us , in a wrong sense , so he behaves himself as ill in every particular of the rest of his title ; viz. in his discoursing of his pretended [ certainty ] of faith , and of the [ nature ] and the [ grounds ] of it . he cannot be won to give us any account how his grounds influence the points of faith with the absolute certainty he pretended . and as for the certainty it self , ( the only word of his title that is left ) he never shews how any one article ( even though it be most fundamentall ) is absolutely secur'd from being false or heretical , by any rule , ground or way he assigns us . nor can i imagin any thing could tempt him to so strange extravagances , but the streight he was in , being put to shew his faith absolutely certain ; and his despondency ever to perform an vndertaking , which he foresaw was , by his shallow principles , impossible to be atchiev'd . and hence he was necessitated to all these crafty shifts , and wiles , and all those vnsound methods which , like so many complicated diseases , affect his languishing discourse and dying cause ; as shall be laid open in the progress of this discourse , and , particularly , in the concluding section . i shall only instance at present in two or three material ones , which , like the grain in wood , run through his whole work. for example : when any question is propounded which grows too troublesome , he never pursues that game but flushes up another , and flies at that , 'till the true point be out of sight . tell him our point is whether the high mysteries and other spiritual articles of faith be clear in scripture ; he will never answer directly , but runs to points necessary to salvation . ask him if the tenet of christ's godhead be necessary to salvation ; no direct answer can we get to that neither , tho' it be the very point we instanc't in . press him that there are no unnecessary points ; and , therefore , that all are necessary for the generality of the church , he cries alas for me ! but answers nothing . ask him what points he accounts necessary ? he is perfectly mute : 'till at length he shuffles about so , that the true question which is about a rule of faith , comes to be chang'd into a rule of manners ; and those high spiritual points which are most properly christian , and could only be known to the world by divine revelation , are thrown aside ; and moral ones put in their place , which were known to many even of the heathen writers . and this is the best sense i can pick out of a man who affects to wrap up those tenets of his , and their consequences , which he thinks would not be for his credit to discover , in mysterious reserves . the like shuffling he uses in the notion of certainty , or any other that is of concern in our present dispute ; for he is a very impartial man , and treats them all alike . ask him then , if faith be absolutely certain by his grounds ? he will not say it , but more than once hints the contrary . are the grounds of it at least absolutely certain , tho' he makes them such ill-natur'd things that ( contrary to all other grounds in the world ) they keep their absolute certainty to themselves , and will let faith have none of it ? yes ; he 'll tell you they are ; provided that by absolute certainty you will mean such a certainty as will permit those grounds may be false , and faith built upon them much more : for we are to know 't is a maxim with him that the absolute certainty he allows his grounds is possible to be false , and he allows a less degree of certainty to particular points than to his grounds , so that faith may much more easily be false then his grounds may , though they may be false too . and all this out of an antipathy i suppose , to infallibility , because the abominable papists own it ; as if mankind did not use to say they are infallibly certain of some things before the papists were born . what then is this absolute certainty ? is it meerly built on his apprehension or thinking it so ? no , but upon such an evidence as the thing is capable of . very good . is any thing in the world capable to be known ? 't is a strange paradox to deny it ; and yet if he grants it he cannot escape meeting with this bug-bear infallibility : for , if the knowledge ( as it is ) be as the thing is , and the thing be infallibly as it self is , the knowledge is infallibly as the thing is . here gentlemen you may expect he will turn it off with some scornfull irony , for he never in his life answer'd any such pressing reason any other way . but the argument will not be laught out of countenance ; and therefore if infallibility must be allow'd , he is to shew us what harm would come to faith if the previous grounds of it , as to our knowledge , were thus certain ? none at all . but then , alas ! his credit and his cause will go to wrack ; for no shew or shadow of any such argument can his superficial principles allow us : and therefore no absolute certainty will he yield to the grounds to know christ's faith , but such a one as permits all mankind may be deceiv'd in them , and much more in knowing what is his doctrin it self after we have those grounds : for absolute certainty shall not mean infallibility , let us say and prove what we will. however i 'le venture to ask him once more ; since ( as he says ) the thing , notwithstanding the absolute certainty we have of its being true , may yet be false , let us suppose ( as 't is not impossible , there being some degree of contingency in it ) that it happens to be false ; can he in that case have absolute certainty that a falshood is true ? here it goes hard with him , nor can all his old heathen philosophers , he so oft recurrs to , in the least help him out . he has but one refuge that i know of to sly to ; and that is to use some trick to shuffle away from absolute certainty , and say that he meant by it sufficient certainty , and that he 'l stick to when all his new notions fail him . for absolute certainty he was unluckily forc't upon by mr g. tho' he had no acquaintance with it , or friendship for it ; but his inclination and heart was for sufficient certainty . and good reason , for in the sanctuary of that common word he 's as safe as in an enchanted castle . those scurvy particularizing expressions are tell-tales , and by their lavishness are apt to discover sense or nonsense ; but this keeps aloof , and by signifying nothing at all determinately , is past the reach of any confute . but if you tell him 't is a relative word , and put him upon proving that his possibly-false certainty is sufficient to conclude it to be true , that any point of his faith is the same that our divine master taught the world , he 'l no more hear or mind you than he did me when i alledg'd that a rule and ground were relative words too ; and , therefore , must communicate their certainty to all the particular points they relate to . and , if you continue to press him hard with such cramp-questions , he 'l tell you he 's not at leasure , having his foot in the stirrup to take a long iourney as far as trent : so being bankrupt of reason , he withdraws his effects thence to trade more fortunately ( as he hopes ) in citations ; and finding himself beaten at tradition he gets letters of reprizall from his new logick to revenge himself on us in combating the tridentin council ; to which he will receive an answer when he first shews us that he stood firm in his own principles at home , ere he took such a leap beyond sea ; and satisfies the world how it is possible that a man who confesses he has no absolute certainty of christian faith , can be sufficiently qualify'd either to prove any tenet of his own , or disprove any tenet of others to be truly christian. in a word , his chief art is to cloak his arts , and he is a great master at it . his aim is to make his discourses run plausibly , whatever it costs his credit : which he hopes is so great now with the inferiour clergy , that , let him be as prodigall of it as he will , it can never be exhausted . the telling of his tale smoothly will take much with those readers who dwell in the middle story : but strip his discourse of all those needfull ornaments and assistances , and 't is plain impertinent nonsense in cuerpo . for , not any thing like a solid ground is found in his whole book : the manufacture and contrivance of it is all in all . it may perhaps be thought by some that i am too downright with him in divers of my expressions ; but i desire them to consider that i do not use him half so rudely as some of the church of england have done ; and besides , that in doing that little i did , i do but write after his own copy ; and fall very short too of imitating him , as appears by his angry viper , venomous froth , gall , spleen , folly , malice , &c. his faults are great , and many ; and must i not name them when i am oblig'd to lay them open ? if i must , the very names we give to great faults will be harsh words , let me do what i can . yet i have moderated them as much as the sense of what i ow'd to christian faith would give me leave . besides as my genius leads me to carry it friendly with unpretended honesty tho' erring ; so it inclines me to show less respect to a man , who as i see plainly by a constant experience , has none at all for truth , but practices and pursues all over study'd insincerity . i have one request , or rather a fair offer to make the dr. which is , that , since it is so mortifying to a man who , ( as appears by all his former writings ) aims to reduce truth to evidence and principles , to be still task't in laying open such multitudes of his shifts and prevarications ▪ ( for i do think in my conscience i have not either in this preface , or my following book even hinted a quarter of them ) he would condescend that we may each of us chuse two worthy gentlemen ; who , leaving out the question of right , may examin only matter of fact , viz. which of us uses indirect tricks and stratagems to avoid the force of truth , and which of us candidly pursues it ; and let them after a mutuall protestation upon their honours , that they will pass an impartial verdict , give under their hands the particulars in which each of us have notoriously fail'd or falter'd : i mean that such faults , whether of commission or omission , should be noted as may appear to be wilfully disingenuous or affectedly insincere , and not meerly humane oversights . this fair and equal offer , gentlemen , will exceedingly conduce to your and all our readers satisfaction ; and dr st's accepting it is the only way to do right to his credit , which stands impeacht of using such unworthy methods : and your pressing him to it , will be both a iustification of your friendship and esteem for him , and be also received as a very great favour by your friend and servant in christ , j. s. errata . page . r. unconsonantly . p. . l. . nor did . p. . l. . of the approvers . p. . l. . can be competent . p. . l. . thence embrace . p. . l. . c●rinthians . p. . l. . disparate . p. . l. . may as much . p. . l. . them not to . p. . l. . . is got . p. . l. . not at all . p. . l. . so plain and easy . p. . l. . recurr to . ibid l. ult . censures . p. . l. ● . any decree . p. ● . l. . . may seem . p. . l. . following it , then . p. . l. . argument good . p. . l. . stand yet in . p. . l. . shewing it . p. . l. . of my words . p. . ( in the margent ) see above . p. . introduction . . in his preamble dr. st. according to his usual way of confuting , quarrels every word he meets with , and gives every circumstance an invidious turn . this looks brisk ; but how weak and flat he is in his arguments shall be seen hereafter . in the mean time the dimmest eye may discern how impertinent this is to our dispute , and to the certainty of his grounds of faith , nay to his own title-page . i am sorry to see him so much out of humour , as to run against , and strike at every thing near him , tho' it lay not in his way . but sinking men , when their case is desperate , must catch at straws having no firmer support at hand to keep them from drowning . first , he wonders why mr. g. did not defend his own cause himself . he was at that very time call'd upon to attend his majesties service ; and it was a duty owing to truth and our sovereign , as well as charity and friendship to him , that some body should step in to supply for him . ly , why must j. s. be the man ? because it was desir'd of him ; and , he was besides prest to it by many judicious persons ; as one who had , in their opinion , and by the dr's own tacit confession by his silence for years , unanswerably overthrown his principles in error non-plust ; and , besides , he was injur'd , provok'd , and in a manner challeng'd by him in his second letter , by his quoting and abetting haeresis blacloana , which was writ designedly against him ; and by pretending the way of controversy he follow'd , was pelagainism . now it belong'd properly to i. s. to clear this by his own pen ; and ( whatever the dr's intention was ) i am to thank him he has put a force upon me to vindicate my self in english , which i have done in * two latin treatises above ten years ago , to the satisfaction of my judges and superiors , and the farther illustration and abetment of what i had written in my former books . ly , he quarrels the titles of my catholick letters , and that no one church of the christian world ever own'd it . and does he in his great learning think the church is to own , or prescribe every one their particular methods of handling controversy ? all she is to do is to deliver to us christ's doctrine ; and then leave it to the learning of her controvertists to take such methods to defend it as best sutes with their circumstances , and the exigencies of the persons they are to treat with . are all the * principles dr. st. laid ? is all his discourse at the conference with mr. g ? is his avow'd position , that every sober enquirer may without the churches help find out all necessary points of faith , own'd by any one catholick church ? i know not what that great conventicle of geneva may do , or what the new one that is now erecting here by the * triumvirate of the church of england's reformers , mentioned in the scurrilous reply to the bishop of oxford , may do in time , when they haue brought about their projects ; but i am confident he shall never find any one catholick church that ever own'd diverse of his principles and that position . ly , but why did i not call those letters [ roman-catholick ] but [ catholick . ] he tells the reader with much assuredness i durst not do so , because i had not forgotten how hardly i had lately escaped censure at rome . now , another man whose reason was free and undisturb'd , would think i should rather have done this , in gratitude to their allowing and accepting my defence upon such honourable terms as a kind admonition , that mindfull of the apostles words , [ i am a debtor both to the greeks and to the barbarians , both to the wise and to the unwise , ] i would explain my self as to some passages , which were * somewhat obscure from the * ambiguity of a word . my true reason , if he will needs have it , was , because dr. st's private-spirited rule was common to all hereticks ; and the rule i defended was quite opposite to it , and therefore catholick ; and this , even in the sense of many eminent protestants , who pretend to universal tradition as the rule , to ascertain their interpretations of scripture ; to whom the name of [ roman ] is not so agreeable . . the dr. will still be leaving the road-way of the question , tho' ( which i am sorry to see ) he runs himself into the bryars most wofully . so he tells the reader i ought to have let him alone , and not have writ against him , because i have done next to nothing for my self , and seem to have forgotten the answer to my sure-footing , meaning dr. tillotson's rule of faith. yes , quite forgotten it without doubt ! about two months after that answer came out , i publish'd my letter of thanks . in which i laid open how he had mistaken still the main point in controversy ; how he had willfully perverted my sense all along , and falsify'd my words in many places ; nay , inserted some of his own , and then impugn'd what himself had disingenuously added ; i defended my testimonies , and reply'd to the most concerning passages . then , observing that his whole answer proceeded on a false ground , viz. that there was no rule of faith but what left it under the scandalous ignominy of being perhaps false , that is , indeed no rule at all ; therefore to stubb-up his shallow-rooted work from its foundations , i writ another treatise [ faith uindicated ] in which i demonstrated from many heads that * the motives as laid in second causes by gods providence to light mankind in their way to faith , or the ( rule of faith , ( and consequently faith it self , in what it depends on that rule , that is , as to us , ) must be impossible to be false ; and * apply'd it home against dr st. and dr. tillotson at the end of that treatise ; and thence shew'd that his book could have no just claim to any farther answer , and that the branches must necessarily be held wither'd and sapless when the root was once shown to be rotten . nor content with this , i follow'd on my blow and penn'd a short discourse , entitled the method to arrive at satisfaction in religion ; comprizing , in short , the strength of sure footing ; and reduc't each branch of it to self-evident propositions , which force humane nature to assent to their verity . farther it was not possible to go . yet all this , my candid adversaries , who must not acknowledge it for fear of giving under their hands they owe a debt they can never pay , slubber over with assuring their readers , i have done next to nothing in my own defence . it seems that to talk triflingly is with them to do all ; and principles and clearest evidences , are either nothing at all , or next to it . . what reply made dr. tillotson ? why , he had a mind to print his sermons ; and , knowing his auditory were his best-inclin'd friends , in a preface ( forsooth ) to them , he gives a slight touch at each of those treatises . he endeavours to clear himself of two of his many insincerities , and ( oh wonderfull ! ) with about a dozen iests quite confutes three books . i would not let him rest so , nor enjoy even this empty vapour ; but gave a full and distinct reply to his preface in reason against raillery . i instructed his shallow logick , utterly unacquainted with the first principles of our vnderstanding , with which nature imbues even the rudest . i prov'd against him evidently those few of his many faults of which he had labour'd to purge himself . i laid open the folly and weakness of his first principle ; and accus'd him severely of making both christian faith and the tenet of a deity uncertain ; and this by vertue of that very first principle of his : and , out of my zeal for such dear concerns , i charg'd home upon him those two shamefull tenets by many arguments . since which time he has not reply'd a word , but has sate very contentedly under that heaviest scandal full fifteen years ; and now he stands indebted to me for an answer to all those treatises . and i have been so civil a creditor as not once to call upon him severely for such considerable arrears , till dr. st. would needs have me to be his debtor , and so oblig'd me to make up the accounts between us . now , to have done all this , is , if a man of dr. st's sincerity may be trusted , to do next to nothing , and not to have defended my self . . but since he will have it so , let 's see what dr. st. himself , who objects this , has done to defend himself . he undertook to write principles for his protestant religion . i shew'd in * errour nonplust he had not laid one for that particular end . i manifested that he was guilty of the most weak piece of illogical procedure that ever mortal man stumbled upon ; by making almost all his conclusions to be self-evident and beyond needing any proof ; and his principles which should prove them , and so ought to be clearer than they , obscure or false . * i shew'd the grounds of his discourse to be plain contradictions and some of his pretended principles to lead directly to * phanaticism . and yet he has quietly endur'd his doctrine , concerning the grounds of his faith to be stigmatiz'd for erroneous , and himself declar'd nonplust ; nay he has had the phlegm to see himself expos'd in capital letters in the title-page of that book for a man of no principles ; and yet has born it with invincible and heroical patience full fifteen years : which yet i had not so particularly insisted on at this time , had he not so utterly forgot himself , as to charge me to have done next to nothing in my own defence , when i had so manifestly baffled and put to silence , ( those who have most reason to pardon my glorying ) dr. tillotson and himself . he 'll pretend i owe him an answer to an appendix of his : the main of which is answer'd in faith vindicated , where its grounds are subverted ; and , if any thing , besides the raillery , remains unspoken to in error nonplust , when he pays me my hundred pound , i will reckon with him for his brass shilling . so much difference in just value principles ought to have above a loose discourse made up of meer misrepresentations and drollery . in the mean time , it were not amiss to give the reader an instance how he quite misses the bus'ness we are about , in that appendix ; which , i conceive , is the most solid way of confuting the whole . * [ if mr. s. ( says he ) would have undertaken to have told us who they were that first peopled america , and from what place they came , by the tradition of the present inhabitants ; and what famous actions had been done there in former ages ; we might have thought indeed , that sole tradition had been a very safe way to convey matters of fact from one age to another . ] by which we see he both forgets that the tradition we speak of is practical , and waves all the obligations and motives to continue the memory of christs doctrine ; which are the greatest god himself could impose , or man's nature is capable of . he should have shewn us that those inhabitants of america , had some constant and obligatory practices and solemnities , commemorating their coming from another nation , or their former great actions ( of the same kind the children of israel had of their deliverance out of egypt ) and then he might draw thence some show of an objection . and yet , even then , it would fall short of a parallel to the force of christian tradition ; unless the matters to be convey'd were of equal concern , and the obligations to propagate them , equally forcible and binding . i shall propose to him an instance of the force of our tradition , and than ask his judgment of it . suppose the anniversary of the powder-plot should be kept on foot , by ringing of bells , bonefires , squibbs , and spitefull preaching against all catholicks indifferently , and their very religion it self , as guilty of that villanous treason ; i would know of him whether the memory of it , tho' kept alive by this practical solemnity but once a year , would not be perpetuated for thousands of generations , or how it should ever be forgot ? if ( as i am sure he must ) he grants it ; he must grant withall that the tradition of christ's doctrine , which had a source incomparably larger , and was of the highest concern to every particular person not to desert it , but to hold to it , practice & live according to it daily , & propagate it to others , must be in a manner infinitely stronger . for , sure , he will not say that the hatred against the papists , which , i fear , is the main motive to continue the other , is a more powerfull cause to effect this , than all the motives laid by god , and the care of the salvation of themselves and their posterity was for the body of the church to perpetuate a doctrine that came from heaven . in a word , this one instance is enough to shew evidently that he either grossly mistakes , or wilfully perverts in that appendix the whole subject about which we are there discoursing . and is such a slight piece , or such a man worth answering , were it not for the repute he has got , not for writing for the church of england , but for his hatred and scribbling against the papists ? since this one errour is so fundamentall that it must needs influence all that discourse of his as far as 't is serious , or pretends to solidity ; and , so , leaves nothing to be replied to but wilely shuffles and aiery trifles , which are frivolous in themselves , and ( in his writings ) endless . sect . i. the author of the catholique letters clear'd from dr. st.'s borrow'd calumnies . . having behav'd himself thus unfortunately to himself and his friends ever since he came upon the stage , dr. st. comes to settle his method , which he says , he thinks is most natural and effectual to proceed in , in handling the main subject of our debate about the nature and grounds of the certainty of faith. it consists of four heads : and i shall follow my leader , he being such a master of method , and take them as they lie . the first is , to shew how unfit j. s. is of all men to undertake this cause , who contradicts himself as occasion serves . certainly , this man has a method as well as a logick peculiar to himself . does it follow so naturally that faith needs no higher grounds of certainty , because j. s. writes unconstantly ? or , does he prove so effectually he has shewn his grounds do allow faith , as 't is controverted between us , the certainty due to it's nature , because i write weakly . but , the truth is , his method is to avoid all method ; and to wriggle in twenty impertinent and invidious things , to make a shew of having said a great deal , tho' to no purpose : and to raise as much dust as he can , that he may run away from the business we are about , and hide himself in the mist. but is he sure that i. s. contradicts himself ? impartial men will doubt it , when they shall know , that both those few pretended contradictions he has borrow'd out of lominus and many more were objected and earnestly press'd against me in a far-distant tribunal ; where my self was unknown , and had few or rather no friends , but what my cause & defences gave me : that they were discust by those strictest judges and compar'd with my answers , and yet not so much as the least check given me , or any correction of my books , even in the least tittle , was order'd ; though this be a thing not unusual in such cases : that the business already transiit in rem judicatam ; and that the satisfaction i gave then to superiours , who could have no imaginable reason to be favourable to me , to the prejudice of catholick doctrine , is an abundant clearing of the soundness of my writings , and the sincerity of my defences . it would , i say , be enough to do this , and then leave the doctor 's malice to the censure of all ingenuous persons , for objecting anew things of which i was about eleven years ago , so authentiquely acquitted . but alas ! his method , which oblig'd him to speak to the true point as little as he could for shame , and to fill up an empty figure of an answer with as many impertinencies as he could well hook in , led him so directly to it , that he could not for his heart avoid it . should he object murther or any other heinous crime to a pretended malefactor , already clear'd of it by his proper judges and the court , every honest man would admire at his folly ; but all 's meritorious with his party against the papists . tho' , i say , this be sufficient for my vindication ; yet because those * defences of mine were in latin , and the clearing this point conduces very much to the shortening and illustrating my future answer , i shall repeat here some few particulars of many which are found there at large . and first , i shall put some notes to give a clear light of this business . next i shall show his shallowness and insincerity in what he objects . thirdly , i will put down the most authentick approbations of my books by the testimony of learned men of all sorts , and beyond all exception ; and then reflect on his imprudence in making such an objection . . for the first , i lay these notes . . that school-divines discourse of faith under another notion or consideration than controvertists do . the former treat of it as 't is a theological virtue , and the material objects of it , as reveal'd by a testimony formally divine : and they prove it to be such by alledging the miracles done to attest it ; the wonderfull conversion of the world by it , and the admirable effects issuing from it ; as the sanctity of it's professors that live up to it , the heroick sufferings of martyrs , &c. and , because 't is a supernatural virtue , and , so , depends on god's supernatural influence as much as natural effects do on his power as author of nature ; hence , they consider it as introduc't by supernatural dispositions inclining men to it , and god's heavenly grace making them embrace it and adhere to it constantly . on the other side , controvertists , particularly we in our modern controversies , being to argue against those who admit whatever was taught by christ to be divine , cannot possibly have the least occasion to treat of it as 't is such , or use any of the former arguments that are apt to prove it such ; but accommodate our discourses precisely to make out what those men deny ; that is , the grounds by which we come to know assuredly that these or those points were taught by christ. much less do we consider faith as it depends on the workings of god's holy spirit , illuminating interiourly the souls of the faithfull , and fixing them in their faith ; these being invisible and so impossible to be brought into arguments , or produc't against an adversary in our controversial disputes . . that 't is evident that in all my books i am writing controversies ; and , consequently , writing of faith precisely as 't is controverted between me and my opposers : which manifestly evinces that i treat of it under none of those considerations school-divines do ; in regard none of my adversaries , ( at least professedly ) deny it to be divine , or that god's grace is requisite to it . nor can any man shew so much as one argument in all my books that looks that way . . that , since 't is manifest beyond all cavill that we are writing controversy , and consequently treating of faith precisely as 't is controverted ; and there are but two points that can be controverted in relation to the evincing or defending the truth of christian faith : the one , that what christ taught was divine ; the other , that christ taught what we now believe ; the former of which being granted by all the deserters of the church , and therefore cannot possibly need to be prov'd by me , or any in my circumstances ; it follows evidently that the later point is only that which can be debated between me and my adversaries ; that is , we are only to treat of faith as it stands under that abstraction or consideration ; that is , as it stands under some certain rule , securing us that it was taught by christ ; it being agreed on all hands , that , if he taught it , it is divine . . that tho' this and no other can with any sense be our task , yet 't is tedious to stand repeating at every turn this abstracted acception of faith , as 't is found or treated in our controversies , or reiterating still this reduplication [ as taught by christ ; ] but 't is enough to have exprest it at first in prefaces , and the state of the question , and afterwards upon occasion in many signal passages , which i did very punctually , as appears by my * defences , where i instanc't in sixty three several places : i might say , i did it in whole books , where i spoke in short , as is seen in my * method ; in which very small treatise 't is inculcated above twenty times . whence , where-ever i use the single word [ faith ] it must necessarily mean faith as controverted , or , according to what is controverted between us . such a sollicitous repetition would argue a distrust in me , that my readers wanted common sense ; who could not reflect on what was in hand , or keep a heedfull eye upon what was at first , and once for all declar'd and signally exprest in those remarkable places . lastly , that my treating of what motives or rule christian faith must have in it self , or in its own nature to make good its truth , ( which is essential to it ) as i did particularly in faith vindicated , does not exceed the bounds of controversy , or treat of faith as 't is a theological virtue , or in any consideration relating to it as such : for i still express my self over and over in the introduction to speak of its rule , or of faith , as proveable by its rule ; and tho' i do not there apply it against any adversary , yet in the inferences at the end i do this against dr. tillotson and himself , without any reply for these fifteen years : nor , have they any possible way to come off , but either , by answering faith vindicated , and shewing there needs no absolutely certain rule to secure us of our having christian faith ; or , by shewing that they have some rule absolutely securing those from error who rely on it . the same introduction , and the same answer serves to show how moral certainty of the infallibility of this rule is , and how it is not sufficient . for i declare my self * there to speak of the nature of those motives ( or rule ) in themselves and as laid in second causes by gods providence to light mankind in their way to faith ; to which the dimness of eye-sight , neglect to look at all , or looking the wrong way , even in many particular men , is extrinsical and contingent . moral evidence then of the rule of faith's certainty , nay , even less , may serve many particular men ; for they are still secur'd from errour , by adhering to what such a rule delivers , tho' they penetrate not the grounds of its certainty ; with which it well consists that that rule as laid by god to light or satisfy all mankind , who are in their way to faith , must be in it self more than morally certain , or must be impossible to be false ; otherwise it could not perfectly satisfy acute schollars that what it abets is true ; nor enable pastors and learned men to defend the truth of faith as far as it depends on that rule ; nor secure any man , learned or unlearned , from erring in faith ; whereas , by being thus absolutely certain , it secures every man , tho' never so weak , from errour while he follows it , and preserves inviolable the truth of faith it self . . this last note fully answers his first pretended contradiction , that my chief end in that treatise ( viz. faith vindicated ) was to settle christian faith , and yet that i speak not of faith in it self , but as it it controverted . for i no where meddle with faith in it self , or as it is a theological virtue as school-divines do , but meerly in order to my opposers . with which may well consist , that i may write a book to settle christian faith by shewing it must have a certain rule , before i apply it against my adversaries , by shewing they have no such rule , and so no certainty of their faith ; as i did against himself and dr. t. at the end of that book , and do peremptorily challenge them to clear themselves of those inferences , and prove themselves to be holders of christs doctrine or christians . an instance will shew how weak this cavil is . a scrivener makes a pen ; and his primary intention , considering him , as he is doing that action , is that the pen should be a good one ; and his writing taking him precisely as a pen-maker was secondary and occasional . and yet writing was for all that his primary intention as he was a scrivener . thus it past with me . my main , primary , and ( if he will ) precise end in that treatise was to settle christian faith , by demonstrating it was to have a sure foundation : and in this was terminated the particular design of that book . now , the doing this was apt to exclude all pretenders to christianity , who had no such grounds ; but i did not this , till i had ended the treatise , nor stood applying my discourses , or striking my opposer just then with the weapon i was but a making . which yet hinders not but the primary end of writing that whole treatise was in order to my opposers , tho' a little more remotely ; and this is so evident by my inferences at the end , that none but a caviller , enrag'd that he could not answer them , would have made such an objection . . hence his second , which equivocates in the word [ objects ] is frivolous . for i no where treat of the objects or mysteries of faith in themselves , or say the connexion of their terms must be evident ; but only that the certainty of the humane authority of the church , which i make our rule , to know they were taught by christ , must be prov'd from the objects or things without us , viz. the nature of mankind , and the nature of the motives laid to perpetuate christs doctrine . and i wonder at his insincerity to alledge this : when i had particularly forestall'd it in my introduction ( p. . ) and declar'd there once for all , that in the following treatise i only spoke of the motives to light mankind in their way to faith ; does he think the mysteries of faith are the way to faith ? or can he pretend that the state of the question , exprest so carefully before-hand in a preface to signify my meaning throughout the whole treatise following , is totally to be set aside and neglected ; and that only single words pickt out , where for brevity's sake i did not constantly repeat it , are to give my true sense ? what impertinent brabbling is this ? again , p. . . i no less punctually declare that i * only treat of the objects or points of faith , as their truth depends on those motives or rule of faith. yet all will not do to a man bent upon cavill . . my last note , towards the end , let 's him see clearly when , to whom , and how , infallible assent is requisite and not requisite . and i had forestall'd this too before in an elaborate discourse from p. . to p. . in error nonplust ; where i shew'd that since faith must be true , and not possible to be a lye , therefore all who have true faith must be out of capacity of being in an error , or must be in some manner infallible . that it was enough simply to have faith , that they be materially infallible , or not capable of being in an error , by relying on a ground that cannot deceive them ( such as is the testimony of gods church ) tho' they see not how it must be so . nay , that this is absolutely sufficient for * all who are coming to faith ; provided they do not happen to doubt that their reasons for the churches infallibility are inconclusive ; and , so , be apt to remain unsatisfy'd ; or , are not bound to maintain the truth of faith against opposers ; in which case they are to be able to see and prove the conclusiveness of their grounds from some certain principle ; which i call there to be formally infallible . this and much more is laid out there at large ; which prevents most of his objections here . but no notice takes the good dr. of it . it was , it seems , too great a mortification to him , to peruse a book , which he was highly concern'd to answer , and knew he could not . . his fourth contradiction is solv'd in three lines . i treated of the humane authority of the church ( the rule of faith ) which was extrinsical to faith as 't is a theological virtue or divine . yet it being an extrinsical argument as all testimony is , i therefore went about to prove it's force from intrinsical mediums , fetcht from the natures of the things ; viz. man's nature , and the nature of the motives . nor can the certainty of witnessing authority be prov'd otherwise . . his fifth is clear'd by my first four notes ; which shew that i spoke of faith , which was by the confession of both parties divine and supernatural , and for that reason called so by me ; but did not treat of it as thus qualified , or go about to prove it divine ; but prov'd it's truth meerly as it depended on humane faith previous to it ; and so , did only formally treat of that humane faith it self , on which the knowledge of divine faith leans , and by which those coming to divine faith are rais'd up to it . yet what hideous outcries the dr. makes here , that by my doctrine we are to seek for the certainty of faith formally divine ; that i make divine and supernatural faith derive it's certainty from natural infallibility , &c. tho' he knows as well as that he lives that we make faith as formally divine derive it's certainty from the divine authority testify'd to us by miracles ; that this establishment of divine faith by supernatural means is presuppos'd to our question and granted by both sides ; and that our only point is how we may know certainly what was this divine faith thus ascertain'd at first . whoever reads third catholick letter . p. . . will admire with what face he could object these falshoods , or counterfeit an ignorance of what has been so often and so clearly told him ; and which he had seen so particularly answer'd in my defences : but this is his usual sincerity . 't is pretty to observe into what a monstrous piece of nonsense our dr. has fall'n here : and how because i argue from supernatural faith , he thinks i am arguing for it or proving it . whereas common sense tells every man who has not laid it aside , that he who argues from another thing , supposes that other thing , and , so cannot possibly , while he does so , go about to prove it , or treat of it . but it seems for and from are the same with his great reason , and not possible to be distinguisht . he might have seen other * arguments drawn from the supernaturality of faith , to prove that the rule which is to light intelligent men , who are unbelievers , to faith , must be more then morally certain . but he thought best to chuse the worst ; and , while he objected that too , mistook [ from ] for [ for ; ] that is , the premisses for the conclusion , and the cart for the horse . . his sixth exception , if pertinent , amounts to this . i.s. did not prove any point divine and supernatural , therefore dr. st. needs prove no point of faith he holds to be truly deriv'd from christ : a fair riddance of his whole task ! for the rest ; we do not desire him to prove by his rule one determinate point more than another ; only , since he talks of his grounds , which cannot be such unless they derive their solid virtue of supporting to what 's built on them , we instance now and then in some main and most necessary articles ; of which , if he can give us no account how they come to be absolutely ascertain'd by his ground or rule , he can give it of none . each point of faith is of a determinate sense ; we shew that tradition gives and ascertains to us this determinate sense ; and we shew why it must do so , and how it does so , & this with absolute certainty . let him shew his rule has the power to do this , & then pretend we are on equal ground . but alas ! he must not say this who is all for moral certainty , and fancies nothing above it . for he cannot say by such grounds any point [ is ] or [ is true ] while it may be false that they were taught by christ ; and if he says they [ are or were taught by christ , ] while they [ may not be so ] he in plain terms affirms the same thing may at once be and not be . for thither the doctrine of faith's possible falshood must be reduc't at last , and the greatest of contradictions will be found to be his first principle . . his th exception is answer'd in my last note ; which shews that the ground upon which the truth of faith depends must be more than morally certain ; tho' every believer needs not penetrate the force of those grounds , or have even so much as moral certainty of their conclusiveness . but , what means he when he objects my saying , that , true faith , by reason of its immoveable grounds can bear an asserting the impossibility of it's falshood ? can this man do himself a greater prejudice , than by thus confessing , that he holds not christian faith , absolutely speaking , true ? or can he lay a greater scandal on christian faith it self , than to quarrel at a position that can give him no displeasure , but by asserting it's perfect truth ? if this do not like his new-fashion'd christian principles , i suppose he will own the contrary position , and affirm that true faith , by reason of it's moveable ( or uncertain ) grounds , cannot bear an asserting the absolute impossibility of it's falshood ; and this is in plain terms to assert , that absolutely speaking , true faith may all be false : which is both unchristian , and strong nonsense to boot . he should have preach't this to his auditory at guildhall ; and then he should have seen how every honest hearer , would have abhorr'd his doctrine , have lookt upon him as scarce half a christian , and on such a faith as absurd , praeternatural , and irrational , as well as i did . . these are the greatest contradictions the dr. could pick even out of an adversaries book ; concerning which he keeps such a mighty noise , blusters and triumphs . he tells the reader , i affirm that moral certainty destroys the essence of faith. and i affirm it does , taking faith without some absolutely certain principle , as demonstration is , to ground it on . for faith is essentially true ; and it cannot be true to those who see that , notwithstanding it's grounds which are to prove it christ's doctrine , it may yet be none of his doctrine . again , he says i make moral certainty sufficient and insufficient for faith. distinguish , good doctor ; 't is not sufficient for the ground of faith as we treat of it ; for , if there may be deceit in that ground , the truth of faith as to us , sinks : * and yet moral certainty , and even less , of the force of that ground is sufficient to many , nay * all , so they adhere to a ground that is really infallible , and salvation is attainable by those persons . oh , but salvation is to be had by such a faith no better grounded ; and that 's the main business . what ? if for want of a firm ground , faith hap to be false ? who ever said it ? or that , in case any point embrac't upon such a ground happen to be vntrue , it could be a point of faith , or that any man could be sav'd by vertue of a heretical tenet , or a pernicious falshood ? yet , for want of dr. st's understanding plain sense , and his applying my words to a wrong subject , i must forfeit my sincerity and moral honesty ; whereas himself forfeits both by confounding every thing which i had so * carefully distinguisht . there is not a tittle objected by himself or lominus , but i distinctly and clearly answer'd in my clypeus septemplex and vindiciae , to the satisfaction of all my superiours and judges . yet this man of moral honesty , has the ingenuity to object them afresh , without taking notice of my answers , or letting the reader so much as know any such satisfactory answers , or any answer at all , had been already given . . as for the three propositions pickt out of my books apart from the context , and which , as taken in the precise words in which they were exhibited , were censur'd : i desire the reader to reflect , that these words [ there is no god ] tho' found in the holy scripture it self , yet as separated from the words adjoyning , and exprest in those precise terms , are perfect atheism , and deserve the highest censure ; and yet the same words as they lie in the sacred book it self with these foregoing words [ the fool hath said in his heart ] joyn'd with them , the direct contrary is signify'd by that place . this was my very case . the words or passages taken alone , without the prefaces , declaring the sole intent of the author , without the state of the question , and other paragraphs ( or words in the same paragraph ) giving light , by the tenour of the discourse , to my true meaning , bore a shew as if i had affirm'd that it was requisite to faith to demonstrate the mysteries of faith , and among them the supernatural infallibility of the church , which is a point of faith. especially since there was inserted by the exhibiter a parenthesis in the middle of the second proposition , [ he speaks of propositions of faith ] whereas there was not a word of any such thing , but about fifteen times the contrary , in the self-same paragraph : viz. that i spoke of motives , premisses , and grounds of faith. now the censurers knew not that those propositions were in any book , or had any antecedents or consequents ( as they * publickly declar'd , and i have it under their hands ) and , consequently , censur'd them ; as my self should have done , had i been in their circumstances , and circumvented as they were . as soon as i saw the censure , i offer'd voluntarily to subscribe to it ; knowing that those propositions thus singled out , were no more my doctrine than [ there is no god ] was the sense of the sacred writer ; nay * quite contrary to it . the censurers declar'd they were surpriz'd , and * complain'd they were by indirect wiles impos'd upon . so at the arch-bishop of paris his command i writ my vindiciae , to manifest the true sense of those passages as they lay in my books ; which i shew'd very clearly and particularly to be , that i only spoke of faith as standing under a rule ascertaining it's descent from christ. my books being in english , it was order'd that some persons of great learning and repute who understood english should examine and testify , whether , taking those propositions as they lay in my books , the orthodox sense i assign'd to them , were indeed my genuine meaning in those places ; my adversary too * allow'd of them to attest it ; for indeed their known probity and learning was such that it was impossible to except against them ; and that venerable and pious personage , abbot montagu , to whom they were known , it being requir'd , gave testimony to both those qualifications in them . they all unanimously attested by their subscriptions , that the orthodox sense i assign'd was indeed the true meaning of those places ; and that the sense condemn'd was not in those books , but the direct contrary ; whence follows that when i subscrib'd the censure , i subscrib'd only to what had ever been my own doctrine . those reverend and judicious persons , were mr francis gage , dr. of sorbon ; mr thomas godden , dr. of divinity ; mr robert barclay , principal of the scotch colledge in paris ; mr bonaventure giffard , and mr iohn betham , then batchelours of divinity in sorbon , both of them since , doctors of the same faculty , and the former of them now bishop of madaura ; mr edward cary , mr edward lutton , and mr g. k. the arch-bishop of paris , being perfectly satisfy'd , hoping it might end future disputes , desired me to subscribe to the censure : i refus'd at first , alledging that such a subscription might be improv'd into a pretence that i had retracted . he replied , * uteris itaque quâ subscriptionis formulâ tibi placuerit ; make use therefore of what form of subscription you please . i replied , then i will declare that i do subscribe , not retracting my doctrine but persisting in it ; which he allow'd ; and i did it in the self-same terms ; adding , that i persisted in it as being free from censure , and approv'd by very eminent personages . which done , the censurers were order'd nay commanded to make me satisfaction by an instrument sign'd by them both ; declaring that no proposition in any book of mine was toucht by their censure . could there be a greater and more authentick clearing my books and doctrine from being censur'd than that was ; or , might not dr st. by parity of reason as well have pretended that the scripture teaches atheism , or that king david deserv'd to be censur'd , for saying there is no god , as that any proposition , as found in my books , was there censur'd or declar'd heretical . . and now to lay open some of the doctor 's falshoods upon this occasion ; they are these . . that the main design of my catholick letters are there declar'd to be no catholick doctrine . well bowl'd doctor . have i a word there pretending to shew the mysteries of faith , or the authority of the church [ that is believ'd by faith ] that is it's supernatural infallibility by assistance of the holy ghost , to be demonstrable ? is it not shewn you in most express words ( third cath. letter . p. . . ) and in many other places ) that we speak only of the * humane authority of the church , which is to be prov'd by natural mediums , and not of the other which is believ'd by the faithfull ? this then is a meer forg'd pretence against your own conscience and perfect knowledge . . that i was censur'd and retracted : whereas 't is manifest not any thing as it lay in my books ( that is indeed nothing of mine ) was censur'd ; nor did i subscribe , otherwise than as not retracting my doctrine , but persisting in it as being free from censure . this the arch-bishop of paris allow'd , and the censurers themselves judged to be iust and true , and upon those terms acquitted me and made me satisfaction . . he says , that if this ( the sense condemn'd ) be not catholick doctrine , he is infallibly certain my letters are far from being catholick in their sense . now , not one word is there in those letters which is the sense condemn'd , as i shew'd lately ; however i am glad he who has still been so high against all infallibility in his writings , and deny'd it to the catholick , or any church , owns it at least in himself . i see now what grounds he went upon when he would not make a candid retractation of his irenicum . certainly this man would persuade us to take his word for our rule of faith. but the ill luck , is his infallibility is evidently prov'd already to be willfull forgery , against plain and authentick matter of fact. he say ▪ the a. b. of d. averrs many fine things already answer'd , and that my plea was ridiculous . which is false for any thing he or i know . for , that illustrious personage deny'd that book of lominus to be his , or did any man own it ; but it came out surreptitiously without the approbation of any man , under an unknown name , nay , without so much as the printers name to it ; which was punishable by the laws there . whence we may judge of our drs. sincerity : in his second letter to mr. g. p. . by putting heresis blacloana in the margent over against his appeal to f. w. he hinted , that that venerable person was author of that book . beat off from that false and ungrounded pretence , he has found us another author for it ; and i expect in his next piece we shall have a third or fourth ; according as his fancy , so heated now that it has shaken off all regard to civility , shall prompt him . again , he shews us how wonderfully ingenuous he is , by his quoting against me the railing book of an unknown adversary , which had besides all the marks of a libel in it ; and over-flipping the attestation of eight worthy divines of great repute ; who , openly and owning their names , did witness that those places , in my books , did not bear the sense in which those words pick't out thence were censur'd . add that dr. st. knew all these particulars were clear'd satisfactorily , since it appears ( by his quoting them ) he had read my defences , in which they are printed at large . which common sense may assure him i durst not have done , in the life-time of all the persons mention'd and concern'd , without quite losing my cause ; nay i should have expos'd my self to new accusations as a falsifier , had i not dealt sincerely to a tittle , and preserv'd all the authentick originals in my own hands , for the justification of my defences , which i yet have . i charge the dr. then , to have publisht against me willfull and notorious falshoods , which he had reason to know to be such . yet we are still to think he did all this out of his pure love to moral honesty , of which he makes such a saintly profession . i challenge him moreover to shew me any one catholique writer of any eminency ( i do profess i do not know so much as one of any degree whatever ) whoever censur'd this position , that the infallibility of the churches humane authority , antecedent to faith , and deriving down christ's doctrine might be demonstrated ; which is all i require in my catholick letters . whereas the * right reverend f. w. has named him divers , both ancient and modern , who follow that method in general ; and i have quoted * divers eminent controvertists as occasion serv'd , and particularly insisted on * two beyond all exception , f. fisher here in england , and dominicus de sta trinitate , who writ and printed his book at rome , and had it approv'd by the magister sacri palatii , who take the same way i do , almost to a tittle . i may add , to the drs. greater confusion , the authority of the arch-bishop of d. himself , and of all those eminent persons who have approv'd my doctrine , as shall be seen hereafter . . not a man then has dr st. on his side , but one unknown and altogether unapprov'd author lominus , and a bitter adversary to me besides ; out of whose falshoods , interlarded with his own , and by his concealing my replyes to all he objects ( and those such as fully satisfy'd my judges and superiours ) he makes a shift to patch up his calumnies . we will see next , whether ( to his further shame ) my books or doctrin have not had testimonials of greater weight to approve and authenticate them , than that of lominus was to condemn them . . in the first place that blessed and glorious martyr , the illustrious , and eminently learned oliver plunket , arch-bishop of armagh and primate of all ireland , assoon as he heard my books were oppos'd , out of his meer justice , love of truth and the esteem he had of my doctrin , unsought to nay unthought of , sent me out of ireland , an approbation of it writ with his own hand , and seal'd with his archiepiscopall seal , in these words . * [ infrascripti testamur , &c. wee underwritten do attest that we have read thorough diligently and accurately , and that with both profit and pleasure , three books writ in the english dialect , publish'd by that learned person mr. iohn sergeant , whose titles and arguments are these ; surefooting in christianity , faith vindicated , and reason against raillery ; in which i have not only found nothing against the integrity of the true faith and of good manners ; but , moreover , clear and solid principles , which admirably conspire to the estabishing and confirming the catholick doctrin . for , both by reasons and authorities they excellently impugn the protestants affirming the holy scripture is the only rule of faith ; and vigorously maintain that the genuin doctrin of christ and his apostles has descended , by the force of tradition , from century to century , nay from year to year , incorruptedly to our time , and still remains inviolably in the orthodox church . in testimony whereof we have subscrib'd , and have caus'd our portatil seal to be assixt , this th of march . at armagh oliversus armachanus , totius hiberniae primas . can any man imagin that this grave and learned personage , who had for twelve years profest divinity in the sacra congregatio at rome , and had been advanc'd by them to this high dignity , would have hazarded his credit there , in approving so highly the writings of one who was a stranger to him and no ways capable to oblige him , had he not been perfectly assur'd there was nothing censurable in them ? yet , this , tho' known to our ingenuous dr. is nothing with him . he crys still lominus for my money , let him be what he will ; and assures the reader upon his morall honesty , he is infallibly certain my doctrin in my letters is not catholik . . the next in dignity is that illustrious and right reverend personage mr. peter talbot arch bishop of dublin , who dy'd a confessor of the catholik faith in dublin castle in the time of that truly hellish , tho' not popish plot. this eminent person more than once has approv'd and highly commended my doctrin . * [ the author of surefooting ( says he ) has with great zeal writ divers treatises of this matter ( viz. the force of tradition ) and has overwhelm'd those who defend only morall certainty in faith with so great confusion that they can no way clear themselves from the blemish of atheism , to which their principles and meer probability of faith lead ; of which crime the foresaid author proves them guilty beyond all possibility of reply . and a little after , he acknowledges that the rule of faith ( viz. in our controversies ) is the humane authority of the church ; and , that it must be an infallible directress ; otherwise it might lead us out of the way . unfortunate dr. st. to quote an authority against me , which so highly approves my doctrine and condemns his as leading to atheism ! the reader may hence discern how likely 't is the archbishop of dublin should be the author of lominus his book , * where he and dr. tillotson are praised for writing so catholickly against mee ; whereas that right reverend prelate so highly extolls my books as writing so unanswerably against them. lastly , in his appendix to that book of his cited above , he has this solid discourse . * [ altho' tradition does not demonstrate or conclude evidently the divinity of christ , nor consequently can demonstrate or conclude evidently that the revelation of our faith was divine ; yet 't is a conclusive argument ad hominem , against protestants and all those who acknowledge the divinity of christ , that god reveal'd all the articles which the roman catholick church professes , in regard they acknowledge christ to be god. and thus the author of sure-footing , faith vindicated , &c. argues invincibly against his adversaries for the conclusive evidence ( by the force of tradition ) that god reveal'd all the articles of the roman catholick faith , out of the supposition that christ is god. note that this appendix was write purposely to clear me , after the conference in abbot montague's chamber : where tho' i would not then answer to propositions taken out of books , when no books were there to clear them by the context ; yet , after i had the objections in writing , i did answer them ; and this to the * satisfaction of the arch-bishop himself , and of * dr. gough who was present , and prejudic'd formerly against my writings . . i had compriz'd the sum of my doctrine into a short treatise , entituled , a method to arrive at satisfaction in religion ; which when i was at paris i translated into latin , and shew'd it to that excellent prelate the bishop of condom ; my singular friend and patron , desiring his judgment of it . he read it , and at my request made his exceptions ; which being clear'd by me , he askt me why i did not print it ? i reply'd i would , so his grandeur would please to give me leave to dedicate it to himself . which obtain'd , it was propos'd to the sorbon for their approbation of it , the former of them ( monsieur pirot ) testifying it contain'd nothing against faith or good manners , & the later of them ( dr gage ) added that the most certain rule of faith was in that treatise exactly settled and invincibly defended . but still obscure lominus is worth twenty sorbons in dr. st's . learned judgment . tho' 't is here to be observed that the bishop of condoms approbation was antecedent to theirs ; not only as allowing and owning the book , but as inviting me to print it . . i alledge in the fourth place the testimony of my superiour here in england , mr. humphry ellice , an ancient dr. and professor of divinity , and late dean of our catholick chapter ; whose sanctity of life and solid judgment gave him a high esteem with all that knew him . this grave and venerable person , besides the ordinary and customary approbation of my books , added that they do clearly demonstrate , out of the very nature of ecclesiastical tradition , that the doctrin delivered by christ and his apostles , was inviolably eonserv'd in the roman-catholick and apostolick church even to this age in which we now live ; and by irrefragable force of reason did evidently convince the grounds of the hereticks ( meaning dr. st. and dr. till . against whom i had writ ) to be meer tricks and vain fallacies . but still lominus ( that is the lord knows who ) is dr. st's . only saint and infallible oracle . . it were not amiss to add next the testimony or rather judgment of that deservedly esteemed , and learned man , mr. r. h. author of the guide of controversy . this excellent writer , though he inclines rather to the school-opinion of the sufficiency of moral certainty , yet , like a truly ingenuous and charitable man , preferring the common good of christianity before his own private sentiment , after having discourst according to his own grounds , he , in allusion to my way of proceeding , subjoyns these words : [ but then , if any , after all this , can make good any farther certainty in such tradition ; i know no party , if christian , that has any interest to oppose him — the stronger any one can make this faith , they have all reason to like it the better . ] by which 't is apparent that he is so far from condemning and censuring the way i take , that he declares 't is not the interest of any party , if christian , to oppose it ; and that himself and every one ought to like it better than the other way , so it could be made good . and , that it can , my best reason tells me ; since , as appears by my method , it has born the test of being reduc't even to self-evidence ; and the miserable shifts and evasions , to which the most learned of our adversaries are driven , to avoid it's force , do more and more assure me 't is not at all hard to compass it . . in the last place , to omit many others , i shall put the testimony of that very reverend person f. martin harney , dr. of divinity of the university of lovain , and principal regent of the general studies of the order of st dominick : who being askt at rome ( where he was at the time of the contest ) his judgment of my doctrin , compriz'd in my method , and of the sense of the three propositions , as they lie in my books , gave under his hand this testimonial of both . i under-written have attentively read the method writ by mr john sergeant , and his vindication of the three propositions pickt out of his books ; and i have found that the method is sound doctrin , and usefull to reduce many to the catholick faith. and in his vindiciae 'tis plainly demonstrated that the foresaid propositions , as written by the author , do make a sense altogether orthodox . this reverend person i had never seen , nor heard of ; nor could any thing but the love of truth move him to this approbation ; nay , he must have lost much credit with the sacra congregatio , had my doctrin been prov'd vnorthodox , or the propositions in my book , ( as infallible dr. st. affirms ) heretical . . modesty forbids me to mention the excessive encomiums of that eminent controvertist mr. edward worsley , a father of the society ; who , though utterly unknown to me , took such a friendship for me upon the reading my books , and in all places where he came extoll'd my poor endeavours with such immoderate expressions , that to save my blushes in rehearsing them i intreat those who have the curiosity to read them in my declaratio from p. . to p. . i shew'd them to the right honourable the earl of castlemain , who was pleas'd to do me the right to attest them to be his hand-writing . the same noble personage & as many as knew f. worsley , will , i doubt not , do that right to his memory , as to witness for him that as he was second to none in ability to distinguish between sound and tainted doctrine ; so his sincere candour and integrity set him as far above the humour of flattery , as my meanness could incline any to it . . the sum of my present defence is this . eight divines of great repute appointed by the arch-bishop of paris , and admitted by my adversary himself , do unanimously attest that the sense condemn'd is not in my books , but the contrary . my judge clears me , the censurers are commanded to make me satisfaction . the highest tribunal allows my plea , and acquits me . primates , arch-bishops , bishops , the sorbon , eminent divines , and even those who take another way in their writings , approve and commend my doctrine , and most of them in very high and extraordinary expressions ; my own superiour does the same ; nay even those , who were formerly highly prejudic't , declar'd themselves satisfy'd in it . so that poor dr. st. is left alone to ballance against all this weighty authority , with one lominus , a meer utopian , or man in the moon ; on whose sole no-authority he grounds all his sensless calumnies . was ever weak man so baffled ! add , that he knew that all these defences of mine had been made and accepted many years ago , and those authorities alledg'd , and my doctrine thus approv'd and clear'd ; yet he had not the candour to let his reader have the least hint of any of those particulars ; which argues not too great love of moral honesty . nor does he take off any one answer of those many i had given ; but only says over again rawly some few things objected , reply'd to , and printed fourteen years ago ; and plays upon a double-sens't word or two by applying them still to wrong subjects . which is in effect to tell the reader he must either talk insignificantly against evident matter of fact , or say just nothing , and to confess in plain terms he is at a perfect nonplus . . to close this present business i desire the reader to reflect that those judges , approvers and commenders of my books and doctrine , liv'd generally in divers and far-distant nations , were of different faculties and universities , of different education , different orders , and ( to some degree ) of different principles and interests ; some of them of slight acquaintance ; divers utterly unknown to me , or i to them. so that , 't is impossible to imagine that any thing but the force of truth and the integrity of my way of proving the certainty of our faith as to it 's being taught by iesus christ , could make them conspire to allow or abet my writings so heartily and unanimously . nor could there be any human inducements to make them so partial to a private man every way inconsiderable , and of no esteem at all but what my writings and principles gave me . whence , though no one church , as dr. st. weakly objects , has ever own'd my doctrine ( to give formal approbations of controversial or theological writings not being a work proper for churches ) yet , the dignity of the persons and all these circumstances consider'd , i conceive it may amount to the full weight of the judgment of any one particular church whatsoever , that my doctrin is sound and orthodox . nor will he , i believe , find that any work of a particular writer hath had more authentick testimonials for it , than my poor endeavours have had ; except that of the never-enough-praised , the bishop of condom . and 't is not the least confirmation of their integrity that they have been twice brought to the tryal , ( at paris and rome ) and nothing unsound found in them . though i must do the doctor the right to acknowledge he has spoke one ( and hitherto but one ) true word : but he is to be pardon'd for prevaricating from his constant method of speaking falshoods , for it was at unawares , and he knew not he did so ; the truth he spoke against his will was this , that i hardly escaped censure at rome : and therefore , to make his words good , i 'le tell him how it was . all my books were sent thither to cardinal barberin ; and amongst them one written by the right honourable my lord chancellour hyde , in defence of dr. st. against mr. cressy ; pretending ( the title of this last being torn out ) they were all writ by the same author , my self ; there went with them a desire to his eminency , that , not to give them the trouble of perusing them all , he would cause only this last of my lord chancellour's to be read ; and , by the character he receiv'd of that , to judge whether all the rest writ by that author ought not to be condemn'd . he gave them to an english divine to keep , who knew nothing of the contest ; ordering him to read only that , and give him a faithfull account of it as soon as he could . while he was reading it , god's providence so order'd it , that an english gentleman , his acquaintance , came accidentally into his chamber , and finding all my books on his table , askt how they came there ? he , hearing mee nam'd as their author , admir'd , and said he could not believe they were mine ; in regard he had heard i was a writer for catholick faith ; whereas this author was of far other principles . after some perusing it , my friend found it was my lord chancellour's book foisted in for one of mine . which understood by my friend's testimony and the finding all the other books to run in a quite different strain , they inform'd the protectour of the fourbe that was put upon him , and so my poor books escapt scot-free . by this or some such stratagem they might perhaps have been condemn'd , but that there was any danger of it when my defences were seen and compar'd with the accusations , infallible dr. st. is the first man that ever inform'd us . but , what would we have from a man that can scarce speak a word of liquid truth ! . but , tho' dr. st. has neither manag'd this invidious cavil solidly , nor ( he must pardon me ) honestly or justly , according to any moral honesty but his own , which he has told us he so loves : has he at least deserv'd the commendation given to the vnjust steward ; has he done wisely , or , in any degree , prudently ? let 's see . in his irenicum , he * had sacrificed the whole order of bishops to the pleasure of the magistrate or the mobile , and actually degraded them into the rank of presbyters ; or , to give us a more compleat map of that ill book , that he had given us there a curtail'd kind of episcopacy coldly and faintly allow'd , presbytery strongly pleaded for , independency much favour'd , and ( says my author ) if my memory fails me not , in the matter of tithes a spicing of anabaptistry and quakerism . one would think by this description the name of that book should be legion , and that such pestilent principles were needfull to be retracted . it seems the bishops who were most concern'd , durst not attacque such a numerous army of private-spirited enemies , drawn-up into one body . for himself assures us that * the bishops and regular clergy treated him with more kindness then so much as to mention any such thing as a recantation . nay , his vindicator tell us moreover that * the prudent and reverend governours of their church did admire the performance . well! but what provision was made in the mean time against the mischief and scandall ? could this man have done the bishops a greater disparagement , than to tell the world they preferr'd a personal civility and a complementary virtue before the care of christs institution , and their own most particular interest ? but , tho' they were over civil to him , why had not he the goodness by a voluntary recantation to give a stop to the spreading that contagious doctrin , if indeed he did not hold it still ? he could not think it pleas'd them , nor that their shews of kindness were real and hearty . however his vindicatour brags they made choice of him to undertake the defence of the conferences with f. fisher. yet so , says the other , as mr prynn , a man of a restless spirit and unsettled judgment was put to the records in the tower to employ his busy mind . well , but how came he off with that task ? a fair occasion might have been taken there to set all right again , had the dr. pleas'd . but he was so far from that , that mr. lowth tells him , it would have discompos'd the arch-bishop upon the scaffold , had he foreseen he should have had such a vindicatour ; and that he finds little amends there for his irenicum doctrins , but rather an evident confirmation of them , if not doing worse . this is still more and more obstinate ; and a kind of huffing those , who had so over-civilly forborn him , by doing still the same or worse . yet afterwards , i know not how or why , he made some ambidextrous retractations , which left all understanding men dissatisfy'd , as well as mr. lowth ; tho' he , about to publish a book of church-government & the irenicum-doctrines crossing his way hapt to be the sole man that oppos'd them publickly , tho' multitudes of the most hearty , most learned , and most eminent protestants utterly dislik't them . but , first he writ to him civilly and upon honest conditions would have wav'd him . but the dr. had got too much head by this kind connivence , and so he could get no other answer , but scorn and some foul play ; the two main ingredients in the doctors constitution , as my self too frequently experience . hereupon that honest and plain-dealing gentleman , whom all true lovers of christ's institution and particularly all genuin members of the church of england ought to respect for his undaunted love of truth , and firmness to church-principles , did animadvert upon him severely ; as an incorrigible wronger of such sacred concerns deserv'd . he demands in behalf of the church he would make a recantation as publick as the errour , scandal and offence had been . the doctor setts on a iack pudding to abuse and scoff at him ; one ( says my author ) who has * hackney'd out himself to write against his conscience and iudgment , as appears by his own letters . a fit man for dr. st's purpose . this pleasant gentleman pretended such a recantation was already made . to which mr. lowth's vindicator ( a person of a solid judgment and moderate temper , and , as is seen , p. . a kind friend to dr. st. ) reply'd , that all amounted to little better than a say so . he shews that what is cited out of the general conferences was a scurvy palliation of the matter . that his book [ the unreasonableness of separation ] signify'd no more than motives to compliance in the iudgment of interest or discretion ; and for the most part might be urg'd for any settled constitution , even that of geneva or amsterdam . that any man might get easily off what he had said ; and each party , as the tide turn'd , might apply them to their own advantage . that the doctor though he pretended mutability of church government in his irenicum , yet he had perpetually fixt the presbytery by divine right unalterable . that the recantation was far from hearty ; in regard that , altho' his vindicator freely confesses the fault , and mr. lowth to be in the right , yet he with the same breath reviles him . lastly , to omit many other particulars , that ( which i have most reason to reflect on ) the dean , when he speaks of church authority , takes away with one hand what he gives with the other ; that the authority of ( meerly ) proposing matters of faith and directing men in religion , is no authority at all ; nay that they rather imply a power in those to whom they are propos'd , at discretion to reject them ; and that it makes the church'es authority , precarious , and lays her open to all manner of hereticks . this is what i ever judg'd lay at the bottom of his heart ; that in things belonging to faith , he sets the judgement of every one of his sober enquirers above the church'es . which made me reflect so severely upon it in my errour nonplust , and in divers other places of my third catholick letter . but of late , the juncture ( as he hopes ) being more favourable , he is gone beyond his former self ; for in his second letter to mr. g. he confidently affirms that every sober enquirer may without the church'es he●p find out all necessary points of faith in scripture . now , proposing and directing are some kind of help , but here they are both deny'd it seems ; and all help from the church , as to the matter of saving faith is deny'd . this then seems to be the antecedent belief the dr. sets up , and thence inferrs , that a man may be in a state of salvation in his single and private capacity apart , * and out of all church society and ecclesiastical communion , tho' he live where it is to be had ; which ( says the answerer ) utterly overthrows all church government . this ought to give every honest man who loves order and government ( of what judgment soever he be ) such grounded jealousies that he is setting up a babel of no-church-men against christ's church , that no satisfaction competent , unless the several propositions be extracted out of his books , and either formally and expressly retracted , or else that he shew that , as they ly in his books they bear not that wicked sense they seem to do , neither of which has been done . nay , lest he should deal slipperily by common and palliating words , at which he is very expert ; it will be farther requisit that he be oblig'd to write against those ill tenets himself , and offer convincing reasons to prove them false ; that so men may see it comes from his heart . and this done and the interest of truth once in demnify'd , he is one of the worst christians who refuses to honour him far more than if he had never lapst . si non errasset , fecerat ille minus . . what concerns me particularly is to note hence the prodigious imprudence of dr. st. in objecting against me self contradictions , which have long ago been clear'd ; and the dissatisfaction of two or three roman-catholicks ( for i know of no more ) who became well satisfy'd when they had read my books , and compar'd them with my explication ; and when as he knew my self after a severe trial was clear'd by my judges ( which he will never be ; ) and during the time of it , when it was most dangerous for any to stand up for me , my books and doctrin were most authentickly approv'd nay highly commended by most eminent authority : what a madness was it for him to object falsly and against evident matter of fact that i retracted . whenas all the while ▪ he knew himself had had the misfortune to have writ such unsound doctrin , that his vindicator is forc't to confess it as his best plea , that he has retracted it ; and yet tho' , as 't is said , he has done it on his fashion , he is still apprehended to be so hollow , that he cannot yet gain the belief to have done any more than palliate his gross errours ; to be inconsistent with himself , and to take away from the church with one hand what he gives it with the other : of these things he never yet clear'd himself , nor can ; but is still accus'd of harbouring the same errours in his breast , nay to grow still worse and worse . which i was so far from desiring to lay open , that i civilly insinuated it afar off in my third catholick letter , p. . without so much as naming his person ; that i might keep him from such impertinent and extrinsical topicks , which the reader may observe , do , for want of better , make up three quarters of his controversial writings . sect . ii. how dr. st. settles the true state of the controversy . . i have been longer about this first section than seem'd needfull . but the influence it has upon our future dispute will recompence my trouble , and excuse my prolixity . the second thing his method leads him to ( for hitherto it has led him quite out of the way ) is to state the controversy . and to this end , he acquaints us with the occasion of the conference ; which was that mr. g. affirm'd in some company that no protestant could shew any ground of absolute certainty for their faith ; and that mr. t. had promis'd him that if dr. st. were not able to manifest the contrary , he would forsake his communion . will the dr hold to these words ? 't is plain here that mr g. demanded he should shew grounds to ascertain his faith absolutely . mr. t. expected he should manifest they had such grounds as did ascertain their faith ; and , if he could not , was to leave his communion : lastly , that dr. st. by accepting the challenge , became engag'd to satisfy mr t 's . expectation , and to manifest the contrary to what mr g. had asserted ; that is to manifest he had grounds of absolute certainty for his faith ; or , ( which comes to the same ) for christian faith upon his grounds being taught by christ. and , how did the dr. acquit himself , and perform this ? why , he assign'd scripture for the ground or rule of his faith , and universal tradition for the proof of the books of scripture . all the company knew this before . for , both sides knew , held and granted already that the book of scripture was prov'd by universal tradition , and every one knew too that dr st. would assign it for the ground or rule of his faith. wherefore , unless all the company were out of their wits , surely something more was expected ; and what could that be , but that he should manifest his faith was absolutely certain by relying on that rule , or that the rule he assign'd , gave him , and his , absolute certainty of their faith , or of those tenets which they held upon it . for , it being agreed on both sides that the sense of the scripture was in it self true faith , gods word , and as such to be embrac't , the only question was of the sense of scripture as to us , or as to our knowledge of it : and of this the dr was to shew and manifest he had absolute certainty by any way his grounds afforded him ; otherwise , he might fall short or be wrong in the knowing scriptures sense ( that is , in his faith ) tho' the letter were never so certain . again , by his counterposing to those words of his [ than you can have for the points in difference between us ] 't is manifest the contest was , whether he had absolute certainty of those points he held upon his rule . what says the dr now to this plain state of the controversy ? . first he changes the ground of absolute certainty for his faith into proving the absolute certainty of the ground or rule of his faith : which transposes the terms of the question , and alters the whole business . for absolute certainty for faith engages him to shew the doctrin or tenets of faith to be thus certain ; whereas [ absolute certainty of the rule of our faith ] makes absolute certainty affect the rule , but leaves all faith uncertain , unless the pretended rule proves a good one , and renders the doctrin of christian faith , consisting of many particular points , thus absolutely certain ; which himself will tell us afterwards , he will not stand to . next , he equivocates in the word [ scripture ] which may either mean the letter , or the sense of it . now the sense of it being faith , 't is that only could be meant by mr. g. and of which it was affirmed he could not shew grounds absolutely ascertaining it ; the sense , i say , of scripture , could only be question'd since the letter was agreed to . wherefore to alledge tradition for his proof of what his grounds will not allow to it , viz. to bring down the sense of scripture or faith , and turn it off to the shewing certainty of the letter , which was out of question , is a most palpable prevarication . . he quite forgets to shew that any point of his faith or all of it , ( speaking of the controverted or dogmatical points as we do ) may not be false , notwithstanding his proof for the certainty of its letter : which if it be , 't is not faith ; unless he will say the points of his faith may be so many untruths . . it has been prest upon him over and over in * my catholick letters to shew how his rule influences his assent of faith with absolute certainty . it has been inculcated to him how both [ rule ] and [ ground ] are relative words ; and , therefore , that he could not pretend they were to him absolutely certain grounds for his faith , unless he shew'd how they made him absolutely certain of that faith of his , which was the correlate . which tho' the most material point , and most strongly prest upon him , he takes no notice of in his whole reply ; and it shall be seen that , when he comes to touch upon that point ( after his fashion ) hereafter , he is forc't to confess they are no absolutely certain ground or rule to him at all . lastly , that , when ( faith being truth ) the question was whether he had any such ground as could conclude it true that christ had taught his faith , and consequently whether he has any faith at all ; he slips over that , and rambles into a discourse about more or less faith in scripture , instead of shewing he had any . other shifts he has , but these are his master-pieces : so that his whole performance , as to the conference , amounted to no more , than to take up the bible in his hand , and cry aloud [ look ye , gentlemen , here is my ground or rule of faith ; and your selves must confess 't is absolutely certain ; and , therefore , you cannot deny but i have shewn you the ground of absolute certainty for my faith. ] but if it should be reply'd : sr , an arian or socinian might do the same , and yet no by-stander be the wiser for it , or more able to discern which of you has christs true faith , which not ; in regard that must be decided by shewing who has an absolutely certain means to know the true sense of the letter ; the drs insignificant principles carry no farther , but ( as we shall see anon ) to confess plainly neither of them have any such means of absolute certainty at all . and that he cannot manifest what was expected of him and he stood engag'd to manifest . . the case then between us being such plain sense , what says the learned dr to it ? why , besides his rare evasions lately mention'd , he tells the reader vapouringly his way of reasoning was too hot for mr. g. which i have shewn to be frigid nonsense . he complains that our obliging him to prove or shew clearly what belong'd to him ( for no body held him to mood and figure ) is like the trammelling a horse . that we insinuate mr. g. is non suited , which is far from true. he is peevishly angry at the metaphor of playing at cards , and persecutes it without mercy ; which is a scurvy sign that , however he pretended to a purse full of gold and silver , he is a loser ; and that he will be put to borrow some citations out of authors to combat the council of trent , hoping to recover by that means some of the credit he has lost by the nonplusage of his reason . he pretends he gives us good security : that is , for the letter of scripture , which was not the end of the conference , nor is our question ; but not the least security for its sense , or faith , which was . he talks of declamations and the schools in the savoy ; and glances at my pretending to intrinsical grounds ; which is to maintain that humane authority ( which is the only thing i was to prove ) is to be believed blindly , whether a man sees any reason why he ought to believe it , or no. he talks too of the cardinals in the inquisition ; who , tho' my just judges , were my very good friends . he says my grounds had sav'd the martyrs lives , and he makes a rare plea for them out of my principles : forgetting , good man , that we are writing controversy to satisfy men who are in their way to faith ; whereas those blessed martyrs were not only already faithfull , but moreover liv'd up to christ's doctrin ; and , so , had inward experience in their consciences of it's sanctity and truth . he imagins the iews who saw our saviour's miracles had no intrinsick grounds . whereas true miracles being evidently above nature , are known to be such by comparing them with the course of natural causes , known by a kind of practical evidence or experience : and must i be forc't to render him so weak as to instruct his ignorance that the knowledge of things in nature is an intrinsick ground , and not extrinsical as testimony is ? he sticks close to his friend lominus , right or wrong , in despite of all the evident and authentick testimonies to the contrary ; whom before ( for want of others to second him ) he split into two , and now multiplies into the lord knows how many . to gratifie his friend dr. tillotson , and excuse his , and his own silence , he says i have retracted the main principles in faith vindicated and reason against raillery ; which , in plain terms , is an vnexcusable falshood . to explicate two or three words , and shew by prefaces , states of the question and many signal passages they were misunderstood and apply'd to wrong subjects , ( as i did to the satisfaction of my judges , and even of prejudic't persons ) signifies plainly not-to retract them : nor shall he name any one learned and orthodox man of our church who says my explication is not genuin and sincere ; whereas i have nam'd him many , eminent in both those qualities , who have attested under their hands they are such . he ends with bidding the reader judge what i. s. has gotten by the confession of parties . as much as in modesty he could have wisht ; as appears by the approbations of his books and success in his suit. what dr. st. has got by the confession of his party , may be seen by an eminent man , not writing in hugger-mugger and disguise , but owning his name , viz. that he * is accus'd of having mountebankt and quackt for full five and twenty years . and these wretched shifts he has thought fit to use here to avoid the point , le ts us see he has not left it yet . nor am i to expect he should easily quit such an inveterate habit , grown into a kind of nature by a five and twenty years custom and practice . . now comes the state of the question , as his second letter has craftily put it ; tho' i conceive it was best stated by shewing the occasion and sole end of the conference ; to which i will hold , nor will i be beat off from it by any excursions either then or since . there was a question then put to dr. st. in these words , whether you are absolutely certain that you hold now the same tenets in faith , and all that our saviour taught his apostles . i thought i did well in putting him to answer directly that , he was . he says by my favour he us'd other words . and what were those ! why , instead of the same tenets in faith , and all that our saviour taught to his apostles , he answer'd [ all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles ▪ ] there 's a cloud in this carriage of his , it being against the clear way of honest nature . was the position as it lay in the terms of the proposer , true ; and , so , to be granted ? why did he not grant it then ? was it false ? why did he not deny it ? was it ambiguous ? why did he not , the proposer being present , desire him to explain it ? no neither . none of these plain and common methods would please him . what then ? he would needs change the words of the question in his answer . and by what rule ? was his answer the same in sense with the question ? if not , his answer was no answer to that question , but the saying another thing on his own head . if it was the same sense , why did he not speak to it directly in the proposers words ? the reason he gives is , because he 's afraid of orall tradition lest it should vary the sense . whose sense ? the proposer's ? his sense was fixt in determinate words , and if it were not known , the doctor might have known it if he had pleas'd . he means then his own sense . what ? must he put what sense he thinks fit to the question ? this is a quaint way of answering . and why should not the proposer fear , as himself did here , lest by changing his words , as he did enormously , he should change his sense too ? but this orall tradition like a spright so haunts his fancy , that all along ( as shall be seen ) he either starts perpetually into excursions and counterfeit mirth , or stumbles into downright nonsense . and this i believe verily is the general reason of all his failings : but we are now to seek out his particular reason of changing the words here . the last words that differ in the question and answer can break no squares , for christ and his apostles agreed well enough ; and that heavenly master of theirs taught them all faith either by himself or the holy ghost sent in his name . the danger then must be in these words [ the same tenets in faith ] which he changes , for his security , into [ the same doctrin . ] because the word [ doctrin ] signifies all in the lump ( as * he expresses it ) to shew which he hop't it might be sufficient to shew the book of scripture ; whereas the plural word [ tenets ] might come to oblige him to shew how he has absolute certainty of each or any point in particular , to which he has a great antipathy . and , accordingly , when he came to perform this , he chang'd again the absolute certainty of faith into absolute certainty of scripture . i answer'd . they held more to be of faith than that the book so call'd is scripture . he first trifles that we mean more than is contain'd in scripture , contrary to our express words , where there 's not a syllable of containing or not-containing all faith. however , if i mean his assent to points of faith contain'd in scripture , he promises a full answer afterwards : which we impatiently long to see . only we intreat him , because 't is a far off , he would not lose absolute certainty by the way ; nor fool our expectations when we come at it , by letting the full answer promist us , vanish away into a flat denial he has any such certainty of those points at all . . i argu'd ad hominem that , since he confesses tradition causes certainty , it makes faith as certain as scripture : he seems to confess it ; but denies we have such an universal tradition for our tridentin faith. as if the faith come down by tradition were not the same before and since that council ; or that the tradition we build on did not consist of such a vast body of attesters as were able to evince the truth of a plain matter of fact , unless those who had renounc't tradition did club to it's certainty . but is it not pretty to observe that he pretends not to hold faith to be certain by our tradition because 't is not universal , and yet at the same time disputes against tradition's being a certain deriver of christ's faith even tho' it were universal ! for , his principles allow no more hand in our faith to universal tradition , but only to bring down the book of scripture , and then make that book the only ascertainer of our faith. he threatens to shew the tridentin council had not universal tradition for it's decrees ; and to give us a taste before-hand of that treatise , he adds , let the matter of tradition it self , as a rule of faith , be one of those points . well shot doctor ! the points he speaks of here are exprest to be points of faith ; and the tradition we defend in our controversy at present is the human authority of the church , which we make to be the rule to those coming to faith ; and so it is antecedent to faith and the object of pure natural reason : and does he in his great learning think this is a point of faith ? or is it not possible to keep this roving pen of his to any thing ? but he designs to prove this mighty advantage of his cause , and that no catholick tradition can be produc't against his church in any one point of the additional creed of pius iv. suppose it could not ; has he therefore prov'd he has absolute certainty of the faith he holds , in case we could not prove some other points which we hold ? yet he has undertaken at all adventures this great design , and will suddenly publish the first part ; and , if god gives him life and health ( he should have said , principles too ) he hopes to go thorough the rest . as much as to say , he designs to leave the certainty of his faith in the lurch , to tell the world publickly he has done so ; and , if god gives him life and health , will continue to run away from that troublesome point as far as ever he can . he should first have answer'd error nonplust , and clear'd himself from being a man of no principles , before he can be fit to impugn others ; unless he thinks a man may dispute without principles ; as i verily believe he does ; for his odd methods of reasoning and answering need none . . but tho' he has the ill luck to want principles , he is , for all that , a good man ; and desires no more to end our controversies but to make salvation our end , and the scripture our rule . but , if there be no means to come at the sense of scripture in those most important articles with absolute certainty , many may come ( as millions have done ) to misunderstand such places , and thence to embrace a grand heresy instead of the chief points of true faith ; and does he think heretical tenets in such concerning points , is saving faith. let him shew that his principles lay such grounds as absolutely secure the truth of faith , e're he talks such pious ( or rather pernicious ) nonsense of a saving faith. for , should it hap to be false ( as by his grounds it may ) 't is neither faith , nor the means to salvation . he pretends i exclude all from salvation , who do not penetrate intrinsical grounds : but , 't is a flam of his own coyning . errour nonplust has long ago told him over and over , that 't is enough they adhere to a rule that is settled on solid or intrinsical grounds , and so cannot deceive them , tho' they do not at all penetrate , or ( as he calls it ) dig into the intrinsical grounds , why that authority or rule is inerrable . let the truth of faith be secured , and they have what 's simply requisit to salvation ; unless they be such persons as speculate or doubt , or are to defend the truth of faith against hereticks , and thence come to need a deeper inspection and knowledge of the reasons which conclude their rule does absolutely secure the reliers on it from error . caeteram quippe turbam ( as st. austin says contra ep. fund . ) non intelligendi vivacitas sed credendi simplicitas , tutissimam facit . for as for the others which are the vulgar , they are render'd absolutely secure , or out of danger of erring , not by the sagacity of understanding ▪ but by the simplicity of believing . . i know not certainly what past at the conference , about which he still keeps such a do . 't is high time to leave it off and follow our point . things should have been better manag'd to give us a clearer light ; for want of which we are forc't to trust the dr himself , tho' a party , and accept what he represents in his second letter to mr g. only i see it was confest on all hands that the sole end of it was that dr. st. should manifest he had grounds of absolute certainty for his faith ; and to that i will stick , and level my discourses accordingly . the dr is at his old shuffle again , of scripture's letter being certain and containing all ; neither of which are to any purpose , since neither of these reach his faith , which is an assent to determinate points . i alledg'd that the certainty of scripture was not the point for which the conference was . he asks how i know it ? by the very words that express it , put down here and acknowledg'd by himself p. . but mr g. knew it not . that 's more than i know , or the dr. either . it appears not what use he would have made of it after he had propos'd some questions to gain light what the drs. principles were ; for the dr. himself confesses mr t. cut off his discourse by declaring himself satisfied , and asking questions of his own . but mr. g. lost the point by asking questions about the rule . not so neither . for he was well acquainted with common sense , which told him the word [ rule ] is a relative word ; and , so , is to regulate us about the particular points of faith , which it relates to ; and that , unless it does this , 't is good for nothing , being meerly ordain'd for that end : which dr. st. either knows not , or will not seem to know , lest he should come to be engag'd to shew how his pretended rule influences any one point with absolute certainty ; and yet , if it does not this , 't is no ground for the absolute certainty of his tenets or faith. he says that by the scripture they are to judge what they are to believe , what not . by which we are to understand that he has shuffled away from shewing his rule to be a qualifying principle , which is to give his faith absolute certainty , to the making it a quantitative measure shewing what 's faith what not , or how much is of faith. it seems quantity and quality is all one with him : and he would be measuring his faith , before he knows he has any . as for his containing faith so often shown to be an insignificant pretence , let him know that between his having the letter of scripture containing all , and the doctrinal points , ( which is truly his faith ) there intervenes a quality in the rule called clearness , or plainness ; and such a one as is able to secure the reliers on it that what they receive upon that rule is not an errour , or a heresy , which is against faith. 't is this he is to make out ▪ and prove that this clearness is found in his rule apply'd to all sincere seekers after faith ; and , till he does this , 't is a phrenzy to maintain those men can have absolute certainty of faith by means of scripture's letter . yet hold him close to this plain point , and he 'l complain he 's trammell'd , he should say , gravell'd . but he says , he must not come near any one point of his faith , because being to shew he held all the same doctrin , &c. the word [ all ] made it necessary to assign a rule in which all is contain'd . now i verily thought that all signify'd every one , but his discourse makes it signify no one : again , how shall we know he holds the same doctrin , as he in his answer pretended he did , without particularizing the points held ? by this discourse the arians and most of the hereticks since christs time held the same doctrin he taught ; for they all held the scripture's letter to be certain , and that it contain'd their faith ; yet tell him this a hundred times over , and demand how this is a particular rule for his protestants , which is a common one to all hereticks , he is still deaf on that ear . lastly , since faith is truth , instead of a rule containing all , he should have assign'd a rule ascertaining it all to be true , and that none of the tenets he holds to be in scripture are hereticall . but he thanks you he 'll not burn his fingers with handling such hot points . he alledges that the mosaicall and mahometan laws are resolv'd into the book of moses and the alcoran . but apply this to our point 't is as wide from the purpose as what 's most . had there been such high and most important misteries contain'd in those laws as there are in the christian doctrin , deliver'd down and profest openly by those bodies from which multitudes had taken the liberty to recede by reason of the obscurity of the letter of those very laws ; in that case , there ought to have been some other rule to secure them from mistaking that letter , and able to give them its true sense ; and , therefore the certainty of that sense being their respective faiths , would necessarily have been resolv'd into such a rule , in regard the letter alone could not give and ascertain it . and 't is to be remark't , that all dr st's instances , parallells and similitudes which show prettily and look fine and glossy , when they come to be apply'd to the true point , do still miss of being sutable in those very particulars which are only to the purpose . . and now we are come to the long expected performance of showing his faith absolutely certain , to which he promis'd a full answer formerly . he begins with telling us that the case is not the same as to particular points of faith with that of the generall grounds of the certainty of faith. and what 's this to say , but that since the general grounds are held by him to be absolutely certain and so cannot be false , the particular points of faith , ( viz. the trinity , christ's godhead , &c. ) are not in the same but a worse case and so may be false . a fair , or rather a very foul concession ! yet he not only says it , but will prove it too from a jew 's having absolute certainty of all contain'd in the books of moses , and yet not having it as to such a particular point , viz. the resurrection . i would gladly know if that point be contain'd in those books ? and , if it be , how he can be absolutely certain of all , ( that is of every point , ) contain'd there , and yet not be thus certain of that point tho' contain'd there . i ever thought that omnis and aliquis non had been contradictories ; and had all the logicians in the world on my side in thinking so : and if the dr. have not invented a new scheme of logick of his own , fitted purposely to maintain nonsence , and can with his great authority make that logick good in despite of the whole world , he speaks flat downright contradiction . perhaps he may mean his jew ( or some other man who is not a jew , ) may have absolute certainty that those books containing all his faith were writ by men divinely inspir'd . and this he may have by the testimony for these books , tho' he can neither read , nor understand , nor ever heard read any one word in them : and has not this man an incomparable certainty of his faith , that knows no faith at all ? is not this to make a man absolutely certain of he knows not what ? yet , this it seems is all the resolution of dr. st's faith. but this is not the worst ; for not-knowing the contents of a book , is a kind of innocence in comparison of holding many wicked heresies by misunderstanding it . which tho' he should do , ( as do it he may , for the drs. principles give him no security from doing it ) his very heresies , tho' they be all the whole rabble of them that have pester'd the church since christ's time are resolved into the self-same grounds , as the drs faith is : for , all those hereticks believ'd the scripture to be the word of god , and believ'd all that the scripture contain'd to be of faith ; whence they had all faith in the lump , ( as he expresses it ) and so had good title to be parts of dr st's motley all comprehending church . if he denies it , let him show a soll●● reason by his principles why they should not ; no shadow of which i could ever discern in him yet . . he slides from this point , which he had no mind to come near could he have avoided it , to divers sorts of particular points ; meerly that he might have a show of saying something . for he knows well , and it has been told him above twenty times , we only speak of such dogmatical tenets as have been controverted between the church and her deserters : and , not to name all , we use to instance in two chief ones , the holy trinity and the divinity of our saviour . but , here our rambling disputant is taking another vagary quite out of the road of the question . lominus has set him so agog that he has quite forgot the thing we are about , nay even that we are writing controversy . he is turn'd school-divine on a sudden , tho' he is so utterly ignorant of it , that he cannot distinguish between controversy and it. he will needs fall to treat of faith as 't is a theological virtue ; and not only so , but moreover ( that he may show us how manifoldly he can mistake in one single point ) of that virtue as 't is in the hearts of those who are truly faithfull already , and have besides , well cultivated their souls by the practice of christ's law. whenas all this while he knows we in our controversy are only treating of faith as 't is provable to those who are looking after faith , that 't is christ's doctrine taught at first . tell him of this five hundred times and make it out never so clearly , he runs counter still and takes no notice of it . he was to write a book , and without mistaking willfully all along , he saw he could not do it in any degree plausibly . after many fruitless attempts to hold him to the true state of our controversy , which is about the rule or ground of faith as to our knowledge , it occurr'd to me that nothing could fetter him to it more fast , than to mind him how his friend dr. tillotson , whose book he approves does himself state it . * [ when w● enquire ( says he ) what is the rule of christian faith ? * the meaning of that enquiry is , by what way and means the knowledge of christ's doctrin is convey'd certainly down to us ; who live at the distance of so many ages from the time of it's first delivery . i intreat him then for dr. t 's sake , to remember that our controversy presupposes faith as 't is divine , and treats of it only as 't is derivable down to us at this distance ; and , therefore , since the knowledge of the certain means to do this , is , in our controversy , antecedent to the knowledge of christ's doctrin or faith , it must be manag'd by maxims of pure reason . . this point then settled , let us trace our prevaricatour in his wandrings . he tells us very gravely god is not wanting by his grace to make ( necessary ) points known to men of honest and sincere minds . what we demand of him is some natural medium or argument within our ken , concluding that what 's held by him now is christ's doctrin . he confesses he has none ( for he mocks at conclusive evidence ) but pretends god's grace will do it for him . we tell him that , without such conclusive reasons to prove our present faith to have been taught by christ , we cannot maintain or make out that our faith is true. and he tells us god is not wanting by his grace to make necessary points known to men of honest and sincere minds . and what man living has the courage to assault an adversary that comes arm'd with such a supernatural logick ! now all this , were it levell'd right , as 't is not , is meer petitio principii ; and , begging the question ; for it supposes scripture's letter interpretable by private judgments is the rule , which he was here to prove , and to shew us how it preserves those who rely on it from errour . for , otherwise , if it be not the rule , did god ever promise his grace to those who leave a clear and conclusive way to follow an obscure and inconclusive one ? did god's grace ever make a conclusion follow which did not follow , or make the terms cohere which were incoherent ? or keep those from errour who took a way , that , for any thing he has prov'd to the contrary , facilitated men to fall into it ? certainly , never was god's grace so abus'd to a wrong end , or call'd in at a dead lift like some deus ● machind to save his credit for bringing never an argument that is worth a rush. yet , 't is pleasant to see what a clutter he keeps about the donum intellectûs and lumen fidei , both which presuppose faith and the way to it , whereas all his work was to prove the certainty of this later . in this lamentable condition he has left his rule , recurring to invisible gifts ( the true blew fanatick method ) instead of producing open arguments to prove it has any power to regulate men in their way to faith. proceeding upon this gross and wilfull shuffle he makes a fine flourish of our school-divines who have not one single word of the way and means by which the knowledge of christ's doctrin is convey'd down to us , which is our present point , as his friend * dr. t. has told him : and then he concludes like a triumphant heroe that i am a stranger to the doctrin of our own church , or an obstinate opposer of it . alas for him ! he obstinately opposes , while he cites them , the known state of the question ; and is such a stranger to school-divinity that he cannot distinguish betwixt that and controversy ; and when he is taken tardy thus miserably , he thinks to salve all with swaggering and vapouring . . at length he sums up his performances with impertinent distinctions of all the things he is certain of . as , . that he is absolutely certain that whatever god reveals is true. who denies it ; or what 's the certainty of god's revealing to the certainty of his believing right , unless he be absolutely certain that the particular points he holds , were indeed reveal'd by god , or ( to speak more pertinently to our purpose ) were taught by christ and his apostles ? . he is absolutely certain of his rule , and it 's containing all necessary points . and what 's he the better for certainty of this , if still he remains uncertain of all the particular articles he is to believe by it ? . that god's grace is requisit to faith formally divine ; which is granted : but what 's this to the proving it by a natural medium to have come from christ , as he must do to those who are in the way to faith ? conclusive evidence must be produc't for this , or the proof must fall short of concluding ( whether we have grace or no ) and so leave it unprov'd and uncertain . . he says , particular points of faith are more or less certain , according to the evidence of their deduction from scripture as the rule of faith. this only seems to touch the point in hand , and it touches it very gingerly . let him speak out and tell us whether he is absolutely certain of all particulars of his faith , nay even of a trinity and christ's godhead by his rule ; or whether any man living is absolutely certain of them by his principles ? if not , then all faith may be a lying story for any thing he or any man else can tell . and that this is his true tenet is evident by his omitting here when he comes to speak of particular points , the words [ absolutely certain ] which he put to the two first parts of his division . nor do i like his expression of [ more or less certain ] for since any quality is more or less such , by having less or more of the opposit quality mixt with it , it follows that this his [ more or less certain ] must mean [ less or more uncertain ] strange language for a christian to use when he is speaking of all the particular articles of his faith , and what certainty is to be allow'd for them ! and yet he calls this , the setting this controversy about the certainty of faith in it's true light . a pleasanter jest than which was never spoke , were not the thing in it self so pernicious . sect iii. how dr. st. answers our reasons produc't against his grounds of certainty for his faith. . he proceeds next to answer my short discourse demonstrating that he , and those of his principles , could not be sure they had right faith. i presum'd he could not do it ; he says he has ; let 's see which of us is disappointed . it consists of five plain propositions . . god has left us some way to know surely what christ and his apostles taught . . therefore this way must be such that they who take it , shall arrive by it at the end it was intended for ; that is know surely what christ and his apostles taught . . scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not that way ; for we experience presbyterians and socinians ( for example ) both take that way , yet differ in such high fundamentals , as the trinity & godhead of christ. . therefore scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not the way left by god to know surely what christ and his apostles taught , or surely to arrive at right faith. . therefore they who take only that way , cannot by it arrive surely at right faith ; since 't is impossible to arrive at the end , without the means or way that leads to it . the reader may know that this very discourse , in substance , was propos'd to him many years ago by a worthy lady , of whose sincerity i believe himself does not doubt . he made a rambling discourse of his own against it , unappliable to any proposition in it . the lady , having a high opinion of dr. st's parts , judg'd it impossible a man of his learning should not be able to give an answer to a few lines in so long a time ; not reflecting how connected truth hampers an adversary , and is perfectly unanswerable : so she prest vehemently for a second & a distinct answer . after some tedious expectation he sends another , more insignificant , if possible , than the former . which seen , and the lady now satisfied that he ( upon whom she most rely'd ) had done his utmost , she alter'd her judgment ; upon no other inducement than the seeing plainly that his principles resolv'd all certainty of faith finally into the private spirit : the drs reflecter was set on , like an unexperienc't perdu souldier , to combat it with a distinct answer : but alas ! he was shown to falter or falsify in every particular . this ill success , made the dr. grow wary in speaking to any particular part of it ; but thought it safest here to stand aloof , and throw stones at distance , instead of grappling with it neerer hand . his answer is , that it proceeds upon two false suppositions , and overthrows the possibility of any rule of faith. my first false supposition is , that there is no certainty without infallibility . no true or absolute certainty , good dr. for , as for your morall certainty it may be fallible enough . i must confess i hate such nonsense as to say [ i am perfectly certain of a thing yet peradventure i am deciev'd . ] the word [ absolute ] signifies perfect ; and certainty , if true , is taken from the natures of the objects or things without us ; and if they stand perfectly engag'd by a true knowledge of them , they would not be what they are , if when we truly conceive them as they are , our conception or iudgment of them can be false , that is , if it be not , in that particular , infallible . this is plain sense , and told him long ago . it has been demonstrated also in faith vindicated that true certainty & infallibility were all one . what answers he ? why , he makes as if he had never known or heard of our arguments for it ; but falls to talk of the stoicks marke , epicurus his fooleries : he learnedly mistakes the definition , [ man is a rational creature ] for a demonstration , and dislikes it at the same time . lastly , he tells us many other things the antients held or said ; which are nothing to me , who judge i know what belongs to certainty and resolving of truths into their principles , as well as they did ; and do think them very weak to stand disputing with the perfect scepticks or convincing them by criterions ; because all discourse supposes something certain to build upon , otherwise it might go on endlessly ; that is , would be to no end ; and the scepticks admitted no certainty of any thing at all . . his application of those preparatives is , that we are to expect no absolute certainty in proving the present faith to be christ's doctrin . and so he hopes to save his own credit for producing none , let the credit of christian faith , and the repute of its being an absolutely certain truth go where it will for him . however , to avoid the shame justly due to such a position , he must cast in some good words to fool his readers ; and , so , he grants that they who use due care and diligence may attain to a true certainty and satisfaction of mind as to the sence of scripture . but he never attempts to show that possibly they may not do so , but may hap to fall into damnable heresies as the socinians do ; who , for ought he or i know , us'd as much care and diligence , as he and his party use . again , what means satisfaction of mind ? is faith ever a jot more certain or true because some may be satisfy'd it is ? are not the socinians as well satisfy'd in mind that christ is not god , as the dr. is that he is god ? moreover ; if the argument he brings to prove his faith to be christ's true doctrin , does not conclude , 't is a thousand to one that acute and intelligent men will find the flaw in it : and what can those men do in that case , so they be true to their reason , the only light they can yet guide themselves by ? must they assent that his faith came from christ , when they see that , notwithstanding all the proof he brings for it , it may not be christ's , and hazard to embrace that doctrin for his faith which may , for any thing they know , have the father of lyes for its author ? they must suspend then in that case , and justify themselves by alledging that the best arguments , the most learned christians bring to prove it , conclude nothing ; nay 't is to be fear'd they will disgrace the faithfull as a company of fops , for believing upon weak grounds ; and , by showing them such , lay a just scandall upon the christian church for pretending to hold what christ taught , when as yet none in it are able to prove it was his doctrin . and how would they laugh christians out of countenance , if , proceeding on dr st's short grounds , they should only show them a well-attested book containing those doctrines , without ascertaining absolutely the true sense of it , when as only that sense was the doctrine of faith ; and , which is worse , when they saw multitudes of numerous sects at perpetuall and irreconcileable variance about that sense ! the true rule of faith then must be such as sets faith above any peradventure of not being christ's true doctrin , and so , secure all who rely on it , how weak soever , from being deceiv'd or in an error ; and , withall , it must be such as intelligent men , seeking for assurance of christ's faith , may be satisfy'd it is able to conclude it to be such , and the more learned faithfull evince to doubters and convince opposers , that the faith held now by themselves and the church is the self-same that christ and his apostles taught at first . but dr st. dares not affirm any of this of his rule of faith ; therefore his pretended rule is none . his instance of true certainty attainable without infallibility in that point of faith , viz. that iesus was the true messias , is partly answer'd in my fourth catholique letter ; and his alledging it has one strange inadvertence in it , which i wonder he was not aware of , which is , that the proof of it depended on the interpretation of scripture . he had it seems forgot that to manifest himself to be the true messias , foretold by the prophets , was the main point of our saviours doctrin ; and that he did miracles to attest that doctrin , and make himself known to be that person ; which miracles were infallible marks that that doctrine of his in that point was true. and , when the dr. produces miracles to abet his private interpretations of scripture , then he may have a fair pretence to lay aside the publick interpretation of the church . again , he is quite out as to the subject of his discourse : for tho' it was a point of faith in the jewish law that a messias was to come ; yet that this very person , iesus christ , was to be that messias , was no point of faith among them ; and god's providence , we see , took a far better way to make it out than private interpretations of the scripture ; unless he thinks miracles , no more effectual nor more certain than private interpretations are . what insignificant nothings this man brings for his choice arguments , and what pains he takes in the worst cause in the world , viz. to maintain that christian faith needs not to be absolutely certain ? and this , for no other reason ( for 't is every christian's interest it should be so ) but because his bad principles can afford him no argument to prove it to be such . . his pretence of my second false supposition , ( viz. that a rule of faith , according to me must be a mechanical rule , and not a rational ) is weak beyond expression . every schollar knows ( his friend dr. t. particularly who took the same way and us'd the same expressions , rule of faith. p. . ) that metaphors are translated from materiall to intellectual things , in regard we have no genuin conceptions of these later ; ( and indeed , most of the language of christianity is made up of such expressions , ) whence we can argue , by analogy , from the one to the other . the word [ rule ] is one of those metaphoricall words : and , hence we say that , as a material rule is that by which if we draw our pen , it directs us to make a right line ; so , the rule of faith , being intended by god to direct us to truth , will lead those right who follow it and regulate themselves by it . does not this metaphor look a little more proper , and the discourse upon it hang better together than his likening scripture to a purse ? yet he utterly dislikes it , and tells the reader i falsly suppose the rule of faith must be a mechanicall or carpenters rule with all its dimensions fixt ; and denies that himself supposes it to be such a materiall or mechanicall rule : nor any man sure that were not stark mad. again , do we here meddle with its dimensions or how much is of faith , as he did when he spoke of his rule ? the straightness of the draught , preserving us from the obliquity of errour , is the only point we aim at . next , he denies there is any such intellectuall rule , because there may be mistakes in the vnderstanding and applying it , and therefore care and diligence and impartiality are requir'd , else men may miss . how ? miss tho' they follow it ? then it self was not straight ; and , so , no rule : for the very notion of a rule is to be a thing that has a power to regulate or direct us right , or keep the understanding that follows it from missing ; and to follow it is all the application it can need to do its effect . whence , all the care and diligence and impartiality he speaks of , must be employ'd in seeing they do indeed follow it : for none of these can help or hinder the rule in its power of directing ; since it had this of it self , independently of the persons . but his rule , tho' all these ( as far as we mortalls can discern ) be us'd by the socinians in the following it , still suffers those carefull , and diligent and impartiall followers of it to err in faith ; therefore 't is no rule of faith. but 't is mighty pretty to observe that when he is pincht with plain sense he ever and anon runs to the old philosophers ; who he says , would have laugh'd at me for applying a materiall rule to intellectuall things . sure he 's not well awake . i draw a metaphor indeed from a materiall rule to an intellectuall one , and then apply that intellectual rule to intellectuall things ; but i know none so mad as to apply a materiall rule to intellectuall things ; unless he thinks i am measuring faith by a taylors yard , or finding out the right sense of scripture by a ruler and a ruling pen. . but , why presbyterians and socinians ? this insinuation ( says he ) has as much folly as malice in it , and makes as tho' wee of the church of england were socinians in those points , viz. the trinity and godhead of christ. god forbid i should be so injurious to them . i do assure him and them faithfully i intended it as a piece of justice to them ; and put in presbyterians instead of protestants because i had reason to hope those private-spirited principles were none of theirs , and that divers of their eminent writers had own'd the universall tradition and practice of the church for their rule of interpreting scripture : and i have some ground to think they might in time have profest it publickly , had not dr. st's irenicum-doctrines * fill'd that church with men of no steady principles — and made luke warm persons flock into it corrupting it's body , — by which means there have been in the church of england so few church-of-england men. but , why so cholerick ? why such wincing and kicking ? i do assure him i did not think i had in the least toucht him . if he be so over-apprehensive and angry withal , i fear he has done himself more wrong in taking it to himself than i ever intended him . again , what means he by [ wee of the church of england ? ] i am told by a hearty member of it , and one who owns his name too , ( how true it is let the dr's conscience look to it ) that * he is contented to sit and sing in the bearing branches of that church , so long as he fills his pockets ; but , when the gathering time is over , it is to be cut down as that which cumbereth the ground . by which he sees that he must either clear himself by a candid and full retractation of his ill principles , or he will have no title to the word [ wee . ] but we are come forwards to his farther defence of his rule , or rather to his overthrowing the absolute certainty of christian faith ; in order to which he asks , how can reason be certain in any thing , if men following their reason can mistake ? very easily . because reason is a faculty or a power , apt to be actuated by true or false principles ; and , accordingly , 't is determinable to truth or falshood . but , if reason follow any maxim , taking it to be a principle to such a thing , and yet errs in that thing , then that pretended principle is no true principle . yet , says he , men following the rules of arithmetick may mistake in casting up a summ. and can he seriously think that a man who casts it up false , does not decline , while he thus mistakes , from arithmetical rules ? may he not with as good sense say that two and three do not make five ? for all rules of computation hang together by the same necessity . in a word , his instance falters in the third proposition , viz. that two who have made use of the same way differ at least a hundred in casting up the sum. which is false ; and by altering the terms irregularly , he hinders any conclusion from following . false , because , no two men can differ in a sum , unless they wrong or abuse the rules of computation . irregular ; because , instead of the words [ who take that way ] found in his second proposition and in our discourse , he coggs in the words [ make use of that way ] which are not so express in sence as the word [ take ] is , which imports following whither it leads , or making a right use of it . and it would have been too palpably absurd to say a man takes a way who leaves it ; as an ill-reckoner must needs leave the true rules of arithmetick . but those who both take and follow all along the letter of scripture interpreted by their private selves , and this to their power , and are skilfull in languages & in comparing places , do yet go wrong ▪ therefore his way is no way , and his rule is no rule . then follows the triumph over my inconsiderateness in not distinguishing between the rule and its application ; and i tell him the taking it , following it , or holding to it , is the applying it , and all the application it can need . nor shall all his starting holes and tricks ever be able to evade the force of this argument . . his discourse of moral qualifications requisit to the certainty of faith , as to know the sense of the new testament , if apply'd to our present question , amounts to this ; that no man can see the force of a natural medium leading to faith , without humility of mind , purity of heart , prayer to god , sincere endeavours to do god's will , &c. so that for want of a good argument , he has left off disputing , and falls to preaching , tho' he has had but ill success in his guildhall sermon . 't is granted all these are excellent means to purge the will from by-affections ; and , by doing so , to leave the understanding free to see the force of the proof , and thence inferr the truth of what 's prov'd or shewn to our reason . but where 's this proof , where 's this truth all the while ? must we produce such invisible things for open proofs ? if all these moral qualifications be requisit ( as he says ) to make men certain of christ's doctrin , he must prove that himself and all his sober enquirers , which are the members of his private-spirited church , have all these qualifications , e're we or any man living can be certain they have true faith. again , how will he satisfy doubters , and convince acute opposers and adversaries what is the true doctrin of christ ? will the alledging invisible qualifications do the work ? moreover , he is certain of his faith by his rule ; and yet his rule of scripture ascertains none by his doctrin but by vertue of these moral qualifications . these then are either his rule or the best part of it . at least he maintains here they are requisit , and that otherwise scripture is no rule . he must then prove he has these qualifications , or he cannot shew he has any rule , or any faith. in a word , we are disputing as controvertists , and demand open & intelligible proofs ; and he sends us to invisible holes , which only god the searcher of hearts can find out ; and is not this mighty learned ? i wonder how he can pretend to convert any man to christ's true doctrin by these principles . all he can do is to alledge and compare texts to prove it certainly christ's doctrin ; i but , sir , says the other , how shall i be satisfy'd you have humility of mind , purity of heart , &c. without which your self confess you cannot be certain of the true sense of scripture at all ? what art the doctor has to satisfy him in this hard point i know not . but setting the doctor 's faith aside , what provision has he made for the standing visible body of the church to defend and maintain she has christ's true faith ? none in the world by his principles , unless she can prove she has all these moral qualifications . so that all is left to each private man's breast ; and , if he has but this good conceit of himself , that he is endow'd with all those excellent virtues , and fancies that he prays better than all his neighbours , let them be socinians , quakers or what you will , he is certain of his faith meerly by vertue of this self-conceit that he is such a saint ; since by dr. st's principles without firm assurance that he is thus requisitly qualify'd , he can never have any assurance at all of his faith. might he not as well have told us in one word , that himself and all his friends are pure saints , and know themselves to be so , and therefore they are certain they have these rare qualifications , and by them assurance of the sense of scripture , or christ's doctrin ; but that all who do not think as they do , want those qualifications , are of the wicked and children of darkness , and so can never have any light to know whether they have christ's true doctrin or not ? this then is the rare resolution of dr. st's faith. i expected he should produce clear arguments as became a controvertist , and he alledges the most hidden means in the world as becomes an enthusiast . . yet the force of truth is so great that it obliges him to confess that the right way will certainly bring men to their iourneys end if they continue in it . i subsume ; but the letter of scripture interpretable by private judgments does not bring the socinians to their end , that is , to know surely what christ and his apostles taught , tho' they continue in it ; whence i conclude that scripture's letter interpretable by private judgments is not the right way to know surely what christ & his apostles taught . to escape this most evident conclusion which utterly overthrows his whole cause , he starts aside with one [ if ] to the remote end [ salvation ] whereas the end i spoke of in my discourse which he is now answering , was expressly , to know assuredly christ's doctrin : then after a second [ if ] he tells us scripture was not design'd as an infallible way to know the truth on falshood of particular opinions by . what have we to do with opinions ? we speak of points of faith , and instanc't expressly in the blessed trinity and the godhead of christ. are these with him but opinions ? indeed , i have reason to doubt that all points of faith are but opinions with him , nay he ought to doubt they are or may be worse than opinions , viz. heretical falshoods , unless he thinks himself absolutely certain of his moral qualifications ; for 't is those , it seems , must do the deed , when all arguments fail . as for infallibility , there was no such word in my discourse , and he ought to answer my argument in the words i put it ; and not to start into such evasions and logomachies . tho' the allowing of natural infallibility has been prov'd against him by reason and authority of those even of his own church , he never answers it , but barely says over again , there is no such thing as infallibility in mankind but by immediate divine assistance . yet he had the boldness or forgetfulness to say , p. . that if this be not catholick doctrin , then i am infallibly certain i. s's letters are far from being catholick in their sense . it seems than either some men are infallible , for seriously i take dr st. to be a man ; or he fancies himself to be something above the herd of mankind ; or else sticks not at the blasphemy to entitle the blessed spirit of peace to have inspir'd him with such a quarrelsome falshood . . he discourses against tradition as 't is practical ; but has he said any thing against it as 't is oral ? the force of which to clear christ's sense delivered down in the church consists in catechizing , preaching , dilating upon the points , and explicating themselves at large ; replying to difficulties , and accommodating their discourse to all the learners exigences ; all which is found in the living voice of the church and her pastours , ( as * i shew'd him at large ) and none of it , in the letter in a book . what answers he to common sense and to his own experience too when he instructs others ? why he puts us off still with this frigid cuckoo answer , that he is of another opinion , that writing is as plain as speaking ; and that words written have as much ( he ought to have said as clear ) sense in them as words spoken . which , apply'd to our case is most palpable nonsense , and makes all explications frivolous , and all catechizers and commentators upon scripture ridiculous . the force i put in the practicalness of tradition is , that , supervening to the oral delivery , or being consonant to it , it confirms it , and makes it more visible . but he combats the practicalness of it consider'd alone ; and so impugns his own willfull mistake . but what says he to my discourse ? he alledg'd that tradition might come down in common equivocal words , and so deliver no determinate sense . i * reply'd that 't is inconsistent with the nature of mankind to mean nothing by the words they use , especially in tenets they were to be sav'd by ; therefore the body of the church had some meaning or other of those words , [ christ is the son of god , ] and [ christ's body is really in the sacrament : ] but this meaning or notion could not be a common or general one , in regard , no notion can be common to god & a creature , to the substance of christs body , & to the substance of bread , much less to that sacred substance , and some accidents or qualities : therefore there could not come down any such common notion , by means of those words ; wherefore , there must have descended some particular notion of each point , determining the signification of the words to one sense or the other . this was the true force of my discourse . i do still pretend it demonstrable , and let him answer it when he can ; for , did he know the consequences it will draw after it , he would think it worth his while . he 's at his old logick again , which is to bring an instance against the conclusion , and is very brisk that it overthrows my demonstration . and what says his instance ? it says the corinthians and artemonites understood by those words , that christ was only an adoptive son , that is a creature ; which is as much as to say , they understood them in a particular sense , which is all i there pretended . and , so , his instance is , as he says truly , unlucky ; but 't is to himself , not to mee ; for it makes good my words , and instead of overthrowing , confirms my discourse that men must have understood some particular sense by those words ; and our learned dr is so weak as to think , that , when what he brings for an answer is so evidently for me , it makes against me . as for their pleading tradition for their sense ; surely he means a private tradition from some former hereticks , and not the publick tradition of the christian church ; or that their heretical tenets were immediately deliver'd by that united body of christians ; for the manifest falshood of this would have been confuted by experience and have sham'd the alledgers : nor could the church , in that case , have condemn'd them , since they spoke her sense . but the good dr mistook the pretence of two or three quibbling hereticks for the vniversal tradition of the church ( as wicked an error as it was possibly to stumble upon ) & then triumphs how rarely his instance has answer'd my demonstration . and thus ends his reply to my short discourse ; which having done , he assures the reader he has fully answer'd my main argument against his rule of faith. whereas he has not so much as touch't any single proposition in it ; & trifled , or done worse , even in the ridiculous odd way he has taken to answer it . which confirms me more then ever 't is past his skill to hurt it , and even beyond his courage to grapple with it . . his contradicting himself is still urg'd upon him unless he can shew that true or absolute certainty does not secure those who have it in any thing , from being deceived in that thing . again , in his th principle he said there needed no infallible society of men either to attest or explain the scripture . i reply'd , that if it be fallible , we cannot by it be more than fallibly certain , and we can have no absolute certainty from a fallible testimony . this seems very plain ; for how should a man be absolutely or perfectly certain of a thing by that very testimony which not being perfectly certain may perhaps deceive him in that very thing ? his first answer is , that [ he understands no such thing as infallibility in mankind , but by immediate divine assistance . ] he understands ? is that an answer ? does he understand how to answer our many arguments to prove it ? by his not taking notice of them , we are to understand , and conclude he does not. again he declares that in that principle of his he meant there needed no infallibility by divine assistance ; and he utterly denies natural infallibility ; whence 't is manifest he allows no certainty at all but fallibility . his faith is in a fine case in the mean time . he must shew i say that fallibility in the testimony can ground absolute certainty of the thing attested , and this , tho' a man sees that the testimony and himself who relies on it may be in an error , before he can make either the letter or the book of scripture , absolutely certain , by tradition or human testimony , which he maintains here is fallible . can a man think or say interiourly , [ i am absolutely ( or perfectly ) certain of a thing peradventure . when that very [ peradventure ] hinders his certainty from being absolute or perfect ? what answers he to this plain evidence ? or how shews he that a seen fallibility is able to beget absolute certainty ? why , first , he says , if by fallible certainty i mean this and that , &c. i mean ? why i mean nothing by it but that 't is a wicked contradiction . i mean the same by it as i would by a hirco-cervus , a four-squar'd triangle , green scarlet , or whatever such desperate words one may put together to compound strong nonsense . how should i mean any thing by a compound of two such words which the goodness of rational nature , and the aversion which our understanding power has to contradiction , has forbid any man to use ever since the creation ? did the dr. or any man living hear any mortal man when he is about to express his certainty of a thing , say [ i am fallibly certain of it ? ] yet , how oft has he heard them say , i am infallibly certain of such a thing ? whence were the word [ infallibly ] a different notion from certain , or difference added to it as to its genus , it would nay must admit the opposite difference [ fallibly ] as is done in all such cases : which since it does not , without straining nature , and the language of mankind , 't is not a different notion , but the same with true certainty ; and therefore in proper speech true certainty and infallibility are both one : yet , after he has thus abus'd the language of all mankind , he has the confidence to tell me i make use of those words in an improper and unusual sense . this farther appears by this , that our speculators use to add moral or some other such epithet to it , which are of a diminishing signification , when they would express it's deficiency from true certainty . this logical demonstration to prove certainty and infallibility to be the same was alledg'd in faith vindicated , p. . but we must excuse such slight talkers from even attempting to give an answer becoming a scholar to any such close proofs ; tho' it has been prest upon him in errour non-plust , p. . and upon dr tillotson in reason against ra●●●ery from p. . to p. . he only tells us what he does own , does not own , and such sleeveless sayings ; that is , he only says over again his own crude tenets with the formality of a distinction or two ; and places his main hopes to uphold his credit , not in the strength of his answers , but in the weakness or partiality of his readers . the upshot is , he owns clearly he has only fallible grounds for his faith having been taught by christ ; which is to assert and maintain ( for it is not to be suppos'd he will allow any others to have surer grounds than his own ) that all christian faith may be false , and the grounds themselves , in more regards than one , most perfect nonsence . . he proceeds next to give us his notion of absolute certainty in these words : [ when the evidence is the highest which in point of reason the thing is capable of , then there is that which i call absolute certainty . these words [ which i call ] are very emphatical , and precisely true ; for no man living but himself and dr. t. that i know of ever call'd it so . for , suppose the evidence be but very slight , and the thing , as propos'd to us , or in our circumstances , can give us no more , will this slight glimmering evidence make us absolutely certain of it ? again , does he mean in point of true reason inform'd by the best maxims to direct and establish it ? this is conclusive evidence or demonstration , and the conclusion thus deduc't is infallibly true , because the maxim which legitimates the consequence , is , as all logicians know , infallibly certain , being a principle of our understanding , and self-evident ; is it this he means ? no : he does not like conclusive evidence in the grounds of his faith by no means . to come closer , i ask him , does he mean that true knowledge , conformable to the thing , or object , fixes him in that certainty , or ( in great part ) his own aiery apprehension ? if such a knowledge , then , since none can truly know what is not , that knowledge is as impossible to be false , or is as infallibly true , as 't is that the thing must be what it is : and , if no such knowledge grounds his certainty , how is it an absolute or perfect one ? can his apprehending it so make it so ? can a man be absolutely certain of a falshood , because he apprehends that falshood to be a truth , or that a thing is so when 't is not so ? if not , then 't is only it 's being so which can be the ground of absolute certainty , and justify that assent , and then that assent is infallible , for a thing is infallibly what it is . he 'l say he took it to be so , and that 's enough . but , to omit that his taking a thing to be so neither makes nor proves it to be so , i press farther : when he took it to be so , did he take it right , or did he mistake it ? if he took it right , then again his knowledge , and certainty grounded on that knowledge , are both infallible ; for his knowledge when he took it right could not but be conformable to the thing , and the thing is infallibly as it is . if he took it wrong or mistook it , and yet be absolutely certain of it , then again there may be absolute certainty of a falshood , or that a thing is so which is not so : which is a rare kind of certainty indeed , especially for the ground of his faith ; and posterity no doubt will owe much to his memory for the invention . 't is left then that he must say he did not know whether he took it right or wrong , but apprehended he took it right . in which case ( to omit that this apprehending or thinking the evidence so strong as to determin assent , is the second kind of certainty he assigns here before he comes to absolute certainty ) i ask how he can possibly think himself certain a thing is such , when he sees he does not know whether he be mistaken in it or no ? and how a judgment that a thing absolutely is , and a judgment that it may not be for any thing he knows , can be consistent together in an intellectual nature , without destroying the first principle of our understanding , viz. that 't is not possible the same thing should at once be and not be . . i have not done with this new invented absolute certainty of his . it must spring he says from the highest evidence which in point of reason the thing is capable of . where every expression is indeterminate and ambiguous . suppose ( as i urg'd lately ) the thing be not capable of any clear evidence ( as himself supposes there is not for such or such a doctrin to have been taught by christ ) why must he needs assent at all ? why does he not suspend ? god has endow'd us with a faculty of doing this , as a bridle to keep us from precipitation , and to preserve us from running into errour ; & why should we not use it , but expose our selves to run headlong into mistakes ; both prejudiciall to our nature , whose perfection is truth ; and pernicious , in its consequences , to the conduct of our lives ? again , certainty , taken from the thing ( as he says this is ) signifies a determination of the mind by means of the object , and is the genuin effect of some kind of evidence ; and , therefore , absolute or perfect certainty ought to be the effect of perfect evidence : nor is any evidence a perfect one , unless it concludes . now he does not like conclusive evidence , and so he ought to renounce absolute certainty . 