The method to science by J.S. Sergeant, John, 1622-1707. 1696 Approx. 739 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 232 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2004-08 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A59232 Wing S2579 ESTC R18009 12437472 ocm 12437472 62043 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A59232) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 62043) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 296:3) The method to science by J.S. Sergeant, John, 1622-1707. [70], 429 p. Printed by W. Redmayne ... and are be sold by Thomas Metcalf ..., London : 1696. Attributed to John Sergeant. Cf. Errata: p. [7]. Reproduction of original in Harvard University Libraries. Marginal notes. Created by converting TCP files to TEI P5 using tcp2tei.xsl, TEI @ Oxford. Re-processed by University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. Gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. EEBO-TCP is a partnership between the Universities of Michigan and Oxford and the publisher ProQuest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by ProQuest via their Early English Books Online (EEBO) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). The general aim of EEBO-TCP is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic English-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in EEBO. EEBO-TCP aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the Text Encoding Initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor. The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines. Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements). Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site . eng Science -- Methodology -- Early works to 1800. Science -- Philosophy -- Early works to 1800. 2004-04 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2004-05 SPi Global Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2004-06 Judith Siefring Sampled and proofread 2004-06 Judith Siefring Text and markup reviewed and edited 2004-07 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion THE METHOD TO Science . By I. S. LONDON , Printed by W. Redmayne for the Author , and are to be Sold by Thomas Metcalf , Bookseller , over against Earl's-Court in Drury-lane , 1696. Book I. Of the First Operation of our Understanding . Less . 1. OF NOTIONS , or the very First Ground on which all Science is built . Less . 2. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions , and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads . p. 10 Less . 3. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided , and of the Common Head of SUBSTANCE . p. 25 ●ess . 4. Some Considerations belonging to those Heads of Notions , or to the Ten Predicaments in Common . p. 36 ●ess . 5. Of the Common Head call'd QUANTITY . p. 50 ●ess . 6. Of the Common Head of QUALITY . p. 60 ●ess . 7. Of the Common Head of RELATION . p. 71 Less . 8. Of the Common Heads of ACTION and PASSION . p. 81 Less . 9. Of the Common Head of UBI , or WHERE . p. 89 Less . 10. Of the Common Head o● QUANDO , or WHEN . p. 9● Less . 11. Of the Expressions of ou● NOTIONS by WORDS . p. 100 Book II. Of the Second Operation o● our Understanding , or JUDG●MENTS . Less . 1. OF the Nature of Judg●ments , or Propositions , Common ; Of their Parts ; Of 〈◊〉 Ground of their Verification , 〈◊〉 of the several Manners of Predic●ting . p. 11● Less . 2. Of Self-evident Propositions First Principles . p. 1●● Less . 3. That First Principles are Ide●●tical Propositions , prov'd by Insta●●ces . The Use that is to be made of them . Also , of some Other Propositions , either in whole or in part , Formally Identical ; and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions . p. 15● Less . 4. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us ; and of the Method how this is perform'd . p. 163 Book III. Of the Third Operation of our Understanding , DISCOURSE ; and of the Effects and Defects of it . Less . 1. OF Artificial Discourse , the Force of Consequence , and of the Only Right Figure of a Syllogism . p. 225 Less . 2. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism , and of the Laws of Concluding . p. 235 Less . 3. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism ; or , what Middle Term is Proper for Demonstration . p. 248 Less . 4. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition ; and , consequently , every Errour to a Contradiction : What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another ; and of the Science of Pure Spirits . p. 261 Less . 5. Of other Mediums for Demonstration from the Four Causes . p. 272 Less . 6. Several Instances of Demonstration . p. 288 Less . 7. Other Instances of Demonstration . p. 302 Advertisement . p. 316 Less . 8. Of Opinion and Faith. p. 322 Less . 9. Of Assent , Suspense , Certainty and Uncertainty . p. 344 Less . 10. Of Disputation and Paralogisms . p. 356 Appendix . p. 374 The Errata's in the Preface . PRef . P. 26. l. 15. out of . P. 28. l. 19. cast about . P. 46. l. 19. the Cartesian . Corrections of the Errata . PAge 5. Line 8. onely which . P. 18. l. 10. as is . P. 21. l. 18. that Motion . P. 62. l. 6. most nearly . P. 69. l. 23. but their . P. 75. l. 1. become . P. 77. l. 6. has besides . P. 106. l. 2. False . P. 107. l. 17. Proposition . P. 122. l. 31. A whole . P. 128. l. 12. Sophroniscus . P. 147. l. 18. make . P. 236. l. 16. Proposition is Identical . P. 245. l. 27. & nunc . P. 250. l. 5. that can . P. 255. l. 7. Sensitivum . P. 257. l. 30. 't is Evidently . P. 258. l. ult . Basis. P. 270. l. 31. at one . P. 273. l. 33. est of . P. 281. l. 27. be a kind . P. 301. l. 1. Cause of . P. 308. l. 20. exercise it 's . P. 311. l. 25. there . P. 318. l. 18. Frailty which . P. 321. l. 23. all own . P. 322. l. 3. main . P. 326. l. 1. what is , is . P. 354. l. 20. Erroneous . P. 362. l. 13. he is not . P. 364. l. 30. Grammatical . P. 369. l. 13. The Sixth . P. 370. l. 34. a proud . P. 381. l. 17. with no. P. 388. l. 3. to be . P. 393. l. 19. gives : P. 414. l. 26. very small . P. 417. l. 22. Slender , Flexible and. l. 24. contiguous . P. 419. l. 25. Art. P. 424. l. 18. Is it . P. 425. l. 13. so they . l. 16. do . P. 427. l. 7. Lock . P. 273. l. 17. and seeing . P. 396. l. 21. that is , ' t is . PREFACE DEDICATORY TO THE LEARNED STUDENTS OF Both Our Universities . REason being Man's Nature , and the Proper Act of Reason , the Deducing Evidently New Knowledges out of Antecedent ones , it may seem Wonderful that Mankind , after the using their Reason and Disputing so long time , should still Disagree in their Sentiments , and contradict one another in inferring their Conclusions : so that those who are sam'd for the Greatest Philosophers , do still remain in Perpetual , and ( as far as it can be discern'd ) Endless and Irreconcileable Variance and Dissension about their Tenets . It seems to shock the very Definition of Man , and to lay in some sort a scandal upon Creative Wisdom it self , that , whereas all other Creatures do arrive at the Natural End for which they were made , Mankind alone , nay the Noblest Portion of that Kind , who cultivate their Thoughts with the most exact care that may be , should still miss of Reasoning rightly , and so fall short of True Knowledge , which is their Natural Perfection . What Tree but bears the Fruit Proper to its Kind ? Or , what Cause in the World but produces such Effects as are sutable to its Nature ? And tho' , by the Interfering of Cross-Agents , there happens now and then a Deficiency in some very Few Particulars , yet that Defect is never found in a Considerable part of the Species ; for Chance would not be Chance if it did come near the reaching an Universality : whereas Mankind , in its whole Latitude , seems to fall short of improving it self in Truth ; at least , in gaining Certainty of it ; or , if some have attain'd it , yet the Number of those Right Reasoners is so very Inconsiderable , that they are lost amongst the Croud of those who stray into Errour . Nor can those Happy Few who have light on it , obtain Quiet Possession of what they have Acquir'd ; but their Title to it is perpetually Disputed by Great Multitudes of Pretenders ; who put in their Claim , and set up their Pleas for their Opposit Tenets . Whence , our First Enquiry ought to be , how Man's Nature comes to be so Disabled from performing its Primary Operation , or from Reasoning rightly ; that so we may bethink our selves by what Means it may ( if possible ) recover the true use of its Natural Faculty ; how it may be cur'd of the Impotency it labours under ; and be freed from those Impediments which hinder it from Acting as it ought . 2. Divines will tell us that this mischief happens thro' Original Sin. Nor can it be doubted but there is some Truth in what they alledge . For , questionless , Passion distorts the Understanding by the Ascendent which the Depraved Will has over it in such Concerns as the Will is addicted to , and has espous'd an Interest in . But , this comes not up fully to our difficulty . For , granting that , when the Soul is thus originally tainted , the Will influences and byasses the Understanding , so as it cannot discern clearly the just value of Spiritual Goods , and , by addicting it to such False Goods for which it self has a Passionate Concern , it makes it over-value Vile Pleasures , Aiery Honour or Sordid Profit ; whence , it becomes blinded and makes wrong Iudgments both of the one and the other ; yet , I see no Reason why Original Sin , which works only by giving us Corrupt Inclinations , should hinder us from concluding right in points meerly Speculative , to which our Discourse confines us ; nor why an Archimedes , an Euclid , an Aristotle , or an Hippocrates , tho' Heathens , may not arrive a● Truth in Mathematicks , and other Sciences to which they apply'd themselves ; nor why a man of a Wicked Life , whose Soul is Corrupted with Actual Sin added to Original , may not cast up an Accompt right , as well as he might have done had Adam never fallen . To deduce Consequences right out of other Knowledges , which we call the Premisses , is so nearly ally'd to our very Essence and Rational Nature , that quite to lose that Faculty seems the same as to lose our Manhood ; which we cannot be thought to have forfeited by the Fault of our First Parents . Nor has the Depravation of our Will any Interest or Inclination tempting it to be Accessary to such a Miscarriage : Rather the Acquisition of Science is so Agreeable to our Innate Vanity and Desire of Esteem , that it runs along with the grain of that primigenial Imperfection . The Honour that accrues to an Eminent Scholar prints him in such a Character , and is so grateful to Pride and Self-love , that it excites In●ustry , whets the Wit , and , thence conduces to clear the Understanding . So that t● exercise our Natural Faculty as we ought 〈◊〉 such kind of Studies , and so arrive at an E●cellency in Reasoning , does sooth and not thwart those Vicious Inclinations . Besides , there have been without doubt , many Persons of Eminent Virtue among the Schoolmen both of the present and former Ages ; who by a long practic'd Habit of Virtue have rectify'd those sinister Propensions of the Will inherited from their Parents ; and yet , by their Contradicting one another , we may 〈◊〉 ●ssured that one side does still miss of Truth . Whence we may conclude that neither Virtuous Inclinations do avail the Good , nor do Vicious ones considerably or discernibly hinder the Bad in order to their Attainment of Science : Wherefore , we must look for Another reason for these constant Miscarriages , and this Unaccountable Disagreement among Philosophers and Speculaters ; and how it comes that the Truth or Falshood of very few Conclusions have , in so many Ages , been decisively Determined ; or , which is the same , why Truth , in things subject to Reason , cannot , in so long time , be made clearly ap●ear . Reflecting then that Mathematicians do very rarely disagree in their Conclusions ; or , if any differ from the rest , as in the Quadrature of the Circle , or such like , either thro' Surprize , or Unattentiveness to the long train of Consequences which are prae-requisit to those Conclusions ; and that by this means a Mistake happens , the Errour is evidently discover'd , so that even the Mistaker himself is convinced of his Failing , when it comes to be thorowly examined by others , Learned in the same Art , who like By-standers see more than did the Gamester ; this leads us naturally to consider whether the same Clear Way has been taken in other parts of Philosophy , as has been in that Science . And , at first sight it appears manifestly it has not . For 't is evident that Geometricians do lay for their Axioms Self-evident Propositions and clear Definitions ; and their Postulatums are not such as are meerly begg'd or supposed , and so need our Favour to let them pass for Truths ; but they claim our Assent to them as their Due ; and the Consequenees they draw are all of them Immediate ; which makes the Contexture of the whole Work Close and Compacted . Whereas I have not observ'd that any other sort of Philosophers have taken that Clear Method . Whence we have good reason to suspect that the want of observing this Method , or something Equivalent to it , has been the sole oecasion of all those Deviations from Truth and Disagreements among Philosophers in their Conclusions and Tenets , which we find in the World. I say , [ or something Equivalent to it . ] For , I do not expect that every Demonstrater should be ty'd to observe that severe Method in rigour . This were to condemn Aristotle , and all the Philosophers that ever writ hitherto . 'T is too laborious to the Authour to cast his Thoughts perpetually into that Nice and Exact Frame ; and very Uneasie for the Readers also , and would too much strain their Brains to keep them still bent to such a Solicitous Attention . Besides , a Discourse that proceeds endways by Immediate Connexion , does comprehend as much in one page , as in Euclid's Method could be contain'd in Many . 'T is enough then that such Discourses be so perfectly Consequential , that they can , if need be , bear that most Rigorous Test. And such they must be ; or , otherwise , they will scarce pass muster with Acute Wits , who candidly and unbyassedly pursue Truth . Nor does this precise Mathematical Method sute , in all regards , with the other parts of Philosophy . For the Notions that Science is employ'd in are , for the most part , Extension and Figure ; which being perceptible to our Sight , they show the thing , in some sort , to our Eye , as well as demonstrate it by Reason to our Understanding ; whereas , scarce any Other Science affords us this advantage ; which forces us to have recourse only to our Notions , and to strive to make them Clear by Definitions . In which , having no assistance from our Fancy or Material Representations , they are hence less easily Imprinted and Reflected on ; which makes our Attainment of Science more Laborious . Yet , notwithstanding this Accidental Disadvantage , their Productions are not at all less Evident or less Certain to the Judgment . For , it is not the Noting them with A , B , C , that either makes them True , or shows them to be so ; but the Connexion of the Notions we have of those Lines , Angles , or other Quantities , and of their Proportions to one another , which we voluntarily agree to signifie by such Letters . Whence results this Evident and Comfortable Corollary that Clear Demonstrations may be had , and , consequently , Science attain'd , in other parts of Philosophy , and in all Other Subjects , as well ( tho' not so easily ) as in those of the Mathematicks ; so the Notions belonging to those Subjects be but Clear'd and rightly Connected ; sinee 't is the Connexion of Notions , or ( as Logicians phrase it ) the Connexion of Terms , which does beget Science , and not the Formality of Lines and Letters us'd by Mathematicians . By this time we may seem to have discover'd the true reason of the General Miscarriages of most Philosophers in the pursuit of Truth . For , since 't is Impossible that he who intends to Travel to London , tho' he have both Clear Eyes , and Strong Legs , and employs both of them to his utmost , should ever arrive at his Iourney 's End if he does not take the Right Way to it ; so it is equally Impossible any Man should arrive at Science , if he takes not the right Method or Way to attain it , tho' he have never so Clear a Natural Wit , and a Strong Brain , and labours never so industriously to make use of both to his best advantage . Providence therefore is justify'd , and the Ability of our Natural Faculty asserted ; and the Blame lies wholly at the doors of the Persons who do not first apply their Thoughts to know the Way to Truth , e'er they set forwards in quest of it : but chiefly in those who pretend to be Guides to others , and yet are Themselves Ignorant of the Method that can bring men to it . Mathematicians take the Way , and so arrive at it . Others ( a very few exeepted ) do not take it , and therefore miss of it . Whence we may establish this Fundamental and most Useful Maxim , that The First and Chief Study of those who pursue true Knowledge in Philosophy , is to apply their Industry to comprehend the METHOD or WAY to it : that , If they find not that , their most earnest Study is lost Labour ; but that , having once found it , they cannot doubt of compassing their End by using such Proper Means . But is not the Knowledge of this Method insuperably hard to be attain'd ? For , if it be , we are never the nearer , but still at the same Loss . To give a Stop to such an apprehension , I must avow that no part of Mathematicks is more Demonstrable than is the Way to Demonstrate , or the METHOD TO SCIENCE . Nature ( as we experience ) gives us our Notions ; on which , as on its Elements , all Science is grounded . To make these Clear and Distinct , we can distribute them under Common Heads , and Divide those Heads by Intrinsecal Differences , or such as are Proper to each of them , till we come to the Notion we are to discourse of . While we thus Divide them , we at the same time , and with the same labour , frame Denitions of each Notion comprehended under those respective Heads ; by doing which we gain a Distinct and Clear Conception of them ; which does , to a fair degree , facilitate our Judging whether such or such of them may be with Truth connected in Propositions , ( or in such Speeches as Affirm or Deny , ) in which Truth does Formally consist . To do this more exactly , we consider that those Propositions must either be such as show of themselves that the Two Notions ( call'd it Terms ) must be Connected ; and then they are Self-connected or Self-evident : Or else they need to be shown Connected by means of some other Notion which is Connected with them both ; to show which we call Proving . Those of the Former sort , if perfectly such , are fit to be First Principles ; whose Nature , as Common Sense tells us , is not to need or admit of Proof . The Connexion of the later sort is made known by Proof , or by their joint Connexion with a Third , which we call the Middle Term , Medium or Argument ; to do which is the Proper work of Discourse or Ratiocination : These Three Terms rightly placed or put together , compound that most Close and Exact Discourse call'd a Syllogism . Certain and most Evident Rules may be assign'd how to place those Three Terms in the two first Propositions , so as that Discourse may be most Clear and Perspicuous ; as also , how to find out such a Middle Term as is Proper to Connect the other Two , whose Connexion or Truth is under Dispute ; and to show the Force of the Consequence , and why a New Proposition call'd the Conclusion , must most necessarily follow out of the Former ones . All which being Demonstrated , ( as I have reason to presume is done in this following Treatise ) and the Equivocation of the Words that express our Notions being avoided , I see not what more can be substantially necessary to the METHOD TO SCIENCE . For , our Notions being Clear'd , First Principles establish'd , the true Form of a Syllogism manifested , Proper Middle Terms found , and the Necessity of the Consequence evidenced ; all those Conclusions may be Deduced with Demonstrative Evidence , which ly within our Ken , or which we can have occasion to enquire after ; that is , all that we have Notions of : provided those Notions be not meerly Accidental , or very Remote from one another , and therefore Incapable of being Connected . Yet still there is one Difficulty that sticks , and lies in our way ; and which is more , seems hard to be remov'd . For LOGICK , or the Art of Reasoning rightly , being the Skill which is to teach us this Method to Science ; and so many Logicks being written by Learned Men , and studied by such Multitudes ; how comes it that , notwithstanding such Helps , men do still differ in their Tenets , that is , many or most of them do still err , as much as if they had never had such Proper Assistances . For , if Logick shows them the way to Science , and they take that way , and have a Natural Ability to follow it or walk in it , they must all arrive at Science ; and their Thoughts center in the same Truths without any Disagreement ; the contrary to which we do notwithstanding Experience . To give an Answer to this , I shall be hard put to it how to bear my self between the two Extremes of Modesty , Dissimulation and Boasting . For , if I grant those Logicks are as they ought to be , that is , Full and Evident , and follow'd by Men of divers Sentiments , I must confess I know not how to reply , or solve the Objection . On the other side , to condemn all the Logicks since Aristotle's time , or all Logicks which are not according to his Grounds , is to set up our selves , and savours of Arrogancy . In this porplexity I have no way to secure my self but to speak the plain Truth , and to hope it will bear me out . I must then , in behalf of Truth , declare , that the Pretended Logicks themselves are in the greatest Fault . For , 't is easie to observe , that they do indeed give many dry and unprov'd Rules and Maxims ; they afford many Definitions , some right , some wrong , being oftentimes Illogical and fram'd out of Fancy ; they pester their Books with many unnecessary Divisions and Subdivisions ; they treat very largely of the Predicaments , of Single , Opposit and Aequipollent Propositions ; they are prolix and superfluous in their Doctrine about Syllogisms , their Moods , Figures , several sorts of idle Fallacies , &c. All which look very Learned to New Beginners ; who do , therefore , take much pains to lay them up in their Memory ; I say in their Memory , for none of those passages being Demonstrated , they never sunk into or settled in their Reason . And therefore , notwithstanding all this , when they have as it were got without Book all these particulars , the Readers are no wiser how to demonstrate any point practically , or how to set himself about it , than he was before he read those Treatises . I have studied many of those Logicks my self when I was young , and all of any note I had seen then , and consider'd them very attentively , till I had almost lost my Natural Reason by dwelling upon them ; yet notwithstanding ( and I believe the same passes with other young Students ) I knew no more how to go to work to demonstrate any thing , than if I had never seen them . They started now and then some curious , amusing ( but jejune and useless ) Questions about Ens rationis , Unions , &c. and set many confused Ideas of the several parts of Logick in my Memory ; but still my Reason was not Enlighten'd , nor enabled to perform those fine things they had told me of . Nor was it any wonder ; for they spoke not to my Reason , nor endeavour'd to ground their Discourse on the Nature of the Things in hand ; nor to show demonstratively why every Step they led me , or Lesson they taught me , must be True ; nor how it did influence True Knowledge , or advance directly towards the Acquisition of Science ; so that it look'd more like a kind of History of what those Authours had said or writ , than like a Method to find out Truth ; insomuch that I came at length to suspect that the Intention of those kind of Logicians , was not to pursue the Knowledge of Truth , which is only to be had by Clear Demonstration ; but that they meant to furnish young Wits with certain Modes of Talking with a show of Learning , and of signalizing themselves for being able to argue pro or con indifferently in Scholastick Dissertations . It resembled the Tiring of a Hawk , serving only to exercise its Nibbling Faculty , and whet the Appetite , but had nothing of Nutritive in it to satisfie it . For , Reflexion will teach us very Evidently , that only that which is made Clear to our Reason , can Settle in it , Nourish and Dilate it , as being Proper and Connatural Food to a Rational Soul ; and that whatever we take in or carelesly swallow , that is not such , but meerly Wordish only fills us full of Wind and Ayr , which breaks out in Insipid Talk. The Fault then lies evidently in the Logicks which have been us'd in the Schools hitherto , none of which have attempted to show Demonstratively the Way how to Demonstrate , or given us a Connected Discourse of the METHOD TO SCIENCE . 'T is noted that the Practice of the Preacher going along with his Doctrine , makes the Doctrine it self more Edifying : and , by parity , had the Teachers of Logick Practised Demonstration all the while they had taught how to Demonstrate , those Rules , so Rationally imprinted , sinking deep into their Soul , and thence becoming as it were a Limb or Faculty of their Judgment , would have truly Enabled them how to act accordingly ; whereas , while they swim only in their Memory , they serve for nothing but to pour out indigestedly what they had rawly taken in . But now , where is that Authour who has hitherto made such an Useful and Necessary Attempt ? None that I know of . The Treatise call'd Ars cogitandi has divers Excellent things in it , and in some places has made many good steps towards True Logick ; and the Examples it brings are very Illustrating . But yet , in the main , it amounts to no more but The Schools Reform'd into Method and Elegancy . It abounds with many useless particulars : It does not bottom it self upon Nature , only which can give Solidity to our Reasons : It has many Unprov'd Suppositions , and bare Sayings without offering any Proof . And , yet I do verily believe that , had not the Authours calculated it for that particular sort of Philosophy they had espous'd , which could bear no Evidence , but had follow'd the guidance of their own Natural Genius ( which , doubtless , was very Extraordinary ) it would have much excell'd its present self . * Mr. Le Grand's Method says much , but proves little ; and I believe , both Cartesius , and himself , did first consider and survey the whole Scheme of their Doctrine , and then fitted their Logick to it . Which is Preposterous and Praeter-natural ; for the certain Way to the End of our Iourney should be foreknown , ere we set the First step towards it . Mr. Lushington has with much pains gone about to demonstrate some particulars of the Summulist part of Logick , and chiefly that about Predication . But , there is nothing at all of Nature in his Grounds . He regards not the Common Notions of Mankind , nor in what they consist ; and therefore his Discourses are so perfectly Artificial , that they have nothing to say to Nature , nor Nature to them . He imposes imprudently new Language and new Terms upon his Readers , which he might have assur'd himself they would never take pains to learn. He affects the way of A , B , C , which makes a show of Science ; but the Product of his Discourse is , oftentimes , no more but the bare Proposition he is to prove , onely drest up in a Mathematical Garb. His whole Book , in my judgment , might have been more clearly compriz'd in one Sheet of Paper : And , lastly , as for want of Nature to ground his Conceptions , his several Proofs can never enter into the Reason , so 't is almost Impossible they should ever stay long in the Memory . Yet his Attempt to demonstrate in such a Sceptical Age , and his Industry , deserve a fair Commendation , and may provoke others to make the same Attempt with better Success . Burgersdicius is clearly contriv'd for the Memory onely , and not for the Reason ; and he confounds and over-burthens it too , with the Multitude of his Canons , Rules , and Divisions ; for which he seldome or never gives any reason , but puts them to be Believ'd by his Reader if he pleases ; and , so leaves him still in the dark . Yet he might be made Useful to New Beginners ; were something of every thing , that is to purpose , pick'd out ; Unnecessary things ( in which he super-abounds ) cut off ; his Errours , which are not a few , Corrected by some Learned hand ; and his shatter'd thrums-ends woven into some kind of Connexion , and Dependence on one another ; to do which , little Transitions from one passage to another are Insufficient . But , as he is , he informs not the Understanding of any one thing groundedly or solidly . He falls exceedingly short of Ars cogitandi in many regards : How , he may please Climates of a duller Genius I know not ; but I should much wonder if any Learned Englishman should consider or esteem him . Mr. Clark , far exceeds him in good Sense , and in giving some Reasons for what he says in many particular passages . But , by his framing the Contexture of his Book out of Authours of different Principles , his Discourses do sometimes appear Desultory , and like a kind of Elaborate Rhapsody , laid well together by his own good Wit. He mistakes Aristotle now and then , by taking his Sentiments as represented by his Adversaries ; whose Interest and Principles conspire to make them misconceive him . He abounds with many Reflexions not all conducing to Science . A Fault , from which Aristotle himself was not altogether free ; which makes it more pardonable . For instance ; To what purpose are his many Distinctions of his Propositions , especially those he calls Exponibiles ? Let but the Learner know certainly and liquidly , what are the Subject and Predicate in any Proposition , which is easie to be discover'd by the Copula that is to come between them , and unite them ; and have a care that the words that express them are Univocal ; he will be furnish'd with means to see the Form of Connexion , which is Essential to a Proposition , and is onely Conducive to Science , which wholly consists in the Connexion of Terms . His chief Misfortune is , that he does not seem either at the beginning , or in the Process of his Book , to know , at least to build upon this Truth and stand to it , that our Notions , or ( as the Moderns have taken a Toy to call them ) Ideas , are the very Natures of the Things in our Understanding imprinted by Outward Objects ; without which no Stability of those Notions or Ideas can be , with Evidence , asserted ; nor any Solid knowledge possibly be had of our Predications ; nor the true Ground of Truth or Falshood be understood ; nor , consequently , ean there be any Firmness in our Judgments or Discourses . Whence , I could wish that every Beginner were at first well instructed and settled in this point ; for , without this , all will be but Loose , and Ungrounded Talk in the Air. And , tho' I lose Credit with our late Wits , I must avow that Aristotle's dry Assertion , that [ Anima intelligendo fit omnia , ] tho' it may seem to some a wild Paradox , has more Solid Sense in it , were it rightly understood , and is more Useful to true Philosophy , than all the other Maxims that do not proceed upon it , and suppose it ; which yet I see the Goodness of Nature intimates to many , and forces them to ground their Discourses on it Practically ; even tho' , while they speculate , they deny it , or , at least , seem to doubt of it , or disregard it . Observing therefore this great want under which Philosophy ( which is the Study of Truth ) labours , I have , out of my true Zeal of improving Science , and beating down Scepticism , ( the profest Patron of Ignorance , and covert Parent of all Irreligion ) hazarded the Opinion of Singularity in endeavouring to write and publish a Demonstrative Logick ; at least I have given such Reasons , quite thorough it , as I judg'd to be Clear and Conclusive , in every piece of it that has any Influence upon Scientifical Knowledge . What my Reader may expect from me is this . I begin with our Natural Notions , the Bottom-Ground of all our Knowledge . I show them to be the very Natures of the Things ; whose Metaphysical Verity being Establish'd by Creative Wisdom , does , consequently , give Stability , and Solidity to all our Discourses that are built on them . I distribute those Natural Notions under those several Common Heads , and manifest why there must be so many and no 〈◊〉 show how their Definitions are to be fram'd , which make our Conceptions of the● 〈◊〉 and Distinct. I lay Rules to escape 〈◊〉 Snares , which Equivocal Words lay 〈…〉 way while we are Discoursing . I show ●he Reason of all Truth and Falshood in Connected Notions , or Propositions : Which , if Self-evident and Identical , have Title to be First Principles , as from many Heads I demonstrate . I trace Nature in all those nice and Immediate steps she takes to generate Knowledge in us at First . Coming to those Propositions that need Proof , and the Way of Proving them , I lay open the Fundamental Ground of the Force of Consequence , which gives the Nerves to every Act of True Reasoning , and of the Certainty and Evidence of every Conclusion which we rightly inferr . To perform which , I manifest that there can be but One Necessary or Natural Figure of a Syllogism , and but Four Moods of that Figure . I lay down and fix the Fundamental Laws of Concluding . I evidence the Nature of that Third Notion or Middle Term ; by the Connexion of which with the Two Terms of the Thesis to be Proved , they must inevitably be joyn'd with one another , and so the Thesis it self must be rightly Concluded ; and , therefore , Infallibly True. I show how to find out a Middle Term fit for our purpose , and thence prepare the way for Demonstration . I lay open how every Truth must have at the Bottom an Identical Proposition , and every Errour a Contradiction as their First Principles , and how they may be reduced to those Principles of theirs : To do which ( tho' more laborious ) is the best Way of Demonstrating . I manifest thence how one Truth is in another , and what strange Consequences follow thence . Also , how Middle Terms , Proper for Demonstration , may be taken from all the Four Causes . To clear better the Notion of Science , I treat of the Natures of Opinion , and ( Human ) Faith ; their Grounds , and how the Former of these two last Deviates from Right Reason ; and when the Later does , or does not . Then I consider the Effects issuing from all sorts of Proof ; viz. Assent , Suspense , Certainty , and Uncertainty . And , to put in Practise my self what I do persuade , and recommend to others , I add Seven Demonstrations of the most Considerable Theses in divers Sciences . And , lastly , I lay open the Ways and Methods of Disputation ; and detect the weak Stratagems , and inefficacious Attacques of Fallacies , or Paralogisms . This is the Summ of my Endeavours in common . But , besides these , many particular Knowledges light in on the by , ( and , as I hope , very Useful ones ) which it would be tedious to enumerate . The Manner I use to carry on the Scheme of my Doctrin , is , not to propose my Conceptions Magisterially , or to expect any one should assent to the least Tittle of what I say upon my Word : But , I offer my Reasons for every Paragraph I advance , if it can be conceiv'd to need any ; by doing which I speak to the Reason of my Readers , and withall I expose my self to the Severe Examination of the most Acute and Iudicious Wits ; of which , I doubt not , there are Multitudes in those Seminaries of Learning , our two Famous Universities ; to whom I humbly dedicate this small Present . I neither strive to ingratiate my self by my Style , nor to surprize any by Plausible Discourses ; much less to Impose upon their Understandings by Voluntary Suppositions . I draw now and then divers Useful Corollaries , and some that will seem , I doubt not , Paradoxical ; that so I may carry on my Doctrine to farther Consequences , and show withall to what Unthought-of Conclusions Reason will lead us if we follow her close and home . Nor am I asham'd to declare openly , that I hold , that the Chief End of Science is to beget Virtue ; and not onely to raise us to Higher Contemplation , but also to comfort , and strengthen Divine Faith in us , and to make it more Lively and Operative . Whence I have taken occasion to excite my Reader 's Devotion out of the Reflexions on divers Points , that seem'd of themselves to be but Dry Speculations : making account that Good Thoughts arising , upon the Spot , but of Truths newly Clear'd to our Reason , do affect the Will most connaturally , raise Devotion , heighten Contemplation , and make it Solid ; and , consequently , keep the Soul Clear from Idle Fancies , and set her above Light Bigotteries . I have not enumerated these Particulars to boast my Performances , ( for these are yet to be Decided , by examining whether the Reasons I have all along produced will bear the Test ) but to bespeak my Reader 's Pardon , if , travelling in an unbeaten Road , I happen now and then to stumble . Which as I am not conscious to my self to have done at all , so I shall hope I no where do in any passage that substantially concerns the METHOD TO SCIENCE : Rather , I must positively avow that it is impossible for any Wit of Man to invent any other Way , than what I have propos'd , that is Solid and Evident . For , 't is granted by all Mankind hitherto ( unless , perhaps , the Cartesians ) that Truth is fundamentally the Conformity of our Judgment to the Nature of the Thing , and that it consists Formally in the Connexion of the Terms ; both which I have follow'd most exactly ; and , as some Readers ( I doubt not ) will think , too superstitiously . Now , since Rectum est mensura sui & obliqui , my Design engages me to show ( as far as the Brevity of a Preface will allow ) that the different Methods taken by Others do not lead us to true Science . And , indeed , there is a kind of Necessity laid upon me to make this Charge good : For , since we take Different Methods , if theirs be a Right one , mine must be a Wrong ; and my Publishing it no Advantage , but an Injury to Truth , and to my Greatest Neighbour , the World. The METHODS which I pitch upon to examine , shall be of two sorts , viz. that of Speculative , and that of Experimental Philosophers ; The Former of which pretend to proceed by Reason and Principles ; the Later by Induction ; and both of them aim at advancing Science . Looking about for an Instance if the Former sort , I did not think Epicurus , and his School worth my taking notice of ; for he who supposes all his Principles , bids Defiance to all Methods of Concluding any thing . And , as for our Modern School-Philosophers , they have so disputed themselves quite out of breath for want of any Certain Method , that they have brought all Science to an Indifferency of Opinions , or maintaining any thing with Equal Evidence ( or rather No-Evidence ) a thing absolutely impossible for those who lay any right Method to Science . And this Deficiency of theirs , losing their Credit with our late Wits , have given them occasion to east about how to model Philosophy a-new , and frame it wholly in another Mould : for the Schoolmen on the one side represented Aristotle wrong , and on the other side his ( perhaps affected ) Obscurity , won them rather to believe the Schools concerning his Doctrine , than to be at the Expence of Pains and Patience to understand him right , speaking by himself , or by his First Interpreters . The Inconsiderableness then of other Pretenders to a Method to Science , and the Weakness of their Pleas , throws me forcibly upon examining the Method of that Great Man , Cartesius : It must be confess'd his Method is vastly different from mine . He pretends to a First Principle , and the Self-evidence of that Principle ; which therefore I must either disprove , or give up my Cause , and condemn what I have written ; since it is impossible that two Methods , contrary to one another , can both of them be the right one ; or lay just Claim to Self-evidence in their Principles . But , with how Potent an Adversary has my Unlucky Audaciousness , in attempting to lay a Demonstrative Method to Science oblig'd me to grapple ! It must be acknowledg'd that he was a a Man of that Prodigious Wit , that scarce any Age has produced his Equal . His School has dilated it self into divers Nations ; and his Scholars and Followers are of such Eminent Rank and Name , that it would terrifie any Man to encounter his Doctrine , especially his Principles ( which must be the solidest , strongest , and clearest parts of it ) who had not an unshaken Confidence in the Invincible Strength of TRUTH , under whose ●anner he fights . He dazles the Understanding of his Reader with his most Ingenious and Clear Way of Discoursing ; a Talent peculiar to himself ; and he lays his Thoughts together with such an Artificial and smoothly-flowing Currency , in proper and unaffected Language , that he captivates it at unawares into a Complaisant Assent ; and his greatest Adversary must be forced to confess that , if his Doctrine be not True , at least Truth was never so exactly and handsomely Counterfeited . He postures his Thoughts so dextrously , that nothing but perfect Evidence can break their Ranks , or make a hostile Impression upon them ; so that , if his Hypothesis be False , and hap to be overthrown , it will certainly be the most Glorious Victory Truth ever gain'd . But all those Bug-bears cannot deter me from the Defence of Truth ; in such a Cause , Non Divûm parcimus ulli and the more his Doctrine resembles Truth and has Greater Patrons to abet and carry i● on , the higher Obligation it lays upon me t● detect its Falshood , if I sincerely judge i● Fallacious , and think I can show it to be so I would not be misunderstood to intend her● a Confutation of his Doctrine ; 't is neithe● a Work for a Preface , nor for a Man of m● small Leasure ; but only to take Minutes o● some few , ( but main ) Hinges of his Do●ctrine in order to confute his Method ; leaving it to others who have better parts and less Employments , to carry on my slight Animadversions , if they may be found of weight , to farther Reflexions . To begin then with his six Meditations . In the first place , I cannot conceive why they should be styl'd his Metaphysicks . For 't is proper for that Noblest and Highest Science to treat of Ens , as Ens , or of sueh Notions as concern Being ; which I cannot discern to have been the direct Scope of those Treatises . He sets himself to investigate some First Principle , to fix upon , by a laborious Divesting himself of all those Knowledges he is seemingly possess'd of ; and , after much tossing his Thoughts to and fro● a long time , with doubting or pretending to doubt , of all he had hitherto known , he arrives at length at that odd first Principle of his [ Cogito , ergo sum ] and triumphs mightily with a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at his having found it . Against which Procedure ( waving here what I have said of it , Book 2. Less . 4. ) I have divers Exceptions , as Irrational in many Respects . For , First he might as well have made that Inference , or have found that First Principle at the very beginning , when he made his first Doubt ; since [ Dubito ergo sum ] is full as Conclusive of his own Existence as [ Cogito ergo sum ] can be pretended to be . Nor can any reason be given why [ Ego sum dubitans ] does not include in it [ Ego sum ] as well as [ Ego sum Cogitans ] does . And Cartesius himself ( Medit . 3d. ) confesses the same expresly . To what end then did he run on in a long ramble of Doubting , when as the very first Act of Doubting , would have done his whole business , and have prov'd that he is ? If it be pretended that [ Ego cogito ] was more comprehensive than [ Ego dubito ] because Doubting is one Head , or sort of Thinking , then his Argument should have been put thus [ Dubito ergo cogito ] as we argue from [ Est Homo ] ( which is one kind of Animal ) to Ergo est Animal ; whereas he takes and pursues a quite different Method . 2dly . He infers his First Principle , [ Ego sum ] and so makes it a kind of Conclusion ; which is clearly against the Nature of First Principles , they being Self-evident , and , therefore Incapable of being Inferr'd or Prov'd ; because there is nothing more Evident than themselves to inferr or prove them by . I know Spinoza , and some others of his School , deny he meant an Inference , but intended by these Words one positive proposition , viz. Ego sum cogitans , or P●es cogitans . But , what means then the Illative particle [ Ergo ] or what sense bears it ? Or , why did himself in his Third Meditation say expresly , [ Ex eo quod dubito SEQUITUR me esse ? ] Again , his first Principle is deny'd by himself to be [ Ego sum res cogitans ] but meerly [ Ego sum , ] at which he arrives by the means of Ego cogito : For , in the 2d . Meditation he has these words . Nunquam efficiet Deceptor ille summè potens , &c. ut nihil sim , quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo ; adeò ut — denique statuendum sit hoc pronunciatum , [ Ego sum , ] [ Ego existo ] — necessariò esse verum . But , not to hold him too severely to his own words , tho' no Man uses to express himself more clearly , let his First Principle be [ Ego sum cogitans ; ] I object then farther against it . 3dly , That , notwîthstanding all that can be alledg'd , it must be granted , he has inferr'd and prov'd that whole First Principle . For was not all that anteceded to the finding it so many Discourses or Reasonings ? And did he not evidently inferr this to be True , because all else might be doubted of ? If not , to what purpose did he pretend he might doubt of all else ? For , if this was Evident of it self , and not needed to be Prov'd , he might have propos'd it at first , without making all that a-do . 4thly , Since he must necessarily grant that something or other is inferr'd or Prov'd by him , that is , follows from his Antecedent Discourses ; and , it is evident that , in his opinion , something did follow thence , because he discours'd or Argu'd all the while , and us'd more than once the word [ Sequitur ; ] and no such Discourse can be , but something must still follow out of what went before ; he ought , in the First place , and ere he began his Discourse , or went about to speak consequentially , to have been perfectly satisfy'd himself , and have shown his Readers , so as to put it past all Doubt , what the Force of a right Consequence is , and in what it consists ; and that himself , while he discours'd , did make use of such right Consequences . And , he should the rather have done this , because Men do more frequently err in drawing Consequences , than in judging that they have a Body , that they see , feel , hear , or use their other Senses ; all which he represents as possible to be doubted of . Whereas , he never starts or makes the least Doubt of his Consequences , which are to bind the parts of his Discourse together all along , and so bring him orderly to his First Principle ; nor gives any Reason why they may not be Doubted of as well as the rest ; nor takes care to settle that Doubt . Which shows that he is not true to his own extravagant Method of settling his First Principle , by Doubting of every thing till he comes at it ; but leaves it , and consequently his First Principle , which depends on it , Uncertain . 5thly , and Lastly , No man can have a Clear and Distinct Idea , ( in which , according to him , all Knowledge consists ) of any thing following out of a First Principle , unless he have a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of that Principle it self : But Cartesius , when , in the Progress of his Thoughts , he came to the settling Ego cogito ( or Ego sum ) for his First Principle , had no Clear and Distinct Idea of that Principle it self ; therefore he could have no Clear and Distinct Idea of any thing which follow'd out of that Principle ; and , consequently , all that Method to Science laid by him is Useless to that End , and Fruitless . The Minor ( which onely can need proof ) is thus manifested . For , he had not , as soon as he had arriv'd at that Principle , as yet any Clear and Distinct Knowledge of the Subject of that Principle ( or Proposition ) [ Ego ] and therefore he had no such Knowledge of the Proposition or Principle it self . The Antecedent is confess'd by himself in the words immediately following the place lately cited , viz. [ Nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim ego ille qui jam necessariò sum ] and thence he proceeds to find , after he had found his First Principle , what Ego means , and at length conciudes that he was praecisè res Cogitans , Mens , Ratio , &c. which Clear and Distinct Conception of himself he had not before , tho' he pretended he knew his First Principle . Again , when he was newly come to the Knowledge of that First Principle , he is put to know nothing but barely that ; nor could he gather this Clear Knowledge of himself from that Principle alone , while it was yet Unknown . It were worth our Enquiry then , how , and whence he had this Clear and Distinct Knowledge of himself . He concludes the Soul to be a Distinct Thing from the Body , because the Idea he has of it , and of its Properties and Affections are clearly different from the Idea , he has of the Body , and its Modifications . By which 't is most Evident that , for want of Logick , he reflects not on the Difference between the Nature , and the Suppositum which has the Nature in it ; that is , between the Essence or Nature , and the Ens or Thing . For , if he did , he would have seen that from the having Different , nay Contradictory Ideas of two distinct NATURES , it does not necessarily follow that they must be two THINGS , meaning by Thing the Suppositum . Surely he has a vastly Different Idea of the Divine and Human Natures , and yet will grant that they were both in One Suppositum , or ( which is the same in an Intelligent Being ) in the same Person , And , I am sure , if he holds the Incarnation , he must renounce this Principle of his , that whenever he has distinct Ideas of two Natures , there must be Two Individual Things or Suppositums . It being one of the most Chief and most Fundamental Articles of our Christian Faith , that there is in Christ our Saviour but One Hypostasis or Suppositum ; tho' the Essences and Properties of the Divine and Humane Nature , and the Ideas ( as he calls it ) of them , do still keep their Exact Distinction , and remain Unconfounded ; and that , whoever holds otherwise , and makes them two Suppositums , does ( in the Christian Phrase ) Solvere Christum , 1 Io. 4.3 . I have not time to reckon up , even hintingly , the many Absurdities that spring from this ill-coherent Position of theirs . But , I will keep to this very Maxim of his , and demonstrate that , even according to that , Man , which must be meant by the Pronoun [ Ego ] is truly one thing consisting of Soul and Body , and not a mere Mens . To show this , I deny that he has a C●●ar and Distinct Idea of himself , unless he conceives himself to be a Rational thing ; or , as he calls himself , Ratio ; nor can he clearly conceive himself to be a Rational Thing , but he must conceive himself to be a Thing that infers new Knowledges out of foregoing ones , leasurely , or with succession of Time , which belongs properly to Bodies and Bodily Motion . Wherefore , something of Corporeal , Extended , or Divisible is found in the Clear and Distinct Idea of Ego , or Himself , if he be a Ratio or Rational Thing ; for , were he meerly a Mens or Spirit , his Operations would be Indivisible , Simultaneous and Unsuccessive , as is abundantly demonstrated in divers places of the following Treatise ; particularly in my Seventh Demonstration , Book 3. Lesson 7. Among the other points , he brings as possible to be yet doubted of , he puts this for one , that a Four-squar'd thing has in it four sides and no more ; of which he pretends he may yet doubt , because some most Powerful Agent may possibly make that appear to him to be so , tho' it be not true in reality . Now , 't is the very Notion or Essence of a Quadratum , to have but four sides ; and , therefore , the Proposition affirming that it has just four sides , is perfectly Identical , and the same as to say , What has but four sides , has but four sides . It being then impossible any thing can be more Certain , or more Evident than an Identical Proposition ; I would ask why he might not as well be Deceivable in his First Principle [ Cogito ergo sum ] as in that Self-evident Proposition ! Or , if he pretends that Proposition , [ Ego sum cogitans ] is more Evident than the other ; then , since all Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition , consists in the Close and Clear Connexion of its Terms , I would demand of him or his Scholars , whether there be any Connexion of Terms more Close and more Clear , than there is of those found in an Identical Proposition , which affirms the Same is the Same with it self ? Or , if they say there is , then to know of them in what that Evidence consists , or how it comes to be more Evident ? To make way towards the settling his beloved and self-pleasing Ideas ; he falls to Doubt of the Certainty of all our Senses in order to Knowledge ; and that not onely as a Supposition for Discourse sake , as he pretended to doubt of other things , but really and seriously ; and his Scholar Malbranche † assures us , the Eyes ( and the same he says of the other senses ) are not given us to judge of the Truth of Things , but onely to discern those things which may either Profit , or injure us ; and all over , he makes them improper Means to attain Knowledge by . Which Tenet of theirs lies open to many Exceptions . For , First , The Reason Cartesius assigns , viz. [ Prudentiae est nunquam illis planè confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt . 'T is a part of Prudence not to trust them at all , who have so much as once deceiv'd us ] is utterly unworthy so Great a Man : For , it discredits all Nature , for some few Men's Morality ; which is a strange Argument for a Philosopher . He that has but once deceiv'd us designedly , is presum'd to have done it out of Knavery ; and consequently , may not deserve to be trusted the second time , because 't is to be fear'd he is still dispos'd to do the same again : But , what is this to Corporeal Nature , in which ( taking in all circumstances ) things are carry'd on from Proper Causes to Proper Effects . Weak men are sometimes deceiv'd by their Senses ; but Speculative or Learned men , who penetrate the Reasons how the Senses came to misinform them , are aware of those undue circumstances , and by that means easily prevent the being led by them into Errour . 2dly , No wise man builds his Judgments barely on the Impressions made on his Senses , being taught by their Reason , as well as by the Senses themselves better circumstanced ( that is , by Experience ) that they do sometime , deceive us . Whence , they reserve in their Minds certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in what circumstances we may truly give Credit to their Testimony , in what , not . Now , since Exceptio firmat Regulam , to say their Information is to be Excepted against in such Circumstances , is to acknowledge that in all others they are to be trusted . 3dly , As Art does preserve the Learned from being Deceiv'd by the Shortness of the Senses in some Cases , so ( as was said lately ) the Senses themselves do generally correct the False Iudgments they may have occasion'd in Weak People . For example , ( to use some of the Instances they object , ) a Brand whirled round represents a Circle of Fire ; a Stick in the Water looks Crooked ; a Square Tower seen a far off appears Round , and Great Bodies Little. But when the Seer comes near the Brand , the Tower and those Great Bodies , or beholds the Stick out of the Water , he having now a more exact View of them in better Circumstances , is inform'd certainly by the same Sense , ( and , if need be , by others conspiring with it , ) that the former representations were not sincere ; whence he easily corrects his former Mistakes . Why then must the Senses be quite discarded as Useless Servants for Knowledge , and be branded for constant Lyers and Deceivers ? since , if we apply them as we ought , they are the Proper Means to make us correct these too forward Iudgments , which in improper Circumstances they may have occasion'd . Nay , they advance our Knowledge accidentally even when they happen to misinform us ; by stirring us up to enquire whence it came , that the right Impressions on them , from the Objects , which were Customary , was thus perverted ; which , doubtless has been the Cause of very many New Knowledges in Nature . 4thly , What is all this to Science , or to our purpose ? For in the Method to Science , we neither need , nor do build our JUDGMENTS on the Senses alone . All we require is , that they convey into our Knowing Power right A●PREHENSIONS or NOTIONS of the things in Nature : And , this 't is Evident they must do ; for tho' , as they object , a Large Square Steeple seen a far off seems Round and Little ; and therefore who Judges it such is Deceiv'd ; yet it imprints truly in my Mind the Notion of Little and Round ; and , 't is on these unmistakable NOTIONS all our Science is built ; and our Judging right in our Speculations is chiefly grounded on other Principles , as will be seen hereafter . Lastly , Themselves must either grant the Certainty of those Impressions on the Senses , or they must confess all their Ideas are nothing worth . For , since they hold that the Objects imprint Motions on the Fibres of the Senses , which , making such a Report ( as it were ) to the Soul , the Proper and ‖ Ingenit Ideas of such a Body are either Excited in the Soul , or else are , as Cartesius elsewhere expresses it , Elicited , that is Produced by it , upon the hint given it by such a Motion ; in case the Impressions causing such Motions be not Sincere , and do not truly inform her , a wrong Idea may come to be made use of , and so they can never have any certain Knowledge of any thing . Having thus got rid of the Senses giving us notice of outward things , by imprinting Notions in them , which Experience teaches us is the Ordinary Way of Knowing any thing ; it follows of course , that they must recurr to Extraordinary ways by Inward means , or to Inward Light ; which is the Method of Fanaticks in Religion , when they have rejected the Ordinary ways of believing their Proper Teachers . And , hence , the Cartesians tell us , they know there is a God , by the Divine Idea of himself Which he has imprinted in them ; which is in other Terms , to say , that they have it ky Divine Revelation ; for Knowledge , according to them , being caus'd in them by those Ideas , nay , consisting formally in thoir having the Ideas of things in them ; and GOD giving them those Ideas without the help of Second Causes , it follows that GOD is the Immediate Cause of all our Knowledge ; and , so , no thanks at all to the things in Nature , or to Natural Agents . These Ideas I can observe by Cartesius's Discourse , are either of Propositions , or else Simple Ideas . Of the former they say , that whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive to be , is true . By which if they mean no more but that whatever we know to be , is ; or that we cannot truly know that to be which is not , nothing is more certain or more Evident by Common Sense ; onely they run counter in their Discourse , and make not the Understanding to be True , because the Outward Thing is so , but they argue that the Thing is therefore thus or thus , because the Idea in the Understanding is such or such ; and , so , they seem to make Truth consist , not in the Conformity of the Understanding to the Thing , but in the Thing 's being Conformable to the Idea in my Understanding ; as Cartesius himself affirms in his Answer to the Instances of Gassendus . How solidly he argues from Simple Ideas may be seen by his Demonstration of a Deity , which he concludes to be , because he has an Idea of a Being that has all Perfections in it , amongst which Existence is one ; which Idea he contends he could never have had from the Things without us , and therefore it must have been imprinted by GOD himself Immediately . In making which proof passable , tho' Cartesius exerts the utmost of his Great Wit , yet this plain Discourse will manifest how untoward and Inconclusive it is . I can have a Notien or Idea of Finis , of non , and of Perfection , and Thing , and All , and lastly of Existence ; and had I not such distinct Ideas of all these , I could not understand the Meaning of those Words ; for an Idea can be nothing but what 's meant by those Words . Having distinct Ideas of all these , I can compound an Idea pf all these , or frame an Idea of a thing that has all Perfections in it , and Existence among the rest : And this Idea is in my Mind , and the Effect purely of my Mind , already imbu'd with those Simple Ideas , and Compounding them ; for I had it not from any one Thing directly , nor did I gather it by Discourse from the Natures of Things I was pre-acquainted with . But how comes it , or how can he argue that because I have such an Idea fram'd by my Mind , it must exist without my Mind , or have a Reality there : unless my Mind could Coyn or Create Beings at her pleasure , as oft as I have a desire to compound such Ideas together ? He plays wittily upon the word [ Existence . ] But we may consider the Notion of Existence , or ( which is all one ) know the Meaning of that Word , and yet abstract whether it does actually put its Formal Effect , that is , whether that Existence is exercis'd or not exercis'd in the thing : which consideration alone spoils his whole Argument : Let us put a parallel . I have a complex Idea of these Words , My Debtor will pay me a Hundred Pounds to Morrow , at Ten a Clock , at his Goldsmiths ; that is , I have in my Mind the Meaning of all these Words ; and Existence is necessarily involv'd in the Meaning of those words , for they signifie Determinate Persons , Time , Place , and Action , all which involve Existence ; will it therefore follow , that that Action of Paying me Money will be , because my Idea includes the Existence of that Action , so determinately circumstanc'd ? Yet upon his Knowledge of a Deity by this Demonstration , depends , by his Discourse , all the Knowledge he has of any Truth , except perhaps of Ego Cogito . What need was there to run after Whimseys coyn'd in the Mint of our own Mind , to Demonstrate a Deity , when there are so many Clear Demonstrations of it from solid Grounds in Nature ? It may seem harsh that I should resemble , tho' Cartesian Method to Fanaticism , or pretend they bring a kind of Enthusiasm into Philosophy . Let the so much applauded Malbranche be my Compurgator . That very Ingenious and Eloquent Person , who has a peculiar Talent of talking Nonsence as prettily and plausibly as any Man I ever read , in his Preface to the First Volume of his Search after Truth , acquaints us with many Extraordinary things , which would no doubt ( as Bayes says ) very much Elevate and Surprize an ordinary Reader . In Common , he confounds all our Moral and Christian Knowledges , which are immediately ordain'd to raise us towards Heaven , and advance Virtue and Sanctity , with the Speculative Knowledges belonging to meer Philosophy ; and most untowardly misapplies the sayings of the Scriptures and Fathers , which were never meant for his purpose , but in order to Devotion , or Mystical Theology , ( nay to the Beatifical State of GOD's manifesting his Divine Essence to the Saints in Heaven ) to the Maxims and Methods by which we are to attain Human Science . In particular , speaking his own sense , according to the Cartesian Doctrine ; he tells us , we must judge of things by the pure Ideas of the Mind ; whereas , I should rather have thought , that we ought to guide our Thoughts , and judge of them , by the Conformity they have to the Things in Nature : since we are sure Creative Wisdom made them , and implanted Truth in them ; whereas , 't is Uncertain whether GOD or our Whimsical Fancies gave us our Ideas ; and , 't is certain they are the Off-spring of the later , if they be not conformable to the Things without us . He tells us farther that , All Sciences are learned by the Attention of the Mind , which is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God , who onely can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance . I am heartily glad to know , that Euclid and Archimedes were converted to God , and that they were so infinitely Happy as to see God's Substance ( which is his Essence ) so manifestly . He proceeds , Men must look within themselves , and draw near unto the Light that shines there continually , that their Reason may be the more Illuminated . — The Mind ought to examin all Human Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which guides it , without hearkening to the False , and confused Testimonies of the Senses . — Those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears , unless he that discover'd them to us , ( he means GOD the Giver of Ideas ) do reveal them at the same time to the Mind . So that all Science it seems , comes by Divine Revelation . To what end then are Teachers , Professours , Schools and Universities , if , when we have done what we can by all our Teaching and Learning , nothing but Divine Revelation must do the business , or gain us any Science . But now he advances to a higher point . The Mind ( says he ) is immediately , and after a very strict manner United to God ; nay , after a stricter and more Essential manner than with the Body . Now , if this be true , I dare affirm that the Mind is more United to God Naturally , than our Saviour's Humanity was Supernaturally and Miraculously . For , This was but United Hypostatically , or according to the Suppositum or Person of the Eternal Word ; whereas , by this new Philosophy , every Human Mind is United Essentially to God , that is to the Godhead it self . For , to be united Essentially is for one Essence to be united to another Essence , that is , to be one or the same Essence with the Divine Essence . Was ever such Quakerism heard of among Philosophers ! Or , plain honest Human Reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into Mystick Theology , by Spiritual Alchymy ! Yet , to say True , this is very Consonant to the Doctrine of Ideas . They slight the Instruction of Nature , they scorn to be beholding to their Senses , and Outwards Objects ; which forces them upon Introversion , and to observe ( as the same Authour says ) what Eternal Truth tells us in the Recesses of our Reason ; that is , in their Darling Ideas . Now common Reason ever taught me , and every Man who did but reflect upon what passes within his Understanding , that the Proper and Effectual way to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of our Simple Notions , is to make DEFINITIONS of them ; and there are most Certain Rules of Art , how those Definitions may be fram'd . But , this was too Ordinary a way to please Minds so Extraordinarily Elevated as these Gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with . The highest Flights of Nature do flag , it seems , too low for their Supernatural pitch , nor can reach the Degrees of their Elevation above our dull Horizon . They are Inspir'd with Heaven implanted Ideas ; and , so , they have no more to do but retire their Thoughts into the Inward Recesses of their Mind , embellish'd and guilded with these Shining Innate Ideas , and their work is done without any need of Definitions made by sublunary Art. Sometimes I am apt to think , that they had recourse to those Spiritual Pourtraitures , out of despair of explicating any other way the Essences of Things , or in what they consisted ; and , I fear two of our Learned men lately mention'd , apprehend them to be Inscrutable and In-explicable . Whereas , speaking of Essences in Common , I do assure them , that nothing can be plainer ; and that every Clown were he interrogated orderly , could give us the true Essences , or ( which is the same ) the true Natures of the things he is conversant with . For , whatever makes Mankind call and esteem any Bodies , such or such Things in Distinction from all others , is truly their Essence ; or , ( to speak in the Language of a Philosopher ) let but Matter be determin'd by such a Complexion of Accidents , with that Harmony or Proportion of parts , connected with that Constancy , that it is fit to act a Distinct part upon Nature's stage , or perform its Primary Operation ; that Complexion of Accidents , ( I say ) is truly the Essence of that Body , or the Form that constitutes it such an Ens , or such a Part of , or in , Nature . Perhaps the Cartesians will say , they allow Definitions to make their Ideas Clear and Distinct. But how can this cohere ? Definitions are the Effects of Art , whereas these Ideas are imprinted by God's Hand who gave them their Nature , and * Cartesius says expresly , they are Ingenitae . This being so , and GOD's immediate Works being Perfect , and those Ideas being intended to give them Knowledge , they can need nothing to make them more Clear and Distinct ; nor consequently can the Users of them have any occasion for Definitions , unless perhaps to explain their Ideas to us ; who think we have a firmer Basis to build them on , than those Ideas of theirs . Nature gives the Ground , and Art , the Rules to make them : And they are such necessary Instruments to true and solid Science , that I could wish for the Improvement of Knowledge , that our Universities would appoint a Committee of Learned Men to compile a Dictionary of Definitions for the Notions we use in all parts of Philosophy whatever . Monsieur de Furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever , in Three Volumes ; Out of which may be Collected those that make for our purpose ; which being , by the Ioynt-labour and Concurrence of the Persons deputed , Examined ; if faulty , Amended , and propos'd to the World ; it could not fail of advancing Science highly . In carrying forward such a Noble Work , and so Beneficial to Mandkind , I should willingly contribute my Quota of Endeavours , nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing I know of . For Definitions explicating or unfolding the Nature of the Thing , and all Proper Causes and Effects being so nearly ally'd to the Nature of the Thing , it follows that there lies involv'd in the Definitions , all Essential and Proper Middle Terms , to demonstrate whatever belongs to the Notion Defin'd , if Right Logick and studious Industry be not wanting . He blames St. Austin , and wishes he had not attributed to External Bodies all the sensible Qualities we perceive by their means . And why ? Because ( says he ) they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter . What Idea St. Austin had of Matter is little to purpose ; but , if he proceeded consequently to his Thoughts , he could not conceive the First Matter to be such as they put theirs to be . For , what Man of Common Sense can frame any Idea of a Thing that has onely Extension in it ; but is not to any degree either Dense or Rare , Easie or Hard to be Divided , Fluid nor Solid , Soft nor Hard ? &c. And , if their Quaint Ideas and Clear and Distinct Conceptions , which seem to be the Ground of all their Witty Discourses , or Divine Revelations ( as Malbranche calls them ) of Science , be no Wiser or Solider than this , which is , or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks , I shall dare to affirm , that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies ; as I have shown at large in my Appendix . And , indeed , how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it ; as may be seen hereafter , p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence , Open Prevarications , and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs , has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature . Nor can we need any greater Confirmation , that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it , than to observe that neither Cartesius himself , nor Regius , Rohault , Regis , Le Grand , nor any of that School I have met with , have ( as I must think ) been Able to give us any Light of it ; since they neither Attempt , nor Mention it ; which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter ; of which , notwithstanding , they acknowledge all their Three Elements , and , consequently , all Nature was made . These few Particulars ( omitting innumerable others ) I have thought fit to hint , to show that the Method to Science , which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it , and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit. That which gives it most Credit is , that , his Suppositions granted , he proceeds consequently , in the subsequent parts of it , which are purely Mathematical . But , what signifies that , if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles ; nor Nature in his Physicks , which he cannot pretend to do , unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter , upon which all depends . A Task , I say again , his Followers neither will ever attempt , nor can possibly perform by his Principles , as is shown at large in my Appendix . Yet it must be confess'd , that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers ; and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words , prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence , Quaint Wit , and Unusual Remarks . For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader , make the Authours pass for Curious men , and bear a fine Appearance of Truth ; till they come to be scann'd Exactly , and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms . Which done , it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth , nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations ; which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy , but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science . Farther , I must declare , for the Honour of our English Genius , that , tho' we do not match the French in the Finery , Gayity , and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions ( a Talent in which they are very Excellent ) any more than we do in our Outward Garb , and Dress ; yet , that there are more Solid Productions , well built Truths , and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise , Entituled , An Essay concerning Human Understanding , than ( as far as I have observ'd ) is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together . We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science , which is the Way of Experiments or Induction . Concerning which , ( not to repeat what I have occasionally , by way of Reason , alledg'd against it in my following Book ) I need say no more , but that Matter of Fact shows evidently , that this Method , alone , and Unassisted by Principles , is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science . For , what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy , ( in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists ) has been Demonstrated by Experiments , since the the time that Great man , Sir Francis Bacon , writ his Natural History ? The very Title of which laborious Work shows , that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method . For , if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ , we shall find that it is , ( as he calls it ) meerly Historical , and Narrative of Particular Observations ; from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick , and Common Sense . To aim at Science by such a Method , may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone . The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes , and decoy him farther ; but he still falls short of his End. What man of any past , or of our present Curious Age , did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches , as that Honour of our Nation , the Incomparable Mr. Boyle ? yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature , as far as that Way could carry him , he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy ; nor could , with the utmost Inquisitiveness , practic'd by so great a Wit , arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no : And certainly , we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge , whether in such a Space there be Something , or Nothing : which , of all others , should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable . Lastly , we may observe , that when an Experiment , or ( which is the same ) a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd , we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect , into which we may certainly refu●d it ; which , and onely which , is the Work of SCIENCE . For , Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles , Cartesius , according to his ; the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby , and his most Learned Master . Albius , ( whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles ) according to theirs ; So that , after all , the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect , and explicating it right , must be Decided by way of Reason ; that is , by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid ; and onely He or They , who can approve their Principles to be such , can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes , or to have Science how 't is done ; and , however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects , yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles , and make out their Title to them , can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS . Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE . But to leave other Men's Failings , and Return home to my Self . To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason , so magnify'd by other Speculaters , I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method ; and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly ; and , perhaps , it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions ; for which yet I shall hope , the Reasons I have given there for that procedure , will bear me out and justifie me . For the same inducement I have very frequently drawn my Arguments from Metaphysicks ; being well assured that such Mediums do make the Dicourses , built on them , approach nearest to Self-evidence . Nor do I fear it should be objected , that , in a Logical Treatise , I bring such Instances and Corollaries as entrench upon , and make an In-road into divers other Sciences . Rather , I must profess that I held it a precise Duty in my Circumstances ; because Logick , or the Art of Reasoning , being a Common Instrument to attain all Science , I was to show how it was , upon occasion , to be Apply'd to as many of them as I could ; so I do not make unreasonable Excursions to hunt for them in Foreign Subjects , but that they light Naturally in my way . Lastly , I thought it became a Lover of Peace and Union among Christians to endeavour they should not wrangle about Equivocal Words , so their Meanings be justifiable . In a word , 't is Connexion of Terms which I onely esteem as Proper to advance Science . Where I find not such Connexion , and the Discourse grounded on Self-evident Principles , or ( which is the same ) on the Metaphysical Verity of the Subject , which engages the Nature of the Thing , I neither expect Science can be gain'd , nor the Method to Science Establish'd . But , this done , I make account both the one and the other may be hoped for . How well I have behav'd my self in attempting this , is left to the Iudgment of those who are the Proper Umpires in such Matters , I mean your selves . Your True Honourer and Humble Servant , I. S. THE METHOD TO SCIENCE . BOOK I. LESSON I. Of Notions , or the very First Ground on which all Science is built . 1. WE experience , that Impressions are made upon our Senses , and that those Impressions are Different , according to the different Nature of the Objects that imprint them . 2. We experience also , that those Impressions do not stay in the Outward Senses , but reach the Soul , and affect it . 3. Every thing being received according to the nature of the Subject that receives it , and the nature of the Soul being a Capacity of Knowledge ; hence , those Impressions must so affect the Soul , as to cause some kind of Knowledge in her , how rude and Imperfect soever it may yet be . 4. The Impressions from Objects that affect the Senses , and by them the Soul , do carry the very Nature of those Objects along with them , and imprint them in the Soul : which Prints , or , as it were , Stamps , as received in the Understanding , we call Notions . 5. Wherefore Notions are the First and Rudest Draughts of Knowledge ; being most Simple , and Naturally wrought in the Soul by the strokes of occurring Objects , without any Industry or Active Concurrence on our part . 6. That these Notions are the very Natures of the Thing , or the Thing it self existing in us intellectually , and not a bare Idea or Similitude of it , appears hence evidently , that when we say interiourly , or judge A Stone is hard , we do not intend to affirm , That the Likeness or Idea of a Stone is hard , but the very Stone it self . And were it not so , the Proposition would be false ; ( for the Similitude of a Stone in our Mind is not Hard : ) whereas yet we are well assur'd that Proposition is True. 7. Again , we experience , that we consider , judge , and dis●ourse of the very Thing it self , and of its very Nature ; which ( these being Interiour or Immanent Acts , bred and perfected within our Soul ) we could not do , unless the Objects of those Acts , or the very Things themselves were there . 8. Lastly , It cannot be deny'd , but that we have in our Soul the full and compleat Sense of this Proposition , and Notions of every distinct part of it , viz. [ There is in me the Idea or Likeness of a Stone . ] Therefore there is in me something signified by the word [ Stone ] not only distinct from Idea and Likeness , but moreover Relatively Opposite to it , as the thing Represented is to that which represents it ; which can be nothing but the very Stone it self . 9. Nor need it cause any Wonder , that the same Ens or Thing may have diverse Manners of Existing ; one Corporeal , the other Intellectual or Spiritual ; since the Thing ( v. g. Peter ) * abstracts even from Existence it self ; for 't is not found in the Notion or Meaning of that word , that the Thing signified by it Exists , or not Exists ; much more then does the Notion of Thing abstract from ( that is , is Indifferent to ) all Manners of Existing . 10. The words Notion , Simple Apprehension , Conception , and Meaning , are all synonymous terms . They are called Notions , because they are the Parts or Elements of Knowledge ; which , put and consider'd together , make Cognition , w●ich is Proper and Compleat Knowledge . They are call'd Simple Apprehensi●ns , to distinguish them ●rom Judgments , which are compounded of more Notions , and belong to the second Operation of our Understanding . Or rather , because by them we simply or barely Apprehend , that is , say hold of , or take into us the thing , about which we a●terwards Judge or Discourse . They are call'd Meanings , because they affect the Mind , which only can mean or intend ; or else , in relation to the Words whose Meanings they are . They are called Conceptions , in order to the Power , which , impregnated by the Object , conceives or ( as it were ) breeds them as the Embryo's of Knowledge . Lastly , they are said to be the Natures of the Things , because ( as was shewn ) they are such essentially and formally ; in nothing differing from them , but only that they connotate a new Manner of Existing , which * is Extrinsecal to the Thing , and to the Nature or Essence of it . The word [ Idea ] is the least proper , because it seems to signifie a bare Similitude ; unless the Users of it would express themselves to take it in that sence in which we take the word [ Notion ] here ; or , as we use to understand it when we say , that the Idea's of all things were in the Divine Intellect before they were created ; that is , their very Essences . 11. Notions are called Simple Apprehensions , not from the Fewness of the words that express them , nor from their not having any Grammatical Composition or Syntax in them : but , from the nature or manner of this Operation of our Understanding . For , since ( as was said ) they are called Simple Apprehensions , because by them we simply or barely apprehend or lay hold of the Nature of the Thing intellectually ; it matters not how many or how few the words are , so we do no more than meerly Apprehend or Take the Meaning of the Words , or the Notions , into our Minds , without Judging or Discoursing of them . Whence , we may have a simple Apprehension of a long Sentence , nay , of a whole Sermon or a great Book ; as long as we do not set our selves to Judge or Discourse of the Truth or Falshood of what 's said or writ ; but purely to Apprehend the Sence or Meaning of the Speaker or Writer . 12. Notions being the Natures of the Things in us , have neither Truth nor Falshood in them formally ; since they do neither affirm or deny ( only with Speeches are capable of Formal Verity or Falsity ) any more than does the Thing it self as it stands in Nature , or out of the Understanding . 13. All the Verity they have is their Metaphysical Verity , or their being truly what they are . And they partake this from the Idea's in the Divine Understanding , from which they unerringly flow , and which are essentially Unchangeable . By which we see how the God of Truth is the sole Author of all the Truth that is in us , and how he does ( ordinarily ) communicate it to us , viz. by Fixing unalterably the Natures or Essences of Things ; from which , being thus Establish'd and imprinted on our Minds by our Senses , all Science and Truth in us have their Certainty originally . 14. All true Science being thus built on the Immovable Stability of the Essences or Natures of Created Beings , it follows necessarily , that all Discourses that are not Agreeable to the Natures of Things , and Grounded on them , are Frothy , Incoherent , and False , and , if pursued home , must be found to have a Contradiction for their First Principle , in regard they make the Natures of Things to be what they are not . 15. Wherefore Notions being the Natures of the Things in our Understanding , the Method to pursue True Science is , to attend and hold heedfully and steadily to those Notions which the Things without us have imprinted or stamp'd in our Minds ; and to be very careful lest Imaginations ( which are the Offsprings of Fancy , and do oft misrepresent the Thing ) do delude us , or the Equivocation of Words draw us aside , and make us deviate from those Genuine and Nature instill'd Notions . COROLARIES . Corol. I. Hence is seen how Unreasonable the Scepticks are who endeavour to undermine all Science , by pretending that all our Notions are Uncertain . For they being caus'd by Natural Impressions on our Senses , those Men may as well pretend , that Water does not wet , or Fire burn , as that the Objects work not their several Effects upon our Senses . If they contend , that , every Man 's individual Temper being different , our Notions must therefore differ to some Degree in every Man , they oppose not us , who say the same ; nor will this break any square , in our Discoursing and our Understanding one another ; for few Men ( perhaps none ) can reach these Individual Differences , nor consequently mean them or intend to speak of them when they discourse . But , if they say they are not the same in all Men ( whose Senses o● imagination are not disordered by some Accidental Disease ) substantially and in the main ; then , besides what has been now alledged , they are confuted by this , that Mankind has now for some thousands of Years held Conversation with one another , yet it was never observ'd that they could not understand one anothers Meaning in Discourse about Natural Objects ; or if any hap'd to occurr which was Ambiguous , that they could not make their Notions known by Explications ; or if there had been some notable variation in their Notions , ( as when to Icterical persons , all things seem yellow , or sweet things bitter to depraved Tasts ) the Mistake can easily be made manifest and corrected by the Standard of the Generality of Mankind , who assure them of their Misapprehension ; and of Learned Men particularly , who find the Cause of their Mistake to proceed from some Disease perverting Nature , or some Circumstances of the unduly-proposed Object , or of the Medium ; or from our Inability to reach to some minute Considerations belonging to its Composition , Figure . &c. which hinder not our having Science of it in other Cases . Corol. II. Hence also is shewn the Vanity of that Tenet that maintains the Pre-existence of Souls , as far as it depends on this Ground , That Knowledges are only Excited or Awaken'd ( as it were ) by the Objects working on the Senses , and not Imprinted there by them . For , this Ground shakes , by manifesting the Ways and Means laid by Nature to beget those Knowledges in the Soul , and convey them thither from the Objects . Besides , ( which overthrows all their Hypothesis ) the Knowledge that I am hic & nunc thus affected , cannot with any sence be pretended to have been Pre-existent to the Time and Place in which that Particular Knowledge was made ; since neither ehat Time nor ( perhaps ) Place was then in Being . Whence it follows , that the Soul can gain some new Knowledges , and this by the Senses ; and if any or some , why not , with equal reason , all that the same Senses can receive from Objects imprinted in her ; which ( as far as it depends on this way of instilling Knowledge ) may reach in a manner ad N●tu●● , and by the assistance of Reflexion , Discourse and Art improving it , may stretch it self much farther . Corol. III. From this whole Discourse it appears , that whatever other Method of attaining Science some may propose , however it may seem witty , and one piece of their Doctrine be consonant to the other , and all of them consequent to the Principles they lay ▪ yet it will , I say , evide●tly appear , that the way they take can never be that which GOD and Nature have laid to ingraft Knowledge in us . Whence , tho' such Discoursers may shew much Art , yet , in reality , and if it be examin'd to the bottom , all their Plausible Contexture and Explication of their own Scheme , will be found no better than the running pretty strains of Division upon no Ground ; since their pretended Knowledges do not begin with , nor grow up orderly from the Natures of the Things themselves , or from our Natural Notions , which are the Seeds of Science . Corol. IV. Our Discourse here abstracts from that Question , Whether sensible Qualities are Inherent in the Object or in the 〈◊〉 ? It is enough for my purpose that the Objects work upon the Senses , so as to imprint by their means several Notions in the Mind . Yet , I do not see how Mr. Hobbs proves ( for he does not so much as attempt it ) that Light coming from the Object does not carry away with it some Particles of it ; since we experience , that the Sun beams dry up great Ponds , which they could not do , unless they did , when reflected , dip their dry Wings in that moist Element , and return with some Particles of Water into the Air ; which , when multiply'd , are condensed afterwards into Clouds : And I believe it will be granted , that the Sun-beams reflected from the Moon bring along with them moist Vapours . Much less is it conceivable ▪ that in Smells and Tasts nothing at all of the Nature of those Objects should be convey'd by the Nerves to the Brain , but only a certain kind of Moti●n . 'T is not my task to defend the Opinions of Schoolmen , nor those of vulgar Philosophers , which he impugns , but to mind my own business . Tho' had I a mind to lose a little time , it were easie to shew , that he seems to mistake all-along our P●●●eptions for what is perceiv'd of the Object : And I might as easily deny , that Colour ( for example ) is n●thing but Light ; and affirm that 't is such a disposition in the surface of a Body , Figur'd thus or thus with Parts and Pores , as is apt to reflect more or less of the Light , and then to assert , that that Disposition of the Surface is truly and really Inherent in the Object or Body it self , — sed haec obiter . LESSON II. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions , and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads . 1. EVery individual Thing not only ( as was said ) imprints a Notion of it self in our Minds , but many diverse Notions , according to the Various Impressions it makes upon the same or diverse Senses . This is manifest by Experience ; for we find that an Orange ( for example ) causes in us the several Notions of Yellow , Heavy , Round , Juicy , Hard , &c. 2. We can consider One of those Notions , without considering the Others . For we experience , that we can abstract the Notion of Round from the notion of Heavy , ( or any of the rest ) and Consider it apart , and Discourse of it accordingly . ( 3. ) Note , That since the Object or Thing in our Understanding is capable of being consider'd diversly , hence [ Notion ] gets the name of [ Considerability ] and diverse Notions are said to be diverse Considerabilities of the Thing ; which yet is no more but the same Thing as diversly consider'd . 3. Whether or no there be any Knower of a superiour Order , that can at one Intuitive View comprehend the whole thing , yet 't is certain that our Soul , in this state , can have no Science of any thing , otherwise than by these Abstracted Notions . For since * our Notions are the Ground of all our Knowledge or Science , and ( as will be seen shortly ) we have no Notion of any Object , but by Impressions on the Senses , and those Impressions do differently affect us , and so breed Different or Abstracted Notions ; 't is manifest that we can no otherwise know any thing here , but by Different , that is , Abstracted , Partial or Inadequate Notions . 4. 'T is necessary to Science , that it be Distinct and Clear , and not Gross and Confus●d . This is evident from the very Terms ; for Science signifies a Distinct and Clear Knowledge . 5. Our Soul cannot in this state wield more Notions at once , nor consider them , or Discourse clearly of them together ; or rather , indeed , not at all . This will appear evidently , by an easie reflexion on our Interiour : For , we shall find , that we can Discourse of each single abstracted Notion in an Orange viz. on its Bigness , Roundness , Colour , Tast , &c. But if we would go about to Consider or Discourse of us Roundness and Tast both together , ( and the same may be said of any other two that are Disparate , or not included one in the other ) we shall find our selves at a loss , and in Confusion , not knowing how to begin , nor how to proceed . 6. We cannot in this state know , even singly , every particular Considerability found in the thing : For , tho' ( for example ) we can by our Common Sight discern the Colour or Figure of a thing , or of its Grosser parts , yet a Microscope will discover to us innumerable Particularities which escap'd our Common View ; and had we a Glass that magnified more , there would be found still more and more Particularities than did appear when we observ'd it formerly . Wherefore , since every New Observation we can possibly make begets a New Notion in us , * and all our Knowledge is grounded on our Notions , we can no more know the last Considerability , which is in the thing , than we can know the least Part that is to be found in Quantity , or in the Differences of Figure , Colour , and other Respects which each of those very least parts may have ; and therefore they are not All knowable by us in this state . 7. Much less can we , in this state , know perfectly , or discourse scientifically of any Whole Individual thing , or ( as the Schools call it ) the Suppositum , taken in bulk . For , * since all the Considerabilities that integrate it , and consequently the Notions it begets in us , are blended confusedly in the entire Notion of the Suppositum or Thing . Again , since these are † innumerable , and many of them Unknowable by us ; it follows , that no one of them ( that is , Nothing in that whole Suppositum ) can be distinctly or clearly known , while we discourse of that which has them all in bulk ; that is , while we discourse of them all at once ; and consequently , the Notion of the Suppositum , which contains them all , cannot be clearly or perfectly known by us , nor discoursed of scientifically . 8. Wherefore we cannot know in this state any One entire Thing perfectly , since we can never have any perfect Science of it , * either taking it in bulk , † or by Detail . 9. Wherefore all we can do in this state , is to glean from the Objects by our Senses so many Notions of them as may suffice to distinguish them from one another ; and may serve for our Common Use , Needful Speculation ; or , lastly , for our Contemplation . 10. Notwithstanding this , the Science attainable in this State may arrive to be in a manner Infinit . For , since our Notions * are the very Natures of the Things , and the † Natures of the Things are the Seeds of all Science , and diverse Truths spring from them , and other Truths do still follow by Connexion with the former ; and , ‖ since no stint is assignable of the Connexion of Truths , or of our Deduction of one Truth from another ; it follows that there is no Bound or Limit of our Science attainable here , but that ( if Art and Industry be used ) it may be in a manner Infinit . 11. 'T is a most Fundamental Errour to fancy that there are many kinds of little Things in the Object , corresponding to all the different Notions or Considerations which we make of it . For , since the least Pa●ticle that is in it does ground diverse Notions of it , and every various Consideration of each Particle , either according to what is Intrinsecal or Extrinsecal to it , does still beget more : Again , since no Particle can be so small , but we can conceive or have distinct Notions of Two Halves , and many other proportionate Parts in it , and the Particles that are or may be conceiv'd to be in Quantitative Things are Numberless ; it follows , that , were all the Distinct Considerabilities in the Object distinct Things , we could never pitch upon any of those Things ( they still including others in them ) which we could say is One or Vndivided in its self ; nor consequently could we know what Ens or Thing meant in Corporeal or Quantitative Things , with which we converse ; which would Fundamentally destroy and pervert all Human Speech and Discourse about any Thing , and make all Science impossible . 12. From what 's said 't is deduced , that it is one necessary and main Part of the Method to Science , to distinguish our Notions Clearly , and to keep them distinct Carefully . For , * since all Science is grounded on our Notions , and Science must be Clear , and this cannot be † if any Two of them be confounded , or taken together at once ; it is manifest , that 't is one necessary and main part of the Method to Science , to distinguish our Notions Clearly , and to keep them distinct carefully . 13. The best way to do this , is to rank all our Notions under distinct common Heads . For , this done , it will be easie to know , to which of those common Heads they belong ; and those common Heads being easily distinguish't from one another , because they differ most vastly , or ( as the Schools phrase it ) toto genere , it will follow that the several Notions comprized under each of those Heads , must likewise , to a fair degree , be clearly known to be Distinct also . 14. There is but one onely Notion that is perfectly Absolute , viz. that of Existence , and all the rest are in some manner or other , Respective : For , since all Notions that are , must be either of the Thing it self , or of what relates or belongs to it , and the Thing it self relates to Existence , of which ( since only a Thing can be ) it is a Capacity ; and Existence , as being the last Actuality conceivable in the Line of Being , relates to no other or farther Notion ; it follows that only the Notion of Existence is perfectly Absolute , and all the rest are some way or other Respective . 15. Whence it follows , that the Notion of Existence is imprinted in the Soul before any other in priority of Nature . For , since * all other Notions are Respective , and so consist in some ( at least confused or rude ) Comparisons , as it were , of that Notion to what it respects ; to have which is much harder than to have that which is perfectly Absolute , more Simple and not Comparative at all ; hence the Notion of Existence is the most Easie , and therefore the first in priority of nature . Again , since ( as ‖ will be shewn hereafter ) the substance of all Operation is nothing but the Existence of the Object imprinted on the Patient , and the Soul must have a Notion of the Operation made upon her , that is , a Notion of the Existence of the thing imprinting it ; it follows necessarily , that the Notion of the Existence of that thing is first in her . 16. From this last Reason it is evinced , that the Notion of the Man 's own Existence is wrought in the Soul before the Notion of things without him , and this by the Man himself as his own Object , and is not imprinted by Outward ones . For * since the Soul has Notions of Objects , not by Emission of its Virtue to them , but by their being Receiv'd in it , and Existing in it Intellectually ; nor could it have a Notion of them , that is , they could not exist in the Soul , without its having a Notion first ( in priority of Nature ) of its own or the Man's Existence ; it follows , that the Notion of the Man's Existence comes into the Soul before the Notion of other things , and consequently that it is imprinted by the Man himself , as his own Object , and is not caused by Outward ones . Again , since the Existence of the Man is Naturally in him , and consequently in the Soul , ( when she has a Notion of him ) after its manner , that is , intellectually ; it follows , that it has ( as it were ) Naturally a Notion of the Man's Existence , and consequently , before it has the Notion of any other thing . Note 1. To explicate how this is done , and why it must be so , Anatomists tell us , that the Embryo lies in a manner round in the Womb ; whence some parts of it do continually and necessarily touch some others . Wherefore as soon as the Soul is infus'd , and it is now from a meer Animal become a Man , and has got an Understanding Power capable to receive Notions of Objects ; those Touches or Impressions of some parts of himself upon others , do naturally affect the Sense , and by it the Soul , and beget a blind Notion there of the Man ; and by a natural kind of Consciousness or Experience , that he Operates thus upon himself , * of his own Existence . Note 2 d. Hence follows , against the Cartesians , that there is no kind of Necessity of Innate Idea's : For , having once got , by this means , the Notion of Existence , and all other Notions being Respective or Comparative to it ; and the Soul being of its own nature a Comparative Power , since ( as will be seen hereafter ) both our Acts of Judging and of Discoursing are Comparative Acts ; hence the Soul becomes provided with Means to have all other Natural Notions whatever , by what it has from the Object , and by it self . But of this Point more towards the end of this Lesson . Only it is to be remark'd , that it is not here intended that the Soul has only the Notion of Existence alone , and afterwards others ; for at the same time it has the Notion of the Man existing , and existing thus by his operating thus . We only discourse which of those Notions is first in priority of Nature , that is , of its own Nature most Knowable or Perceptible . 17. All other Notions of the Thing besides Existence , being Respective , are either of something Intrinsecally belonging to it , or else of something Extrinsecally refer'd to it by our Understanding . This is evident ; for we can have no Notion of Non-Ens , or Nothing , nor consequently of what belongs to it . 18. Intrinsecal Notions are but Four. For , since Existence is the only Absolute Notion , and can be refer'd to no other , all other Notions must either Immediately or Mediately refer to it ; Wherefore all Intrinsecal Notions must either refer the Thing it self immediately to its Existence , by considering the Ens to be of such an Essence , as it is capable to recieve it ; and then Essence being the Immediate Power to Existence , they are Essential Notions , and belong to that Common Head we call Ens or Substance . Or else they refer the Thing to some Common Manner or Modification ( that is , Consideration ) of it , in which all things we converse with do agree ; that is , to its Bigness or Quantity . Or else they refer the thing to some Modification or Consideration belonging to its own peculiar Nature , denoting how it is well or ill dispos'd in that respect ; which Common Head is called Quality . Or , lastly , they refer some one Individuum , according to something Intrinsecal to it , to another Individuum ; which constitutes the Common Head of Relation . And more Common Heads of Intrinsecal Respects cannot be invented ; therefore there are only Four Common Heads of Intrinsecal Notions . 19. Those Notions that refer not something that is Intrinsecal to the thing , but what 's Extrinsecal to it , are conceiv'd to apply that Extrinsecal to it either by way of Motion , or in Rest. If by way of Motion , then , since Motion has two terms , it may be consider'd either as coming from the Mover , and 't is the Notion of Action ; or as affecting the thing Moved , and then 't is called Passion . And , because the most Regular and most Equable , Motion , to our apprehension is that of the Sun , call'd Time , and therefore all Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it , and be measur'd by it , being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing ; and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust , Proportion , and Design all their Motions or Actions by , and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods ; hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd , which we call Quando . If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest , then , either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole , that is , to be Immediate to it , or meerly to Contain it , which grounds the Notion , and answers to the Question Where , or Ubi : Or , it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it ; and then either the whole , or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing , must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing , and 't is call'd its Site or Situation ; or else the Extrinsecal thing , or its parts , are conceiv'd to be Fitted , Ply'd , or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing , and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments , that is , Common Receptacles , which Contain , and whence we may draw , all our Predicates for the Common Subject , Thing : which we may briefly exemplifie thus : Peter 1 , tho' but a yard2 and half high , yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 , fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 , in8 the Field , standing9 upon his guard , armed10 . 21. All these Notions , under whatever Head , if they be Corporeal ones , are Natural and Common to all Mankind . For , since they are made by Impressions on the Senses , which are Common to all Mankind , it follows , that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions , must be such also ; since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects , must work the same Effects . 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together , of Considering them diverse ways , of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections ; and , lastly , of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion ; such as are the Notions of Indivisible , Immaterial , Incorruptible , Unactive , Insignificant , &c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things . All which is manifest by plain Experience , if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour . 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads : For Corporeal Notions are imprinted direct●y ; Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind , and on its Operations or Affections ; or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions . And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions . Wherefore , since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal , Spiritual , or Mix'd , or Compounded of Former Notions , 't is manifest , that all the Notions we have or can have , do arise from one of those Heads . 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn , that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate ; and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless , who affirm , That by a Motion made on the Senses , the Soul , by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self , Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea , which till then lay dormant in it , because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites : For , first , how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object , or , that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies , which are ( as it were ) little Models of their Nature ? It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses , and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler , but that the Particles emitted be more subtil ; which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher , who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible : And , of all Men in the World , the Cartesians should not be startled at it : whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums , and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves , or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves . Now , this being granted , the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence . For , such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them , are apt , when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge , to breed in the Mind , or convey into it the Nature , ( or an Intellectual Notion ) of the Thing it self . To do which , there can need no more , than that every thing ( according to the Maxim ) be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver ; viz. that those Effluviums , by affecting the Body Corporeally , do affect the Soul Intellectually . Secondly , How is it conceivable , or any way Explicable , that a Motion , which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind , should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea ? Indeed , were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs , that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them , they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas , as our Words do now ; or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory . But here things are quite otherwise ; for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement , nor by our voluntary Designation , that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions ; nor , as is confess'd , are they Naturally alike ; wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's . Add , That this hidden Virtue in the Soul , to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve , is both said gratis , and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality ; and so far from Explicable , that even themselves ( as far as I can learn ) have not so much as attempted to explain it : but it seems to be in part taken up gratis , to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's , as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body . Lastly , Their Argument drawn from Experience , that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty , is shewn to be Inconclusive , by alledging , ( as was said lately ) that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles , and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually ( or as standing under Notion ) are the self-same , and not so Vnlike as they imagin . Add , That their Argument faulters in this too , that the makers of it did not duly reflect , when they advanced it , on that ' foresaid Axiom , Quicquid recipitur , recipitur ad modum recipientis : For , had they done this , they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body ( which is imprinted directly ) and an Affection of the Soul which is spiritual ( and known only by Reflexion ) should have a Different Appearance : The two Manners of Existing , with which the same Nature is vested , differing toto genere , that is as far as Body and Spirit ( their subjects ) can distance them . To explicate this more fully , and to shew the difference between Corporeal and Spiritual Idea's , I offer to their thoughts this Reflexion concerning the distinct nature of a Phantasm , which is a Corporeal Resemblance , and the nature of the thing in the Mind ( that is its N●tion ) express'd by a D●finition , which is Intellectual and Spiritual . The Phantasm or Corporeal Resemblance of a Man is a kind of Picture of a thing with two Legs , two Arms , such a Face , with a Head placed uprightly , that grows , moves itself , &c. Let us regard next the Definition of a Man , or rather ( which is , abating the Expression , the same ) the Notion of him ; which is , that he is a Rational Creature ; and we shall easily discern of how different a shape it is from the other ; how it abstracts from many Corporeal Qualities , Figures of the Parts , and other Considerations , which were Essential Ingredients to the Picture or Phantasm , and not at all Essential to It , nor found in the Definition ; and how some Considerations too are added in the Definition , or imply'd in it ( as to Apprehend , Iudge , Discourse , &c. ) which no more belong to the Phantasm , than it did to Zeuxis's Grapes , to have the Definition of the Fruit of such a Vegetable predicated of them . In a word , one of them is a kind of Portraicture , outwardly resembling ; the other speaks the most Intrinsecal Essence of the thing Defin'd . The one signifies Bodily Parts belonging to such an Animal , and therefore is Corporeal : the other does not signifie , but is the Nature signified ; and this too by Words which denote to us the Mind or Meaning ( that is , the Notion ) of the speaker ; which is therefore Spiritual , at least in part . Whence the Compleat Essence of Man could not be understood , nor a Definition of it fram'd , without making use of some of these Notions or Idea's , which are made by our Understanding , reflecting upon its own Spiritual Operations . LESSON III. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided . 1. THE Differences that divide each Common Head must be Intrinsecal to it . For , since * we cannot discourse of two Disparate Notions at once ; and since were those Heads divided by Differences that are Extrinsecal to the Common Genus , ( or taken from another Head ) each Species of it would consist of two Disparate Notions ; hence it is absolutely necessary to Science that the Differences which divide these Common Heads be such as belong to no other Common Head , but be within the Limits of that Head , or Intrinsecal to it . Again , since the Difference is most Formal in constituting the Species , and the Genus only Material ; were the Differences Extrinsecal or Borrow'd from another Head , it would follow , that all the Species of the Head divided by such Differences would belong to another Head , viz. to that Head whence those Differences are taken : Which would put all our Notions into Confusion , and involve a direct Contradiction , as making Substances to be Quantities , Qualities , &c. 2. Intrinsecal Differences can be no other but more and less of the Common Notion : For since , being Intrinsecal , † they cannot be taken from any other Head , it follows , that they must partake of the Common Notion of their own respective Heads . Again , since , if they did partake of the Common Notion Equally , they would not differ in that Notion , and so would not be Differences of it ; it follows , that they must partake of it Vnequally ; that is , they must be more and less of the Common Notion . 3. Hence the Common Notion of Ens , Thing or Substence being that which is capable of Existence , is Immediately , Intrinsecally , or Essentially divided into what 's more and less capable of Existence . Wherefore , 4. Divisible and Indivisible , which constitute Body and Spirit , are the proper and intrinsecal Differences of the Common Head of Substance : For , since Actual Division of the Entity makes the thing to be no longer indivisum in se ; that is , to be unum ; that is , to be Ens ; that is , to be capable of Existence ; it follows , that that Ens which is Divisible ( or Body ) is less capable of Existence , that is , has less of the nature of Ens or Substance ; and the Ens that is Indivisible ( or Spirit ) has more . Again , since Things Divisible , or Bodies , can only have their own Being or Existence , whereas Things indivisible , or Spirits , are capable of being Other things also , or of having in them the Natures and Existences of all the things they know ; hence they have a greater Capacity of Existence than Bodies have ; since they have enough for themselves , and can impart it to Millions of Other things besides ; and , consequently , Body and Spirit are constituted by Divisible and Indivisible , as by the proper , immediate , and Intrinsecal Differences that divide Substance or Ens. 5. The Divisibility and Indivisibility that are the Intrinsecal Differences of Ens , are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative . For , were it so , it would follow , that some Intrinsecal Differences of Ens in Common would be taken from some other Head , viz. that of Quantity , and * so , the Differences being what 's most Formal in the Species , hence those Species of Ens would rather be under that Head than its own . Again , that Divisibility , which is of Quantity , may oftentimes be put into Act , and yet the same Ens remain ; v. g. a Man may lose the Quantity of an Arm ; a Tree , of a Branch , &c. and yet remain still the same Things ; whereas , if Quantitative Divisibility were the Intrinsecal Difference which constituted it such an Ens , Quantitative Division must by consequence make it cease to be that Ens. Moreover , since Quantity ( as will be † shortly seen ) is Divisibility , and Divisibility in Vnity , in case Quantity did Intrinsecally divide Ens , and constitute Body , where-ever there were Quantity there would be Vnity under that notion ; and so all Quantitative things would be but one Ens or one Body ; which is the highest absurdity . Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which are the intrinsecal Differences of Ens , are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative . 6. Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally , must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of the Constituents of Ens , as such ; that is , the Divisibility of it into Matter and Form , and Indivisibility of it into such Constituent parts : Which differences do Essentially divide the Genus of Ens , and constitute the species of Body and Spirit . For , since we see Bodies chang'd into one another , and therefore , the former Body had really somewhat in it determining it to be actually what it was , which we call the Form ; and somewhat by which it could be Another , which we call the Power to be another , or Matter : Again , since we see that the Form , which made the former Thing be what it was , is gone when 't is made Another Thing , and a New Form succeeds into the same Matter ; hence we can frame diverse Conceptions of Body , which belong to it as such an Ens , viz. Matter and Form ; and have a Ground in Nature to say there is a Real divisibility between them . Wherefore since that Ens call'd Body , by being divisible into Matter and Form , becomes liable to have the Form , that constituted it such an Ens , separated from the Matter , and so to lose its being the same Ens it was , and incapable of existing any longer ; and , for the same reason , a Spirit , by it s not being divisible into Matter and Form , has not in its Essence any Principle giving it a Capacity not to Exist , as had the other ; but has in its self , or rather is of its self a more simple and more perfect kind of Vnity , and consequently a more Noble kind of Entity or Capacity of existing , than is the other ; Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally , must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of it into Matter and Form ; which we call Metaphysical Divisibility , because it is the divisibility of the parts of Ens as such ; that is , of Ens under the Notion of Ens. 7. For the same Reason given above , ( Sect. 1 , 2. ) Mixt and Simple are the Intrinsecal Differences of Body : For , since Simple Bodies , which we call Elements , have in them but the Nature or Essence of One kind of Body only , and Mixt Bodies have both the nature of That Kind , and of other Elements besides ; it is manifest that they divide the Common Notion of Body by more and less , which are Intrinsecal Differences . 8. For the same reason Mixt Body is divided into Living Bodies , and not Living by Intrinsecal Differences ; because Those are more mixt , These less . 9 , For the same Reason , a Living Body , being that which has a Principle of Motion in it self , is divided , as by Intrinsecal Differences into Animal , which is more Living , or more moving it self ( viz. by every slight Impression on the Senses ) and Plant , or Vegetable , which is less-moving it self . 10. For the same Reason , Animal , which is a Body moving it self by Impression on the Senses , is intrinsecally divided into Brutes , which do thus move themselves onely to a set Determinate number of Actions , which is to be less moving it self by impressions on the Senses ; and Man , who by his Reason and Knowledge is apt to move himself to a kind of Vniversality of Action , which is to be more moving himself by means of such impressions . 11. For the same Reason , Man , or Rational Animal , is divided intrinsecally and essentially into those who have more and less the Faculty or Power of Reasoning ; who are , therefore , properly and essentially more and less Men. Note , That Common Logicians , because we cannot descend or reach to those particular intrinsecal Differences which constitute Individuals , do therefore make [ Man ] the lowest species : But 't is one thing what may serve for Logical Speculation ; another , what the nature of the thing bears , and the right division of the Commoner Notion by Intrinsecal differences requires : Wherefore , tho' not able to discern the intermediate Species , and ( as far as I have observ'd ) not reflecting that more and less of the common Notion do make the Intrinsecal and Essential Differences that constitute its Species , Common Logicians do content themselves to put Individuums immediately under Man , and thence mistake Man to have no Essential Differences at all , but Accidental ones only ; yet 't is manifest , that , since all Individuums are diverse Entia or Things , and Essence does formally Constitute an Ens , the Differences that constitute diverse Entia must necessarily be Essential . So that amongst Men there may be many Degrees of more or less Rational , constituting diverse under - Species of Man , could we have light to distinguish them ; as well as there are diverse species of Dogs , Horses , Trees , and Flowers . 12. Particular or Singular Things are properly call'd Individuums , because they cannot be divided into more of the same Notion , as all others in the same Line could . For Socrates cannot be divided into more that have the particular Nature of Socrates in them , as Man could into more that have the Common Nature of Man. 13. Individuals only are properly and compleatly Entia or Things , and capable of existing . For , since the Notion of Thing is [ Capable of Existing ] and all Notions that are superiour to the Individuum are Inadequate or Partial Notions of it , as is manifest ; and the Individuum is the Whole , as comprizing all those Parts ; and no Part can exist by its own Virtue , or out of the whole ; in regard it would then be of it self a whole Ens and not a Part onely ; it follows , that onely Individuals are properly and compleatly Entia or capable of Existing . 14. Individuals are the proper Subject or Suppositum of all other Notions or Natures both of its own Line , and of all the rest . For , * since Individuals onely are properly Things , or capable of Existing ; it follows , that both all in its own Line , and much more in all the other Lines ( which have not at all in their peculiar Notions any Order or Title to Existence ) must exist and subsist in Individuals , as in their suppositum or subject ; which lends them to be , and sustains them in Being . COROLARIES . 1. Hence , 't is Logically demonstrated that every individual Man is but One Ens or Thing ; since he descends Lineally from that Common Head by intrinsecal Differences of more and less , which constitute him truly One in that Line ; that is , one Ens , or one Thing . Whence the contrary Position ravels all the Well-Order'd Frame of Human Notions , and the Division of them by intrinsecal Differences ; which ( as * has been shewn ) must needs put all our thoughts into Confusion , and wholly obstruct the Way to Science . Nor matters it that there are two contrary Natures in him , Corporeal and Spiritual ; since the Notion of Ens is not the Notion of the Nature , * but of the suppositum which has the nature in it . Add , that the notion of Ens is indifferent to both Natures ; and therefore , if they may be co-ordinate to one End , and that it wrong no other Principle , they may both club into one Thing , and compound one Ens : As appears in the Incarnation , in which the Second Person of the Trinity assum'd Human Nature , and joyn'd it to it self in the same suppositum . 2. The Notion of Rational ( which is in some sort truly Spiritual ) may be Co-ordinate to the Notion of some kind of Body . For , since Animal is directly subsum'd under the Notion of Body , and the Notion of Animal ( or of a Thing moving it self by Impressions on the Senses ) is Intrinsecally divided by less-moving it self thus , which constitutes Brutes ; and more-moving it self thus , which is manifestly done by its being Rational , that is in part spiritual ; It follows , that the Notion of Rational or Spiritual may be Co-ordinate to some Body , ( viz. to Animal ) as one of the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of that Genus , as is shewn above . 3. Notwithstanding Man cannot be both Body and Spirit formally . For , then he must necessarily be Two Entities in distinct Lines of Substance ; the one under the Genus of Body , the other of Spirit . Whence , he would be Vnum and non-Vnum , in the same regard , or according to the same Formal Notion ; that is , he would be Ens and non Ens ; and consist formally of two Things as perfectly distinct as an Angel and an Ape ; and even be more monstrous than a Hircocervus or Chimaera ; because he would be formally , that is essentially , made up of two more-generically-opposit Things than these are conceiv'd to be . Wherefore , the Notion of Man being deduced by Intrinsecal Differences from the Genus of Body , he is formally a Body , tho' his Soul be of a spiritual Nature , which makes him virtually a Spirit . Whence also , the manner of Existence following from what 's Formal in the Thing , he has , in this State , a Corporeal Manner of Existence ; as appears by his gleaning Knowledge by the Senses ; his being Measurable by Quantity , Alterable by Corporeal Qualities ; nay , even his peculiar and proper Action of Discourse attends the slow pace of Fancy and Bodily Motion ; none of which could be competent to a Pure Spirit that exists after a Spiritual and Indivisible manner . Nor does this more prejudice the Spiritual Nature of a Soul that it exists and works in some regards after the manner of a Body , than it does prejudice the Nature of a Body , ( a Stone , for example ) that it exists in us spiritually ; as it does when we know it , or have the Notion or Nature of it in our Understanding . 4. Hence is seen what Notions do formally belong to the Line of Substance , or to Ens as Ens , viz. the several species of it descending downwards from the Common Head , till we come to the I●dividuum ; which therefore is a compleat Ens , as including all those Superiour or partial Notions ; and * therefore it only is in proper speech , an Ens or Thing ; in regard It onely being ultimately determin'd to be This or That , only It is , by consequence , capable of existing , which is the Definition of Ens. Whence all Potential or Indeterminate Notions of Ens , such as are Ens , Corpus , Vivens , or Animal in Common , are , for the same reason , incapable of Existing , otherwise than as they are Parts of the compleat Ens or Individuum ; and therefore they are phras'd by the Schools , Substantiae Secundae , and the Individuum Substantia Prima . Lower than the Individuum in the Line of Ens we cannot go , nor can any Notion be superadded to it that belong Properly to Ens , but that of Existence , of which Ens is a Capacity . Whence we do not call Existence a Form ( or Act , ) for This joyn'd with the Matter ( or Power ) does constitute that compound Ens call'd Body , and , therefore , are both presuppos'd to Existence ; but we call it the last Formality of every created Ens , because it has no Potentiality at all in that Line , but is Pure Actuality ; and therefore most resembles GOD , our Creator and the sole Giver of It , whose very Essence is Self-Existence . 5. All those Notions before said , taking them precisely as determining the common Notion of Ens , and belonging to it ( even to the last Actuality of it [ Existence ] inclusively ) are Metaphysical Notions : The proper Object of which Science is Ens ; not taken as it abstracts from Existence , but as it abstracts from all the other Predicaments or common Heads of Notions ; that is , from all Matter and Motion , and all Modes or Manners of them . For which Reason Existence , which more perfectly abstracts from both , does more formally belong to the Object of Metaphysicks . LESSON IV. Some Considerations belonging to those Ten Heads of Notions , or to the Ten Predicaments in Common . 1. THE last Nine Predicaments , call'd Accidents , are not truly Things , nor ( of themselves ) capable of Existence ; and therefore they are onely Capable of Being by their Identity with Substance . For , since * we cannot clearly know any thing but by framing diverse Notions or Considerations of it , † and all the Notions we have are divided into Ten common Heads , ‖ and it hinders the way to Science , if we keep not the Distinction of those Heads unmingled : Wherefore , it being manifest and undeniable , that among those Heads there is one which is truly the Notion of Ens or Thing , that is , of [ apable of Existing ] viz. that of Substance . Hence , in case we should conceive , or put all the rest to be also Entities or Things , or of themselves capable of Existence , we should confound and jumble all the Common Heads of our Notions together ; which would fundamentally destroy all possibility of Science , even while we are laying it . 2. Notwithstanding this , the Notions or Natures of those Nine Heads are not Fictitious , or fram'd gratis by our Understanding , but real Affections or Modifications of the Thing . For , since * we cannot comprehend all that is in the thing at once , but are forced to make diverse Considerations of it ; nor could we do this unless the thing were diversly Considerable ; it follows , that these Nine Heads ( as well as the First ) are diverse Considerabilities of the same Thing ; that is , the real Thing it self as diversly consider'd or conceiv'd by us ; and therefore , since they are not Things by virtue of their distinct Notions , and yet are really the Thing diversly consider'd ( which takes nothing from their Re●lity ) it is left that they must be Real Affections , Modifications , Respects or Determinations of it , and not meer Nothings or Fictitious ; but , ( as we may say ) somewhat of the Thing , or belonging to it ; which Logicians phrase to be a Thing in an Analogical or Secondary sense . 3. The Distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding , partly from Nature it self . For , since the diverse Considerabilities of the Thing * are not so many little Entities found in it , but the same thin● diversly conceiv'd ; the distinction of them cannot be taken from the Thing it self , singly consi●●red . On the other side , * since our Understanding is naturally apt to make diverse Abstract Notions of the Thing ; nay , is forced to do it because it cannot discourse clearly of more of them to●ether , much less of the whole suppositum ; and , that the Impressions on the Senses which cause those Notions are naturally diverse ; and , that the Causes in Nature do often work upon the suppositum or thing , according to some one Notion or Considerability of it , and not according to another : for example , on its Figure , and not on its Colour ; on its Locality or Situation , and not on its Substance ; hence ample occasion is ministred to the Understanding to consider it diversly ; that is , to make diverse Conceptions or Notions of it . Wherefore the distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding , partly from Nature it self ; Nature affording Ground and Occasion for the Understanding to make this Distinction , and the Understanding making it formally . 4. Hence follows , that the only way to acquire solid Knowledge of the Nature of Things , or ( which is the same ) of those Nature-imprinted Notions , is , not to frame high-flying speculations of them , beaten out of our own Brain , or coin'd by our own Wit : but , to gain by attentive Reflexion , the true and genuine Meaning of those Words , which the Generality of Mankind , or the Vulgar , make use of to signifie those Notions : For , this known , * the Meaning of the Word being the Meaning or Notion of those that use it , and their † Notion being the Nature of the Thing , it follows , that the Nature of the Thing will be known likewise . Wherefore , this is the best Test to know which Speculations are Aiery , which solid and Grounded on Nature . For Instance . To know what is properly meant by the word [ Thing ] , ask an honest Country fellow ( as my self did once to satisfie a Sceptick ) how many Things lye upon the Table ; and we shall see that he will readily reckon up all the individual Substances , and be ready to swear there are no more : Which shews , that Nature teaches him that only an individual Substance is truly and properly a Thing . This done , tell him he has not reckon'd all the Things there , but has omitted Bigness , Whiteness , Roundness , &c. which are not Nothings , but Things , and really there . Which done , you will find you have blunder'd him , by putting him to distinguish , which he is not good at : Yet , for all that , he will stand to his former Answer , and tell you , These are not such Things as we call Things ; and that in reckoning up the Other things , he reckon'd up Those into the bargain . Which rude Answer contains the sum of this present Discourse ; viz. that only Individual Substances are truly Things ; the others somewhat of the Thing , or belonging to it ; and that they are no otherwise ●hings , but as they are it , or somewhat of it ; and consequently are not , or have no Existence of their own , but its . 5. Artificial things are in no One of these Heads . For , since Artificial things are either more things join'd together , or some one Natural Body , not as it stands in Nature , but as vested with a new ●rtificial Form , introduced by A●t ; it cannot have one Notion ; nor , consequently , can it be comprized under any one Head. Nor are these Notions Common to all Mankind ; nor , lastly , are they constituted by Essential or In●rinsecal Differences in the Line of Ens , but such as are Accidental or Extrinsecal , and generally by their Figures or Situation of their Parts . 6. What 's Infinit can be in none of these Heads . For , since an Infinit Ens ( for example ) involves in its self all that is or can belong to the Notion of Ens , and can be but One , in regard , were there more , one of them would have something of Entity in it which the other has not , and so they would limit one another , and both of them would be Finite ; it follows , that what 's Infinite can neither be a Common Head it self , because it can have no Particular Infinites under it ; nor can it be a Particular under that Common Head , because it could have no Genus to it , nor Intrinsecal Differences to divide that Genus , and to constitute a Distinct Infinit from the other . 7. Ens , diversly conceiv'd , is the Adequate Object of our Understanding , working naturally . This is evident from the whole Scheme of our Discourse concerning the Ten Common Heads of all our Notions , shewing they are nothing but diverse Conceptions of Ens. 8. Hence we can have no proper Notion of a pure Non-Entity ; not only for the Reason now given , but also , because a Non-Ens could never make any impression on our Senses , and thence convey it● ●otion into our Minds . 9. For the same reason we can have no proper and direct Notions of Indivisibles or Points , or of what 's purely Negative of Ens , or of any real Affection of Ens , taking them as purely Negative , without connotating the Subject , or the Thing ; whose notion only is truly Positive . For ( as has been shown ) all our Conceptions are Notions of the Things as conceiv'd by us ; which when , by a Reflex Act , we consider to be Limited , and to reach no farther under such or such a Notion , we abstract Limitedness from the Real Notion ; and because we can have no Conception but under the notion of Ens , we are forced to use an improper Notion , and conceive it as a kind of Ens ; even tho' at the same time wise Reflecters judge and say , 't is none of it self , or , as totally abstracted from the Thing . In which case no harm is done by our barely Apprehending it so , for 't is Natural , and we cannot help it ; but if , not distinguishing our Manner of Conceiving from what is found in the Thing , we come to judge that to be an Entity which , by the Thing 's reaching no farther , is evident that of it self 't is none ; or to be Diverse Entities because our Conceptions are different , it will certainly pervert all our Discourses , and make them Aiery , Fantastical , and Contradictory . 10. Hence it is a most Intolerable Error , to make Imaginary Space , or an Immense Vacuum beyond the World to Exist ; and , by consequence to belong to some one of those Common Heads . For , the word Vacuum must either be taken as a Concrete , and then it must signifie a Subject or Ens which has an Accident in it call'd Vacuity ; in which case , since none says that that Ens is a Spirit ; nor can it be a Body , being put to be beyond the World , that is , beyond the whole Mass of Bodies ; it follows , that it is no Ens at all , but a meer Nothing ; and so , to put a Nothing to be , is against Common Sence , the Light of Nature , and the very First Principle of our Understanding ; for it puts that to be , which , being no Ens , is not capable to be ; that is , it puts a perfect Impossibility or Contradiction . Or else it is a meer Abstract Term , and means a Vacuity ; and then the Asserters of it must put a Form to bee without any Matter or Subject inform'd by it ; which wanting , it can be no Form ; or an Accident to subsist without any Subject , which makes it no Accident ; since an Accident is that which does accidere substantiae , or is Adventitious to it . Again , the Name they give it , viz. Imaginary Space , by which they distinguish it from Real Space , confesses it not to be in re , but only in our Imagination : Which words can have no sence , unless they mean , that the Imagination is the Only Subject in which it subsists . Wherefore , to speak consequently , they ought to say , that our Imagination , in which only it has any Being , is some infinitely-extended Thing beyond the World ; for there they put this Imaginary Space to bee ; but this is so notorious a Banger , that they dare not say this neither ; and , therefore , they can make no piece of their Tenet cohere , nor make any Sence of their own Words . But let them wriggle what way they will , their putting it to be without the World , and yet not to exist in re , but in our Imagination only , which is within the World , is so full fraught with variety of Contradictions , that they cannot even name it or talk of it , without speaking palpable Nonsence at every step of their Discourse . Moreover , they deny it to be a Thing , and yet they attribute to it the Properties of a Real Thing , by making it have assignable Parts in it ; as also to be Extended , Measurable , &c. which is the highest strain of Contradiction imaginable . For , since Ens and Non-Ens do differ more than toto genere , and as far as Contradiction can distance them ; whatever is affirm'd of an Ens must necessarily be deny'd of Non-Ens ; so that , if a Thing ( a Body for example ) can be extended , measur'd , pass'd through , or mov'd in ; it must necessarily be affirm'd , that a Non-Ens cannot be mov'd in , extended , measur'd , or have Parts . Lastly , Imaginary Space or Vacuum never affected our Senses ; and therefore , since we can have no distinct Notion of it from outward Objects , neither can it , consequently , belong to any of those Common Heads of Notions ; whence follows that one of these Heads , which gives Being to all the other , being Ens , Imaginary Space and Vacuum are meer Nothings . Note 1. That this Discourse equally concludes against Vacuum within the World. For that Imagin'd Space would neither be Body nor Spirit , Subject nor Accident ; and therefore it must be meerly Nothing . Nor , consequently , could it be Measur'd , Extended , Mov'd in , &c. Note 2. That these two Tenets being overthrown , the whole Epicurean Hypothesis , built on them , falls to the Ground , and needs no farther Confutation . 11. Hence 't is Logically demonstrated , that there can be no Protuberancy in the outmost Superficies of the World ; for , were this so , there would be some Distance between the Extream Surface and that Protuberancy ; and that distance could be Measurable , Divisible , &c. which would make Non-Ens to be Ens. 12. This Humour of Fancy , or of ill-govern'd Reason , making Entities of Non-Entities ; and conceiting every Negative , purely as such , to be a Thing , because we cannot conceive Nothings but as Thin●s , destroys all Science , and makes it Chimerical . For , every Species in Nature includes a Negation of all other Species , and every Individuum in the World of all other Individuums : at which rate we should have far more Nothings in the World than Things , if we come to put all those Negations to bee . It were very proper , but withal very pleasant , if such Men of Fancy would , in pursuance of their Tenet , frame us a new No-Logick of their own , and put Non-Ens in Common to be the First Head of their Negative Notions ; and then divide it by more of Non-ens that is , No-Body , and Less of it , or no Spirit ; and then descend to its proper Individuums . as Non-Petrus , Non-Ioannes , Non-Bucephalus , &c. This would be consequent to their Fantastick Tenet . But , even then they must be forc'd to contradict themselves , and confess , that as Non-ens means not capable of existing ; so , by the same reason , they ought to make Non-Corpus to be Non-quantum , Non-quale , Non-passivum , Non-locabile , &c. which would spoil all their Positions of Vacuum and Imaginary Space . So certain it is that all Errors , pursu'd home to their bad Principles , will still confute themselves . Hence the distinction some make of Ens into Ens-Positivum , Privativum , and Negativum , is no wiser than was the saying of the Fanatick Preacher in Ben's Play. viz. That he had three Lights in him ; a Great Light , a Little Light , and No Light at all . 13. We have no Natural Notion , nor Ground , from Nature , of an Union , as they call it . For , the Asserters of it , neither make it the Action that unites two things or parts , nor the Effect of that Action wrought upon the Subject , that is , their being united , ( which hinders it from belonging to the Common Heads of Action or Passion ) but an Intervening Little Entity , whose nature it is to tye them together . And , since such a Notion was never imprinted by our Senses , 't is plain it can be no Natural Notion as those in the Predicaments are , nor belong to any of those Common Heads . Nor can it be collected by Reason ; for since the Matter , before the Union be made , is Ultimately dispos'd by Nature to receive the Form , and the Form is Proper , and by the course of Causes , Necessary to be received into the Matter thus disposed , there can need nothing to Unite them ( as they call it ) but the Efficient , making the Form result from such Matter as was fitted for it and requir'd it , which is to be in it ; any more than , if Fire be apt to burn what 's Combustible , and what 's Combustible be perfectly fit to be burnt by Fire , there can need any thing but Application , to burn it , or ( which in their Phrase is the same ) to unite the Form of Fire to the Matter of the Wood. This Conceit therefore of those little Entities , call'd 〈◊〉 , to tack things together at every turn , is a meer Chimera coin'd by Fancy ; and seems to be borrow'd from those mens observing that two Things , unapt otherwise to cohere , ( diverse pieces of Wood , for example ) do need Glew , or Pitch , or some such tenacious stuff , to fix them together ; whence , by an Unsuitable and Ill-grounded Metaphor , they translate it to the Uniting the parts of Natural Entities ; which , by the wise Conduct of the Author of Nature , are always ready for an Union e're they come to be made One , and can need nothing at all to unite them or make them One Entitatively . Vnion therefore is the Effect of the Action of Uniting , or the same with their being united or their Vnity , and not an Intermediating Entity ; since whatever Things or Parts are naturally Vnited do cling together into one Entity by a kind of spontaneous Inclination ; and by means of the antecedent Dispositions requiring the Form , are such good Friends of themselves beforehand , that there can need nothing to Reconcile them . Besides , this Conceit is ill-grounded in another respect ; for , the Inventers of it make account that those Vnible Parts were , before they were united , Two Things ; whereas , in reality , there was but One Thing , dispos'd to be chang'd into another , by sitting the Matter to receive a new Form. Which Discourse may be apply'd to those who ask , How , or by what means , the Soul and Body were United or made One Thing ? To which the proper Answer is , They were never Two Things . 14. We can have no One Notion of a Transcendent ; for , since Transcendents are those that run through all or many of the Predicaments , and the Predicaments are so many Heads of Notions Generically distinct ; it is impossible to have any one Notion of Transcendents ; Again , there is no more common Genus , which can be divided into those Ten Heads , as its Species , by Intrinsecal Differences ; but those several Summa Genera are distinguish'd from one another by their own Common Notions . Whence the Words that signifie them , whether Vnum , Verum , Bonum , Idem , Diversum , or what ever they be , are the most Equivocal of any that can be imagin'd , and have a vastly different signification as apply'd to the Notions in each of those Heads . 15. No Part of an Ens ▪ can belong to any Predicament : For a Part of an Ens is no more an Ens , than a part of an Apple is an Apple : Nor , can Parts have Intrinsecal Differences in the Line of Substance ; for such Differences would with the Genus make the Part to be a Totum in that Line . COROLLARY . Hence by the way , we may frame a Logical Demonstration against Actual Parts in a Compound . For , were they Actually Distinct , they must have each of them Matter and Form of its own ; which being the proper Constituents of such an Ens , each of them would be such an Ens or a Body ; and so they would have each of them , a Title to Existence , which is the proper Notion of a compleat Ens ; and by consequence each Part would be a Whole . 16. The Notions of Genus , Speci●s , and the Terms of Art , fram'd by the Reflexion of our Understanding , are not Things distinct from the Notions of Ens , Corpus , Vivens , &c. which Logicians call by those Names ; nor are they in any of those Common Heads . For , First , ( * as wil● appear ) these Notions are but Parts of the Individuum , which is the whole Ens. Next Terms of Art are made by Men of Art , who are Reflecters , and not directly imprinted by Nature , or Common to all Mankind : For which Reason we must learn the Meaning of those Words , and , consequently , those Notions themselves , from Learned Men , and not from the Generality . 17. Notwithstanding , it must be Granted , That Nature gives our Understanding Hints or Ground to frame such Artificial Conceptions ; without which they would be Fictitious and Chimerical : For Example , by observing that all the Men we ever knew , do proceed to Action upon some Reason or other ; hence , we frame a Common Notion of a species or Kind , call'd a Rational Thing ; and , observing farther , that Beasts as well as Men have Senses , and are excited and mov'd by means of them ; hence we frame a Higher Notion , common to both the Kinds of Man and Beast , and call it a Genus ; and so still upwards . Nature all along affording us some Ground of framing Universal Notions , and the Understanding making and framing them actually . And , where these Notions were bred , there they dwell or exist ; for , out of the Understanding , and in Nature , there is nothing but Individuals . 18. Note , that the Notions of Genus , Species , &c. as abstracted and rais'd to a Common pitch by Men of Art , or Logicians , reflecting on the Agreement of more under that one Notion , are ( as such ) Wholes ; but , as consider'd in the Ens or Individuum , and as causing our Natural Notions of them , they are but Parts , and the Individuum is the Whole , in respect of them : For , since the whole is that which is larger than some parts are , or rather which comprehends all the Parts ; it follows , that those Notions , thus abstractedly consider'd , being ( according to the condition they have in our Understanding ) larger than the Inferiour Notions , and comprehending all under them , are therefore certain kinds of Wholes , as thus consider'd . On the other side , since only Individuums are truly the Compleat and Whole Entia , as being only Capable of Existing ; and the Notions of Ens , Corpus , Vivens , Animal , Homo , are but Partial and Inadequate Notions of the Individuum ; it follows , that the Individuum does , in reality , comprehend what answers to the Notions of each or all of them : wherefore , thus consider'd , ( that is , as they stand in Nature ) they are but Parts , and the Individuum is the Whole . LESSON V. Of the Common Head called Quantity . 1. QUantity may either be consider'd Mathematically , as abstracted from Motion , and meerly Extending the Body , as it were , in Rest ; or Physically , as affecting Body , its Subject , in order to Motion ; that is , as to natural Action and Passion . This needs no Proof , since it is Evident that Quantity may be consider'd both these ways , and we experience that we can both these ways consider it . 