't is as difficult to guess what he means here by those words [ in point of reason , ] true reason knows no methods but this : to assent if the thing be clear , and to suspend if it be not ; and , to conclude or argue being the proper act of reason straining after truth , what 's not concluded is not clear , and therefore not to be accepted for an absolute truth or assented to as such ; the summ then ( to come close to our present question ) is , that , absolute certainty of such a doctrine's having been taught by christ must either be built on true evidence of the grounds for it , and then it cannot consist with deception , and so is infallible : or it is not ; and , then indeed it may sometimes come to iustify a great propension , hope or deeming that 't is so ; or , if i conceive it to be of small concern , an unexamining letting it pass for such , but it can never iustify an absolute assent . see more of this subject , and a perfect confutation of this wild assertion in * errour-nonplust and * reason against raillery . after many rambling sayings of his own he falls to speak of putting an end to controversies , especially , about certainty and fatality . what we have to do with fatality i know not ; but i believe he heartily wishes an end of this fatall controversy ; concerning certainty ; for he is in a miserable ross about it ; being driven now to declare whether he will deny first principles , or renounce his vnprincipled doctrin . the best way i can invent to end all controversies , is this , that , since controvertists are disputants , and are to produce their arguments ; which are good for nothing nor can ever end controversies unless they conclude , those who renounce conclusive evidence and instead of it bring invisible motives & qualifications , may be expos'd and turn'd out of the lists , as being , even by their own confession insignificant talkers and endless brabblers . his wrangle about light and darkness , christ and belial is spoke to in my second catholique letter . let him shew that his rule , scripture interpreted by private judgments , does not patronize heresy as well as faith , ( which he will never do ) and we will be content to acquit him from that horrid blasphemy of making light and darkness very consistent ; and christ the author of our holy faith and belial the father of heresy and lies , very good friends ; of which wicked doctrin , 'till he does this , he stands indicted . . i alledg'd that scripture being the common rule to him and all hereticks , the particular or distinguishing rule must be their own private iudgments interpreting scripture . does he deny this , or shew my discourse faulty by assigning any other that particularizes or distinguishes them ? no , neither . what does he then ? why he sends me to the old philosophers to learn logick . and i tell him with many thanks , i know none , except aristotle , a competent master for me. next , he makes sense to be a rule of iudging , that is an intellectual rule : which i deny : for the rule to any thing is the immediate light to judge of any thing , and multitudes of intervening knowledges are requisit to inform us when the advertisements of our senses are right ; as is evident in the fallaciousness of sense in a stick seeming crooked in water , the bigness of things seen at distance , and innumerable other particulars . but i ought to distinguish between the rule of iudgment , and the iudgment made according to that rule . and so i do , if that be all . for the rule is the informer , & my iudgment the thing inform'd : but yet if my judgment follow the information and still go wrong , my informer was no good informer . the evidence of this , and the propension of uncorrupted nature to believe pastours , fathers and teachers , and those who were wiser than themselves in things they were ignorant of , did ( i told him ) make the generality of those out of the church follow the way of tradition of their own church ; and not regulate themselves in the choice of their tenets by their private judgment of discretion working upon scripture's letter ; as is evident in whole nations ( as denmark ) meeting in one particular belief , and whole sects agreeing in the very judgment of their respective leaders ; whence the sense they make of scripture as themselves understand it , is not their rule . first , he quotes a decree of the church of england , that nothing is to be requir'd of any man to be believ'd as faith but what 's read in scripture or may be prov'd by it . but this makes against himself , unless he thinks the generality , that is , the layity of that church esteem themselves more able to judge of the sense of what 's read in scripture , or to prove all the highest points of faith by it , than their pastours and church-governours are ; for otherwise nature will and ought to incline them to believe their judgment rather than their own in that affair , which is to follow the way of tradition . indeed , i must confess that by the doctor 's principles every one of his sober enquirers ought to preferr his own judgment of discretion above the church'es ; but what he says is one thing , what the dictates of honest nature teaches mankind is another . 't is confest , the layity of each congregation judges the sentiments of their leaders to be agreeable to scripture ; but i affirm withall that not one in ten thousand , when he comes at age , lays aside prejudice , and setts himself to consider anew by his scanning the letter whether his leaders told him right , or presumes of the competency of his own knowledge to judge or determin whether they understood scripture in the right sense or no. he talks to us indeed of helps , and how they call in the old interpreters of the church , and desire them to use their own reason , &c. but every man sees that few or none stand indifferent 'till they have us'd all these helps ; but undoubtingly accept that very faith in which they were educated : and so they continue ; 'till the discoursing or reading those of a contrary opinion , unsettles them and put them into doubts . besides if those helps he talks of are not secure from erring themselves as to what they help others in , they may help them to misunderstand the sense of scripture in the highest points of faith , and so help them to be hereticks . and yet these are all the best helps his principles can help them to ; for he assures us and maintains stoutly by affirming them all to be fallible in what they are to help us , that all his helps may be deceiv'd in that very thing in which they are to help others : they may indeed according to him , give a strong guess at what is christ's doctrin , but that 's all ; for he allows none to be absolutely certain of the sense of scripture , but only of the letter . he proceeds after a strange rate and talks of opinions , doubtfull and obscure places ; but avoids still to come up to those high points of faith , particularly those of a trinity and christ's godhead , in which he knows i instanc't . then he blames my logick , for not distinguishing between the rule of faith and the help to understand it . and my logick remembers its respects to his no logick , and sends him back word , that since an intellectual rule to such a thing is an immediate light or means to know that thing as his friend dr. t. has told him , rule of faith ▪ p. . and is purposely fram'd to give us that knowledge , nay essentially ordain'd to that end , 't is a contradiction to say it needs another thing to lend it clearness , in order to give us christ's sense ; for then this other thing would be clearer than it as to that particular effect ; and , so , this not the other would be the true rule of faith. yet he will needs prove this contradiction true , and that it may be a rule and yet not have power to regulate without the help of another ; and , by what argument will he prove it ? oh , he can prove things by better means than arguments . he has an instance still at hand , either when he is prest too close , with anothers arguments or wants one of his own . these instances are good serviceable drudges and are ever ready to do all his jobbs ; and yet i doubt his instance brought to prove a contradiction , must it self be of the same chimericall family . let 's see 't is this , that a nurse teaches children to spell and read the new testament , & so by degrees to understand christ's doctrin ; and yet the faith of those persons is not resolv'd into this help , of the nurse's teaching but into the new testament it self as the ground of their faith. i must confess i extreamly admire at this drs confidence , and no less at his imprudence that he does not rather not write at all then perpetually put such shams as these upon his reader . are we speaking of all remote helps whatsoever , or are we speaking only of a help for the rule to do its proper effect , which is to give us christ's sense or our faith ? god and nature has helpt us with a rational being , eyes , and brains ; conversation or masters have helpt us with skill in the language in which the letter of scripture is deliver'd , and tradition has helpt us with the right books and copy of scripture ; do any of these concern our present enquiry ? are not these all presuppos'd to his rule ? the only question is what help is necessary to give his rule ( the rest being all presuppos'd ) the power to regulate us in knowing the sense of that book or our faith , as to those spiritual and most important articles ? to do this being the proper effect of his rule , and , a thing not being what it should be , or is pretended to be , unless it have a power in its self to do its proper effect , ( since it 's essence was ordain'd for it ) hence i affirm it must need no help to do this , but must have it of it self ; and therefore if scripture's letters have not of it self clearness enough to give those who are coming to faith the requisite certainty or knowledge of what 's its true sense in those dogmaticall points , 't is no rule of faith. this is the only point , and therefore must only be omitted : what 's this to a nurse's teaching to read ? or what 's her teaching to the immediate and certain light to know christs sense in those main articles ? his friend dr. t. goes ( by chance ) a little more consonantly , and confesses the substance of this discourse of mine , by allowing that the letter of scripture must be sufficiently plain , even in those high points i mention ( rule of faith , p. . . ) but it seems , that upon second thoughts fearing to be pinch't hard upon that point , they have since that time , chang'd their measures . . put case then one of dr. st's flock should say to him ; doctor , this very rule you bid me follow , to my best iudgment tells me you have err'd in holding the true godhead of christ ; nay , suppose he should say the same to the whole church of england , what could he or that church either , say to such a man according to his principles ? they can only propose and direct , and that 's the utmost they ought to do ; and , if he likes not their proposal & direction , they ought to let him alone , nay commend him for sticking so close to his rule , as he understands it , without fearing the face of man. for 't is the greatest injustice and tyranny in the world to punish a man temporally , or ( which is worse ) by ecclesiastical censures for following sincerely this rule of faith. besides , who can tell but this man is better stock't with dr. st's morall qualifications and inward light than his judges and pastours are ? and then to vex such a saint is to fight against god : and therefore the scabb'd sheep must be let alone to run astray or infect the flock ; let the church & her government go where they will. now , who sees not that these principles must shatter the church in pieces , fill her with a multitude of bedlam sects , and utterly overthrow church-government ? but what would i. s. do with such a man ? why , first i would endeavour to dispossess him of that luciferian spirit of pride , which such wicked principles have tainted him with , and win him to a rational humility by representing how all mankind in their several affairs seek out one more skill'd than themselves and use their best reason in pitching upon him , and then trusting him in things themselves are ignorant in . i would shew him how the order of the world , the commands of god , and his known duty , do all oblige him to believe the church in such matters rather than his own private interpretations ; i would endeavour to shew him that the preservation of these necessary orders engages god's providence to assist his church and keep her from erring in faith , rather then private men. i would show him that , since the only thing he doubts of is to know what christ taught , & that god has left some way to make us sure of his true doctrin , he must first find out such a way that , if men follow'd it , would secure them from errour in that particular . nor would it be hard to demonstrate to him that * tradition is such a way , and that scripture's letter interpretable by private judgment is not that way . i would shew him how impossible 't is the body of the church should have unanimously deserted that way ; and , amongst other things i would inform him how weakly dr st. had defended his own rule and impugn'd ours ; and , lastly , how he and others who follow'd another way , have been forc't to grant that all the main points of christian doctrin may be false for any thing they know . these and such like discourses , i hope , would at first startle him , and at length cure him , if he were not too deeply tainted with enthusiasm , or a high opinion of his own moral qualifications and divine assistances : for , if he were , he is got beyond the reach of reason and humane discourse ; and is not to be helpt by any thing under a miracle , perhaps not by that neither . . he seems to deny people the liberty to interpret scripture against the teaching church . but his discourse sounds hollow when he comes to show he does so . some sleight thing he says about the sense of the teaching church in the best and purest ages ; but not a word of what they owe to the present church , which is their proper and immediate instructress and governess ; by which discourse it should seem he holds the church of england none of the best nor purest . the main point is , whether , if , after having consulted the primitive church , and consider'd what grounds she brought for her doctrin and decrees , the enquirer still likes his own interpretation better , he is in that case to submit his private judgment to the decrees of that or any church ; and how the church is to look upon him in case his private interpretation leads him into a flat heresy ? these are the true points , and tests of dr. st's principles and yet undiscover'd consequences ; but these are slubber'd over , or rather , indeed , never toucht . yet he complains of me , for being obscure ; when as 't is acknowledg'd he writes clearly , but 't is clearly from the point , nor has any packing the cards , &c. he says too , that 't is aukward reasoning , to say nothing but infallibility will content him now . pray , which is more aukward ? if the judges acknowledge themselves fallible , ( in which case nothing can be said to be true that is held upon their testimony ) then he allows them very much authority , but not upon other terms . but he is high in choler against me for saying he has an aversion against the churches intermeddling in matters of faith ; and imputes it either to great ignorance or a malicious design to expose him to church governors . but his comfort is he pities my ignorance and despises my malice . this is stately and great . i do assure him my only design is to oppose such principles as leave all to the fanatick phrenzy of every private interpreter ; and till he satisfies the world better that his principles are not guilty of this enormity , i shall still oppose him let him huff never so high . the point is , how does he clear himself ? why , he says he disputes not against church-authority in due proposing matters of faith ; certainly church-authority is mightily oblig'd to him . a genuin and learned son of the church of england , speaking of this very doctrin of his , tells him , that * proposals of their own nature are so far from inferring an authority to command their reception , that they rather imply a power in those to whom they are propos'd , at discretion to reiect them ; and so , in the issue gives the authority to the people . which words contain the full sense of my discourse here against the dr and his beloved sober enquirer . why is he then so high against me for exposing him , when those of the church of england have already expos'd him more than i have done ? this is no great sign either of ignorance or malice , when persons who are otherwise of different judgments and communions , do center in the same opinion of his doctrin as destructive of church-government . but 't is yet more pleasant , that he will not promise he will not dispute against church-authority even in this due proposing matters of faith , but with a proviso , that every man is to judge for his own salvation . as much as to say , if the church will be so sawcy or so wicked as not to let my sober enquirers alone to interpret scripture as they list , or hold what seems to their wise worships to be the sense of it , ( which , with him , is judging for their own salvation ) but will be censuring or excommunicating them for hereticks , if they hap to err in christ's godhead for example , or any other such point , then church-authority have at you ; for i tell you plainly if you do this i shall and will dispute against you . it would be worth our knowing too what the pretty cautious words [ due proposing ] means . there seems to lurk some hidden mystery in that little monasyllable [ due ] which may come to help the sober enquirers with an evasion from submitting to church-authority , or obeying it , in case it misbehaves it self unduly , or grows so malapert as to restrain them in their licentious prerogative of interpreting scripture as their gifted fancy inspires them . it looks oddly , and seems to have some ambidextrous meaning in it ; but we will hope the best till he comes to unfold it . now , because honourable company is creditable to those who are highly obnoxious , he names st. chrysostom , st. austin , st. thomas of aquin , and bellarmin as of his opnion , but with the same sincerity as he pretended all divines of both churches , and even my self to hold all necessary points may be found by every sober enquirer without the churches help ; as may be seen hereafter § . . 't is indeed the general opinion of the fathers , that we are not always heard when we pray for temporal things , or even spiritual goods for others ; but that our request is always granted when we ask spiritual goods for our selves . but then , 't is ever understood with this restriction , that we must not make our suit to have knowledge or virtue by extraordinary ways , and neglect the ordinary methods laid already by god's providence to attain those good gifts . our question then being of understanding those difficult places of scripture which contain the main articles of our christian belief , and whether they can better attain to the sense of scripture with unerring certainty by their own private judgments , without the churches help , or by the churches means , and dr st's principles asserting the former method , mine the later , i do affirm , that none of those authors hold with him , but would condemn his tenet for heresy . he quotes none of the places except bellarmin , who speaks not of persons looking for faith in scripture's letter as to those points , but of the faithfull , praying for wisdom to live well ; and he , as the dr relates it , denies the gift of interpretation ( the dr's way to come to faith ) is to be had by prayer , which is our main point . however , our dr pretends himself wonderfully skillfull in our authors , because he can make a shew of quoting them , tho' it be quite from the purpose . he should have kept an eye to the state of the question , and brought his citations home to it ; but this is not his way . his main art through this whole treatise is to keep that from the readers sight , talk in common , name great authors for his vouchers , but never shew how they savour him by applying them . and then he 's safe , by virtue of a great noise & fine raree shows . he ends with railing , at the rate of a man at his wits end ; i desire him to pacify his spleen , for no man that knows me and my circumstances , does or can think i write to raise my self , or to be caressed ( as he phrases it ) by any man. i will never court any man's favour , or fear his frowns , when i am defending truth . . but the scene is chang'd , all of a sudden , & i am almost asham'd to reflect as it deserves on what follows in his two next paragraphs . 't is so purely a-la-mode of merry andrew ; never did grave man make such a fop of himself . but his reason was nonplust , and his fancy was over-heated , and this must plead his excuse : for what could he do better in such ill circumstances ? to set right what his raillery has so ravell'd ; i declar'd my tenet was , that every man is to use his iudgment of discretion or his reason in finding out a rule which could ascertain him of all the several points taught by christ : since the rule of faith being antecedent to faith , must consequently be the object of pure reason . that by this rule he was to judge for his salvation , and of all controverted points . for , if this rule gave him absolute assurance that all those determinate points were indeed taught by christ , then since he acknowledg'd christ's doctrin to be from god , they were to be held by him to be divine and true ; if it give him no such assurance of this , being in it self fallible , then they are not to be held divine , nor true , nor faith , nor the way to salvation ; since , in that case , they might perhaps be diabolical , false , heresy , and the way to damnation . now no such rule does he assign us , but leaves it to the iudgment of his sober enquirers to find out those determinate points in scripture's letter ; which , in those articles of so profound a sense is obscure to them . our judgment of discretion is to find out a certain light to walk by in those sublime passages , in which the light of our own reason is very dim . his is to do as well as he can in penetrating the sense of the scripture in such high passages , tho' he sees he may fall into error every step . that is , his way is indeed to be a rule to our selves , and scorn to be led by the church , tho' there be all the reason in the world to think her wiser than our selves in that affair . what says the pleasant dr to this ? or how does he make good his judgment of discretion , or overthrow ours ? why , first ; he laughs heartily over and over , that i come closer to take a view of his judgment of discretion after . pages . as if my whole book had been to treat meerly concerning that one point , and i had never handled it till now : whereas his conscience knows , ( but that necessity has forc't him to bid it farewell ) and every reader sees that above forty other points were to be handled as they lay in my way , and that this concerning the iudgment of discretion , was the very last i was to speak to . what pityfull trifling is this ? then comes in the game at cards , blew apron and tub over and over : that i yield to his sober enquirer what he aim'd at ; that i make the fanaticks catholiques , and his sober enquirer a iudge of controversies , and would have him judge without his rule : which is a continu'd series of willfull and ridiculous forgeries : for i allow him to judge of never a point of faith but by his rule , and affirm that he is to find out his rule by his reason or judgment of discretion . but this clear method he casts a mist over all the way ; and , finding that seriousness would gravell him , he has recourse to his beloved and still-assisting friend , drollery . next , he asks , what if the matter propos'd by this certain authority which i have found out by my reason be very much against reason ? and i ask , whether the matter under consideration be the object of naturall reason , or no ? if it be not , then reason is to concern it self in judging of the humane authority of the church attesting it to be christ's doctrin , which is subject to reason ; and not with the other , which is confessedly above reason . he knows i still speak of the high mysteries and articles of our christian belief which are supernaturally reveal'd or taught by christ and his apostles ; and will he have the profound judgment of discretion of his sober enquirers scan them by their reason ? this savors too strong of the socinian . yet he sticks not to say the same , ( that is , natural ) reason helps men to iudge of the matters propos'd by this certain authority . it makes yet worse for his credit , that , whereas i instance all along in the tenets of the blessed trinity and the godhead of christ , he stills recurrs to points necessary to salvation ; by counterposing which he seems to think those mysteries not necessary to salvation . but who set the bounds of reason ? why , god and nature , by alotting reason for its sphere naturall objects ; and by so doing , precluding her from attempting to sound the profound depth of supernatural ones by her shallow line . he is angry that as soon as this certain authority is discover'd , we then cry , good night reason , i have no more use of you . this savours yet more strongly then the former . would he have us , after this certain authority has assur'd us 't is christ's doctrin , still to suspend our belief till we have examin'd the mysteries themselves by our naturall reason ? i am loath to name what this signifies . i omit to insist on his bad logick , shall i say , or want of common sense ; who , tho' a certain authority were suppos'd , yet discourses all along as if the things it proposes may still be false , or need the examination of reason whether they be false or no. but this argues he has not once in his thoughts the notion of true certainty , but means some mock-certainty or probability by that word ; otherwise 't was impossible such a fancy should have a seat in his mind . for the most obvious and common light of reason tells him that what 's truly certain ( as what 's built on a certain authority is , ) cannot be false , nor can need any further scrutiny whether it be or no. . next he asks , are all people capable of this certain reason ? they are , or may be made so according to their pitch , so tradition be rightly represented , and not perverted as it was by him throughout his sermon : for nothing is more sutable to the capacity of every one then is the force of a vast witnessing , authority . and , tho' they were not , yet being in it self certain , it preserves even those who are uncapable of seeing the reason for its certainty , from erring in faith while they rely on it , which his rule does not . he puts questions and gives answers here very kindly for his own behoof ; and from such sleight grounds concludes he may have true faith and be sav'd without finding out this certain authority . the later i leave to god's mercy , which may , i hope , give him the grace to repent his impugning known truths , which with him i fear is too frequent : but he makes himself too liberall a promise of true faith without it . however he expresses it modestly , and only says he may have it ; that is , he may hap to hold right in some points of faith by his private interpretation of scripture , without tradition of the church ; and he may hap to hold twenty heresies . his fifth head is ridiculous ; for 't is a pure folly to talk of believing the scripture , without knowing certainly what the scripture says . let him secure this , and none will refuse to yield a perfect and stedfast belief to what christ has taught us by it . our knowing the sense of it in passages containing dogmatical tenets of faith is the only point between us ; in assigning some certain means to do this , he is dull and flat , or else perfectly silent ; but mighty brisk in what 's nothing to our purpose . his sixth is frivolous , and answer'd with a bare denying that we hold that tradition is only to lead us into the certain sense of scripture . and this he knew before , as he did five hundred things he pretends here unknown to him . and this was but fitting . for had he own'd he knew them and the reason brought for them , he had stood engag'd to answer them : but by seeming still not to know them , he puts us to say our tenets and bring our proofs over and over again ; in the mean he reaps the advantage of gaining time , and coming off dextrously at present . his seventh is the same with the second , and spoken to already . his citing scripture texts has the same fault with better half this whole book ; viz. something is said in common never apply'd to the point in hand , or brought close to it , but left in that raw condition , to make the reader think there is something in it , tho' he knows not well what . our point is , that our judgment of discretion is not to be employ'd about scanning the mysteries of faith by our natural reason , after we have found a certain authority proving them to be christ's doctrin , or interpreting such texts of scripture by our private judgments to gain assurance what is to be held of faith. the first text [ i speak as to wise men , judge ye what i say ] may , for any thing he has shown relate to manners , or to the avoiding idolatry spoken of the verse before , which is known by the light of nature ; or to something relating to or consequent from a point of faith already known , as is intimated in the following verses . of all these they may judge , but none of these comes near our business , as appears by the state of the question . the second text is prove all things . and does he think this can mean , they should consult their natural reason how it lik't the misteries , or rather ( in case that text had indeed related to them ) does it not signify that they should consider well of the grounds why they embrac't them ? the third is , try the spirits whether they are of god. and this is spoken in order to the antient hereticks ; whose spirits they were to try by examining whether they deviated from the doctrin preacht by the apostles ; or , by looking what grounds or motives they produc't to prove their new doctrin to be christ's . the judgment of discretion in this last case we allow ; and the two former are both of them wide of our business , unless the second were meant of examining things by the grounds for them . it were good to dive into the drs thoughts , and get light what it is he would here be at . the apostles ( says he ) allow'd them to make use of their understandings , tho' themselves , the proposers were infallible . what mean these dry common words ? does he mean they were to vnderstand what it was the apostles taught ? this is the duty of every hearer , catholick and protestant , and the very end of all teaching and preaching ; and , so , it does not reach the peculiarity of his iudgment of discretion . does he mean they were to examin whether the apostles were divinely-inspir'd or not ? this was very laudable in them ; for this is to use their reason e're they allow their authority , and is the very judgment of discretion we recommend ; but he is here impugning our judgment of discretion , and so cannot mean thus . he is then contending for a judgment of discretion which shall scan the verity of the points of faith themselves , or the matters propos'd even by a certain authority , by his naturall reason . i am loath to fix a censure upon common words ; but i must tell him that if he means so , and that , tho' we receive the tenets of a trinity and christ's godhead ( for example ) upon a certain authority , we are still to suspend our assent , till our great judgment of discretion shall consider well of the matters propos'd , and reject them if such uncouth articles seem disagreable to natural reason , ( his usefull servant not yet discarded : ) if this be his tenet , as it seems to be , then i must tell him his principles are perfectly socinian . whether he follows those principles in his particular tenets i am not to judge ; but such edging and leaning towards those principles do , i conceive , oblige him to satisfy the world he is not that way affected . . but what if men differ about this certain authority wherein it lies , and how far it extends ? i answer the authority our question proceeds on is the humane authority of the church deriving down christ's faith : nor do i know any catholick who ever impugned that , but one unknown nameless author lominus ; whom here out of his constant love to sincerity he is pleas'd to call [ others . ] but , in case any should differ about it , it being a thing previous to faith , and , therefore , subject to our natural reason , all i can say is , the better reason must carry it . he knows well how many most eminent catholick writers have approv'd and follow'd in their writings the same way of controversy i take . but he is not now in such good circumstances as candidly to acknowledge any thing . he is put to his shifts ; and counterfeit ignorance does him as much service as any of the rest . but how proves he that when we have found a certain authority we must not follow it and rely on it ? plain sense tells us we may and ought . why , he says 't is putting out our eyes , throwing our selves headlong from a precipice , and there 's an end of controversies . is not this mighty learned ? another man would think that a certain authority were the only way to preserve us from all these inconveniences , and keep us from erring , especially in matters only knowable by authority . but our dr has a judgment or discretion of another mold than reason has fram'd for him . in the mean time what answer gives he to my reason for the contrary position , and that the relying on a certain authority is to keep our eyes in our head still ? * [ in doing this we do not at all relinquish our reason , but follow and exercise it ? for , nothing is more rational than to submit to an authority which my reason has told me is abso , lutely certain , in things which the same reason assures me can no other ways be known certainly but by that authority . this seems plain sense , and comprizes the whole point ; and for that very reason he thought it not safe to meddle with it ; but , instead of doing so , to amuse the reader with * seven impertinent discourses of his own ; and thus it is he answers my catholick letters . . hitherto he contented himself to impugn me with false suggestions , nimble avoidances , pretended ignorance of our known and oft-repeated tenet , and with merry conceits ; but now he thunders out his dreadfull indignation against me , with angry viper , venemous froth , spleen , gall , &c. by which he gives us to understand that the place i prest upon was very raw and sore . at the end of my discourse i repeated * his avow'd position , that every sober enquirer may without the churches help find out all necessary points of faith in scripture . this being a paradox , so pestilential in its self , and so pernicious to church-government , and to all the dearest and most sacred concerns of christianity , i could do no less , out my zeal for those best goods , than brand it with these just censures , viz. * that it was the very first principle , nay , the quintessence of all heresy ; fanaticism in the egg ; perfect enthusiasm when hatcht , and downright atheism when fledg'd . this i said , and thus i justify my charge . to make private men competent interpreters of scripture as to all necessary points of christian faith , without the churches help , and yet not to furnish them with any certain means of not erring or mistaking its sense , is the very first principle of all heresy ; for , * non enim natae sunt haereses nisi dum scripturae bonae intelliguntur non bene . no heresy has any other source , but when the scriptures good in themselves are understood in an ill sense . next , let this wild licentious principle , that they need not the churches help to find out all necessary points in scripture , settle in the heads of the mobile , 't is perfectly consequent that they must judge that whatever the church holds contrary to what they conceive is the sense of scripture , is either false or unnecessary ; and in case the church judges that what they hold is a grand heresy , and therefore that the contrary tenet is a necessary point , and therefore subjects them to her censures , they must hate the churches government as the worst of tyrannies that would oblige them to forgo their rule , renounce their faith , and obey man rather than god. in a word , this principle naturally leads them to contemn the church and her pastours , as neither able to help them in their way to faith , nor to govern them in it ; unless the dr means by governing , that the church-officers are to see , that each of them follows their own fancies , and decline not from such tenets ( let them be never so heretical ) as their wise judgment of discretion has thought fit to embrace , which is fanaticism in the height . again , the conceit of this self-sufficiency codling as i may say , in the hot brains of many of those fanaticks , enfranchized thus blessedly from the churches government , dr st. still assuring them they cannot miss of knowing gods will in such points so they but pray for wisdom ; and common sense telling them they are no scholars , nor have this knowledge by humane means ; it follows necessarily that they must think their prayer is heard , and that they have it by divine inspiration . whence they will imagin the holy ghost buzzes truths in their ears like a bee in a box , which is perfect enthusiasm . and. it will come pat to their purpose , and help forward very well , that dr st. when he stood engag'd to shew or produce his proofs that his faithfull have absolute certainty of their faith , that is of the true sense of scripture , confesses plainly no such proofs are producible and recurrs to moral qualifications and many other invisible requisites to give men assurance of it ; which are impossible to be known by human reason , being only knowable by god himself . whence , nature obliging all men to guide themselves by some sure light in things of infinite concern , and all motives that should appear outwardly to reason , being , according to him , cloudy and dark , it directs them necessarily to seek for this sure light within ; and so become enthusiasts . in the mean time not to speak of atheists who are by-standers and confirm'd in their atheism by seeing such bedlam-doings amongst professors of christianity , imbu'd with no better principles than what he gives them ; the more refin'd & ingenious sort of mankind , who are too wise to be led in the dark , & strain their best endeavours to search after solid grounds , by which they may be perfectly assur'd of christs faith , or the sense of scripture , in such points ; & find that none such could be brought by the famous dr st. but that , when he was most highly engag'd to produce his proofs for that most important point , he recurrs still to holes as dark as the private spirit ; what can they do other ( were there no better grounds than his producible ) but conclude that there is no certainty of christian faith at all , and that the greatest professors and writers do by their carriage confess as much ; and thence come to apprehend that religion is a meer cheat to keep up the interest and ambition of those who look for rich livings , and affect to have many followers ; which will bring them to a mepris of religion it self , and so dwindle into atheism . this is the natural progress of dr st's principles . from which ill consequences he shall never clear himself till he shews us the light and method giving him and his no church men certainty of the sense of scripture ; and this such an absolute one as can in true reason beget and justify a most firm and vnalterable assent that the tenets they hold are indeed christs true doctrin ; and till he restores to the church and her government that necessary authority of which his ill-contriv'd principles have robb'd her : let him not think to acquit himself by telling us here of his allowing the church a power of proposing and directing in faith. a learned son of the church of england has * told him a private person may do the former ; and that the later is such a liberall grant as was given to the statues of mercury , which of old were set up to direct passengers in their way , and leaves men much at like liberty to regard either . more is justly and prudently requir'd , viz. a power to make her declarations law ; and this as to matters of faith , & not only in things belonging to order and decency ; otherwise the later without the former , makes ( as he argues very well ) some kind of fence about the church against schismaticks , but lays her open to all manner of hereticks . . this just censure of mine , upon the drs. principles , was such a choak-pear to him , that 't is no wonder he keck't at it so vehemently . the great credit he had got ( whether for defending christian faith , or no , the reader is to judge ) made him scorn to bring it up again and retract it : but he uses all the arts imaginable to palliate and excuse it , and those such wretched ones that 't is a shame to mention them ; and , certainly , never was so heavy a charge so miserably refuted . he says confidently this doctrine of his is own'd by all men of understanding in both churches . whereas , if he can show me any one catholick who maintains that he can have any faith at all or ground such a firm & sacred assent upon his own private interpretation of scripture without the churches help in those most sublime and necessary articles which have been dubious and contested between the church and any heretick , ( of which only we speak ) he will do more than miracle . but i am mightily mistaken ; he will name one , and who should that be but i. s. himself : what a boldness is this , to make me his patron to defend him in that very position which i am in this very place impugning ? well but what says i. s. why , he says that every man is to judge for his own salvation , and of the best way to his salvation , and of all the controversies between them and us , and especially of the true grounds of faith , and all this without the churches help . now i. s. says indeed that a man coming to faith does by his reason find out the true rule and true church ; that thus he iudges for his own salvation , by using his reason to find out a rule ground or way to right faith which is to bring him to salvation ; that , by his rule thus found out , he judges of all our controversies , in judging that to be christ's true doctrin which that rule recommends as such : but is this to judge of points of faith without the churches help , when that very rule by which he judges of them is avow'd by him to be the churches testimony ? above all , does he not all along declare his abhorrence of finding out faith in scripture's letter by private judgments , which is the drs position ? and must i. s. still be of the drs sentiment , tho' he in all occasions contradicts it , disputes against it , and baffles it ? what will not this nonplust man say , when he is put to his shifts ! any common words , tho' when apply'd to particulars they be directly contrary to him , must be presum'd to be for him ; in despite of a long and constant tenour of all circumstances , and whole discourses to the contrary : whoever peruses my third catholick letter from p. . to the end , will see that my way of iudging for our salvation is as opposite to his as one pole is to another , and he has the incredible confidence to make them the same . at length he hopes to come off by alledging that he spoke it only by way of supposition , that if one may without the churches help find out the churche's authority in scripture , then why not all necessary points of faith ? and , was this all he said ? indeed , he craftily introduc't his position conditionally ; but did he not , after the words [ * then every such person ( viz. any sober enquirer ) may without the churche's help find out all necessary points of faith ] espouse the position it self , which had been thus introduc't ; and this most peremptorily ; by immediately subjoyning these words [ which is a doctrin i am so far from being asham'd of , that i think it most agreeable to the goodness of god , the nature of the christian faith , and the vnanimous consent of the christian church for many ages . ] and will he now tell us after all this positive asserting it , that it only proceeds upon a supposition , a why not , & a parity of reason . he objects i answer it not . why ! was it an argument ? or must i stand answering every voluntary saying of his ( which are infinit , ) every supposition , and every why not ? if i must needs speak to it , the imparity of reason consists in this , that the church being constituted by god to instrust the faithfull in their faith , it was but fitting scripture should be clearer in those texts that concern the churches governing them in faith and their obligation to hear her , than in the particular points , which they were to be assur'd of by her teaching . besides , the former point viz. the following the churche's instructions and being govern'd by her in their faith , is a kind of morall point , whereas the other points were , many of them , sublime mysteries ; and therefore , not so easily intelligible without a master . and st. austin had beforehand confuted his pretended parity of reason , by telling him , that * proinde , quamvis hujus rei , &c. wherefore , tho' no example of this thing were produc't out of the canonicall scriptures , yet the truth of the same scriptures is held by us even in this matter , when we do what seems good to the universall church , which the authority of the same scripture commends . and , because the holy scripture cannot deceive us , whoever fears to be deceiv'd by the obscurity of this question , let him consult the same church concerning it , which ( church ) the holy scripture demonstrates without any ambiguity . where he clearly intimates the infallibility of the church ; that 't is to be consulted in dubious points ( and all controverted points , of which we speak , have been call'd into doubt ) which makes its help very needfull ; and , ( which i chiefly insist on ) that its authority is clearly and without any ambiguity demonstrated in scripture ; whereas yet in his second book de doctrinâ christianâ , he acknowledges the obscurity of scripture in divers places , obscurè quaedam dicta densissimam caliginem obducunt . some things , spoken obscurely , involve us in thickest darkness ; and if any be obscure then surely those necessary and high mysteries of our faith , which are of such a deep sense , must be such , when they come to be scann'd by eyes as yet unenlighten'd with faith ; as the same father cited in my fourth catholick letter has also told him . . after this he sums up his performances , and tells us in short how he has err'd at large . next he gives us a lame excuse for his indirect answer to the fourth question propos'd at the conference , and in effect only commits over again the same faults he was charg'd with , a little more formally , as his fashion is , and then calls it an easy answer ; and if it be an answer at all , i must confess 't is an easy one ; for any man may with ease answer a thousand objections in a trice at that rate : nothing is easier than to omit all that is objected . but i dare undertake that whoever reads my third catholick letter . p. . . . . where four several prevarications were charg'd upon him in giving one single answer to mr. g's question , will judge it so far from easy that 't is impossible for him to answer even with any degree of plausibility . but with this sleightness he slips over most of my objections in my letters , and supplies the defect with confident talk , or a scornfull iest. but , because his main shuffle is his altering those words of the question , [ all the divine revelations of christ and his apostles ] into [ all matters necessary to salvation ▪ ] and this is his constant evasion , we will examin it more particularly in order to the sole end of the conference to which all the particular questions were to be directed , viz. his showing grounds of asbolute certainty for his faith. . i ask , with the good leave of his jest , does he think christ and his apostles taught any unnecessary points ? if not ; why did he use such cautious diminishing expressions , and instead of all their doctrin , put , all matters necessary to our salvation ? . christians are wrought up to the love of heaven , the immediate disposition to it , by motives , and some may need more than others ; nay the variety of peoples tempers and circumstances is so infinite that scarce two persons will precisely need the same . he is to acquaint us then how he knows , or how he can make out , that every man shall , by reading the scripture , be sure to find his own quota of motives adjusted and serving for his particular exigencies ? . is he sure they cannot err as to what 's necessary to their salvation ? if , provided they do their best , they cannot , then every man is so far infallible ; which the doctor has deny'd hitherto to all mankind but to himself . if they can err in matters necessary to salvation , then doubtless many will err , and how can errour save them ? . tho' all cannot err in all moral points , yet can he shew us any thing securing them from erring in all those articles of faith held by the church , and renounc't by her heretical dissenters ever since christ's time ? if he cannot , ( and he declines shewing us they can , nay he by his doctrin confesses they may ) then they may be sav'd tho' holding all the heresies that ever were ; in which case i doubt he will scarce find them competent assurance of their salvation . again , how knows he but the mixture of many of those gross errours may not as much deprave their souls as their understanding plainer places will edify them ; especially if the church interposes , and excommunicates them for hereticks ? for his grounds forbid them to meddle with those high points , but leave the whole scripture to their scanning , and his approved friend dr. t. says they are plain , and so are subject to their profound judgment of discretion . . he must tell us how must church-disciplin be exerciz'd upon such a miscellany of heterogeneous members of which many obstinately deny , what others pertinaciously affirm ? . is the holding the godhead of christ , and that god dy'd to save and redeem mankind , a matter necessary to salvation ? or is it enough to hold it was only a man to whom they owe that highest obligation to love him ? let him speak to this at least ; for i am not to expect but his aiery wordish divinity makes him look upon the mystery of the most blessed trinity as on a kind of dry speculation . tho' , were it seasonable to dilate on that article , i could shew him that , besides it's exceeding usefulness to the sublime contemplatives , the most sacred and most influential points of christian faith , and the main body of christian language , and the truth of it , depend on it's verity . lastly , who told him that all sorts of people who are yet unbelievers and looking after christ's true doctrin , shall by reading scripture come to all-saving faith ? has he it by divine revelation , or by reason ? or , will he recurr to divine assistances to keep particular persons from errour , and yet deny them to the church ? if so , how proves he this at least ? i wish he would speak out fairly and candidly to these points , and make something cohere : for i profess with all sincerity i cannot for my heart make any idea or sense of this motly church which his principles would patch up . the several members of it hang more loosely together than if they were ty'd to one another with points : nay , they agree worse than fire and water , and all the several contrarieties in in nature : for they are distanced by direct contradiction of one to the other . whence they are utterly incapable of any kind of coalition ; there being no imaginable means left to refract the irreconcileably-opposit qualities of his affirmative and negative faithfull , or reduce so many independent private-spirited members into one compound . he is to shew us then how the parts of this rope of sand ( as it may more fitly be called ) must hang together . i much fear it will be invisibly , by vertue of their being of the elect , and at the same rate as the terms coher'd in the invisible proofs he alledg'd to shew us he and his followers had christ's true doctrin . . we shall never have done with this purse of his . he is so fond of the pretty similitude that he puts it here over again at large , and spends incomparably more time and pains in defending it , than he does in making out the absolute certainty of his faith ; tho' he both stood engag'd to do it , and any good christian too would think it were far more worth his while . had he done this , the rest might have been more fairly compounded , and his purse have remain'd unransack't . however , he thinks it sutes well with the conceit he had of scripture , but i am sure it sutes not at all with our purpose , his shewing the absolute certainty of his faith. hence i * told him that scripture's containing faith was impertinent to the whole drift of the conference ; that the only business was how to get the gold and silver of faith out thence with absolute certainty ; and how to secure those that aim'd to enrich themselves by it , that instead of extracting the pure gold of truth by understanding right those high and most inestimable articles , the ransackers of it did not draw out thence the impure dross of errour and heresy . lastly , that he ought to have put two purses . one , the heads and hearts of the faithfull , into which the apostles put this heavenly treasure of faith by their preaching ; the other , the book of scripture into which they put it by writing ; and that faith was properly in the former only , in regard truth is no where formally but in the minds of intellectuall beings ; whereas it was only in words written as in a sign ; that is , no more properly than wine was in a bush ; and that therefore the former had incomparably better title to be the purse ( if no metaphor else would serve his turn but such an odd one ) at least it ought not to have been quite set aside . but the dr. without troubling himself much to mind what any body says but himself ( by which method of answering , he has left , above forty parts for one , of my several discourses unanswer'd ) will needs have scripture to be the only purse , & containing faith shall be enough for his purpose , ay , that it shall , tho' it be to no purpose . and , so , he tells us , that if all the doctrin of christ be there , we must be certain we have all , if we have the scripture that contains all . and i tell him what common sense tells all mankind , that a man may have all aristotles works which contain all his doctrin , and yet not know or have one tittle of his doctrin : nor , by consequence , has the dr. one jot of christ's doctrin by having meerly the book that contains it . shall we never have done with this ridiculous and palpable nonsense ? how often has it been prov'd against him in my catholick letters that the having a book which contains all faith as in a sign ( for words are no more ) argues not his having any faith at all , unless he knows the signification of that sign ? let 's examin then the meaning of the word [ have . ] a trunk has the book of scripture when that book is laid up in it ; and that book contains all faith ; and , so , that trunk may by his logick have all faith. dr. st has the same book , and by having it , has according to him , all faith too . i ask , has he all faith by having the book , any other way then the senseless trunk has it . if he has then he has it in his intellectuall faculty as a knowing creature should have it ; and , if so , he knows it , that is , he knows the sense of it as to determinate points in it , for all christ's faith consists of those determinate points : but he still waves his having knowledge of determinate points , and talks still of faith only as contain'd in scripture in the lump ; and , 't is in the lump in the book too lying in the trunk ; whence , abstracting from his knowledge of the particulars of faith , the wooden trunk has all faith as much as he. he 'l say , he believes implicitly all that 's contain'd in scripture whether he knows the particular points , or no : but is not this to profess he believes he knows not what ? or is implicit belief of all in the book , saving faith ; when 't is the vertue of the particular points apply'd to the soul 's knowing power , and thence affecting and moving her , which is the means of salvation ? he tells us , indeed , ( for he must still cast in some good words ) that he pretends not 't is enough for persons to say their faith is in such a book , but — now did i verily think that the adversative particular [ but ] would have been follow'd with [ they must be sure 't is in it . ] but this would have made too good sense and have been too much to the point . his [ but ] only brings in a few of his customary lukewarm words which are to no purpose , viz. that they ought to read , and search and actually believe whatever they find in that book . he means , whatever they fancy they have found in it ; for he gives neither his reader nor them any security , but that after their reading and searching , they may still believe wrong . he skips over that consideration as not worthy , or else as too hard , to be made out , and runs to talk of things necessary and not necessary . i wish he would once in his life speak out and tell us how many points are necessary for the generality of the faithfull , and whether god's dying for their sins be one ; and then satisfy the world that the socinians , who deny that point , do not read , search and actually believe what their judgment of discretion tells them is the sense of scripture ; and yet , notwithstanding all this , do actually believe a most damnable heresy . but still he says if a man reads and considers scripture as he ought , and pray for wisdom , he shall not miss of knowing all things necessary for his salvation . so that unless we know that he and his party do pray for wisdom and not pray amiss , and consider scripture as they ought , none can be certain by his own grounds that he and his good folks have any faith at all , or that their rule directs them right . he would make a rare converter of unbelievers to christ's doctrin ; who , instead of bringing any argument to prove that what his church believes is truly such , tells them very sadly and soberly , he has right knowledge of it and is sure of it , because he has consider'd scripture as he ought and begg'd wisdom of god. but if this sincere seeker hap to reflect , that these pretences are things he can never come to know , and that socinians and all other sects equally profess to consider scripture as they ought and to pray for wisdom too , and yet all contradict one another ; he must , if he have wit in him , and light upon no better controvertists , think christians a company of fops ; who can shew him no assured ground of faith , but such a blind one as 't is impossible for him to see ; and would have him believe that that is a certain means for him to arrive at christ's faith , which every side , as far as he can discern , do equally make use of , and yet are in perpetual variance and contention with one another about it : so that our doctor got deep into his old fanaticism again ; and , which is yet something worse , would have pure nonsense pass for a principle to secure men of the truth of the points of faith we believe , and be taken for a good argument in controversy . certainly , never was weaker writer , or else a weaker cause . . i am glad he confesses that a rule of faith must be plain and easy , and that , otherwise , it could not be a rule of faith for all persons . let him then apply this to the dogmatical points which are only in question , and shew it thus easy to all persons in those texts that contain those articles , and his work is at an end. but alas ! that work , tho' 't is his only task , is not yet begun ; nor , for any thing appears , ever will. for 't is a desperate undertaking to go about to confute daily experience . what new stratagem must be invented then to avoid it ? why he must slip the true point again and alter it to an enquiry , whether the scriptures were left only to the church to interpret it to the people in all points , or whether it were intended for the general good of the church , so as to direct themselves in their way to heaven , and consequently , whether it may not be open'd and understood by all persons in matters that are necessary for their salvation . what a rambling , what a clutter of questions is here , when he knows , and it has been repeated near a hundred a times over , that our only question is , whether the letter of scripture be intelligible by all sorts coming to faith in those revealed articles which are properly christian with such a certainty as is fit to build faith upon . but this is one main part of his confuting talent , to throw in twenty questions so none of them be the right one . however , tho' he 'll not keep the way , he 'll triumph unless we follow him out of the way . to his questions then i answer . that none but madmen ever thought or said that the church was to interpret it as obscure to the people in all points . for , ordinary moral passages , such as the ten commandments are plain enough of themselves . why did he not instance in the trinity , the godhead of christ and such like , which and only which we say are obscure ? because , that had been to speak to our purpose , and he thought it safer for him to suggest other matters which were not all to purpose . . they were intended for the general good of the church , to direct them in their lives , and , so in their way to heaven ; and to that end are freely read by all that can understand latin , and might likely have continued permitted to all even of the most vulgar capacities , had not men of his principles made them think themselves , when they had got a bible in their hands , wiser than the whole church . whence they came to wrest them to their own destruction , and , therefore , it being now not for the general good of such proud fools , the church took care they should not be promiscuously allow'd to all , tho' indulg'd to many , even in the vulgar tongue , and explain'd and preach't to all by their pastours . lastly , none knows distinctly what he means by matters necessary to salvation ; he should mean such as those sublime points so often repeated ; but then he must make out such passages can be understood by all persons looking after faith with unerring certainty to secure their faith from being so many falshoods or heresies ; but he was not able to do this , tho' he pretended the rule for all persons must be plain and easy . as far as i can guess by a man's words whose whole discourse is made up of reserves , he mistakes the rule of manners for the rule of faith ; and thus meant 't is indeed plain and easy , but as 't is such 't is nothing to the question in debate , which is of christian faith , & so 't is nothing to our purpose . i , but bellarmin says , scripture is a rule , and that a certain and infallible one . but when it comes to the proof he speaks only of the old testament , and this as to the law , testimonies , or commandments , which are easily intelligible as being either levitical ordinances , or moral precepts . i , but christ proves his doctrin by the scripture , and confutes the sadduces from them . well , give us such an interpreter of scripture as christ was , and we shall not doubt but they will prove his doctrin , and confute all the hereticks in the world. his referring the pharisees to scripture was ad hominem ; for they allow'd the scriptures yet would not believe his miracles ; tho' sure dr st. will not say but christs miracles were in their own nature more convincing arguments than interpretations of scripture made or allow'd by the pharisees . but what 's all this to our purposes . i gave three senses of the word [ rule ] in my third catholick letter , and shew'd him in which of those senses it was and could only be call'd a rule in our circumstances . but i might as well have spoke to a deaf man : he must either counterfeit he never heard of it , or he saw he must be baffled . common words are his constant refuge , and to speak distinctly exposes him to be nonplust . his friend * dr tillotson maintains that a rule of faith is the next and immediate means whereby the knowledge of christ's doctrin is convey'd to us . does he pretend that learned cardinal holds scriptures letter to be such a rule for all people coming to christian faith to know certainly its sense in these high mysteries , without the churches interpretation ? the dr knows he abhorrs the tenet as the source of all heresy . yet he quotes him on to say that nihil est notius , nihil est certius , nothing is more known , nothing more certain than the scripture ; and immediately applies it against me for saying that the * sense of it as to the understanding the mysteries of our faith was not easy to be got out of the letter . but where 's his sincerity ? not a syllable has bellarmin of scriptures being so known as to its sense , nor any thing that looks that way . * he speaks only of the canon or books being most known by the consent of all nations who for so many ages acknowledg'd its highest authority ; and that it is most certain and true ( in its self ) as not containing humane inventions but divine oracles . so that our learned dr is exceedingly brisk when he gets the sound of any word on his side , no matter whether the sense be for him or against him . if he can but gull his reader dextrously his work is done . for a transition to treat of a rule , he tells the reader that i have spent twenty years hard labour about it . i have indeed employ'd some years and much pains in writing severall treatises to settle christian faith ( as to our knowledge of it ) on a sure basis , which he and his co-partners are still vndermining ; and i glory in the performance . in return , i will not tell the dr that mr lowth says he spent a longer time ( that is * full five and twenty years ) in a worse employment . i shall only say that i have through god's blessing , in less then two months time , writ a little treatise against his principles called errour nonplust , which he has been fifteen years in answering ; and all his quirks will never enable him to give it even a plausible reply in fifteen more . . and now we are come to scan the nature of a rule : which being a point to be manag'd meerly by reason , the reader must expect that one of us must necessarily speak perfect nonsense . for , however both sides may talk prettily & plausibly when the bus'ness is handled in a wordish way of glossing citations , & such knacks of superficial knowledge where the waxen ambiguous expressions may be made pliable to the writers fancy ; yet the natures of things will not brook they should be injur'd , but will revenge themselves upon him that wrongs them by exposing him to the shame of speaking perfect contradictions . i * alledg'd that the word [ rule ] speaks rectitude , and that such an evident one as preserves those who regulate themselves by it from oliquity or deviation ; that is , in our case , from error . after the dr. had play'd the droll a while upon particular words taken asunder from their fellows , as is his usuall manner , he grants , there wants but one word to make it past dispute , viz. who effectually regulate themselves by it . now the word regulate has clearly an active signification ; whence , it being impossible an action should be without an effect , it follows that efficiency or effectuallness is involv'd in it's notion : so that , to do a thing effectually does not signify any better degree of doing a thing , but only to do it really and indeed . he pretends [ regulating ] is an ambiguous word , and therefore he assigns it a double signification . one of them is , what a man doth in conformity to his rule : and common sense tells us that as far as a man acts unconformably to his rule , he is not regulated by that rule , whence , to act conformably to a rule is the self same as to be regulated by the rule to which he is to conform . this then is one signification of regulating ; and 't is a right one ; for to regulate one's self by a rule is nothing else but to act conformably to it . le ts see the other sense of the word regulating . 't is this . to * profess * declare and * own to conform to a rule , but not conform to it , that is , not follow that rule or regulate themselves by it . now , only to profess , declare , and own to conform to a rule and not conform , is not to-follow it or regulate themselves by it . so that our learned dr. has given us here two sorts of regulating ; one , which is regulating , the other which is not regulating . let us put an instance . the rule of justice is to pay every man his own : now comes an unconscionable debtor , and maintains he has followed that rule or regulated himself by it in some sense ; because he has profess'd , declar'd and own'd he has follow'd that rule , tho' he has not effectually and indeed done so . is not this a special way of regulating himself by the rule of justice , and a most cheap way for a man to pay debts without disbursing a farthing ? yet he may justify himself by dr. st's distinction , and maintain that he has paid them professingly , owningly , and declaringly , tho' not effectually . yet the dr. is mighty fond of this choice distinction , and says all mr s's subtlety vanishes into nothing by plain and so easy a distinction . notwithstanding , as nonsensicall as it is , he will bring two instances to make it good , viz. that there is one sort of regulating which is not-regulating . the one is of a ciceronian , who declares he orders his speech by his manner , and yet for want of sufficient skill and care may use phrases which are not cicero's . now , 't is plain that to regulate himself by cicero is to use his phrases ; and can he then regulate himself by cicero when he does not use his phrases ? can he be truly said to regulate himself by him , when he does not use his manner of speaking , meerly because he professes and declares he does it ? or can he be said to regulate himself by a rule in that very thing in which he deserts that rule and regulates himself by some other author or his own fancy ? did ever common sense go so to wrack ! if he says he intended to follow cicero but mistook , i understand him ; but intending to do a thing is not doing it ; intending to get riches is not to get riches , otherwise none need be poor . his second instance is , that some may profess that christ's commands are their rule , and yet through their own fault may deviate from them or sin. but can sinners with any sense be said to regulate themselves by christ's commands , when they sin meerly because they profess to follow his rule of life ? or can any man of a settled brain ( dr st. still excepted ) pretend a sinner can be said to be regulated by that holy rule , and deviate from it , or desert it at the same time ? so that his instances as well as his distinctions are pure folly and contradiction . these performances , we must think , qualify him to laugh at my admirable logick for not allowing his palpable nonsence ; whereas himself is still caught stumbling in the plainest paths of that common road to true learning . i could wish some of dr st's friends would advise him soberly to fall to quoting and gleaning notes , & then stitching them handsomly and methodically together ; where he is in his own element ; for in that wilderness of words he may take his full vagary , and scribble to the world's end , without much danger of meeting with conclusive evidence , which he so dreads and hates ; but certainly his talent lies not in this crabbed way of close reason . the rest of his discourse here is imposing upon me that i make men incapable of deserting the rules of christian faith and virtue : tho' he knows in his conscience i have told him the express contrary above twenty times . all i pretend to in my discourse from the nature of a rule , is , that if follow'd , it will secure the followers of it from errour : but i no where ever said but all free agents , or all mankind may desert those rules , and , by deserting them , fall into errour and sin too , unless supported by god's grace . he asks if it be possible for men to misunderstand a certain rule ; and i tell him , it is , in case it be not clear as well as certain : and * i have already shewn him that the living voice and practise of the church ( our rule ) has so many ways of delivering clearly her own sense , ( or christ's doctrin ) that the generality cannot fail of understanding it right ; however divers souls to whom this rule is not so well apply'd , remaining less cultivated by their own carelesness or the negligence of pastours , may hap to misunderstand some points . nor can they run into errour so as to fix in it , while they think to follow the rule : for , knowing they are to receive their faith from the church , they take not upon themselves to judge of faith , as his sober enquirers do , whom he allows to judge of scriptures sense without any certain teacher to preserve them from errour and heresy ; whence such men became fixt and unretractable , by fancying they have gods word on their side ; while the others continue docil and capable of the churches instruction upon any occasion : and , when it comes to be discover'd ( as in likelihood it will be ) by their expressions that they have any misconceit concerning faith , it obliges them to seek to be better inform'd by the church , their mistress , whom they are willing to hear and believe ; and the church too becomes oblig'd to rectify their mistakes , and instruct their ignorance . . i have spoken formerly of his necessary points . only i am to observe here that he avoids very carefully with if 's , the telling us whether any of the highest mysteries of our faith be necessary for salvation . but must we still be put off with that frigid evasion that such sublime points are as intelligible now at this distance from the time of the apostles , tho' only couch't in a few words in a book , as they were when spoke by those living teachers ; who doubtless not only deliver'd their sense in a few set words , but ( such points needing it ) explain'd it and dilated upon it , to settle it better , and sink an express conceit of it deeper into the minds of their auditors ? can it be imagin'd but that many of the people ; and the pastours especially , put their doubts , and askt them questions , concerning the points of faith they had preacht , and receiv'd pertinent answers ; none of which a book could do . how ridiculous a pretence then is this ! yet this is his best shift : for , unless the book have this or an equivalent virtue to make clear its sense , it cannot have the plainness or clearness requisit to a rule of faith. he contends that , if those points be necessary to salvation , they must be so plain that we may be certain of our duty to believe them . which retorts his discourse upon himself ; for if those two sublime articles there spoken of be necessary for the salvation of the generality ( which cannot be deny'd without accusing the primitive church of tyranny for casting those out of the church who deny'd them ) then they must be certain , one way or other , that 't is their duty to believe them ; and , since he does not think fit to say this duty can be certainly shewn them by the letter of scripture , it follows that this duty to believe them , must be made certain by the testimony of the church delivering them . 't is easy to be seen the whole force of his discourse here is built on his begging the question , that scriptures letter as understood by private judgments , is the rule of faith ; and that it is plain in all necessary points : which he ought not to do without shewing us first which points are necessary , at least those of the trinity , and godhead of christ , if he think them so , and then proving his rule is plain in all such points ; and not still to suppose , presume upon , and occurr to that which is yet under dispute , vngranted , and unprov'd . let me then mind him of one piece of logick , which tho' it be not admirable , yet 't is solid and never regarded by him . 't is this , that no argument has any force upon another , but either by its being so evident that he must forfeit his reason to deny it , or granted by his adversary ; so that he must either argue from something clear of it self or made clear by proof , or else argue ex concessis from the party 's own concession . by which rule if all the reasons he brings here were examin'd , it will manifestly appear he has not spoken one word of true reason against me in his whole answer . i do here challenge him to shew me so much as any one argument of his that has either of these qualifications : and to encourage him to such a performance , if he can shew me any one such , i promise him to pass all the rest for valid and good . i end with desiring the considering reader to reflect on the drs discourse here p ▪ . and upon an exact review of it to determine whether principles are not deeply laid here to make the socinians and many other known hereticks , members of his church , and to free them from church censurers . for if they find not in scripture that the apostles preacht the trinity and godhead of christ in clear and express terms , and with this connotate , [ as necessary to salvation ] they cannot be certain of their duty to believe them , the consequences of which i need not dilate on . his own church is more concern'd to look to his tenets than i am . . he triumphs much that i grant some may be sav'd without the knowledge of all christ taught ; he means , those spiritual points so often mention'd . but , if he knew how little advantage he gains by it , he would not think it worth his taking notice of . what may be done in an abstracted case is one thing ; what , if they live in a church , and hold heresies contrary to christ's and the church's doctrin , is another . some catholick divines treating of faith do mantain that to hold there is a god , and that he is a rewarder and punisher , is simply enough for salvation if they live up to those tenets ; whence they conceive hopes that nebuchadnezzar was sav'd tho' he was no iew. but what 's this to our case ? christ has left us a body of doctrin ; and since he did nothing unnecessary for the salvation of mankind , this being the end of his coming and preaching , each point conduced to that end either immediately or by consequence , whence by the way 't is a folly to expect the apostles taught such points as necessary to salvation , others as not necessary , since no point was vnnecessary for the salvation of mankind ; except when they said for distinction , dico ego , non christus , or us'd some equivalent expression . but to return , god has also settled a church to conserve that doctrin of christ intire . whence , if any falls into heresies contrary to that doctrin by misunderstanding scripture's letter in such passages , 't is her duty to cast them out of the church and deliver them over to satan , for their contumacious pride in preferring their own private judgments before the judgment of their pastours , and the church whom god appointed to teach them. whence , i do assure him i do not hold that any one such privative unbeliever will ever be sav'd , tho' he holds some points which , of their own nature might suffice for salvation . for , such a man believes nothing at all but upon his own self conceit , and the very ground of his faith , let him prate of scripture as much as he will , is spiritual pride ; which vice alone is enough to damn him , even tho' he held all those points of christ's faith to a tittle . hence follows that either the primitive church ( as hinted above ) was very uncharitable in excommunicating those who dissented from those high articles ; or else , the rule of faith must be so plain and clear that it must preserve those from heresy who follow it , and render them inexcusable who by deserting it do fall into the opposit heresies : and , therefore , that we may bring our discourse back to the question , he must either prove his rule of faith thus qualify'd , or 't is no rule . what follows to p. . is meer drollery ; which gives all the seeming strength to his weak reasoning . only he has a fling at transubstantiation , which is a topick of course in his controversy . he thinks 't is unnecessary to the church ; but the church it seems thought it necessary to define it , in her circumstances ; and i humbly conceive the necessary occasion of defining it was , because such as he equivocated in the tenet of the reall presence ; and ( according to the drs late distinction making not-regulating to be one sort of regulating ) would needs have the word [ reall ] to mean [ not-reall ] whence it was judg'd expedient to put it past quibble by such a rigorously-express definition . and i much fear this vexes the drs sacramentarian spirit far more then transubstantiation it self . i omit , that he has forgot here the common distinction of what points are necessary necessitate medij , and what necessitate praecepti . i suppose because this later did not sute with his levelling principles , which set the church and his rabble on even ground as to matters of faith. . i alledg'd that those articles of the trinity and christ's godhead were fundamentall points ; and therefore if his rule could not absolutely ascertain people of all sorts coming to faith of those articles , it could assure them of none , and so is no rule of faith. he runs quite away from the points , and thinks he has done enough to say , it is absolutely certain that god has reveal'd the fundamentalls of our faith. but the question sticks still , are you absolutely certain by your rule that the trinity and christ's godhead are christ's doctrin or signify'd with absolute certainty by scripture's letter ? to this he says nothing , but shifts it off most shamelessly to another thing . let him set himself to do this which is his task , and we will undertake to examin the nature of his medium , and show it inconclusive . i alledg'd that there is experience , by the socinians taking the same way , that his medium or way to be certain of this is not certain . he again turns off experience that the way he takes is not certain , to experience of his inward certainty , or his inward persuasion . and asks briskly , whether he or i know best ? a pleasant gentleman ! why does he not confute all my book by that method ? does he think 't is enough to show he is absolutely certain of the sense of scripture as to those points , with barely saying , he knows he is thus certain of it better than i ? what wretched shifts are these ? in pursuance of this new method of proving and confuting he asks again , how comes mr. s. to know we are not certain when we say we are ? because , when you are most highly concern'd , and stood engag'd by promise to show this absolute certainty , and are prest to it vehemently , and upon the brink of losing your credit for not doing it , you still decline the showing you have any such certainty for the sense of scripture as to those points . still he asks , are not we certain because some ( that is , the socinians ) are not certain ? no , sir , not barely for that reason ; but because the socinians proceeding upon the same rule , are so far from being certain of the sense of scripture as to those points , that they esteem themselves certain by the same scripture of hereticall tenets point-blank opposit to those points . common reason assures us no end can be compass'd without a means , and therefore you can never show us you are certain , till you show us you follow a better way , rely on a firmer ground , and guide your selves by a clearer light to make you certain of scriptures sense in those passages , than they do : which you can never show , and , as appears by your wriggling from that point by the most untoward shifts imaginable , dare not attempt . but some are uncertain of orall tradition , nay censure it : i do not know one man but holds and reverences it . it lies upon his credit to name those who censure it : for lominus is a chimaerical name and signifies no body that he knows . but suppose some did ; yet it being an object of naturall reason , they and i in that case , could not proceed on the same grounds or reasons ; as his protestants and the socinians do upon the same rule of faith. . i alledg'd that by his principles , he could be no more certain of his rule , then he is of the truth of the letter of scripture , in regard the truth of the sense of scripture depends on the trueness of the letter . does he deny this ? or does he show that without the care of the church preserving the letter right all along , he can have any such certainty of the letter ? he not so much as attempts either . i alledg'd farther that he cannot be thus certain of the right letter without having the same certainty of the right translation or the true copy ; nor that any copy is true , unless it be taken from the first originall . does he deny this ? or does he show that all these may not fail if the churches's care be set aside ? no , neither . what shift has he then ? why he says , . that some of us are concern'd to answer this as well as he. not at all , for those who say that part of faith is contain'd in scripture , do not , for all that , say that their faith is built on scripture's letter interpreted by any but the church ; nor do they say but the church without scripture could have ascertain'd them of their faith. . he says , this strikes at the authentickness of the vulgar translation . not at all : for we have other grounds to go upon which they have not. . he skips , after bringing some words of mine for what they were never intended , from the translation , to the canon of scripture , which are a mile wide from one another , that so he may , however he speeds in all the rest , at least talk plausibly of the concurrent testimony for the canon . in order to which , he stands up a patron for those christian churches of his who thus concurr'd ; and will not condemn them as not truly christian till their cause be better heard and examin'd . yet 't is evident from his second letter to mr. g. p. . that some of those churches were arians , nestorians , and eutychians , condemn'd for hereticks by most antient general councils ; which he blames , it seems , for declaring so rashly against them , and reprieves his friends from their censures till a fairer hearing . it had been happy for them , had dr. st. presided in those councils , for he would doubtless have dealt with them very kindly , and have clapt them head and tail together with good catholicks , into one latitudinarian bill of comprehension . . i alledg'd that the same sense in the heart of the church enabled and oblig'd her to correct the copy when faulty in texts containing points of faith ; which , instead of shewing it incompetent or disagreeable to the nature of things , he confutes most learnedly by pretending that atheists and unbelievers would be scandaliz'd at it . whereas they would be much more scandaliz'd to see no certain means assign'd to preserve the letter right from the beginning ( the very first originals being lost ) and all left , ( the churches care set apart ) to so many contingences of translating and transcribing . . we must prove it first to be impossible for the sense of the church to vary in any two ages . as if this had not been prov'd already , and never yet answer'd but by shuffles and evasions . . he frames a plea for the arians against the nicene councill from my principles : but very untowardly , for the arians allow'd the copies , and quoted scripture as fast as catholicks did , and yet err'd most abominably ; which makes against himself . lastly , he tells us that 't is a pernicious principle , a miserable account , &c. at which i wonder not . for , every thing is miserable and pernicious with him that makes the church good for any thing . yet he * could grant the churches testimony was needfull at first to abett the truth of the gospells ; and she enjoy'd that priviledge in * st. austins time ; and i wonder how she came to lose her title to god's gracious providence and assistance , or how she came to be disabled in the following ages to preserve the letter uncorrupted in those texts that contain'd known points of faith. it seems , translaters , and transcribers ( for the most part mercenary ) are sacred with him , and admirable preservers of the letter ; but , alas ! the miserable church is good for nothing . i have * already told him why i hold scriptures letter no rule , how 't is sometimes call'd a rule in an improper sense , and why that sense is improper , and his friend dr. tillotson has told him what a rule of faith means * in our controversies ; but he never heeds either : but runs on here with frivolous descants upon an ambiguous word , and will needs take [ rule ] in a sense never meant , nor possible to be meant in our circumstances . he 's not satisfy'd with the care of the council of trent in correcting the copy . but let him remember i spoke there of texts of inferiour concern , not of those that concern'd faith. and why is he not satisfy'd ? did she not do her best in the present circumstances ? how will he prove it ? because clemens the th recall'd and corrected the bibles put out by sixtus the th for an exact edition . but , if both did their best , according to the observations were made in their time , and the light they had then , neither of them were to blame . but all this humane diligence amounts not to absolute certainty as i. s. requires of us : and is it not more reason i should require it of him than he of me , since he makes it ( scriptures letter ) the proper rule of faith , which he knows i do not , and yet , which is pleasant he calls upon me aloud to declare as much , and then he knows how to answer . and now i know the true reason why he has answer'd nothing hitherto , viz. because i had not declar'd what i had own'd in all my books near a thousand times over . but we have lost our point by answering a multitude of impertinent cavills . 't is this . the sense of scripture cannot be absolutely certain , unless there be absolute certainty the letter is right : nor can there be absolute certainty the letter is right even in texts relating to faith by his principles , which deny this was perform'd by the churches knowledge of the points of faith , but by making out with absolute certainty how the letter was by some other means secur'd from being wrong . this he never attempts even in this very occasion when it lay upon him to do it ; and , therefore , for all his empty flourishes he has said just nothing . nor has shewn or defended that even the ground of his faith , scriptures letter , is absolutely certain . besides his discourse still beats upon this mistake that we do not hold the letter absolutely certain in such concerning texts ; whereas we only say he cannot prove it to be such by his principles ; and he makes our words good with not performing it , or so much as attempting it . only he tells us for our comfort , that as to books , copies , and translations , he has as high a certainty as the thing is capable of ; and then 't is madness to expect and require more . so that , tho' it happen that the certainty be but a very sleight one , his kind of faithfull and converts may take their choice whether they will be fools if they will believe it , or madmen if they will not . he tells us indeed faintly the faith previous to divine faith , may have absolute certainty ; but if it only may have it , it may not have it . in the mean time , what is all this voluntary saying , to his proving that he has really and indeed absolute certainty of those books , copies , and translations . 't is his proofs we lookt for , and not bare narrations of his own weak tenets , with which he thus puts us off continually . . but how strangely insincere ( if any such carriage could after so frequent use of it be strange in him ) is the dr to pretend we hold it is in any churches power to correct original texts because they contradict the sense of the present church . these words he puts into italick letter as if they were mine ; but he cites no place , and i do assure the reader i have neither such words nor sense . the first originals are not extant , & so cannot be corrected ; & those call'd originals , which are already acknowledg'd , ought as little to be corrected as the other , in texts belonging to faith. all the power we give the church is to correct succeeding copies upon occasion , in texts relating to the articles of our faith , when they deviate from the faith of the church , or ( which is the same ) from former copies allow'd by her universally . . i desir'd the dr to satisfy us concerning the number of books requisit to a rule of faith , and how many will just serve the turn ; as also whether some book , for any thing his principles can assure us , were not lost . this lay upon him to prove , and this with absolute certainty , if he would have scripture an intire rule of his faith ; how proves he it ? why , he makes me mightily concern'd to lessen the authority of the new testament ; and that i charge the christian church with a gross neglect . for all this noise , he knows well enough that i agree with him , that 't is not in the least probable the churches should suffer any such book disperst among them to be last , nor do i so much as suppose they did . what i say is , that he who holds all humane authority fallible , can never prove it true they deliver'd down all ; unless he can convince the world that a fallible medium can prove a thing true ; which he cannot do without proving that what may be false is true. nor can he do this , without proving the same thing may be and not be at once . i wish then he would set himself to work , and prove this abominable first principle to be false ; for , otherwise , this alone will confute all the substantial parts of his book , and convince every man of common sense , that his grounds , confest by himself to be fallible , can never make out , that 't is true that he has either right letter , or right sense of scripture , or that no book is lost , &c. and so there 's an end of his problematical faith. i must confess that to prove first principles false is something difficult ; but i have reduc't the business to as narrow a compass as i can , that he may make short work of it . he recurrs at present for want of some clear proof , to gods providence concern'd in preserving books written by divine inspiration , of which none doubts . but , why should not god's providence be as much concern'd in preserving his church from erring in faith that so both all those books , their letters and sense might be kept right as far as was necessary ? or , why was god's providence the less for making the churches care and help the means to preserve both the books and letter of scripture from suffering detriment ? lastly , why must his providence be confin'd to only translaters and transcribers ? . dr st. in his second letter to mr. g. p. . made the canon of the new testament the rule of his faith. to show the inconsistency of his tenets , and utterly overthrow his pretence of that rule , i * alledg'd , that if the whole canon be his rule , then his rule was deficient for some hundreds of years till the whole canon was collected and acknowledg'd . i prest farther , that , since it must take up some time e're those severall books were spread and accepted , sometimes the primitive church had according to his principles , but three quarters of their faith ▪ half of their faith , or less , and so were but three-quarters or half-christians , according as the several pieces came by degrees to be vniversally accepted . for no man of sense can doubt but that it cost some time e're the churches , so diffus'd , heard of all those books , and much more e're they could be perfectly satisfy'd of the universal testimony of the church ascertaining them to have been writ by men divinely inspir'd ; in regard it was of most dangerous consequence to accept that for gods word , which was not beyond all doubt such . so that we may with reason imagin that some churches had at first but two or three books of scripture , others but four or five that were well attested or could be rely'd on in such a high concern . add , that there were divers false gospells and spacious books given out under the names of having the apostles or apostolical men for their authors ; which must have redoubled their care , and made them backward to receive any that were not authentick , which would take up still more time to examin thoroughly . to press my argument still more home , i urg'd that perhaps , according to him , they had no faith at all during that long interval ; because wanting other books or sufficient warrant to rely on them , they , by consequence wanted a multitude of other texts , with which they might compare those they already had , which is one part of his method to find true faith in scripture . to show more the inconsonancy of his doctrine , i noted that , notwithstanding all this , * he declar'd that he lookt upon the primitive church tho' so ill furnish't with his rule , as on the best arbitrator between us in all our controversies about the sense of the doubtfull ( that is controverted ) places of scripture . now , one would verily think this pressing discourse , following the point in question so close and pursuing it so home , were exceedingly worth his while to answer , if he could ; since it toucht his rule and his cause to the quick . now le ts see what he says in their defence . the substance of his answer ( for all the rest is impertinent ) is a most doughty and most weighty word [ if ] if god ( says he ) hath so abundantly provided for his church that there may be a full revelation of all points of faith in the rest , then the disputing the authority of such an epistle ( meaning that to the hebrews ) doth not derogate from the compleatness of the rule of faith. what 's become of his sincerity and morall honesty , which he so profest to love ? did i speak of the epistle to the hebrews ? did not i , not only speak of but most expressly discourse all along of those many or most books of scripture , not universally known and accepted at the very first , but by degrees spreading and gaining in process of time the credit of being authentick ? does not my discourse that by his principles [ the primitive church had but three quarters of her faith , half her faith , or less ] barr this shamming pretence that i speak only of that epistle ? or does he think i meant that that single epistle was half or three quarters of the canon of scripture ? and now , reader , i beg thy leave to insist here upon this prevarication as an instance of one great part of his method in confuting . he picks out a word or two which may best serve him to slip away from the point ; and turn it to quite another business , but leaves the whole stress and full import of the argument unanswer'd . it were tedious still to reflect how oft he has done thus in this pretended reply to my catholique letters : but , whoever compares his severall answers to the respective places he pretends to speak to , will see how dull and insignificant they are ; tho' if he be read alone , especially with an implicit belief of his dealing fairly , they look very jolly and brisk . however to divert the readers eye he is even with me in another point . i said the accepting or not accepting books whether in the latin or greek churches was an act of prudence antecedent to the iudgment or determination of any church , and so could not make or marr the latin churche's infallibility in her iudgment or decrees . he falls into a gross mistake of the word [ antecedent ] and erects a trophy of victory upon his own errour . to clear which 't is to be observed that our divines admit prudentiall considerations in any church , even tho' held infallible , previous to her decrees , & yet do not hold that church is infallible in those acts of prudence which are thus antecedent . now , tho' the whole series of my discourse there shows clearly that i spoke of an antecedency in the course of humane actions , or of a prudentiall deliberation antecedent to an absolute decision ; he turns it to an antecedency in chronology , or of more antient writers ; and when he has apply'd that word to a wrong matter he has the vanity to insult . but , he says , i say not a syllable to his proving hence the roman church was not then believ'd infallible . surely he never consider'd what he pretends to answer ; for by saying it was not only an act of prudence antecedent to any degree , i show there was no occasion to show what was then believ'd of her infallibility or not believ'd . again , since the certainty of that epistles being writ by st. paul depended on testimony , other churches might perhaps know that better for some time than she. but , the worst is , he was preparing for new questions , to avoid the danger in keeping to the true one . for he knew the infallibility of the church we are here defending , is that of tradition in delivering down the doctrin of christ ; and he does not , sure , judge it a point of christ's doctrin that the epistle to the hebrews was writ by s. paul. add , that when the church of rome did decree any thing at all in that matter , it was for the reception of that epistle ; in doing which he will not , i hope , say she err'd . so that our great dr is out in every particular in which he shows such confidence , or rather he is to talk very confidently whenever he is out , that he may not seem not to be out . . he puts my objection against his universall consent , of the testimonies of marcion , ebion , valentinus and cerinthus , who ( as he makes me say ) rejected the canon of the new testament ; and then asks , could any man but j. s. make such an objection as this ? and , i may , i hope , ask another question ; could any man but dr st. put such a gull upon his adversary and the reader too ? now , if i us'd such words as [ who rejected the canon of the new testament ] i spoke nonsense ; for those hereticks were dead long before that canon was settled : but if i did not , then he has abus'd me and our readers too , and done no great right to himself . let eye-sight decide it . in my third catholick letter . p. . ( the place he cites ) line . . my express words are , the consent of all your christian churches for scripture ; and he instead of [ scripture ] puts down as my words [ the canon of the new testament . ] i can compassionate humane oversight ( for it may hap possibly tho' it can never knowingly to be my own case ) and not too severely impute a mistake in altering my words , and by them my sense : yet i must needs say that to put those wrong words in the italick letter to breed a more perfect conceit they were mine , and quote the very page in the margent where no such words were found , to make me speak nonsense , looks a little scurvily ; especially , because when men have their eyes upon the very page , as he had , they have an easy and obvious direction to the words too . but , why do i make such a spitefull reflexion on him as to call them his christian churches ? because he would needs allow other sects , as perfectly hereticall as they were to be [ * christian churches ] tho' he was put upon it to give them a distinct character ; and here again he grants them to be parts of the christian church , tho' they be cut off by lawfull authority from the body of christianity . next , that i may speak my conscience , because i fear , by many passages in his books , by his ill-laid principles , and the very grain of his doctrin and discourses , he judges all to be good christians who profess to ground their faith on scripture , let them hold as many heresies as they will. and , lastly , for his fierce anger here against me for calling those hereticks , viz. the arians , nestorians , &c. which have been condemn'd by generall councils , ( for i concern not my self with his greeks or abyssins or any others ) excrementitious outcasts , and that i sling such dirt in the face of so many christian churches . and is not this to cry , hail fellow , well met ? but my cause ( he says ) is desperate , because i call such men knights of the post. yet he knows the fathers oft complain of hereticks for corrupting the scripture ; and the testimony of the churches truly christian was absolutely certain , without calling in so needlessly blasted witnesses . moreover i told him that the universall testimony he produc't did attest the books , but it must attest the chapter and uerse too to be right , nay each significant word in the verse , otherwise the scripture could not assure him absolutely of his faith. can he deny this ? if the chapter or verse he cites be not true scripture , or if any materiall word in the verse be alter'd can he securely build his faith on it ? what says he to this ? does he deny it , or show that his grounds reach home to prove these particular texts or words to be right , by universall testimony or any other medium ? neither of them is his concern : what does he then ? why he complains how hardly we are satisfy'd about the certainty of scripture and that we are incurable scepticks . sure he dreams . we are satisfy'd well enough ; but his vexation is that we are not satisfy'd of it by his principles ; and how should we ; if , when it was his cue to satisfy us , he will never be brought to go seriously about it ? and why must we be scepticks ; when as we both hold the rectitude of the letter our selves in texts relating to faith , and assign a way to secure it absolutely , which he cannot ? must all men necessarily be scepticks who allow not his no-way of doing this , tho' they propose and maintain a certain way that can do it ? this is a strange way of confuting . he says there are different copies in all parts to examin and compare . 't is these very copies that are in question , whether they give absolute certainty of every verse or materiall word in the letter of scripture , and we expected he should have shown how they did so , and not barely name them , and say there are such things . but the main point is , must those who are looking for faith run to all parts of the world , and examin and compare all the copies e're they embrace any faith ? this looks like a jest : yet 't is a sad , tho' a mad truth by his principles . for without knowing this , scripture cannot be their rule ; and hee 'll allow no way to come to faith but by scripture ; so that , for any assurance he can give them , ( even of his necessary points ) they must e'n be content to stay at home , and live and dye without any faith at all . he ends . and thus i have answer'd all the objections i have met with in j. s. against our rule of faith. here are two emphaticall words [ thus ] and [ met ] of which the word thus has such a pregnant signification and teems with so many indirect wiles and stratagems that it would be an ingratefull task to recount them ; and the word [ met ] is as significant as the other . for how should he meet those that lay in the way , while he perpetually runs out of the way . sect . iv. how solidly dr. st. answers our arguments for the infallibility of tradition . . but now he exerts his reasoning faculty , which he does seldom , & will answer mr g's argument for the infallibility of oral and practical tradition . with what success we shall see anon . but , first he will clear his bad logick for letting the argument stand yet in its full force , and falling very manfully to combat the conclusion : and tho' common sense tells every man this is not to answer but to argue , yet he will have arguing to be answering for all that . 't is his interest to do it solidly , for he has all the world , who in their disputes follow the contrary method , to confute . his main reason to prove that arguing is a good way to answer is because the argument attempts to prove a thing impossible , and that 't is contrary to sense and experience to say the latin and greek churches do not differ in what they receive upon tradition ; and so the same answer that diogenes gave to zeno's argument against motion by walking , will serve the turn . let 's examin this parallel , in which consists the substance of his defence of his bad logick . does all the world see that the generality of the greek church proceed upon tradition in what they differ from the latin as certainly and evidently as they see there is motion ? have not i produc't in my first catholick letter , p. . reasons enow to shew him how disputable this point is , none of which he so much as mentions ? did not i there p. . quote him out of his own book peter lombard , saying , that the difference between the greeks and latins is in words and not in sense ? nay , thomas a iesu , azorius , &c. who were of the same judgment ? and could not these learned men see a thing manifest to sense and experience ? our point then is nothing like that of denying motion , nor is it contrary to sense and experience , but such as bears a dispute amongst intelligent men and great schollars , and therefore , even by the drs own discourse , an argument or instance , brought against the conclusion was no answer to the premises of the argument brought by mr. g. and so all the division he runs upon it here is perfectly frivolous . nor was mr g. oblig'd either to grant or deny the greek church had err'd , but was to insist on an answer to his argument ; because the dr had playd foul play , in attacking his conclusion when he was to answer his proof ; which if admitted , no discourse could possibly proceed . for , let us suppose dr. st. had been to argue , and had brought this instance of the greek church ; would he have thought it fair that mr g. when he was to answer it , should have brought the argument he made use of in the conference , and have bid him prove that two churches following tradition differ'd in faith , notwithstanding his demonstration that they could not ? or , would it be held a competent answer to his late book against the council of trent , to bid him prove it had not follow'd tradition , notwithstanding all that a multitude of learned catholick authors had writ to the contrary ? i took heart then indeed , as he says , seeing the dr so nonplust , but 't is his own fiction that i resolv'd to grapple with his instance , it being impertinent to do it in those circumstances , and so he may thank himself if he were disappointed . i was ty'd to the known laws of dispute , and not bound to dance after his pipe when he strays from all the clearest methods of reasoning . i objected that himself had defended the greek church from erring in his rational account ; which spoils his own instance of a church going upon tradition and erring . he calls this trifling , and says the dispute was about mr g 's argument . yes ; but these words were not brought to abet his agreement , but expressly to shew the drs inconsonancy to himself , and his unconscienciousness in arguing from the greek churches erring ; whereas it was his opinion it did not err. and tho' mr g's answer may be pretended not to be so pat to the particular demand , yet it was apposit to the main point that no church did at once adhere to tradition and err at the same time . for which i gave my reason , because if each successive generation follow'd their fathers tradition from the beginning , the last son must believe as the first did . this was too hot to handle , and so 't is answer'd with good night to the greek church ; which is learned beyond expression . lastly , upon my saying , he might as well have instanc't in the latin church it self , without running so far as greece ; he takes hence an occasion to accept of the challenge , tho' it did not look like one , being only spoke occasionally ; and threatens us not with a bare instance but a whole book against us : he may use his pleasure ; tho' i must tell him it looks but cowardly to threaten when he 's running away from his business , undertaken and not yet perform'd ; and leaving the absolute certainty of his poor destitute faith in the suds . one would think it had been the more compendious way to overthrow our cause , to answer five or six lines if he could have done it . but , he had a mind to be at another work more suitable to his quoting genius , and hop'd to draw us after him from a conclusive and short way of discoursing to an endless one , of answering every frivolous misunderstood or misapply'd citation . . but now he will shew us how 't is possible to adhere to tradition & yet err . a hard task , if apply'd to our business ! for , since to adhere to tradition is still to believe what was deliver'd , to shew that those who adhere to tradition do err , is to shew that they who still believ'd the same christ taught did not believe the same christ taught . a point so evident that his reflecter could not but grant it . yet let the dr alone ; i dare hold a good wager on his side that he can by his confuting method & his logick prove direct contradictions to be true without any difficulty , or , as he calls it here , with an easy distinction . he begins with two senses of adhering to tradition . one of adhering to it as the rule and means of conveying matters of faith. the other for adhering to the very doctrin taught at first and truely convey'd down since by tradition . that is , there are two sorts of tradition or delivery ; one is tradition , the other is not tradition or delivery , but the points deliver'd . parallel to this is his distinction of traditionary christians . to what purpose is it , to talk sense to a man who is resolv'd to run still so wildly into nonsense ? do but see , good reader , with what care i had forestall'd this very absurd distinction in my third catholick letter , p. . . . . and shew'd how he had deform'd tradition into all the untoward senses man's wit could invent , by making it now signify articles , now power , now points deliver'd ; yet to convince the world that he cannot or rather must not speak sense , he 's at the same work again as briskly as ever : and good reason : contradictions are better friends to him than principles : for nothing more confounds the reader , which is all he looks after ; and to confound him with a shew of distinguishing , which nature intended for a way to clear things , does it with a better grace . the same work he makes with the word [ traditionary ] and , tho' he were told what we meant by it first letter , p. . and second letter , p. . yet 't is never acknowledg'd , but he still runs his division upon it , as if it were some ambiguous or mysterious word , till he has put the whole tenour of the discourse into confusion . once more i tell him , and desire the reader to witness it , that he already knows what we distinctly mean by those words : and , if he will not acknowledge it and speak to the sense we give it upon our assurance that we never took them , nor ever will take them otherwise , he speaks not to me , nor gives a word of answer ; but , as baffled men use , runs for shelter to meer brabbles and impertinencies . . and now that is , after he had laid contradictions for his principles , he comes to give a clear and distinct answer to our demonstration of the infallibility of tradition . and no doubt by virtue of such grounds he will do wonders . mr. g's discourse was distinguish't by me in my first letter p. . . into four parts or propositions ; of which , the first is , that all traditionary christians believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so up to the time of our blessed saviour . now he knows that by tradition we mean an immediate delivery , and this from day to day ; for it would not be immediate if it were at all interrupted ; and by [ traditionary ] those who follow'd this rule of immediate delivery and do actually believe the say to day which they did yesterday ; and that , if they do not this , they desert this tradition by interrupting immediate delivery , and so cease to be traditionary christians . all this he already knows for it has been told him over and over : whence he cannot but know , tho' he thinks not fit to acknowledge it , that the proposition is self-evident , and plainly amounts to this , that they who believe still the same do still believe the same ; and the word [ traditionary ] was only made use of to express those persons in one word , because it had been tedious still to use so many . could any man but this gentleman undertake to combat a proposition so formally , which is in sense identicall and self-evident ? i took him to be one who would own his humane nature which obliges every man to assent to such clearest truths , and so vainly hop't he had nothing to say to it . but , as he says very true , i was mistaken : for he has many things to say to lay open the notorious fallacy of it in every clause . how ? every clause ? why , there 's but one clause in the whole ; for the adjoyn'd words [ and so up to the time of our blessed saviour ] are the most essentiall part of it , and distinguish christian tradition from that of hereticall traditions begun since christ's time . so that the dr makes account that one signifies many . this is but an ill beginning ; and i do assure the reader all the rest is not a jot wiser . but , now come the notorious fallacies . why did i not say that all christians are traditionary ? or that all christians have gone upon this principle ? because many are call'd christians especially by him , who have deserted this principle , and so have no title to be call'd traditionary : but principally , because if we speak of true christians , that was the thing to be concluded ; for those men are not such , who disacknowledge a way of knowing christ's doctrin , which is prov'd to give them absolute certainty of it . so that it is a notorious fallacy , according to dr st's new logick , not to make the conclusion the very first proposition of an argument ; and the fallacy lies in judging that the last thing should not be the first . hitherto then this most learned logician has not taken one step , without stumbling into a manifest contradiction . one single clause is many clauses . self-evident propositions are notoriously fallacious . words , whose meaning have been particularly explain'd to him over and over , and so can have but one sense as we speak of them , may have many senses : adhering to and following tradition is not adhering to it and not following it , and the conclusion or end of an argument is to be the beginning of it , or the proof is to be the thing proved . nor is this any wonder : for 't is but fit that self-evident truths should only be oppos'd by self-evident contradictions . . after these noble performances , he falls into his old track of dividing and subdividing , he talks of evidence from the word of god , from the guides of the church , he runs to infallibly holding to tradition , ( not spoke of yet , but following in the argument ) he tells us they may go upon another rule &c. anticipating thus all the following discourse , and complaining all is not prov'd at once , when as we are as yet but at the very first words of the proof . there is no end of the faults and failings of these sinfull self-evident truths ; falshoods and contradictions are saints to 'em : it supposes falsly ( he says ) that the change in faith must be so sudden and remarkable , whereas it was graduall , and so to pitch upon such a precise and narrow compass of time is very unreasonable . lastly , to illustrate and compleat his answer with an instance , he tells us , that by the same method one may demonstrate it to be impossible that any language should be chang'd . by which we may gather that dr st's incomparable skill in philosophy , and deep inspection into the natures of things , makes account that truths are of the same nature with quantitative things or bodies . all corporeall motions , amongst the rest sounds or speaking , have a thousand indeterminate degrees between any two determinate points . does he think 't is so with truths and falshoods ? or does he imagin the thoughts of the christian world could take a walk of two or three hundred years between is and is not ? did he never hear that truths consist in an indivisible , that he thus compares them to quantitative or divisible natures , and judges the comparison so apposit ? putting then once the true notion of the points in the head and heart of the christian church , ( and , if they were never there the apostles lost their labour ) the least change in it must change the point . did he never reflect why a tenet is metaphorically call'd a point ? and that 't is because a point is indivisible ? the putting in the proposition [ to day and yesterday ] is to express the immediateness of tradition . others , amongst the rest the council of trent , and many of the fathers , particularly st. athanasius , call it [ delivering down by hands ] and the hands of the children must be immediate to the hands of their fathers , else the one could not receive what the other delivers . nor do i , or any man living , know how , if the whole church should be in an errour but one day , by deserting the rule of faith , they should ever retrieve true faith again , having forsaken the only way to it . of such consequence it is that the means of conveying down christ's faith be immediate , even from day to day . and thus dr st. has begun to answer mr g's demonstration , by keeping such a huge pother about a proposition evident by its own light , and pretending more faults in it than even a wise man could have shown in the arrantest falshood . but he has not done with it yet : the most essentiall part of it remains yet behind ; [ and so up to the time of our blessed saviour ] now the proposition speaks of believing the same all that while ; and he confutes it with talking of claiming and pretending to follow it . whence , since to believe the same that was deliver'd , is actually following tradition , his distinguishing talent has afforded us two sorts of following tradition : one which is really and indeed following it , the other is only pretending to follow it and not doing so ; that is , there is one sort of believing the same or of following tradition , which is not-following of it , which is still of the same learned strain . . the second proposition is [ and if they follow this rule they can never err in faith ] what says he to this ? if they follow this rule , that is , believe the same from christ's time that was taught at first , do not they believe the same christ taught ! one would verily think that this is as evident as 't is that , to believe the same is to believe the same . true , 't is so , and therefore 't is with him self-evidently a meer fallacy . certainly never was any mortall man such an enemy to common sense . but 't is his constant humour to talk big when he 's at a perfect nonplus . well , but how proves he 't is a meer fallacy . why . he grants that those who believe christ's doctrin cannot err. and is not this a rare answer ? we both grant that christ's doctrine is true , and consequently that who hold it cannot err : all this is presuppos'd to our question , and so is no part of it . but our point is how we shall know assuredly what is christs doctrin ? or by what means shall we come at it ? . he says , they might mistake in this rule ; it has been shown him , third cath. letter , p. , . . ▪ and in many other places upon occasion , that they could not mistake in this rule ; & he never takes notice of it in his whole answer , and yet has the confidence to object it afresh . . he says , they might follow another rule . this too has been prov'd against him , nay 't is here prov'd in the fourth proposition of this very argument ; for by proving they could not innovate in faith , 't is prov'd they ( that is the body or vniversality ) could not desert tradition . but what a shift is the dr put to ? do we contend here they could follow no other ? all the proposition pretends to is , that if they follow this rule they cannot err in faith. what says he to this ? can they , or can they not ? if they cannot , then the rule is a good rule , which is all we labour to prove here , the rest is prov'd in the fourth proposition . and if they can err , tho' following it then , since to follow it , is still to believe the same , the dr must say that the same faith tho' still convey'd down the same is not the same it self was at first ; which is a direct contradiction . not one single word of answer then to the proposition has he given us , only he affirms stoutly 't is fallacious ( a very cheap answer to any argument that is too crabbed and difficult ) but he cannot for his heart tell where the fallacy lies . the conclusion is naught , that he 's resolv'd on , but he has nothing that is pertinent to say to the premisses or proof . yet , something he must say for a shew ; and , so , he will shew some other ways that errours might come in . and perhaps i can shew him twenty more ; but , still , what 's this to the point ? can errours in faith come in while men follow this rule of tradition , that is while they continue to believe the same that was still taught immediately before , and this ever since christs time ? this is our only business . . since i must now run out of the way after our straggling disputant , i desire first the reader would remark , that the proposition he is now answering is this , [ if they follow this rule ( viz. tradition ) they can never err in faith ; ] as also that by [ tradition ] is meant the publick testimony of the church of — what was deliver'd as christs doctrine . his first particular way of introducing errours , is , by the authority of false teachers . but was tradition follow'd , while they follow'd their authority ? if it was , then the christian church was a false teacher , and her publick testimony attested false doctrin to be christs ; which if he holds , let him speak out , and see how all christians will detest him . if tradition was not follow'd but deserted when men were led by false teachers , what 's this to us ? or whom does it oppose ? for 't is plainly to abet tradition , to say that none could follow false teachers , but they must at the same time desert it. 't is hard to conjecture then what he meant by alledging de molinos unless it were to make his friend dr burnets book concerning molinos sell. 't is no news that false teachers may introduce errours ; and that that man pretended the publick testimony of the church , or that his whimsies were christ's doctrin deliver'd down from the beginning , is both unheard of and incredible . his second way of introducing errours , is by enthusiasm . very well . did the testimony of the christian church tell them that enthusiasm was christ's doctrin ? if he says it did , he makes the whole christian church in some age to have been a pack of hare-brain'd enthusiasts . if it did not , then 't is an honour to tradition that they deserted it when they fell into that spiritual madness . his third way is by a pretence to a more secret tradition . but was this pretence to a secret tradition a pretending to follow the publick tradition of the church ? if it was not , it opposes not our tradition but credits it . and if he says it was , then he makes what 's secret to be publick , which is a contradiction ; and the very alledging this makes him in some manner guilty of that old failing of his . his fourth is , differences among church-guides about the sense of scripture and tradition . i have * already shewn him that it was impossible the generality , especially of pastours , should not know the sense of tradition ; and , as for some church guides differing about the sense of scripture , it was equally impossible they should err in faith , as long as they interpreted scripture by the rule of the church's tradition ; and , when they once left that rule , instead of being any longer church-guides , they became generally if they were any thing , eminent ringleaders of heretical sects ; which gives a high repute to our tradition , even by their erring when they deserted it . his fifth way how errour might come in , is too great a veneration to some particular teachers — which made their disciples despise tradition in comparison of their notions . and were those men followers of tradition who despis'd it ? his th is , by compliance with some gentil superstitions , &c. but did tradition or the church's testimony deliver down to them these heathenish superstitions for christs doctrin ? or rather , would it not have preserv'd men from them , had nothing else been attended to but that rule ? his th and last is by implicit faith , that is , that when a man had found a faithfull guide to direct him , he should submit himself to be guided by him in things in which he could not guide himself . a very dangerous case indeed ! but the antidote to this malicious suggestion is , that the same church that they believ'd , condemn'd all new revelations , and adher'd only to what was deliver'd . he could have added an eighth way how errours in faith come in , had he pleas'd , and that too such a one , as had done a thousand times greater mischief than all the rest put together ; viz. private interpretations of scripture ; which every man knows has been the source of all the heresies since christ's time . but this being the sole ground of his faith , it was not his interest to let his readers know it had been the ground of all heresy . . but what 's all this to the point ? or how is the demonstration lost if many men err'd upon divers other accounts so none err'd while they follow'd tradition ? unless he proves this , he establishes our demonstrations by his shewing how multitudes err'd who were led by other motives and by his not being able to produce so much as one instance of any that err'd by adhering to it. what noise and triumph should we have had , could he have alledg'd so many hereticks sprung up by grounding their opinions on mistaken tradition , as 't is known have arisen by grounding their wicked tenets on misunderstood scripture ? but alas ! tho' that were exceedingly to his purpose , not one such instance could he bring . he talks a little faintly of the arians , pelagians , nestorians , &c. not disowning tradition . but does he hope to perswade any man of sense those upstarts durst ever go about to put out the eyes of the world by pretending their heresies were deliver'd down as christs doctrin by the publick testimony of the church in their days , or out-face the present church that she her self had taught them what she knew themselves had newly invented ? or would she have condemn'd them had they spoke her thoughts or follow'd her doctrin ? with what sense can any of this be imagin'd ? the tradition then which they went upon was citations of some former authors , which they misunderstood , ( the very method dr st. and his fellow-quoters take now a-days ) or else the judgment of a few foregoers ; of whom some might speak ambiguously , others perhaps hanker'd after their heresy . 't is very hard to guess what dr st. would be at in alledging so many ways how errour might be introduc't . that it might come in , and by various ways no man doubts . that it came in meerly by following tradition or the churches testimony he says not . that particular multitudes might be seduc't by deserting tradition , is equally granted , and needs no proof . and that it came in tho' men adher'd to tradition ( which was the true point ) he goes not about to prove nor seems so much as to think of . besides most of the ways he assigns if not all , are so many desertions of tradition which highly conduces to strengthen our argument ; while he impugns it : yet surely that could not be his intention neither . i cannot imagin then what all these seven formall heads are brought for , but to make a show of none knows what . sometimes , i incline to think he is combating the fourth proposition , proving the body of traditionary christians could not innovate in faith but either through forgetfulness or malice . and yet i cannot fix upon this neither ; both because he names not these two defects before he shows us his other ways of erring ; as also because we are not come as yet to the fourth proposition where all the stress lay , but have spent all our time in confuting the first and second , which were self-evident . but , if that be his meaning as he intimates p. . to escape replying to the fourth proposition , then let him know that , whatever his unsound principles say , whoever deserts the testimony of god's church whether by the authority , ( or rather no-authority ) of false teachers ; or , by enthusiasm , the root of which is spirituall pride ; or , by following secret traditions against the publick authority of the church ; or , by adhering to a sense of scripture contrary to what tradition allows ; or by too great a veneration to some particular teachers ; or by compliance with heathenish superstitions ; or , by whatever other motive , is guilty before god of a heinous sin , and it must spring from some degree of malicious or bad disposition in his heart . for he cannot but see that himself or his leader breaks the order of the world by disobeying , rising against and preferring himself before those whom god had set over him to feed , direct , instruct and govern him . of which order , and of the goods coming by it , and the mischiefs which attend the violating it , none of common sense , whom some by-affection has not blinded , can possibly be ignorant . . he concludes with these words [ if then errours might come into the church all these ways ; what a vain thing it is to pretend that orall tradition will keep from any possibility of errour ! ] ah , dr. dr ! where 's your love of moral honesty ? where 's your sincerity ? where your conscience ? did ever any man pretend that tradition will keep men from any possibility of errour whether they follow it or no ? were not our most express words put down by your self , p. . l. . . [ if they follow this rule they can never err in faith. ] and must those most important words be still omitted , and no notice taken of them but only in an absurd distinction , making * adhering to tradition or following it , to be not-following it ? is this solid answering or plain prevaricating ? again , what nonsense does he make us speak by omitting these words ? is it not a madness to say , a rule will direct them right that do not follow it ? that a means will bring a man to his end , who does not use it ? that a way will keep a man from straying in his journey who does not walk in it ? yet all these contradictions we must be guilty of by his leaving out the words [ if follow'd ] 't is pretty too upon review of his words to reflect on his craft [ 't is vain to pretend that orall tradition will keep — ] whom was it pretended to keep from any possibility of errour ? he should have added [ the followers of it ] but because he had slipt this all along , he leaves the sense imperfect , and the word [ keep ] must want the accusative case after it , due to its transitive sense by the laws of grammar , meerly to avoid his putting the right one , because it would have been unsutable to all his foregoing discourses , which never toucht it . but , since he speaks still what causes of errour he has shown , tho' i have already manifested , that all those causes were accompany'd with malice in the first deserters of tradition , yet to enforce our demonstration the more , i discourse thus . if tradition could be deserted or innovation in faith made by the generality of christians ( for none ever said or doubted but many particulars might do so ) it must either proceed from some defect in their vnderstandings or in their wills. a defect in the will is call'd badness or malice ; whence , if they willfully innovated , it must spring from some degree of malice . if in their understanding ; then it must either be in that power as apprehending , or knowing christ's doctrin ; or as retaining it . it could not be in the former , for none doubts but the body of the church , particularly the teachers who were to instruct the rest , did very well comprehend christ's doctrin in the beginning , and the many * clear ways tradition comprizes to deliver it down , renders faith intelligible still to each succeeding age. wherefore since the defect cannot be in their understanding or their having christ's doctrin in their hearts , it must be ( if any where ) in that knowing power as 't is retentive , that is in their memory . but , it was absolutely impossible the generality of the church should be so weak as to forget in any little determinate part of time ( by which immediate steps tradition proceeds ) what was taught and practis'd a little before ; or considering the motives to keep them firm to it ) so wicked as to conspire to alter it purposely . therefore whatever contingency there must be in some particulars , it could not be that the generality of the church should have alter'd it , or consequently , err'd in faith. wherefore this conclusion stands yet firm , the premisses remaining yet untoucht : since he neither shows nor can show more faculties in mankind engag'd in the perpetuating the former faith than these two. add , that he does not even attempt to show that the causes he produces can have the power to prevail or carry it against the force of tradition ; and , unless he does this , all he alledges signifies nothing . but his especiall reason why he gives no other answer ( he should have said none at all ) to our fourth proposition , is , because he intends to shew in a particular discourse , how the errours and corruptions he charges on the church of rome did come into it . that is , we cannot have an answer to two lines but by perusing a large book . i would desire him to resume the force of all his little testimonies , and conjecturall descants upon them , with which that book abounds , and to be sure they conclude the point ; which he shall never do . and unless he does this , he only shows he has taken a great deal of pains to no kind of purpose ; since he leaves a presum'd demonstration in its full force , without bringing so much as a pretended conclusive proof against it . indeed , it is a great shame for him to pretend it ; for 't is to profess publickly to the world that he can produce better arguments against the papists then he can for his own faith ; and that he cannot answer the argument , or say any thing to the premisses , yet he will revenge himself upon the naughty conclusion , when he catches it alone , and unback't with any proof for it . . next , he will prove that our way of resolving faith into christ's and his apostles teaching , by the infallibility of the church's human authority or tradition , is pelagianism . but never was such a malicious and silly charge so impotently defended . we were told ( says he ) that divine faith must have infallible grounds , and when we come to examin them we find nothing but what is naturall . here again our whole controversy is lost , and a new state of the question is obtruded . faith as 't is formally divine has for its grounds the divine authority ▪ but are we in our controversy examining it as 't is formally divine ? do either of us alledge miracles , or any arguments that proves it to be such ? is it not confest and suppos'd by both parties that the faith taught at first was divine ; and are we to examin what 's confest and granted ? or , that supposition being agreed to , have we any more to do , but to prove what was the doctrin taught at first , by assigning a certain method of conveying it down to us ? he proceeds ; and now to avoid the charge of pelagianism , this divine faith is declar'd to be meer human faith. alas for him ! does not divine faith stand yet on it's own bottom , the divine authority , because human authority , gives those who yet know it not , assurance of its derivation to us ? the immediate effect then of our tradition is human faith ; the remote effect is to give us knowledge of a doctrin of faith which is divine ; not prov'd to be such by tradition , but acknowledg'd to be so by our mutuall concession . but how shamelesly insincere the dr is to object that i chang'd this purposely to avoid the charge of pelagianism : whenas he knows i had told himself the same in errour nonplust , some years before any contest arose about my writings ? does he not cite my words here , that this human faith had by tradition , leads us to what 's divine ? human faith is the way or means to know divine faith ; and cannot we obtain the favour of him to intermit a while his constant nonsence , and allow the means to be distinguisht from the end ? he goes on : and so human faith must have infallible grounds , but divine faith must shift for it self . can any thing be more trifling ? what shifts is faith put to for grounds , taken as 't is formally divine , in a controversy which supposes it such ; in which case no proof nor grounds for it need be produc't ? do those that holds the infallibility of the churches humane authority deriving it down to us , deny but the verity of the mysteries thus deriv'd , as in themselves , depend on divine revelation as on their formall motives ? do not these two consist well together ? may not faith depend on the divine authority in it self , and as it was made known at first , and yet not be known to us who live now but by humane authority . can he be certain of christian faith by his own grounds , but by the book of scripture , and yet does not himself say , that the certainty he has of that book , depends on tradition or humane authority , and consequently that humane faith is the way to know divine faith ? what quacking then and mountebanking is this , to make me a pelagian for doing the same himself does and publickly avows ; omitting in the mean time my answers which at large * clear'd before-hand , all that he has here so weakly and insincerely objected ? lastly , he tells us , that if divine faith fixes not on the infallibility of tradition , then we may have divine faith without it . yes , by his enthusiastick principles , but not by connatural ways ; since himself must acknowledge that neither the letter nor sense of scripture is absolutely certain without it . . it would be very pleasant to see how this gallant caviller would prove st. paul a pelagian heretick . that blessed apostle affirm'd that fides per auditum , faith comes to our knowledge by hearing : for the certainty of the primitive faith was resolv'd into the certainty of the senses , as the means to come to the first knowledge of the doctrin , and of that sense more particularly , because preaching was the way of instilling faith then . now comes dr st. and ( having pray'd , i suppose for wisdom before-hand ) tells that holy apostle , that divine faith must have infallible grounds , but that the certainty of the senses is meerly natural ; that he runs from divine motives to humane ones . he asks him smartly , what infallible ground is there for this divine faith , and where it fixes ? if not on the certainty of the senses , then we may have divine faith without them . if it does fix on their certainty , then divine faith is to be resolv'd into naturall means . and what is this but pelagianism ? thus the stupendiously learned , and more then supernaturally enlighten'd dean of st. pauls , has clearly prov'd st. paul himself an arrant pelagian . but , if st. paul should answer as i do that he spoke not of divine faith , or the doctrin of it as in it self , or as 't is formally supernatural , but only of divine faith as standing under natural means for us to come to know it , then it would follow that it would require higher grounds to be resolv'd into as 't is divine , & yet , for all that , that he could have no faith at all , nor certainty of it , unless by miracle , but by virtue of these natural means to give him knowledge of it . but our verball controvertist never reflects that there may be divers resolutions made of faith as 't is controverted , according to the nature or exigency of the dispute . against a deist that holds it not divine , it is to be resolv'd into the divine authority , and this must be shewn to be engag'd for it , by those motives of credibility which prove it to be such . but this is quite besides our present dispute , since both parties grant it ; and , consequently all his discourse here is quite besides the purpose . . i doubt not but the dr would have had another fling at st. paul for pelagianism , in case he would not allow that a pious disposition of the will did make the verdict of the sense of hearing certain , and piece out the deafishness of the auditours , when that sense had some imperfection ; as he does here , by making me a pelagian for saying the will 's assistance cannot make an argument if it be defective . especially should we both say , that dr st's moral qualifications , purity of heart , humility of mind , and prayer for wisdom , would not make a deaf ear hear well , or a bad argument conclude . for both our cases are perfectly parallel ; since we both speak of the way to come at the knowledge of divine faith. but his logick , i see , would have his readers ( when an argument drawn from meer nature is propos'd which is short of concluding , let it be in physicks , metaphysicks , or what he will , for it alters not our case ) shake their heads very piously , and answer [ truly sir , tho' i see your reason does not conclude , or satisfy my understanding , that the thing you would prove is true , yet out of a pious inclination to the cause , i will call in my wills assistance , and out of pure goodness think it does conclude , and that the thing is for all that , really true. i would wish him by all means to maintain still that 't is pelagianism to deny that the inconclusiveness of an argument is supply'd by the kind-heartedness of the will. nothing in the world but this can justify all his insignificant proofs , & make them pass for valid & good ones . 't is ridiculous he says , to alledge that i resolve all into christ's and the apostles teaching . why ? is it not agreed on between us , that christ is god , and his doctrine divine ? and is not this to bring us to divine faith , if we prove it to be his doctrine ? or is it not enough for our purpose when 't is confess'd on both sides that christ's doctrine is divine ? why is it then ridiculous to profess we do this ? because caelestius & pelagius did the very same . and so i must be a pelagian still ; that 's resolv'd on . those hereticks did indeed pretend their heresies were christ's doctrin ; but this is no particularity in them , for every heretick since christ's time did the same ; else they had not been hereticks , but pagans , iews , turks , or deists : but , we go no further upon this principle than they did . why ? did they ever alledge , that the tradition or immediate testimony of the body of the church , deliver'd down their doctrin for christ's ? or durst they disgrace themselves by going about to avail themselves of such an open and notorious lye ? this he should have prov'd solidly and clearly : but , instead of proving it , he barely says it ; and who will at this time of day believe his word ? and yet , if he does not this , every sincere reader must see that he has sacrific'd his sincerity to his spite against catholicks , and judges slander and calumny no sin. observe here by the way his consistency with himself . in his second letter to mr g. p. . he affirm'd , that we resolv'd all into meer humane faith ; and here he confesses we resolve all into christ's and his apostles teaching . had not i then good reason to ask him if christ was a meer man , it falling in so naturally ? yet he is mighty angry at those words , and says he gave no occasion for them , and imputes it to malice . i do assure him that i us'd those words to shew that by resolving all into christ's teaching , i resolv'd faith finally into what is confessedly divine . why he should take it so to heart , or apply it to himself when it was not in the least intended , his conscience best knows . however , it puts him to make a profession of his faith in that point ; which i heartily pray may be sincere . . the last point which he thinks fit to take notice of , omitting ( by his favour ) many which were more concerning , is , that the council of trent * disowns a power of making implicit articles of faith contain'd in scripture to become explicit by its explaining the sense of them . he proves this , because the church of rome doth not pretend to make new articles of faith , whereas to make implicit doctrines to become explicit , is really so to do . this a little varies from what he said in his second letter ; nor can i find a word of making new articles of faith pretended there , and i am sure there are none such in that place . yet still he would put it upon the council to introduce some articles by new explications of scripture ; but he only says it , not proves it ; and so , till proof comes , let it rest upon his bare word , which signifies little . other answers i have given to this point , ( third cath. letter , p. . . ) which since he has taken no notice of , i shall presume they stand good in their full force . . he concludes with these words , [ but , because the council of trent doth pretend to apostolical tradition for the points there determin'd , and the shewing that it had not catholick and apostolick tradition , is the most effectual confutation of the present pretence of oral tradition , i shall reserve that to another discourse ; part whereof , i hope , will suddenly be publish't . ] now who sees not that , since a demonstration for the infallibility of tradition is the most effectual , and most compendious proof that is imaginable ; and unless it be answer'd , most necessarily concludes the descent of that faith from christ which is held upon it ; and that the evidence of such a proof consisting in the necessary connexion of the terms which are us'd in it , has the self-same force whether the council of trent , or any council , had ever been held , or not ; who sees not , i say , that this is a meer plausible shift to avoid the shock of our arguments and to run the field by the still-necessary ; and still friendly assistance of his former bad logick , viz. of arguing against the conclusion instead of answering the premisses ? and , therefore , that his proper conclusion , had he spoken out candidly , should have been this . [ but , because i was neither able to shew the absolute certainty of christian faith by my principles , nor to make out , that the rule i have assign'd does influence any point of faith , so as to prove it to be absolutely certain , that 't is christs doctrin ; nor yet able to answer their close arguments against the absolute certainty of mine , or for the absolute certainty of the catholique faith , therefore to come off handsomely before i utterly lose my credit , i think it the safest and wisest expedient to let the premisses alone or pass over them with some sleight touches , and to combat the conclusion by quoting of authors , and tacking the two disperate matters together as well as i can , so to make a kind of transition from the one to the other , i will set my self to write against the council of trent . a business which will take mightily in this iuncture ; nor will many readers much concern themselves in case they should observe it , how i have dropt the question , or shrunk away from my adversary . ] and so a good journey to the drs ▪ rambling pen , till i meet him next in the field where we fought last : whither , in the behalf of christian faith , whose certainty he has here vndermin'd i do recall and challenge him . the concluding section . hitherto of doctor st's sins of commission ; viz. of his groundless and impertinent calumnies , his manifest falshoods against his own knowledge , his constant prevarication from the question in every respect , and this quite thorough his whole answer ; his bad logick laid open in many instances , his shifts and evasions , his paralogisms , cavils and contradictions . now follow his sins of omission . by which i do not mean his failing to give a good answer to those arguments he thought fit to take notice of ; for this , as has been shewn in every particular , would spread one universal blot over his whole book ; but his not so much as attempting to give the reasons i alledg'd to prove them , or other particular omissions charg'd upon him , any answer at all , or taking the least notice of them . . to begin with my first catholick letter , or the answer to dr. st's first letter to mr. g. why might we not know the particular reason how mr. t came to be satisfy'd ; this being of such special concern , and laying so precise an obligation upon us to clear that point ? but changing his making a secret of mr. t 's convincing reason , which was requir'd of him , p. . . into his making a secret of the ground of his certainty , ( p. . ) why did he turn it off to mr. g. to shew that the doctor 's protestants have not absolute certainty of their faith , when as he had taken it upon himself to shew they had ? but instead of giving a reason for that carriage of his , to deny his own express words ( first letter , p. . ) which put the proof upon mr. g. and then , to turn absolute certainty of his protestant faith , which consists of a determinate number of points , into certainty of scripture ; which perhaps may not signify so much as one point of faith , unless he shew absolute certainty that the letter of it is rightly understood in those texts that contain those points ? which he is so far from shewing that he not so much as goes about it . why no reply to our proof that mr. g. has , by doing his own work , at the same time perform'd what the doctor would needs have put him upon ; viz. prov'd that doctor st's church has no certainty of its faith ? why conceal'd he the true meaning of the word [ traditionary ] given by us , but took it purposely in another sense , and then rally'd upon it ? why no notice taken of our explication of those words [ if they follow'd this rule ] declar'd by us to mean the [ believing still the same ] which had forestall'd his ill-grounded descant upon them ( p. . . ) and why no regard to that most important conditional proposition , but starting aside to ways how errours might come in by not following it ; which instead of answering , asserts and makes good our tenet ? why no reply to our several reasons brought against his intollerably bad logick , shewing at large from many heads the absurdity of it , and that the subject of our argument , as impugn'd by his instance , was not at all like zeno's denying of motion ; which reasons had prevented and utterly defeated his pittifull defence of it here ? why nothing to the unavoidable force of our argument , manifesting it to be self-evident that tradition is a certain rule ? why does he not justify his palpable prevarication from the whole question laid out at large & prov'd against him , p. . . why not a word of answer to my discourse shewing absolute certainty & infallibility to be the same ? why does he no where distinguish himself & his protestants from all sorts of hereticks owning the same common rule ; by shewing us by what particular means he is more certain of the true sense of scripture then they were , and thence differenc't from them by his having some particular rule or way to arrive at true faith which they had not ; this being a point of the highest importance in our controversy , and most earnestly prest upon him over and over ? and yet for all his flourishes about criterions he has said nothing to those reasons , only he has made a sleight discourse of his own , p. . . but never shew'd any particular means securing his party from erring , more than the vilest hereticks us'd . why little or no regard to my reasons shewing that scripture interpretable by their private judgment of discretion is not the rule which the generality of protestants rely on ; which , if true , utterly overthrows his whole pretence to that for his rule ? he blunders indeed about it in clear words , and tells his own tale very prettily ; but he has not answer'd my reasons , as the reader may discern , who is pleas'd to compare them with his reply . lastly , why no answer to each particular proposition of my short discourse , or shewn it inconnected , demonstrating that none who follow'd his rule can have assurance that what they believe is christ's doctrin ▪ but instead of this duty , bringing pretended false suppositions against the whole , which suppos'd nothing but that we could have no more reason to judge the socinians insincere , or careless , or less skilfull in the sense of words than we have to think he is ? . these are his omissions in answering my first catholick letter . as for my second ; since his title pretends an answer to them all in generall , and he referrs us to another able to speak for himself , meaning his reflecter , we are to imagin he makes account he has answer'd them all , by himself or by his proxy , but , good god! what an answer has that weak man given us ? his discourse is a chain of sand. 