2. The Essential Notion of Quantity is Divisibility into Parts ; and , such a Divisibility as that each of its Parts , after Division , becomes a Whole . For , since the Essential Notion of it cannot consist in its having Matter and Form , which make it an Ens , and so fit it for Existence ( as it was in a Divisible Substance or * Body ) the Essence of it ( such as it is ) must be taken from some Consideration belonging to its own single Abstracted Notion , and from that in the first place that best expresses its Metaphysical Vnity . And , since nothing can be said to be Divisible , or capable to be made more , but it must be said eo ipso to be Actually and truly One ; therefore Divisibility , or a Capacity to be made more , is the very Notion of its Vnity , only connotating that 't is such an Unity as makes its subject Capable to be made more , or dissolved by Division into Parts . Again , † as was said above , and will more evidently be shown hereafter , that is the true Notion of any Nature to which the Sayings of Mankind do agree : But Divisibility is thus shown to be the Notion of Quantity . For example , ask what a Mile is , it will be answer'd , That it has so many Furlongs , Paces , or Yards in it . Ask what a Yard is , it will be answer'd , It consists of so many Feet ; and so of the rest . And when we come to so small a Quantity , that we can no more give an account of it , or assign the parts into which it is divisible , we find our selves at a plunge , and know not how to define it , but seem to have lost the Notion of it . Therefore , however Extension , Measurability , and such others , may truly belong to Quantity as its Properties , yet only Divisibility is its Primary and Essential Notion , because 't is this only denotes its Vnity . And , since it is not a Divisibility into such parts as could not remain Wholes after their separation , such as were Matter and Form , which are the Essential parts of Substance ; hence the Divisibility which Quantity gives to its Subject must be such as makes it remain so many Wholes after the Division is made ; as Experience also shews us . 3. Quantity is adequately divided into Continu'd , or Coherent ; and Discrete , or Number . For , since 't is impossible to ask any Question concerning the Quantity of Things , but either how Many they are , if more Things ; or , how great it is , ( that is how much there is of it ) if it be but One thing ; 't is evident that Mankind has no Notion of any other kind of Quantity but of Discrete and Continu'd ; and , therefore , the Division of Quantity into these two Species is Adequate . Note , that Discrete Quantity is less Quantity than Continu'd , because 't is less Divisible ; or rather 't is not so properly Quantity as is the other , because it has no Vnity to distinguish it from a mere Confused Multitude of Ones but by means of the Understanding , conceiving it to be so many Units terminated by the last ; yet , because Plurality and Paucity are More and Less of any one Determinate Number , and that there is a Ground in Nature for our Understanding to consider many Scatter'd Ones and comprehend or bind them together into one Notion , and that such Notions are useful or necessary to Mankind ; therefore this Order'd Multitude of discrete or shatter'd Ones , call'd Number , is rightly placed in the Predicament of Quantity . For , t is to be noted , that when 't is said Quantity is Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia , it was not meant of Quantity in Common , or all Quantity , but only of that Species of Quantity call'd Continued . 4. The Unity proper to Extended Quantity is Continuity of its parts ; For , if the parts of this sort of Quantity be Discontinu'd , either Nothing ( or vacuum ) comes between them , and then they are still Continu'd against the Supposition ; for Nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the Parts of Quantity . Or else some Body comes between them and Discontinues them ; and then , since all Bodies bring their own Quantities along with them , however the Bodies , A. and B. are distanced by C's coming between them , because every Body has its determinate bounds and Limits ; yet , the Quantity of those three Bodies , precisely consider'd , has none , but goes on Smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole Mass of Body , whether those Bodies be Different or the Same ; without Notches or Nicks butting and bounding it here and there , or in the least diversifying it ; what ever Variety is found in the Figure , Colour , Hardness , Softness or in any other consideration belonging to those Bodies . Again , since this Species of Quantity has its peculiar Notion , Nature , or Essence , it must have some kind of Vnity too peculiar to it self : But , none is imaginable except Continuity , nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of Quantity , which is Divisibility or Vnity of its potential parts , or sute so exactly with it . Nay , were the parts of Quantity discontinu'd quantitatively , they would be divided quantitatively , that is , not Divisible or One ; that is none , or Not-Quantity , against the Supposition . Therefore the Vnity proper to this Species of Quantity is Continuity of its parts . Cor. I. Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Vninterrupted Continuity , and the World it self ( speaking of Quantitative Unity ) One Great Continuum . 5. Quantity , according to its precise Notion , cannot be Essential to Body , because it can neither be the Genus of it , nor the Intrinsecal Difference that constitutes it ; as is prov'd * above . 6. Yet Quantity , Materially consider'd , and not according to its precise and formal notion of Divisibility , may ( as it were ) per accidens contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies . For , since nothing is truly and perfectly Ens , or Capable of Existence , but Individuals ; nor ( since Thing in common cannot exist ) can any thing be Capable of Existing , but by being ultimately Determinated , and thence compleatly fitted to be This or That ; and this Determination , distinguishing one Individuum from all others , is perform'd by means of such a particular Complexion of Accidents as fits them for their Primary Operation for which Nature ordain'd them ; and this Complexion of Accidents is either of Quantity , or else ( as is shewn in Physicks ) of different modifications of Quantity ; it follows , that Quantity , materially consider'd , and not according to its Formal notion of Divisibility , may ( as it were ) by Accident contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies . 7. The Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity are more and less of the Notion of Quantity . This is prov'd * formerly , when we treated of the Division of Substance ; and the reason given there holds equally here . 8. The Proper Species of Quantity , mathematically consider'd , or as it abstracts from Motion , are Longitude , Latitude , and Profundity ; otherwise call'd Linea , Superficies , and Corpus . For , it is evident that Latitude is another sort of Quantity , and has more of that Notion in it than Longitude has ; and that Profundity is a different sort of Quantity , and has in it more of Quantity , thus consider'd , than either of the other , as containing in it self all the three Dimensions . 9. Therefore , the Intrinsecal Differences of each of these continued Quantities ( consider'd Mathematically , as abstracted from all Order to Motion ) are Divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts : For , since the Notion of Quantity is Divisibility , and Divisibility respects the Parts into which it may be divided ; and this respect cannot be to Indeterminate parts into which it may be divided , they being ( as Euclid has demonstrated ) Infinit , as well in the greatest as the least Quantities , so that they cannot have any differences , thus considered ; wherefore Divisibility into Greater and Lesser parts , being the Intrinsecal Differences of all such Quantities , in regard that the Greater have more of the Immediate Generical Notion , or of that kind of Quantity , in them ; the smaller , less of it ; and Divisibility into parts which are Determinate , may bear the Notion of Greater or lesser Divisibility , which Divisibility into Potential parts ( as was said ) cannot ; it follows that Divisibility into Greater and Lesser Determinate parts are the Intrinsecal Differences of this kind of Quantity , Mathematically consider'd . Besides , Greater and Lesser bear in their Notions some Proportion between those parts ; which cannot be conceiv'd unless those Parts be Determinate . 10. The Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of Continued Quantity consider'd Physically , or in Order to Motion ; that is , Affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by Natural Causes , are more or less Divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those Causes . This is evident from the very same Reason , supposing Intrinsecal Differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common Notion , or of the Genus they are to divide . 11. The More and Less Divisibility of Continu'd Quantity thus consider'd , is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by Natural Agents . For , since Quantity , thus consider'd , does not respect the Parts it contains or may be divided into , but the Causes in Nature , and their Operation upon its Subject , Body ; it follows , that the Notion of its being more or less Divisible , as thus consider'd , can only mean more or less susceptive of the Efficiency of Natural Causes ; that is , more easily or less easily Divisible by the said Causes ; which is to be Rare and Dense . 12. The Division of Continu'd Quantity into Permanent and Successive , is made by Accidental Differences , and not by Essential ones , as were the former Divisions of it : For , since to move and to stand still are Accidental to Quantity , and have no respect to that Generical Notion , as more and less of it , as had the other Differences above mentioned ; it follows , that these Differences are Accidental to their Generical Notion , and not Essential or Intrinsecal to it . Again , more and less , which are Intrinsecal Differences , signifie some Proportion or Comparison of one to the other , which can have no place in Permanent and Successive Quantities ; for , what sense bears it to say , that a Yard is as Long as an Hour ? Wherefore , since it is a most certain Maxim , That Comparisons are made of things which are of the same Genus or kind ( which by the way shews , that Intrinsecal Differences of any Genus or Kind are Comparative Notions , or More and Less of it ) 't is Evident that Continu'd Quantity is not a Proper Genus to them , as such ; nor They Proper Species of it , or constituted such under it by Intrinsecal Differences ; but each of them is the very Genus it self of Continu'd Quantity , consider'd under diverse States altogether disparate ; and one of them , viz. Successive , connotating the Predicament of Action , the other seeming rather to hold on the side of meer Quantity ; tho' that Common Head does , in rigour , Abstract from both those States . 13. The Division of Permanent Continu'd Quantity into Extensive , containing the three Species * above mentioned ; and Intensive or Weight , is yet more defective than the other : For , first , part of the Genus it self ( viz. Permanent ) is Accidental to Quantity . Next , ( there being no Natural Propension one way or other Inherent in Bodies while in Rest , ( as is shown in Physicks ) Weight must be taken for an Actual tendency downwards ; and so it belongs to the Predicament of Action or Passion , according as the Body that weighs is consider'd either as prest upon by the superiour body , or pressing that below it . Whence , whatever else we can conceive of the Notion of Weight in any Body is nothing else but its Density ; for this makes it apt to receive the full Impression of the descending Ayr , and better and more swiftly cut the medium , when its Motion is once determin'd ; whereas Rare Bodies suffer the descending Particles to slip thro' them , and do but dully and slowly divide the Medium thro' which they are to pass in their descent . But of this more in Physicks . 14. Infinit Discrete Quantity , that is Infinit Number cannot belong to the Predicament of Quantity ; For then , it must either have the place there of a Genus , or of a Species ; whereas it can be neither , because the Generical Notion would in that case be Common to more Infinit Numbers as its Species , which is a Contradiction : For , since each of these Species , being Infinit in such a line , or under such a Notion , must comprehend All that can be in that Line , they would each of them contain the whole Line of Number ; and so each of them would be of as large a Notion as their Genus ; nor would they , in that case , be Different from one another in that Line , because one of them can have nothing which the other has not ; nor consequently can they be diverse Species , nor can Infinit Quantity be their Genus . Besides , two Infinits , under what Notion soever , limit , and so destroy one another : nor can it be solv'd by saying , that Quantity may be divided into Finit and Infinit , and that Species that is Infinit be but one , or have no more of its kind but its single self ; for , since Infinit in any Notion includes All that can belong to that Notion , nothing of the Genus would be left for its fellow - species to partake of ; which makes Finite Number to be no Species . Lastly , As the Differences of Continu'd Quantity were Greater or Lesser determinate parts , so the Differences of Number must be More or Fewer determinate parts ; which can bear no Sense if one of the species have All , or be Endless or Indeterminate . 15. Hence 't is Logically demonstrated that Infinit Number is Impossible and Contradictory ; since it contradicts the Methods and Maxims of all our Natural Notions . For , were it put , it ought to belong to the Common Head of Quantity , which we see is in many regards Implicatory . Add , That as no Ens is capable of Existence unless it be first Ultimately determin'd to be This or That ; so no Affection of Ens , v. g. Number , can possibly exist in Things , unless it be determin'd in its own Line to be This or That Number ; which is here forbidden it by the very Notion of Infinit , which signifies Indeterminate . 16· Therefore Continu'd Quantity , for the same reason , cannot be Infinit ; that is , there cannot be an Infinit Extent or Expansion of Body ; for , then the Subject would verifie it , that there must be in it an Infinit Number of Yards , which is now prov'd Impossible . 17. For the same reason there cannot have been Infinit Time ; for then , again , there must have been an Infinit Number , viz. of Hours . Again , let us put Time to have been Infinit , that is , never to have begun ; then there must have succeeded an Infinit Number of Hours ; wherefore in that whole Collection of Hours there must either have been some one hour distant from this present hour by Infinit Intermediate ones , or no one Hour thus distant . If no one , then the whole Collection of Hours ( consisting of Ones ) is Finite : If some one Hour be distant from this present one by Infinit Intermediate ones , then we are forc'd to put an Infinit which has two Ends , viz. that Hour said to be Infinitely long ago , and this present Hour that now passes ; that is , we must put an Infinit to be Finite . Corol. Hence is demonstrated , that the Course of Nature , consisting in Motion , had a Beginning or First Motion ; therefore a First-Mover , therefore some Spiritual Nature ; as * will be demonstrated hereafter . LESSON VI. Of the Common Head of Quality . 1. THE Notion of Substance being What a Thing is ; and that of Quantity , how Great it is , or how much there is of it ; the Common Notion of Quality , ( as was said above , and indeed as the very word imports ) is how a thing is in respect to its own peculiar nature ; that is , whether it be so as it should be or no. This will be farther Evident from the whole following Discourse . 2. Wherefore there must be so many Common Kinds or Species of Quality as there may be Common Considerations of How a thing is in regard to its own peculiar nature . 3. Wherefore , seeing the Subject may be thus Consider'd , either according to its Intrinsecals , or according to Extrinsecals , to which it may be refer'd : And , if to Intrinsecals , then , either according to some Perfection or Imperfection of its Intrinsecal Temperature or Constitution , which we call Habit , if Permanent ; or Disposition , if Transitory ; or to its outward Shape conceiv'd to inhere in it , call'd Figure . If it be consider'd according to Extrinsecals , then , either according to the Causes from which it may suffer or be variable , which we call Passible Quality , if steddy ; or Passion , if sudden and fleeting ; or to the Effects or Operations it may or may not produce ; which we name its Power or Impotency : Hence Quality in common is divided into Four Kinds and no more ; nor can more sorts of Answers to the Question , How a Thing is , be invented or imagin'd . Examples of the Questions proper to Quality are such as these : How do you ? To which is Answer'd , Sick or in Health , well or ill dispos'd . How is he as to his Understanding ? Learned or Ignorant ; which Answers we call Habits or Dispositions . How is he as to his Walking , or using his Natural Faculties ? To which we answer , well able to walk , or Lame , &c. which signifie his Power or Impotency . How is the Milk that 's over the Fire , or the Bread in the Oven ? To which is answer'd , Hot or Cold ; Dough-bak'd or Enough : which are Passible Qualities . How is he affected to me ? To which is answer'd , Angry , which is Passion . Lastly , it may be ask'd , How he is as to his outward shape ? To which is answer'd , well or ill shap'd , Handsome or Vgly , which Quality is call'd Figure . 4. The Intrinsecal Differences of more or less in this Common Head of Quality , are more properly to be call'd Better and Worse qualified , since they fall into the same as more and less ; only the latter Expressions sute better , having a qualifying sense . 5. Wherefore Power and Impotency are the First Species of Quality , because they spring immediately out of the Essence as it's Properties , and most meerly concern it as to making it Better or Worse ; as also , because they most dispose or indispose the Subject to the substance ( as it were ) of it's Natural Operations . Habit and Disposition are the Second ; because they Supervene to the Power , and only give it a better or worse Facility or Difficulty to Operate . Passible Quality and Passion , taken as such , are the Third ; because , taken as such , they meerly qualify the Subject to be Passive or Alterable by another . I say , taken as such , that is , as Passible ; for , if they be consider'd as Active , as Heat in Fire is conceiv'd to be apt to effect Heat in another thing , then 't is a calefactive Virtue , and has the Notion of Power . Lastly , Figure has the least share of the Notion of Quality , because it onely regards the Outward Lineaments and Appearance , which are the sleightest of all other Qualities . Though it may sometimes , ( especially in Organical Bodies and their several parts , ) contribute to their Power or Impotency ; as an Acute Figure in Dense Bodies makes them better divide the Ayre , and other Bodies , adding thus an Accidental perfection to their Power of Dividing ; and Splay-footedness hinders the Power of Walking , whereas Straightness helps it . Accidental , I say , for the , Essential Notion of Figure is onely to terminate thus , or thus the Quantity of Bodies , as will be shewn hereafter . 6. Wherefore , the Intrinsecal Differences of Quality being to make the Subject of them better or worse , hence most Qualities may admit of several Degrees in each of it's Species , or , as the Schools phrase it , may be Intended or Remitted ; whereas neither Substance nor Quantity can . Not Substance ; because , as we no sooner step out of the Notion of Ens in common but we plunge into Non-Ens , so we cannot depart from the Essential Notion of Hoc Ens , but we must fall into Non-hoc-Ens or Another Ens. Not Quantity ; for , let us design any particular or determinate Species of Quantity ( a Yard for example ) and but in the least Increase or Diminish it quantitatively , and immediately it becomes no yard but of an other Species really , tho' perhaps so little may be added or detracted that we may want a Name for it . 7. Power differs from Habit also in this that Powers are Natural , and spring out of the Essences of things as their Properties ; as the Power of Walking , Seeing , Hearing , Fancying , Understanding , Willing , Heating , Dividing , &c. Whereas Habits are generally , Acquir'd by frequent Acts. In things Inanimate , and Vegetables , and in some sort of Animals they are properly call'd Virtues ; thus we say such a Mineral or Herb has the Virtue of Drying , Cooling , Healing , Cauterizing , Poisoning . In Animals , they are call'd Natural Faculties ; as those of Seeing Walking , Flying , &c. Where the word Faculty is not taken in the same Sense in which we use it , when we tell one he has got a Faculty of doing this or that , meaning thereby a Facility or Habit of doing it , but for the Power it self which is to be facilitated by that Habit. The Privations or want of those Powers due to Nature we call Impotences ; as Deafness , Blindness , Doltishness , &c. Which signify Inabilities to perform such Operations as we ought , were the Subjects Qualify'd as they should be . 8. Habits are generally Acquir'd by Acts : yet some may seem to be had by Nature : as Healthfulness and Sickliness . Of the former we use to say such a one has got a Habit of Dancing , Drinking , Brawling , Swearing , Praying , &c. Of which sort are all kind of Skill's in moving the Body , and all Arts and Sciences qualifying the Mind , and their Opposites : All which we shall find to be Perfections or Imperfections , belonging either to the particular Nature of the Body , as Dancing , Pronouncing , &c. or else suitable or disagreeable to the peculiar Temper of the Mind , which is Reason ; such as are Sciences , Virtues , Vices , Ignorance , &c. But those that are Innate , and have withal some constant Ground of Stability by the steady or fixt course of Causes , are rather call'd States or Conditions than Habits ; such as are Original Justice , Original Sin , Impeccableness in the Saints in Heaven , Obdurateness in Sin in the Divels ; and , Healthfulness or Sickliness , if it comes out of a Man's Natural Constitution . All which , tho' less properly Habits than those that are Acquir'd , yet Habit having in it's Notion a kind of Constancy , we do therefore from their Steady manner of working , denominate Habitual Propensions , Dispositions , Affections , or Determinations of the Subjects , and reduce them to the Species of Habit . 9. Those Natural Affections of Body , consider'd as apt to render the Subject , not to be determinately This or That in the Line of Ens ; nor Bigger or Lesser , but only Alterable thus or thus , without changing the Entity , are for the most part Passible Qualities . This is manifest ; For considering them thus , there is no Predicament but that of Quality , nor any Species of Quality but This , under which they can be rank't . Under the Genus of Passible Quality are particularly The Four First Qualities , Heat , Coldness , Moisture , Dryness ; and the Second , ( and perhaps Third ) Qualities compounded of these , with a variety almost Infinit , of which more in Physicks . 10 All Passible Qualities are Objects of the Senses , Otherwise they would not be Natural Notions , nor belong to any Common Head ; and , consequently , we could not discourse or think of them , which yet we experience we do . 11. Yet 't is not the Consideration of them as the Objects of our Senses which Constitutes them , nor Essentially Distinguishes them ▪ This is evident , for their Essence , as Qualities , must be taken from their manner of affecting their own Subject , and thence giving us ground of denominating it diversly , or framing distinct Notions of it . Besides , to be an Object of any Power , can , as such , be Essential to Nothing ; because it is perfectly Extrinsecal to the Thing or it's Power to which 't is an Object ; as will be farther seen when we come to treat of the Predicament of * Relation . Wherefore , the Division of this Species of of Quality into Visible , Audible , Tangible , &c. is Accidental to Quality and far from Intrinsecal or Essential . 12. Notwithstanding what is said above , some Qualities may contribute to the Essence of a Thing , and so be in part Essential . For , since ( as is shewn in Metaphysicks ) the Complexion of Accidents , and of some Qualities , among the rest , do determine a Thing to be This and Distinct from all others , and withal fit it for its Primary Operation ; and consequently do help to constitute the Essence of an Individual Body as part of it's Form ; Passible Qualities , in particular , may contribute to the Essence of a Thing ; or be in part , and , as joyn'd with Quantity , Essential to it . Yet so , that each of these consider'd Alone is an Accident : but all of them taken together and as clubbing to determin the matter ultimately to be This , they are to be consider'd not as meerly Quantitative , nor as Qualificative , but as belonging to the Substantial Form. 13. No other Species of Quality but Passible Qualities has this Prerogative , Not Power : For Powers are Properties ; and , so , are conceiv'd to follow the Essence constituted , and presuppose it ; much less Habits , for they supervene to the Natural Powers . And least of all Figure , for this is Extrinsecal to the Constitution of the Body ; however in Organical Bodies they may help to determine the Species or Individuum . 14. Figure is nothing but the Termination of the Quantity of a Body , or ( which is the same ) Body thus Terminated . For , since Figure is nothing but such a Superficies , and the Superficies is the Termination of Profundity which is the proper Quantity of Body ; it follows that Figure is nothing else but the Termination of the Quantity of Body . Again , if we look narrowly into particular Figures , we shall find them nothing but that the Quantity goes no further , or ends , here and there . Whence the Figure of it must necessarily be thus and thus . And this is all can be made of it as it is distinguisht from the Body it self or its Quantity ; however we are prone to conceit it , as 't is distinct from Body , to be a kind of Ens. 15. Figure alone is Incapable of more or Less in the same Species . For , since Figure is the Termination of the Quantity of Body , and Quantity being Divisibility , the Termination or No-fartherness of Quantity must be no Quantity , and therefore Indivisible , and there can be no Degrees in Indivisibles ; it follows that Figure is not capable of more and less within the same Species , but every Alteration of the Figure is a New Species of it . 16. Hence the Termination of the Self-same Quantity ( tho' being oft-times Imperceptible , it happens to be Nameless , ) after Several Manners make so many particular Figures . For example , the self same Quantity , ( viz. a Pint of Water , ) may be put into a Round viol and a Square or Oval one ; which being terminated after a particular manner , do make so many particular kinds of Figures . Corol. I. Hence is seen that there is a Real Divisibility ( that is such a Notional one as is grounded in Nature ) between Quantity and Figure ; since the subject may be chang'd according to Figure and not according to Quantity , of which we can have no better nor more familiar Instance than a Pastry-Cook's forming the same quantity of Dow into a Pye , and a Lid for it , or into Pyes of several Figures . 17. The Termination of the Quantity of Body , being the Outside , that Circumscribes and Comprehends all the Body enclos'd in it , which is the Containing it ; the Species of Figure , simply speaking , must be More or less a Capacity to contain Body ; that is , to Contain more or less of it . Hence a Round Figure is the best , a Quadrate Worse , and a Parallelogram still worse than the former : I say , simply speaking ; or regarding Body in common ; for otherwise , if the nature of some sorts of Bodies ( Organical Ones for Example ) requires such a determinate Figure , then that Figure is Better or Worse , which approaches more or less to such a Figure as best sutes with that Nature , fits it best for its Operations , and makes the Symmetry with its other parts most perfect . Things endow'd with this Quality we use to call Well shaped or Handsome ; which , with fit Colours rightly placed in the respective Parts , make up that amiable Quality we call Beauty . 18. All Corporeal Qualities are in reality the very Particles or Parts of Body . This has been prov'd * above , where it was shewn , that Accidents are not Entities , nor can exist of themselves , but meerly by their Identity with their subject . 19. Wherefore Corporeal Powers are nothing but several Mixt Parts , so contriv'd and Organiz'd , as enable the Compounds to perform such and such Operations . Corporeal Habits are nothing but the same Parts by Vse and Bending to and fro made plyable , and , so , apt to perform them more easily . The Passible Qualities are the same Parts as rendring the Subject either perfectly or imperfectly Divisible or Capable to be Alter'd by Natural Causes . Figure can the least be thought to have any Being of its own , since it is onely the Termination of Quantity which is it self but a Determination of Body . Corol. II. Hence is evident that all the Qualities that affect our Senses are nothing but the minute and subtil particles or Effluviums of Bodies ; sent out from them , and lighting on those most tender and sensible Receivers , and affecting them agreeably or disagreebly to the nature of the Subjects . And the same may be said of the Ideas lodg'd in the Fancy or Imaginative Power it self . Nor will this be hard to conceive if we reflect attentively , how Quantitative particles may be still less and less , almost Infinitely . Corol. III. Nor will it hence follow , that Cartesians and Aristotelians agree in the main about the Explication of Nature , in regard they do both of them hold , that there is nothing but the Matter or Substance thus or thus Modify'd . For , the Aristotelians give an account of there Minima Naturalia ; they make them Mixt Bodies ; they reduce them to their First or Original Mixture ; and shew the Intrinsecal Temperature or Constitution of their Subject , or the Inform'd Matter of which they consist , from the Conjunction of the highest and most known Notions in nature , viz. of that matter and Quantity diversly proportion'd ; whence arise the Natures of Rarity and Density in the First species of Bodies . None of which the Cartesians do ; nor can they by their Principles reach the Explication of their First Matter , or render any tolerable account of it ; whether it is Dense or Rare , Hard or Soft , &c. as will be more amply demonstrated in the Appendix . 20. Nothing more obstructs the way to Natural Science than the doctrin of Vulgar Philosophers , That Qualities are certain Kinds of little Entities , which of themselves have a diminutive sort of Being , and are able to produce such and such Effects . For example , Ask them how a Bell works that effect upon my Ear which we call Sound ; they 'll tell you there is a Quality in the Bell call'd Sonoreity , whose nature it is to make a Sound . Ask how a Green thing makes such a pleasing Impression on my Eye ; they 'll answer , There is a certain Quality in it call'd Greenness , whose nature 't is to work such an Effect ; and so of the rest . Which ridiculous Method explicates nothing , but makes the Silliest old wife as good a Philosopher as the most Learned Naturalist , if she can but name the Word that Signifies that Quality . Next , it makes Learners rest easily contented , and well appay'd with a meer Word ; whence they will grow Negligent and Careless to take pains to look into the Natures of the Things ; or else ( if they have any wit in them , ) to despair of all knowledge of Nature , by seeing their Masters so profoundly Ignorant , and so Superficially Learned . And lastly , it hinders Learners from Seeing , or even endeavouring to see , the Natural Proportion and Alliance between Proper Causes and their Effects ; and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole Administration of Nature , and all Consequence of one thing from another , which renders all natural Science precarious . For , 't is not Science , unless we use our own Eyes , and see the point Demonstrated . Jurare in verba — is ( in such cases ) the Fool 's Oath ; and is , in plain terms , to swear the Devoting or giving up our Reason to a Slothful Contentedness never to grow Wiser . LESSON VII . Of the Common Head of Relation . 1. THE Notion of Relation being what one Individual Thing is , if compar'd to another , there must be some Real Ground of it in the thing Referr'd , which is the Reason of our Referring it , and by which formally we do thus Refer it : For otherwise Relation would be a Chimerical and Fictitious Notion ; and not a Real or Natural one , common to all Mankind , and held by them to be such ; which yet we experience , by our daily Converse with them , it is . 2. This Ground cannot be their having Disparate or Disagreeing Notions in them , or their being of Disparate Orders , which have nothing to do with one another : For , we find that we cannot Refer or compare Green and Hard , Youthful and Transparent , Hot and Triangular , nor any other disparate Notions ; nor yet a Writer and a Plough-share , a Father and a Mill-stone , a Brother and a Handsaw , &c. because they are in Disparate Orders , and have no Respect to one another , grounding our Referring them or Comparing them together , as have a Writer and a Writing , a Father and a Son , a Baker and Bread , &c. 3. Wherefore the Ground of Relation must either be some Notion agreeing to both the things related , that is , found to belong to both , either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally , or else their having Communication with one another by way of natural Action and Passion . This is prov'd by the former Section , and is evident , because there can be no other Considerations by which they can be order'd to one another , or be of the same Order , but their having some Intrinsecal Notion common to both , or else their Acting and Suffering upon and from one another , which is an Extrinsecal Consideration . 4. Relations of the first sort , which have one and the same Notion in them , are of as many kinds as there are Heads of Notions , since all these have a kind of Nature or Notion in them , and so some kind of Transcendent Unity . Thus , if they have the same Nature or Essence in them which belongs to the Common Head of Substance , the Relation between them is call'd Identity , which is their being of one and the same kind of Entity . If of one and the same Notion of Quantity , 't is call'd Equality , which is their being of one and the same Quantity : If of Quality , 't is call'd Likeness : if of Action , ( singly consider'd ) they are call'd Co-actors , as Fellow-Souldiers , Fellow-Servants , &c. If of Passion ( singly consider'd ) Fellow-Sufferers , Fellow-Martyrs , &c. If of Place , ( or Vbi ) Bed-fellows , Chamber-fellows , Townsmen , Country-men , &c. If of Time , Contemporaries , Co-eve , or born at the same time . If of Habit , Fellow-Mourners , Fellow-Curassiers , Fellow-Souldiers of the Blew or Grey Regiment . If of Situation , Fellow-Assessors or Sitters ; tho' such as this seldom occur . Nay there may be a Relation grounded on having the same notion even of Relation in them ; as Parents or Fellow-begetters . 5. Of the second sort grounded on Action and Passion , not singly consider'd , but with an Order to one another , or as Inferring one another , are such as these , viz. Father and Son , Master and Servant , Prince and Subject , Tutor and Pupil ; which are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Begetting and being Begotten , Commanding and being Commanded , Governing and being Governed , Teaching and being Taught , &c. 6. In both these sorts of Relations the things Referr'd must have their Correlates ; that is , there must be a mutual Relation on both sides . In the former of them , because there is the selfsame Ground or Reason of Referring in one as in the other , viz. that one same Notion , Common or Belonging to Both , to wit , the same Essence , same Quantity , same Quality , same Relation , same Place , same Time , same sort of Action and Passion , same Situation , and the same Habit. 7. This Agreeing and Corresponding of the two things thus Related in those of the former kind of Relation , must be meant to be their Agreeing in the same Abstracted and Common or Specifical Notion , and not in the same Individual one . For , otherwise two Men could not have Identity in their Individual Essence , since then they would be the same and not the same , that is , Vnum and Non-unum : And , for the same reason , Intrinsecal Accidents being Identify'd with the Subjects in which they inhere , and having no Entity but theirs , they can have no Individuality but by them , and so the same Individual Intrinsecal Accident cannot be Common to two Subjects or Substances , but must be Individually Two , as They are . Whence the Relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in Species or Kind , and not Individually . Which reason holds equally for those Relations that are grounded on Action , Passion , and Situation , and the rest : For , two things cannot be in one Individual place ( that is , in a place capable to hold but one Individual thing ) without Penetration of Bodies : Nor is it possible , in the course of Natural Causes , that two should be born or dye at the same precise Time , that is , in such a portion of Time as is terminated by the same Instants : Nor can Two wear the same Individual Arms , &c. at once . Wherefore it must be meant , that the Notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical Notion , and not the Individual . 8. The Relations of the later sort became Mutual upon another score , viz. because Action and its proper Passion corresponding to it , do infer one another ; For , nothing can Act , but it must Act upon something that receives that Action , or suffers by it ; nor suffer or be Acted upon , but by something that Acts on it . 9. There is a Third Mix'd sort of Relation , call'd , Of the thing Measured to the Measure ; that is , when the Thing Related depends for its Essence or its Perfection , on Another , and that other does not at all depend for either on it . For Example , When a Picture is drawn from the Prototype , it depends on the Prototype for its Perfection , and is , as it were , Measur'd by it , in regard 't is only so far Good or Bad as it resembles the Man it was drawn for ; but the Prototype or the Man , gets Nothing , nor is in the least Better or Worse , by having a Picture drawn from him . Again , there is a common Notion of Lineaments and Colour found in both , which makes it seem to partake of the first sort of Relation ; also the Prototype , by imprinting an Idea of it self in the Painter , enables him in some sort to draw him , and so contributes something to that Action which gives it to partake of the Second Kind : so that this Kind of Relation seems to be Mixt of the other two , and yet ( as will be shown ) is perfectly of Neither . 10. This kind of Relation is not Mutual , but is found only on the side of the thing measured : For , since the Measure ( v. g. the Prototype ) has no natural Order of Agency or Patiency by which it respects the Picture , because the Man is not a Thing naturally ordain'd to work upon the Fancy of the Painter so to render him , a perfect Efficient cause of the Picture , as Fire is Ordain'd to Heat , a Master to Command , &c. Nor is there a true Vnity of Form , to wit , of Colour and Figure , in both , but only some Counterfeit Resemblance of them ; whence we cannot , without speaking nonsense , say , The Man is like his Picture , as we can that the Picture is like the Man , or that two white Walls are like one another ; nor ( as was said ) does the Man receive any degree of Perfection or Imperfection by being pictur'd ; it follows , that there is no Ground or Reason on the Man's side to make him Related to his Picture ; wherefore he has no Real Relation to it at all , but only a Verbal one , consisting in the Grammatical chiming of the word pictured to ●●●ure . 11. Of this sort are the Relations between all our Powers , whether Corporeal or Intellectual , to their Objects ; for the very Essence and Nature of those Powers is to see , hear , or understand the Objects : and the Perfections of the Powers in their several kinds , are Measured and rated by their doing this Better or Worse ; whereas the Objects are never the Better by being seen , heard , or known . Wherefore there wants on those Objects side a Real Ground , and therefore a Real Relation to our Powers ; however , the words Seer and Seen , Knower and Known , do answer one another , as if they were proper Agents and Patients , and Order'd mutually to each other . 12. Of this sort too is the Relation between GOD , as Creator , and his Creatures . For , seeing the Creature has received all it has , or can have , from its Creator ; that is , has to be an Ens , and not a meer Nothing from the Essential Ideas it had from all Eternity in the Divine Understanding ; and was put afterwards into Actual Being or Existence , and is conserv'd in the same by his continual Influence ; and has , besides all its Accidental Perfections and Conveniences , by the course of Causes , laid by his Divine Providence ( all which is demonstrated in Metaphysicks ) : Hence there is all the Ground imaginable of a Real Relation on the Creature 's part towards GOD. On the other side , since GOD gains no kind of perfection by making Creatures , nor is intrinsecally better in the least by his Creating them , there can be no Ground at all of a Real Relation on GOD's side to the Creature , but only a Verbal Sound of [ Creator ] answering Grammatically to Creature , as Creature does to Creator . So important a thing it is in Philosophy not to be deluded by Articulate Ayr , or meer Characters , but to look deeply and attentively into the Thing it self , and to guide our Thoughts by what we find there , lest we come to frame Mock-notions out of our Fancy which Nature never gave us . Corol. I. Hence follows , that all the Expressions of the Holy Scripture of a Pact or Covenant between God and Creatures , That , upon their behaving themselves thus and thus , he enters an Obligation of doing thus or thus towards them ; the which do , consequently , put God and the Creature upon the same rank of Agency and Patiency : It follows , I say , that such Expressions are purely Metaphorical , and far from Proper or Literally True ; but are spoken humano more , or in accommodation to our Human Actions and Manners of Proceeding . For , on God's side there is nothing but his Infinit Wisdom and Goodness , carrying on Supernatural Good Dispositions to conformable Effects , as he does Natural Dispositions to Effects suitable to the Nature of such things . Which Rectitude of his Will being Essential to him , and consequently Independent on Creatures or their Actions , had produc'd the same Effects whether he had made any such Covenant or no. And the same may be said proportionably of God's Promising , Threatening , Commanding , Requiring Satisfaction , Accepting the Payment of it , and such-like ; which tho' Metaphorical , are notwithstanding True , amount to the same , and induce the same Effects , tho' in a more soveraign way , and more becoming God's Infinit Majesty , than the Gross Capacity of the Generality of Mankind ( for whose sake those low Conceptions and Expressions were us'd ) can apprehend . 13. There is yet another sort of Mutual Relations , which are partly Artificial , partly Natural ; such as are those of Genus and Species , Antecedent and Consequent , Subject and Predicate , Premisses and Conclusion , &c. These are partly Natural , in regard our Vnderstanding has its distinct Nature or Notion , as well as Whiteness , Action or any other Ground of Relation hitherto spoken of ; and these are grounded on the Manner of the Objects existing in our Vnderstanding ; where they are as truly Vniversal and Particular , Subject and Predicate , &c. as the Wall is White , or the Quantity a Yard , &c. And they are also partly Artificial , because Artists in Logick , who reflect on the things as they are in our Minds , do make use of such to clear their Notions , predicate them of one another , and discourse of them exactly . 14. Wherefore those Logicians who call them Relationes Rationis , meaning to oppose them by that Expression to Real Relations , seem to forget that the * Understanding and its manner of working are Real ; whereas they have more of Entity , and consequently of Reality , in them than Bodies , and their Powers or Manners of Working have ; and , consequently , those Relations are far more Real than those which are grounded on Corporeal Powers and their Operations . 15. The Substance ( as it were ) of Relation consists in that Immediate Ground which is the Reason of our referring one thing to another . For , 't is Evident , that 't is the Thing it self in my Mind which is Referr'd , and not the Act of the Mind Referring it . For example ; Two White things have Vnity of Form , or the same Notion in them , which makes them Really Alike of themselves , were they in a Comparing Power , that could actually Referr them and denominate them Relatively as their Nature requires ; so that it is not the Act of my Understanding which made the white Walls really Alike , but their own Natures which are the Object of my Act ; by means notwithstanding of the Comparative Act of my Understanding , which they inform'd , as a necessary Condition to relate them actually , and without which they had each of them had but the Absolute Notion of White , and not the Relative one of being Alike . Corol. II. Hence we have some light given us how there may be True and Real Relations in God , Knowing and Loving himself ; and , how they depend and not depend on our Understanding . 16. The Intrinsecal Differences of Relation being more and less , and our Act adding nothing to the Substance of the Relation , they must be taken from the Greater or Lesser Ground or Reason why the thing is referr'd to another . Hence our greatest Relation is to God , because all the good we have or can have does entirely Referr us to him . Upon which therefore is founded all our Religious Respects , and our Duties of Serving , Obeying and Adoring him . Next follows the Relation of a Husband to a Wife , who is ( in some manner ) the same Individual with himself . After them comes our Relation to our Parents , who concurr'd to our Being , gave us Education , and provided for our Subsistence . Then to Mankind , to whom we are Related by Identity of Nature ; to our Country , our King , and other Superiours , according to their several Ranks ; to our Kinsfolks , Neighbours , &c. from which Relations arise several Duties in proportion to the more or less important Reason or Ground that makes them more or less nearer or remotely Related to us . LESSON VIII . Of the Common Heads of Action and Passion . 1. THERE are Two , and but Two , Common Heads of Extrinsecals conceiv'd to be apply'd to one another by way of Motion . For , since Motion has two Terms , viz. that thing from whence it comes , and that to which it reaches , and these are distinct Considerations ; hence we have Two Common Heads of one Extrinsecal thing conceiv'd to be apply'd to another by way of Motion . Nor can there be more ; for Motion , consider'd ( as it were ) in the Midway between those Terms , has no Notion but that of meer Motion ; whence it is the very Notion of Successive Quantity , and belongs clearly to that Common Head , and therefore cannot belong to another , or constitute a new one . 2. The Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions , and most approaching to Non-Entity . For , since Motion , as it superadds to the Extensive Quantity of its Subject , is wholly made up of not being in this place , or that ; or , of not being still here and not being yet there ; nor has any thing of Permanency , which is in a manner the same Notion with Actual Being ; it follows , that , besides the Common disadvantage other Accidents are liable to , of having no Entity of their own but what 's borrow'd of their Subjects , it has moreover this , that neither it self , nor any part of it self , exists so much as for one Moment . Wherefore Ens being a Capacity of Existence , Motion seems to be ( in a manner ) incapable of Existence , or a Non-Entity ; and this out of its own peculiar Nature or Notion . Again , since in every part of Motion the thing moved is in a space bigger than it self , and Place ( as will be shewn * hereafter ) properly such , is but Equal to the thing it contains , and not bigger than it , hence Motion hinders its Subject to be , properly speaking , in any place , that is any where , which amongst Bodies seems next akin to not being at all . Lastly , Motion is destructive of Actual Being in those things that are arriv'd to their full state of perfection ; which shews its nature to be in some sense directly opposit to the Notion of Being , which has some kind of Constancy and Stability in it . Nor can it be said that it gives Actual Being or Existence to the new Entities it helps to produce , for Existence † is the proper Effect of Self-Existence or the First Cause . Wherefore the Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions , and most approaching to Non-Entity . Corol. I. Hence is demonstrated that , since every Agent produces an Effect suitable to its own Nature , and therefore an Agent infinitely perfect cannot be the Immediate Cause of what 's most Imperfect ; therefore Motion , being both most imperfect , and withal most disagreeable , nay , directly contrary , to God's Nature , which is pure Self-Existence and Essentially Immovable and Vnchangable , was not immediately caus'd by God , but by * some imperfect Agent , or some Creature , that is , by such a Cause as of it self is a Non-Entity . 3. The Notion of Action , as it superadds to meer Motion is , the Exercise of a Power , which is Effective of something . For , since to Act is to Do , and to do Nothing is not to do , it follows , that to Act is to Do something ; but to do something presupposes a Power to do it ; and this so as not to stay in the Notion of meer Power ; for , if it stays there , it only denominates the Thing Able to do , which ( again ) is not to do ; wherefore Action is not the Notion of a sluggish Power , but of a Power Exerted and Exercis'd , that is , Effecting something ; whence the Power is call'd Effective , the Action Efficiency , and the Something it does is term'd an Effect . All which superadd to the notion of meer Motion . 4. The Primary and Chief Natural Action is Division . For , since Substance is the Subject of all Accidents ; and , which being changed , all the Accidents do suffer a change with it ; hence that Action that works upon a Body according to the Substantial Notion of it , has more of Action in it , as working a Greater Effect : But Division makes Two Things of One , and so destroys the former Vnum or Ens , and makes Two new ones , therefore Division is the Primary and Chief of all other Natural Actions . Note , That this is to be understood of Perfect Division , which makes the thing Divided , and is therefore only properly to be call'd Division ; for , Imperfect Division only alters the Figure . It may be objected , That Rarefaction and Condensation , if they be in a great degree , change the Substance as well as Division does . Answ. This arises out of the nature of some particular sort of Bodies , and not out of the precise Notion of those Actions : For , 't is evident that Rarefaction and Condensation import no more in their Notion but the altering the Subject according to some Quality ; whereas Division imports directly the taking away the Vnity of the Thing , and consequently its Entity . Again , meer Rarefaction does not change the Substance , but the Degree of it , when it comes to great height ; and every Body admits Rarefaction a long time without losing its former Essence ; whereas Division consists in an Indivisible , so that the Divisum esse is esse aliud , or esse duo ex uno ; whereas the Rarefactum esse may be without any such Effect following it . 5. Rarefaction and Condensation are the next Actions in Dignity : For , since ( as was proved above ) Rarity and Density are the First Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity , as it affects Body ( in order to natural Action and Passion , it follows , that those natural Actions that cause Rarity or Density , are the next in dignity to Division , which works more upon Divisibility their Genus . 6. These three sorts of Action take up the whole Head of Natural Action . For , since the Genus and its two Differences must needs comprehend all under any common Head , as being Adequate to it , and Division answers to Divisibility , the Genus , and Rarefaction , and Condensation to the Intrinsecal Differences of more or less thus Divisible ; it follows , that these three sorts of Action do take up all that Head , so that there cannot be any kind of Natural Action , which is not reducible to some of these , or not comprehended under them . Besides , all the First and Second Passible Qualities , which generally are the Immediate Objects of Natural Actions , are comprehended in , or spring out of , Rarity and Density ; as will be seen in Physicks . 7. The Formal Virtue of Acting , or working any Effect , which we call its Causality , is the Agent 's being what it is , or its very Existence apply'd by Motion to the Patient , and Communicated to it , or ( as it were ) imprinted on it . For , since no particular Agent in Nature can do every thing whatever , the reason why such particular Causes work such particular Effects must spring hence , that the Effect has something in its Nature that is like the Cause , comes from it , and is Communicated to the Patient , or partak'd by it . Whence come those Vulgar Axioms , Operari sequitur esse , Every thing acts as it is ; An Effect is a participation of the immediate Ca●se , &c. Thus the Cause or Reason why Water moistens , is because it is moist in it self , and imparts that Quality to another thing . The reason why a Seal makes such an Impression , is ; because it self is of such a stamp . The reason why God Creates , or is the Cause of Being , is , because Being is Essential to him . Corol. II. Hence Motion is only requisit to apply the Virtue or Existence of the Agent to the Matter or Patient ; but the Substance of the Effect springs from the Cause's being what it is : Whence it happens , that the Effect from the same Causes is more or less perfect , according as the Existence of a Cause which is of such a Nature or Essence , or more or fewer parts of it , are apply'd better or worse to the Patient , or to more or fewer parts of it , by a feebler or smarter Motion . 8. It follows from this discourse that there must be Four Sorts of Causes necessarily belonging to every Effect in Nature , viz. There must be an Acter which we call the Efficient Cause ; a Subject for the Acter to work upon , called the Material Cause . The Effect wrought in that Matter or Receiv'd in it , which makes it otherwise than it was before , and therefore has the Notion of some Form newly accruing to it ; which constitutes the Formal Cause . And , since Corporeal Action is Motion , and no Body can move it self , and therefore all Motion in Nature must be caus'd ( either Mediately or Immediately ) by something that is not a Body , that is , by a Spiritual or Intelligent Being : and such Agents do design or act for an End ; therefore , there must also be a Final Cause to make those Agents to move Bodies , and make them act as they do in every particular Action tho' never so minute ; which grounds our Notion of Providence adequately Governing the World even as to the least circumstance of it . Wherefore , there are to every Action in Nature Four Causes necessarily requisit ; which will afford Reflecters ample occasion for Speculation and Contemplation . For example , When I write a Letter , the Efficient Cause is my Self ; the Material Cause , Paper , which receives the Effect of my Writing ; The Formal Cause , the Characters received in the Paper ; the Final Cause , to gratify my Friend , treat of Business , or acquaint him with News . 9. There is no Fifth Cause call'd an Idea , as Plato affirms . For , either that Idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and Receiv'd there , and then 't is clearly a Formal Cause : or , as 't is in the Mind of the Artificer ; and then it concurrs to make him an Efficient Cause ; for without such an Idea he could not produce such an Artificial Effect . 10. Operation has not the same Notion with Action , but is Indifferent to Action and Passion , or rather a kind of Neutral Notion made up of both . For example , Notions or Simple Apprehensions are said to be the First Operation of our Understanding , tho' the Soul in having them is purely Passive . So also my Acts of Discoursing , Willing &c. are call'd Operations , tho' they be both perform'd by my Soul and Receiv'd in it ; Whence they have a kind of Neutral Notion , such as have Curro , ardeo , and such-like , taking such words not in a Grammatical , but in a Philosophical and Natural Sense . Of which kind are all Immanent Actions or Acts ; And , therefore , these are not so properly call'd Actions , as Operations , in order to what they have of Effective in them ; or else Acts , because they Actuate or Inform the Subject in which they are as well Received , as they are Produced by it . Whence Action , in the Proper and Obvious Sense , signifies the Efficience of a Natural Cause ; which has a Transitive Notion , and inferrs Passion ; and , consequently , some Effect in the Extrinsecal Subject it lights on . Note , That since Action inferrs Passion , and referrs to it , hence whatever is discoursed here of Action , may , by turning the Tables ( as it were ) or considering Motion in order to its other Term , be understood likewise of Passion ; for which reason we treat of both those Heads in the same Discourse . LESSON IX . Of the Common Head of Ubi or Where . 1. UBI or Where signifying [ in what Place ] the Notion of Place , must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right Notion of the Common Head call'd Ubi . And the word [ Place ] being no Artificial Term but a Natural one , and us'd by all Mankind , we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the Users of it ; that is , we must take the Notion of Place , not from men of Art or Speculaters , but from the Vulgar ; and the surest way to do this , is to gather their Sense by reflecting on their Sayings and known Intentions . 2. Since then the Vulgar agree naturally to say a thing is in a Place ; the Notion of Place is to be a Container of the thing that is in it ; and , withal , such a Container as is not Intrinsecal to the Thing of which 't is enquir'd where it is , but Extrinsecal to it ; for it would be very odd and dissatisfactory , and look like a Jest , if when we are ask'd , Where such a man is ? we should Answer , He is in his Skin . Whence , pursuing these Natural Apprehensions of theirs exactly , we shall find , that the Proper Place of any Body must be Another Body that is Immediate and Equal to it ; for were it Distant from it , and so , Vnequal to it , or too wide for it , then ( since there is no Vacuum ) that too-large Container would be a Common Place to other Bodies as well as it , and so would not be its Proper Place , ( which was the Question that was ask'd ) since it would be no more Its Place than that others , but a Common Place to both ; which , therefore , would be no competent Answer to the Question where It was ? Whence , by Reflexion , we shall discover , that Place , in proper and exact speech , is the Ambient Superficies of the next Body ; for , this is Immediate , and therefore Equal to it , because an Indivisible ( such as the Superficies is in respect to Body ) can add no Quantity to it or make the Container Vnequal to the thing Contained . But 't is to be observed , that the Vulgar , whose only aym it is to find a thing by asking for its Place , do not reflect oftentimes upon their own Notion , or as it were refine it to an Exactness , but content themselves to know near what Visible thing that which they look for is placed ; as on the Cup-board , behind the door , under the Beds-feet , &c. which is a Slubberd or Imperfect Notion of Place , even according to their own Sayings ; for these do put the thing sought for to be in that Place , whereas perhaps many other things are on the Cup-board , or near the Bed's feet , as well as the thing sought for . 3. Again , since the Intention of Mankind in asking Where a Thing is ? can be no other but to know how to find it , it follows that Place must be certainly Knowable , that is , such as does not it self need seeking for . Nor could it be such if it were still Subject to be Remov'd ; for then we should be at a loss both to find It and other things by it : and our selves would be at the same plunge as are those that practise the Art of Memory ; who , being to range the things they would remember in ●et Places their Fancy had design'd , do affix them to Stools , Chairs , Brooms , and such like ; which being taken away and Remov'd , they have lost the Memory of the thing their Fancy had placed there ; wherefore Place must have as much Immobility as may Serve for our finding a thing , so that our Enquiry where , or in what Place the thing is , be not defeated ; and no more is requisit . All farther Immobility being nothing to the purpose mankind intended , and therefore was no part of their Notion of Place . 4. Wherefore , there is no Necessity of having recourse to Imaginary Space or Subsistent Dimensions , to find something which is Immoveable Absolutely , which some do upon this account , because all things in Nature are subject to motion . For , we experience , that we can find any thing that we can have necessity to use or know well enough without recurring thither . Besides , Place must be more Knowable then the thing we look for ; whereas , these Imaginary Vbies are not Distinguishable or Knowable at all . So that such wild Conceits as these are Extravagant even to madness . We have prov'd Vacuum to be purely Nothing , and consequently Vnknowable ; and , therefore , to be in a Vacuum is to be in no place or no where . And , as for Subsistent Dimensions , 't is a plain Contradiction upon another score ; because it puts Quantity to be Substance , and capable of subsisting alone or without a Subject . 5. 'T is not much less ridiculous to invent little Entities call'd Vbies for Bodies , or for Spirits ( which are incapable of being in place ) of which we can give no account . For , since the surface of the containing Body , in a Determinate distance from some Parts of the House , the Town , the Country , or the World , which to our apprehension are fixt , answers all Questions that can be proposed about the Place of a thing , and we can be furnisht with this by our Natural Notions ; it follows , that all other far-fetcht Conceits , invented to explicate Place , are Needless and Sensless . Such strange extravagancies capering wits are apt to fall into , when they relinquish Nature and the Solid Notions she imprints in them , to follow meer Fancy , the mint of a thousand ungrounded Capricio's and Chimera's . 6. Examples of Vbi may be such as this . Quest. Where , or in what Place , lives Dr. H. ? Answ. In Kings-street . Q. Where is that Kings-street ? A. In high Holborn . Q. Where is Holborn ? A. At the West end of London . Q. Where is London ? A. About the middle of England . Q. Where is England ? A. In such a part of Europe . Q. Where is Europe ? A. In the Northwest part of the Earth . And , farther than this ( or rather not so far ) none of the Generality of Mankind can have occasion to enquire ; tho' perhaps Artists , or Geographers and Astronomers , may ; nor needs there any more Immobility to be ascertain'd , to find out where that Skilful Doctor lives , since this may serve our purpose of finding him . And we may do this easily , ( let the whole Earth move round never so swiftly ) by getting an Answer to some of these Questions , without the help of Imaginary Space , Subsistent Dimensions , or those little Entities call'd Vbies , which no mortal Man's Eyes ever saw , or any man of Sense could ever understand . Corol. I. Hence it is a Contradiction to say the World is in Place , since it Contains all Space , and , consequently , all Place in its self , and therefore is Contain'd by none ; which ( as was shewn ) is requisit to the Notion of being in Place ; nor is there any necessity or sense it should ; unless we should Fancy that some ultra-mundane Traveller bewilder'd in Imaginary Space , should be put to it to ask some of the Chimera's there , which is the way to the World ? Corol. II. Hence is seen , that the Concave Superficies of a Body , consider'd as affecting its own Subject , is in the Head of Quantity ; but , as Containing another Body , and connotating a respect to some other things , so fixt and known , that by knowing them and It , we may know where the thing contain'd is ; it constitutes the Common Head of Vbi , and consequently of Place . Corol. III. 'T is seen also that Angels are not properly in Place , nor consequently have properly any Vbi ; since they have nothing in them which can have any Commensuration to a Superficies , or be Contain'd within it . Wherefore their being in Place can only be understood of their working upon Bodies which are in Place . 7. From what is said it will appear , that the true and proper Notion of Ubi is not Place it self , but the being in such or such a Place ; that is , it consists formally in the Application of one Extrinsecal thing to another , in Rest ; viz. of the Body Contain'd to the Superficies of the Body Containing , with a Connotation of the respects above-mentioned . Yet , because to be in a Place includes Place in its Notion , it was proper and necessary to treat of it under this Head , seeing it belong'd to it Formally , and to Quantity only Materially . LESSON X. Of the Common Head of Quando or When. 1. THere is some Motion that is Even and Regular , at least to our Apprehension ; and withal Knowable to all Mankind . For , every man sees that the Sun moves ( at least it appears so to us ) and if there be any Irregularity or Unevenness in its Motion , yet it is to us Undiscernable . 2. Therefore this Regular and Known Motion is fit to be a Measure to all our other Motions . For , since there are but three things Requisit to compleat the Notion of a Measure , viz. that it be apt to bear a Proportion to the Thing Measured , and to be compar'd to it , which all Motions have from being Quantities of the same kind , viz. being Successive Quantity ; and that its Quantity be more Known than the Quantity of the thing Measured ; and , lastly , that it be fix'd or Constantly the same , that so it may be a Standard to the others ; and , since the Motion of the Sun has both these last Properties , as well as it has the First from its being of the same Kind of Quantity with other Motions , therefore this proportionable , known , and even Motion of the Sun is every way fit to be a Measure to all our less known and less regular Motions ; which kind of Measure we call Time. 3. Hence Motion may be consider'd three several ways , and thence ground three several Notions : One , as it respects the parts into which it is Divisible , and its peculiar manner of having no two Parts at once ; the former of which gives it the Notion of Quantity , the latter to be of that Species of Quantity call'd Successive . Next , it may be consider'd as it respects the two Terms or Things , viz. that from which it begins , and that on which it lights and where it ends its Career ; which Considerations of Motion ground Action and Passion : And , lastly , it may be consider'd as bearing a proportion to other Motions , and as having such other Properties as fit it to Measure them ; and Motion , as conceiv'd to be furnish'd with these Requisites to Measure all others , is that which we properly call Time. 4. The Notion of Time is a Natural Notion , and Common to all Mankind . This is evident ; For all Mankind , the Rudest as well as the most Learned , ( as we find by their expressions ) has that Notion , must need it , and does use it . 5. Tho' the Notion of Time be clearly grounded in Nature , yet it needs some help of the Understanding to make it compleatly and actually a Measure : For , when I write an hour ( for example ) that motion of Writing was really perform'd while the Sun did run the four and twentieth part of his Diurnal course ; and so , that Motion of my Pen was in reality proportion'd to such a part of Time. On the other side , since every particular Measure bears in its Notion to be determinately thus much , and there is no Determination in Nature of any part of the Sun's Motion , nor any part of it at once , and only my Understanding divides its Annual and Diurnal Motion into so many Proportionate and Determinate parts ; and ( tho' the Motion it self be perpetually fleeting ) yet it resumes so much of it into one Determinate and Constant Notion ( viz. of an Hour ) without which Determination it could not actually be a Measure ; therefore , tho' the Notion of Time be clearly grounded in Nature , yet it needs some help of the Understanding to make it compleatly and actually a Measure . 6. The Notion of Time depends on our Understanding in the same manner that Relati●n did : For , the Ground , Reason , and Substance of Times being a Measure , is found in Nature ; and yet the otherwise-Indeterminate parts of the Sun's Motion must be made Determinate by our comprizing so much of them at once into one Notion , and then considering them as Proportion'd , that is , by our Referring or Comparing them to other Motions , e're they can be Actually a Measure . 7. Hence may be collected , that the True and Genuin Notion of the Common Head of Quando or When , is not the meer precise Notion of Time it self , but of being in such a determinate part of Time ; that is , its Notion consists in the Application of the Extrinsecal Motion of the Sun to Sublunary ( or perhaps in Artists who reach further ) to subsolary or supersolary Motions ; and the Answer to Quando tells us to what part of Time they belong , or are conceiv'd to be Apply'd . For example , these Expressions ; I writ yesterday , I will come to morrow , I will speak with you within an hour , and such-like , do Apply our Past , Present , or Future Actions to some different part of Time. Yet , because their being perform'd in such a Time includes Time in its Notion ; and that Time , tho' it be materially Successive Quantity , yet taking it formally , 't is not consider'd in order to its own Subject , of which it is an Intrinsecal Accident , but in order to Another ; it was necessary to treat of it under this Head ; since taken thus formally it can belong to this , and cannot to any other . Corol. I. Hence 't is a meer Chimera , and as sensless as that of Imaginary Space to fancy Time before or after the World. For , it is in direct terms to put Motion and Time to be when they are not , which is , to put it to be and not be at once . Corol. II. For the same reason meer Being , without Order to Motion , has nothing to do with Time , nor can be said to be in it , or subject to it , or measurable by it . For Being , precisely as such , has no parts by which it may be proportion'd to the Sun's Motion , or Commensurable to it : Wherefore , to fancy God's Eternity ( which consists in the most Absolute Impossibility of his not-being ) to be Commensurate to an Infinit flux of Time , is a Groundless and Sensless Imagination . Tho' his never-altering Being does , even for its being such , eminently include all Possible Time and all Differences of Time , Past , Present , and Future , and this concenter'd in it all at once . Corol. III. For the like reason the Internal Operations of Spirits being Indivisible and Instantaneous , can have no Commensuration to the Motion of the Sun , or to Time ; tho' their External Operation upon Bodies may ; correspondently to what is said before of their being in Place . 8. The Questions of Quando , and their proper Answers , are such as these ; When was Christ born ? Ans. 1696 Years ago . When will there be a Leap-year ? Ans. This Year . When did Mustapha the Turkish Emperor begin his Reign ? Ans. The last Year . 9. The Differences of Quando are Past , Present and Future . Tho' the Present is not in reality , it being an Instant and Indivisible ; yet , since our Understanding can comprise such a portion of Time into one Notion , and consider it , and conceive it , and thence speak of it by a participle of the Present Tense , and as one entire Part of Time , and say 't is Running , till as much as we had fram'd a Notion of were run out or ended ; hence we can truly say , something is doing this present Age , Year , Month , Day and Hour , nay , this very Moment , taking Moment for some short Indeterminate part of Time. 10. The Differences of Past and Future are more and less distant from the Present prefix'd Time ; for Past signifies before it , Future , after it . Inferiour Differences also must be taken from some determinate point , ( as it were ) as , from the Creation , the first Olympiad , the Birth of our Saviour , &c. Note , That it is very nicely to be remark'd , that when Questions are ask'd , by how much or how little of Time ? the Answer belongs to the Predicament of Successive Quantity ; whence an Age , a Year , a Month , &c. are Quantitative Notions , divided by more and less of Successive Quantity or Motion , and constituted by them ; and only what answers precisely to When , belongs to this Predicament of Quando . Thus , if we ask how long Time it is since the Invasion of William the Conqueror ; the Answer is , Six hundred and thirty years ; which is a quantitative Notion consisting of both Continu'd and Discrete Quantity . But if you ask , When was the first Olympiad ? the Answer will be , In the three thousandth two hundredth twenty eighth year from the Creation ; and so it will belong to this Head ; for then it formally signifies , that the Motion or Action of the Games in the first Olympiad were celebrated while such a part of the Sun's Motion was passing . The Predicaments of Situation and Habit are of little use , therefore not worth the dilating on them . LESSON XI . Of the Expression of Our Notions by Words . 1. NOtions being ( as was said ) the Meanings of Words , it comes next to be examin'd , what Advantage or Disadvantage may accrue to Science , by the expressing our Notions by Words , either distinctly or confusedly . If the word have but one Sense or Signification , either taken alone or as apply'd to other Notions , 't is said to be Vnivocal , or to be spoken Vnivocally of them ; because Vex or Word differing from meer Sound in this , that a Voice is apt to express our Inward Sense , Mind , or Notion , so that Sense seems to be the Form or Soul of a Word , and Sound only the material part or ( as it were ) the Body of it : Hence a Word is said to be Vnivocal , when it has but One Sence or Meaning , and Equivocal when it has or may have more . 2. Since , as * was prov'd above , Notions are the Natures of the things in our Understanding , and so can have no Falsity , in regard they have their Metaphysical Verity ; that is , they are what they are , and cannot be other than they are ; nor can they have Formal Falsity , for this consists in the Compounding two Notions together by Affirming or Denying , neither of which is found in Notions or Simple Apprehensions , which are not thus Compounded ; hence no Error can possibly proceed from the Notions , but all Truth ; wherefore , were all Words Vnivocal , and had but One Notion or Meaning , there could be no more possibility of Error from Words than there could be from the Notions themselves , which are signified by those Words . Wherefore , on the contrary , if words be Equivocal , that is , Ambiguous , or liable to be taken in a double Meaning , or ( which is the same ) to signifie diverse Notions , and it happen that some of the persons that use them do take them in one sense , others in another , they must necessarily speak and discourse of different things , and , so fall into different sentiments , and contradict one another . 3. Hence , supposing the Persons be sincere , and that there be no Fault in their Will , most of the Contests and Wranglings in the World do arise from the Equivocal Meaning of Words : For , since the Use of Words is Common to all Mankind , and most Single Words are Equivocal , and the Contexture of them , or the whole Clause , may also be oftentimes taken in a different sense ; hence , unless the double sense of the Words be Clear'd and Distinguish'd , Innumerable and Endless Contests must necessarily happen from the Equivocal Meaning of those Words . 4. Written Words are far more liable to those Inconveniencies than words Spoken , especially if the Authors of those Written Words be Dead , and no Certain way of Interpreting them be agreed on by all Parties . For , if an Equivocation happen in Words spoken , the Speaker , if alive , may easily come to see he is misunderstood , and by a Pertinent Distinction shewing the double sense of the Word , and in which of the senses he means it , may come to a right understanding with his Opposit ; which is Impossible in Written Words , when the Author is Dead , and there is no Certain way of Interpreting those words Agreed on ; as it happens in the followers of Aristotle or any other Dead Authors . Corol. I. This Method or way of Interpreting such Words must either be Evident of it self , or made Evident by Proof ; and it must , besides , be Agreed by both the contending Parties . Evident , because it is a kind of Principle to find out the true sence of the Author . And it must be Agreed on ; for otherwise the Principle not been yielded to , all Contests which depend upon that Principle must remain Vndecided , and end ( if they ever do so ) in a meer Logomachy or Word-skirmish . 5. For the same reason , even the same person , if he be deluded by the Ambiguous Sound of a Word , and , thro' Inadvertence or want of Skill to keep his Thoughts steady , happen to take it now in one sense , now in another , must necessarily blunder in his Discourse , and speak Incoherently . For , since the true Notion of the Thing does Ground all our Knowledge of it , and all our Discourses concerning it ; it follows , that he who proceeds now upon one Notion , then upon another , must needs vary and hobble in his Discourse , and talk Incoherently ; having no Certain and Fixt Notion affording him Light to guide his Steps to the same End , or take the right Way to it . 6. The Meaning of those words that express Natural Notions is to be taken from the Vulgar ; and the sense of Artificial Words from Men who are Learned in those respective Arts : For , the signification of Words can only be taken from the Authors and Users of them ; which in the former sort of Words is the Vulgar ; in the later , Men of Art. 7. Hence Criticisms , generally speaking , are Incompetent to give us the Certain Sense of Words . For , Criticks do very frequently ground the Sense of Words upon Etymologies , or the Derivation of them from other words : Or else , on the Sense in which some few learned Writers do take them ; both which are Fallacious Rules to know their Sense certainly . The former , because the Reason why the word was Impos'd , and the Sense it self of those words are many times Different Notions : For example , a Stone ( as some of them tell us ) is in Latin nam'd Lapis , a laedend● pedes ; but the Notion or signification of that word is the very Substance it self of such a Body . Nor is the latter Rule competent to give us the true Meanings of those words that express Natural Notions ; first , because those Learned Men use to speak Learnedly or Rhetorically with Tropes and Figures , and affect to deliver their thoughts neatly and finely , with quaint Phrases , Allusions , Metaphors , and other knacks of Language ; all which are so many Deviations from the Natural manner of Expression Common to all Mankind , and , consequently , Unsuitable to our Natural Conceptions . Besides that , a Few Authors suffice the Criticks to build their Observations upon ; All which falls infinitely short of that Certainty and Plainness which the Common and Constant Vse of the Generality of Mankind , or the Vulgar , affords us . 8. Equivocal Words are either Simply and Absolutely such , which we call Equivocal by chance ; or Relatively , which we call Equivocal by design . Absolutely , when there is no kind of Reason or Ground why the same word should have two different senses ; as when [ Far ] in English signifies a great way ; in Latin , Bread-Corn ; or any word in one Language happens meerly casually to have a different Signification in another . In which sort of Equivocation there can be no danger to Science , those two Senses of the Word being so vastly disparate : Relatively , when there is some kind of Ground why the same word should be transferr'd from one Notion to another . And this may be done for two different reasons . One , when it is referr'd to another for some Connexion with them as Cause and Effect ; as , when the word [ Healthful ] which properly belongs to an Animal , is ; transferr'd to Meat , because it is the Cause of Health in the Animal ; and to Vrine , because it is an Effect of its Health , and therefore a Natural Sign of it . Or , as when we say there is much Art in such a Picture or Poem , it means the Effect of Art ; for Art in proper speech is to be found only in the Understanding of the Artificer . The other Reason of the words being Transferr'd from one to another , and consequently , Referr'd back to it again , is , when this is done for some Proportion or Resemblance between them : As , when we say of a good Governour , that he is the Pilot of the Common-wealth , to steer it into a safe Harbour , and preserve it from splitting upon the Rocks of Division . Where the word [ Pilot ] which in the First and Proper Meaning signifies a Director of a Ship , is transferr'd to a Governor , because he does the same in Proportion in a Common-wealth which the other does in a Ship. Thus Tranquility , which is properly said of the Sea in a Calm , is Transferr'd to a State or Kingdom , because its Peaceable Condition resembles or bears a kind of Proportion to the Undisturb'd Quiet found in a Calm Sea. 9. Words Transferr'd to another for some Proportion or Resemblance between them are call'd Metaphors , or Metaphorical ; and the best Metaphors are , when the thing , from which 't is Transferr'd , is Eminent under that Notion we intend to express . As when we call a Valiant Man a Lyon , and a Meek man a Lamb ; because Courage and Mildness are Eminent in those Animals . A Continu'd Metaphor is call'd an Allegory . As , in the Example lately given , the word Pilot , steer , harbour , splitting and Rocks , are all Metaphors , and therefore the whole speech is Allegorical . 10. There is no Danger nor Detriment to Science that such words are us'd in Common Speech , or Loose Rhetorical Discourses ; but they are exceedingly pernicious to it when we are treating of Dogmatical Tenets , and searching for Truth out of the Words of Written Authors . For , since those Metaphors , however they be True while understood to be meant in Proportion and Resemblance onely , yet are Literally Tals ; and in delivering Doctrines or Dogmatical Tenets only Litteral Truth is aim'd at ; and , if the Reader happen to take a Metaphorical Expression for a Literal one , he will most certainly embrace an Errour for a Truth ; or , if he takes a word Literally meant for a Metaphor , he will take a Truth for an Errour ; hence , it must Needs be most pernicious to Science not to distinguish between the Metaphorical and Literal sense of the words , but mistake one for the other . And , therefore , unless some Certain Rule be Establisht , by which we may be ascertain'd when Written Words are to be taken Literally , when Metaphorically , 't is impossible to be Certain of any Truth meerly by those Written Words . 11. Those Words which are Transferr'd from Corporeal to Spiritual Natures are , by far , more highly Metaphorical than can be any Transferr'd from one Body to another ; and therefore , the Misunderstanding them must needs be very destructive to Science : For , since Corporeal and Spiritual are the First Species of Ens , and the Division of that Genus into those Species is made by the Contradictory Differences of Divisible and Indivisible ; it follows demonstratively , that whatever , except the precise Notion of Ens , is properly Affirm'd of Body must be properly Deny'd of Spirit : and therefore the words Transferr'd from Bodies to Spirits which are in Different Lines are far more Improper than those which are Tranferr'd from one Body to another ; they being in the same Line , and so less Disparate . Corol. II. Hence is confirm'd the former doc●rine that Spirits are not in place ; nor are Them●elves , or their Spiritual Actions , Subject to Time ●r Commensurable to it , &c. Since all these may ●roperly be said of Bodies ; and therefore must ●roperly be deny'd of Spirits . Corol. III. From the two last Sections it fol●ows evidently that no Dogmatical Tenet can be ●rov'd from Books that treat of Spiritual Natures , ●r of such considerations as belong to them , unless ●ome Certain Rule be first Establisht by which the Reader may know when the words are to be taken ●iterally , when Metaphorically in this or that place ; ●nce a Mistake in this may make the Reader em●race a Falshood for a Truth , or a Truth for a Fals●ood in matters of greatest Importance . For ex●mple , this Proportion , [ God is mov'd by our pray●rs ] is Literally False ; for to be Moved is to be Chang'd , and God is Esse●tially unchangeable . Wherefore , it is only True in a Metaphorical ●ence ; and the Word [ moved ] is a metaphor of the last sort , viz. of Words transferr'd to ano●her for some Proportion or Resemblance between them ; and , so , the true sense is this ; God , tho' Unmov'd in himself , yet acts in the same manner towards him that prays to him , as a good Man here ( who is properly Mov'd ) would act towards one that Petitions him . Corol. IV. Hence also is demonstrated that all the Names and Words we can use when we speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes , are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper . For , since we can no other wise name or speak of a thing but as we Conceive it , and all our Conceptions are Notions taken from Natural Objects , and onely said of them with Propriety ; and no otherwise said of Created Spirits but onely Metaphorically ; and that God's Infinite Perfections do far more excel Created Spirits , than those Spirits do Bodies ; it follows that all the Names and Words we can make use of to speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes , are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper : as may be farther shewn in Metaphysicks . 12. The Word Ens , as apply'd to Substantial and Accidental Notions is of the former sort of Equivocal words , and Analogically spoken of them ; that is , first and properly , of Substance ; and Secondarily or Improperly of Accidents . For , since ( as was shewn above ) Ens signifies Capable of being , and none of the Accidents is of itself Capable of Being , but onely comes to have some Title to Existence by the Substance , from whose Being they have entirely all the Being they have , and that Its being : it follows that the word Ens must be Analogically said of them ; that is , Properly of Substance , and Improperly of Accidents . 13. Since it appears , from what is said hitherto , that the Equivocation of words is most highly Prejudicial to Science , it is one necessary part of of the Method to Science to detect the Snares it lays in the way of our Discourse , that we may avoid them . And this may be done . 14. First , by observing the Explication we make of the Word that is apply'd to different Notions , that so we may know which is the proper Signification of it . For , by doing this we shall certainly find that the less proper Notion , when the word is explicated , will still include the Notion of the Proper one , and bear up to it . As if we would Explicate the word Strong as 't is spoken of Ale or Wine , we shall be forced to say ( if we be put to express our selves Literally , and tell what it means ) that as he is call'd a Strong Man , who is able to overthrow his Enemy , so we call Wine or Beer Strong when it is able to overpower our Brain . Or , if we call a man Hard-hearted , it would be explicated thus , that his Humour is as Hard and Inflexible , considering the Temper of a Rational Creature which ought to be mov'd by Reason , as Hard things , which are very difficult to bend , are among Natural Bodies ; for which reason they sometimes call such men [ Stony-hearted ] or [ Iron-hearted ] ; in both which we see that [ Strength ] is properly in Man , and Hardness in such Bodies as Stone or Iron , and improperly in Wine or the Heart . And the same may be observ'd in the word [ Pilot ] apply'd to a Governour ; in [ Moved ] apply'd to God ; in [ Healthful ] to Meat or Urine . Thus the word [ Religious Honour , Worship or Respect ] is first and properly apprehended as belonging or Due to God , the sole End and Author of all Religion , and Analogically or Improperly to Holy Persons , either on Earth or in Heaven , as his Servants ; and to Sacred Books , Pictures , and Churches , as either Causing , Exciting , Increasing or Belonging to the Religious Honour due properly to Him Alone . Whence Religious Honour given to any other things cannot be Explicated , but in Reference to God , the only proper Object of Religion ; which therefore will be found Included in the Explication of that Religious Honour which is given to any thing else . And yet what Endless Squabbles , Contests and Animosities has this one Equivocation produced , while Passionate or Ignorant men will needs take the word [ Religious ] when spoken of those Different things , to be Vnivocal , which is most clearly Analogical . 15. The next way is , to observe the Notions any way Connected in our Common Speech with that Word whose Equivocalness we doubt of ; that is , to consider the Causes , Effects , Antecedents , Consequents , Contraries , its Superiour and Inferiour Notions , its Circumstances , &c. For , if some or any of these do not agree to the Meaning of any Word when spoken of more things , or found in diverse Contexts , then we may be sure 't is spoken in diverse Senses , and is Equivocal ; and then , by the foregoing Rule we may certainly come to know its proper Signification . So , in the Notion of Religious Honour apply'd to God as properly due to him , and Adoration of him , the chief part of which is an humble Acknowledgment of him to be our Creator , Redeemer , Sanctifier , the Supreme Lord of Heaven and Earth , the Searcher of Hearts , and Judge of all our Actions , &c. none of these are possible to be Connected , or Agree to any of the other Improperly called Objects of Religious Worship : So , when we stile any Eminent Person for Learning [ a Great Man ] we shall easily find it is Equivocal and Improper , because Greatness means , in Proper Speech , much of Quantity , and has that Common Head for its Genus ; whereas a very Little Man in Quantity may be Great in the sence in which we meant it . 16. The Third way is , to attend to what True Science or Faith teach us . For , since one Truth cannot contradict another , therefore we may be assur'd , that , in case we be Certain that what the Writer meant is True , his Words must be taken in that sence which is Agreeable to True Science , or Faith. Hence , when it is said that God made two Great Lights , the Sun and the Moon , it being Evident by Science , that Other Stars are incomparably Greater than the Moon , hence the words [ Great Lights ] in that place , cannot be meant of Great in it self , but as to their Appearance to us . But , care is to be taken that we have true Science of the thing exprest by such words , and that the Subject be not such as exceeds our pitch of Knowledge . 17. The Context may help much to give us the right Notion of the Words ; especially when the Literal Truth is aim'd at , Axioms and evident Principles are laid , and the Discourse is perfectly Connected or Coherent . For , in that case the Symmetry found in the parts of the whole Discourse forbids any word to be taken in a wrong signification ; as we experience in Mathematicks and other Close Discourses . 18. The Intention of the Author , and the Argument and Scope of the Book , avail much to direct us to the right sense of those words in it which are most Material and Significant . For , the Notions meant by such words are as it were the steps which lye level all the way , and lead to the End at which the Author aim'd them ; and , therefore , cannot easily permit a Deviation from their true Sence , or suffer their Meaning to be mistaken . 19. The Words in which Laws are conceiv'd are best interpreted by the Common Practice of those who are subject to those Laws . For , since those Laws are the Causes of the Common Practice , and the Common Practice is the Effect of those Laws , hence the sence of the Laws is demonstrated by the Common Practice a posteriori . 20. But the very best and most assured way to detect and avoid Equivocation in all words whatever , is to observe and examin , whether the same Definition agrees to the word as found in diverse places : For , since the Definition consists of a Determinate Genus , and its Intrinsecal or Proper Differences , it must needs give us the precise Notion or Meaning of the Word ; since , if it be either under any Other Genus , or constituted by any Other Differences , the Essence which they constitute must needs be a different Essence ; and , therefore , the Word which signifies it , must necessarily have another Meaning or Notion . Corol. V. Words being invented to express Sense or Meaning , it follows , that those Words that have many Senses , and all of them True and coherent to one another , have the highest perfection that Words can possibly have . Wherefore those passages in Holy Scripture that bear both a Literal , Tropological ( or Moral ) Analogical and Anagogical sence ( or several of them ) are of a more sublime nature than other Words are , and argue , that they were endited by a Divine Author . BOOK II. OF THE SECOND Operation OF OUR Understanding , or Judgments . LESSON I. Of the Nature of Judgments , or Propositions in Common ; of their Parts ; of the Ground of their Verification ; and of the several Manners of Predicating . 1. HAving treated of Notions , and of their Clear Distinction and Expression , to that degree as may be sufficient for Science , it follows of course that we treat next of Cognition , or the putting together of Notions ; and this not joyning them together on any fashion , by rote as it were , in our Memory , as a School-boy gets a Latin Sentence without book , the meaning of whose words he understands and revolves in his Mind , but regards not whether it be True or no ; nor yet , the putting them together according to Grammatical Congruity , as is this Sentence , [ Virtue and Vice are both equally Laudable ] in which the Words do Cohere indeed according to Grammar Rules , but the Sence is False , and Incoherent : But ( as the word [ Cognition ] imports ) it must be the Connecting or Joyning them together , in order to Knowledge ; that is , with an Application of our Knowing Power to see whether they ought to be thus put together or no ; or , ( which is the same ) whether the Proposition be True. 2. Wherefore , since we cannot know any thing to be so , but what is truly so , it follows , that all Knowledge must be of some Verity or Truth ; and this not of a Truth which is materially such , or repeated in our Mind , ( for this amounts to no more but a Complex Notion or Apprehension ) but to make up the Notion of Knowledge , we must see the Notions of which that Truth does Formally consist , to be truly and indeed Connected . As , when we say [ A Stone is Hard ] we must see that what 's meant by [ Stone ] and by [ Hard ] are some way or other Connected in the Thing ; or , otherwise ( all Truths being taken from the things ) we cannot be said to Know it to be True. 3. Judging , in proper speech is not meerly and precisely the Seeing or Knowing that the Notions are Connected , but the Saying Interiourly or Assenting heartily that they are so . Otherwise , since nothing can be Known to be so , but what is so , it would follow that there would be no False Iudgments . Wherefore , Judging adds to the meer notion of Knowledge , that it is the subduing of all Hesitation , or the Fixure of our Intellective Faculty about the Verity or Falsity of any thing . Whence Judging is the Effect immediately and necessarily resulting from our Knowledge that the Notions are really Connected , when 't is a True Iudgment ; or else from our only Conceiting them to be Connected , when the Judgment is False . Whence , this is a right consequence , I see or know the Notions cohere , therefore I judge the Saying or Sentence that signifies they are connected to be True ; which is the Method that all Rational or Judicious men take : Whereas Passionate or Ignorant men , who are blindly addicted to their own Sentiment , take the Contrary way ; and will have the Notions to cohere , and the Proposition to be True , because they had prejudg'd it so upon some other Motive than the seeing that the Terms themselves were indeed connected . It will be objected , that Knowledge also fixes our Understanding ; and , therefore , Knowing is Judging . I answer , That to fix the Understanding so as to acquiesce to what it sees , is to make it Judge ; but the Notion of Knowing is compleated in the bare Seeing the Terms Connected , and is terminated in regarding the Object or the Proposition that is Known : But Judging superadds to it , that it is moreover the yielding to reject all farther disquisition , and adhering firmly to that Knowledge ; which ( tho' the distinction between them be nice and delicate ) is another Consideration superadded to meer Knowing , and sinks and rivets the Object more deeply and unremovably in the Soul. Lastly , the Intuitive Knowledge of Pure Spirits is True Knowledge ; but it is not made by our way of Judging , in regard they neither Abstract , nor Compound or Divide Notions . 4. Hence is seen that to make Judgments of things out of True Knowledge , is the Greatest Natural Perfection our Soul is capable of . For , since nothing can be Known to be so but what is so , or True ▪ all Judgments resulting from True Knowledge not onely fill our Mind with Truths , but are , moreoever , a Firm Adhesion to Truths and the Secure Possession of those incomparable Endowments , which are the Best Perfections of our Understanding , and make us like the God of Truth . Nor ends the Advantage we gain by Truth in meer Speculation ; but , Truth excluding from its notion all Possible Errour , it makes it Impossible we should ever embrace any Errour while we thus Judge . Which , since Omnis peccans ignorat , and that every Sinner ( as the Proverb is ) has his blind side ; must therefore , if Truth be Express in our Understanding , and kept awake there , Preserve such a mind from Sin ; and by making right and Lively Judgments of our Present and Future State , and of our several Duties here , most certainly bring us to Eternal Happiness hereafter . 5. That Speech that Connects Notions in order to Knowledge , or Expresses a Judgment , is call'd a Proposition ; that is , such a Speech as proposes the Notions , and puts them into such a Frame or Posture of Connexion , as best serves for us to Judge whether they are really Connected or no. Whence it must consist of three parts , viz. that which is Affirm'd or Deny'd of another , which in an Artificial term we call Predicated , and that notion the Predicate . That of which 't is Affirm'd or Deny'd , call'd the Subject : and that Notion which signifies their Connexion , call'd the Copula . The two first are also call'd the Terms or Extremes of a Proposition ; whence all Truth is said to consist in the Connexion of the Terms ; and , if the Terms be not found to cohere , the Proposition is justly held to be False . 6. Since Propositions may be both in the Mind and in Words , and the Meanings of the Words are the same with our Notions ; it follows hence ( so the words be not Equivocal ) that Mental and Verbal Propositions are the same thing ; so that it is , in reality , all one to treat them under either of these Considerations . Therefore , in regard we must use Words in our Discourses concerning Propositions , and many times Artificial ones , we shall treat of them indifferently as taken in either condition ; and sometimes use the Word [ Judgments ] sometimes [ Propositions ] as it lights . Only let it be remember'd , that Judgments are onely in the Mind Formally and Truly : and in Verbal Propositions , only as in Signs of the Mental ones . Tho' even taking them as in our Understanding , they have , even there , their Subject , Copula and Predicate , as well as when they are Pronounced , or Writ in Words . Corol. I. Hence is deduc't , that the rude Vulgar , nay , even Children who cannot Speak or Discourse , may have Mental Propositions , and Consequently what answers to Subject , Copula and Predicate in their Understandings ; tho' they cannot Reflect or Distinguish them , and ( as it were ) dissect and Anatomize their own Thoughts and Inward Acts , as do Men of Art. For Example , when a Clown Knows or Judges that there is such a place as London , or a Child that what it sees is Milk ; they have in their Minds the True , tho Rough , draught of these two Propositions , [ London is Existent ] and [ this is Milk ] and , consequently , of what corresponded to the several parts of those Propositions , after a Natural manner ; tho they cannot yet lick their rude Embryo Judgments into Form , or bring them to a perfect shape , by distinguishing in them these several parts . Corol. II. Hence also , tho' we cannot know the precise time in which Children begin to judge , yet we may be assured it must be as soon as they have Cognition or Knowledge of Common and Familiar Objects , and of their Agreeableness to their own Nature . And , first of all , of that which is next to them and most Knowable , Viz. that themselves exist ; as will be seen hereafter . The reason is , because Judgments are the Immediate Effects resulting out of Knowledge ; and , therefore , as soon as they know any object is Agreeable or disagreeable to them , or that it Exists , they cannot but Judge so after their dull fashion . 6. To proceed . As the Metaphysical Verity ( of which onely our Notions are capable ) is taken from the Things , and Consists in their being truly what they are : so the Formal Verity of our Judgments must be also taken from the Thing 's being such as we Iudge it to be ; Whence Truth is by some defin'd to the Conformity of the understanding to the Thing , wherefore , when we affirm the Thing to be This or That , or to be such or such , the true Meaning of that Affirmation is , that what corresponds to both those Notions of the Subject and Predicate is found or exists in the same Thing or Being ; and , were not this so , it would be False to affirm that one of them is the other . 7. Wherefore the meaning of the word [ is ] which is the Copula , is this , that those Words are Fundamentally Connected in the same Thing and Identify'd with it Materially ; however those Notions themselves be Formally Different , provided they be not Incompossible ; for then the Proposition must , for the reason now given , be necessarily False . As when we say [ a Stone is Hard ] the Truth of that Proposition consists in this , that the Nature of [ hard ] is found in that Thing or Suppositum call'd a Stone , and is in part Identify'd with it ; however the Notions of Stone and Hard be Formally Distinct. Or , ( which is the same ) it is as much as to say , that that Thing which is Stone is the same thing that is Hard. 8. The Copula [ is ] has alwayes the sense now given , except when we are to Speak of Nothings which ( the adequate Object of our understanding being Ens ) we are forc'd to apprehend as Things , even when at the same time we Judge them to be otherwise . As when we say [ Imaginary Species a Chimera ] and yet , even then , it expresses a kind of Identity of the two Nothings , and affirms them to be the same Nonsense , and that to put a Space or Quantity to be no Quantity : or to put a Non-Ens to be Ens is Contradictory and ridiculous . And , indeed , these kind of Propositions are in effect no more than to say , that Non-Ens , Non est Ens , or , What is not Capable of Being cannot be . 9. The Copula [ is ] is the most proper to give us a Clear Intellectual Light ; and , by consequence to fix our Judgment . First , because the Notion of is , or Actual Being , is impossible to admit any Explication ( and therefore 't is self-known ) as any one may evidently experience , if he goes about to Explain it ; for he will find that he must be forc'd to put is , or some word that imports Actual Being in its Explication ; which makes the Explication to be none , but leaves it as obscure as it was before ; nay , more Obscure than formerly by adding other Notions more Obscure than it self was . For example , Ask what it is to be or Exist , all that can be said of it is , that 't is Esse extra Causas ; where ( Esse being the same with Existere ) we vainly endeavour to explicate the same thing by its self ; and to make it look like an Explication , we add extra Causas , which two Notions are less Clear than Esse it self was . 2dly , The Notion of [ is ] is most Determinate of its own nature , and so most Fixt of it's self ; and , therefore , most proper to fix the Judgment . 3dly , Because all other Notions having some Potentiality and Indifferency in them , are ( as it were ) wavering between two or more Notions ; call'd Differences . Whereas the Notion of [ is ] having none , is only Absolutely Steady , Immoveable or Undeterminable to any other Notion . Lastly , Because hence , in Literal , and not Figurative , Speeches , the word that expresses this Notion , can never be Equivocal , since 't is impossible to distnguish it into this or that sence ; all Distnguishing or Differencing Notions being evidently more Formal , Actual and Determinate than the Notion to be Distinguisht : which is in this case , Impossible . 10. To proceed : There being ( as was said ) a Real Relation between those Notions which are the Subject and Predicate , the later being really in the understanding as That which is said of the Former , and the Former that of which 't is said ; and Relation being necessarily compleated and actually such , by the Act of a Comparing Power ; it follows , that every Judgment is a Referring or Comparing one of those Notions to the other , and ( by means of the Copula ) of both of them to the same Stock of Being on which they are engrafted , or the same Ens ; where they are Entitatively Connected ( or the same Materially ) before they are Seen or Judg'd to be so by our understanding . 11. It is sufficient that the two Terms be Materially the same , or Identify'd with the same Ens , when the Subject is a Concrete ; whether it be Substantially a Concrete , that is , consisting of the Nature and the Suppositum , as when we say Petrus or Homo is Animal . Or Accidentally ; as when we say Album est Dulce . But in Abstract Notions , they must , besides this , be moreover the same Essentially or Formally ; that is , they must not onely be found in the same Material Ens or thing , but those very Notions themselves must have the same Formality , either in part , or in whole , in our Understanding . In Whole , as when we say Petreitas est Petreitas , Quantitas est Divisibilitas ; In part , as , when we say , Petreitas est Humanitas or Animalitas ; for then Humanitas and Animalitas are as Essential to Petreitas , and Petreitas as much includes and is the Subject of their Notions and of its own Differnces besides , as Petrus does or is of the Notions of Homo or Animal . 12. An Abstract and a Concrete Term can never be Subject and Predicate in the same Proposition ; tho' never so Essential to one another ; For an Abstract Notion , out of the very Nature of its Abstraction , is formally a Part ; and a Concrete Notion in respect to it a Whole ; and a Part , tho' taken materially , it may belong to the same Ens which is a Whole , and be the same Thing with it ; yet taken formally , it cannot ; for then a Whole would be Formally a Part , and a Part Formally a Whole . Hence we cannot say Petreitas est Petrus , or Petrus est Petreitas , &c. Hence also this Proposition Quantitas est Quanta ( and such like ) is False ; for Quanta being a Concrete , signifies the Subject which has Quantity in it ; and it is False to say that Quantity alone is Quantity and its Subject too . 13. From what 's said above we may gather , that there may be diverse manners of Predicating or referring one Notion to another , and they are reckon'd by Porphyrius to be Five , called by the Schools Predicables ; that is , several Manners how one Notion may be predicated of another . Whose Pardon we must beg , if following the Dictates of Reason , which we Judge Evident , and not the Track beaten by others , we dissent from them , and assign Six . The first is , when the whole Notion is Predicated of the whole , as when we say [ Quantity is Divisibility . ] [ A. Whole consists of all its parts ; or , when we Predicate the Definition of ●he Notion Defi●'d , as , [ Man is a Rational Animal ] ; or , all the Dividing Members of the Notion Divided . And this Manner we call Entirely Identical ; that is , the predicating of the same Whole Notion wholly of it self . In the rest ● Part only is Predicated of the whole ; and then ●he Predicate is either Essential to the Subject , or ●ot . If Essential , then it either predicates that part of his Nature which ( in the common acce●tation of Mankind not reaching to inferiour Differences ) is immediately Superiour to it , and is thought to denote the whole Essence of the thing , and then 't is call'd a Species ; as , Petrus est Homo . Or , but some lesser part of its Essence ; as , Petrus ●st Animal , Vivens or Substantia , which are call'd the Genus or Generical Notion . And both these ( as also the first ) are said to be predicated in Quid , because they are Essential Predicates and answer differently , tho' imperfectly and but in part to the Question made by Quid. As ask , Quid est Petrus , we answer appositely , Homo , Animal , Vivens , &c. Or else the Predicate is that Compart which distinguishes the Genus Essentially from others of the same Common kind , and constitutes it in an inferiour Class under the Common Notion ; and is therefore Referr'd to what it thus constituted , as its Essential Difference ; as , Homo est Rationalis . And , this supposes the Question made by Quid , or what Thing , and answers to a further Question , What kind of Thing . And therefore , 't is said to be predicated not meerly in quale , for then it might have been a meer Quality , and not Essential ; but in Quale quid , as both giving account of the particular Nature of the Thing , as also of its belonging to the Essence of it . If the Predicate be not Essential , then either one notion is Referr'd to another , and Predicated of it ( not as any Part of its Essence , but yet ) as more or less Connected with it , as an Effect or Sign of it ; as , Capable of Admiring , or the being affected with Musick , Proportion , or Beauty , are Connected with Rational Nature or Man , and referr'd to him accordingly , that is Predicated of him as a Property . Thus Combustive or Rarefactive are Connected with Fire ; Opacous with Earth ; and referr'd to those Subjects , or predicated of them as Properties . Or , lastly , the Predicate is Com●par'd or Referr'd to the Subject , as having no kind of ( at least known ) Connexion with the Essence , but meerly casually belonging to it ; or , as Indifferent to the Essence whether it belong to it or no. As Armed , Placed , Situated , &c. belongs to Ma● or Body : and then 't is said to be predicated as an Accident , that is , as affecting him only Casually and Accidentally . Note 1. That in this last Predicable only the Manner how it is Predicated or Compar'd to the Subject is consider'd , and not the Nature of that which is Predicated ; nor , whether it be a substantial Notion , or , whether it does belong to some one of the other 〈◊〉 Accidents , so it be but Casually or Accidentally belonging to the Subject , or Referr'd to it ; for Wooden , Golden , and Earthen are all Predicated as Accidents , or Accidentally , of Cup ( for 't is still equally a Cup , whether it be made of any of those , or of any other matter tho' Wood , Gold , and Earth be substantial Notions . Whence the word ( Accident ) does not here signifie what Inheres in the Substance , as it does in those Predicamental Accidents which are Intrinsecal ones ; but that which belongs to a Subject by Chance or Casuality ; so that the Notion of the Subject is preserved entire , whether it has it , or has it not . Note 2. That since it was clearly the Intention of him who invented these Predicables , and of those who follow'd him and us'd them , to comprehend all the Different Manners how Notions could be Predicated of their Subjects ; and , the being Predicated as a whole of the whole , is most evidently one Manner of Predicating , and Distinct from the Five they assign'd ; it is manifest , that their Account of the Predicables was Defective , and our Supplying it Rational and Necessary . Add , that they omitted that Predicable , or Manner of Predicating , which , if it were not the most Vseful , at least it was the Chief and First in Dignity , all the First Principles having ( as will be shewn hereafter ) this Manner of Predication , and consequently having Title to belong to this Predicable . Besides that , scarce any thing can be so Useful to Science as are those First Principles , and the Definition's being Predicated of the Thing Defin'd ; These being the Propositions which give us chiefly all our Certainty , and all the Ground , to Scientifical Knowledge . 14. When the Notions of the two Terms are of an Vnequal Extent , the Subject of the Proposition ought to be the Inferiour or more Particular Notion , and the Predicate that which is the superiour or more Common one . For , since , when the Notions are not entirely the same , and the Whole Predicated of the Whole , they can belong to one another , but in part , and the Predicate is conceived ( even as to its whole Notion ) to be something belonging to the Subject to which 't is Attributed , and as it were receiv'd in it ; and , that this hinders not the Subject from having many other Notions belonging to it as well as That ; hence , the Subject is conceiv'd to be a kind of a Whole , in respect of the Predicate , and the Predicate but a Part , in respect of it . Again , since ( as was shewn formerly ) all the Superiour and Larger Notions are but Parts of the Inferiour ones , the Lowest ( v. g. Peter ) comprizing in it self Actually all the Superiour ones ( v. g. Man , Animal , Vivens , Corpus , and Ens ) and adding , over and above , other Notions to them which Particularize or Individuate it : it follows , that when two notions are of an unequal size , the Superior , which is the Partial notion , ought to have the place of the Predicate ; and the Inferior , which contains in it self both what corresponds to it , and also to other superior and Partial Notions , and therefore is a kind of whole in respect of them , ought to have the Place of the Subject ; since a Whole cannot be properly said to belong to a Part , ( or to be Receiv'd in it ) but a Part in the Whole . And , Nature it self seems to abet the Reason now given ; for it sounds naturally to say , Peter is a Man ; but most absurdly and unnaturally to say , A Man is Peter . Nor matters it that the Superior Notion is a Whole in the way of Abstraction , and the inferior but a Part of it as thus consider'd ; for the Copula [ is ] by which all Predication is made , does not necessarily express what or how the Notions are in their Abstracted state , where they are only Potential , and ( as such ) only found in the Mind , and made meer●y by our manner of understanding ; but what passes Actually in the Thing in which the Notions of the Predicate and Subject are to be the same Ens or Actually Identify'd . And , 't is Evident , ( as was now shewn ) that in the Thing , whether it be without or within our Understanding , there goes more to make up the Nature or Notion of the Inferior than there does to make up that of the Superior Notion . 15. However , the Predicate has of it self a Large sense , taken alone and Abstractedly ; yet , when attributed to the Subject , it is restrain'd by ●t to mean only such a proportional part of its Notion as befits the Subject to receive . Thus , when we say , Petrus est Homo or Animal , it cannot be meant that he is Homo or Animal at large or in common ; ( for , were it so , Peter might as well be a Brute as a Man ) but one Determinat● Man or Animal . And the same passes in the Thing , as it does in our Vnderstanding . For , tho' Albedo taken alone may reach all the whiteness in the World , yet apply it to a Subject , by saying Paries est Albus , 't is restrain'd to signifie only some part of Albedo in common , or as much of it as affects the Wall : Whence , thus consider'd , it means only Haec Albedo , or Albedo Parietis ; that is , so much of Whiteness as is in the Wall , and no more . 16. Thus much of the Nature or Essence of s●●gle Propositions ; their Quantity and Quality come next to be consider'd . As for the former , eithe● the Predicate is referr'd to more Particulars , as the● agree in one Common notion ; as , Every Man 〈◊〉 an Animal , and then 't is call'd an Vniversal Proposition . Or to some one only ; and this either Indeterminately ; as , some Man is wise ; and then 't is call'd a Particular Proposition : or determinately ▪ as , Socrates was the son of Sophronisens ; and the● 't is called a Singular Proposition . These need no Reflexions on them , it suffices to name them ( they being Artificial Words ) and to explicat● what we mean by them : Only we may note , tha● in regard the Subject is as it were the Matter , and Matter is properly determinable by Quantity , the words expressing the Quantity of the Proposition can only be apply'd to the Subject ; as Nature also will inform us . 17. The Quality of a Proposition , is either its being Affirmative or Negative , which can need no farther Remarks . Or lastly , its being Evident or Inevident : And Evidence is Two fold ; Self-evidence and Evidence by Deduction or Proof ; of both which hereafter . Note that the Negative particle [ non ] must affect the Copula , and not either of the Terms ; otherwise it is no Proposition , or a Speech predicating one Notion of another ; in regard such a Speech wants one of the three Notions ; as , Petrus est non-brutum ; or , Non-homo est Bucephalus : For , the Particle [ Non ] destroys the Positive Notions of Brutum and Homo , and puts no other in their stead . 18. If Propositions be Compar'd to one-another , they are either Equivalent in sence , or Opposit . Equivalents have no difficulty in them . Opposits are either Contradictories which affirm and deny the same in all respects ; as , Petrus hic & nunc currit , Petrus hic & nunc non currit ; or Contraries , which are the Extremes in any kind , having middle Notions between them ; as White and Black are in Colours . Whence these Propositions , All Men are wise , No Man is wise , are said to be Contraries , because they are Extremely distant , and have middle Propositions between them , viz. Some Man is wise , Some Man is not wise ; which Differ or are Oppos'd only according to their Quality ; the one being Affirmative , the other Negative ; for , the Quantity in both is the same ; whence they are call'd Particularly Opposit . But , if one Proposition be an Vniversal Affirmative , and be oppos'd to a Middle Proposition that is Negative , as Omnis homo est sapiens , Aliquis homo non est sapiens ; or , if it be an Universal Negative , and be oppos'd to a Particular Affirmative , as Nullus homo est sapiens , Aliquis homo est sapiens ; then they are said to be Subcontraries , because the one of them opposes the other not fully , as do Omnis homo est sapiens , Nullus homo est sapiens , but in part only . Singular Propositions have no Opposition but that of Contradiction , which happens when one affirms what the other denies of the same Subject in all respects , as was said above . LESSON II. Of Self-Evident Propositions , or First Principles . 1. SINCE , as was said , Judgments or Propositions may be True or False , and in laying the Method to Science we can have no occasion to Speak of False Judgments , but in order to the avoiding them , which is easily done , if we settle the Knowledge of the True ones ; hence that which concerns us , is , to treat of True Judgments or Truths ; and , in the first place , of Those Propositions or Judgments that are the First Truths which we call First Principles . Again , since al● Propositions are either Evident or Inevident , and Inevident or Obscure ones cannot avail us in our quest of Science , it follows , that only Evident Propositions are to be treated of , or made use of by those who aim at Scientifical Knowledge . Wherefore , since all Propositions or Judgments that are Evident must either be Self-evident , or made evident , which is done by way of Proof , and these Latter must depend on the Former for their Evi●dence , we are therefore to begin with the Former which are Self-evident . 2. All First Principles , as being the First Truths must be Self-evident Propositions . This is manifest from the very Terms . For , being the First they can have no other before them , out of whic● they may be Deduc'd or made Evident ; or , into which their Evidence , if lesser , may be Resolv'd . Wherefore they must either not be Evident at all , which would destroy all Possibility of any Evidence , or they must be Self-evident . 3. Our Knowledges may either be consider'd according to the Order by which they are Generated in us at first , or according to the Dependance of one Truth on another , and the Resolving them finally into First and Self-evident Principles . The Former of these is the way that Nature takes to instill Useful Knowledges into us , when as yet we know nothing ; the Later is the Method which Art makes use of to polish and promote those Rude and Short Knowledges had from Nature ; then to link many of those Knowledges together ; and lastly , to render them Exact and Evident by Resolving them into First or Self-evident Principles ; to do which , we call to beget Science , or to frame a Science of them . The Former comes by Experience Unreflectingly ; the Later is attain'd by Study and Reflexion . And 't is of this Later sort of Knowledge , and its First Principles , we intend to treat in this and the next Lesson ; reserving the Former Consideration of how and in what manner Knowledge is first Generated , till Lesson IV. 4. The Self-Evidence belonging to First Principles consists in this , that the two Terms must be Formally Identical . For , since ( as was shewn above ) the Terms in every Ordinary and Inferior Proposition , nay , in every Conclusion that is True , must be materially the same , and so the Proposition it self materially Identical , it follows , that the Terms of the First Principles , which ought to be more evident than They , as being Self-evident , must be Formally Identical . 5. The Terms of the First Principles must no● only be Formally Identical in sense , or be the same Formal Notion ; but it is , moreover , most convenient that they be such in the Expression also ; th●● is , 't is fit that the Subject and Predicate in those Propositions should be the same Word taken in the same sence . For , since First Principles must be the most Evident , and the most Clearly Expressive o● Truth that can be imagin'd , and not liable to the least Mistake ; and Words are subject to Equivocation , which is apt to breed Mistake , Obscurity and Error ; hence , First Principles should not only be Formally Identical in sense ; as when we say , Ho●● est Animal Rationale ; but it is most Convenient they should be such in Expression too ; as , Hom● est Homo , Idem est Idem sibi ipsi , Quod est est , &c. For then , whatever Distinction ( in case of Ambiguity ) affects the Predicate , must also affect the Subject ; and so the Proposition will not only remain still most Formally , but also most Evidently , i● every regard , Identical . Note , That tho' this be most Convenient , yet it may suffice that the Terms , when explicated are reducible to the same Formal Expression by the same Word ; as when we say [ A Whole is Greater than a part ] For , a Whole being that which consists of Parts , and a thing being that of which it consists ; hence , a Whole is All its Parts : that is , is one part and more than one part , whence , the Proportion is reducible to this , [ what 's more than a part is more than a part ] which is not onely most Formally , but besides most Evidently Identical . 6. This Proposition [ Self-Existence is Self-existence ] is , of it self , most Supremely Self-Evident , ●or if the meaning of the word [ self ] which is ●oyn'd with Existence be but understood , and that the Addition of this word to Existence be not meant ●o signify any the least Composition in it but the most ●imple and most Uncompounded Actuality that can ●e imagin'd ; then the same Formality in every respect is predicated Intirely of the same , and so 't is also most perfectly Self-evident . And 't is most Su●remely such , because it expresses the Existence of ●he Deity , which is Infinitely more Simple , and more necessarily it self than any Created Exi●tence can be . Again , since every thing , the more Potential it is , is more Confused ; that is , less distinct and less Intelligible ; and , the more Actual it is , the more Intelligible ; and the Divine Nature , which ●s meant by Self-Existence , is a most infinitely Pure Actuality ; it follows , that this proposition [ Self-Existence is Self-Existence ] is , of its self , the most supremely Self-evident Proposition that can be Imagin'd . 7. This Proposition [ what is is ] or [ Existence is Existence ] is the most Self-evident Proposition that can be imagin'd to be taken from Created things . For , since Existence is the most Evident Notion that can be found amongst all our Notions that can be had from Creatures , that Proposition must needs be the most Evident , ( and consequently , amongst Self-evident ones , the most Self-evident ) in which not only the Notion of the Copula , but of the Subject and Predicate too , is Existence . Again , since the Clearness of all Truths whatever depends on the Connexion of the Terms by the word [ is ] it follows , that unless the Nature or Notion of Existence be first immovably Fix'd or Establish'd , to be Coherent with its self , that is , unless this Proposition What is is , or Existence is Existence , be Self-evident , no Proposition whatever could be Absolutely Certain , Clear , or Coherent ; and so , there would be no possibility of any Truth , Certainty , or Evidence in the World. Lastly , since both the Essences of things , and the Existence they have are in the Divine Understanding , and the Essences which are only Capacities of Being , belong to things as they are Limited , or apt to be Created , that is , belong to them according to the Notion of Creatures ; which being only Potential as to Being , they can have no Claim thence to actual Being or Existence , but meerly by the Free Gift of Him who is Essential Being ; hence the Nature of the Existence of Creatures , and their being such is taken purely from God's side , and holds entirely of him . Whence it is most actual , and most Like him ; that is , most defecated from all Alloy of Potentiality , most Pure , most Intelligibly Clear , and most Establish'd , above whatever else we can conceive in Creatures ; and therefore , It alone is able to give Certainty , Clear Light , and Establishment to all other Truths . 8. Equivalent to the Former , or perfectly Identified with it , ( abating the putting it in a diverse Logical Frame ) is this Proposition , [ Existence is not Non-Existence ] or which is in effect the same , [ 'T is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once . ] For , if the Notion of Existence and Non-Existence could at once belong to the same Subject , then , since the Notion of Existence , as being most Simple and most Actual , can admit of no Distinction of being in part Existence , and in part Non-Existence ; that is , of being in part such , in part not-such , as Potential Notions can ; it would follow , that the entire and most simple Notion of Existence is Non-Existence ; which is directly contradictory to this Principle now mentioned , and consequently , to the equivalent Proposition [ What is is ] ; whence it would be unavoidably consequent , that all we could say must necessarily be False , because the Notion of Existence , by which only we can affirm or say , would involve a Contradiction in its own Bowels , as being Indifferent to Being and not Being , or rather as being both of them . Note , That the same may be said , in some proportion , ( that is , as to the Extent of their own Notion ) of all Propositions that are equivalent to First Principles in any particular Subjects ; as of Homo est homo , Aequale est aequale sibi , &c. to which are equivalent Homo non est non homo , Aequale non est non aequale sibi , &c. For , the same Inconveniences would follow in all Discourses upon those particular Subjects , as did in all Discourses whatever , by wronging the former Self-evident and Universal Propositions ; that is , all that could be said of such Subjects would be Incoherent , Contradictory and False . 9. The next Self-evident Proposition is that of ( Ens is Ens. ) For , since the notion of Ens is most nearly ally'd to Existence , being wholly order'd to it , and a Capacity of it , it follows , that that Proposition which predicates Ens of Ens , is the next , in Self-Evidence , to those which predicate Existence of Existence . 10. Hence all propositions consisting of particular Notions that subsume under Ens , that is , such propositions which affirm that particular Notion or Nature to be what it is , are likewise Self-evident : For , since Ens , taken as Undistinguish'd , or in its whole Latitude , has the force of an Vniversal , and is equivalent to all ; and an Vniversal engages every particular under it , of which it consists ; so that if the terms expressing those particulars be not Self-coherent and Self-evident , it would follow , that neither would the terms of this proposition [ Ens is Ens ] be such : Hence all propositions consisting of particular Notions , that subsume directly under Ens , must be likewise Self-evident . Again , since the proposition ( Ens is Ens ) is for no other reason Self-evident , but because the Notions of the two terms are every way formally Identical ; and this reason is found in those propositions , the notions of whose terms subsume under Ens ; it follows , that these also must , for the same reason , be likewise Self-evident . Corol. I. Hence Homo est Homo , Quantitas est Quantitas , &c. being Self-evident , are the First Principles to all Discourses treating about the Nature of Man or Quantity ; that is , they are the last and most Clear propositions in that Matter or Subject , into which all that can be said of Man or Quantity is finally resolv'd ; and , moreover , the Test of the Truth or Falshood of all that can be said of them . So that if any part of those Discourses do hap to violate those Principles , that is , if it deviates from those Natures , or does , by consequence , make Man not to be Man , or Quantity not to be Quantity , 't is most evidently convicted of Falsity : As , on the other side , if those Discourses do proceed Agreeably to these Principles , it must most certainly and evidently be True. Corol. II. It is not meant here , that these last-mentioned self-evident Propositions do follow the former by way of Proof or Deduction ; but we are only enquiring what Propositions in the resolving of Truths into their Principles are most Self-evident ; and therefore , in priority of Nature , presupposed to the other , and imply'd in them , as those without the Certainty and Evidence of which no Certainty or Evidence at all could be had of any of the others which are thus Imply'd , or Contain'd in the former , and engage their Verity ( as it were ) a posteriori . As if Homo , which is a particular Ens , be not that particular Ens or Homo ; then , neither is Ens Ens , nor Existentia Existentia , because there is the same reason for the Former to be Self-evident as for these Later , tho' not altogether in the same degree . Corol. III. From the Self-evidence and Truth of that Proposition Self-existence is Self-existence , and from the Ground of Verity in all Propositions whatever that are True , we may demonstrate the Existence of a Deity . For , since not only our Simple Notions or Apprehensions are taken from the Things , but also all Connexions of those Notions or Propositions are therefore True , because what 's meant by the two Terms exists in the same Thing ; so that neither this Proposition [ A Stone is hard ] could be True , unless what 's meant by Stone and Hard were found in the same Entity ; nor even could this Self-evident Proposition ( Homo est Homo ) be True , unless there were something , or such a thing as , by being Fix'd in its determinate Nature , or by being the same with it self , had thence a power to verifie it ; it follows , that neither could this Self-evident Proposition [ Self-existence is Self-existence ] be True , unless there were some most Actual Being , which , by being most perfectly the same with it self , did verifie that Proposition . But such an Actual Being can only be the Deity , there is therefore a Deity . It may be reply'd , That we can compound Notions , and joyn Self to Existence ; which done , this Compound Notion , having such a nature in our Understanding , has , consequently , a determinate Nature or Actual Being in our Mind only , and thence a kind of Metaphysical Unity or Verity there , which gives it to be predicated of it self ; so that there is no necessity that such a Thing should be put to be in re to verifie it . 'T is answer'd , That our Argument is not grounded meerly upon our having such a Notion ; for we do not argue as Cartesius does , upon the Notion or Idea of such a Subject ; but we grant , that we may Compound such a one , and yet remain Vncertain whether that Nature be or not ; but our Argument proceeds also , and chiefly , upon our Verifying that Proposition , which is done formally by the Copula ; and I affirm , that the Copula [ is ] could not verifie it , unless there were something out of the Vnderstanding that oblig'd us to do so ; which I explain thus : This Copula sometimes meerly puts together Fictitious Notions , or Non-Entities , which ( all Truth being grounded on Ens or the Thing ) have consequently direct Opposition to Being , and therefore Falsity in their very Natures , or rather No-natures ; as , when we say [ Imaginary Space is a Chimaera ] , for then , indeed , the Connexion is meerly in our Vnderstanding , there being no Thing , nor any Terms , which have an Entitative Notion to be Connected or Verify'd : or rather indeed there was no Connexion at all ; but , as the Terms were Mock-things , so they could only have a Mock-Connexion . In all other Cases , since the Copula [ is ] cannot signifie nothing at all , ( for this would make it a meer Sound and no Word ) it can only signifie the Actual Existence or Co-existence of what 's meant by the Terms , in the same Thing ; and this ( as was * said ) whether that Co-existence be only Material or Formal . And , should it be deny'd that the Copula [ is ] has this signification , we can never know any thing which we say , or can say , is true ; because we can never know , nor see , that the Notions are Agreeable or Conformable to the Thing . Since then the notion of Self-existence is so far from having Non-existence in its Notion ( as the others had Non-ens ) that it is the most perfect in that kind that can be imagin'd ; the ' foresaid Proposition could not be true , unless there were actually something that has , in that Supreme Manner , Metaphysical Verity and Vnity in it self , to verifie it . In the same manner as [ Homo est homo ] could never have been True , had there not been Something which had such a Metaphysical Unity and Verity in its self , as grounded that Proposition . So that the Objecter must either find more significations and uses of the word [ is ] than we have assign'd ( which is impossible ) or alledge , that the Notion of Self-existence is Chimerical , or Destructive of Existence , as Non-Ens is of Ens , which is as absurd as the other ; or , he must be forced to grant our Conclusion , and acknowledge our Argument to be a true Logical Demonstration . I know it will run in the Objecter's Fancy , that we can connect Notions which our selves have coin'd ; but he may easily correct these Misconceits , by reflecting , that this Proposition is True ; and that Truth must not be grounded on our Aiery Fancies , but on the solid Nature of the Thing to which it is a Conformity . I know too he will fancy that the Copula [ is ] has an Office of meerly Connecting without any reference to the Existence of the Thing which is its proper signification ; but he may see the Folly of such a Conceit , if he but consider that we cannot with truth conjoyn Notions in our Minds that are not Conjoyn'd before-hand in the Thing ; and that when the Notions are of some Positive Being , or such as are not Chimerical and Contradictory , the Copula [ is ] must signifie Exists , and does but say in our Mind what is in the thing , if the Saying be true . Also , that that Copula cannot divest it self of all sence while it conjoyns such Terms ; and he will do more than Miracle to invent any other for it but that of Exists . It may yet be further Objected , that these Propositions ( Rosa est Rosa , Animal est Animal ) and such-like , are still True , tho' their Subjects do not actually Exist when we thus Predicate of them ; and that therefore it is not necessary the Copula ( est ) should always signifie Existence , even tho' the Notions of the Terms be Positive Entities . 'T is answer'd , that either the Subjects ( Rosa ) and ( Animal ) mean the Individuals of those Natures ; and then , if once they are perish'd , the Propositions are False ; for haec Rosa is no longer Rosa , nor is hoc Animal Animal , when they are corrupted or turn'd into another thing . Or else these words mean the Abstracted Notions of Rosa and Animal ; and then , since Abstracted Natures , or Vniversals , do ( as such ) no where exist but in the Vnderstanding , they have their Actual Existence where they ought to have it ; and the Copula [ est ] signifies they have their Existence there ; and so the Proposition is True. And it is to be farther noted , that they could not have been even there , unless there had actually been diverse Individuals from which they might be Abstracted . But now , in our Case , it is quite otherwise ; for Self-existence being the simplest Notion that can be conceiv'd , nay , more Actual than any Notion of Existence found in Creatures , it is Impossible there should be any abstracted notion of it ; both because that Abstracted Notion would have Potentiality in it , which would destroy that Notion , and make it Chimerical and Self-Contradictory ; as also , because ( as Metaphysicks demonstrate ) Self-Existence is Unlimited or Infinit in Existence , and so , can be but One. Wherefore the Copula ( est ) does not meerly Conjoyn such Positive Notions , but always signifies Existence , when the Notions it connects are not Chimerical or Opposit to Existence , as Non-Ens is to Ens ; and consequently , if this Proposition [ Self-existence is Self-existence ] be True , there must Actually be , and this out of our Vnderstanding , some Being that verifies it , which can be nothing but the Deity . It may be ask'd , What is to be said of these Propositions , such a Thing is Possible or Future . 'T is answer'd , the word [ Possible ] signifies possible to be , or capable of Being , which is the very notion of Ens ; and so , it means that such a Possible thing is an Ens ; and then it might be true , could we Frame such a Proposition of a thing meerly possible , which is Impossible ; for , if the thing be only [ possible to be ] it never was ; and so ( all our Notions being taken from the Thing ) we could have no Notion of it ; and therefore the Proposition would be none , since we want that Notion that makes the Subject . The Proposition [ such a thing is Future ] is in rigor False , ( for that which is not at all , can have nothing predicated of it ) and it can only be True , as it signifies that there are determinate Causes laid to produce it : which is to say , those Causes are , and so the Copula [ est ] still signifies Existence . 11. To settle this main point , that First Principles must be such Propositions as are most formally Identical , in the manner declared above , many other Proofs may be alledged ; as , that Contradictions are the First of Falshoods ; therefore those Propositions that are directly Opposit to them must be the First Truths or First Principles : But only Propositions thus perfectly Identical are directly Opposit to Contradictions ; Therefore these only are the First Truths or First Principles . To prove the Minor , we shall find by reflexion , that the two Contradictory propositions are comprizable into one which is equivalent to both ; as to ( Peter here and now runs , Peter here and now runs not ) is equivalent ( what here and now runs , does not here and now run ) . Whence is seen clearly , that only such Identical propositions are directly opposit to Contradictions ; since Man's Wit cannot invent a proposition directly Opposit to ( what runs runs not ) but ( what runs runs ) which is perfectly Identical . Add , that all Fault consisting in this , that 't is a Privation of the Opposit Good , Contradictions would not be at all Faulty , but that they violate the Truth of Identical propositions , ( as has been now proved ) since there are no other Truths which they directly and formally Oppose or destroy . 12. Again , as will be seen hereafter , to Conclude is to shew the Terms of the Conclusion to be Connected , by their being Connected with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses . But , how can we shew that Middle Term is really connected with those Two other Terms in the Premisses ? By finding still another Middle Term to be connected with the Terms of the proposition to be proved . And , how far must this go on ? Endlesly ! or no ? If Endlesly , it is impossible any thing should ever come to be prov'd ; if not , then we must come to some proposition whose Terms are so Connected that no Middle Term can come between them ; that is , such as cannot be Connected by means of Another ; that is , which cannot be prov'd or made evident ; that is , which are self-connected or self-evident ; that is , which are formally Identical . To enforce this , we may observe that the more Remot● the Terms of a proposition are from Formal Identity , the less evident they are , and the more proo● they require ; as also , that they grow still nearer to Evidence , according to the degree of their Approaching to be Formally the same . Wherefore , since all Approach of Distant things ends in their Conjoyning and Centering in the same ; 't is manifest that all Approach of Distant Notions ends in their being the same in Notion , or in a proposition Formally Identical , as in a First and Self-evident Principle . 13. Besides , all Causality , or the whole Course of Nature , is finally refunded into this Self-evident Principle , that Things are such as they are , that is , are what they are . For , since an Effect is a Participation of something that is in the Cause ; and the Cause , as such , is that which imparts or communicates something it has to the Matter on which it works its Effect . Again , since the Effect is such as the Cause is , as to that which is imparted to it ; and if the Cause be of another sort , the Effect still varies accordingly ; there can be no doubt but that Causality is the Imprinting the Existence of that Essence or Thing which is the Cause , upon the Matter . Whence follows evidently , that the very Notion of Natural Causality , and the whole Efficacy of it , consists in the Causes existing ( that is being what it is . Only Motion is added as a Common Requisit to apply that Existing Cause better or worse ; which is refunded into a Nature Superiour to Body ; as will be shewn * hereafter . 14. Lastly , God himself has exprest his own Supreme Essence by this Identical Proposition Ego Sum qui Sum ; that is , I exist ( or am ) Existence . Which is the same , in a manner , with ( Self existence is Self-Existence ) Which , therefore , is the First Increated Truth ; as 't is the First Created one that ( what is is ) or A thing is what it is ; which is therefore True , because God is what He is ; or , because Self-existence is Self-existence . From which Divine and Soveraign Verity all our Created First Principles derive their Truth . For , were not This True , all our Identical Proposition and First Principles would all be False : in regard they have their Verity from the Natures of the Things , and of our Vnderstanding ; neither of which could have their Metaphysical Verity , nor , consequently , could they ground or be capable of any Truth at all , if Self-Existence , their Cause , were not Self-Existence , and thence Unlimited in Power , Wisdome and Goodness to Create and Conserve those Beings which are the Foundation of all the Truth we have or can have . The Reader is desired to referr this Section , to the Third Corollary , and to consider them well together , because they mutually give Light to one another . And , if we rightly consider it , as the Proposition ( Homo est Homo ) is onely the reducing the Metaphysical Verity of Homo into a Formal Truth ; so ( Self Existence is self-Existence ) is the same in respect of the Soveraign Metaphysical Verity of the Divine Nature . Corol. IV. Hence is seen that an Atheist can have no perfectly Certain Knowledge or Evidence of any thing ; but that , by denying his Maker , he deservedly comes to lose the best Perfection of his own Nature . For , if a Sceptick should put him to prove that things have any Metaphysical Verity in them grounding our first Principles , and ▪ consequently , all our Knowledge ; and object , that for any thing he knows , Things are Chimerical , and so contriv'd as to beget in us False Judgments ; he is utterly at a loss through his denying a First Cause : whose Unchangeable and Essential Truth and Goodness has Establisht their Natures to bee Unalterably what they are : whence onely any Certain and Evident Knowledge of them is possible to be attain'd . 15. Definitions , tho' very useful to Science , are not Self evident ; nor are those Propositions that Predicate the Definition of the Notion Defin'd , First Principles . For , Self-evident Principles , by force of their very Terms , do oblige the Understanding to assent , which such Propositions do not . Again , Art is requisit to make such Definitions as are Proper and Adjusted to the Thing Defin'd ; whereas First Principles must antecede all Art , and be known by the Natural Light of our Understanding . Besides , the Possibility of being defind , goes before the Definition ; which Possibility the Thing has from its Metaphysical Verity , determining it to be This and no other . For , if the thing were not truly what it is , it could not be exexplaind to be what it is ; were it not One , that is , Undivided in its self and Divided from all others ; it could not be compriz'd in one Definition ; and , if it were not Determinately of this or that Nature , it 's certain , Bounds and Limits could not be drawn , which is done by the Definition . Whence 't is manifest , that that proposition which affirms , that a Thing is what it is , is the First Principle and Ground to all Definitions : and therefore Definitions themselves are not First Principles . 16. This is further evinc'd , because , Words being liable to Equivocalness , where there are more words ( as there are in Definitions ) there is more room for Equivocation ; which Inconvenience appears no where more than in the known Definition of Man : For , there wants not many Witty , ( or rather half-witted ) Discoursers , who Distinguish , that is makes Ambiguous , the Word [ Rational ] and do not stick to maintain that Man is Rational , or ( Concluding being the Proper Act of Reason ) can Conclude Evidently in Lines and Numbers , but not in Logick , Physicks , Ethicks or Metaphysicks , much less in Theology ; and , by this means they cramp the Definition to less than half the sense the words contain . There are others too , who make Brutes Rational in many things ( and they make Men to be Rational but in some ) and so quite destroy the said Definition by Enlarging and Ampliating it , and making it Common and Indifferent to Man and Beast ; and not apply'd to either of them adequately , but only in some Degree onely : And yet the same men , even tho' perfect Scepticks , would not dispute the Truth of this Proposition , A Man is a Man. Wherefore , since 't is directly against the nature of First Principles to be Disputable , Definitions cannot be First Principles ; and , consequently , only Propositions most perfectly Identical can be such . 17. There is another kind of Self-evidence call'd Practical , which is Inferiour to this we have hitherto spoken of , and Proper to the Vulgar . This is call'd Self-evidence , not because its Evidence is seen in the very Notion of the Terms , as was the other , but because it is bred or instill'd from the Things themselves without Speculation or Study , by a Practical converse with those things . Thus the Vulgar know evidently what is Moist , Dry , Hard , &c. as well as the best Philosophers , tho' they cannot define them as the others can . Nay , the best Philosophers ( as will be seen hereafter ) must learn from their Sayings how to make their Definitions of all such Natural Notions . Thus they know Evidently ( tho' Naturally ) the force of Witnessing Authority , when 't is Vniversal , and of Sensible Matters of Fact : For example , They know there was such a one as Queen Elizabeth , or the Long Civil War in England , for , they know Men could not be deceiv'd themselves in knowing such things , and that they could not All universally conspire to deceive their Children in attesting such a Falshood ; or , if they had had a mind to it , they know that the Cheat must needs have been discover'd by some among so many thousands . Note , That this is call'd Evidence , because , tho' it be a Rude Knowledge , yet it is a True one ; and 't is the Work of Learned men to Polish by Art those rough Draughts of Evidence which the Vulgar have by a Natural way ; as will be farther seen hereafter . 18. Those Speculations only being well grounded which are according to Nature , it will add a great confirmation to this new piece of Doctrine , that First Principles are Identical Propositions ( and help withal to satisfie some superficial Readers , who perhaps may think such Speculations A●ery ) to shew that the Nature-instructed Vulgar do abet this Doctrine , and make use of Propositions exactly Identical , when they would express themselves to stand finally to some Truth which they judge to be most Evident . For example , if you would force a Clown to deny a thing which he is sure of , or knows to be True ; he will tell you soberly , and ( if you press him much ) angrily , that Truth is Truth , or that he is sure A Spade is a Spade , or that he knows what he knows ; or , if it be in a point belonging to Justice , that Right is Right , and he brings these as Evidences from whence he can never be driven . Which signifies clearly , that such Truths as these are Judg'd by him Self-evident , and to be the Principles which naturally determin and fix him in an Immovable Adherence to the point , as the Vltimate Ressort and Reason of his Perswasion ; that is , Nature teaches him to have recourse to these , as to his First Principles . 