't is a mess of controversy dish't up in sippets ; a meer hash of repartees , or reason torn into raggs . a discourse , as every man knows , has it's true force by the constant tenour of it ; and this tenour is shatter'd all to pieces by a new invented method of short dialogues ; where he makes me , at his pleasure , say as little at a time as he lists , and he plays upon it as much as he pleases : i must break-off just where he thinks fitting , and he enlarge against an imperfect discourse , unassisted by it's comparts , as long as he judges convenient . now he 's at the beginning of my book , and immediately at the middle or end of it ; gathering thrums-ends of little sentences , which he patches together so aukwardly that they have no connexion at all but what his unskillfull or partiall hand bestows upon them . if we expect reason from him , he tells us he never undertook to prove but to reflect . a very pretty come off ! i wonder what answer is proper to a man who proves nothing , nay not so much as vndertook it ! thus much for his method : but the tricks and shifts in managing it are innumerable : 't is almost as easy to determin how many words may be made of the four and twenty letters , as to trace all the anagrams he makes of my sense , by weaving it in his loom to sute his own fancy or interest . when our question is only about a certain rule of faith , he alters it when he lists , to a certain rule of life ( p. . ) as if we pretended scripture not clear in morall points : by which means he turns the whole question to a quite different subject . his contradictions are frequent , for he never speaks of the nature of any thing that concerns our dispute but he constantly falls into that irrecoverable lapse . as he turn'd the precise duty of proving into the needless impertinency of reflecting , so tell him of falsifications he tells you ( p. . ) he meant them for ironies . and , indeed his whole reflexionary ( if i may call it so ) is nothing but a continu'd irony ; it being very hard to know when he 's in jest , when in earnest : only he garnishes his scorn with demure pretences of charity and civility , that so he may affront his adversary with a more plausible garb of affected gravity and godliness . . as for the strength of his reasons , since one instance is held by dr st. and him a competent answer to a pretended demonstration , i hope one pregnant instance how he quite misses the whole matter in hand , may be allow'd sufficient to render insignificant his hopping and skipping dialogues , by shewing plainly that his ill-levell'd reflexions hit not me , but squint aside to other subjects . e're i come to my instance , i desire the reader to bear in remembrance ( for i cannot repeat it too often because my adversary is resolv'd never to take notice of it ) that , our controversy supposes as agreed to by both parties that christ's doctrin is divine , and that our whole question is about the means to bring down to us those sublime spiritual articles of christian faith , with such a certainty and clearness as may oblige us to assent firmly and unalterably , that what we hold concerning them now at present is the self-same that was taught by him and his apostles ; and consequently is divine and true. next , we affirm that the letter of scripture not being clear to people of all sorts looking after christ's true doctrin , in those texts which relate to such high points , the best way to satisfy such men that those articles came down invariably from christ is the humane authority of the christian church . and , lastly , that the credibleness of this authority is prov'd by intrinsical mediums , taken from the natures of things lying levell to our reason , which contribute to support it from being liable to be deceiv'd or to deceive us in that affair : viz. from the nature of man , who being a rational creature cannot possibly act without a motive or a reason ; and is withall endow'd with such and such faculties belonging to such a nature ; as also from the practical nature , & highest import of the doctrin to be deliver'd , and the nature of those most powerfull motives obliging the generality to whom they are apply'd , to transmit down faithfully a doctrin held divine ; and , lastly , from the nature of divers circumstances of the universe . all which are laid out in my second cath. letter , p. . . . . to which nothing but a very sleight return ( with many omissions ) has been given us by him , and nothing at all by dr st. tho' these ( as the reader may see if he pleases to review them ) be the most forcible part of that treatise to prove the uninterrupted perpetuity of tradition hitherto , on which the resolution of our grand question mainly depends . 't is enough , it seems , for such a trifling reflecter , at the end of his pamphlet , to call the passages he has omitted , amongst which are the natures of those things , hedges and puddles ; and close reasons drawn from them frisking fancies ; and that 's all can justly be expected from one who seems to be a sworn schollar to the great professor of learned jests and ingenious prevarications . . these particulars concerning our tenet , known to all that have read our controversy , being reflected on , let 's see how this gentleman represents it , and how profoundly he discourses against us . in his th page he will needs repeat our tenet , or ( as he with much formality is pleas'd to call it ) the lesson i have taught him : which , put into distinct sentences , he makes to be this . . your churches authority is human authority . answ. our church'es authority is also divine , and as such 't is the rule of faith to those who are already faithfull : but in our controversy , which is about the way for men to come to faith , 't is not proper to alledge any other than her natural or humane authority , consisting of a vast body of men both able and oblig'd to testify such open matters of fact as is the delivery of a doctrin so qualify'd by those that educated us ; and the reason is because 'till men come at christ's faith they can only guide themselves by their reason ; whence the credibility of that authority must be provable by reason against those who shall deny it . . he says , it has force to prove the truths which depend upon it . yes ; it has force to prove to us this matter of fact , that those truths descended from christ ; but not the intrinsical truth of any one article in it self . to do this is the work of divine revelation , not of humane authority . . it has this force and concludes against such as own its veracity , but it deserves no assent further than reason gives it to deserve . well then , since we bid him guide himself by his reason e're he admits it , will he at least admit it and yield assent to it , when reason shews him it deserves it ? this is all we desire of him ; and 't is a very reasonable request in us , for it only desires he would not renounce his reason and forfeit his manhood . now come his conclusions from mistaken premisses : hence i conclude , seeing we admit not your church'es authority , nor own its veracity it proves nothing to us nor concludes any thing against us . from what antecedent is this conclusion drawn ? did we ever press him to admit it blindly ; the point is , will he renounce his reason when it tells him this authority ought to be believ'd ? this is our tenet and should have been taken in e're he had inferr'd any thing at all : but then it would have marr'd his conclusion and his admirable method of taking every discourse of mine to pieces and never putting it together again , and so it was thought expedient to neglect it . his next conclusion is , seeing articles of faith depend not on humane authority , your church'es authority can have no effect on humane nature to oblige to a belief of them . where we have near as many faults as words . for , first , articles of faith in themselves or as to their intrinsicall verity , depend only on the divine authority as their formall motive ; but , as to us , or as to our knowledge of those articles now , which were taught by christ long since ( which is our only business ) a successive human authority , the most strongly supported of any that ever was in the world to convey down a matter of fact of infinit concern , is the properest way to attest them ; whence all those articles , in that regard do depend on that human authority , after the same manner as even himself also holds the book of scripture does . secondly , what an incredible folly is it , not to distinguish between those articles which were taught at first , ( and , so , are divine ) as in themselves , and the same articles as knowable by us now to have been taught long ago ? nor to reflect that our controversy only treats of them under this latter consideration ? nor to know that , as thus consider'd , all articles of faith not only may but must necessarily depend on human or naturall means , since without such they cannot be introduc't into our understandings connaturally , nor by any way but by immediate inspiration , which is perfect enthusiasm ? nor lastly , not to advert that even the divinity of faith depends , in some sort , on naturall means ? st. paul tells us faith comes by hearing ; and , if so , then faith depended on hearing as to its coming to be known by us . nay , as christian faith was formally from god , it depended thus on miracles , which could not be known to be such but by their being above the course of nature ; nor could they be known to be above the course of nature unless the course of nature it self had been fore-known , the knowledge of which is only naturall or human. thirdly , his following words in this ridiculous conclusion , shew him utterly ignorant of our whole question ; otherwise he could not with any degree of sincerity have put it upon us , that we hold the human authority of our church obliges to a belief of the articles themselves ; whereas what we hold is , that it only obliges us to assent they came from christ , or were inerrably deliver'd down by the churche's testimony . fourthly , by leaving out all mention of what 's most particularly our tenet in this point , he puts it upon us to hold that human authority has effect upon human nature of it self ; whereas we never presum'd or affirm'd it either had or ought to have any but by vertue of the reasons which vouch't for its veracity , nay , i both affirm'd and prov'd the direct contrary . his third conclusion is , seeing all its credit depends on its intrinsicall reasons produc't , till they be produc't we are not bound to give any credit to it . no , nor bound to mind them much it seems , nor answer them fully when produc't ; as appears by his omitting the most forcible reasons for the certainty of tradition's continuance as was lately shown . but why is this made a distinct conclusion or disjoynted from the rest , whereas it was the most necessary and essentiall part of our true tenet ? because the method he so religiously observ'd throughout his dialogue-answer , which is to shatter asunder the intire sense of every passage , would not allow it . his fourth conclusion is , when these reasons shall be produc't , its testimony has but the nature of an externall motive , not of an intrinsicall ground . answ. intrinsicall ground ? to what ? to christian faith as 't is divine ? 't was never pretended , nor can it belong in any regard to our question , since 't is not disputed between us , but acknowledg'd by us both , that christ's doctrin is such . means he then 't is not a proper medium to prove christ's faith deriv'd to us who live now ? how can he even pretend to shew that so vast a testimony is not proper to attest a notorious matter of fact , viz. what doctrin was deliver'd immediately before , and this throughout every age , year , or day ? again , what means he when he says , testimony is not an intrinsicall ground ? what man in his senses ever said or thought it ? we spoke indeed of intrinsicall grounds to prove the credibleness of that testimony , but not a word have we even hinting that testimony it self is an intrinsical ground to any thing . if he will needs be talking nonsense let him take it to himself , and not put it upon me . lastly , why is not an extrinsicall ground or testimony prov'd to be such by intrinsicall reasons sufficient in our case ? this should have been shewn , but for this very reason 't is not so much as taken notice of either by him or his master . in a word , he uses some of our words , taken asunder from the context of our intire sense ; then blends them confusedly together on any fashion , without any kind of order or respect to the true question ; he gives us relative words without telling us what they relate to ; he puts upon us tenets we never advanc't or held , but the direct contrary . and the witty gentleman would still persuade his reader he is repeating his lesson i have taught him , when as all the while he deserves more then a ferula for his rehearsing it wrong , or rather saying it backwards . then follows his grand conclusion as the flower of all the foregoing ones , which we may be sure hits the point exactly ; and therefore ( says he ) either your position overthrows your churche's authority , or it your position . most excellent ? my position is about tradition which is the self-same thing with the churche's authority ; and this precious scribbler will needs have the same thing to destroy it self . a fit upshot for a discourse without sence . . we see by this one instance there is scarce one line , nor many significant words in this half-page of his , but runs upon enormous mistakes . and , does he think i have nothing else to do but to stand rectifying still what he all along takes such care and pains to put into disorder ? especially , since those few things that are pertinent , are abundantly spoke to in my third catholick letter , and this present reply . i must intreat the dr to excuse me if i have no mind to break his young controvertists , and teach them how to manage . mr g. did him , i hope , no disparagement in making me his substitute ; but 't is not so gentile in him to set such a fresh man upon my back . i 'le have nothing to do with his little iourney-men or apprentices till the world be satisfy'd that their master himself is a better artist . and , if it shall appear that even the learned dr st. is able to make nothing of so bad a cause , 't is neither discreditable to me nor any disadvantage to the truth i am defending , if i neglect such a sixth-rate writer who confesses himself unworthy to carry his books after him . . the omissions in answering my second catholick letter are as many as that letter it self contains : since his untoward method renders all his talk , twitching and girding at little sayings of mine , utterly insignificant . whence , that whole treatise as 't is in it self , stands yet intire , unless the dr can shew by his new logick that to mince half a book into fragments is to answer the whole . . thus the dr has trickt off the answering my second cath. letter . but his omissions in answering the third are both numerous and most highly important , and he is to render an account of all this long roll of his neglects . why did he not clear himself of his altering there the notion of tradition into articles and powers of doing this or that , * shewn at large , p. . . why answers he not the several reasons , proving against him , that tradition brings down the sense of christ's doctrin , and not only common words ; in the clear delivery of which sense consists one of the main properties of a rule , viz. its plainness to people of all sorts who are to be regulated by it ? and why , instead of performing this necessary duty , does he ( p. . ) after having vapour'd that 't is bravely said if it could be made out , does he not so much as mention the reasons by which it was made out ; but ramble into such nonsense ( p. . ) that he and his party ( who are deserters of tradition ) cannot mistake it ; that tradition ( or the church'es human testimony ) being the rule of faith is a part of christ's doctrin , &c. why no excuse for his deforming the meaning of that plain word [ tradition ] into many unsutable significations , and putting it in all shapes but its own ? why no defence of his most ridiculous drollery , in paralleling tradition or the testimony of god's church to the relation of two or three partial witnesses of his own side in favour of their fellows ? or for his inconsonancy to himself & his insincerity in thus perverting it still when he was to impugn it ; whenas he took it very right when it made for himself ? why not a word to my clearest demonstration , that 't is impossible but tradition must bring down a determinate sense of the tenets it delivers , which he answers not at all , but only brings against conclusion an instance of the corinthians and arlemonites ( p. . . ) which as far as it pretends they pleaded tradition for their heresy , ( taking tradition as we do for the immediate testimony of the church ) is both false and senseless . why no answer at all to that most concerning point prov'd against him , that the church has power to declare diverse propositions to be of faith , not held distinctly before , without any prejudice at all to tradition ? and why no notice taken of my most evident proof that we make christian faith as 't is formally divine rely on the divine authority , notwithstanding our tenet , that the church'es humane authority is the means to bring us to the knowledge of christ's doctrin ; and that the asserting this later is not to overthrow the church'es authority in matters of faith , as he objected ? as also that the venerable f. w. was not an adversary to our way , and that lominus his book the dr rely'd on was no argument that my doctrin was faulty even in the opinion of my judges ; why gave he no reply to any of these , but still run on with his former calumnies , as if nothing had been produc't to shew his manifest and wilfull mistakes ? why no answer to my reasons proving at large the impotency of his malice in charging pelagianism , more than to repeat a few of words for a shew , that this humane authority leads us to what 's divine , and there stopping ; whereas the very * next words [ yet not by its own force but by vertue of the supposition agreed upon that christ's doctrin is such ] had spoil'd all his pretence ? why no notice taken of my citation out of errour nonplust writ against himself fifteen years ago ; which forestall'd all his rambling mistakes , and by consequence , shew'd him strangely insincere , in dissembling his knowledge of my tenet so expressly declar'd . . why no plea alledg'd to justify his shuffle from the grounds of his protestant faith in particular to the grounds of christian faith in common ; nor to excuse his next shuffle , and nonsense to boot , in making [ faith ] by vertue of an id est , to signify the grounds for his ground of faith ; and turning [ certainty of scripture ] into a long ramble , viz. into [ certainty of the grounds on which we believe scripture to contain the word of god. ] why not a word of reply to my discourses , there and in many other places , shewing that scripture's containing faith is nothing at all to our purpose , but the getting out from scripture it 's true meaning or sense , this only being our faith ; and that his faith is still vncertain unless there be certainty that such and such articles are contain'd there . which point tho' it be of the highest consequence , yet he never sets himself to solve our arguments against it , in his whole pretended answer ; but he runs on still in the same errour , as if nothing had been alledg'd to shew his discourses insignificant and frivolous ! why no answer to my discourse proving that a rule or ground is none , if it carry not thorough to the particular points , especially to those which are most fundamentall , unless granting it in effect ( p. . ) and allowing no absolute certainty to any particular point of faith , may be called an answer ? why no excuse for his skewing comment upon his own answer ( which spoke of absolute certainty of all christ's doctrin , which consists of such and such particular tenets ) to the writings of the apostles ; whereas there was not a word of writing in mr. g's question or in his own answer either ? nor any notice taken of my argument , manifesting that a resolution of faith speaks connexion of the motives that are to prove it christ's doctrin , to the points of faith ; laid home to him in a close discourse demonstrating the necessity it should be such . why no account of his distinguishing between christ's doctrin and that of the apostles ; that so he might mis-represent tradition , and alter the question from a publick to a private delivery ? why no reason given of his not resolving his faith into the apostles preaching , but only into their writing ; i mean , no answer to my reasons why he ought to have resolv'd it into the former , at least , equally ? why no answer to my reasons , shewing from his ill-laid principles , that perfect contradictories , points of faith and wicked heresies , opposit to them , are both equally certain ? why no excuse for his shuffling from the new testament's containing all the divine revelations , to the church'es making men fix by degrees upon the certain canon of it , which is there shewn ( and indeed appears of it self ) to be a quite disparate business ? why not the least excuse for his most abominable four-fold prevarication in answering to one single question , expos'd there at large ; and why no defence or particular explication of his beloved sufficient certainty , nor any application of it to the nature , ends , and uses of a firm faith , that any point is christ's true doctrin , shewing that his feeble motives are sufficient for those particular purposes ? why , to make his odd similitude of scripture's being a purse , apposit , does he not shew us some certain way , how the gold and silver points of faith ( as he calls them ) may be got out of it , without danger of extracting thence the impure dross of errour and heresy instead of true faith ? again , to make it square , why does he not rather make the heads and hearts of the first faithfull the purses , since ( as was shewn him ) faith is more properly contain'd there than in a book ? or , if he will needs make use of an improper container of faith too , why does not he put two purses ; viz. the souls of the faithfull , and the scripture ? and why not a word of reply to my plain reasons why he ought to have done both these ? why no answer to my reasons proving that all the points of faith are necessary for the salvation of mankind , and for the church ; otherwise than by rambling to transubstantiation ( p. . ) and that he sees no necessity of it : which makes his often-alledg'd distinction of necessary & unnecessary points , brought to avoid the question , perfectly frivolous ; and why runs he still on with the same distinction in this pretended answer without taking off the exceptions against it , by only crying alas for him ! when i askt him , if christ taught any unnecessary articles : and by saying they are not equally necessary , p. . why nothing to justify that his assent of faith may not be false , and so , no faith ? why no reply to my reasons , that , notwithstanding his pretended grounds , he has no absolute certainty that even the letter of scripture is right ; whereas , if it be not , he can have no certainty but all is wrong that is grounded upon it ; since , in that case he may embrace a grand heresy for true faith ? why no answer to my plainest argument , shewing how christ's doctrin , continu'd all along in the breast of the church , is the best means to correct the letter in texts that contain faith ? why no reply to my many reasons , shewing that the ancient church allow'd our way of tradition , and disallow'd his of scripture privately interpreted ? why does he not confute my discourses , manifesting that he can have no absolute certainty by his principles of the number of books ; or of each chapter , verse , and material word in each verse that concerns any point of faith ; without doing which , he cannot pretend to have certainty of the letter , nor , consequently , of any one of those points ? why no reply to that important objection , that if scripture were the rule of faith , the primitive church had , for some time , but half or three-quarters of their faith , or less , ( and so , by his principles , were but three-quarters or half christians ) according as the several pieces came by degrees to be spread , accepted , or universally acknowledg'd ; nay perhaps no faith at all , as was there shewn ; and why did , he instead of replying , * turn it off to the single epistle to the hebrews , and to an insignificant if ? why , when it was objected that divers of his christian churches doubted of divers books of scripture , and some late brethren of his of some others , does he again turn it off ( as to the former ) to the canon of scripture made afterwards ; and to the later says nothing ? why not a word to my clearest proof that our tradition or testimony for doctrin is incomparably more large in its source , which gives it its chief force , than his is for scripture's letter ? why does he not clear himself of his preferring his sober enquirer before the church , the unreasonableness of which was urg'd home against him , nor justify his weak discourses in some sleigter passages laid open , p. . . why not a syllable of answer to that most highly-concerning discourse , and which , if it stands in its full force , overthrows all the whole fabrick of his doctrin , viz. that a rule or ground are relative words , and therefore scriptures letter cannot be an absolute certain rule or ground , unless its ascertaining virtue affects the articles known by it ? this point has been prest upon him so vigorously , and pursu'd with so many forcible arguments that there can be no plainer confession that his cause is lost than not to attempt to answer them ; especially , since the hinge of the whole controversy depends upon it . it was his concern too to avow or disavow his dear friend dr. burnet's position , making his sober enquirer judge of councils ; but he would not be so candid . why declines he the giving us satisfaction that he does indeed hold the testimony for scripture absolutely certain , by making out from the nature of the things why it must be so ? see , reader , how it was there demanded of him and urg'd upon him to do himself and his faith that honour and credit ; yet he is perfectly deaf to all sollicitations of that kind . and the reason is , because , should should he do this as he ought to do , he must necessarily make the church infallible , and rely upon her infallibility for the certainty of scriptures letter ; and should it come to be prov'd that 't is easier to transmit down the same doctrin than an exact copy , this would oblige his sober enquirer to be led by her in matters of faith. a condescendence not to be submitted to by his fanatick friends ; both because their first principle is to think themselves wiser than the church ; as also , because to prove this would make the knowledge of christ's doctrin too strong by proofs and outward means , which their gifted and inspir'd genius ( impossible ever to be prov'd but by doing miracles ) cannot away with . to proceed , why clears he not himself from being oblig'd by his principles to own a brotherhood with all hereticks who profess to follow scripture as much as he does ; by shewing some absolutely certain means to distinguish his faith from theirs ; did not the doing this mainly concern his credit , when it was severely objected , and shewn that he had given just occasion for this suspition of all comprehending principles ? why no account given of the absolute certainty of particular texts , and the most significant words in each of them , as well as of the canon or number of books ; without which , let the canon be as certain as it will , 't is impossible for him to know assuredly whether what he holds be true faith or heresy ? why no answer to my objection that to be the word of god is not sufficient to make scripture a rule , unless it has withall perspicuity or clearness , to give those who read it and rely on it , absolute certainty of its true sense , or faith , in those high mysteries and spiritual points controverted between the church and her deserters ? why no reply to my confutation of his smartest or rather only argument to prove scripture a rule , given by me particularly to every branch of it ? is not a business of such high consequence worth his defence , his whole cause , ( as far as 't is manag'd by him ) standing or falling by his maintaining or deserting that main proof for it ? why does he give us no grounds that elevate faith ( as it depends on the rule ascertaining us it came from christ ) above opinion ; whenas it was charg'd upon him that he had no such grounds , and he was loudly call'd upon to produce them ; but to aggravate the fault , to call here ( p. . ) all the points of christian faith ( there spoken of ) particular opinions ? why takes he no notice of the several senses of the word [ rule ] and in which of those senses it is taken properly , and why it must necessarily be taken in such a sense in our controversy ; but instead of doing this , run on wilfully mistaking it still ? why not a word in confutation of an infallible iudge , as that point is stated by me ? why did he not accept my challenge that he could not shew me any one solid proof in his whole treatise that he could maintain ; since the doing this had been a great blurr to me , and a high credit to himself ; nay the very offering at it , might have kept our readers in some suspence whether he were perfectly baffled or no , whenas his total declining it is a plain confession he does not think fit to stand to any one proof he has produc't ? why no reply to my discourse demonstrating that a rule must be the immediate light to know the thing in order to which 't is to regulate us ; and , therefore , that , however he pretends to scripture , yet his own interpretation , or the means he uses to interpret it , is unavoidably his rule ? as also that the testimony of all christian churches did not recommend to him such a rule of faith ; and that a testimony for the letter confess'd by himself to be fallible , stood in great need of his logick to make what 's built on it to be absolutely certain ? why not a word to the testimony of that antient and holy father , and most solid controvertist , st. athanasius ; which quite overthrows the whole scheme of his doctrin , and makes all his sober enquirers unbelievers or infidels ? and why no excuse for his not putting amongst his helps the iudgment of the present church , at least of the church of england ; ( this being both an easier help than 't is to use his other painfull methods to understand scripture right , & more agreeable to the order of the world . ) especially , since he stands impeacht of destroying church-government as to any thing belonging to faith ? why does not he shew us how mr t. could be a sober enquirer , whom he defends for so suddenly settling his enquiry and resolving , tho' he did not use those means which the dr himself affirm'd his sober enquirers were bound to use ; especially , since this carriage of the dr's shews him very willing to contradict at pleasure even his own principles , and to dispense with those obligations he himself had impos'd , when it suits with his interest ? whence every considering man must necessarily conclude he holds not heartily and steadily to any principle at all . why should not his sober enquirers trust the church rather than themselves ; and why no answer to the reasons why they should ? why does not he confute my discourse , proving that a judge proceeding upon an inerrable rule is infallible ; and that 't is no prejudice to the church , that those whom she has cast out , or are her enemies , deny her to be such ? why answers he not my particular reasons against his kind of judgment of discretion , or the reasons given for ours , but makes impertinent discourses of his own at random , without regarding either our objections , or our proofs ; nay , when he had occasion , without acknowledging their distinction , but most unconscionably pretending them to be the same ; whereas their difference and perfect opposition to one another , is laid out there very largely and particularly . and now , gentlemen , i request even those who are the most partial of his friends to count over the pages cited in the margent ; and , if you find by an exact review that i have neither misreckon'd them , nor misrepresented his answers ; be pleas'd to frame thence an impartial judgment of his prodigious confidence in pretending in his title that this every-way-defective treatise is , in answer to my catholick letters ; whereas he has given no answer at all ( to speak with the least ) to the fortieth part of them ; and , as for that small inconsiderable pittance he has attempted to reply to , it has been shewn you by detail , with what incredible weakness or worse , he has perform'd it . i intreat you also to reflect that the passages he has left unanswer'd , are not trivial or sleight ones ; but all of them , pertinent ; almost all of them , substantial ; and , by far the greater part , of vast import ; as coming up close to our main point , the absolute certainty of christian faith , ( that is , as to its having been taught by christ , ) by our respective principles . so that , in case they , and the reasons for them , be left standing in their full force , as they yet stand , his whole cause is utterly lost ; and himself convinc'd not only to be no good defender of christian faith , but withall no steady holder that his faith is truly christian , or derived from christ ; or , if he holds it to be such at all , it must be by enthusiasm , or fanatick inspiration , not upon truly rational or ( which is the same ) conclusive grounds . he will say perhaps he has touch't upon some of those particulars ; nay , now and then , made long discourses against diverse of my positions . but , all this he might have done tho' he had had never an adversary . to answer is to solve the arguments of another , not to find fault with his conclusions and make discourses on his own head ; a method which any judicious reader may observe runs thorough his whole book . whence i am not ty'd to reply to such impertinent and irregular prevarications ; but only to defend and stand by my reasons ; and 't is a courteous condescendence , not a right due to his carriage , that i have reply'd to them at all ; since my arguments , according to the laws of disputation , must be granted to stand firm 'till they be overthrown . yet , notwithstanding i was not oblig'd to humour his illogical proceedings , i do not know of any thing that is pertinent and of moment that i have over-past ; and i could have spoke it with more assuredness , had he quoted the pages in my letters all along as i did in him , especially when i cited him ; but he would not expose himself to that disadvantage , lest the reader should by that means be directed still to my discourses themselves ; and comparing them with what he had said to them , see how frigid , indirect . or utterly insignificant his pretended answers were . tho' i say i know of no such passage omitted , but what has been already reply'd to and forestall'd in my former letters , or in errour nonplust , yet , in case he still contends i have , let him single out those which he judges the strongest , or any page in this answer of his own which concerns the certainty of faith as we treat of it , that is of christ's doctrin as 't is knowable by us at this distance from his time , and i do promise him a very punctual reply to each particular passage , one by one . he would much oblige our readers and mee too , if instead of answering he will needs fall to arguing , he would please to pick out what 's most pertinent and weighty , and let each single point be debated apart . this would give a far clearer light to our readers : and for their sakes , if he will not do this himself , i shall ( as my leisure serves ) do it for him . in the mean time i am to demand of him publickly as my right , both a punctual reply to the long roll of these his important omissions , and also a defence of his trifling performances : and , in case he denies to give me and the world that satisfaction , since none who knows him can think he wants wit and parts to do it , if feisible , it must necessarily be concluded his cause wants truth . your well wishing friend and servant in christ , j. s. finis . advertisement . the five catholick letters are to be sold at mr matthew turners , bookseller at the lamb in high-holborn . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. tillotson 's rule of faith , p. , . pag. . dr. st's second letter , p. . there can be no necessity suppos'd of any infallible society of men , either to attest or explain these writings among christians . dr. st. principle . dr. st's copy . notes for div a -e * second letter , p. . notes for div a -e * p. . * dr. st 's first letter , p. . & second , p. . p. . p. . * p. . ibid. p. . * p. . p. . p. . p. . see reason against railery , p. . to p. . ibid. my first letter , p. . dr. st's second letter , p. . ibid. p. . dr. st's first letter , p. . p. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . p. dr. st's second letter , p. . p. . ibid. * see my first letter , p. . * p. . p. . my first letter , p. . p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . ibid. p. . * my first letter , p. . * p. . p. . * faith vindicated , p. , . p. . p. . * my first letter , p. . * p. . * p. . p. . * first letter , p. . my first letter p. . p. . p. . p. . * p. . * my first letter , p. . * p. . * p. , . * my first letter , p. . p. . tim. c. . , . p. . p. . * p. . . p. . p. . p. . ibid. * p. . p. . p. . * see above . sect. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . * dissuasive from popery , p . p. . * first letter , p. . l. , . p. . * ibid. notes for div a -e dr. st's first letter . p. . p. . * p. . * ibid. * p. . * see sect. , & . p. . see haeresis blacloana . p. . * p. . error non-plust , p. . ibid. p. . dr. st. second letter , p. . * ibid. p. . p. , r . * see above , sect. . & . p. . ibid. epist· ad martinum dorpium . p. . dr. st's first letter . p. . (a) epiphan . haer . . n. . (b) iren. lib. . (c) iren. lib. . cap. . (d) iren. lib. . cap. . hier. ad paul at eustoch . in proem . ep. ad philom . epip . haer . . p. . p. . ibid. ibid. p. . p. . p. . error non-plust , p. . * dr. st. second letter , p. . * see sect. ▪ * p. . * see the anwer to dr. st 's first letter , sect. . , . see mr. kidder's famous sermon preach'd at st. paul's cross , feb. . . * dr. st's first letter , p. . * dr. st. second letter , p. . * see first 〈◊〉 p. . * se faith vind . p. , , , . notes for div a -e * rule of faith. p. . §. . * ibid. * dr. st's . second letter , p. . * faith vindicated from possibility of falsehood . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. , . * p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . pag. . pag. . * dr. st's answer to the catholic letters , p. * dr. st's second letter , p. . see p. . p. , . &c. * p. . * ibid. * p. . * p. . * see above §. . note . * ibid. * pet. . . * p. . * p. . ibid. ibid. * p. . . * see my third catholick letter §. , & . * p. . * p. . * p. . ibid. p. . * see third catholic letter , p. . p. . * see errour non-plust , p. , . * lib. . gen. ad lit. imperfect . cap. . * de doct. christ. l. . c. . notes for div a -e * dr tillotson's rule of faith. p. . . p. . notes for div a -e p. . * clypeus septemplex & vindiciae . p. . * see error non-plust . * dr. burnet , dr. tillotson . and dr. stillingfleet . rom. . * aliquantulum obscura . * ob ●quivationem utriufque evidentiae . p. . * introduction to faith vindication . * faith vindicated . p. to the end. * from pa. . to the end. * error non-plust . p. . * ibid. p. . . * app. to the rule of faith. p. . notes for div a -e * clypeus septemplex & vindiciae . * see clypeus septemplex from . p. . to . * declaration p. . * faith vindicated introduction . p. . p. . p. . * introduction to faith vindicated . p. . . p. . * error non-plust . p. . p. . p. . * faith vindicated . object . . p. . p. . p. . p. . . * see §. . * see error non-plust . p. . * see my declaration and vindiciae . vindiciae j. s. p. . . * querimonia j. s. p. . and . ibid. p. . * see vindiciae j. s. p. . . . . * querim . p. . * app. seu quer. p. . . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . * app. seu quer. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. ibid. p. . p. . * third catho . letter . p. . l. . . ibid. p. . l. . . p. . p. . * see third cath. letter . p. . . * declaratio sergeantii . p. . * app. p. . ad p. . * declaratio sergeantis . p. . * a sovereign remedy against heresy and atheism . p. . see my declara . p . ibid. p. . . * haeres . blacloana . p. * declaration p. . * querim . p. . & declaratio . p. . * declaratio . p. . . * answer to a letter against mr. lowth , in defence of dr. st. p. . ibid. p. . * see answer to m. lowth's 〈◊〉 . p . * answer to a letter against mr. l. p. . ibid p. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. answer to mr. lowth . p. . * postscript to an answer to a letter against mr lowth . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . . p. . . p. . * see the answer to a letter written against mr. lowth . p. . answer to a let. against mr lowth . p. . . . notes for div a -e p. . p. . l. . ult . & p. . l. . . * first cath. letter . p. . third cath. letter . p. . . . . p. . p. . ibid. ibid. p. . ibid. p. . p. . p. . ibid. * answer to mr. lowth . p. . p. . p. . * second letter to mr. g. p. . p . p. . p. . p. . . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . * rule of faith. p. . p. . p. . * rule of faith. p. . p. . p. . l. . & . ibid. notes for div a -e p. . . &c. p. . p. . . p. . p. . p. . p. . fourth cath. letter . p. . . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . * answer to a letter against mr. lowth . p. . * answer to mr. lowth's letter to dr. st. p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . ibid. l. . . p. . * third cath. letter , p. . . . * third cath. letter . from p. ▪ to p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . p. . ibid. p. . . * from p. . to p. . and fr. p. . to p. . * discourse fifth . p. . p. . p. . . p. . p. . . p. . . p. . p. . . p. . ibid. * see it confest by the reflecter , p. . p. . p. . * answer to a letter against mr. l. p. . p. . l. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . l. ▪ p. . ibid. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . ibid. * third catho . letter . p. . * from p. . to p. . p. . * dr st's second letter to mr g. p. . * third catho ▪ letter . p. . * augustin . tract . . in joan. * answer to a letter against mr. l. p. . ▪ ibid. p. . p. . * dr st's second letter to mr. g. p. . * aug. lib. . contra cres. con . cap. . p. . . p. . . rule of 〈◊〉 . p. . . p. ● . * third cath. letter from p. . to p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . . * rule of faith. p. . p ▪ . * third cath. letter p. . . . * bellarm. de verbo dei. lib. . . * answer to mr lowth's letter . p. . * third cath. letter p. . p. . * p . l. . p. . l. . * p. . l. . * p. . l. . p. . l. . ibid. p. . * third cath. letter p. . . . p. . p. . p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . l. . . . p. p. . * dr st's sermon at guild-hall . p. . . * aug. in epist. fund . * third cath. letter p. . . ● ▪ * rule of faith. p. . & p. . p. . p. . p. . . p. . * first cath. letter . p. . . * second letter to mr g. p. . p. . third cath. letter . p. . p. . p. . * dr st's second letter to mr g. p. . . p. . p. . p. . notes for div a -e p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . * third cath. letter p. . . . . p. . p. ● ▪ p. . * see above §. . & . * third cath. letter p. . . . p. . . p. . * third cath. letter . from p. , to p. . p. . p. . ibid. ibid ▪ p. . * dr st's second letter to mr g. p. . notes for div a -e first catho . letter . p. . p. . . p. . . p. . ibid. p. . . p. . . . . , . & p. . . . p. . p. . . p. . p. . ▪ p. . . . . p. . . p. p. . * third cath. letter ▪ from p. . . p. . . . . . p. . . p. . p. . . . p. . . . p. . . . p. . . . . . * see third cath. letter p. . p. . p. . p. . . p. . p. . . p. . . p. . . p. . p. . . p. . . . . p. . . . . p. . . . p. . . p. . p. . . . p. . . . . p. . p. . p. . . * see above §. p. . p. . p. . . . . . p. . . . . . . p. . . . . p. . p. . p. . p. . . . p. . . p. . . p. . . p. . p. . . . p. . ▪ p. . . p. . . p. . . . . p. . . . . . p. . the jesuits gospel according to saint ignatius loiola wherein their impious doctrines against the christian faith, their pernitious maxims against christian princes, and their unjust practices destructive to all humane society, contrary to the sacred scriptures, the laws of god, and right reason are declared. approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing j a wing s _cancelled estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : , : ) the jesuits gospel according to saint ignatius loiola wherein their impious doctrines against the christian faith, their pernitious maxims against christian princes, and their unjust practices destructive to all humane society, contrary to the sacred scriptures, the laws of god, and right reason are declared. sergeant, john, - . [ ], p. printed for norman nelson ..., london : mdclxxix [ ] sometimes attributed to john sergeant--cf. nuc pre- imprints. item at reel : identified as wing s (number cancelled). reproduction of originals in the harvard university library and huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng ignatius, -- of loyola, saint, - . jesuits -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the jesuits gospel , according to saint ignatius loiola wherein their impious doctrines against the christian faith , their pernitious maxims against christian princes , and their unjust practices destructive to all humane society , contrary to the sacred scriptures , the laws of god , and right reason , are declared . veni gladium mittere non pacem : sicut serpentes . london , printed for norman nelson , at grays-inn gate in holbourn . mdc lxxix . the jesuits gospel , acccording to saint ignatius loiola . chap. i. of the pope . . the bishop of rome is god. dist. . ca. satis evidenter . . the pope is no man. lib. . sext. de electione tit . . c. fundament . in gloss . . the pope is neither god nor man. in. prolog . clement in glossatore . . it 's lawful for no man to imagin or practise to transgress the precepts of apostolical see. dist. . c. nulli dist. . . . an heretick is he who is not obedient to the pope's decrees . ibidem . . the pope is lord of all temporalties upon earth . lib. . sext. tit . . c. bericuloso . . no man ought to say unto the pope , why dost thou thus , or thus ? decret . lib. . c. . gloss . . no mortal man may sit in judgment upon the pope . dist. . c. si papa . c. non omnes . gloss . . it 's lawful for no creature to call into question the judgment of the apostolical see , or delay the sentence thereof . caus. . q. . c. memini . . the pope may dispense against the apostles . dist. . col. in gloss . dist. . c. presbyter in gloss . caus. . q. . c. authoritatem in gloss . . the pope hath celestial arbitriment , lib. . decret . greg. c. . . the pope's will is a law. ibidem . . the pope may cause an unjust decree to be received for just . ibid. . all nations and kingdoms are under the pope's jurisdiction . ext. com. tit . . super gentes . . god hath delivered over unto the pope the power and rule of heaven and earth . ext. jo. . tit . . dist . . c. omnes . . the whole world is the pope's right and inheritance ; therefore if emperours or kings have at any time given any privileges or lands , to any pope , ( as they say constantine did to sylvester ) they did not give that which was their own to give ; but only restore that which was formerly taken from them by tyranny and injustice . aug. de anconade potestate ecclesiasticâ , part . . q. . ar . . . the pope is above all principalities and power , and every name that is named , not only in this world , but in that which is to come : and that he is the sun and light of the world. b. . de roman pontific . ca. . p. , , , . eph. . . . the pope hath an almighty infallibility , and cannot err . sanch. suarez . g. valentia . chap. ii. of the papal grandeur , or greatness . . when the emperour goeth to be crowned by the pope , he , as soon as he espyeth his holiness , is to kneel and worship him bare-headed , then to approach nearer and kiss his feet ; and the same is to be done by the empress when she is crowned : sacrarum ceremoniarum , lib. . fo . . edit . rom. . when the emperour is crowned at the publique procession before the people , he is to go to the pope's house , and then to hold the stirrup till his holiness mounts on horseback ; and then like a lacquey must he hold the pope's rosinant some wayes by the reins . ibidem , fo . , . . this piece of service must the emperour , king or chief potentate perform when the pope is chosen , in his procession to the lateran church . ibidem . . if there be two kings present , then the pope doth command the one of them on his right side , the other on his left must lead his palfray along by the bridle . ibid. . and therefore when frederick barbarossa held the left stirrup of his holiness as he alighted from his horse , his holiness pope adrian the fourth took great displeasure , because he held the left stirrup of his saddle and not the right ; which if he had intended to have honoured us , he would have held the right , which ought to have been holden . funcii chronicon . bar. de vita pontific . . the best lay-man though he be emperour or king , must carry water for the pope to wash his hands in , and must carry up the first dish of meat to his table . ibidem , fo . . . if the pope will not ride on horseback , but be carried in a chair , then four of the greatest princes , yea though the emperour be one of them , must put their shoulders to the said chair , and so carry him some space : ibidem , lib. . fo . . by this all the emperours , kings and princes of the earth must learn to obey , fear and reverence him . . when his holiness is elected and carried to the lateran , he takes up as much money as he can in his hand , and throws it amongst the people , saying , silver and gold have i none , but such as i have , give i thee . ibid. fo . . act. . . we must bow at the name of the virgin mary , and of the pope , as well as at the name of jesus . par. crassus de ceremoniis card. & episc. lib. . c. . . whosoever obeyeth not the command of the pope , shall die the death . ribadeniera , lib. . de principe , c. . p. . . the cross hath precedence before the eagles or ensigns of the empire ; the sword of peter before that of constantine ; and the apostolick seat judgeth , and is above the imperial power . baronius in paraen . p. . . that the pope cannot be judged by any person ; for it 's written , that the spiritual person judgeth all things , but he himself is not judged , cor. c. . . all the princes of the earth must do honour and reverence to the pope as a great god. blondus lib. . rom. instaurat , . an appeal can be made from the council to the pope . johannes de sylva de beneficiis , part . p. . n. . t. . part . fo . . . no appeal can be made from the pope to the council . jacobatius de concil . ar . . n. . t. . part . . fo . . . . fo . . chap. iii. of the power of the pope . . the pope can do all things that god himself can do , only sin excepted . jacob. de griffiis decis . aureae . part . . c. . . the pope hath no limits or bounds in the whole world , but those which it self had . jacob. fuligattus vitâ card. bellarm. lib. . c . . he hath power of making sin more sin ; and that which is no sin , to be sin . bellar. contra barclasum , c. . . the pope can give empires and kingdoms to whom he pleaseth , and depose the possessors of them . jul. ferrettus de re & discip . militari , p. . celsus mancinus de juribus principum , lib. . c. . p. . greg. de valentia , to. . disp . . . . punct . . col . . . . the pope may depose kings by his power , if they be either negligent in the administration of their government , or do not extirpate all hereticks out of their dominions . hostien . sum. lib. . tit . de haeretic . . quae poena . s. . johannes de tuzz . cremala sum . de eccles . c. . propos . . panormitanus , lib. . decret . de haeretic . c. . . if a king turns heretick , he hath no right to his kingdom , and so no man ought to think it strange if the pope depose him . dom. à soto . in . sentent . dist . . q. . a. . n . alphons . à castro de justa hereticorum punitione . lib. . c. . col . . . . . if kings will not be obedient to the church , then may the pope by his great power from heaven very justly turn them from all their royalties and government ; and the subjects themselves , if the pope bid them , must take up arms against them . gre. nunnius coronel . de vera christi eccles. lib. . p. . . the pope can quit subjects from the obedience and allegiance which they owe to their kings . joh. maria bellettus disq . clerical . part . . p. . p. . panormitan . in decret . de haereticis . c. . . if the king doth tyrannize , and doth not execute his office duly , or when there is any other just cause for so doing , then the people may dethrone him , and elect another . em. sa. aphoris . . principis . . . molina de just . tom . . tract . . disp . col . , . jacob. simonica de cathol . inst. . . § . . . the pope may make an ordinance contrary to the epistle of st. paul. char. ruinus cons. . n. . vol. . . the power of the pope is greater than that of the apostles , having power to derogate from the sayings and words of the apostle . the decis . of the rota at rome . decis . . n. . antonius maria in addit . ad decis . novas , n. . . the doctrine of the pope is the infallible rule of faith , and the holy scripture hath taken its force , and doth take it from his holiness ; and he that doth not believe this is an heretick . silvester prieras in epitom . resp . ad luther . c. . to. . . the pope is he by whom kings reign , according to that which is said , by me kings reign . fr. bosius de temporal . eccles. monarchia . lib. . ca. . . and therefore henry the fourth emperour , being excommunicated by pope gregory the th , he puts off his royal and imperial habiliments with his wife and young son bare-footed and clothed in canvas ( being made a spectacle to angels and men to admire at ) in a most bitter winter , and most dangerous kind of travel , cometh to canasium , where the pope then resided ; fasting and suiter like from morning till evening he danceth attendance ; for three dayes he patiently endureth this lamentable affliction , being often told his holiness was not at leisure to attend his suit , and denyed admittance ; but after great importunities and solicitations , and giving oath and security for his good behaviour for the future , he is absolved . nauclerus , p. . urspergensis , platina in vita grego . . by this the power and supremacy of the pope is to be seen over emperours and kings . . the pope may do , what god doth . decret . de major . et obedient . c. solicit . . chap. iv. religion , prayer , faith , charity . it 's in the precept of prayer , as in that of faith , hope , and charity , there is no certain time wherein this precept obligeth directly ; but only indirectly , to wit , when its necessary to acquire some good , or to remove some evil . he that prayes not to god in a temptation against chastity , sins only against chastity ; for he sins not in omitting prayer , but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity . tamber . decal . c. . sect . . n. . so that we are not at any time obliged directly to pray unto god any more than to love him , believe , or trust in him ; but indirectly , and as it were by accident , when we have need , as in a temptation , or the like . . in our private prayers which we make to god , it 's not necessary to use any attention ; nor are we obliged to attend : for this obligation goes no further than to venial sin ; and those prayers which are made by command , in that case none is obliged upon pain of mortal sin , to an inward attention in saying his office , provided he rehearse it outwardly and entirely . fliut . mor. q. q. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . . whatsoever distraction or evil thoughts there are in the mind of man in prayer , and when he rehearses the divine office , though it be voluntary , if it comes of negligence and not of contempt , it 's but a venial sin : when it comes from a formal and deliberate contempt , yet we fail not in satisfying the church , and discharging our duty . escobar . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . for it 's not necessary to satisfie the command of the church , to have any inward attention ; but it 's sufficient to give some outward respect , and behave ones self decently . coninck . part q . art . . . n. . n. . p. . the outward act of prayer , which is done with the outward circumstances which it ought to have , is a true exterior action of the virtue of religion , though it be done with voluntary distraction , which is it self a sin . coninck , ibidem . for the outward adoration which is rendred to an idol , is a true and outward act of adoration , and of idolatry ; though he who makes this adoration outwardly , hath no intention to adore the idol . bauny in his sum. ch . . p. . so we must believe that they pray who recite the office , though without intention , yet not without exterior decency and composure such as the action requires . bauny . ibidem . . christ commands us to receive baptism , a tyrant forbids us to receive it , upon pain of our lives ; we are obliged not to receive it . escob . lib. . theol. mor. sect . . . problem . . . in receiving the sacrament of the lord's supper , it 's not necessary to have actual devotion ; for he who is voluntarily distracted in the receiving the sacrament , provided he contemns it not , puts no obstacle to the effect of the communion , because he sins not mortally . fillut. tom. . mor. q q. tr . . chap. . n. , . p. . . if actual sin be committed in the very communion it self , it hinders not at all from the receiving the grace of the communion ; because this sin makes not the person unworthy of the participation of the body and blood of jesus christ ; for there is nothing but mortal sin that is capable of causing this unworthiness . fillut. ibidem . . he who hath sinned mortally , and hath remorse for his sins , and hath confessed them , may absolutely communicate , though the very night before , or even a little before the communion , he hath sinned mortally . filut. tr . . c. . n. . . if a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad state , cometh to be converted , he shall receive in an instant all the graces which were due to so many communions , though they were received in an unworthy manner . mascarenhas . tr . . de sacr. in gen . disp . . c. . n. . from this admirable doctrine it followeth , that a man may become most holy in an instant , and will surpass in holiness , many of those who have lived in innocency , when he was plunged in sin ; and the greater and more sins he hath committed , the more holy he is . . it 's not necessary that the priest who finds himself guilty of mortal sin , should confess himself before he administers the sacrament . discast . tr . . de sacr. d. . d. . n. . . the priest may administer the sacrament to one who sinneth publickly , provided that he doth not receive it publickly through contempt of the sacrament or of religion , but for some other end ; and that he threaten the priest with death or loss of reputation , or to do some great wrong to him in his goods ; and this is rather to permit sin in another for some just cause , than to co-operate therewith . escob . lib. . theol. mor. c. . . in extream necessity we are obliged to do alms of such things as are not necessary unto life , though they be needful to support us in our condition . escob . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . by extream necessity , we must understand that on which the life of man depends ; so that if he be not assisted , he will surely dye : in this case we are obliged to give that which is superfluous . . a person who hath abundance , after he hath satisfied all his own necessaries , and those of his own family , having yet a superfluity , is not obliged in a public famine to give unto the poor , nor to any one whomsoever , if he see him not in eminent danger to die with famine . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . we are not obliged to assist or give alms unto the poor with any notable diminution of our wealth , honour or life . tolet. lib. . inst. sacerd. c. . n. . p. . . we may fulfill the precept of alms , by lending only , without giving any thing . tolet. lib. . c. . n. . p. . and that unless in extream necessity , ( in evident danger of death ) alms are not commanded under mortal sin . ibid. and in that case we are not obliged any further to provide for them , if we have not wealth to spare , and riches which are superfluous ; which very few persons believe they have , because covetousness and ambition make all men in a manner necessitous : so that it 's clear by the doctrine of these doctors , the rich are not obliged to give alms , but out of their superfluity ; and not then , but in case of great necessity . those things which may exalt us unto a better condition , as honour , preferment or places , are not to be accounted superfluous . granad . . controver . . d. . lib. . n. . so that rarely it happens that we can have superfluous goods ; and so by consequence we must rarely give alms . tamb : lib . decal . c. . sect . . n. . . amongst christians there are few who are damned for failing to exercise the works of corporal mercy , none being obliged thereunto under mortal sin , unless in the utmost and greatest necessity of his neighbour , which happens very rarely , so as to impose any great obligation on any particular person . less . lib. . de perfect . divin . v. . n. . and though we are not to give alms , but in the greatest necessity , yet when that happens , no person is particularly obliged to provide against it ; because the obligation is to assist our neighbour in general to all those who have means to do it , but none in particular ; so that a poor man may die of hunger in the view of many persons who may and ought to assist him , while they expect and attend one another , none being bound in particular to satisfie an obligation which is in common to them all . . it 's certain , there is no obligation to love our neighbour by any intern al act of the will , expresly terminated in him ; whence it is , if you hate him not , and for his sake observe the outward works of good will , you love him sufficiently . suarez . c. . d. . lib. . n. . filut. tom. . mor. q. q. tr . . c. . n. . p. . of parables , which is the most frequent manner of christ's discourse , he applyes but one for the recommendation of the love of our neighbour , in the person of the distressed poor man abused by thieves betwixt jericho and jerusalem . sermond . tr . . p. . it 's no mortal sin to have such a hatred against our neighbour , as not to be willing to keep company with him , to have such and so violent an aversion from him , as upon no terms or occasion to be willing to speak with him , nor help him in his business , nor at all to forgive him , when he acknowledgeth his fault , and offers satisfaction . bauny's sum. p. . . there is no absolute commandment to love god , because every command carries some threatning with it to keep them in their duty to whom it is made , and then some penalty or punishment against those who violate it ; now the commandment which god gave us to love him , contains neither threat nor punishment , and so by consequence it 's no commandment truly so called . sermond in his defence of virtue , tr. . p. . god commanding us to love him , contents himself that we should obey him in his other commandments : for god hath not obliged us absolutely to testifie our affections to him , otherwise than by yielding obedience to him . ibid. p. . and god hath not commanded us so much to love , as not to hate him . ibid. p. . and all those which in scripture are vulgarly called commands to love god , they are advices and counsels , but not commands . ibidem , p. , . god ought to be content that we love him a little as we please , because to love him more , and to a certain degree , is only an advice ; it sufficeth that we love him much under what we could , if we would ; because the least degree of love , is enough for him , and to satisfie the commandment . amic . tom. . d. . sect . . n. , , . whereas it 's said we must love god above all things ; we must not extend these words ( all things ) to the rigour in its utmost extent , and according to its natural sence , so as it comprehend under it all creatures , but that we must understand ( by all things ) only those which are evil , contrary to god , and which destroy the friendship we have with him by grace ; ( that is to say ) mortal sin only . amic . tom. . disp . . sect . . n. . and if we be obliged to love god , we are not obliged to love him above three or four moments in our life , whereof the first is when we begin to have the use of reason ; secondly , at the point of death . thirdly , every fifth year during life . filut. tom. . mor. qq . tr . . c. . n. , . p. . the rest of our time we may love god or the world as we please . . if a man hath committed any mortal sin , he is not obliged to contrition and sorrow for the sin before the article of his death . filut. tom. . qq . mor. tr . . c. . n. , , . so that ( according to this doctrine ) who is in mortal sin , may with a safe conscience persist voluntarily all his life in a state of enmity and aversion to god , and delay his conversion until the point of death , demanding only forgiveness of god , when he is ready to die and can offend him no longer . . if a man being at the point of death , endeavours to do what he can , and having in his mind only an act of attrition present , he saith unto god these words , lord have mercy on me , with design to pacifie him , he shall be justified , god himself supplying the want of absolution . escob . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . . faith and charity are not such supernatural graces and vertues as the world takes them to be ; for a man may be a martyr and merit the crown of martyrdom , not only without any act of charity , but also without any act of faith ; and though he suffers without love to god , and though he never thinks of him , it 's sufficient that he be killed out of hatred to the faith , though he have not so much as a thought of confessing it ; as it happens in a suddain eruption of barbarians , one is killed in his sleep through hatred of faith. connick . par . q. . de baptis . a. . n. . p. . celot . lib. . c. . p. . . it matters not , if death had been proposed to this man , the fear it would have brought on him , would possibly have forced him to forget god ; yet because this conditional supposition produces no real thing in the man , it cannot hurt him . connick . par . q. . de baptis . p. . so then to be a martyr , it 's not at all necessary to have so much as a conditional will to die for god , if occasions were presented , that the contrary disposition , rather to forsake god than lose his life on this occasion , cannot hurt him ; and by consequence it 's not bad , nor hinders a man from being in a state to receive a crown of martyrdom , if he die without ever thinking of it in this disposition by the hand of a tyrant . . he who outwardly recites the office of the church , doth perform the duty of prayer , though he doth it without any inward intention or devotion , so as the outward appearance and precept be observed , which such an action requires ; for the outward action wherewith we attend on god , is of the same nature , and appertains to the virtue of religion . bauny in his sum . c. . p. . and the duty of prayer is satisfied though there be no intention . escob . tr . . exam . . c. . n. . p. . for he that doth in substance , that is to say , outwardly , that which is commanded , satisfies truly the commandment of the church , though he hath no will to accomplish it , but rather the contrary . layman . lib. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . the blessed virgin is more easie intreated than jesus christ , therefore her protection is more assisting and helpful to us . fr. de mendoza virid . lib. . probl . . . there is as great efficacy , as to salvation , in the virgin mary's milk , as in our saviour's blood. andr. rivet . apol. lib. . c. . p. . idem , lib. . c. . p. . idem , jesuita vapul . c. , . p. , , . . a man may be saved without ever loving god in all his life . let. provinc . . p. . . it 's lawful to consult a conjurer . addit . myster . jesuit . p. . and that an expert conjurer in diabolical arts is well worthy a reward . let. provinci . p. . and a fortune-teller is not obliged to restitution , if he hath consulted the devil . addit . p. . § . . chap. v. of sin. . he that from the impression of an inveterate custom , as it were dy a sort of impetuous necessity , is transported to do evil , as to speak words of blasphemy , sins not at all ; because a man cannot sin without rational knowledg and deliberation . layman , lib. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . an evil custom takes away the use of reason , and so by consequence it doth not augment but diminish sin ▪ nay , sometimes it takes it away ; so that man who hath these evil habits , is in a better condition than he that hath them not : and by often sinning , is put into a condition or state of not sinning any more . . perjury , which one commits through natural inadvertency , or because of the custom he hath to swear , is no mortal sin , though he who doth it , hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit . filut. mor. tom. tr . . c. . n. . p. . by this admirable doctrine , although a man perjure himself , he having not a full knowledg , or transported with some violent habit , it 's no mortal sin in him . . if a man customarily curse his horse , dogs , hawks , or other creatures , which are without reason , setting aside choler by which he suffers himself to be transported , it 's no sin at all ; because this evil custom is become natural , and makes him do it without any passion , and even so as he perceives it not , therefore he commits no sin , in the most strange curses and execrations . bauny's sum . c. . p. . c. . p. . . those who in their youth , have committed many actions of a vitious nature , which they did not believe to be such , are not obliged to confess one word of them , when they know and understand their nature . bauny in his sum . c. . p. , . because when they were committed , they had not the full use of reason , and knowledg , and at most they were but venial sins , if any sin at all . . if any one shoots an arrow by which he hits his enemy , supposing invincibly that it was a beast , he is altogether innocent of this man's slaughter , though he was in such a disposition , that if he had known that it had been his enemy , he would have killed him with more joy . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . the pleasure which is taken in an action of mortal sin , which is done in sleep , drunkenness , madness or through ignorance , is no sin . filut. mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . ignorance is a great asylum for innocency , for it doth not only protect men from the greatest sins , but it giveth them liberty and power to rejoyce and take pleasure in them as good actions , when one comes to know them or call them to remembrance . . he who knows that it is a mortal sin to commit an action , but knows not that it is a sin to command another to commit it , through invincible ignorance , is excused from sin in doing it . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . therefore if a peasant should hear it spoken by a man reputed to be pious and knowing , that it was a sin to steal , and commit fornication outwardly , but that it was lawful to desire the one or the other , in this case the interior act is exempt from all sin , because of invincible ignorance . ibidem . . to sin mortally , it 's not enough to see the evil that is done , and the danger incurred in doing , but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledg , and besides this , both time and means to deliberate on it ; therefore such actions which are committed out of ignorance , evil habits , or passion , are not mortal sins ; it 's not enough to commit a mortal sin , to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done , but this consideration and deliberation must be full . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . therefore when there occur in one and the same action two sorts of different wickedness , it 's not sufficient to perceive one , to make him guilty of both , but we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledg of the other ; therefore when a man lyes with a woman whom he knowes to be not his wife , but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman , he is guilty of fornication , but not of incest . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. , . amic . tom. . d. . s. . n. . p. . escob . tr . . exam. . c. . n. . p. . . he who doth some unlawful act , knowing well that it 's forbidden , but not remembring it to be such when he doth it , is exempt from mortal sin ; because forgetfulness or negligence which is the cause we think not of it , the evil we are about to do , is not imputed for sin , if it be not voluntary : and it 's not voluntary , if we bethink us not to consider that we are obliged to examin what we are about to do . layman . lib. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . to sin , it 's not sufficient to do the evil that is forbidden , or not to do that which is commanded by the law of god , nature or the church ; but it 's necessary to have a knowledg of the evil that we do , and an intention to do it : by this rule we are free from the greatest sins , so we have a good intention in committing of them , or that we have no evil intention : we may wish evil or death to our neighbour , without sin , when we are induced thereunto by some good motive , as that he is given to suing ; or that he is a person of good reputation for his well living , and therefore doth eclipse our credit . bauny's sum . c. . p. . . he who doth maintain an heretical proposition without believing it , or who shall be a communicant or auditor amongst protestants without having his heart there , but out of pure derision , or to comply with the times , and to accomplish his designs , he ought not to be esteemed a protestant therefore ; be cause his understanding is not infected with their errors . bonacina . d. . q. . n. . . he who hath knowledg of the law , and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it , doth not incur the penalty which he is to undergo if he obey not . tambur . decal . lib. . c. . sect . . n. . . god cannot command or forbid a matter that is in it self slight under the penalty of mortal sin . em. sa. verb. praecept . n. . p. . amit . tom. . a. . de lege humana . s. . n. . p. . . he that hath a will to commit all venial sins if he were able , sins only venially . escob . tr . . exam . . c. . n. . p. . . to make an action evil and unlawful , is required first to make it appear , that the reasons which prove the malice of the action be demonstrative ; that is , that they be such as whereunto no probable answer can be given . secondly , that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawful , be not so much as probable . thirdly , that the opinions which maintain that this action is good , hath not sufficient authority to be held probable ; all these must be observed , otherwise the action is not evil . caram . fund . p. . . to tell a lye in preaching on any doctrinal point , is but a venial sin . escobar . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . to perform the most sacred actions , as to administer the sacraments , or to receive them , or to celebrate the mass for vain-glory , is but a venial sin , though vain-glory be proposed as the principal end . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . when a slight thing is commanded , the commandment obliges not unto mortal sin , although that be the intention of him who commands . em. sa . verb. praecept . n. . p. . . the greatness of the sin ought to be estimated from , and according to its matter and subject . escobar . sanch. . no person is obliged to avoid the next occasion of sin , when thereby some great loss will befall him ; in this case it cannot be said that he wills this occasion , but permits it only ; because that he withdraws not from this occasion , is not that he would absolutely abide in it , but because he would decline the damage which this withdrawing would bring on him . sanch. in select . disp . . n. . for this reason a man is not obliged to put away his concubine , if her company be very advantagious to him , and in departing with her he lose any great benefit . . a thing is not the next occasion of sin , unless it be vitious and a sin of it self . bauny's theol. mor. par . . lib. . de poenit . q. . p. . . to sell a woman paint , which he knowes she will use to draw young men to unchast love , it 's lawful ; otherwise he would lose a customer , and suffer loss and damage : so to build the temple of an idol , or to sell an idol it self , or to sell an infidel a lamb , which he knew he would use in sacrifice to an idol , is no sin . tamb. lib. . decal . c. . s. . n. , , , . . all the breaches of the first and second table of the decalogue are no sins at all , when they are committed by any out of ignorance , surprise or passion . myst. of jesuit . add . p. . london . . . it 's no sin to contract a marriage by personation , as if it were in a play upon the stage , by using equivocal expressions in the church , when one is forced thereunto by great fear . add. myst. of jesuitism , p. . § . . so that you may learn how comfortable and holy these sacred doctrines of the jesuits are , and how far their gospel doth exceed that of jesus christ ; for he hath made the way to heaven so narrow , and the gate so streight , that few can enter in : whereas by the indulgence of these holy fathers the way to heaven is made so broad , that the people may safely go thither without jostling one another , and may with less pains go to heaven than to hell ; and indeed let men do what they will , they cannot ( according to their pious doctrines ) go to hell ; for none go thither but for mortal sins : and how difficult a thing it is to sin mortally , you may observe by what hath been delivered unto you ; and in case they go to hell , these great and learned doctors have a holy knack , and mysterious exorcism to fetch them out . chap. vi. of directing the intention of good and bad intentions . . to do evil , there must be an evil intention ; but to do good , it 's not necessary to have a good intention . the commands of god and the church may be satisfied by an outward execution of what they ordain , though it be done without intention to fulfil them , or with an evil intent ; and contrary to the commandment , and even with an express intention not to fulfil it , and on the contrary , to render a man guilty of having violated the commands of god , and the church , it 's not sufficient to violate them , but it 's required to have thereof a formed design and express intention . . ecclesiasticks satisfie the precept of the church in saying prayers , when they sing or read them , though they do it without any inward intention or devotion ; provided they observe outward modesty and decency : nay the precept is satisfied , though the intention be express and formal not to satisfie it . bauny's sum . ch . . p. . escob . tr . . exam . . c. . n. . p. . so that the outward appearance is more necessary to prayer , and to the actions of religion , then the inward motions of piety ; because they can subsist without this inward motion , but not without external shew : and we may perform the duty of prayer , though we have a formal design not to obey the church , and to despise its commandement . if a man fast for vain-glory , or to content his sensuality in eating and drinking wine ; and so act contrary to the intent of the church , yet he doth not violate her commands ; for he that doth in substance , that is to say , outwardly , that which is commanded , satisfies truly the commandement , though he hath no will to accomplish it , but rather contrary . laym . lib. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . if a man hears a sermon , or be present at the divine office of the church , a bad intent thereunto joyned , as an intent of looking on a woman dishonestly , is not contrary to the commandements of the church , neither doth he therein sin , but fulfil the precept of hearing prayers . fillut. mor. qq . tom. . tr . . c. . n. , . p. . . if a man speak never so dishonourably and irreverently of god , it 's no blasphemy , if he had not a formal intent to blaspheme god and dishonour him . bauny's sum . c. . p. . bonacina . d. . q. . p. . n. . . no man is responsible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action , except he formerly intend and procure them ; therefore though a woman knowes that a man loves her dishonestly , she sins not , how often soever she presents her self before him , and in his view , so as she hath not an intent to stir up the dishonest love which he hath towards her . fillut. to. . tr . . c. . n. . because he that loves her dishonestly , doth rather take this occasion of offence from his own malice , then she gives it him by the use of her own right and liberty . . if a man be to do an act , and makes protestation that his intention is not to do any evil ; let the act be never so wicked , it 's no sin in him . bauny's sum . c. . p. . therefore to kill an heretick , if your intention be to propagate the roman catholique faith it 's no sin ; and an usurer who giveth his money to interest to make profit thereof , may deliver himself from usury and restitution , with protestation that it 's not in his intention to make any usurious contract , but to lend it him for his good , and that he would do nothing therein against god and his conscience . bauny . ibidem . . a mother which desires the death of her daughters for want of beauty or portions , because she cannot make them according to her desire , or because perhaps by occasion of them , she is ill treated by her husband ; this good intention of the mother is sufficient to excuse the mother from all sin , who desires the death of the daughters . bonacina . d. . q. . n. . . if a servant by the command of his master goes and tells a woman with whom he knowes his master intends to commit adultery , that his master will be found at home such an hour ; or if by the command of his master he followes a damosel to see and enquire where she lodges , if by his command he doth not only open the door , but shew her where his master is , if he aid his master to get up by the window to enter the house where he is to commit the sin , the servant by directing his intention , may free himself of any such or the like sin ; by intending that he did it for some good end , as for the just reward which he expected , or for fear of the loss of his master's favour , or some other damage : and protesting that he is not pleased with this sin of his master . tamb. lib. . decal . c. . sect . . n. . . you may desire the death of an enemy who might do you much hurt , not of hatred to him , but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you ; you may also rejoyce in his death , because of the good which you receive thereby . em. sa. verb. charitat . n. . p. . and all this may be done without sin , by that excellent science of directing the intention . . to lye with a woman ( by the rule of directing the intention ) whom he representeth to himself as under a condition , and as if he were married to her , is a thing which is not ill , and which on the contrary is good . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . fillut. mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . it 's lawful for persons of all qualities , conditions and sexes , to go to the the stewes or places of common prostitution , ( intending to convert women ) though it be very probable ( as frequently before ) they will there commit sins themselves . myst. of jesuitism . p. , . . if any man hath done me an injury or wrong , i may pursue him , not with an intention to be revenged of him , or to render evil for evil , but out of an intention to preserve my honour . reginaldus in praxi . lib. . n. . p. . there is no more to be done , than to divert the intention from the desire of revenge , which is sinful , to incline it to a desire of maintaining our honour , which is allowable ; and by this means you may acquit your self of all obligation both towards god , and towards man , for you satisfie the world by permitting the action , and satisfy the gospel by purifying the intention . . a man may accept of a challenge and fight a duel in maintenance of his honour ; and come to the place appointed , not with an express intention to fight the duel , but only with that of defending himself , if he , by whom he was challenged , comes unjustly to set upon him ; for what hurt can there be for a man to go into the field to walk there , in expectation of another , and to defend himself if any one sets upon him ? it's no sin at all ; for when the intention is directed to other circumstances , the challenge is not at all accepted ; for the acceptation of a challenge consists in the express intention of fighting , which such a man hath not . provincial letter . . . in the indies in china , they allow their proselyte christians to commit idolatry by this craft , viz. that of enjoyning them , to hide under their cloaths an image of jesus christ , to which they teach them by a mental reservation to direct those publick adorations , which they render the idol . cachins . choan . succum . myster . of jesuit . lib. . p. , . chap. vii . of adultery , fornication . . virgins have power to dispose of their virginity without the consent of parents ; for when that is done with the consent of the maid , though the father hath just cause to be troubled at it , yet neither she , nor the person to whom she hath prostituted her self , hath done him any injury , nor as to what concerns him , violated any law ; for the maid is in possession of her virginity as well as of her body , she may dispose of it , as she pleaseth , and to whom she pleaseth , death or mutilation of member only excepted . bauny's sum. p. . . it 's no sin to let a house to a whore , though he knows she will abuse his house to sin ; because he let his house to lodg in , and not to prostitute her self therein . molina de inst. & jur. to. . tr . . disp . . p. . gre. valentia . tom. . d. . q. . escob . tr . . exam. . c. . n. . , . p. . . to lye with a married woman is not adultery , if the husband doth consent thereunto . addit . to the myst. of jesuit . p. . § . . . if a woman presents her self to the view of a man whom she knows to love her dishonestly , doth not commit any mortal sin , because she is not obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a dore or a window , or to walk forth into the town . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. p. . . to lye with a woman considered as ones wife , is no sin ; for the pleasure that the will takes in a thing which is represented to it as good , is no mortal sin . escob . tr . . exam. . c. . n. . therefore the will may without mortal sin , not only desire this action , considered in this manner , but may regard it simply with pleasure . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . filut. mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . an ecclesiastick is not faulty who procures an abortion , if he doubts whether the fruit of the womb were quick . myst. jesuitis . addit . p. . § . . . that which one receiveth for being a pander to a debauched person , or for committing of fornication , he is not bound to any restitution , but may conscionably be detained , if the fact be already done . filut. mor. . tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . . if a drunken or mad-man lyeth with a woman , it is no mortal sin , because there was no use of reason , and the action without liberty , and therefore indifferent as the coupling of beasts . filut. mor. tr . . c. . n. . p. . . if a peasant hath heard it said by a man that is in reputation for a knowing or honest man , that fornication is sin , but the desire of it is lawful ; this interior act of concupiscence is exempt from sin , because the opinion was probable . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . p. . . there may be a dispensation granted for fornication , because it 's not evident that it 's forbidden by the law of nature ; and it 's probable that it is only by the positive law. tamb. lib. . decal . c. . s. . n. . and so it may be made lawful when authority shall think it convenient to take away the prohibition , which alone renders it evil and criminal . . a man may be invincibly ignorant that fornication is a sin ; and in that case if he doth commit fornication , it 's no sin , because invincible ignorance excuseth from sin , therefore a man in state of ignorance may commit fornication without sin . fillut. mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . azor. tom. . lib. . c. . p. . . masters and maid servants , and cosins of both sexes living together , and mutually induced by that means unto sin , if their relapses be but once or twice a moneth , they may continue therein , when they cannot avoid them without finding the world matter of discourse , or running into some inconvenience thereby . myst. of jesuit . p. . . if the concubine be very useful to the fornicator to cherish him , and to keep him in good humour , so that without her he lives in melancholy , and hath great distast of the food which is prepared for him ; he cannot be obliged in this case to put away his concubine , because his satisfaction in these circumstances are more worth than any temporal good . sanctius in select . disp . . n. . . if you be desired by your friend to carry a present to be given on the account of dishonest love , unto a concubine , to whom he sends it , you may carry it without sin , if you have a just cause of fearing a considerable loss . tamb. lib. decal . c. . s. . n. . as the loss of your friend . . absolution may be given a woman who entertains at her house a man with whom she offends frequently , if she cannot handsomely send him away . bauny's theol mor. p. . tr . . de poenit . q. . p. . . it 's lawful for a married woman to retain to her self the price of her adultery ; and the reason is excellent , because the husband is not so master of the body of his wife , that he hath a perfect dominion over it ; but he hath only the power to use it according to the law of marriage , which certainly takes not from the woman power to gain something by prostituting her body . tamb. lib. . decal . c. . s. . n. . . if a concubine dyes or withdraws her self , it 's lawful for the man to take another maid-servant , what fear soever he hath of falling into sin with her , if he cannot find some other who is capable to assist him in his affairs and conveniences ; for if this reason dispense with him for not putting her away whom he hath already taken , it will give him a right to take her whom he hath not as yet . sanct. select . disp . . n. . . by the bull cruciata , a man may be dispensed with the vow he hath made not to commit fornication or any other sin . addit . to the mysterie of jesuitism . p. . § . . chap. viii . of murder . . it 's lawful for an honourable person to kill an assailant who would strike him with a cudgel , or give him a box on the ear to affront him , if he cannot otherwise avoid the disgrace . lessius de justitia & jure , lib. . c. . dub . . n. . p. . otherwise the reputation of the innocent person would be perpetually exposed to the affronts of the insolent . azor. inst. mor. par . . p. . hurtado de mendoza . disp . . s. . § . . . if a man endeavour to deprive me of my honour before a prince , judge or person of great quality , by accusing me of some feigned crimes , and i have no other way to divert this loss of reputation , it 's lawful for me to kill him secretly . less . lib. . c. . dub . . n. . p. . and the same may be done against him , though the crime be true , so it be hid and secret . bannes . q. . a. . dub . . and molina gives the reason , because it 's lawful to imploy all sorts of means , and to make use of all sorts of ways , and of all sorts of arms , to do that which is necessary for self-defence . molina . de just. & jure . tom. . tr . . disp . . n. . p. . . to defend our selves from an affront which would be given us , it 's lawful to prevent the aggressor by killing him , in the same manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of life or member , it 's lawful to kill him before he execute his design . amicus , tom. . de justi . & jure , disp . . s. . n. . p. , , . . it any person doth unjustly detain your goods from you , you may kill him when you cannot without great trouble and difficulty recover them by the way of justice . less . de just . & jure , lib. . c. . dub . . n. . dicast. lib. . tr . . disp . . dub . . n. . this is an excellent invention to cut off all suits , there is no need of judges or counsellors ; but any may do themselves justice ; and instead of sending a serjeant to arrest the party who detains the goods , he may send one to take away his life . . if any person shall take from you an apple , or any thing to the value of five shillings , and will not restore it , if it will be a shame to you not to take it out of the thief 's hand , you may endeavour to take it from him , and even kill him if it be necessary . less . de just. & jure . lib. . c. . c. . d. . n. . p. . . if a man hath committed a crime which is not publickly known , and he understands that another hath a design to inform against him , before a magistrate , if he fears lest his accuser should cause him to be condemned to lose his life , or goods , he may lawfully kill him . molina de just. & jure , tom. . tr . . n. . p. . dicast. lib. . tr . . disp . . par . dub . . n. . . it 's no murder to kill excommunicated persons . grat. caus . . q. . c. omnium & exam . fo . . edit . paris . . . it 's lawful to kill all those who do us wrong , and all other persons who offend us , though we be assured that they shall be damned by dying in that state . escob . tr . . exam . . c. . p. . s. . n. . and this right doth not only appertain to one private man , against another private man , but to a publick person ; to a subject against his prince or superior ; to a son against his father , or the father against the son. amicus de just. et jure , disp . . s. . n. . p. . . if any person shall endeavour to take away from you your estate unjustly by foul practices and vexatious suits at law ; it 's lawful to accept or give a challenge ; nay , a man may dispatch his enemy at unawares ; nay in such occurrences a man need not confine himself to the ordinary ways of duels , if he can secretly murder his adversary , and thereby put an end to the business ; for by that means he shall not only avoid the hazard he may be in , by exposing his life in sighting , but also not participate of the sin which his enemy would commit by the duel . sanch. theol. mor. lib. . c. . n. . provinc . letter , . fo . . so if persons shall conspire to ruin you , or shall unjustly hinder your creditors from paying you what they owe unto you , it 's lawful for you to kill them . less . de just. & jure , lib. . c. . n. . p. . . a man may lawfully kill ( by ambush and behind his back ) an informer that prosecutes us in any court , provided there be a right direction of the intention ; he may lawfully kill the false witness which such a prosecutor produceth against him ; and the judge also , if there be any correspondency between him and the witness . molina , tom. . tr . . disp . . reginaldus , lib. . c. . n. . tannerus , tr . . disp . q. . n. . provinc . letter , . fo . . . a priest is obliged to kill a detractor . myst. of jesuit . p. . . . if a man hath made use of a woman , he may kill her if she offer to discover what passed between them . myst. of jesuitism , p. . § . . caramuel . fund . s. . p. . . when he who is assaulted be a person whose life is of importance , and necessary to the weal publique and others , whether it be in temporals or spirituals , he is obliged under mortal sin to kill if he can the aggressor in defence of his life . molina de just. commutat . tr . . d. . p. ; because he cannot give away the right of those who belong unto him , to whom his life is necessary , being obliged to maintain and defend them ; therefore he sins mortally in not killing the aggressor if he can , for the preservation of his life . . he commits not the sin of manslaughter , who kills him who invades him unjustly , though he gave him an occasion to assault him . amicus de just. & jure , disp . . dub . . n. . p. . and when it 's lawful to kill an invader , it 's lawful to desire his death , as a means necessary for our defence . dicast. lib . tr . . disp . . dub . . n. . . it 's lawful to kill him who says to you , you lie . bandellus , lib. . disp . . n. . provincial letter . . fo . . . an adulterer may lawfully kill the husband of a woman with whom he hath committed adultery , if her husband , having surprised him in the fact , doth assault him . molina de just. & jure , tom. . disp . p. . tamb. lib. . decal , c. . sect . . n. . this is an excellent way for an adulterer to expiate his crime , by making away the husband's life , after he hath taken away the wifes honour . . a thief being entred into a house to steal , may in consequence kill him who would kill him for his theft , if he cannot escape death . molina de justitia & jure , tom. . p. . n. . . if a thief fly away on horseback , he may be pursued with a weapon , or killed with a pistol-shot , when after he hath been threatned to be killed , he cease not to bear away what he hath taken ; and though he be not threatned nor admonished thereof , because time permit not , and there is danger never to recover what he carries away . dicast. lib. . tr . . disp . . dub . . n. . . it 's not against charity to kill a thief who robs me of things which i cannot recover at law without much trouble . dicast. ibidem . . if an honourable person be assaulted , and in danger to lose his reputation , if he fly , though by flying he might preserve his own life , and his who assaults him , he is not for all that obliged to fly ; but it 's lawful to kill him , who invades him unjustly in defence of his life and honour . mol. tom. . p. . for when a man hath only his honour to defend , he is not obliged to fly , because he is to set more by his honour , than money or goods ; therefore there is no reason to oblige christians to lose possession of so pretious a thing as honour ; by flying from him who assaults them so unjustly . . it 's lawful to kill a slanderer or false witness secretly in an affair , wherein not only life , but even outward goods also of great importance are in question . amic . tom. . de just. & jure , disp . . sect . . n. . p. . . if any one assault you , and makes use of an innocent person to shelter him , you may kill him , that you may hit him who invades you . escob . tr . . exam . n. . p. . if a man fly from his enemy and cannot escape but through some strait way , wherein he will crush to death some infant or lame person , he may kill or ride over him , though he be assured that he will die thereof ; because every man hath right to defend himself , and his meeting with or interposure of an innocent person doth not take away his right . less . de just. lib. . c. . dub . . n. . p. . you may observe how highly this new theologie of the jesuits hath obliged the world , in granting this liberty to defend mens lives , honours and goods against any aggressor , which the gospel of jesus christ hath denyed unto them . by this indulgence people are kept in obedience from invading the rights of others , and peace established amongst them , for fear of offending , when the person offended , is both judge , party , and executioner ; by their divinity you may kill an enemy , a slanderer , a thief , an informer in false crimes , and even in true ones , but secret ; and which is yet more , an innocent person , and from whom you never received any displeasure ; an infant , a prince , a king , without excepting fathers or mothers ; you may challenge into the fields , assassinate publickly , kill by surprise , cause to die secret , by poyson or otherwise , for preservation of the life , honour or goods , and even for the least thing , as for an apple ; and all these without sin or punishment ; what mortals can desire more , we know not . chap. ix . of theft . . theft is no mortal sin , if he that steals doth believe that his father , master or he from whom he steals the goods , would have given him them , if he had asked him , or if he had known he had need of them , or when he makes no account of the goods which are stollen from them , or when he is of such a disposition , that he would not have him that had stollen them from him , obliged therefore to any great punishment . less . de just. & jure , lib. . c. . d. . n. . p. . . theft , which men and maid-servants commit in meats and drinks , are no great sins , though insensibly they amount unto a notable value ; if they steal them only to eat and drink them , themselves . less . de just. & jure , lib. . c. . d. . n. . p. . escob . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . . a woman may take and purloin money from her husband upon divers occasions ; and amongst others , she may take it to game withal , to buy her cloaths , and to get other things she stands * in need of . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . . the poor in extraordinary necessity may steal from the rich with a safe conscience . vasquez de eleemosyna . c. . n. . provinc . letter . . fo . . tambur . lib. . decal . c. . sect . . n. . . he who taketh what is anothers , doth him no wrong if he made no use of it , or was not like to use it ; neither is he obliged to restitution . em. sa. verbo , furtum . c. . p. . . he who steals frequently by little at a time , so to gather together a notable sum , is not obliged to restitution when it 's not done with intention to steal this great sum . exam. sa. verb. furtum , n. . escob . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . . where a man hath by many petty thefts proceeded unto a great sum , he is not obliged under pain of damnation to restore any of it , because he only sinned venially . bauny in his sum. c. . p. . by this a man may enrich himself with the goods of another , provided he takes not too much at once . . if a man finds any thing which doth belong to another , he may appropriate it to himself ; and though the true owner appears afterwards , he is not obliged to quit the possession of it ; and if he shall alienate or spend it without fraud or unjust contrivance simply and honestly , the owner comes and presents himself , he is not obliged to restore any thing unto him , but what he hath put out to use , and whereby he is become more wealthy . bauny in his sum. c. . p. , . layman . lib. . tr . . c. . n. . . a person after he hath made a renuntiation of his goods unto his creditors , may in conscience substract and keep one part of his goods to maintain his family and his port. bauny's sum. c. . p. . . it 's lawful for servants to rob their masters to make their wages proportionable to their service . myst. of jesuit . p. . letter . . fo . . . a religious man may quit his habit , and go and steal , as well as go incognito to the stewes . myst. of jesuit . p. . . a son may with a safe conscience steal money from his father . addit . to the myst. of jesuit . p. . § . . chap. x. of deceit . . avintner who hath better wine than ordinary , for that he may not sell it by reason of some publique order , above the common price , he may recompence himself therein by mingling water therewith , because those who buy this wine have no prejudice thereby . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . the same may be done with grain , he may mingle so much of rie with his wheat to reduce it to the quality of common grain which is sold at the same price with his . amicus de just. & jure , disp . . sect . . n. . p. . . a treasurer , a factor , solicitor , a servant , and such like , may traffick with their master's money without his privity , and retain the profit for themselves . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . a taylor who hath been accustomed to buy cloath or silk by command from another to make his cloathes , goes on this occasion most commonly to a shop of a merchant , who for this reason sells him a good pennyworth ; the taylor may retain to himself the benefit of his good market ; because the merchant finds his advantage therein , therefore the taylor ought to have his advantage thereof . secondly , because this practice is past into a custom . fillut. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . if the magistrate hath regulated the price and weights of flesh , and the measures of wine , so that the price is not sufficient for the charge , and for their pains , and the wayes of those who sell these merchandizes , they may diminish the weight and the measure so far , as is necessary , to satisfie all these things . amicus , de just. & jure , d. . sect . . n. . p. . and being examined by a judge , whether he hath sold it too dear , or hath changed the weight or measures , he may say he hath not , and assure him , that he hath sold according to the price appointed , and that he hath observed the weight and measure intending , according to the money that he hath received . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . if one thinks and probably believes that the price which is set upon any merchandize , is unjust , and that for this reason , he who sells recompences himself for this injustice by selling by false weights , or by some other way , being afterwards examined by a judge upon these facts , he may deny all upon oath . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . if a man hath run into debt to supply his debaucheries , he may frustrate all his creditors , and continue to live in luxury , by renouncing his estate ; for he that renounceth his estate with safety to his conscience , may retain so much thereof , as is necessary for him and his family to live in honour . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . . if a man gets mony unjustly , and mingles it with his other the like money which did belong unto him , insomuch that one cannot distinguish them ; by this means he gains to himself the property of the money , and is become the just owner and lawful possessor of it : therefore if a merchant or tradesman hath received more mony of his customers than is due to him , if he mingles this with his other mony that they cannot be distinguished from each other , the party who hath paid this mony comes to the merchant and demands it , he is not obliged to repay it ; because that he received it in payment and so took it on good account , and in honest simplicity . esc. tr . . exam . . n. . p. . vasquez de restitutione , c. . sect . . dubium ultimum . . when children are grown up and are imployed by their fathers in their shops , trades , or other their affairs , if their fathers do not content them and give them a just recompence for their pains , it 's lawful for them in conscience to take so much of their father's goods secretly for their recompence according to the proportion of their labour and pains . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . so that children are permitted to estimate and rate their own labour and pains , and pay themselves with their own hands ; and this estimation depends on their own judgments and wills. . cheating is lawful by virtue of the contract moliatra : as when a man buys a commodity for l. to be paid within a year , and then sells it immediately to him of whom he bought it , for half so much mony . myst. of jesuit . p. . he who prudently maketh use of these maxims of the divinity of the jesuits , may do all his affairs by deceipt , and yet not pass for all that for a cheat ; and it 's but reasonable , that if a butcher , vintner , or other person be ill husbands , or an ill chapman , or suffer himself to be cheated or buy too dear , that the publique pay for all this : for if the merchant be an ill buyer , he may be a wicked seller ; and cheat in selling , because he was cheated in buying . chap. xi . of oaths , promises , mental reservations , and of equivocations . in conduct of affairs to be well instructed in the subtilities and inventions of the jesuits are of great use ; which may be referred to equivocations in words ; and want of intention in oaths and promises : the one is a means to say what you will without lying ; and the other an expedient to swear and promise all things without being obliged to perform any thing . . a man may make a promise without any intention to promise ; but in case he had an intention to promise , but no intention to perform , then he is obliged to his promise , but not obliged to perform what he promised ; the same of an oath . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. , . p. . gr. valentia . . d. . q. . p. . . a man may make a promise without any intention to promise , and so he is not obliged to perform ; because he had no intention to promise : and therefore if he be asked if he made any such promise , he may with a safe conscience say , no ; intending that he had not promised by any promise to oblige him ; and by consequence he may also swear ; for otherwise he should be constrained to pay that which he owes not . fillut. tom. . tr . . n. . p. . and therefore he may safely say , that he owes not that which he hath promised , and that he lies not , in forswearing it ; because , in promising and in swearing , he had no intention to promise or swear , no more than to perform what he promised . . if you have made a promise or an oath , and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your self ; it 's probable you are not obliged to keep it . tamb. decal . . c. . sect . . tit . v. n. . . to feign in an important matter , and to vow only with ones lips , is but a venial sin , because it 's only a lye which contains no irreverence towards god. tamb. decal . . c. . sect . . n. . . if to promise without an intention to promise , and to promise without an intention to do what is promised , be not sufficient , the better to carry on designs , and to cause your projections to prosper , and to gain belief , it 's lawful to add an oath . . he who desires not to swear , ( the better to obtain belief ) may find out many wayes to speak , and to affirm , which passeth commonly for oaths , but indeed are not ; as for example , if i swear by god , wherefore do you not believe me ? if this be not , i have no faith in god , i renounce god. this is as true as the gospel ; before god this is so ; god knows it 's so ; on my faith , by my faith , god be my witness ; i may swear by god , by jesus christ ; i will swear by god ; though the ignorant , and those who do not look nearly to them , take these speeches for oaths , but they are not , because they assert nothing , and they are imperfect discourses , and have no determined sence . escob . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. , , , . p. . . when one is resolved to swear , you may choose words of double meaning , and make use of a mental restriction the better to effect your ends ; and this is warrantable according to the most learned doctors amongst the jesuits : for no man is obliged by virtue of his oath , beyond his intention ; for an oath cannot oblige in conscience beyond the intent of him which swears ; and by consequence he that hath no intention to swear , cannot be obliged to any thing at all . sanch. op . mor. lib . c. . n. , . p . . the art of mental restriction or reservation , is an art of great use , and must be well studied , and none can teach the theorie or practice of it so well as the jesuits ; they being the great doctors of the faculty of equivocation . this doctrine shall be illustrated by some few examples ; if a promise by oath to pay a certain sum of money , be drawn from a man unjustly , or by force , he that swears in this manner , may use an equivocation in these terms ; i swear to you , i will , give this mony ; intending that he would give it to him , to whom he sware , or to some other ; because these words may receive either of these two sences . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . if a woman be excommunicated for departing from her husband , because she knows of some secret impediment which makes the marriage void , being at the point of death , she is obliged , that she may receive absolution to swear , that if she recover her health , she will return to her husband ; she may promise and swear it , intending in her mind , if i be obliged thereunto , or if it shall please me at that time . sanch. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . if in the tongue in which one express an oath , the name of god signifie divers things , it will be lawful to swear by the name of god , taking it in some other signification : according to this rule a man may safely swear by the name of jesus christ , because there are others named jesus , besides the son of god , and that this word , christ , is attributed to divers persons in scripture , and that not only christians , but to jews . . when one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes that he is not obliged to swear ; he may do it without fear of perjury ; he may make use of the one or the other of these two expedients ; first to take the words wholy he uses in swearing , and which are false in their true sence , in a quite different sence , such as he pleases , provided it be true : secondly , to give no sence at all to his words , and to take them materially , that is to say , as sounds which signifie nothing . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . if a person be ignorant , and cannot make right use of mental reservation , upon occasion , he may swear plainly without obliging himself in any sort whatsoever , provided he hath no intent to swear , nor to perform that which he swears . escobar . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . to establish this knowledg of equivocation in the world , and to facilitate the practice of it amongst all sorts of people , the jesuits have delivered to their disciples divers excellent rules , and examples for the perfecting of them in this marvellous art of equivocation ; therefore , if you be asked , if you have eaten of such a dish ; you may answer , i have not eaten of such a dish ; intending in your mind , to day ; though the intention of him that asked , was to know it you had ever eaten of it . fillut. op . mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . if one enquire whether the prince be at court , he may say and swear it too , without any great sin , that he is there , ( though he be not there ) intending that he is there in picture . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . if one demands of a man to borrow mony , which he indeed hath , but which he will not , and which he is not obliged to lend ; he may swear that he hath it not at all ; meaning not to lend him , or meaning not in another place than in that where he laid it up to be kept . fillut. op . mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . if a witness be interrogated juridically if he know a thing ; provided the judge ask him not whether he hath heard it spoken ; he may swear he knows it not , having only heard it spoken . fillut. op . mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . if he be interrogated by a judge , whether he had done such a thing ? he may safely swear he hath not done it , when he hath done it ; intending in his mind some other thing , which he hath not in truth done , or some other day than that on which he did it , or some other circumstance as he pleases , so it be true ; he doth not lye , neither is he forsworn . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . this is a rare way to justifie all manner of lies , and perjuries : the greatest impostors may make use hereof to maintain themselves in these crimes . and it 's always justifiable when necessary , or advantagious in any thing that concerns a man's health , honour or estate . zanch. op . mor. p. . lib. . c. . n . provinc . letter . . § . , . fillutius assigns a way much more secure than the former , to avoid lying ; and that is when a man having said , i swear i have not done such a thing , he adds , whispering to himself , this day . fillut. tr . . c. . n. . this is to speak truth towards himself , and lie to others . men will be often at a loss if they have not this science . . it 's not enough to know the rules of any mystery , if it be not known how to reduce them to practice . therefore there are two rules given by the jesuits , that men may have change , and make use sometimes of one , and sometimes of the other . the first is , to have an intention to pronounce the words materially , that is to say , as if they signified nothing ; and to take from them in his mind their proper signification not desiring they should have any at all . and that this method may be made easie to understand , take this example : if a man be interrogated by a judge if he did such a fact ; he may safely swear he did it not ; with this mental restriction ( this day ) , though he did it at another day . fillut. op . mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . the second rule or method is , to have an intention to compose ones discourse , not only of words , which are audibly pronounced , but also of those which are secretly reserved in ones mind , it being free for those who speak , to express their thoughts wholly or in part . fillut. ibidem . . it 's lawful in our defence at all times to make use of equivocation , though he who doth examine us , do press us and make us swear not to use them , but to answer him without making use of equivocation : he may safely swear , understanding secretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to speak clearly , and to expound himself , or by forming some other thought , which may make him answer true . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . if any one be examined by a judge if he did such a thing ; he may swear he hath not done it ; intending his answer , not in that manner as the judge examins him maliciously , but in the manner he ought to examin him in the quality of a judge . sanch. ibidem . . when a prince commands a subject to do such a thing when he receives his orders , he promises to obey him ; though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him , by making use of this mental restriction , saying in himself , i will do this not as you command me , but as you ought to command me . sanch. ibidem . . a wife or children being called before a judge to declare and confess what they have put aside or taken out from , or usurped of the moveables or goods of the deceased , are not in conscience obliged to confess , or declare the same ; but because they may be brought to swear , they may make use of this expedient that they may not lie , and so doing forswear themselves , the prudent confessor may teach them that they are to frame a conception in their mind , according to which they may form their answer and oath , which they may make by the command of the judge , to justifie and make him believe their innocence . bauny his sum. c. . p. . . one is discharged of his oath , though in doing what he swears to do , he hath an express intent not to do or fulfil it . less . lib. . c. . d. . n. . . if i swear to do such an act , and have no intention to swear , though i do not perform the act , i am not forsworn , because an oath depends on the intention of him who swears . em. sa. verb. jurament . n. . p. . . if a man lies in using equivocation without any necessity obliging him thereunto , and swears to confirm this equivocation , he doth neither lie nor commit perjury ; because he that speaks and swears in that sort , hath no intention to speak or swear falsly . fillut. to. . tr . . c. . n . p. . this maxim is of admirable use to licence the lies and oaths which some do make use of ordinarily to deceive others , and those who forswear themselves before judges . . oaths , which are made without actual advertency and consideration , which of themselves are sufficient to a mortal sin , are not of themselves new sins properly , because of the custom of swearing , how great soever they be , though no retraction be made of them . sanch. mor. par . . lib. . c. , , . p. . . if one commit perjury through natural inadvertency , or because of an ill custom he hath to forswear , it 's no mortal sin ; because he doth forswear himself without perceiving it at all . fillut. mor. to . tr . c. . p. . . when a man blasphemes customarily without having full knowledg thereof , he doth not sin mortally . fill. ibidem . . it 's a less sin to swear in common talk by the holy name of god , than it 's to eat an egg in lent. sanch. fillut. . it 's lawful as well in judgment as out of judgment , to swear with a mental reservation without any regard to the intent of him who obliges a man to swear . myst. of jesuit . p. . . to call god to witness to a light inconsiderable lie , is not so great an irreverence , as that a man should or must be damned for it . myst. of jesuitism , p. . s. . chap. xii . of the doctrine of probability . . that opinion is probable which hath one only author of reputation , or one reason to maintain it ; and that which is supported by a probable opinion , is simply good and lawful ; and a man may safely in conscience act by it . em. sa. verbo dubium . n. . p. . nay , though many doctors do positively hold the contrary , yet if any one doctor who hath examined and weighed the reasons of those who hold the contrary , doth say , that the action is good and lawful ; the opinion is probable , and you may in conscience act by it . therefore if a priest , of whom i have a good opinion for his integrity and parts , shall tell you ; it 's lawful for you to burn a city or any other place , though it be against the principles of justice or charity ; yet to you it 's probable , and so you may safely fire the city without sin : and the most universally condemned crimes may become lawful to you for to act , if a priest in whom you have a confidence for his learning and honesty , shall tell you they are lawful . escob . in praefat . theolog. problemat . and in case you have a great desire to do any thing , and can find no opinion to rely on , and to assure you it 's probable ; it 's enough that you are probably assured , that the opinion is probable ; so that probability is not only sufficient to excuse sin , but probability of a probability . tamb. lib. . decal . c. . sect . . n. . . when two opinions are probable , the one as well as the other , we may justly prefer in the practice that which is less probable , though not so safe , if you like it best , or may be more acceptable to others . azor. lib. . c. . p. . dicast . de confessione , tr . . d. . d. . n. . a councellor at law may counsel his client that adviseth with him , not according to his own opinion , but the contrary which other councellors hold probable , if it be more favourable and acceptable to the client , though he doth know and believe assuredly that the opinion of the other councellor is false in the theory , and therefore not to be followed in the practice . layman . lib. . tr . . c. . nay , a learned councellor may give to plaintiff and defendent , counsels quite contrary according to contrary probable opinions . layman . ibidem . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . . it 's lawful in conscience for a man to quit his own proper opinion , though more probable to follow the probable opinion of another though less sure ; because , he who believes an opinion probable , acting according to that opinion , ought not to be deemed as rash and imprudent : upon this principle pilat acted when he put jesus christ to death , quitting his proper judgment , by which he believed him to be innocent , to follow the opinion of the jews , who maintained that he was worthy of death . nay , pilat herein , according to the jesuits , ought to be justified , because he followed a probable opinion , and more than probable , because it was not the opinion of one doctor , but of all the doctors and priests of the jews , that jesus was a malefactor and deserved death . matth. . . when one believes assuredly that an opinion is false , and that we cannot follow it directly in the conduct of some person , we may send this person to those who hold with it , and counsel him to follow their advice . layman . lib. . c. . p. . . if you meet with two contrary opinions , you may follow them both in different affairs , and even in the same affair also , acting and giving contrary counsels , now after the one , and then after the other . layman . lib. . c. . p. . . a man may hold an opinion probable , when he is persuaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons upon which that opinion is grounded ; and it 's safe in conscience to act according to such a probable opinion . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . . when a superior and those which are under his charge be of different opinions , the inferior is not bound to obey his superior : and therefore when a subject believes according to a probable opinion , that the commands of his prince are unjust , or that he exceedeth the bounds of his jurisdiction , he may disobey him , because it 's lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion . escob . in praem . exam. . n. . p. . . the priviledges of probability cannot only dispense with an inferior for the obedience which he owes to his superior , but may elevate him above his superior , and to oblige the superior to obey his subject . upon this principle a confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent , and quit his own opinion , though more probable ; because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion , hath a right unto absolution . escob . in praem . exam. . c. . n. . p. . and the confessor is obliged to absolve the penitent against his own proper opinion , when the penitent following the maxims of a probable opinion , believes that he may do that , which the confessor believes he may not do , according to his probable opinion . amicus . tom. . disp . . sect . . n. . p. . . it 's probable that an excise is justly established by a prince ; it 's probable on the other side ; that it 's unjust ; you being at present appointed by the prince to collect this impost , require it according to this opinion , which maintains that it 's just , and therefore it 's lawful for you to levy it without doing any injustice : but if to morrow , or the same day , you being a merchant , may secretly defraud this impost or excise , following the opinion that it 's unjust . tamb. lib. . theol. c. . sect . . n. , , . p. . . a man may , relying on an opinion sweet and indulgent , but probable , disobey his prince or superior in a thing in which it's probable that he is not obliged to obey , but it 's more probable that he is obliged to the prince or superior following the opinion which is more safe , judges that he ought to obey , and therefore that he hath sinned ; the prince or superior hath reason to command obedience , the inferior hath reason not to obey , both founded upon probable opinions ; inthis case the prince or superior is rash , if he judges that the inferior sins , because it 's not probable , that he sins who follows a probable opinion , and so it being probable , that the inferior hath not sinned ; the prince or superior shall be unjust , if he treats him as guilty ; for where there is no fault , there is no punishment . cat. in com. in reg. . bernard . lib. . n. . . he who believes that it 's more probable that we cannot in conscience follow that of the two opinions which is most probable , may yet follow it himself , if he believes that it 's also probable that he may follow it . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . p. . . it 's probable , that the loss of reputation may , and may not be compensated with mony ; therefore this day , you being defamed , desire satisfaction in mony , and to morrow or this day you having defamed another , may safely deny to allow him the same compensation . tamb. lib. . theol. c. . sect . . n. , , . p. . . a lawful prince doth publish just laws for his subjects to obey , and they have no cause to complain thereof ; or just reason to refuse them : the subjects do sin , and it may be said they do not sin at all ; for there is great authority and reasons on each side to make both opinions probable , and to give liberty to which the jesuits please ; but the more safe , and more probable is to disobey . esc. tom. . lib. . s. . c. . prob . . p. . but priests and ecclesiastics , must be exempted from obedience to the laws of princes ; for they are not subjects of necessity and obligation , but only out of respect and good example towards princes laws , which regard the government of their states , and which derogate not from the ecclesiastic state. escob . theol. mor. to. . lib. . c. . prob . . p. . . all probable opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other ; but the more pleasant , though they be less probable , are always more profitable and more safe , because they are more easie , and by consequence more favourable to temporal interest . cat. in com. in regal . sancti bernardi . lib. . d. . n. . idem , theol. fundam . p. . . as it 's impossible that an opinion which hath the approbation of many learned doctors should not be probable , so it 's impossible to reject it ; none of their propositions can cease to be probable , if the contrary doth not become an article of faith. layman . lib. . c. . p. . by these maxims , following a probable opinion , you are exempted from all sin : you may act , do , or say what you please , and you are safe . the gospel of christ made men sinners , but these make them all innocent . if there be two persons which do the same thing , he who knows not this doctrine , sins ; and he who doth , sins not . if things and actions should be measured by the scripture and the fathers of the church , they could not be done without sin ; therefore it was necessary that the jesuits should by their prudence moderate things so , that those things which persons could not act by the law of god without sin , they may safely do and act by these maxims . they have discovered many new ways to heaven , which were heretofore unknown to the church and jesus christ himself , who hath not spoken any thing of them in his gospel ; if he doth , it hath been only to condemn them . following the principles of these good men , you will find it 's not only easie to be saved , but it 's almost impossible to be damned ; there can be no affair of conscience so troublesom or so desperate , for which expedients may not be found ; nor any crimes so black , which may not easily be excused and justified ; there was never a better contrivance invented in the world , than this of probable opinion ; for there are but two conditions required to make an opinion probable ; first , that it be founded on reasons in some sort considerable , which will be very easie ; for no man hath formed an opinion , but doth believe that the reasons which he brings are good enough to support what he maintains . the second condition , that there be no convincing reason for the contrary ; which is no less easie than the former ; for a reason may be convincing in respect of one man , which is not to another : and an obstinate man will always think his reasons best ; but in case you cannot answer the reasons on the contrary , you may persuade your self some other more learned may do it ; and so it doth remain probable , and you may safely act in conscience by and according to it , though that which you act or do be against the divine law , and condemned by god in scripture . sanch. op . mor. lib. . c. . n. . p. . chap. xiii . of judges and witnesses . . if the right of the parties seem equal on both sides , the judg may take money or a present of one party , to give advantage whether he pleaseth , because he may do favour , and this favour may be valued by money , and because for the most part the judg loseth the friendship of one of the parties . esc. tr . . ex . . n. . p. . . if the opinions are so doubtful and divided , that its in the power of the judges to follow which he pleaseth ; if one of the parties make him a present to gain him to his side , the judg doth not offend against justice in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two parties rather than the other . esco . tr . . exam. . n. . p. . . a judge giving judgment , may follow a probable opinion , leaving that which is more probable ; nay he may judg against his own proper opinion , as did pilat , who condemned jesus christ , after he had declared publickly , that he believed him innocent . escob . in proem . exam. . c. . n. . p. . . when the right of the parties is not clear , or when it happens that there are different opinions concerning the sence of the law ; when the one opinion is as probable as the other , it 's in the power of the judge to chuse which he pleaseth , and to follow it in his judgment . sanch. lib. . c. . n. . and he may , if it gives no scandal , judge one while according to one opinion , and another time according to another opinion . ibidem . for if he may choose of two probable opinions , that which he pleaseth , it follows , that he may follow sometimes the one opinion , and sometimes the other , as he pleaseth ; but if one of the two opinions be more probable than the other , the judge may pronounce judgment according to that he likes best , and even to follow that which he believes to be less probable . ibidem . and the judge doth not herein behave himself imprudently or rashly , guiding himself as he doth by a probable opinion . ibidem . . if a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertency , which occasions the condemnation of a man , and the loss of life or member to another ; he is not obliged after that he understands the truth , to retract his false testimony , for fear of exposing himself to great evils . tolet. lib. . c. . dicast. lib. . tr . . disp . . dub . . n. . for it 's lawful to kill an innocent person , after we have slandered him , rather than to expose our selves to danger by retracting ; though it 's not so much the offence or hang-man , as the false witness which puts him to death : . if a witness corrupted by mony , hide or retire himself before he hath been legally examined or cited into the court ; he is not obliged to restore the mony he received in this manner . dicast. lib. . tr . . d. . dub . . n. . . if a man is accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the accuser ; he may not only deny the crime , but say , that the accuser lies and slanders him . tamb. lib . decal . c. . sect . . n. . for it 's no lie to say unto a man he lies , when he knows that he speaks truth , and to slander an accuser as a slanderer , where he accuses us of a crime which we have committed , of two accusers the one speaks the truth , the other lies ; the one objects a true crime , and the other a false , yet in that saith the truth is the liar ; and he who objects a true crime , is a slanderer ; which is admirable divinity , and may be made use of in conduct of affairs . . if a man cannot defend himself against a false and unjust witness but by slandering of him , he may without sin impose on him so many false crimes as will be necessary for his defence . tamb. lib. . decal . c. . s. . n. , , , . if he doth it , he sinneth not against justice , and by consequence he is not obliged to restitution . ibidem . so that by this maxim to defend our selves from true but secret crimes , and whereof there is no publick proof , we may say to the honestest man in the world , who would inform against us in a court of justice , that he is a sodomite , heretick , excommunicate , &c. and we may for proof of this slander , make use of false witnesses , counterfeit false deeds and writings , and corrupt publick notaries to subscribe them , without committing of any injustice at all , though the scriptures do forbid it as a sin. so that you may observe the pious care of these holy fathers , in framing maxims stable to all times , persons and things . the gospel of christ may be useful to some ends and designs , but being not equally serviceable to all , many times it 's to be laid aside ; for if you make too much use of it , it will give a check unto your actings , and obstruct your designs if you act according to its directions . . a false witness , is he who chargeth one with a false crime ; an unjust witness , is he who accuses one of true crimes , but secret , and which he cannot prove according to the form of justice . that witness is to be held for a slanderer , who cannot prove the crime which he accuses one of ; and by consequence having accused unjustly , he is obliged unto restitution . dicast. lib. . tr . . d. . p. . dub . . n. . chap. xiv . of restitution & satisfaction . . they which by traffick , merchandize , usurious contracts or bargains , believing them to be good , have gained great wealth , being invincibly ignorant , that such manner of dealings were forbidden , and unlawful , are not obliged to make restitution of those goods so gotten , although they have so gained them , they not being informed of the injustice of such contracts . bauny in his sum. p. . . if you intreat a souldier to beat his neighbour , or to burn the farm of a man who hath offended you ; if the soldier doth these outrages , you are not obliged out of your estate to repair the damage , which proceeds from thence ; for no man is obliged to restore , if he hath not viola●●d justice ; and he doth not , who submits himself to another's pleasure , and only intreats of him a favour . bauny in his sum. c. . p. . . a person who is indebted for very great sums of money , to the prejudice of his creditors gives away part of his goods ; he to whom the gift is made , is not obliged to restore any part thereof to his creditors , if he be not constrained thereunto by law. bauny in his sum. cap. . p. . . there is no natural precept which obliges us in this life to make satisfaction for temporal pains . fillut. mor. tr . . c. . n. . p. . . god punishing sins in purgatory , when satisfaction is not made in this life , the sinner may without injustice refer satisfaction unto the other life . fillut. ibidem . and though the sinner defers satisfaction until the next life , he loses not by this , neither bliss or the love of god ; and though he retards the injoyment thereof , yet the loss made by this delay may be repayed . ibid. . that which one receives for doing any dishoncst action , as to cause a man to be killed , for committing of fornication for defaming our neighbours , for bearing of false witness , may in conscience be detained , and is not subject to restitution , if the action be done . fillut. mor. tom. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . but if the action be not done , you ought not to pay him till he hath performed the action , as if a man promises to pay unto titius l. to assassinate caius . till he hath done the fact ; he can require nothing , and if he hath executed it , common right requires that you pay him what you promised to him . layman . lib. . tr . . c. . n. . p. . for the pains which he hath taken , and the danger which he exposed himself unto for your sake , deserves to be well recompensed with money . . a judge who hath taken money for an unjust judgment , is not obliged to make restitution , no more than a murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder . lessius de just. et jure , lib. . c. . disp . . n. . p. . but if the judge hath taken money to give a just sentence , he is obliged to restore that which he hath received , because he hath done no more than he ought to have done ; but in giving an unjust judgment , he runs the hazard and loss of his place , and so is not bound to restore that which he hath received . . this divinity of these good fathers is very indulgent , and merciful to sinners ; for by their doctrine , this judge doth deserve a reward ; but by the laws of god , a most severe punishment . . if a man hath done wrong unto another , he is obliged to make restitution , if he did it not expresly on design , and with knowledg . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . for only sins of malice oblige us to restitution , and not those of infirmitie or ignorance . . where it 's impossible to make restitution without diminishing ones retinue and expence , so as to be taken notice of ; he is not bound to restitution . escob . tr . . exam . . c. . n . . p. . . whatsoever wrong a man hath done or caused to be done , to ones neigbour to hinder his wealth , or to procure his hurt , no restitution is to be made if he hath used no violence , but only prayers , promises , presents to deceive him or cause another to deceive him or wrong him . escob . tr . . exam . . n. . p. . . a man is not obliged to restore what he hath stollen , by trivial and inconsiderable theft , whatsoever the total sum thereof may amount unto . add to the myst. of jesuitisme . p. . § . . a summary account of the sacred doctrines , holy principles , and pious maxims , contained in this gospel , necessary for all christians to understand , and which will much advance devotion and holiness of life . chap. . . . . the bishop of rome is god. . the who is not obedient to the decrees of the pope , is a heretick . . the pope is lord of all temporalties upon earth . . no man ought to say unto the pope , why dost thou thus ? . the pope may dispense with or against the commands of christ or the apostles . . the pope's will is a law. . all nations and kingdoms are under the pope's jurisdiction . . god hath delivered over unto the pope , the power and rule of heaven and earth . . the whole world is the pope's inheritance . . the pope hath an almighty infallabilitie and cannot err . . the pope can do all that god himself can do , only sin excepted . . he hath power of making sin , to be no sin ; and that which is no sin , to be sin. . he can give empires and kingdoms to whom he pleaseth , and depose the possessors of them . . the pope may depose kings by his power , if they be either negligent in their administration of their government , or do not extirpate all hereticks out of their dominions . . if a king turns heretick , he hath no right to his kingdom ; and no man ought to think it strange if the pope depose him . . if kings will not be obedient to the church of rome , then may the pope by the great power from heaven , very justly depose them ; and the subjects themselves if the pope commands them , must take up arms against them . . the pope can quit subjects from their obedience and allegiance which they owe to their king. . the power of the pope is greater than that of the apostles , having power to derogate from the sayings and words of the pope . . the doctrine of the pope is the infallible rule of faith , and the holy scripture , hath taken its force , and doth take it from his holiness , and he that doth not believe this is an heretick . . the pope is he by whom kings reign , according as it 's said , by me kings reign . chap. iv. . there is no precept which obligeth us directly to pray to god to love , believe or hope in him , but only when it 's necessary to acquire some good , or to remove some evil . . he who prayes not to god in a temptation against chastity , sins only against chastity ; for he sins not omitting prayer , but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity . . in our private prayers which we make to god , it 's not necessary to use any devotion or attention ; nor are we obliged thereunto : and in those which are made by command , we are not obliged unto any inward intention , provided that we rehearse them outwardly , and behave our selves decently and with respect . . whatsoever distractions or evil thoughts come into our minds when we are at prayer , if they be not on contempt , but negligence , the sin is but venial . . christ commands us to receive the sacrament of baptism , a tyrant forbids us upon pain of our lives , we must obey the tyrant rather then christ. . in receiving the sacrament of the lord's supper , it 's not necessary to have actual devotion ; for let one be distracted with evil thoughts in the receiving the sacrament , provided he contemns it not , yet he is a worthy receiver , and only sins venially ; and so if he commits any sin , in the communion it self . . he who hath sinned mortally , and hath remorse for his sins , and hath confessed them to a priest , may well communicate , though a little before the communion he hath sinned mortally . . if a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad state , cometh to be converted , he shall receive in an instant , all the graces which were due to so many communions . . it 's not necessary that the priest who finds himself guilty of mortal sin , should confess himself before he administers the sacrament . . a person who hath abundance , after he hath satisfied all his own necessaries and those of his family , having yet a superfluity , is not obliged in a publick famine to give unto the poor , nor to any one whomsoever , if he see him not in eminent danger to dye with famine . . the precept of giving alms may be fulfilled ; by lending only , without giving any thing . . rich men are not obliged to give alms but out of their superfluity , and not then , but in case of great necessity ; those things which may exalt us to a better condition , as to places or preferment , are not to be accounted superfluous : therefore alms are rarely to be given ; for it seldom happens that we have goods superfluous . . there is no obligation to love our neighbour ; it 's sufficient not to hate him . . there is no absolute commandment to love god ; but when in scripture we are commanded to love god , they are but counsels and advices , and no commands ; for god hath not commanded so much to love him , as not to hate him ; and he ought to be content that we love him , as little as we please , and it sufficeth that we love him much under that we could if we would ; for the least degree of love is enough for him . . if we be obliged to love god , we are not obliged to love him above three or four months in our life ; whereof the first is when we begin to have the use of reason . . at the point of death . . every fifth year during life . for the rest of our time we may love god or the world , as we please . . if a man hath committed any mortal sin , he is not obliged to contrition or sorrow for that sin before the article of his death . . a man may be a martyr not only without any act of charity , but also without any act of faith ; and though he suffers without love to god , and though he never thinks of him . chap. v. . he that by custom is transported to do evil , as to swear or blaspheme , sins not at all , because a man cannot sin without reason , but by an ill custom the use of reason is taken away ; so that he who sinneth out of those ill habits , is in a better condition than he that hath them not ; and by often sinning , is put into a state of not sinning any more . . perjury which one commits through natural inadvertency , or because of the custom he hath to swear , it 's no mortal sin . . those who in their youth , have committed many actions of a vitious nature , which they did not believe to be such , are not obliged to confess them , when they know their nature ; because when they committed them , they had not the full use of reason ; and at most they were but venial sins , if any sin at all . . the pleasure which is taken in an action of mortal sin , which is done in sleep , drunkenness , madness , or through ignorance , is no sin . . he who doth some unlawful act , knowing well that it 's forbidden , but not remembring it to be such , when he doth it , is exempt from mortal sin ; because forgetfulness or negligence which is the cause we think not of it , the evil we are about to do , is not imputed for sin , if it be not voluntary , if we do not consider that we are obliged to examine that we are about to do . . god cannot command or forbid a thing that is in it self slight , under the penalty of mortal sin . . he who hath knowledg in the law , and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it , doth not incur the penalty . . he who hath a will to commit all venial sins , if he were able , sins only venially . . no man is obliged to avoid the next occasion of sin , if some great loss will thereby befall him . . a thing is not the next occasion of sin , unless it be vitious and a sin of it self . . to tell a lye in preaching on any doctrinal point , is but a venial sin . . all the breaches of the first and second table of the decalogue are no sins at all , when they are committed by any man out of ignorance , surprise or passion . chap. vi. of directing the intention . . to do evil , there must be an evil intention ; but to do good , it 's not necessary to have a good intention . . ecclesiasticks satisfie the precept of the church in saying prayers , when they read them without any inward intention or devotion , so they observe outward decency . . if a man speaks never so dishonourably and irreverently of god , it 's no blasphemy if he had not a formal intent to blaspheme god and dishonour him . . if a man be at prayers , and hath a bad intent thereunto joyned ; as an intent of looking on a woman dishonestly , it 's no sin . . if a man be to do an act , and makes protestation that his intention is not to do any evil ; let the act be never so wicked , it 's no sin in him . . a mother may wish the death of her daughter , because she cannot match her according to her desire for want of a portion . . you may desire the death of an enemy , who might do you much hurt ; not of hatred to him , but to avoid the damage he might do you . . to lye with a woman , when he representeth to himself , that he is married to her ; it 's no evil , but good . . a man may accept of a challenge to fight a duel , not with an intention to fight the duel , but only of defending himself . chap. vii . of adultery or fornication . . to lye with a married woman is not adultery , if the husband doth consent thereunto . . a virgin may dispose of her virginity , and prostitute her self without the consent of parents , and it 's no injury to them . . to lye with a woman considered as his wife , is no sin . . if a drunken or mad-man lyeth with a woman , it 's no sin ; because he hath not the use of reason . . there may be a dispensation granted to commit fornication , because it 's not forbidden by the law of nature . . men and women being together , and by that means induced to sin , if their relapses be but once or twice a month , they may continue therein , if they cannot separate without some inconvenience . . it 's lawful for a woman to retain to her self the price of her adultery . chap. viii . of murder . . it 's lawful for an honourable person to kill an assailant , who would strike him with his cudgel , or give him a box in the ear. . if a person endeavour to deprive me of my honour or reputation before a person of great quality , by accusing me of some crimes ; i may kill him , and the same may be done against him , though the sin be true , so it be hid and secret . . to desend one's self from an affront which would be given us , it 's lawful to prevent the aggressor , by killing him . . if a man doth detain from me my goods , and i cannot in course of justice receive them without much trouble ; it 's lawful for me to kill him , though the goods be but an apple , or to the value of five shillings . . it 's no murder to kill an excommunicated person . . it 's lawful to kill all those who do us wrong , though we be assured that they shall be damned dying in that state . . if any person shall endeavour to take away from you your estate unjustly by foul practices and vexatious suits at law ; it 's lawful for to kill him . . a man may lawfully kill by ambush and behind the back an informer that prosecutes in any court , and likewise the witness which the prosecutor produceth ; and also the judge , if he holds a correspondency with the witness . . if a man hath made use of a woman , he may kill her , if she offer to discover what passed between them . . he commits not the sin of man-slaughter , who kills him who invades him unjustly , though he gave him an occasion to assault him . . it 's lawful to kill him who sayes to you , you lie . . an adulterer may lawfully kill the husband of a woman with whom he hath committed adultery , if her husband , having surprised him in the fact , doth assault him . . it 's not against charity to kill a thief who robs me of things which i cannot recover at law without much trouble . . it 's lawful to kill a slanderer or false witness secretly in an affair , wherein not only life , but even outward goods also of great importance are in question . chap. ix . of theft . . it 's no mortal sin in him who steals , that doth believe that his father , master , or he from whom he steals the goods would have given him them , if he had asked him , or if he had known that he had need of them , or when he makes no account of the goods which are stolen from them , or when he is of such a disposition that he would not have him that had stolen them from him , obliged therefore to any great punishment . . theft which men and maid-servants commit in meat and drink , are not great sins , though insensibly they amount unto a great value . . a woman may take and purloyn money from her husband to game withal , and upon divers other occasions . . the poor in extraordinary necessity may steal from the rich with a safe conscience . . he who taketh what is anothers , doth him no wrong , if he made no use of it , or was not like to use it . . he who steals frequently by little at a time so to gather together a great sum , is not obliged to restitution , when it 's not done with intention to steal the great sum. . if a man finds any thing which doth belong to another , he may appropriate it to himself though he knowes the owner , and he demands it . . it 's lawful for servants to steal from their masters , to make their wages proportionable to their services . . a son may with a safe conscience steal money from his father . . a religious person or priest may quit his habit , and go and steal ; as well as go incognito to the stews . chap. x. of deceit . . a treasurer , factor , solicitor or servant , and such like , may traffick with their master's money , without his privity , and retain the profit for themselves . . if a tax be imposed upon wine , the vintner having better wine then ordinary , to recompence himself may mingle water with wine ; and he that buyeth , hath no loss thereby . . a taylor who is imployed to make cloathes for another person , buyes a good bargain of cloath of a merchant of whom he uesth to buy ; the taylor may make his benefit of this good penyworth , and make his customer pay what it's truly worth . . if the magistrate regulate the price and weights of flesh , and the measures of wine , so as the price is not sufficient for the charge , pains , and the wayes of those who sell these merchandizes ; they may diminish the weight and measure so far as it 's necessary to satisfie all these things ; and if they be examined before the magistrate concerning the same , they may deny all upon oath . . if a man hath run into debt to supply his debaucheries , he may frustrate all his creditors , and continue to live in luxury by renouncing his estate ; for he may with safety to his conscience retain so much thereof , as is necessary for him and his family to live in honour . . if a man gets money unjustly , and mingles it with his own , so as they cannot be distinguished the one from the other ; by this means he gains to himself the property of the money , and may justly detain it . . cheating is lawful by the contract moliatra . chap. xi . of oaths , promises , mental reservations and equivocations . . if a man makes a promise without any intention to promise , or makes a promise without any intention to perform ; in neither case he is obliged to perform what is promised , though an oath be superadded , because he had no intent to oblige himself either by his promise or his oath . . if you have made a promise or an oath , and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your self , it 's probable you are not obliged to keep it . . to seign in an important matter , and to vow only with one's lips without any intention , is but a venial sin ; because it 's only to lye , which is no great irreverence towards god. . he who desires not to swear ( the better to obtain belief ) may find out many wayes to speak and to affirm , which commonly passeth for oaths , but indeed are not . . when one is resolved to swear , you may choose words of double meaning , and make use of a mental restriction , the better to effect your ends ; no man is obliged by his oath beyond his intention , so by consequence if you have no intention to swear , you are not obliged . . the art of mental restriction or reservation is of great use , and must be well studied ; if a promise by oath be drawn from a man unjustly by force to pay a certain sum of money ; he that swears in this manner may use an equivocation in these terms , i swear to you , i will give this money , intending to give it to him to whom he swears , or to some other ; because these words may receive either of these two sences . . if in the tongue in which you swear , the name of god signifies divers things , it will be lawful to swear by the name of god , taking it in some other signification . . when one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes he is not obliged to swear ; he may do it without fear of perjury , though that he saith be false . . if a person be ignorant and cannot make use of mental reservation upon occasion ; he may swear plainly without obliging himself in any sort whatsoever ; provided he hath no intent to swear , nor to perform that which he swears . . this art of equivocation in the conduct of affairs is of marvellous use , and the jesuits have given many rules and examples for the facilitating of it . if one desires to borrow money of a man , which indeed he hath , but which indeed he will not lend ; he may swear he hath it not at all , meaning , not to lend him . . it 's lawful in our defence at all times to make use of equivocations , though he who examines us , do's press us , and makes us swear not to use them ; yet he may safely make use of them . . one is discharged of his oath , though in doing what he swears to do , he hath an express intent not to do or fulfill it . . it 's a less sin to swear in common talk by the holy name of god , than it 's to eat an egg in lent. . if i swear to do such an act , and have no intention to swear , though i do not perform the act , i am not forswern , because an oath depends on the intention of him who swears . . if a man lyes in using equivocations , without any necessity obliging him thereunto , and swears to confirm this equivocation , he doth neither lie nor commit perjury ; because he that speaks and swears in that sort , hath no intention to speak or swear falsly . . if one commit perjury through natural inadvertency , or because of ill custom he hath to forswear , it 's no mortal sin ; because he doth forswear himself without perceiving it at all . chap. xii . of the doctrine of probability . . a probable opinion is that which hath one good author , of reputation , or one reason to maintain it ; that which is supported by a probable opinion is simply good , and we may lawfully and safely in conscience act by and according to it . . where two opinions are probable , the one as well as the other , we may justly in the practice prefer that which is less probable ; though not so safe , if you like it best , or may be acceptable to others . . it 's lawful in conscience for a man to quit his own opinion , though more probable , to follow the probable opinion of another , though less sure . . if you meet with two contrary opinions , you may follow them , both in different affairs , and even in the same affair also , acting and giving contrary counsels now after the one , and then after the other . . a man may hold an opinion probable , when he is persuaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons upon which that opinion is grounded ; and it 's safe to act in conscience accordingly . . he who believes that it 's more probable , may yet follow it himself , if he believes that it 's also probable , that he may follow it . . all probable opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other ; but the more pleasant although they be less probable , are alwayes more profitable and more safe . chap. xiii . of judges and witnesses . . if the right of the parties seem equal on both sides , the judge may take money or a present of one party , to give the advantage to whether he pleaseth . . if the opinions are so doubtful and divided , that it 's in the power of the judge to follow which he pleaseth ; if one of the parties make him a present to gain him to his side , the judge doth not offend against justice to receive that which is given him . . a judge giving his judgment may follow a probable opinion , leaving that which is more probable . . if there be two probable opinions , the judge may give sentence according to which he pleaseth ; and one while he may judge according to one opinion , and another time according to another opinion . . a person who hath born false witness through ignorance , who occasioned the loss of life , after he understands the truth , he is not obliged to retract his false testimony , for fear of exposing himself to punishment . . it 's lawful to kill an innocent person , after we have slandered him , rather than expose our selves to danger by retracting . . if a man be accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the accuser ; he may not only deny the crimes , but slander the accuser , and may impose so many crimes upon him as will be necessary for his defence ; and he sinneth not against justice . . a false witness is he who chargeth one with a false crime ; but an unjust witness is he who accuseth one of true crimes , but secret , and which he cannot prove . chap. xiv . of restitution . . if any man hath by merchandize , usury , or otherwise , being invincibly ignorant , gained a great estate ; though afterward he be informed of the injustice , he is not obliged to restitution . . there is no natural precept which obliges us in this life to make satisfaction for temporal pains . . a sinner may refer satisfaction without injustice , unto the other life , if he maketh not satisfaction in this . . a person who is indebted in great sums of money , and gives away part of his goods , to the prejudice of his creditors ; he to whom the guift is made , is not obliged to restitution . . that which one receives for doing of an unjust action , as for bearing of false witness , for killing of a man ; he is not subject to restitution . . if a judge hath taken money to give an unjust judgment , he is not obliged to restitution ; but if he hath received money to give a just judgment , he is obliged to restore what he hath received . . if a man wrongeth another out of ignorance or infirmity , he is bound to make restitution . . where a man cannot make restitution without diminishing his retinue or expence , he is not bound to make restitution . . where one hath done wrong to another not by violence , but by promises , prayers or presents ; he is not obliged to restitution . . a man is not obliged to restore what he hath stollen by trivial and inconsiderable thefts , whatsoever the total sum may amount unto . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e it 's true of pope joan. true of pope clement the th , when he was cooped up by charles the th in the castle of st. angelo ; then papa non potest errare . god commands one thing , and a tyrant another ; we must obey the tyrant rather than god. ●ide contr . ●oh . . . ●o . c. . v. ● , . mar. ● . . v. . by this maxim , he that doth not know that hell is the punishment of mortal sin , shall not be in danger of going thither . * a gallant . reflexions upon the oathes of supremacy and allegiance by a catholick gentleman, and obedient son of the church, and loyal subject of his majesty. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) reflexions upon the oathes of supremacy and allegiance by a catholick gentleman, and obedient son of the church, and loyal subject of his majesty. sergeant, john, - . p. s.n.], [london : mdclxi [ ] attributed to john sergeant by wing and nuc pre- imprints. also attributed to john austin and hugh paulinus cressy--nuc pre- imprints. place of publication suggested by wing. errata on p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- great britain. oath of allegiance, . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion reflexions upon the oathes of supremacy and allegiance . by a catholick gentleman , an obedient son of the church , and loyal subject of his majesty . printed in the year . mdclxi . errata . page . line . fet read set , l. . dele and , p. . l. . excepting r. not excepting , p. . l. . christian r. christians , p. . l. . auihority r. authority , p. . l. . r. in the marg . ib. p. , p. . l. . ther r. their , p. . l. . mogannant r. moyenant , l. . entire r. entier , p. . l. . scots r. sects , p. . l. . invention r. intention , p. . l. . the useselsesse r. uselessnesse , p. . l. . charter r. character , p. . l. . at r. an , p. . l. . permitted to the people to be taught , r. permitted to be taught to the people , p. . l. . fiers estate r. tiers estat . l. . they are r. there are , l. . to article r. to be an article . reflexions upon the oathes of supremacy and allegiance . sect . i. the occasion of making these reflexions : and the summe of that which follows . the divine providence having been so watchful over his most sacred majesty in his wonderful preservation from dangers , and so miraculous in restoring him to his throne , just and necessary it is that both himself and his counsel should make use of all lawful means to preserve him in safety , and his subjects in obedience and peace . and because a greater obligation cannot be imagined among christians then a solemn oath , it became them to make use of that obligation indifferently to all , the which in all probability would now at last have a greater effect by vertue of his majesties declaration of a liberty to tender consciences , and that no man shall be disquieted , or call'd in question for differences of opinion in matter of religion , which do not disturbe the peace of the kingdom : by which is taken away the chief cause which began and fomented the late troubles and confusion . . notwithstanding seeing that the manner of the application of that preservatory and remedy of an oath , hath lately occasioned great disputes , and unquietness of minds , in several persons ; and seeing the oath by none more readily taken and earnestly imposed on others , then by those who began the war , and promoted the covenant , and of whose party not one was ever found that drew a sword for his majesty ; and on the other side by none more scrupled at or refused , then by those who alwayes assisted the king , and of whose party never any one drew a sword against him , and withall of whose loyalty his majesty hath oft professed that he hath sufficient assurance : the consideration of all this begat in my mind an opinion , that surely there lay hidden in these oaths some mystery fit to be discovered , and which is attempted in the following reflexions . . in which , . after a brief declaration of the nature of a solemn oath , how high a point of gods worship it is , and what reverence and caution is to be used in it . . and after the setting down the formes of the two oaths at this time imposed . . there follow reflexions upon the said oaths in gross , shewing the occasion of the making of them , &c. . after which it is demonstrated that the oath of supremacy as it lyes , and according to the sence of the first lawgiver , cannot lawfully or sincerely be taken by any christian. . then is declared in how different a sence the two oaths are taken by protestants , . and by presbyterians , independents , &c. . and upon what grounds roman-catholicks do generally refuse to take the oath of supremacy , . and some of them make scruple to take that of allegiance . . lastly there are short reflexions on his majesties gracious declaration for tender consciences , shewing who have the justest pretentions to the benefit of it , &c. . all this is offered to the consideration of all good christians among us , to the end advice may be taken whether it be for gods honour , or the kingdoms peace , that such formes of oaths so manifestly ambiguous , so inefficacious to the producing of loyalty and peace in the generality of the kings subjects , so piercing and wounding to tender consciences , &c. should be continued to be imposed , or new formes more effectuall for his majesties security contrived , after the example of scotland , &c. sect . ii. touching oaths in general . . an oath , by which god is invoked as a witness , surety and caution of whatsoever we affirm , renounce and promise , and a revenger upon us if we transgress in any of these , is certainly an high act of religion : but such an one , as that like medicines , it ought not to be used except in cases of just necessity , and then with great advice and sincerity . . the conditions therefore required by god himself in an oath are expressed in this saying of the prophet , thou shalt swear , the lord liveth , in truth , and in judgment , and in justice . so that if an oath be ambiguous , captious or false , it wants the condition of truth . if it be either unnecessary , or indiscreet and unprofitable , it will be destitute of judgment ; and if in the object and forme of it , and in the mind of the taker , there be not a conformity to the eternal law of god , it will want justice : lastly if with all these , it be not attended with fidelity in the execution of what is promised , ( supposing it be a promissory oath ) and this according to the intention of the law-giver , it will be dishonourable , irreligious and odious to god ; and wanting any of these conditions it will respectively be destructive to those that so contrive or take it . . all these conditions are doubtless with more then ordinary caution to be observed in solemn , publick and national oaths : the breach of which will involve whole kingdomes in guilt and punishment , and this , even in the opinion of heathens , inevitably . . these things considered , if we will call to mind how many oaths , covenants , abjurations , &c. ambiguous , entangling , trayterous , contradicting one another , and consequently inducing a necessity of perjury , have been sometimes voluntarily taken , or by a pretended authority imposed on the subjects , it will surely deeply concern us all to take some fitting course to avert gods most just indignation from our nation , by humbling our selves before his divine majesty , and making a publick acknow●edgment of the guilt universally contracted by us : and however for the future to take ●are that men may clearly see and understand what it is that they must be compelled to wear . sect . iii. the forme of the two oathes , of supremacy and allegiance , and the proper litteral sence of them . . the oathes at this time in force , and publickly or generally imposed are two , . that of supremacy , . that of allegiance , conceived in distinct formes . . the oath of supremacy is in the forme here expressed , viz. i a. b. do utterly testifie and declare in my conscience that the kings majesty is the only supream governour of this realme , and of all other his highnesse dominions and countries , as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes , as temporall : and that no forreign prince , person , prelate , state or potentate hath or ought to have any iurisdiction , power , superiority , pre-eminence , or authority ecclesiastical or spirituall within this realme : and therefore i do utterly renounce and forsake all forraign iurisdictions , powers , superiorities and authorities : and doe promise that from henceforth i shall bear faith and true allegiance to the kings highness , his heirs and lawful successours , and to my power shall assist and defend all iurisdictions , priviledges , pre-eminencies and authorities granted or belonging to the kings highness , his h●irs and successours , or united and annexed to the imperial crown of this realme : so help me god , and by the contents of this book . . the tenor of the oath of allegiance is this , viz. i a. b. do truely and sincerely acknowledge , professe testify and declare in my conscience before god and the world , that our soveraign lord king charles is lawful and rightful king of this realme , and of all other his majesties dominions and countries ; and that the pope neither of himself , nor by any authority of the church or sèe of rome , or by any other means , with any other , hath any power or authority to depose the king , or to dispose any of his majesties kingdomes or dominions , or to authorise any forreign prince to invade or annoy him or his countries , or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance and obedience to his majesty ; or to give licence or leave to any of them to bear armes , to raise tumults , or to offer any violence or hurt to his majesties royal person , state or government , or to any of his majesties subjects , within his majesties dominions . also i do swear from my heart that notwithstanding any declaration or s●ntence of excommunication or de●rivation made or granted , or to be made or granted by the pope or his successours , or by any authority derived , or pretended to be derived from him or his sèe , against the said king his heirs or successours , or any absolution of the said subjects from their obedience ; i will hear faith and true allegiance to his majesty his h●irs and successours , and him and them will defend to the uttermost of my power against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever , which shal be made against his or their persons , their crown or dignity , by reason or colour of any such sentence or declaration , or otherwise ; and will do my best endeavour to disclose and make known unto his majesties heirs and successours all treasons and traiterous conspiracies which i shall know or hear of to be against him or any of them . and i do further swear that i from my heart abhorr , detest and abjure as impious and hereticall this damnable doctrine and position , that princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the pope may be deposed or murthered by their subjects , or any other whatsoever . and i do believe , and in my conscience am resolved that neither the pope nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this oath , or any part thereof , which i acknowledge by good and full authority to be lawfully ministred unto me . and do renounce all pardons and dispensations to the contrary . and all these things i do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear according to these expresse words by me spoken , and according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words , without any equivocation or mental evasion , or secret reservation whatsoever . and i do make this recognition and acknowledgment heartily , willingly and truly , upon the true faith of a christian : so help me god. . these are the formes of the two oathes : both which if they be understood according to the proper and natural sence of the words import , that there being only two kinds of jurisdictions , viz. spirituall and temporal , both which are named here , the king within his dominions is equally the fountain and root of them both : so that whosoever exercises any office or magistracy either in the state or the church , does it ( and must acknowledge so much ) meerly by communication from the king , or a participation of so much of his power as he is pleased to impart . upon which grounds it will follow not only that no forraign prince , prelate , &c , no assembly or councel of bishops , though never so oecumonical hath right to any superiority or jurisdiction within these kingdomes , but also that whatsoever any bishop or priest in the kingdom &c. acts in matters & duties purely spiritual , as conferring orders ecclesiastical , inflicting censures , administring sacraments &c. they do all this with a direct subordination to the king , & as his delegates or substitutes : insomuch as if he pleases , he may himself exercise all those functions personally , and may according to his pleasure suspend the execution of them in all others . . all this plainly seems to be the true importance of the oathes ; neither will any stranger or dis-interessed person , reading them frame to his mind any other meaning of them : though certain it is that our four last princes have not intended that all that took them , should accowledge all this , that is imported by them . neither is there at this day any church or assembly of christians , nor perhaps any person ( unlesse it be the authour of leviathan ) that taking these oathes , will or can , without contradicting his belief , mean all that the formes and clauses of them do directly , properly and grammatically signify , as shall be demonstrated . sect . iv. reflections upon these two oathes in grosse . . it well deserves to be considered , what was the occasion of framing this oath of supremacy by k. henry the eighth , and what power he received , or at least executed by vertue of such acts of parliament as enjoyned the taking of it , &c. . the title of supream head and governour of the church of england , was first given to king henry the eight , in a petition addressed unto him by the bishops , obnoxious to a praemunire for having submitted to cardinal wolsey's legantine power without the kings assent . now how far this new ecclesiastical power of the king was intended to extend , will appear by following acts of parliaments , and by the kings own proceedings in vertue thereof . . it was enacted by parliament , . that no canons or constitutions could be made by the bishops , &c. and by them promulgated or executed without the kings command . . yea the clergy were forced to give up also their power of executing any old canons of the church without the kings consent had before . . all former constitutions provincial and synodal , though hitherto inforce by the authority of the whole church ( at least westerne ) were committed to the abitriment of the king & of sixteen lay persons and sixteen of the clergy appointed by the king , to be approved or rejected by them , according as they conceived them consistent with , or repugnant to the kings prerogative , as now a new head of the church or to the laws of god. by which means without one single voice of the clergy , all former ecclesiasticall lawes might be abrogated . . an authority was allowed to the king to represse and correct all such errours , heresies , abuses and enormities whatsoever they were , which by any manner of spirituall jurisdiction might lawfully be repressed , &c. any forreign lawes , or any thing to the contrary notwithstanding . . all manner of jurisdiction ecclesiasticall was by parliament ackowledged to belong to the king , as head of the church ▪ so that no bishop had any ecclesiastical jurisdiction , but by , under , and from the king . supreme power of dispensing with any ecclesiastical constitutions is ascribed to the king and parliament , as recognised supreme head of the church , and the archbishop is made only the kings delegate . so that in case he should refuse , two other bishops might be named to grant such dispensations . and after all , the king and his court of chancery are made the last judge , what things in such dispensations are repugnant to scriptures , what not . . though the king did not personally himself exercise the power of the keys , yet this right he claimed , that no clergy man being a member of the english church should exercise it in his dominions , in any cause or over any person without the leave and appointment of him the supreme head . nor any refuse to exercise it whensoever he should require . . it was moreover enacted that no speaking , doing or holding against any spiritual lawes made by the see of rome , which be repugnant to the lawes of the realme should be deemed heresies . as also that whosoever should teach contrary to the determinations which since the year were , or afterwards should be set forth by the king , should be deemed and treated as a heretick . so that the king and parliament are hereby constituted judges of heresy . . in the dayes of king edward the sixt an act is made in which the king and parliament authorise bishops , &c. by vertue of their act to take informations concerning the not useing the forme of common prayer then prescribed , and to punish the same by excommunication , &c. . there were also appointed six prelates and six others nominated by the king , by the same authority to frame a new forme of consecration of bishops , &c. . hereby it is apparent that a jurisdiction purely spiritual was communicated to , or assumed by king henry the eighth ; & this he further shewed by many practises . for besides jurisdiction , as if he had the key of divine knowledge given him by christ he set forth books of instructions in catholick doctrine by his own authority ; declaring them hereticks that taught otherwise . the labour indeed , and we may say , drudgery of composing those books ( as also of executing other spiritual functions ) was left either wholly or in part to the clergy ; but when they had done , he perused them , and and made what additions and alterations he pleased in them , and without remanding them to the bishops , caused them to be printed . the book with his interlinings and changes is still ex-tant . . indeed it was only spiritual jurisdiction that he by his new title of head of the church sought to deprive the pope of : for he feared not his pretended temporal power which in those dayes the world was little troubled withal . for he stood in need of a power to justify his divorce and to dispense with the horrible sacriledge designed by him ; he was unwilling to be looked on by his subjects as a heathen and a publican , and therefore to prevent this danger , he devested the pope , and assumed to himself the power of excommunication also , that is , not the execution of it , but the disposing of of it by delegation to the arch-bishop , who should execute it according to his will and directions only . . a further irrefragable proofe that it was a power purely spiritual which that king challenged by his new title ; is taken from the declaration of stephen gardiner bishop of winchester ( the contriver of the oath ) as we find it recorded by calvin himself ; for ( saith he ) when stephen gardiner was upon the kings affairs at ratisbon , he there taking occasion to expound the meaning of that title of supream head of the english church given to king henry the eighth , taught that the king had such a power that he might appoint and prescribe new ordinances of the church , even matters concerning faith and doctrine , and abolish old : as tamely that the king might forbid the marriage of priests , and might take away the use of the chalice in the sacrament of the lords supper , and in such things might appoint what he l●ft . a title thus interpreted the same calvin vehemently inveighs against , calling gardiner ( and worthily ) an impestour , and archbishop cranmer with his fellowes inconsiderate persons , who make kings too spirituall , as if beside theirs there were no ecclesiasticall government and jurisdiction . . as for his son king edward the sixth , the same title with the plenitude of power was given him , which he likewise , as very a child as he was , executed : for he by his authority made ecclesiastical lawes to be new reformed , church service and administration of sacraments to be changed , and new instructions in matter of religion to be published , quite contrary to what the foregoing head ( though his father ) had decreed to be christian doctrine . and the reason was the same , because new sacriledge was to be committed by the protectour , for which he was loath to be excommunicated . . his elder sister succeeding , repealed and renounced this jurisdiction , and restored it to the church : but her younger sister repealed her repealings , and took it again , when it was in as high language , yea higher , confer'd on her by parliament . and there was a greater necessity for it , than her brother had : for her mothers marriage was declared null by the pope , and consequently her right to the crown . . and that this was the design & intention , of the parliament in the first year of her raign , when they renewed the title of her supremacy in church matters , ( though they blushed to call a woman head of the church ) may sufficiently be collected from a speech yet extant , and made in that parliament upon that occasion by the then lord chancelour nicholas heath ; for arguing very strongly against the said title , and the authority imported by it , he takes it for granted that by giving the queen such a title they must forsake and fly from the sea of rome , : the inconveniencies of which he desires may be better considered . in the next place he recommends to their advice , what this supremacy is : for sayes he , if it consist in temporal government , what further authority can this house give her , then she hath already by right of inheritance , and by the appointment of god without their gift ? &c. but if the supremacy doth consist in spiritual government , then it would be considered what the spiritual government is , and in what points it doth chiefly remain . i find , sayes he , in the gospels , that when christ gave to st. peter the supreme government of the church , he said to him , tibi dabo claves regni coelorum , &c. that is , i will give thee the keyes of the kingdom of heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth , &c. now if you mean to give to the queen that authority which our lord gave to st. peter , if you will say , nos tibi dabimus claves regni coelorum , &c. we will give to your majesty the keyes of the kingdom of heaven , i pray you shew your commission by which you are authorised to make such a gift . again , for the same purpose our lord said to st. peter , pasce , &c. pasce , &c. pasce , &c. feed my sheep , feed my sheep , feed my lambs : as likewise , tu aliquando conversus confirma fratres , when thou art converted , confirm thy brethren . now if you mean to say so much to the queen , let us see your commission , and withall consider whether her person , being a woman , be in a capacity to receive and execute such an authority , since st. paul forbids a woman to teach in the church . thus argued the said lord chancelour , proceeding in the same manner upon other branches of spirituall government , and concludes , that without a mature consideration of all these premises , their honours shall never be able to shew their faces before their enemies in this matter . . but notwithstanding all this , the lords , &c. proceeded to frame an act without any distinct explication , whether it was a temporal or spirituall authority which they gave the queen . or rather they framed it with such clauses , as that the most obvious sence of it imported that it was an authority purely spiritual , that they invested her withall : and most certain it is , that if she had executed such an authority , she might have justified her so doing by that act. . however , after that parliament was ended , but before the first year of her raign was expired , such considerations as the lord chancelour had formerly in vain represented had so great an influence upon the queen , that she was obliged by an admonition prefixed to her injunctions , to declare that which the parliament would not , that it was not her intent by vertue of that act to challenge authority and power of ministry of divine offices in the church , but only to have soveraignty and rule over all manner of persons born within her realmes , of what state either ecclesiastical or temporall , soever they be . which explication of hers was confirmed four years after by parliament , yet without changing the foregoing act , or any clauses in it . . and consequently she left ordering of matters purely spiritual to bishops , &c. expresly renouncing it ; for as for the power of excommunication , having again taken it from the pope , she did not fear it from any of her bishops . . in the times succeeding after her , what qualifications were made and declared by three kings touching spiritual jurisdiction , shall be shewed afterward . they had not any such interests , nor such fears as the three foregoing princes had ; and therefore look'd with a more indifferent eye upon the matter : without repealing lawes , or changing the exteriour forme of the oath of supremacy ; they esteemed it sufficient to qualifie it by moderate interpretations , as shall be shewed . . as for the other oath of allegiance , the compiler whereof was king james , the most sad and horrible occasion of it is but too well known ; the intention of it is obvious , and the sence plain . so that it did not stand in need of such a multiplicity of acts of parliament , with many clauses to shew the extention of it . excepting one party , scarce any except against it ; and were it not for some few incommodious expressions and phrases ( nothing pertaining to the substance and design of the oath ) it would freely and generally be admitted and taken , notwithstanding the foresaid parties condemning it , who take that advantage to decry the substance of the oath , from which they have an aversion in as much as fidelity is promised thereby . sect . v. that the oath of supremacy as it lies , and according to the sence of the first law giver , cannot lawfully and sincerely be taken by any christian. . it is a truth from the beginning acknowledged by the fathers of the church , that all kings are truly supream governours over the persons of all their subjects , and in all causes even ec●lesiastical , wherein their civil authority is mixed constitutions of synods , however they may oblige in conscience , and be imposed under spirituall censures , yet are not lawes in any kingdom , that is , they they are not commanded , nor the transgression of them punishable in external courts by outward punishments , as attachments , imprisonment , &c. further then supream civil governours do allow . . this is a right due to all kings , though heathens , hereticks , &c so that kings by being converted to christianity or catholick religion , have not any new jurisdiction added , or their former enlarged thereby . they do not thereby become pastours of souls , but sheep of lawfull pastours : and it is not a new authority , but a new duty that by their conversion accrews to them , obliging them to promote true religion by the exercise of their civil authority and sword : and subjects are bound to acknowledge and submit to this authority of theirs , that is , not alwayes to do what princes in ecclesiasticall matters shall command , but however not to resist , in case their inward beliefs be contrary to theirs , but patiently to suffer whatsoever violence shall be offer●d them . . such a submission therefore to kingly authority may , when just occasion is , be lawfully required by kings from all their subjects , yea a profession thereof by oaths . but such an one was not the oath of supremacy when it was first contrived and imposed . for there an authority in many causes purely spirituall , was by our princes challenged , as hath been shewed . therefore if we consider that oath as now imposed on subjects infinitely differing from their princes beliefe and judgment , both in point of doctrine and discipline , it is not imaginable how it can be taken in such a sense as was first meant , by any congregations , no not even by that which is of the kings own religion . . the oath consists of two parts ; one affirmative , and the other negative : the affirmative clause obliges all the kings subjects though never so much differing in their beliefs , to swear an acknowledgment that the king is the only supreme head and governour of his realme , as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal . and the negative to deny that any forraign prince , prelate , &c. hath or ought to have any jurisdiction , power , superiority , preeminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realme , and to renounce all such . . these two recognitions , if the words be interpreted in their proper grammatical sence ( as all oathes in reason ought to be , unlesse they be otherwise interpreted by authority ) and according to the intention of the first lawgiver declared by his practice , imply ( excepting even a personal conferring of orders , and administring sacraments ) that all jurisdiction purely spiritual is acknowledged to be the kings right . now what christian at this day alive will make these two recognitions in the sence aforesaid ? yea what english protestant will be willing to make even the negative recognition ? for if there be no forraign power at all superiour to the king in things or causes purely spiritual , then neither is the pope a patriarch of the west ( which yet king james will not deny ) neither can a lawful and free general council oblige english protestants , which yet they so often protest to submit to . and as for the affirmative clause , it is well known they do not admit it , at least in k. h. the eighth his sense ; we may add , nor in q. elizabeths , as their article will testify , contrary to the rigorous sence of the words of the oath . . how much lesse then can any english subjects divided both in belief and ecclesiastical discipline from the head and body of the church of england , submit to the same oath ? for can the king be acknowledged in all causes spiritual to be a head of churches of which he renounces , and is renounced the being so much as a member ? shall he contrive , or order the contriving of articles of belief respectively sutable to each congregation , and bind his subjects severally to subscribe thereto , when himself believes them to be false ? will he require some to be obedient to bishops as instituted by christ , and others to renounce them as antichristian ? some to use no other forme of service but the common-prayer-book ; others not that but the directory ; and others neither of them , but their owne crude imaginations and non-sense ? will he command some to submit to the pope as supreame pastour , others calvin , others zuinglius , or socinus , or a john of leyden , or a knipper dolling ? . it is evident that by vertue of this oath unchanged in any words , this kingdom has at least thrice changed its religion , and the whole frame of the church . for in k. henry the eighths dayes , excepting onely in one point , it was intirely catholick . in king edward the vi. his daies it was almost lutheran : and in q. elizabeths very much calvinistical . and which is strange , excepting catholicks , those that did not change their belief , yet were content to take the same oath . which could not be done without framing to themselves different sences and mental evasions , so as though all took the same oath , yet each severally took a different oath , with a meaning in all of them contrary to the intention of the oath-makers . . matters standing thus , what a burden of guilt most we suppose to lye upon these kingdomes by occasion of an oath so solemnly imposed on the whole nation , which if we regard the force of the words , no man can take sincerely ? and this guilt is the more aggravated in this respect that there cannot possibly be any real necessity for the imposing of it . for since by an oath of allegiance and obedience , his maiesty may be secured of his subjects loyalty , what necessity or use can there be of such ambiguous acknowledgments of such a supremacy which the king himself will not acknowledge , and the affirming or denying of which contributes nothing to his safety ? he has experienced great disloyalty from a world of those that have most freely taken it , and none at all from those catholicks that have refused it . it is manifest that it was first contrived meerly on purpose that king henry the eighth might make a most filthy and execrable use of it . but now at last his majesty having been pleased to declare a liberty to tender consciences , a world of men there are in these kingdomes that are or ought to be weary of colluding with men , and dis-honouring god in swearing according to a a forme which they cannot but judge unlawful , though it were for no other reason but because it is ambiguous . and these are not roman catholicks , for they refuse the oath : but many of distinct sects from both catholick and protestant belief . and surely that christian conscience which is not tender in a matter in which the honour of god and the salvation or damnation of souls is so much concerned as in a solemn national oath , or that would voluntarily make advantage for temporal ends of gain to themselves , or malice to others , by such an oath to ensnare the consciences of another , only pretends to be a christian , but in his heart saies , there is no christ , and no god. sect . vi. in what sence the oath of supremacy is taken by english protestants . notwithstanding what hath been said , although the oath of supremacy as it is conceived , and in the rigorous sence of the words , cannot lawfully be taken by any sect amongst christians ; yet we see it freely taken by persons of quite different perswasions in matters of religion : neither will charity permit us to judge , that they do all , or indeed any of them directly against their consciences either take it , or impose it . and some make no doubt at all but that an oath , though it contain expressions which absolutely considered are false , yet are capable of a good interpretation , and that a commodious interpretation is allowed by supreme authority , such a forme of an oath may not unlawfully be sworn to , if other circumstances impede not . . now what the sences are in which respectively the protestants and other divided sects do take this oath , cannot assuredly be determined , otherwise then as they have expressed themselves in their writings . but however certain it is that they all of them take it in a meaning so farr different from that which k. henry the eighth intended , that if they had lived in his dayes , and given such limitations to the kingly power in ecclesiastical matters , as we find openly and plainly discovered in their writings , they would have been esteemed as guilty of treason , as bishop fisher and sr. thomas more were . whence appears that an oath remaining for the forme unchanged , may be taken , and allowed to be so taken , in various senses . . first for english protestants , i mean since from toward the latter end of queen elizabeth to these dayes , that notwithstanding any spiritual authority either by statutes confer'd , or assumed by k. henry the eighth , and edward the sixth , they attribute to the king only a civil power in matters ecclesiastical , and that they do this with the allowance of our princes , who questionlesse have authority to interpret oathes ( such especially as concern their own safety , and when their interpretations do no waies enlarge their own power , nor diminish their subjects rights ) may appear by evident testimonies in all these three last princes times , published by the most learned doctours then living among them . . in queen elizabeths reign we have the testimony of doctour bilson , afterwards bishop of winchester , whose expressions are these ; the oath ( saith he ) expresseth not the duty of princes to god , but ours to them . and as they must be obeyed when they joyne with the truth , so must they be endured when they fall into errour . which side soever they take , either obedience to their wills , or submission to their swords , is their due by gods law. and that is all which our oath exacteth . again , this is the supreme power of princes , which we soberly teach , and which you [ jesuites ] so bitterly detest , that princes be gods ministers in their own dominions , bearing the sword , freely to permit , and publickly to defend that which god commandeth in faith and good manners , and in ecclesiastical discipline to receive and establish such rules and orders as the scriptures & canons shall decide to be needful and healthful for the church of god in their kingdomes . and as they may lawfully command that which is good in all things and causes , be they temporal , spiritual or ecclesiastical : so may they with just force remove whatsoever is erroneous , vitious or superstitious within their lands , and with external losses and corporal pains represse the broachers and abbettours of heresies and all impieties . from which subjection unto princes no man within their realms , monk , priest , preacher , nor prelate is exempted . and without their realmes no mortal man hath any power from christ judicially to depose them , much lesse to invade them in open field , least of all to warrant their subjects to rebel against them . moreover intending to explain in what sence spiritual jurisdiction seems by the oath to be given to princes , he saith first , we make no prince judge of faith : and then more particularly , to devise new rites and ceremonies ; for the church is not the princes vocation ; but to receive and allow such as the scriptures and canons commend , and such as the bishops and pastours of the place shall advise , not infringing the scriptures or canons . and so for all other ecclesiastical things and ●auses , princes be neither the devisers nor directours of them , but the confirmers and establishers of that which is good , and displacers and revengers of that whi●h is evill . which power we say they have in all things and causes , be they spiritual , ecclesiastical , or temporal . hereto his adversary is brought in replying and what for excommunications and absolutions , be they in the princes power also ? to this he answers ; the abuse of excommunication in the priest , and contempt of it in the people , princes may punish : excommunicate they may not , for so much as the keys are no pa●t of their charge . lastly to explain the negative clause in the oath , he sayes , in this sense we defend princes to be supreme , that is not at liberty to do what they list without regard of truth or right : but without superiour on earth to represse them with violent means , and to take their kingdomes from them . thus doctour b●lson : whose testimony may be interpreted to be the queens own interpretation of the oath , since as appears by the title page of his book , what he wrote was perused and approved by publick authority . and to such a sense of the oath as this , there is not a catholick clergy man in france , germany , venice , or flanders but would readily subscribe . . in the next place suitable to him doctour carleton in king james his time thus states the matter ; bellarmine ( saith he ) disputing of jurisdiction saith , there is a triple power in the bishop of rome ; first of order : secondly of internal jurisdiction ; thirdly of external jurisdiction : the first is referd to the sacraments ; the second to inward government which is in the court of conscience : the third to that external government which is practised in external courts : and confesseth that of the first and second there is no question between us , but only of the third . then of this ( saith carleton ) we are agreed that the question between us and them is only of jurisdiction coactive in external courts , binding and compelling by force of law and other external mulcts and punishments , beside excommunication . as for spiritual jurisdiction of the church standing in examination of controversies of faith , judging of heresies , deposing of hereticks , excommunication of notorious offendours , ordination of priests and deacons , institution and collation of benefices and spiritual cures , &c. this we reserve entire to the church , which princes cannot give or take from the church . this power hath been practised by the church without co-active jurisdiction , other then of excommunication . but when matters handled in the ecclesiastical consistory are not matters of faith and religion , but of a civil nature , which yet are called ecclesiastical , as being given by princes , and appointed to be within the cognisance of that consistory ; and when the censures are not spiritual , but carnal , compulsive , coactive , here appeareth the power or the civil magistrate . this power we yield to the magistrate ; and here is the question , whether the magistrate hath right to this power or jurisdiction , &c. this then is the thing that we are to prove , that ecclesiastical coactive power by force of law and corporal punishments , by which christian people are to be governed in externall and contentious courts , is a power which of right belongeth to christian princes . again afterward he sayes , concerning the extention of the churches jurisdiction , it cannot be denyed but that there is a power in the church , not only internal , but also of external jurisdiction . of internal power there is no question made . external jurisdiction being understood all that is practised in external courts , or consistories , is either definitive or mulctative . authority definitive in matters of faith and religion belongeth to the church . mulctative power may be understood either as it is with coaction , or as it is referred to spirituall censures . as it standeth in spirituall censures , it is the right of the church , and was practised by the church when the church was without a christian magistrate , and since . but coactive jurisdiction was never practised by the church when the church was without christian magistrates : but was alwayes understood to belong to the civill magistrate , whether he were christian or heathen . after this manner doth doctour carleton bishop of chichester understand the supremacy of the king acknowledged in the oath . . in the last place doctour bramhall bishop of derry in our late kings dayes , and now archbishop of armagh , thus declares both the affirmative and negative parts of the oath touching the kings supream authority in matters ecclesiastical , and renouncing the popes jurisdiction in the same , here in england , in his book called schisme guarded , &c. the summe of which book is in the title-page expressed to consist in shewing that the great controversie about papal power is not a question of faith , but of interest and profit ; not with the church of rome , but with the court of rome , &c. this learned and judicious writer thus at once states the point in both these respects . my last ground , ( sayes he ) is , that neither king henry the eighth , nor any of his legislators did ever endeavour to deprive the bishop of rome of the power of the keyes , or any part thereof ; either the key of order , or the key of jurisdiction . i mean jurisdiction purely spirituall , which hath place only in the inner court of conscience , and over such persons as submit willingly . nor did ever challenge or endeavour to assume to themselves either the key of order , or the key of jurisdiction purely spiritual . all which they deprived the pope of , all which they assumed to themselves , was the external regiment of the church by coactive power , to be exercised by persons capable of the respective branches of it . this power the bishops of rome never had , or could have justly over their subjects , but under them whose subjects they were . and therefore when we meet with these words or the like , ( that no forraign prelate shall exercise any manner of power , jurisdiction , &c. ecclesiastical within this realm ) it is not to be understood of internal or purely spiritual power in the court of conscience , or the power of the keyes , ( vve see the contrary practised every day : ) but of external and coactive power in ecclesiasticall causes in foro contentioso . and that it is , and might to be so understood , i prove clearly by it proviso in one main act of parliament , and an article of the english church . [ which act & article shall be produced afterward . ] the bishop continues they ( that is , the parliament , ) profess their ordinance is meerly political : what hath a political ordinance with power purely spiritual ? they seek only to preserve the kingdom from rapine , &c. and then having produced the article , he concludes , you see the power is political , the sword is political , all is political . our kings leave the power of the keyes and jurisdiction purely spiritual to those to whom christ hath left it . nothing can be more express then this so clear a testimony of so judicious a bishop touching the kings supremacy in matters ecclesiasticall acknowledged by oath . only we must be excused if we assent not to what he affirms , touching king henry the eighth his not assuming spiritual jurisdiction . . again the same bishop thus further adds , wheresoever our lawes do deny all spirituall jurisdiction to the pope in england , it is in that sence that we call the exteriour court of the church , the spirituall court. they do not intend at all to deprive him of the power of the keyes , or of any spiritual power that was bequeathed him by christ or by his apostles , when he is able to prove his legacy . to conclude , omitting a world of other passages to the same effect , he saith , we have not renounced the substance of the papacy , except the substance of the papacy do consist in coactive power . . moreover to warrant these explications of three so eminent men of the protestant church , who write expresly upon the subject , may be added , testimonies yet more authentick and irrefragable , of our princes themselves , who are to be esteemed unquestionably authoritative interpreters of their own lawes , at least in these cases , as afore was observed ; and besides those , the publick articles of the english clergy , yea the statutes of parliaments also . . in an act of parliament made in the fifth year of queen elizabeths raign there is an interpretation of the oath of supremacy in an express proviso , that the oath of supremacy shall be taken and expounded in such forme as is set forth in an admonition annexed to the queens injunctions published in the first year of her raign . the which admonition was made to take away a scruple raised by some , as if the queen had usurped a jurisdiction purely spirituall , which she renounces : professing first that by vertue of that oath , no other authority is to be acknowledged then what was challenged and lately used by king henry the eighth , and king edward the sixth . this clause is not to be supposed to be any part of the interpretation of the oath : but it is only intended to signifie , that this is no new invented usurpation of a title , but that the same had been allowed to those two kings before her and the same authority ( saith she ) is and was of ancient time due to the imperial crown of this realm . neither doth she say , that she challenges all that those two kings did , as in effect it is apparent she did not , but that what she requires had been formerly granted to them . and it is evident that if her meaning had been that the oath should be taken according to that enormous latitude of power allowed and exercised by them , such a way of indefinite explication would have been far more burdensome and entangling to conscices then before : for that would signifie , that all that swear should be obliged to inform themselves in all the clauses of acts of parliament made by those two kings , and in all the actions performed by them , or else they will swear they know not what . her explication therefore is set down clearly and distinctly in the following words , by which she declares what that authority is which she challenges , and which must be acknowledge in taking the oath , viz. that is , the queen under god to have the soveraignty and rule over all manner of persons born within these realms , dominions and countries , of what estate , either ecclesiastical or temporal , soever they be , so as no other forraign power shall or ought to have any superiority over them . . this clause according to the queens interpretation confirm'd by act of parliament , contains the true sence of the oath , so that if this clause can be sworn to , that is all that is signified in the form of the oath , say protestants . now that by this clause only civil power over all persons ecclesiasticall is challenged , appears by a wrong interpretation of the oath which she complains to have been spred abroad , viz. as if by the words of the said oath it may be collected that the kings and queens of this realm , possessours of the crown may challenge authority and power of ministry of divine offices in the church : she renounces all medling with any offices purely ecclesiasticall in the church , ( as also doctor bilson by her authority declares in the forecited words : ) she pretends not to administer sacraments , conferr orders , inflict ecclesiastical censures , determine controversies of faith , &c. but she challenges a supream civil authority over all those that have right to exercise those offices , as being her subjects as well as the laity : and this jurisdiction she will have acknowledged so to be her peculiar right , as that no forraign power shall or ought to have any superiority over them , that is , no part of this regal power , whatsoever spiritual jurisdiction , which she medles not withall , they may challenge . that this is the true sence of this clause appears by that expression [ so as ] which would be void of all sence , if the meaning of it should be conceived to be , that the queen has the supream regal authority , so as no other hath a pastorall authority , no way prejudicial to the regal ; and this sence is evidently confirm'd by the act . eliz. which gives this title to the act . eliz. that it is an act by which there is restored to the crown the ancient jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical and spiritual , and an abolishing of all forraign power repugnant to the same ; not simply all forraign power , but only that which would diminish her regal power . for how ridiculous would it be to declare a power challenged , and another power renounced that has no repugnancy to it , and renounced with the words so as ? . moreover in the said admonition there are other matters worthy to be well observed : for first by making and with authority publishing that admonition and injunctions , she expresly assumes as her right , a power to interpret oaths and acts of parliament : which if she may do , so doubtless may her successors . secondly , besides this she gives power to any one that takes the oath , in taking it to signifie that he accepts it with the said meaning ; for sayes she , if any person that hath conceived any other sence of the form of the said oath , shall accept the same oath with this interpretation , sence or meaning , her majesty is well pleased to accept every such in that behalfe as her good and obedient subject , and shall acquit them of all manner of penalties contained in the said act against such as shall peremptorily or obstinately refuse to take the same oath . thirdly , that this her interpretation and addition is moreover established by a following act of parliament , which sayes , that it is to be taken and expounded in this forme . lastly , that the oath it self is by the queen in her admonition said to be an oath prescribed to be required of divers persons for the recognition of their allegiance to her . which shews it concern'd not beliefe , but duty only in maintaining her supream civill authority . . next in king james his daies what was conceived to be the power challenged by our kings in vertue of that oath , will easily appear by a notable passage in his premonition to all christian monarchs , in which his intention is to convince ( as he saith ) those ( roman ) libellers of wilful malice , who impudently affirm , that the oath of allegiance was devised for deceiving and intrapping of papists in points of conscience . [ now speaking thus , surely he would not it should be believed that his meaning was by continuing to urge the oath of supremacy likewise to deceive and intrap his poor subjects in points of conscience . from which unworthy intention how averse he was , that is , how far from assuming to himself or even denying to the pope a jurisdiction purely spiritual , the following words will testify : ] the truth is ( saith he ) that the lower house of parliament at the first framing of that oath made it to contain that the pope had no power to excommunicate me ; which i caused them to reforme , only making it to conclude , that no excommunication of the popes can warrant my subjects to practise against my person or state ; denying the deposition of kings to be in the popes lawful power : as indeed i take any such temporal violence to be far without the limits of such a spiritual censure as excommunication . [ and suarez and becanus , &c. go further , affirming that by excommunication not any temporal right or power is taken away , or diminished . ] so careful was i ( saith he ) that nothing should be contained in this oath except the profession of natural allegiance , and civil and temporal obedience , with a promise to resist to all contrary uncivil violence . and presently after he adds , that the occasion of the oath was ordained only for making of a true distinction between papists of quiet disposition , and in all other things good subjects , and such other papists as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody maximes that the powder-traitours did . nay moreover touching the patriarchal jurisdiction he saith , for my self ( if that were the quèstion ) i would with all my heart give my consent , that the bishops of rome should have the first seat : i being a western , king would go with the patriarch of the west . and how far he was from challenging spiritual jurisdiction , he shewed by his constant committing such affairs to his clergy , only adding his regall authority for the execution of their ordinances : but more publickly and validly by a new confirming and causing to be published by his authority the articles of the english clergy , among which is the th , we do not give our kings either the administration of gods word or sacraments , which the injunctions published lately by queen elizabeth do most evidently daclare : but only that prerogative which we see to have been alwayes attributed to all godly princes by himself in holy scriptures , that is , to preserve or contain all estates and orders committed to their trust by god , whether they be ecclesiastical or civil , in their duties , and restrain contumacious offenders with the civil sword . , this one article , not only publickly acknowledged by all english protestants , but a subsciption thereto enacted from ecclesiasticks , and those that take degrees in the vniversities , and withall by act of parliament enjoyned to be read by all beneficed ministers within two moneths after their induction , this one article , i say , so confirmed , may alone suffice to demonstrate evidently and distinctly that it is only a civil jurisdiction that the kings of england challenge in ecclesiasticall matters , and not at all an authority purely spiritual or pastoral : they are as all other christian princes have ever been acknowledged , custodes utriusque tabuloe : they ought to see and provide that all their subjects do their duty both to god and man. wherein that duty consists , which concernes the divine worship , they are to learn from the church : and at their peril it is , if they be misdirected by a false church ; but however thus far their just power extends , which must be submitted to either by obeying or suffering . as long therefore as this article is in force in england , there will be no need of searching into the senses or interpretations of following kings , say protestants ; yet if we should do this , it is well known that our late soveraign , and his majesty now raigning , ( besides many expressions vivae vocis oraculo , ) have been rather more carefull then king james , not to interpose themselves in functions purely spirituall . . this section shall be concluded with setting down a notable provizo extant in that very statute in which the popes jurisdiction was most prejudiced , and the greatest authority in ecclesiasticall matters confer'd upon king henry the eighth . the which provizo is so cautelously framed , that though king henry esteemed himself to have gained a jurisdiction purely spirituall , and accordingly in many particulars practised it ; to the which several clauses also both in this and following statutes seem as if they gave warrant ; yet the parliament by the said provizo laid a ground how they might in future and better times shew how they meant no such thing . the words are these , provided alwayes that this act , nor any thing or things therein contained shall be hereafter interpreted or expounded , that your grace , your nobles and subjects intend by the same to decline or vary from the congregation of christs church in any things concerning the very articles of the catholick faith of christendom , or in any other things declared by holy scripture and the word of god , necessary for your and their salvation : but only to make an ordinance by policies necessary and convenient to repress vice , and for good conservation of this realm in peace , unity and tranquillity , from rapine and spoil , insuing much the old ancient customes of this realm in that behalfe . not minding to seek for any reliefes , succours or remedies for any worldly things and humane lawes in any case of necessity , but within this realm , at the hands of your highness , your heirs and successors , kings of this realm , which have and ought to have an imperial power and authority in the same , and not obliged in any worldly causes to any other superiour . by this proviso , never repealed , the parliaments ordinance is declared to be meerly political , that the kings independence on forraign power is in worldly things and humane lawes , he being in worldly causes not obliged to any other superiour . . thus far of the sence in which both the most judicious among the english protestants have declared , and have been authorised to declare , what power it is that by the oath is deferred to the kings of england , and renounced to be in any forraign prince or prelate ; to wit , a civil political power , wheresoever it can be exercised in any causes ecclesiastical , &c. against this there is not extant a contradictory testimony of any one protestant writer : so that the protestant subjects of england do intend , and judging that they have unquestiónable grounds to judge this only to be the sence of the oath , in this sence only do they take it , and require it to be taken by others . sect . vii . in what sence the oathes of supremacy and allegiance seem to be taken by presbyterians , independents , &c. . it is a wonderfull mystery how it should come to pass that our english prebyterians , &c. should ( especially now of late ) with so much willingness and greediness themselves swallow these oaths , and so clamorously , not without threatning , urge the imposing them upon others . is it because the oath of supremacy has so peculiar a conformity to their principles , and that of allegiance to their practises ? or that they are so ready , and pressing to disclaim and condemn all that themselves have done these last twenty years ? . first for ther doctrinal principles , i do not find that any of those sects of late in england in peaceable times have publickly declared in what sence they allowed his majesty to have a supreme jurisdicton in causes ecclesiastical or spiritaul , as to themselves : but as to the oppression and destruction of poor roman catholicks , they have alwayes shew'd too great a willingness to exalt the kings authority , and to draw out and sharpen his sword , far more then himself was willing . i do not find that any of them have busied themselves , as a world of protestants and catholicks have , with making discourses upon the oathes . their silence in this point wherein they are doubtless much concern'd one way or other , is surely very argumentative . . who ever knew or heard to flow from the tongue , or drop from the pen of a presbyterian , so christian a positon as is sincerely avouched both by english protestants and the generall body of roman catholicks , viz. that even in case a christian or heathen prince should make use of his civil power to persecute truth , that power ought not upon any pretences to be actively resisted by violence or force of armes : but though they cannot approve , they must at least patiently suffer the effects of his misused authority , leaving the judgment to god only . how unknown , at least how unreceived such a doctrine has hitherto been among their brethren abroad , will but too manifestly appear in a volume entitled , dangerous positions , collected by archbishop bancroft out of severall books written by calvinisticall preachers . what judgment their patriarch calvin made of king henry the eighths new title of the head of the church , we have seen before , and what an exception , terrible to princes , the french calvinistical church hath made in their confession of faith , speaking of obedience due to the supreme magistrate , appears at least every sunday in all their hands in print : where they acknowledge such obedience due to them , except the law of god and religion be interested , or to use their own expression , mogennant que l'empire de dieu , demeure en son entire , that is , upon condition that gods soveraignty remain undiminished . which clause what it means , their so many , and so long convinced rebellions do expound . . and as for their practices in england and scotland , it were to be wished they could be forgotten , especially all that has hapned the last twenty years : and it may suffiice only in gross to take notice , that the most efficacious engin for begining the late war and engaging their party in the prosecution of it was a publick declaration , that their design was to root out popish doctrines , favoured by the king and bishops , to abolish publick formes of church-service , and to destroy episcopacy and church government , root and branch , which had been established in england by the universal authority of the whole kingdom . . these things considered , is it not a great mystery that such persons of such perswasions should be so zealous to take and impose generally either of these oaths ? to think that they do knowingly , directly and formally forswear themselves , and force others to do so , would be uncharitable . therefore an evasion they have to secure themselves in their own opinions from perjury . how little they deferr to kings in their own ecclesiastical matters and government , yea how they declare that none must be excepted from their consistories and synodical jurisdictions even externally coercive , is evident both in sco●land and elsewhere . and it is observable that in the form of an oath lately contrived in scotland , the word ecclesiastical is studiously left out . how comes it then to pass that they can in england swear that the king is supreme head and governour in all causes ecclesiastical or spirituall ? who can reconcile these things together in such a sence ? . surely it will be extremely difficult , if not impossible to imagine any colourable evasion or pretext for cousening themselves , except it be this , that both the oaths were made only against roman catholicks acknowledging the pope to be supreme pastour of gods church , so that whosoever can swear that he is no papist , may freely and without scruple take those oaths , as being nothing at all concerned in them : whatever he does , he cannot be a traytor by vertue of the oath , because he was not a powder-traytor . . if the secret of the affair do indeed lye on such an interpretation as this , then it will follow that none of the kings subjects are , or can by any oath as yet in force be obliged not to be traytors , but only such roman catholicks as take the oath of allegiance . a hard case for his majesty . . this evasion may perhaps serve for the negative clause of the oath of supremacy , wherein profession is made , that the pope has no jurisdiction in this kingdom : but how will they defend themselves from the most principal affirmative clause , that the king alone is supreme governour in all causes ecclesiastical ? till they express themselves in this point , no other expedient , i suppose , can be found , but by denying that there are two distinct clauses in the oath , and consequently by saying that the whole oath is but one simple assertion , viz. that the king is so far to be esteemed the supreme governour as that the pope is not above him : but yet a consistory of presbyters though his subjects , yea any single minister in causes toùching religion and church government may be his superiour . now if this guess hit right , upon the like grounds the oath of allegiance will be interpreted too , as if they that take it should say thus , we promise fidelity to his majesty so sincerely , that notwithstanding any excommunication or sentence of deprivation issuing from the pope against him , we will not seek to depose or murther him . but if our teachers , or we our selves do interpret the word of god against any of his actions , or if we find in scripture that he loves not the pure reformed religion , and shewes his dislike by any publick action , then he must look to himself : for these oaths do not extend to such cases , no not so much as to hinder us from defending our purses with our swords against any illegall exactions . we are sure we are not papists ; that we readily swear , and that is enough . . notwithstanding if they look well upon the oath , they will find the word only too stubborn to comply with this sence , where they profess the king to be the only supreme governour : unless they will conceive the meaning to be , that he is only a supreme governour in regard of the pope with whom he will have nothing to do , and who therefore is neither under him , nor above him , and in regard of no body of the world besides , not the most pittifull tub-man . this indeed would be an evasion , the invention whereof is beyond the art of equivocation . . it is not here pretended , that by this evasion and no other , presbyterians have the art to sweeten oaths , which in the ordinary sence and understanding of all the rest of the kingdom are point blank opposed , at least to their brethrens doctrines and their own practises : so that the author of these reflexions must leave a more perfect discovery of their mysterious wayes to the eyes of the state infinitely more clear-sighted and penetrating . . as for the independents , all that to me is known of them since they lately shew'd their faces to the destruction both of church and state , is their new name : what they think of the oaths , does not to me appear . but the very name implying a renouncing of all order and subordination in church-government even among themselves : and their known practice having been an usurpation of supreme authority to themselves , purchased with the most execrable murther of their undoubted and too too mercifull soveraign : if they can be so hypocritical as to take either of these oaths , they will deceive no body : for it will be evident to all men , that not changing their tenents and courses , they must needs be perjured ; so that to some it may be a doubt whether it be a lawfull or however an expedient mean for the kings safety to offer them the oathes , or to relye upon their taking them . . all that for the present will be collected from the words or practises of these two sects , is , that at least they do acknowledge so far a concurrence with the sence of protestants touching these oathes , that they do assure themselves that by them there is no jurisdiction purely ecclesiastical , attributed or due to his majesty : how far , or whether at all they will permit his civil power to act in matters ecclesiastical , till they discover their minds , ( if they be not too much discovered already ) who can tell ? . besides these , other scots there are in abundance , which the common voice tyes together as samson did his foxes , tail to tail , their faces all looking several wayes : however they are called usually fanaticks . of these some professe obedience , others profess against it , but not any of them will swear either the one , or the other . their sence therefore of these oaths is neither to be expected , nor if it were had , is it to be valued . sect . viii . vpon what grounds roman-catholicks do generally refuse to take the oath of supremacy . . it may very well , and indeed does to protestants seem a mystery almost as hard to be penetrated into , as was that in the last section , why roman-catholicks should so generally refuse to take the oath of supremacy , considering that the whole kingdom besides , does unanimously agree at least in this point , that the supremacy ascribed therein to his majesty does not at all prejudice the spirituall jurisdiction of pastours , with which the king does not meddle , neither indeed does it concern him ; for it is nothing to the king whether one of his subjects be for his faults excommunicated , or admitted to the communion ; whether he be an ecclesiastical person , or a lay-man ; as likewise whether his excommunication or ordination proceed from one beyond seas , or at home ; and the like is to be said of his orders . now since catholick faith teaches that secular power which belongs to caesar , should be given to caesar : and meer spiritual authority over consciences , and upon spirituall penalties only , should be given to the supreme and subordinate pastours , protestants wonder why catholicks so perswaded should refuse to swear that which they profess : especially since by such a refusal they deprive themselves of a comfortable exercise of their religion , and withall expose themselves to many and grievous penalties . they profess loyalty to the king , and dare not swear it . and they hopefully perswade themselves , that if they did swear it , he would believe them , which is a grace that he will not afford to all : but by not swearing it when they are required by lawfull authority , they put themselves in an incapacity to make their loyalty usefull to his majesty , & give perhaps scandal to many out of the church , as if indeed there were some unknown principle of disloyalty in their religion , which forbids them to confirm by oath that which they without oath willingly and almost unanimously profess . this is a mystery that protestants wonder at . . if catholicks answer , that they are ready to swear that which protestants so confidently affirm to be the sence of the oath , but the oath it self according to the present form they dare not take , because they find such a sence very unsuitable to the expressions in the oath : the others will reply , that catholicks take too much upon themselves , to give a sence to an oath , contrary to what is declared by publick and supreme authority : that protestants themselves would make a scruple perhaps at it , were it not that the sence in which they declare their taking of it so seems to them warranted by supreme authority , as no man can imagine , almost a more authentick testimony : for that by the oath our princes would have no other then civil regal authority in ecclesiastical matters attributed to them ; and that as they themselves pretend not to a jurisdiction purely spiritual , so neither do they envy or deny it to any of those whom our lord has constituted pastours of souls in his church : all this is attested by all particular writers , nemine contradicente , by the voluntary assertions of our princes , the undoubted authoritative interpreters of their own lawes , who publickly approved such writers , and also shew'd this by their actions , or rather their omissions to exercise spiritual power . further the same is attested by a publick article or confession of faith of the whole body of the english clergy confirmed and made an ecclesiastical law by regal and parliamentary authority : and lastly by acts of parliament remaining in full force , so that in the opinion of protestants it is almost impossible to find stronger assurances of any truth , then are the proofs that this is acknowledged to be the true sence of the oath . thus say protestants . . notwithstanding in the judgment of catholicks , the negative clause in the oath , [ viz. no forraign prince , prelate , &c. hath or ought to have any jurisdiction , power or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm ] seems incapable of that sence , and directly contrary to a point of their faith , viz. that the pope is supreme pastour of the whole church in matters purely ecclesiastical or spiritual . that clause has so horrible an aspect , it implies a renouncing even the popes pastoral authority , and this with so much emphasis , that least the word [ ecclesiastical ] might possibly import a civil authority in ecclesiastical courts , there is added also [ spiritual : ] that therefore a catholicks tongue cannot repeat it , much less swear to an acknowledgment of it . . but this excuse does not satisfie such protestants as out of compassion to the fellow-sufferings of roman catholicks , are desirous that their fidelity may be usefull to their soveraign and country . for they reply , that though the said clause might perhaps deserve to be ill looked on by strangers , yet not so by englishmen : since the word [ spiritual ] has not the same notion elsewhere , that it has in england . the oath is to be administred not only to schollers , but to all lay-persons in office , to soldiers in ships , &c. now in england the word [ ecclesiastical ] is not commonly understood by ignorant persons , and therefore for explanation of it there is added [ or spiritual , ] which term whensoever it is applyed to jurisdiction , signifies in england no more then such jurisdiction as is exercised in foro contentioso , and ecclesiastical courts , which we call the spiritual courts , and spiritual judges , and spiritual authority , as my lord of derry well observes : for as for that purely spiritual jurisdiction that a bishop exercises in censures , or a confessarius over his penitent in the internal court of conscience , english men ordinarily know little or nothing of it . and therefore if that clause were to be translated into italian , french or latin , the word [ spiritual ] ought not to be turn'd spiritualem , but some other term must be invented , which should import this sence , and no more . . again , though the clause sayes that the pope has not any authority , no not so much as ecclesiastical or spiritual : it hath as they think , already been shewed that that phrase implies only that he hath not any such regal or civil authority by his own right and divine law , as the king challenges in matters ecclesiastical , as the approved explication by the words [ so as ] in queen elizabeths admonition demonstrates . neither is it unusual among writers , when they speak of a present matter , and would deny any thing concerning it , to deny it in indefinite terms . so when our saviour sayes to the scribes , if ye were blind , ye should have no sin ; or , ye should not have any sin , his meaning is not , that if they had not had sufficient light whereby they might perceive him to be the messias , they would not have been proud , malicious , adulterers , &c. but only this , that the sin of infidelity should not have been imputed to them , which before he had charged them withall . . therefore although that clause look so hideously in the eyes of roman catholicks , that if it stood alone , and were considered absolutely and simply by it self , they could not without renouncing a point of acknowledged catholick faith subscribe to it : notwithstanding if it be considered with dependence on the foregoing words of the oath , it speaks a quite other language then otherwise it would in their opinion . . to give some examples of the like case . if it were proposed to an orthodox christian whether he would subscribe to these assertions , the father is greater then the son , and , there is no evill , but god is the author of it ; he would doubtless refuse to subscribe to the former , as being heretical , and to the later , as being moreover blasphemous . notwithstanding having been informed that our saviour speaking of himself as a man , said , my father is greater then i am , and that the meaning is , that the father is greater then the son , if the son be considered according to his humane nature : and again that god has by his prophet speaking of afflictions , said expresly , is there any evill in a city , of which i am not the author ? and that the word [ evill ] in that speech doth not signifie sin , which it does , when it is mentioned absolutely and simply ; but only punishment ; then a good catholick will make no difficulty in subscribing to both those sayings . now the very same , say they , may be said touching this clause as it lies in the oath , especially having been sufficiently declared that it is only a civill temporal jurisdiction in ecclesiastical courts , &c. which is denyed to belong to any other by right , except only the king. . but in all events , they conceive that among all roman catholicks those might soonest be perswaded to admit a favourable interpretation of this oath , who maintain the doctrine of equivocation , which is not expresly excluded by this oath , as it is by that of allegiance . though how can equivocation be excluded , when according to them one equivocation may be renounced by another ? a most horrid example whereof england has lately seen in the r. padre antonio vais . . neither do protestants think that a declaration formerly made by the pope , and forbidding catholicks to take those oaths with any interpretation whatsoever , needs to be a hindrance to the taking of it in the forementioned sence so publickly avouched , but onely in any secret meanings invented , or mentally reserved by particular persons . for surely the pope intends not to take a power from law-givers to interpret their own lawes , nor to forbid their subjects to admit their interpretations , if they be agreable to truth , and that the words be capable of being so interpreted , as these are pretended to be . certain it is that the pope was never informed of this so legal an interpretation : for if he had , he would never have forbidden that to distressed english catholicks , which to his knowledg all good subjects in france , germany , venice , &c. neither will nor dare refuse to acknowledge and profess . besides , ( say they ) is england now become the only kingdom in christendom where all manner of briefs must be immediately submitted to without a publick legal acceptation , and without examination of the motives , or suggestions by which they w●re procured ? it is far otherwise now in the most catholick countries , and was formerly even in england , when it was most catholick : the lawes then made against receiving or executing bulls from rome without a publick admission under the penalty of incurring a praemunire , are still in force . . if catholicks rejoyning , say that there is another regard for which they are unwilling even to receive information touching any qualifications of these oaths , viz. because the mere admitting a probability that they may lawfully and without prejudice to catholick faith be taken , would argue that so many vertuous , wise and holy men as have suffered death , &c. for refusing them , have suffred without any necessary cause : such were bishop fisher , sir thomas more , &c. in king henry the eights dayes , and many good priests since . . notwithstanding , say protestants , such a consequence is not necessary : for first , it hath been shewed that king henry the eighth intended to exclude the purely spiritual jurisdiction of the pope , his power of determining matters of faith according to former lawes of the church , &c. and therefore no wonder that good catholicks then would not betray their consciences . but it is well known that sir thomas more advised the king to limit some excesses of the popes jurisdiction . and an eminent writer , tells us that bishop fisher offered to take the oath , if it might have been permitted him to explicate his sence of it , which could be no other then this , that he should deny the popes temporal jurisdiction . secondly as for those that suffred in q. elizabeths time , it is certain that all good catholicks would never have esteemed it a martyrdom to dye for refusing to the king a supreme kingly power , and attributing that to the pope . they had therefore a quite different notion of what the state of england required by this oath . but of late good occasion has been given for a more exact examination of it . for to make a sincere and ingenuous confession , it was a committee of the late rebellious parliament , that probably first of all discovered what use they made of the foresaid proviso in the act . eliz. to warrant them to take this oath without submitting their religion to the king. and the same use they judged that all other sects might make of the same , and justify their so doing by law , even roman catholicks themselves . . all these things considered , it is no wonder that english protestants not being fully informed of the state of catholicks , should wonder at roman catholicks for their so universal agreement in refusing an oath so interpreted , without the least prejudice to their faith , but with so unexpressible a prejudice both to their estates and exercise of their religion . . the authour of these reflexions does freely acknowledge that he has been inquisitive with more then ordinary diligence into the grounds upon which protestants do make no scruple at all to take an oath , which if it had no expounders to qualifie the sence properly imported by the words , he knows they could not take it with a good conscience nay moreover he has given all the advantage that he could to the proofes produced by them to justify that no other sence ought to be given therto , by any english subject : in so much as he may apprehend that he shall incurr a danger to be esteemed by catholicks to have a design to encourage them also to take it , since that sence is such as is very convenient to the principles of catholick religion . . but he protests the contrary . his end in writing all this is ( besides a satisfaction given to his mind , that he cannot now without breach of charity charge protestants with such an unsincerity in their taking this oath , as presbyterians &c. are apparently guilty of ) to afford unto the world an illustrious proof of the most perfect sincerity , and the greatest tendernesse of conscience expressed on this occasion by the generality of english catholicks , that i believe ever was given by any church since christs time . . they live here in their own native country with lesse priviledg then strangers , they are excluded from having any influence on any thing that concerns the common-weale of which they are freeborn subjects ; when laws are made against them as guilty persons , they are not permitted to separate their cause from a few that only deserved the penalties of those lawes ; they are by lawes obnoxious to greater sufferings then enemies ; they see their families impoverished , their houses invaded by savage officers , their lives forfeited as traytours , for entertaining those without whom they could not live otherwise then as pagans , deprived of performing any service and worship to god , &c. all these miseries they groan under without proofe of any demerit on their parts ; the crimes of a few miserable seduced and seducing wretches , and their bloody doctrine , by none in the kingdom more detested then by themselves , are made their guilt . and these calamities they could avoid by taking an oath , the present new acknowleded sence whereof ( as to his majesties right ) is just and lawful . and yet they dare not take it . why ? because they fear god above all . but do not protestants fear him too ? they are no judges of the consciences of others . this they assure themselves of , that if those that now take the oath , had been to have framed it , they would have shewed a greater proof of their fear of god , then to have expressed the kings supremacy in termes fit for none but k. hen. the viii . . but moreover great difference there is between the case of protestants and roman catholicks in regard of this oath . for protestants know that the first invention of this oath was to explore the consciences of catholicks , and to tempt them to schisme , by renouncing the spiritual authority of the head of gods church , which under perill of damnation they cannot do . they would not perhaps find so great difficulty , ( without swearing , ) only to say , that the king alone is the supreme governour in all matters ecclesiastical within his dominions , &c. when they are obliged to say this to persons that acknowledge with them such power to be only civill : but an oath to catholicks is a thing so dreadful , that they dare not call god to witnesse that they sincerely swear an acknowledgement that the pope has not , nor ought to have any superiority ecclesiastical or spiritual , unlesse it might be permitted them at the same time , & in the same breath to signify that this is intended of civil , kingly authority in ecclesiastical causes . they tremble to swear in a phrase at the best ambiguous , or rather not ambiguous , but formally contradictory to catholick doctrine : for all the words that they pronounce , and of their acknowledgment whereof they make god a witnesse , are such as they are perswaded to be manifestly erroneous . now god is called a witnesse to what men say in an oath , not to what they think , unless they think as they say . . but moreover there is another consideration that is more than sufficient to make the taking of this oath inconsistent with catholick religion : and that is , the difference that king james , bishop andrews , &c. put between the two oathes of supremacy and allegiance , in regard of their end and intention . for sayes king james , the oath of allegiance ( was not framed against roman catholicks in general , but ) only to make a separation between catholicks of a peaceable disposition & in all other things good subjects , and such roman catholicks as maintained the rebellious maxims of the powder-traitours . but as for the oath of supremacy , the intention of the continuation of it , was to the end to discover who were roman catholichs , and who protestants . so that whosoever takes that oath , is presumed by king james &c. to declare that he is no catholick : bishop andrews has the like expression : but withall he discovers the usesessness of that oath . for ( saies he ) what needs any oath at all to detect who are roman catholicks ? for they refuse to be present at the protestants church service , they will not come to our sermons , they dare not receive the eucharist with us , &c. so that without any oath you may easily know who are roman catholicks . . lastly the principal proof by which protestants demonstrate that by the oathes no other authority or supremacy is given to our princes , but civil only ( which is the article of the english church ) though it be sufficient to clear the affirmative part of the oath , yet not so for the negative , concerning the popes spiritual jurisdiction . yea in the same place it is expresly excluded : for the words following in the same article do apparently give and require a very uncatholick sence of that negative clause ; for there is expressely affirmed , the bishop of rome hath not any jurisdiction in this kingdom . now since both king james , bishop andrews , and the thirty seventh article , even in the very same places where they speak of kingly and papal power do as the former rightly state the kingly , and leave the papal ( spiritual ) power indifinitely excluded , their intention appears to have been to declare against , and require an abrenunciation of a catholick point of faith . . upon these grounds catholicks dare not but refuse to take the oath of supremacy . perhaps by the new unlawful art of casuistry some of them might think they could find evasions : but generally such is the tendernesse of their consciences that they dare not think it lawful to make advantage of casuistry in a solemn oath . very likely protestants will call them nicely scrupulous , foolish or improvident for this their tendernesse of conscience . but sure they will not suspect them disloyal , who attribute as much authority to the king as themselves do : and if it were permitted them to confirm this by a clear oath , in their own language , they would not yield to them in the fullnesse of the expression . if hereafter they are resolved not to grant them any ease from their pressures , if a harmlesse scrupulosity in catholicks shall bear those penalties which direct rebellion in others escapes , if to satisfy the passion of not very good subjects , those that are truly loyal shall be treated as rebells , and their religion only punished indeed ; however that will not be acknowledged by those that punish it , all that remains for catholicks to say , is , dominus judicabit fines terrae . sect . ix . vpon what grounds some catholicks make scruple to take the oath of allegiane . . next followes the oath of allegiance , framed by k. james upon the greatest provocation , and an attentat the most execrable , the most abhorred by the whole body of catholicks , both at home and abroad , and the most scandalous to christian religion that ever was . this oath affords also matter of wonder to protestants , why catholicks who acknowledge the kings supreme civil authority , should make any scruple to take it , since it was never meant against such . . but they may impute only to themselves the cause of such a refusal : for by some incommodious phrases unnecessarily thrust into it they have frighted many from taking it : and as if they had conspired with that one too well known party which alone gave occasion for the framing it , they have given them advantage for those unnecessary phrases sake to fix upon all the refusers a scandalous however unjust imputation as if they approved these abominable principles , from which flowed that more abominable attentat , which deservedly wrung extreme severity from a prince the most element that ever this nation formerly had enjoyed . . in the following reflexions therefore upon this oath , justice requires that we should divide between the innocent and the guilty , between those that ( not in this kingdom only ) have made that principle of disloyalty their distinctive charter ; and those that are ready to renounce that principle , if they might be allowed to renounce it by any other , though more emphatical expressions . . as touching the former unhappy party , it is observable that at the first publishing of the oath , there were in every line and almost particle of it pointed out by them a several heresie : all which heresies are now at last vanished , excepting only one , which is that by which there is enjoyned [ a renouncing of that so bruited article of faith touching the popes power of deposing princes not for heresie only but almost any other fault that shall be esteemed sufficient to deserve it . . this pretended article of faith is by such new de-fide-men grounded either upon the actions of certain popes since pope gregory the seventh , which both for their own sakes and ours it is to be wished had never been done , or might be blotted out of all mens memories ; or upon the decrees of some councels not received or acknowledged by catholick churches ; but principally upon a decree of the councel of lateran under pope innocent the third , in which an ordinance is said to have been framed to oblige ( not supreme princes but ) temporales potestates and dominos , which bear offices in states to take at oath to root out of their dominions all hereticks , upon penalty ( if they do not performe what they swear ) of being denounced by the pope to be deprived of their estates , &c. yet reserving the right of the supreme lord. . all these allegations have been already unanswerably confuted by several learned writers of our nation : but because this last decree of a councel not so questioned , for as much as can be proved to have been decided in it , and because it is almost alone suggested to the tongues of some catholicks among us , as the principal pillar of that pretended article of faith , for the maintaining of which they are exhorted to forfeit their estates and lives , they are desired sadly to consider , . first , that this pretended decree of faith has been disclaimed by a world of unquestion'd catholicks ; and doctor bishop the last catholick bishop but one in england , has written a book purposely against it ; and no proof can be given , that it was ever received or executed by any catholick kingdome out of italy : the reasons whereof are , . because these decrees were never published by p. innocent , nor so much as a copy of them extant either in the body of councells , or the vatican library , or any where else , till a certain german three hundred years after , said that he found them in a manuscript , compiled he knowes not by whom , being indeed a meer collection made by some unknown person out of the decretals of his nephew gregory the ninth . . because by the testimony of all historians of those times , p. innocent the third suffred much in his reputation for having convoked such a multitude of prelates to no purpose . above sixty capitula were by the popes order recited in the assembly , and many of them pend in a stile as if they had been concluded ( for that was the popes expectation ) but nothing at all could be plainly decreed : they seemed indeed to some [ placabilia ] passable , to others onerosa , but no conciliary determinations were made except one or two , ( which was about the recovery of the holy land , and the subjection of the greek church to the roman ) by reason of a war then begun between them of pisa and genua , which called the pope from the councel . . again , though it were granted that this was a conciliary decree , it is far from looking like an article of faith , which ( saith bellarmine and canus ) may easily be discerned by the stile ; here is nothing proposed to be believed ; no anathema fulminated against those that are of a contrary sentiment ; no signification that the contrary is against the words or sence of scriptures . &c. at the best therefore it is a mere ecclesiastical ordinance touching external discipline and being such , what is more ordinary , and by custom permitted , then for princes to refuse the admittance of them ? we see at this day that the state and church of france do reject the decrees of reformation made in the councel of trent . this is known at rome and all christendom over ; and yet who dare impute heresy to them ? what confusion would follow , if all the ordinan●es of the councel of trent should be practised among catholicks here in england , as about clandestine mariages &c. . thirdly suppose this were granted to be an ordinan●e established , and admitted all christendom over , yet supreme , and independent princes not being expresly named in it , but rather excluded by the expressions of it , what can be more palpably injust , then without , and against their consent , to captivate them to such an ordinance ? moreover to demonstrate that they were purposely excepted , the emperour frederike not above five or six years after , published an edict to the very same intent , and in the very same language and titles , by which he intended to oblige only the feudatary princes and officers of the empire by oath to root out heresy : and yet after all , no example can be produced either in the empire , or other christian states that such an oath was in succeeding times imposed . this is the article of faith , for the maintaining of which it is by one party expected that all english catholicks should ruine both themselves and their religion . it is not so in catholick countries abroad : vve know that charles the fifth by a law of the empire publickly permitted lutherans in several provinces , and all the kings of france since henry the third , the calvinists through their kingdom , and yet the pope never so much as threatned , nor they feared a deposition . . and as for the doctrinal point of faith most shamelesly pretended to be involved in that or the like decrees , to wit , the popes power of deposing princes , what one catholick state , kingdom , republick or city can the preachers of it name where it is received , or permitted to the people to be taught , even as a probable opinion ? . it is well known that in france , in the year . a book written by suarez the jesuite , purposely against this oath , in which that deposing power was asserted , was by a decree of the parliament of paris condemned therefore to be burnt by the publick executioner , as containing propositions scandalous , seditious , tending to the eversion of states , and inducing subjects to practise against the lives and sacred persons of kings , &c. and moreover it was ordained , according to a former edict made a. d. . that a decree then made by the theological faculty for renewing a doctrinal censure of the same faculty , a. d. . against the like doctrine , and confirm'd by the councel of constance , should every year upon a certain day be read in the schools of the jesuites , and of the four mendicant orders . besides all this , the same parliament enjoyned the four principal jesuites in paris , armandus , cotton , fronto and sirmond to take order that their general at rome should renew a prohibition to any of the society to teach and publish the like doctrines , and themselves were commanded in their sermons to preach a contrary doctrine : all this under the penalty of being proceeded against as traytors . . the like fate had several other books written by eminent persons of the same order , as mariana , bellarmine , santarellus , &c. which maintained the popes temporal jurisdiction and power to deprive princes , and to absolve subjects from their obedience . and particularly upon occasion of santarellus his book , no less then eight universities in that kingdom , paris , valentia , tholouse , poictiers , bourdeaux , bourges , rheims and caen did of their own accord , not expecting any command from the court , in the year . brand the doctrine of the popes deposing power with the titles of impious , seditious , infamous to popes , ruinous to states , &c. . yea moreover within these six moneths a certain priest of the hermitage of caen , called fossart , a known emissary of that society , having in his publick acts for a degree in that university advanced this proposition , that the pope has a soveraign authority in temporals as well as spirituals , and that he has power to depose and constitute kings ; though to evade a censure , he interpreted his assertion , saying that he understood that power of the pope to extend only to tyrants : notwithstanding by a decree of the whole faculty of that university , both his proposition and exposition of it was censured to be impious , pernicious , seditious , and in all regards to be detested , and as such it was by them condemned . and the same fossart being after this imprisoned , was sentenced by the presidial court of justice in caen publickly and bare-headed to acknowledge that the said propositions were false , contrary to the holy decrees of councels , to the fundamental lawes of that kingdom , and to the liberties and rights of the gallican church . . such is the judgment of the ecclesiasticks and state of france of this article of faith , from which was issued rivers of blood during the ligue there . as zealous against the temporall power of popes , has the state of venice shewed it self : and if other catholick kingdomes have not done the like , it is because they have not had such dismal occasions and provocations to declare their minds . in spain indeed the schools are connived at , to preserve it from extinguishing , because by its assistance a great part of navarre has been annexed to that crown , and some hopes of england too gave it credit there . but yet when the court of rome would interpose in temporal matters there without the kings liking , he is as boldly resisted as in any other catholick kingdome besides . . and as for the church and state of england , i mean even in former times when catholick religion most flourished here , and when church-men had the greatest power , what sign can be shewed that the foresaid decree and the new article of faith was admitted either in parliaments or synods ? yea so far were they from acknowledging the popes deposing power , or supremacy in temporals , that statutes were then made , and the penalty no less then a praemunire against any that without the kings licence should make any appeals to rome : or submit to a legats jurisdiction ; or upon the popes summons go out of the kingdom ; or receive any mandats or briefs from rome ; or sue in a forrain realm for any thing , for which the kings courts took cognisance ; or for impeaching a judgment given in the kings courts ; or for purchasing bulls from rome for presentments to churches an●iently sued for in the kings courts , in the time of all his progenitors . and it is very observable that in the act , where the last ordinances were made , we find this expression , to this all the bishops present , and all the procuratours of the absent unanimously assented , protesting against the popes translating some bishops out of the realm , and from one bishoprick to another . and moreover the ground of their rejecting the popes usurpations in temporal matters is there thus expressed , for that the crown of england is free , and hath been free from earthly subjection at all times , being immediately subject to god in all things touching the regalities of the same , and not subject to the pope . . all these lawes and many other of the like kind , all the kings catholick subjects knew , and willingly submitted to , without any prejudice to their beliefe that the pope was the supreme pastour of gods church in spiritualibus . and all these lawes are still in force , and the penalty of them no less then a premuni●e . our de-fide-men are not much concern'd in all this : but sure persons of honour and loyalty , and such as have estates in the kingdom , are very deeply interested . . and now let any english catholick judge what reception such a decree or article of faith would have had in england in those most catholick times , if they had been proposed those that were so jealous of the least deminution of the kings temporal power in matters of the smallest consequence , and that imposed the greatest penalty but death upon transgressours , that is , upon all factours for the gaining to the court of rome any illegal temporal authority , with what indignation would they have heard only the mentioning of the reception of such a decree ? and yet those lawes were made not long after that councel had been assembled : whereby it is apparent that they were ignorant of it . those that would not suffer the least flower of this imperial crown to be ravished from it , would they admit a power and forraign jurisdiction to take the crown it self from the kings head , and afterward the head it self from his shoulders ? . it is true , the teaching of such an arti●le of faith brings very great temporal commodities to those few that have the cruelty to their country to become the preachers and apostles of it : great favour and power they gain thereby abroad , and therefore they will take it kindly at the hands of english catholicks , if for a mere secular advantage of theirs , they will be content to sacrifice their own estates , honours , families and lives , as traytors , to the law●s , and withall bring an unavoydable scandal to catholick religion , besides . but truly this is too dear a rate to be paid for such a commodity : . a man would think that such apostles should be content , yea and by their own doct●ine of probability should be obliged to grant this doctrine of the popes deposing power to be somewhat less then an article of faith. the opposition of the whole state & ecclesiasticks of france against their single forces surely may be available to make it pass at least for a probable opinion . but this they must not allow , because if it be not an article of faith , unless infidelity to princes be de fide , it signifies ju●t nothing , neither can it have any effect at all . for certainly no law nor justice wil permit that an authority only probable , and therefore questionable , can dispossess kings of their right to a supremacy in temporals , in which they are actually instated : so that such an authority can only have force to dispossess princes already dispossessed . . however they would esteem themselves much bound to any other learned catholicks among us , if they would condescend to grant that it is only probable that it is a point of faith and decree of a general councel . but in vain will they expect such a compliance . for by granting only so much , it will necessarily follow ? . that all the so rigorous censures given of it by the parliaments and vniversities of france have been most temerarious and damnable , for what can be more horrible then to call a doctrine impious , seditious , detestable , &c. which probably is a fundamental christian verity ? . that the preaching of that doctrine will be far more safe , yea only safe in conscience : because if it be probable that it is an article of faith , the teaching of the contrary may perhaps come to be heretical , which the teaching of it cannot be . . in vain therefore do they expect so easie a condescendence from others : and the more unreasonably , because themselves dare not justifie this their article of faith in the catholick kingdom of france to be so much as a probable opinion , no not in these times when they lately had a great cardinal a minister of state their confident , and a confessarius or manager of the kings conscience , their court-instrument : who is so much , too much a courtier , and ( as long as he lives in france ) too little a zelot for this their peculiar principle , as that he dares not so much as motion to his penitentan acceptation of that decree of lateran interpreted in their sence , but freely absolves him , and admits him to the communion without so much as confessing among his faults his dis-beliefe of this article , yea professing the contrary . nay more , they themselves whilst they are there , do not believe it : for if they did , they would not surely omit to attempt the conversion of french catholicks , at least , in articulo mortis , to this their fundamental point of faith ; but this they dare not , and care not to do , nor do they refuse to take mony for praying for their souls , as they did formerly in england to some that defended the oath of allegiance . . what charme then have they to make such a topical , uncatholick aricle of faith to serve only for the meridian of england , which of all the countries in christendome ought least to hear any mention of it ? they themselves in france are , or at least appear catholicks a la mode de france , and dare not so much as in a whisper say that this is a topical opinion , much less an article of faith : and yet the king there is of the popes own religion , and consequently not obnoxious to the danger of it . what stupidity then , what blindness do they presume to find among us english catholicks , that they should fancy that we do not evidently see that it is their own secular interest only that makes the same point of doctrine to be de fide in an island , and a pestilent errour in terra firma ? . in vain therefore do they hope that all catholicks which have not made them the depositaries of all their reason and common sence , will admit a position infinitely prejudicial to their religion , to their king , and to their own souls , which they would renounce in regard of their own single estates or persons . for suppose a bull of excommunication should be procured from rome against any catholick lord , gentleman , or farmer in england for some new heresie of jansenisme , or for denying their exemptions , &c. and that in consequence thereof , the pope by his temporal authority should lay a sine upon their heads , or deprive them of their titles and estates : would those lords or gentlemen quietly be content to be unlorded and become peasants , or would they pay their fines and resign their estates to such apostles ? if not , as most certainly they would not , with what conscience would they suffer themselves to be perswaded that the sacred person of their soveraign only is obnoxious to slavery , beggery and danger ? . though that party therefore be so tender-conscienced that they dare not , or so obnoxious to superiours abroad that they must not , according to the clause of this oath of allegiance , swear , that they do detest as impious that position of theirs , that princes excummunicated or deprived by the pope , may be deposed or murdred by their subjects : yet since english catholicks , yea even their own penitents will be both good catholicks , and therefore good subjects , as all are in france , germany , venice , flanders , &c. till an authentick approved , received decree of the church be produced , or procured to declare , not in england only , but all christendom over , that that position is de fide , they will not be deprived of their christian liberty to renounce it , especially being assured that without renouncing of it the state will never acknowledg them for loyal subjects . it is well known that in france there was an oath framed by the whole body of the fiers estate , in which they are to be sound farr more comprehensive expressions then are in our oath , for therein is expresly affirmed , that there is no power on earth , either spiritual or temporal that hath any right over his majesties kingdom to deprive the sacred persons of our kings , nor to to dispence with , or absolve their subjects from their loyalty and obedience whi●h they owe to them , for any cause or pretence whatsoever . . this will suffice concerning that position , which those who will not be permitted to renounce , but rather maintain it to article of faith , yet however will perhaps not refuse to profess themselves ready to swear . . that the kings of england excommunicated by the pope , may not be murthered by their subjects , and to detest the contrary as heretical . . yea moreover , that notwithstanding any sentence of deprivation ever hereafter , upon what occasion soever to ensue , they will bear faith and true allegiance to his majesty and his successours . and what needs princes desire any greater security ( say they ) what need they trouble themselves with their subjects speculative opinions ? . but ( alas ) a miserable security , a poor testimony or gage of fidelity is all this , god knowes . for first , murder being an unjust killing out of malice , and with a deliberate purpose , is a sin so horrible in it self , that god himself cannot make it lawfull , much lesse the pope : therefore in all reason instead of those words [ may not be murdred ] they ought to say [ may not be killed by their subjects ] for otherwise notwithstanding that oath the pope may be acknowledged to be a competent judge of life and death over our kings to sentence them to the slaughter , and that sentence may be put in execution without murther : for who ever said that a malefactour put to death by law was murthered by the judges sentence ? . but whether they say [ may not be murthered ] or [ may not be killed ] princes will esteem themselves little advantaged by such an oath , unlesse the swearers say withal [ may not be deposed . ] for whosoever has a supreme just right upon any pretence whatsoever to depose princes , has thereby right to cause them to be killed , in case they by armes oppose the execution of that sentence . and can it be imagined that any prince judged an heretick or otherwise guilty by the pope , and by him sentenced to be deposed will thereupon quietly descend out of his throne , and yield up his scepter to one of a contrary religion ? or rather , is it not most certain that they will not , but on the contrary bring with them many thousands of their armed subjects to resist the execution of such a sentence ; all which must together with them be killed or murthered before it can have its full effect ? . in the next place touching the offer made by the same persons , who without renouncing the position of the popes deposing power will however swear future allegiance to the king and his successours , notwithstanding any past or coming sentence of deprivation ; in what age do they hope to find in england a king that will be so simple , and so over good-natured as to believe them , or rely upon such a promise , especially considering what passed little above fifty years since ? is that oath to be believed which they that take it do know to be unlawful , and consequently to be ipso facto null and invalid , so that it must be repented of , and must not be kept ? for either they must swear that assoon as ever they shall have taken their rectifyed oath , the kings of england will have this particular priviledge annexed to their empire , that they shall never deserve ( let their religion or practises be what they will ) that the pope should exercise his just authority of deposing them ; that they alone will be out of danger to the worlds end of being denounced no-catholicks or rebells to the see apostolick : and this none can swear without the spirit of prophecy , which they will hardly perswade the state here to believe to be in them : or else , they will swear that though the pope never so justly and necessarily exercising his lawful authority should command the deposition of any of our kings , and absolve all their subjects from their allegiance , yet they against their duty , conscience and religion will disobey such his lawful authority , and continue in allegiance to him , to whom in such circumstances an article of their faith obliges them to believe that no allegiance is due , but rather utmost hostility . now who will believe such an oath as this ? or rather will they not be esteemed for such an oaths sake , resolved to be disloyal both to god and man ? after this manner argues the great master in the deposing doctrine , suarez , writing upon this very clause of this oath . . i would to god i could have delivered my conscience on this subject without danger of incensing or contristating any person . but in the present conjuncture of affairs , after so many years proof of the constant fidelity of catholicks to his majesty , it being necessary that the state should be assured that such fidelity proceeded from a principle of catholick religion unalterable ; to discourse upon such a subject with a complying softnesse and tendernesse to any party , that is , without a free , hearty , sincere and confident renouncing of a false principle of disloyalty maintained but by a very few , but imputed to , and punished in the general body of english catholicks , would have been to betray the cause of catholicks in general , and to justify the suspicion that protestants have formerly had against our religion . . there is another sort of loyal , well meaning catholicks , who have no scruple at all to renounce this pretended article of faith , nor to make any the most strict professions of their allegiance , but in this oath meet with some expressions and adventitious phrases nothing pertinent to the substance , which they out of tendernesse of conscience cannot swear to . for first , they seem to professe a declaration of a point of faith which a particular christian cannot presume to do again , they cannot say that position of the popes deposing power is heretical : any other ill names they will be content to give it , but they dare not swear it is heretical , because the contrary is not evidently in scripture , neither has it been condemned by the church . . for the former , protestants perhaps will account it a needlesse scrupulosity , since those which framed the oath never intended that any one that takes it should seem to make himself a judge and decider of a point of faith , but only to signify his acknowledgment touching it . besides ( say they ) this is the ordinary stile by which a profession is made abroad of the condemning and renouncing of any erroneous propositions , which are by parliaments and courts declared to be impious , seditious , &c. not that each doctour , or whole faculties take upon them an authority conciliary to propose doctrines to the church , but only to testify their judgment concerning them . . but the second difficulty will not so easily be cleared , which is the profession of detesting such a position as heretical ▪ because catholicks know that it cannot be called heretical according to the notion of that term universally received among them : and what notion protestants have of that word does not appear by any publick declaration of theirs ; how then can catholicks by oath protest a detestation of that position as heretical , since if they understand it in their own sence they should swear that which they know to be false : and if in any other unknown sence , they shall swear they know not what ? besides they should by oath testify , that all popes that have exercised , and all writers that have maintained such a deposing power , are to be esteemed hereticks , persons fit to be excluded from catholick communion . and what catholick alive will presume to say this ? ¶ . such is the case of afflicted catholicks touching these two oathes : their tendernesse about phrases hath hitherto been either interpreted , or at least treated as professed disloyalty . but their hope now at last is that his majesty according to his most gloriously element dispositon , and the whole state so miraculously renewed , will with a compassionate eye look upon , and read their most secret thoughts touching this matter . though their abilities and number be inconsiderable , yet justice even to a single person ought not to be esteemed so . they are not unwilling , nay they are desirous to be obliged to make protestations of their unalterable fidelity , obedience and peaceable submission to the state : and if none other besides themselves shall be esteemed to deserved to be obliged hereto by oathes , they are contended to endure such a mortification , and they beseech god that his majesty may never have just ground to suspect any others , for then they are sure that without any oaths at all he may be most secure . . if any oath of supremacy shall be still accounted necessary , they only beg that they may not seem to renounce the supreme spiritual jurisdiction of him whom they acknowledge for the head of gods church : or at least that for refusing to renounce this , and suffering for such a refusal , they may be acknowledged to suffer purely for their religion , without the least imputation of disloyalty to his majesty , which they will never be guilty of , whether they swear against it , or no. . that which they deprecate in the oath of allegiance is that which god himself requires , that it may not be ambiguous , dificult to be interpreted , nor charged with expressions which if they were absent would not prejudice the substance and intention of the oath : and being present do render the whole ineffectual . they are assured that the first framer of this oath , k. james never intended to intangle the consciences of his subjects , and if he had foreseen that a few unnecessary words would have rendred them uncapable to serve him , he would never have made choice of such unhappy expressions . but so long experience having demonstrated what it is that wounds the consciences of catholicks , they confidently hope that this tendernesse will shew how infinitely more tender they will be to keep the fidelity promised in the oath , since they have kept it when they were treated as breakers of it , only for , i cannot say , not daring to professe it , for that have alwayes been ready to do : but for not dareing to say things unnecessary to be said , or that they understand not or are not permitted to explicate their meaning . . never certainly was there a time when it was either more seasonable or more necessary to obstruct all passages of jealousies amongst english subjects , and to prevent all attempts of disturbing the kingdomes peace . as for other sects , the state will ( it is hoped and prayed for ) be assisted by a divine wisdom , to provide against the particular tempers of each : and as for roman catholicks no other expedient will be necessary but to afford them means to shew abroad that fidelity which their religion indispensably obliges them to . this indeed will be a great affliction to other sects among us , who would rather forgive catholicks for being real traytours , then for manifesting themselves in the eyes and to the satisfaction of all to be good subjects . . certainly that old policy of queen elizabeths calvinistical statesmen is now very unseasonable , and was alwaies dangerous , of first fomenting divisions among catholick subjects , especially about principles of loyalty and disloyal●y , and then exposing both the loyal and disloyal subjects indifferently to the same rigour of lawes . surely it is of greater concernment now for his majesties security to unite all catholicks with one heart to assist and defend him by casting out all principles of disloyalty inconsistent both with catholick and protestant religion . . now what more efficacious mean , or rather what other mean is there for this then that which his majesty may if he please conferr upon them by allowing such an ecclesiastical government among them by which there will be produced a true christian unity and uniformity both in opinions and practises , and consequently by which without giving the least jealousy , but on the contrary very great security to the state , they may all be united to concurr in promoting his service ? . now to what special parties both within and without the continuation of a defect so projudicial is to be imputed , is but too well known . it is not to be doubted but that the forementioned party will make use of all their skill and power to oppose all good correspondence among them , upon more then one motive . for . a strong affection which they have to independence , and to a promoting of their particular interests dividedly from all others ( by which means they have got great power abroad , little for the publick good of this kingdom ) this will make a common union very unwellcome to them . . and again they will easily foresee that by this only means those wicked principles of disloyalty which made them heretofore eminent abroad , must necessarily then be renounced . they will no longer be looked upon as the only apostles of a forraign temporal power , either direct , or ( which is as bad ) indirect ; the enormous writings and worse practices of their forefathers , which only procured the continuation of the oath of supremacy , and the framing of that of allegiance together with the sharp lawes , not against them alone , must be condemned to the same fate that they have suffered in other kingdomes : and lastly an advantage of corrupting good english natures with maximes of morality odious to all christenstom , and condemned by supream authority will be taken from them . . these cannot chuse but prove unto such dispositions very great mortifications , and as great as any of these , would be the framing of oaths which all good catholicks could securely take . for it is well known that they have been publickly told that it is for their advantage only that such oaths are imposed here as cannot generally be taken , and that worse newes cannot come to their brethren abroad , then that such oaths were taken away from catholicks : because they have a strong apprehension that themselves having been the sole clauses of those rigours against the whole body of english catholicks , shall have but a small portion in any future indulgence without an explicite , satisfactory renunciation of their principles , and an assurance given to teach the contrary , as they were obliged by an arrest of the parliament of paris , a. d. . . and that this was no suspicion groundlesly taken or invented , there was produced a well known verified story hapning toward the latter end of queen elizabeths raign : for that queen being at last satisfied of the loyalty of certain catholick priests , had a purpose to shew some indulgence and qualification of the lawes to them . hereupon certain of their brethren went to rome to carry such good newes thither , whither being come they were by that party branded with the names of schismaticks , spies and rebels to the see apostolick : and moreover there was by one of the party [ t.f. ] compiled a treatise in italian to advise his holyness , that it was not good or profitable to the catholick cause that any liberty or toleration should be granted by the s●ate of england to catholicks . and why not good for the catholick cause ? because not for their own interest : for having been persons never formerly admitted by publick authority into this kingdom , and having given sad proofs of their temper , they did not without reason suspect that if only good loyal catholick subjects were tolerated , their so dangerous , and to themselves only advantageous principles must be abandoned . . it is not therefore to be expected , but that a charitable concurrence of several ecclesiastical pastours here would be to them very unwellcome . but the commodities and benedictions flowing there-from are unexpressible . for . though perhaps by a hindrance thereby given to that parties divided way of agitation here , the number of catholicks among us might come to be diminished ; yet then there would be none but good , charitable and obedient catholicks in england , free from all intelligence or designs abroad . . matters of discipline and spiritual government would not be only and immediatly ordered by a court too far distant from us , and too much suspected by the state here . . english catholicks would be freed from a burden , ( and the king from jealousies ) to which no other in the world are obnoxious . for in france , &c. none dare under utmost penalties execute orders or publish mandats without express allowance from the state , though such briefs touched only spiritual matters . whereas in england whensoever any such briefs are published at rome , although upon information of one interessed party , there being no setled correspondence of pastours to whom they ought in common to be directed , & by them communicated to their respective flocks , not only the consciences of particular catholicks are disquieted , whilst some of their directours press the validity of them , & others reclaim : but the state also , not causelesly , entertains jealousies , & suspicious of secret practises , not being at all , or not sufficiently informed . all which inconveniences by such a government would be easily avoyded . . lastly by this means catholicks would be enabled to receive from his majesty any orders that may be for his service , and effectually put them in execution . . it is well known what important advantage the prince of orange , and the states of holland received from the catholick bishop there , during the seditions between the arminians and calvinists : the prince doubting the success of those contentions , to strengthen his party , sent two or three persons of condition to the bishop usually residing at amsterdam , to propose to him these two demands : fi●st , to whether of the two factions the catholicks had an inclination to adhere : next , what assistance of forces they were able to bring . the bishop being then absent , they were to this effect answered by his vicarius in spiritualibus : as to the first , that without studying or consulting with his brethren he could immediately assure his excellency , that he being the prime person trusted by the states with all their forces , the religion and consciences of all catholicks obliged them to offer their estates and lives for his service and assistance . but that he could not give an answer to the second demand , till two sundayes were passed , in the one of which he was to publish orders for enquiry into their numbers , and in the other to receive information . and in effect accordingly after the second sunday he gave them assurance of the readiness of above ten thousand well appointed soldiers out of that one city . this hapned in holland , where catholicks though proportionably far exceeding us here in numbers , yet never gave any jealousies to the state , and the less because of their good correspondence among themselves . . such and many other great commodities fl●wing from such a government , it is no wonder that besides the formentioned party , there should be found out of the church also many that have , and no doubt will endeavour to oppose it , especially their embitterd enemies the presbyterians , partly out of the hatred which they bear to the very name of lawfull pastours , which they want , and will not have : but principally least catholicks thereby should be in a better capacity to serve his sacred majesty , and his faithfull subjects after a manner that they do not desire ; and this not only by sacrificing their estates and persons to the maintaining of his power and safety , but also by gaining to himself and the state , both civil and ecclesiastical here a great affection and readiness of an assistance from catholick kingdomes , when it shall appear that in england the scandal of disloyalty which heretofore was cast upon catholick religion in general , shall be taken away . . these things considered , and moreover that the presbyterians , &c. ( implacable adversaries to prot●stant religion and government , as well as catholick ) have great intelligence and correspondence abroad upon that account , and for the mere interest of their religion , which protestants hitherto are utterly destitute of ; it would be strange if there should still remain any one among them , after so long experience of the ready concurrence of catholicks with them in adhering to his majesty , and suffering with them for him , who should not now at last have spent all their aversion from them , no●e being more interested then they to make use of all lawful means to enable his majesty , now more then ever to oppose all future practices . . it hath been an objection formerly against this , that the prom●ses made by catholick ecclesiasticks of canonical obedien●e to their supreme pastour in their ordinations are dangerous to the state. but alas how groundless is such a fear ? for ( this ground being once laid and assented to , that no forraign power whatsoever hath any right to dispose of temporals in these kingdomes ) what shew of prejudice to any mans loyalty is the promise of canonical obedience in mere spiritual matters ? do not all ministers in england owe and promise canonical obedience to their bishops , and presbyterians to their consistories , which yet in merè spiritualibus , they will not allow to be subject to the king , but only and immediately to our lord ? besides , all manner of such submissions and obligations are every where meant and understood , and if need be , may be expressed with a salvâ obedientiâ regi debitâ . what apprehension have the kings of france , spain , or the state of venice from such promises ? and yet were ever any princes more scrupulous in defending their temporal superiority and authority against the power by some flatterers ascribed to the pope , then the king of france and the state of venice are ? nay they would not be so secure of their pastours loyalty , if they should suspect them to be regardless of their duty to the church , which indispensably obliges them to loyalty . sect . x. of his majesties declaration for liberty of tender consciences . and who they are that have the justest pretentions to the benefit of it . . by what hath been hitherto said it is apparent , that the words , phrases and formes of these oathes are at least ambiguous : and that by such ambiguity no manner of convenience , not the least addition of security accrews unto his sacred majesty or the state &c. but on the otherside infinite prejudice to his afflicted subjects : what then can be more just , more for gods honour , more becoming the benignity of his majesty , and more for the reputation of the kingdom then that such ambiguous expressions ( suggested no doubt by some particular malignant spirits ) should be cleared or taken away : and that oathes should be conceived in such a form that they may be taken uniformly , sincerely and cordially by all good subjects , and must be refused by all ill subjects ; and withal that our princes safety and the peace of the kingdom may be provided for , by them ? . besides the ambiguity , there seems now to be another motive , more pressing , though none can be more weighty to perswade a change in the formes of the oathes , and that is this . when the oathes were made the intention of the state was to have one only religion openly permitted in the kingdom : and then the catholick was that which appeared opposite to it , as having been formerly the only religion of the kingdom : and for this reason consequently the oathes were framed either upon a jealousy of a doubtful title , or at least against some special point about the popes authority , which one party among catholicks falsely pretended to be essential to their religion , & in consequence thereto gave too just cause to th● state to provide against them . . but of late the temper of the kingdom is strangely altered . god only knowes how many new religions are star●ed up , the natural issues of the more antient presbyterian private spirit : all which perhaps think themselves little or nothing concerned in oathes made against roman catholicks , and therefore will not much stand upon the taking of them : by which means they , notwithstanding their known principles and practises , destructive both to allegiance and peace , wlll passe for good subjects , without any obligation to renounce such principles , or change such practises : and only roman catholicks will keep the oathes , though they dare not take them : by which means being yet more odious to such sects for keeping the oathes then they would have been if they had broke them , the only revenge that the others have against them , is to force them to take them . so that between them all the security of his sacred majesty , which was only intended by the oathes , is not in the least measure provided for . yea i may , i hope , be permitted to say , that his majesty thinks himself secure of those that do not take the oathes , and stands in great need of securing himself from too many that freely take them , and swear to be loyal to him . what then can be imagined more necessary for a cure to so great a confusion , then to change such inefficacious instruments of loyalty ? . but moreover since it is not to be doubted but that his majesty will not be unmindful of his promise so publickly made of a liberty for tender consciences , and that none shall be called in question for differences of opinion in matter of religion , which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom : those certainly will declare themselves most unworthy of the fruit of so unexampled a beingnity , that shall either expect from such a promise a liberty to reserve any ill principles of disloyalty , or that shall exclude from the benefit of it any other of his subjects that shall submit themselves to all possible proofs of renouncing such principles , and that have hitherto without any oathes taken , constantly adhered to him . . as his majesty therefore has been pleased to take notice that among his subjects of a different belief there are tender consciences , and has promised to have a merciful regard to them : so it is most just and necessary that his subjects likewise should allow his majesty to have a tender conscience too , to which also they must have regard . now wherein can he ( or any in authority under him ) more truly and perfectly shew that he has a tender conscience with regard to his subjects , then by using his authority to root out all ill principles that disturbe peace , or dispose to sedition and rebellion ? for this end especially princes were ordained by god : so that if they do otherwise , they should resist the ordinance of god , and become far worse then tyrants to their people . those subjects therefore that would expect or desire that the maintaining any principles of disloyalty should be esteemed a proof that they have tender consciences , do consequently expect that the king should give them leave , whensoever they have a grudge in conscience thereto , to depose him , and to put the whole kingdom into confusion . . and now , till his majesty shall vouchsafe to interpret his promise more distinctly , let any indifferent person judge , who they are among so many different beliefs that ought to be esteemed to have tender consciences , and to hold opinions which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom : whether they that have and ever will be ready to give all possible proofes of loyalty both by words and deeds , so that the words by which they professe this may not prejudice their relig●on in a point of mere internal belief which has not any influence upon their loyalty : and who if they cannot otherwise then by betraying their faith be accepted and treated as loyal , will protest themselves bound in conscience and by their religion never to disturb the peace of the kingdom , but patiently to suffer as if they did disturb it ; or those which make no conscience to swear according to a forme that requires loyalty , though they know that such a form in the proper sence of the words cannot consist with their belief ; and when they have done , make lesse conscience of violating that duty which they know the law requires , and which ought to have been performed though they had never sworn it . surely unlesse passion alone be judge , unlesse that be to be called a tender conscience which is none at all : and unless the title of disturbers of the peace of the kindom , be appropriated to those only that trouble no body , and wrongfully imputed to those only who are irreconcileable to all that love and promote peace and loyalty , both protestants and catholicks , there will be no errour in making a iudgment . . it is not out of any design to please men , but only because god and religion require it , that roman catholicks acknowledg his majesty to be our supreme governour over all persons , and in all causes , as far as kin●ly power can be exercised in them : and by gods grace it is not any fear of man that shall hinder them from professing that they acknowledg the pope to be the supreme spiritual pastour of souls , not only not subject to kingly civill authority therein , but in his line above it , as all spiritual jurisdiction of the church is , ( by the testimony of dr. carleton in his admonition to the reader . ) it is purely from the fear of god that they deny unto the king a spiritual jurisdiction , and to the pope a temporal . flattery , disrespect or malignity have not the least influence on either of these professions : if they should ascribe to the king a pastoral authority in spiritual matters , or to any spiritual pastours a lordly dominion over the persons or lives of other mens subjects , and much more over kings themselves , they should give to caesar the things which are gods , and to god spiritually ruling in his vicar , the things which belong to caesar : they should herein wrong both the pope and the king too , and by mixing or doubling either of their powers , destroy both . as for their duty to kings , they hear our lord saying , the kings of the nations bear a lordly dominion , but nor so yee ( my apostles : ) i have not given to you any such authority : yea they find our lord refusing to be a king , or so much as a judge in temporal matters , but not refusing to pay tribute , nor to acknowledg pilate to have power from heaven over him . they hear the first vicar of our lord st. peter commanding with an authority greater then ex cathedrâ , be subject to every humane creature , to the king as precelling all others , &c. again , as touching spiritual pastours , they hear st. paul say , the weapons of our warfare are not carnal , but spiritual . they are not carnal , not externally coactive by attachments , imprisonments , banishments , executions , &c. but far more powerful as being spiritual , binding and imprisoning in invisible chains , banishing from the communion of saints , delivering up to satan , &c. it is a zeal to this jurisdiction a jurisdiction greater then any that the angels injoy , that forbids catholicks to enervate it by adjoyning thereto , with an opinion of making it stronger , a carnal authority ; as knowing that popes were never so powerful over m●ns souls , as when they despised worldly advantages . by hearkning to flattering ca●●nists or schoolmen who invested them with temporal power , popes never gained any so much as temporal commodity to themselves , but infinitely prejudiced their spiritual ; being often looked upon by princes not as fathers , but as , &c. so that the parliament of paris in their censure did very justly say , that such doctrines rendred the dignity of the pope odious . . this is that which catholicks have been taught by gods word , by tradition , by counsels , &c. this they are ready with or without oathes to professe , and which , god willing , neither oathes nor lawes , nor humane power shall force them to d●ny . if this renders them obnoxious to the penalties of lawes as ill subjects , yet it cannot make them ill subjects ; if this renders them disloyal subjects , there is not a loyal subject in france , germany , &c. if humane tribunals condemn them , god will in his time acquit them . . in a word , to demonstrate how little they deserve the imputation of being not most perfectly good subjects , roman catholicks are ready to subscribe to such a profession and oath of loyalty , as whosoever takes it will give all the security of fidelity that honour , conscience , religion and the hope of eternal happinesse , or fear of eternal damnation can lay upon a soul , that is , by oath to protest not only an indispensable obedience and non-resistance in all things to his majesty and his successours of what religion soever they be , but also a firm perswasion or belief that it is absolutely unlawful upon any pretence or motive whatsoever , either of ascribing to any other an undue power , or even of defending religion , for subjects actively and with armes or violence to oppose his majesty . by the same oath they will oblige themselves to discover all secret plots or conspiracies against his majesty or the state. this oath they will promise to keep inviolably ; from the obligation of whi●h no commands or perswasions of any person whatsover , spiritual or temporal , no private interpretations of gods word , no supposals of divine inspirations shall or ought to free them . and lastly , both in this and all other promises they will sincerely professe a detestation of the abominable doctrine of mental reservation , and of the lawfulness of breaking faith given to hereticks . . if this will not serve to approve the loyalty of roman catholicks ; if there be no possibility of conjuring down the furious calvinistical spi●it among us , but that it must be suffered both in protestant churches to preach down prelacy and ecclesiastical government , and in the state to embitter lawes for their own advantage only , & to the prejudice both of protestants and all other good subjects : what will become of the reputation of the english nation in forreign countries ? it is too well known how strangely we are fallen of late in esteem abroad ; the dismal effects produced in this kingdom by that ill spirit , have been , though unjustly , imputed to the whole kingdom : english men have been looked upon as enemies both to god and their kings , as persons ready to admit any frenzies in religion , & the horriblest cruelties against their princes . . but blessed be god , his divine providence hath wrought miracles to restore our reputation again , which was almost forfeited . all the world almost is now satisfied that the generality of englishmen are the best subjects in the world to the best of princes ; and therefore it is to be hoped that the presbyterian spirit will not , now that it is so well known , be permitted to have that influence as to imprint again upon us this peculiar character , that england is the only nation in which pure religion is most pretended to , and the way to make that challenge good is ( by the malignity of one faction ) to make the most sacred bonds of religion snares and engins of unlawful passions : where a just and peaceable government is designed , and the way to it is by unlawful , however legal , means to make peace impossible : where oathes are framed against disloyalty , which are ruinous only to good subjects , and advantageous to the disloyal : where loyalty and duty are only excluded from rewards , or even indemnity : where lawes are made against crimes , and the penalties of those lawes are insupportable only to those that are free , and are known ever to have been free from any suspition of such crimes , and are commodities and rewards only to the nocent : where persons of approved fidelity are condemned as traytors , and both jurors , witnesses & judges for the most part are presbyterians , very incompetent and unindifferent parties in such matters , and especially against such accused persons : lastly where the only proof of tenderness of conscience is to sear their consciences ; and of no intention to disturb the publick peace , is to take oathes with an intention , yea an obligation in conscience to break them ; and openly to profess both by words and known practises that peace shall never be setled till the whole frame of the kingdom , both for religion and government , shall be first broken in pieces , and then new moulded for their own only advantage . and after all this , if rebellion and desolation follow , we will wonder ( forsooth ) what demerit god can find in us to punish , and how it could be possiblé that a desolation should happen in a kingdom , where piety , justice , and his sacred majesties safety have been so well provided for . . if among all religions and sects now swarming in this kingdom , there shall yet be any english protestants that are still implacable against catholicks only , it will be more suitable to english dispositions which heretofore have been above all other nations esteemed frank and sincere , to discover their intentions clearly : let them therefore say , we will only destroy that religion which all our forefathers professed ; which through all christendom abounds most with learning , civility and loyalty ; which gave to protestancy our baptisme , bishops , churches , estates , and whatsoever affords us an advantageous appearance above all other sects ; the professours of which only will assist us in the maintaining our priviledges against sacriledge and professed prophaness ; which will indispensably concur with us in preserving his majesties person and prerogatives from the attempts and usurpations of all others ; these are the only persons we will destroy : and because a publick promise is made of liberty to tender consciences , we will annul or interpret it so , as that only those shall have no right to it that dare not swear an ambiguous oath , but with all dare less think it lawfull to neglect that duty which is intended by the oath : those only shall be excluded from the protection of lawes , or banished , or made the victimes of publick rigour : but as for all other sects , the names and number of which we do not know , or if we know many of their names , we scarce know how blasphemous and dangerous are their secret tenents , only we know that they are haters of antiquity , and learning ; united in designes of destroying our religion , our estates and government ; and what care they are likely to have of his majesties safety and dignity , hath been shewed these last twenty years : these are the only persons esteemed by us to have tender consciences , because they are bound to disturb peace , to cry down bishops , to gather hands against lawes , &c. if any protestants will make this profession , they will at least deal ingenuously ; whether conscionably and prudently , or no , they must be judges . . to conclude , if it be necessary ( as doubtless it is ) that oaths should provide against ill principles , and consequently that the present oaths should be interpreted or changed , then is the proper season to separate the guilty from the innocent : for he that justifies the wicked , and condemnes the just , both of them are an abomination to our lord. then is the proper time to have regard equally both to loyalty and tender consciences joyntly together : and an effectual mean to discover who are such tender consciences as his majesty intends liberty to , would be to require from all parties a distinct and sincere explanation in what sence and how far they acknowledge his majesty to be supreme , in all both temporal and ecclesiastical matters . after which , the state will easily find out who are the tender consciences that are most tender both of their duty to god and of his majesties safety , and who are they from whom it will behove him to stand most upon his guards . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e declaration from breda , april . . . . notes for div a -e an. . eliz cap. . an . jac cap. . notes for div a -e stat. . hen. . records of convocation . vit . heylins hist. sect . . p. . stat. . hen. . pref . stat. . hen. . pref . c. . stat. . hen. . c. . stat. . hen. . c. . stat. . hen. . c. vid. reform leg. eccles. de offic jud. stat . h. c. . stat , , & . ed. ibid. m s in bibl. col. calvin on amos cap. . vid epist. ded . to the book of jurisdiction of bishop carlton . l. chancellour heaths speech , m.s. notes for div a -e dr bilson of subject . par . p. . id ibid p. . ibid p in marg . ibid p : ibid p. carleton of jurisdict . c. . p. , . id. ibid. pag. . schisme guarded . id. ib. pag. . id. ib. p. . stat. ▪ elizab . admonit . of q eliz. to ●er injunctions . ibid. ibid. act. , eliz . c. . admonit . o● q eliz . stat. . eliz . artic. . praemon of k. james to all chr. monarks pag. . ibid. k. james premon . ibid. ibid. ibid. pag. . stat. . hen. . cap. . notes for div a -e confes. des eglises de france . . ult . notes for div a -e q r. ob. ob. sol. ob. schisme guarded . joan. c. . ob. ob. sol. k. james defence of the oath . defence of the oath . tort. tort . pag. . notes for div a -e m. paris , nauclerus , a.d. . godf. monachus . platinain innoc. . . bel. l. . de . r. pont. cap. . canus . l. . q. . stat. . edw. . stat. . rich. . ibid. ibid. widdring . last rejoynder . p. . suar. defens . fid. lib. . c. . widdr. against fitzharb . in the pref . p. . ob. sol. an historical romance of the wars between the mighty giant gallieno, and the great knight nasonius, and his associates sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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[s.n.], dublin : . reproduction of original in huntington library. attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . a satire on the wars between louis xiv, king of france, and william iii, king of great britain. errata: p. . created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng great britain -- history -- william and mary, - -- anecdotes france -- history -- louis xiv, - -- anecdotes - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an historical romance of the wars , between the mighty giant gallieno , and the great knight nasonius , and his associates . — ridentem dicere verum quis vetat ? — doublin : printed in the year . an historical romance of the wars , &c. chap. i. how the mighty giant gallieno dealt with other princes , and how they joined in a confederacy against him . sometimes in the famous and rich country of luyslandia reigned a mighty giant , by name gallieno , by some called also grandissimo , who for his great prowess and war-like exploits became terrible to all his neighbours : in so much , that no man , tho' never so hardy , was able to compare with him in feats of arms , or by plain force or policy to encounter him. he had already subdued the fair countries of lothoringia , alsatia , millesia , with part of trapezond , calatonia and inferiana ; and made inroads into other places ; and was now grown so formidable as all men stood in great dread of him . this gallieno was moreover a great necromancer , for he had at his devotion many familiar spirits , who gave him notice of the strength , and all the secret designs of other princes ; so that nothing could be hid from him that he desired to know . he had also by the same wonderful art got all his cities and castles inchanted , so that no mortal power was able to take them , and a damnable spell set round about his dominions , in so much , that scarce any enemy could enter them ; or , if he did , he could not stay there long , and wish'd afterwards he had never come there at all . after which , having , as he thought , made all things safe and sure , he surceased from war , and led his life in quiet and pleasure ; right-glad of the many conquests he had made : but it fortuned , that as he slept one night in his bed , he saw in his dream many armed men of several nations come against him on all sides , threatning him with their swords , pikes and guns , as if they meant to kill him : whereupon awaking , and calling up mephostophilo , one of his familiar spirits , and asking him what it meant , he answered and said unto him , my dread lord , this is no dream , but the very truth , which i have revealed unto you in your sleep : there are many nations who , envying your greatness , are now bandying against you in council , to bereave you of what you have got by force of your arms , and of your own inheritance to boot . which as soon as gallieno heard , he sent for all his under-giants , and great officers , to surprize their towns before they could be in a readiness to oppose him , which they did accordingly , especially in trapezond , otherwise called regomania . now the chief princes and potentates , who had joined into an association against gallieno , were these , austriaco the great emperour of trapezond , don ibero formalitoso the proud , the duke of bawwaw , tricongio ; with many other potentates of regomania ; and lastly , the dreadful many headed monster , called hydra , whose property it was to spit out flames of fire in the midst of the water ; i do not mean that hydra , which in times of yore ( as historical romances do inform us ) was quell'd by the famous champion sir hercules ; for this was a water . hydra of another kind , and living under the sea , was for that reason of great repute in the court of the sea-god neptune , who was a great friend to it on all occasions , except when it's demerits , or the blustering affronts of god eolus do put him into an ill humour . now this monster hydra was mightily afraid of the great giant gallieno , having heard by tradition , that he was descended of the race of the most valiant knight sir hercules ; but especially since he had by his necromancy got the trick of spitting fire on the water , as well or better than it self ; wherefore , tho' this hydra was half panim , yet those christian princes were glad of its assistance against the giant gallieno , as dreading his great prowess , and standing in great fear of his necromantick policy : besides the monster hydra was powerfully abetted by one of the idol-goddesses they chiefly worshipped , called mammoneta , to which they were particularly devoted , and often sacrificed to her some of their children and relations , by exposing them to the throw in storms ( as their heathenish custom was ) to the bottom of the sea for her sake . and yet this many-headed monster hydra was all this while ( as being born and bred in the sea ) more fish than flesh : it had the head and face of a man , the beard of a goat , the neck of a bull , and the belly of a hog , but was of the nature of a herring , of which , for the most part it fed ; it had also a slight cross on the forehead ( tho' the mark of it was for the most part half worn out ) but no sign at all of christianity any where else . yet for neptune's sake . and the assistance they hop'd from mammoneta , even those christian princes were right-glad to have the monster hydra on their side ; and indeed it was no shallow monster , but as crafty and politick as any of them all , and knew how to watch for its advantage very sedulously , especially when there was any mony to be got or kept . chap. ii. how nasonius , the famous knight of the hydropick land got into high esteem there ; and how he disgusted fortuna in attempting to ravish the amazonian lady victoria . now so it fortuned that in times of yore , the hydra commonwealth had great wars against their own king don ibero , against whom they had rebelled ; and tho' they had very many heads , yet , being more fishermen than souldiers , they had never a good one fit to lead an army , or at least none so good as the noble kt. nasonius , who in all justs and tournaments had behaved himself right-valiantly , and won much renown : for which reason those of his family and their descendents were , out of meer necessity , by the hydropick commonwealth chosen to be their generals in war , which they call the hydra-holder : by which means they came to that power , that one of them attempted to sear one of the heads of the hydra , and that was the greatest of them , call'd emporiana , but living under water , it gush'd forth such floods upon his approach , that it quench'd all his irons . now in the time of the war with the giant gallieno , it happened that hydra had for its general a hardy knight of the nasonian family , who was for a particular reason very visible to be seen , height nasonious ; who had behaved himself so craftily , that tho many of the heads hated him for his high and proud humour , yet there was some others that loved , and more that feared him , the which bred much difference between the heads ; yet all of them having but one body , they never fell to open vvars with one another . this famous knt. nasonius , being , as great vvarriors used to be , exceeding amorous , and much given to court fair ladies , had a long time made suit to dame fortuna , not regarding her want of sight , ( a great blemish in a mistress ) but hoping by her means to get great vvealth , dignity , and high preferment , after which he gap'd exceedingly ; which gave some shrewd lavish tongues occasion to talk at random , seeing him ( like the noble knight sir hudibras ) more to value the advantages than the woman . his suit had this effect , that she requited his good vvill with divers favours , and promised to do him some friendly o●fices ; but being of a nature very fickle and unconstant , she would not consent to marry any man , or to hold to him very long ; but carelesly scattered her kindnesses here and there , as if she regarded not much to whom she gave them ; nay , it was very hard for any but a very wise man to enjoy her friendship any long time , and for that reason it was suspected , that she did secretly affect , if any , the politick giant , k. gallieno . now it happen'd that dame fortuna had a relation of hers , call'd the lady victoria , a stately and majestick dame , of the noble race of the amazons : her fortuna ( being blind her self ) thought might be a fit match for the kt. nasonius , and that by this means she might requite his love to her self ; and therefore she broke her mind to him on this manner : noble knight , tho' i find in my self no inclination to marry any man living , and experience my humour to be such , that i shall never be constant to my husband , and therefore desire you to court me no more upon that score ; yet to make you some amends for your kindness , i let you know that i have a beautiful and stately kinswoman of mine , hight victoria , descended from the warlike-race of the amazons , and sought to by a great many great kings and princes , whom , if you can by gentle and wise courtship , and fair , and valiant carriage win to affect you ; i , for your love to me , give my consent ; and when you have her , you may be sure to have me for your friend . to whom the noble kt. nasonius being indeed the very pink of courtesie , tho' his nature and education did not enable him to express it but with a very ill grace ) with an obeisance so low , that his nose almost toucht the ground , did with much courtesie answer . excellent lady , or rather goddess ! i esteem my self much bound to you for this your grace and favour ; i have heard much of the incomparable perfections of the most accomplish'd lady victoria : indeed i have never had the luck to see her , though i sought after her much ; which i impute to the necromancy of the wicked giant gallieno : for when i attempted to wait upon her , and let her know how passionately i doated on her rare perfections , as soon as i came near the place where she used to be , he did by his enchantments raise from hell such a smoak and fire , that i could not come at her sight , and sent down such showers of hailstones , as big as bullets , as no mortal man might abide them ; so that i was still forced to retire , and was divers times in danger of my life , had i not ran away : to avoid which , if you please to bring her near my tent in this time of truce and peace with him , i will be ready to receive her ; for you know it is the fashion of knights never to court any amazonian lady but in their tents . dame fortuna lik'd well of what he said , and persuaded the fair lady victoria to come with her into the field , not far from his tents , and seeing him come to meet her , civilly withdrew her self . but nasonius no sooner cast his eye upon victoria , and saw he had her now at an advantage , and in his power ; but he was so enamour'd of her , that , neglecting all courtship , and decent treaty , contrary to the laws of chivalry , and fair carriage becoming a knight , he most dishonourably set upon her by surprize , and attempted to ravish her even in the open field : who , tho' being an amazonian lady , she stoutly resisted him , and had she but foreseen such a rudeness , and had been arm'd ready for him , she could easily have beaten him ( for unfair fighters are generally cowards ) yet having laid unworthy violent hands upon her , he kept her as his prisoner , falsely pretending she was won by the law of arms , and could his disobliging persuasions have prevailed , he would have kept her still as his concubine . but she in great disdain refused it , and writ to her aunt dame fortuna on this wise . dear aunt , i am most shamefully and dishonourably abused by the recreant knight nasonius ; for he no sooner had me in his power , but , forgeting all knightly honour , he set upon me to ravish me . you know i never lik'd the man , because he was rash , foolish and inconsiderate , wanting both conduct and wisdom , and i was absolutely resolved never to marry a mock souldier : as also , to tell you true , because my fancy had a strange aversion against his ill-look'd phisnomy , his slavering mouth , lean-chaps , spindle-shanks , and paramont nose ; which , to tell you my very thoughts , i never saw , but it caused in me an horrible loathng . besides , i like his rustick churlish humour far worse than all the rest : nor can that man have the le●st regard for honour , or be master of true valour , who thus proudly tramples underfoot all considerations of vertue and worthiness by which base and ignominious actions . and though it was your will i should go along with you to visit him , yet i assure you i went with an intention to let him know how much i scorned him , and how unworthy he was of my affection . i request you therefore to join with me in revenging such an impardonable affront , without which , i can receive no comfort . your sorrowful niece , victoria . when dame fortuna had perused this lamentable letter of her beloved niece victoria , she was so inrag'd that none came in her way but had some mischief or other happen'd to them : some had their necks broken , some were burned or drowned , some were hang'd , some died of sudden diseases , others lost their wits , and others their estates by casualties , &c. at length rushing into nasonius's tent , who was imperiously proud , and puffed up with the imprisonment of victoria , she thus accosted him . base varlet , and no knight ! how hast thou abused my kindness , in using victoria so dishonourably , and now triumphest that thy wickedness took effect ! hear then what i say unto thee , and what my sisters the fates have decreed concerning thee . though i cannot altogether recall my words by which i promised thee good luck in divers things ; yet this curse shall go along with it , that thou shalt never have success but in ill things , and by means of ill men , which shall at last turn to thy greater infamy with all truly noble and disinterested persons , and bring thee in the end to the greatest shame and utter destruction . as for the renowned giant gallieno , to overcome whom thou bendest all thy small and borrowed power , he shall perpetually prevail against thee , and thy dishonourable associates : and either force you to truckle to his great might , managed by the wisest policy , and sue for peace , or else utterly subdue you . and so fare thee ill . with that she flung away out of his tents , and left him in melancholly damps , and an unspeakable disturbance of mind , which ( as some authors write ) made him , as his custom was , groan backwards , which left an ill savoured scent behind it . chap. iii. how the invincible giant , king gallieno , sent the valiant grandorsio to deliver the fair lady victoria from her unjust captivity . as soon as dame fortuna's passion was over , and that having vented her angry freaks , and recover'd her wits again , the want of which had caused many disasters to sundry persons ; she set her self to consider by what means she might be revenged on the recreant kt. nasonius , and set her niece at liberty ; and nothing seem'd to her more proper and effectual than to stir up the mighty giant gallieno to undertake the lady victoria's quarrel , and to redeem her from her thraldom ; and therfore she caused a letter to be writ to him after this manner . to the invincible giant gallieno . right puissant prince : it is not unknown to your mightiness how base and unknightly the recreant kt. nasonius has dealt with the lady victoria , when pretending all peace and love , he set upon her , and most fouly intended to ravish her , and how he still keeps her as his prisoner . wherefore , my humble request is , for the love you bear to honour , and the compassion your generous soul has for distressed and abused ladies , you would employ your irresistible strength and power both to take satisfaction for the affront done to all our sex in general , and to my self and her particularly , by revenging it upon that dishonourable kt. ; and withal to rescue victoria from her unlawful and undeserved captivity . by doing which , she will owe you her self , and you shall also have , as far as her changeable nature permits , for your constant friend fortuna . which letter , when the noble giant had read , he answered it on this wise . to the great lady fortuna . madam , this is not the first time the ignoble wretch nasonius has stain'd his knightly honour by foul actions , tho' this is the foulest he ever did . there needs no other motive but the indignity of the thing , and the dear respects i bear the noble lady victoria to stir me up to revenge it upon him , and also to rescue her . besides that , by a just title that lady should once have been spouse to my self . doubt not then of my performing your request both for her sake and my own ; only because you know how nasonius is supported by the ignoble hydra , and other powerful associates ; therefore , after i have deliver'd her , you must give me time to take my full revenge of the hydra and him ; for i must not wrong the regular methods of my conduct which i have very severely observed , by entring on any rash action : as for your assistance , i do not desire you to strain your nature for my sake , but as far as in you lies to stand by an indifferent spectator . i know the fates , to whose decrees you are subject , may sometimes make you look askew upon me , to teach me to acknowledge , and to submit to their sovereignty . however , i shall hope for this favour from them and you too , that i be never crost in my well laid designs , but in such circumstances that all the world may see , that 't is not through want of wisdom or conduct , but by an over-ruling providence , to which all human power and prudence is subject ; that highest point of honour , i must confess , i do value my self upon , and would not willingly forfeit it , and while i preserve that temper , i fear not any great opposition from your self or the fates either , who are still wont to be favourable to those who are wary and prudent . your servant , gallieno . after king gallieno had dispatch'd away this letter to dame fortuna by his trusty servant mephostophilo , he call'd unto him one of his greatest and most valiant under-giants hight grandorsio , and thus said unto him ; go grandorsio , and according to the orders i shall give thee , take revenge of the recreant knight nasonius , who , ( as thou remembrest well ) attempted to ravish the excellent lady victoria ; beat him wherever thou dost find him . but , above all , be sure that thou dost rescue that lady , and bring her hither to my court , for which i do give thee my full power and commission ; i shall send my other commanders against the rest of the associates , but i make schoice of thee for this exploit , knowing right-well how much both the hydra , don ibero , and nasonius himself do stand in dread of thy prowess . right-glad was the valiant knt. grandorsio of this commission , and therefore returning his most humble thanks to k. gallieno for honouring him with such a wish'd command , and assuring him of his utmost devoir , he addressed himself to this noble expedition ; and finding out nasonius in the head of the hydropick army , he set upon him with such courage and conduct , that he put him to the rout , took his tents , and by that means , got the lady victoria into his power , and set her free ; who in recompence of that favour took a stately belt , which according to the fashion of the amazonian ladies she daily wore , and girt it about him , saying thus unto him ; wear this , renowned grandorsio , for my sake , and be thou ever victorious against this monster of men nasonius , for know that there is that hidden charm in this belt , that whoever has freed a distressed lady , and shall wear it , shall be sure to prevail still against his enemies in the field . great was the joy of the noble grandorsio to receive such an honourable reward from so gallant a lady : but much more to havé performed king gallieno's command . so putting the lady victoria into a coach , lin'd with crimson velvet , inlay'd with oriental pearls , and most costly precious stones , and hung round with ensigns taken from the enemy ; he accompanied her to tutelia , where the mighty giant gallieno kept his royal court ; whither she was very desirous to , both to render her thanks to her great deliverer , as also to have the sight of the most magnanimous , and most magnificent king living . chap. iv. how this amazonian lady victoria arrived at king gallieno's court , and after what a noble manner she was courted by him . as soon as the heroick king gallieno heard of the delivery of the fair lady victoria , and that she was coming to his court , he was right-glad thereof , and went in great pomp himself to meet her , and conduct her to his stately palace : at their first encounter , he alighted out of his coach of ebony , and taking her by the hand , led her into it : twenty thousands of his royal guard gallantly attir'd , and arm'd at all points , were rank'd on both sides the coach , and accompanied her to the royal city tutelia ; into which , when he was about to enter , command was given , that all the bells should ring : the streets were cover'd with rich tapestry , bestrow'd with the most choice flowers , the beauteous daughters of the spring , no less delightful to the eye , than odoriferous to the smell : the guns were discharged ten several times ; the conduits ran with wine : the altars sent up the sweet perfumes of incense to heaven ; and in a word , all the solemnities were used , that might express a most affectionate welcome . the lady victoria was entertained in a majestick palace , curiously adorn'd with the most costly furniture in all luyslandia , and accompanied by all the princesses of the blood , and ladies of the court : whose attire was so quaint and admirable , and their demeanour so charmingly civil , that the noble amazon , surprized with wonder , thought her self happily translated from a kind of hell of misery , to the joys of heaven : where k. gallieno coming to visit her , would have seated her in a chair of state next himself ; but she modestly refused , and humbly requested she might first perform the duty to which she was oblig'd both by gratitude and honour ; and so falling on her knees , she began this oration . invincible monarch ! how much is your servant victoria oblig'd to you for your goodness and valour in freeing her from the slavish thraldom in which she was detain'd by the unworthy knight nasonius ! for not to speak of his former rude behaviour ( which is shameful to remember ) a dungeon had been as welcome to any noble personage , as were their following civilities to make amends for that basest of injuries . i had no company but that of ill-bred boars , and which was worse of all , that of nasonius himself , whose ill-humour'd conversation , even , when he was in highest mood , bred in me an unspeakable abhorrence . not one action did i see ; not one discourse did i hear amongst them to divert my grief , that had the least resemblance of a gentlewoman : their mirth was unsavoury taunt , their wit dulness it self , their complements rustick , their language harsh , and grating to a ladies ear ; their carriage brutish , and their very eloquence hoggish : besides the hourly expectation of further rudeness from their bear-like natures . but oh ! how quite contrary do i find every thing here ! wisdom polisht and mixt with sweetness , civility , decency , grateful conversation , noble receiption , and highest magnificence : accept then , glorious monarch , the humblest thanks of your ever indebted servant victoria , with her firm vows never to forget such invaluable obligations . having thus said , the noble gallieno rising up , took her kindly by the hand , and told her , that such actions were their own reward , and that whilst she staid there , she might command all , and use the same freedom in every thing , as if she had received no benefit from him at all : for that he sought not interest but glory , and plac'd his greatest glory in performing honourable and valiant actions , especially to those noble personages who were injured by unworthy men , and sought to him for redress . the next day king gallieno gave order for knightly exercises of justs and tournaments in which the war-like lady took especial content . at night opera's were shewn , sung with most ravishing musick , the subject of which were the lawless imprisonment , and the coarse entertainment of the lady victoria in her unjust confinement in the hydropick camp , representing the rustickness of her jaylours , and her noble sufference : and lastly , her deliverance by the valiant giant grandorsio . to close all the solemnity , balls too were prepared : but the heroick lady , not much delighting therein , excused her self with much civility , as not being the custom of her country , or suitable to her genius or education . some days after king gallieno call'd together an assembly of all the princes , princesses , and nobility of his court , and invited thither also the fair amazonian lady victoria ; every one wondring what this august meeting of so many great personages should mean ; when the king taking the lady victoria by the right hand did in the hearing of them all deliver his mind on this manner . incomparable lady , i understand that your self , for your excellent beauty , and heroick endowments , have been sought to by all the greatest princes and potentates in the world for their spouse : wherefore my request is , that you would please , in the presence of this great , and honourable assembly , to declare your mind freely , which of them you think most worthy to be your husband : in doing which , i desire you to set aside entirely that small title , that some may judge i have to your affection , since i wholly quit all the obligations it may be conceived you owe me , leaving you fully to your own choice , nor would i yet have your self , or any others , deem that this frank proposal of mine springs from any indifferency towards your person , or signifies any sleightness of affection to so excellent a lady , fit to be a vvife to the greatest monarch in the vvorld ; but because i esteem it honourable not to restrain you in the least while you are in my hands , much less to force you unlawfully as did the recreant knight nasonius : for i should have courted you for my self , but that i fear'd my applications might have been lookt upon by you , or interpreted by others as a kind of over-awing you from following your own inclinations : in which point of honour i am so tenderly sensible , that it would damp all my felicity in enjoying you , should i apprehend , that my procuring that deliverance , or any involuntary tye upon you , had the least share in a determination , which ought to be the most free and unforc'd of any action in the vvorld . please then to speak your mind freely , as if you had the sole command over me and all my actions and dominions : assuring you of my faithful promise , that ( how highly soever i wish it may be my lot to be your choice ) whoever renders himself worthy of you , i will with all disinterested freedom render you back to be his spouse . to which the lady victoria , after some short pause , with a lowly bow , full of respect and gracious demeanour , replied in this wise . invincible monarch ! this modesty of yours where you may command is the highest complement , and most eloquent courtship , that is possible to be imagin'd . vvhom can i better chuse than my noble deliverer , to whom i owe my safety , my liberty , and my self ; i resign my self therefore wholly into your hands , and submit my self intirely to your disposal , as your constant and loyal spouse . hoping that your unparalell'd vvorth , most civil courtship , and highest merit , will screen the blushes of my modesty , and keep the world from censuring me as too easily won : nay further , i must confess i had been yours long since , had i not been surpriz'd by the treacherous incivilities of the unmanly knight nasonius , you having just title to me by your high wisdom and conduct , with which you manage your affairs both at home and in the field : only i beg this boon of you , that when ever you go to the campaign , i may still be with you , and wait upon you : for i know that my presence join'd with his unworthy guilt , will so terrify nason . that he will not dare to approach where i am ; but he shall saunter up and down year after year , with an army at his heels without doing any thing worthy a captain , which will expose him to ridicule , and lose him that little credit he has got among the boorish , heads of the hydra . indeed , i should have ask'd the leave of fortuna , upon whom i have some kind of dependance , before i had made this final determination : but i have partly her good-will already ; and shou'd she be something out of humour ( to which she is now and then obnoxious ) and a little frown upon us for a while , i know your wisdom is such as can reclaim her , and recover her friendship . which said , she immediately gave him her fair hand , in token of her faithful heart , which he graciously took , and seal'd the contract with a kind salute , which done , k. gallieno added these words . excellent lady ! tho' i am surpriz'd at your goodness in bestowing upon me so frankly the rich gift of your self ; yet i desire , if you please , as a thing most becoming your honour , and mine , that our nuptials be defer'd till i shall have challeng'd all my rivals the associates to come themselves with their armies to tutelia ( as they have often bragg'd they would ) and fetch you out of my hands , as i , by grandorsio forced you out of the hands of nasonius ; and i engage my royal word , that i will yet part with my title to you , if they can accomplish it . your worth is so great , that the winning you is too easy a conquest , unless it costs me more trouble than a few complements , and an ordinary entertainment . nor do i speak this as if i were indifferent to part with a jewel ( which i esteem too valuable for the mortgage of the whole world to purchase ) but because i am assur'd they neither dare attempt it , nor can compass it ; and should they indeed , they would in that case very well deserve you ; and so in honour and reason , ought to have you . all the assembly stood amaz'd at such a transcendent strain of nobleness , which amidst the affectionate respects and courtship of a lover , still kept up to the height , the grandeur of a heroe . as for the lady victoria , she , being all honour and courage , most highly applauded this gallant motion , and declared , that k. gallieno cou'd not possibly have better pleas'd her humour , than in so doing . whereupon an herald was dispatch'd to the several associates , to the purpose aforesaid ; who carried also , with k. gallieno's consent . letters from the lady victoria , inciting them by the most powerful perswasions she could use , to force her out of king gallieno's hands , and promising that whoever did so , she wou'd therefore be his . what became of the embassy shall be declared in the following chapter . chap. v. how the luyslandian herald went to all the associates challenging them to fetch the lady victoria out of king gallieno's hands . and what answer he brought back : as also of the solemn marriage of that lady with king gallieno at tutelia . the herald having receiv'd his commission sets forward on his journey : and first he went to the court of the great austriaco , emperor of regomania ; and when he came to deliver his message , he found him playing a lesson upon the lute ; and he was so attentive to his musick , that tho' the herald repeated his embassy twice or thrice over , he hardly heard him ; and when with much ado he rightly understood him , he told him he was a troublesome fellow to disturb his recreation , and , that as for the lady victoria she was such a ticklish mistress , and had so often deceiv'd his expectation and scorn'd his courtship when he fought against the half-moon of the great emperor magog ; and on divers other occasions had so taken his master's part , that he did not think it worth his intermitting his musical recreation , nor his wearying himself with so long a journey , much less to meddle with fighting for her ; in which kind of harsh and untuneable musick he had no skill . and so without any kind of respect due to such publick messages he bid him be gone , and that neither his master nor he shou'd trouble him any more with such impertinencies . next he went to the great king , don ibero formalitoso , and requested one of his court-officers to acquaint his majesty , that there was an herald come from the mighty giant king gallieno , who demanded audience , but the strutting courtier drawling out every syllable with a most formal gravity , answer'd him , that his illustrious majesty was playing at shuttle-cock , with some court ladies , and was yet in querpo , and that it was against the highest punctilio's of honour to disturb so great a king in his pastimes , especially being de scompuesto . after many tedious delays , he obtain'd audience , but not till don formalitoso was accoutred in his royal habiliments , and seated with great solemnity in his chair of state with all the lords of his court attending him . to whom when the herald had declared his message , and deliver'd his letters ; don ibero formalitoso with his hands on his sides , and a mien overlooking all the company , proudly answered , that it was very easie for him with a puff of his breath to blow king gallieno out of tutelia ; but that it did not become the high majesty of the great king of iberia to gad out of his country upon any account whatever . and as for the lady victoria , she had played him so many slippery trickss in calatonia , that he wondred how she durst write to the greatest king in the world , having so often , and so shamefully disoblig'd him , and so with the waving of his hand he signified his pleasure that he should be gone . from thence he went to the noble duke of bawwawia , whom he found in company of the rest of the associates , as tricongio , &c. who were all assembled together to consult how they might quell the mighty giant gallieno . but they were so high in their cups , and so distemper'd with drinking , that he did not think it seasonable to deliver such an honourable embassy to men whose reason was totally drown'd in wine . wherefore he staid two or three days longer , hoping by that time he might take them in some lucid interval , but he still found them in the same pickle : so that a friend of his advis'd him , that if he would needs stay till they are all perfectly sober , it was his best course to hire a house , to save the charges in an inn. yet he obtain'd of his friend to acquaint them in the case they were in , on what message he came . when one of them , who scarce half understood it , taking it to be some high compliment sent them by the persons mention'd ; to shew he was a generous foe , and a man of honour ; after two or three yawns , having a well-fill'd glass in his hand , began a health to king gallieno , , and his fair lady ; which they all took down very glibly : but not a man of them remembred what they had done or said , the next morning . at last he heard that they were all to assemble again the morrow after at nine ; at which time he hop'd it would be a proper season to deliver his embassy . but they no sooner me● , but they leapt on their horses ( with great troops hallooing and hooting after them ) to hunt the wild boar for nine or ten days . so that the herald , fearing that the time allow'd him for his return would be elaps'd ; and knowing , that to lovers , delays are tedious , would not stay to wait their coming back , but thought sit to haste homewards , taking the hydra in his way . where , when he arriv'd , he found some of the heads counting their money ; others adjusting their book-reckonings ; some chaffering for merchandize ; others ba●ie about repairing old rotten shi●s , and building new ones , and some of them too , pickling herrings . as for their answer , as the hydra has many heads , so they were of divers sentiments . many cry'd out , let king gallieno keep victoria , if he will , what is that to us ? this fighting does but spoil our trade , and our markets . but the generality of the greatest heads said , they were busie , and his errand foolish ; for he mistook them , they were not land-rats but water-rats : but if king gallieno , who has such a rare talent at cutting rivers through the dry-land , wou'd but be at the charge and pains , to make the sea navigable as far as tutelia , he shou'd then see what they would do ; but , that sure , he could not think them such fools as to run knight-erranting to free fair ladies : not they : let such light ware sink or swim , or hang , it is all one to them : profit and money is all they care for ; and that if they could be sure to lose nothing by king gallieno , or to gain any thing by him , they were his humble servants . he had also a particular audience of nasonius ; who , when he had heard the message , and read the letters , answered surlily , that victoria might have kept her self well with him whilst she was well , and not to have run to the luyslandian court to learn to cut capers : and for his part , he was not in an humour to run as far as tutelia to fetch back such a baggage . and lastly , that since he could not keep her while he had her , he had set up his resolution , never hereafter to venture himself in any battle to catch her again ; but would continue his ambition to stand still , and look on , and let them fight who were so fool-hardy . the well bred herald wondred at his incivility , and much more at this strange resolution of a knight who profest himself a warriour , and a general . so parting thence , he posted to the court of tutelia ; and gave an account very particularly of his sleeveless embassy , and the respective answers , or no answers of the several associates : which made the two royal lovers smile , and gave the whole court plentiful occasion of divertisement , to see what valiant , gentile , pretty-humour'd enemies he had to deal with . and now all rubs being smooth'd , preparation was made for solemnizing the marriage the week after ; which was celebrated with all the gallantry imaginable . the particulars of which were so extraordinary , that it would over-task the best wit in the world to express them to the life , in their due order as they were perform'd . only i cannot omit the epithalamium made by philopompus , and sung by a consort of most harmonious voices , which was this , i. caelestial spirits that tune th' harmonious spheres , with charming musick strike the ears , of this great croud that celebrate the marriage of the happy pair : gallieno the great , victoria the fair : rulers both of war and state. may ill chance never their vnion sever ; nor sneaking treachery their loves undermine : but firm accord , in deed and word , in honour and truth , their noble hearts combine . ii. mars and bellona joyn'd and link'd in one can ne'r by force be overthrown : wise conduct guiding their designs , no multitude of distructed foes envying their greatness , spreads , and grows , can work them any countermine . the associates , weak kings , base states , whose scatter'd , ill-knit raggs of unjust war , to the worlds wonder , torn asunder , shall turn their braggs , and folly to despair . iii. may golden glories circle their bright throne ; and joyn their foes crowns to their own ; fair-ey'd peace on their victory wait ; peace ! of all just vvar the sole end , tho' war alone to peace can the obstinate bend . kindness they abuse , who peace refuse , so nobly offer'd when he cou'd by force subdue . and may they live crowns to regive to injur'd princes , who for their protection sue . chap. vi. how nasonius treated with the great lucifero about driving his father eugenius out of his three kingdoms and get them to himself . and how all the furies of hell , were let loose , and sent into utopia , to stir up the subjects to rebellion . many days together lasted these nuptial solemnities , and never was there seen such universal rejoicing and feasting throughout luyslandia , as was at that season . but it pass'd far otherwise in the hydropick country , and least of all with the discomfited knight nasonius . he had suffered the lady victoria to be taken from him by plain force : he had utterly lost his honour as well by getting her unlawfully , as by not being able to keep her . he saw that king gallieno was like to encroach daily upon the hydropick territories , and that little help was to be expected from don ibero , whose best politicks were meer folly , his souldiers half starv'd for want of meat and cloaths , a●d their consultations nothing but empty braggs , and haughty bluster . he knew well much assistance might come to him from the war like dukes , bawwaw , tricongio , and other potentates of regomania , had he but money to hire and pay their souldiers . but where was that to be had ? himself had lost his own patrimony in luyslandia ; and was but a pitiful poor knight himself , or , as some authors write , but a kind of better sort of burgher , living mostly upon his pay as a souldier , allow'd him by the hydra ; and so could spare nothing out of his own purse . he had an uncle and father-in-law , whose daughter he had married hight eugenius king of vtopia , carduana , and lyramia ; a pious and mild prince , after whose kingdoms he had a long time gap'd , and had by the assistance of the idol mammoneta , by his private emissaries sown much discontent , and ●issatisfaction towards him amongst his subjects , and dispos'd many of them to rebellion : to which many of them , especially those of the panym party were prone enough of themselves , seeing how much their immedi●te predecessors had thriven by driving that devillish trade . the only difficulty that stuck with him was how he might go about it with security that he should not miscarry in the attempt , in regard that king eugenius was of his own nature mild and merciful , and never burden'd his subjects with taxes , for which reason he had a very great party faithful and loyal to him . wherefore nasonius , to get rid of this perplexity , call'd his best friend , sodomicus to him ; and asked hm by what means , ( good or bad ) he might be certified aforehand , of the success of his undertaking ; not doubting but that if it took effect he could do well enough ; for then he could either by dissimulation gull the credulous people of vtopia , who were of such an unwary and silly humour , that they would easily believe all that was told them that sounded maliciously , and even lov'd to be deluded : or else he could by authority crush , or put to death all that durst oppose , or approach to him . he told him too , that he had already consulted the star-wizard sydrophell , but that he answer'd , he could see no phaenomena , or indications of astrology that cou'd give him any certainty of it ; and to tell you true , added nasonius , i had as live hear him tell me of pigs , and sows , and their sties , as talk to me of bulls , and bears , and lyons , and their caelestial houses . now to acquaint you , whom i dare trust with my true thoughts , i had rather apply my self to the black art , as the surer way , but that i fear it may be against the rules of piety . at this sodomicus cou'd hold no longer . piety ! said he , are you yet such a puny , such a novice in politicks , as to stand upon the weak supports of that sneaking vertue , piety ? cou'd the hydropick commo●-wealth ever have been raised , upheld , or grown to this pitch , but by renouncing utterly that puleing consideration ? did we mind piety when we rebell'd against our lawful king don ibero formalitoso ? or when we robb'd foolish vtopia of so many plantations , massacr'd her merchants in ambyona , plunder'd their ware-houses , &c. or are we ever the worse esteem'd for it now ? do we not see how the good-natur'd puppies the vtopians do whine after us , and court our friendship . or does any monarch in the world for that reason refuse to treat with our ambassadors ? i tell you , power is all in all : get but power , and let the demure gentlewoman piety go hang her self . in a word , get b●t powe● , and what by interested men , di●ines , or others , what by the authority of great men who partake of power , and influence the people ; what by the connivance of the fearful , which make up the generality , po●er will be able to justify , nay , to sanctify it self . at these words , nasonius embracing him affectionately , cried out in a kind tone . sodomicus ! better half of my self ! thou hast spoken my very thoughts , and prevented my declaring that which i would have said , but ( pardon my diffidence ) durst not openly and abruptly discover . hereafter therefore assist me with thy advice , in the pursuit of that glorious end , and thou shalt see that i will in all things follow thy counsel . there are , said sodomicus in the hellish country of laplandia , certain old haggs , who have infinite familiarity with the infernal spirits , and have often sold winds to our country-men for old rags , and mouldy crusts : over these beldams there is one of incomparable skill , hight crampogna , her i would have your highness send for immediately ; follow her profound advice , and know of her the event of your undertaking . as soon as nasonius heard this , without further pause , he presently dispatch'd a vessel with a messenger , and such presents as he was inform'd would be most acceptable unto her , requesting her attendance on him . the witch answer'd , i will be there before thee . and so without any more ado , embarking her self in an egg-shell , or as some authors say , in a rotten-orange-peel , or as others say , getting a stride upon a broom-staff , she arriv'd in the hydropick land in the space of two hours , and signified to nasonius in his dream , that he shou'd meet her the next evening in a fog , near the side of a stinking fen , well known unto him . as soon as he came to the place , he saw the grisly hag with hollow eyes , dishelveld hair , lank cheeks , and shrivell'd chaps , who chatter'd out this rhime . thou art too great , with me to treat ; send for my lord lucifero , and all things well with thee will go . nasonius , though he was couragious enough in bad things , yet at first was something stumbl'd at this sudden proposal ; but being over-shooes in impiety already , he resolv'd to wade through : and bade the witch send for him , or call him up . whereupon , turning her self nine times round one way , and as often back again , and repeating a long ribble-row of prayers backwards ; at length , in a kind of extatick amazement she yell'd out , brimstone i smell , the breath of hell ; he comes , he flies , through earth , through skies . draw near , draw near , appear , appear , not with a look that may affright , but with a shape that may delight . upon which words appear'd lucifero with horns on his head , and a cloven foot , but in all other appearances , a most accomplish'd gentleman : the first word he spake , he bid nasonius not to fear , for he was his friend , and knew well his design ; which was to drive his pious father out of his three kingdoms , and get them for himself . know then , continued he , that it was i that inspired thee with this thought , and i will carry thee through : only thou must wed spiritually , or take to wife i mean concubine , ( for we hate all marriages ) my eldest daughter ambitiosa superba ; that is , thou must give thy whole heart to her , hold to her constantly , and follow all her motions and inspirations , which done , she with her maids of honour will easily bring that design of thine to perfection . nasonius thank'd him for the high favour in dignifying him with the honourable title of his son ; professing that he had ever lov'd and ador'd that goddess , though ( hindred by some foolish christian principles , instill'd by education , or taken up upon the paroll of preachers ; which from hence-forward he utterly abjurd ) he had not till now made his immediate applications to her great father , and espous'd her : humbly begging by his good leave a sight of that high-spirited princess . with that , lucifero gave a dreadful stamp with his cloven-foot , which made the earth tremble , and crack asunder , when out of the breach issued forth an horrible cloud of blewish smoak which darkned all the sky , and that once dissipated , there appear'd the stately lady ambitiosa with a train of black-brow'd furies , or fiends attending her : her self was clad in a gorgeous robe , with many great crowns dangling about it , spurning many lesser ones , and trampling them under her feet . her lofty head seem'd to reach the very skies , and her grasping hand seem'd to pull down heaven it self . but , after a while descending from her height , approaching nasonius , she took him kindly by the hand , with these words : here take me , and with me the glory thou affectest , and the three crowns thou so much desirest . acknowledge the great honour i do thee , and see thou observest me in all things , and so shalt thou be sure to be great as far as thy cursed fates will permit thee . see here my train , my maids of honour , who will assist in accomplishing thy projects , and going before thee into vtopia , so prepare the minds of those sottish people , who are far the better half at my father's devotion already , that thou shalt have little to do but to gather the fruit , and reap the rich harvest which they shall prepare for thee . then calling 'em forth one after another first stept out the proud fury rebelliosa , of so way-ward , and ungovernable a humour , that she would scarce obey even great lucifero himself , but that she knew he would only command her such things as were most agreeable to her own inclination . to whom ambitiosa said , what wilt thou do for my devoted servant nasonius to obtain him his father's three kingdoms ? i will , answer'd rebelliosa with a lofty tone , fill the hearts , heads and tongues of the vtopians . with murmurs and discontents against their kind and lawful king eugenius , so that they shall be ready to rebel , and drive him out , when ever they shall get an opportunity to do it with safety . fear not thy success , great part of that nation are my sworn slaves already . 't was i who inspir'd them to make war against his father eusebius . 't was to me they sacrificed a hundred thousand of that damnable sect call'd loyallists , for which i rewarded them afterwards with riches and preferments . lastly , 't was i , that , to crown my triumphant exploits , inspir'd them to cut off his head ; and the same fate , if it suit with thy policy , shall betide his son. this said , rebelliosa retir'd and there came forward next a monstrous deform'd hag , whose ill-contriv'd shape much resembled that of a chymera , as the poets describe it : her eyes squinted contrary ways ; her feet interfer'd with one another , and all her parts hung loose , as if they were inartificially tied on with points , without any natural contexture or coherence . of whom , when nasonius had demanded her name ; my name , said she , with a confident look and tone is alethia , i am truth it self , and cannot lye . but ambitiosa interrupting her , and turning to nasonius , said , believe her not , my friend , her name is fictitiosa , she is the spirit of lying , and her nature such , that she cannot say true , but only when she is to answer my dread father lucifero , or my self . then turning her self to the fiend fictitiosa , she demanded of her what she would do to get her truest gallant nasonius his father's three kingdoms ? i will said she , spread thousands of horrid lyes against eugenius , his queen , and their son all over vtopia , to disaffect his subjects , and make them hate him ; i will inspire the pamphletteers , news-writers , lampooners , and others of the state-scribblers with the genius of forging 'till almost all the land be possest with the spirit of falshood and lying nay , the pulpits out of which they preach the doctrine of their god , and the preachers themselves shall be deeply tainted with my venemous infection . after her came out a third fury , which look'd like a fool , or meer ninny , in a long mothly coat , with a niaisy countenance , a gaping mouth , her head hanging down , and a great bibb on her breast to receive her slaver , staggering and stammering still as she walk'd and spoke . and what , said nasonius , can this silly thing do in my behalf ? as much replied ambitiosa , as any of the rest . she is the spirit of folly , and her name fatuitosa credula , let her self speak , and tell thee what she will perform ; i will , said fatuitosa , so besot and infatuate the people of vtopia , that they shall give full credit to all fictitiosa's lyes , tho' never so monstrous and incredible ; by which means i will make them abdicate their hereditary king , tho' were they not absolutely my creatures , they might easily see that it would breed endless distractions . i will stir them up to make war against the powerful and politick giant gallieno , tho' to their vast charge , and the utter destroying their traffick and comme●ce . i will inspire them with the refin'd folly , that they shall voluntarily and contentedly beggar themselves to maintain the war of the hydra , tho' they cannot but know that it laughs at them for it , as great fools ; and in their hearts hates them . nay , i will so totally and perfectly dose their reason , and common sense , that they shall magnify and adore thee nasonius all the while thou doest impoverish , abuse , and ruine them , and ( which i esteem my chief master piece ) they shall thank thee , and congratulate with thee , not for any real benefits they have receiv'd from thee , but meerly because thou hast beggar'd and ruin'd them . at these last words nasonius took the jest to fully , and relish'd it so feelingly , that , ( tho' it were a thing unusual with him ) he could not refrain from shewing his high contentment with a pleasant smile . till , as he was going to return an high complement to ambitiosa for such a notable assistant , by telling her , that the very folly of lucifero's courtiers out-witted , and over-reached the highest wisdom of mortals ; there appeared a fourth fury with a surly countenance , that came in stamping and staring , cursing the earth for bearing her , the air for giving her health , and the sun for lending her light. nasonius all amaz'd at such an uncouth kind of fiend intreated of ambitiosa the knowledge of her name and nature . her name , replied ambitiosa is diabolica , and she is the spirit of ingratitude . she had that particular name given her as an high reward for her great merit ; for she was the forwardest to oppose that cursed angel michael , when he endeavoured to debauch our confederate angels , from joining with us in rebellion , by alledging the gratitude ( forsooth ) we owe to god , as being our creatour , and who gave us our being , and all the good we had ; and who is in greater esteem with my father lucifero than she ? nasonius being a gentleman well-bred , and full of courtesie , thought it was his duty , and would be grateful to lucifero , to pass upon such an high personage , and so great a favourite of his a special complement . whereupon approaching to her with a low bow , and kissing his hand , he was about a very formal expressing his respects to her ; but she , with her fist gave him such a sound cuff on the ear , that ( being but limber hamm'd ) his proboseis well nigh toucht the ground ; so that he had much ado to recover himself . to take off his trouble and fear , ambitiosa told him , it was diabolica's nature to render evil for good ; and that had he not followed her inspiration formerly in being ungrateful to his father , who had done him so many favours she had certainly done him some great mischief for his kindness : but she bid him rest contented with that fury's candid dealing : for had she saluted or kiss'd him , she would most certainly have kill'd him . after nasonius had certainly well recover'd himself , and come to his senses and wits again , diabolica thus accosted him ; fond mortal ! who could so think , that i , who am ingratitude it self could be won or oblidg'd by any courtesies . thou might'st have known by thy self , who art one of my greatest devotes , that civilities and kindnesses are not the way to oblige me , and had not thy great merits in being ungrateful to thy obliging father represt my fury , this had been thy last day , and all thy ambitious projects had vanish'd to smoak : but for following my inspirations i have both spar'd thee , and will reward thee . perhaps thou think'st that my sisters have left nothing for me to do for thee ; but thou art much mistaken . thy father eugenius has hugely obliged many personages of the highest rank , and the chief officers in the army , nay , indeed the whole army it self , by being so good a master to them ; and unless these be taken off , and rendred ungrateful , they will give thee such disturbance as will quite ruin all thy undertakings ; but i will take such order , that they shall all of them either desert or oppose him ; for i will infuse such a subtil poyson into the wretched souls of those most oblig'd to him , that most of them , nay , his own flesh and blood , as his own very children , shall be the first traytors to him , and his bitterest enemies . nasonius , upon hearing this comfortable news , taking fresh heart , blam'd himself for being so foolishly unmindful of her genius , and humbly ask'd of her , ( for he was deadly afraid of the t' other cuff ) if it wou'd not disoblige her , to return her his humble thanks . if thou wilt oblige me replied diabolica , be sure thou never repentest thy ingratitude to thy father or others , but continuest it unto the end . but particularly , be sure thou dost not shew the least gratitude to the vtopians , though hey foolishly serve thee against their own interest : but both disoblige those who have first and most assisted hee , and do all thou canst to requite the kindnesses of that sottish nation with their utter ruin . huff their nobility as occasion presents , and imprison them lawlessly ; pay not their souldiers , nor any who are so foolish as to trust thee with their goods , stores , or other commodities . regard not the seamen though most useful to thee , nor pay 'em their wages : only give the fops good words , and some little pittance to keep up their folly to trust and serve thee further . give the royal assent to no national bills , that may in any wise serve to support or secure their pretended rights , liberties , and properties ; nor to any others that do not strengthen thy power , enable thee to crush their persons , and drain their pockets . thou must also use thy utmost endeavour to procure an act to endenise all the rascally refuse of thy noble allies , especially our beloved hydropicks and vagrant luyslandian panyms , by which means they will eat the bread out of the foolish , and tame vtopians mouths ; rob their cloaths from their backs , and reduce them and their posterity to utmost beggary and slavery . they have made themselves thy slaves , use them accordingly . nasonius was about to assure her of his doing his utmost to follow this advice , when there steps forward another fury in a rich gown of cloth of silver , richly embroider'd with massy gold , studded all over with faces and stamps of divers sorts and figures ; who said , i am the great goddess mammoneta , chief idol of the accursed sons of adam . what i will do for thee thou shalt know when thou comest to confer with the heads of the hydra , whom i will require to serve thee heartily for their own interest . at this , lucifero put in ; see , said he , that thou sacrificest the wealth of vtopia to my best beloved hydra , and in all things seekest her advantage . for know that none are so dear to our deity ever since they in the indies formally renounc'd and crucify'd god , and chose to adore my slave mammoneta in his stead for their goddess : which binds me to requite their highly meritorious apostacy with temporal wealth . when he had thus said , there came forward two he fiends , of which one was a bold , brisk blade , clad in a long gown , with a short purple cloak over it , and a square cap like a judge , and seem'd to be a devil of great authority . the other in a black short vest , between a cassock and a jump , a little formal narrow band , and a black velvet cap , with another of white underneath turn'd up over the edges of the other , with a lace , who walkt gravely and demurely with his eyes lift up to heaven , as if he were in some divine contemplation , and in the height of prayer ; with a little bible in his hand , making shew by his gestures and actions as if his prayer ended , he were about to hold forth . these are , said lucifero , two of my chief , and most useful servants , by name injurioso , and hypocritico ; the former my chancellor , the latter my chaplain : who , at the inspiration of mammoneta ( which idol , being of the same religion with the hydra the adore ) will , to give thee title , wrest both law and gospel , and make both the bar and the pulpit be at thy devotion . speak both of you in your turns , continued he , and declare what you will do for my best beloved son nasonius . what will i do ? says injurioso ; why i will inspire the judges and the lawyers with such quirks and quillets , that they shall torture and writh the laws of the land with their face backwards , till they come to acknowledge thee their rightful monarch : i will teach them how to make out eugenius's abdication in despight of all those antiquated rules of common sense and reason , which foolish mortals follow'd hitherto : by which means they shall satisfy those who are unskilful ; or else they shall punish imprison , and adjudge to death those overwise fools who dare declare themselves for eugenius , or speak , write , print , or publish any thing in his favour . and i , said hypocritico , with a grave and goodly look and tone , do prosess verily and truly , that i will inspire all those bishops and preachers who do bear a servent devotion to the goddess mammone●a ( as the generallity do ) to teach dis-allegiance to thy father , and allegiance to thee out of their pulpits ; nay , they shall assure their hearers in the name of the lord ; and quote the wrested word of their god to abet it , that thou art their true and lawful soveraign , god's annointed and vicegerent on ea●th . nay more , verily , they shall pray for thee too , and by obliging their sheepish flock to say amen , they shall innure their conscience to fancy that their treason is a special act of religion . lastly they shall maintain it lawful to unswear their former oaths made to eugenius , and swear 'em to thee as their only lawful king and supream governour , and even sanctify perjury by their devout pretence of religiousness . these goblins disappearing , lucifero turning himself to nasonius , said these words , thou seest my dear son , how by the care of ambitiosa , and her maids of honour and my willy servants , jujurioso , and h●prcritico , all the way is pav'd and smooth'd to the glorius end thou aimest at . see thou beest a constant and loyal lover to my daughter ambitiosa , adore her , and her only next to me ; observe all her ways , and follow steadily all her inspirations , fear not that thy pretending religion will displease me ; 't is the best cloak for all my darling villanies , and makes them more sucessfull ; but take heed of setting up that religion which is the true one , and values its self upon the score of its principles , especially in carduana , where i have many panym servants , ( whom i would wish should have some particular favour . ) but the better to keep up a conterfeit pretence of being kind and equall , give freedom to all ; and if thou canst jumble 'em all into one motly church : if not , let all sects whatsoever , even atheists , and socinians , which are next to them , hold and teach what they will , as does my servant the hydra : for that 's the only plausible way to make mortals be of no religion at all . for the rest , advise with the hydropick heads ; i my self will be present invisibly at all you● consultations , and direct your councils in the way of true policy , which teaches you not to regard the unlawfulness of the means you make use of , but resolutely to pursue the end you drive at . in a word , behave thy self so as best becomes the son and sworn slave of lucifero . hereupon nasonius kneeling , and laying his right hand on his cloven-foot , sware all duty and vassallage to him , and loyalty to the goddess of his soul , ●mbitiosa ; who at parting warn'd him not to engage too rashly with the enchanted giant gallieno , but to make use of the letters of his partial friends , and his own gazzetts ( th● gospel of the vulgar ) to keep up the repute of his courage and conduct . which said , the hellish scene quite disappear'd and nasonius full of joy return'd home , and the next day went merrily to hunt at holoo , having perfect faith and hope ●n the assistance of lucifero , and of his haughty , new betroth'd mistress , ambitiosa . chap. vii . how the good king eugenuis was driven out of his kingdoms , and how nasonius vsurp'd his throne . nasonius had spent but few days in his divertisement e're news was brought him from vtopia how all the country was in an uproar , and ready to rise in open rebellion as soon as they might find a fit man to head them , and an army to fly to for their protection . shameless sl●nders against eugenius had possessed every corner of the nation . the g●eat men caball'd to desert him , the pulpits dinn'd into peoples ears nothing but fears and jeolousies ( the sly language of treason a brewing ) that he was about to destroy their religion , when only themselves were actually a●tempting it by preparing to relinquish their principles , in which it consisted essentially . the common people grew factious and mutinous ; and traytors almost beset him round , spoke him fair , and advis'd him false-heartedly . the officers of the army were tamper'd with , the city of thamopolis , and even the army it self was in great part poyson'd with treachery and disloyalty ; and but a few in comparison remain'd firm to his party and interest . which nasonius no sooner heard , but convinc'd that the hellish furies had done their business effectually ; call'd to him his best friend , sodomicus , and thus bespoke him . my entiire friend ! thou seest that he promise lucifero made , is come to effect , and vtopia is ready to receive me with open arms ; and as the furies have handled the matter , does sue to me to have me come over ; courting me as their noble deliverer : while in reallity i go only to enslave them . what remains but that we now convene the heads of the hydra , and with them take fit measures to prepare for my expedition , which thou knowest i can i no wise do , unless they assist me with ships seaman , and souldiers . to whom sodomicus answered , i have already dispos'd 'em to thy mind and they shall be ready to assist thee . only because thou knowest how superstitiously they are devoted to their idol goddess mammoneta , without whose directions they undertake nothing , they are now consulting her oracle ; but to morrow i will assemble them all , when proposals shall be drawn up , which i know will be grateful to mammoneta , and therefore i doubt not they will readily agree to them . two days after the heads of the hydra met in a full junto . to whom nasonius deliver'd himself after this plain dunstable manner , better suiting with their rusticity than if his speech had been garnish'd with all the flowers of rhetorick , perfuming the breath of the most eloquent orators . high and mighty lords ! 't is not unknown unto you how the mighty giant gallieno encroaches daily upon us and our associates in arms , and how necessary it is to strengthen our selves against him ; and i am sure no way is so effectual to do this , as to get the whole power and riches of vtopia , carduana , and lyrania to joyn in our assistance . this , if we can compass , the giant will be reduced to the stature of a dwarf ; and ( as our ingenious emblem long ago foretold ) our holland cheese will darken and ecclipse the lustre of his rising sun. you know how averse my father eugenius is to joyn with the associates , being resolv'd by preserving a neutrality , and keeping his country in peace to advance the trade and riches of his kingdoms , which with his giving freedom from persecution to tender consciences , will bring the traffick to them , and half ruin us . i have already by the assistance of mammoneta , corrupted many of his subjects , , nay some of his chief commanders , to give him such advice as should dis-affect his subjects in vtopia , and dispose 'em to rebellion . but for all that , finding things go on but slowly , i have , to tell you true , ( which is not to go further than this assembly ) crav'd aid of our common lord and master lucifero who has sent his furies and wicked spirits into vtopia to invite them to rebellion , and so infatuate them that we may do what we list wish them ; and instead of their spoiling our markets , we may make our markets of them . and now the deed is brought to perfection , so that there needs no more but my presence to accomplish that glorious and profitable work. now because i cannot go thither with an army ( as is requisite ) without your mony , ships and souldiers , my request is , that you would furnish me with such a competency of all these as may suffice to gain that incomparable advantage to our common cause , assuring , that as things are , and will be ordered , we shall find no opposition . and besides , i do promise to pay super abundantly , when i am setled , whatever you shall disburse . in doing this , you shall highly oblige great lucifero , who commanded me to treat with you about it ; as also our powerful goddess mammoneta , who has in person appear'd to me , and promised me your assistance . when the heads of the hydra had received certain intelligence of these good tidings , they were right-glad in their hearts ; yet it being a crafty and wary monster , it only said the matter should be considered the next day , and an answer return'd . when they were assembled , and began to discuss the point , they all lik'd the project exceedingly : only some doubted lest nasonius , when he had got so much power , might come to swallow them up too , and there wanted not some who said , that he would not stick at devouring them , if he saw it his interest ; who made no reckoning of ruining his father , who had been so good to him , and had ever espous'd and upheld his interest . others hoped he was not so ill natur'd , and self-seeking ( for he had craftily conceal'd his having married the all coveting , and insatiable friend ambitiosa ) and that what he did was to carry on the common cause against the giant gallieno ; or if he were desiours of honour and dignity , he was not so immoderate , as not to be satisfied with three kingdoms . others hoped by that means to get rid of him , of whose proud and ambitious humour they were al●eady weary . at length they all agreed to assist him with what he desir'd ; but yet on such conditions that they should find a good account in doing so , e're they yielded to set him up so high : and as for the danger of his encroaching on their authority afterwards , it was concluded , that if it were perceived he aim'd that way , they could quickly check his towring ' thought by chopping up a peace with the mighty giant gallieno , and leave the associates in the lurch ; as by the advice of mammoneta , they had done formerly . sending therefore for nasonius , they told him , that he could not fail by their assistance of getting vast riches in vtopia ; and therefore , it was but reason they should share with him in his opulent aquisitions ; and that otherwise their goddess mammoneta , whose dictates their religion oblig'd them to obey in all things , had advis'd them not to intermeddle in the matter . he answer'd , that the hydropick land was his native country where he was born and bred ; and where he suck'd in with his milk and the air , all the wise religion , and gen●eel education he had : and that therefore he could not but retain his chief affection for the hydra ; and that he was willing to sacrifice the men , mony , and interest of vtopia to that of his own dear country-men . so after some debate , the articles of agreement were sign'd between them , which are these that follow . imprimis , it is agreed between the great knight nasonius , and the heads of the hydra , that the associates should be acquianted with the project , and their contributions and assistance requir'd , that they may all bring in their quota towards the charges of the expedition . but that the treaty with lucifero , and the intent of dethroning eugenius be only communicated to some choice friends amongst them : and that it be only pretended to the rest , that they aim at no more but to bring him to join with them against the giant gallieno , lest their foolish piety should warp them from true policy , and make them against it . item , that in what their contributions shall fall short , it should be supplied by the hydra ; and that tho' what they added were but twenty hundred pounds , yet they should be paid six hundred thousand pounds for it out of the mony of the foolish vtopians . item , that nasonius when he was setled , should furnish mony out of the estates of the said vtopians , to set up and uphold the green-headed kt sabaudiero to make war upon k. gallieno , and to pay large sums to assist the poorer associates ; and to make the sottish vtopians maintain the wars of the hydra . item , he should prevail with the vtopians to declare war against the giant gallieno , and fit out a great fleet , and raise armies of his own men , at his own proper costs and charges to oppose him ; and yet notwithstanding , that he should pay the vtopian souldiers and seamen but slenderly , tho' with their own mony ; but the hydropick souldiers fully and nobly . item , that in regard vtopia is the only competitor in trade with the noble hydra , he should do his utmost to advance the hydropick interest , and depress the vtopian , by denying them convoys , though of their own ships , as also to take strict care that no vtopian should trade privately with luyslandia : but yet that he should connive at the hydrpicks doing the same , which would impoverish vtopia , and enrich the hydra : than which nothing can be more grateful to their powerful patroness , the goddess mammoneta . item , that to the same end the best money should be transported out of vtopia , and none but the riff-raff left behind , and that the transported money should pass through the hands of the hydra to make their advantage of it receiving it cheap , and vending it dear : clipping it first if capable , washing it if weighty , or melting it down if they saw occasion . item , that nasonius should promise to enslave and improverish the vtopians as much as it is possible in policy , and permit the hydropicks and other forreigners to abuse their souldiers that should be sent over to defend them ; it being but reason , that they who would needs be slaves , should be treated as they are . lastly , that some of the greatest personages of the hydropick common-wealth should go over with nasonius , whom he is to advance to high dignity , making some of them his prime ministers of state , and his most secret council ; and communicate to them all his actions , and consult with them about all his affairs : that so they may certainly see he keeps his promise with the hydra , as to all the particulars abovesaid , and give sure intelligence to the hydra of all his proceedings . these articles agreed and sworn to ; and the associates having sent in their quota , the hydra supplied nasonius with shipping , souldiers , and what money was wanting . which done , he full of aspiring thoughts , embark'd for vtopia : but neptune , who knew the lewd intention of this voyage , and had formerly by a charter , confirm'd by a long possession , constituted king eugenius his ancestors soveraigns of their seas , did signifie the great displeasure he conceived at this unnatural attempt , and therefore , he gave leave to eolus ( no less angry at the hydropicks for buying winds of the lapland witches to the prejudice of his prerogative ) to ruffle his waters to an horrible storm , so that divers of nasonius's ships , men , and horses were lost and drown'd . insomuch that he began now to stagger in his faith , and to doubt of lucifero's promise , fearing it was but a trappan , had not the inferral lady ambitiosa , who now possest his whole soul , and was still pres●nt with him invisibly , encourag'd him to pursue his undertaking , and not to be daunted with the first mishap . yet , had not his heart been hardned , he might have seen that this was but an ill abodement , and a fair warning that this inauspicious beginning shew'd that this action of his was displeasing to heaven : yet , it is believ'd that those two gods above-mention'd had drown'd his whole fleet , had not mercury , jove's messenger , been sent to them , to order them to permit him to go forward ; telling them , that the sins of vtopia were now full ripe , and cry'd for vegeance ; and that he was sent thither by a decree of heaven to be a perpetual scourge to them , 'till taught by dear experience they come to see their old and new sins of rebellion , and grew so wise to repent , and make satisfaction to their injured prince , and restore him to his throne ; which message heard , the storm ceas'd , and nasonius landed at his wish'd for port. assoon as the news of his arrival was spread , all vtopia began to shew openly the spirits , and confess the furies that possess'd 'em , some spread lies , some deserted ; some chief officers caball'd to put their disloyalty in execution . the rabble play'd a thousand tricks ; and in a word , all ( but some loyal persons who had no power to withstand the innundation of rebellion ) with shouts and acclamations welcom'd the invader . yet nasonius having profest he only came to redress abuses ( as all reformers do , though they afterwards turn every thing topsy-turvy ) durst not yet pull off his mask , lest he would discover his ambition too early : nor yet durst he treat with eugenius , for then ( things being adjusted between him and his subjects ) he had been reduc'd , but yet king still , wh●ch suited not with the end he aim'd at . wherefore nasonius refused all treaties with his father , answer'd not his messages ; nor accepted his kind invitation ; but ( contrary to all honour , and the law of nations ) imprison'd his ambassador ; hunted him out of his own palace , even at midnight , and put him under a guard of hydropick souldiers : hoping , that by seeing his life in danger ( no further outrage being lest but the taking away that ) he would for his safety run out of the kingdom : which succeeding as he wish'd and projected , nasonius got himself by those of his faction , without much ado , proclaim'd kind in his stead ( though against the fundamental constitution of the government , ( even though eugenius had been dead without any children ) to the great joy of lucifero , and all his true servants the hydropicks , and the no less rejoycing of the mad-headed people of vtopia . now the reader is to understand , that there was at that time a kind of hyd●a in vtopia , who upon king eugenius's retreat did set up for themselves , and gave themselves authority there ; and this done , they , though no better authoriz'd , gave the supream authority to nasonius , and he again kindly imparted to them some of the authority they had given him , and so made their no-authority legal , and stronger than it was before : which though strangely mysterious , pass'd for admirable good sence in infatuated vtopia at that season , but will be laugh'd at for the most refin'd and exquisite nonsense by all mankind in succeeding ages . chap. viii . how eugenius retired into luyslandia to request protection of the noble giant gallieno . and how the infatuated utopians for that reason proclaim'd open war against him . and also of nasonius his coronation . and the heroick adventure of the contaminated breeches . the good king eugenius being thus unworthily driven out of his kingdom by his graceless son nasonius , and the treacherous falsehoods of his own subjects ; after he had receiv'd unpardonable affronts from them , arriv'd at length at the glorious court of the great giant gillieno , and thus addressed himself to him . behold , invincible monach ! an injured and destitute prince , dishonourably , and unnaturally bereav'd of his crowns by an ungrateful son , and treacherous subjects , through the instigation of the hydra , and the rest of their shameless associates , and flying to your court for refuge , and redress . the safety , honour , and dignity of all crown'd heads are concern'd in my quarrel : for , no injury have i , to my knowlegde , done to any of those , who thus against all honour , justice , and allegiance , have conspired to my ruin ; and those which were pretended , were done by advice of counsellours of their own party , whom they had corrupted to betray me . be then a mighty king as well in goodness as you are in greatness , another tamberlane , and revenge the cause of an injur'd prince , bereav'd of all , what both by god's and man's laws he possess'd , by an ambitious usuper ; who not content to have robb'd me of all i had , does to render his crime more enormous , and to palliate his usurpation , add to his wicked injustice most reproachful , and base calumnies , to debauch my credulou●s subjects from their allegiance . i have no hopes left but your puissant patronage , to whom nothing can be more glorious than to relieve the oppressed , and restore crowns to those princes who have lost them not through their own faults , but by the malice of unprovok'd enemies , when the good king eugenius had thus ended his address , the noble and generous gallieno embrac'd him tenderly in his arms , and thus be spoke him . dear brother , were not your misfortunes the occasion of this visit , no man living could have been a more welcome guest 〈◊〉 my court than such a suitor ; nor do i esteem any conquest in m● cause half so glorious , as is the undertaking a business which is every way so honourable , and full of renown : for by how muc● your innocency is greater ; and the wickedness of your enemies mo●● manifest ; so much higher will it set my reputation to redress yo●● injuries , and revenge your disgraces upon your inhumane and base enemies . be here as free as my self , and be assur'd of my effectu●● assistance ; only let me take my own season , in regard i have many foes deal with , which may cost me some time to make them sue for pea●● or to subdue them by war. having ended his speech , he gave orders to coin a medal with his own effigies on one side , and eugeni●● on the other , with this inscription : je vous met●ray sur vostre throne , ou jo perdray ma courenne . in english : i 'll either set you on your throne , or i resolve to lose my own. so king eugenius remain'd in the court of king gallieno , where lived in great splendour , caress'd by king gallieno himself ; the p●●ces of the blood , and all the nob●lity ; with less fear now that he shou●● not regain his kingdoms in due time , than he had formerly assur●● he should keep them while he had them among such a multitude of t●●tors as he had daily about him : though his piety towards his 〈◊〉 subjects was such , that dreading the calamity of war , which wo●● have harrass'd the nation , and undone many of his well-beloved p●●ple , he had much rather have recover'd them by the returning of kingdoms ( made sensible by their taxes and losses ) to their 〈◊〉 than by the force of any forreign armies , which , though never so well disciplin'd or restrain'd from offering any outrage , except to those who opposed them , yet could not fail , for all that , of b●inging great distractions and miseries to these kingdoms , which , with the eye of a compassionate father he look'd upon as his own . in the mean time nasonius triumph'd now gloriously in vtopia , having obtain'd by the favour of lucifero ( of whom only as his liege he held it ) the crown and imperial throne of that kingdom ; which he had acquired neither by honesty or valour , but by the high●st injustice , and basest treachery ; according as dame fortuna had told him , that he should never have success , but in ill things , and by means of ill men. assoon as he was seated in his throne , he receiv'd the congratulations of his hydropick friends , and some other of the associates , who now made no doubt but by his assistance to pull down the mighty giant gallieno , and to shrink him into a pigmy . and the overjoy'd vtopians were so fond of their new king , that no money was enough to give him to prosecute his designs . nay , such a sound drench had fatu●tosa given them , that at his instigation they would needs undertake the quarrel of other men , and declare war against the invincible giant gallieno , ( whom so strangely did malice transport their foolish and rude natures ) they mortally hated , because he had harboured and protected thei● lawful soveraign : as if not contented to have spoil'd and robb'd hi● of all he had , they were resolv'd still to prosecute him where he was and threatned ruin to any man that should shelter him from their malice , or give him meat , drink , or lodging , and so ( as far as they wer● able ) to make any place in the world afraid to entertain him ; b● which it is easy for any men in their wits to discern , and might be so even to the vtopians themselves , had not fatuitosa absolutely besotte● them with folly and madness , that nothing but lucifero himself , an● all the furies of hell could have inspir'd them with such a diabolic malice . after this , nasonius's coronation was to be celebrated , which w●● performed with all the splendour imaginable : but while he walk'd 〈◊〉 convalcade in his knightly robes under his royal canopy , a sad and 〈◊〉 accident happened , which in the worst and ugliest manner dusk'd and 〈◊〉 dirted the whole solemnity : his heart was so full , and so over-swol●●● with the windy glory of his coronation , and the joy he conceiv'd the●● of was so overflowing , that it burst forth backwards , and the perfu●● of that yellow aromatick matter was so strong , that it imparted , and c●●municated it self to as many as were near him ; and which was wors● all , his thus annointed majesty was not in circumstances to alter his condition , but was forc'd to remain in the same abominable pickle , and to retain the same scent a long time after ; the effluviums of which were so very puissant , that whoever smelt it might safely swear it was specifick to a king ; nor could proceed from any other but from the most powerful , and most magnanimous monarch in the world. many and divers were the conjectures what this unusual and ominous accident should portend . the wizzard sydrophel erected schemes of the nativity of this new birth ; he consulted all the caelestial bodies , and knock'd at the very doors of all their houses to enquire the reason of it , and brought certain news thence , that the noble constellation ariadne's crown had veil'dits height , and become a falling star to do honour to his coronation : that such sort of stars when they fall , leaving a kind of slough behind them , this was only the caelestial slough , or gelly of that star , and was very sweet-scented of its own nature , and only seem'd otherwise to us , because it was so uncouth to our sublunary noses . others , who were poetically given , wrote panegyricks , and swore by parnassus that it was as sweet as its cousin-german musk ; but , as sweet perfurmes seem to many to have a stinking smell : so it was nothing in the world that made people conceit that it was not odoriferous , but the vast disproportion between that part in a soveraign , and the noses of his subjects . and others said , it was a freakish revenge of dame fortuna for the injury he had offered to the lady victoria . but the eugenians were of another opinion , and made far different constructions of it : for some of them noted , that this was his first adventure , and that it was an evident sign that he should bewray all the glory of his reign by base and cowardly actions : or that the giant gallieno would make him often do the same in the process of his reign , which he did at the beginning of it . others would needs have it signify that all which the nation should ●gain by him , would be no more than a sir reverence . others , that the inward gripes of his conscience did ( as gripes use ●o do ) occasion such a sudden laxativeness ; but those of his good ●ubjects , who granted it to be as it was , and were heartily sorry , and sham'd to see it , gave out , that the great giant gallieno by his necro●ancy , or some of his familiar spirits had invisibly convey'd some pur●ing powder into his mornings draught , to work him that foul disgrace , ●o disparage and beshit his coronation . however it happened , it was a very foul business , both in it self , ●nd especially in the timeing of it , and lighting at such a nick●●g season ; and the further prognosticks will , i conceive , be better found out hereafter by his history ( as appears in part already ) than by all the most learned maxims of judiciary astrology . chap. ix . how the panym knight refugio was sent into lyrania against king eugenius . and how nasonius himself went thither afterwards , and what succeeded . now the country of lyrania did , for the most part remain stedfast to their allegiance to king eugenius , and the noble giant tarcon had raised him fifty thousand souldiers , but undisciplin'd , and ill arm'd : wherefore by the friendly assistance of the giant gallieno , king eugenius though fit to send over thither , and try his fortune there , though that country was far too weak to resist the forces of vtopia , not having conveniences and necessaries to maintain a war comparable to what was found in vtopia . he kept his royal court at lyrapolis , and was now about to assault walkerburga , whither the greatest part of the rebels , who were almost all panyms , had betaken themselves . now , this place he could easily have taken , but the besieged being obstinate , he was loath to assault it , well knowing that the lyranians , who used to spare none in their just anger , were so enraged against them , that they would certainly have put them all to the sword ; which he ( whose piety towards his misled people often much hindred his policy ) had too much compassion to permit ; hoping that overtures of mercy , and their own famine , and other hardships would in time reclaim them , and bring 'em to their duty ; and they were many of them starv'd , and the rest about to yield , when they were reliev'd by sea with all necessaries , which eugenius being destitute of ships , could by no means hinder . after this , the panym knight refugio , than whom few were more in savour with nasonius , was sent over to lyrania with an army of seven and twenty thousand souldiers to make head against king eugenius ; to whom the vtopian hydra ( for money was yet plentiful there ) gave a noble , but very foolish gratuity of an hundred thousand pounds : thus encourag'd , he went forward on his expedition ; and when he landed , he encamp'd at lutosia , where he staid so long in dirt and mire , not daring to fight with king eugenius , that far the better half of his souldiers breath'd out their souls backwards : but they all embrac'd their death as the greatest honour that could befall them , because it was regis ad exemplum . our seamen at the same time had as great calamity befell them as the other , tho not so slovenly : for , a strange giddiness seiz'd their heads on a sudden , which made them desirious , and fall down as if they had been epileptick ; and three days after they dy'd of this malady , and a third part of them perish'd . this disease being so sudden , so mortal , and so strangely unusual , and indeed scarce ever heard of before , lucifero fear'd it would be look'd on as a judgment from heaven , and therefore took care that fictitiosa should give it out , and fatuitosa make it believ'd , that their meat was poyson'd by treachery : but though all the industry imaginable was us'd to discover the poysoner , and find out the poyson , yet not one grain of it could be found , and though such a vast quantity as could taint so much meat was inconceivable , for all the three nations could not furnish half so much , much less could any art apply it so undiscernably , yet still , ( so had lucifero , and his furies handled the matter ) that it pass'd for current sense in vtopia . after this disaster had happened to the knight refugio , nasonius himself pass'd over into lyrania , with a right puissant army , and march'd towards eugenius . but whilst he lay near a river called vndana , which he was to pass the next day , going to bed , not without some sollicitous and frightful fancies in his head ; he dream'd a dream which ( though no authors write of , yet may be probably conjectured to have wrought a coronation effect with him . he dream'd that while ( contrary to the charge ambitiosa had given him ) he unadvisedly came too near the enemy , a bullet of six pound weight granted upon his shoulder . upon which awakening in a fright , and great anxiety , cryed out , treason , treason . sodomicus , who lay in the next room to him , rush'd in suddenly and asked what the matter was . oh! said he , i have had such a fearful dream , that i 'm afraid it portends some ill luck to morrow : for methought , a six pound weight bullet hit me on my shoulder , took away part of my cloaths and shirt , raz'd the skin , and that had it gone but a little deeper , it had put an end to all my glory , with my life . take courage , said sodomicus , for i dream'd that ambitiosa had appeared to you in your sleep , to assure you , that she had taken care to dispose some of eugenius's army to treachery , and some to cowardise , and promised you that to morrow you should win the day . neither think i that your dream is to no purpose ; doubtless it was inspired to hint to us what politick use we may make of it . i will take orde● to make it pass for a reallity , and cause the relation of it to be writ and sent into vtopia , and to make it believ'd there in good earnest : then what sport shall we have to hear how the whining puppies will bemoan their good king , who undergoes such hazards , and suffers so much for his beloved people . this will have a twofold good effect ; one is , that you will be look'd upon as a person , over whom providence , ( as it shews by this miraculous escape ) has a peculiar care , which will gain you universal credit with the bigotted generallity , the other is , that kind pity will so soften the hearts of those silly whelps ( whose heads are soft enough already , ) that they shall give you what money you shall ask , and contentedly beggar themselves to enrich us . and as for carrying it well with the people here , 't is but conjuring your chyrurgeon to say as we say , for some gratuity : and tearing , and beblooding your shirt in that part to delude the landress , and all will pass current ; or put case that any do distrust it , yet who dares contradict it , or rob you of the honour you assume of suffering for the publick good. nasonius smil'd at the project , and approv'd of it exceedingly : so into vtopia the news was sent , and had all the effect they expected . for , the sottish vtopians with one voice , magnify god's merciful providence in averting so miraculously the chymerical danger . and now , who was so ill-natur'd as not to be willing to give even half they had to assist this good king , who had so profusely expos'd his sacred person , and had incurred such imminent danger of losing his life for their sakes ? whereas , has they not been infatuated beyond measure , they could not but see plainly , that all that little that he did , or suffer'd ( had his hurt been real ) was the least he could do to uphold his grandeur and ambition . nasonius was mightily pleas'd with the project of sodomicus , but much more encouraged by the promises , which both lucifero , and ambitiosa had given him of their particular assistance in the present action ; but yet , ( as if he would have a trick beyond the devil ) to make sure work , he sent several , who , under the notion of deserters , and flying to the assistance of their old master , eugenius , discover'd to him how all matters stood in his father's camp , and withal , knowing that there was a dearth of money in lyrania , he sent great sums by the same pretended deserters , with which they should not fail to corrupt , what counsellors and officers they could , still making promise of greater sums : thus having all the assurance that could be , he commanded the old panym knight refugio to pass the river vndana at such a place , where he knew the beat of of the battle would fall upon him ; refugio , as presaging his end , was utterly against this undertaking , but obey'd ; and no sooner could he and his forces pass the river , but they were so briskly received by certain luislanders , and loyal vtopians , that it gave no small hopes of victory to the party of eugenius ; and it was remarkable , that about thirty brave vtopians , who had followed their lawful , injur'd prince through all fortune , made a vow among themselves , to put an end to this unnatural war , if possible , by cutting of the false nasonius ; and accordingly they furiously broke through all the troops to find him , but instead of him , discovered refugio , well and stoutly guarded , but they forced their way , and one shot the old panym in the head , who fell from his horse into a filthy ditch , where lying unregarded , he breathed his last ; a fit end for him , who spent his very last days in the most dirty actions , and in playing the most shameless , treacherous , and faithless pranks . but while these things were in acting , nasonius sent over a strong body of rebellious vtopians , who came upon the corrupted officers , and the main strength of the lyranians ; but the lyranians having for many ages been subject to the vtopians , and beaten , as it were , into a habit of running away from them , could not so quickly conquer those deep-rooted fears , but presently betook them to their heels , and fled as so many hares before hounds . eugenius grieved , and enraged at such cowardise , did all he could to turn and rally them , and to that end , often put his own life in imminent danger , but nothing would prevail with them , but they still ran , and had left him to the mercy of the enemy , had not some gallant luislanders , and loyal vtopians come to his succour , who seeing all lost by such matchless treachery and cowardise , not without much ado was perswaded , and prevailed with eugenius to go off , and reserve himself for a further tryal , and better fortune . and now nasonius , who had carefully observed all from a hill on the other side the river , seeing the danger over , and the day his own , took the courage to pass the water after his army , to reap the fruite and glory of the victory . having then thus obtained the victory , nasonius march'd to lyrapolis , where he was highly welcom'd by all the panym party , and king eugenius and turn'd to king gallieno to tutelia . now might nasonius , had he not sauntered at lypapolis , but pursued the enemies with his horsemen while they were in that distraction , have cut them off in parcels , and hindred their rejoyning : but fatuitosa envying that she could have no influence over nasonius , to govern whom even uninspired by others , she made account she had the best title , gave him a draught of her poppy with a dash of lethe in it , knowing it would easily work with his temper so fitly disposed for it ; which so doz'd and infatuated his reason , not us'd to be over-burthened with any politick considerations , that neglecting his manifest and best advantage , he thought of nothing but of the high and mighty encomiums which the panyms at lyrapolis gave him : which gave the noble giant duke tarcon a fair oppotunity to rally his army again to breed him further trouble . however , after he was weary with hugging himself for the victory which chance , folly and treachery had given him , he march'd forward with his army towards the strong city shannonopolis , whither great part of eugenius's army had retired , and laid siege to it . there govern'd at that time in it a noble luislandian under-giant , called pandaro , who boldly set open the gates , and suffer'd six thousand of the unpolitick nasonians no enter , but assoon as they were got in , he had prepared such volleys of cannon and musquets to welcome them , that they cut of great multitudes of them ; and the resolute , and valiant lyranians set upon the rest ( dismay'd by such an expected and rude greeting ) , with that fury that few of them escaped . nor could they be relieved or seconded ; for nasonius , by a fineness of policy peculiar to himself , ( for the dose given him by fatuitosa had not yet done working ) had left his main body on the other side of the river ; so that it could afford them no help , but they were exposed to be massacred in the manner aforesaid . after which defeat , the garrison rush'd out to their astonishment , and fell upon nasonius's army , and killed many more of them , and put the rest to a disorderly flight , which the poet elegantly describes thus in an apt simile . when all the elements at once conspire , and round those walls there 's nothing seen but fire : when crossing billows caus'd the shannon swell , and from above the wat'ry buckets fell : when air condens'd unwholsom vapours sent , and earth dissolv'd to putrid water went. — what them ? as beds of eels by clap of thunder broke , frighted they run , each fears the dreadful str●ke : so conger-like the hero first broke way , and through the mudd his scamp'ring legions stray . sure none but such at b — t dare call this success , heaven's peculiar care. but nasonius , whose chiefest policy was shewn upon such occasions , made as much haste away as if his life had been concern'd , and blamed the slowness of his horse , though he had been a pegasus ; never looking behind him till he came to the sea-side , and there finding a little vessel , he got over to the happy and safe shoar of vtopia . those who write thus of him , do seem to doubt whether a coronation accident might have befallen him upon this occasion : because , ( say they ) his precipitate haste gave him no respite for a decent and leisurely evacuation . but to speak impartially , this is too great an injury to the known courage of nasonius . for , to say the truth , he had no occasion to fear any thing , but the dishonour of staying , when he saw no good could be done : and therefore he posted back , that he might prevent the news of the defeat , and make it thought that ( his occasions inviting him home ) the ill success light , assoon as he had left them , and only by reason of his forced absence , which none can blame for bad policy in such a warriour . and this was the upshot of those two famous expeditions performed by the panym knight refugio , and nasonius ; in which this latter did forfeit more of his honour , by this defeat and sudden retreat ( when his presence was most needful to retrieve the disgrace that had happened , by his conduct , and valour , had they avail'd any thing ) nay , and lost him more men too in that siege , than had the eugenians in the famous battle at vndana . but things went yet worse with nasonius and his party , in inferiana ; for the valiant and politick giant grandorsio , charmged and assisted by the enchanted belt , which the amazonian lady victoria had given him , set upon the hydropick , general valdectius , in the field of florus ; kill'd twelve thousand of his men , and made him run away thirty miles to save the rest . which made the giant grandosio still more famous , and redoubted , and caused the routed panym valdectius to cast out most bitter complaints and lamentations in his letters to nasonius , and the hydra , cursing grievously the frowardness of dame fortuna , who by her unkindness and partiality had brought him to such disgrace , and dishonour . chap. x. how nasonius himself went into inferiana ; and how gallieno took petrana , even before nasonius's face , and of his other successes there . how lyrania was totally subdued by the knight ginglero ; and how the green-headed knight , sabaudiero broke truce with his vncle , the great giant gallieno . when the next spring approach'd nasonius having ( as was his custom ) sleec'd the sheepish vtopians of vast sums of money , went over into inferiana to fight the battles of the associates , being appointed their generalissimo . at his arrival they had a very solemn consultation , how they might utterly subdue the great giant gallieno , and assault him both by sea and land : so that now their foolhardly party ceased not to make boasts that they would carry on their conquests as far as tutelia , and that in despight of gallieno's enchantments , and power , nasonius would fetch away the lady victoria by plain force of arms : which great huff , instead of causing the least fear in luyslandia , gave great matter of divertisement and laughter to the tutelian court. but before nasonius took his leave of vtopia , he call'd his admiral , the panym knight , tornano unto him , and thus bespoke him . thou knowest , dear tornano , how i have always treated thee with the highest respects ; nor has any man more oblig'd me than thou hast by thy faithful service : but now the time is come , that thou must go beyond thy former self in fidelity , both in executing my commands , as also in keeping the orders i shall give thee , severely secret , which shall be both for thy safety at the present , and ( when time serves ) for thy higher advancement : none knows better than thy self , that the accursed giant gallieno would quickly land my father eugenius , and dispossess me of my throne , did not my power at sea bridle and restain him : so that should i lose my fleet in a sea-fight , i should be in great danger of losing all . my request therefore is , that when the fight begins , thou wouldst hover a loof with thy squadron , which will keep the rest from being too rash ; by which means , the brunt of the enemies fury will light most upon the ships belonging unto the hydra : for ( besides the politick consideration now mentioned ) i am ( to tell you true , ) much incensed against that commonwealth , and not without just reason , for attempting to take away from me the office of hydra-holder ; or , at least , to abridge the authority of it , and make it insignificant , which is an affront so little suiting my honour , and so unbecoming so great a monarch , that i can in no wise brook it ; as i have wrote to my dearest friend sodomicus , and ordered him in soft terms to tell them so much . wherefore , i would at once revenge my self , and by preserving my fleet , and weakning their power at sea , make them rather court me for my assistance , than that i should sue or truckle to them . tornano was heartily glad to hear the proposal ; for he had no maw to encounter the luyslandians at sea , having been so rudely beaten by them the year before , on the coast of lyrania . besides , 't is said he had a fair lady with him on board , in whom he took especial delight , and he fear'd the roaring of the cannons might maker her head-ake : wherefore he readily consented to the motion ; only he as'd how they might be secured against being impeach'd for treason by the hydra , and vtopian sea-officers , if he should refuse to fight in such a juncture . to which , nasonius answered , feign what plausible excuse thou seest fit , and i will give private orders to those that shall examine the matter , that they shall acquit thee from blame . which , when nasonius had promised by the most sacred oaths , and ( which was more binding , and more sacred with him than all the rest ) by the word of a king ; the thing was agreed upon . this done , nasonius addressed himself for his expedition , and met the associates in inferiana , where they had very long consulations how they should bring the giant gallieno on his knees , and the idea each of them had with much hammering fram'd of this project had such a gay appearance to their wise fancies , considering it speculatively , that they made account it was as good as done already . but while they were talking so long about what they should do ( their many heads being of so many minds and opinions , and never a good one ) the powerful and politick giant gallieno ( who had but one head worth them all ) did his business , without talking ; and with a right puissant army besieg'd petrana , the strongest city and fort in all inferiana . the sudden and unexpected news of this siege broke off their consultations , e're they were full ripe ; and made them all distractedly do , they knew now what , nor how : and such power had the sound dose , given 'em by fatuitosa , over their stupified senses , that they had neither once thought of possessing themselves of the passages to petrana , nor of preventing the giant grandorsio from intrenching himself , so as to cover the siege . so that all nasonius could do , was to march that way with his army , and stay a great way off : as if it had been honour enough for him to come so near gallieno's army , as but to hear the frightful noise of bombs , and cannons , which fir'd and batter'd petrana ; which was not done neither without mature advisement , and a deep reach of policy ; which made 'em conclude , that it was more adviseable to avoid the hellish fire and smoak that the giant gallieno ( wo fought still in a spell , or , circle of flames ) us'd to spit , and sputter round about him . so petrana , which they foolishly boasted , and thought impregnable , was taken by the luislandians : however , gallieno was sure to pay for that his bold rashnness , in presuming to take the town without nasonius's leave ; and was never securely victorious , if words would do it : for nasonius gave out that he was resolutely determined to revenge himself by battle . but the giant grandosio had by his necromancy so order'd things , that nasonius could not for his heart tell how to come at him , or how with any safety , to attack him . and thus continued both armies , till the nasonians forced thereto by grandorsio's stratagems must needs decamp and be gone : which , nasonius with all the inconveniences likely to ensue , thought it his best policy to retire to holoo , pretending he had no more to do since grandorsio would not fight , though indeed it was to save his own credit , which was like to suffer some disparagement , had he staid and b●en present . the nasonian army therefore was left under the command of the panym knight valdectius to bring it off as well as he could . but they no sooner began their retreat , but the giant gran●orsio fell on their rear , and gave 'em such a kick o th breech for a farewel , as killed of them near three thousand men. thus ended the campaign , and this was the issue of all the vast designs , and glorious braggs of entring luyslandia , taking tutelia , and fetching thence the lady victoria , which was sufficiently redicul'd by the luyslandians , who were now asham●d to have to do with such weak , improvident , and cow-hearted enemies . but the mirth was heightned , even to loud laughter , that the nasonian star-gazers had undertaken to demonstrate by the unerring arts of astrology , that this campaign ws to be the very last period of all the glory of gallieno , and the fatal time that luyslandia was to be subdued and destroyed . but since no more was to be done , who could help it ? so , the associates , after they had had another grave consultation what plausible excuses it were best to give out to palliate their unwise conduct , and ill success , separated themselves , and nasonius return'd into vtopia . where , no sooner arriv'd , but he found the complaints made by the hydra , and the vtopian sea-officers against tornano were very high , and heavy . they alledged that this backwardness had cost the english many rude blows , but had cost the hydra eighteen or nineteen ships , for which they demanded vengeance and justice against him . tornano put in his plea , which was bandied to and fro , till the severe heat by degrees somewhat cooling , his tryal came on , and as nasonius had promised ( tho' with much regret of the hydra ) he was acquitted . to comfort nasonius , and to keep up his heart for his ill success in inferiana , dame fortuna granted him the happy reduction of lyrania by the panym knight ginglero . not for his own sake , whom she mortally hated , but for ginglero's , as being of all the panym officers the most courteous , civil , and of best conduct . this knight led his armies through the land of lyrania , and took divers of their towns and forts : at length they came into a pitch'd battle . the lyranian army was at that time commanded by the politick and valiant luyslandian giant hight rutheno , who with the noble gigantick knight , lucanio , so encouraged the lyranian soldiers that they thrice beat back the panym army , and now were the horse coming up to secure an intire victory under the leading of the giant rutheno , when , a cannon bullet did unfortunately light on that noble giant , and bereaved him of his life ; which so daunted his army ( his valour giving heart and courage to them all ) that the panyms got the victory , killed many of the army , and the rest retired into the strong city of shannonopolis ; but the places being fifty miles from the sea , so that no relief or provision could come to them by sea or land , they , with the allowance of king eugenius , capitulated , but upon such good terms that he by yielding to it as he did ( according to his usual piety ( both preserv'd all his subjects in lyrania from utter destruction , and withal , it was stipulated that they should have all their liberties , immunities , and priviledges restored to them . and moreover , that as many soldiers as would , should be transported into luslandia , of which there went twenty thousand . all which was advis'd by the wisdom of the politick giant gallieno , who consider'd that the loyal lyranians that capitulated , would still retain the same principles , and be ready to serve king eugenius upon any fit occasion ; and withal , that this new army of valiant souldiers , when well cloath'd and paid , ( all which in great pa●t they wanted in lyrania ) would do eugenius and himself more service in luyslandia , than they could ever have done had they remained in lyrania : which they performed accordingly , as shall be seen hereafter . about this time , or rather before , it the green-headed knight sabaudiero was prevailed upon by the associates to rise up in arms with them , against the noble giant gallieno . nasonius promised him whole indies of money , and that he would maintain too at his own cost , many troops to assist him . the associates also unanimously promised him , that in the winding up of the war , when they came to divide the spoil , they would add some part of luyslandia to his dominions ; having very politickly divided it among 'em , e're they had got a foot in 't . this project was carried so secretly , that never was any mystery of state so carefully conceal'd . however , the necromantick giant gallieno had not only by his familiar spirit got light of it , but had moreover by a strange charm got an exact copy of their agreement . upon knowledge of which he sent the valiant giant sabaudocrato into his country , e're he was ready , who took all montania , otherwise call'd sabaudia , and was about to fall into alpiana , when sabaudiero confident of the impossility it should take air , sent ambassadors to king gallieno falsely protesting he was his most humble servant , and meant nothing but peace and amity towards him . now did many sober men admire at this strange action of gallieno , as breeding himself causeless , and needless enemies , when he had so many already : for one could imagine that sabaudiero should be so unworthy and ungrateful to his uncle , the great king gallieno , who ever favoured him , and had formerly assisted him against his own rebellious subjects , as without any cause given him to joyn with his enemies , who sought nothing but his desctruction ; which made men think it very harsh in king gallieno to invade his nephew's dominions , and to refuse to withdraw his armies till sabaudiero had put two of his chief cities , as cautionary towns , into his hands : 'till at length , king gallieno , when he saw his time , shewed the copy of sabaudiero's agreement with the associates ; to let the world see how false and hollow-hearted he was , to pretend peace by his ambassadors , and yet at the same time to have conspir'd against his uncle , his friend , and his ally , to bring him , if he could , to utter ruin. but , it was the luck of this ill-contriv'd association to be supported by the violation of all the nearest tyes of nature and honour , and all laws , both divine and humane . yet did the noble gallieno so moderate his resentment , as not to let sabaudocrato destroy all his country , as he could easily have done . pitttying the folly of his youth , too easily led aside by his secratary , who had a great ascendant over him , and had received , as 't is said , for such treacherous services , an hundred thousand pound from the associates , but chieftly from nasonius , who was still very profuse in laying out the easy got money of vtopia upon projects of his own , for which , they that gave it , never intended it . wherefore the luyslandian army continued still in montania and alpiana ; took , and garrison'd divers of the principal cities and forts : but of this ; more heareafter . chap. xi . of the annus mirabilis ; or the campaign of the year , when the associates with their utmost efforts intended to invade the mighty giant gallieno on all sides , and to destroy both him , and his , root and branch , and also of the infallible prognosticks of his ruin. all men , though never so dull , are taught wisdom by their frequent misfortunes ; and by their often experiencing what occasioned them ; they learn how to prevent them for the future . wherefore these subtil politicians , the associates , though they were but bad reflecters came at length , with much ado , to discover , after gallieno had with many repeated victories beat it into their heads , that two things especially had given him great advantages over them , ( viz. ) his being early in the field , e're they were ready ; and his carrying the war still into his enemies countries : hereupon , after many consultations , they fully and und unanimously resolved to bereave him of both these advantages , and get them to themselves . but , as nothing is more rediculous than an ape , because it is like a man , and yet is not a man , so nothing is so mirthful and pleasant as mimical and ape-politicians , who would seem such by imitating the true ones , and yet are politicians at all . however , they muster'd up , and encreased their forces , and bent their utmost endeavours , both to be before-hand with gallieno in the earliness of their preparations , and also to enter luyslandia on all sides , as well by sea as by land ; and teach him to let the invading of others alone hereafter , and to study his best arts to defend his own country . it was agreed amongst them , than an hundred thousand men , led by nasonius , should invade his territories bordeering upon inferiana ; that the regomanians should fall into alsatia ; that don ibero formalitosa should enter luyslandia on the side of calatonia ; that sabaudie●o should make incursions into delphicoris , where his frontiers were least fortified ; and lastly , that nasonius and the hydra should make a descent upon his coasts , take his sea-port towns , burn his ships in their harbour , and pillage and spoil all the country before them . so that now nasonius did not doubt but that victoria , seeing her gallant so beset on every side , would of her own accord come over to him , and renounce her faith and troth to king gallieno for ever . to facilitate these great undertakings , they had prevail'd with don ibero , to create the valiant duke of bawwawia governour of inferiana , who had formerly won much credit by fighting so successfully against the half-moon of the great emperor magog , who accepted his proffer ; though some men too severe , said , that in doing so , he sold all his wit and former reputation to the iberians , in taking upon him so troublesome and hazardous an employ , insomuch that he had left little or none to himself , as the event shew'd : for he has made no figure at all of a souldier , nor done any thing worthy the least note ever since he became formalitoso's underling . however , this served to keep up the drooping hearts of the inferianians , ready to sink under the ill success , and bad conduct of nasonius . as astrologers consort it with thieves to know what they have stollen , that they may get credit by telling how it was lost , and how to retrieve it : so it is a common thing with all politicians to give half light of any success they think themselves assured of , to some star-gazing conjurer , or apocaliptical fortune-teller of some reputation with the common-people , that when they read it foretold , and afterwards see it come to pass , they may conceit it was laid by divine providence , and that that person who is to bring it about , is highly in heaven's books ; in that god would deign to signifie it thus to the admiring world before-hand . now , nasonius , who was the very idea of deep policy , knew right-well of what consequence such a prediction would be , and therefore resolved to send for his astrologer sydrophell , who had heretofore done him great service in the same kind when he first intended to invade his father fugenius's kingdoms . sydrophell , when the messenger came near hand , was sitting in a dark brown-study what he should say in his next almanack , by way of star-prophecy , and yet not lose his credit by being quite mistaken . he saw no symptoms of hope to prognosticate good luck to nasonius , and was to hearty to the cause to tell bad : wherefore he left off that quest , and betook himself to invent some neat and profitable sleights of gulling the credulous people , and to make 'em believe he knew almost any event by consulting the twelve signs of the zodiack : as by aries , how may cuckolds should be made next year , and who in particular . by taurus , who was the first bull that leap'd their heifer . by gemini , who should have two children at a birth , or meet with double-hearted people . by cancer , who should deceive them with false pretences , and delude them by crawling backwards , while they seemed to go forwards . by leo , who should be a valiant souldier , and come to high preferment for his feats in arms. by virgo , who should be married that year , and whether the person courted for a spouse , be a virgin , &c. he was got thus far in his caelestial speculation , when the messenger from nasonius knock'd at the door , and summoned him at attend him ; where , when he was arrived , — sydrophell , said nasonius , thou knowest , that formerly i caused an hint to be given thee when i had assurance of it my self , of driving my father eugenius out of his kingdom ; and thou didst acquit thy self well in prognosticating it very exactly , both to my great credit , and advantage , and thine own . now i have such another job for thee : ask me no questions , nor hint thou heardst any thing from me for thy life . i do tell thee , and assure thee , that the luyslandian tyrant gallieno , will be quite pull'd down this summer ; and therefore prognosticate it boldly . let me alone , replied sydrophell , i will make it so credible , and so plain to all those silly fools that understand nothing , by the position of the planets , and the unintelligible schemes i shall erect , that none of them all shall in the least suspect that i needed any sublunary advertisement of it ; nor is it for my credit they should . so , with a lowly bow he departed , blessing his kind stars , which had shined so propitiously upon him , as to offer him such pregnant occasions to make himself more famous than booker , lilly , or any of the rest of that canting tribe ; for now he made account that not only his almanacks , that related such grateful news , but that when his predictions succeeded , all his future writings would be snatcht up faster than they could be printed . to work then he went , and foretold the doleful downfal of king gallieno with so much asseveration , that if their were any truth in heaven , that poor king was by the nasonian party given for lost already : and to make this the more credible , the panym star-gazer , monsieur helmontius , who had fled from luyslandia to the hydra , did ( as we may suppose ) by the same inspiration , in which case it is no wonder if good wits jump ) with all imaginable assurance prognosticate the same . how exactly their star-prophecies were fullfilled , will be seen in the sequel . the spring was now come , and nasonius , ( as was his custom ) having again drain'd a mass of money out of the pockets of his poor slaves the vtopians , took the field very early with an hundred thousand of associate souldiers at his heel , and was now tickled with the conceit how he should firk king gallieno : but when it came to the tryal , instead of his invading luyslandia , king gallieno came himself into inferiana , and laid siege to the strongest city and fort that remain'd there , call'd sambrina , e're nasonius once thought or dreamt of it . it was very obvious to imagine that king gallieno would set down before that place , and it had been easy for nasonius , he being first in the field , to have possessed himself of the posts and avenues which gave the luyslandians passage thither : but , as if the senceless spirit fatuitosa had intended to make a property of him , and his associates too , it never once entred into their heads in all their consultations , to provide against so great a mischief . however , when the siege was already laid , then , ( as if he awak'd out of a dream , with some sudden noise ) he began to bustle up , and bestir himself , and march'd directly thither with his whole army in a most formidable manner , threatning to fight the giant gallieno , and raise the siege immediately : but the politick giant grandorsio had by his skill in magick , so postured his army to cover king gallieno , who , with another army push'd on the siege : that nasonius and his great officers could not for their lives tell how to come at them with any safety , or how to set upon him without hazarding their whole army . so they very soberly stood still , and look'd on , whilst king gallieno , and his souldiers did , with incredible valour and dexterity make themselves masters of sambrina . some were of opinion , that this was an high point of policy thus to stand still , and view , that by making their observations , how wisely king gallieno went to work , they might learn to take his towns afterwards . others said , they came to bear witness that the town was surely taken , because they were very nigh , and saw it with their own eyes . but the nasonians imputed it to the luyslandian witches , or to king gallieno's skill in conjuration , by which he caused a storm upon the river mahaignia which sunk some of their bridges and boats , by which they should pass , and by some charm had so stupified their bethinking faculties , that they had forgot to provide or look afterward to make more . but the wisest saw , and said plainly , that all those were but pretences , and that had they pass'd the river , and attack'd the giant grandorsio , in all liklyhood it had cost nasonius the greatest part of his army . so king gallieno being now possessed of that strongest city and castle , feasted his nobility , and the lady victoria , and the next day he sent an herauld to nasonius , offering him battle within two days , if he pleased to accept it . nasonius return'd him this politick answer , that he would fight when himself saw fit . well then , said gallieno smiling , i see nasonius has nothing to say to me , so i will leave him to the mercy of grandorsio ; and immediately returned to tutelia , with his lady victoria , now more than ever endear'd to him by seeing his warlike courage and conduct . the congratulations of his subjects , and triumphs they had prepared for him were very noble and magnificent : but the noble king gallieno would needs divest himself of that merit , and give the honour of that action to the amazonian lady victoria , who was in his company all the while he took it : and to that end he caus'd a large medal to be coin'd , representing nasonius with his army looking on , whilst gallieno with his , took fambrina , with this motto about it . — amat victoria testes . thus paraphras'd in english. victory of her brave , and valiant deeds , no more authentick witness could have chose , than this ; which hist'ry's credit far exceeds , an hundred thousand tamely viewing foes . chap. xii . how nasonius and the hydra fought against half the fleet of king gallieno ; together witht the reasons given by jupiter , why king gallieno's fortune should for the time receive some small check . about this time nasonius and the hydra with a vast fleet of near an hundred men of war , prepared to infest king gallieno by sea , fearing he should land the good king eugenius in vtopia , where those of his subjects who had remain'd loyal , and others who became so , by seeing their past errors , and present miseries , were ready to joyn and receive him : but fatuitosa had so besotted nasonius , and his council , that when eugenius's forces came to the sea-coast , they weakly imagined they were drawn thither , meerly to hinder their making a descent upon luyslandia . but when the project was about to be put in execution , dame fortuna , who was never constant in any thing , an had ow'd king gallieno a spite , for a long time , for engrossing the lady victoria ( for her fickle nature hated that either love or success in war should be permanent ) and withall , enrag'd that his providence and forecast made him so perpetually victorious , went to the throne of jupiter , and to the fates , and complained heavily that her deity would become neglected , and providence it self grow into contempt , if humane courage and policy should render the designs of mortals thus continually successful ; wherefore she earnestly besought them for hers , and their own honours sake , to give some check to the too contant successes of king gallieno . the matter was debated in the senate of the gods , and it was unanimously voted , that it was unworthy the caelestial deities , and would seem as if they were envious of gallieno's high merits should they hinder wisdom and valour from having their due rewards and successes . especially since gallieno did humbly attribute all his victories to the overseers of the world , and never failed to give thanks accordingly : but jupiter standing up , ( which made all the rest with a reverent silence expect his final determination ) deliver'd himself on this manner . it is decreed by the fates , and i have signed the decree , and bid it stand irrevocable that gallieno's well meant , and wisely laid designs shall in this juncture receive some small check . not for his own sake , ( for none but fortuna who is blind her self , could think his merit ought not to be cherished with deserv'd success ) much less for king eugenius's , whose magnanimous patience , and heroick vertue , under so many afflictions , as well as his noble hearted charity , and love to his people , tho' rebellious , gives him a most deserved title ( besides that of justice ) to regain his hereditary right : but for the sake of traiterous vtopia , and to punish their crying sins of dis-allegiance and ingratitude by the same man , whom of their own head , but not by me , they have fondly set up to be their king , which makes 'em incapable of so great a mercy , as the restoring to them so fatherly and good a prince . now , that you may see how just this decree of mine is of denying ' em . yet as a deliverance from their oppression , i will make known to you how obstinately and willfully blind , both nasonius , and they are , in their wicked and malicious errours ; and what i have done to signifie my displeasure at their disloyal , and ungrateful proceedings ; enough to make any repent of their sins , but such as are hardened in them : i will not speak of the prodigious mortallity of their souldiers and land , nor of their seamen at sea , nor divers other such ; but i will recount some of those disasters which pointed at their particular persons . i sent an horrible tempest at nasonius's first setting forth ; by that first inauspicious omen to deter him , and them , from proceeding on their cursed design , and could in justice have d●owned them all , at that time , but that i meant he should be a scourge to 'em , till they saw their fault , and became penitent ; but it wrought no effect with either . well! by my permission they possessed themselves of their father's throne and being settled , fell a building a hamptonia ; but down it came . they did the same at nothinghamia , but that fell down too ; this could not be imputed to treachery , negligence , or a common casuallty ; for , none can but know that kings ( their lives being endanger'd by the instability of their dwelling-houses , ) would make choice of the best materials , and workmen ; and that those workmen would use their utmost care that their work should be most firm , when they are employed , by such great personages : yet in despight of their best choice of artificers , and these artificers best circumspection , both those works suffered a shameful miscarriage . now these instances pointed personally at nasonius , and his unnatural tullia : for they cannot name , nor did any one ever hear of any other in the whole nation , who was going to build in two places , have had such a disaster light to them in both . was it possible then to impute these ill-boding accidents to any thing but an over-ruling providence , plainly telling them ( in such language as the soveraign governours of the world do generally use ) that is , ( speaking to them by deeds ) that let 'em use their best care , and exert their utmost art , nothing they build shall stand . this working nothing with 'em ; i took more severe ways , and sent the dreadful fire at alb● regalis , they removed thence to nottinghamia ; but the judgment of fire pursued them thither also ; and yet no willful malice , or treachery could be alledg'd ; nor could there be want of particular care to avoid such disasters in the courts of princes . did they ever hear of any other person in the whole kingdom , to whom the like mischiefs happened , as first to be burnt out of one house , than to be like to be burnt , a short time after in another ? or any in the world , of what rank soever , ( much less of princes ) to whom the falling and burning of two of their houses did ever happen ? 