19. The other Test , by which to examin the Truth of this Discourse of ours about First Principles , is to desire the Objecter to settle some First Principles of his own , after his Fashion ; which done , it will manifestly appear , that , if he takes any other way , either his First Principles will not be Self-evident at all , which yet First Principles must be ; or , in case he pretends them such , he will not be able to tell you or explicate in what that Self-evidence of theirs consists ; or else , he will produce such as he will tell you he will undertake to prove to be Evident , which ( since what 's Prov'd is concluded ) will be the same as to offer to obtrude upon us Conclusions instead of First Principles . Or , lastly , they will be meer Fancies of his own , put together prettily , and exprest wittily and plausibly ; which , when they are divested of their gay Dress , and their naked sence is laid open , will be either meer voluntary Talk or plain Nonsence in cuerpo . Into which Fault of Groundless and boldly and Magisterially pronounced ( tho' wittily exprest ) Assertions , and the Imposing them upon us for Principles , the Author of the Leviathan does fall very frequently ; and I could wish all his Followers would please to examin all his Principles by this Test , and they would quickly discover how strangely they fall short of Self-Evidence , that is , of the Nature of First Principles . Or , in case they judge I have stated 〈◊〉 the Nature of First Principles , I should take it for a Favour , if they would vouchsafe me an Answer to my several Reasons for my Doctrin , as to this point , in this Lesson and the next ; and , in a full Discourse , settle their own First Principles , and shew me my Error ; which , I am very confident , they will never think fit to Attempt . LESSON III. That First Principles are Identical Propositions prov'd by Instances . The Use that is to be made of them . Also of some other Propositions , either in whole or in part , Formally Identical ; and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions . 1. THAT the First Principles in Metaphysicks are Identical Propositions , has already * been clear'd . It remains to shew they are such in other Sciences also . We will begin with Physicks . The First Principle that grounds that whole Science , according to some Modern Philosophers , is , [ Corpus est Quantum ] , in which tho' the Subject and Predicate do indeed differ Grammatically , the one of them being Substantively the other Adjectively express'd , yet if we rifle the Words to get out the Inward Sense , ( as Philosophers ought ) we shall find that , since all the Essential Differences they allow between a Body and a Spirit , is this only , that That is Divisible , This Indivisible , as also , that Quantity and Divisibility into Integral parts are ( with them ) the same Notion ; it will appear Eyidently , that , according to them , this Proposition [ Body is Quantitative ] is perfectly equivalent to this [ What 's Divisible is Divisible ] which is every way Identical . I say , with them , for they deny all Metaphysical Divisibility of Body into Matter and Form * by denying all Formal Mutation . The same Discourse holds , if they put for their First Principle [ Corpus est Extensum ] ; for , in that Supposition , they hold that Extension is the Notion that Intrinsecally constitutes Body or Matter , and differences it Essentially from Spirit . Whence the Proposition [ Corpus est Extensum ] is the same as [ Ens Extensum est Ens Extensum , or Corpus est Corpus ] which are most Formally Identical . 2. That the First Principle which grounds all Ratiocination in Logick is an Identical Proposition , will be shewn hereafter , Sect. 10. when we come to shew the Vse of First Principles . 3. The First principle that grounds all Ethicks , or Morality , is , [ A Will is a Will ] . For , since all Morality ( at least in its practice ) consists in Acting for an End , and no man acts for an End but because it appears to him a Good , and therefore an appearing Good is the proper Object of that Active Power call'd the Will ; and Powers are specified by their proper Objects , and have their Essences from them ; it is as certain the Will cannot act when there appears to the Man no Good , and that it will act for what appears to him , taking him as thus Dispos'd , hic & nunc a Good , as it is that A Will is a Will. Object . This takes away the Freedom of the Will , to tye it up to First Principles , or pretend that its Actions can be reduc'd to Rules of Science or Demonstration ; for , this seems to hamper it , and lay a Necessity upon it , which destroys its Free Nature . I answer , that the Will has a Nature of its own , which it can no more forgo than Homo can not be Homo . Whenever then there is but one Appearing Good , the Will is not free in that circumstance , because in such a Case its Essence is engag'd ; and 't is not in the power of the Will to chuse whether it will be its self or no. In all other Cases where its Essence is not engag'd the Will is free , provided there be on the Object 's side Variety enough for Choice : Yet , in the former Case , those Acts of the Will , tho' not free , are Voluntary , because they are more according to what 's Essential to it , or to its very Nature ; and would , if the Will did not bear it self accordingly , make the Will to be no Will. Corol. I. Hence is seen , that the only solid way to perfect our Souls in Christian Morality or True Virtue , is by Wise Judgments or Frequentation of Devout Thoughts and Actions , to gain a Lively and Hearty Conceit of the Transcendent Excellency of Heavenly Goods , and of the Vileness of all Temporary Goods in comparison , since 't is the very Nature of our Will to pursue that with her Interiour Acts which appears lively to be the Greater Good ; that is , to be hic & nunc , a Good to him that wills . 4. Lastly , to omit others , the First Principles in Mathematicks are Identical . For example ; At our first entrance into Euclid , we are met with those Famous and Useful Principles : Those things that are Equal to the same , are Equal to one another . If Equals be added to Equals , the Wholes are Equal . If Equals be taken away from Equals , the Remainders are Equal . Those which are twice as big as the same , are Equals . Those which are Halfs of the same are Equals . All which are in effect but this Identical Proposition [ Aequale est aequale sibi ] ; or else diverse Inferiour Identicals , subsuming under that Common one , as Homo est homo does under Ens est ens . For example , this Proposition [ If Equals be added to Equals , the Wholes are Equal ] is that common Identical Proposition thrice ( as it were ) Repeated ; and is plainly as much as to say , the two supposed Equals are Equal to one another : the two Equals added are Equal to one another ; and so the two Equal Wholes , made up of both those Equal parts , are Equal to one another . There are many other such Identical Propositions on which that great Mathematician builds as on his Principles ; and among the rest [ A Whole is greater than a part of it self ] which I have shewn above to be , in sence . Formally Identical . 5. As for the Vse that may be made of First Principles ; First , they cannot be the Conclusion , for that is the thing to be proved , and First Principles are above Proof , as not being to be made Evident , because they are Self-evident . Nor can they be either of the Premisses ; for ( as will be more clearly shewn hereafter ) the Middle Term must be Connected with one of the Terms of the Conclusion in one of the Premisses , and with the other Term in the other ; which could not be , if the self same Notion were us'd twice in one of those Premisses ; for then the Syllogism must either be fram'd thus , [ Omnis Homo est Homo , Aliquod Animal est rationale , ergo aliquod Rationale est Homo ] ; or thus , [ Nullus Homo est Irrationalis ; Ted aliquis Homo est Homo , ergo Aliquod irrationale non est Homo : ] where we see ( to omit other faults ) that the Notion of Homo is taken thrice , whereas in a Legitimate Syllogism no Term ought to be taken more than twice ; and , so the whole Discourse is Preternatural and Absurd . 6. Hence follows , that since the Vse of First Principles cannot be the bringing down or deducing Truths , which are yet unknown , from them ; therefore the Use of them must consist in the bringing up or Reducing Truths to them ; which is done by Resolving less-clear Truths into others still Clearer , till we arise to those which are the Clearest of all , that is , to Self-evident Principles ; to shew which by Instances , or lay open the way how this is done , is not proper for this place , but belongs to the next Book , where we shall treat of Rigorous Discourse or Demonstration . 7. To make this use of First Principles is no more , in effect , but to attend heedfully to the Nature of the Thing , and not to deviate from it . This is Evident ; for , to Deviate in a Discourse about Homo or Corpus , from their Natures , is , by consequence , to make Homo not to be Homo , and Corpus not to be Corpus ; which Propositions are Contradictory to Homo est Homo and Corpus est Corpus , which are the First Principles in those Discourses . 8. Quaere . It may be ask'd , if there be no more in the business but to attend to the Metaphysical Verity or Nature of the Thing , why we keep such a pother about putting it into such nice , and dry , and seemingly Insignificant Identical Propositions , since we may attend to our Notion , or the Nature of the Thing , without framing Formal Propositions about it , or saying It is what it is ? 'T is answer'd , Because all our Discourses are made up of Propositions , without which we cannot say or affirm any thing ; and therefore those Sayings into which we do finally resolve their Evidence and Truth , as into what 's most true and evident , must be Propositions also . Besides , Self-evident Propositions , which advance the Metaphysical Verity of the thing into Formal Verity , do reflect and redouble ( as it were ) the Notion of it upon it self by expressing its being what it is ; and thence gives an advantage to our bare Single Notion , by not only having had ( as had the Single Notion ) its Metaphysical Verity in it , but by expressing that Metaphysical Verity , so as to make it more fit to be discours'd of . 9. Tho' First Principles cannot be any Proposition in a Legitimate or Regular Syllogism , yet this hinders not but that those particular Identical Propositions which subsume under Ens est Ens * , may in some sort and improperly be Deducible from that Common one . For , since a Common Notion , taken without restriction , is Equivalent to an Vniversal , and includes All that have that Notion , and All includes and signifies Every particular one , as a Whole does its parts ; hence follows , that if Ens be Ens , then Homo is Homo , Lapis is Lapis ; and the same may be said of every particular thing that is comprehended under that Universal . Note , That this is not perform'd by virtue of those Terms orderly plac'd and connected , as 't is done in a Syllogism ; but by vertue of some Logical Maxims applying or referring the Common propositions to those particular Identical ones , as appears in the proof of this last Section . Corol. II. Hence is seen how Metaphysicks give the Principles to all Inferiour Sciences that treat of particular Subjects ; and how they establish both the Truth , Certainty and Evidence of those respective Principles . 10. The other main Use of First Principles is to Establish all our Ratiocination or Deduction of New Truths out of others formerly known : this is evident , because all Inference , Concluding or Proving is perform'd by Identifying the two terms of the proposition to be Concluded with a Middle term in the premisses ; and if it be found that they are both of them the same with it , it is thence Inferr'd that they are the same with one another , and that the Conclusion is true . But , what if that Middle term be not the same with its own self , but Divided within it self ? Why then it must certainly follow , that we could Inferr or prove Nothing : For if that Middle term were divided in it self , as Hirco-cervus , Chimera , and all Non-Entities are , then one of the terms of the proposition to be prov'd might be Identify'd with it according to one of those Considerations , and the other term Identify'd with it according to the other ; and so , it would not follow that the terms of the Propositions to be proved are at all Identified or Connected in the Conclusion by being both of them Identified with it in the Premisses ; but rather it will follow , that they would be Diversify'd or Unconnected , because that Middle term had Diversity and not Identity in it self . Wherefore all the Force of Inference , nay , all possibility of Concluding or proving any thing is entirely grounded on this Self-evident proposition , Idem est Idem sibi ipsi , or , a Thing is the same with it self . Which shews how Useful First principles are , and how they are both the First Truths in themselves ; and , besides , the Bottom-Ground to all Others which are not Evident in themselves , but need Proof to make them so ; how Dry and Insignificant soever they may appear at first sight , or seem ridiculous to Superficial Talkers , or some Men of more Witt and Fancy than of Exact Speculation . Corol. III. Hence is seen that the Light of Reason or the Light by which we draw New knowledges out of foregoing ones , is the Light that shines in this Self-evident proposition : A thing is the same with it's self . Corol. IV. Hence also , if the Terms be Univocally understood , and do agree to the Middle Term in the Premisses , we may be as Infallibly Certain our Conclusion is True as we are that The same is the same with it self . Which will give a great Encouragement , to the Laborious Pursuers of True Science , and comfort the pains they take in Seeking after Truth . Corol. V. Hence , lastly , if any Discourse be so fram'd as to thwart this First Principle or clash with it : 't is Self-evidently Absur'd , False and Contradictory ; as will be particularly seen when we come to treat of Discourse or Ratiocination . 11. There are other Propositions which are , either in the whole or in part , Formally Identical , ●ho ' not most Formally : that is , such as have the ●ame Formal Notion in whole , or in part ; and ●herefore are , upon a sleight reflexion , Evident , ●ho ' not self-evident from the very Terms , as were First Principles . Of the first sort are those whose Predicates belong to the First Predicable , in which ●he whole Notion is predicated of the Whole . And ●hese are either Definitions ( of which we have spo●en above ) as when we say Homo est Animal Ratio●ale ; or the Members of such Divisions as are made ●y Contradictory Differences . For since there ●an be no Middle or Third between two Contra●ictory Notions , and therefore the Dividing parts , ●f Contradictory , do take up all the Parts of the whole , and consequently ( abating the manner of Expression ) are perfectly and Intirely the Whole it self ; it follows , that such parts , taken Divisively , ●re predicated of the Notion Divided as the Whole ●f the Whole . For example , Animal is divided into Rational and Irrational ( that is , not-Rational ) and Number into Even and Odd , ( that is , not-even ) . Whence in those Propositions , [ Animal is either Rational or Irrational ] and ( Number is either Even or Odd ) all the Parts or the whole is predicated of the Whole , and the Propositions are Formally Identical and Evident in the manner explicated in our former Note . Note 2. That these are call'd Formally Identical , because they are Evident by their own Terms when they are once Explaind ; without needing any Formal Proof for the Learned to discern the Connexion of those Terms ; onely there is requir'd some sleight Reflexion on certain Common Maxims , known by the Light of Nature : such as is that a thing either is or is not , and that therefore there can be no Middle between them ; and that All the Parts are the Whole . They are also Self-evident Practically ( that is Evident without Study ) to the Vulgar , because they cannot but know those maxims by their Mother-wit . In like manner as they know also the Substance of the Definition of those Notions they are conversant with , if plainly and fully exprest ; tho they cannot compile or frame it Artificially : whence they will heartily acknowledge it to be true when 't is thus propos'd to them , finding the Notion or Sense of it in their own Understanding . 12. Propositions whose Terms are Formal in part are those whose Predicates belong to the second , third and fourth Predicables ; that is , such as are predicated as the Genus Species and DiffeDifference ; for all these do in part belong essentially to the Thing or Individuum ; as Petrus est Animal , Homo , Rationalis . They belong to it Essentially ; because they are deduc'd by Intrinsecal Differences in the same Line : In part , because the Thing or Individuum ( v. g. Peter ) comprehends both them , and more than them , viz. his Individual Essence . 13. Those Propositions whose Predicates belong to the Fifth Predicable ( viz. Properties ) are neither in Part nor in Whole Formally Identical , and therefore not Evident ; tho' they are oftentimes easily reducible to Evidence . For , since such Predicates are not of the same Line as the Thing is , but in another , they cannot be at all Essential to it , or any direct part of its Formal Notion or Definition ; and , so , not at all Evident from the Terms , but must be made so by Proof . Yet , since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions , and those Notions ( or what corresponds to them ) must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding ; and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents , as resulting necessarily from it , or being immediately Connected with it ; hence they are , by consequence , most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing ; and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations . 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects ; and , more immediately , the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others , or Suffer from others ; as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration . 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident , and , as such , not easily Evidenceable . For , since ( as was shewn * above ) such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance , or as their very name imports , by Accident ; and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know ; it follows , that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason , or prov'd that they must belong to it , because we can never know al● the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it . Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident , nor ( as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence ) easily Evidenceable by way of Reason , that they must belong to them ; however they may be known to belong actually to them hic & nunc by Sense or Experience . Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments , and many Quantities , Qualities , and Relations . 16. Notwithstanding , those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates , were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known , might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable . For , as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it , from that single Cause ; so , did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes , we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow ; in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident , but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes ; nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental . Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God , but all Events , tho' never so minute or so odd , are Equally Certain to him , as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes ; because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect . LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us , and of the Method how this is perform'd . HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments , according to their Dependence on one another , and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles . Our next task is , to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally . 1. The Soul , or the Understanding , is at first void of all kind of Knowledge , or Rasa Tabula . For , since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain , nor acts needlesly , he puts no Effects immediately , or without Second Causes , when there are Causes laid by him to produce them ; and , since we experience that Causes are laid by Him , apt to imprint Notions in us ; and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative , we can compare those Notions , and can see how they Agree or Disagree , which is to know : Hence , in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwis● than by those Causes , it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us , and make Nature contradict her self . Again , since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of , and that we can compare those Notions , and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare ; and , that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects , and from the nature of the Soul ; it falls into the same Absurdity , to affirm , that those Causes do only Excite , and not Beget Knowledge in us . Lastly , the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body , or at least distinct from it ; and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For , this cannot be done Quantitatively , as is evident , nor by their Acting together , as the Cartesians hold ; both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing ; whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens ; as also , because the Line or predicament of Action is * distinct from that of Ens , and Extrinsecal to it , and so cannot † Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing . Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body , if it be not one Ens with the Soul , can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument ; and it would be most Absurd , to say that my Hand and Pen are o●e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways , to the Action of Writing . Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge , but is a Rasa Tabula , capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her . 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has , is . that its self or the Man exists . For , since ( as * was shewn ) the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself , and of his Existence , and † all Judgmen●s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions ; it follows , that the most Obvious , most Easie , most Natural , and consequently the First Judgment , in priority of Nature , that a Man has when he is ripe to judge , is , that Himsel● is , or [ I am ] . 3. The next Judgment is , that [ He is struck ] or affected by some Object without him ; for , since the Course of Nature is Motion , and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is , and , so , do light and act on his Senses , that is , do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them , it follows , that he must , after he comes to frame Judgments , necessarily and frequently know , and , consequently , Judge he is struck . Nor can this be the first Judgment , both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition [ I am struck ] the Proposition [ I am ] is most Simple , and manifestly antecedes [ I am struck ] ; the Notion of [ struck ] being clearly superadded to it . 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former , in order of Nature , is , [ I am struck thus ] or Affected after such a manner . For , the Notion of [ I am struck ] is more Simple , and so , antecedes [ I am struck thus ] which superadds to it : Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section . 5. These Judgments had , we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us . For , since we get all our Notions or the Natures of things into us by Impressions from Objects ; and by such Impressions , or by their affecting us thus or thus , their Different Natures ; that is , Knowledge how those things Differ from one another ; and Differences do constitute the Nature of the thing by Distinguishing it from all others ; 't is manifest that from the Judgment or Knowledge that we are struck thus and thus by these and these Objects , we are furnish'd with means of Knowing , in some measure , the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us , and of our own Bodies in the first place . And our Soul having the power of Comparing them to themselves , and to Other Natures that are also in her , we hence become capable of framing Innumerable Judgments concerning them , or Knowledges of them . 6. These Knowledges of all things that affect our Senses being gain'd , to a fair degree , by the Different Impressions of Objects , are made more Express , and Improv'd very much by Study and Reflexion . For , since Study and Reflexion are not the Inventing New or Counterfeit Notions or Natures of our own coyning , but the Receiving frequently , and minding heedfully the true and solid Notions of the things which Nature had imprinted there before ; it follows , that , as in Corporeal Sight , by our Regarding the Object frequently , wistly and attentively , we come to observe more and more in it ; so , by often Reflecting on and Revolving Intellectual Objects , or the Natures of things in us , the Eye of our Mind must needs look deeper into them , make new Discoveries of diverse Considerations in them which escap'd a single Cursory view , and gain more exact and more penetrative Knowledge of them . 7. By Methods of Discoursing or Ratiocination made evident by Maxims of Art , this Improvement of Knowledge ( were not vita brevis ) might come to be in a manner Infinit . For , all this is perform'd by Evident Connexion of Terms , both in some propositions which are Truths , and the deducing others by necessary consequence from them , and so forwards . Since then there is no stint assignable of the Connexion of Truths , and ( as will be shewn hereafter ) there are Rules or Maxims of Art to teach us how to connect Terms Aptly and Evidently ; it follows , that there can be no Bounds of the Improvement of Knowledge . 8. From what 's said above , 't is manifest that this proposition [ Ego cogito ] cannot be the first-known Truth whence all our Science is Generated ; for , since this proposition ( Ego cogito ) if put entirely or explicitly as it ought , is ( Ego sum cogitans ) and in the order of Nature the proposition ( Ego sum ) is antecedent to ( Ego sum cogitans ) and more simple than it ; so that if it be not suppos'd to be known , the other cannot possibly be known ; 't is most Evident that ( Cogito ) or ( Ego cogito ) or , which is the same ( Ego sum cogitans ) cannot be the first-known Proposition or First Truth that can be laid in the Method of Generating Science . 9. The proposition ( Ego sum cogitans ) is less clear and evident than many other propositions that have for their predicate Notions directly imprinted on our Senses such as are ; I am Heated , Hurt , Extended , Moving , &c. For , since all our first-known notions ( the Soul being Rasa Tabula ) come by Impressions of Objects on our Senses , those propositions are most Clear whose predicates are the Immediate Effects of those Impressions , and , joyn'd with Ego sum ( which is the first Judgment ) do compound those propositions . But such are the predicates abovesaid , and not the predicate ( Cogitans ) . Therefore the proposition ( Ego sum Cogitans ) is less clear than are the propositions which have those directly imprinted Notions for their Predicates . That the other predicates are notions more known than is Cogitans , I prove thus . The notion of Cogitans is Spiritual , and therefore could not be imprinted in the Soul by a Direct stroke of the Object on the Senses , as are the Others , but must be known by Reflexion ; but what is known by Reflexion is less easily and less early known , that is less Evident to us , taking us as not yet imbued with other Knowledges , than that which is known by Experience or Directly ; therefore the notion of ( Cogitans ) is less known than are those other predicates ; and consequently this proposition ( Ego sum Cogitans ) is less Clear than the propositions ( Ego sum Extensus , vulneratus , movens , &c. Again , were the predicate ( Cogitans ) known experimentally , or by Impressions on the Sense , which it is not at all but as it is joyn'd with the Imagination ( the most Fallacious Faculty we have ) co-operating with the Understanding ; nay , were it an Affection of the Man , and its Notion directly imprinted in him , and , so , as easily and early known as any of the rest ; yet the proposition ( Ego sum Cogitans ) could not be the First or Second in the Order of Knowable : for , since ( as was shewn ) [ I am struck or Affected ] antecedes [ I am affected thus ] or have such an affection in me , and Cogitans is not barely to be Affected by Objects , but to have such a manner of Affection ; hence the proposition ( I am affected by Objects ) is more Simple , and therefore , in priority of Nature , precedes ( I am affected thus ) or ( I am Thinking ) and is more Clear than it . 11. Hence the proposition ( Ego cogito ) is also less Certain than multitudes of other propositions , whose predicates are experimentally known by Direct Impressions on the Senses . For Certainty follows Evidence as its Proper Cause , as Judging does Knowing . Wherefore , if that proposition be less Evident , it is also less Certain . 12. If it be alledg'd , that it is Certain by way of Evident Proof that this proposition ( Ego cogito ) is the most absolutely firm Ground we can relye on to generate and principiate all our other Knowledges , because tho' we would voluntarily divest our selves of all other Knowledges , and call them into doubt ; that is , were all the rest Vncertain , and my self Insecure whether I think True or False in holding them ; yet it is Unquestionably Certain , and Impossible to be doubted of , but that , whether I think right or wrong , still I think ; whence follows , that the proposition ( Ego cogito ) seems to be a firm basis to ground all the rest upon . I answer , that the whole Discourse seems to me to be a Paralogism , and a kind of Fallacy of non causa pro causa ; for , the Question is not whether it be not more Certain that I think than that I think wrong or right ; for , 't is granted that this proposition [ I think ] is more Simple , and therefore antecedes , and is presuppos'd to the propositions [ I think right or wrong , or thus and thus ] and , consequently , it is more Evident and more Certain than These are . But the true point is , whether I am more Certain that I think at all , than that I am Certain that I am ; since if it be not presuppos'd that I am , 't is most Certain that it is Impossible that I should be Certain that I am thinking , or any thing like it . The Objecter then slides over the Certainty of this proposition ( I think ) as compar'd with the proposition ( I am ) and other Judgments experimentally known ; and compares it with other propositions subsequent to ( I think ) . Wherefore he first supposes it to be most Certain , that is , more Certain than they are , and prefers it before all others , without Comparing it with those others ; which is to suppose it so gratis , and ( which is yet more strange ) he grounds all Knowledge whatever upon it . 13. 'T is yet a worse Error , that whereas Ens or Being is the Basis of all other Notions , so that if no Thing be , They cannot be ; the Alledger , by arguing thus [ Cogito ergo sum ] does by a strange Hysteron proteron , put an Operation to be Antecedent to Being it self ; and that [ to be Thinking ] is a more Simple , Clear , and Distinct Notion than [ to be ] . And then , from an Operation found out or suppos'd , he concludes the very Notion of Being it self to be in the Thing . Nay , which is yet more odd , he supposes the Notion of Knowledge of Himself , imported by the Word ( Ego ) and supposes that Ens ( or Ego ) to be , as is signified by the Copula ( Sum ) ; nay more , he supposes that Ens , or ( himself ) not onely to be , ●ut moreover to be such , viz. Operating or Thinking , which most evidently speak or imply Existence ; and when he has done all this , he Infers thence , ( contrary to our 3d. & 4th . Sect. ) the simple being of that which he had not onely put to be and be known ; but , which he had over and above put to be ( or be known ) to be such : that is to be Operating or Thinking . 14. Hence , this Method of Generating Science is Unnatural , Preposterous and Self-contradictory . T is Vnnatural , first because the way Nature takes to Beget Knowledge in us is not by divesting our selves of all other Knowledges to find out what 's most Certain : but , she at first instils Knowledge into us by a Natural way of Imprinting Notions in our Mind , and our Conparing them ; and thence letting us See whether they Agree or Disagree : 2 ly , because it strains Nature to fancy our selves Ignorant of many Clear Truths which the goodness of the same Nature forces us to assent to as Evident . And , 3 ly , because [ I am ] is according to the Order of Nature Antecedent to [ I am Thinking ] . T is Preposterous , because it argues from Compound Judgments which are less known , to in●er what 's more Simple , and , so , more known . And lastly , t is Self contradictory , because it supposes that to bee or to be known ; which , as yet according to that doctrine is not , or is not known : but is to be Concluded , that is , made known ; as is shewn Section 13th . 15. Hypothetical Philosophy , which is grounded on Suppositions ; and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate al● Nature , is built on meer Fancy , and is unworthy the name of Philosophy . For , since it belongs to a Philosopher to Resolve all Truths into their Principles , and all Natural Effects into their Proper Causes ; and , finally , ( if need be ) into their first Principles or First Causes : and a Hypothetical Philosopher can never perform this Duty which is most Essential to a Philosopher ; in regard the First Grounds he layes are barely begg'd or Supposed ; that is neither self-Evident nor made Evident by way of Proof : Hence , Hypothetical Philosophy is utterly unworthy the name of Philosophy ; since all its Assertions and Conclusions , if driven home , are resolved finally into Precarious Suppositions . Again ▪ since all Speculation is Aiery and Fantastical that is not grounded on the Things as they are found in Nature , and such Discoursers do not finally build their Discourses on the Natures of the Things as they find them to be , but on their being such as they suppose them or would have them to be ; it follows , that the whole Scheme of their Doctrine and all the speculations they advance , how Ingenious so ever they may appear , are far from Solid , and , in reality Groundless , Aiery and Fantastical . 16. Hence follows , that who ever supposes any Principle or Proposition that influences his Explication of Nature , or of Natural Effects which ar● apt to be produced by Natural Causes , and demonstrated by them : whether that Principle be that Matter is divided into such or such parts , or that it is moved in such a manner ; That it continues its motion without a Natural Motive Cause continually acting on it , notwithstanding that it still meets with Rubbs from other parts of Matter which it ●reaks asunder ; That there are such Figures of it's Parts ; or such Qualities affecting the Subject and giving it a Virtue of Operating thus or thus ; That ●here are multitudes of little Entities , brought in ●o serve a present turn when the Discourser is at 〈◊〉 plunge ; or Atomes , pursuing and over taking ●heir fellows , and clinging together conveniently ●or his purpose : without giving a reason why and 〈◊〉 they must do so , ( as is the manner of the Epi●ureans ) or , what ever other useful Expedient he ●upposes to carry on the Clockwork of his Scheme ; such a man is no true Philosopher . 17. Likewise , who ever layes for his Ground ●hat neither is nor can be : viz. Vacuum , Imaginary Space , Subsistent Dimensions , Infinit Expansion of Continu'd Quantity . Infinit Number of Atomes and suchlike , can be no true Philosopher ; since they ( as do the former ) Resolve things finally into their own Unprov'd and Ridi●ulous Suppositions : and would have us accept their Groundless Fancies for First Principles ; when as many ●imes the contrary to these is clearly demonstrable . 18. Whoever proceeds meerly upon Experiments and Induction , and cannot assign Proper Causes for the Effects or Matters of Fact they see ●one ; how ever their Inquisitiveness into Nature may merit Commendation , and oblige Artificers and Practical men by many useful Observations ; and , in some measure ▪ help Speculative Men also , who do make use of Principles , to find out more easily the Proper Causes of many Effects : from which Industrious Researches into Nature , such men may deserve the name of Virtuosi , or Curious and Ingenious persons ; yet since ( as will be shewn hereafter ) they cannot , by that Method alone , without making use of Principles , refund Effects into their Proper Causes , nor give the true reason of the Effects they Experience ; nor Deduce so much as one Scientifical Conclusion ; they cannot , in true speech , be call'd Men of Science or Philosophers . 19. Those of the Vulgar who have good Mother-witts , and addict themselves to think much and attentively of some certain Natural Objects , may , by Practical Self-evidence , well improv'd , arrive to such a true Knowledge of the Causes of things , as may rank them in the next Class of Knowers to Scientifical Men , or true Philosophers . For , such Men , by an Innate or Casual Addiction of their Thoughts to some particular sorts of Natures ; and by industrious and frequent consideration of them , joyn'd with a natural Sagacity to penetrate them , and natural Logick to discourse them in their thoughts ; are furnish'd with all the Materials ( as it were ) that are requisite to Science : Nor , while they attend to the Natures of the Things , can they want First Principles by which to guide their thoughts ; so that , they onely want Maxims of Art to put their Thoughts into the posture of Science , to make them more firm , distinct and express , and to improve them by drawing new Consequences from them : Wherefore such Acute Men ( some of which are found in every Country and every Age , ) by having their Knowledge grounded on solid Nature , may far exceed Hypothetical Philosophers , or any of the others before-mentioned , in True Knowledge ; and , so , come nearer the being true Philosophers than any of them ; nay , than Great Artists and Reputed Scholars ; though they caper in the Ayr never so nimbly and quaintly with School-Terms , Distinctions , and Witty and Congruous Explications of their own Schemes ; if they do not begin with , and build upon , Good Honest Solid Nature . BOOK III. Of the Third Operation of our Vnderstanding , Discourse ; and of the Effects and Defects of it . LESSON I. Of Artificial Discourse , the Force of Consequence , and of the only Right Figure of a Syllogism . 1. DIscourse may either mean Common Reasoning us'd by all Mankind in their Ordinary Conversation , or by some in Rhetorical Speeches ; which may fitly be call'd Loose Discourse : Or , it may mean that Artificial way of Reasoning , which consists in such a Connexion of Terms in two Propositions , call'd the Major and Minor ( or the Premisses ) as that a Third Proposition , call'd the Conclusion , must naturally and necessarily follow from them ; which may be properly nam'd Contracted or Strict Discourse , and by Logicians is call'd a Syllogism . 2. This following or Consequence of such a Proposition out of two others , is call'd Inference , Deduction , Concluding , Argumentation and Proving . So that the Essence of a Syllogism consists as formally in the Consequence of that Proposition , which is Concluded from the Premisses , ( exprest by the Illative Particle [ ergo ] as the Essence of a Proposition does in the Copula that connects its Terms , and Predicates or says something of another . 3. Wherefore , since , if the Consequence , in which consists the Essence and all the Force and Nerves of Discourse , be not Clear and Evident , there could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded ; and , so , our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have been given us to no purpose : hence 't is manifest that , however one Proposition may be made known by others that are Connected and Consequential to one another ; yet , the Consequence it self cannot be prov'd or made clear by another Consequence ; for the Question would still return how , and in virtue of what , that Consequence which made the other Evident is Evident it self ; and so in infinitum . Whence it follows , that the Evidence of all Consequences whatever , must be built on something in a higher manner Evident than any Consequence or Proof can make it ; that is , on a Self-evident or Identical Proposition , as will be shown hereafter . 4. Hence we may gather manifestly , that a Syllogism can have but Three Terms in it ; Two of which are given us in the Proposition to be Concluded ; and the Third is that Middle Term , by finding which to be Identify'd with the other Two in the Premisses , we come to be assur'd , by virtue of the self-evident Proposition hinted above , that they are Identify●d in the Conclusion ; or , which is the same , that the Conclusion is True. 5. From what 's said it appears that a Syllogism is the T●st of all other Discourses ; by reducing them to which their Truth is to be try'd . For , since whatever is most Perfect in its Kind , ought to be the Standard or Test by which to Measure and try the Perfection of all others of the same Kind ; and a Syllogism is the best and most firmly grounded Act of our Natural Reason , made exact by Art which is to perfect Nature ; and therefore absolutely the very Best that can be in its Kind , or the best Discourse ; it follows that 't is to be the true Test and Standard of all other Discourses ; to which the Verity , Sense or Coherence of all the rest are to be reduc'd , and to be try'd by it . Corol. I. Hence , 't is of very Excellent Use for Young Wits to exercise themselves in Reducing loose Discourses to strict ones , or Syllogisms ; For , by endeavouring this , they will , to their Admiration , find how Shallow and far from Evident the Grounds ; how precarious ▪ unprov'd , and oft-times contradictious the particular Assertions ; and how Open and Incoherent the Contexture and Consequences are in many Rhetorical Discourses and Speeches ; which , drest up in fine Language and embell●sht with little Tropes and Figures , and other pretty Tricks of Wit and Fancy , did before look very plausible , and made a gay Appearance of most Excellent Sense . Perhaps scarce any one Expedient can be invented that is more useful to advance Truth , beat down Error , and keep the Generality of Mankind from being deluded , than thus to divest such empty Discourses of their Glossy Out-side ; and to let them see how deformed a Hag Errour will appear to the Eye of Reason , when expos'd stark-naked . Whereas , on the other side , 't is the Glory of Truth to be stript of these Ornamental Tri●●es ; for by this means her Native Beauty and the Symmetry of all her parts will appear more Amiable in the Eye of those who do sincerely affect her . 6. From the third § . it manifestly follows , that , the Consequence of a Syllogism having a self-evident Proposition for its Basis , if upon severe examination , we find that any Discourse does indeed bear that Test , and can be Reduc'd to a rigorous Syllogism ; and the Premisses ( which the Consequence supposes to be True ) be really so , or can be by this Method prov'd True ; it follows , I say , that we may be as perfectly assur'd as that we are that the Conclusion is Consequent , and True ; and , that sooner , may all the Material World crumble into Incoherent Atoms , or relapse into the Abyss of Nothingness , than that any Conclusion , thus deduced , can be False ; since , if it could , then that Identical Proposition , on which the Consequence is grounded , would be False ; and , so a Contradiction would be True ; which falsifies the Metaphysical Verity of Creatures , and of the Ideas of them in the Divine Understanding ; which would consequently shock the Wisdom , and even the Essence of the Godhead it self : For self-existence might not be self-existence if a Contradiction might be True. Corol. II. Were that which is said here , and some other main Hinges of Science , which occur in this Treatise , duely consider'd and well penetrated , it might be hoped , that they would to a fair degree cure the Disease of Scepticism , so Epidemical among our late Wits . For , even the worst of Scepticks will grant that an Identical Proposition must be True ; and he may see here , that by this Doctrin both First Principles must be such , and that all force of Consequence also ( which two are the main Pillars of Science ) must be grounded on such . This last § . requires and supposes that none of the Words which are to signifie any of the three Terms be taken there Equivocally . For , if any of them be taken now in one sense , now in another , that is , if any of these words have , in the same Syllogism , two Meanings or Notions ; then , however the Sound or Character o● that Word may seem the same in a Verbal Syllogism , and make a show of its having only Three Terms ; yet , in a Mental Syllogism , ( which only is Formally and Essentially such ) there are Four Notions of the Extremes , that is , four Terms . Wherefore such a Discourse ( if it be indeed at all such , and not a meer Blunder ) is a Paralogism , or a Fal●e and Deceitful Argumentation , and not a Syllogism ; because a Syllogism ought to be apt to prove the Connexion of Two Terms by their joint-Connexion with a Third , and therefore can consist but of Three Terms . 8. It is most requisite also that a Syllogism be fram'd after the best Manner ; which is done by disposing all its parts in such a Figure as may make the Connexion of the Middle Term with the other Two most Clear ; For , we experience that the placing the Words aptly , renders every Common Discourse clearer ; much more is it requisite in so Nice and Exact a Discourse as a Syllogism is , where there are but Three Terms to be placed . 9. To place the Parts of a Syllogism right , no more is requisit but to place rightly the Middle Term in the Premisses . For , the Proposition that is to be Concluded or Prov'd , and consequently the order of its Terms , is given us to our hands , and already determin●d ; and the C●pula must of necessity still keep its own place . So that nothing more can be requir'd but to place rightly the Middle Term in the Premisses ; for , that done , the Place of the other two Terms , conjoyn'd with it there , must ( as will appear presently ) be likewise necessarily determin'd ; and , so , all the parts of the Syllogism will be placed and ordered as they ought to be . 10. The Middle Term is then placed rightly , when 't is placed in the Middle , or between those other two Terms which it is to conjoyn with one another . This is evident by the Light of Nature ; for , were it not joyn'd to both , it could not be the Means of conjoyning them ; nor could it be joyn'd to both , unless its Notion were in the middle or between both : 11. Hence the Middle Term must be Inferiour in Notion to one of those Terms , and Superiour to the other . For , since ( as has been shown above ) Notions do arise orderly from the Inferiour to the Superiour ones ; it follows , that that Notion is in the Middle between other two which is Inferiour to one of those Notions and Superiour to the other . 12. Wherefore the middle Term must , in the two Propositions which are the Premisses , be the Subject to one of the Terms , and the Predicate to the other . For , since the middle Term must be Inferiour in Notion to one of those Terms , and Superiour to the other ; and the Inferiour or Narrower Notion , by virtue of its place , † is to be the Subject , and the Superiour and Larger Notion the Predicate ; it follows that the Middle Term must be the Subject in one of the Premisses , and the Predicate in the other . For Example , in this Syllogism . Virtue is Laudable , Courtesy is a Virtue , therefore Courtesy is Laudable . The Proposition ( Courtesy is Laudable ) is the Conclusion , and to be Proved ; and so , the placing of it's Terms is already determin'd : The middle Term [ Virtue ] is plac'd in the middle , being subject to , or under Laudable in the Major , and above or Superiour to Courtesy in the Minor. 13. Tho' the place of the Terms of the Conclusion were not determin'd , yet the reason lately given would determin it . For if Laudble be above Virtue , and Virtue above Courtesy , it must follow à fortiori tht Laudable must be above Courtesie , which is the lowest of the Three ; or , that Laudable must be the Predicate in the Conclusion . 14. Wherefore the other two Figures are Unnatural and Monstrous ; For , since Nature has shown us that what conjoyns two Notions ought to be placed in the middle between them , it is against Nature and Reason to place it either above them both , as is done in that they call the Second Figure , or under them both , as is done in that Figure they call the Third . 15. Hence no determinate Conclusion can follow in either of the last Figures from the disposal of the parts in the Syllogism : For , since as appears § 13. the Extreme which is predicated of the middle Term in the Major , has thence a title to be the Predicate in the Conclusion , because it is above the Middle Term , which is the Predicate or above the other Extreme in the Minor ; it follows that , if the Middle Term be twice above or twice below the other two Terms in the Premisses , that Reason ceases ; and , so , it is left indifferent which of the other two Terms is to be the Subject or Predicate in the Conclusion ; and the Indeterminate Conclusion follows not from the Artificial Form of the Syllogism , but meerly from the material Identity of all the three Terms ; or from this , that their Notions are found in the same Ens. Wherefore from these Premisses , Some Laudable thing is Virtue , Courtesy is a Virtue , Or from these , Virtue is Laudable , Some Virtue is Courtesy , The Conclusion might either be , Therefore Courtesy is Laudable , or Some Laudable thing is Courtesy . So that to argue on that fashion , or to make use of these aukward Figures , is not to know certainly the End or Conclusion we aim at , but to shoot our bolt at no determinate Mark , since no determinate Conclusion can in that case follow . 16. From these eight last §§ . it is manifest that nothing can be more Unnatural and more Inartificial , than to invent two other Figures , and then to study how to lay many Elaborate Rules how to reduce them again to the First . For , it will appear by our last Discourse , that this is no better than to use our Wits to contrive how to Erre and goe out of the way ▪ and , when that 's done , to take twice as much pains in shewing how we may get into it again ; whenas we might easily have stay'd in the right way when we were in it , and have sav'd all that Mis-spent Labour . 17. Wherefore , if an Adversary puts a Syllogism in Baroco or Bocardo , or in any Mood of the two last mishapen Figures , the Respondent ought , by the Reason here given , to shew him plainly , and then tell him roundly , that his Syllogism is Illogical and Inartificial , and require of him to mend it . And , if the Opponent , to justifie his proceeding , alledges Universal Custom of the Schools , then to tell him smartly that no Authority , Custome or Prescription ought to be allow'd as a Iust Plea against Reason in Matters subject to Reason ; And that Art ought to perfect , and not to pervert Nature . Nor can the Arguer have any Just Reason to make use of those two last Figures , since ( as will shortly be shown ) all Questions what ever may be prov'd in the First Figure . Nay , he will be convicted of seeking to blunder and obscure Truth , and not to clear it ; since he leaves a plain and easie path of Reasoning for an Intricate and Perplext one . LESSON II. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism ; and of the Laws of Concluding . 1. THE Right Figure or Position of the Lesser Parts of a Syllogism , ( viz. it's Terms ) being shown to be but one , and the force of it's Consequence , in which consists it's Essence , being still the same ; the Variety of Syllogisms , or the several sorts or Moods of them can only be taken from its greater Parts , the Propositions , or from something belonging to them . This is manifest , because there is nothing , besides these , from which the Distinction of those Moods can be taken . 2. The Moods of Syllogisms may be in part taken from the Quantity of the several Propositions . For , since the Essence of a Syllogism , or the force of Consequence does consist in the Connexion or Identification of Two Terms with a Third ; and , to be universally or particularly Identify'd , are evidently divers Manners of being Identify'd ; 'T is manifest that the variety of Syllogisms may be in part taken from the Quantity of the Propositions . 3. The Moods , or several manners of Syllogisms must be taken also in part from the Propositions being Affirmative or Negative : For , since Affirmative Propositions do express the Agreement of the two Extremes with the Middle Term , and those which are Negative their Disagreement with it ; and this Agreement or Disagreement with it have equal Influence upon the Consequence , and diversifie it , or make it follow after a diverse manner ; it follows that the Moods or Manners of a Syllogism must also be taken from those Propositions being Affirmative or Negative . 4. As it is self-evident that the same is the same with it self ; so it is equally self-evident that what is Different or Diverse from another is not the same with it , or different from it . This is Evident both by the Rule of Contraries , as also because this Proposition is Identical as well as the other . 5. The Quantity and Quality which ought to be in the several Propositions of the Syllogisms of each Mood , are by a kind of Art of Memory , signifi'd by these four words , Barbara , Celarent , Darii , Fe●i● in which the three Syllables correspond to the three Propositions found in a Syllogism ; and the Vowels in each Syllable tell us the Quantity and Quality of each Proposition . A and E signifying an Universal Affirmative and Negative ; I and O a Particular Affirmative and Negative . 6. We are also to reflect on what was shown above , that , in the way of Predication , an Universal is consider'd as a kind of Whole in respect of the Particulars contain'd under it , and the Particulars are conceiv'd to be Parts of that Whole ; whence an Universal Proposition expresses the Identity of its Terms in the Whole or Totally , and a Particular one but in part . 7. The distinction of Moods may also in some part be taken from the Conclusions in the several Syllogisms . For , since those Conclusions are all of them Propositions , and all Propositions ( Singular ones excepted , as not belonging to Science ) must be either Universal Affirmatives or Universal Negatives , Particular Affirmatives , or Particular Negatives ; and the Vowels in the last Syllable of those four Words do answer to all these several Conclusions , and the two Vowels in the two former Syllables of each word do tell us of what Nature the Premisses must be , if we would conclude such Propositions : it follows that the number of those several Moods , or several manners of Concluding , may , in some sort , be taken from the Propositions that are to be prov'd or Concluded , as from the End we aim at , and by which we are to contrive or cast our Premisses . 8. Hence , as we shew'd before there ought to be but one Figure , so 't is shown here , that there can be no more Moods of that Figure Necessary but these Four now mentioned ; because these do fully direct us ( as far as concerns the Form of a Syllogism ) how to Conclude or Prove all the several Questions or Theses that can be ask'd , or propos●d to be Prov'd . And , since all these Moods do belong to that which they call the First Figure , hence also , by the way , is farther confirmed what we prov'd above , that there cannot need , and therefore ought not to be , any more than that one Figure . 9. But , because in treating of the Method to Science , we ought not to deviate from that Method our selves while we are shewing it to others ; hence , we become oblig'd not barely to tell the Reader , as it were by rote , how the Syllogisms in each Mood do conclude , or by pretty Inventions to help their Memory how to do this ; but we are bound to inform their Understanding , and to shew them why such Premisses must necessarily inferr such Conclusions as those four Words do hint to us ; or , which is in a manner the same , why or for what reason such Conclusions must follow from such Premisses . 10. As the substance of the Connexion of the Terms in the Conclusion depends wholly on the Connexion of them with the Middle Term in the Premisses , so the Degree of their Connexion in the Conclusion must depend on the Degree of their Connexion with it in the said Premisses . This is evident , because all the Connexions those Extremes have , is from their Connexion with the Medium ; wherefore , if they be more Connected with the Middle Term in the Premisses , they must be more Connected with one another in the Conclusion ; if less , less Connected . 11. Hence , from two Premisses which are both of them Universal Affirmatives must follow a Conclusion Vniversally Affirmative ; because the Middle Term in the Premisses was Totally or Universally the same with one of the Extremes , and the other Extreme Totally or Vniversally the same with it ; whence follows , that those Extremes must be Totally or Vniversally the same with one another in the Conclusion . For example . Bar-Every Body is Divisible , ba-Every Atome is a Body , therefore ra-Every Atome is Divisible . 12. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium in the Major , and the Medium Universally Affirm'd of the other in the Minor , the Conclusion must be an Vniversal Negative . For , were the Extremes to any degree the same in the Conclusion , when one of them is Totally the same with the Medium in the Minor , and Totally not the same with it in the Major , it would follow that the Middle Term would be ( in part at least ) not the same with it's self , as being in part Identify'd with two Extremes , which are not Identify'd at all . For Example . Ce — no Indivisible thing is Corruptible , la — Every Spirit is an Indivisible thing , therefore rent — No Spirit is Corruptible 13. When one of the Premisses affirms Universally , the other Particularly , the Conclusion must be a particular Affirmative . For tho' one of the Extremes be Universally or Totally connected with the Medium , yet the other Extreme is but Particularly or in part Connected with it : and so , it can never infer the Total Connexion of them , nor can the Conclusion be an Universal Affirmative * because they were not to that degree Connected with the Medium in the Premisses . For Example , Da — Every Good Man is Charitable , ri — Some Rich Man is a Good Man ; Therefore i — Some Rich Man is Charitable . 14. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium , and the Medium particularly affirm'd of the other Extreme , the Conclusion must be a particular Negative . For , were the Terms Totally the same in the Minor , as it was in Celarent , then the Terms of the Conclusion had been not at all the same , but Vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there ; wherefore , being but in part the same in the Minor , they can only be in part not the same in the Conclusion . For Example , Fe-No harmful thing is to be used , ri — Some Mirth is a harmful thing , therefore o — Some Mirth is not to be used . From these Grounds , the Reason may be given for diverse Maxims or Axioms , commonly used by Logicians , concerning this present matter ; telling us when and how the Conclusions follow or not follow ; such as are , 15. From two Vniversal Negatives nothing follows . Because neither Extreme is Connected with the Medium , either in whole or in part ; nor , from this that two Notions are different from a Third , is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another . Wherefore , a Syllogism being such an Artificial and perfectly order'd Discourse , that , putting the Premisses to be True , the Conclusion must be True also , such as this ( and the same may be said in part of those other that follow ) wanting that due Connexion of the Terms which is Essential to a Syllogism ; are not Syllogisms , but Paralogisms , v. g. No Brute is Rational No Man is a Brute ; Therefore No Man is Rational 16. From two particular Propositions nothing follows . For a Particular Proposition expressing but some part of the whole Notion of the Middle Term with which it is joyn'd , and there being more parts in that whole Notion , one of the Extremes may be united with it according to one part or Consideration of it , and the other according to another part ; in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the Conclusion : v. g. Some Man is a Fool. Some Wise Man is a Man , Therefore Some Wise Man is a Fool Where some Man , the Medium , is taken for a diverse Part as it were , of Man in common ; and so the Medium , as considered according to it's Parts which are Diverse , is not One it self : nor , consequently , can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self , which is the Fundamental Ground of all Consequence . Corol. Hence follows immediatly that one of the Premisses must be an Vniversal , else nothing is Concluded . Which deserves Remarking , this being useful to confute some Wrong Methods to Science . 17. A Negative Conclusion cannot be deduced from Affirmative Premisses . Because , if the Extremes were the same with the Medium in the Premisses , and not the same with one another in the Conclusion , it would follow that the Middle Term is the same and not the same with it self ; or else , that the Connexion or Inconnexion of the Terms in the Conclusion is not to be taken from the Connexion or Inconnexion with the Middle Term in the Premisses , which utterly subverts all Ground of Discoursing . 18. The Conclusion cannot be Vniversal , unless the Medium be once taken Vniversally in the Premisses . Because , otherwise , both the Premisses would be Particulars ; from which ( as was proved § . 16. ) no Conclusion can follow . 19. The Conclusion always follows the worser part ; that is , it must be Negative or Particular , if either of the Premisses be such . The reason of the former is , because , if either of the Premisses be Negative , then the Medium is not the same with one of the Terms of the Conclusion ; and , therefore , it can never be the cause of Identifying them both , which is done by inferring an Affirmative Conclusion . The reason of the latter is , because if it be only in part the same with one of the Extremes , it cannot prove those Extremes to be wholly the same , which can only be done by their being united with it universally ; for it can give no greater degree of Connexion to the two Extremes than it self has with them , as was shown § . 10. These Maxims or Positions being shown to be Rational , and necessarily Consequent to the Grounds of Rigorous or Syllogistical Discoursing , we proceed in our intended Method . 20. A Singular Proposition may supply the Place of a Particular one in the Minor of Darii and Ferio . For a Singular or Individual Notion is , in reality , some part of the Common Notion ; and the words [ Some Man ] or [ Some Men ] do signify some Individual Man , or Men ; wherefore , abating the manner of the Indeterminate Expression , the sense is the same in both . Hence these are right Syllogisms and Conclusive . Da-Every Philosopher resolves Effects into their Proper Causes , ri — Aristotle is a Philosopher ; therefore i — Aristotle resolves Effects into their Proper Causes . Fe-No Man who supposes his Grounds gratis is a Philosopher , ri — Epicurus supposes his Grounds gratis ; therefore , o — Epicurus is not a Philosopher . 21. Expository Syllogisms , that consist of Singular Propositions are true and perfect Syllogisms . For , since a Syllogism is such a Discourse as from the Clear Connexion of a Middle Notion with the two Extremes inferrs the Connexion of those Extremes with one another , and Singulars have their Notions as well as Universals , and may be connected with one another ; it follows that ( in case these Discourses be not Faulty in other respects ) they cannot , from the regard of their consisting wholly of Singulars , be degraded from being true and perfect Syllogisms . v. g. Tom Long brought me a Letter This Man is Tom Long ; Therefore This Man brought me a Letter . 22. Such Syllogisms do not advance Science . For , since we experience that our Soul is not only Capable of having Universal Notions , but that 't is her peculiar Nature to Abstract , that is , to draw Singular Notions to Universal ones ; and , since Notions are the Ground of all Knowledge , and , consequently , Universal Notions of Universal Knowledges ; and Science is a Perfection of our Mind according to her Nature ; and , therefore , does dilate and enlarge her Natural Capacity by Extending it to the Knowledge of Vniversal Truths : Wherefore , since , on the other side , an Expository Syllogism , as consisting of Singulars ; can Conclude , or gain the Soul knowledge of no more but some one Singular , it Cramps , Contracts or makes Narrow her Natural Capacity ; whence it follows , that such Syllogisms are far from Perfecting the Soul , or from generating Science , which is her Natural Perfection . 23. Hence follows , that such Syllogisms are good for Vse and Practise , and only for That : For , since such Syllogisms are True Discourses , and , therefore , are not wholly in vain , but must be good for something ; Wherefore , since they conduce not at all to Speculation or generating Science ; it follows that they must be good for Vse or Practise , and for that only . Again , since all Outward Action , Use and Practise is wholly employ'd about such Subjects as Exist , and nothing Exists but Suppositums , Individuums , or Singulars ; it follows , that Singulars are the Proper Subjects of Artificers , or such as work Outwardly upon Determinate Matters ; and the Knowledge of the Nature of those Singulars is Useful and Necessary for such men ; for , by this , they know how to work upon those Subjects and Manage them accordingly . For example , an Architect by knowing the certain Quantities and Proportions of his Materials ( Wood , Brick , or Stone , ) may build a House ; but he cannot , without the Science of Mathematicks , have a Clear knowledge ( out of the Natures of those Quantities ) why it must be so always , though it hit to do so once , or hic est nunc . Note that Practical Self evidence may oftentimes ( as was shown formerly ) in a great Measure supply here the place of Science , and Operate like it ; though it can never arrive to that Clear and Grounded Penetration into the reasons of such , Actions as is found in Scientifical Men. 24. Hence , the way of arguing by Induction can never breed Science . First , because out of pure Particulars nothing follows . Next , because to Argue from some Part or Parts to the Whole , is Inconsequent . Wherefore , we cannot thence Inferr an Vniversal Proposition or gain Science of any Nature , unless we could enumerate all the Singulars in the World , that is , all the Parts so to make up an Equivalent to the Whole , which is Impossible . 25. Hence follows immediatly that some Vniversal Proposition must be taken in if we would Conclude any thing from a Singular one . This has been amply Show'd above ; and , accordingly , in Mathematicks Vniversal Maxims and Axioms use to be first laid , without which nothing in any Subject can be known scientifically . 26. Further , 't is collected from our former Discourse that Hypotheticall or Conditional Syllogisms are , in proper Speech , no Legitimate Syllogisms ; nor , consequently , can they generate Science , but by seeing , in common and confusedly , they are the same in sense with Categorical ones . For , since we cannot see Evidently the Truth of any Conclusion or have Science of it , but by seeing Evidently the Connexion of the Two Extremes with the Middle Term ; and , this cannot be seen Evidently unless all the Terms be posturd in their right place , as is done in the First Figure ; therefore , since neither this Clear Position of the Terms , nor any thing like it , is found in Hypothetical Syllogisms , they are not in proper Speech , Syllogisms ; any more than are some sort of more concise Rhetorical Discourses , which have oftentimes virtually the sense of a Categorical Syllogism in them , though the parts of it be disjoynted and out of that due Order that ought to be in a Syllogism . 27. Wherefore all Hypothetical Syllogisms ought in Disputes to be reduced to Categorical ones . For , the Major neither absolutely affirms nor denies ; and therefore cannot be absolutely either affirm'd or deny'd . Next , the same Major proposition has a kind of Consequence in its single self ; and so is a kind of imperfect Syllogism even taken alone . 3ly . It does not identifie it's Terms ; and , lastly , unless they be reduced to Categorical ones , the Figure of its parts cannot clearly appear . 28. The way to reduce them is to vary the phrase or tenour of the Words , still keeping the same sense . For example this Hypothetical , ( If Science be a perfection of the mind it ought to sought after . But Science is a perfection of the Mind ; Therefore Science ought to be sought after . ) May easily be reduced to a Categorical Syllogism in Barbara thus . What ever is a perfection of the Mind ought to be look'd after . But all Science is a perfection of the mind , therefore All Science ought to be look'd after . 29. For some of the same reasons Disjunctive Syllogisms ought to be reduced to Categorical ones , as It is either Day or Night . But it is not day ; Therefore 'T is Night . Which may be reduced to a Categorical in Darii thus . Da-What ever time is not Day is Night ri — This present time is not Day , therefore i — This present time is Night . LESSON III. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism ; or , what Middle ▪ Term is proper for Demonstration . THE right Manner of framing a Conclusive Syllogism , or of drawing a Consequence right , which is the Form of it , being thus laid open from its Grounds ; there remains no more to be done as to the Attainment of Science , but to shew what is the proper Matter of such a rigorous Discourse : For , since the Matter and Form do constitute the whole Essence or Nature of every thing ; if both these be made known , there can nothing more be wanting for us to conclude or prove Evidently ; which is the sole end and aim of the whole Art of Logick . Wherefore , all the elaborate Rules that occurr in common Logicians , which conduce not to this end , are Frivolous , and meerly invented for vain Show and Ostentation ; and are so far from advancing Science , that they pester the way to it by making in more Perplext and Intricate , which obstructs the attainment of it . 2. Such a Middle Term as is Proper to conjoyn the other two is the only Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism . For ; since there can be in a Lawful Syllogism but Three Terms , and Two of them are given to our hands in the Thesis to be proved , and the right Placing of those Terms belongs to the Form of it ; there is no Consideration left that can be conceiv'd to be the Matter of it , or which , joyn'd with the Former , makes it Evidently Conclude , but such a Middle Term which is apt to conjoyn the other Two in the Conclusion . 3. Wherefore , such a Term being found and order'd in the right Form , nothing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition whatever . For , this done , the Conclusion so necessarily follows , that it is as Impossible it should not be True as it is that an Identical Proposition should be False ; or ( which is the same ) that a Contradiction should be True , which are the highest Impossibilities . Wherefore , since to have Science of any thing , is to know evidently the thing is so and cannot but be so , and this is known by the means now mentioned ; it follows that no thing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition whatever . 4. Hence such a Syllogism is Demonstrative , and to produce or frame such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate : For , since a Demonstration bears in its Notion that it must be the most Certain and most Evident Proof than can be ; and no Proof can be more Certain than that which renders it absolutely Impossible the Conclusion should not be True ; nor more Evident than that which engages immediately the highest Evidence of an Identical Proposition ; and all this ( as has been prov'd ) is found in a Syllogism consisting of such a Matter and such a Form , it follows that such a Syllogism is a Demonstrative one , and that to Prove by such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate . 5. All Middle Terms that are Proper for Demonstration must be taken Originally from the Nature of the Thlng or from it's Metaphysical Verity , For , since all Inferiour Truths are therefore such because they are finally resolvable into Identical Propositions which are the First Truths ; that is , because those First Truths are virtually in them ; and Identical propositions are therefore true ( because the thing is what it is , in which consists its Metaphysical verity ; it follows that the Verity of all Inferiour Truths ( such as are the Premisses ) on whose Truth all Demonstration and Truth of the Conclusion necessarily depends , is taken originally from the Metaphysical verity of the Subject and Predicate . Again , since ( as has been shown ) the force of all Consequence is grounded on this that the Middle Term is the same with it's self , or what it is ; It follows that the Force of all Middle Terms that any way conduce to Demonstration must be taken originally from the Nature of the Thing , or from it's Metaphysical Verity . 6. We can have no Demonstration of the Whole Thing taken in gross . For , the Whole Thing , as was said , may be consider'd diverse wayes , and so ground many Notions , and contains in it confusedly what corresponds to all those Notions we can frame of it ; since then we cannot have at once a Distinct and Clear knowledg of what corresponds formally to any two Notions , it follows that we can have no Demonstration ( or Distinct and Clear Knowledg ) of the whole thing taken in Gross . 7. Wherefore , if we would demonstrate the Nature of the Thing according to what 's Essential to it , we must take in pieces , Unfold , Explicate , and , as it were , Detail the Thing into it's Essential Parts , that so we may look more clearly thro' it's Nature or Essence ; which is done by Definitions of the Whole first , and then of it's several Essential Parts , till we come to those Parts of it which are most known , or to the Common Head. For , we experience that we have but a Confused Notion of a Thing while it is exprest but in One Word ; but , when Many Words are used to tell the Nature of it , our knowledg of it grows Clearer , and still more Clear and Distinct after each of those Words also has It's Meaning told , or is Defind . For Example , ask what such a Thing is , it is answer'd a Man ; which gives us , indeed , a True but a Confused Knowledg of it . Whence we may have occasion to ask farther what is a Man ? and the Answer is a Rational Animal ; which clears the Notion of Man to a fair degree . But , the word Animal is also Confused , tho' less than Homo was ; wherefore , to gain a more Distinct Knowledg of it , we set our selves to define It , and we find it to be a Living or Self-moving Thing that is Sensitive , or which is mov'd by Impression on the Senses . And thus still to gain Clearer Light of more and more Essential Notions or Considerations of Man , we may drive on farther the Definitions of the ascending Genus till we come to Ens or Substantia , which is the Supreme in that Line , ( and the Clearest of any except Existence ) which stints our quest . By which way of defining still upwards , we gain many Distinct Notions of Man's Essence , which were before confusedly blended in the single word [ Man ] . And , were the Collateral Differences , which constitute the Inferiour notions to Ens , Defin'd too as well as each Genus , descending in a right Line from it , we should gain a most Distinct and clear Essential Notion of Man. 8. It remains to define the Difference [ Rational ] which is the other Essential Notion that compounds the Entire Notion of Man. If we ask then what Reason is , it will be answer'd that it is a Faculty of Deducing some new knowledg out of foregoing ones ; or ( to express it in the Language of Art ) to draw a Proposition call'd the Conclusion from two other true ones call'd the Premisses . To know more distinctly what this Definition means , we may ask what a Proposition is , and what True means , and it will be answered that a Proposition is defin'd , A Speech by which one Notion is Affirm'd ( or Deny'd ) of another . Next , ask what a Notion is and we are answer'd by the Definition of it , that a Notion is the very Thing as conceiv'd by us , or , the Thing as existing in our Understanding . Ask what True is , it is answer'd , it is the Conformity of what is in our Mind to the Thing without us . Ask what Affirming is , it is answered , it is the Comparing one of the Terms of ●he Proposition to the other , or seeing they both ●gree in the same Ens. Ask what Deducing is , ●nd 't is answer'd 't is a Comparing two Terms ●o a Third , and seeing them to be the same with it , and thence the same with one another ; All which being known , we shall have gain'd ●he Distinct and Clear Notion of Reasoning or Exact Discoursing , and consequently of Rationa●ity , the Power which produces that Act. 9. Hence Proper Middle Terms may be taken from the Line of Ens ( and the same may be said of any other Common Head ) for Demonstrations of any Truth that belongs Essen●ially to any Notion or Nature in those ●espective Lines . For they are taken from the Definitions , afforded us by the Genus and Dif●erence in each Line , both parts of which De●initions are Essential . 10. Tho' when it happens otherwise it wrongs not the Demonstration , yet this is best done when the Superiour Notion is predicated of that which is the Immediate Inferiour , and that Inferiour of the Notion immediately under it . For then the Middle Term is not by our Choice or Ordering , but ex naturâ rei placed in the middle between them . as Every Animal is a Living thing , Every Man is an Animal , therefore Every Man is a Living thing . Every Man is an Animal . Peter is a Man , therefore Peter is an Animal . 10. The same may be said when any of the Intrinsecal Differences is used for the Middle Term ; even tho' it be Remote , in the same Line , from one of the Extremes ; as Every Sensitive thing is an Animal , Every Worm is a Sensitive thing ; Therefore Every Worm is an Animal . The same holds in all the rest , whether they be Generical or Differential Notions ; whether Immediate or Mediate . For , the same Reason concludes for one as for the other . viz. because all such are Essential Predicates ; and , being found in the same Essence , are not only Identify'd in the same Thing materially , as is done when in a true Proposition the Subjects and Predicates are in Distinct Lines as Aethiops est niger ; but being , either expresly , or by consequence , Included in some part of the Definition , the Formality of one is , in some part , the Formality of the others ; as the Notions of Ens , Corpus , Mixtum , Vivens , Sensituum , are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo . The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions . Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and integrate the Definition . Note that the Genus must be Immediate ; because , otherwise , it confounds the Intermemediate Notions with the Species ; and , so , gives a less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd . Hence , Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo ; because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly , or in part , speak the Notion or Nature of Animal . Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Difference of Ens and Vivens . 12. Hence Dichotomy , or a Division made by two Members , is the best . For , in such a Division , the Parts , if rightly exprest , may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole . That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd . As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible ; ( that is not-Divisible ) of Animal into Rational and Irrational ; ( that is not-Rational ) of Number , into Odd and Even ( or not-Odd ) For , since there can be no Middle between Contradictories , it is Evident there can be no more Members than Two ; and , consequently , that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole . 13. The Whole Definition , and All the Members of a Division that is rightly made , ( if taken together , ) may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration . For both of these , taken together , are Equivalent to the Whole Notion Defin'd and Divided ; and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word , as by Man. Animal , &c. v. g. Every Rational Animal is capable of Science , Every Clown is a Rational Animal , therefore Every Clown is Capable of Science . What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion , All Number is either Even or Odd , therefore All Number is capable of Proportion . 14. Out of what has been proved 't is seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science . For , since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing ; and , therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg ( such as Science ought to be ) from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented ; and this ( as has been shown ) is done by Definitions ; it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science . 15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this ; when two Notions , by being Remote , seem in a manner Disparate , and , so , the Proposition is Obscure ; we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally Identical appears in both of them , Which done , all farther disquisition ceases , and the Point is demonstrated . For example ; If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable , we shall find that the word [ Laudable ] signifies [ deserving to be spoke well of ] and Practical Self-Evidence , as well as Reason , telling us , that , our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Mankind to express their thoughts , that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of ; and that what 's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks , or to true Reason , deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good , that is , thought well of , To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Disposition to Act according to True Reason , it comes to appear that [ Virtuo ] and [ Laudable ] have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical ; and that this Proposition , [ Virtue is Laudable ] is full as Certain as that What 's according to right Reason is according to right Reason , or what 's Laudable is Laudable ; which seen , perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of [ Virtue is Laudable ] that is , 't is the Proposition ; Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated . Note hence that , in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles , Rigorous Definitions do not alwayes need , but Explications of the two Notions ( or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms ) may serve , so they be True and Solid ; since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the Inferiour Truths , and the Notions that compound them , into Superiour ones . For which reason also Practical Self-evidence , or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts , through Converse with those Natural Objects , is sufficient : For this is a Solid Knowledg , tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape . Whence it may Suffice oftentimes without Framing the Demonstration , coucht in these Discourses , into a Syllogistick Method ; unless the Form of the Discourse be Deny'd . 16. Hence follows , that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions , and are Grounded on them . For , since all Truths are therefore such , because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing , or to its being what it is , which is express'd by an Identical Proposition ; it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them . 17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction , and is grounded on it . For , since all Truths , as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing , are grounded on the things being what it is , and so have an Identical Proposition for their Bases ; therefore , for the same reason , every Error , being a Dis-conformity to the Thing , or a Deviation from its being what it is , must be Grounded on this , as its first Principle , that the Thing is not what it is , which is a perfect Contradiction . 18. Hence follows necessarily , that , if Art and Industry be not wanting , Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evid●nt or an Identical Proposition , and every Errour to a Contradiction . For , since these ( as has been prov'd ) are the Bas●s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Falshoods ; and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods , that is , from Identical Propositions or Contradictions ; it follows that , either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known , or be Knowable or Provable to be such ; or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Propositions or to Contradictions , as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity . Corol. I. Hence follows that , all Learning being Knowledge , those Men only ought to be accounted , Absolutely speaking , True Schollars or perfectly Learned , who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour ; that is , thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing , or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute . By which it will appear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned , by the Generality , meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors : Since the Former know the Truth of the Things , or of the Subjects discours'd of ; These only know it to be True , that such and such Authors , say thus or thus . Those are such Schollars as have God and Nature for their Masters . These are only the Schollars of meer Men ; who , if they take not this way , speak out of Fancy , which is Ungrounded , and therefore Various and Inconstant : Whence , such Men of Reading use to fill their Heads with a gallimowfry of thrums ends of Sayings glean'd from diverse Logicians or Philosophers discoursing thus or thus ; but if you put them to Demonstrate any point , or to Reduce it to its First Principles , they are utterly at a Loss . A certain Sign they do not , in true speech , know any thing . Corol. II. Were the Method of Reducing Truths , as is abovesaid , well settled , Probability in Speculatives ( which is the bane of Science ) would be quite dash'd out of countenance , and sham'd out of the Schools . To do which , how highly it conduces to the Advancement of Science , is ●●sily discernible by the dimmest Eye . LESSON IV. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition ; and consequently , every Errour to a Contradiction ; What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another ; and of the Science of Pure Spirits . 1. TO Reduce any Truth to an Identical Proposition is nothing but to show clearly that , if you deny such a Truth , you must , by consequence , deny the Identical one which is proper to that Subject , and expresses its being what it is . For , since the Reducing Inferiour Truths in any Subject to those which are Supreme or Identical is perform'd by way of Discourse or drawing Consequences ; and , it is Evident that those Propositions which are Inferiour Truths , and the Supreme ones cannot be the same Formally and Expresly ; it follows that they can only be the same Virtually , or as one Truth is Included in another . Wherefore as Deducing is nothing but Deriving downwards the verity which was in some Higher Truths to the Inferiour ones ; so Reducing is the carrying upwards or Resolving those Inferiour Truths into those Higher ones on which they Depend , and the showing them to be by consequence the Same ; or that the Inferiour Thesis must needs be True , if the Identical or Supreme one be so ; and that the Supreme one cannot be True , unless the Inferiour one be such also : So that the verity of the Supreme Truth does by consequence stand engag'd in the Patronage of the Inferiour one . L●mma . All Essences consist in an Indivisible . For , since Essence is the Form of the Ens , and Ens that which is Capable of Existing , and nothing can Exist but that which is Ultimately determin'd in the line of Ens , and distinguisht from all others in that Line ; and , any Essential Predicate taken away , it wants Part of its Essence , that is , Part of that which was to Constitute it such an Ens , and distinguish it from all others , that is , which Determin it to be This ; it follows that the Notion of Ens or Essence requires a Totality of all its Essential parts : But a Totality ( since the least part defalkt from it makes it to be no Totum ) consists in an Indivisibility ; therefore All Essences consist in an Indivisible . 2. Hence an easie way is chalkt out how to Reduce any Truth to an Identical Proposition or any Errour to a Contradiction . For , let but the Subject of the Discourse ( Homo for example ) be Defin'd , and the two parts of its Definition be Defind likewise , and so forwards ; we shall have gain'd a clear and distinct Notion of the Subject , and of all its Essential parts . If , then , the Discourse be about the Nature or Essence of Homo ; all the Divisions of the parts of that Essence , which are Common Notions , being ( as they ought ) made by Contradictory Differences , and this from the Notion of Ens to the very Notion Discours'd of ; consequently , that Discourse must either evidently clash with and Contradict some one of those Essential Parts , or Agree to them All. If it contradicts any one of them , then , since Essences consist in an Indivisible , it does , by consequence , destroy the whole Essence of the Subject , and make homo not to be homo ; and , if it Agrees with All its parts , then , since , All the parts are evidently the whole , 't is by consequence as Certain as it is that Homo is Homo ; since to say that Homo is an Ens , and such an Ens as is Corpus , and such a Corpus as is Compounded , and such a Compound Body as is Vivens , and such a Vivens , as is Sensitive or an Animal , and such an Animal as can have Notions in it , and can Compare one Notion to another , and two to a Third , is evidently to say in Equivalent Terms Homo est Homo : 3. Another Method of Resolving all Truths into Identical Propositions is to Define both the Subject and Predicate , and to pursue their Definitions till some Notion that is perfectly Identical appears in both ; as is Instanced in this proposition [ Virtue is Laudable ] in the last Lesson § . 15. 4. Moreover , all Conclusions formally as such , that is , considering them as Inferr'd or Concluded , are resolv'd finally into this Identical Proposition , [ The same is the same with its self ] as has been demonstrated above B. 2. L. 3. § . 10. 5. Wherefore , the Method being settled of Reducing to Identical Propositions both Inferiour Truths , which are the Premisses ; and , also the Necessity of the Following of the Conclusions from their respective Premisses , which is the Consequence ; it is hard to conceive what can be farther wanting to the Method to Science ; so these Rules be thorowly penetrated , and industriously put in Practice . 6. All Truths whatever that concern the Essences of things , if we have but Notions of the Terms of the Propositions which express them , do come within the Compass of this Method , and are Demonstrable . For , since all Truths , whose Terms we understand , do consist of Notions ; and , it s not hard to know to what Common Head those Notions do belong , nor insuperably hard to Divide by Proper Differences that Common Head ; nor the less General Notions under that Head , till we come to the very Notions whose Connexion is in question ; it follows , that all Propositions belonging to any Head , are , for the same reason , equally Reducible to their Proper Identicals ; since all the Predicates in the nine last Common Heads , which are Analogically Entia , have also their Analogical Essences ; of which we can have as clear and distinct Notions as we have of the First Common Head which is properly Ens ; and , so we can as easily define their Abstract Notions as we can the other , ( or rather much more easily ) and consequently Reduce them to their Identicals . 7. Hence we can Discourse Scientifically , or have true Science , not only of Quantities , which are the Subject of Mathematicks ; but , with equal reason , of Virtues and Vices , which are the Subject of Ethicks . For , we can equally Abstract the Notions of the several Virtues , have a Distinct Conception of them , equally define them , and by that means equally Reduce them to their Identicals . And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly , as Heat , Cold , Moist , Dry : &c. Note , that in such as these , if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus , as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two , and are not Contradictory to one another ; then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them , or their Sayings concerning them , For such Qualities , being sensible ones , are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind , and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men . Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them , they ( if enow of them be collected ) must give us the true Notion of them ; or which is all one , of what they mean by the Word that expresses them , which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition . For example , when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist , we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about , and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so ; or they bid their Servants do it . On the Contrary , they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard , or on a Shelf ; and never put them in a Vessel , or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub , out of fear they should squander about . Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities ; viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure , and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing ; and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure , and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another ; which are the very Definitions , which that great Observer of Nature , Aristotle , gives us of those two Qualities . Note II. Whence we may , with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks , reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth , who unenviously bestows knowledge on all , who will dispose themselves to receive it ; that , where-ever Art , by reason of our Shortness , is at a plunge , he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence , or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar : whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art , to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature ; whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning . — Sus Minervam — 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses ; For , since the Premisses , by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it , have in them the whole force of the Consequence ; and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition , which can be nothing but the Conclusion ; it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses . Again , since , before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude , and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses , and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded ; it follows evidently that , since we know the Conclusion , e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it , to be in the Premisses , it is there virtually . 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another . For , since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions , and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses ; and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first , or for one single one ; it follows that , let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point , the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them . 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions ; and , consequently , in the Definitions . For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things , and from their Metaphysical verity , and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally ; and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions , and in all its parts by the Definitions ; it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions , and , consequently , in the Definitions . 11. From what 's lately said , 't is evinced that , if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect , the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses . For , though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing ; yet , since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause , and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it ; and , the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the * Existence of such a Cause ( which is sutable to its Essence ) imprinted upon the Patient ; hence , such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another ; and therefore nothing hinders , but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths , and this throughout the whole Course of Nature , from the very Creation , are virtually in one another , For , since , as will be more clearly seen hereafter , all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes , and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects ; and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion ; and so were apt to Inferr one another all along ; that is , new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses ; and , consequently , the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses ; it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another , and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation . 13. Hence , had we liv'd in every Place , and in every part of Time , where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects , and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance , and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work ; we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects , through the whole Series or Course of the World , from the beginning to the end ; except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course . For , in that case , all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration , as well as any single Subject does now ; Wherefore , if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid , and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance , it had been done . 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature , and this all at once , at the first Instant of her Separation . For , since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes , and Proper Effects , and those Mutually inferr one another ; that is , the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other , as being Virtually in one another , and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not fill'd by knowing many Truths , but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more ; and , being clear of the Body , she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy , but intimately and necessarily present to her self , and , consequently , to what is in her self ; and so is Addicted , Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body , and , consequently of her self , as being the Form of that Body , and fitted for it ; and , by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self , that is ( as was shown ) all Nature ; and this , not Successively , one Truth after another , as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy , and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace , but , being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible ▪ and so not commensurable to Time , or to before and after , which are the Differences of Time , she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit , that is , at the Instant of her Separation . These things being evidently so , it follows that every Soul separated from the Body , that knew any one Natural Truth , knows all Nature , and this , all at once , in the first instant of her Separation . But of this more hereafter . Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels , and how Angels must know things Intuitively . For , since they have no Senses , they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses ; nor , consequently , can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition ; much less can they Discourse , or Compare Two Notions to a Third , and so deduce thence New Knowledges , call'd Conclusions : It is left therefore , that they must a tone view , comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing , and all that is in it , which we express by an Identical Proposition . Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs , abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition ( which too is the least that is Imaginable ) is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals . By which we see that the Supremum Infimi , in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge , is ( as the Order of Entities requires ) contiguous as it were , to that which is Superiour to it . Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do . For , though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive , as is the Angels ; yet , because her natural Genius led and forced her here to d●scourse and gather one Truth by another , that is , to see one Truth in another ; hence , she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here , though she cannot in that State exercise it ; and that , though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths , yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another , or following one another by Consequence . We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude . When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective , all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves , and we see them too all at once ; yet , they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another , even to a vast distance ; observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness , according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous . So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her , and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding ; yet , because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse , that is , by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths , she sees them as following one another , or , as it were , beyond one another ; because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves , but depending on the others for their Evidence . LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes . 1. THere must necessarily be † Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature . For , since Nothing can do Nothing , it follows that Nothing can be Done , unless there be something that Does or Acts , that is unless there be an Efficient Cause . Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient , which is the Matter on which it works , or the Material Cause . And it must work something in that Matter , which , being Received in it , must be some Form ( either Substantial or Accidental ) which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally , or be the Formal Cause of it . And , since the Orderer of all Nature , or the First Cause , is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance , ( for whàt's Blind can Order nothing ) and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World , and , being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design , that is , with prospect of some End in every thing that is done , how great or minute soever ; and e●ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World , in their several Stations , under him ▪ ( wh●●her they be Angels or Men ) do , for the same reason , act Designingly too ; that is , do propose to themselves some end , Good , Reason or Mo●ive for which they Act , and without ●hich 't is against their Nature to Act ; and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being , and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him ; hence , there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World , how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem . Wherefore , there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to ev●ry Effect in Nature , viz. The Efficient , Ma●●rial , Formal , and Final . For Example , in my Action of Writing a Letter , the Efficient Cause is my self : the Material Cause , is the Paper ; the Formal , the Characters drawn in the Paper ; and the Final , to gratify my friend , acquaint him with News , &c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature , how Remote soever it is from us ; and that they must concur to every Effect , tho' we do not know the Quid est of them . The first part of our Thesis is proved ; For , since the An est of all those Causes , or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect , follows out of the nature of Action , from the Subject●s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally , and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent ; and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe , how Remote soever they be , or in the whole Mass of Bodies ; it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World , as they do in those Bodies near us , and with whose Operations we are acquainted . The Second part is evident , since the knowledg of the An est or [ that there is something ] may it be known by Experience , tho' we know not what that thing is ; as we experience when we hit casually upon something in the dark , or run against it , tho' we neither see or know what that thing is ; or , when we see a thing a far off , we know that that thing is , tho' as yet we know not what it is . The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cau●es and Effects ; For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise , he Administ●rs his workmanship , the World , after the wisest and best manner ; which is , that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack , but perfectly Coherent ; nor can this be done , among an infinit variety of Bodies , by any other means ( so as to make up the Course of Nature ) but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes ; since , if that were not , the Course of Nature would be at a stand , and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on , which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self : it follows , that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects . 4. The Course of Nature must be c●●ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 ●roper to one another . For , were ●ot ●●ese ●auses and Effects Proper to one anothe● ▪ any 〈◊〉 might do any thing , or suff●r from any thing : v. g. Fire might both heat , and cool , and m●i●ten ; and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood , and so of all the rest . In whi●h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions , or what Efficient Cause , or what Matter , rather than another , he is to make use of to produce any Effect ; nor , consequentl● , sin●e ●uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends , could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance . 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing , must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect . For since to Caus● is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do , what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or pro●uce some Effect . An● this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd . § . 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing . For , since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self , as being nothing but it's Existence , and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative , that is , of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible , and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities ; nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause , hence , it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent , provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient , and that it is pr●st upon it : But , there being no vacuum , immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature ; and the Course of Nature consisting in Mo●ion , one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it . From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing . 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes , which we call Demonstrating â priori ; and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects , which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori . For , since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this , that the word [ Cause ] speaks the thing as it is in Nature , and [ Reason ] the same thing as 't is in our understanding ; and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another , and , consequently , do Infer one another naturally ; it follows , that those Causes ( and , for the same reason Effects ) as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding : Whence follows , that tho●e Causes and Effects can be u●'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another . And , that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear ; for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and , so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise ; as 't is shown these are § . § . 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd , because , Two Bodies that are Immediate , do Act and Re-act , or are ( in some respect ) mutually Causes and Effects to one another : For since their Existences ( which is their Power of Acting ) are immediately Apply'd ; and by the Course of Nature , consisting in Motion , prest upon one another ; and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power , nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant ; it follows that , till one of them be , by degrees , totally subdu'd , the Resisting Body must necessarily , for the reason given , Re-act upon it ; whence they will be , to some degree or in some respect , Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other . Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence ; and , as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones ( Interiour and Exteriour ) perfecting and stre●gthening the Will all along to the very end , and ripening Souls for Bliss ( which we call Grace ) is that which is truly meant by Predestinatio● ; which sounds so terribly and is such ●●ugbea● to those that mis-understand it . Cor●● . ●I . Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it . For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something . Corol. ●●I . Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of ●●e First Cause to cause , or lay any 〈◊〉 , for Sin. For , Sin ( formally as such ) has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it , either ●etaphysical , Physical or Moral ; but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature ; whence it comes that , by falling-short here in using the Means , that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End , which is only attainable by such Means . To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines . I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words , but by Reason and Good Sense . Corol. IV. Hence follows also that , were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect , known to us , we could have no Accidental Predications , nor consequently any Opinions ; but the Effect would still be equally Demonst●able from the Complexion of those Causes , as it is now from some one single Efficient , as was hinted formerly . Corol. V. Hence , to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes , there could be no Chance ; nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion ; For , Chance ( as the common use of the word tells us ) signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause ; whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes , and that they cannot but follow from such Causes . Corol. VI. Hence , tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World , or the Course of Nature , because we Comprehend not all Causes , nor know what Cause or Causes did all a long produce such Effects ; yet , since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order , or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects ; hence , we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause , call'd Chance , governing the World ; which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans . Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect , the Figure of every leaf of a Tree , or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore , do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature , or Gods Providence ; which neglects not the least of his Creatures , but has a Superintendency over all . Which Considerations , tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical , and Stun our Reason ; yet , after that , by recourse to our Principles , we have recover'd our dazled sight , and clearly see they must be True , will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom , Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences ; and let us see and be asham'd of our froward , proud , peevish and selfish humour , which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes ; as if the World were made meerly for us , or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects . Which being a Contradiction , is therefore , as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man , that wants Money , to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty . Corol. VIII . Hence , none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes . For , since we know à priori that God , he being Infinitely wise , casts the whole Frame of the World , or the Course of Causes , in the most perfect and best Order ; to wish we should be otherwise , after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect , is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it : which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour , who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good ; and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens , who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World , ( their own Country ) have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns , nay to Sacrifice their Lives . Corol. IX . On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have , of what nature soever . For , it is hence seen demonstratively , that God is as much the Giver of that Good , by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us , as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately ; nay , it ought more to increase our Gratitude , to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes , from the beginning of the World , to be Instrumental to our Good. Corol. X. Hence , lastly , is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity ; which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language , and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths , which we have , with so much labour , Speculatively Demonstrated . As when they say that , Every thing that happens is Gods Will ; pray his Will may be done ; Resign to it ; Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God , thank him for it , free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them , and bear it with a Humble Patience , &c. 9. There is a certain Order , or priority of Nature , in our Notions taken from the same subject , by which one of them ( or which is the same , the Subject as grounding one of those Notions ) is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them . For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating ; out of which , if continu'd , it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works . To which 't is Consequent , that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it , and Congregates the Homogeneous ones ; from which latter Effects of Heating , as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind , Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things . Thus , out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths , which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul ; and , from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths . Thus Risibility springs from Rationality ; the Object of which is not a Solid Food , nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later , which causes some increase of Science in her ; but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her , sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd , Aukward , and Sudden or Unexpected , and withal not Harmful or Contristating . 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them , we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject , and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect ; which found , we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect . For example , put case we experience Aloes purges Choler , we must separate its Colour , Smell , Hardness , Bitter Tast , and the rest of its Accidents , and endeavour to find out , according to which of them it produces that Effect ; and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter , we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler ; and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge , and establish this Universal Conclusion , that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler ; according to that Solid Maxim in Logick , A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia . Note , That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles . But , this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis● that it be meant to hold per se loquendo , as the Schools phrase it ; that is , if nothing hinders ; as it does often in the Practise of Physick . For , in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities ; divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another ; so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering , and make the intended Effect follow . Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active , or from the Efficient ; which is the first of the Four Causes . 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause , that is from the Thing or Subject , as it is Passive . For , from the Divisibility of a Thing ( whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical , or Physical ) we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it ; which , necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible , is therefore a Property of it . Thus , capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject : Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at a stand , or non-plust , to find a Reason for the thing it admires ; whence it inferrs demonstratively a Power of Reasoning , capable to act or exercise it self in other things . Of this kind are all Passive Properties , which are quarto modo ( as the Schools Phrase is ) or properly such : For , these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the Essence , are , by consequence , Naturally Connected with it , and the Essence with them ; whence they are Proper Mediums to inferr demonstratively such an Essence à Posteriori , and the Essence a fit Medium to demonstrate them à priori . 12. That Demonstrations may be taken from the Formal Cause or from the Subject as 't is Formally and Essentially such , has been shewn above Lesson . 3. §§ . 7. and 8. where it was manifested that the Middle Notions in the Gradual Line , giving us the parts that were included in the Definition , are Proper Middle Terms to connect demonstratively the Inferiour and Superiour Notions . 13. The Causality of the Final cause consiststing in this , that it moves the Efficient to act , this Cause can have no place but in Intelligent Beings . This is Evident , because only such can know an End or consequently aim at it , or work for it . Corol. II. Wherefore , when 't is said that such an Effect ( v. g. the following of water in a Pump ) happens in Nature ne detur vacuum , that Nature flies from or abhors vacuum ; that ( as Aristotle acutely speculated ) Entia nolunt malè gubernari ; and such like ; the true Meaning of those Sayings can only be this , that 't is highly against the Nature of the First Intelligent Being who created the World , and of the Inferior ones ( Angels ) who manage it under him , that Ground should be laid in Nature for a Contradiction to be True , or that the Course of Nature should be contriv'd in a bad method or carry'd on after an absurd manner . Corol. XII . Hence , these sayings , thus rightly understood , have in them the force of a Nobler and more Solid Demonstration from the Final Cause , than can be taken from any Corporeal Efficients and Effects , though they be never so Proper to one another . For , these Sayings engage the Nature of the Supreme Cause , and of the Noblest causes under him ; and which , had they not Rectitude in their Understandings , Wills and Operations , all Nature would be wrong , and ground or beget in us nothing but Error . The Demonstration stands thus . The Immediate End of those Causes is that the World should be Order'd Wisely , that is , so as that th● Things should be a Ground for Truth ; therefore 't is most highly Impossible there can be any Ground for a Contradiction , in Things which the First Cause did make , and the others do manage : But , were there a vacuum there would be Ground for a Contradiction . Ergo , &c. Corol. XIII . Hence , we may with pity remark the Ignorance , Folly or rather Phrenzy of those gross Speculators , who , by allowing nothing but the Course of Nature , are forc●d by their Impious and Foolish Tenet to speak of Insensible things , as if they were Intelligent . 'T is something pardonable in Lovers , when they speak to Trees , Rivers , and Mountains to vent the Passion that be-mads them ; but 't is shameful in Pretenders to Philosophy , who are to reduce Natural Effects to their Causes , and to speak of both literally as they are . Yet , such and so apply'd , must be the Common language of meer Naturalists , who look no higher than Matter , and talk of Great Nature , or the Soul of the World , and such windy whimsies , Ordering things thus and thus , that is Designing an End ; Hating and Abhorring this thing , Affecting another . Which yet , all the while , they deny to be Intelligent things , lest they should grant a First Being making Nature , and Spiritual Second Causes carrying on the Course of it , and Moving it regularly . Nor Matters it that we had now and than to use the same Language ; for we do acknowledge it to be Improper , and can reduce it to a Litteral Sense agreeing to the Natures of those things manag'd by such Governors , which these Men cannot . 14. There can be no Final Cause in respect to GOD. For End and Good being the same , and GOD being Infinitely Perfect and Infinitely Happy in Himself , there can no Good accrue to him from any thing out of himself , or from Creatures , and so they cannot have the Notion of an End in respect to him . Wherefore , when it is said that GOD aims at the Good of his Creatures , or that to Govern the World wisely is his End ; the meaning of these words is only this , that he acts as becomes his Wisdom , or ( his Wisdom being his Essence ) he acts as he is . 15. Speaking of Mankind , we can demonstrate some Acts of his Will from the Final Cause supposed , and a Final Cause from the supposed Acts of his Will. For , since the Will is a Power , and all Powers are specify'd or have their particular Essence from the respect they have to such or such Objects ; and the Object of the Will is an Appearing Good , it follows that it is Essential to the Will to act for an Appearing Good , Wherefore , if we can demonstrate ( as we may often ) that such a particular Object must ( all things consider'd ) appear a Good to a Man in such circumstances ; it will both follow â priori that , if his Will acts , it is for an Appearing Good ; and also â posteriori , that , if there be an Appearing Good , there will follow an Act of his Will. The Proof of both is plain , For , since the Will is a Power to Act for an Appearing Good , if it did not ( in due circumstance ) act for it , it would follow that the Will is not a Will ; or else it must follow , that an Appearing Good is not the Object of the Will. Whence , since it can have no other Object Imaginable , it would follow again that the Will is no Power ; and consequently , no Will. Nor does this take away the Liberty of the Will , which is exercis'd in Chusing one out of many , but establisheth the Essence of it . Corol. 14. Hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with Mankind , is , to make that , which you would bring them to do , appear to be their Good ; for then they will be sure to obey . And if , either thro' Perversness or Delusion by others , they will not be brought to see that which is for the Common Good to be their own , there is no way left but to Over-awe them with fear ; that so , at least , it may appear to them a Good to avoid Punishment . LESSON VI. Several Instances of Demonstration . 1. THE Method of Demonstrating is two-fold ; the One Is perform'd by Exact Syllogisms in right Mood and Figure . The other by laying first certain Maxims , Axioms , or Pestulatums . and then proving the Theses by the Concatenation of many Propositions orderly succeeding one another , which is the way Euclid takes . For this later way may be full as solid as the other , tho' it looks not so Artificially ; provided it's several Consequences be Immediate , and nothing be assum'd which is not some way Evident . This way also is Shorter , and more fit to comprize much Truth , or many Syllogisms , in a little room . The other way is Clearer at first sight . This is more fit for Writers , whose Productions may be scann'd leasurely by multitudes of Readers and Examiners . That , is proper for Disputants in the Schools , who are to Argue or Answer upon the Spot : and ought to be so well verst in the Rules of Art as to be ready to act the part of Opponent or Respondent ex tempore , and without Studying . Amongst the other differences between them this is one , that if an obstinate Adversary denies any Link , in the Demonstration of the Second kind , to be connected to the Other part of the Chain , recourse must be forcibly had to the Syllogistick Method , to convince him by plain Self-evident Principles of our Understanding , on which all Force of Consequence is built , We shall give here some few Examples , of either Method . The first of which is purely Logical ; the Second , Arithmetical : The Third and Fourth , Physical : The Fifth , Sixth , and Seventh , Metaphysical . Thesis I. Infinit Number is Impossible . Demonstration First . Bar-Whatever involves a Contradiction is Impossible ; but ba-All Infinit Number involves a Contradiction ; therefore ra-All Infinit Number is Impossible . The Minor is thus prov'd . Bar-Whatever Notion compriz'd under any of the Common heads is neither the Genus of it's Particular Kind , nor any Species under that Genus , involves a Contradiction , but ba-All Infinit Number ( it being Discrete Quantity ) is Compriz'd under one of the Common Heads , and yet is neither the Generical Notion of Discrete Quantity , nor any Species of it ; therefore ra-All Infinit Number involves a Contradiction . 2. The Major is evident . For all the Notions of any Common Head , till we come to the bottom of that Scale , are either Generical or Specifical . Whence , such a Notion as Infinit Number would be under that Common Head ( as 't is evident Discrete Quantity is under Quantity ) and yet it would not be under it , because Infinit Number is neither the Genus of Discrete Quantity , nor any Species of it . The Minor likewise as to it 's First part is most Evident , because Infinit Number is a Number ; nor is it less a Number for it's being Infinit , but more . The same Minor , as to it's Second part , viz. that Infinit Number cannot be the Genus , or the whole Notion of Discrete Quantity , is thus prov'd . Ce-No Notion that is not Comprehended in each of it's Species can be a Generical Notion or a Genus ; but la-Every Infinit Number is a Notion that is not comprehended in each of the Species of Discrete Quantity therefore rent-No infinit Number can be the Generical Notion of Discrete Quantity . 3. The Major is Evident . For the Genus or Superiour Notion is but a Part of the Inferiour or the Species , and a Part must necessarily be Comprehended in the Whole . And , accordingly , we find the whole Notion and Definition of Animal to be in Homo , of Corpus in Vivens , and of Ens in all under it . 4. This last Minor is likewise most evident : For Ten and Twenty are Species of Discrete Quantity , being both of them Numbers ; and yet 't is impossible that the Notion of Infinit Discrete Quantity or Infinit Number , should be found in each of these ; which yet it must be , if Infinite Quantity be their Genus . 5. The Former Minor , according to it's Third part , viz. that Infinit Number can be no Species of Number or Discrete Quantity , is thus prov'd . Ce-No Species comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species , but leaves it somewhat which it self has not ; but la-Every Infinit Number comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species , and does not leave it somewhat which it self had not ; therefore rent . No Infinit Number can be a Species of Discrete Quantity . 6. The Minor is prov'd : For , Essential Differences that constitute the Species , are more and less of the Genus , and not All and None . And , as for the Formal part of the several Species of Number , they are Constituted formally by some one Unity shutting up the rest ; otherwise those Species had had no Distinct Notion , being Indeterminate : v. g. Ten and Twenty are Formally such Species of Number , because there is a Tenth Unity and a Twentieth in them , shutting up or Determining ( that is Terminating ) those Unities which were presupposed . Wherefore , for the same reason , if Infinit Number be a Distinct Species , it must have , besides It 's other Material Constituents , something belonging to it's own Intrinsical and Particular nature , constituting it formally of such a Species ; which can be nothing but an Infinitth one , Determining or Terminating it in the Line of Number ; which is a clear contradiction and makes an Infinit to be Finite . The same Thesis Infinit Number is impossible . Demonstration Second . Axiom . Units are the Elements of which all Number consists , v. g. The Number of Twenty is Twenty Ones , The Number of a Hundred is a Hundred Ones ; and for the same reason , an Infinit Number consists of Infinit Ones . Da-Whatever Tenet puts some One to be Infinitely distant in the Line of Number from Another One assignable , or puts an Infinitth One , puts a Contradiction ; but ri-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts some One to be Infinitly distant in the Line of Number from Another One assignable , or an Infinitth One ; therefore i-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts a Contradiction . 7. The Major is self-evident , for it clearly puts àn Infinit or Endless Number , to have Two Ends ; viz. this One assignable , and that other One Suppos'd Infinitely distant from it , or the Infinitth One. 8. The Minor is also Evident . For , since , by the Axiom , all Number , even tho' Infinit , consists of One's as it 's constituent parts , if no One be an Infinitth , then every one is a Finitth ; and so ( all the parts being the whole ) that Whole , or the Infinit Number it self , must be Finite which is a Contradiction . Thesis II. All Continu'd Quantity is one Whole consisting of Potential , or still Divisible , Parts . Demonstration III. Axiom I. Quantity is Divisible without end , This is suppos'd prov'd by Euclid , Element . Lib. 6. Prop. 10 th . Axiom II. What is Actually distinct in any Line , is determinate in that Line . All Act coming from the Form ; which being Determinate it self , makes those Subjects in which it is Determinate likewise . Axiom III. A Quatenus ad omne valet consequentia . Proposition I. Quantity cannot be compounded of a Finite Number of Indivisibles . Co-Nothing that is Infinitly Divisible can consist of a Finite Number of Indivibles ; but la-All Quantity is Infinitly Divisible , therefore rent-No Quantity can consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles . 9. The Major is evident , For , putting it to consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles , ( Ten for example , ) when 't is Divided into those Ten , it can be no longer Divisible , and so no Quantity , by the Ax. I. Proposition II. Quantity cannot be compounded of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles . Ce-No One Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity ; but la - All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of , or is One Indivisible added to Another : Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity . 10. The Minor is Evident ; for all Number ( tho' Infinit ) consists of Ones ; that is , of One added to another . Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible . Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct , All the parts must be Actually distinct also . Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity , or throughout all the parts of Quantity , by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity ( if put in any two ) springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity , therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity ( if put in any two ) must be equally found wherever there is Quantity , or throughout all the parts of Quantity . 11. The Minor is proved ; for , all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar , that is , in our case , out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity . Again , this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance ; for this has no Distinction of parts , but that of Matter and Form. Nor out of any other Line ; for all those do presuppose Quantity , and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body ; therefore , if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct , that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self . 12. Now , that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct , destroys the Nature of Quantity , and is Contradictory ; is thus proved . Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity . But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct , makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles , therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity , actually Distinct , contradicts the nature of Quantity . 13. The Minor is Evident ; For , those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively ; or rather are already so ; as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance , are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line , Wherefore , since the Nature of such a Subject , as they put Quantity to be , does bear it , let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into ; that is , into All , they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct ; it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles . They must be Indivisible , because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into ; and they must be Infinit , for Divisibility that is but Finite , would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration . Besides , it would follow hence , that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct , each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity ; Wherefore , they being also Infinit in Number ( for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration ) it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension ; for the least Determinate Quantity , Infinit times repeated , makes an Infinit Extension . 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration , that , since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit , nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles , nor of Actual parts , it is made up of Potential parts : that is , there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity ; and this Whole is Divisible without end . Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity ; or which is the same , the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body . Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum , and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory : As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One ; the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole , Divisible still into its Potential parts , or parts still farther Divisible . Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion , and , consequently , the Course of Nature , could not have been ab Aeterno , but must have had a Beginning . Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible , but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time , therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible . The Minor is Self-evident ; The Major is thus prov'd . Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time , v. g. Infinit Hours ; but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible ; Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible . 16. The Major is clearly Evident ; for , were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite , then all the Parts ( which are equivalent to the Whole ) being Finite , the Whole must likewise be Finite , The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible . 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis , that Time , Motion , or the Course of Nature had a beginning . Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists . Note , that 't is the same as to our Argument , whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time , which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd , or no ; 't is sufficient the Subject [ Infinit Motion , or Infinit Time ] bears the having such a Determination made , by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts ; for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction . Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings , which we call Angels . Demonstration V. Axiom . 1. What acts , is . 2. Every thing acts as it is ; and , à fortiori , cannot act directly contrary to what it is , especially as an Immediate Agent . 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings , but either Divisible or Indivisible ones , that is Body or Spirit . 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable . Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts , and , consequently , is : but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect ; viz. of the First Motion in Nature , therefore i-An Angel acts ; and , consequently is , The Minor is thus prov'd . Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediat●ly by the First Cause no● by a Body : must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel ; But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body ; Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel ; and , consequently , an Angel acts & is . The former part of th● Minor , viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause , is thus demonstrated . 19. Fe-No * being that is Essentially Vnchangeable , and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change , can be the Immediate Cause o † Change or Motion ; nor , consequently , of the First Motion in Nature , but ri-The First Being is * Essentially Vnchangeable , and his Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion ; therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change ; nor , consequently , of the First Motion in Nature . 20. The latter part of the former Minor , viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature , is thus prov'd . Ce-Nothing that , antecedently to the First Motion , was not-Moving , or in Rest , † could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature , but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving , or in Rest ; therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature . Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature , which was prov'd . Demonstration 4. LESSON VII . Other Instances of Demonstration . Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being ; or a Deity . Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures , ( and consequently of Essence and Existence ) are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which [ Existent ] and [ not-existent ] may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent ; But ri-The Notion of Ens ( in its First and Proper Signification , taken for an Individual Substance ) is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated ; therefore i — The Notion of Ens ( thus understood ) is d●fferent from the Notion of Existent ; and , consequently , the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident . For we can truly say that [ Petrus est ] while he is Living ; and as truly say of the same Peter , that [ Fuit ] or [ non-est ] when he is Dead . 3. The Major is no less Evident ; For , when we say [ Petrus est ] or [ Peter is Existent ] were the notion of the Predicate [ Existent ] the same with [ Peter ] the Subject , the Proposition would be ( in sense ) formally Identical , and the same as 't is to say , [ what 's Existent is Existent ] Wherefore , when we say [ Petrus non est ] or Peter is not-Existent , Peter Signifying the same as Existent , it would be the same as if we said , what 's Existent is not Existent , which is a Contradiction . Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence , or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence . This needs no farther Proof ? For , in the two Propositions lately mention'd , Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter ; which could not be , unless the Subject [ Peter ] did Abstract from both , or were Indifferent to both . Besides , all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever , do so perfectly Abstract from Existence , that it is neither Exprest , Imply'd , nor in the least Hinted in them ; as appears in the words , Lapis , Quercus , Bucephalus , Petrus , Raphael ; which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent . Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other , it seems to be rather to Not-being ; than to Being . For , since Peter , even tho' possest of Actual Being , is still no less capable of Not-being ; it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being ; because , tho' supported Formally ( as it were ) by it's Opposit [ Actual Existence ] he is notwithstanding , no less a Capacity of Not-existing ; his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature , that it sticks to it , and inclines him to it , even while he is . Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens ; either Essentially , or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence . This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals , and what follows out of them , or is Connected with them ; and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them , as Ens is to have or not have Existence . Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them . For , whatever has any thing and not from it's self , or from it's own Intrinsical Nature , must have it from Another , or from something that is Extrinsical to it ; there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable , which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical ; that is , which is neither it's self nor Another . Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another , For tho' ( as was shown formerly ) the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens ; yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is , or according to the Nature of the Thing , which has that Existence ; whose Nature it actually Imprints ( as it were ) on the Subject , as we find in Fire heating , in Water moistning , and in the whole Line of Universal Causality . Again , since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd , and , as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect , ( whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects , and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur . ) Therefore , seeing ( Prop. 2. ) The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs , and , consequently , the Nature or Essence of that Ens , Abstracts from all Existence ; and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own , and much more to the Existence of any other Ens ; it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another , or be the Proper Cause of it . Therefore Proposition VII . 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities . This is already † Evident ; since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature , or from any other Creature . Proposition VIII . 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent ; that is , his Essence must be his Existence . For , were his Essence Indifferent to Existence , or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential , he would need Another Cause to give him Existence , for the same reason Creatures do , and , so He would not be Vncreated . Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY . Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities , grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon ; by Altering the Matter so that , out of those Alterations brought to such a point , the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind ; and consequently loses it's Existence . At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World , that those Determinations of Matter , which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens , should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed ; to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be , and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this , He , by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being , gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence . Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being . Demonstration VII . Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient , there needs no more to begin the Effect , actually but Application . 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient , and the Effect be Indivisible , there needs no more to begin and end , that is to Compleat the Effect at once , but Application . 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts . 4. Every thing operates as it is . 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause . 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative , a Body is . Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion . For , since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is , what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively ; but , nothing can operate Quantitatively , or exercise 't is Quantity , when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity , that is , moves not according to it's Quantity : It follows , then , that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity . Wherefore , since nothing can move according to it's Quantity , but either Intrinsically , by having it's Quantity made greater or less ; or Extrinsically , that is , by having it's Quantity ( unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self ) mov'd towards Another ; and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion ; 't is Evident likewise , that No C●●poreal Operation is without Local Motion . Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion . For , since Motion is Mutation ; and , consequently , Local Motion , Mutation or Change according to Place ; and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space , and Space is Quantity ; it follows , that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity . But Angels ( they being Pure Spirits ) * are not Quantitative ; therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion , or capable of having Local Motion made in them . Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel. For , since no † Operation of Body is without Local Motion ; and † an Angel ( it being a Pure Spirit ) is not susceptible of Local Motion ; it follows , that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body . But † No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it ; Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel. Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant . For , since a Cause , the self same in all respects , if the Patient be likewise the self same , and the Application also the self same , produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect ; and an Angel , put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant , is put to be the self-same , as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts ; as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects , and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal ; it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect , that is , act upon it self or change it self . Wherefore , since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible , that is , Impossible not to be all at once , or in one Instant ; and an Angel , being a Pure Spirit , is * * an Indivisible Subject ; t is Evident that this Effect , or the Action of that Spirit upon it self , would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made ; that is , can only be made in the First Instant . Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant . Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent , one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being . Let there be only Two Angels , the one whereof can work upon the other ; and let the Agent be A : the Patient B : and , because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant , but after some Duration , let the Duration assign'd be C ; the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant , † and ( as is suppos'd ) one works not upon the other till the Instant D : they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D ; that is , for the whole Intermediat Duration C : Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each ( nay in the very First ) Instant of the Duration C : as they are in the Instant D ; But in the Instant D , in which they acted , they were in all points fitted to act ; therefore , they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C : Wherefore † the Effect Begun , and , the Subject being Indivisible , * Ended in the very First Instant , in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient . But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant ; For , since Quantitative Application , or Propinquity , is not competent to Pure Spirits ; all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will. But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent , because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration . And , tho' they had not had it formerly , the Argument returns with the same force ; that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration , nor from a Body , and therefore they must have had it from an●ther Spirit ; and this in the First Instant , because * that Other was then perfectly apt to give it , This perfectly apt to receive it . And , consequently , If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being . Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels , how great soever , all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being . For , since , where there are only Two , † one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all , because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put ; the rest also , where there are more , will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant , in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put . But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant ; For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent , and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self , or by what it has from another ; wherefore , since it can never want what it has of it self , or by it's self , it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third , unless it be to be wrought upon by the First , and so be fitted to work upon the Third , but this is done in the very † first Instant , wherefore also the Third will , for the same reason , be wrought upon in the self-same Instant . Again , since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work upon the Fourth , but to be chang'd by the Second , and this was done as was now shown , in the First Instant ; the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequately put in the same Instant too , and † consequently the Effect . And , since how far soever we proceed , the same reason holds , viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible , and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect , still adequately put in the first Instant , it will follow , that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant , by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being ; Therefore , all whatever any Multitude of Angels , how great soever , can work upon one another is perform'd in the First Instant of their Being . Proposition VII . 19. That 't is Infinitly more Impossible an Angel should be chang'd by God after the first Instant , than by any other Spirit . For , since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change , as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed , whether God or any other Spirit be to change it , on that side precisely there is a perfect Equality . Wherefore seeing , on the other side , 't is infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant , than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power ; and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not , of himself , be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it , his Nature being Pure Actuality . Also , since 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should , after some Duration , receive any Change in himself , fitting him to produce that Effect , than that any other Spirit should ; And , lastly , since 't is Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient ; both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it , and most intimately , by himself , conserves it in Being . Wherefore , since from these Considerations or Reasons , however Infinitly short in Creatures , it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit , if it should change an Angel at all , should not change it in the First Instant , and these Considerations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage ; it is Evident that 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD , if he change an Angel at all , should not change it in the first Instant , that is , should change it in the Intermediate Duration ; than that any other Spirit should . Proposition IX . 20. That 't is absolutely Impossible an Angel should be Changed after the First Instant of it's Being . For , since * no Change can be made without ●he working of Some Cause ; and no † Body can work upon an Angel , and all that it self or any other Created Spirit can work upon it , must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being ; † and * 't is much more Impossible GOD should work upon it , unless in the First Instant , than that any Created Spirit should ; and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable besides GOD , Created Spirits , or Bodies ; it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work upon an Angel , or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being ; and , therefore , it can undergo no Change after that First Instant . ADVERTISEMENT . 1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers , whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy . But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles , which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion , such men are desir●d to reflect that [ Ens ] being divided as by it's Proper Differences , by [ Divisible ] and [ Indivisible ] and these Differences being Contradictory to one another ; it follows that [ Body ] and [ Spirit ] which are the Species constituted by those Differences , do agree in nothing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens ; or in this that they are , both of them , Capable of Being . Whence , 't is Logically demonstrated that they must Differ , nay contradictorily disagree , in every thing else ; so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other . Wherefore , since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative , Corruptible , in Place mov'd Locally , Chang'd by Time or Subject to it , Capable of Succession , or of Before and After which are the Differences of time &c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels , because none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens , but to that Difference which constitutes that Species call'd Body ; and , therefore , the Contradictory to all these , and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Operations , must be predicated of the other Species , call'd Spirit . It will , I doubt not , be much wonder'd at too , that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being ; which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation ; A thing certainly , most Unworthy GOD , who is Essentially and Infinitly Good. But , their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg , and consequently more perfect Deliberation ( such as they can have ) in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End , and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Finally . So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty , and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty , as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant . Whence , the Crime of Lucifer , and his Adherents , was a Sin of pure Malice , and not mere Frailty , or mixt with Frailty ; much less of Inadvertence , Speculative Ignorance , or suggested by the Soul 's deprav'd Companion , the Body ; as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind , some Inconsiderable number of them excepted , whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin 's peculiar to the Devil ; such as are Spiritual Pride , Malice , Envy or such like ; which wicked Sinners are therefore , even while here , so many Limbs ( as it were ) of the Devil , and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance . And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom , Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind ; and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition , in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves . Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes , that that Sin , which was so perfectly , and ( in despite of all Motives to the contrary ) so Wilfully Resolute , should be Irretractable ; whereas , on the other side , Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of , when the alluring circumstance is past and gone ; The same Faculty which permitted them to fall , leaving them likewise in a Pliableness to reform and retract what their Reason , abus'd by Passion , had ; perhaps either by surprize or after much struggling , ( that is half unwillingly ) yielded to . Corol. I. Hence , abstracting from Faith and Theology ) 't is Demonstrated against the Originists , by Reason reflecting on the nature of Things , that the Devils are to be Eternally Damn'd ; and how , and why 't is Impossible their Hell should have an End. For , they cannot be saved without Repentance , nor repent without having some new Motive which they either knew not of before , or did not well consider of it . Neither of which can have place here ; for , since they acquire no New Knowledg either by the Senses , or by Discourse , it follows that they have all in the first Instant that is due to their Natures ; that is they know all they could possibly know , and out of that Knowledg made their Full and Final Choice . Nor can there be Consideration in a Knower that sees all things by Simple Intuition . For , Consideration is the Comparing one Motive with another , and therefore 't is an Operation Proper to that Knower that works by Abstracted Notions or Considerations of the Thing . Whence it is most Improper and Incompetent to such an Intelligent Being as knows all as once by way of Simple Intuition . Corol. II. Tho' all that can concern the Internal Operations of Angels was finished in an Instant , yet we may , for all that , conceive certain Priorities of Nature , in the Course or Process ( as it were ) of what belongs to them in that First Instant . v. g. We can conceive them to be ; and to be Good according to th●ir Essence and Existence , as coming Immediately out of God's hand , ere we conceive their own Depraved Will made them Bad. We can conceive them to know Themselves ere they knew in and by Themselves the whole Angelical Order , and the whole Course of Nature . We can conceive them to know Themselves as most fit ( under God ) to preside over Humane Nature , ere they knew that a Man , by the Incarnation of the Word was to be their Head , and ( as it were ) take their office out of their hands , and be Lord of themselves too ; We can conceive them to know This ( which was the cause of their Aversion from GOD ) ere we can conceive them to have had that Aversion from him , for his thus Ordering things . We can conceive Lucifer , their Ring-leader , to have had that Aversion ere he propos'd his Seditious thoughts to other Angels , to debauch them from their Allegiance . We can conceive him to have Debaucht them , ere we conceive the Contrast and Battle was between Michael and his Loyal Angels , and Lucifer with his Rebellious Troops . Lastly , we can conceive this Battel fought , ere the latter black Squadrons were cast down from their Sublime Height into Hell. All these , I say , may be Conceiv'd to have had certain Priorities of Nature to one another , such as those Causes and Effects use to have which are in the same Instant : So that this Single Instant of theirs is , ( tho not Formally , yet ) virtually , and in order to the many Indivisible Effects producible in it , Equivalent or ( as we use to say ) as good as a Long Series of our Time : Not by way of Quantitative Commensuration of one to the other , but by the Eminency of the Angelical Duration or Aeviternity , which is of a Superiour Nature to Body , and consequently Bodily Motion or Time ; and Comprehending it all Indivisibly and Instantaneously . Corol. III. Hence it follows , that the Several Instants which Divines put in Angelical Actions , and particularly in Lucifer and his Fiends , before their Fall , can be no way Solidly explicated and conformably to the nature of Pure Spirits , but by those Priorities of Nature : For since Comparisons can only be made of those Natures which are ejusdem generis we cannot Compare , or Commensurate those Actions which are Spiritual to the Succession found in the Actions of Bodies , which are Measurable by Time , any more than we can their Essence to the Nature of a Body ; and it would be an odd Comparison to say , an Angel is as Knowing as a Horse is Strong , or as a Wall is Hard : Wherefore , [ Before ] and [ After ] which are Differences of Time or Successive Motion , can never be with good Sense apply'd to the Operations of Pure Spirits . Again , should we allow such Instants Succeeding one another , it would avail nothing : † For , since one Indivisible added to another cannot make a thing Greater , nor , consequently , a Duration Longer ; the putting many of them advances no farther than the First Indivisible or the First Instant . Add , that even those Divines who put diverse Instants , do all owe our Principles , that Angels are Indivisible Substances ( for did they hold them Corporeal , as some of the Fathers did , I should not wonder at their Inconsistency ) but they are frightned from the Conclusions that Naturally and Necessarily follow thence ; either because they vainly fear Scripture-Texts , expressing things humano more , or in Accomodation to our low Conceptions , cannot otherwise be verified ; or else , because those Conclusions too much shock their Fancy by their seeming Extravagancy ; or lastly , because they are willing to gratifie and please the Fancy of the Vulgar which is startled at such uncouth propositions : And this is one mane Hindrance to the Advancement of Science , when men are afraid of their own Conclusions ; because the herd of vulgar Philosophers will dislike and decry them : A Fault which , I hope , I have not been Guilty of in this former Treatise ; but have both avoided it my self , and have Indeavour'd to prevent it in others ; by holding firmly , and directing others to hold to the right Notions or Natures of the things , and to pursue steadily the Consequences that do naturally Issue from them ; how Aukward soever the Conclusions may seem , to those who take their Measures from Fancy how to frame their Rules of Logick , which are to direct their Reason . LESSON VIII . Of Opinion and Faith. 1. SCience being grounded on Intrinsical Mediums , and on such as are Proper or Immediately Connected with the Extrems , whence it has to be Evident ; it follows , that those Mediums which are either Extrinsical to the thing , or Common ones cannot beget Science , but some Inevident or Obscure kinds of Light , call'd Faith and Opinion : The former of which is grounded on an Extrinsical Medium call'd Witnessing Authority or Testimony ; the Later , on Remote or Common Mediums ; which seem to bend or lean towards the Conclusion , but do not by any Maxim of true Logick reach it , or inferr it ; Examples of both may be these . 2. That which is Attested unanimously by such a Multitude of Witnesses , and so Circumstanc'd , that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves , nor Conspire to deceive others is true ; But That there is such a City as Rome is attested by such a multitude of Witnesses , and so Circumstanc'd , that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves , nor Conspire to deceive others ; therefore That there is such a City as Rome is True. What 's Promis'd will be ; but That my Debtor will pay me money to morrow is what 's promis'd ; therefore That my Debtor will pay me money to morrow will be ; Where Omitting the Former at present , the Medium [ what 's Promis'd ] is a Common Notion in respect of Paying ; whence we use to say , All Promises are either Broken or Kept : Besides , 't is far from being Proper or Immediate to the Effect of Paying ; in regard that multitudes of Cross-causes may intervene , hindering that Effect from following , tho' never so really intended ; whereas taking a Proper Effect [ viz. my Chambers being Enlightn'd ] prov'd by it's Proper Cause [ the Suns darting it's Rayes in through my Window ] at which rate all the Course of Nature , and all the Demonstrations that might be fram'd of it all along , do hang together , nothing can intervene to hinder it ; the Efficiency of the Cause being still the Putting the Effect . 3. Common Mediums not being immediate but Remote , are not in true Speech Mediums apt to Connect the Extremes . For , since what Connects two others must it self be Connected with them both ; and what is Connected to two things must be Immediate to them both ; it follows , that a Common Notion , not being Immediate to the Two Extremes , cannot Connect them ; and , so , cannot be in proper Speech , or Univocally , a Middle Term with that which is Immediate . 4. Wherefore , all Assent to a Conclusion from a Common Medium is a Deviation from Humane Nature ; and , consequently , Opprobrious . Whence comes the Proverb Turpe est opinari , 't is Shameful to Assent upon Uncertain and Inconclusive Mediums , such as are Common ones . To which agrees that saying of Holy Writ , Qui credit citò levis est corde ; He that assents hastily is light of heart ; that is Inconstant or Unsteady in his Thoughts and Actions . Whence also he that adheres stiffly upon Opinionative Grounds incurrs the Note of being an Opiniatre . The reason is , becau●e , Reason being Man's Nature , so that as Brutes are led by Sense so he is led by some Reason ( good or bad ) in all his Actions , and True Reason being a Power to draw True Conclusions out of True Premisses ; hence , every Assent Involves ( as it were practically ) that the thing is True for such a Reason ; which Proposition is False if that Reason , for which he assents , does not Conclude it True , as Common Mediums do not . Wherefore , Reason being the true Nature given us by GOD ; and Truth the Perfection of that Nature , all Assents upon Incompetent or Inconclusive Grounds do doubly injure our Nature ; First , as to its Essence , by Concluding unduely ; next , as to it's Perfection , in making it embrace a Falsho●d ; and , such a Falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others , by imbuing the understanding with a wrong Method of Reasoning ; whence he lies expos'd , by leaving the paths of Right Reason , to the Disrepute of being either Passionate or Ignorant . 5. They who do Assent upon such an Inconclusive Medium , notwithstanding that they see it is Inconclusive , are convinc'd to be Deserters of Humane Nature , and led blindly by Passion . For , since all Reasoning is built upon First Principles , they who come nearest the Deny●ng First Principles , do radically ( as it were ) put off and abdicate their Whole Nature ; But such Assenters come as near as is possible to the Denying First Principles ; for they Assent , that is , they Judge or say interiourly , the Conclusion is True , or that the thing is ; and yet they see at the same time , that the Reason , on which only they relie for that Assent , does not Con●lude it to be ; that is , they see it may not be , notwithstanding that Reason : which is to Assent or Judge that to be , which yet , at the same time , they Judge may not be : which is in Substance , though not in Direct Terms , ( Nature not permitting such a palpable Contradiction to settle in a Subject made to see Truth ) as 't is to Deny the First Principle [ what it is ] or , It is Impossible a Thing should be and not be at once . Corol. I. Hence , such Men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge , to be False to themselves , Self-condemn'd , highly Passionate , Prejudic'd and Govern'd by meer Will ; that is , to be blindly Willful ; which is the Greatest and most Unnatural Depravation , that a Spiritual or Knowing Nature is capable of . Wherefore , they are Justly held to be disposed for any Ill that a Depraved Soul can desire . Which ought to make every prudent Man wary in his Conversing or Negotiating with them , if he cannot well avoid them totally ; since , having renounced the Conduct of Evident Reason , no Reason can manage them , nor the wisest Man give any guess at what they will do , or whether the blind Impulse of Ungovernable Passion will hurry them . 6. Whatever Allowance may be made for Weak or Ignorant People , there can be no Excuse for a Learned Man if he Assents upon a Common or Inconclusive Medium . Because there can be no Necessity Imaginable that can compel him to Interiour Assent , as ( perhaps ) there may be to force him to Outward Actions ; in regard God has given us a Faculty of Suspending our Assent till we see Evidence ; lest our Weakness or Carelessness should at every turn precipitate us into Error . 7. From what has been said , 't is seen that Common Mediums can , at most , but prove a thing Probable or likely to be ; which may consist with it's not-being or being False . The Former part is prov'd , because Proper Mediums only make the Conclusion Certain ; and therefore such as these can only render it Probable or Likely . The Second part is prov'd by every days Experience , which shows us how often we are Deceiv'd in Likelihoods or Probabilities , even though Great ones ; and that the Contrary frequently happens to what such slight Grounds made us expect . 8. When those who are Invincibly Ignorant do assent upon such Common Mediums , it leaves no Note upon them more than that of Weakness and Ignorance ; For , since such Men do , as is suppos'd , use the best of their Understanding , their Erring does not spring from the Obliquity or Byass of their Wills perverting their Light of Reason , which secures their Morality Untainted . 9. Tho' we ought not to Act thus Interiourly , or Assent , upon Inconclusive Mediums ; yet Probability is very often enough to make us act Exteriourly when those Actions are Necessary to be done ; even though they be subject to great hazard . Thus Merchants venture their Effects to Sea , even in the time of War , because their State of life requires it ; yet , even then , they must have Evidence that 't is best to venture ; otherwise their Reason is some way Defective . So that Humane Nature still Obliges all Men to Act upon some Evidence . 10. In Cases of Conscience , and Law-suits , which are only Probable , and in which Interest is concern'd ; the safest way is first to purge our Affections from Coveting that which is perhaps our Neighbours ; next , not to trust to Casuists whom we apprehend to have Large Cases favourable to our Interest ; nor to make choice of a Lawyer who is a Crafty Knave ; but rather one who is reputed Honest , so he be Intelligent . For , while we proceed thus , the Will and Conscience is kept Clear ; however the Decision of the matter may hap to be Vnjust . 11. Thus far of Opinion : FAITH or Belief ( speaking of Human Faith to which our Circumstances determin our Discourse ) is built on Human Testimony or Witnessing Authority . To which ere we ought to yield Assent , two things are Prerequisit , viz. That we be Certain it could certainly know the things it Attests , and that it speaks truly when it does Attest them : that is , there are requisit Knowlèdg and Veracity in the Attesters . 12. If we certainly know that the Attesters knew the thing , and did not only fancy they knew it , it is most Certain the thing is so as they knew it to be ; For , since to know a thing is to have the thing in our Understanding as it is in it self , and none can know what is not Knowable , or is not : it follows , that all Knowledg of the Thing 's Being , or of it's being thus or thus , does most certainly Infer that thing to be as the Asserters knew it to be . 13. Care is to be had that the Attesters did truly Know the Thing and not only fancy they knew it when they knew it not . For , since Mankind is often deceiv'd in thinking they know , and only True Knowledg in the Attesters can ground our Second-hand Knowledg that it is , grounded on their Knowing it to be ; it follows , that we must be sure those Attesters could not err in knowing that thing , ere we can Rationally beleive them . 14. Wherefore no Testimony built on their Knowing Speculative Points can have any force upon our Understanding or Oblige it to Belief . For , since we experience that even Learned Men do often err in their Speculations , either thro' Inadvertency , the Obscurity or Perplexedness of the Object , Ambiguity of Words , Dread of some Authority which over-aws their Reason , or , lastly , thro' want of Logick or a Right Method how to manage their Thoughts : It follows , that we cannot be Sure that they do not err , or that they do truly know Speculative Points ; nor , consequently , can we be Certain that the thing is truly so as they pretend to know it is . All the power they have over us is , to make us prudently wary not to oppose such Speculaters , but upon Evident Reason : especially if they be many and of Repute ; but much more if they pretend to go upon Intrinsical Mediums ; in which the Mistake is both seldom , and quickly discover'd if brought to the Test. Corol. II. Hence no Credit at all is to be given to such Reasoners who do not so much as pretend to Demonstrate , tho never so many . For such men do not so much as affirm themselves to be Knowers , or that the thing is Certainly so as they deem it to be ; and , so , they can have no kind of Authority , even tho' their Speculative thoughts were a thing Attestable . Whence we may establish this Maxim , viz. That No Reasoner ( precisely as such ) has any kind of Authority but by virtue of the Reason he produces ; that is , the Reason , which he alledges , and not his Saying or Word ought to have any force at all upon our Understanding . 15. Wherefore Testimony has for it's Object either Particular things , or Matters of Fact necessarily knowable by Mankind , using their Common and Frequent Sensations , or relying on Vnerrable Experience . For since Vniversal Notions are the Object of Speculation , and men † may err in their Speculations ; Vniversals cannot be the Objects of Witnessing Authority or Testimony , but Particulars only . Again , since every Particular is not obvious to Sense , but many of them are so Circumstanc'd , Insensible , or Remote , that we can have no Certain Experience of them ; it follows that only su●h Particular Objects or Matters of Fact , as make a lively and Certain Impression on the Senses , are those which can be Attested or be the Object of Testimony . 16. Experience may be so Circumstanced , that it is Impossible the thing Experienced should be otherwise . For , since the Senses of Mankind , in due circumstances , are as apt to convey sincere Impressions of Sensible Objects into our Minds , as other Natural Causes to produce their Effects , they being design'd and fitted by God and Nature for that end : it follows , that ( if other Circumstances be agreeaable ) it is Impossible but they should give us such Experiential Knowledg of Sensible Matters of Fact , or Particulars , as may assure us of the things being as we Experience it . The Circumstances requir'd to this Absolute Assurance is , that the Object propos'd be of a thing Subject to Sense ; that it be within a Convenient Distance ; and , that the I●pression be not hindred or perverted by an Inconvenient Medium . Hence , we can be absolutely Certain what House or Street we live in , of our Acquaintance , or Employment , who reigns in such a year ; and of Notable Actions , Universally Knowable , that happen'd in such or such a time ; lastly , of Multitudes of Private Actions , familiarly known to our selves only . 17. Besides Knowledg in the Attester , there is also requisit Veracity in him to ground Human Faith. For , let the Attester know the Object never so well , if we cannot be Certain he tells us True when he sayes he knows it , his Original Knowledg cannot have any Effect on us , or beget a Second-hand Knowledg in us , derivable from his Pretended Knowledg of that Object . 18. No Authority deserves Assent farther then Reason gives it to deserve . For , let us take two Authorities , one that of a whole Town , the other of a Knight of the Post ; and ( since our Nature allows us that Privilege ) let it be ask'd why the Latter is not to be credited as much as the Former ? and the answer will be , For such a Reason . So that Reason , in Common , is the Ground of our Believing at all , as well as of our believing one Authority rather than Another . And , this because Reason is our Nature given us by GOD ; and , therefore , every Act of our Soul that is not for some Reason and according to Reason , is totally without Reason ; that is Unnatural , that is Irrational , that is Brutal or Unbecoming a Man. 19. Wherefore no Man can be oblig'd to believe beyond the Motive he has to believe . For , that degree of Belief that is beyond the Motive or the Reason , as far as it is beyond the Reason is Evidently without Reason , or Irrational . Whence follows that our Reason is to give us our Grounds of Belief , both as to the Knowledg and the Veracity of the Attesters . For otherwise our Belief would have no Reason at all for the Grounds it is to rely upon , and so would be perfectly Irrational . Corol. III. Wherefore , since God governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them ; he does not Command us to Assent absolutely upon any Authority which may either be Deceiv'd or Deceive us . For , otherwise , men may be led into Errour by obeying GOD's Command ; that is , since GOD laid that Command , by GOD Himself . 20. Wherefore both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters must be Knowable by Intrinsical Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing ; and those must be also Conclusive ones . For , their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums , or by Extrinsical ones ; that is by Another Authority ; and the same question recurrs , How we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority , and so in infinitum . Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by Intrinsical Mediums , or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority . Moreover , the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate , which is done by Intrinsical Mediums ; and , unless they be Conclusive , they prove nothing , and so are good for nothing . 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd . § . § . 15.16 . Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us ; and the best proof ( omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive , the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact &c. ) is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End , which was to Deceive . Which reason is grounded on this , that no one man , who is not perfectly Frantick , acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed . For example , to fly to the Moon , or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead . Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since , in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First , or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here ; because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it , which was their Immediate End ; ( whatever farther End they might propose to themselves ) So many Records , Practices , Laws , and other Consequences Issuing thence , giving them the Lie ; besides the Histories of our own and other Countries ; and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neighbouring Nations , all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore , the End being Evidently Impossible to be atchiev'd ; it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End , or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it ; and , therefore , they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case ; therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it . 22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated , and , Consequently , the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True ; yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no● Opinion . It cannot be Opinion , because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes , as is found here . Nor can it be Science , because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested , causing such a Notion or Impression in us directly by it's self , or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones ( on which kind of Impressions all Science is built ) but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it , or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg . Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand , a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg . Nor is the Thing , as an Object , the Proper Cause of that Knowledg ; only which can beget Science . For , a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation , to it 's Proper Effect ; whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power , as was shown above where we treated of Relation ; By which we may farther more clearly discover the Essential Differences between Science , Faith , and Opinion . It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens ; therefore every Ens is a Proper Cause of Knowledg . 'T is answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively ( as it were ) in regard nothing can be understood but Ens ; Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us . Or , it may mean that 't is only a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsical thing , not a true Property , Perfecting it Intrinsically ; as Properties due to a thing by Nature , and Springing from their Essences , do . It may be objected farther that all Natural Powers are true Properties tho' they respect Extrinsical things on which they are to work . 'T is answer'd , that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically , or give them some perfection in their Intrinsical Nature , which , Intelligibility does not ; for nothing is Intrinsically better , or otherwise than it would be , for being Known or Vnderstood . To explicate this better , we may consider that every Entity , being a Part of the World , has some Office or Place there , and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature . And , accordingly , Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation , which 't is fitted to produce ; as Fire to heat , Water to Cool , &c. Whence , what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it , or a Property immediately Connected with it's Essence ; such as are those Natural Powers objected . Now 't is Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically ; since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for ; and so the whole course of Nature , carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects , would be quite out of frame and Order ; whereas , 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self , whether those Proper Causes or Effects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters , or made known to us by their Knowing them , is not a Proper Effect of those Causes , nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature , but Accidental to them as such ; but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them ; and , so , does Necessarily infer the Conclusion . 23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies , is adequately divided into Living and Dead ; that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce , and those that speak by Writing . Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others , or testify to them their Knowledg of such things . 24. Matters of fact done long a go , if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd , and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Mankind , may be made known to us who live now , by a Delivery of them down from the foregoing Age to the succeeding One. Which Continued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition . For , since the Generality of First Attesters , who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd , could not but know them ; and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents ; it follows , that the Continuance of those Causes may still continue the same Effect , and bring the Knowledge of them down to our times . 25. Practise , if Frequent , and Obligatory to be Continu'd , will most certainly bring down the Tradition of Former Matters of Fact. This is Evident ; for it is Impossible that the Martyrdom of King Charles the First , or the horrid Powder Treason should ever be forgotten , if the Anniversary of them have a Continu'd Obligation of celebrating such Matters of Fact but once a Year ; much more , were such Practises often repeated . 26. Such a Tradition of such Matters of Fact is Equally Certain tho' the thing Attested had happen'd some Thousands of Years ago , as if it had happen'd but an Hundred Years since . For , since it is equally Easie for the succeeding Age to understand the Attesters , Witnessing still all along that they had been told it , as it was to understand the First Attesters relating they had seen it ; Their Testimony , as far as concerns their Knowledge of what was transmitted , has equal force as had the First Attestation : And , since the Wills of the Intermediate Attesters had the same Object ( viz. an Apparent Good ) which they could not desert or go against , or act without it , and an Evident Impossibility could not be an Apparent Good ; and it was equally acting for an Evident Impossibility , to conspire to say they had such a thing Universally Testify'd to them by their Fore-fathers , or to hope to gain Belief of it , if it had not been so Attested ; their Veracity , in Attesting they thus received it , was no less Assur'd . Wherefore , the same Causes being put all along in each succeeding Age as were at the first , the same Effect of Delivering it down with the same Certainty , must still be Continu'd , though for some thousands of Years . 27. No Dead Testimony or History has any Authority , but by virtue of Living Testimony or Tradition . For , since Falshoods may be Written or Printed as well as Truths , it follows that nothing is therefore of any Authority , because 't is Written or Printed . Wherefore , no Book or History can Authenticate another Book ; whence follows that , if it have any Authority , it must have it from Living Authority or Tradition , continuing down to us the Consent of the World , from the time that Author Writ , or the matters of Fact it relates were done , that the things it relates are True in the main ; and , consequently , that the Book that relates them deserves Credit , or is ( as we use to say ) an Authentick History . For example , had a Romance , ( soberly penn'd , ) and Curtius's History been found in a Trunk for many Hundreds of Years after they were writ ; and the Tradition of the former Ages had been perfectly Silent concerning them both , and the Matters they relate ; we must either have taken both of them for a Romance , or both for a True History ; being destitute of any Light to make the least difference between them . 28. Tradition not only authenticates Books in the bulk , but it gives moreover the d●stinct degrees of Credibility to divers passages in the same Book already authenticated in gross . For no wise Man can give the same degree of Credibility to Alexander's cutting the Gordian Knot , or to his speaking such and such words to Hephaestion or Parmenio , as he is forc'd to give to his Conquest of Asia : And why ? all of them being Equally in the Books ? Certainly , because the latter being Visible , Remarkable , and of great Concern to Innumerable Attesters of it at first , so vast a source of Original Attesters did , consequently , carry down a Matter of fact so hugely Notorious with a vast sway ; whereas the others , being particulars , of small Concern or Note , and seen or heard but by a few at first , wanted a strong Tradition to recommend them for Certain Truths . Whence , ( for ought we know , ) they were grounded and writ upon Hear-say , as our News and many particular Actions and Sayings of Great Men are now adays , which oftentimes prove False . 29. Hence appears , that Historical Faith , meerly as Historical , that is , in passages Vnabetted by Tradition , is not Absolutely Certain , but is liable to be False or Erroneous , and so is not without some Degree of Levity to be absolutely Assented to ; tho' we cannot generally with prudence Contradict them , but let them pass as if they were Truths , till some good occasion awakens our Doubt of them : The reason is given , in our last Paragraph , from this , that all Particulars are of slight Credit that were not Abetted by a Large and well-grounded Tradition . 30. Tradition thus qualify'd as is above-said , viz. So that the Matters of Fact were Certainly Experienced by very great Multitudes of the First Attesters ; that they were of great or universal Concern , and so prompting them still to relate them to the next Age ; that they were Abetted by some obligatory Practise ; and , lastly Impossible to gain a Belief , if they had not been ; and thence , Obliging the Attesters to Veracity : Such a Tradition , I say , is more than Morally , that is , Absolutely Certain . To omit the foregoing reasons , which have evinc'd the force of each of these particulars . This will be Evidently seen , or rather Experientially felt ; by Reflecting on our own Interiour ; and by observing how Nature works in Mankind and forces them to Assent firmly to the points which such a Tradition recommends , and to Suspend as to the other . For Instance ; Let us take some Particular that is only Morally Certain ; as , that I shall not dye this Night ; or , that when I walk abroad a Tile shall not fall from a House , and kill me ; or , that the House I live in shall not fall down and crush me ; or such like . I find at first sight , that these are highly Vnlikely , because it very seldom happens ; and many reasons may occurr why I think it will not be ; Yet if I severely call to account my most Serious and Deliberate thoughts to find any Absolutely Certain Reason , why that may not happen to me which has happen'd to others ; I shall perceive that I can find none such . Whence , I can entertain some Degree of Suspence , whether it may not possibly happen to me or no ; which restrains me from Assenting absolutely that it will not . This duely reflected on , let us propose to our selves Another Particular , to be scann'd likewise by our most strictly-examining Thoughts : viz. whether there was a Henry the 8 th . a Julius Caesar , or that Alexander conquer'd Asia . Which being propos'd to our Examination , let us again consult our Thoughts , and put on the most Sceptical Disquisitiveness we are able , to find out some reason , why these may not possibly be False , as well as the others might . And , in despight of all our most Exact search , and our utmost endeavours to put our selves upon doubting of these said particulars , we shall still find the Affirmative of each of them writ in our Breast in such Indelible Characters , and so Solidly Imprinted there by Nature ( I say , by Nature , for that Certainty was not Acquir'd by Study and Speculation ) that we can never be able to invent any kind of Reason that can breed in us the least degree of Suspense , as to the Verity of these , and such like Matters of Fact ; or unfix us from our most stedfast Adherence to them as most Certain Truths . Which shows Evidently that the former were only Morally Certain , that is , had some Contingency in them , and so , might possibly be otherwise than we , till we came to reflect , deem'd them ; whereas those Latter were more than Morally , that is Absolutely Certain ; because , after the most accurate Reflexion , we could not invent , and heartily embrace , any Ground or Reason to admit the least Suspence as to their Truth ; nor how or why they might possibly be False , or ( which is the same ) that the Testimony or Tradition for them could be Fallacious . Corol. IV. Hence we may make a farther Discovery of the force of Practical Self-evidence instill'd by Nature without Study : and , that it is a solid Knowledge of the An est of the thing Attested , and , consequently , of the Conclusive Force of Tradition , as also of many other Truths ; the Quid est of which ( or the Grounds on which our Rational Nature Unreflectingly , and as it were , at unawares proceeded , ) is to be Demonstrated by Learned Men , looking exactly into Intrinsecal Mediums ; and thence discovering how this Effect , viz. such a Firm Adhesion , was wrought in us Connaturally ; or why such an Authority could not deceive us in Attesting such Particulars . Note , That some of these Matters of Fact now mention'd , do fall short as to some of the best Qualifications found in diverse other Traditions ; viz. as to that of their being Practical . Which gives us farther light to discern the Incomparable Strength of Tradition , and how every way Impossible it is it should deceive us , were it furnisht with all the Advantages it might have . 13. Hence is seen that Opinionative Faith is as much Irrational as Opinion was shown to be , taking it as Oppos'd to Science ; for example . What an Old Wife said is True That she saw a Spright is what an Old Wife said ; therefore That she saw a Spright is True. LESSON IX . Of Assent , Suspence , Certainty and Uncertainty . 1. THE Notion of Potentiality , Indifferency , Indetermination , and Uncertainty , as conceiv'd to be in the Thing , are one and the same ; For , if the Thing be consider'd meerly as a Power to be This or That , or to be thus or thus , 't is evident from the Terms that it is not ( as thus conceiv'd , ) Actually , Particularly , Determinately or Certainly this , or thus ; since all Difference , Determination , and , consequently , Certainty in the thing ( which , if well reflected on , are no more but it's being what it is ) do spring from the Act or Form ; as all Potentiality , Indifferency , Indetermination and Uncertainty of being this , or being thus , does from the Matter . 2. Existence , as being the Last Actuality , takes away all Potentiality , Indifferency , and Uncertainty of being this , or thus that can possibly be in the Thing . This is as Evident as 't is that Perfect Light takes away Darkness , or , that any Opposit is Inconsistent with the other Opposit in the same kind ; or , to come nearer our point , that what is , has , while it is , lost all Potentiality or Power of not being while it is . 3. Wherefore , considering the Thing as it is in our Vnderstanding , it remains Indeterminate and Vncertain to us ; that is , our Understanding , which is Inform'd by it , is Potential or Indeterminate it self ; and consequently , we are Vncertain Intellectually till we see it is . The reason is , because all our Knowledg is Intirely and Adequately taken from the Thing , which makes the Understanding Conformable to it according to the degree of Clearness or Obscurity whereby it is represented to us , or affects us : Whence follows , that , when we see the Existence of the Thing , or that it is , our Understanding is ultimately Determinate , that is , we are Absolutely Certain . 4. Wherefore , on the contrary , while we see the Thing may not be for ought we know , our Understanding is Indeterminate as to it 's Being ; that is , we must remain Vncertain that it is . For , 't is against a First Principle of our Understanding , that the Thing may not be and be at once . 5. Wherefore , [ Assent ] being the Judging that a thing is , all that passes in us ( if we act Rationally ) is Suspence till we come to a Proof that Concludes it is . This is manifest from the Terms ; For the Words [ Suspending of Assent ] do show that , take away all Suspence , Assent succeeds : and , consequently , that ( unless it so happens that we see a thing to be clearly False ) all is Suspence till we come at Assent . 6. Wherefore all Common and Remote Mediums , which are only apt to ground Opinion , being unable to conclude the Thing is ; they are , consequently , unable to Determin the Understanding that the Thing is , and , therefore , they must leave it ( if it works rationally ) in some degree of Suspence ; Indetermination or ( which is 〈◊〉 same ) in Vncertainty . This is Evident ; because such Proofs do reach only to show the thing Likely to be , which falls short of it's Being really and Indeed ; for Likelihood to be is not the Notion of Being , since [ what is , most Certainly is ] which goes beyond all Likelihoods , how great soever they may be imagin'd to be . 7. Suspence may be consider'd as Indifferently hovering between the Things being or not being , or without Inclining to either of them . For , sometimes we have no kind of Reason inclining us to the Likelihood of the one more than of the other . As we experience it happens to us as to our Determining whether the Number of the Stars be Even or Odd. 8. Hence Assent consists in an Indivisible ( as does also Dissent , or a Judgment that the thing is not ) but all Suspense is Divisible or Capable of Different Degrees . The former part is Evident , because it 's proper Object , [ is ] or [ being ] is Indivisible , as is also the Object of Dissent [ is not , ] whereas the Objects of Suspence are seeming Distances from the things being so Actually , or Approaches towards it ; or in Dissent , Approaches towards it's seeming not to be so ; that is , Removes from it's being so . 9. The Differences of this perfectly Indifferent Suspense are more and Less seemingly Distant from , or Approaching to , the Actual Being of the Thing . For this Indifferent Suspense , by it's being Indifferent , is a kind of Genus to the others , and abstracts from them both ; and therefore , the Differences of it must be more and less in that kind . Corol. I. The Disinclining towards Assent or Inclining towards Dissent that the thing is , is call'd Doubt ; and , if the Being of that Thing is our Good , it grounds that Passion call'd Fear of loosing it . And , the Inclining towards Assent in such a Case , or Disinclining to Dissent , causes a disposition in the Understanding opposit to Doubt ; which , ( tho we want a name for it ) is a certain chearing Glimpse in the Understanding , which was in perfect Darkness before , and grounds that Passion which we call Hope . Both which Passions are Rational or Irrational , according as the Likelihoods on which they are built are Great or Slight . 10. Those Different Inclinations or Propensions of the Understanding towards the Things being or not being may be taken from Innumerable Heads : viz. From the meer Frequency or Seldomness of the things Happening ; from Historical Relations unabetted by Tradition ; from Rumour and Common Talk ; from Writers of Uncertain Authority , or proceeding upon Speculation or Opinion ; from the Multitude of such Authors as do not so much as pretend to know , yet are of great Name or Authority ; from the bare Sentiments of Antiquity ; from relying on our Nurses , Parents or Tutors ; from Medals , Monuments , Inscriptions , Fables , &c. From Misconceits deluding our Fancy ; from Equivocation of words ; from Interest and Prejudice ; from ill-agreeing Observations made by our selves of the same happening in a like case ; from Mistakes of Proper Causes , &c. All which agree in this that they are Common or Remote Mediums . 11. Some Degrees of Suspense are so small and Indiscernable , that they are not easie to be discover'd , so that they counterfeit an Assent even in the Wisest , and cause a Real Assent in Weak People . Such as are the Instances of Moral Certainty mention'd * above . 12. The way to discover whether they be Assents or Suspences is to Reflect on our own Interiour , and to study better our careless thoughts , by asking our selves what Certain Ground we had for them . For , 't is Evident that we have many Effects wrought in us by Nature , which , for want of Reflexion , we are not aware of ; in regard our Thoughts , and the several natures of them , cannot possibly be known but by Reflexion . For , to use our former Example , we seem to Assent Absolutely that we shall not dye this Night ; and even the Wisest Men , if they be now in perfect health , do seem to take it to be altogether Certain , or ( to speak more properly ) that themselves are Absolutely Certain of it ; yet , upon recourse to their Grounds , finding themselves unable to fathom the Series of Hidden Causes and the multitude of Casualties that may occur , which they habitually knew before-hand that they did not certainly know ; we shall find that , notwithstanding this seeming Assent of theirs , they yet retain'd some small Degree of Suspence whether it might happen or no , which hinder'd them from truly Assenting . 13. From what 's said it appears that Certainty is a Qualification of Assent , giving it it 's best perfection by Securing it from Errour ; and making it , at the same time , Incapable of ever admitting the least Degree of Suspence . For , since our Assent may hap to be , and oft-times is , upon Irrational and Inconclusive Grounds ; which expose it , when discover'd , to the shame of a future Retractation ; but Certain Assent , cannot be liable to that Hazard and Inconvenience , because what 's Certain to us , is True beyond all Peradventure ; it is evident that Certainty superadds to Assent the highest Perfection that can be . 14. Certainty may either be consider'd as it is in the Object or the Thing ; or else , as it is in the Subject or Person who is Ascertain'd by by that Object . 15. Certainty on the Objects side is nothing but the Things being Determinately what it is , or as it is . This is in a manner Self-evident ; For every thing that is , is Determinate ; and it 's being Fixt to be such , is to be Certainly such of it 's own Nature ; independently on any thing but on the First Cause Establishing that Nature to be what it is ; or ordering it , by Second Causes , to be as it is . 16. Certainty on the Subject's side is the Conformity of our Understanding to this Objective Certainty . For , we can neither be Certain nor Uncertain without Reasons or Motives ; and those must either be taken from the Establish'd or Certain Nature of the Things , or they can be no Reasons . 17. Wherefore , when we discourse or dispute about the Certainty of any Point , it can only be meant of Certainty in the Subject , or of Certainty to us : for , of Certainty on the Object 's side , or that the Thing is Certainly or Determinately what it is , there can be no Dispute . Corol. II. Hence , Certainty being the Determination of the Vnderstanding , which is to be led by Reason ; all Determination of our Understanding which springs from the Will , and not from Reason , is not to be call'd Certainty , but Resolvedness or Wiliful Adhesion . 18. Wherefore 't is most Irrational , and a most senseless Abuse of the word [ Certainty ] to ground it on the Subjects or the Person 's own Perswasion that the thing is so , and not on the Thing it self . For , since our Soul is of her self Tabula rasa , all our Knowledg , and the Firmness or Solidity of our Knowledg , that is our Certainty , must either be taken from the Things that are without us , or ( since Nature can have no other Method but tha● ; ) it must be inspir'd Supernaturally . Wherefore , such a Fantastick and Catachrestical Certainty , is convinc'd to be nothing in those men that are capable of weighing Reasons , but a Self-conceited Resolution to hold or think thus , and to Stick to it , out of meer Wilfulness ( its true and only Ground ) in defiance of all Reason , and of the Natures of Things which do ground all our Reason . 19. Hence follows , that that Certainty they Nick-name [ Moral ] is in reality , Vncertainty . For , since all Certainty has for it's Object or Cause the Existence of the Thing on which all true Assent is grounded ; and this , consisting in an Indivisible has no Degrees ; it follows that as when you step never so little out of the Notion of [ is ] which is its Object , you plunge into [ is not ] so you no sooner relinguish ( tho' never so little ) the true Notion of Certainty but you fall into Vncertainty , in regard the Object of it permits no degrees of passing from one to the other , or Approaching to it nearer by little and little . Wherefore , since Moral Certainty imports some Diminution of True Certainty , it must necessarily be some kind , or some degree of Uncertainty , Whence to say [ I am morally certain of a Thing ] is , in rigour , the same Nonsense as it is to say I am Vncertainly Certain , or ( which is consequent to it ) I ignorantly know , I suspendingly or hoveringly Assent , I diffidently believe or can probably demonstrate . Wherefore , when in common speech men use to say they are morally certain , 't is a Catachrestical phrase , and signifies only that the thing is highly likely , or that they Incline strongly to think 't is True. 20. Hence follows , that Certainty and Infallibility are all one , or the self-same Notion . For , since Nothing sounds more contrary to the Common Sense of Mankind than to say , we are Certain of any thing peradventure , Certainty must be such a Fixure of the Mind , as to the Existence of the Thing , as is beyond all Peradventures of being Deceiv'd in that thing , or beyond all Contingency that it may happen to be otherwise than we are Certain it is . Again , since Certainty is the Immediate Effect of our Knowledge of the Thing , and the thing is Infallibly , what it self is ; and our knowledg of a Thing ( it being Essentially a Conformity to that thing ) is Infallibly as the Thing is : it follows demonstratively that Certainty , which determins and fixes our Understanding by such a Knowledg , or a Knowledg so grounded , must be likewise Infallible . Lastly , ( to omit many other Conclusive Proofs ) If Infallibility and Certainty be not the same Notion , then they are different Notions ; that is , [ Infallible ] is one of the Differences of Certainty , distinguishing it from other sorts or Species of Certainty ; wherefore there must ( in that supposition ) be another species of Certainty which is not Infallible ; that is , ( since what is not Infallible must be Fallible ) there must be another Species of Certainty which is Fallible Certainty ; But this is against the Common Sense and Language of Mankind ; nor can there be greater Nonsense than to say , I am Fallibly Certain of such a Thing ; nor , ( though there could not want occasions to use such words ) was it ever heard or read since the Creation that any man did ever joyn these two words [ Fallibly and Certain ] together in their Discourses and Writings . Therefore , [ Infallible ] is not a Difference of Certainty as its Genus or ( which the same ) a Notion Different from it ; whence 't is Logically demonstrated that it is the same Notion with it , or that Certainty and Infallibility are all one . Quaere . Why is [ Infallible ] then added to [ Certainty ] if it have no Different Signification from it , or do not add some degree of Certainty to it ? Or why does Mankind use such a needless Tautology ? 'T is answer'd ; We may observe that though to say I am Infallibly Certain of such a Thing , sutes very well with the Notions and the Sense and Language of Mankind , yet men never use it but when some Circumstance requires it to put others out of all possible Doubt of the Thing in question : And then Nature puts them upon Redoubling , as it were , their Words or Expressions to assure them of their Certainty of that Thing . Thus in such Cases , they use to say , I know it , I tell you once again , I know it to be so ; or , they think it not enough to say barely I saw it , or I heard it , but they express themselves thus , I saw it with my own eyes ; or I heard it with my own ears ; which , were it not on such an occasion , would seem foolish and Tautological ; since no man can see but with his own Eyes , nor hear but with his own Ears : Or , it may be answer'd that some men use in such occasions to joyn [ Infallible ] to [ Certainty ] to signifie True Certainty , and to distinguish it from that Mock-Certainty call'd Moral ; which must be a Fallible Certainty if it be any Certainty at all , that is , an Vncertain Certainty . Whence , since Mankind never us'd such a phrase as Fallibly Certain , though they might have had many occasions to do so , had it not been Chimerical and Nonsense , and against their Natural Notion of Certainty ; we may hence farther demonstrate ( in confirmation of our 19th . Sect. ) that Moral Certainty , being ( if any ) a Fallible Certainty , is no kind of Certainty at all ; and that 't is as great Non-sense to say Morally Certain ( meaning by those words such a Certainty as we may be Deceiv'd in ) as to say Fallibly Certain ; and it would be as much abhorr'd by Mankind , were not the Phrase cloak'd , and the sense of it clouded by the Unintelligible Notion of the word [ Moral ] which , as they use it , has no determinate Bounds ; and so it cannot be Defin'd , nor Consequently distinctly Vnderstood . Nor ( as far as I have observ'd ) do we read such an Expression in the Antient Latin Authors , either Heathens or Christians , but the word Verisimilitude or Likelihood only ; which is not so apt to impose upon Learners or Readers ; till some late Speculaters being most of them Sceptical , and blundering between Certainty and Uncertainty , invented this odd Mixture call'd Moral Certainty , which should be partly the one , partly the other . To which they were forced by their bad Speculation , and the Care of their Credit : For , it was highly opprobrious to say they had No Certainty at all in their Writings ; and it was Impossible for such Superficial Discoursers to show any thing truly Certain , because they durst not undertake to Demonstrate any thing ; and , therefore , to uphold their Repute on some fashion , they were oblig'd to advance this Ambidextrous Notion of Moral Certainty , which might be either Certain or Vncertain as occasion serv'd . Whereas , ( as has been shown above ) they might with full as much reason have invented a Compound of [ is ] and [ is not ] which would have done a great kindness to Scepticism , and have been a most excellent ground to verifie Contradictions . Nor is this spoken in the air ; Diverse of them have made many great steps towards this Heroick Exploit to un-man Mankind by their putting Vacuum , Imaginary Space , Subsistent Dimensions , Negative Entities and such Chimaeras to have a being ; tho' , either directly or by consequence , they have been manifested to be Pure Nothings . And as they dealt with the Notion of Ens by confounding it with Non Entities , so they labour hard to do the same with the Notion of Existence too , as is seen above . For they are utterly destroying the Notion of [ is ] and the Truth of this Proposition [ what is , is ] while all their Sceptical Discourses would have those best Perfections of our Understanding ( I mean Certainties ) that are Immediately grounded on , and correspond to , the being of the Thing , to be possible not to be as the thing is , or possible to be False ; which they must be , if the Notion of Certainty may be compounded with Moral . 21. No Testimony that is Fallible in what it attests , can prove the thing Attested by it to be True. For , since Knowledge in the Attester is necessary to ground all Attestation , and give it any Weight ; and a Testimony that is Fallible in what it attests , may be Deceiv'd in what it attests ; it cannot be said to Know that thing it Attests , because all knowledge consists in this that the Understanding be Formally , that is Infallibly , as the Thing is . Whence follows that , how firmly soever such Attesters may deem or opine that the Thing is highly Likely to be True ; yet they cannot be said to know , really and indeed , that the Thing is True. Whence 't is Concluded that such Attesters can never prove the Truth of that thing : Truth , Fundamentally consider'd , consisting in an Indivisible , as being the Existence of the thing Known ; and Formal Truth ( or Truth in us ) being the Conformity of our Understanding to the Thing thus Existing ; and , therefore , consisting likewise in an Indivisible . Which sets it above all Gradual Approaches of Likelihood , or Probability of being so ; nay , above all Possibility of no● being so , that is , of being False . Again , they who are Fallible in the thing they Attest may be deceiv'd in that thing ; that is , may be in an Error ; and so what is built on their Testimony may be Erronious or False : But what 's True cannot be False ; therefore a Fallible Testimony cannot be a Ground or Reason to prove a Thing , no better Attested , to be True. Note that this Proposition [ what is True cannot be False ] does hold in all Truths , but those which are in materia contingenti ; as , when we say to day [ it Rains ] this Proposition may be False to morrow , when it is Fair ; because the Matter or Subject , viz. the Temper of the Air on which it is built , is Alter'd . But , this Exception has no place in Speculative Truths ; which Abstract from such Contingency , and are grounded on our Natural Notions , or the Natures of things and their Metaphysical Verity , which cannot Alter . 22. Therefore no Fallible Testimony can deserve Assent to what it Attests or says . For , since a Fallible Testimony may attest a Falshood , and Falshoods do deprave the Understanding , and to Assent to a Falshood is a certain and Actual Depravation of it ; and , therefore , to Assent to a thing that may be false is to hazard to deprave it ; and none ought to hazard such an Injury to his Soul , especially when there is no necessity of doing himself that harm , or of Assenting in such a Case ; both because GOD and Nature have furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending till we have Evidence ; as also , because no Outward Force can impel us to Assent ; nor any Interiour Force , but that of Clear Evidence ; and a Motive that may be False ( as Fallible Testimony may ) cannot lay Claim to Clear Evidence , either of it's self , or of its Grounds . It follows that such a Testimony cannot deserve our hazarding to embrace an Error ; nor , consequently , to make us Assent upon its Attestation . LESSON X. Of Disputation , and Paralogisms . DIsputation must be fitted to the Occasions , and to the Ends , we aim at ; which may be either to clear Truth by combating our Adversary with down-right Reason ; or only to gain a Victory over the Defendant by Stratagem . The manners of Disputing may be shown by putting Four Cases or Circumstances which vary the Method of it . 1. When the Defendent holds a False Thesis , the way to convince him will not be Difficult , if the Doctrin deliver'd above be well consider'd and dexterously made use of . For , if a fit Middle Term be taken and rightly placed , the Conclusion will necessarily follow against him ; so that he will be certainly overthrown , and his Cause lost . But , if the Disputant be so Skilful as to Reduce his Discourse to Identical Propositions , he will not have the face to own his Position any longer ; the First Lights of Nature standing so Evidently against him . 2. To know in what Mood we are to frame our Syllogism , we must take the Proposition which is Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet ; and , by the Certain Rules given as * above , it will be easie to know in which of the Four Moods such a Conclusion is to be prov'd . For Example , suppose the Defendent holds that [ Some Body is Unchangeable ] you must take and prove the Contradictory to it , viz. [ No Body is Unchangeable ] which being an Universal Negative , and withal the Proposition which is to be the Conclusion , it can only be prov'd in Celarent ; as Ce-No Divisible thing is Unchangeable ; but la-Every Body is a Divisible thing ; therefore rent-No Body is Unchangeable . 3. The same Method must be taken if the Defendent absolutely denies any of the Premisses of the First Syllogism , or any of the Succeeding ones ; or , if , by Distinguishing , he alters the more Universal or Ambiguous Proposition , to a more Determinate one ; Only you must not now take the Contradictory to it , as you did at first , for then it was your Adversary's Proposition which you were to disprove , now 't is your own which you are to prove ; and , therefore , you must take your Measures now from it self . For example ; if he Denies the Minor , which was an Universal Affirmative , you must prove it in Barbara , thus . Every Quantitative thing is Divisible , but Every Body is a Quantitative thing ; therefore Every Body is Divisible . 4. Besides the having a Middle Term , and knowing in what Form to argue , some other Rules must be Observ'd . 1. Get an Exact Notion of the Terms of the Proposition under debate ; that is , consider well in what Common Head they are , and how defin'd ; which is the same as to look attentively into the Nature of the Thing . For this will best furnish you with Proper Mediums . 2. Agree before-hand with the Defendent about the Meaning of the Words which express those Terms ; which is the most Solid way of Stating the Question , and of avoiding Wordish Distinctions . 3. See the Mediums be Proper or Immediate ; otherwise , not being well connected , they cannot Conclude certainly , although the Form be right . 4. Take heed of Equivocation of Words ; For , otherwise , you will hazard to be carry'd aside from the True State of the Question , and lose sight of the true Nature of the Thing by mistaking one Notion for another ; and , so , you will be certainly non-plust . And , the longer you dispute , the farther still you will err . 5. Observe well the Doctrin of Dividing right , and be sure that each Member of the Distinction he brings , has in it the true Notion of the Term Divided or Distinguisht . Otherwise he will baffle and confound you with impertinent Distinctions , introduce a new Question , and put you besides your Argument . For example , if he distinguishes Space into Real and Imaginary , and obtains of you to admit Imaginary Space for one kind of Space ( which is in reality Nothing ) he will defeat your Argument , and put you to fight against the Air ; while , by getting you to admit Non ens for Ens , he may answer or say any thing . You have lost all your strength when you forego Nature , and suffer your Natural Notions to be perverted . The same may be said of the Distinction of Ens into Positivum and Negativum which is plainly to distinguish Ens , into Ens and Non Ens. 6. When the Defendent grants any thing , then to lay up in careful memory his own Concessions , and make use of them against him to force him to admit Truth or retract . For , otherwise , he may perhaps in the beginning of the Dispute yield candidly to diverse things ; which , afterwards , when he finds himself pincht and reduced to streights , he will flatly deny . 7. To be true to your Cause , and to seek the Victory of Truth over Error , rather than your own over your Adversary ; that is , to hold him still to the Point , and to pursue the Eviction of that ; and not , leaving that pursuit , to catch the Adversary at advantages , and follow on that game to show him Weak and Self-contradictory ; ( tho' it is not amiss to hint , and then wave it ) as is the less-laudable way of those who fall to argue ad hominem . Yet , if the repute of the Person happens to weigh more with his Followers than the Strength of his Reasons , and that he is held Obstinate and to want Candour ; it may be a Duty to Truth , and to the Cause , to Expose him to Contempt by Baffling him . 8. To reflect that , tho' the Words in Common have the same Sence ; yet , as standing in the Context , it may have diverse Constructions , and so cause that Fallacy we call Amphibology . 9. That not only Single words and Sentences may be Ambiguous , but there may lurk an Equivocation even in the Connexion it self ; as when the Middle Term is Accidentally joyn'd to one Extreme by [ is ] and Essentially to another . Thus far of Disputation when the Defendent holds a False Tenet ; which is the only Method an Honest Man , whose sole End is to evince Truth and beat down Error , ought to take . The following ways are more becoming vain Sophisters , whose aim it is to combat Truth on any Fashion . Yet , 't is fit that Honest Men should know them , that they may know how to avoid the Ambushes and Snares of Truth 's Enemy . 5. The second Case then is when the Defendent holds a True point . v. g. [ that there are Angels ] and yet holds a False one Inconsistent with it . v. g. that [ That which is no where ( or in no place ) is not . ] The Disputant , if crafty , may make use of this False Thesis to overthrow the True one , Thus Nothing that is in no where ( or in no place ) is ; but All Angels are no where ; therefore No Angels are . 6. The Third Case is , when the Defendent does not hold an Inconsistent Thesis , yet he is Ignorant of the Antecedents and Consequents of his Tenet . In which case , if the Defendent can be brought to deny some Truth necessarily Connected with his Thesis , he will be forc'd to deny the Thesis it self . As , put case the Defendent holds that GOD , our Creator , is Infinitly Perfect in himself ; yet , through want of Logick , is Ignorant that GOD has no Real Relation to Creatures ; and therefore that the word [ Creator ] apply'd to him is meerly an Extrinsecal Denomination , and no ways Intrinsecally perfecting Him or affecting him ; such a Man may be in danger of foregoing his Christian Tenet by this Argument . Fe-Nothing that depends on another for some Perfection is Infinitly perfect in it self : but ri-GOD depends on Creatures for his being a Creator , which is some Perfection in him ; therefore a-GOD is not Infinitly Perfect in Himself . 7. The Fourth is , when the Defendent Understands only his own Thesis , and is in a manner Ignorant of all others . For example ; Let us suppose that some Defendent by the Language of Christianity , with which he is imbu'd , or by some Solid Discourse he has accidently heard , and ( though not Learned yet ) having a good Mother-wit is made well Understand , does hold that GOD is Vnchangeable ; but yet , being not us'd to Disputes or Speculative Reflexions , he is little verst in other points ; as in the Nature of Christian Language in Spiritual Points , of which , consequently , we have no Natural Notions ; and therefore is not aware that all our Words we use when we speak of them are Equivocal and Improper ; and , especially , when we speak of GOD , highly Metaphorical : Such a man , no better qualify'd , may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that Evident and True Tenet by a Contentious alledging things very Forrein which he not skilful in , and then backing them with Authority , on this manner . What is not GOD Pleas'd when we do well , and when we Sin becomes displeas'd ; that is , changes from being Pleas'd to be Angry ; and , when we repent , is he not Pleas'd again ? Will or dare you deny that which Scripture , Fathers , Catechisms , Prayer-books , and Sermons do so often inculcate , and the Consent of all good Christians does Unanimously and Constantly avow ? Why are we afraid of Sinning , but for fear of losing GOD's Favour , and of a Friend making him become our Enemy ? Will any but a Heretick deny this ? Again ; is not GOD Omnipotent ? cannot he do all things ? 'T is an Article of our Creed he both is and can ; since then to change Himself is to do Something ; will you stint GOD's Omnipotence , and say there is Something he cannot do ? Such Insulting Talk as this , tho' there be never a wise word in it , working upon the Weakness of half-witted People , may hap to make them forego their True Tenet ; and even fright them to renounce their Faith out of Fear of renouncing it . Corol. I. These three last Cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be Truth 's Champion , and to undertake her cause , unless he be thorow-pac'd in Logick , and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her ; lest Truth it self Suffer for the Confident Weakness of the Unable Undertaker . Corol. II. This last Case belongs to such Disputants , who , to maintain Absurd and Impossible things , do use to argue from Divine Omnipotence ; by alledging and magnifying which , they hope to fright the Piety of a well-meaning , but weak , Defendent to admit any thing though never so Senseless or Ridiculous . The way to answer these men , is to show the Effect to be contrary to our Natural Notions , and , consequently , to the Wise Conduct of the World , which was the Cause of those Notions ; And , therefore , what GOD can do , or cannot do , is nothing to the purpose , unless the thing in question be Agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness , which determin his Power to act ; and without which it cannot be that he should act . Whence it is generally more Safe , more Edifying , and more Proper , to say in such Cases ; that it cannot be that GOD should will to do such a thing , than bluntly to say GOD cannot do it . For , This flatly limits Omnipotency ; That only restrains its exerting it self hic & nunc because of some Attribute of the Divine Nature to which 't is Disagreeable . I say Generally ; For oft times such Discourses would hav● GOD's Power to do perfect Contradictions ; that is , to undo the Natures of things Establisht by himself ; which is not to do . As in the Instance of his Changing Himself ; which is the same in Effect as not being Himself . Or , when they say , GOD has a Power to Annihilate ; For , since Powers are specify'd by their Objects , and Non-ens ( which can do nothing in any kind , nor consequently specify a Power ) is the Object of Annihilation ; a Power to Annihilate is to be no Power . And 't is as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving ; for this takes away from GOD his Goodness , or the Redundancy , Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being ; which is Essential to him , and was the Sole Cause of the Creation . Thus far of Disputation it self or True Syllogisms . The Faults of it come next to be consider'd , which are call'd Fallacies , or Paralogisms . 