't is the common sentiment of all mankind , who have any ( even unnatural ) religion at all , that when humane care and prudence have done their utmost , and yet their intentions meet with disasters , that 't is then to be imputed meerly , and particularly to the will of the supream deity . yet they continue to shut their eyes against such manifest judgments , and carelesly huddle up the consideration of them under the common notions of casualties ; not regarding the particularities now mention'd . which were far from being common , being indeed till then unheard of . but , did these men regard any principles , they might know that what they call casualty , is with me providence , and design ; and if it be incredibly particular , it argues some particular design of mine : and what could that be but to make them , and the world to take notice , by those events so stangely remarkable , how highly i am displeased that they dare presume with another man's money , and on another man's ground , to build , or to live in houses which are none of their own ; and that i declare my self by such signal and peculiar mischances , relating to their very persons , that my dread anger is kindled against them for their unjust vsurpation . i proceeded further , and hinted plainly my just indignation at their audacious and vain-glorious coronation , and their ill-plac'd crown , and not to speak of the ridiculous slur put upon nasonius , by dame natura , offended at their unnatural intrusion into their father's throne ; i took order , that the ship call'd the crown-frigat should be sunk , and that other called the coronation , should by a strange disaster in calm weather be suddenly plunged to the bottom of the sea : thus to intimate to them , and threaten them , that when they think themse●ves safest , and furthest out of danger , all their vsurped glory should in a moment sink into the deepest disgrace , never to rise again . and now , what could i , in wisdom , have done more to inform that infatuated nation of my resentment against their illegal rulers , and rebellious selves , unless i had come down in humane shape ( as i did before deucalion's flood ) and told 'em to their faces of their deep ingrafted sins ? and had i done so , there would not have been wanting wolvish lycaons enough to worry and murder me , as they did my annointed vicegerent eusebius , eugenius's father ; and would have done the same to eugenius himself , had he not providently withdrawn himself for his security . wherefore , seeing if gallieno's wisely projected designs be not cross'd , he will certainly do that unmerited kindness to the vtopians , as to restore their good king eugenius ; and i will take order that it suffer some defeat at the pesent , to such a degree as to hinder it . now , let nasonius , their scourge , still harrass , impoverish , and bring 'em to the very brink of ruin. let the war they maintain to keep him out , take their ships , spoil their traffick , make dear their forreign commodities , and all their provisions too : let it empty their purses , and lose the lives of some hundred thousands of the vtopians ; for , till they repent , and heartily desire to restore their king , the justice of the goddess nemesis cannot be satisfied , nor my dread anger appeased , nor they deserve the mighty blessing of good eugenius's restauration . but to let you further see , how just this decree of mine is ; it is not ignorance in the vtopians , which makes 'em thus rebellious , but willful mallice against their own consciences , and against their own knowledge . to shew which , i will not alledge how they sin against my divine law , and their own humane laws ( for all such considerations they have trampled under foot ) but i will challenge them with their own thoughts , and bring themselves to witness against themselves . not one judge or lawyer in the naton , but would six years ago , without any hesitation , have condemned any man as guilty of high-treason , by the laws of the land , who should have asserted it was lawful upon any occasion whatsoever , to have invited a forreign prince to invade king eugenius's kingdoms , and no less treason to have deserted him , run over to , or sided with the invader , much more to have abdicated their lawful king , who still challenged his right , and only retired to a place of safety , till he might try their temper , and receive their proposals . again , not one divine , or preacher , ( no not scoto apostato himself , but would , at that time have maintain'd , and undertaken to prove it out of my written word , to be divine law , to pay indispensable allegiance to him . nor do the lawyers either , pretend to have any new light , to understand the law of the land better now and formerly . nor do those mercenary pastors pretend to any new revelation of my divine will , or better means of interpreting holy writ than they had before , when they taught out of it the contrary to what they now profess , preach , and practise : and , that both lawyers , and preachers held thus formerly , and hold , and teach the quite contrary now , without any pretence of new , or better light , is known to their whole abdicating senate , and to the generality of sensible men throughout the whole nation : so it is every way most manifest , that nothing but a rebellious spirit , slavish fear , or sordid interest , are the only rules of their new interpretations , both of law , and gospel . most justly then do they deserve to be punished by that which was their sin , their setting up an vsurped power . decreed therefore it it is , and that irrevocably , that eugenius shall not come yet to deliver them , but they shall still reap the harsh fruits of that which they have so wickedly sown , in despite of my divine commands , their own laws ; nay , against their own consciences and knowledge . the king of the gods having thus finished his speech , which was received with an universal approbation , and applause of the inferiour deities , he immediately dispatch'd mercury , his messenger , to eolus , commanding him to hinder the better half of the giant gallieno's fleet from coming up to joyn the rest . now , had king gallieno commanded his sea-giant thalassarchus , to set upon nasonius , and the hydra's fleet assoon as possibly , presuming his whole navy was got together by that time : that while he kept them in play , king eugenius with his army might be safely transported into vtopia . the noble giant , though not half the number of his enemies ( no more of his ships but four and forty being yet got together ) yet mindful of king gallieno's precise order , he thought it became not his duty to gloss upon his commands , but to obey them literally , struggled against the wind , and made towards them . indeed , king gallieno , who was now far off in inferiana , having intelligence that the wind had been contrary , sent him three several expresses not to fight , till the whole fleet was come up ; but by the peevishness of dame fortuna , who ( for the reasons abovesaid ) waited all opportunities to do him some displeasure , they never came to the hand of thalassarchus . wherefore , not regarding the exceeding inequality of their number , he like a brave and couragious giant , boldly set upon them ; and notwithstanding their odds , had rather the advantage during the fight , having shatter'd some of the nasonian and hydropick ships , far more than they had done any of his . but , while he retreated the next day , hoping to meet , and joyn some of his other ships , and prudently designing by that advantage of number to draw them nearer the luyslandian coast , and ports , where he might with more safety renew the fight ; neptune , by an order from jupiter , put back the tide an hour , so that he could not pass the cape ; by which means sixteen of them were in part burnt by the fire-ships of the enemies , lying on the shoar , and so not able to make resistance . but fatuitosa taking delight to make fools of those who would needs be so , inspired them with such carelessness , and folly , that they never minded the making use of that advantage but were fully satisfied with the imaginary conceit of having beaten the luyslandians , now resounding all over vtopia ; that they never dream'd of making any further conquests , till too late : for the politick giant gallieno had by this delay so fortified all the coasts , that having lo●t their opportunity , they durst attempt nothing . many impartial considerers denied that nasonius had the victory , because ( say they ) to conquer , is to have the better in fight , which he had not , and the disadvantage was meerly accidental ; which put those luyslandian ships out of capacity of fighting , and so it required no mastery , or valour to do them a mischief , and therefore was a disadvantage , and loss to them indeed , but no true named victory , nor any gain to the enemy . chap. xiii . how nasonius intended a descent upon luyslandia , and what became of it . as also of the exploits of the green-headed knight sabaudiero , in skipping into , and out of delphicoris . afterwards the vtopians set themselves resolutely to make a descent into luyslandia , and it was given out , nasonius would exert the q●intessence of his infallible policy and war-wisdom , in bringing this vast attempt to perfection , to the utter overthrow of king gallieno , and his own immortal glory . long , very long had this mighty project amused all europe ; huge preparations of cannons , mortars , bombs , and other formidable military engines had marched with great solemnity from thamopolis , and were embarqu'd . many hundreds of transport ships , and well-boats were taken up , and made ready . nay , all that the wit of man could invent , or such a noble exploit could need , without sparing any cost ( for vtopia had money enough ) was put in a readiness . the souldiers were not only furnished with arms , and all things necessary nay , ( which was to them a special favour and encouragement ) with money too ; but as report went , with ten thousand arms to equip the panyms in luyslandia , who were to rise up and joyn with them . the panym knight , misanglus , eldest son to the knight refugio , who was to command this powerful army , looked as big as alexander , hugely proud of this blessed occasion to signallize his matchless valour , and to equal ( for none could outdo them ) his father's unparallelled performances at lutosia . what gazet ? what couranto ? what news-letter , nay , what nation was there on this side the world which did not ring with the loud and astonishing sound of this renowned enterprize . the nasonian courtiers were all turn'd astrologers , and prognosticated the miserable downfall of king gallieno , from the success they promised themselves of this undertaking ; which was so sure , and the grounds of it so firmly and wisely laid by the unerring politicks of nasonius , and the certainty of it seal'd by the universal approbation of all the associates met in a general consultation for that purpose , that it was beyond the casual condition of bearing any wager ( though at never so great odds ) to which few or none of their other designs , but were liable . besides , the profound secrecy of it , gave it the revered esteem , of a wonderful mystery . the most searching wits of vtopia were too shallow to found the dark bottom of it , and were at a deadly plunge how to frame the least conjecture where this iresistable thunderb●lt would light ; but being of a temper easily appay'd with any thing ( or nothing ) they contented themselves to believe by implicite faith whatever their oraculous , and infallible nasonius did propose to their credulous assent , and as long as they were thus assured this object of their new faith was true , they would not be so prophane as to dive into the inscrutable majesty of his apocalyptical policy . but fatuito●a , who had only order from the luciferian court to besot the vtopians , in order to the interest of the hydra , being a very foolish fiend her self , went often beyond her commission , and so infatuated nasonius , the whole junto of associates , and the vtopian council , and generalls too , that the so much bragg'd of design vanished in a mist ; and the brisk invaders came back greater fools than they went forth . however , some nasonian counsellors were sent down to them , to remove , by their wise advice the impediment , that render'd their attempt abortive . but all the effect that appear'd of their consultation was this , that after some dodging ( as the manner was ) to cozen the people , it should be given out , that they would out again when the wind served , and pursue their project : 'till at last , mens expectations being wearied , and in tract of time , pretty well cool'd , instead of setting foot on the enemies country , they went to visit their friends in inferiana ; and very fairly , easily , and prudently too ( there being no danger , nor any to oppose 'em there ) they landed at ostelia ; which put their friends to great confusion , brought a cruel disgrace upon nasonius , gave occasion of much mirth to the luyslandians , and as much regret to the wiser sort of vtopians to see their expectations still fool'd , and such vast sums still thrown away to do just nothing . in a word , this grand design , as it was conceived and born in a mystery , so it died as mysteriously too . the reason of its miscarriage being so carefully hush'd up , that to this day few know certainly the occasion of it . some undertake to clear nasonius's credit , and conduct , by alledging that he never meant or designed any thing in his life but to march to and fro with a great army at his heels , to shew his greatness , and get money of the vtopians , in neither of which projects did his policy ever fail him , and that all the rest was but pretence , which some unwise criticks mis-understanding to be design , do frame thence a rash and censorious judgment , that his designs suffer defeat ; which ( things being rightly understood ) is impossible . about the same time the young knight sabaudiero , assisted by nasonius's money , picked dexterously out of the vtopians pockets , and by twenty thousand souldiers of austriaco , and don ibero , did on a sudden invade that part of luyslandia which border'd on his country ; where , when he had entred , he plunder'd and burnt country towns , and villages most valiantly , tho' they were strongly fortified with hedges , ditches , and mud-walls , while there was as yet , none there to resist him : especially the panym knight caprea out of his innate hatred to all that 's sacred , sparing not either churches or religious houses ; not caring what credit he lost his master austriaco by such insolencies , so he might gratify the licentious humour of his barbarous regomanians ; though ( as is said ) against the will of sabaudiero , who tho' he wore the fine cap and feather , yet his officers valued not his authority , but did in that , and all things else what themselves listed . as a left-handed fellow , though unskillful , puts a very good gamester out of his play ; so this left-handed policy of sabaudiero gave some small trouble to king gallieno ; who , governing all his actions by wisdom , and expecting that others too , would ( to some degree at least ) do the same , could never have thought that sabaudiero , who had now a good army in the field , would not have rather attempted first to have clear'd his own country of enemies , e're he had invaded that of another . this being no wiser than for a man , when he knew his own house was on fire , to neglect the quenching of it , and run to set fire to that of his neighbour , and all this to satisfie the braggadocio humour of the iberian officers : but , assoon as the news of this impotent invasion allarmed the giant gallieno , and that he sent the giant sabaudocrato with forces to drive 'em out ; they shew'd their chief policy and valour in running away as fast as they could ( as thieves out of a house , when they perceive the lord of it is awake ) e're they could come up to them ; carrying some inconsiderable booty along with them , tho' not of worth to countervail the tenth part of the wise expedition . nor had they ability , leisure , or wisdom to stop the passages , or hindring his potent enemy from following him to the heart of his country , with such force ( as appears by his flight , and the sequel ) as he was not able to resist : there ( if not restrained , by king gallieno's noble mercy ) to take quadruple satisfaction . as for these subjects of king gallieno , who had been thus harrass'd , he , by easing 'em from taxes for many y●ars ; by repairing their buildings , and other prudent methods he took , reduc'd em again to as good a condition as ever . and moreover to comfort 'em , and secure 'em for the future , he fortified their great towns , and the passages into his country on that side . only sabaudiero got , and carried away with the due reward of such inglorious fool-hardy sacrilegious actions , inflicted on him by the just hand of the goddess nemesis , incensed at him for his unnatural opposition to his obliging uncle , a soul disease , and an ugly disfigured face : the former of which and the arrears of it could not by any help of art , he cured for a year after , and often brought him to the brink of death , a proper trophy for such soul actions . but we will leave him at present , and return to the heroick nasonius . chap xiv . how nasonius thought to surprize the giant grandorsio's camp at steenkirkia , and how he succeeded . and of his attempt on ipresburga ; as also of his noble enterprize to besiege dunkirkia together with what happened in regomania . now did the hopes of doing any good upon the mighty giant gallieno , rest upon the puissance , and policy of nasonius , and the duke of bawwawia , who had a great army in inferiana yet entire ; for they were very moderate men in their way , and had no such vast designs as to besiege any of king gallieno's towns , which might lessen their armies , or impair the number of their men , and grandorsio had sent many of his to other places : yet it was necessary for nasonius , especially having this seeming advantage , to do something at least to uphold his credit , much sunk last year by doing nothing at all . long time he had watched his opportunity , and at length thought verily he had caught it : for being informed by some of his infatuated scouts , that the giant grandorsio lay negligently , and weakly incamp'd near steenkirkia , he betimes next morning drew forth his army , and marched without beat of drum , or sound of trumpet , not doubting but that now he should take him napping , rout him horse and foot , and revenge the disgrace he had formerly done him , by forcing from him the amazonian lady victoria : but arriving at the place , the giant ( to his great surprize and dis-satisfaction ) having had timely notice of this design by mephostophilo ) had so postured himself , and so conveniently disposed his army , that they might regularly come up to relieve those that went before , and received him so warmly , that the fool-hardy vtopians , who bore the brunt of the charge , were after a sharp conflict , totally defeated . indeed , nasonius himself did that day signalize exceedingly his valour , by standing half a mile off on the top of an high hill , and thence , as the gods used to view the grecian and trojan hosts when they fought , did very attentively behold all that pass'd : and as if he had taken a peculiar felicity in seeing the towns of the associates taken ▪ and their armies routed , while he , as if he had been unconcerned , and only came as a curious spectator , stood still , and looked on . those that fell , were all vtopians , or those whom they had hired ; for , tho' being the generallisimo , it lay in his power to send the hydropick souldiers to relieve them ; yet , mindfull of his promise to lucifero , which was to sacrifice the foolish vtopians to preserve his darlings the hydropicks , he very fairly let above ten thousand of them be knocked o' th' head , without coming himself , or sending any souldiers of the hydra to assist ' em . some imputed this strange carriage of nasonius to want of courage , orthers , to his defect in conduct ; but , others , without disparagement to these two qualifications , ( which they are far from denying to him ) attributed it , as the main motive to his following the faithful advice of his spouse ambitiosa , charging him not to come too near the armies of the necromancer gallieno , and to the inspiration of the arch-fiend diabolica , to be most ungrateful to those to whom he was most obliged . not long after , nasonius having staid long in one place , began to want forrage , the reason of their continuing so long in the same spot was very politick , for they were ashamed to go back , and durst not go forwards ; and therefore , out of a deep reach of wisdom , they judged it best to sit still . there was a part of the country which was very plentiful , having never yet been harrassed by the armies , which they had a months mind to be nibbling at : but they knew not how to move , lest the giant grandorsio getting light , by his familiar spirits , of their intentions , should ( as his wicked manner was ) set upon their rear , and pluck some feathers out of their tail. however , grandorsio himself , had an eye upon that commodious place ; and by his sorceries cast them into such a dead sleep , that he decamped with his army , and took possession of it , e're they so much as dream'd of any such matter : but , when he was gone , they march'd on valiantly to the place he had left , and resolved to cry quits with him , by taking the strong town of ipresburga , and it was their peculiar manner of conduct , to have oftentimes done great matters , but that something or other still hindred them : so , understanding that grandorsio was now a great way off , they with good resolution marched towards it , not doubting but 't was their own ; insomuch that letters were by way of anticipation sent into vtopia , that it was actually taken . but , so it unluckily happened , that another of king gallieno's giants , nicobelgus by name , having by sorcery , ( for they were all great conjurers in their way ) got notice of their intentions , came just in the nick , and frustrated their expectations . at this time the panym knight , misanglus who ( as was said ) had put to sea formerly to make a descent upon luyslandia , and had shamefully miscarried in his project , that they might make a shew of doing something , landed his army in inferiana : upon which , nasonius set up a firm resolution , being joyned with the forces under misanglus , to besiege , and take the famous and strong town of baldwinopolis : for this purpose he caused great cannon , bombs , and all sorts of warlike provision to be brought from mosana , overthwart brabantia , and in inferiana . this set up afresh the courages , and hearts of the nasonians ; not doubting but the wisdom and policy of their generalissimo was such , that all this formidable preparation could not be made for nothing , and made 'em cock-sure that baldwinopolis was as good as their own . but so short-sighted were their politicks , that they did not yet well know , or soberly consider the strength of the place they were to attack , nor what the enemy could do to hinder their approaches to it ; much less had they compared these ( as wise leaders ought ) with their own force . wherefore , after they had vapoured a long time and ( as it was their main policy to trump one sham-pretence after another to keep up the drooping hearts of the party ) had fill'd the easy deluded vtopians with assured hopes of such huge importance ; and that the thamopolitans had , upon that prospect , lent great sums of money . they upon second thoughts ( for otherwise they generally acted upon the first ) very fairly let the project fall easily by degrees , and only gave out , they would at least bomb it , and fire it ; but , when they came to execute even that , they found all too late ; that king gallieno had by his necromancy raised such inchanted forts in their way , that it was impossible for them to come within five miles of it ; besides they were afraid the wizard grandorsio , who lay behind 'em , would play them some legerdemain trick , if they offer'd to move far either one way or the other . whereupon , all the cannons , bombs , &c. as i● they had been brought only to muster , shewing their postures , and then as they were , remarch'd back again a long journey to strong mosana , and so the project vanish'd , to the eternal discredit of na●●nius , and the loud laughter of all sensible men , and served only ●o shew the weak poli●icks , and great fo●ly of the pro●●c●ors . a ●ertain hydropick , ( for these 〈◊〉 have a pretty kna●k at 〈◊〉 picture ) would needs 〈◊〉 n●●●nius in a motl● coat , and a ●abel out of his mouth , with this motto non potar●m , and a phryg●●n inspiring him how to c●●ch ● butter●ly , which when 〈◊〉 ●ame near , and reach'd out hi● hand 〈…〉 , it immediately 〈◊〉 away , so that all he could do was to 〈◊〉 after it . no better success had the associates in attempting to invade the country of grandosio , from which the giant of that name had his title , for they were utterly routed by the valiant giant harcourtio ; lost two thousand horse , and a great part of their foot ; and were forced to retire with much shame . in this conflict , the lyranian souldiers ( who , as was formerly said , were transported into luyslandia upon the capitulation of shannonopolis ) won much credit for their couragious behaviour , breaking down all before ' em . by which they convinced the world how slanderously the reports were , that were spread of 'em in vtopia ; for then they were not inferiour to the best of the nasonians , when well cloath'd , arm'd , and fed ; all which in great part they wanted in lyrania . it past after the same unfortunate manner , or rather much worse with the regomanian associates , needs they would ( as it had been concerted amongst 'em ) invade the territories of king gallieno on that side , and destroy alsatia : but having appointed three or four solemn drinking matches ( which out of devotion to god bacchus , they would not omit ) they had not leisure to come into the field till the campaign was almost at an end ; and when they did ( as if the fumes of the wine had not been yet well evapourated , they took such broken measures , that when they made account to pass into luyslandia , where the great giant allemano-mastix had strongly posted himself , they lost many men in attempting it , and were forced with shame and loss to retire . after which , that politick giant led 'em such dances , ad made 'em reel from one end of the rhenusia to the other , till their heads were giddy , and quite ravell'd all the designs their muddy policy had laid . in the mean time allemano-mastix waiting his opportunity , took their towns , burned , and plundered their villages , and put all the large country of wirtemania under contribution . but the campaign now drawing to an end , and the associates thinking it a great dishonour to them all , that the avow'd project of invading luyslandia should come to just nothing at all . they ( poor dull gentlemen ! ) held a consultation , as their courants tell us , for a whole day together , what they should do , and the result of it was , the besieging the castle of ebrenburga , defended by no more than three hundred of king gallieno's soldiers . mean while the politick giant allemano-mastix , having defeated their army beyond the rhenusia , and taken the duke of wirtemania prisoner , hasted to raise the siege . but assoon as this came to the ears of the improvident knight hessio , who would , contrary to the sentiments of the rest , undertake that worthy business ; away he ran as fast as he could , and yet for all his haste , there wanted but little of his being intercepted in his flight , by the vigilant allemano-mastix , which had cost him the loss of his army , and brought him prisoner to tutelia , to bear his fellow-general , the duke of wirtemania company , in their land of captivity . chap. xv. how nasonius surprized meudixia , and furnium , which were soon after retaken by the giant nicobelgus . the season of the year began to grow so severe , that souldiers could not much longer abide the field ; and scarce any thing but one disgrace upon the neck of another , had befallen nasonius , so that he thought he must now be forced to break up that years campaign , with an irreparable blast upon his reputation , upon which he was so cursedly fallen out with himself , and grown so enragedly out of humour , that he was become a plague to himself , and a torment to all that were about him . yet in this temper he at length bethought himself , and he , which never had any kindness for women , but for the promoting some wicked designs ▪ retired to the apartment of the haughty daughter of lucisero , his coneubine ambitiosa , with whom he very passionately expostulated his case , telling her , that he thought his designs to be wicked enough to have obliged her by her own inclination to assist him , though there had not been that near relation between them , and that he wondred that she and her mai●s of honour could not , or would not do him as good service against his only enemy gallieno , as they had done against his father eugenius ; she replied , that his sorrows and disgraces were also hers , and that she was as deeply affected as himself with all his misfortunes and disappointments : that she and her maids had not been wanting on their part , but the strict government , and strong spells set upon luystandia had hitherto render'd all their endeavours ineffectual ; but that she would immediately haste away to her father lucifero , the grand master of all mis-rule , and mischief , all the world over , and having co●●ulted with him , would contrive something yet , which might make for his better satisfaction before the campaign ended . upon this she immediately posted away , and he a little better comforted with her promise , lay down to try if his troubled mind could admit of , or find any ease or refreshment in a little sleep . ambitiosa somewhat nettled with her gallant 's misfortunes , made all haste to the plutonick court , where she found her father lucifero all alone , drawing up a scheme of hellish politicks , how to employ all his under-devils , and fill the world with wickedness and confusion , whom , without further ceremony , she thus rudely accosted . dread sire ! whilst you take care even of the minutest matters , relating to your infernal dominions , i wonder you should be so regardless of my gallant , and your son-in-law , nasonius , as to suffer that damn'd necromancer archimedes , to command your spirits to his assistance against him , and to blast all his designs , and undertakings ? as she woud have gone on , lucifero with a kind , but somewhat scornful smile , thus took her up . my dear daughter ! if you be such a fool as to be fallen in love , yet i pray do not take my work out of my hands , and teach lucifero to play the devil ; i throughly understand nasonius , he is as fit an instrument for my use , as the world affords ; but if i should flush him a little too much with successes , the devil himself would not be able to rule him ; and when he descends hither , and ( if for want of my spectacles i lately read right in the book of the destinies , ) his fate is not far off , he would be as ready to dethrone me his hellish father-in-law , as he hath already shamelesly in the face of the whole world done the same to his too kind earthly father-in-law . besides i am highly offended at the wrong done to you , and i wonder that you should not highly resent it , to see sodomicus more dear to him than your self ; for though sodomy be a sin of my own invention , devised on purpose to make the righteous jove with his thunder-bolts to strike down all mankind to hell , as it did provoke him to destroy whole cities by fire from heaven , yet i am not pleased to see my darling sins turned against my self , and my own dearest daughter thereby wronged : and further , you know that it is an infallible maxim in hell , that i must bring all my servants to shame ; and the more signal service they do me , so much the greater shame must they be brought to , and i assure you he shall have it , according to his deserts . but , because at present i have great occasion for him , i will give him some small encouragement ; go therefore and advise him to set upon meudixia , and furnium , and i will take care that both shall fall into his hands . ambitiosa● zeal for her gallant , upon her father's lecture , began to cool , and being somewhat weary of the open air , and desiring to refresh , and recreat her devilish nature for some time in hell , and ●lso being suspiciou● that her father had some trick , and further design in it , which she durst not then enquire after , she would not go herself , but with a low courtesy retiring , she went and called for the old mother of the witches c●am●ogna , and having given he , her errand , presently dispatched her away and immediately the old hag bestriding her broom-staff , and muttering to her self her usual charms , rode post through the air , and in the dead time of night alighted where nasonius with his army lay , and entring hi lodging room , she somewhat rudely drew his curtains ; at which , nasonius , who for grie● and vexation could not sleep , was not a little startled , fearing the devil was come to fetch him away alive ; but seeing the flaggs writhled face , and sunk eyes , he presently knew his old friend crampogna , who had done him many a kindness , and thereupon took so much courage as to ask her , what might be her business ? quoth she , i am come from the infernal court to tell you , that your design to take in some towns was not amiss , but that your mistake lay here , that you made your attempt upon places of such strength , as the shallow brains , and cow'd hearts of your souldiers were not able to cope with , you shou'd have set upon such as you were sure could not have withstood you ; for a town is a town , and if you had surprized but a pidgeon-house , we could have made as great a noise about it , as was for the taking the sometime thought impregnable , strong holds of petrana , and sambrina , and thus have ballanced your reputation : and now i have in charge from the great lucifero , to bid you go immediately , without making any noise before-hand , and set upon meudixia and furnium , and you shall not want the assistance of all the powers of hell. nasonius , whose mind was uneasy , and who was never very courtly , received her message with a kind of sullen reservedness . the hag took it somewhat hainously , that he seemed so little to regard her great pains , and so kind a message , and in an angry tone said , well! for this once thou shalt succeed in thy enterprize , but because thou serest so light by my kindness , i will give thee one small shot before i go , and therewith she suck'd in her breath , and squeezed her body , whereupon her guts fell a rumbling , and out slew a fart , that roar'd in his ears like thunder , and left such a suffocating stench behind it , that poor nasorisus , whose lungs were not very good , could not forbear coughing for above half an hour after : but sadomicus lying near , and mistaking it for cannon-shot , sprang into his dear master's room with all speed , where when he came , the witch indeed was flown , but bearing the ugly noise of a rotten cough , and smelling such a poysonous stink , he thought there was some damn'd design , and bawled out , treason , treason , as if he would have torn his throat . nasonius could not prevent him , because he could not speak for coughing , so in rushed the guards , and all within hearing , who all cursed the stink , and some swore that they were got into the devils house of office. nasonius , as ill natur'd as he was , could not forbear smiling , and as soon as he could recover his breath , said , my friends , i thank you for your care , but be not too inquisitive , all is well , and perhaps much better than you think , go to your respective posts , and take care to be ready early , for i intend to march by break of day . as for the forts , mendixia , and furnium , they were neither great nor strong ; nor had the powerful necromancer archimedes , set any spell , or charms upon them ; only in whose hands soever they were , they afforded some advantage to annoy the other , and to secure , or hinder forragers ; some thought that grandorsio did design to flight them , others said , that he kept them only as a bait for nasonius , but however it was , they were but weakly garrison'd . hither nasonius hasted with all his forces , and also with the recruits of those aids who had lost their way in a foolish project of a descent into luystandia , and upon that account had repaired to him ; it was not possible for those small , and weak places to withstand so great a force , yet at first they made a brisk defence , but finding they could not hold out , they surrender'd upon honourable terms , and marched away to grandorsio , to acquaint him with the truth of the matter , and receive his orders ; and so in a very short time , both these forts successively ●ell into the hands of nasonius , which not a little puffed him up : and whereof , news was presently sent into vtopia , where was great rejoycing ; but to secure what he had gotten , he put a very great number of souldiers therein , under the command of ginglero , who had done such feats in lyrania , and left with him store of cannon , powder , ball , and all sorts of ammunicion so that he seemed to b● furnished to withstand a potent army and now the season for the field seeming quite spent , away rode . nas●nius in triumph to hol●o , where under colour of hunting , he met with his confiden●s , and the choicest of the heads of the hydra , who all laid their noddles together , and set their wits on the tenters , in contriving how to s●ueeze the stupid , infatuated vtopians , and d●aining away their coin , to leave them as pennyless as witless . but now behold an unexpected turn , which altered the whole scene of affairs ; for when all thought the campaign for that year was ended , and while they were rejoycing in vtopia , and consulting , or hunting at holoo , the fierce and restless giant nicobelgus , having received private orders all on a sudden , like lightning comes with a strong army of mad , fiery sparks , and demands restitution of both the forts , meudixia and furnium , alledging that they were only lent to make a jest on , and as he could take them again when he would , so to prove the truth of what he said , he would have them now . ginglero trusting in his forces , ammunition , and provision , gave big words at first , and dared him to do his worst : but nicobelgus , besides his resolute army , had certain enchanted engines , which were sent to him by the famous necromancer archimedes , wherewith he sorely annoyed the forts , and the defendants ; but above all , the conjurer had sent him certain iron balls , wherein , by his magick art he had enclosed a great number of active , malicious spirits , which being thrown into the air , made dreadful sights , and would also without ceasing , spit down fire directly into the faces of the besieged , so that none were able to endure them . ginglero , and his forces being affrighted , and unable to withstand such unusual assaults , yielded up both the forts to the fierce giant nicobelgus , leaving behind them all their cannon , ammunition , and provisions , to the great dishonour and damage of nasonius , and the associates : and thus in a short time all their glories were fullied , and their joy turned into mourning , so little assurance is there in the enjoyment of any humane affairs . chap. xvi . how nasonius returning to inferiana , kept himself and his army in an enchanted circle , and what means the giant grandorsio used to get him out ; and how he discomfited his host. after so many shameful miscarriages , nasonius , though impudent enough , could scarce set on a face to return to vtopia ; but go he must , for there the goddess mammoneta had a great hoard , wherein lay his self , and his hopes , and indeed thence only could he hope for supplies to support both himself , and his drooping associates ; but having sent fatuitosa before , she so play'd her part among the besotted vtopians , that at his coming over , they received him with joyful acclamations , never regarding , or talking of their losses , but expessing all thankfullness , that the person of their idol had escaped ; and as a testimony of their joy , and their true love to mischief and rebellion , quickly furnished him both with men , and money , in a more prodigal manner than formerly . nasonius , thus plentifully provided , could scarce have patience to wait for the spring , but hasted away to inferiana , that , if possible , he might take the field before the enemy ; and being come thither , he presently got together both his , and the associates forces ; but when he considered what an enemy he had to do with , his heart smote him : for , his enemy grandorsio was not only valiant , but naturally crafty , and of the greatest experience of all the giants , which fought in the quarrel of the mighty gallieno . this made our knight stagger in all his resolutions , and therefore that he might come to some issue , he retired into a certain deep hollow vault , where crampogna had obliged herself to give him the mee●ing at any time , upon the use of a certain call , consisting of some odd , uncouth , necromantick words , which she had taught him . when nasonius had repeated his beadroll , the witch was forced to appear , but she seemed to come in no very good humour , and our knight remmembring the affront he had before put upon her , now set himself all he could to light a candle to the devil , and to entertain her with the utmost courtship of a froglander ; and thus he began . my dearest crampogna , i hope you can pardon a thoughtful man , who did not entertain you and your last message in such manner as i ought ; it was the trouble of my mind , which diverted my thoughts , not any want of respect to you , whom i highly honour , and next to lucifero adore . forgive my neglect , and be the same kind crampogna to me as formerly . i have a bold , and cunning . enemy to deal with , but i have a gallant army , advise me what to do . the witch poutingly replied , you know you are much better at shiting than fighting , and if you had taken the course , by all manner of lies , and slanders , to beshite your enemies , it would have stood you in more stead , and done them more disgrace than ever you are like to do by drawing your sword ; but something you must do with all these forces , and that you may be sensible that i am more kind than you deserve , i will give you such advice , that if you be quick in pursuance of it , it will put grandorsio into such a rage , that he will go near to endanger his whole army ; but be sure you warp not from it , for if you do , mischief will befall you . at this his heart leapt for joy , and with a thousand thanks he could not forbear embracing the ugly hag , who put a stop to his courtship , by thus proceeding in her discouse . there is ( quoth she ) a certain place yclepied vivaria , by nature strong , but still more strong , by reason of certain charms laid upon it by the conjurer archimedes , which are still in force . thither go and encamp and i will use all my arts further to secure you , so that grandorsio shall not attempt any thing upon you , but to his damage , but be sure to keep you there . as nasonius was about to make his compliment , he heard a rumbling noise , and therewith came so violent a wind , as made the vault shake , and the earth tremble under him , and while he stood agast , expecting the issue , the witch insensibly slipt away and left him alone . as soon as nasonius came to himself , he made haste away to his army , and marched directly to vivaria , and there , according to the old haggs advice , encamp'd , which when grandorsio heard , it put him into a strange fit of passion , for he designed to have encamped there himself . but , assoon as he could get his forces together , away he led them to vivaria , intending by any means to set upon nasonius ; but though his rage was great , and his arts many , yet so strong were the enchantments , which guarded the place , that he could by no means come at him , or do any harm to his souldiers , but if he approached too near , received harm to himself . by chance , a certain spirit gave notice of all this to the necromancer archimedes , who was not a little concerned for his old friend , and acquaintance grandorsio , and to prevent the danger , if not too late , he immediately dispatched away to him a certain mercurial devil , who always attended him , hight mephostophilo , who in a trice flying though the air , came to grandorsio , meditating a rash attempt , and deliver'd him the following letter from the conjurer . great sir , in vain shall you attempt any thing against nasonius at vivaria ; and if you do , you will come off with shame and dishonour : for there are certain of my own spells upon that place , which , it is not in my power to undo ; besides , all the arts and helps that magick affords , are made ●use of at present for the security of the place by others ; but , if by any arts ( in which ● need not instruct you ) you can draw him out from thence , you may defeat him , which is the hearty desire of sir , your most humble servant , archimedes . upon receipt of this letter , grandorsio altered all his measures , and having dispatched away mephostophilo with ( as is said ) a very kind answer ( for the letter is unfortunately lost ) he gave up all thoughts of setting upon vivaria , and set all his wits on work how he might draw him and his army out of that unapproachable place . to this end he considered that there was a certain place called episcopatum , which was of great consequence , though not very strong ; thitherwards grandorsio marched with his whole army , making a feint , as if he would besiege it ; at this the associates were all alarm'd , and nasonius to prevent the danger , sent a considerable body of men from his camp , who marching another way , got into the town to secure it . and now nasonius thinking all things safe , and wanting provisions , sent a strong detachment under the command of signieur cabbagio , who marched many miles , with commission to steal turnips , and roots , ( and a few sheep , and oxen if they could get them ) for sauce . grandorsio being aware that he had weakened his army with two such considerable detatchments , now sent away in good earnest a brisk under-giant hight villerio to besiege huana , whilst he himself lay in wait to set upon nasonius , if he should offer to march forth to the relief of it . this huana , though no great town , was of some strength , but the more considerable , for that the taking of it would leave episcopatum naked , and open the passage to the last barrier of the hydropick country , which so affrighted the heads of the hydra , that they plied hard with all the associates , and all with one consent pressed nasonius not to suffer a place of such consequence to be ravished from them . thus being overcome with their complaints , and clamours , he rashly forsook his impregnable , inchanted camp , at vivaria , and marched with all the forces he had to relieve huana , which was just the very thing grandorsio hoped , and wished for : but , whilst he , and his heartless forces made their slow marches , villiero followed his business so close , that he became master of huana , before nasonius drew near it , and sent his spare forces to reinforce grandorsio ; the tidings of this being brought to nasonius , his countenance changd , and his heart so fail'd him , that stout rubbing , and the help of the brandy-bottle , were scarce able to keep him from fainting away , but being somewhat come to himself , he gave orders to march immediately back again to his enchanted camp at vivoria . but when he heard that grandorsio had posted himself in his way , so that he could not return thither , without hazarding himself , and his whole army , he bitterly curs●d those who had perswaded him to leave that place of safety ; and himself , for not following the witches counsel ; and all his counsellours , who had advised to the making so great a detachment , to the weakning of his army ; though some say , that none gave such counsel , but that it was purely his own silly contrivance , and that none ought to share with him in the glory of it : all these things concurring with his further fears , put him into such a vehement passion , that scarce any durst , or car'd to come near him , and that working violently downwards , it so strongly perfumed his tent , that when it was afterwards taken by grandorsio , the peculiar scent thereof , presently discover'd to whom it belong'd . but to make what amends he could , for this fatal error , he chose a place the most like to vivaria , as in such a streight he could find , and caused his pioneers to fall to work , and called on all his devils , witches , and conjurers , to set their spells , and charms , whilst he with a select party rode out , to discover which way grandorsio was bent ; but grandorsio , who knew that the pioneers , and conjurers would quickly so guard the place , as to be a mighty annoyance to him , was coming in all haste to prevent it ; which , when nasonius perceived , he turned his horse-head , set spurrs to his sides , and rode faster than ever did any man for a wager , and would have thought pegasus too slow , had he been under him , and before he , and his swift followers could well reach the camp , they all bawled out , like so many strenters , the enemy comes , the enemy comes , to arms. to arms. grado●sio was to lose no time , both to prevent intrenchments , and re-inforcements , and accordingly strait drew up his forces against nasonius , and now both armies faced each other , and the generals encouraged their men ; grandorsio told them of the glories they had won , and the experience they had had of their foe , nor did he stick to tell them of the danger , and difficulty of assaulting an enemy in his camp , but then he spurred them on to it , by shewing the immortal honour of overcoming it , as also the necessity of doing it now , while the enemy's army was weakened by so great detachments sent away . nasnius had no great victories to boast of , and was unwilling to tell his souldiers , that it was his guise always to run away ; but he shewed them their advantage of ground , and told them what unparallel'd glory they should get , if they could now overcome that enemy , which they never could before ; and though the whole course of his life was in a manner one continued husting humour , yet now he was quite another man , nand promised golden mountains to them that did bravely , and even with prayers and tears besought them to fight , whilst he , as became a prdent general , retired to a place of safety , from whence , upon occasion he might give orders , or send recruits . he could scarce slip away from danger before the luislanders came on with fury , but were so stoutly received by the vtopian , iberian , and regomanian forces , who had the advantage of ground , and resolutely maintain'd it , that the field was covered with the dead bodies of the luyslanders , and for several hours it was doubtful , which way the honour of the day would go ; but grandorsio still sending fresh and plentiful supplies , and nasonius not taking sufficient care to relieve his wearied men , the luyslanders began to break into the camp. the hydropicks all this while , instead of assisting their associates , had kept themselves together in a safe place , wisely leauing fools to fighting , and now like crows , who 't is said , smell powder at a distance , apprehending danger to come on , they thought it was their time to be gone , and accordingly away they went , making the best of their way . nasonius endeavour'd to perswade them to stay , but they thanked him kindly , and told him , that they thought it greater wisdom to provide for their own safety , whilst the armies continued fighting , and secured their retreat , than to take his counsel , and stay to have their brains knocked out . nasonius , who was always careful to avoid danger , and lov'd fighting as little as themselves , ( though it was necessary he should sometimes make a bluster , and shew ) that they should not be judg'd wiser than he , without taking any care , or leaving any orders , for his army , immediately fled away as fast as the best of them , and never made stop or stay , till he had rode twelve leagues , and passed two rivers , and then dark night putting a stop to his carrier , he put into a barn , and cover'd himself all over head and ears in straw , setting a watch to observe if any of the enemy came after him . the noble duke of bawwawia maintained the fight after this for about the space of two hours , till a loyal subjet of the injured eugenius , for his master's sake then in the service of the mighty gallieno , the valiant lyranian lucanio , with his horse , broke in like lightning upon the enemy , seized all their cannon , and turned it against them , and trampled under foot , or cut down all before them . and now all the associate forces could do , was to shift the best for themselves they could ; but the duke of bawwawia causing a bridge to be broken down to hinder the pursuit of the victorious enemy , it prov'd fatal to a great part of his forces , for thousands were slain like sheep by the river side , and such as attempted to get over , not being able to climb the high banks , were drown'd , till the vast number of dead bodies making a firm bridge , afforded a way for the poor remainder to run over , and save themselves . in this battle many great persons of the associates were made prisoners , and many brave persons slain on both sides , amongst whom , none is to be more lamented than the gallant lucanio , who , after his wonted generosity , neglecting himself to take care of the prisoners , and wounded of the enemy , his own wounds ranckled , and killed him . the luyslanders lost many at the beginning of the fight , but in all , first and last , not so many by two thirds as the associates , whose army was wholly broken , and had been totally and i●reparably lost , but that the long fatigue which the luyslanders had undergone , disabled them from a through pursuit , and make them willing to give off , and enjoy their victory . however , what remained of the associate army , was so dispersed all manner of ways , that it was some weeks before nasonius could by any shifts get so many together as might seem to counterfeit any thing like an army . but , while he lay thus troubled with the grumbling of the gizzon , and conjuring up all the devils of hell to assist him for his revenge , gallieno , with the lady victoria , were singing divine hymns of thanks to the caelestial powers , and great entertainments were made at tutelia , and over all luyslandia great demonstrations of joy were every where solemnly expressed for so signal a victory . chap. xvii . how the green-headed knight , sabaudiero , attempted to take pineria , and how the giant sabaudocrato came upon him , betwixt whom there was a bloody fight , in which sabaudiero , and his forces were overthrown . let us for a while leave nasonius , picking up his scatter'd forces , and revolving ten thousand projects , in his brain , how to do nothing , and see what better fortune the associates met with elsewhere : youth is forward , rash , and greedy of glory , and in montania their forces were thought to be much the stronger , not only as having the advantage in number , but also , as consisting for the most part of stout , and well-disciplin'd men ; this pricked on sabaudiero to do something , both for his glory , and in revenge of his losses ; and after a serious consultation , where there was scarce one wise head among them , and that least set by , it was resolved to besiege pineria , a town strong , and of great consequence . and now without delay their forces were drawn about it ; but the great necromancer , archimedes , had been there before , and raised certain small magical forts , which so guarded pineria , that till one , or more of them were taken , they could not come at it without running a desperate hazard : and therefore that they might seem to act like wise men , they resolved in the first place to attack the fort called pontilla , which they did with great fury , and renewed f●om time to time with great resolution ; but on the other hand , the fort was as bravely defended by some select men put therein , there was nothing of valour or industry wanting on either side , there were mines against mines , charms against charms , ( for in those strong countries they are all addicted to necromancy ) and vehement assaulting , and as stout repulsing : but in the end , their charms being countercharm'd , the fort wofully batter'd , and they over-power'd with numbers , they found they could no longer maintain it , and yet resolved so to quit it , that it should do the enemy no good , nor they suffer the least in their honour and reputation . and accordingly they secretly convey all their cannon , ammunition , and provision into pineria , and then they had but one trick to try more , and that was a certain spell , or charm left them by the famous necromancer archimedes , with this strict charge , that they shoul never use it but in their last neccessity ; and this they thought the time , now the fort was no longer tenable ; and therefore they set it on work , when presently all the fortification fell a heaving , and suddenly flew up into the air and vanished , whilst the besieged under coverture of the cloud , safely retired to pinera , to re-inforce that place , and desend it against the threatning danger . sabaudiero was somewhat surprized with the novelty of the thing as having not often seen such conjuring tricks , but withal , proud that he had conquer'd such a devilish place , he swore he would now have pineria , or make it fly away after pontilla . they made themselves cock-sure of the place ; for they took it for granted , that sabaudocrato had not sufficient forces , and consequently that he durst not adventure to relieve it . the noise of this siege slew abroad into all countries , and the associates mightily comforted themselves , that some considerable feats would be done on their part , which they hoped would force gallieno to recal many of his forces out of inferiana , by which means they might become an equal , if not an over-match for those which should be left . but the foolish vtopians were so taken and besotted with this small prank , that therewith they more than balanced all their losses in inferiiana , and elsewhere , and conffdently reported pineria to be taken , before any direct assault was made upon it ; and these whimsies , and conceits , working in their giddy brains , they magnified the rash youncker subaudiero , as if orlando furioso , or garagantua had been meer weaklings , and pygmies to him . all this time the wily giant sabaudecrato lay lurking up and down in secret and safe retreats , as well to conceal , and augment the number of his army , as to give encouragement to the unadvised associates , to fatigue , and breake their forces against a strong and resolute garrison ; but he no sooner had tidings that pine●ia was really in danger , but he fliely fell down to the relief of it , before they were well aware . his unexpected coming , somewhat allarmed them all , and various were their opinions of it ; some concluded him rash and unadvised , who had been hitherto thought cunning ; some said he was a crafty fellow , and that they ought to beware of him , but these were despised , and branded as cowards ; some said it was only a sham , or bravado , and that he would as quickly be gone again ; but a counsel of war being called , after a short debate ( they never making the least question of their superiority in number , and force , nor staying for any intelligence to know how strong he was ) it was unanimously resolved to break up the seige for the present , and go to meet him , concluding , that if they could fight him , and beat him out of the field , then the garrisons , and strong holds having no hopes of relief , would more easily submit to them : but in the mean time they never thought what the danger might be on their part , in case they were beaten , for they would not spoil their fine thoughts with such a melancholly conceit . the associates drunk with assurance of victory , if they could but find their enemy , march'd away with all the briskness and jollity imaginable ; but far they had not gone , when contrary to their expectation he appeared in sight ; for he was as ready for them , as they for him : and now they too late perceived their errour , for they might plainly see that he was equal , if not superiour to them in number of men : but however , their souldiers being well disciplin'd , and of late somewhat flushed , and eager , they presumed of the advantage in the stoutness and valour of their men , and therefore resolved to give battle ; nor did sabaudocrato at all decline it . both sides seeming thus eagerly bent upon it , the generals drew up their forces in battle-array , in a large plain , where all advantages for ground , numbers , and all other matters ( except brains ) were so equal on both sides , that there was likely to be as fair a tryal of skill , as had been known in many ages . the on set was fierce on both sides and for sometime it seem'd doubtful , which way the victory would incline : after some time the left wing of sobaudocrato made the right wing of sabaudiero , where the altianians were , to give way : but to make amends for that , the left wing of sabaudiero , where the iberians , and regomanian were , made the right wing of sabaudocrato to go back in some disorder , so that still there seem'd to be no great odds ; but sabaudocrato wisely foreseeing the danger , and knowing where his battle was weakest , had so posted the good knight prioro , that he might in time of need come to their succour , which he did just in the nick of time , and thus re-inforcing , and rallying them again , the ibe●ians and regomanians were slaughtered in great numbers , and being overpower'd , were forced to retreat , and sabaudiero not succouring his left wing , it was utterly routed , and now they were no longer able to stand , the best men retired in as good order as they could , but the greatest part of hi● forces lay at the mercy of the luyslanders , who in their fury made mortal havock of them ; which sabaudiero beholding , in compa●●●● 〈◊〉 prevailed with sicamber , a valiant , but wicked knight , the 〈…〉 old refugio , to try if he could bring them off , which , with a strong detachment of horse he attempted , and covered the retreat of many , but in the action was himself mortally wounded , and within a few days died . so short an enjoyment had he of the fruits of his own , and his father's treachery . the forces of sabaudiero thus utterly broken , he durst no more appear in the field , but put what were left into his garrisons to strengthen them , in hope they might hold out , winter now drawing on ; then fled out of his dominions for safety of his life , and to sollicite the associate princes to supply him with fresh succours . chap. xviii . how the great giant allemano mastix took the goodly city necariana , and how the giant grandorsio took the strong enchanted fort called caroloregium , and what measures and resolutions the associates and nasonius took thereupon . this disaster which happened to sabaudiero , was upon many accounts very grievous and prejudicial to all the associates ; for it was a strange blow to their reputation , and people in all places made it their sport , and cast out bitter scoffs against them , that those who had so boasted of their strength in montania , and told the world how sure they were of victory , should be so miserably beaten by those whom they despised ; but which was worse , they were forced to sit still , and look on , while the enemy in all places ravaged and spoiled , and did what he list ; for they were not able to bring any army into the field to face an enemy , unless a small force upon the great river , rhenusia , from whom they themselves did expect little good , and they were not a little afraid that sabaudiero would clap up a peace with gallieno , the way to which seem'd the less difficult , by reason of the near relation between them , and the inclinations gallieno had always shewn towards it ; and that would utterly break all their measures , and make their bad condition desperate . but still to increase their sorrow and shame , misfortunes and further losses attended them in all places ; the great allemano-mastix , had been a sore scourge to them upon the flood rhenusia ; but to encounter , and ( if possible ) drive him away , they had sent the puissant knight rabadenero , who was a villanous fighting fellow , and had done wonders against the half-moon ; but he finding that the scene was alter'd , when he came against the brave luyslander , posted himself securely , and would by no means be drawn to sight , for which , many commend his wisdom ( of which he had scarce ever before given any testimony ) for that he was inferiour in number , and had to do with equally disciplin'd men , allemano-mastix , covetous of glory , had an aching tooth to try what this mighty man at arms could do , and would sometimes make him fair offers , sometimes ravage his country before his face , and was always by one means or other provoking , or tempting him to battle , but rabadenero would by no means be drawn to run the hazard . whilst the eager luyslander was working his brains to compass his design , it came into his head that there was a fair city hight necariana , dedicated to the god bacchus , which god , the regomanians adore above all others , for that he was both a stout fighter , and a good-fellow ; in this city the bacchanalia , or feasts of their beloved god were kept , in which there was no great store victuals , but a world of drink ; and to that end and purpose , a vast vessel was made , or rather built , at the publick charge , which might contain wine enough to serve all the comers to the feast , from all quarters ; this vessel was in all those parts known by the name of decumandolium necarianum ; and upon the front , or head thereof , was written in letters of gold , this motto , ex lvxet pocvla sacra for this , or the like reason , i suppose , that when they were mellow with their festival cups , their dull souls were enlightned , or their eyes saw double , which they took to be a great advantage , and therefore hated sobriety , because it always bereav'd them of half the goods they had , or which at least they thought they had , whilst their brains swam in liquor . allemano-mastix concluded with himself , that they would never suffer this sacred place , and the consecrated vessel to be taken , but would rather fight it desperately at any disadvantage ; and therefore to draw them to a battle ( for otherwise he valued not the place ) he went and besieged necariana , giving out , that if he took it , he would break the decumandolium all to pieces , so that they should not be able to celebrate the feast of their darling god bacchus . the noise of this siege presently slew through all regomania , and all persons were mightily concerned for their holy city , and impatiently urged rabadenero to relieve it ; but he knowing his own want of forces , and with whom he had to do , could not be prevail'd on ; but that he might let them see it was not his fault , he earnestly sollicited all parties concern'd , for supplies , but they came so slowly , that it had been to as much purpose , if they had not come at all ; for a great part of the inhabitants fled away at first , carrying their riches along with them , and though many stayed , and a great number of souldiers were put in to defend it , yet they drank so plentifully of the sacred liquor , out of the mighty vessel , that they had little mind to defend their works , but easily quitted them upon every attempt and in the end , suffer'd the city to be taken by storm , making either none , or a very mean defence , whereupon , the luyslanders committed great slaughter , ( as is always done , where a place is taken by assault ) got great riches , and broke the huge vessel , profanly letting all the sacred liquor run about ; there were some few who fled into the castle , but being threatned with an assault , they submitted upon easy terms , and thus allemano-mastix became wholly master of the place , to dispose of at his pleasure . the regomanians were enrag'd at the taking their holy city , and the affront offer'd to the god bacchus ; and rabadenero being now reinforc'd with his late supplies , resolv'd to give battle to allemano mastix , to revenge this injury . but he led them a wild-goose chase , while they followed stamping , and swearing , and knew not where to find ; and yet durst not march very fast , lest they should fall into some of his ambuscades , and so make the matter still worse , for they were as afraid of his craft , as they were of his valour ; and thus both parties standing on their guard , and seeking their advantage , they were both too wary to do any thing further ; and therefore we will now leave them playing at bo-peep , and return to great giant grandorsio . while matters stood thus with the associates , and their heads and hearts were full of troubles , the restless giant grandorsio was contriving how he might further distress , and vex them ; and vvell remembring that he had been much annoyed by a strong enchanted fort , called caroloregium he thought this his time to be revenged of it , and well knowing that none now durst appear to interrupt him , or were able to hinder his design , he marched thither , and sat down before it . the nevvs of this bold attempt made the associates at their wits end , and though they could do nothing , yet to set as good a face on the matter as might be , they met to consult what to do ; nasonius , who was always forward , and though bashful in the face of an enemy , yet bold as any whatsoever , when they were far enough off , made this proposal , that he might gather together all the scattered forces , and drain all that could be spared out of garrisons , and go and raise the siege : they replied , that they were not at present , able to bring such a considerable force into the field , as might venture to encounter grandorsio , and a miscarriage in the attempt might be the loss of their other garrisons . nosonius insisted upon it as his priviledge and prerogative , that no town ought to be taken , but that he with an army ought to stand , and look on , or at least be within hearing . answer was made , that he had forfeited that priviledge , by not being present at the taking of huana , when he had an army , and might have been there , and looked on his belly full , if he durst . great wrangling there was , and many things were argued to and fro , but in the end it was very gravely concluded , that it was not safe for them to attempt any thing , but they would trust to the strength of the place , and leave grandorsio to do what he could , whom in the bitterness of their soul , they bloodily cursed , whilst he , like the fox , fared the better for it . caroloregium , was a place strong , both by nature and art , it seemed to be dedicated to mars , as thriving best in the time of war , and having few inhabitants besides souldiers ; it was not easily to be approached , as being scituate at the meeting of two rivers ; and in the open part , in a great measure guarded by a wonderful enchanted pond , or lake ; many mighty spells had been formerly set upon it by the great necromancer , archimedes , and the haughty don ibero formalitoso , setting no small value upon it , had put in the choicest of his souldiers to defend it , and commanded all his conjurers to use their utmost skill to strengthen it against all attacks , so that by many it was thought impregnable : but all this could not discourage the hardy and daring grandorsio from his undertaking ; yet in pursuing his design , he met with many difficulties , and was longer held in play , than some , who thought themselves wise , layed wagers he would . when his men drew near the lake , strange and terrible flashes of fire would rise out of the water , and lamentably scorch and burn them , when they endeavoured to fill it up with billets , either the flashing fires in a moment consumed them , or the lake swallowed them up , so that they thought it had no bottom . grandorsio being thus at a loss , sent to his old friend , that devil of a conjurer , archimedes , who , by the messenger , sent him this answer , that he should mind his batteries , and his bombs , but not trouble himself about the lake , nor any way concern himself as to it , for he would take care of that in a very short time , to his satisfaction , that he should be able to walk over it dry-shod . having received this answer , he bestowed no more pains that way , but with his batteries and his bombs , so plied the town , that he scarce gave the besieged any rest ; and on the other hand , they were not wanting to themselves , but returned cannon for cannon , and with continual firing , gaul'd , or cut off the approaching men , and as opportunity served , made sudden sallies and destroyed the works , as well as persons of the the besiegers . grandorsio seeing their resolution , and knowing that none could appear in the field to disturb him , made slower approaches , and with greater safety to preserve his men : but in the end , with his flying fireballs , he so burnt the town , that it was little but a heap of ruines , and the besieged were forced to secure themselves by retiring into certain enchanted cells , made by magick art , adjoining to their walls and fortifications ; and to their farther grief , the roaring cannon had frighted a part of their wall , so that there appeared a breach , whereat several souldiers at a time might enter . while grandorsio was about this work , the conjurer archimedes was not idle , or forgetful of his promise , for being one of general acquaintance , and having dealings with all sorts of devils , he employed certain subterranean spirits , who made such cavities and conveyances under ground , that suddenly , to the amazement both of besiged , and besiegers , the pond or lake appeared dry . nevertheless , the besieg'd still seem'd obstinate , and all their charms and conjurations did not yet fail them ; for violent flashes of lightning , and certain fiery spirits seemed to guard the breach , that none could enter ; but in the end , their breaches being daily made wider , the way to them laid plain and open , and there being no hopes of relief , they capitulated , to whom , grandorsio granted very honourable conditions , which being accepted , and sign'd on both sides , they marched forth , carrying the unwelcome news to the duke of bawwawia , and the rest of the associates , and grandorsio put in what forces he thought fit , employing many to remove the ruins , rebuild the destroyed habitations , and repair all damage done to the fortifications , in which work he sent to archimedes for his direction and assistance , so that in a short time he made it stronger than it was before . it is to be observed , that , contrary to the relation of all histories , and all countries known to us , that the giants in these countries generally beat the knights , and that the giants are courteous , sweet-humour'd , and chearfully undertake the protection and relief of wronged ladies , and all distressed persons , but the knights , except some few , are proud , surly , injurious , and set upon mischief . such difference is there in the unknown parts of the world from the known . but to return to our business , it is doubtful whether the taking this strong-hold caused greater joy in tutelia , or grief of heart at sennopolis . the associates having gotten nothing all this campaign , but shame and confusion , hung their heads , and knew not how to look on each other ; their only comfort was , that the season of the year for action being past , grandorsio had dispersed his forces into their winter-quarters , and was gone to the mighty gallieno , to give him an account of all transactions , and consult what was to be done for the future ; whereupon , the associates met at sennopolis , and held serious consultation how they might repair their broken fortunes . some said , that their moneys were spent , their souldiers slain , their towns taken , and that if sabaudiero made a peace , they were all undone , and that therefore it behoved them to take care of themselves : at this nasonius rose up in a rage , asking if they intended to betray him , who had fed them with such sums of money as they had never before seen , and urged their promises , and solemn oaths , that no peace should be made without his consent . it was replied , that he himself upon occasion , never stood upon such formalities , and therefore it was unreasonable for him to press any such thing upon them , unless he could produce his charter of priviledge , that he alone was not to be bound by any promises or oaths . nasonius smelt that their design was to get more money , and therefore in a calmer stile , answered thus : that it would be an eternal shame to give over thus , that there was no want of men , which they could raise abundantly , and that he had made so many beggars in vtopia , that he did not question , but that in a short time he should out of them raise a formidable army , and that if money was wanting , they should be supplied to their hearts desire , for vtopia was not yet above half drained , and he was resolved not to leave one penny in the kingdom , rather than any associate should want ; and that at present to secure sabaudiero , he would send him more money than his barren dukedom ever afforded him , and make him think himself the richer for his loss . at these golden promises they began all to prick up their ears , and talk complyingly ; and so , some pittance at present being distributed among them , and an agreement made , what share he would afford to every one , they came to a resolution , that they would all raise more than their former quota's , and try their fortune● the next year with greater forces and courage than ever . nasonius could scarce sleep for thinking what large promises he had made , which it was not possible he should perform , unless he could most shamefully gull the vtopians out of their money , of which he was somewhat doubtful at this time , because by reason of his great losses , and ill conduct , he must return to them under some kind of disgrace but that he might consult what to do , he repaired to holoo , where he found his damn'd mistress , ambitiosa , newly returned from the revels at the plutonick court. to her he made a long and lamentable complaint of his misfortunes , expostulating with her , why she had deserted him at such time ; as he most needed her advice and assistance . quoth she , there are certain laws of hell ( unknown to you ) which indispensably required my presence there ; but withal , she told him , that his misfortunes befel him through his own rashness , and inconsiderateness , in that he had not followed her counsel ; but ( said she ) if you will yet follow my advice , i will do all i can for you . this somewhat cheared his spirits , and after a seeming passionate salute , he intreated her to open her mind . she bade him to make haste to vtopia , without any the least fear : for said she , i have sent before you , fictitiosa , and fatuitosa , and before you can possibly get thither , the one will have framed so many lies in your behalf , and the other made them believed , that when you come , you shall be received with ringing of bells , roaring of cannons , making of bonfires , and all the windows of their houses set with glaring farthing candles , as if they were all in a flame , so that you shall return in such a triumph , as the most famous greeks or romans never knew or heard of . but when you come thither , above all take care to caress the bethlehmites of dom. com. give them offices , places of profit , large pensions , larger promises , stick at nothing : i have prevailed with mammoneta and fatuitosa so to bewitch them , that they shall not only afford you supplies beyond your expectation , but contrive such tricks , and find out such ways and means , as shall make all the moneys in the kingdom run into your exchequer . nasonius overjoy'd with these promises and prognosticks , after a plentiful return of thanks , in the kindest expressions his sowr nature could squeeze forth , took his formal leave , earnestly begging that she would not be long after him , to advise and assist him in any difficulties , that might arise , and then in all haste departed for vtopia , to put her advice in practice . what is to ensue , history cannot at present inform us , it belonging to astrology , or rather , it being wrapt up in the shady leaves of destiny . to prejudge of which ( leaving the foppish almanack-makers to fool weak people with their silly predictions from the stars ) we may frame a more solid prognostick from the immense riches , vast power , and highest wisdom of king gallieno : the former of which can never be exhausted by the wars , whilst the multitudes of ships he has taken from the vtopians , ( reckoned to be above two thousand five hundred , since the war began ; and perhaps near as many from the hydra , and the great contributions he raises upon his enemies countries ) bring him in such huge supplies , besides his own vast revenues . secondly , from his power , which encreases daily , he having raised for the next year , upwards of sixty thousand souldiers , besides recruits , and knowing how to use the victories he still obtains , as well as how to get them . and lastly , from his wisdom which lays all his designs in the best methods , out of a true and exact a knowledge of all that his enemies can do ; his intelligence of what they aim at , and his proportioning the causes , he lays to the effects he intends , in comparison of which ; the best policy of the associates is meerly childishness : every man of good sence , being able to discern that their projects are laid in no steady tennent and carried on disorderly and distractedly ; as if they proceeded from men meerly awaked out of their sleep , or half frighted out of their wits by the surprizes he gives them . this high wisdom i say , is that , which ( being peculiar to himself ) gives a dazling lustre and glory to all his designs , and entitles him to the ●rotection and assistance of divine provid●n●e . nullum numen abest si sit prudentia . whole heaven does for success engage , when soveraign prudence war does wage . finis postscript . before the devastations made by these bloody wars , the places where these things appeared were generally very rich , and plentifully stored with all manner of commodities , but the merchant , who for his gain : had a long time traded in these unknown , unheard of parts , during these convulsions , had undergone no little trouble , and sustained great losses , and now by some means coming to the knowledge of these future counsels and revolutions , weary of these continual dangers , and ●earing the storm , gathered together all his effects he could , and embarqu'd for england , his own country , where he lately arrived , and now resides in london ; his name is mr. non-such , a courteous , and affable person , and very free and open ●n his discourse : he dwells at the sign of the ●●ico●ns-horns , in the oudemi●n-st●eet , whither if any please to repair , they may have from him a very large and satisfactory account of these strange countries and actions ; but he hath told so no of his friends , that he left a greater share of his effects behind him , than he is willing to loose , and therefore intends speedily to adventure one voyage more , and if it please the fates , that he return in safety , he shall then be able to give a further , if not a full ●ccount of all the strange revolutions , hellish contrivances , cruel wars , and infinite convulsions , which have now almost wasted those goodly forreign nations so little known in these parts of the world. the reader is desired to correct with his pen the following errata's , which among others less considerable , slipt in the press . page . line , for the throw read be thrown . p. . l. penul for which , r. such . p. . l. . after to , insert go . p. . l. . for gentlewoman , r. gentleman p. . l. . for trickss , r. tricks . p. . l. . r. proboscis . p , . l. . for willy , r. wilie . p. . l. . for i , r. in . p. . for would , r. should . p. . l. . dele ( and put it in the beginning of l. . ib. p. . l. . for send , r. go . p. . l. . dele eugenius . p. . l. . for as'd , r. ask'd . ib. l. antepenult . for them , r. them . p. . for grendosio , r. grandorsio . p. . l. . for places , r place . p. . l. . for bordeering , r. bordering . ib. l. . for form●litosa r. formalitoso . p. . l. . for fambriua , r. sambrina . p. . l. . for , yet as ; r. as yet . p. . l. . after with , insert in contents of chap. . for dunkirkia , read balwinopolis . p. . l. penul . for self , r. heart . p. . l. . for stenters , r. stentors . a discovery of the groundlesness and insincerity of my ld. of down's dissuasive being the fourth appendix to svre-footing : with a letter to dr. casaubon, and another to his answerer / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a discovery of the groundlesness and insincerity of my ld. of down's dissuasive being the fourth appendix to svre-footing : with a letter to dr. casaubon, and another to his answerer / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], - , p. [s.n.], london : . errata: prelim. p. [ ]. wing apparently in error in dating this . also issued as a part of the second edition of sure-footing in christianity (wing, s ). reproduction of original in cambridge university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng taylor, jeremy, - . -- dissuasive from popery. sergeant, john, - . -- sure-footing in christianity. catholic church -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a discovery of the groundlesness and insincerity of my ld. of down's dissuasive . being the fourth appendix to svre-footing . with a letter to dr. casaubon , and another to his answerer . by j. s. habentes speciem quidem pietatis , virtutem autem ejus abnegantes . et hos devita , tim. . . london , printed in the year mdclxv . corrections of the press . pag. ● . l. . my lds. p. . l. . have added . p. . l. . ephrem . p. . l. . sense . p. . l. . truths . p. . l. . the head . p. . l. . thing . p. . l. . thus , it. p. . l. . unproov'd . p. . l. . characters . p. . l. . from the words . p. . l. . schism . fourth appendix . subverting fundamentally and manifoldly my ld. of downs dissuasive . . i had observ'd my self and was inform'd by others what harm my l. of down's dissuasive did to divers persons ; yet i found also that it wrought different effects in his protestant readers according to their respective abilities of understanding . those who were thoroughly intelligent universally dislikt it as a very weak and ungrounded discourse ; but the middle or rather meaner sort of schollers who have sufficient capacity to apprehend the sence of an objection , yet not enough to weigh by principles and so comprehend the force of it , nor to distinguish between church and schools , much less the sagacity to dive into the many sophistries , artifices , and indirect dealings which mis-used rhetorick can employ to delude men's eye-sight , were many of them startled , and entertain'd a high conceit of it . to which helpt , that their well-meaning and natural sincerity permitted them not to suspect , and so be aware of any deceit in a discourse manag'd all along with so much formal gravity and showes of the greatest piety that could be : for a grave carriage being , where nature is not perverted wilfully , the proper effect of a sincere earnestness and perfect seriousness in the heart , and , piety being conceiv'd to be that which ought to heighten supernaturally that interiour disposition , they are consequently apt to breed in the observer of them a conceit of the greatest seriousness in the world ; nay even , to those who are very weak and mean well , it gains the affecter of this way so much authority that it persuades those who esteem them for it they have perfect assuredness of what they so soberly write or affirm . whence follows that this kind of grave and seemingly pious demeanour , especially if carry'd on with a constancy , is the most effectual engin in the world to inveigle rational souls which are not aware of the craft or by looking into principles above it , whither the discourser pleases : and i conceive our country hath already so much felt its lamentable effects out of pulpits in the beginning of the late troubles , that all reflecters on it are sufficiently warn'd not to think all to be the solid gold of truth which glitters with saintly shows . now , in this consists the most efficacious part of my l. of downs dissuasive ; the rest , whether reasons or citations being very ordinary : and , 't was this exceeding plausibleness , and , by means of this , harmfulness of that treatise , which oblig'd me to alter my resolution , and make the answer to it a fourth appendix to sure-footing , which i had refused to the suggestion of my first thoughts , hoping some other would lay it open more at large . but how shall i go about to answer it : for , as sampson's strength lay in his hair , the weakest part that can be found in a man , so the chief virtue of the dissuasive lies in the godliness of its style ; which being meer voluntary words and most unapt to make up propositions expressive of connected sence or to compile a rational discourse , 't is by consequence the weakest peece of performance which can possibly spring from a reasonable creature ; yet with this weapon i am soonest beat ; nothing being more averse to my genius than to saint it in scripture-phrases ( a performance in which , i confess , a quaker would easily worst me , and would even put the dissuader himself very hard to it ) especially in a controversy , which ought to be a severe proof of the truth of the point under debate . the way then which sutes my humour best , and , as i hope , is most efficacious to conclude and satisfy , is to examin by principles whether there be force of truth at the bottome , grounding the disluader's long invective . if there be , it ought to have all handsome advantages of expressions allow'd it ; if not , 't is no more , as to the harmony of truth , but the running a great deal of division upon no ground . . i shall suppose the reader of this appendix hath already perus'd & weighed the force of my reasoningsin sure footing ; which done , he will easily comprehend the strength of this reply , and the manifold weakness of my l. of downs dissuasive . all truths being connected , it follows that every errour is by consequence opposit to all truths , and they to it . hence each single errour lies open to be confuted many wayes , if the method of reason or connexion be taken . i take therefore that method ; because , by its priviledge of bringing things to first-principles , 't is apt to undermine and blow up errour from its very foundations . eight several mines i lay to perform this effect ; each of which wayes is alone sufficient to do my work . first way . . the first is to alledge that my l. of downs has not one first or self-evident principle to begin with , on which he builds his dissuasive from catholick faith. if i wrong him , let him do himself right by pointing it out and showing that 't is opposit to our churchees doctrin ; which if he does , i here yield my self absolutely confuted . in the mean time i have proved that traditiones certainty is the first principle of controversy , and am confident in the invincible force of truth that all the wit in the world cannot confute that position . and if it stands , he is convincet not onely to want the first principle of the science we are to discourse in , but ( his cause forcing him to renounce tradition's certainty ) to go point-blank against it , and so to invalidate to our hands all he shall write as a controvertist ; and how weakly he behaves himself where he goes about to lay other principles , shall be shown when i come to answer his first section . now , seeing all reason has force by relying on the truth of the premises , and they are known to be true either by being first principles themselves , or by being finally resolvable into others which are such , it follows there can be no true reason where there is no first principle . till he shows us then that he builds his dissuasive on some first principles , it will follow his whole endeavour is to dissuade not by way of reason but fine words , which are indeed the substantiallest , strongest and most efficacious part of his whole book . second way . . the second way is to exclude him all right to alledge either scriptures , fathers or councils ; i add , reason , history or instances , ( see corol. . , , , . ) and , it is done thus . all discourse supposes that certain on which it builds : but , if tradition or the way of conveying down matters of fact by the former ages testifying can fail , none of these are certain : therefore a protestant or renouncer of tradition cannot with reason pretend to discourse out of any of these : that is , ( reason being man's nature ) he has lost his natural right to alledge any of these in way of proof . now , that none of these are certain if tradition be renounc't is shown thus . scripture's letter as to its incorruptedness , nay its very being , is uncertain alone , or without tradition , as is confest by protestants , and proov'd sure-footing disc. d , and th . so are fathers and councils too ; for , fathers being eminent witnessers to immediate posterity or children of the churches doctrin received , and councils representatives of the church , their strength as proofs , nay their very existence is not known till the notion of church be known , which is part of their very definition and to which they relate . nor is the being or nature of church known , till it be certainly known who are truly faithful or have true faith , who not ; which must be manifested by their having or not having the true rule of faith : wherefore , since the properties of the rule of faith do all agree to tradition our rule , and none of them to theirs , as was evidently and at large shown there in my five first discourses : it follows , the protestant or renouncer of tradition knows not what is either right scripture , father or council ; and so ought not to meddle with them , nor alledge them . again , since pretended instances of traditions failing depend on history , & historical certainty cannot be built on dead characters but on living sence in men's hearts deliver'd from age to age that those passages are true ; that is , on tradition ; it follows , that , if the way of tradition can fail , all history is uncertain ; and consequently , all instances as being matters of fact depending on history . and , lastly , since reasons are fetch 't from the nature of things , and the best nature in what it is , abstracting from disease or madness , unalterable , is the ground of the human part of christian tradition , and most incomparable strength is superadded to it as it is christian by the supernatural assistances of the holy ghost ( disc. . ) 't is a wild conceit to think any piece of nature or discourse built on it can be held certain , if tradition ( especially christian tradition ) may be held uncertain . third way . . the third way is to examin the method he takes in dissuading . for , common sence telling us 't is not to be expected any should be able to perform any thing unless he takes the right way to perform it , 't is evidert he cannot be held in reason to have power to dissuade , unless the method he takes be proper to that effect , that is , not common to that effect and a contrary one . now , to dissuade is to unfix the understanding from what is held before ; which includes to make it hold or assent that what it held before certain is false or at least uncertain . the way then he takes must be evidently able to oblige to some kind of assent , nay , as he handles it ( for , i suppose he aims to make them hold as protestants ) to assent to the contrary ; which therefore must needs require the evidentest method imaginable , obliging their reason to conclude that a man who takes this way of discourse cannot but make good what he sayes ; at least , that it may be strongly hop't from his method he will do it . this reflected on , let us weigh the method my ld. takes in his dissuasive ; and , if it be evident to every ordinary capacity , that , as to the godly part of it , the quakers out-do him ; and , as to its quoting part the smectymnuans us'd the same against the protestants to confute episcopacy ( for they too quoted and gloss'd scriptures and fathers both ) and indeed every sect that has not yet shaken of the shame to disrespect all antiquity ; then it is also evident that this method is common to those discourses which have in them power to satisfy the understanding , and those who have no such power . now , that being most evidently no method or way to such an effect , which many follow and take , yet arrive not at that effect , 't is plain to common sence that my ld. of downs miscalls his book a dissuasive and that it can have in it no power of moving the understanding one way or other , unless he can first vouch some particularity in the method he takes above what 's in others , in which we experience miscarriage , and himself professes we , though taking it , miscarry in it . let us then search after this particularity in his way of writing . is it that he brings some stronger or more unavoidable sort of testimonies then were ever yet produc't by others ? no : every scholler sees they are so common that they have been hundreds of times produc't , and himself ( p. . & . ) acknowledges their vulgarness . but perhaps he invalidates all the answers our controvertists have given to those testimonies and presses them farther against us , beyond what any has done yet ! quite contrary . he barely and rawly puts them down as if this were the very first time they had seen light , nor takes the least notice of any answer at all given to them formerly . but it may be he layes grounds to distinguish and press home his testimonies , and so gives them their full weight which others have not done . alas , no ; i fear he never thinks of that , but judges ( if we may conclude from his carriage ) the deed done , so he but quote ; nor can i see one principle laid in his whole book strengthening any one testimony by bringing it to its ground , experimental knowledge in the authour he cites , that the churches constant voice and practice manifested this her sence ; but as they are put down carelesly , so they are past over slubberingly , without the least enforeing them by way of laying principles : is he at least particular in his sincerity and ingenuity ? i know not how they will be satisfied with it who read his late adversary impeaching him for the contrary vices , and some passages in this present appendix , where , lies then this particularity in his method , without which his dissuasive can never in reason be held creditable ? i speak ingenuously and from my heart ; all the particularity i can observe in it lies in these two things ; first , that he huddles together multitudes of his own sayings , without any pretence of proof for the most part , and when he brings any they are such as we have spoken of . next , that instead of enforcing his proofs by way of reason , he overflowes strangely with godly language and scripture-phrases ; with which plaufible manner of expression most unreasonably and unnaturally he strives to combat the wills of his readers , before he hath brought any thing able to satisfy their understandings . . yet , though his method have no particularity in it as to its quoting part , who knows but it may be very particular as to its rational part , that is , full of proofs which conclude evidently or demonstrations ! but i am so far from feeling the force of any one such proof in his whole book that i cannot discern its very existence , or even any attempt of that kind ; and i dare affirm my ld. of downs never meant it or dream't of it . if he have any such i request his lp. would in his reply single them out from all the pious and inconclusive talk which swell his book , and i promise them very heartily to lend them a due and respectful confideration . but i am sure he will neither pretend he has any , nor attempt the having any if he but reflect that a demonstration is a proof which has in it a virtue of obliging the understanding to assent , and that it obtains this virtue by building on intrinsecal mediums ; that is , on proper causes or effects , of which 't is impossible the one should be without the other . this clearing method onely the champions of truth dare take , and the defenders of errour must avoid under penalty of having their cause quite ruin'd and crush't to pieces . and this severe method of finding truth , relying on the goodness of my cause , i fear not to take and stick to in sure-footing as appears there by my transition : which sufficiently shows the particularity of my method ; i expect now my ld. of downs would show me the particularity of his , or renounce all right and title to dissuade . . i have been something longer about laying open the necessity of a proper method to dissuade ere one can in reason hope to perform that effect , because i see plainly that , in the pursuit of truth , method is in a manner all ; and , that 't is impossible any controversy should hover long in debate if a right method of concluding evidently were carefully taken and faithfully held to . i have told my ld. of downs where he may see mine ; and i desire him earnestly as he loves truth either to admit it as conclusive and follow it , or show it inconclusive and propose us a better to begin and proceed with evidently : and , that i may more efficaciously endeavour to bring him , nay provoke him as far as i may with civility , to a method particular and proper to dissuade , i declare here before all the world that i know his cause to be so unable to bear it , and hope himself is so prudent , that he will never either venture to allow our method competent to conclude evidently , nor yet go about to establish a better of his own . fourth way . . the fourth way of disanulling my lp's whole endeavours , is to speak ad hominem and challenge him thus . your grounds allow neither fathers to be infallible in any testimony you produce from them to dissuade with , nor yet your self in interpreting scripture ; nor ( i conceive ) will you say that you see with infallible certainty any proposition you go about to deduce by reason ( if there be any such in your dissuasive ) to be necessarily consequent from any first or self-evident principle , therefore you are certain of nothing you alledge in your whole book . if then his lordship would please to speak out candidly , he ought to say ; i know not certainly that any thing i say against your religion is true , yet notwithstanding i would fain dissuade you from holding the faith of your forefathers , and to relinquish a religion you judge unalterable and hope to be sav'd by holding it . which were it profest and deliver'd ingenuously as it lies at the very bottome of his heart , his lp's dissuasive would be a pleasant piece , and lose all power to move any child of common sence , nay the vulgar reason of the wild irish would be too hard for it . now , that this ought in due candour to be profest , in case neither the fathers nor himself be infallible in any saying or proof of theirs , is thus evidene't . for , since to be infallible in none , hîc & nunc , ( taking in the whole complexion of assisting circumstances ) is the same as to be hîc & nunc fallible in all , or each , and if they be fallible or may be deceived in each , they can be sure of none ; it follows that who professes the fathers & himself ( though using all the means he can to secure him from errour ) fallible in each , must , if he will speak out like an honest man , confess he is sure of none . let then my ld. of downs either vouch infallible certainty in himself reasoning or interpreting , or in the authorities he cites , ( i mean infallible considering their endeavours in complexion with all the means on foot in the world to preserve them so ) or else confess that , notwithstanding all means us'd by them they are in each saying and proof fallible , and so himself sure of never a motive he brings to dissuade with . now , to see so eminent a writer and chosen out on purpose ( as he professes ) by the whole church of ireland , go about to combat a settled persuasion , held sacred , unalterable , descending from christ by attestation of forefathers the way to bliss , &c. and bring no better arguments to do it but such as are ( were he put to declare it and would speak out ) confessedly uncertain , is so far from being a competent dissuasive from catholick faith , that 't is when laid open ( which is here perform'd ) as good a persuasive for the generality of catholicks to hold stedfastly to it as man's wit can invent ; and far better to the weaker sort of speculaters than to demonstrate the infallibility of the ground of faith. such advantage catholick faith gains by the opposition from her adversaries , if they be rightly handled , and their discourses brought to grounds . fifth way . . the fifth way is built on the fourth , or , indeed on the protestants voluntary concession . for they granting they have no demonstration for the ground of their faith , must say they have onely probability , and consequently that faith quoad nos is uncertain , or ( to use their own expression ) that faith in us is an assent cui non subest dubium , of which we have no doubt , yet cui potest subesse falsum , or . possible to be false , which amounts to this that faith at large is but highly probable , much lesse their faith as contradistinguisht from ours . probabilities then being of such a nature that they do not absolutely weigh down the scale of our judgment ) i mean while they are seen to be but probabilities as is my ld's case ) it follows that if there be probabilities for the other side , the way to dissuade from it is to put all those probable reasons in the opposit ballance , and then , by comparing them , show they have no considerable weight , counterpos'd to those he brings for his tenet . now , that there is no probability for our side is very hard to be said , since the whole world sees plainly we still maintain the field against them , nay dare pretend without fearing an absolute baffle ( which must needs follow had we not at least probabilities to befriend us ) that our grounds are evidently and demonstrably certain ; nay more , dare venture to take the most clearing method imaginable to stand or fall by , and withal are bold to challenge them that they have no evident grounds to begin with , nor dare venture to pursue that evidencing method . but my lds own words in his liberty of prophecying , sect. . § . . will beyond all confute evince it , ad hominem at least , that we have probabilities , and those strong ones too on our side . i pick out some , leaving out other weighty ones which hisexpressions had too much deform'd . his words are these . such as are the beauty and splendor of their church ; their pompous service ; the stateliness and solemnity of the hierarchy ; their name of catholick , which they suppose their own due and to concern no other sort of christians ( he ought have said , which the establisht use of the word and deriv'd riv'd down to the successours of those who first had that name , forces all , even their adversaries , to give them when they speak naturally ; and makes them despair of obtaining it for themselves ) the antiquity of many of their doctrins ; the continual succession of their bishops ; their immediate derivation from the apostles ; the title to succeed s. peter ; the multiteudand variety of people which are of their persuasion ; apparent consent with antiquity in many ceremonials which other churches have rejected ; a pretended and sometimes an apparent consent with some elder ages in many matters doctrinal ; the great consent of one part with another in that which most of them affirm to be de fide ; the great differences which are commenced amongst their adversaries : their happiness in being instruments in converting divers nations : ( he should rather have said , all ) the advantages of monarchical government , the benefit of which as well as the inconveniences they dayly enjoy ; the piety and austerity of their religious orders of men and women ; the single life of their priests and bishops ; the severity of their fasts , and their exterior observances ; the known holiness of some of those persons whose institutes the religious persons pretend to imitate , &c. after which he subjoyns . these things and diverse others may very easily persuade persons of much reason and more piety to retain that which they know to have been the religion of their forefathers , which had actual possession and seizure of men's understandings before the opposit professions had a name . thus he . by which words 't is evident we have probabilities and high ones too , on our side ; else how could they be able very easily to persuade persons of much reason ? especially , they having as he sayes more piety ; or more then much , that is very much ; which argues rather that those motives for catholick faith were sutable to piety or truths ; ot at least exceedingly-seeming-pious ; so as the great piety of those persons , neither checkt at the practice according to those motives , nor their much reason reach't to a discovery of their fallaciousness . whence , we may gather farther than those motives so standing for us , are to be rankt in the highest degree of probability . for since those persons are confest to be very pious , that is , very good , and , so , unapt to be byast by passion , and withal to have much reason , 't is plain the cause of their assent to catholick faith must be look't for in the object , and have a wonderful appearance at least of evidence or highest probability which is able to conquer and satisfy so rational and sincere understandings . this being so , my ld. cannot in reason own himself a dissuader , nor pretend his discourse has power to dissuade any from our faith , unless he put down the whole force of what we build our faith on together with his motives why he judges it false , and then compare or weigh those reasons together , and so conclude his absolutely preponderating . i doubt those very motives deliverd faintly by himself though an adversary , are such , as , had he laid them open at large as he does his own objections , he would have been infinitely puzzled to find others to overballance them with any show of reason . but i will not put him upon so large a task : let him onely consider on what grounds the rule of our faith is built , to wit on sensible and unmistakable matter of fact from age to age , and this unmistakableness confirm'd supernaturally by the concern of the thing , obliging the beleevers best care to preserve it , and by the goodness implanted in their hearts by christ's doctrin , which kept lively awake that care ( as it is at large laid open in sure-footing ) and then compare it with descanting upon scripture's letter by human skills , which is the ground of the protestants faith as contra-distinguish't from ours , ( or rather of their dissent or negative tenets ) and show those grounds preponderating ours , and then his reader will have some encouragement to heed his dissuasive , otherwise he can have none . sixth way . . a sixth way is to demand of his lp. if he will undertake the pretended evidences he produces whether reasons or citations have not also been ( pretended at least to be ) answered by learned men on our side , and that the indifferent part of the world have judg'd the catholicks were so evidently concluded against by the protestants , that they were not able in reason to reply . however he ought to have alledg'd that in the evidences he brings the protestants have had the last reply , that so at least there may be some sleight conjectural likelihood they were unanswerable or convictive . this , i say , seems in reason fit to have been voucht , and ( as natural method requires it ) plac't at the very entrance of his book , so to give the reader some faint hopes his perusing it might be perhaps to some purpose . what does my l. of downs ? he professes at the very beginning of his introduction the direct contrary ; for he confesses there that the evidences on both sides ( in questions of difference between our churches ) have been so often produc't , &c. it will seem almost impossible to produce any new matter , or if we could ( observe how unlikely he makes it he should conclude any thing ) it will not be probable that what can be newly alledg'd can prevail more than all which already hath been so often urg'd in these questions ; he should after the words [ so often urg'd , ] have added and never answer'd , otherwise the often urging signifies nothing as to convictiveness . yet , careless of this , he proceeds ; but we are not deterred from doing our duty by any such considerations , as knowing that the same medicaments , &c. which , waving the pious rhetorick , to any understanding man signifies directly as much as if he should profess , i am resolv'd to write a book against the papists whatever comes onit , or whether it be to purpose or no. for , to confess he brings nothing but common objections without undertaking to manifest they were never satisfactorily answered , is to carry it as if meerly to transcribe were sufficient to convince ; especially , since the being often urged , is a very probable argument they have been also often answer'd . seventh way . . the seventh way to confute him is to run over his whole book , bringing it into heads ; and then by disabling those heads , overthrow the book it self ; noting first that i guid my quotations by its third edition in octavo . first then we will distinguish it into the matter of his dissuasive , that is ; those things on which he builds his pretence of dissuading ; and the manner of it , or the way he takes to manage that matter . the matter is divided into his authorities and his reasons : wee 'l begin with his authorities . and , because we have found and shew'd dr. pierce's so fam'd sermon to be the very idea of inefficacious quoting : 't is but reason we should manifest how the dissuasive participates of its nature , by ranking the citations produc't in it under those ten faulty heads which comprehended the other's authorities . to the first head belong that of senensis p. , and . those two p. . those p. , and . maldonat's p. . those p. . those noted with b , c , d , e , and f. p. . aeneas sylvius p. . those three so maliciously and wilfully misrepresenting the catholick tenet . p. . to which add that of s. john p. . that cluster of citations p. . and that which follows . elutherius and s. ambrose p. . his scripture p. . his general muster of such as wish't reformation of manners in the church , . now , to vindicate these testimonies his lp. should show to what purpose as a controvertist he alledg'd these more than for show . i note that all these fall also under the d , and d. head , and perhaps diverse of the others . to the d . head appertain , those of tent. bas. theop. alexandrinus in the preface . tert. p. . s. cypr. and dionysius p. . ambrose , hilary and macarius p. . olympiodorus and leo p. . his scripture p. . and . justin and origen p. . eusebius and macarius . p. . ephren and nazianz. p. . those p. , and . origen p. . lyra and those noted g , h , i , k , l , m. p. , & . the council of eliberis and s. austin p. . cyprian . p. , and . those p. , and . against all these it is charg'd that they are raw and unapply'd , onely saying something in common which comes not home to the point . wherefore to validate them his lp. must show the contrary . to the third belong those p. . those p. . innocent . p. , and p. . clemens and origen . p. . epiph. p. . those p. , , , . the extravagants p. . those p. . and . chrysost. p. . of these he is to show that he has levell'd them directly at a question rightly stated . i charge him with the contrary , and add that most of his other citations fall under this faulty head. under the th are rank't those p. , . those p. . , , . lombard p. . a castro p : . s. austin p. . s. gregory p. . canus . p. . these either impugn a word for a thing , or some circumstance or manner for the substance . under the th the whole pag. . and all those p. . which are evidently negative ; and , so , inconclusive . under the sixth are comprehended his first p. . and his second p. . bellarmin and gerson p. . albertus p. . roffensis and polydor virgil p. . his first citation p. . which we affirm to be the saying of private authours , or schoolmen which others do or may contradict . to this head also belong all those in a manner in his two last chapters , that is , in the better half of his book . to the th head are related that of s. ambrose in his preface . s. austin p. , and . of the emperours p. . leo the th . p. . pius the th , p. . the ephesin council p. . the council of trent p. . those three p. . nazianz. p. . tertull. p. . the two first p. . those three p. . and that p. . those first p. . s. greg. p. . his descant on the th synod p. . , . symmachus p. . and , lastly , my ld. of downs his testimony of himself the page before the title page , so strangely misrepresenting the minde of that frontispiece . these i affirm to be false and not to signify the thing they are expresly quoted for . diverse of them also are direct disingenuities , with a craft in the managing of them which argues design , and are inexcusable by mistake . to the eighth belong those of athanasius , lactantius and origen in the preface . s. chrysostom p. . theodoret and gelasius p. . in which 't is easy to be made appear , the words are ambiguous . those of the th , or sayings of writers on his own side are not worth mentioning : nor yet the th . or pieces of scripture interpreted by himself ; unless he will show us he proceeds on evident principles in sencing them , which so force the meaning he gives them that they can possibly bear no other . till he does this , all his glosses are presumable to have no other foundation but meer strength of fancy ; and since he professes ( p. . ) that his dissuasive wholly relies on scripture , that is on the sence he conceives it to have , the common mode of interpreting scripture by fancy which reigns so in the world , will make any sober man doubt , unless he show us the evident principles which necessitated his interpretation , that his whole dissuasive is perfectly built on his own imagination . the dissuasive hath two or three other faulty heads of citations besides those mention'd ; as vnauthentick ones : such is origens p. . and that against the th . synod p. . those also which cite an authour but no place where they are to be found as s. cyril p. . and lastly , brought to impugn faith , but speaking onely of alterable practices , as those p. . which he is to show authentick , well-cited and pertinent ; and as well of those as the former he is to make good if he will go to work like a solid man that they have in them the true nature of testimonies , and such certainty as may safely be rely'd on for principles of those serious discourses he makes upon them . see sure-footing p. , , . . but that i may do right to the dissuader , i am to confess ingenuously that he has in him one citation which hath in it the true nature of a testimony , or depending on the authour's knowledge had by sence of the present doctrin of the church at that time . now , though it be the testimony only of one single father , and so i am not in severity bound by catholick grounds which vouch onely consensus patrum , ( which i understand to mean a consent of so many and so qualify'd as is apt to convince ) to answer it , and not at all by protestant grounds which yield them all fallible ; yet i have that regard for any thing that tends ( though remotely ) to solidity , that i will even remit something of my own advantage to give it a respectful consideration . the testimony is of gennadius cited by my l. p. , & . thus . for , after christ's ascension into heaven the souls of all saints are with christ , and going from the body they go to christ , expecting the resurrection of their body , with it to pass into the perfection of perpetual bliss . to which my ld. subjoyns , and this he delivers as the doctrin of the catholick church . i take this excellent testimony as put down by himself , to do which the usage of st. greg. nazianzen's immediately foregoing , gives me small encouragement . in answer then , i affirm that this testimony so insisted and rely'd on as against us , is as plain a declaration of the faith of our church at present as any now-adayes catholick could pronounce . for , since no catholick holds that any goes to purgatory but they who die sinners to some degree , and that all who are saints are with christ in heaven , as is evident by the churches common language affirming constantly the saints are in heaven , and never that the saints are in purgatory , but the souls onely , it is manifest that the words are as expresly for us as we our selves could invent or wish . i hope it will not wrogmethod , if on this occasion i show how protestant writers speed when they bring against us any testimony of a father speaking as a father , that is , declaring that he delivers the sence of the catholick church ; however in other testimonies which speak not narratively , or matter of fact , the very nature of words joyn'd with the variety of their circumstances must needs afford room for ambiguity and several glosses . i affirm then that this testimony not onely is not in the least opposit to us , but is directly opposit to the protestants in another point of faith in which we differ . to discover this let us reflect on the words [ after christes ascension into heaven the souls of all saints are with christ , ] and ask what mean these words after christs ascension ? and first 't is evident it puts a distinction between the souls of saints before christs ascension and after it in some respect , and what is this respect ? most expresly this that the souls of the saints after christes ascension go from the body to christ , that is , that before the ascension none did . the avowed doctrin of the catholick church , prosessing that those who die saints in the law of grace go straight to heaven , but that the best saints before our saviours dying for them and ascending with them , did not . whence also we hold that christes descending into hell , was to free them from that state of suspence and want of their strongly desired and hopet for bliss . according to that hymn of s. ambrose and s. augustin , in the common-prayer-book , so oft said over by rote but never reflected on , when thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death thou didst open the kingdome of heaven to all believers : signifying plainly that no believers sound heaven open for them till after christ's death . by the success of this one testimony is seen how utterly the protestant cause would be overthrown by way of testimony as well as reason , were citations distinguish't , brought to grounds , and those onely admitted from the fathers in which 't is manifest they speak as fathers or witnessers of what is the present churches doctrin . to close up this discourse about the dissuader's citations . he is to show us first that they fall not under the faulty heads to which they are respectively assign'd , or under diverse others of those heads . next , that they have in them the nature of testimonies : and , lastly , ( which is yet harder ) that though they have in them the nature of testimonies , their authority is certain and their language unambiguous so that they may be safely rely'd on for principles or grounds of a solid discourse ; this if he shows of any one citation which strikes at our faith , i promise him very heartily to subscribe to the validity of all the rest . . thus much for his authorities . next should follow a refutation of his reasons produc't against our faith ; for , as for those against our school-divines or casuists they concern not me as a controvertist : let him and them fight it out . now , reasons that strike at our faith must either be against the ground of faith , and those shall be consider'd in my answer to his first section ; or against , points of faith : and these , may proceed two wayes ; first by showing those points incomprehensible to our natural reason , or unsutable to our faney ; and this way he frequently takes , making a great deal of game upon such subjects , as any atheist may do by the same way in points common to him and us . but this hurts us not in the least ; in regard we hold not mysteries of faith objects of human reason ; nor spiritual things the objects of fancy ; and , so , these reasons need no farther answer . the other way reasons against points of faith may proceed , is to show those points contradictory to some evident principles , at least to some other known or else acknowledg'd truth ? and these were worth answering ; but such as these i find none in his whole book , rather that he builds his sleight descants or discourses on some controvertible text or citation , relying on them as firmly as if they were first principles . indeed p. . the dissuader tells us of a demonstration of his for the novelty of transubstantion and that a plain one too : but , i shal manifest shortly from the very words of the author peter lombard , on which his plain demonstration relies , that 't is either a plain mistake or plain abuse of him ; nay argues the direct contrary to what the dissuader product it for . some consequences also he deduces ad hominem against diverse points of our faith , built on our own concessions or allow'd truths taken from the fathers ; by which he attempts to overthrow it : but these consequences are so strangely inconsequent , and those tenets he would counterpose so far from contradictory , that 't is hard to imagin whence his reason took its rise to leap into such remote conclusions . i 'le instance in two , found p. , and . that the conflagration of the last day , and the opinion of some fathers that the souls were detain'd in secret receptacles till the day of judgment , do both destroy intermediate purgatory . which consequences if he will make good , i will vield his whole book to be demonstrative and unanswerable . in a word , all the good reasons he brings , are taken from some of our divines writing against others , and he hath done himself the right to chuse the best ; which levelled against the opinion of a less able divine in stead of a point of faith , must needs bear a very plausible show . . next follows the manner how he manages this matter ; which in the civillest expressions i use i must call so many sleights to delude his reader ; and those so craftily coucht that none but a scholler can discern the snare . the first and fundamental one is his wilfully mis-stating the question all over . as p. . when he confounds the making new symbols or creeds , which signifies the putting together into a profession of faith articles formerly-held ( as did s. athanasius and the nicene council ) with making new articles . all his whole section d. of indulgences , which he makes to signify meerly those which pardons sins or pains after this life ; whereas yet himself confesses p. . that those were not defind by our church . so also his next section of purgatory , by which we mean a penal state for those who die imperfectly contrite , and from which they are deliverable by the prayers of the church militant : instead of which he impugns sometimes material fire , sometimes the duration of it . it were tedious to reckon all his faults in this kind , scarce one point escapes this voluntary misprision ; that is , he scarce discourses steadily ( though perhaps he may glance at it accidentally ) against one point of our faith rightly stated or as taken in the declarative words of our church . now , common honesty telling us that if one be to impugn any mans tenet , the first thing natural method leads him to is to put down that man's very words profest by him to express his tenet , and not what others deem , conceit or talk about the same matter ; my ld. ought in due candour have first produc't the words of the council of trent , and then have leveld his opposition against them : and not have told us what school divines say about the point ; or ( having thus conceald the point it self ) argu'd against some circumstance or manner of it instead of the substance . now this kind of carriage so evidently preternatural , and so constantly us'd , forces me to judge it sprung from voluntary insincerity and not from accident or inadvertency . . his second disingenuity at once evidences and aggravates the former . 't is this , that , when by such a management he hath made the point odious , he uses to bring in our churches tenet in the rear ; and , whereas her speaking abstractedly frees her absolutely from the invidious particularities he would fasten on her faith , he ( as if he had resolv'd to abuse her , right or wrong ) makes that very thing which should clear her tend to disgrace her more : as is seen p. . where he is forc't to confess our church defin'd indulgences onely in general terms ( that is , none of his former discourses so particularizing toucht her or her faith ) and then cries out the council durst not do this nor the other : that is , she durst not do , and consequently did not do , what all his former discourse would persuade the world our church had done : worse then this is his instance p. . where after he had pretended in the whole th . section to impugn purgatory , which he had confounded with school-opinions to p. . with the time of delivery p. . . . with a state of merit or demerit p. . . with his own parenthesisses p. . and told us some stories of revelations and apparitions which seem'd to him most ridiculous ; lastly confounded it with simon magus his opinion , plato's or cicero's conceit , and virgils fiction ; after all this he adds , this doctrin which in all the parts of it is uncertain , and in the late additions to it in rome is certainly false , is yet with all the faults of it past into an article of faith by the council of trent . now these big words all the parts of it , the late additions , all the faults of it , and all these said to be past into an article of faith by the council of trent , would make one think that council had defin'd all that medley he had huddled together , for christian faith ; but looking in the council , not a syllable of any of these is to be found , but barely these few words , that there is a purgatory , and that the souls there detain'd are help't by the prayers of the faithful . where we see but two parts at most , for there are but two propositions in the whole definition : again , the late additions which he sayes are defin'd by the council can be but one at most , that is , the second proposition , that those souls are helpt by the faithfull's prayers ; and lastly , when he sayes this doctrin of purgatory with all its faults is past by the council into an article of faith , the large word all its faults can mean onely the same second proposition ; there being nothing defin'd , besides the very doctrin of purgatory it self , but this . which kind of carriage of his , so sinisterly descanting on the point all along , not pretending to put down our tenet at all till towards the end , then deforming it to be a bundle of god knows how many faults defin'd for faith , putting all these upon the council of trent , and yet avoiding to put down the words of the council at all ( though so few ) lest they should discover he had lavish't out at randome , show evidently the dissuader stands not much upon conscience or sincerity , so he can colour and hide his disingenuities , and he is the greatest master of that craft i ever yet met with . now , to avoid this calumny ( it being frequent in his book ) i discourse thus , points of faith are supreme truth which stand in the abstract , and it is the work of divines not of the church-representative to draw long trains of consequences from them , and dive particularly into the manners how they are to be explicated , or into their extents if it be some power : nor is this particular in the point of indulgences or purgatory , but is found in all the other points of faith , as every learned divine knows very well . again , 't is against the principles of universal & supream government for a church representative defining faith to descend out of its highest sphere and engage in particularities ( especially if they belong not to them , as school-opinions do not ) but onely to order in common , and leave the application of their common orders to those who are to execute , or to inferiour officers ; and , should they engage in particulars which are both below their highest office , and oft-times contingent and uncertain , they would commit the greatest imprudence in the world . since then my ld acknowledges here p. . that the council orders all hard and subtil questions concerning purgatory , all that is suspected to be false , and all that is uncertain , and whatever is curious and superstitious , and for filthy lucre be laid aside , he should have shown that it befitted a council's gravity to descend to particulars , or to define negatively to the school-opinion concerning the churches treasure , and not rather order in common and leave it to inferior officers to execute as circumstances should work upon their prudence : which is , that in opinions which pretend a subordination to and coherence with faith , divines should first clear their incoherence with it ere they engage their authority against them , and then to do it efficaciously being back't with the majesty of the council's orders . my lds words that the fathers of the council set their doctors as well as they can to defend all the new , curious and scandalous questions , and to uphold the gainful trade , is indeed to the purpose , but withal ( by his leave ) an unhandsome and most false calumny against so many persons of honour and quality ; and so invidious a charge , that could he have proov'd it , he had not slubber'd it over so carelesly without offering any proof for it but his bare word ; nor with a sleight proper to himself , immediately after he had directly charged it , have half recanted it with however it be with them : that is , whether they did any such thing or no , as he had so lately and so pressingly challeng'd them to have done . and this i note as a third head of his disingenuity , frequent in his book ; that he brings very good proofs for diverse particulars which concern not our church , but when it comes to the very point and which directly strikes at her , his own bare word , we know , or , it is certain , ( p. . l. . p. . p. . p. . &c. ) is the best argument he produces . . a fourth disingenuity is his perverting wilfully the intention of catholick authours . how he hath dealt with the council of trent in the two late mention'd points of indulgences and purgatory is already shown . in like manner has he treated the expurgatory indies ; for , whereas by the word purgari & emaculari in a citation of his own p. , it is manisest they meant but to amend corruptions of the late by the antient copies , he makes as though out of gripes of conscience ( forsooth ) that the fathers were not right on our side , they had therefore purposely gone about to corrupt the fathers themselves , ( p. . and . ) so to make them on our side because we could not find them so . an attempt impossible to fall into head of any man not stark mad ; for this altering the fathers could not have serv'd our turn unless we had made it known and publish't it ; and , if made publick could not be imagin'd to do the deed neither , for the fraud must needs be made as publick as the book : so that an action thus intended must be a human action without a motive or reason , which is a contradiction . worse is what follows p. , & . but withal the malice of it is more easily discoverable : for 't is evident by the particulars he mentions in those indexes or tables that the printer or correcter who made them was an heretick , and put in those tables what his perversness imagin'd was found in the fathers : whence it was but fit his whole index should be expung'd : not that we fear the fathers , but that we disallow the wicked intentions of the index-maker , who abuses the fathers to injure us . so p. . he would make catholikes themselves dissatisfy'd of the ground of transubstantiation , because they say 't is not express'd in scripture : as if catholiks held that nothing could be of faith but what 's expresly found there ; whereas he well knows they universally teach and hold the contrary . but his abuse of peter lombard p. . & . is very remarkable , though perhaps it might spring out of his little experience in school-divinity . to make transubstantiation seem a novelty he would persuade his reader lombard sayes , he could not tell whether there was any substantial change or no : whereas that authour dist. . brings testimonies of the fathers to prove it , and concludes thence that 't is evident that the substance of bread is converted into christ's body , and the substance of wine into his blood , which is what the council of trent calls transubstantiation . and there ends that distinction ; after which immediately succeeds the th . de modis conversionis , of the manners of this conversion ; and of these he sayes he cannot sufficiently define whether this conversion be formal , or substantial , or of another kind . so that substantial here supposes the conversion of the substance of bread into christes body , and is put by him onely to signify one of the manners of this conversion ; which he explicates to be , sic substantiam converti in substantiam ut haec essentialiter fiat illa , that one substance is so converted into another substance that the one is made essentially the other . whereas others who also hold transubstantiation do yet explicate that conversion by putting the body of christ to succeed under the same accidents in place of the substance of bread annihilated . now this manner of conversion ( calld by him a substantial manner , in opposition to formal , which he makes to be a conversion both of substance and accidents , and not in opposition to the change of one substance into another ) he leaves undefin'd ; but the conversion it self of the substance of bread into the body of christ which is our point , he both defines , hold , proves out of fathers ( disc. . ) and calls them hereticks that deny it : how unfortunate is my l. to quote an authour as not holding transubstantiation , then to call that citation a plain demonstration that it was not known in his dayes ; whereas he both professes to hold it , and , by alledging fathers for it , evidences he holds it was held anciently ; and , lastly , gives my l. such hard language for not holding it himself . whether it be likely my l. should light by some accident in reading peter lombard onely on the th . dist. and never read or light on the end of the th . let indifferent men judge . i onely desire the reader to observe how ill my l. comes of with his plain demonstration , and to remark that he ever succeeds worst when he most ayms at a good and solid proof ; the reason of which is because truth being invincible , the neerer one closes to grapple with her the worse still he is foil'd . those few instances may suffice for the th . kind of the dissuaders disingenuities , which is to pervert the intentions of his authours ; of which sort , were it worth the pains , i would undertake to show neer an hundred in my lds. dissuasive . this piece of art being now so customary to him that 't is even grown into a second nature . . his fifth kind of disingenuity is a most wilful one and most frequent too , for it takes up far the better half his book . 't is this that he rakes up together all the less solid or ill opinions and cases ( and sometimes deforms the good ones ) of some private writers in the church which he will needs lay upon the church her self as mistress of our faith. nay , so strangely unjust he is in this particular , that whereas it evidently clears our faith , disengages the church , and shows it but opinion when other catholick doctors uncontrolledly write against such an opinion or explication , himself often alledges that very thing which should clear the church , and and makes use of it to her farther disgrace ; first , making the school and church , private opinions , or explications and faith all one ; and , at next , that the difference amongst such opiners and explicaters argues our difference in faith ; how strange a malice is this ! was there ever any time since the apostles in which there were not in the church diverse persons and even some governours bad in their lives , and also erroneous in their opinions , when the abstractedness of christian faith restrain'd not their understandings from descending to particulars nor secur'd them in such discourses depending much upon human sciences ? do not the best champions of protestants object to the ancient fathers themselves such errors in opinions ? yet no ancient heretick was ever so weak as to make that an argument against the church of those times . did not many protestant writers holdmany roman-catholick tenets , as may be seen at large in the protestants apology ? yet no catholick in his wits thought therefore the church of england her self was roman-catholick , i have heard that one of their chief ecclesiastical officers , namely bishop bilson , writ a book purposely to justify the hollanders rebellion against the king of spain , maintaining that subjects might in some cases rise against their soveraigns and turn them out of their government ? and yet catholicks are far from that peevishness to esteem the protestants disloyal in their principles but honour them highly for the contrary virtue , even though they are pleased to permit us their fellow-sufferers for the same loyal cause , to be abused and branded publickly for traytors by every disloyal scribbler . and , to come neerer home , did not my l. himself formerly write some strange opinions , ( i need not name them ) yet no catholick was ever so absurd as to charge his church with those tenets . but , which is yet far worse , he imputes to the catholick church such licentious cases , which not onely private authours may and do freely contradict but even mulritudes of church-officers , namely almost all the bishops in france in diocesan synods , nay the head of the church himself has disapproov'd in condemning the apology writ for them . yet , for all this , all must be our churches fault whether she will or no ; and our doctrin , though she condemns it . was ever such a disingenuous writer heard of ! but what aggravates most the case is , neither the church of england nor the arch-bishop of canterbury , nor any officer or bishop of hers that we heard of did ever in any solemn act blemish those authours cited in the protestants apology by condemning their books , nor yet those writ by the dissuader , though they judg'd them amiss ; but , on the contrary his person is advanc't and chosen for their champion ; and yet our writers are soberer & more candid than to impute to their church any of these not-yet-disavow'd faults , whereas my ld. ( for want of better proofs ) will needs clap upon our church any misreasonings of private men , though our chief church governour and many inferiour ones have discountenanc't and blemish't them . nor is it onely every defect human nature is liable to in reasoning or acting which must be made our churches crimes , but every unfavorable circumstance man's nature can light into , and their defective effects are all made by the dissuader's logick to spring from meer popery ; nay the very national rudeness of his wild irish is ( in his preface ) confounded by his carriage with our churches doctrin ; and the inability of their teachers with much rhetorick complained of , and charactered to be popery , when himself enjoyes the revenue which should educate them better and encourage them . against this kind of unreasonable procedure in the dissuader , i levelled those corollaries from corol. . to . . which i intreat my reader to review and him to consider particularly . in the mean time i would ask him on this occasion a few short questions . may not any one remain a catholick , and never hold or practice these cases and opinions ? do not catholicks impugn them as much as protestants ? does he find any of those opinions or cases in our catechisms , or any command of our church to hold or act them , nay even in that most common point of extending indulgences to the next world ; but they who will use them , may , who will not , need not ? how then does he hope to dissuade from catholick religion , by impugning that which touches not that religion nor concerns any ones being of it ? and why does not he rather fear all sober men will see his aym by this declamatory kind of opposition to endeavour to gain credit as a great anti-papist , and not to convince solidly his readers , whose experience ( if they know any thing ) enables them to give a ready and satisfactory answer in their own thoughts to all those questions i have now ask't , and so , to confute neer three parts of his book . he saw it himself , and though he carries it on all along as if he were willing all should be thought the doctrin of our church or faith , yet , fearing the calumny is too manifest to be cloak't , he provides excuses and evasions before hand , in his title ( p. . ) saying , the church of rome , as it is at this day disorder'd , teaches doctrines and uses practices which are in themselves or in their immediate consequences direct impieties , &c. so that he speaks of our church precisely as having some disorders in her , and that they lead to ill onely by consequences drawn from such disorderly tenets ; and who 's the drawer of these consequences ? himself . but , grant his position that there are disorders in the church ( i mean not in faith , held universally and obligatorily , but in unobligatory opinions and practices ) i ask does he think there was ever any time in which there were not some disorders in the church , or ever will be while original corruption lasts ? does he 〈◊〉 the very time of the apostles was exempt from such frailty ; or that s. paul complain'd for nothing of the pastors in those primitive and purest times ( phil. . v. . ) that omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt non quae sunt jesu christi ! again , thinks he it any wonder that a disorder'd tenet or a falshood in a point belonging to manners is apt to lead by consequence to ill actions ; none doubting but that as virtue is the connatural effect of truth , so is vice of falshood . what hath he got then by this kind of proceeding , taking up better half his book ? onely this , he hath proov'd there is original sin in the world , and so it's effects , ignorance and interest ; again , let him consider how disputative an age this last century has been , and what infinit multitudes of writers concerning opinionative points of all sorts have been in our church , how voluminous , how descending to particulars , or cases , and this both in school-divinity , morals and canon-law ; and then let him speak seriously whether he can conceive it possible in human nature , there should not be much contingency in such an universality depending on their private reasons ; whereas scarce two men debating the same point particularly , can light into the self-same consequences , but differ in their deductions . thinks he it possible many should not be ignorant and so miscarry casually , many passionate and incline to some tenets because sutable to their humour ; many conceited of their new inventions , and thence , judging their consequence to be connected with the point of faith , cry it up to be de side in their opinion , and alledge that , denying this , you by consequence deny faith ? this being so , nay impossible to be otherwise , and every reader that sees the dissuader's unreasonableness against us easily judging he would pick out the worst instances he could find in that infinity of authours , and ( the very complexion of his style being wholly invidious ) expose them to shame with all the most disgraceful rhetorick so great a wit as his heighten'd by that bitterest of passions could deliver ; he will easily be able to make an estimate what he may judge of my ld's performance in this kinde . . but now whates all this to to our church ? for his title p. . tells us 't is the church of rome which teaches such doctrins and uses such practices , &c. the notion of church , as one would conceive , is terminated and bounded precisely within the limits of its definition , a body of the faithful ; and logick tells every one who understands it , that , since we work by abstracted notions , or conceive a thing now thus , now otherwise , we must not confound those notions but hold strictly to the formal meaning of the word which expresses the thing we undertake for . we are then to expect in honesty , that , since the dissuader charges all those doctrins and practices on our church , all his testimonies to fasten them on her should be of our churches words , or expressions of the churches faith ; we need not doubt then but they will all be definitions of general councils . let the margent inform us . the first citation is of navarr's enchiridion , a private casuist . the d. of reginaldus , another casuist . the d , and th , of sotus and medina , two other school-divines . then comes in reginaldus again , & then sotus again ; & in this tenour he proceeds for pages ; that is from p. , to p. . not quoting the council of trent past , or . times ( but once , as i remember , the words of that council ) and as oft abusing it by his strange misconstructions . . for instance take his first quotation of that council p. ; which i the more insist on , because on that occasion i shall lay open his crafty and voluntary defiling every point he touches with most abominable misrepresentations , and ●hose vizarded with an outward form of holiness and such devout expressions as a saint from heaven would scarce 〈◊〉 , lest prudent men should think it too much ; which i intended for a sixth head of his disingenuities . after then p. , and . he had made all the most odious cases he could pick out the roman doctrin , because the books of three or four authours perused and allow'd by two or three others as not opposit to faith , ( see coroll . . ) that is , the private reasons of half a dozen divines conceiv'd so , which he amplifies beyond all bounds of moderation , that one would judge a general council or provincial one , at least that many church governours or bishops had recommended those cases to be held and follow'd ; at length he tells you sadly p. . that this , though infinitly intolerable , yet it is but the beginning of sorrows ; then follow the super-infinit sorrows themselves ; the first of which sorrows is the council of trent's doctrin ; and , if it be naught , 't is certainly the chief of them , and so ( had i a word to express it so high which the dissuader's rhetorick would easily reach ) it should be phrased something above super-infinit ; in regard by the sacredness of it's authority it would be a ground and an abetment to all the wicked cases issuing from it . ere i come to examin it i premise this note that such testimouies as this are onely to my ld's purpose if he will argue against our churche● doctrin ; in the success of these then lies the whole trial of our cause . we have seen how he has sped formerly in his plain demonstration , and his onely efficacious testimony of a father ; let 's see how he thrives in this , which we must acknowledge beyond all evasion to express the sence of our church . . his last § . then p. . begins with describing a true and perfect contrition and its sacred recommends as sufficient to blot out sin ; all this is well , nor is there , as far as i know , a catholike in the world that was ever taught otherwise ; what follows ? yet , sayes he , the church of rome does not allow it to be of any value unless it be joyn'd with a desire to confess their sins to a priest , saying , that a man by contrition is not reconcil'd to god without their sacramental or ritual pennance actual or votive . and this is decreed by the council of trent , &c. then comes thundring in a declamation fraught with such invidious yet holy rhetorick that any honest unexamining reader would almost lay his salvation on 't , he had all the reason in the world . which things ( adds he ) besides that is against scripture , & the promises of the gospell , and not onely teaches for doctrins the commandments of men , but evacuates the goodness of god by their traditions , and weakens & discourages the best repentance & prefers repentance towards men before that which the scripture calls repentance towards god , & faith in our lord jesus christ. and there ends his paragraph , in which his passion was in such hast that he forgot to add an also to answer to the word besides . now ld have mercy upon usl what strangely wicked doctrin is this which can occasion such a clutter of devotion and invectiveness jumbled together ! attend reader , and from one instance which i pick't not out purposely , but took the first that my discourse led me to accidentally , learn the nature of all the rest ; for scarce one passage in his whole book is free from this fault . the council sess. . as it is commonly reckon'd , ( not th , as perhaps his printer mistook it ) c. . speaks of contrition ; which it distinguishes into perfect contrition , the same my ld describes ; and declares that it reconciles a man to god before this sacrament ( to wit , of pennance ) be actually received ; and imperfect or attrition , springing from consideration of the vileness of sin , or fear of hell , not from love of god as its motive ; and to this it requires actually the sacrament of pennance , this being properly efficacious to advance by preparations to it beforehand , ( which attrition gives them will to make use of ) and the whole course of exercises in it or belonging to it , that attrition into perfect or properly call d contrition : and ( speaking of the first sort or proper contrition , ) it adds farther , that reconciliation to god is not to be ascrib'd ( ipsi contritioni sine sacramenti voto quod in illa includitur ) to contrition without desire of the sacrament which is included in it ; that is , in contrition . thus the council . i note first , the dissuaders craft in not putting down the words of the council . a practice frequent with him ( as i show'd before ) and purposely omitted , as appear'd evidently then and will do more now , because not at all favourable to his insincere humour of deforming all he meddles with . next , by this means , he , handling onely perfect contrition , makes our church require actual or votive pennance to its sufficiency ; whereas the council expresly voids any necessity of actual pennance to this or proper contrition , and onely requires it to attrition . ly . he omits the words which is included in it ; which put down had disanull'd all his whole discourse and cleard our church from all his calumnies ; for this shows the councils sence to be that contrition alone , if qualifyed as it ought to be , reconciles to god ; but that to be qualify'd as it ought to be , it includes a purpose or desire of doing other duties incumbent on the sinner by reason of his sin ; and signalizes this particularly of his duty to the church in resolving to come to the sacrament of pennance . let us parallel it . suppose the council had said . true sorrow for sin will save you ; but not , unless you have a will to restore what you have stoln , for otherwise your sorrow is not true , in regard true sorrow for sin includes a will to rectify what sin had disordered . where 's now the occasion of my lds. ranting declamation of the councils going against scripture , and the promises of the gospel , teaching for doctrins the commandments of men , of evacuating the goodness of god by traditions , of weakening and discouraging the best repentance , and of preferring repentance towards men , before that which the scripture calls repentance towards god and faith in our , ld. jesus christ. yet , supposing that sinners are commanded by christs law to give account of their souls to the church and receive their absolution and pennance from her , as well as they are to restore what 's stoln , the case is undeniably parallell . but , since many other duties are included in contrition , as an obligation to restore credit or goods unjustly taken away , to repair temporal damages our neighbours have incurr'd by us , and the spiritual ones of scandal , asking pardon for affrontive injuries , curing our former uncharitableness and wordliness by giving almes , and such like : a purpose of all which , if our contrition be right , ought to be included in it ; 't is worth enquiry why the council particularises this of coming to the sacrament of pennance . and to catholicks who understand the nature of that sacrament , the answer is so easy that 't is needless . for , after the heart is contrite or substantially turn'd , there remains no more to be done but to wash of the tainture of bad inclinations mortal sin uses to leave behind it , and to make satisfaction to our neighbour or the world : wherefore , because the wholsome sacrament of pennance , rightly us'd , is ordain'd and apt of its own nature both to wash away those remaining staines by sorrowful and penal actions enjoyn'd by church disciplin , and also to ty men to the execution of all due satisfaction to the injur'd world ; hence , the heart being truly converted interiorly , this sacrament is the most efficacious means to set all else right , & so to come to it is the onely remaining duty ( as including all else ) and for that reason 't is particularly exprest by the council that true contrition must include a purpose to come to it ; because , if true , it must needs include a desire to take the best means to rectify what 's amiss . and , lest a sinner should be apt to conciet and say within himself thus , i am truly sorry for my offending god , there is then no more to be thought on ; the council most prudently declares that , that will not do unless they desire likewise to set right what they had disorder'd , of which the church is to be the judge and careful overseer , and so 't is their duty to the church to let her take cognizance of it . the dissuader did ill then to phrase it ritual pennante , as if onely a dry ceremony had been enjoyn'd by the council ere the soul could be reeoncild to god , whereas 't is a sacrament of its own nature executively satisfactory of all the kinds of duties , and efficaciously reparative of all the disorders which are the arrears and effects of a sinful action : but he did worse to omit the councils words , and so leave out totally quod in illâ includitur , which candidly put in had made all his process to no purpose : but worst of all , when he could not but see all this , to inveigh against so innocent , so rational , charitable and wise proceedure of this grave and venerable council with the harshest expressions that ever were clad in holy language . and , it were good my ld. who is so high against our casuists , would let us know by what cases he guides himself in his whole book , where he sprinkles scripture holy-water all over as if every thing were a devil he met with , and here particularly , in wilfully publickly and causlesly calumniating not a private person , but an whole council consisting of so great a multitude of the most grave , most venerable , and most sacred personages in the whole christian world. . a seventh kind of his disingenuities is his exaggerating and magnifying manner of expression ; by virtue of which he can make any mote seem a beam ; and though the fault would ly in a very small room , perhaps require none at all , yet , as men blow up bladders with wind , he can so swell and puff it up by plying it with his aiery rhetorick , that it looks as big as a mountain ; whereas come neer it , examin and grasp it , that will not now fill your hand which before took up the whole prospect of your eye . he can also by placing things in false lights make even the greatest virtue seem a vice , and then make that new-created vice a monstrous one ; both which were visibly discovered in our last instance out of the council of trent . . i pass by many other of his petty disingenuities ; as his interposing parenthesisses of his own ; speaking most confidently where he has least ground , so to make up the want of this with abundance of the other . his confounding good cases with bad ; some private bigotteries with acts of true piety ; books approved by the church with those of private authours ; understanding spiritual things grosly and materially ; as in his whole business of exorcisms : in which , were i in as merry an humour as his lp. is there , i could make his discourse there far more ridiculous than he makes any thing found in the churches ritual , which book we are onely to defend or he to object , if he would deal candidly . himself confesses the inquisition of spain corrected one of those books , he names , and i know no obligation any man has either to use or abet the others ; and then to what purpose were they brought against the church ? . the last greatest and most notorious disingenuity is his most unworthy and most intolerable calumny against all catholicks that they are traytors , and unfit for human society . he names not these words but that he endeavours to have the thing beleeved by his readers appears thus : the title of his third chapter , p. . is this : the church of rome . teaches doctrins which in many things are destructive of christian society in general , and of monarchy in special . we see here what he charges on our church : and , since 't is known all catholicks not onely are oblig'd to hold , but to hold as sacred and of faith what the church of rome teaches , nay , to be ready to dy for that faith , 't is plain his endeavours are to make us pass in the opinion of his readers for persons who hold treason and villany lawful , nay sacred , and that we are ready to dy and hope to be sav'd by such damnable points of faith. nor will his false-hearted pretence , p. . exempt any , while 't is known that nothing is more deeply rooted in our hearts than our obligation to beleeve as the church beleeves and teaches . in particular he assures his reader , p. . that , no contracts , leagues , societies , promises , vows or oaths , are sufficiēnt security to him that deals with one of the church of rome : and p. . that the doctrins of our church are great enemis to the dignity and security , to the powers and lives of princes . 't is not fit we should use here the language proper to express what 's the due return and genuin brand for so malicious a calumny : but perhaps it were not unfit nor injuring the modesty of subjects humbly to beg protection for our innocence against the virulent tongues and pens of our uncharitable accusers ; whom neither reason nor experience will restrain from going on still to stigmatize us all with the faults of a few rash ( or sometimes misconstru'd ) writers . but when writes the dissuader this ? after such fresh testimonies of the unanimous loyalty of catholicks to his sacred majesty and his royal father , spending their lives and fortunes in his service . and against whom ? against a multitude in which are found very many noble and honourable personages , and many thousands of others very considerable and remarkable for their fidelity . how strange a wickedness is it then to calumniate so highly and so publickly so many eminently deserving and honourable subjects of his majesty ! now , the mischiefs naturally apt to flow from such a calumny are these . it breeds ill correspondence between our fellow-subjects and us , and makes us ill look't upon by them , which violates civil unity so necessary for the peace and strength of a kingdome ; especially being between those two parties who have ever been so friendly and brotherly in their affection and allegiance to their prince , and fellow-acters and sufferers for his cause ; it discourages loyalty to see that after such best testimonies of it we are not even able to obtain a bare acknowledgment that we are loyal , but that it shall still be lawful for any one at pleasure to brand us for traytors , and this publickly in print in the face of all england ? and lastly ( were not our known fidelity too strong an antidote for his malice ) it tends to breed a conceit in our governours that we are not to be endur'd in any state , and onely fit to be ruin'd and extirpated ; not to mention the breach of charity ensuing such unworthy criminations , which must needs breed very many feuds , and unneighbourliness between private persons all over england and ireland : nor will there be ever any hearty union in church or state , till thatwicked uncharitableness of affixing upon a whole party the faults of some few be totally laid aside . . now on what does my ld ground these horrid charges against our church , or how proceeds he to make them good ? after the old fashion , of quoting the private opinions of a few authours , viz. emonerius , father barnes , emmanuel sà , tolet , vasquez , navar , &c. now my ld supposes his . readers are to be credulous silly asses , and to believe that these private casuists or discoursers are the mouth of our church ; that she by them declares what we are to believe ; that such private discourses are so many definitions of our churches doctrin or faith : that these discourses are held by our church to be constant and certain ( for such all catholicks hold her doctrin or faith to be ) whereas every child knows these and such like opinions are controllable & changeable as the moon ; that they were taught by christ and his apostles , whereas any one may and himself does quote who first invented them : that they who deny or impugn them are hereticks , whereas yet others do and any one may write against them at pleasure . lastly , that these points are all divine revelations , whereas the very nature of the thing shows and himself confesses they are all human deductions . these madnesses which are my ld's first principles in this whole chapter and the chapter foregoing , that is , in better half his book , if his reader will be such a bedlam as to yield to , then all his discourse is as sure as gospel ; but if not , then 't is evident such pretences are flat and most unconscionable calumnies against our church . little better is his quoting two or three particular acts of some popes : does he think the words church and pope are equivalent , or that the word particular act signifies doctrin or faith that he should think three or four acts all in several kinds , that is , one in each kind , argue the churches doctrin or faith in those points . this in case he deals truly with those popes ; but i know he is apt to deform all he meets with , and i see he does that of pope clement p. . which makes me suspect the rest . that pope extinguish't the templars ; and consest that de jure he could not do it , but that he did it ex plenitudine potestatis . here my ld so interprets de jure that he makes the pope disown any justice in doing it , that is own an injustice in doing it , for that 's my ld's intention in wresting those words ; which being impossible to conceive the pope should prosess of himself , 't is clear he meant by de jure the same we mean by the words [ by law ] that is , that there was no positive law of the church impowering him to dissolve them , yet , the exigency requiring it , his office might give him a natural right to do it ; by which if governours might not act in great emergencies , but must be ty'd to let all go wrong because it happens no provision is made against it in any written law ; all churches , kingdomes , cities , nay families would be at the same loss the spanish master was at , who hiring a proud servant and agreeing with him that he should do nothing but what was concluded between them and writ down , a while after falling in the dirt under his horse , and calling to his man to help him out , he told him he would first consult his written paper whether that were put down there or no ; where not finding it , he let his master ly . but the case of pope clement is far from the envy he would asperse it with : for why may not the pope dissolve the templars by his power without law , whereas christian princes and the church universally complain'd of them , and mov'd him to it , and so their consent went accompany'd with this action of their chief governour . . he hath onely two passages in that whole chapter which even seem to concern our church . one of the council of trent concerning a point of practice put down by him thus , p. , . that if a man have promist to a woman to marry her , and is betroth'd to her and hath sworn it , yet if he will before the consunimation enter into a monastery , his oath shall not bind him , his promise is null , but his second promise that shall stand , and he that denies this is accurst by the council of trent . thus my ld. ; where he tautologizes and layes it out at large to amplify it the more , adds the words hath sworn it , not found in the council , but put in by himself because he was resolvd we should be perjur'd , and avoids , ( as was his frequent custome ) to put down the councils own words in a distinct letter ; so that his additions , may be safer and in more hope to escape too open shame . but to the point , i ask my ld. as a divine ; does not he hold heaven our last end , consequently that all our actions are to be steps towards it , consequently that there can be no ty to embrace any state of life in case it appear upon mature consideration of circumstances highly unapt and dangerous to the attainment of bliss ? i ask again ; would not my ld. himself renounce actually living with a wife if he in his conscience judg'd so , but keep his promise let his salvation go whether it would ? if he sees this plainly , then the difficulty consists not in breaking a promise made to a temporal end , subordinate to our spiritual last end for our last ends sake , but in this whether such a case can be put . i propose him one ; may not a man come to see by better knowledge of his spouses humour , her newly-discover'd dishonesty , the inconveniences he shall incur by her ill-condition'd friends , and many such like , that such a cohabitation tends to make his whole life a hell upon earth ; which case is very possible and sometimes happens , to the eternal and temporal ruin of both parties , and the infinit scandal to the world ? in this case does he not think in his conscience it had been better in all respects they had been parted ere matrimony had been consummated ? if then the man or woman to redeem their rashness in so lightly promising chose to debar themselves from all future hopes of marriage , and quite forsake the world to serve god in a religious life , it at once clears the reality of the inconvenience , and the persons intentions , and satisfies temporal expectations , nay ennobles in the conceit of good christians the attempt by the knowledge , as far as any human action can give of any intention , that the person had no base end in his action , but that which is infinitly best . oh , but this will break all contracts , leagues , vows , &c. let not my ld. fear , there is too much original sin in the world , for very many to run rather to a severe life in a monastery , and there to make vows of chastity than to go to bed with their brides . by this may be judg'd how my ld. jumbles some good cases with other bad ones , and makes all equally naught , did my designe of an appendix give me leave to trace him through them all . . his next passage seeming to touch our church is alledg'd , p. . thus it is affirm'd and was practic 't by a whole council of bishops at constance , that faith is not to be kept with hereticks , &c. this is something now , being the affirmation ( i suppose he means or would be thought to mean definition ) and practice of an approv'd general council . attend now , reader , for here the dissuader once or twice at least in a whole chapter ayms to speak to the purpose . but first , what a favour is this of my lds. not to put down the words of the council where it affirms this ? for this had made the case plain and the fault unavoidable . next , ( which is yet a greater kindness ) he not so much as cites the place in which this affirmation is found ; and to disabuse the reader , i assure him faithfully there is no such place or words found in the council . to say that safe conduct given by lay men absolv'd from the secular court but not from the ecclesiastical , is quite another thing from his invidious proposition , and withal very rational ; for why should it , since both their cauies and laws are distinct ? whereas to violate faith given , and upon this score because the party to whom i gave it is an heretick , which my ld. falsely charges , is most unmanly , nay diabolical . yet , though it lay in the churches power to proceed juridically her way , yet it lay in the emperours to hinder or differ the execution if any publick concern made it prudent . but what i stand upon ( with leave of others ) is that no safe conduct was promist them to return , but onely to appear and have a fair trial . my reason is , because in the safe conduct given by the council to hierom , ( and we may with reason conceive it was equivalently given to both ) we find it given with this conditional clause , justice being still preserv'd ; also , appear according to the tenor of thy foresaid writing to answer to those things which one or more will object to thee in the cause of faith , that thou mayst receive and perform in all things the accomplishment of justice . which implies that he was to expect justice from the council if he clear'd not himself . again , a disciple of husse's who writ his tryal and death , and professes himself as much verst in the particulars as his senses could make him , complaines indeed of safe conduct given by sigismund in writing of coming and returning ; yet , putting down the very form of safe conduct , no such thing as returning is found in it . nor did hus in all his defence complain of safe conduct violated , except when he was first bound , which was upon occasion of his flying and being brought back . nay , the emperour alwayes threatned hus that he had rather burn an obstinate heretick than defend him . in a word , all this clamour is built on the testimony of the hussites , and an imperfect relation writ in dutch by an unlearned catholick , which was greedily catcht at by such as leapt for joy to find any licks thing to bespatter the church with , and startling some unattentive and too credulous catholikes , drive them , zealous of defending the council , to an unwarrantable position ; which tenet and its practice my ld. himself knows well the generality of catholikes hate and detest as much as himself . eighth way . . the eighth and last way is to pick out as well as i can those propositions or principles my ld relies on , and show their weakness ; which is sufficiently performed by singling them out , and then naming them principles , they are so quite unlike what they 're call'd . now his principles he layes in his first section : i mean , his main and fundamental propositions , which because he relies on , yet never proves , we are from his carriage to take for principles and self evident to him , though he himself calls them not so ; for 't is dangerous to them who have not truth on their side even to mention the word principle , evidence or demonstration . his first concerning scripture i shall speak to anon . a second seems to be this p. . we all acknowledge that the whole church of god kept the faith entire and transmitted faithfully to the after-ages the whole faith ; that is , to the ages next after the apostles , as he expresses a little before , call'd by him p. . the first and best antiquily , and signify'd to mean the first three ages . now the positive part of this principle is good and assertive of tradition , but withall unapt to stead him . the negative part of it , or that the third age transmitted it not to the fourth , and so forwards , imply'd in his discourse , would onely stead him ; but 't is left unproov'd , and so is a voluntary assertion , and strangely ridiculous . for , if the first two ages kept the faith entire and transmitted it to the third , 't is evident the third was able to transmit it to the fourth , and so forwards ; wherefore , it being evident from the concern of the thing it was also willing to do so , 't is demonstrable it did so . this principle then on which he so much builds is either not for him , or else highly against him . . another main and fundamental proposition ( or principle ) is found p. . and as the former concern'd the tradition of the church , so this and the three following ones concern the authorities of fathers . the present roman doctrins ( saith he ) which are in difference were invisible and unbeard of in the first and best antiquity . that is , no heretick had arisen in those dayes ( or in the first three hundred years ) denying those points , and so the fathers set not themselves to write expresly for them , but occasionally onely ; and yet , by his leave , our controv●●●●●● are frequent in citing them for diverse points , especially for the ground of our faith , the churches voice or tradition , to the utter overthrow of the protestant cause . so far this improov'd and main position , disannulling all use of the fathers of the first years in our controversies , is from not needing proof or being self evident . . it may be his respect and value for the fathers of the next ages will make amends for this rashness . he tells us immediately after , that in the succeeding ages , secular interest did more prevail , and the writings of the fathers were vast and voluminous , full of controversy and ambiguous sences fitted to their own times and questions , full of proper opinions , and such variety of sayings , that both sides eternally and inconfutably shall bring sayings for themselves respectively . now , if they be so qualify'd that both sides may eternally dispute out of them , and neither be ever able to confute the other or conclude , then let him speak out and say all the fathers after the first years are not worth a straw in order to decision or controversy ; nor yet the fathers of the first years because they spoke not of our points in difference ; and so there is a fair end of all the fathers and of his own dissuasive too for that part which relies on them , which looks like the most authoritative piece of it . the reader will easily judge now whether we ( as he charges us , p. . ) have many gripes of conscience concerning the fathers that they are not right on our side , or the dissuader . our constant and avow'd doctrin is ( that the testimony of fathers speaking of them properly as such , is iufallible ; that in two cases they speak as fathers ; that is , when they declare it the doctrin of the present church of their time , or when they write against any man as an heretick or his tenet as heresy . some complexions of circumstances also may be found out by much reading and comparing several considerations which make it evident they speak as witnesses ; though it be more laborious and tedious to compass a satisfaction this way . whereas ( as appears by our dissuader ) the protestants neither acknowledge them infallible , nor indeed useful . and this is my ld's fourth principle , which with the former destroyes the efficaciousness of all the fathers , & invalidates all that part of his own book which should seem weightiest . . notwithstanding the two former principles to invalidate the fathers , it may still be said by the catholicks in behalf of their validity ( as was by me now ) that the sayings of fathers as witnesses are convictive ; and therefore it should seem sit my ld did lay another principle to provide against that . he is not unmindful of it , but hath taken order about it . for , though p. . he tells us the fathers are good testimony of the doctrin deliver'd from their forefathers down to them of what the church esteem'd the way of salvation ; yet that is to be understood according to the rule premised p. . thus . things being thus it will be impossible for them ( the catholicks ) to conclude from the sayings of a number of fathers that the doctrin they would prove thence was the catholick doctrin of the church , because any number that is less than all does not proove a catholik consent . so that unless each single father affirm each single point to be of faith or the doctrin of the catholick church ( which , morally speaking ; is impossible to happen ) it follows by his words that 't is impossible to conclude thence the catholick doctrin of the church ; which amounts to this , that 't is impossible to conclude any thing in controversy from the fathers even taken as witnesses . and this is his fifth principle . a strange conceit , that it should be impossible to know the consent of all england in a matter of fact , ( for example , the late war ) without speaking with each single man in the whole nation . yet this is his discourse when he sayes that no number less than all can prove a catholick consent . . yet some use certainly he allows of the fathers for all this , else why does he quote them . yes , and the principle ( which i reckon his sixth , ) by virtue of which he enforces them is this , p. . the clear saying of one or two of those fathers truely alledg'd by us to the contrary will certainly prove that what many of them ( suppose it ) do affirm , and which but two or three as good catholicks do deny , was not then a matter of faith or a doctrin of the church . i wish my ld. had been so ingenuous as to have made use of this principle when he charg'd our church it self with the mistakes of a few writers contradicted , not by one or two , but sometimes by a whole nation . but this principle shows 't was not reason in him but will and interest which made him so hot . as for his principle it self , it subsists not at all . for is it not known that more than one or two , that is s. cyprian and the african fathers deny'd the baptism of hereticks valid , yet the contrary was notwithstanding found and defin'd to be faith and the sence of the church . let him consider how perfectly he engages himself in the very sphere of contingency and recedes from universality , the sphere of certainty , when he comes to rely on one or two ; unless he can show those one or two strangely supported and upheld by universal nature or concurring circumstances . 't is possible even one or two lawyers may hap to be ignorant of two or three acts of parliament . but , my ld is still the best confuter of himself , as appears lately by this present principle apply'd to his former carriage against our church ; to himself then let him answer . i conceive that if one or two's ( not denying it to be of faith or affirming expresly 't is not-of-faith , he engages not so far ; but ) bare denying a point , argues what many do affirm , to be not-of-faith ; à fortiori , one or two's affirming positively that to be of faith and the doctrin of the catholick church which many others barely deny , argues 't is of faith : 't was of faith then what gennadius cited by himself , p. . affirms , that after christs ascension the souls of all saints go from the body to christ ; this being so , let him reflect what himself asserts , p. . that justin mariyr , tertullian , victorinus martyr , prudentius , s. chrysostom , arethas , euthimius , and s. bernard affirm none go to heaven till the last day . either then gennadius his testimony delivering the doctrin of the catholick church is inefficacious , and yet 't is incomparably the best , nay the onely efficacious one in my lds. whole book , or else according to him many fathers ( and not one or two onely ) denying a point is no argument but that point may be of faith. whether all those fathers held so or no is another question and requires a longer discussion . . fathers then are useless to the dissuader , as having according to him no virtue at all of setling the understanding ; yet he must make a show of them , else all 's lost ; and so he tells his readers , p. . as if all were well , two things , both very remarkable . the one , that , notwithstanding , in the prime and purest antiquity the protestants are indubitably more than conquerours in the fathers . a high expression ! but , compar'd with what he sayes ; p. . that in those times our present differences were unheard-of , it signifies that they miraculously more then conquer , where ( if his words be true ) no mortals else could either conquer or even attacque for how should one fight against such points in difference from those fathers who never heard of those points ! the other is , that even in the fathers of the succeeding ages the protestants have the advantage both numero , pondere & mensurà , in number weight and measure ; which , joyn'd to his words at the bottome of p. . that each side may eternally and inconfutably bring sayings for themselves out of those fathers , which signifies that 't is to no end or purpose to alledge them , amounts very fairly to this , that he brags protestants have a far greater number of citations which are to no purpose than catholicks have ; that those citations which have no possible force of concluding or no weight at all , do weigh more strongly for them than for us ; and , lastly , that they have a greater measure than we of proofs not worth a rush with which they can bubble up their books to a voluminous bigness . and we willingly yield them the honour of having a very great advantage in all three , in case they be such as his own words qualifie them , to wit that each side may eternally and inconfutably alledge them . . we come now to his main and most fundamental and ( in comparison ) his onely principle , p. . laid out thus . we do wholly rely upon scriptures as the foundation and final resort of all our persuasions , but we also admit the fathers , &c. to finish our discourse about the fathers will make way to the scripture . what means admitting as contradistinguisht to relying on ? not , relying on ; that 's certain , for 't is contradistinguisht to it ; and yet to alledge any thing for a proof as they do fathers , and not to rely on it , is to confess plainly ( for truth will out ) that they alledge them meerly for a show . he sayes they admit them as admirable helps for the understanding the scriptures and good testimony of the doctrin deliver'd from their forefathers . have a care my ld. : this supposes the certainty of tradition ; for , if there be no certainty of delivery , there is no doctrin delivered , nor consequently any thing for them to testify ; and so the words good testimony ( unless our ground of continual tradition stands ) mean directly that they are good for nothing , as your former discourses or principles made them . but i ask , is their interpretation of scripture or testimony certain ? if not , why should they even be admitted ? or how can vncertain interpreters and witnessers be admirable helps to interpret right and good testimony ? i fear my ld. can onely mean they are admirable helps as dictionaries and books of criticisms are to assist his human skill about the outward letter . ( which is a rare office for a father ) and not to give him the inward sence of it or the deliver'd doctrin of the catholick church ; for , unless all conspire to speak to the same point , if any one be silent concerning it , it argues not ( according to my ld. p. . ) a catholick consent , and so is far beneath an admirable help . and this is what we reprehend exceedingly in the protestants , that they love to talk gaily in common of any sacred or grave authority for an affected form or show ; but not at all value the virtue or power of such an authority , not judge interiorly they have any worth valuing . they would credit themselves by pretending fathers , yet at the same time lay wayes to elude them at pleasure ; or ( which is their very temper , springing from their renouncing living and determinate sence , and adhering to dead unsenc't words ) they study to speak indeterminately and confusedly , not particularly and closely . . do i wrong them ? let my ld. clear me ; his first principle is by him exprest to be the scripture : and , on this expression he so strongly builds that p. , . he concludes thence , and certainly too , thus . the religion of our church ( sayes he ) is therefore certainly primitive and apostolick , because it teaches us to believe the whole scriptures of the old and new testament , and nothing else as matter of faith. what mean the word scriptures ? any determinate sence of it , or the dead characters ? alas , their church is far from teaching them the first , or from having grounds to own such a pretence ; but puts the book in their hands and bids them find the sence of it or their faith , for there is their rule . 't is the bare letter then unsenc't he means by the word scriptures , and so he must say 't is the outward cuaracters his church teaches us to believe , and nothing else as matter of faith ; that is , their whole faith has for its object , ink thus figur'd in a book ; a worthy argument to proove their church is certainly primitive and apostolick : whereas itis known , faith was before those characters ; and besides , if this be to be apostolical , we owe nothing to the other apostles for our faith , but onely to those six who writ . but we mistake him , he means neither sence of the word scripture , and hates these distinctionswith all his heart which would oblige him to either . he meant to talk of scripture indeterminately and confusedly , which might make a fine show , and yet expose him to no inconvenience by giving any particular account of his meaning . his inference from this his first principle , being an immediate one , will utterly overthrow the papists without doubt ; therefore ( saith he p. . ) unless there can be new scriptures we can have no new matter of belief , no new articles of faith. no my ld : yes , as long as by scriptures you mean no determinate sence of scriptures , but the bare letter onely , whose sence is fetch 't out by interpretations , and these ( as we experience ) depend on menes private judgments and fancies ; if menes fancies may vary every hour , you may have diverse interpretations every hour , and so new articles of faith every hour . is not this a mad kind of arguing , to conclude as absolute an unerrableness in faith , as if they had not onely a determinate principle but even as self-evident and unmistakable as the first principle in metaphysicks to guid themselves by , whereas our daily eysight and their own sad experience every day teaches us by the practice of this principle , and yet their differing in the sence of scripture in most high and most concerning points , that the speenlation is naught , and the principle it self a false and mis-guiding light. nay i doubt my ld. himself has no hearty value for this his first principle , though he sayes he wholly relies on it ; for i never saw protestant book in my life thinner and sleighter in scripture-citations than is his dissuasive : so that if that be his first principle he makes little use of it . . many other propositions or supposals are imply'd in his book to give it force . as that it matters not how a citation is qualify'd so it be but alledg'd . 't is no matter whether the question be rightly stated or no. the tenets of our church are not to be taken from the use of definitions found in approved councils , speaking abstractedly , but from the particular explications of some divines . every foppery is a proper effect of the churches doctrin . points of faith ought to be comprehensible to reason , and spiritual things sutable to fancy . the act of an inquisition , sayings of a few divines or casuists are all catholik faith and the doctrin of the church . that is rationally dissuasive which is confessedly uncertain . no answer was ever given to the citations or reasons produc't in the dissuasive . talking soberly and piously about a point is oftentimes as good as prooving it . that t is self-evident scripture's letter can bear but one interpretation as wrought upon by human skills . these and multitudes of such like , though not exprest yet run imply'd in his carriage all along this book , and suppos'd true to give it any force ; yet so evidently false and weak , that to pull them out thence and make them show their heads , is enough to confute them . i conclude , and charge the dissuader that he not onely hath never a principle for his dissuasive to subsist by , but farther , that 't is impossible but himself should know in his own conseience that he has none , nay more that the protestant cause ( and the same i say of all out of the church ) can have none . the first part of my charge i have manifoldly prooved in this present appendix ; the other part of it which charges him with consciousness of having no grounds , hath two branches ; and ; for the former of those i alledge that the wayes he takes all along to manage his dissuasive , are so evidently studious , so industrious , so designed and perfectly artificial , that , though one who is guided on in a natural way is oftentimes not aware of his thoughts or their method till he comes to reflect , yet 't is impossible he should not be aware of his . which he postures with such exquisit craft and such multitudes of preternatural sleights to render his discourse plausible . for the later of those branches namely , that he cannot but know the protestant cause can have no principles , to make it evident i discourse thus ad hominem , what i have prov'd in sure-footing out of the nature of the thing . 't is their most constant and avow'd profession , and his p. . that they do wholly rely upon scripture as the foundation and final resort of all their persuasions . this being so , fathers and councils are not held at all by them , but as far as they are agreeable to scriptures ; that is , their testimony has no basis of certainty from themselves or of their own , but what they participate from scripture . wherefore either they are no principles , or else subordinate ones to their first principle , scripture . unless then it be certain or deserve the name of a principle , they can never be held by protestants such , nor consequently can merit the name of principles ( even subordinate ones ) because then pretended first principle from which onely they can derive title to that dignity is , in that case , none it self : to scripture then le ts come . by which word if they agreed to mean any determinate sence of it certainly known to be the true one , their discourse were well-built : but , since their church can own no determinate sence of the scripture deriv'd down from christ and his apostles in antecedency to the scripture's letter , but ( having renounc't that way or tradition ) must say she has it meerly from that letter as yet unsenc't , she must mean that 't is the scripture letter she relies on as the foundation and final resort of all her persuasions , nay for her persuasion that this is the sence of it . since then principles are determinate sences , not characters or sounds , neither is scripture ( as they take the word ) a principle , nor consequently fathers or councils , whose certainty is resolvable into it. they 'l say , that letter is a certain way to arrive at a determinate sence , and consequently that they have determinate sence by means of it . i ask , is the letter alone such ? then , in case it alone be absolutely sufficient to such an effect , it will perform it in every one ; as , if fire be alone sufficient to burn all the world , and so overpower all the resistence of the matter , do but apply it , 't will do that effect or burn it . is there requisit some schollership in the subject scripture's letter is to work upon , or desire to see truth in their will ? then , if this be the onely requisit , it will work its certifying or determining effect upon all schollers and well-meaners ; and so no schollers and well meaners can disagree in the sence of it . the contrary to which all sober men acknowledge , & daily experience teaches us as much as we can be sure of any human action . the like discourse holds whatever requisits they desire ; for still it will follow they must say , that in whomsoever they place that requisit they cannot differ in the since of scripture , which common experience will confute . nor will it avail them to run to fundamentals , unless it be said the trinity is no fundamental , which the dissuader makes the onely one p. . for the socinians deny this , amongst whom 't is a strange immodesty in the protestants to say there is nonc well-meaning , learned or unapply'd to scripture . adding then to this most evident proposition that a cause proper to produce such an effect if we put the patient dispos'd and the application , alwayes produces its effect , on the truth of which all nature depends , adding this , i say , to the obvious and common experience of differers about scriptures sence , in all whom 't is impossible to judge either disposition of the patient or application is wanting , for all read it and strive with all the wit and skill they have to find the sence of it ; it will follow most evidently that the fault is in the agent or cause , that is , that scriptures letter is unsit to certify or bring us to a determinate sence of it : and therefore , since , till we know the sence of that letter 't is to us but meer words , i am forc't by my reason to judge they have no principles ( those being sence ) but that their whole way is wordish ; and , not out of disrespect to them ( for this touches not them more than it does all others who have lest off the way of conveying down determinate sence by living voice and practise , or tradition ) but i am oblig'd by conscience and my duty to my cause to declare that their whole ground of their faith is thus hollow and empty . whence i contest out of the nature of the thing , that their cause can bear no way of sence or principles , but must forcibly be upheld by wordishness ; as by quoting texts without any certain interpreter , citations of fathers not brought to grounds not held by themselves certain , fine scripture phras'd flourishes of piety , and such like , in which the dissuader is excellent ; or else ( if the objecter be very witty and have taken a great deal of pains in the way of scepticism to be too hard for himself ) by bringing all into uncertainty , which is the acutest way of wordishness , and most proper to oppose any discourse that tends to establish and settle , because most opposit to it ; and so i am to expect necessity will force them to take this way when any replies to sure-footing . i know some will expect i should have answer'd the dissuasive particularly ; but i know no reason why i should be sollicitous to stand cutting of each single branch of errour or be careful to hinder their growth , after i have once pluck't the tree that bore them up by the roots . postscript . if my ld. please to reply , ( which i fear will be too troublesome a task , because of the illnaturedness and inflexibleness of principles ) or , if he resolve to write hereaster against our church , his lp . is intreated he would please to go to work like a man ; that is , orderly , not confounding and jumbling all together . let him first define then what makes a thing obligatory to be held by catholiks , a doctrin of our church or point of faith ; then put down the very words of the council in case it be difin'd ; next , acquaint us with the nature of his objections , vouch them conclusive , and let his reader know in what their virtue or force of concluding is plae't , for this will strengthen them exceedingly ; and then let him fall to work when he will. above all i beg of him not to go about to forestall the sincere verdict of reason by corrupting first the will of weak people by pious talk ; but first speak smart and home to their understandings with solid reasons , and then at the end of the book preach as much as he pleases against the wickedness of a point when he hath once demonstrated its falshood . otherwise the sermon so expands and ratifies the proof , and his godly rhetorick so evaporates his reasons , that it reflects no light at all ; and so no mortal eye , though straining its optick nerves , is able to discern it . a letter to dr. casaubon . honoured sir , after i had printed sure-footing , i heard accidentally that you had been pleas'd to take notice of my way and some signal passages in schisms dispatcht . i was glad to hear that so ancient a friend of mine had offer'd me a fair occasion to renew our acquaintance , resolving to take an account of his exceptions , and requite them with a due satisfaction assoon as i could find a season proper . wherefore , when the last sheet of my appendix against the dissuader was under the press , finding both leasure and opportunity to second my intentions , i took your book , perus'd diverse chief passages in it , and particularly what concern'd my self , p. . the first glance of it put me in some wonderment at the difference i found between you in your book and the character of you in my thoughts long ago imprinted there : for in these i found you a solid sober man , a good schollar , as also ingenuous and candid ; but in your book , particularly in those passages , i saw plainly ( and was troubled to see it ) you had either none of those qualities i imagin'd in you , or to a very small degree . but , i began straight to reflect with my self that as , when i was a child , i fancy'd rooms very spacious and streets very long . which , coming to the state of a man , i found very strangely diminisht ; so my riper and more judicious thoughts saw now the measure of your virtues in their true demensions , which my younger and unexperienc't years had so strangely magnify'd and enhanc't . i doubt not but your outward appearance will make it thought by those that know you , i have said too much , let 's see how i can justifie my self . i complain then that your carriage in this one page discovers you at once an absolute stranger to science , and withal very uncivilly injurious to me all along without any imaginable need , ground or the least occasion given . you begin with a mistake of the reason why the rational way explained in rushworth's dialogues was follow'd by me in schism dispatcht , or rather why that way was devised ; and conceive 't is because we despair of maintaining the popes personal infallibility , and think all your own if you disprove this ; so that you strongly apprehend this the basis of all our faith. by which i see opinion and faith is all one with you . deceive not your self nor your readers sir ; our d r● . came and do dispute against personal infallibilities far more strongly than you are even likely ; and if you please to look into our councils you find no news of building faith on any such ground , but onely on tradition . the way i take is the old-and-ever-way of the church ; the farther explication of it is indeed new , not occasion'd by our relinquishing personal infallibility of the pope , ( you shall never show the church ever built her faith on a disputable ground ) but by this occasion . had you look't into things and consider'd the progress of the rational part of the world as well as you pore on books , you would have discern'd that the wits of this last half century have been strangely curious and inquisitive , and straining towards a satisfaction apt to bring all into doubt which they conceiv'd to hinder their way to it . had you reflected on those heroes of such attempts , the noble and learned sr. kenelm digby , des caries , gassendus , harvey , and now the royal society , those living libraries of learning in their several wayes , you would have found that , parallel to them in the matter of controversy were the ld. faukland and mr. chillingworth ; whose acute wits sinding no establishment nor satisfaction in the resolution of our faith as made by some particular divines , nor yet in the grounds of the protestant beleef , endeavour'd to shake the whole fabrick of our faith , and allow but a handsome probability to their own . whence , doubt and inquisitiveness being the parents of satisfaction and evidence , catholick controvertists began to apply themselves more closely and regardfully to look into the ground● of their faith , tradition or universal delivery ; se●tled from the beginning of the church , proceeded upon by councils and all the faithful , insisted on and stuck to by the fathers , especially those ) who were most controversial as athanasius , s. augustin , tertullian , s. hierome , &c. and at large by vincentius lirinensis ; and , to consider how proper causes lay'd in things by the course of god's providence had the virtue to produce the effect of deriving down with infallible certainty christ's doctrin to us . hence sprung our farther explication of this way which so much bewonders you . this is your mistake ; now to your injuries . i quoted rushworth's dialogues and call'd it the rich store-house of motives fortifying tradition . upon this your reason works thus . this i do not understand ; i never heard of such an authour ; and it is possible the better to cry himself up he might borrow another name . what means this i do not understand ? i 'le acquaint the reader . it means you are so wedded to talk by the book that you are utterly at a loss if an authour be quoted you have not heard of : the reason of which is because as i see by your discourses , which look like so many dreams , your genius inclines you not much to trade in books which pretend to the way of reason ; and , if schism dispatch't so amaz'd you , 't is to be fear'd that sure-footing and its corollaries may put you out of your wirts . but with what civility should you hint i so extoll'd my self under another name , it being ( as you say ) but possible . should i put upon you all things that were possible , what a monster might i make you ? but it abundantly manifests your short reach of reason that 't is highly improbable . for either i must have discover'd my self to the world to be authour of both books and then i had sham'd my self with so high self-praises ; or not have manifested it , and then where 's the credit i had got by the other book i had so extoll'd . your next injury is that i make nothing of , and disclaim the testimonies of popes and prelates , calling them the words of a few particular men , and cite for it schism dispatch't p. . where there is not one word of either pope or prelate , nor of disclaiming any testimony , nor of calling those the bare words of a few particular men ; now , if this be so , every word you charge against me is an injurious calumny and your whole charge a direct falsisication . my words are these . by this is shown in what we place the infallbility of the church , not in the bare words of few particular men , but in the manifest and ample attestation of such a multitude , &c. where , though you cannot or will not , yet the reader , if he understands plain english , will see i meddle not with who is or is not infallible besides the church , nor sean the validity of testimonies of popes or prelates but treat in what the infallibility of the church consists : now the word church denothing in its first signification an universality , i place her infallibility in universal attestation from age to age. notwithstanding which , my corollaries in sure-footing , if your wonderment at my new way or your own habituation to words will let you understand them , will let you see i also place infallibility in lesser councils ; & even in particular sees , but most in the popes or the roman ; not by way of an afflatus ( of which i for my part an able to give no account ) but by a course of things natural and supernatural , laid by gods sweetly-and-strongly ordering providence in second causes . but what aggravates your falsification is , that whereas i there counterpose bare words and attestation , rejecting the first and making use of the later , you make me affirm testimonies to be bare words ; to which how much i attribute every such passage of mine will tell you ; for on them the way i follow entirely builds . so that this whole charge is either quite opposit or else disparate to what i say in the place whence you cite my words . your third injury ( and 't is a strange one ) is that i sleight scriptures , fathers and councils as much , ( in this business ) and call them in scorn wordish testimonies ; for which you cite schism dispatch't p. . but not such a word is found there , nor i will undertake any where else in my writings . 't is likely indeed , that speaking of such things as you use to call testimonies , ( for you name every sleight citation such whether it have the nature of witnessing in it , that is , be built on sensations or no ) i may say they are wordish , in regard you have no certain means to arrive at their sence ; and till then i beseech you what are they else but meer words ? or rather meer characters and sounds ? what high deference i give to scripture see § . , & . beginning p. . in sure-footing : to councils , see corol. . to fathers , taking them properly , you may be inform'd by the whole body of my discourse concerning tradition , of which they are a part , and the eminentest members of it in proportion to their number . your th . injury is that the onely thing i place infallibility in is oral tradition and the testimonies of fathers of families ; whereas i place infallibilities also in other things , though i make this the greatest . but your discourse makes me disesteem and exclude all others , both popes , prelates , fathers and councils , by establishing this ; whereas by settling this , i establish all others , nor find you any such expressions in my book ; on the contrary 't is evident by those words i include them ; unless you think popes and prelates are not fathers of families , but take lodgings or hire rooms in other mens houses by the week . truth is , being to express the obligatory descent of faith from age to age , i cast about for a common word fit to express such deliverers , and conceiv'd this of fathers of families the aptest ; because the church consisting of families , this was most general ; and every master of a family , by being such , has an obligation to see all under him taught their catechism or faith. this in common , which was enough for my purpose then . but , were i to distinguish the strength of those testimonies , i should show that a priest hath an incomparable advantage above a layman , a bishop above him , and the head of the church above a bishop . your th . injury is lighter , because it speaks but your own apprehensions and i am to expect no better from you . my many chimerical suppositions , and my impertinencies in which i so please my self , must needs begets wonder ( say you ) in case the man ( as probably ) be of any account and reputation in the world . now my suppositions in the way i take are chiefly these , that men in all ages had eyes and ears , the wit and ( if they were good christians ) the grace not to tell an open and damnable ly to no purpose ; and , for these , i should much wonder my self if you did not wonder at such odd grounds , and esteem them chimerical , because you have read them in no ancient book ; for you use not to look into things . by this extravagant kind of dealing , you say you cannot but suspect me to be one of the fraternity of the new-pretended lights . i believe you heartily : for , to begin with self-evident principles and thence to deduce immediate consequences is such a new light to you , as i dare undertake scarce one beam of it ever enter'd into the eye of your understanding . i conceive 't is the difference between your way & ours which breeds all this mis-intelligence . ours ayms to bring all citations to grounds by way of cause and effect ; yours to admit them confusedly , especially if writ by some old authors provided they speak not for the interest of papists , for then they are questionable . ours is to be backwards in assenting to any thing writ long ago , till our reason be satisfy'd no passion or mistake could invalidate its authority ; yours to believe them hand over head , if the book be but said to be authentick ; which is to a degree the same weakness as that of the rude country people who think all true they see in print , and that their having a ballad of it is sufficient to authenticate it . our principle is that no authority deserves any assent farther than reason gives it to deserve , and hence we lay principles to assure us of knowledge and veracity in the authour ere we yeeld over our assent to his sayings . yours is kinder-hearted than to hold them to such strict terms , and is well appay'd if some authour you have a conceit of , praise the other for a good writer , or his work for a good book . ours is to lay self-evident principles and deduce immediate consequences , and by this means to cultivate our reason , that noblest faculty in us which constitutes us men ; yours to lay up multitudes of notes gleand from several authours ; and , if you better any spiritual faculty you have , 't is your memory not your reason . hence we carry , for the main of our doctrin , and as far as 't is antecedent to written authority , our library in our heads ; and can as well study in a garden , as sitting in a library stufit with books ; whereas your way of learning ties you to turn over leaves of authours , as children do their dictionaries , for every step of your discourse : and as an ingenious man said of those poets who spun not their poems out of their own invention , but made them up of scraps of wit transcrib'd from other authours — lord ! how they 'd look if they should chance to lose their paper book ? so we may say of you ; that , if your notes you have with much pains collected , hap to miscarry , you are utterly at a loss ; so that little of your learning is spiritual and plac't in your soul , as true learning should be , but in material and perishable paper and characters . in a word , your whole performance ends here , that you are able to declare what other men say ; whereas ours aims at enabling us to manifest what our selves know . no wonder then if our wayes being so different , we cannot hit it ; but that , as you think ours chimerical , so i assure my self yours ; and consequently all you write in that way , is ( as far as you go about to conclude or cause assent by it ) exceedingly ridiculous . this , i doubt not , will confirm you in what you said before , that i am no friend to ancient books or learning . to note-book learning indeed not much ; to true learning or knowledge , very much ; and even to the other as far as it conduces to this. to books i am so much a friend , that i desire not a few should be selected of each sort by a general council of schollers , and the rest burn'd , as did an ingenious person ; but i would onely have the riff-raff burn'd ( 't is no great matter if that tedious legend of dr. dee's sprights accompany them ) and the generality preserv'd ; but so , that their contents should be gather'd in heads or common-place books for schollers to look in occasionally , not for rational creatures to spend their whole lives in poring on them and noting them with a foolish expectation to find true knowledge by stuffing their heads with such a gallimawfry , and after . years thus spent , never the wiser ; for , indeed , this is little better than for one to hope to frame himself a good sute of apparel by picking thrums ends out of a multitude of old and overworn garments . but to the point , i distinguish books . and , as for the scriptures , ascertaining their letter and sence ( which is done by tradition ) 't is clear they are of incomparable value ; not onely for the divine doctrin contain'd in them , but also for many particular passages , whose source or first attestation not being universal , nor their nature much practical , might possibly have been lost in their conveyance down by tradition . next , follows those of councils and fathers , and ( supposing christ a perfect law-giver ) 't is clear all they have to do with faith is to witness the churches beleef ; and the former of them to declare or explain faith or the churches sence against obstinate hereticks . as such then their books are to be valu'd , that is exceedingly . next , follow such as euclid's or archimedes his , which express science ; and those are of very great worth , in regard they acquaint us with and manifest to our hands the knowledge of the former world ; which being speculative , little of it could have come down by tradition , except when that speculation became practical , and exprest it self in matter by many useful or rather needful arts , trades or manufactures . after these succeed opinionative books , of which this last age has produc't multitudes ; and these also are very useful , if the reader go not too credulously to work , but have right principles laid already in his head ; for then the variety of mens conceits and their reasons for them will hint to a considerer diverse consequences , which otherwise the slowness and distractedness of our reason would not have light of ; nay , even the miscairiages of such reasoners avail a wise man , as aristotle out of the contrary opinions of philosophers , whom he saw failing in their grounds , gathered very happily the middle truth . these books therefore are worth preserving . human histories come next ; and these second tradition in her object , matter of fact , after she hath authenticated them and the circumstances of their writers . there are others fit for explications or rational declarations of a point by similitudes , allusions , examples & such like , as pliny's natural history , emblems , fictions , & others of an ornamental nature ; which being useful for sermons and discourses sutable to the middle size of the world , 't is plain they are preservable : with this caution that these and chiefly opinionative books be either kept from the weak and credulous vulgar , or else in the preface to them some learned authority declare in common how far they are to be credited ; lest by imposing on the reasons of the generality , they hinder the world's improvement . prayer-books and recreation-books 't is almost as evident they are to be preserv'd , as 't is that prayers and recreations are to be used . onely caution is to be had the former be examin'd well and approov'd by ecclesiastical authority , and that the later be chast and unabusive . you have here my sentiment concerning books ; against which you shall find nothing in schism dispatch't , or any of my writings . in a word , i would have every thing distinguish't , examin'd by grounds , & allow'd as far as 't is reasonable : nor wonder i much at your mistake of me in this point , for you are not the onely man that thinks all books , and even authority to be absolutely deny'd , when they are sorted , and rank't in their just degree of merit ; that is , indeed , settled and establish't ; for we metaphysicians think nothing to stand firm but by being , or being held-to-be , truly what it is . you denounce wo to colledges and libraries if these men should prevail . yet , you see now i leave you libraries enow , and permit you your onely darlings , books ; and onely desire you would love them wisely . neither will colledges forfeit their libraries to my discourse . onely , whereas you would have schollers educated there , onely pore on books , note and ( when they come to write , ) quote , i would have them take principles along with them by which to judge and consider of what they read . without which 't is to be fear'd their much reading will do them more harm then good ; and even pervert honest natural reason in them by filling their heads with a multitude of unconnected and unconnectible ends of sayings , impossible to be ever postur'd in the frame of reason , and themselves unfurnish't of means to know which rather to adhere to ; which may sit them to talk indeed of many things , like parrats ; yet , all the while , for want of principles , know nothing of what they say . if you would have colledges consist of such , i conceive i am a far better friend to colledges than your self are , and that no great cause of woe will come to them by my means . but , as our way in your conceit brings woe to colledges and libraries , so you affirm that atheism and mahometism will get by it . by which i understand what a disputant you are . i beleeve you would quote scriptures and books to confute an atheist or mahometan ; whereas i conceive , since all discourse supposes an agreement between the discoursers in some common principle , and they denie or undervalue your written proofs , you must begin to confute them by maxims of common reason , antecedent to all authority . for these , human nature obliges all men to hold to , unless they have quite irrationaliz'd themselves into perfect scepticism ; whereas they reject or sleight the other ; which to render efficacious you must go to work first with principles of plain reason . your last injury which i account the worst of all the rest , is deliver'd thus . others , of approved worth and abilities have met with this man , who , i think , have done him more credit than he deserved . this argues you are so set to abuse me , that no testimony , though never so valid , and confest to be such , can stave you of . and the judgment or veracity of my friends , who speak by experience shall be question'd , rather than you will be brought to entertain any conceit of me that 's handsome . you leap voluntarily into falsifications and ill-languag'd misconceits without any motive , but are so restif and backward to think or speak in the lest civilly of me , that witnesses of approved worth and abilities , cannot win you to favourable apprehensions nor keep you from pursuing your resolute censoriousness . had you found half that testimony for the authentickness of an old writer in some mouse-eaten rag of antiquity it had gone down currently with your genius , and bin next to gospel . i value not your judgment of me ; but highly and equally dislike your humour as void of all ingenuity , whether it had been us'd to my self or another . when you review schism dispatcht , and see your mistakes , i hope you will have a good conceit of my friends at least ; for whom in this passage i apologize . but that i may re-acquaint my self with you , i am to tell you that you also have met me formerly and knew me very well . nay , that i am exceedingly bound to you for the best favour in the world ; which is that , accidentally , you contributed to make me a catholick . but , because 't is long ago , i am forc't to remind you of it by two tokens . one is that in durham-house where you at that time lodg'd when you came to london , and in your chamber there , upon occasion of reading a book writ by a certain protestant bishop against the real presence , i observ'd , and acquainted you with my observation , that , to my judgment , the fathers spoke more favourably for the papists tenet than the protestants : hereupon , you took me by the hand and told me they were mad who read the ancient fathers and saw not they meant christ was as really in the sacrament as in heaven . the other was yet more remarkable , and this ; that ( either your grandfather or father , i know not which , but i think ) your grandfather was intimate with mr. calvin , and , when he had put out his explication of christ's presencein the sacrament , which dodg'd and shuffled between really and notreally , that is , between is and is-not , he challeng'd mr. calvin with it , and laid open to him the non-sence and indefensibleness of it , asking him why he put out so strange an opinion , which he was never able to make good ? at which mr. calvin took hold of his own finger , and said , see you this ? i would willingly cut it off on condition i had never put it out so . to which your grandfather reply'd , you should then explain it some other way ; mr. calvin answer'd , my institutions are so spread all over france that 't is now too late . thus you , letting me see by a testimony very immediate , that the late authour of this tenet which now so reigns all over england , wish't his finger cut off when he writ it . how you will reconcile this with the late new piece of the rubrick in the common-prayer-book , absolutely renouncing all real presence , in which point the church of of england formerly exprest her self abstractedly , do you consider . sir , i beseech you let this be a fair warning to you how you deal disingenuously for the future ; and pardon some of my expressions to my high provocation and exceeding great hast : i am sure the worst of them is a civility compar'd to the harsh carriage you have us'd towards your self in openly falsifying both my words and sence , and causlesly wresting to an ill construction every passage you touch't ; yet not doing me the right to go about to answer any one in the least , that so i might see by your reasons you had grounds to think as you writ . had you argu'd against me i know too well the right of a writer , to take it ill if you laid open and nam'd my conceived faults , though the names of them had been harsh words ; but not even to attempt to confute them , yet to flie into such expressions , is the very definition of railing . i was extreme sorry to lay open the fault of a friend , though my own concern made it fitting , and your demerit just , and do assure you that onely the injury to my cause , which went along in that action oblig'd me to this vindication . setting aside the duty i owe to that , i am still as ever . your true friend and humble servant , j. s. a letter from the authour of sure-footing , to his answerer . sir , i am certainly inform'd there is an answer to my book intended , and a person chosen out for that employment ; whose name i am unconcern'd to know , it being only his quality as a writer i have to do with . i receive the alarum with great chearfulness ; knowing that , if my adversary behaves himself well , it will exceedingly conduce to the clearing and settling the main point there controverted . but , because there is difference between being call'd an answer and being an answer , and that 't is extremely opposit to my genius , to be task't in laying open mens faults even as writers , ( though it has been my unhappiness formerly to meet with adversaries , whose way of winning made that carriage my only duty ) wherefore to prevent , as much as i am able , all occasion of such unsavory oppositions , and to make way to the clearing the point , that so our discourse may redound to the profit and satisfaction of our readers , i make bold to offer you these few reflexions ; which in effect contain no more but a request you would speak to the point , and in such a way as is apt to bring the matter nearer a clearing . this if you please to do , you will very much credit your self and your endeavours in the opinion of all ingenuous persons . if you refuse , and rather chuse to run into rhetorical excursions , and such discourses as are apt to breed new controversies not pertinent to the present one under hand , you will extreamly disparage both your self , your party and your cause , and give me an exceeding advantage against them all ; i shall also have the satisfaction to have manifested before-hand by means of this letter , that i have contributed as much as in me lies to make you avoid those faults , which i must then be forc't to lay open and severely press upon you , little to your credit nor your causes neither ; you being ( as i am informd and reason gives it ) signally chosen out as held most able to maintain it . . that there may be no more distance between us than what our cause enforces , i heartily assure you that though i highly dislike your tenets negatively opposit to what we hold faith , and the way of writing i foresee you must take ( unless you resolve to love candour better than your cause ) as being inconclusive and so apt to continue not finish debates , yet i have not the least pique against yours or any mans person . nor have i any particular aversion against the protestant party ; rather i look upon it with a better eye than on any other company whatever which has broke communion with the catholick church : it preserves still unrenounc't the form of episcopacy , the church-government instituted by christ ; and many grave solemnities and ceremonies , which make our union less difficult : many of their soberest writers acknowledge divers of the renounc't tenets to be truths : some of them also profess to hold tradition , especially for scripture's letter ; and even for those points or faith-tenets in which they and we agree ; that is , where their interest is not touch't . i wish they would as heartily hold to it in all other points which descended by it , and look into the virtue it has of ascertaining , and declare in what that virtue consists ; i am confident , a little candour of confessing truly what they finde , joyn'd with an endeavour of looking into things rather than words , would easily make way to a fair correspondence . i esteem , and even honour the protestants from my heart for their firm allegiance to his sacred majesty and his royal father ; this uniting them already with all sober catholiks under that excellent notion of good subjects , and in the same point of faith , the indispensableness of the duty of allegiance we owe our prince by divine law. lastly i declare , that for this as well as for charitable considerations , i have a very particular zeal for their reconcilement to their mother-church ; and that 't is out of this love of union i endeavour so earnestly to beat down the wordish and dissatisfactory way of writing , and go about to evidence the ground of all our faith ; knowing , that , as wounds are never connaturally and solidly cur'd , by uniting the distant sides at the surface , and leaving them disunited and unheal'd at the bottom , but the cure must begin there first ; so , the onely way to heal the wounds of the church , is to begin first to win some to acknowledge the most radical and bottom-principle of all faith , as controverted between us ; without which all agreement in particular points must needs be unsound and hollow-hearted . this is my onely aym in sure-footing . that therefore you may not obstruct so good a work , and withall perform the duty of a solid and candid writer , i offer to your self and all ingenuous readers these few reflexions : not sprung from my will ( for what authority have i to prescribe you your method ) but from true reason working upon the thing ; which makes it just duty in you , and so ought oblige you to follow it . . in the first place , fince the scope of my whole book is about the first principle in controversy , or the ground of all faith , as to our knowledge ; that is , about a point antecedent to all particular points ; i conceive it reasonable you should let your discourse stand firm to the matter in hand , and not permit it to slide into controversies about particulars . for so , 't is evident , we shall be apt to multiply many words little to our present purpose . on what conditions you may have right to alledge particulars as pretended instances of traditions failing , shall be seen hereafter . . next , i desire you would please to speak out categorically , and declare whether you hold faith absolutely certain to us , or else possible to be false for any thing we know . to explicate my self better , that so i may void some common and frivolous distinctions , my intent is to demand of you in behalf of the christian reader and his due satisfaction , whether you hold gods providence has laid in the whole creation any certain means , by way of proper causes to such an effect , to bring down faith truly to us , and whether we can arrive at certain knowledge of those means , that is , come to see or know the connexion between such causes and their effect spoken of . i make bold to press you earnestly to this declaration ; and my reason is , because nothing will more conduce to the conclusion of our present debate : for , in case such causes be laid and can be seen by us , then they are evident or demonstrative reasons for the ground of our faith's certainty : but , if no such causes be laid , or being laid , cannot be seen by us , then all the wit of man can never avoid the consequence , but that we can have onely probability for all our faith ; that is , for any thing we absolutely know , 't is all as false as an old wife's tale ; since there are no degrees in truths and falshoods . if you advance this civil piece of atheistry , you must pardon me if i be smart with you in opposition to so damnable and fundamental an errour : i love christianity and mankinde 〈◊〉 well to suffer that position which destroyes effectually the root of all their eternal happiness , and the substance of all their hope , to pass unstigmatiz'd , as it deserves . nor think to avail your self by some discoursers in our schools , it will be shown , when prest , that they are still preserv'd good christians through the virtue of tradition which they all hold to , notwithstanding their private speculations : but you not , because of your want of certain grounds , to make you rationally hold christs faith. they onely mistook a word , whereas you will be found to erre in the whole thing , or the ordinary means to true christianity . again , if such causes be fitting to be laid by god's providence , 't is impossible to avoid the doctrin propos'd in sure-footing , because 't is absolutely impossible to invent any thing that looks like such causes , but those which are deliver'd there ; nor did any other way ever attempt to show any such . whence i foresee your cause will force you to fly for refuge to the actual uncertainty , or possible falshood of all our faith for any thing any man living knows by ordinary means . a sad consequence of an erroneous tenet ! but 't is connatural , and , so to be expected , such effects should follow the renouncing the rule of faith. . thirdly , i conceive it very reasonable that you would please to declare whether controversy onght to have any first principle or no ; if none , then to speak candidly out , and confess that controvertists are certain of nothing they say , since their discourse has no ground or first principle to rely on . if any , whether tradition be it ; or , if it be not , what else is ; and then vouch ( as plain reason tells us you ought ) that what you assigne has truly in it the nature of a first principle , which common reason gives to be self-evidence . or , lastly , to profess ( if you judge it your best play ) that , what you substitute in stead of tradition , though it be a first principle , yet it need not be at all self-evident . any thing shall content me , so you will but please to speak out , and to the point . . again , since it is evidently your task to argue against tradition's certainty , 't is as evident that while you argue against it , you must bear your self as holding it uncertain ; i conceive then plain reason obliges you not to produce any thing against tradition which depends upon tradition for its certainty ; for , in doing so you would invalidate and even nullify all your own proofs : since , if tradition be held by you uncertain , and they have no certainty but by means of it , they must be confest uncertain too ; and so they would be incompetent to be produc't as proofs , and your self very dis-ingenuous to produce them : i add self-contradicting too , and unskilful ; nature and aristotle teaching us , that a discourser ought not sustain contrary to himself . hence plainest reason excludes you from alledging any kind of testimony , either from scripture , councils , fathers , or history , till you answer my corollaries , , . which pretend to demonstrate the certainty of all these dependent on tradition's ; and the onely way to show my discourses there to be weak , is to manifest my mistake by declaring into what other thing your certainty of those testimonies is finally resolvable , which is not coincident with tradition . when you produce such a principle , and prove it such , you have right to alledge the foresaid testimonies , for then you can make good their authority : till then , you can have no right in true reason to do it . not onely , because till then you are to be held a renouncer of that thing 's certainty upon which there are pretended demonstrations against you theirs is built ; and those presum'd true ones , because you let such strongest attempts pass unanswer'd ; but very particularly for this consideration that our present matter restrains you from it : for , our discourse is about the ground of that authority which ascertains to us faith ; which theresore is antecedent to the notions of faith , faithful , church , councils , fathers , nay and creditable history-books too ; since those rely on tradition ( taken at large ) for their certainty , as is evident by plain reason , coroll . , . which devolves into this , that tradition is first authority , and so not proovable or disproovable by any other secondary authorities , but ought to be impugn'd by pure reason . but , if you think fit to grant this certainty to tradition taken at large , yet deny it to christian tradition , which hath , besides its human force most powerful divine motives also to strengthen it ; please to speak it out , and the strange unreasonableness of the position will quickly be made appear . or , if you grant christian tradition certain in bringing down those common points in which we agree , yet fallible , nay actually erring , in bringing down to us those other points which we were found holding upon tradition when you left us , and for which , as grievous errors , you pretended to leave us ; please to declare in what you hold the virtue of tradition consists , ascertaining to us both those common points , and how we come to know tradition is engag'd for them ; which done , it will quickly appear whether its ascertaining virtue has its effect upon some , and not others ; or on all . unless you do this , your very admittance of tradition's certainty in some , overthrows you without more ado : for , to acknowledge it argumentative for the certainty of some , grants it a virtue of ascertaining , which therefore you are oblig'd to grant in all , unless you give the reason of your exception : otherwise to admit it when your interest is not toucht , and reject it when it opposes you , is plainly to confess that tradition is able to certify , yet that you admit it when you list , and reject it when you list . . being inform'd then by evident reason , that no kind of authority but only the way of reason is a competent weapon to fight against tradition with ; i have three things to propose to your thoughts on this occasion , which i hope will sound reasonable to any intelligent man by the very mentioning . first , that you would not alledge such arguments as strike as well at the constancy of every species in nature , especially rational nature ; that is , such natural mediums as tend to destroy all natural certainty . secondly , that your objections be not forrain , or fetch 't from afar of ; for these are multipliable without end , and apt to be suggested by fancy upon every not-seeing the coherence of some other remote ( whether real or conceited ) truth , with the tenet we aim to impugn ; but that they be immediate and close , that is , taken out of the intrinsecal nature of the thing ; for so , they will be more forcible and by consequence be apt to do your cause much service ; and unless they be such , they will do it none : for , in regard my whole process is grounded on the nature of the thing , as appears by my transition , and every logician knows that remote and common considerations are liable , for any thing we know , to be connected or not-connected with the point we would apply them to , because we see no connexion but what 's immediate ; it follows that 't is a very incompetent and dissatisfactory way to impugn an adversary who endeavours all along to frame his discourfe out of the intrinsecal nature of the thing , by remote , or unimmediate , that is , indeed , unconnected mediums . the third thing i request is , that you either grant that no argument or reason is conclusive , obliging-to-assent , or satisfactory , but what is either proper ( at least necessary ) cause or effect ; or else show us out of logick that other mediums have this virtue , and how they come to have it . this way of procedure will give me a great respect for you as taking honestly the way which is apt to clear truth ; and you will have this satisfaction to your conscience that you have endeavour'd it to your power by following the best method you could imagin to give your cause its due advantage , in case it can bear that test ; that is , in case it be truth . and , if it cannot bear it , that is , if it be no truth , 't is your own best advantage by this strict procedure to have discover'd it . your judicious readers also that look seriously for satisfaction , will rest much edify'd and thankfull for your pursuing that method which is likely to save them a great deal of fruitless pains in reading multitudes of books writ in a loose way , whence no conclusion or satisfaction is likely to result . . my fifth request , and i hope 't is just and reasonable , is this ; that , if you conceive your discourse has made good the certainty of written authorities or quoted testimonies , without tradition , ( which i see isimpossible , ) and hence you make account you have title to produce them against tradition's certainty , ( that being the matter in hand ) and therefore you resolve to pursue the way of citing authours ; you would then be please'd to vouch your citations to have truly in them the nature of testimonies ; that is , to be built on sensible knowledge , and not on speculative , or opinion in the authour alledg'd , and that they fall under none of dr. pierce's faulty or inconclusive heads ; or else show they are conclusive though thus faulty , which is done by confuting my grounds laid in my first appendix . § . , , . or , lastly , to declare , that though thus faulty and inconclusive they ought still to be alledgd ; and to give your reason for it ; which , candidly spoken out , i am sure will be this , that you must either produce such , or none . i hope all our ingenuous readers will think me very reasonable , who am well contented with any thing which is spoke out expressly and declaratively of what method or way of satisfying you take ; and onely desire you would not quote and speak confusedly and in common , as if you meant to persuade your readers that your discourse has in it some strange force taken in the bulk , though you will vouch no one particular piece of it to be certain ; or , as if you suppos'd their reasons were to be amazd and stupify'd meerly at the venerable names of authors and the solemnity of a diverse-letter'd , or diverse-languag'd quotation . without clearing to their judgements the virtue by which such citations can pretend to have force able to subdue their understandings to assent , or ( which is all one ) satisfy them . if you refuse to do me reason in this point , and still resolve to pursue the huddling together testimonies without warranting their certainty by showing upon rational grounds they must be such , i shall declare beforehand to my readers , that i must be fore't to do right to my self ; which is , to rank all your testimonies under dr. pierce's faulty heads , and so let them go as they are . . particularly , i beg the justice of you not to think to over-bear me with the conceiv'd authority of other divines resolving faith in their speculative thoughts after another manner than i do : since this can onely tend to stir up invidiousness against my person ( which yet their charity secures me from ) and not any wayes to invalidate mv discourse . for , every one knows t is no news divines should differ in their way of explicating their tenet , which they both notwithstanding hold never the less firmly ; and every learned man understands that the word divine , importing a man of skill or knowledge in such a matter , no divine has any authority but from the goodness of the proofs or reasons he brings and on which he builds that skill . please then to bring , not the empty pretence of a divines authority or name to oppose me with , and i shall freely give you leave to make use of the virtue of their authorities , that is their reasons against me as much as you will. i easily yeeld to those great discoursers , whoever they be , a precedency in other speculations and knowledges , to which they have been more addicted , and for which they have been better circumstanc't ; in this one of the ground of faith , both my much practice , my particular application , my discourses with our nations best wits of all sorts , my perusing our late acute adversaries and the answers to them , with other circumstances ; and lastly , my serious and industrious studying the point , join'd with the clearing method god's providence has led me to , have left me ( as far as i know ) in no disadvantage . what would avail you against me and our church too ( for my interest as defending tradition is indissolubly linkt with hers ) is , to show that our church proceeds not on tradition , or that in her definitions she professes to resolve faith another way rather than mine , or ( which is equivalent ) to rely on somthing else more firmly and fundamentally than on tradition . but the most express and manifold profession of the council of trent to rely constantly on tradition , has so put this beyond all possible cavil on my side , that i neither fear your skill can show my grounds in the least subcontrary to hers , nor the goodness of any learned and considering catholik ( however some may conceive the infallibility of the church plac't ad abundantiam in somthing else ) will or can ever dislike it . i expect you may go about to disgrace my way as new : but i must ask , whether you mean the substance of it is new , or onely that 't is now deeper look't into and farther explicated than formerly : if you say the former , my consent of authorities ( p. , , &c. ) has clearly shown the contrary ; and common sense tells us no other way was or could be possibly taken ( for the generality of the church at least ) in primitive times till scripture was publisht universally and collected : if the later , please to reflect , that every farther explication or declaration , as far as 't is farther , must needs be new ; and so , instead of disgracing us , you most highly commend our reasons for drawing consequences farther than others had done before us . again , if it be onely a farther explication , it is for that very reason not-new ; since the sence of the explication is the same with the thing explicated ; as 't is onely an explication , then 't is not-new ; as farther , 't is indeed new , but withal innocent , nay commendable . but there are three things more to be said on occasion of this objecting catholik divines ; one is , that , taking tradition for the living voice of the present church as i constantly declare my self to do , not one catholick does or can deny it ; for he would eo ipso become no-catholick but an arch-heretick ; and this all acknowledge . in the thing explicated then , that is , in the notion of tradition all agree with me ( and consequently in the substance of my explication ) nor can any do otherwise , except they be equivocated in the word tradition and mistake my meaning , which i conceive none will do wilfully after they have read here my declaration of it so unmistakably laid down . the second thing is , that an alledger of those divines will onely quote their words as speculaters , not those in which they deliver themselves naturally as christians or believers ; which sayings were they collected , we should finde them unanimously sounding to my advantage , and not one of them oppositely . and , lastly , speaking of our explication as to its manner , divines contradict one another in other kinds of explications , but not one author can be alledged that expresly contradicts this which i follow . . my sixth request is , that you would speak to the main of my book , and not catch at some odd words , on the by as it were : otherwise , understanding readers will see this is not to answer , but to cavil . . and , because we are ( i hope ) both of us endeavouring to clear truth ( i am sure we ought to be so ) therefore , to acquit your self to your readers that you ingenuously aim at it , i conceive you will do your self a great deal of right , and me but reason , nay ( which is yet weightier ) do the common cause best service , if you will joyn with me to retrench our controversie as much as we can . let us then avoid all rhetorical digressions and affectations of witty and fine language ; which i have declin'd in my whole book , and chosen a plain downright manner of expression , as most sutable and connatutural to express truth . likewise all repetitions of what particulars others have said or answer'd before us , such as are the objections made by that ingenious person , the l. faukland , and the answers given them in the apology for tradition ; unless it be conceiv'd those solutions are insufficient , and reasons be offer'd why they are judg'd so . for i conceive it an endless folly to transcribe and reprint any thing others have done before us , except it be grounds which ought to be oft inculcated and stuck to ; and those particulars which we show to be not yet invalidated , but to preserve still their strength . much less do i suspect it can fall under the thought of one who aims to discourse rationally ( such my answerer ought to be ) to rake together all the filth and froth of the unwarrantable actions or opinions of some in the church , or to run on endlesly with multitudes of invective & invidious sayings on his own head without proof ; & then apply them to the church , as does the disswader . it would also very much conduce to the bringing our differences to a narrower compass if you would candidly take my book endwayes , and declare what in it is evident , and so to be allowed ; what not : what principles are well laid or consequences right drawn ; and what are otherwise : to requite which favours , i promise the same carriage in my reply to you . by this means it will be quickly discover'd whether or no you have overthrown my discourse by showing it ill coherent , and how far 't is faulty ; that , if i cannot clear it to be connected , i may confess my fault and endeavour to amend it . for , however i see my grounds evident , yet i am far from judging my self infallible in drawing my consequences ; though i see withal the method i take , will not let me err much ; or , if i do , my errour will be easily discoverable ; because i go not about to cloud my self in words , but to speak out as plain as i can from the nature of the thing . . in the next place i earnestly request you , as you love truth , not to shuffle of the giving me a full answer , nor to desist from your enterprise ( as i hear a certain person of great esteem for his learning and prudence has already done ) though you find some difficulty where to fasten upon the substantial part of my discourse . there are perhaps many difficult passages which my shortness forc't me to leave obscure ; these will naturally occasion mistake , and mistake will breed objections to impugn me with . please , if others fail , to make use of those at least . 't is no discredit in you to mistake what 's obscure ; rather it argues a fault in me ( did not my circumstance of writing grounds , & onely to schollers , excuse me ) that i left it so ; to make amends for which i promise you to render it clear when i see where it pinches you or others . and on this score , i owe very particular thanks to mr stillingfleet , that by speaking clearly out his thoughts , he gave me a fair occasion to open that point he impugn'd , i think , upon mistake of our tenet . . if you think fit somtimes to argue ad hominem , be sure what you build on be either our churches tenet or mine ; for i am bound to defend nothing else . if then you quote fathers , first , see they speak as fathers , that is as believers and witnessers ; for so 't is evident our church means them by her expressions in the council of trent ; as also did antiquity . for both of them constantly alledge and stand upon traditio patrum , not opinio patrum : next , see you bring consensus patrum , or an agreement at least of very many of them speaking as witnesses , otherwise you will not touch me nor our church ; for she never abetted them further . in case you bring councils , it would be very efficacious you would chuse such testimonies ( if you can finde them ) as i brought from the council of trent ; that is , such in which they declare themselves ( or the circumstances give it ) they proceed upon their rule of faith : for , otherwise , every one knows that bishops in a council have in them , besides the quality of faith-definers , those also of governours , and of the most eminent and solid divines in god's church . if scripture , you must make evident the certainty of your way of arguing from it , ere i or our church shall allow it argumenative . thus much for authority . if you oppose me by my own principles or discourses of my reason , i must defend my self as well as i can . one thing on this occasion , i must mind you of ; 't is this , that though you should conquer in this way of arguing ad hominem , you onely conquer me as a discourser , by showing that i contradict my self ; not my tenet : for to prove that false , you must fix your foot and build your discourse on some certain ground ; which barely my holding it ( on which your discourse ad hominem relies ) cannot make it . you must build then on some grounded truth if you will go about to overthrow a pretended one . indeed , if you can show tradition contradicts her self , you will do more than miracle , and so must conquer . but i fear not the gates of hell , much less man's wit can prevail against that impregnable rock . onely , i beseech you bring not as parallels against our tradition in hand , which is a vast and strong stream , other little petty rivulets sprung originally from the sensations of two or three : for , then , as one side was liable , in a thing not known publikly , to bely their senses ; so the conveyance down of such sleight built attestations may easily be self-contradictory . in a word , if you will argue , take first into your thoughts the nature of the thing you argue against , and then fall to work assoon as you will. now , if you should chance to say you hold the sayings of fathers and councils ( some at least , to be certain , my reason tells me from principles , that , having renounc't tradition which onely could ascertain them , rational nature in you will not let you have any hearty conceit of their convictiveness , whatever you pretend ; but that you rawly alledge them , and so let them go with a valeant quantum valere possunt . that therefore we may have some security more than your bare word ( which experience tells us is now affirmative now negative in this point , as it best sutes your interest , or , after a pretty indifferent manner , half-one-half-tother ) that your profession of holding to such authorities is not hollow-hearted but rooted in your reason , 't is just your readers should expect you would declare in what the virtue of certifying consists , and that they have this virtue . this if you do , you acquit your self to go to work solidly , and you offer us fair play in giving us some hold of your reason , whereas a common expression gives none . this procedure also will show , when apply'd , whether you are justisiable or no for admitting some authorities of that nature and rejecting others . . my last request is , that , if in the course of your answer you think fit to complain of me for bringing history and other proofs heretofore commonly without more ado admitted , into incertainty : please to amend the fault you finde , and settle their certainty on some better principles than i have endeavour'd . in the mean time 't is evident my whole book ayms at settling the certainty of all authority , by evidencing the certainty of first authority ; upon which the assuredness of history , fathers , councils , church , faith , nay virtue or christian life must all be built . this is my way ; if you judge it incompetent to do the effect spoken of , be pleas'd to manifest it unfit and show us a better . . perhaps i may have demanded more of you in some particulars than is due from the strict duty of meerly answering : in the schools , a bare denial , or distinction is enough for a respondent . but i conceive we are not on these terms : in regard we are not met face to face , where the returns of the one to the other can be quick on every occasion . this obliges us , for the readers satisfaction , to enlarge our selves and bring reason for everything we affirm or deny , lest we should be thought to do it gratis . and , your case here , is particularly disadvantageous : for , if you go about to overthrow that on which i aym to show the certainty of all authority built , and yet declare not on what your self hold them built , and , by your faithful promise to show it shortly , give them strong hopes you will perform it ; you send them away very much dissatisfy'd either with you or with all the authority in the world , though built on sensitive knowledge : of which it being impossible rational nature should permit them to doubt , they must needs dislike your attempt , and have an ill conceit of your performance . sir , i understand , to my exceeding satisfaction , that multitudes ofthe of the most eminent , solid and ingenuous wits of our nation have been diligent perusers of my book . consider , their eyes are upon you while you answer ; i am confident they will judge i have requested no more of you in this letter , but what 's reasonably due to their and my satisfaction ; and so , will look your answer should be correspondent . they are weary of endless contests about faith ; and , seeing we are not now controverting the signification of some ambiguous testimony , but penetrating deep into the very bowels of a point which is of the greatest concern in the whole world ; and pursuing ( in a method likely to decide ) the clearing of it , their expectations are very much erected and attentively observing what will be the issue of this rational combat . frustrate not their desires to see truth manifested by bringing the question back from the plain open field of evidence-in-our-method , to a logomachy or word-skirmish in a wilderness of talk , out of which the thread of grounds or principles had disent angled it . to them therefore as well as your self i address this : requesting those of them who are acquainted with my answerer , to press him to do himself , me , the world ( his cause too , if it can bear it ) the right due in reason , and here demanded . this sir , if you will perform , i shall lay aside the remembrance of the justice i have to it , and look upon it purely as a favour and most obliging civility to him who is , next to truth 's , feb. th . your friend and well-wisher , j. s. postscript . if you complain of this fore-stalling as unusual ; as long as it is rational you can have no reason to do so : and it will appear such to him that considers it was an unusual circumstance occasion'd it . it is this : i had endeavour'd to bring controversie from an endless to a conclusive way : and both my reason and experience made me apprehend my protestant answerer would have such strong inclinations to bring it back into the way of quoting and glossing testimonies ( that is , into a wordish scanning a great part of all the libraries in the world ) that a slender touch at it in my book was not forcible and express enough to oblige him to take notice of it . having communicated therefore my thoughts with intelligent and ingenuous persons , both catholiks and protestants , and receiv'd their approbation , i resolv'd , and pursued it as you see ; and i hope the manifold usefulness of it ( as shall be seen what way soever now you take upon you of answering ) will sufficiently justify my action . finis . a letter to the d. of p in answer to the argueing part of his first letter to mr. g[ooden]. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter to the d. of p in answer to the argueing part of his first letter to mr. g[ooden]. sergeant, john, - . p. printed by henry hills, london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. attributed to john sergeant. cf. nuc pre- . created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng stillingfleet, edward, - . gooden, peter, d. . -- letter to mr. g. giving a true account of a late conference. catholic church -- great britain. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter to the d. of p. in answer to the arguing part of his first letter to mr. g. published with allowance . london , printed by henry hills , printer to the king 's most excellent majesty , for his houshold and chappel . . a letter to the d. of p. in answer to the arguing part of his first letter . . that you may not take it unkindly the arguing part of your letter to mr. g. should pass unregarded , i have been prevail'd upon to accept of his commission to hold his cards , while he is not in circumstances to play out his game himself . but can assure you beforehand , since matter of fact is clearing by other hands more proper , i mean to confine my self to matter of right ; and so shall give you the least and most excusable trouble that can be , a short one . . your letter tells us , that the conference was for the sake of a gentleman , who i heard desir'd to be satisfi'd that protestants are absolutely certain of what they believe , and made account you could satisfie him , and profess'd , if you could not , he would quit your communion . and you take care to inform us ( p. . ) that he was satisfi'd , and declar'd immediately after the conference , that he was much more confirm'd in the communion of your church by it , and resolv'd to continue in it . but could you not have afforded to inform us likewise by what he was satisfi'd ? for there is many a man who would be as glad , and is as much concern'd to be satisfi'd in that point as that gentleman ; and he would not have been a jot the less confirm'd or the less resolv'd , if his neighbor had been confirm'd and resolv'd with him . i cannot for my life imagin why you should make a secret of a thing , which , besides your own and your churches honor , concerns the salvation of thousands and thousands to know . . your letter i perceive would shift it off to mr. g. whom you desire ( p. ) to prove that protestants have no absolute certainty , &c. of this proposal there will be occasion to say more by and by . at the present i pray you consider how you deal with those souls who rely on you . if you should move them to trust their estates with a man of your naming , of whom you would give no other satisfaction that he were able to manage them , and faithful , and responsible , but only to bid those who doubted , prove the contrary ; i fancy there would need all the credit you have to hinder the motion from appearing very strange : and yet you have the confidence to make them one as much stranger as their souls are more worth than their mony : for you would have them hazard their souls where they are not safe , for any care you take to satisfie them that they are . why , suppose mr. g. could not prove that protestants are not certain , are they therefore certain ? has peter twenty pounds in his purse , because paul cannot prove he has not ? or , ever the more title to an estate , because an adversary may have the ill luck to be non-suited ? must not every body speak for himself one day , and bring in his own account , which will pass or not pass as it is or is not faulty in it self , whether any fault have been found in it before or no ? and will not the happiness or misery of their souls for ever depend on that account ? can you suffer them to run that terrible hazard , without making them able to justifie their accounts themselves , and furnishing them with assurance that they can , and with no more to say but that they hop'd dr. st. would make his party good with mr. g. ? that things so precious to god as souls should be of no more value with those who set up for ministers of the gospel ! that their great and only care , as far as i see , should be to make a shew , and pass for some body here , let every one take his chance hereafter ! besides , truth is therefore truth , because 't is built on intrinsecal grounds which prove it to be such ; and not on private mens abilities , or their saying this or that ; wherefore till those grounds be produc'd , it cannot be with reason held truth : and dr. st. is more particularly oblig'd to make good he has such grounds , having had such ill fortune formerly with the principles to which he undertook to reduce protestant faith , as appears by the account given of them in error non-plust . . but , leaving these matters to be answer'd where we must all answer why we have believ'd so and so ; pray let us have fair play in the mean time . let every one bear his own burthen , and you not think to discharge your self by throwing your load on another man's shoulders . you affirm there is absolute certainty on the protestants side , and 't is for him to prove it who affirms it . if you do it but half so well as mr. g. can , and has , the infallibility which he asserts , you will earn thanks from one side , and admiration from the other . but it is for you to do it : to trick off proving the contrary upon your adversary , is to own that proving is a thing which agrees not with your constitution , and in which your heart misgives you . . yet even so you were uneasie still , and would not venture what mr. g. could do , as slightly as you think , or would have others think of him . you know well enough , that to prove protestants have no absolute certainty of their faith , is no hard task even for a weak man : you know any man may find it confess'd to his hand by protestants . and therefore you had reason to bethink your self of an expedient to trick it off again from that point , and put mr. g. to prove , that protestants have no absolute certainty as to the rule of their faith , viz. the scripture . the merits of this cause too i think will return hereafter more fitly ; in this place i mind only the art. pray , was not the very first question at the conference , whether protestants are absolutely certain that they hold now the same tenets in faith , and all that our saviour taught to his apostles ? and your answer that they are ? did our saviour teach , and do protestants believe no more , than that the book so call'd is scripture ? is certainty of this more , and certainty of this book all one ? and was not the question plainly of the certainty of this , and of all this more ? here is then an enquiry after one thing plainly turn'd off to another . yes ; but this was one of the two things which the whole conference depended upon . as if the whole conference did not depend on that thing which was to be made manifest by the conference , viz. the absolute certainty of protestant faith. mr. g. indeed did himself ask some questions about your certainty of your rule ; questions , whose course it was wisely done to cut off , before they had question'd away your certainty of faith. for , after they had caus'd it to be admitted , that the certainty of scripture is from tradition , there was no refusing to admit that tradition causes certainty , and makes faith as certain as scripture . and then it would have prov'd something difficult to satisfie even a willing man , that the faith is certain which is opposit to a faith come down by tradition . but it was seen whereto it would come , and thought fit to break off in time , and not let the conference proceed too far . in the mean time absolute certainty of scripture was not the point of the conference nor is it the point of concern . besides that 't is agreed on all hands , men are sav'd by believing and practising what christ taught , not barely by believing scripture is scripture : and salvation is the thing that imports us in these disputes , and 't were well that nothing else were minded by disputers . but it imported you it seems both to shift off proving from your self , and to stifle any further talk of the certainty of protestant faith , and keep us from looking that way by fixing our eyes on another object . and this is all you do ; but with so much art , that i verily think many a reader is persuaded you are talking all the while to the purpose . the truth is , you have reason to carry it as you do ; for it is good to avoid undertaking what cannot be perform'd : and you cannot , and i believe know you cannot make out , that protestants are absolutely certain , that they now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles , as you affirm'd in your answer to mr. g's first question . and this i thought it imported to tell you plainly and publickly , that it might be in your hands to pin the controversie-basket , and bring all catholics to your church ; where i will answer you will be sure to find us , if you make us sure we shall find this certainty there when we come . . in the mean time why has not mr. g. done already as much as should be done ? it is plain that where churches differ in faith , infallible faith in one , cannot stand with certain faith in the other . wherefore if mr. g. have fix'd infallibility in his own church , he has remov'd certainty from all that differ from her . let us then take and sift mr. g's argument , even as you put it , who had not , i suppose , partiality enough for him , to make it better than it was . you put it thus , p. , . . all traditionary christians believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so up to the time of our blessed saviour ; and if they follow this rule , they can never err in faith , therefore are infallible . and you ( mr. g. ) prov'd they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . and now , that there may be no mistake , let us take each proposition by it self . . the first is , [ all traditionary christians believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so up to the time of our blessed saviour . ] you have nothing to say to this , i hope : for since traditionary christians are those who proceed upon tradition , and tradition signifies immediate delivery , it follows , that unless they believe the same to day which they did yesterday , and so upwards , they cease to be traditionary christians , by proceeding not upon an immediate , but an interrupted delivery , or some other principle . and so there is no denying this proposition , but by affirming that traditionary christians are not traditionary christians . . the second proposition is this . [ and if they follow this rule , they can never err in faith. ] this is palpably self-evident : for , to follow this rule is to believe still the same to day which they did yesterday : and so , if they did this from christ's time , and so forwards , they must still continue to believe , to the end of the world , the self-same that christ and his apostles taught ; and , therefore , cannot err in faith , unless those authors of our faith did : which that they did not , is not to be prov'd to christians . . there follows this inference : [ therefore they are infallible . ] this is no less plainly self-evident . for these words [ they can never err in faith ] in the antecedent , and [ they are infallible ] in the consequent , are most manifestly the self-same in sense , and perfectly equivalent . . the fourth and last ( which according to you , aim'd to prove , that they could not innovate ) is this . [ they could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . ] and this is no less unexceptionable than its fellows . for , if they knew not they alter'd faith , when they alter'd it , they had forgot what they believ'd the day before . if they alter'd it wittingly , excuse them from malice who can ; who , believing , as all who proceed upon tradition do , that tradition is the certain means to convey the doctrin of christ , would notwithstanding alter the doctrin convey'd to them by tradition , pray what ails this argument ? and what wants it , save bare application , to conclude what was intended as fully and as rigorously as you can desire ? and , pray , what need was there to apply it to the roman church , and say she follow'd tradition , to you who deny it not either of the roman or greek church ? as every thing is true , and every thing clear ; who now besides your self would have thought of an evasion from it ? and yet you venture at one , such as it is . . you tell us then , ( p. . ) that you thought the best way to shew the vanity of this rare demonstration , was to produce an instance of such as follow'd tradition , and yet mr. g. could not deny to have err'd , and that was of the greek church , &c. you had e'en as good have said , what mr. g. says is true , but yet he does not say true for all that . for to pitch upon nothing for false , is , in disputes , to own that every thing is true . the best way , say you ? i should have thought it every jot as good a way to have said nothing when one has nothing to say . but yet the world is oblig'd to you for letting them know what scholars knew before , that protestants think it the best way to answer catholic arguments , to give them no answer at all : for you are not to be told that this instance of yours is not an answer to mr. g.'s argument , but a new argument against him of your own , which undoubtedly you might have produc'd as well as my lord falkland , if you had been , as my lord falkland was , arguing . but it is your turn now to answer . and must you be minded of what every smatterer in logic knows , that an answerer is confin'd to his concedo , his nego , and distinguo , as the propositions which he is to speak to ▪ are true , false or ambiguous ? he may deny the inference too , if he find more or other terms in the conclusion than in the premises . but these are his bounds ; and answering turns babbling , when they are exceeded . must you be minded that the business must be stopt before it come to the conclusion , and that otherwise there is no speaking against it ? for you know that if the premisses be right , and the inference good , the conclusion must be as necessarily . true , as it is that the same thing cannot be , and not be at once ; that is , must be more certain than that england , for example , shall not crumble into atoms , or be swallow'd up in the sea to morrow : for this , and a thousand such things may happen to all material nature ; that a contradiction should prove true , cannot . and 't is perfect contradiction that terms which cohere in the premises , by being the same with a third , should not cohere with one another in the conclusion . must you be minded that an arguer is to prove his conclusion , and an answerer to shew he does not , by assigning where and how he fails ? do you do any such matter ? do you so much as go about it ? and would you have what you say pass for an answer ? pray consider the case : the church of rome is infallible , says mr. g. : she is not , say you . he brings his argument , and you your instance against it . what are people the wiser now ? and which shall they be for ; the argument or the instance ? they have reason to think well of the argument , because you have no fault to find with it ; and they may think as they please of the instance . you would not , i suppose , have them believe you both , and think the church of rome for your sake fallible , and , for his , infallible at once . pray what assistance do you afford them to determin either way ? and what do you more than e'en leave them to draw cuts , and venture their souls as handy-dandy shall decide , for you or mr. g. ? 't is true , when zeno would needs be paradoxing against the possibility of motion , his vanity was not ill ridicul'd by the walking of diogenes before him . for 't was palpably and ridiculously vain to talk against motion with a tongue , that must needs move to talk against it . and there may be vanity too in our case , for ought i know : but where shall it be lodg'd ? why more with mr. g's . argument than your instance ? why is it more vain to pretend to prove infallibility , upon which depend the hopes which millions and millions have of a blessed eternity , and which is prov'd by arguments , to which you think it your best way not to attempt to answer , than it is to except against a conclusion , against the premises whereof there lies no exception ? that is , to find fault with a sum total , and find none in the particulars or the casting up : for a conclusion is a kind of sum total of the premises . but it is infinitely more vain to talk against one infallibility , unless you will set up another . for , if there be no means , by which men may be secur'd , that the ways they take to arrive at their greatest and only good will not deceive them it cannot be expected they will take all the pains that are necessary to compass that good , which for ought they can tell , they may not compass with all their pains . 't is a pleasant thing in you to talk of the vanity of mr. g's . demonstration , when , by seeking to take infallibility out of the world , you are making the whole creation vain . for all material nature was made for rational nature , and rational nature requires rational satisfaction in all its proceedings , and most of all in the pursuit of happiness : and what rational satisfaction can there be , if there may be deceit in whatever can be propos'd for satisfaction ? in short , the result of your instance , whatever was the aim , it is to amuse and confound people , and hinder them perhaps from seeing what otherwise would be clear ; but it shews them nothing , nor can ; for that argument of yours is not at all of a shewing nature . . 't is , at best , but an argument ( as they call it ) ad hominem ; which you know are of the worst sort of arguments . they serve for nothing but to stop an adversaries mouth , or shame him , if he cannot answer without contradicting himself ; but are of no use towards the discovery of truth . for a thing is not the more or less true , because such a man's tongue is ty'd up for speaking against it . but is it so much as an argument ad hominem ? as all the little force of the topic consists in the obligation which a man may have to grant or deny what it supposes he does , it affords no argument at all against the man who has no such obligation . and pray where does it appear that mr. g. is oblig'd not to deny that the greek church has err'd in matters of faith ? and how can you , of all men , suppose he is ? you , who in your rational account ( p. . ) quote these words from peter lombard ; the difference between the greeks and latins , is in words and not in sense ▪ name thomas a iesu , and azorius , and tell us of other roman catholic authors , of the same judgment , whom i suppose you could name . pray , how comes mr. g. to lye under an obligation , from which men of reputation in his own communion are exempt ? and what a wise argument ad hominem have you made against him , whom your self have furnish'd with an argument ad hominem to confute it when he pleases ? in fine , he goes to work like a scholar , puts his premises , and infers his conclusion , which you know cannot but be true , if there be no fault in his premises : and 't is for you to find one when you can . you put nothing to shew how the inference you make should be true , but barely assume , without proof , that he cannot deny it ( p. . ) : as if truth depended on his denying or affirming , and that what people say or think , made things true or false . and even , for so much , you are at his courtesie : if he be not the better natur'd , and will crossly affirm or deny in the wrong place , you and your argument are left in the lurch . in a word , one may see he aim'd at truth , who takes at least the way to it : what you aim'd at , you best know ; but no body shall ever discover what is , or is not true , by your method . . but that you may not complain , your cock is not suffer'd to fight , let us see what your instance will do . you put it thus , ( p. . ) the greek church went upon tradition from father to son , as much as ever the roman did . and i desir'd to know of mr. g. whether the greek church notwithstanding did not err in matters of faith ; and , if it did , then a church holding to tradition was not infallible . how ! if it did ? why then it is apparent if it did not , your argument holds not . and will you assume that the greek church errs , who believe she does not ? will you take a premise to infer a conclusion , upon which the salvation of people depends , which premise your self in your own heart think is not true ? can you deal thus with their souls , who pin them upon you , perswade them of what you are not perswaded your self , and offer them a securiy for their eternity , in which your own judgment tells you there is a flaw ? for you have declar'd your self upon this matter in your rational account , and taken great pains to clear the greek church , at least upon the article of the holy ghost , in which consists their main difference with the latins , and to which the other two you mention were added , i suppose , for fashion sake . i know you there propose to free that church from the charge of heresie . but pray what difference betwixt heresie and error in matter of faith ? unless you will trifle about obstinacy , and such collateral considerations ; which neither concern us here nor were any part of your defence there . i see too that you word it here conditionally , and with reference to mr. g's . answer : as if his answer made or marr'd , and the greek church did or did not err , as he says , i , or no. whatever mr. g. may say , or you have said , unless the greek church actually does err , your instance is no instance of a church that goes upon tradition and errs ; and your inference that then a church holding to tradition was not infallible , is wondrous pertinently inferr'd from the example of a church that errs not . pray take it well that i intreat you by all the care you have of your own soul , and should have of others , to manage disputes about faith a little otherwise , and not propose arguments , in which you must needs think your self there is no force . for there is plainly none in this , if the greek church does not err ; and you at least think she does not . i am sure 't is what i would not do my self for all the world. . but to proceed to mr. g's . answer , ( p. . ) it was say you , that the greek church follow'd tradition , till the arians left that rule and took up a new one , &c. and why has he not answer'd well ? you assum'd that the greek church err'd while it went upon tradition ; if you did not , you said nothing ; for , that a church may follow tradition at one time , and leave it at another , is no news . 't is the case of all erring churches which ever follow'd tradition at all . mr. g's reply then that tradition was follow'd till another rule was taken up , denies that tradition and error were found together , as you contended , in the greek church . and pray what more direct or more full answer can there be to an argument , than to deny the premises ? as slightly as you would seem to think of him , he understood disputing better than to start aside into an exception against your conclusion , but answers fair and home by denying the assumption from which you infer it ; which now he has done , you know it rests with you to prove it ; and yet you never think on 't , as far as i see ; but , as if you had no more to do , fall a complaining against mr. g. for speaking of the arians , and not of the present greek church ; and against his copy , for leaving out the inference which you drew . in doing which , if he did so , he did you no small kindness ; there being no premises to draw the inference from , as has been shewn above ; or if any , such as put you to contradict your own doctrin ere any thing could follow from them . . as for the omission of the inference , i know not how it happen'd , nor mean to meddle with matter of fact. but i see they had reason , who observ'd before me , that 't is a thing of no manner of consequence , i verily think , in your own judgment . unless you think the age we live in so dull , that , without much hammering it into their heads , it cannot be perceiv'd , that if a church has err'd which held to tradition , a church may err which holds to tradition . or , unless you think it of mighty consequence to have an inference stand in the relation which fell with the premises at the conference . mr. g. took them away by his denial , and you must begin again , and bring something from whence you may draw an inference , if you will needs have an inference ; for an inference cannot be drawn from nothing . pray divert us not perpetually from minding what we are about ; but remember the question now is , whether the greek church held to tradition and err'd at once ? and bethink your self , if you please of a medium , which will infer that point for you ; for mr. g. you see denies it . . from his mentioning the arians you take occasi-to speak big , and bear us in hand he was hard put to it , and sought an occasion , and affirm ( p. . ) you could get no answer at all to the case of the present greek church . as if his answer pincht on the arians , and were not as full to the present as past greek church . it goes on this , that those who err in faith , let them be who they will , and the error what it will , and in what time and place you will , all leave tradition . whether the case of the present greek church be the same with the arians , is matter of fact , with which mr. g. did well not to meddle ; it is for you to make it out , if you will make good your argument . modern or ancient heresie is all one to his answer , which is applicable to all heresie : and you complain of the want of an answer when you have one . pray , if a man should put an objection to you about an animal , for example , and you answer it of all animals , would you think it just in him to quarrel with you for not mentioning the rational or irrational in particular ? and yet this is your quarrel to mr. g. all your magnificent talk ( p. . ) of undeniably true , granted by mr. g. known to every one , &c. as apt as i see it is to make a reader believe your instance is notoriously true , and against which mr. g. has nothing to say , cannot make me , or any man of reason , who examins the point , believe he has any reason to say more , till you do . he has answer'd directly , and positively deny'd , that error and tradition can be found together in the greek church , or any other , modern or ancient . there it sticks , and you may drive it on farther ( it being your own argument ) if you please . only when you tell us ( p. . ) that the present greek church in all its differences with the roman , still pleaded tradtion , and adher'd to it , i wish you had told us whether you speak of differences in matter of faith , or no. for differences may be occasion'd by matters of faith , which are not differences in faith. if you do not , you support your instance very strongly , and prove the consistence of tradition with error in faith very learnedly , from differences which belong not to faith. if you do , as nature itches after strange sights , i long to see by what differences , or any thing else , it can be made out , that an erring church can still plead tradition , and adhere to it . not but that for pleading much may be , there are such confident doings in the world. as certain as it is , that the religion in england now , is not the same which it was before henry the eighth , i think there is confidence enough in england to plead tradition for it . 't is but finding some expression in an ancient writer , not couch'd with prophetical foresight enough to avoid being understood , as some will desire it should , and it will serve turn to pretend to antiquity , and bear the name of tradition . so i suspect you take it your self , when you say the arians insisted on tradition : for sure you do not think in earnest , that doctrin contrary to consubstantiality , was taught by christ , and believ'd from father to son till the council of nice . this , or some such thing may perhaps have been pleaded ; but for adhering to tradition , your servant . for , pray , did christ teach any error ? when a father believ'd what christ taught him , and the son what the father believ'd , did not the son too believe what christ taught ? run it on to the last son that shall be born in the world , must not every one believe what christ taught , if every one believ'd what his father believ'd ? and will you go about to persuade us , that there actually is a company of men in the world who adher'd to this method , all sons believing always as their fathers did , whereof the first believ'd as christ taught , and who notwithstanding err'd in matters of faith ? they would thank you for making this out , who would be glad that christ taught error and were not god. but it is not plainer that two and three make five , than it is that this cannot be . and yet you would top it upon us , and bear us in hand it is not only true , but apparent in the greek church , and known to every body who knows any thing of it . the comfort is , there is nothing for all these assertions but your word ; in which , where you stick not to pass it for an arrant impossibility , i for my part do not think there is absolute certainty . . i see not what there remains more , but to bear in mind where we are . at the conference , instead of answering mr. g's argument , you would needs make one of your own , which was in short ; the greek church goes upon tradition and errs , therefore another church may err which goes upon tradition . there was no need to trouble the greek church for the matter : it had been altogether as methodical , and as much to purpose , to have instanc'd in the latin church it self , and never gon further ; and shorter , to have spar'd instancing too , and have said without more ado , mr. g's conclusion is not true : for you do no more , till you make it appear , that the church you pitch upon for an instance , do's indeed adhere to tradition and err . but , because this had been too open , and people would have sooner perceiv'd that it had been to say , i know not how to answer mr. g's argument , but will notwithstanding stand to it , that his conclusion is false , you thought the best way to divert the reader 's attention from what 's before him , was to travel into greece ; and yet when you come there , do no more than if you had stay'd at home : for you barely say there is both tradition and error in the greek church , and you might have said as much of the latin ; or , without mentioning either , have said , tho' mr. g. has prov'd a traditionary church cannot err , i say it can and has . all is but saying till you come to proving : only to make a formal shew with an antecedent and a conclusion , you say it with the ceremony of an argument ; of which since mr. g. deny'd the antecedent , he had no more to do till you prov'd it . . so it stood at the conference , and so it stands still , and for ought i see , is like to stand : for tho' you have writ two letters since , there appears no word of proof in either , or sign that you do so much as think on it : you only say your instance over again , and would have the face you set upon it , and great words you give it , make it pass for plain and undeniable , when all the while it is plainly impossible , and actually deny'd . mr. g. i hope , will bide by his answer , because it is a good one , true in it self , and direct to the point : for it denies just what you assum'd , that the greek church stood upon tradition , and fell at the same time into error . and speaking as you do , or should do , of error in matter of faith , euclid never made any thing plainer than it is , that where ever error comes in , tradition goes out . of necessity therefore , if the present greek church have adher'd to tradition , it has not err'd : if it have err'd , it has not adher'd to tradition . which of the two is the case , neither concerns mr. g. nor can he dispute it without following bad example , that is , falling to argue now it is his part to answer . you would pass it upon us , that the greek church has err'd without swerving from tradition ; and you must either make it out , or acknowledge you have made much ado about nothing : for your instance is no instance , till it appears to be true ; till you do it , there is no work for mr. g. at the close ( p. . ) you desire mr. g. to make good two things , and tell us why you desire it , and what will follow if he accept or decline your motion . i neither understand how your proposals follow from your reasons , nor your consequences from your proposals : but think it no more worth losing time upon them , than you thought it worth boasting of the victory . the first is , that we [ protestants ] have no absolute certainty as to the rule of our faith , viz. the scripture ; altho' we have a larger and firmer tradition for it , viz. the consent of all christian churches , than you [ catholics ] can have for the points of faith in difference between us . . i can tell you a better reason for this proposal than any you give . there was no avoiding to own absolute certainty to a man who talk'd of quitting your communion without it . but you knew well enough that your absolute certainty would be thwittled into sufficient certainty , and sufficient certainty into no certainty at last ; and had your wits about you when you thought of this proposal : for it is in effect to say , this certainty of faith is a troublesom matter , and not for my turn ; let us go to something else , leave faith and pass to scripture ; of which you , mr. g. shall prove we have no absolute certainty : for , if i should go about to prove we have , i foresee , that while i am seeking harbor in my larger and firmer tradition , i shall venture to split upon your infallibility , to contradict my th principle for the faith of protestants , and fall at unawares into the snares laid for me in error nonplust , from p. to p. , which i have no mind to come near . but whatever reasons you had to make this proposal , i see none that mr. g. has to accept it . do you prove , if you please , that you have absolute certainty ; you , who bear those in hand who consult you , that you have ; and absolute certainty too of that of which you profess'd your self absolutely certain , viz. that you now hold all the same doctrin that was taught by christ and his apostles ; which by your own confession there , is the true point . for you know very well , one is not certain of his faith by being certain of scripture : your self take all who dissent from yours , to have not only an vncertain , but a wrong faith , else why do you dissent from them ? and yet they have all as much certainty of scripture as you . the truth is , if you were prest to make out your absolute certainty even of scripture in your way , you would perhaps find a hard task of it , for all your appeal to tradition . but it was not the point for which the conference was , nor ought it be the point here , neither ought mr. g. to meddle with it , and you trust much to his good nature to propose it : for , besides that all the thanks he would have for his pains , would be to have the arguments against your certainty , turn'd against the certainty of scripture one day , as if he did not believe scripture certain : you would have him undertake a matter in which he has no concern , to save you from an undertaking in which you are deeply concern'd , but with which you know not how to go thorow ; which is a very reasonable request . in a word , it is for you either to make manifest now , what you should have made manifest at the conference , viz. that protestants have absolute certainty , not only of the scripture , which they call their rule , but of the faith which they pretend to have from that rule ; or else to suffer another thing to be manifest , viz. that i said true when i said you cannot do it ; and thither i am sure it will come . . however , i am glad to hear any talk from you of absolute certainty , even tho' it be but talk : 't is a great stranger , as coming from your quarters , and has a friendly and an accommodating look , and therefore for both regards deserves a hearty welcome . for , this very profession makes a fair approach towards the doctrin of infallibility , or rather 't is the self-same with it ; it being against common sense to say you judge your self absolutely certain of any thing , if at the same time you judge you may be deceiv'd in thus judging . but i accept the omen that you seem to grant you are thus absolutely certain , or infallible , by virtue of tradition ; for this makes tradition to be an infallible ascertainer in some things at least ; and , so , unless some special difficulty be found in other things that light into the same channel , it must needs bring them down infallibly too . now i cannot for my heart discern what great difficulty there can be to remember all along the yesterdays faith , or to be willing to be guided and instructed by their yesterdays fathers , teachers and pastors ; especially the sense of the points ( to omit many other means ) being determin'd by open and daily practice . yet i a little fear all this your seeming kindness for tradition , is only for your own interest ; and that , because you were necessitated to make use of it to abet scripture's letter , you allow it in that regard , these high complements ; but in other things , particularly in conveying down a body of christian faith ( which is incomparably more easie ) it will presently become useless and good for nothing . in the former exigency you esteem it a worthy rule , but in the later duty , a rule worthy — . now to let the reader plainly see that it was meer force , and not inclination , which oblig'd you to grant an absolute certainty in tradition conveying down scriptures letter , we will examin what you allow'd it when you laid your principles , and so spoke your own free thoughts unconstrain'd by any adversary : your fifteenth principle is put down ( p. . ) in error nonplust , and that part of it that concerns this present point , is thus reflected upon by your adversary ( p. , . ) [ again , tho all this were true , and that the scriptures were own'd as containing in them the whole will of god so plainly reveal'd , that no sober enquirer can miss of what 's necessary to salvation , and that therefore there needed no church to explain them : yet 't is a strange consequence , that therefore there can be no necessity of any infallible society of men to attest them , or to witness that the letter of scripture is right . this is so far from following out of the former part of dr. st's . discourse , that the contrary ought to follow ; or , from prejudicing his own pretence , that it conduces exceedingly to it . for certainly his sober enquirer would less be in doubt to miss of what 's necessary to salvation in case the letter , on which all depends , be well attested , than if it be not ; and most certainly an infallible society of men can better attest that letter than a fallible one : and those writings can with better shew of reason be own'd to contain in them the will of god , if their letter be attested beyond possibility of being wrong , than if left in a possibility of being such ; for if the letter be wrong , all is wrong in this case — ] as manifest then as 't is , that to be absolutely certain of any thing , is not to be fallibly certain of it ; that is , as manifest as 't is , that to be absolutely certain of a thing , is to be infallibly certain of it ; so manifest it is , that you there contradict your self here , and , that , however you may endeavour to come off , you allow not heartily , nor without some regret and reluctancy , an absolute certainty to tradition , even in attesting scripture's letter . . in these words of yours ( p. ) [ as to the rule of our faith ] give me leave to reflect on the word [ ovr , ] and thence to ask you , who are yov ? a question which i ask not of your name or sirname , but of your judgment ( as you call it ) of discretion . are you a socinian , an arian , a sabellian , an eutychian , &c. or what are you ? are you a whole , or a half , or a quarter-nine-and thirty-article man ? do you take them for snares , or fences , and when for the one , and when for the other , and wherefore ? these words [ the rule of ovr faith ] make you all these at once ; for all these profess unanimously scripture's letter is their rule of faith. mr. g. when he came to your house , imagin'd he was to treat with a protestant , or something like it , and to have learn'd from you what absolute certainty you would assign for your , ( that is , protestant ) faith ; and you give him only a generical latitudinarian rule , common to all the heresies in the world. the project of the comprehension bill was a trifle to this : it brings into one fold all the most enormous straglers that have been since christ's time , nay wolves , and sheep and all . it blends into one mass the most heterogeneous and hitherto irreconcilable sects . nay , it miraculously makes light and darkness very consistent , and christ and belial very good friends . for your own credit sake then distinguish your kind of protestants ( if you be indeed one of that church ) from that infamous rabble of stigmatiz'd hereticks ; and let us know what is the proper difference that restrains that notion of a common rule to your particular , as such a kind of protestant , and shew us that specifical rule to be absolutely certain . i say , such a kind ; for even the word protestant too is a subaltern genus , and has divers species , and 't is doubted by many , who are no papists , under which species you are to be rankt . but , why should i vex you with putting you upon manifest impossibilities ? for the letter being the common rule to them all , and , as daily experience shews us , variously explicable , that which particularizes it to belong specially to this or that sect , as its proper rule , can be only this , [ according as my self , and those of my iudgment understand or interpret it . ] the difference then constituting your protestant rule , as distinguisht from that of those most abominable heresies , can only be [ as my own iudgment , or others of my side , thus or thus interpret scripture's letter ] and wriggle which way you please , there it will and must end at last . go to work then , distinguish your self by your ground of faith , and then make out this your proper rule to be absolutely certain or infallible ; and then , who will not laugh at you for attempting it , and assuming that to your self , which you deny to god's church , and preferring your self as to the gift of understanding scripture right , before the whole body of those many and learned churches in communion with rome ? nay , and before the socinians too ; without so much as pretending to make out to the world , that you have better means , either natural or supernatural , to interpret those sacred oracles , than had the others . . my last exception is , that you pretend the letter of scripture is a rule of faith for your people , which not one in a million , even of your own protestants relies on , or ever thinks of relying on , in order to make choice of their faith , or determining what to hold . this pretence of yours looks so like a meer jest , that i cannot perswade my self you are in earnest , when you advance such a paradox . for , 't is manifest that while your protestants are under age , and not yet at years of discretion to judge , they simply believe their fathers and teachers ; that is , they follow the way of tradition , however misplac'd . and , when they come to maturity , pray tell us truly , how many of your sober enquirers have you met with in your life , who endeavour to abstract from all the prejudices they have imbib'd in their minoriy , and , reducing their inclin'd thoughts to an equal balance of indifferency , do with a wise jealousie , lest this popish way of believing immediate fathers and pastors should delude them , as it has done the whole world formerly , resolve to examin the book of scripture it self , read it attentively , pray daily and fervently , that god's spirit would discover to them , whether what they have learn'd hither to be true or no , and what is ; and , in a word , use all the fallible means ( for you allow them no other ) which your sober enquirers are to make use of to find out their faith ? i doubt , if you would please to answer sincerely , you would seriously confess you scarce ever met with such a one in your life ; that is , never met with any one who rely'd upon scripture's letter practically for his rule of faith , whatever you may have taught them to talk by rote . can any man of reason imagin , that all the reformed in denmark or sueden ( to omit others ) did light to be so unanimously of one religion meerly by means of reading your letter-rule , and your sober enquiry ? or can any be so blind , as not to see , that 't is the following the natural way of tradition , or childrens believing fathers ( that is , indeed , of education ) that such multitudes in several places , continue still of the same perswasion ; and that you consequently owe to this way , which you so decry in catholics , that any considerable number of you do voluntarily hang together at all ? and that those principles of yours , which you take up sor a shew , when you write against catholics , would , if put in practice , in a short time crumble to atoms all the churches in the world ? perhaps , indeed , when your protestants come at age , they may receive some confirmation from their fathers and preachers , quoting scripture-places against what catholics hold , or what they shall please to say they hold ; and by the same means come to believe a trinity , the godhead of christ , christ's body being absent in the sacrament , and such like ; but do the hearers and learners make it their business to use all careful disquisition ( for a slubbering superficial diligence will not serve the turn in matters of such high concern ) whether the catholics , and those great scripturists , who deny those other points , do not give more congruous explications of those places than their own preachers do ? unless they do this , or something equivalent , 't is manifest the letter of scripture is not their rule , but honest tradition . and that they do no such thing , is hence very apparent , that they rest easily satisfi'd , and well appaid with their parson's interpretation of scripture , they presently accept it for right and good , and readily swallow that sense , which some learned men , of their own judgment , assign it , without thinking themselves oblig'd to observe your method of sober enquiry . you may rail against the council of trent , as you will , for forbidding any to interpret scripture against the sense which the church holds ; but 't is no more than what your hearers perpetually practise , and the preachers too ( for all their fair words ) expect from them . and i much doubt even your self ( tho' your principles are the most pernicious for taking matters out of the churche's , and putting them into private hands , of any protestant , i ever yet read ) would not take it very well if some parishioner of yours , presuming upon his prayers for direction , &c. should tell you that you err'd in interpreting scripture , and that the sense he gave it , was sound and right faith , yours wrong and heretical ; and i would be glad to know what you would say to him , according to your principles , if he should hap to stand out against you , that he understands scripture to be plainly against a trinity and christ's divinity , as iohn biddle did against the minister of his parish , and the whole church of england to boot . 't is plain you ought to cherish and commend him for standing firm to his rule ; but i am much afraid you would be out of humor with him , and esteem your self affronted . you may pretend what you please of high expressions given by antiquity , of scripture's incomparable excellency , and sufficiency for the ends it was intended for , which we do not deny to it ; but i dare say , even your self do's not think , that either the ancient faithful , or the modern reformers , meant that any of the ecclesia credens , or believing church , should have the liberty to interpret scripture against the ecclesia docens , or teaching church , i. e. pastors ; or coyn a faith out of it , contrary to the present or former congregation of which he was a member . . the sum is ; 't is evident hence , that tradition of your fathers and teachers , and not scriptures letter , is indeed your rule ; that by it you interpret scripture ; which then only is call'd your rule , and made use of as such , when you are disputing against us ; because having thus set it up , to avoid and counterbalance the authority of the former church you left , you make account your own private interpretation of it may come to be thought argumentative against the great body of those churches from whose communion you departed ; and yet you judge no private parishioner should claim the same priviledge against you , without affronting your great learning , and pastoral authority . but i much wonder you should still venture to call scripture's letter a rule of faith , having been beaten from that tenet so pitifully in error nonplust , from pag. . to pag. . where i believe you may observe divers particulars requisit to be clear'd e're the letter can be in all regards absolutely certain , which the consent of all christian churches will never reach to by their meer authority , unless you will allow the sense of christ's doctrin descending by tradition , did preserve the copy substantially right and intire . . your pretended rule of faith then , being in reality the same that is challeng'd by all the heretics in the world , viz. scripture's letter interpreted by your selves ; i will let you see in this following short discourse , how far it is from being absolutely certain . i. god has left us some way to know surely what christ and his apostles taught . ii. therefore this way must be such , that they who take it , shall arrive by it at the end it was intended for ; that is , know surely what christ and his apostles taught . iii. scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not that way ; for we experience presbyterians and socinians ( for example ) both take that way , yet differ in such high fundamentals , as the trinity , and the godhead of christ. iv. therefore scripture's letter interpretable by private iudgments , is not the way left by god to know surely what christ and his apostles taught , or surely to arrive at right faith. v. therefore they who take only that way , cannot by it arrive surely at right faith , since 't is impossible to arrive at the end , without the means or way that leads to it . . i do not expect any answer to this discourse , as short as it is , and as plain and as nearly as it touches your copyhold ; it may be serv'd as mr. g's argument is , turn'd off so so with an instance , if there be one at hand ; or , with what always is at hand , an irony or scornful jest , your readiest , and , in truth , most useful servants : but you must be excus'd from finding any proposition or inference to deny , or any thing , save the conclusion it self : which , tho' it will not be fairly avoided , i cannot hope should be fairly admitted , unless i could hope that men would be more in love with truth than their credit . till truth be taken a little more to heart , catholic arguments will and must always be faulty ; but they are the most unluckily and crosly faulty of any in the world ; faulty still in the wrong place . when fault is found in other arguments , it is always found in the premisses ; in these , 't is found in the conclusion : in which , notwithstanding , all who know any thing of a conclusion , know there can be no fault , if there be none in the premisses . indeed , they shew that to be true which men cannot endure should be true ; and that is their great and unpardonable fault . that you may not think i talk in the air , i declare openly , that you cannot answer this discourse , unless you will call some unconcerning return an answer ; and i engage my self to shew the proposition true , and the inference good , which you shall pitch upon to deny ; and the distinction , if you will make any , not to purpose . the truth is , i engage for no great matter ; for i know beforehand you can no more answer now , than you could to error nonplust , or can prove an absolute certainty in protestant faith. . to return now to mr. g. the second thing which you desire him to make good , is , that the tradition from father to son is an infallible conveyance of matters of faith , notwithstanding the greek church is charged by him with error , which adher'd to tradition . that is , you desire him to prove over again , what you tell us your self he has prov'd once already : for you tell us ( p. ) , he prov'd , that they [ traditionary christians ] could not innovate in faith , unless they did forget what they held the day before , or out of malice alter it . pray , when it is prov'd , that the conveyance of faith by tradition , excludes the possibility of change in faith , save by forgetfulness or malice , is it not prov'd , that , where there could be neither forgetfulness nor malice , there could be no change in faith ? you do not , i suppose , desire he should prove , that men had always memories , or that christians were never malicious enough to damn themselves and posterity wittingly ; and yet it can stick no where else : if it can , said mr. g. assign where . now you know very well , that a conveyance which makes it impossible that faith should ever be chang'd , is an infallible conveyance ; and the very thing is prov'd which you desire should be prov'd . what reason has mr. g. to prove it a second time ? and what reason have you to desire it ? if proof would content you , you have it already ; but a second cannot hope to content you better than the first , unless it be worse . . yes , but you would have him prove , notwithstanding the greek church &c. ( p. . ) notwithstanding ? why do you think it is with arguments as with writs , where the want of a non obstante spoils all ? when a truth is once prov'd , is it not prov'd , notwithstanding all objections ? and will any notwithstanding unprove it again ? will your notwithstanding shew us there was a time in which men were not men , nor acted like men ? will it shew us , that a thing which cannot possibly be chang'd , may yet possibly remain not the same ? will it shew us , that a cause can be without its effect , or an effect without its cause ? will it shew us , that a thing can be and not be at once ? unless it can do such feats as these , you may keep your notwithstanding to your self , for any service it will do you here : for all the notwithstandings in the world cannot hinder a thing which is true , from being true ; nor the proof which proves it to be true , from being a proof . mr. g's proof shews , that tradition from father to son is an infallible conveyance of faith as plainly as that men are men : and would you persuade us with the rhetorick of your notwithstanding , that we do not see what we see ? tho' you had brought twenty of them instead of one , we could see nothing by them , but that you had a good fancy ; for they shew us nothing of the object , nor offer at it . you shew us not how the operations of human nature should be suspended in our present case , nor any thing which should or could suspend them , but would have us believe men were prodigiously forgetful or malicious , purely for the sake of an imagination of yours . i pray rub up afresh your old logical notions , and reflect whether it were ever heard of in university disputes , that when an argument is advanc'd , the defendant is allow'd to make objections against it ; and instead of answering , bid the arguer prove his conclusions to be true , notwithstanding all his objections ? consider how perfectly this confounds the offices of the disputant and defendent , and makes all regular discourse impossible . consider how this new method of yours destroys the very possibility of ever concluding any thing that is , the very faculty of reasoning ; for objections being generally multipliable without end , if all of them must be solv'd e're any argument concludes , nothing will be concluded , nor any conclusion admitted : and so a long so farewel to rational nature . consider that truth is built on its own intrinsecal grounds , and not on the solving objections . for your own credits sake then with learned men and logicians , do not seek to evade with notwithstandings , but answer fairly and squarely to the argument as it lies : consider , that who has found the cause , has found the effect . mr. g. has found us a cause of infallible conveyance , and therefore has shew'd us an infallible conveyance . you pretend , that tho' there was the cause , there was not the effect ; and this 't is known beforehand cannot be , and you knew it as well as any body : but you knew likewise there was no saving your stakes without playing a new game ; and therefore , give you your due , did all that could be done , in trying to divert our sight from a matter plain before us , and amuse us us with a matter of fact , which you are sure will be obscure enough , by that time it is handled long enough . the terms you put , viz. tradition , error , and the greek church , must needs bring into dispute , whether such and so many quotations , or some one or two men disclaiming their tenet to be a novelty , be a proof of tradition from father to son ; whether the error be any error ; and whether , and for how much , an error in faith , and how much of it belongs to divinity ; whether the greek church be ingag'd by a citation from a greek author ; of two that be cited , one against another , which shall be preferr'd , and thought to speak the sense of his church ; and which is a latiniz'd , which a frank grecian . and who shall see through the mists which these disputes will raise ? more too will fall in in process of time : there will be wrangling about the sense of words , the propriety of phrases , the preference of readings , and twenty such important quarrels ; which will tire out every body , and satisfie no body . in short , you saw that if you could perswade people not to think the church of rome infallible , till all be said , which will occur to be said of the greek church , you are safe enough ; for doomsday will come before that day . till then you may carry it with a shew of erudition , because there must be abundance of greek cited . and this is all which can come of your instance ; and i wish it were not all you had in your eye . . in the mean time you have not answer'd mr. g. because you have found no fault in any proposition , or in the inference of his argument ; and therefore it rests with you to answer it . he has answer'd you ; because he has found this fault with your instance , which you make your antecedent , that it is not true ; and that the greek church did not at once err in faith , and adhere to tradition : and therefore it rests again with you to prove it ; and yet while you are debtor both ways , you call upon him to pay . ere we part , take this along with you , that the debt which you are precisely bound to satisfie , first is to answer his argument , and till you do this , you can claim no right to object or argue . i am sir your humble servant . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. tillotson's rule of faith , p. , . pag. . dr. st's second letter , p. . there can be no necessity suppos'd of any infallible society of men , either to attest or explain these writings among christians . dr. st. principle . dr. st's copy . non vltra, or, a letter to a learned cartesian settling the rule of truth, and first principles, upon their deepest grounds / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. 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[ ], - p. printed for a. roper ..., london : mdcxcviii [ ] attributed to john sergeant by wing and nuc pre- imprints. reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng truth -- religious aspects -- christianity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion non vltra : or , a letter to a learned cartesian ▪ settling the rule of truth , and first principles , upon their deepest grounds . by i. s. london , printed for a. roper , at the black-boy , over against st. dunstan's church , in fleet-street , mdcxcviii . to the much honoured sir edward southcot , knight and baronet . sir , 't is so unusual a complement , to make a person of your quality a judge in a philosophical controversie , that it will be admir'd at by those who do not know you ▪ and , i fear , scarce accepted by your self . such studies do so seldom colour with the profession of a gentleman , that he must be much rais'd above the common , who can merit the esteem of being fit for such an umpirage . to be held , not only a lover of learning , but a discerner too in that highest sort of knowledge , is such a starry embellishment to a noble extraction , and sets such a deep stamp of honour upon it , that it gives a double tincture of excellency to such illustrious persons , and ranks them in the first file of heroes . in the time of augustus , when the roman learning was in its zenith , such famous worthies might have been easily met with ; but they are so rare now-a-days , that they seem uncouth , and look like monsters : and such , indeed , they are , in scaliger's phrase ; that is , monsters of perfection . great men do generally , now , so undervalue learning , and 't is so despicably-little in their eye , as if they took a view of it at the wrong end of the prospective . the noble sir kenelm digby , the honourable mr. boyle , and some few others , have rescu'd the universality of their peers from this imputation : but , now that they have left us , such personages are so very thin-sown , that , for any thing we see , there are but few left , besides your self , who give us any prospect of keeping alive a succession of men , endow'd with that renowned character . yet , ignorance and folly are such ignoble blemishes , that knowledge , in common , does still uphold it self , with the generality of mankind , in a fair esteem : but , this thing , call'd [ philosophy , ] looks like such a bug-bear to most of our modern great ones , that the very name and sound of it puts them in a marvellous fright ; whence , 't is no wonder men do not love , or esteem amiable , what they fear , and look upon as hideous . whereas , indeed , the study of philosophy is no more but the improvement of our reason , ( by which we are men , ) in reading , and ( to a fair degree ) understanding the book of the world ; or , in knowing those things , with which , whether we will or no , we must converse , and be concern'd daily . certainly , their palate is much out of taste , who cannot relish a benefit so natural to our soul ; but think it below the station of a gentleman , to regard it . i could wish such men would please to reflect upon what kind of objects their thoughts and affections are employ'd , while they neglect this. i believe it would shame their choice , if they duly consider'd what empty toys they pursu'd , and preferr'd before this solid and substantial good. philosophy , truly such , and rightly understood , is far from being such a frightful thing as their imagination paints it ; being only plain , natural reason , polish'd , better'd and elevated by art and reflexion : so that they who check at the knowledge of philosophy , ought , with much better reason , find fault with the teaching persons of quality to sing , dance or play on the lute : unless they think it very prudent , and expedient , to give our voice , feet and fingers the best advantages we can , to perform their actions artificially , and exactly ; but , that 't is a very needless folly to perfect the knowing power of our soul ; and wondrous wise , to let it still doze on sluggishly , in its home-spun native rudeness , and lie wholly uncultivated . nay , such gentlemen would be much offended their houses should not be clean swept , and garnish'd ; yet , they are not , in the least , concern'd , that cobwebs should hang in the windows of their intellect , and dusty ignorance dim and blear the sight of the noble inhabitant . but , where is this philosophy all this while ? or , is there , indeed , any such thing in nature ? whatever glorious attributes some have given it , they all agree in this , that it is the knowledge of truth : if so , then , as truth can be but one , so it should follow , that ●either can there be more than one ●●ilosophy which is the true one and , that all others are but 〈◊〉 pretended ; and , consequently , in reality , fabulous , and erroneous . where , then , shall we certainly find this one , or only-true philosophy ? multitudes of sects did , of old , set up to drive the trade and profession of philosophizing : but , they all broke , and shut up shop , having but a very few chance-customers ; except that great man , ( whom st. hierome calls , ingenii humani finis , ) aristotle . he , i say , alone , has got quiet possession of the schools , for a long time ; and , ha● now strengthen'd his title , by an immemorial prescription : nor did any pretender of note put in his claim against him , till , in our days , the admirably-ingenious cartesius declared himself his competitor . till then , aristotle being drawn into different senses , by his many-minded commentators amongst the modern school-men , those men who were of sharp wits , and hated jurare in verba — were in danger to turn scepticks ; and began to think that truth was either flown to heaven in astraea's coach ; or , ( as some antients thought , ) was in puteo defossa ; or else , if she were above-ground , that she was sequester'd in some terrestrial paradise ; so that none could get knowledge of her habitation , or come at her . in this juncture , to rescue the flower of mankind from falling into perfect scepticism , and to encourage them still to hope for truth in philosophy , there arose , very opportunely , those great men , thomas albius , sir kenelm digby , and cartesius ; who were , all of them , in a manner contemporary : all of them promis'd science , which kept up those men's drooping spirits from despair of truth . the former two of these , in many of their main principles , declar'd themselves aristotelians ; as also did those who follow'd their philosophy : whereas , cartesius ravell'd all the schemes hitherto woven by others , moulded all the world in a new frame ; and set up for his single self , without any copartner . by which you see , sir , that your task , which seem'd at first so vast , and endless , is reduc'd , and confin'd to this one enquiry ; viz. to determin ( in your own thoughts at least , whether you think fit to pronounce sentence , or no ) which party , viz. these followers of aristotle , or of cartesius , are true philosophers . on which side soever the lot falls , it follows of course , that , since they contradict one another , the other , let them talk and write as long as they will , are , in reality , none . still you will complain , that even this is beyond the extent of your narrow province , and exceeds the purlew of your reading , and thinking too . but i dare assure you , sir , that this present debate is of that nature , that it requires no more to decide it , than a fair stock of clear and penetrative natural reason ; in which your discerning genius ( besides what acquisition may have added to it ) is well known to be abounding , and no way deficient . to perform this , there needs no sedulous and tedious turning over all the books writ by both parties , or scanning the force of their arguments . providence would be wanting to mankind , were there no other way than this left us , to know where truth is to be found : nor would man's life be long enough for such an endless task . i know not what untoward ways men , who love much talk , have fram'd to themselves , and introduced into the world : but , certainly , the god of truth , who envies not to mankind his best natural perfection , exact knowledge , or true science , has furnish'd us with a more compendious , and more sure method , if we will but follow it : which is , to examin which party , what book , what discourse has right principles ; and , which not . if two mathematicians follow their principles , and yet differ in their conclusions , we may be sure the pretended principles of one of them are no principles at all : and the same , for the same reason , holds in all other sciences . but , how shall we know who has true , or right principles ? most easily , by examining the first principles either side pretends to . for , if the first principles may be fallacious , and , consequently , none ; then the second principles , which depend on the first , can be none neither ; and , so , they will be unavoidably convinc'd to have no kind of principles at all . nor is it possible for any man to be ignorant , whether the first principles , or first truths , which are to be the rule of knowing all other truths , be truly such ; because these must be self-evident , most firmly grounded , unmistakable , and necessarily assented to , by all mankind ; as is demonstrated in the following treatise ; and , indeed , is evident by common reason . again , if either side would pass upon us gratuitous , or unprov'd supposisitions , for principles ; or decline the way of connexion of our simple apprehensions , in which all truth formally consists ; and , without which , all discourses must be necessarily incoherent : lastly , if the rule of knowing truth which one party assigns , be such , that even learned men may be mistaken , and deceiv'd , while they think they follow it ; in all these cases , i say , 't is incontestably evident , that that party are no philsophers : nor can know any thing at all , if nature be not kinder to them , than their own unprincipl'd doctrine . you see , sir , by this time , that a gentleman , endow'd with a far less perfection of understanding than your self is master of , may , by these tests , determin , who are true philosophers , who not : as also , how all controversies in philosophy may be easily decided ; how all occasions of wrangling about particular tenets , may be avoided ; and , lastly , how the fiercest opposers , if they really seek after truth , may be reconcil'd , and satisfy'd . 't is the business of this following paper , to let you into the certain knowledge , what kind of propositions are the first principles , and the rule of knowing all truth whatever . the first step we take into our inmost thoughts , we meet with and discover these primary truths : whose self-evidence is the earliest light that dawns to our soul , as soon as over her power of knowing awakens into action . 't is a subject , tho' most necessary , and of the highest influence , yet neglected by writers hitherto . two or three have , indeed , spoken of it ; but , none i know of , has handl'd it professedly , and at large . tho' it be dry , and requires chawing ere it becomes nutritive ; yet , i dare presume , it is solid , and not at all windy . even , seeds , when first planted , are dry ; which , yet , hinders them not from yielding a large increase afterwards : the first principles are the seeds of all truths ; which , by how much their roots are laid deeper , so much higher they rear and extend their branches . the present i offer you , is small ; but the little it contains , ( as far as concerns this subject , ) is wrought entirely out of natural and reflected reason , without being beholding at all to the dishonourable task of transcribing ; as some pieces , i could name , are . i dare undertake , that the reasons produc'd here , are so firmly grounded , that they can fear no opposition but drollery , the last effort of nonplust reason . you will not expect fine language , in a matter that cannot bear it . self-evidence is so brightly luminous , that nothing can make it more glossy : nor is all the eloquence in the world able to do these first truths any service at all : all attempts to burnish or varnish them , do , instead of doing this , dawb and hide them ; as painting does a perfect beauty . the sum is ; the whole controversie , now agitated , is this ; whether of these two philosophies abovesaid is built on more evident principles ; or , has a more self-evident , and unmistakable rule of knowing ; and , your steady , and equally-poiz'd iudgment , is requested to hold the scales . what the trifle i here send you , wants in worth , is , i am sure , abundantly supply'd by the sincere respects , which are , at the same time , presented you by , much honoured sir , your ever devoted , and very humble servant . i. s. honoured sir , . i give you many thanks for your kind visit. had you known how welcome it was , i am confident you would have accepted my kind invitation , and have gratify'd my request that you would repeat it often . but your exceeding modesty and civility , did , it seems , fear that might be a trouble , which , i do heartily assure you , was esteem'd by me as a high favour . of which i thought i could give you no better testimony , than by letting you see that i am not willing that small scantling of your conversation you then allow'd me , should be lost . wherefore , i thought it not amiss to give you a rehearsal of it , as far as my memory reaches at such a distance ; and withal , my sentiments of the several particulars then touch'd upon ; what my first thoughts of them were then , and my second thoughts since : not debarring myself the liberty of adding some farther reflexions that occurr'd to me , while i was writing this paper ; because the treating of many things confusedly , ere any one was concluded , made the tenour of our conference uneven , and shatter'd ▪ for , in discoursing of principles , a slow pace is the surest ; and , when wit is too nimble , it hazards to lame reason and iudgment , to keep pace with it . . i must confess , dear sir , that when i heard you discourse , you did it so ingeniously in the cartesian way of wit , which consists in explicating and doubting , and seems to exclude proving , that i did not see how the great cartesius himself could have defended his doctrine better : for , he could not have doubted more scrupulously than you did ; nor , i think , have explicated himself more ingeniously . you guarded his doctrine so warily , that it was scarce possible to attack it . tho' , that i may not flatter you , i cannot say you did this by the evidence of any proposition you advanc'd , but by your ready exceptions against any thing that art or nature could oppose ; at least , taking them as manag'd by one no better skill'd than i am . your cause seem'd to me , as if it had been secur'd in some castle ; made impregnable , not by means of the ordinary methods of fortification , us'd in lawful war ; but , ( which is against the old laws of arms , ) by a kind of enchantment . your bulwarks , entrenchments and redoubts lay so cunningly hid in your way of ideas , that they were altogether invisible ; so that the most quick-sighted engineer living could not discern them , or take any sure aim at them : much less such a dull eye as mine ; who , tho' i bend my sight as strongly and steadily as i am able , yet i cannot , for my heart , see what kind of things those spiritual ideas are . and , which leaves me in a helpless condition as to that particular , such very ingenious cartesians as mr. le grand , who , having por'd so long upon them , should be best acquainted with them , and therefore best qualified to inform me what they are , gives me no account of them ; unless we can think there may be such things as are made up of contradictions , and altogether chimerical . as you may see in the d examen of my ideae cartesianae expensae , §§ . , , , , . . now , sir , this looks like a kind of rosycrucianism in philosophy , to build all your doctrine on ideas , and yet keep the secret among your selves , and conceal from us what those same ideas are . indeed , our doctrine , which makes our notions , conceptions , or simple apprehensions , to be the very things objectively in our understanding , seems very abstruse to those who guide themselves by fancy , and not by connexion of terms ; in regard it depends on the manner of operating proper to spiritual natures ; which is above our common speculation concerning natural subjects , and is only reachable by those who are well vers'd in metaphysicks : yet , notwithstanding , i tell you plainly ( preliminary d . ) what these notions are : i explicate them fully , so that none can doubt what i mean by them : nay , more ; i bring there many ( at least pretended ) demonstrations , to prove they must be such ; none of which mr. le grand ( if he do , indeed , differ from me in that point ) has thought fit to solve . this being so , you would very much oblige me , if you would help me to the sight of any cartesian author , who has so clearly and candidly given us his thoughts concerning your ideas ; who has fully explain'd their nature , defin'd them , and attempted to demonstrate they must be such . which if it be not done , all other sorts of philosophers in the world have reason to complain that they are very hardly dealt with . for your method calls into doubt , in a manner , all the ways of knowing held by mankind , till cartesius's time : and you would have us renounce all our former judgments , and accept nothing for certain , but what appears to us by your way of ideas ; and yet you will not give us a clear and distinct knowledge , what your ideas are , nor demonstrate them to be such as you would have us believe them to be : without which , perhaps there are no such things as those ideas of yours ; nor , consequently , is your way of philosophy , building all our science upon such ideas , any way at all . but , to return to our conference . . foreseeing i should not be able to give satisfaction to your acute wit , without beginning from the very bottom-ground of all truth , ( to do which my own genius also inclin'd me , ) i alledg'd , that it was manifest we could neither speak true nor false , without affirming , or denying , ( which we use to call formal truth ; ) and therefore , that truth was no where to be found , but in such speeches as were affirmative , or negative : which kind of speeches logicians call propositions . also , that all truth , if affirmatively express'd , consists in the connexion of the two main parts of a proposition ; which logicians call , its terms , or extremes ; and that , for the same reason , if those terms were unconnected , the proposition was false . i flatter'd my self , you would become convinc'd thus far ; the ground i built on being unavoidable , my deductions thence immediate , and the consequence clear and undeniable . but you were too hard for me in your doubting way : for , you gave some small stop to my proceeding , by your dis-like of the word [ proposition ] as savouring of the way of the schools . this a little surpriz'd me : for , i conceiv'd , that since words were only intended to signifie our meanings , there could be no reason why the word should dislike any , so it was declar'd what was meant by it ; which , the common usage of it by philosophers , for so many centuries , had , i thought , sufficiently manifested , and warranted . this gave me occasion to explain my self ; and to declare , that i meant no more by the word [ proposition , ] but a speech that affirms , or denies . i added , that therefore , such speeches , if affirmative , ( and the same , mutatis mutandis , is to be said of negative ones , ) must consist of something that is affirm'd , something of which , is affirm'd , and some word which affirms or expresses the affirmation . which three parts of a proposition , logicians agree to call predicate , subject , and copula . these plainest . first rudiments i was forcd to begin with ; not out of any apprehension you did not know them ; but , out of my desire you would admit the words , after such an explanation of them ; fearing , otherwise , i should want language to discourse with you , in a subject of this nature . . what follow'd immediately , i do not certainly remember ; but i think it was , that you excepted against that whole artificial way of discoursing ; and made account there was a more compendious method , or shorter cut to science : which , i conceive , was , by contemplating your ideas ; by which you hop'd to arrive at truth , by the clear and distinct appearance of it to your mind . to defend our method , i alledg'd , that it was the way of nature , tho' perfected by art ; as all our other natural faculties and operations are . that all art , if it be solid , and not fantastick , is nothing but a deeper inspection into plain , honest nature , made by the reflexion of our mind . that such mental speeches and propositions , and each part of them , ( as was shewn lately , ) were in the understandings of all mankind , when they do conceive , or intend to speak any truth , or falshood . that all the discourses about a syllogism , made by true logick , ( which is nothing but exact reflexion upon what passes in every man's mind , naturally , ) is nothing but the dissecting an evident or conclusive discourse , made by our natural faculty of reasoning , into all its parts ; the placing those parts best , in order to clearness ; and the shewing those nerves and wires , ( the first principles of our understanding , ) which are , as it were , th● main springs of our reason , an● give strength and vigour to such a discourse . and the same may be said of a proposition , both as to its p●●●s , and the connexion or identity of its two terms , ( the subject , and pr●●icate , ) in which consists its truth : a●● which , i hope , i have shewn very par●●cularly , in the second and third books of my method to science . moreover , because i saw , your prejudice against our way was taken from the insignificant iargon of some of our school-men , i take leave to add , that , let others talk as superficially of those matters as they please , and disparage the true way of art , by mis-managing it , and making it look phantastick ; yet i am not conscious to my self , that i have any thing in my method , but what is entirely built on the nature of the thing in hand ; i mean , notions , propositions , and rational discourses , found in the minds of all mankind : which way of building on the nature of the subject of which we are speaking , is the only ground that can give solidity to any discourse : at least , i am sure , that , if i have any argument there , which has any other fountion , i shall renounce it , as swerving from my method , and my intention : and i do candidly here declare , that i am oblig'd , either to bring a more solid proof for that point , or i ought not to expect it should be well receiv'd by any man of learning . which being so , i have that good opinion of your equity , that you will not therefore discard a way which is thus willing to approve it self to be solid , and to subsist by arguments built on the firm ground of the nature of the thing , because some slight understanders of it have us'd it triflingly . nor would you think it reasonable , that the cartesian hypothesis should be quite rejected , upon no other reason , but because you think some late writers have not done it the right they ought . . in order to your clear and distinct perception , which you therefore judg'd to be the rule or test of all truth , because we cannot but assent to that , as true , which we clearly and distinctly see to be so , i make these preliminary remarks . . that this is the main hinge of all the cartesian hypothesis , which persuades them to place the ground of truth within their own minds , and its productions ; and not in the things themselves . . that this is the most ingenious and plausible conception , which the great wit of cartesius ever advanc'd ; and therefore it most deserves clearing : which is , indeed , one main reason why i strain'd courtesie a little , in publishing this paper . . that the plausibility of it lies chiefly in this , that every man must grant the truth of that proposition , as it lies : for , who can deny , but that what i see to be true , is true ? this being full as evident , as that i cannot see what is not . this , then , is a plain truth , and might deserve the name of a subordinate rule ; were it certain , or prov'd first , that we could not possibly be mistaken in thinking we have a clear and distinct perception of a thing , when we have it not . mr. le grand confesses , this may happen when the will is byass'd , or men are unskilful ; ( and how frequent is that ? ) and we shall give many instances afterwards , how we are deceiv'd in many other occasions . . that this clear and distinct perception , the cartesians so much speak of , and value themselves upon , tho' the expression be new , is no more in reality , but perfect evidence of an object : for , the seeing any object clearly , is the seeing it evidently ; nor can we see it evidently , if that object , or it , be confounded with others , and not seen to be distinct from them . wherefore , this phrase , of clear and distinct perception is a meer amuzement ; and , being new , makes the readers apt to conceit that it is a lately-found-out discovery of some unheard of thing , or some new method , of which all former philosophers were hitherto ignorant ; whereas , 't is the self-same with perfect evidence of some particular object ; which all the learned part of mankind have ever us'd , before cartesius was born ; nay , have allow'd , and held also , that no man could refrain from assenting that the thing , or mental proposition , is true , when with perfect evidence it is seen to be so . wherefore , this last point will not , i hope , break squares between the cartesians and me ; for , thus far we agree in our meanings ; however , i except against the novelty of the expression , which would seem to intimate something extraordinary in the method you pretend to have first found out , and introduced ; and which , by your carriage , you seem to appropriate to your selves , as singularly yours . . these things being so , it follows , that the first rule of our knowledge of all truths whatever must be common to all knowing natures in the world : it must also be the most evident that can be , or self-evident ; so that none can disagree , dissent , or be deceiv'd in it , but must see and assent to it , in despite of any weakness of the understanding , or any byass or obliquity of the will ; as we shall see hereafter our rule is , and must be . and the reason is , because this rule being that , by means of which , a creature made for knowledge is capable of knowing any thing ; it follows , that , if it lay in any man's power to be ignorant of this rule , or to dissent from it , or be deceiv'd in it , it would be in his power , not meerly to pervert , but utterly to destroy and unmake the nature given him by god ; and , of cognoscitive or capable of knowledge , make it uncognoscitive or incapable of knowing any thing ; which , the natures of things being fix'd by god's wisdom , to be what they are , 't is as impossible for any man to do , as it is for him to put off his own individuality , and not be the same person he is . . these notes premis'd , i come closer to examine your rule of truth . you say , if you clearly and distinctly see that a thing is true , you do thence certainly know it to be so . i allow the conditional proposition ; for , 't is impossible to see that which is not to be seen ; or ●o know that to be true , which is not-true . the only question , then , is , whether this be a rule of truth ; mr. le grand very rationally granting , p. . there goes more to constitute a rule of truth , than to be true ? in order to the clearing of which , i ask : was it true before you saw clearly and distinctly it was true ? or , did it become true by your seeing it ( as you phrase it ) clearly and distinctly to be true ? if it were true before you thus saw it to be true ; then , 't is unavoidable , there was another rule , or reason , for that truth which anteceded your seeing it to be such ; and therefore , your clear and distinct perception could not be the rule of knowing that truth , being subsequent to it . and , if you say , it became true by your seeing it clearly and distinctly , then it was not true before ; and then , you saw that to be true , which was not true ; that is , you saw it to be otherwise , than , in effect and reality , it was . and , consequently , that pretended sight or perception is so far from being a rule of truth , that it is a palpable errour and mistake ; and therefore , all the judgments issuing from it must be false . which , instead of constituting it a rule of truth , would make it , indeed , a rule of falshood . . to make this yet plainer , please to reflect , that this clear and distinct perception is such an act of your understanding ; and that all acts have their being such , from the object of those acts. for , the faculty or power of understanding was , of it self , indifferent and indetermin'd to all and every particular act : and , since nothing that is indetermin'd , nor any act in common , can be ; it follows , that the being , and being such , of each act , depends formally on the object , and is such in particular , as that object , which informs the power , is . wherefore , when you see a thing to be true , that which you saw thus clearly and distinctly true , must have been thus true before you saw it to be so . whence , we ask , what was that which made the object you perceiv'd-to-be-true , to be true ? or , what was the rule of truth to that object that was true , ere you saw it to be such ? must not the object be such , ere you can know it to be such ? or clearly and distinctly perceptible to be such , before you can clearly and distinctly perceive it to be such ? if not , then you must say , you can know what is not to be known , or clearly and distinctly perceive what is not clearly and distinctly to be perceiv'd : which is a perfect contradiction . . for instance ; since truth is no where to be found , but in such speeches as affirm , or deny , that is , in propositions ; let us put some proposition which you thus clearly and distinctly perceive to be true , and therefore ( as was lately demonstrated ) must have been true before you saw it to be so . does it not clearly follow , that , either that truth must have been made evident by another , and that again by another , and so in infinitum ; ( by which means , nothing at all could ever be seen to be true ; ) or else there must have been some first kind of truths , whose noon-day evidence imparts evidence to others , and is it self visible , or ( if you please ) clearly and distinctly perceptible to all mankind ; and forces them , at first sight , to assent to its verity ? now , if some such first kind of truths can be found , which , by their absolute self-evidence , do , as objects of our understanding power , necessarily determin the understandings of all mankind , to assent ; and do withall influence all our other truths , and our knowledge of them ; then ( our act of perception being clearly excluded from being the rule of truth ) these first truths have all the requisites that can be imagin'd for a ratio cognoscendi veritatem , or a rule of truth ; since they self-evidently manifest to us their own truth ; and by it , give us light to know all others . let us pursue then the quest of these first truths . our discourse , because it concerns and antecedes all other knowledges , and all particular truths , must necessarily be fetch'd from the deepest grounds , and therefore ▪ must needs be very speculative . but , i know i speak to him whose piercing wit will easily comprehend it . only , i beseech you , so far to bend your byass , which you must needs have contracted by your long and steady meditating on your way of ideas , till you reduce any obliquity that may have prepossess'd your good judgment , to a rectitude , or indifferency ; and then i cannot doubt , but i may do you some service , even , perhaps , against your will : for , evidence , if clear , and well penetrated , does oft-times force assent , whether the will repugns , or no. . the ideas , or essences , of each piece of the world's fabrick were in the mind of the divine architect , ere they were made . again ; since he did not make them by the hand of some bungling journey-man , who might , perhaps , deviate from his pattern , or model ; but immediately , by his own infinite wisdom and power ; it cannot be doubted , but that each part of the creation was fram'd exactly according to the archetypes of those unchangeable ideas ; and therefore , was perfectly establish'd in its respective essence , or nature , as those original ideas were ; that is , they were fix'd to be what they are , by an inerrable hand ; in which consists that which we call their metaphysical verity . wherefore , since all truth , originally , primarily and most fundamentally consists in this metaphysical verity of things , it being the immediate effect of the divine wisdom ; it follows , that the first formal truths that can be in our minds , ( which , consequently , are the rules , or principles , to all others , ) must be those which speak , express , or affirm this metaphysical verity , or , that the things are what they are . which kind of self-evident propositions , can therefore , be no other than those we call identical . this is most evident , and incontestable : for , since this metaphysical verity , which ( next to the divine maker of all things , from whom it immediately proceeded ) is the ground and cause of all truth , does consist in this , that things are fix'd in their essences , or are what they are ; 't is impossible to speak this truth , or make it a formal truth , by affirming , or denying , ( that is , by putting it into a proposition ; ) but by affirming , that they are what they are ; which is most evidently an identical proposition . . hitherto , then , it is undiscernable , how it can , with any shew of reason , be deny'd , that the self-evidence that so visibly shines in identical propositions , bids fair towards their being the first rule of knowing all truths ; or , which is the same , the first principle to all other knowledges . for , . there cannot be any so great clearness , or evidence , as is self-evidence ; nor so close connexion of the terms in any proposition , or speech , that expresses truth , as is perfect identity , or self-connexion ; consisting in this , that the thing , or mode of thing spoken of , is what it is , or , is its self . . 't is impossible any thing else can be so solid , or so firmly establish'd ; being immediately built on the unchangeable metaphysical verity it self ; or rather , being it , spoken , and express'd : which verity ( as was shewn ) is imprinted in the essences of every created thing , by the immediate hand of essential truth . whence it is so nearly ally'd to that infinite truth it self , that it is remov'd but one degree from it . . by reason of this connatural and immediate descent from that brightest and most glorious luminary of all knowledge , the father of lights , who is candor aeternae lucis , and infinitely intelligible ; it forces the assent of all mankind to its verity . insomuch , that no disease can so pervert a rational being , which has the least use of reason , as to deny it , or doubt of it ; nor suspend their judgment concerning it : nor can the highest passion of the most profligate wretch living , hurry his understanding into the admittance of such a folly. no scepticalness can call the truth and certainty of it into question . no whimsical speculation can inveigle any man into a conceit , that it can be false . no opposition can make head against it ; since , whatever can be alledg'd to overthrow it , must needs appear to be less evident than it ; and , therefore , unable to shock it . no subtil distinction can impair its truth ; or pretend it is true in one respect , but not in another ; since it is impossible to distinguish the copula [ is ; ] the notion of existence being so perfectly simple , and most formal , or indivisible , that it can admit of no distinction into divers formalities ; according to one of which , it may be true ; according to another , false . nor can it prejudice any such proposition , to distinguish its subject , or predicate ; since whatever distinction can fall here upon the subject , must fall upon the predicate too ; both of them being the self-same notion . by which means , the identicalness and self-evidence of the proposition will be still the same after the distinction is given , as it was before . so that 't is impossible to imagin , that any thing can be propos'd , which can , in any regard , or in any degree , vye with identical propositions ; either in being so solidly grounded , or so perfectly clear , undeniable , unmistakable , and plac'd above the reach of any possible attack . nor did cartesius himself , amongst all the evident things he call'd into doubt , in the least question the evidence and truth of such propositions , formally express'd : nor could he have done it , without utterly destroying , at the same time , the certainty of all he could have said ; nay , even of his own first principle too ; as will be seen hereafter . from all which considerations , ( any one of which might suffice , ) i may safely and evidently conclude , that , in point of evidence of its truth , and stability of its grounds , nothing can be any way comparable to the light which strikes the eye of our understanding , by its steady rays emitted from these self-evident , or identical propositions : which goes very far to the entitling these , and these only , to be the rule of knowing all truths , or the first principles to all science , in whatever particular subject ; not excepting even metaphysicks it self . . notwithstanding all that has been so fully evinc'd hitherto , i have , as yet , done but half my business ; or rather , the better half is still left behind . for , a first rule , or first principle , requires another quality , peculiar to it self , to compleat its notion , besides its being thus solidly grounded , and thus supreamly evident ; which is , that all other truths , or knowledges , must be rul'd , or principl'd by it : it must have an universal influence over all other knowledges , and impart its light to them . the former qualities will , i believe , be granted to identical propositions , by every attentive considerer , who knows what belongs to logick , or reason reflecting on it self ; and is , withall , but meanly vers'd in metaphysicks . this later qualification will be deny'd by many , perhaps by most ; nay , will be fancy'd , and abetted by very few . for , every one's genius does not lead him to speculate so deep ; and there are scarce any who have propos'd this highest and nicest point , much less handl'd it at large ; tho' divers have given the grounds whence it must follow . the reason of this general dis-like of identical propositions , is , because they have such a dry meen , and contemptible aspect ; so unlikely to give us the least kind of instruction , or light , to know any thing but their own insignificant selves , that nothing seems more ridiculous , than for any man , who is to teach others , even to propose such insipid sayings as a means , much less as a rule , to gain the knowledge of any truth whatever ; nor is it discernable how we can come to know any thing , or work out ▪ any new knowledges , by making use of such blunt tools . i think i have said the worst against them , that the keenest adversary can alledge . it remains , then , to shew how i can clear them of this disgraceful character ; or make out that they have such a general influence over all other truths , as is pretended . . i demand , then , of my opposers , whether it be not fundamentally necessary in all discourses about whatever truth , to attend still , and keep an eye directed to the nature of the thing or subject about which we are discoursing , and to take special care we do not deviate from it ? i do not think any scholar living , attending to his natural thoughts , or common sense , will deny this . for , if any discourse makes the thing be otherwise than it is , it must necessarily be false ; and expose the author of it to speak manifest contradictions . now , i do no more but this , while i make self-evident or identical propositions to be the first rules , or first principles of all other knowledges : all i do , is , to keep a heedful eye to the nature of the thing , and its metaphysical verity . only , because it is manifest to every reflecter , that all our discourses are made up of propositions ; nor can a rule or principle be express'd , but by such forms of speech ; nor is the comparative , or ( as i may say ) the compositive nature of our soul satisfy'd , till it has brought the object it would discourse about , into some formal truth , ( her only perfection in this state , ) which is express'd by a proposition : hence , we become forc'd to put the nature of the thing , or its metaphysical verity , into such a frame of speaking ; so to fit it for discourse : which 't is impossible to do , but that speech , or proposition , whether we will or no , must be an identical one . . as for their seeming so ridiculous , and dry , this happens because of their most perfect simplicity , having as little composition in them as is possible ; or rather , none at all , but what is in the form of expression ; i doubt not but your acute judgment is well aware , that the first stamina , in what kind soever , are , and must be , the most simple ; and , therefore , such , that , should nature stop her course there , and proceed no farther , they would be the most insipid , and useless things in nature . and yet , from such simple beginnings , or ( to use virgil's expression ) tenues orsus , all the most perfect productions in whole nature have their rise : nor could any work of hers ever arrive at maturity , or attain to that admirable frame it afterwards grows up to , unless it had had at first such a simple and shapeless origin . the same happens in the first stamina of all our succeeding knowledges : they are so simple , and have such an odd , bald and unfledg'd appearance , that we know not what to make of them , when we regard them only in themselves ; or , what use they are of in the acquisition of science ; yet , without such simple beginnings , fore-laid in our knowing power , no distinct knowledge at all could be had of any other thing ; as will most clearly appear shortly . . we may observe , that , generally , we are not so sensible of goods , as of harms ; because the former , thro' the generous bounty of god's good providence , are of so many kinds , surrounding us on all sides , that they are common , and quotidian ; whereas , the later are seldom , and ( as it were ) casual : whence , these are remarkable , and apt to strike our apprehensions smartly , and f●rce us to take notice of them ; which those , being ordinary , and customary , do not . to breed then a due reflexion , what good those first truths now spoken of , laid up in our minds , do us , we will consider what universal mischiefs their proper opposites , [ contradictions , ] would do to all our knowledge ; and what a malignant influence they would have , not only to pervert all our actual knowledge , but to destroy our very power of knowing any thing . let us suppose then , that those two propositions , [ what is , is not ; ] and [ a thing is not what it is , ] which are the proper contradictories to those chief identicals , [ what is , is ; ] and , [ a thing is what it is ; ] to be , both of them , true : would it be possible , in that case , to speak a word of truth ; or , to discourse at all ; but , instead of speaking consequently , to talk a hotch-potch of incoherent nonsense ? for , we cannot affirm any thing to be true , but by means of the copula [ is , ] in whose connecting or identifying sense , all truth most formally consists : wherefore , if that word , or the notion it signifies , were chimerical , and might be the same with [ is not , ] then , since there can be no middle between them , all we affirm might be false . and , since the subject we speak of , must either be some thing , or some mode of thing ; all that we speak of that thing would go to wrack , and be false , in case the subject of our discourse , or speech , were not distinguish'd from all other things or modes ; that is , if it were not it self only , but another , all the while . since then , the contradictories to these two identicals now spoken of , have such an universal influence , that they constantly set up errour , and destroy truth ; 't is manifest , that identical propositions ( their contradictory opposites ) do , for the same reason , of their own nature , tend to abet truth ' and destroy errour ; and therefore they are deservedly entitled to be the rule of truth ; the influence they have over all truths being full as universal , as contradictions , their opposites , have , to induce errour . . but nothing can more victoriously confute , or more unanswerably convince an adversary , than to shew that he must be forc'd , for his own interest , to admit the truth of that tenet which he opposes . ask , then , a cartesian , how he knows any particular truths ; or ( which is the same ) how he knows that such predicates , or attributes , do belong to such a subject ? he will answer , because he finds those predicates in the idea he has of such a thing , or such a nature . very good , replies the other : but , how shall we know that the idea you have of that thing is not chimerical , and involves in it many other things , as well as that ? which , if it does , your discourse , applying it to that thing only , must needs be incoherent , and false . your only answer , in this case , can be this , that each idea you have is distinct from all other ideas , and has its metaphysical verity and unity peculiar to it self , or ( which is the same ) is its self only ; which is an identical proposition , and speaks , or expresses the metaphysical verity of each idea you have . now , say i , hence appears evidently , that this truth , viz. [ every idea is it self only , or no other ; ] which is an identical proposition , is the very first truth you can have ; and , that on it depends , fundamentally , your whole doctrine by way of ideas : for , if this be false , 't is most evident that your ideas can give you no distinct knowledge of any thing , or mode of thing ; that is , they could enable you to know nothing at all . . you will say , perhaps , it is not needful to put , lay or propose so expresly those identicals , they being so very clear , of themselves , to all mankind . i reply , . that this comes over to me , as to what relates to their clearness , and self-evidence , and abets my position . . that , certainly , that is most needful , on which , as was now shewn , all depends . you must , then , have those identicals in your mind , at least understood , and presuppos'd , tho' you express them not . . you must be forc'd to express them if you come to discourse rigorously , and reduce your thesis to the first , and self-evident truths ; without doing which , ( especially , if you hap to encounter with a sceptick , ) nothing can be finally decided , or concluded . . the point is , that 't is most needful to express them , nay , unavoidable , when the question , [ which is the first truth that can be , which gives light to all others , ] is in agitation ; as is our case at present : you must be forc'd to confess , that the truth of these identicals is antecedent to all the following knowledges you can have by your ideas ; that , thence , you can know nothing , unless this be presuppos'd , and foreknown ; and that , therefore , it influences all your future and dependent knowledges , after its fashion ; and gives and secures to them all the strength , distinction and evidence they have . whence is clearly inferr'd , that the self-evident light which appears in such first truths , ought to be made , by the cartesians themselves , the rule of knowing whatever other truths they can pretend to know by their ideas ; that is , the very first rule of all others ; that is , the only one : for , none can be , in proper speech , a rule , unless it be the first ; all others being regulated by that which is the first : so that it , and only it , is the rule ; all the rest , ruled . and , certainly , it will appear evident to all mankind , that what is most self-evident , as all identicals are , were there nothing else , should be the rule of knowing all other truths which are not so evident as they. be pleas'd , sir , to reflect upon that proposition , by which you notifie , or express to us your rule of knowing , viz. [ that which i clearly and distinctly see to be true , is true. ] consider , how many words are in this proposition ; and that each word has its proper , or peculiar idea , each of which ideas must be distinct from all other ideas , that is , each of them must be the same with its self only , ( which make so many identical propositions ; ) or else , none of those ideas can be possibly able to do you any service . so that , 't is manifest , your rule of knowing depends on the self-evident light suppos'd to be in ours . whence 't is concluded , that yours is not the first ratio cognoscendi , the first rule , or first truth ; but , ruled by ours , grounded on ours , and subsequent , in the order of knowing , to ours . . i do not expect , that such high speculations will please every body : but , i hope , it will plead my pardon , that i could not avoid it . in so nice a point , as is the settling the first rule of all knowledge ; or , what is the very first , self-evident , and most firmly-grounded truth ; no speculation , resolving all dependent truths into that which is absolutely-independent , ( as the rule of all truth must be ) can be too accurate , or laid too deep . 't is not , then , any humour of mine , or a kind of trial of skill , which mov'd me to this very abstracted , and metaphysical way of discoursing ▪ but , it was the very nature of the present subject , that forc'd me upon it . . nor was it any care of over-reaching your acuteness , nor the desire of opposing the rule of knowing truth introduc'd by the great cartesius , which put me upon this unusual piece of doctrine . i had , above twenty years ago , upon some hints given me by that second aristotle , the profoundly-learned albius , apply'd my speculative thoughts to dig very deep into this subject , to find out the immoveable center of all truth ; and i had begun to write a very speculative treatise , shewing how to reduce every truth into an identical proposition ; and every errour , to a contradiction ; which , i saw , lay hid at the bottom of every truth , and falshood . this , i say , was an old design of mine , before i thought of opposing any , or of being oppos'd by any . i foresaw also , while i was writing my method , that ( it being more easie to be witty , than to be solid ) identical propositions would be look'd upon by very ingenious men , who were not thorow-speculators , as sapless , useless , and insignificant . wherefore , i did there take some occasions , which lay in the track of my thoughts , while i was settling the grounds to true science , to clear those first truths from such unworthy misapprehensions . to this end , i demonstrated there , b. . less . . § . . that all the force of consequence , in which consists our rationality , can only be built upon such propositions . i shew , b. . l. . in what their self-evidence consists : what is the first of them , and their several sorts and degrees . i set my self to demonstrate , by many arguments , from § . . to the end of that lesson , that all first principles must be identical propositions ; and ( § . . ) that plain reason teaches us it must be so : which evinced , it follows , that whoever denies these to be useful , must , with the same breath , affirm , that all first principles are useless , and good for nothing ; which is a strange position . nay , since there is an order in truths , and therefore all second principles have their force from the first , it follows , that we can have no use of second principles , if the first be useless ; and so , we must talk ramblingly , and at random , all our lives , without any principles at all . i manifest the same , ( l. . ) by instances , fetch'd from the mathematicks , and other sciences ; and shew what use is to be made of them ; which is not to make them either of the premisses in a syllogism ; but to avail our selves of them in a higher nature . i shew ( b. . l. . § . . ) that even plain , uncultivated nature makes the vulgar recurr to them , as their first principles , when they would express that which is decisive of the dispute , and undeniable . i prove , that all middle terms which are proper , are built upon the same ground with them . i endeavour ( b. . l. . §§ . , , . ) to evince clearly , that all truths have , at the bottom , identical propositions , and are reducible to them ; and i attempt to shew , ( less . . ) the way how to reduce inferiour truths to those highest ones . all which , if i have fully prov'd , especially , that all first principles are identical propositions , which bears all along with it , and is concluded there by divers demonstrations , on which i dare venture my whole cause , that they are impossible to be solv'd ; then , i may safely presume , i have evinc'd , that the intelligibility and light of identical propositions is most self-evident ; the ground on which they are built , most solid ; and the usefulness or influence of them upon all other truths , most universal : and , therefore , that they are every way qualify'd to be the first and only rule of knowing all truths whatever . . to comprehend better the evidence of this discourse , let us imagine a man devested of the knowledge of identical propositions ; and then let us consider whether he could know any thing at all , or what he is good for . to instance in one of them ; let us suppose him ignorant that a thing is what it is ; or a cartesian , that each idea is it self , and no other ; and common sense will tell every one , that such a man could know nothing , nor make any judgment or discourse concerning any thing , or idea either ; since that thing , or idea , he would judge , or discourse of , is , perhaps , all the while , for ought he knows , another . whoever would see farther the use of identical propositions brought to practice , may please to observe how they are serviceable in many places of my three treatises here mention'd : not by proposing them first , and then deducing and arguing from them , as some may mistake ; but by reducing the truth of my discourses up to those standards of all truth ; and by shewing these to be engag'd in the patronage and support of my thesis ; by which means , they smartly clinch the force and evidence of my arguments , by bearing up to them , and relying on them . . it was a well-aim'd reach of speculation in mr. locke , [ essay concerning humane understanding , b. . ch. . § . . ] where he says , that the metaphysical verity of things contains in them a tacit proposition : which i would understand , not to be meant of that verity , as it is in the thing it self ; but as it is in our understanding , where only propositions are , or can be . for , since this metaphysical verity is not a natural notion , imprinted directly by our senses , it can only be known by reflexion . the mind , then , careful to be well assur'd of the subject of which it is to judge , or discourse , ( without which pre-assurance , it could do neither , ) reviews it heedfully , and steadily ; and then says of it , within it self ; [ 't is this , and no other . ] which is an identical proposition , in substance ; tho' , for a reason we shall give shortly , we put it afterwards into an expression more formally identical . why the soul does this , springs hence ; because , being naturally made to see truth ; and no truth ( in the first and proper signification of that word ) being possible to be had , without affirming , or denying ; hence 't is natural , and necessary , that , when it comes to review the object , in order to see its truth or falshood , it should put it into the frame of an identical proposition ; only which kind of speeches are capable to affirm , or deny . and this is that i mean , when i use to say , ( as i do frequently , ) that the nature of the soul is comparative , or relative : for , when a proposition is molded in the mind , the predicate of it is compar'd or related to the subject , in order to see their agreement , or disagreement ; without which , nothing can be known to be , in proper speech , true , or false : in which position , mr. locke perfectly agrees with me . now , setting aside extrinsecal denominations , which are not at all found in the thing , but meerly tack'd to it by our consideration ; this comparing is , either of the mode , to the thing ; and , seeing , in general , how it affects it , as is seen in the two last predicables of porphyrius ; which , because modes are not distinct things , and yet differ vastly from the formal notion of the thing it self , of which they are modes , can only be connected with it materially ; or , as belonging to the thing , as their subject : or else , the mind compares the thing to what 's formal , or essential to it . and this , either in the whole , as is found in our identical propositions ; for which reason , i am forc'd to make a sixth predicable , in which the whole is predicated , entirely and formally , of the whole : or else , in part ; when some part of the essence or nature of the whole thing is predicated , or compar'd to it diversly ; as is seen in porphyrius's three first predicables , call'd genus , species , and difference ; which do , all of them , in part , belong to the essence . these notes borrow'd from logick , and premis'd , 't is here farther to be noted , that all those comparisons , or relations the soul makes in whatever proposition , is done by that relation , call'd identity ; as is manifest from the copula [ est. ] wherefore , to review what we said lately ; the predicates belonging to the two last predicables of porphyrius , are referr'd only according to material identity ; or , only as found to belong to the same thing , and not as essential to it . the three former are related , or compar'd , as identify'd formally to the thing ; yet , still so , as but several parts of its essence . the th is , when the whole thing is compar'd , related to , or identify'd with the whole thing ; and this entirely , or according to all that is in the thing . and , this way of comparing or relating the whole thing to its self , is that relation of identity , which is the most essential , most formal , and most expresly such , of all other ; and , is only found in those propositions we call first principles . which propositions being , for the reasons given , most fully and properly such , we do therefore , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , call identical . . whence may be seen , that the virtue of identical propositions threads , or runs thorow all those propositions that are essential ; and , collaterally , those also whose predicates are immediately and necessarily connected with the essence . for , since the parts are found in the whole , and all identification in part , is a part of the identification of the whole thing with its self ; it follows , that propositions , or truths , in which the predicate is but part of the whole , are , in reality , but parts of our identicals . nor is this all ; but the force of every consequence too is grounded on them , in which consists all our rationality ; as was shewn above . whence mr. locke , in his essay , b. . ch. . § . . shews , very judiciously , that every step we take in true demonstrations , is made by intuitive , or self-evident knowledges . . whence , 't is evident , that even your rule will force you , tho' contrary to your intention , to come over to us ; and , will oblige you to guide your selves by connexion of terms , ( which is our way , ) however you strive to avoid it . you say , that when you clearly and distinctly see a proposition to be true , it must be so : and we say , you can never see a proposition to be true , but when you see its two extremes , ( or , the subject and predicate , ) connected . you will alledge , you see it in your idea : but , ( as is shewn above , ) there are three parts in a proposition , which have , each of them , a distinct idea ; in regard , the self-same idea which is of the subject , cannot be the idea of the predicate ; for , this would throw you upon identical propositions , which is our rule : and , the idea of the copula is , most evidently , quite different from the other two ; being , precisely , that which affirms , or denies ; which neither of the other does . this being so , i beseech you to reflect , that truth ( which is the thing in question ) cannot consist in these ideas , singly consider'd ; for , taken thus , they are , all of them , simple apprehensions ▪ which can neither be true , nor false . it remains , then , that you must confess , truth can be only in those ideas , put together , or connected ; nor , can they be connected , but by that which only is apt to connect or identifie them ; viz. by the copula [ est ; ] for , these three parts cannot be fram'd into one speech , by any other manner , but by putting the word [ est ] between them . wherefore , 't is evident , that you cannot pretend to see clearly and distinctly , that any proposition is true , ( which is your rule to know truth , ) but by seeing its said terms connected , or identify'd . i see not how you can , even in your way of ideas , deny this clear discourse : and , if you grant it , we are thus far friends . only , we add , that , to make such connexions the rule to all others , you must allow them to be self-connexions , or identical ; which is our position . so that , which way soever you wriggle , to avoid our rule , the light of common reason , or natural logick , will force you into it , whether you will or no. . as for the dryness of identical propositions , which goes not down with some men of fancy , i have this to add ; that that which is objected to them , as scandalous , and opprobrious , is , in reality , a great commendation to them . for , this conceit of their dryness springs from their seeming too obvious . whereas , were not the very first principles , and the rule of knowing all truths , thus most plain , easie and obvious , but needed the least reflexion , or consideration , they would be utterly unfit to be what they ought to be ; first principles , and self-evident . nothing pleases the palate of such gentlemen , which is not new , or such as they knew not before . not reflecting , in the mean time , that nothing is new , but conclusions lately deduced ; and that all first principles must be as old as nature , or mankind it self : nor could they be the rule of truth , which must oblige all mankind to see their evidence , and assent to their verity , were they otherwise . . how pretty a delusive faculty is this fancy of ours ! and , how apt , if we be not aware , to decoy us , every step , into errour , by customary appearances ; which , by striking often upon it , would fool our reason ! our own thoughts , and those of others , do , in all our conversations , use to come to us , clad in words : whence it happens , that 't is very hard , liquidly and clearly to strip the sense from those words ; and to consider it , and nothing but it. if a man says , [ every thing is distinct from all other things , ] none is apt to smile at him , or impute it as ridiculous , or foolish : but , if he says , [ a thing is its self , ] witty men can scarce contain their iest at such an idle proposition : and yet they are , most evidently , the self-same in sense ; for , that which is distinct from all others , must either be its self , or nothing ; and , the taking away all distinction , does , almost in terms , at least , most formally , and necessarily , put identity . let us take another instance : if one says , [ a whole is more than a part , ] it appears to such men , wondrous wise ; and , none blames him , in the least , that says it , or lays it for a principle . but , if he says , and puts for a principle , [ what 's more than a part , is more than a part , ] it is good luck if they do not think he deserves midas's ears . yet , both of these propositions are the self-same , and both of them equally , and most perfectly identical in sense ; and only differ in the manner of expression . which i thus shew : a whole consists of its parts ; and , since every thing is that of which it consists , a whole is its parts . but , the word [ parts , ] being plural , signifies more than one part ; wherefore , [ a whole is more than a part , ] is the same as to say , [ what 's more than a part , is more than a part ; ] which is as perfectly identical , as can be imagin'd . nay , more ; if we regard it well , we shall find , that the former proposition had not been known , speculatively , to be self-evident , nor could have been made out to be such , but because it is the same with this later , whose terms are most formally identical ; to which , the other is easily reduc'd . . it will be ask'd , why we could not let the sense alone in its former dress , ( which became it much better than this other , ) since it was self-evident enough before ? i answer ; because the self-evidence better appears , when it is also brought to terms most perfectly identical ; as any one may discern , who compares the two propositions now mention'd : and , hence also the sceptical dissenter , or denier , is most forcibly , and unavoidably thrown upon a direct and open contraction ; for , to deny those identicals , which are such , not only in the sense , but in the manner of expression too , is , to avow a contradiction propos'd bare-fac'd , and in the plainest terms ; which could not have appear'd so clearly from the terms of the former proposition . lastly , a brabbling pyrrhonian might have drawn the words , [ who le , ] and [ part , ] into some sinister construction ; and have wrangl'd and quibbled about them , by putting upon them divers senses ; which he is quite debarr'd of , when the terms are thus identical : for , when the words of both the terms are the very self-same , whatever sense he gives the words of the subject , must be allow'd to the words of the predicate too ; so that he will be put quite past his shifts , and the proposition will still remain equally identical as it was before , maugre all his cavils , and evasions . . by this time i have , as i conceive , good reason to presume enough has been alledg'd by us , to prove that our rule of truth is , in every regard , qualify'd for such an employ . we will therefore , if you please , now turn the tables , and examine what your rule can pretend to ; or , what it it has in it , which can entitle it to be such a rule ; or , in any respect , counter-ballance what has been produc'd for ours . to do which , we will consider it , both as to the act of your clear and distinct perception , the immediate object of that act ; and , at the same time , as to the stability which each of these may be conceiv'd to have from its ground . we will begin with the object , that determines your faculty of understanding to this or that particular act. if i rightly conceive the cartesian doctrine , the immediate objects of your clear and distinct perception , are your ideas , in which appears this truth which , you say , you clearly and distinctly see . now , these ideas of yours are , confessedly , effects produc'd by a second cause , the mind it self ; and not the immediate work of the first cause , on which ( as has been sh●wn ) our rule is built : which gives ours an infinite advantage , above yours , as to the stability of its ground : ours having , for its solid foundation , the ideas in the divine understanding ; whence are unquestionably deriv'd , and by which are establish'd , the essences of things , on which ours is immediately grounded : whereas , your ideas are held by your selves , to be the creatures , or productions of your own mind ; which ( were it granted it could produce any such ideas ) is a defective agent of its own nature ; and , therefore , its productions so uncertain , that it seems a most strange piece of doctrine , to build all the certain truth and knowledge mankind can possibly have on such an unsteady foundation . how many thousands , even of a fair pitch of understanding , have mistaken lively fancies , for evident knowledge ? must , therefore , all truth be built on a mistakable principle ? nay , more ; such men , judging thus , by mistake , the thing was evident , taking them as possess'd with such a mistake , cannot but assent to it , as true , tho' it be never so false : must we therefore consecrate this erroneous ground of theirs , into a rule of truth ? oh , but it belongs to god's goodness , to take care , that , since we cannot but assent upon such a clear and distinct appearance , we should not be forced upon errour . why so ? if you will needs leave the things his wisdom has made , take your own way , and over-conceit the infallibility of your own faculty , in judging you clearly and distinctly know a thing , when you do but fancy it ; is god's providence answerable to support every over-weening rashness of ours ? doubtless , his goodness is never wanting to such a considerable species , as is mankind , in n 〈…〉 to their knowledge , for which th●●● nature was made : but , if there 〈◊〉 another way , more solidly ground●● and evident than yours ; nay , aga●●●● which ( as has been prov'd ) ther● can lie no exception , and men will not take it ; his providence is acquitt●d , and , 't is just to let them delude themselves . at least , it will be said , that this clear and distinct perception is a rule of truth to us , tho' not to truth , consider'd in it self . but , if what we assent to upon that imaginary ground , may still be false , for any thing that ground can assure us , how can it be a rule of truth to any ? to return to our ideas ; the main point is , that it is so far from evident that there can be any such ideas elicited , or produced , by our minds , that there are many pretended demonstrations against it ; as may be seen in ideae cartesianae expensae , exam. . from § . to § . . nay , there are very many others in my second preliminary , proving there can need none ; the thing it self being objectively in our understanding . to none of which demonstrations , i do expect any full and solid answer ; but only , perhaps , some slight touches . i add , that the ideists themselves cannot agree amongst themselves , what kind of things these spiritual ideas should be . mr. locke makes them to be similitudes ; which mr. le grand denies ; and , is so at variance with himself , that he puts them to be many several sorts of things , and those inconsistent with one another ; and so makes them to be chimeras . this inconsonancy of those writers with one another , and with their own selves , makes it very dubious that there are any such things as these ideas , at all ; at least , 't is evident , that they who ground all their doctrine upon them , do not know what they are ; and , therefore , they build all their hypothesis on they know not what . and , if this be so , then the immediate object of their clear and distinct perception is , perhaps , a non-entity ; or , at least , such an entity , as no man living ( nor themselves neither ) knows what to make of it . . again ; this object , which you clearly and distinctly see to be true , must be some mental proposition ; for , nothing can be formally true , but some speech that affirms , or denies . now , say we , 't is most incontestable , that the first proposition we can make of a thing , is , to affirm its metaphysical verity ; or , to say , 't is this , ( or its self , ) and no other : for , the subject being the basis of all our thoughts , we must fix it certainly , clearly and distinctly , ere we can , with certainty , say any thing else of it . this proposition , then , say we , is such , that our understanding no sooner opens its eye , to take a view of it , but it must assent to it , because of the self-evident identification of its terms ; whose self-evidence we do therefore make our rule . it remains then , that you shew us some truth , or proposition , which is before this , ( which we think to be the first , ) and which both makes it self thus visible ; and also , by its self-evident light , gives clearness and intelligibility to all other truths ; and , lastly , which is so firmly grounded , that it may be a solid first principle , and not an aery and phantastick conceit . you must then , ( we say , ) produce , and shew us some other proposition than that you have brought hitherto , which tells us your clear and distinct perception is your rule ; for , this , you see , is already , by many unanswerable arguments , thrown out of doors , and shewn unfit to be a rule . and , till you do this , you ought not to be offended , if we tell you friendly , and plainly , that you have no rule of truth at all . . thus much for the immediate object of your clear and distinct perception . as for the act it self , i beseech you , sir , consider on what a sandy foundation you would build all truth . what signifies yours , or mine , or any man's iudgment , that he clearly and distinctly sees a truth ; or , that he must assent , or may not assent to it ? what signifie these , i say , to the truth of the thing ? must truth be built on men's iudgments , or their manner of conceiving ? what 's true , is infallibly such ; and this , by virtue of its grounds . is our iudgment , or manner of conceiving , such a certain ground , or infallible ? how many instances is the world full of , to prove those perceptions of ours , tho' judg'd by us most evident , to be fallacious ? a passionate man , highly injur'd , and bent upon revenge , judges it most evident that he ought to take his private satisfaction : and , you can do no more , but verily iudge you have this clear and distinct perception , that such or such a proposition is true. i am to presume , that those cartesians who stigmatiz'd me with the ignominious note of being impious against god , &c. judg'd they did clearly see , i was thus wicked ; for , otherwise , they left their own beloved rule , to blacken me ; which is too high a malice for any man to charge them with : and yet , no man living , as far as my self , or my friends , can discern , did think so , but themselves ; for , 't is hard to conceive , that , if others had thought so , none of them should have that zeal for god's honour , as to object it , or reprehend me for it : nor am i to doubt but they thought they clearly and distinctly saw , that when i said , annihilation was impossible , i did , by that doctrine , set upon god himself : and , yet , tho' the learned albius maintain'd the same , in his metaphysicks , years before , no friend ever admonish'd him , that by saying so , he had fallen into a wicked errour : nor any of his opposers , who were very learned men , tho' they gather'd many propositions out of his books , which seem'd to sound ill , did ever object this ; whereas , had they judg'd it impious , they would not have spar'd him , but have laid load upon him for it . but , it seem'd , they all wanted this gift of clear and distinct perception , which is peculiar to the cartesians . to come to other instances ; how frequently are people mistaken , in thinking they have a clear and distinct perception , or perfect evidence ! prejudice , faction and education work this ill effect , and make men absolutely judge they see most evidently , they are in the right . people far gone in the spleen , or a deep melancholy , do assent , and judge , perhaps , more firmly than you do , that they see clearly twenty ridiculous fooleries to be true. high-flown enthusiasts judge the same . pious women , and prudent in other things , if much given to introversion , judge , they see clearly and distinctly ( nay , far more lively than we do ) many strange things in their imaginary visions and revelations ; insomuch , that they would pawn their very souls for their truth ; which , yet , are oft known , by their effects , to be meer illusions of fancy . from all which errours and inconveniences , our rule is free : for , who can , out of humour , precipitancy , fancy , disease , or any other casualty whatever , be deceiv'd , in judging , that identical propositions are true ? this , then , unanswerably concludes ours to be the genuin rule of truth ; in regard , this must be such as all men must be forc'd to assent to , unanimously agree in it , nor can ever hap to be deceiv'd in it by any chance whatever : since , otherwise , the whole nature of those men would be depraved , and good for nothing , as having no rule by which to know any truth whatever . nay , it must be such as may be produc'd openly , by the asserters of any truth ; that , by alledging it , they may be able to convince others , that what they maintain is a real truth , and not some phantastick conceit of their own ; without which , their clear and distinct perception is invisible , and so can satisfie no man ; nor clear themselves from being self-conceited ; but , to argue like phanaticks , who pretend they discern things by an inward light , which none can see but themselves , nor they themselves make it visible to others . of which , more hereafter . . i beg of you , once more , ( the point being of great importance , ) that this question , concerning your rule , may be rightly stated , and understood . none doubts , but that , if we clearly know a thing to be true , it is true ; otherwise , it would follow , that we may know what is not ; or , ( which is the same , ) may know that which is not to be known . the only question , then , is , whether we may not be mistaken in iudging we know it , when , indeed , we do not know it , but only fancy it : which is a thing so common amongst all mankind , that not very many escape this fault of overweening . wherefore , ere you can pretend that this rule of yours is useful , and a certain means to know truth , you should first prescribe us some self-evident rule , how we may know assuredly , that our iudgment that we do clearly and distinctly know a thing , is not a mistake : for , otherwise , we are often apt to think we do most certainly know a thing , when we have only a lively apprehension , or fancy of it . besides which , this rule must have force upon all mankind , that we may easily make it out to others , that we do indeed and really know , and not meerly presume we know , when , perhaps , we do not : otherwise , it will neither give others , nor our selves , any certainty that what we imagin we know , is true. this is the true difficulty ; and against this , i do not discern any effectual provision made by you ; nor how you can make any , without having recourse to the self-evident connexion of the terms in an identical proposition . this self-evident connexion we can produce openly , to every man's eye ; whereas , you cannot produce your pretended clear and distinct perception to any man : and , it being , when thus produced by us , impossible not to be seen and acknowledg'd by any man , who has any use of his intellectual faculty , 't is able to give perfect satisfaction to our selves , and to others also , that we neither are , nor can be mistaken in our judgment , that we do really and indeed know it ; and , not only deem it . you see , sir , where the difficulty pinches . that can never be a certain rule to me , or to any man , which i can never be sure i make use of : now , 't is evident by what is said here , i cannot be assur'd i do clearly and distinctly know , unless my judgment that i do so be secur'd from mistake : for , if i be mistaken in that judgment , and do not clearly and distinctly know , your rule affects not me at all ; nor am i a jot the better for it , or nearer the knowing any truth by it : but , which is yet worse ; 't is evident from this discourse , that there needs another rule of knowing , antecedent to yours , to guide my iudgment that i do clearly and distinctly know , and do not mistake , or rashly presume i know ; as we experience , the generality of mankind does . which evidently concludes , that the proposition by which you express your pretended rule of knowing , may , indeed , be a truth , ( in case you do really know , ) but can never be a rule of truth to you , me , or any man : for , this must be first known , or self-known , to all mankind ; or otherwise , it needs another antecedent rule , to make it useful ; and , so it is ruled , and no rule . here it is , then , that the point sticks ; and , here 't is like to stick , for any thing i can imagin , in behalf of the cartesians . . i am apt to apprehend , that your acute wit will object , that some few of those instances i alledg'd formerly , of men who verily judg'd they clearly and distinctly knew such and such things to be true , and yet were mistaken in thus judging , do fall short of concluding ; i mean , those that concern'd people in diseases ; which you may , with some reason , think , are known to be plain deviations from nature , by an easie criterion ; viz. by the standard of mankind , who have the right use of their reason . which i shall not contest with you ; nor had i brought such as these , but that i see your writers bring the same against the certainty of our senses ; as , that icterical people see all things yellow , and such like ; which are solv'd by the same criterion . but , what are these to many others which i there alledg'd ; and could press farther , were it sutable to the brevity i had intended . to force that objection home , what shall we think of speculative men , and great philosophers ; nay , of many great mathematicians , who thought they had most certainly squar'd the circle ? they are held to be men in their perfect wits ; nay , they are held to be candid too ; and , moreover , learned ; and , which is more , both sides offer demonstrations for their tenet ; and have , oft-times , great multitudes that follow them , and embrace their doctrine . can it be deny'd , but that such very learned , acute and ingenious men do verily judge that they clearly and distinctly see their doctrine to be true ? and yet , we are certain that , since they contradict one another , one side must needs be in an errour in that judgment . we will bring it yet nearer home , and lay it even at our own doors . . i do not doubt , but your self ( for , i cannot suspect your candour ) does verily judge that you clearly and distinctly perceive , or ( which is the same ) have perfect evidence , that your way of ideas is the true way to science : and i , on the other side , am as fully persuaded , as that i live , that i do clearly and distinctly see , it is so far from being the way to science , that it is perfectly groundless , and leads to innumerable errours . that you are thus persuaded , seems very evident to you ; for which , i am very willing to take your word . and , that i am thus fully persuaded i do clearly and distinctly see the contrary , besides my faithful asseveration , i believe indifferent men will think i have given sufficient testimony , by bringing so many pretended demonstrations against your way ; and hazarding my credit , by vouching them to be conclusive ; which , therefore , are so many sure gages for my sincerity , when i declare this to be my sentiment . add , that these demonstrations are not like flashes of wit , coin'd by my own brain ; for , then , perhaps , i might , for some by-end of applause , or some such foolery , have falsly pretended they were my true thoughts : but , they are all built upon the nature of the thing , or subject in hand ; which being establish'd to be what it is , 't is beyond the wit or power of man , to make , marr , alter , or deface it ; and , should i go about to disguize or mis-represent it , 't is easie for any adversary to shew , i speak contradictions , and expose me to open shame for my confident ignorance : for , what is against the nature of the thing , makes that thing to be what it is not ; which is a plain contradiction . this , then , being so manifest , that i may convince you by your own method , why ought not you , by your way of doubting of every thing that has any shew or possibility of falshood , or any uncertainty , to lay aside , and renounce your rule of truth , as uncertain and fallacious ; since we do both of us follow it to our power ; and , yet , since we contradict one another so diametrically , one of us is , notwithstanding , in a vast errour ! here is matter of fact , then , against the usefulness of your rule ; and that too , as certain , and evident , as that one ( or both of us ) is not the worst sort of hypocrites ; that is , belies himself , and his own thoughts : whereas , i believe , no man that knows either of us , had ever such a bad opinion of us . i could press this topick much farther ; but i had rather leave it to your sincere and deliberate consideration . . the rule by which we are to know truth , ought therefore , ( as was said , ) in such a manner oblige all mankind to assent , that it should be apt , of it self , to compose all differences in opinion , by applying , and bearing up to it : whereas , yours can compose none at all ; but , contrariwise , engages learned men in an endless wrangle . we both grant , that if we see a thing clearly to be true , it is true ; since common sense tells every man , that none can see what is not to be seen : nor is there any such mystery , or mastership , in advancing this obvious position ; or , for magnifying cartesius so highly , for inventing it ; since , i think , no man living ever deny'd it . the question is , which of us has this true evidence , which you call clear and distinct perception ? you will say , you have it , and i want it : i shall reply , that i have it , and you want it . you will blame some defect in my understanding , or some untoward byass or propension of my will , both which , according to mr. le grand , ( p. . ) can make one deceiv'd in thinking that he evidently perceives : and i , on the other side , think i may , with equal justice , blame yours : and , so , we may come to lay the fault , either on the weakness of one another's understanding , or the depravedness of his will ; which naturally leads men to pelt one another with rash iudgments , and hard words : but , since we can , neither of us , see one another's thoughts , or discover to others , how clear they are , which is your way ; both sides will still remain as far from conviction , and the point from decision , as at first , for any thing your rule helps either of us . and , if we set aside propositions and discourses , and the shewing that their terms are undeniably connected , and therefore , themselves certainly true ; ( which is not yo●● way ; ) how , i beseech you , shall men ever come to a final conclusion by dint of reason , without being put to it to avail themselves by ill words , and passion ; which ( i fear , by proceeding upon your rule ; for , you pretend not to have produced any connexion of terms ) has been such a stickler , of late , to uphold the cartesian cause ? . this seem'd to me so odd a procedure , that i begg'd the favour of you , to acquaint me , how , or by what means , you would make others know you had , indeed , this clear and distinct perception ; or , how you could prove you had it , but by making use of propositions and discourses ; the force of which consists only in affirming , denying , or inferring ; that is , in the connexion , or inconnexion of the terms . as i remember , your answer was , by explicating to them clearly the point , and desiring them to meditate upon it : which way you seem'd to magnifie very much . i could have alledg'd , that you could not have propos'd , or us'd , even this way , without making use of propositions , and discourses : but , letting you proceed , i barr'd explications , if they were brought ( as it here seem'd ) to evacuate any need of proof : for , explicating , as contradistinguish'd to proving , amounts to no more but a kind of rhetorical persuasive , made up of similitudes , parallels , allusions , and such little sorts of light , witty fancies , which may serve , and are made use of , in a manner , equally , to abet errour , as well as truth . indeed , if the terms of the question be dubious , explications are needful , and very requisite ; lest , otherwise , we level our argument at a wrong thesis : but , if the point in question be rightly understood by both parties , it must either be prov'd , if it be not self-evident and needs no proof ; or , it must remain for ever uncertain , and undecided . i should be glad to know whether , or no , you would go about to convince such a man by grounds and principles ? if you say , you would , and that you think you can do this : then you wrong your cause exceedingly , by waving the mention of such strong supports as principles and grounds ; and recurring to , and relying on such unsteady , feeble reeds as explications . if you say , you cannot evince your thesis by principles ; then all your explications , tho' never so witty , are , confessedly , unprincipl'd , and groundless . if you pretend , your explications do involve proofs in them ; 't is clearly for the interest of your cause , to make use of the argumentative part of such discourses , and leave out the explicative : for , 't is certain , that the argument , if a good one , subsists upon some solid principle ; whereas , an explication may be without any at all . it will therefore , to any considering man , be a strong prejudice against the cartesians , and make men apt to think they have no grounds or principles at all , that they do not much pretend to them , much less build their discourses on them , or reduce them to them ; but seem to abdicate them , while they place their chief support in explications . in a word ; let the position be first prov'd to be true , or all explications are frivolous : for , to what purpose is it to stand explicating a falshood ? the nature of all explications , is , to give us the sense of the thesis propos'd ; but , let it be first prov'd , and seen that it bears good sense ; for , 't is a very sleevless task , to stand explicating nonsense . . on this occasion , it were not amiss to note here a certain manner of writing , very frequent amongst some modern philosophers ; which is apt to lead the generality of learners into very great errours . we do , all of us , naturally affect knowledge ; and therefore , we love to read authors that are clear , or write clearly ; as being very knowable , or intelligible . but , now , clearness is of two sorts : the one makes clear the thoughts of the writer ; the other makes clear the truth of the point he writes of . the one expresses clearly his own meaning , when he says thus : the other manifests clearly , that he says true when he says thus . the former is perform'd by means of rhetorick , and witty expressions : the other can only be done by solid principles , and by true logick . but , it too often happens , that those readers who have not a strong bent to see truth , and , with a steady aim , pursue it , and it only , are so well appay'd with the clear expression of an author , in delivering his own mind ; which cannot but be very pretty , and taking , being , generally , neatly clad ; that they are , at unawares , decoy'd to think the thing it self is clear , when 't is only the sentiment of the author which is render'd so evident ; especially , if there be also some slight shew of coherence ; which seldom wants , if the writer be a man of parts . and , yet , perhaps , all this while , were that discourse strip'd of its superficial gayity , and sounded to the bottom , nothing will be found to support its truth ; but it will appear plain bald nonsense en cuerpo . on the other side , it lights so , that discourses that are solid , and built all along on evident principles , ( only which can clear the truth of the point , ) do want the other sort of clearness , which consists in explicating , to recommend them to the liking of the reader . and this happens for two reasons : one , because principles do consist of few words , or notions ; and those too , such as are general , or universal ones ; which do not admit such varying the phrase , or smooth explications , to make them more knowable ; their clearness consisting only in the greater simplicity of those general terms , and their close connexion . the second reason is , that those writers who endeavour to look deep into the foundation and principles on which truth is grounded , and are not satisfy'd with skimming over questions superficially , do not care to avail themselves by explications , and the way of smooth expressions ; but quite dis-regard them , and judge them only luke-warm words in their present circumstances ; because they neither conduce to the attainment of science , nor to settle and clear the truth of the thesis ; which such men see can only be done by the strict and evident connexion of their notions . to apply this discourse ; i intreat you , sir , to consider whether the former sort of clearness be not that which the cartesians affect ; the second , that which we take , and pursue . i shall hope , that whoever peruses my method to science , with an attentive and indifferent eye , will easily observe , that i first put my thesis , and then endeavour to establish it by rigorous proofs , drawn from the nature of the thing or subject treated of in those respective places : and that the cartesians do not use to take any such method , but place their hopes of recommending their tenets to the reader 's approbation , in their explications . which makes it so difficult for a logician to find where their arguments lie hid , or where they press ; of which , with just reason , i so often complain . . thus much concerning your method of proving by explicating ; or rather , of substituting explications in the place of proofs . as for the other part of your method , which is , your putting learners to meditate long and seriously , upon what you have propos'd to them , i lik'd that as ill as i did that of explicating : and , my reason is , because , unless men take principles along with them , to guide their thoughts right , and keep an attentive eye to them , while they thus meditate ; 't is to be fear'd , their long meditating will , by its frequent dints , so imprint and fix what you have told them , in their brain ; and , at length , make it sink so deep into their minds , that , whether it be right or wrong , it will stick there , as daily experience shews us ; custom , a second nature , having a very powerful ascendent over the understanding , to imbue us with false impressions , by the oft-reiterated thinking upon any point that is disputable ; especially , ingenious explications ( as was shewn lately ) too often serving for reasons , to those who are not well vers'd in true logick . . but , the main objection i make , is , that this method of yours quite overthrows the rule of truth , which you intended to establish by it . for , this rule being that , upon which all all our knowledge of truth depends , must be so very clear of it self , above any thing we can add to its highest evidence , that it cannot possibly need any explication , nor meditation neither . nor , consequently , can any stronger argument be brought , to demonstrate that this rule of yours is not the right one , than 't is to confess or pretend that it stands in need of , or , even , can admit assistance , or light , either from the one , or the other . for , if it can need any explication , it follows , that it must be something obscure : and , if it can need poring and meditating upon it , ere it be admitted , or can be known , then 't is far from being most self-evident : both which utterly destroy the nature of such a rule . for , since we must know all other truths by it , its evidence must be the first thing to be known ; and therefore , the knowledge of its truth must antecede the knowlege of all other truths whatsoever , and be clearer than they. which being so manifest , i wonder what thoughts or considerations our explicating or meditating can suggest , that can do this first rule of truth any service , or give it any advantage ; since , all others being more obscure than it , they may , indeed , ( could they affect it , ) impart to it their own greater obscurity , and make it less clear and intelligible than it was ; but , can never make it clearer , as having no greater , but far less clearness themselves . lastly , as this pretended necessity of explicating , and meditating , quite degrades yours from being the genuin , first , and , consequently , the right rule of knowing truth ; so it abets ours , and gives it a clear title to be such a rule , since the self-evidence of those first truths , express'd by identical propositions , ( which is our rule , ) is such , as is both impossible to be explicated , and impossible to need meditating , to clear it to us ; but , at the first instant we open the eye of our mind , it discovers it self fully to all mankind , to be most true ; and , withall , begets , forces and fixes us in a full and firm assent to its verity . . perhaps it will be alledg'd , notwithstanding what i have said above , that this clear and distinct perception is not pretended to be a rule of truth in it self , so that it establishes truth fundamentally ; but of truth to us , or , ( as the schools phrase it , ) quoad nos ; that is , a rule whereby we may know what 's truth , what not : and , it seems , that it cannot be deny'd to be such a rule , in regard 't is evident that we must assent , or hold a thing true , when we see clearly and distinctly it is so ; nor ought we to assent , or hold it to be true , unless we do clearly and distinctly see it to be so . i answer , that this pretence is already fore-stalled , in divers places of my former discourse ; where it was shewn , by many instances , that , even in the opinions learned men held , this guiding our thoughts and judgments by what appears to us a clear and distinct perception , is uncertain , and fallacious . whence , in the thesis constituting this to be your rule , there is tacitly involv'd a false supposition ; v●z . that that perception , on which we solely rely , is unmistakable by us : for , if we may mistake it to be really a perception thus qualify'd , when it is not , then our assent may be erroneous ; and , how can an erroneous judgment , in any sense , be true to us , or make us know a thing to be true ? if i am to draw a straight line , and the rule by which i guide my self be sometimes straight , and sometimes crooked , how is it a rule to me , in that action , or draught ? . in constituting this perception to be your rule , you begin at the wrong end : for , seeing this perception is an act , and that the object specifies every act , and makes it such as it is ; the object , or thing , must be true in it self ; and , by being in it self true , it thence makes our judgment ( when we rightly conceive it ) to be true also . this distinction , then , in our present case , is altogether frivolous ; and the alledging it , preposterous . . to perceive , is an act of the understanding , and the same as to know ; and , to perceive clearly and distinctly , is the same as to know perfectly . whence follows , that to say , [ i know that to be true , which i clearly and distinctly perceive to be so , ] is the very self-same sense , as to say , [ what i know to be true , i know to be true ; ] or , [ i know what i know : ] which is a good confident saying ; and , moreover , true too . but , nothing can be more ridiculous , than to make knowing the rule of knowing , or a rule to make a thing true to us . to say , [ a thing is , because it is ; ] or , [ i know it , because i know it ; ] is more like a woman's reason , when she is fix'd , and wilful ; than a rational man's , or a philosopher's . . the ingenious mr. le grand seems to go more charily to work , by putting his rule of truth , ( dissert . pag. ) in these terms , [ illud omne verum est quod clarè & distinctè percipitur . ] he does not say , [ quod percipitur esse verum ; ] but barely , [ quod percipitur . ] which words do not tell us , whether he speaks of our perception by the first operation of our understanding , simply apprehending a thing ; or of the second , which is express'd by a proposition . but , this still falls into the same : for , if he means the former , then , since simple apprehensions have neither truth nor falsity in them , being no more but , barely , what 's meant , or signify'd , by the words ; it cannot follow , that what i clearly and distinctly thus perceive , is therefore true : for , i simply apprehend , and this clearly and distinctly too , the meaning of these words , [ a triangle has four corners ; ] yet t is far from being true , being a plain contradiction . he must mean then , that i am to perceive the sense or meaning of those words to be connected , which is done by putting them into a proposition ; and then his rule must run thus , [ whatever simple apprehensions i see clearly and distinctly to be connected in a proposition , that proposition is true : ] which is that very rule which we advance , and the cartesians would avoid . only , we say , that to make this a rule , we must see the parts of it self-connected , or self-evident ; for , all other connexions are made , by the terms being connected by means of a third ; which is the same as to be deduced , or prov'd . but , these connexions being , all of them , conclusions , they cannot pretend to be rules , or principles , since they must depend on such rules , as shew those conclusions must follow . again , if he means , ( as he must , if he means any thing , ) that his rule is , that we must see those simple apprehensions , which we call the terms , connected in a proposition ; then we must see , or clearly perceive , that that proposition is true : and then , his principle must run thus ; [ whatever proposition i clearly and distinctly perceive to be true , is known by me to be true : ] wherefore , since to perceive thus , is , to know ; and that , as appears by cartesius's words , there cited , he speaks of what 's verum mihi , as the effect of his principle ; that is , of what i know to be true ; join these two together , and this principle , or rule , does manifestly amount to this ; [ that which i know to be true , i know to be true ; ] which is a most prodigious rule of knowledge ; and yet , this is most evidently the sense of it , in case to perceive means , to know ; and verum mihi means that which i know to be true : which , i think , is undeniable by any man of common sense . and , i wonder how the great wit of cartesius could imagin that any thing could be true to him , unless he first saw it to be true in it self , which it has from its grounds ; unless he makes account , that a thing may be true to him , which , in it self , is false : which makes those two truths fall out , and contradict one another , which i ever took to be very good friends . this makes me wish that the ingenious mr. le grand , who tells us here , p. . that there goes more to a rule , than to a truth , had told us , in what a truth , and in what the nature of a rule consists ; which we plainly deliver , by affirming that a truth consists in the connexion of the main parts ( or terms ) of any thesis ; and a rule in the self-connexion of them , by formal identity ; whence , such rules become self-evident to all mankind , and able to impart their light to all other truths whatever . but , this shews the genius of the cartesian writers : they take what 's uppermost , and descant very prettily and gentilely upon it ; which , being obvious , and facil , does mightily please the fancy of the readers : but , they go not to the bottom of any question . they rake the surface of the most difficult points ; but they never dig deep into it , to find out the ground and foundation on which truth is built . and , i hope , the reasons i have alledg'd , both here , and elsewhere , will satisfie my readers , that it is not the ridiculous motive of pique , or humour , which makes me give this character of their way of writing ; but , meerly , the duty i owe to truth , which obliges me to do it . thus , worthy sir , i have us'd the best reason i was master of , in examining exactly , and understanding rightly , your rule of truth ; and i have endeavour'd to stop all the startingholes , by which the cartesians may think to evade the force of my arguments . which done , i presume i may take my leave of this point , and apply my discourse to what follow'd next at our interview . . my design , at the beginning of our conference , was to convince you , that truth consisted in the connexion of the terms , in those speeches we call'd propositions ; which evinc'd , i made account i could easily prove , that the very first truths , which were to give light to all others , or be the rule of truth , were such propositions as were self-connected , and therefore self-evident . how your over-acute way of doubting defeated my intentions , and stop'd my progress , is seen above . sorry to have been put out of that direct road , which i saw was the only right one , and without settling which , all our discourse would be unconnected talk to no purpose , i was casting about how to get into it again . but a learned and judicious friend of ours , who was present , suggested , that [ cogito ergo sum ] was pretended by you to be a first principle ; and , he prest earnestly it might be thorowly examin'd , that we might see whether it had in it the nature of a first principle , or no. i was something troubled to relinquish the method i had prefix'd to my self ; without which , i saw , the nature of a first principle could not be settled , nor shewn : however , i yielded to his request . i allow'd then , that [ cogito ergo sum ] was a true and evident consequence , as are a thousand such others , viz. dabito ergo sum ; scribo , ambulo , dormio ; nay , somnio ergo sum , &c. ) which is what , with unattentive considerers , give it all its credit , and makes them look upon us , as unreasonable men , who , as they apprehend , do question this consequence , or call it into doubt . but they are quite mistaken ; there is no body that doubts it is an evident consequence ; but , there is a very wide difference between a consequence and a principle ; or rather , if it be a consequence , tho' never so good , it can never be a first principle , because , the premisses , which induced that consequence , were before it ; and that truth , on which all force of consequence is grounded , , ( as was noted above , ) is before either of them . what we affirm then is , that it is not a first principle , nor could be so to cartesius , when he propos'd , and made use of it as such : and i addrest my self , to show it had not in it , the nature of such a principle , nor could , with reason , be pretended such by cartesius himself . . to prove this , i alledg'd , that it is an inseparable property , or rather , essential to first principles , that they must manifest themselves , to be such by their own most perfect self-evidence ; whereas cartesius was forc'd to use very many prolix antecedent discourses , to prove all else to be dubitable ; and , because they were so , he went on , enquiring farther , till he could find something that could not be doubted ; which , he conceiv'd , was [ cogito ergo sum , ] from which he came to conclude , that this was the first principle . whence i alledg'd , that therefore , those antecedent discourses of his , which prov'd all else to be doubtful , were the reasons or arguments whence he drew his conclusion , that this was the first principle . now , i think this as plain reason as plain can be , that no man can evince a thing to be the first in any kind whatever , but , because , there is nothing before it in that kind . and , from this consideration , i prove my allegation clearly ; because , had not those many and large antecedent discourses , to prove all else to be doubtful , been true ; his conclusion , viz. that [ this is the first principle , ] could not have follow'd , or been true neither . for , in case the senses had not been thus fallacious as still to deceive us , perhaps , science might have been had from the things without us affecting those senses ; nor had there been any need to recur to the operations of our own mind , to seek for the ground of all truth there , because , we might have had it from the things in nature . this being so , how many propositions did he use all along , to prove that our senses might all decieve us ; that we know not certainly whether we sleep or wake ; that mathematical demonstrations might be all erroneous , &c. all which antecedent propositions , by the plain rules of logick , ought to be more evident , and more certain , than the conclusion he gather'd , or inferr'd thence , viz. that therefore this , and only this , being indubitable , and certainly known , is the first principle . add , that this being plain sense , his own discourse overthrows the establishment of his first principle . for , since he had not this first principle of his till he had found it , nor did he find it , till he found all else to be doubtful ; it will be ask'd how , and in virtue of what first principle he became , while he was in quest of it , more certain , that all other things were doubtful , than he was of the conclusion he inferr'd thence , viz. that [ cogito , ergo sum ] being impossible to be doubted of , was his first principle . wherefore , if he guided himself by no indubitable , or first principle all along , in those antecedent discourses , which were in reality his premisses ; that conclusion of his , cannot in any logick follow , nor be certainly true , nor ought to be embrac'd ; especially , by such a philosopher as he was , who professes doubting of ever thing , till he came at his first principle , that can be in the least dubitable . . in reply to this discourse of mine , which is grounded on the supposition , that cartesius guided himself by reason , in settling his first principle ; and on the plainest rules of logick that the premisses must be clearer than the conclusion ; the former of which , i suppose you will grant , the latter is obvious to common sense ; you brought an ingenious explication , by way of similitude , or parallel ; which , i see , are to supply the place of arguments , and answers too , in the cartesian way . it was this . suppose i see a man making great holes in the ground , or throwing aside rubbish ; and that i ask him what he is doing ? he tells me , he has an intention to build , and to lay foundations for that end , and is making way for it . now this action of his looks like an idle business , if we consider it alone ; but , if we regard his farther intention of building , it is a wise and necessary preparative . and yet this antecedent action , of preparing to lay a foundation , does not give strength to the building , which is an action quite different from it ; but the building depends on the foundation it self , and on nothing else . and , therefore , it follows , by way of parallel , that the antecedent discourses of cartesius , need not be connected with that first principle , as premisses , to inferr it must be such ; since they serv'd only to remove the rubbish , or the pretended knowledge of things by means of the senses , which encumber'd the mind with prepossessions ; and , so to make way to lay that first foundation of science . i think i have done your parallel all the right you can expect : wherefore , i come now to examine what force it bears , and what strength such a way of discoursing has in it ; which , i the rather do , that i may inform those readers , who take such kind of similitudes for reasons , how easily , and how frequently they are deluded , by such unsteady , inconclusive , and illogical methods . first then , 't is so certainly known , that similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia , or , ( as they say , ) run on four feet , that it is grown proverbial ; which lays a great prejudice upon that way in common . . similitudes drawn from material things , to immaterial , are particularly liable to this defect . they may , indeed , oft times , serve to illustrate some truth , as fit metaphors to sute with our fancy ; but then they presuppose the truth , which they are to illustrate , to be known some other way . whence , unless this be done first , all they can do is to explicate we know not what , which destroys the nature of an explication ; for , explications are not intended to put the truth of the point , but suppose it . . all the actions of our soul are , or ought to be rational ; and have a dependence on one another , by the way of reason gathering subsequent truths from those which preceded . now , i think , 't is impossible to be contested by any man who has read cartesius's meditations , but that his discourses which anteceded his finding out this first principle of his , are reducible to this enthymem ; [ for these and these reasons , there can no certainty be had , as to speculative knowledges , by any information had from outward objects affecting the senses ; therefore , it ought to be sought for in some interiour act of our mind , which is most comprehensive and peculiar to it , ] which he concieved was cogitation ; and thence he laid this first principle : [ cogito ergo sum ] which being so , it follows necessarily , that the laying this for his first principle , depended on the goodness of the reasons he had , why our senses were not to be trusted , nor could give us our first notions ; whence , by reflecting on their metaphysical verity , we might have those self-evident , and first truths , of ours . this , i say , was evidently the tenour of his discourse ; because , did not those reasons of his , against the sufficiency of our senses to give us this information , conclude ; but that , notwithstanding all those reasons could prove , the senses might still imprint on our mind those first notions , his consequent would not have follow'd : nor , could he have had any ground for recurring to the interiour act of cogitation , for his first principle , in regard it had been given to his hand by means of the senses , as was now declar'd . . it being then evident , that the substance of those antecedent discourses was summ'd up in the enthymem now mention'd , 't is manifest , that this explication of yours falters in the main particular , in which it ought to sute , and resemble . for , in case those impressions on our mind could have been made by means of the senses , as aforesaid ; then those impressions , or notions , being the immediate foundation , on which is built all our knowledge , could not be call'd , or resembl'd to rubbish ; nor compar'd to a hole , to lay the foundation ; for , the holes were already made in those inlets , our senses ; which were pervious to the effluviums affecting the seat of knowledge ; and thence , the soul. so that your similitude is , in effect , the begging the whole question ; and can have no force at all , but by our granting it ; which , i see plainly , we shall never have reason to do . rather , unless this petitio principii ( which is tacitly involv'd in this parallel ) be yielded by us , or prov'd by you , it makes against your selves . for , by denying all such certain information from the senses , you will be found , not to remove the rubbish , in order to lay the foundation ; but , to stop up the way to the laying any ; and , to damm up all the holes , by which the materials could come into our minds , where only such a foundation could have been laid . at least , you see , your explication amounts to nothing ; and , that your similitude is lame in all its legs , and has not one sure foot to stand on . which will , i hope , sufficiently inform others , that this way of explicating , so mightily affected by cartesius , and his followers , is utterly insignificant . i shall hope too , that this paper will light into the hands of some readers , who are so intelligent , as to discern , that this explicative way is taken up , to avoid the way of rigorous proof ; which is so unfriendly to a doctrine that wants principles . . whence i should give this advice to all aristotelians , that whenever the cartesians would obtrude upon them their ingenious explications , they would demand of them smartly , by what grounds they know , or will prove to others , that what they explicate , is true ; without doing which in the first place , no explication ought to be admitted . it may serve for a kind of currying favour with weaker understandings ; but it can never improve any intelligent man in solid knowledge , nor make him one jot the wiser . . after this , we came to argue that other objection of mine , that first principles , of all others , must be most clearly and distinctly known ; because they ought to be , of all others , most knowable ; there being no others before them , by means of which they might come to be better known . now , cartesius himself expresly confesses , that , when he had found this first principle , he did not yet sufficiently understand what [ ego , ] the subject in that principle , meant : whence i inferr'd , that therefore , [ cogito ergo sum , ] could not be to him a first principle . this is enforc'd , because the subject is the principal , and most substantial part in every proposition : and , since , in ordinary things , when we do not well know what we talk of , plain s●nse tells us , 't is a folly to talk at all ; much more is it disallowable in philosophical matters , where exact truth is aim'd at ; and most of all in first principles , which must be most self-evident . you seem'd to think an obscure knowledge of the subject was sufficient . but , how an obscure knowledge can be either clear , or distinct ; much less , superlatively such : or , how a proposition , whose principal part is neither clear , nor distinct , should , notwithstanding , it self , ( as here it must , ) be most clear and distinct , is , i believe , past any man's comprehension . . however , i let your smooth explication slide , without pressing my discourse too forcibly : for , it had been something rude , at so civil a visit in my own chamber , to push things forward too rigorously ; or , to seem to affect the victory of a confutation . but our friend urg'd me to bring some one argument , that might decisively conclude the point . it came into my mind , ( waving what i had objected elsewhere , ) to alledge against it , that a first principle must be some one determinate proposition ; whereas it was evident that this principle of yours had in it two , and those very different ones . for , [ cogito ] is a speech that affirms , which logicians call a proposition ; and involves in it all the three parts that compleat such a speech , being clearly the same as [ ego sum cogitans ; ] as [ sum , ] for the same reason , implies , [ ego sum existens ; ] which is evidently a proposition too , and distinct from the other . your answer was , that , notwithstanding the manner of expression , they made , or amounted to but one proposition ; and signify'd no more but [ ego sum re cogitans . ] but i reply'd , that this was the first proposition ; and hence i a●k , what becomes of the later , [ ego sum existens , ] since the predicate [ existens , ] is a quite different notion from the predicate [ res cogitans . ] add , that to prove himself existent , was the sole scope cartesius aim'd at in laying this principle ; as appears by his words immediately following ; viz. [ nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim ego ille qui jam necessario sum . ] he does not pretend to have evinc'd that he was res cogitans , but only necessarily existent . to enforce this the more , i alledg'd , that the illative particle [ ergo ] did shew plainly , that there were two propositions ; of which , the one was an antecedent ; the other , a consequent . but you would not allow that [ ergo , ] in that place , had an illative signification ; nor , as far as i could discern , any at all ; for , i am sure , if it has any , it can have no other . i remember , you bestirr'd your wit as dexterously as any man could in such a cause , to bring off cartesius ; but 't is beyond the power of wit , or art , to do it , unless the most pregnant and significant words which rational creatures can use , must , for his sake , lose their signification . which is such an injury to the rest of mankind , who would be at a strange loss to discourse or understand one another , were this admitted , that it will never be allow'd by other philosophers , who are dis-interessed , and have not that passionate concern for cartesius , as some others seem to have . i remember , mr. le grand tells us , he has spoke to some exceptions made against this principle formerly , and , perhaps , this may be one of them . but , as i could not light on that book of his , so i clearly see , this particular is so manifest , that 't is impossible for any man , in such a case as this , to answer to the purpose . . and thus ended our discourse ; in which , if you had any disadvantage , it proceeded hence , that you would needs undertake to defend cartesius's logick : whereas , nothing is more evident , than that , in the far greatest part of his meditations , ( not to speak of some other pieces of his , ) he regarded no rules of logick at all ; but meerly follow'd the current of his own ingenious thoughts , in gliding smoothly and gentilely , from one thing , to another , as his first design led him , and in putting his conceptions clearly ; i mean , according to the first sort of clearness , mention'd above , § . . the summ is this ; without propositions , we cannot speak ; and , without illative particles , we cannot make use of our rationality ; both which , notwithstanding , you do not seem very willingly and heartily to admit . had i been of your party , i should have advis'd you to have flatly deny'd all syllogisms , inferences , antecedents , consequents ; and , in a word , all logick , and all kind of connexion , and then it had been impossible for any man to attack you , or bring any argument against you ; i add , nor you any for your selves . . the generality of mankind ( i wish i might not say , of philosophers too ) being much govern'd by fancy , i am to expect , such a high speculation as is the foregoing discourse , will scarce find a civil entertainment amongst such gentlemen . however , i hope it will not displease them , if , on this occasion , i ask them some few pertinent questions ; leaving the resolving them to themselves . . whether there be not such propositions ; as those i call identical ? . whether mathematicians , and some others , who treat of philosophy in a mathematical method , have not propos'd such before me , and made use of them ? . whether such propositions are not the most-firmly-grounded , and the first of all others ? . whether they are not self-evident , and force the assent of all mankind ? . whether we can be deceiv'd in iudging them self-evident ; as we may , and often are , in judging that we clearly and distinctly know a thing to be true ? . whether they have not an universal influence , in their way , over all truths , especially all deduced truths ; since 't is demonstrable , that all the force of consequence is grounded on them ? . whether , all these qualifications being shewn to be found in the self-evident knowableness of identical propositions , this clearest light , or intelligibility , which so necessarily appears in them , ought not , with just right , entitle them to be held the rule by which to know all other truths ? lastly , whether this self-evident connexion of the terms of a proposition , found in them , which is producible openly , be not a clear means to shew to others , that we do not mistake when we judge them self evident , and true ; since all mankind that sees them produc'd , must think the same of them we do ? and , whether , on the other side , it can possibly be shewn to others , that our selves do clearly and distinctly know a thing to be true , without producing finally some proposition that is unmistakable and self-evident to every man ? when they have duly weigh'd each of these particulars , and the proofs brought for them , i appeal from their fancy , to their reason , whether i have not done a just and necessary duty to philosophy , in endeavouring to settle the rule of truth upon so solid and evident a basis ; and , whether i could have been less speculative in such a high subject , as requires a deep inspection into the very center of all truth whatever , even to the resolving it finally and connaturally , into essential truth it self ? if these considerations do not acquit me upon either account , i cannot but think my self unjustly condemn'd ; and , i hope , the whole court of philosophers , who are impartial , and sincere , will judge the same . . to clear me from singularity in this uncommon method of philosophizing , i could farther alledge , that mr. locke , in his essay , b. . ch . . § . . gives us this doctrine ; that the first act of the mind , is , to perceive its own ideas ; and , that one of them is not another ; that is , that each of them is its self only ; which is an identical proposition . — that this is so absolutely necessary , that , without it , there could be no knowledge , no reasoning , — no distinct thoughts at all . which sufficiently expresses it to be the first truth , or rule of truth , which influences all other truths ; since , without it , nothing at all could be known . — that a man infallibly knows that the ideas of white , and round , are the very ideas they are . — that this is the first agreement , or disagreement , ( that is , the first truth , ) the mind perceives in its ideas . — that men of art have , for ready application in all cases , reduc'd this into those general rules , [ what is , is , ] &c. in all which , ( as he does in divers other main speculative points , ) he so perfectly agrees with me , that , tho' i did not proceed on my own grounds , i need no more but these of his , to draw such immediate consequences thence , as would establish and abet my thesis . indeed , it did not lie in the way of that very learned man's speculation , to reflect on the universal influence identical propositions have over all truths , and all knowledges , whatever ; and therefore , his dis-like of them afterwards , ( chap. . ) can be thought to relate only to their apprehended uselesness : tho' , even there , ( § . . ) he acknowledges an excellent use of them too ; where he says , that [ what is , is , ] may serve sometimes , ( he might have said , always when it needed , ) to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of , when , by circumlocution , or ambiguous terms , he would , in particular instances , deny the same thing of it self ; because no body will so openly bid defiance to common sense , as to affirm visible and direct contradictions , in plain words . to which reflexion of his , if this learned gentleman pleases to add , that whoever discourses false on any subject , does , at the same time , make that subject not to be what it is , or ( if the question be of some mode ) as it is ; his penetrative judgment cannot but discern , that identical propositions are equally useful in all questions , all disputes , nay , all discourses whatsoever , if the way of reducing inferiour truths to them , were but well improv'd , and cultivated . . i much value your good opinion ; and , i perceiv'd , i was in danger of losing it , by a hint you gave me , with a dis-relishing air , that i call'd cartesius a fanatick ; which you thought very harsh . in answer , i deny the charge . 't is one thing to say , that , when cartesius was laying his method to science , by denying his senses , and devesting himself of all his former knowledges , which ( as my author expresses it ) was no less than to unman himself , he fell , for some few days , into a spice of enthusiasm ; nay , was brim-full of it ; and fancy'd he had visions and revelations ; so that he seem'd crack-brain'd , or to have drunk a cup too much ; which are the very words a cartesian , who wrote his life , has given us , ( p. , , . ) and , 't is another thing to say , he was habitually a fanatick , or enthusiast , all his life , and in every action he did , or book he writ ; the former of which can neither be deny'd with truth , nor the later objected with any degree of modesty : nor does it sute with the high character i have given of him , in the preface to my method , and the encomiums i have , upon occasion , bestowed on divers of his books . i beseech you , sir , be so just , as to stare my case right . i was writing a method to science , and two other methods , ( if , indeed , they do not fall into the same , ) which look'd very extravagant , did lie cross my way ; which , unless i remov'd , my whole design had been spoil'd , and of no effect . i mean , that of malbranche , which makes all humane science come by divine revelation : and , that of cartesius , that we must deny all our knowledge of natural truths , had by our senses . the settling this later method , had , confessedly , lost cartesius his wits , for some time ; and therefore , i had good reason to fear , that the following the same method might do a greater mischief to others , who had not such strong brains as that great man had ; of which too , there do not want instances . the former method , advanced by malbranche , i saw evidently , brought a kind of fanaticism into philosophy . for , i believe , no man doubts , but that the genius of fanaticks is , to over-leap all humane means , and to pretend that their light of knowledge comes to them immediately from god. my fault , then , only consisted in this , that i was such a friend to truth , and to mankind , as to endeavour ( to my power ) to avert such mischiefs from young students , by fore-warning them of what had prejudic'd others , and therefore might highly prejudice them ; and , to confute those ways to science , that so directly thwarted mine , which , my best judgment told me , was the true one . now , this being a task so unavoidable to one in my circumstances ; and the confuting such strange methods being , with good reason , judg'd by me to be so beneficial to others , it cannot , without rashness , be thought , i did this out of a desire of opposing other learned men ; but , purely out of duty to my reader , and a just regard to my self . yet , for pursuing this laudable and ( in my case ) necessary intention , i am persecuted with the highest malice , by two over-zealous cartesians ; who , to uphold these aukward and pernicious methods , make no scruple to break in upon the most sacred methods of christianity ; tho' i have done no more but cite the words of their own authors . besides , every candid reader will , hence , easily discern , that it is not out of pique against their persons ; but , purely , out of my dis-like of their unprincipl'd and dangerous methods , that i have oppos'd them at all . nor have i any personal reflexions upon their morality : nor do i charge them with impiety , but of folly ; which every antagonist in philosophical debates is forc'd to object to his adversary . . but , am i the only man , of our moderns here in england , who have thought it the interest of philosophy , and of truth , to oppose malbranche and cartesius ? mr. iohn keyll , of oxford ; a person of great wit , and greater hopes , being ( as i am informed ) scarce arriv'd yet at the summer of his age , has lately put forth an examination of dr. burnet's theory of the earth ; where , after he had , in his introduction , discover'd the fopperies of divers of the antient philosophers ; and of three of our moderns , spinoza , dr. more , and mr. hobbs , not much less ridiculous than the former ; he lays open that superlatively absurd opinion of malbranche , which i noted above . he gives us a summary , and parallel consequences , of his doctrine in that particular ; which is , that we see not the things themselves , but only their ideas , which the soul sees in god : — and , that there is no possibility of seeing any bodies , except in that being , ( god ; ) which contains them after an intelligible manner . — bodies , therefore , and their properties , are ( only ) seen in god ; so that ( says he ) a man who reads this book , does not really see the book it self , but the idea of it , which is in god. which he deservedly characters , to be unintelligible iargon , and a solid piece of nonsense . he exposes that equally-senseless opinion , that bodies , of their own nature , are neither heard , seen , smelt , nor tasted ; and , that when , for example , we taste any thing , the body tasted cannot produce any savour in us ; but god almighty takes that occasion , to stir up that sensation in us , to which the body does not really concurr . so that mankind has , it seems , quite lost its animality ; at least , that we are not naturally sensitive creatures , but only supernaturally ; or , by god's immediate power making us such , every time we are to use our senses . he proceeds : according to him , it is impossible for any man to move his own arm ; but , when he is willing to move it , god takes it , and moves it up and down , as the man wills. if a rebellious son , or subject , murther his father , or his prince , by stabbing him , the man himself does not thrust the ponyard into his father's or prince's breast , but god almighty does it , without any other concurrence of the man , but his will. it seems , our laws are very unjust ; which do not hang men for meerly intending , or willing ; but for ouvert - acts ; in which the man himself has no hand at all ; they being , all of them , entirely of god's doing . whence we see , that , with the cartesians , such doctrine as this has no impiety in it at all against god : it comes from them , and so 't is all sacred . he proceeds , and affirms that no second causes act : so that no body , tho' mov'd with never so great a velocity against another , can be able to drive that other before it , or move it in the least ; but god takes that occasion , to put it into motion . at this rate , one need not fear his head-piece , tho' a bomb were falling upon it , with all the force that powder can give it ; for , it would not so much as break his skull , or singe his hair , of god did not take that occasion to do it . — the most natural agents , with him , are not so much as instruments , but only occasions of what is produc'd by them : so that a man might freely pass through the fire , or jump down a precipice , without any harm , if god almighty did not take that occasion to burn him , or dash out his brains . . coming to cartesius , whom he calls the great master and deliverer of the philosophers , from the tyranny of aristotle ; — and the first world-maker of our century , he lays the blame at his door , of all this presumptuous pride of his followers , and their fantastick philosophy ; and animadverts severely upon divers of his odd placita : as , that there is always the same quantity of motion in the world. so that , if all the men and animals in the world were moving , which most part of them can do when they please ; yet , still there would be no more motion in the world , than there is in the night-time , when they are at rest ; and , what motion they had when they were moving , must be communicated to the aether , when they are at rest. and , whereas cartesius ' s skill in geometry gave those contrivances of his witty fancy all their credit , this author assures us , p. . that , from the beginning to the end of his principles , there is not one demonstration drawn from geometry ; or , indeed , any demonstration at all , except every thing illustrated by a figure be a demonstration ; for , then , indeed , there may be enow of such demonstrations produc'd in his philosophical works . now , in case this be so , then , it seems , explications by figures do serve cartesius , and his followers , for demonstrations in geometry , as well as explications by words serve them for demonstrations , or proofs , in other sciences . — he adds , that , his great fault was , that he made no use at all of geometry in philosophy . — nay , that his whole system was but one continual blunder , upon account of his negligence in that point . — that galileo and kepler have by the help of geometry , discover'd physical truths , more worth than all cartesius's volumes of philosophy . he confutes his vortices , by mr. newton's principles ; who shews it impossible , upon many accounts ; that the earth , and other planets , should move in a vortex . with which most consummate geometrician , i believe , none of the cartesians will be willing , or able , to grapple , or contend . and , were cartesius now alive , perhaps he would have as much admir'd him , as himself , in his life-time , was admir'd by others . — he subjoins , that , his notion of a vortex being ruin'd , the whole cartesian system must of necessity fall to the ground : and , that world , whose origination he pretended to have deduced from mechanical principles , must be a wild chimera of his own imagination . he affirms , that cartesius's discourse about the motion of the moon , is so notoriously false , that there is no almanack-maker , but can demonstrate the contrary . farther , that the cartesians pretend to give a true account of all the phaenomena in nature ; whilst they understand so very little , that they have not given us an explication of any one thing : — and , that cartesius has blunder'd so much in the easiest , and most abstract things in nature , that of the seven rules he has given of the laws of motion , there is but one of them true. lastly , he affirms , that cartesius's fancy of making a world by mechanical principles , — has given the ignorant atheists ( for , so are , says he , most of that persuasion ) some plausible pretences for their incredulity , without any real ground . where the the parenthesis lays such a blemish on the greater part of the followers of cartesius , and on his doctrine , as occasioning it , that , as i have charitably endeavour'd , in divers places , to wipe off that aspersion , and have taken their part ; so , i am sorry to see now , that 't is beyond my power to do it . i must own , that there have been many vertuous persons , cartesians ; but i am not so well vers'd in their catalogue , as to to know , whether they , or the athèists of that persuasion , do make the major part. these are his present objections against des cartes ; and , by what i have read of this learned author , i know no man more likely to make good what he has charged upon him , than he is . . you see , sir , how much it behoves the cartesians to look to their hits , if they have any ; and , to arm themselves against such brisk attacks , tending to the overthrow of all their hypothesis by way of geometry ; which i have attempted to do by way of logical , physical , and metaphysical principles . for , if this opposition to cartesius , by geometrical arguments , should come to be a confutation ; then , since mr. le grand tells us , his physicks is but a part of the mathematicks , his credit , as a philosopher , will sink utterly ; as i am inform'd , the esteem of his doctrine does , by large degrees , in both the universities ; or rather , it is quite vanish'd out of one of them already . . for my part , let them come off with the geometricians as well as they can , i will not give them much trouble ; but , do sincerely declare , that if they can bring any one evident principle , either in logick , physicks or metaphysicks , which they will vouch to have the nature of a principle in it ; and prove that it abets any point of their doctrine , as 't is distinguish'd from ours , i will cross the cudgels for the next comer , and promise , never to oppose them more . fairer offer was never made ; nor any method ever propos'd , that shews a greater sincerity of the proposer in pursuing truth , nor that can be more decisive of a philosophical contest ; in which , half a sheet of paper will do the business , as well as whole volumes . you see , sir , i allow my adversaries a large field ; out of which they may please to pick and cull what they like best , or judge they can best prove . if they know of any thing that grows there , which will bear the test , and can approve it self by principles , to be an evident truth , they have free liberty , and a fair occasion to do right to themselves , and oblige the world ; and , withall , they will do me an especial favour , ( for which i shall not be ungrateful , ) in making me , by their confutation , see a truth i never knew before . this very compendious method , i say , will shorten disputes , avoid all shew of wrangling , which is grateful to no man ; and , finally conclude the whole cause . or , if this does not please them ; and , that it agrees not with their genius to stand bringing evident proofs ; then , let them but meerly name , or put down categorically , any one principle of theirs , which they judge to be the strongest , and most evident , of any they have ; and , which they will vouch to be influential upon the cartesian doctrine ; and i will undertake to demonstrate , that either it is no principle , or , that it has no force to prove any point of their doctrine , nor has any influence upon it at all . in case this rational proposal ( which , if both parties do candidly seek truth , ought rather to be call'd an overture of peace , than a challenge ) be as friendly accepted as it is meant , it must needs draw upon us both the eyes of all learned men who are lovers of truth , and are weary of long disputes ; especially , if they be concern'd to know whether the so much fam'd philosophy of cartesius be solidly principl'd , or only extravagantly witty : and , their expectation will be strangely rais'd , to see what will be the issue of a controversie thus closely manag'd ; our philosophical combat being , by this means , brought to the last trial , and a final decision by principles , which are the arma decretoria or truth . for , if it shall hap to appear that cartesius's doctrine has not so much as any one principle , which is truly such , their cause will be quite lost , past hopes of recovery : but , if it subsists by principles , then i must make them satisfaction , by acknowledging publickly , that i have foolishly over-ween'd ▪ and take the shame to my self , for my rash presumption . we may confine our selves ( as i said ) to half a sheet of paper : all shall be transacted by pure dint of reason ; and , he that uses the least uncivil word to his adversary , and falls into passion , shall be held to have lost his cause , and to be reduc'd to a nonplus . every man , acquainted with humane affairs , knows that , in some cases , [ responsum non dictum , ] may be a sufficient plea to justifie one who is to vindicate his christian credit , unjustly attack'd , without any provocation given to his opposer . it happens too , often times , that a man cannot clear himself fully of those blemishes with which he is aspers'd , but by laying them at the door of the injurious affronter ; whose faults , if they be great ones , cannot be so much as nam'd , but the words which express them must needs sound harshly . retorted language , in such a case , is only the rebound of the aggressor's violent strokes , upon himself ; and are not thrown at him , but only reverberated from an object incapable to receive their impression . but , especially , such a replier is excusable , when he observes such a temper and measure , that he imputes no impiety or irreligion to his adversary ; but rather , charitably excuses him from any such high crimes , even tho' he had causlesly , and uncharitably , imputed the same to himself ; which ( as i hope every man will observe ) is the distinguishing character between mr. le grand's aggressive , and my defensive . notwithstanding , however such a carriage against an assaulter may , in prudence , seem sometimes unavoidable ; yet , certainly , it is , in it self , neither edifying to good christians , instructive to the learned , nor profitable to the readers . therefore , to avoid it for the future , and to clear truth , which ought to be our only care , i have thought fit to make this fairest and civillest overture . if it be accepted , neither party , in case they do seek truth , can be justly displeas'd . but if it be refus'd , and that my opposers resolve to pursue their former rude method , i shall hope that all wise and good men will hold me excus'd , ( i dare say , your self will , ) if i decline the ungrateful task of reciprocating the saw of contention ; but let them still wrangle on contentedly to themselves , and apply my thoughts to better things . . it remains , worthy sir , that i beg your pardon for publishing this paper , without acquainting you first with my design . but , since you are not nam'd in it , it need not concern you in the least , unless you please your self . besides , i have discours'd with other cartesians , of your profession , upon the same subject ; and , added , for their sakes , some passages , which , otherwise , had not needed : so that it cannot particularize you , in the least . and , since this paper has no other tendency , but to clear truth , i have reason to presume , that your candour would not have been displeas'd at it . i intreat you to do me that justice in your thoughts , as not to interpret this address , by way of letter , to be a kind of challenge , or provocation . i am too well acquainted with the study and practise , in which you are so laudably and successfully . employ'd , to think it can allow you any leasure for an avocation so impertinent to your proper and precise business . i hope my [ ideae cartesianae expensae ] may give you satisfaction in divers other points . but , i must bespeak your pardon , while you peruse it , for the many errata . it happen'd , that the compositor understood no latin ; and ( besides other faults , ) in two or three places , he hapt to put in what i had blotted out in amending my copy ; and , my circumstances were such , that i could not always be in town , to correct the press . i am , honoured sir , your sincere friend , and humble servant , j. s. finis . some books printed for , and sold by abel roper , at the black-boy , over against st. dunstan's church in fleet-street . solid philosophy asserted , against the fancies of the ideists : or , the method to science farther illustrated . with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning humane understanding . by i. s. the history of poland , in several letters to persons of quality ; in two volumes : comprehending an account of the form of government in that kingdom ; king 's power , court and revenues , the senate , senators , and all other officers ; of the religion , dyet , and little dyets , with other assemblies and courts ; of the inter-regnum and election , and coronation of the king and queen , with all the ceremonies ; of the present condition of the gentry and commonalty , as likewise , of the genius , characters , languages , customs and manners , military affairs , trades and riches of the poles : together with an account of the city of dantzic's origin , progress , and present state of the teutonick order , and the succession of all its great masters : of the present state of learning , natural knowledge , practice of physick , and diseases , in poland : and , lastly , a succinct description of the dutchy of curland , and the livonian order ; with a series of the several dukes , and provincial masters . with a table for both volumes ; and a sculpture of the dyet , in their session . by bernard connor , m. d. &c. compos'd and publish'd by mr. savage . of the nature and qualification of religion , in reference to civil society . written by samuel pussendorff , counsellor of state to the late king of sweden . translated from the original . marriage-ceremonies : or , the ceremonies used in marriage in all parts of the world. very diverting , especially to ladies . by seignior gaya . translated from the italian . the second edition : with an addition of remarks on marriage ; by mr. brown. a defence of dramatick poetry : being a re-view of mr. collier ' s view of the stage . in two parts . a voyage to the east-indies : giving an account of the isles of madagascar and mascareigne , of suratte , the coast of malabar , of goa , cameron , ormus , and the coast of brasil ; with the rellgion , customs , trade , &c. of the inhabitants . as also , a treatise of the distempers peculiar to the eastern countries . to which is annex'd , an abstract of mr. de rennefort's history of the east-indies : with his propositions of the improvement of the east-india company . the new atlas : or , travels and voyages in europe , asia , africa and america ; thro' the most renowned parts of the world , viz. from england to the dardanelles , thence to constantinople , egypt , palestine , or the holy land , syria , mesopotamia , choldea , persia , east-india , china , tartary , moscovy and poland ; the german empire , flanders and holland ; to spain , and the west-indies : with a brief account of ethiopia ; and the pilgrimages to mecha and medina in arabia , containing what is rare , and worthy of remarks , in those vast countries ; relating to building , antiquities ; religion , manners , customs , princes courts , affairs military and civil , or whatever else is worthy of note . perform'd by an english gentleman , in years travels , more exact than ever .