8. Fallacies are of two sorts . Those which arise out of Words ; which happens when the Ambiguity of some Single word , or of some Words put together , do lead us into a Mistake of the Thing . And those which are not in the Words , but arise out of the Thing or the Sense ; and thence , make us mistake the Thing and the Words too . 9. Those of the Former sort are , almost all , little Gramarical Quibbles ; and it would do too much honour to them , to spend labour to name them , being too open of themselves to need Exposing . Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this . He that says you are an Animal says true , but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal : Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true . Where , as has been particularly shown above , the word [ Animal ] is taken in diverse Senses ; for in this Proposition [ Peter is an Animal ] it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind , viz. Rational ; But , in the Proposition [ An Ass is an Animal ] it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind , viz. Irrational . whence 't is no Syllogism , because it has Four Terms . 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words , but are built on the Thing or the Sense ; the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente ; which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes , and not per se , or out of its own Nature , As , Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad ; but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth ; therefore ra-All Religion is bad . The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both ; and to say , that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature , is Bad ; but not that which breeds them Accidentally ; for , otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad , because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther , and the other causes Drunkenness . But , the more Solid way , and which bears up best to Logical Grounds ; is to deny it to be a Syllogism ; because , though the Form of it be Legitimate , yet the Matter or the Middle Term , is not so . For , a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises , so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes , we may know it to be Certainly True ( for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant ) it follows , that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes , or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it ; neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them . We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones , or such as beget Opinion : For , between Religion and Commotions , intervene Perversity of will , Disregard of Virtue , Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground , Pride , and Faction against Church Governours , who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties , Interest &c. All which , or some ( if not most ) of them , are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention ; at least , nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self ; the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity . 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi , which , in easier Language , is the attempting to prove what 's not in question ; or , putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held ; as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds , when they object to others what they neither held nor thought , that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious . This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right , and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd ; as was recommended in the second and third Rule . Or , if this be not done before the Dispute begins , it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum , and forcing the Adversary , weary with aiming his blows amiss , to recur to the true point , and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet ; which was his only Duty , and ought to have been done at first . 12. The Third is , Begging the Question , or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd . Which is manifestly faulty : For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion ; which they cannot be if the Proof , in whole or in part , is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self ; as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd ; and begg'd gratis . Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty , as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts , as follows here . 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division , which happens w●en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated ; or , that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd ; when , perhaps , there is Another way how that thing may be done , which was never assign'd , but either Unthought of or Neglected . As , if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum , or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD , and his Continuing it ever since ; when as a third way may be assign'd , viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes , and all along , Continues , the Motion of the first-moved Bodies , which move the rest . This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition , which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action ; and , by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate . 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa . That is , in plain terms , the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude ; or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it . This Fallacy , if it must be call'd so , happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers ; who , going by meer Induction , and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature , a priori , to guide their Thoughts by , but Hypothetical ones only ; do , hence , refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes ; whence every man who sets up a new Scheme , does still assign new Reasons or Causes , according to which he strives to Explicate Nature , and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it . But , why this should be call'd a Fallacy , I cannot comprehend . At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy . For , since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion ; whoever argues ill , argues Fallaciously ; and assigns a wrong Cause , by producing an Incompetent Medium . But , in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant , it is then enough to deny it ; and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground , as was pretended . 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense , as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly ; or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense ; Example of the Former is this , He that is actually sitting may Walk , Peter is actually sitting ; therefore Peter actually sitting ( or while he sits ) may walk . Where the Major is False , unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively ; and mean that he who sits now , may Walk hereafter . An Example of the later may be this . Two and Three are Even and Odd. Five is Two and Three : Therefore Five is Even and Odd. Where the Major is False , unless Two and Three be taken Divisively , whereas in the Minor they are taken Conjoyntly . Or , it may be said that Five are † not Two and Three formally , but only materially : In which sense Aristotle said that Bis tria non sunt sex . 16. The Seventh Fallacy is when the Opponent argues à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter . Which kind of Fallacy is the Erroneous Principle that begets the Vice of Pride , and therefore is peculiar to all Proud People . For the sin of Pride does not consist in Knowing what Endowments any one truly has , or Esteeming himself as having such Endowments ; for this is a Truth ; and did he not know it , and what degree of Perfection it adds to him , he would neither strive to perfect himself , nor know how much he is particularly bound to Love and Thank GOD , who bestow'd on him those Accomplishments or Advantages above others . But Pride , ( as all other Vices have ) has a Lye for it's Principle ; and consists in this , that a Proud Person over values himself , and Preferrs himself Absolutely before all others ; that is , Concludes himself to be the very Best , or Better than others , and to deserve more Esteem than they , because he is Good or Estimable secundum quid , or in some particular which is far short of rendring him so highly Estimable . Thus , some self-conceited Lady Esteems or Concludes her self to be the Best Woman in all the Country , because she has a New-fashion'd Gown , or is Finer , Handsomer , or Richer than others . Thus a King or Lord preferrs himself absolutely before all others , because he has more Power , or can reckon up more Titles than others can . Thus a Great Scholar who is Proud , values himself absolutely to be Better than those who are Unlearned . Whereas a Poor , Ignorant , Ragged Beggar , who has more Virtue or Love of GOD in him , has more Intrinsick Worth in him , and is , absolutely speaking , more Valuable than any or all of them ; notwithstanding their Gayness , Beauty , Riches , Knowledge , Honour and Power . All the rest are but only Good secundum quid , and he is for his Sanctity , Good and Valuable simpliciter . 17. Thus much concerning those Fallacies that are worth noting ; if , indeed , any of them do much deserve it . For , I cannot discern but that , if the Rules for Distinguishing our Notions , of Predicating one of them of another , and lastly the Right Methods of Arguing , both as to the Matter and Form of Syllogisms , were observ'd Exactly ; there is nothing in them that can require the treating of them so elaborately , or making such a pother about them as Authors do . The Agreeing with our Adversary about the Meaning of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd , forestalls those Fallacies of Ignoratio Elenchi , and that of Begging the Question . * The Doctrin given above how to detect the Equivocation of Single Words , will prevent any advantage that can be taken from the Ambiguity of the Terms ; and the Rules of Predicating , by shewing how a word that is Univocal , taken single , may become Equivocal by being joyn'd to Different Subjects , will defeat all Stratagems that lurk secretly in such Propositions , * as is seen in the First Fallacy § . 9. The Doctrin of using only such Middle Terms as are either Essential , or Proper Causes and Effects , renders Ineffectual the Fallacy ex Accidenti ; as also those of Non causa pro causâ , and à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter . The Common Doctrin concerning Division , viz. that it's Members be Adequate to the Notion Divided , makes void and insignificant , that Fallacy call'd mala Enumeratio partium . In a word , let but the Rules given here be warily observ'd , and it will scarce be possible the Defender of Truth should be circumvented by any Fallacious manner of Arguing ; but it will either be seen that the Terms are Ambiguous , or ( which generally happens ) it will be found that the Syllogism has Four Terms ; and , so , is no Legitimate Syllogism . The subtlest of them seems to be the First . For the single word [ Animal ] seems to be taken in the same sense , both in the Major and Minor , and has the same Definition in both places ; and yet , by reason of the Different Subjects , it is not Predicated in the same sense , but according to Different Parts of it's Intire Notion or Signification ; whence the Syllogism has Four Terms in sense ; that is , in reality , or in our Mind , where Syllogisms are only Properly and Formally ; however the Word [ Animal ] be the same materially . 18. The Syllogism which is imply'd in every Practical Judgment of a Sinner , has Four Terms , or else one of the Premisses which he grants to himself is False ; and therefore both It and the Action that proceeds from it , is a Deviation from Right Reason , and a Perversion of Human Nature . v. g. Justice is to be done , That Satisfaction be taken of my Enemy who injur'd me , is Justice ; Therefore That Satisfaction is to be taken by my self of my Enemy , is to be done , or I may revenge my self . Where the Major is True , so is the Minor ; but when the injur'd person comes to conclude , instead of the true Conclusion [ Therefore that Satisfaction be taken of him that injur'd me is to be done ] which abstracts from Who is to take that Satisfaction or Revenge , whether Himself or the Magistrate , who is the Overseer of the Laws and the Proper Revenger of Injuries , his Passion , and not Right Reason , coggs in a Fourth Term , not found in the Premisses , viz. Satisfaction is to be taken [ by my self . ] And the same may be observ'd in the Practical Judgment of any other Sinner , whether their Sin be Theft , Incontinency , Rebellion , &c. Corol. III. Hence , all Right Reasoning , which causes Science and Truth , is also , of its own nature , the Parent of Virtue ; and can dictate nothing but what tends to True Morality . As , on the contrary , all False Reasoning , does naturally and necessarily beget Error ; and , by means of Error , leads to Vice. APPENDIX . THE Grand Controversy Concerning Formal Mutation Decided In favour of the Peripatetick School . 1. THE main Hinge on which the greatest Contests between the Peripateticks and Anti-Peripateticks turn , is , Whether or no there be that Composition and Division in Natural Bodies , call'd Formal ; and , consequently , FORMAL MUTATION . The Corpuscularian Philosophers and Atomists deny there is any Mutation in the Thing it self , either in the Whole or any Part of it ; and they affirm that there is only an Extrinsecal Application of Particles Figur'd , Mov'd and Plac'd in various manners ; and , consequently , that the whole Contexture of Natural Bodies is a meer Mechanism . On the contrary , the Peripateticks ( by which word I do not mean the Common School-men , but those who take pains to understand Aristotle , either by his own Books , or by his First Interpreters ) do grant some kind of Particles and Minima Naturalia ; that is , some Least Size of Bodies , which are ( generally ) no farther Divisible because there want Natural Causes little enough to pass between their parts and divide them ; but they say , moreover , that there is not only Local or Situal ( which are Extrinsecal ) but also Intrinsecal or Formal Composition and Division , and , consequently Formal Mutation in them , either in Whole or in Part ; that is , a Change in them according to the Form , and not according to the Matter or Subject ; and they deny that any Solid Discourse or Explication either of Nature or Transnaturals ( which we call Metaphysicks ) can possibly be made , unless this be admitted . 2. The Parts of which they affirm all the Essences or Natures , of all those Entities we converse with , are Compounded , they call Act and Power , or Form and Matter ; whether those be Essential or Accidental . And , they put the Matter and Essential Form to be necessarily found in every Body , and in each of the most minute and insensible Atomes and Particles that can be imagin'd . The reason they give for this Assertion is , because each of them is a Distinct Ens from the Others , in regard it can subsist alone , and so , is Capable of a Distinct Being : whence they conceive there must be Somewhat in every Body and every Atome , by which it is Distinguisht from all Others , and somewhat in which it Agrees with them . That which Distinguishes them they call the Form , and that in which they Agree , the Matter . And they think that , however their Adversaries may quarrel the Words , yet they must allow the Sense : Nature and daily Experience teaching us that One Thing is made of Another ; which cannot be , unless Somewhat of it remains , and Somewhat be lost . For , otherwise , one Thing could not truly be said to be made of another ; but the Former Ens , of which Nothing remains , would be Annihilated ; and the Ens or Body , newly produced , would be made of Nothing ; that is , Created . 3. Now , when the Peripateticks speak of Matter and Form , and that each thing is Compounded of these ; and consequently , that there is some kind of Divisibility or Difference between them ; the Corpuscularians , who fancy nothing but Particles commodiously laid together , are presently apt to conceit that those Parts ( as it were ) that Compound a Body , are meant to be two certain kinds of Things joyn'd together into One ; and , if this be deny'd , they are ready to conclude , that they are either two Nothings , or at least that they leave us in the dark , and at a loss how to distinguish Things from Nothings : and thence object that this doctrin of Matter and Form cannot explicate any thing , or make a man one Jot the wiser . And , indeed , in case the Asserters of them did stay in these Common Expressions , and not draw many Clear Consequences from them , giving a farther account of them , the bare Saying there are such Part● so named , would be as Insignificant as to talk of Occult Qualities . 4. To rectify this Misconceit of theirs , sprung from a just Prejudice against meer School-terms , the Aristotelians defend themselves , by declaring their Meaning to be that One and the same Thing does ground those diverse Notion● of it self in us . That the Faecundity ( as it were ) of the Thing , not being Comprehensible at one view by our short Sighted Understanding , which knows nothing here but by Impressions on our Senses , which are Distinct and of many sorts , forces us to frame Inadequate or Partial Conceptions of it . And , because we cannot Speak of a thing otherwise than as we Conceive it , hence we can truly say , One of those Notions or Conceptions of the Thing is not the other ; which yet means no more , but that that Thing as thus Conceiv'd , is not the same Thing as otherwise Conceiv'd ; or that the Thing , as working by my Sense upon my Understanding thus , is not the Thing as working by the same or another Sense upon my Understanding otherwise . Whence , because what corresponds to both these Conceptions or Notions is found in the same Thing , hence they affirm that there is a certain kind of Composition of them both , in the Thing it self ; which is no more , in reality , but that there is found in that Thing what corresponds to , and grounds , both these Conceptions . 5. Farther , they declare , that , since Nature shows us that the Thing may be Changed according to somewhat in it that answers to One of these Conceptions , Notions , or Natures , and not Chang'd according to what answers to the Other ; hence , we must be forced to grant that there is a kind of Divisibility between them in the Thing , answering to the foresaid Composition ; and consequently , a Capacity of Formal Mutation , by which the Thing may be Chang'd accord●ng to one of them , viz. the Form , and not Chang'd according to the Matter . Whether that Form remains or no after such a Change is Another Point , and Extrinsical to our present business . 6. For Instance ; We experience that that Thing we call ( Wood ) is Chang'd into Another Thing call'd ( Fire ; ) and , therefore , unless we will say that Wood is Annihilated and Fire Created in its room ( which we are forbid to do by the very Notion of its being Chang'd into another ) there must have been Somewhat in Wood by which it was Actually Such a Thing before the Change was made , and which is Lost by its being Chang'd into Fire ; and also Somewhat in it which remains in the Fire into which 't is Chang'd . The Former they call the Form , the Later the Matter ; and thence conclude there must have been a Composition of Matter and Form in the Wood. And , since all Mankind agrees that Wood is One Thing and Fire Another Thing ; hence , ( Essence being the Form that constitutes an Ens , or makes it Formally a Thing ) they do farther affirm , that that which was in Fire , and made us denominate it such a Thing or Ens , is an Essential Form. And , because the Matter of the Wood had , ( or rather was ) a Power to have such a Form as made it now to be Wood , ( and also a Power to be afterwards Fire ) hence they say that that Thing , Ens or Substance we call'd Wood , did consist of Matter and Form , or was Compounded of them ; that is , Wood had truly in it what corresponded to both these Natures or Notions . Lastly , because Wood was Chang'd according to One of them only , viz. the Form , hence they conclude there was Formal Mutation made in the Wood ; which , therefore , was a Change according to somewhat that was most Intrinsecal to it ; because it chang'd it's Essence by making it become Another Thing ; and , consequently , that Change was an Essential one . Thus much of the Doctrin of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Composition and Mutation which is Essential . 7. But , besides this Formal Composition , and the Divisibility of that Essential part call'd the Form from the Matter , which we have now spoken of , there is moreover , ( say the Peripateticks ) another sort of Formal Composition and Mutation , which is Accidental . For even the Intire Thing , consisting of Matt●r and the Essential Form , has many Ac●idental Forms or Modifications in it , which are also truly Intrinsecal to the Thing , tho' not Essential to it . Which Forms are Compounded with the Intire Thing as with the Matter or Subject of them . For example ; We say a piece of Wood is Round , Hard , Long , Green , and such like ; and , therefore , since Wood has in it , besides it 's Essential Form , these Accidental Forms of Hardness , Length , &c. there is therefore a Real Composition of Wood ( which is a Complete Ens , and their Subject ) with these supervening Forms ; because the Thing has really in it what grounds and answers to all these several Conceptions . Farther ( say they ) there is , consequently , a Real Divisibility between the Wood and these Additional Forms ; in regard the Causes in Nature can work upon and Change the Wood according to it's Length , Roundness , Hardness , &c. and yet not change the Nature or Essence of Wood. Therefore ( say the Peripateticks ) the Wood , which is the Subject , can be Chang'd according to these Accidental Forms ; that is , there may be Formal Mutation in it according to those Accidental Notions or Natures , tho' it remains Substantially and Essentially the same . And , since the Form , of what nature soever it be , is conceiv'd to be in the Subject , hence ( say they ) both these sorts of Formal Mutation are also Intrinsecal ; or a Change of the Thing according to somewhat that is truly conceiv'd to be in it . 8. I expect that all this Discourse will look like Gibberish to the Corpuscularians , whose thoughts beat upon nothing but upon Particles thus Figur'd , Moved and Situated ; and all the while they read this , they will be conceiting how dextrously all this may be explicated to be perform'd by their Hypothesis ; and therefore how needless it is to have recourse to such abstruse Speculations as are those about Matter and Essential Forms that are Intrinsecal ; and , especially , to such unintelligible points as Formal Composition and Mutation . But I must beg their Patience to suspend their thoughts till we come to the Proof of Formal Mutation , which we are not yet got to . What we are now about , is barely to declare and lay open the Scheme of the Aristotelian Doctrin ; resting confident that in the sequel of this Discourse , the main point we have undertaken will be forced upon them with such Evidence , that it will be unavoidably necessary to admit it . In the mean time the Aristotelians , with so less Assurance than they use Confidence , do peremptorily challenge their thoughts , and bring them as Witnesses against themselves , if ever they reflected on the Common Rudiments of True Logick , and they set upon them thus . 9. It must be granted that we cannot have Science of any thing but by means of Discourse ; That the most Exact , and most Evident Discourses are those we call Syllogisms : That Syllogisms are resolved into Propositions ; and Propositions into Two Terms , and a Copula that connects them : That all that we can say of those Parts of a Proposition is , that they are Notions , or Meanings of the Words that express them : That , therefore , all Discourse is built on the right putting together of these Notions , and can be built on nothing else , nor made on any other fashion : That no Discourse can be Solid but what is grounded on the Natures of the Things themselves : without which they must necessarily be Aiery and Chimerical , and impossible to beget Knowledge : That , for this reason , our Notions , which ground all our Discourse and Knowledge , are the very Natures of the Things without us , existing Spiritually in our Understanding ; That our Operations of Apprehending , Iudging , and Discoursing of the Natures of Things being Immanent , or Perform'd and Perfected within us , the Objects of those Operations , or the very Natures of the Things , must be likewise within us : That 't is Evident by Experience that we do make Diverse Conceptions or Notions of the same Thing ; that is , all the Operations of our Mind are built on those Partial and Inadequate Notions of the Thing about which we are to Discourse : That we can frame a great Number of these Abstracted or Partial Notions of the same Thing , and many of them Intrinsecal ones : That , therefore , that Thing must have in it what corresponds to all those several Notions ; which we call Formal Composition : That , hence , there is a Divisibility in the Thing as grounding one of those Notions from the same thing as grounding Another of them , by reason that Natural Causes are apt to work upon the Thing according to that in it ( or that part of it , as it were ) which is thus conceiv'd , and yet not work upon it according to what in it is otherwise conceiv'd , or , to what grounds a different Notion . Whence they make account is inferr●d this Grand Conclusion , that therefore There is FORMAL MUTATION , in regard it can be wrought upon according to that in it which corresponds to the Notion of FORM , and not to that in it which answers to the Notion of Matter : Whence follows unavoidably that there is Formal Composition , Divisibility and Mutation in it , as is above explained . Which Conclusion must necessarily follow , if they allow ( as they must ) this Method of Discoursing ; each part of which has been made good in the foregoing Treatise . And the Aristotelians presume it is altogether Impossible for them to assign any other that can bear the least show of Sense or Coherence . 9. The Peripatetick School has yet another great Exception against the Corpuscularians ; which is , that , because their Schemes do not take their rise from our solid Natural Notions , made by Impressions of the Things upon our Senses , and thence convey'd to the Mind ; they come by this means to have little regard to the Nature of the Things , or to their Metaphysical Verity , the only Firm and Deep-laid Ground of all Knowledge . Through which neglect having render'd themselves Incapable of laying any First on Self-evident Principles , ( taken from our most Firm and most Radical Conceptions of the Thing , and Predicated of it accordingly ) to which they may finally reduce their Discou●ses ; hence , they are forced to coin to themselves Principles from their own Wit and Fancy : Out of which they contrive certain Hypotheses ; which granted , they hope they can make some congruous Explication of Nature . By which manner of proceeding , their Systems of Natural Philosophy , being Grounded on such Supposed Principles , is meerly Conditional or Hypothetical . Whence , they not only disable themselves from Concluding any thing , or Advancing Science ; but , instead of doing this , which is the Duty of a Philosopher , they breed an utter Despair of it , and introduce meer Scepticism . To pursue the Truth of which is not our Task at present , nor sutes it with our intended Brevity . 10. Yet to show the Justice of this Objection , it may suffice to remark at present , that neither does Epicurus regard the Intrinsecal Nature of his Plenum or Atomes , or go about to show why they must be so Infractil , nor in what their more than Adamantin Hardness consists ; nor how the Potential parts of these Atomes do come to have such an insuperably-Firm Coherence . Nor yet does Cartesius explicate to us of what Nature his First Mass of Matter is ; what Degree of Consistency or Density it has ; and , if any ( as it must have some or o●her ) why it was to be of that Density , or in what that Density consists . Which shows that neither of them regarded or minded the Intrinsecal Nature of their First Matter ; tho' this must needs have had great Influence on the Oeconomy of the World , and have afforded us much Light to know the Constitution and Temper of Natural Bodies , and consequently of their Proper Causes and Effects ; as also of many Intrinsecal Modifications of them , highly conducing to give account of , and explicate the Operations of Natural Agents . The only thing they seem to have regarded was the Extension of their First Matter , and the Motion , Figure and Situation of it's parts ; which are Extrinsical or Common Considerations ; but to give any account of what Intrinsecal or Essential Nature that Matter was , they are perfectly silent . They suppose it to be , but they do not so much as Suppose it to be of such or such an Intrinsical Nature ; which yet they must be bound to do , since all Extrinsical respects came by Motion , which was not yet begun . Or , if Epicurus does , by making his Atomes Infractil , 't is both said gratis ; and , besides , he gives us no Account in what that Quality of Indissoluble Hardness consists , or how it is to be Explicated . 11. Hence the Peripateticks alledge that , however the Authors of those Sects are men of Great Wits and strong Brains , ( for 't is not a Task for Ordinary Capacities to undertake a Design that fathoms and comprehends all Nature ) yet they can never begin with Evident Categorical Propositions and First Principles , or carry on their Discourses so as to bear the Test of True Logick ; but , either their Principles must be far from Self-evident , and must need Proof , which is against the nature of First Principles ; or else their Consequences must be Loose and Slack . And the only way to refute this Objection is , for some of their School to put it to the Trial by laying their Principles , and , proceeding forwards , to draw all along Evident Conclusions without intermingling their own Suppositions . But the Peripateticks are very Confident they neither can do this , nor will ever Attempt it . I mean so as to carry it along with Connexion and Evidence ; in which Spinoza , tho' perhaps the best Writer of the Cartesian School falls , very short , and pieces out his Discourse with many unprov'd Suppositions ; as is hinted above in my Preface . 12. And hence it is that the Corpuscularians , being forced by their Cause to decline such a severe Method , strive to avail themselves and uphold their Cause by Witty Discourses , Smooth Language , Clear Expressions , Apt Similitudes , Ingenious Experiments that bear a Semblance of Agreeing with their Doctrin , and such like Stratagems , to make a Plausible Show of Science . But their Chief Reliance is on the Facil and Familiar Appearances to Fancy ; with which they court that Delusive and easily Deluded Faculty : And , to this end , they gratifie it with such Proposals as are apt to sink into it most pleasingly ; such as are Particles of Matter , whose Variety of Imaginary Figures , and the Diverse Positions of them , they , without Study , quickly apprehend . And conceiting that all is done when they have thus Fancy'd or Apprehended them , they argue thus ; If these Pores and Parts will do the business , what need is there of those Abstruse and Metaphysical Speculations of Formal Composition and Mutation , and those many Intrinsical Changes , of which Fancy , can frame no Idea's or Shapes . And , indeed , such high Points seem to that Superficial Faculty Mysterious Whimsies ; they disgust it with the Laboriousness of comprehending them ; and persuade men of Fancy 't is Impossible to explicate Nature by such Principles , because they are rais'd beyond it's reach . And , indeed , if Nature could be solidly explicated by a kind of Contessellation of Particles , Fancy would have ( as it never has ) Some Reason : But , if , upon Examination , we come to find that such Schemes go no deeper than the Surface of the Essences of Things , that they can never reach to the Bottom-Principles of Nature , nor give Solid Satisfaction of the true Intrinsical Natures of any thing , to the Judgment attending to Maxims of Evident Reason , and to true Logick ; then we must be forc'd to follow the Aristotelian Doctrin , and have Recourse to Intrinsical and Formal Mutation ; especially , if the Necessi●y of Allowing it shall happen to be Demonstated . 13. To do which being our present Work , we will begin with Epicurus , a Scholar of the First Class in the School of Democritus . This Philosopher ( if we may call him so ) puts Innumerable Atomes , or rather ( contrary to a Clear Demonstration ) an Actually Infinit Number of them , and of an Infinit Number of Figures , descending in an Infinit Imaginary Space or Vacuity ; some of them downwards , some of them overthwart ( according as his Hypothesis had occasion ) that so they might overtake their fellow-Atomes . With which , clinging together by virtue of their meer Figures , they compound several Worlds , and every particular Body in each of those Worlds . That Natural Bodies become Rare or Dense , according as they have in them more or fewer of those Atomes , or ( as they call it ) Plenum , in proportion to the Vacuum . Thus much in common of his Hypothesis ; which , were the circumstance proper , it were easie to show , ( besides it being Vnprov'd ) be a Hotch-potch of the most Refined Nonsense , in every particular Sentence , and almost in every word ; notwithstanding the Explications and Patronage which Gassendus , Lucretius , and our Dr. Charleton have lent him . While I am speaking of his Tenet , I note here by the way , that by the Indivisibility of his Atomes , he means Insuperable Hardness or Absolute Infractilness ; and not that they consist in a Point , or want Extension ; as he is understood by Mr. Le Grand in his Entire Body of Phylosophy , Part 4. c. 4. § . 6. For , to think that , since he makes them of several Figures , there should want room or space to admit Division , could not be meant by such men as Epicurus or Gassendus . But , to return to our business , what concerns us at present is this , that let him contrive his Scheme as he pleases ( for , in such Fantastick Philosophy , all is as pleases Fancy , the Painter ) yet he must be forced to grant Intrinsecal and FORMAL MUTATION , even while he most industriously strives to avoid it . At least , tho' , perhaps , his Followers will not own the Conclusion , yet they must allow the Grounds of it , or the Principles that ought to inferr it . 14. To show which we ask , Are all his Atomes of the same Matter ? He must grant it ; for he allows no difference between them , but that of Figure . Again , each of those Atomes must be granted to be an Ens or Thing , because it can and does Exist alone ; and , to be a Distinct Ens from all the Other Atomes ; for , otherwise , all his several Atomes might be but One Ens or One Atome ; which is both a flat Contradiction , and , besides , quite destroys his own Hypothesis . Wherefore , each Atome must have something in it , that makes it a Distinct Ens , or distinguishes it from all the rest ; which cannot be the Matter of the Atome ; for That is Common to them All ; and what is Common to all , cannot distinguish One from Another . And , if there be Somewhat in each Atome that makes it a Distinct Ens , then ( Essence being that which formally constitutes an Ens , ) it gives it a Distinct Essence , or distinguishes it Essentially ; which is what the Aristotelians mean by an Essential Form. So that they are at unawares , in despite of their own Doctrine , become ( thus far ) Aristotelians . 15. To proceed ; Therefore it is not Impossible but each Atome may be Chang'd according to the Form , and not according to the Matter ; that is , each Atome is Capable of Formal Mutation . Which I thus demonstrate , Whatever does not imply a Contradiction is not Impossible ; but The putting each Atome to be Chang'd another to the Form , and not according to the Matter , does not imply a Contradiction ; therefore The putting each Atome to be thus Chang'd is not Impossible . The Minor , only which can need Proof , is thus Evidenc'd . For , since a Contradiction is no where but in our Vnderstanding , there can be no Contradiction unless the Same be Affirm'd and Deny'd Secundum Idem , or according to the same Notion or Respect , in our Understanding . But , this cannot be in our case : For the Notions of the Matter and Form of each Atome ( as has been in the last § . Metaphysically demonstrated from the natures of Idem and Diversum ) are Distinct Notions that is , Distinct Considerations , Regards or Respects of the same Thing ; and therefore , to Affirm that the Atome is Chang'd according to One of those Different Regards or Notions , viz. the Form , and Not-chang'd according to the Other , viz. the Matter , has not the least show of Affirming and Denying secundum idem ; nor , consequently , the least show of a Contradiction . Wherefore it is evidently Demonstrable from plain Logick , acknowledg'd by all Mankind , that it is Possible each Atom should be Chang'd according to the Form or Formally Chang'd ; whence , if there be Causes in Nature sufficient to change it , it will be Actually Chang'd or Broken ; that is , it will undergo such a Mutation as is not only Formal , but Essential ; because the former Ens is no more when Two Entities are made of it . It remains then only to examin whether there be sufficient Causes in Nature to work this Change , supposing each Atom of it's own Nature Changeable , as has been demonstrated . 16. In order to which we are to reflect that Epicurus puts those Atomes of his to be of all imaginable Figures : Wherefore , there must be some of them like Needles , ending in the smallest Point that can be conceiv'd . Others full of Pores or very small holes , into which some of these sharpest Points will light ; and the more bulky part of the Atome not being able to enter it , that Point will remain Wedg'd in that Pore or Cavity . Now this Point of the Atome may be so almost infinitely Slender , that the least Impulse of other Atomes , crouding and pressing upon it , may be able to break it ; much more , when it happens ( as it needs must ) that the vast weight of Mountains or a great Part of the Body of the Earth do press with a Transverse or Side-motion upon that Atome . In which case , it will be impossible to conceive how that smallest Point , perhaps a million of times less than a Hair can be able to resist such a stupendious Pressure . The same may be said of those Atomes made like our Hooks , clasping with another Hooked one , when a very strong Divulsive force , able to rend Rocks asunder , tears the Compound several ways ; as when Mines of Gun-powder blow up Castles or Mountains . Wherefore , since ( as has been shown ) the Atome is Capable of being Broken , that is , Capable to be Intrinsecally or Formally Chang'd , and there are Causes sufficient to break it ; it follows that ( whatever Epicurus does extravagantly , and against the Sense of Mankind , suppose ) his Atomes would be de facto Broken ; that is Two Entities would be made anew , and the Vnity ( that is the Entity ) of the Former Ens or Atome would be destroy'd ; and , consequently , there must be not only Intrinsecal , but Essential , that is , the Greatest of Formal Mutations , made in his Atomes . 17. The same is Demonstrated from the Notion of Mutation it self , and the Effects it causes in our Understanding . I discourse thus , Our Words express our Notions , and our Notions ( unless they be Fictitious ) are taken from the Thing . Wherefore , unless there be some Change or other in the Thing , our Notions , and , consequently , our Expressions and Denominations , must still be the same . But , when Local Motion of the Atom is made in the Vacuum , we must be forced to speak of it or Denominate it diversly , and to say it is now Here , now There , or in another place than it was before ; for , otherwise , it could not be said truly to be mov'd Locally if it did not change Place . There must then be some Novelty or some Change in some Thing or other to ground this New Notion , which causes this New Denomination . Themselves will not say 't is in the Vacuum ; and , should they say so , it would be perfect Nonsense ; for the Vacuum , being nothing , cannot be Capable of Change ; Therefore this Novelty or Change must be in the Atome . Otherwise , did all the Causes whatever remain the Same , the same Effect , viz. the same Notion and the same Denomination , and not a Different one , must ensue ; or else there would be an Effect ( viz. this New Notion and Denomination ) without any Cause , which is Impossible . Wherefore 't is Logically Demonstrated that there must be Formal Mutation made in the Atome . 17. Perhaps they will say ( for such Discoursers think they have given a sufficient Answer if they can but give us a New Word ) there is only an Extrinsical Change made by the Application of the parts in the Atom to Different parts of the Vacuum . But first a Vacuum can have no parts , much less any Difference of Parts . Next , an Extrinsical Change is a most Improper Expression , and signifies a Thing may be Chang'd , and yet no Change in it . But , suppose we should admit those Words , yet themselves must say an Extrinsical Change means or implies a Change in some Extrinsical Thing which is realy and Intrinsically Changed : and which , by being thus Changed , give an Extrinsical Denomination to Another Thing ; which is all they can mean by these words [ Extrinsical Change ] As when the Wall is Extrinsically denominated [ Seen ] from the Act of my Seeing Power , my Eye is Intrinsically Chang'd by having that Act , and thence gives that Extrinsical Denomination to the Wall : And if the words [ Extrinsically Chang'd ] have not this meaning , they can have no Sense , but are altogether Inexplicable . To be Cloath'd , is an Extrinsical Denomination to the man on whom Cloaths are put : But then the Cloaths suffer an Intrinsical Change of their Figure , and perhaps their Quantity , by being fitted and acomodated to the Body of that man , and the Air suffers the same while the Action or Motion of Cloathing is perform'd . To be Mov'd Locally is an Extrinsical Denomination to the Body that is Moved : but then , Local Motion being a Division of the Medium through which that Motion is made , there is an Intrinsical Change in the Medium Divided , and a New Continuity of the parts of the thing Moved , to New parts of the Medium , is acquir'd ; which is a Quantitative , and therefore an Intrinsical Mutation ; whence the Extrinsical Denomination of [ Moved ] accrues to the Moved Body . Besides , it is scarce possible in Nature , where there can be no Action without some Degree of Reaction , but the Body it self that is Moved must undergo some small Change. But now , in the Scheme of Epicurus his Philosophy , all things are quite otherwise ; since neither the Vacuum , nor the Atoms ( and he puts nothing else ) even according to his own Doctrin , are in the least degree Capable of Change : Wherefore he is convinced to Deny this Self-evident Maxim [ Idem , manens idem , semper facit idem , ] while he must affirm that there can be a New Effect , ( viz. that New Notion and Denomination ) without any Novelty or Change in the Cause , or the Thing ; that is , he must put a New Effect without any New Cause ; or ( which is the same ) an Effect without a Cause . 18. But , leaving him , and turning our Discourse to our Modern Corpuscularians , the Cartesians : These Philosophers tell us the Particles of their Ma●ter are Crumbled or Shattered by Rubbing against one another . Wherefore their Matter , and each Part of it was One Thing before it was Moved , and now is by Motion become Many Things . Nor can it be deny'd , but that All of them were Entities before their Motion ; since both that Whole Mass of Matter , and each of the first Divided Parts , were ( antecedently to the Division ) Capable of Existing apart , and pre-suppos'd to the Division as the Subject of it . Wherefore , both that Whole Bulk of Matter , and each of those Parts , by losing their Vnity did eo ipso lose their Entity too ; and , consequently , the respective Forms that constituted them such Entities ; which is the Greatest Formal and Intrinsical Mutation that can be ; and far Greater , even by their own Doctrin , than could be made afterwards , according to any Accident or Modification of those foresaid Entities . 19. Again , since Motion cannot be made in an Instant , that Mass of Matter must be granted to have been Created , that is , to have had Being , antecedently , in Priority of Nature , to Motion . Wherefore , it had in that Instant some kind of Intrinsecal Nature ; and somewhat in it which made it to be of that Nature : Hence I argue thus ; that Nature and the Form that constituted it , is either Lost when it came to be Divided , and then it was Intrinsecally and Formally Chang'd : Or else it retain'd that Nature after it was Divided ; and then 't is Manifest that that Mass was Diminisht , that is Chang'd according to its Extension ( in regard the Greater Extension of that Original Mass was now made Less ) and yet was Vnchang'd according to its Nature . Let them take which of these they please , they must unavoidably yield there was Formal Mutation ; in the former case , of its Essence ; in the Later of its Extension ; and a Formal Divisibil●ty in it , either of its Form from its Matter ; or of its Extension from its Nature or Essence ; in regard it was by Motion , Chang'd according to the One , and not according to the Other . But , now , in case they make ( as they do ) Extension to be the Essential Form of that Matter , Formal Mutation is made more Unavoidable , and must be granted even by themselves . 20. To understand the force of this Demonstration more Clearly , it is to be noted that the Cartesians do not make their First Matter to be only an Abstracted Conception of an Ens or Body , as it has in it a Power to have a Form and so to be a Thing , as the Aristotelians do ; for which reason they rightly , and acutely Define , or rather Describe it , as thus Abstracted by our consideration , to be Neque Quid , neque Quantum , neque Quale , neque aliquod aliud eorum quibus Ens determinatur ; in regard that , as thus consider'd , 't is a meer Power to be any of them , or all of them , that is , none of them Actually . But they put their first Matter to be Inform'd ; otherwise they could not put it to have Extension in it , which must necessarily be granted to be a Form either Essentially Constituting it , or some Accident or Modification of some Thing that has a Substantial Form. Whence , they must hold that their First Matter is an Ens or Compleat Thing , that is , Compleatly Capable of Existing ; which appears farther by its Terminating the Action of Creation ; the peculiar Effect of which is to give Actual Being ; which concludes it to have been Compleat under the Notion of Ens ; since it is Self-evident that that cannot Actually be , which is not Capable to be ; that is , which is not an Ens. This Note reflected on , it is manifest it must have a Nature of its own , and Somewhat in it to constitute that Nature , or some Essential Form ; and so is Formally Mutable ( whether Extension be that Form or no ) as is deduced by our Argument . § . 19. 21. To come up closer to them , and enforce the Evidence of our Argument to a Nonplusage of their Cause , we ask ▪ Of what kind of Consistency was that Original Matter , into which GOD ( according to them ) did infuse the first Motion , and so Divided it . The very Terms tells us that it must have been of it's own Nature either Easie or Hard to be Divided , nor do we ask the precise Degree ; Let them say 't is either One or the Other , or a Middle Degree between both , we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn . It being then indifferent to our Question , in this perfect silence of theirs we will g●ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their Doctrin ; and so we will suppose it to be Dense . We enquire next in what consists this Modification or Affection of it call'd Density ? or how they will explicate it ? Motion had not yet begun in that Instant in which it first was , by the Means of which they put all Qualities ( and this amongst the rest ) to be Produced . If they should say ) which yet I do not read they do , nor so much as speak of it as 't is found in their First Matter ) that it consists in the Rest of it's Parts . 'T is reply'd first that that Matter has as yet no Parts , for these are made by Motion , which was not in that Instant begun . Or , if they mean only it's Potential parts , or ( which is the same ) that One Actual Whole ; not to pose them by what virtue those Potential parts do formally cohere , which without making Divisibility ( which is Quantitative Vnity or Continuity ) the Essence of Quantity is impossible to explicate ; the Question returns and we demand how Firmly those parts do cling together ; that is , how Dense that Whole was , and in what it's Density consisted ! which we affirm must have been either in it's Intrinsical Nature or such a degree of Consistency ( which is in it's being to such a degree more or less Divisible by Natural Causes ) or in Nothing . Again , if Density consisted in the Rest of it's Parts , and there was most perfect Rest before there was any Motion , then the Density of it must have surpassed all Degrees ; and , therefore it must have been of the Nature of Epicurus his Atomes ; that is , Insuperably and Essentially Incapable of being Divided ; which they must not say who make their Elements made by the Rubbing of some parts of the Matter against the others . Besides , in tha● supposition GOD , as the Author of Nature , had offer'd Violence to his own Creation , by Dividing it immediately at first . Lastly , that Matter was of it's own nature Indifferent to be Mov'd or not-Mov'd , that is , Indifferent to Rest or Motion ; for Being and Extension abstract from both ; whereas in our case , Density ( and the same may be said had it been Rare ) being Natural to it , and not Adventitious or Accidental by the Operation of External Causes ; it could not have been Indifferent to it ; since every thing necessarily Requires what is Natural to it self . Nor is a Thing , meerly by it's being in Rest , of another Nature . To understand this more clearly , let us consider this Proposition [ That Thing call'd the First Matter is in Rest ] 't is about the Essence or Nature or Intrinsecal Quality of the Subject of this Proposition we are Enquiring ; to which supervenes that Accidental Predicate of being in Rest. Wherefore , to be in Rest does not alter the Intrinsecals of their First Matter , but presupposes them ; and , therefore , all it's Intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature , whether it had happen'd to be in Rest , or in Motion . 22. Density then in their First Matter cannot be explicated by Rest , nor , consequently , Rarity by Motion . Let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist , or how it may be Explicated . Now , we are to note , that all Particular Natures or Notions , are to be Explicated by more Common and General ones , if we go to work like Philosophers ; for all Grounds and Principles are made up of such Notions as are Common or Vniversal ones ; and , to Explicate Particulars by other Particulars , is the way of Proceeding by Similitudes ; which may serve sometimes to Elucidate , but never to Prove or to Resolve any thing or Notion into its Formal Cause , which belongs properly to Philosophers . We find then , abstracting f●om Rest and Motion , which are Accidental to that Matter , no Notion or Nature in it that can be Superiour to Density and Rarity , but the Essence of it , that is , that Thing it Self call'd the First Matter , and its Quantity : And Quantity may be consider'd two ways ; Either as affecting the Body meerly in order to its Self ; or else in order to the Causes that may work upon it ; The Former we call Extension , the latter , Divisibility ( physically consider'd . ) Now , Density cannot any way be Explicated by Extension as that in which it consists , as is most Evident ; in regard a Body may be Equally Extended , whether it be Rare or Dense ; nor is any thing therefore Rarer or Denser because it is Longer or Shorter . Let us apply then our Consideration to Divisibility , taken in the sense spoken off lately , viz. as making its Subject apt to be wrought upon or Divided by Natural Causes ; and the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of every Common Notion being More and Less , and it being also Evident from the very Notions , and from the Consent of Mankind , that we call those Bodies [ Dense ] which are Less Easy to be Divided , or Less D●visible ; and those [ Rare ] which are more Divisible or more Easy to be Divided , we are in a fair way to find out clearly what Rarity and Density do consist in ; viz. Rarity in an Excess or greater Proportion of Quantity ( thus consider'd ) to the Matter or Subject of it ; and Density in a Lesser Proportion of the same Quantity to the Matter ; that is , to the Subject of it according to the Notion of it as Matter . Nor , does this more strain our Reason to conceive this various participation of the same Accident [ Quantity ] than it does to conceive a Thing to partake the Quality of Whiteness Vnequally , and be More or Less White . For that Maxim of [ Quantitas non suscipit magis & minus ] is meant Evidently of Extension ; in regard that the least imaginable Extension being Added or Abstracted from the former , must necessarily vary the Species . 23. That we may bear up more directly to our main Thesis : Since Rarity , or else Density must necessarily be in their First Matter , ( for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all Divisible by Natural Causes but it must be either Easily or Hardly Divisible by them ) if we joyn to this that Contraria ( according to the Maxim ) sunt circa idem subjectum , it will and must follow that the same Matter ( whether theirs or ours ) that had a Power in it to be Less Divisible or Dense , had also a Power in it to be More Divisible or Rare ; and this not only in the First Matter it self , but also in every particular Body in Nature made of it , and which has the nature of that Matter in it : whence results this Conclusion , that Rare Bodies are Transmutable into Dense , and Dense into Rare ; and that , therefore , there is Formal Mutation in Bodies according to these two Primary Qualities ; and , consequently , according to all Secondary Qualities too ; which ( as will be demonstrated in Physicks ) are made up of those Primary ones . So that most of the Effects in Nature are carry'd on by Formal Mutation ; nor consequently , can Nature be ever rightly Explicated by the Deniers of such a Formal Change. 24. Let it be well noted that I speak not in this last Discourse of Contradictories , which have no Middle between them , and therefore cannot have the same Matter or Subject , or make it Changeable from one to the other ; as , because Body is Divisible , it does not follow that the same Subject can be Chang'd to Indivisible . What I discourse of , and from whence , in part , I drew my Argument was , from the nature of Contraries , which are two Extremes under the same kind of Quality , and therefore have Middling Qualities between both ; by passing through which , as by Degrees or Steps , the Body is Transmutable from one of them into the other . And the reason is , because neither Extreme is Infinitely such , and therefore has necessarily some Mixture of the Opposit Quality an● is ( as it were ) Allay'd by it ; so that it comes to be Finite under that Notion . Whence the Subject which has one of those Extreme Qualities , becomes a Capacity of Admitting the other Extreme . And therefore Epicurus seems to go to work more like a Philosopher , in this point , than the Cartesians , by supposing his Atoms Essentially that is Infinitely Dense or Incapable to be Broken or Divided ; tho' in most other things he falls very much short of Cartesius his Clear Wit , by his building in a manner wholly on Suppositions ; and , those too , the most Extravagant ones an ill-grounded Judgment could stumble into . 25. They will ask how or by what means can a Dense body be chang'd into a Rare one , or a Rare into a Dense ; or , what Causes do we find in Nature Proper to produce such an Effect ? And , it must be confest the Question is very Pertinent . For to put the Operations of Rarefaction and Condensation without any Proper Agents to cause those Operations , is a thing unbecoming a Philosopher . We answer then , that all Compressive and Divulsive Agents , which we experience are Frequent and almost continually working in Nature , are as Proper to work upon Quantity as such , and to make the Subject of it Rarer or Denser , as Dealbation is to work upon a Subject as 't is Colourable , or Combustion upon a thing as 't is Combustible , or any other Action to produce or inferr it's Proper Effects , or , to cause the Passions that correspond to it . Nor can there be any Notion or Consideration found in a Body on which those two Actions of Compression and Divulsion , can be conceiv'd to work properly and precisely but on it's Quantity or Divisibility , in order to make the same Matter have more or less Quantity in it ; or to make a Body that is Compressed or Drawn several wayes to be Formally Chang'd in those respects . So that we must either say that those two Common Words , importing Natural Actions , and us'd by all Mankind , to have no sense in them , or they must allow them their Proper Effects , which are to Shrink or Dilate the Quantity of the thing , which is to make it Rarer or Denser . Granting them that sometimes and even very often those Effects are perform'd by the Intromission and Extrusion of subtil particles of other Bodies , ( which as the very Terms show , are improperly call'd Rarefaction and Condensation ; ) whenever any Natural Body is Prest or Stretched on all sides by other Bodies closely besieging it , if Quantity be capable of those Effects as is demonstrated above § . 15. it is , the Proper Effects of such kinds of Operations must ensue , and the Body enclos'd , will be to some degree Condens'd or Rarefy'd . 26. Now , had Cartesius put these two First Qualities in the Matter Created by God in the Beginning , so that some parts of it had been Created Dense , some Rare , Nature had been furnisht with Immediate Causes to made Division or Motion connaturally , ( supposing them set on work , or mov'd first by some Superiour Agent ) in regard Dense Bodies are naturally apt to Divide Rare ones , and Rare ones naturally apt to be Divided by those which are Dense . Nor had he then needed to assign to Essential Being whose Nature is Unchangeable , and in which there is no Transmutatio aut Vicissitudinis obumbratio , that is , neither Change nor Shadow of Change , a Drudgery so Mis-becoming his Essence , as to be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change. Hence I argue : Since neither to be Easily nor Hardly Divisible , is the Essence of that First Matter , in regard it was Compleat in the line of Ens , and terminated the Action of Creation , and so could have subsisted whether it had been Rare or Dense , or , tho' it had not been Divided at all , there is manifestly a Divisibility between the Essence of that Matter and its Rarity or Density ; and therefore , by the same argument we brought formerly against Epicurus , that Matter might have been Chang'd according to either of those Qualities , and not according to its Essence , and yet no Contradiction ensue ; which demonstrates it to be Possible . Again , that Matter being Indifferent to either Rarity or Density , had GOD Created some part of it Rare , some Dense , the course of Nature ( as was lately shown ) had gone on more connaturally : Wherefore , since GOD , as the Author of Nature , and abstracting from Miracle , does always act most connaturally or agreeably to the Nature of Things ; it follows that he did actually order that some parts of the First Matter , of which the World was to be Form'd , should be Rarer , and some Denser than Others , and not of an Uniform or homogeneous Nature . And , accordingly , we are taught by Holy Writt , that in the Beginning there was Earth , Water , and Air. And , if the Cartesians will needs make their First Matter Uniform , and that GOD must move it immediately , 't is justly Requir'd of them to show this Tenet of theirs , most Agreeable to the Natures of the Things : I mean to the nature of GOD whom they put to be the Immediate Cause of the First Motition ; and to the Nature of Matter , the Patient ; and not overleap and slide over the Proof of both these main Points and suppose them ; and this , not because they can even pretend that those suppositions do suit best with the Natures of the Things themselves ; but , meerly , because it best serves to introduce and carry on the Scheme of Doctrin they had resolv'd on . 27. From Essential Mutation of Things in Nature , or their losing their Substantial Form , we come now to demonstrate that there is moreover Mutation in them according to those Forms which are Accid●nt●l . In order to which we will premise this Consideration taught us by daily Experience , that No Body becomes Another Thing in an Instant , but is Alter'd or Dispos'd before hand ere it comes to Suffer an Essential Change. For example ; A piece of Wood ere it comes , by perfect Division , to be made two Things of One , is first Alter'd according to its Figure , that is , Cleft or Nick'd . Before the same Wood is turn'd into Fire , it is first Heated ; that is , it has that Accidental Form call'd the Quality of Heat first introduced into it ; and so in all the rest respectively . Which Changes not being Essential ones , in regard they antecede the Change of the E●tity as Dispositions to it , they must be Accidental ones ; and this , according to Quantity , Quality or Relation , which are all the Accidental Notions we have of the Thing that are Intrinsecal to it . Now , if we admit those Previous Alterations and Dispositions , we cannot avoid the admitting Mutation of the Subject according to those Forms . Wax , by melting is Rarifi'd , that is , Chang'd as to its former Density . A Man or Horse loses a Limb , and consequently their former Quantity and Figure too ; and yet they are the same Individual Man and Horse . A Husband loses that Relation when his Wife dies , and yet is the same Man he was . So that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things , and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms ; and the Subjects are evidently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These , and not according to its Essence or Nature ; that is , the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental . And , let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner , they shall never avoid the Conclusion , if they do put the Subject or Body to be truly an Ens , and that it may be otherwise than it was , and yet not Immediately cease to be that Ens ; either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense . 28. I know it will be repli'd , that all Natural Bodies are Compound Entities , or made up of many little Particles ; which , put together , Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously , do enable them to perform those several Operations peculiar to each ; and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech , it is such an Ens. And that , therefore , all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground ; since all may be Explicated by the Taking away , Adding . Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner . But , this comes not up to the Point , nor can serve them to escape our Argument , but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction . For , admit that each Compound Ens ( as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities ) or at least a great part of it , be made up of those little Particles ; I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no , after the Composition ? that is , whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing , or Many Actual Things or Entities ? If the First , then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force ; for then , since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Corruptible , it must ( as was prov'd above ) have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w ch is to be made out of it , which we call Matter , and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was , and consequently , which does not remain in the New One ; which is what we call the Form. And , because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant , the Former Subject or Body admitted of Alterations first ; and , consequently , there was Mutation in it , both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms . But , if they say , ( as I fear they will , because they must ) that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many ; or , if they say that , after Composition , there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities ; then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens , and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens , which is a plain Contradiction ; for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect . Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin , there is but One Ens Actually , tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Divisibility between them ; or ( which is the same ) One Thing apt to verify different Conceptions and Notions ; which ( as was said above ) partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once , partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another , we are naturally forced to make of it . Now , to make the Subject consist of Potential parts , Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it ; for , to say it is Potentially Many , is the same as to say it is Actually One ; and , to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens , neither of which were One Actual Part before , is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titl● to be One of its own nature : For , to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens , is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express . 29. But , to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds , I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae ( as Gassendus calls them ) of Epicurus , and from that Original Mass of Matter , of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made , which the Antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vncompounded . And , I farther alledge , that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quantum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively ; so neither can Many Entities ( such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be ) compound One Ens , unless they be United Entitavely . Wherefore those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound ( as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are ) for , were they Actually there , they would be Entitatively Many . Whence the Ens , made up of those Many Actual Entities , could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens ; but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se ; and which is worst , ( to compleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Contradiction ) it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se , viz. in ratione Entis ; which is to be perfectly Chimerical . 30. Thus they come off , and so must every one , who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense . For , the Word [ Compounded ] is in reality a kind of Transcendent , and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal ; whence , while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches , they take the word in an Vnivocal signification , they come to apprehend that the compounding many Entities together according to some Extrinsecal respects ( such as are Situation , Motion , joynt-Action and such like , ) is the same as to compound them according to that most Intrinsecal respect call'd Substance ; and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively , or One Ens. 31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body , which leads them into Innumerable Errours . And , the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing , is far greater than to make One Body compounded of those Particles ; in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least , make One Artificial Compound , ( v. g. a House ) tho' not a Natural one ; whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture ; but must unavoidably , when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can , remain Two Actual Things ; and , moreover , such Two , as are toto genere Distinct ; nor , consequently , can they , either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind , be signify'd by One Word ; or be called A Man ; as the former Compounds could be called a House , or a Clock . And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natural thing , or have an Entitative Union , but by being join'd together as Act and Power , that is , as Matter and Form ; which are the Potential Parts of an Ens , and therefore are apt to compound One Ens , in regard neither of them is a Thing Actually . 32. And indeed if we look more narrowly into the Doctrin of the Deniers of Formal Mutation ( the Antiperipateticks ) we shall find that they have Perplex't and render'd Obscure the most Common , Easie , Obvious , Useful and Necessary Notion which Mankind has or can have , viz. the Notion of a Thing . For I cannot discern that they make their First Mass of Matter to be One Natural Thing , unless they fancy it to be a kind of Idea Platonica of Body , existing Indeterminately or in Common : For they put the Form of it to be Extension , and they make this Extension to be Indeterminate , that is not-Particular ; that is , to be Extension in Common . Nor can we learn of them what kind of Thing it is , more than that it is barely thus Extended : Which tells us , indeed that it has Quantity , but gives us no light of it's Intrinsecal Nature or Entity ; that is , they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is Extended . And what man living can conceive a Body which has neither Figure , or Colour , Density or Rarity , Heat or Cold , Hardness or Softness in it , but meerly Extension ? Again , I cannot see that they put those little Particles , made by Motion out of that Matter , to be Natural Things , tho' they do Actually and Distinctly exist in Nature ; because they make them Principia or Elementa Rerum Naturalium ; and the Elements of which Things are made can no more , with good Sense , be called Things , than Letters , which are the Elements of Words , can be said to be Words . The Compound , made up of those Particles , they do , indeed , expresly own to be a Thing ; but , by making it consist of Many Things , ( I mean those Particles ) each of which has a peculiar Actual Existence of its own , and which are not United or made One according to the Notion of Ens , but only according to the Notion of some Accident which is Extrinsecal to the Notion of Ens and differs from it toto genere , they cannot with any show of Reason , call such a Compound A Thing , or One Thing . Whence , according to their Hypothesis ; we can have no Clear Light what is to be called a Thing , or what the word [ Thing ] means . As for our Four Elements ( which perhaps they will object ) they either are found Pure , and out of the Compound ; and then having an Actual Existence of their own , they are truly Things . Or they do not , and then they are Potential parts of the Compound in which they are ; which , and only which , Exists by One Actual Existence , which shows it to be One Thing ; and not by Many , as their Compound does , which makes it Many Things ; at least such Things as they will allow those Elements or Particles to be . 33. But to give them what Satisfaction we may without Injury to Truth , and withal to Clear the true Aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those School-men , who make Accidents so many little Entities distinct from Substances , we will confess that many of those Forms we call Qualities , are Effluiums or Particles sent out from other Bodies ; which , while they transiently affect that Body on which they light , they retain their own Distinct Entities , and are call'd the Particles or Vertue of the Emittent Body affecting another Body that is Passive from them . But , when they gain a Permanency there , and , by Continuity of Quantity , or Similitude of Nature , or any other Cause , they come to be naturally Vnited to it , and assist it in its Proper Operation , they lose their Actual Entity and Unity which they had formerly , and become a Potential Part of the Subject that was Passive from them , and Exist and Subsist in it . And ; because the Notion of [ Form ] is to be Receiv'd in the Subject or Matter , and those Particles advene to it already Existing , they are hence call'd Accidental Forms of it ; and either give it such an Alterableness as is agreeable to their nature , as is seen in Passible Qualities ; or , sometimes , if they suit with the Primogenial Constitution of that Body , they strengthen and belong to some Habit , Disposition , Power or Property of it ; and piece out ( as it were ) those Qualities , and , in some degree or other denominate the Subject thus or thus Qualify'd . 34. But to make it yet more manifest how industriously the Cartesians do wave the giving any account of their First Matter , of which notwithstanding they hold all their three Elements , and consequently all Nature , was made , we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more ; which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it ; by omitting that Consideration , which , even by their own Doctrin , was the Chiefest and most Necessary . They affirm that Matter of theirs to have been Divided first by God into greater parts , which again being moved or jumbled one against another , did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their First Element was made : Division then was the first and Principal Physical Action , and that which most conduced to frame all Nature : Nay , in case there be no Vacuum , ( as they grant there is not ) it is manifest that the First Motion , and which was exercis'd Immediately upon their Matter , as also all the following Motions exercis'd upon the said Matter , was Division . Now , Divisibility of the Matter being the Proper Power that answers to the Act of Division , or ( which is the same ) to Motion , and withal directly speaking the nature of their Matter as apt to be wrought upon by those Causes : how was it possible they should slip over that , and regard only the Extension of it ? Divisibility is a Natural Notion , and imports an Order to Natural Action ; whereas Extension is a dull sluggish Notion , and meerly Mathematical ; that is , it does Abstract from Action and Motion both ; For an Extended thing is never the more or less Extended whether it Moves or stands still ; but its whole Nature and Notion is taken up in affecting its own Subject , or Extending it , equally and all one whether it Acts or not acts . But , the reason of this willful neglect is this , that , tho' they grant it to have been Divided , yet , should they tell us it was thus Divisible , Common Reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were Easily or Hardly Divisible , that is Rare or Dense ; of which Qualities in their Matter , antecedently to Motion , and the Contexture of the particles made by that Motion , their Principles can give no kind of account , nor possibly explicate them . 35. I am apt to think that they foresaw this Rub in their way , which hindred the Currency of all their Doctrin of Physicks ; and , seeing they could not remove it , they very fairly let it alone ; Yet , for a show they take notice of the Word , but they turn it to a quite different Sense : For Mr. Le Graud * coming to give us account of the Divisibility of this Matter , where it was the Proper place to acquaint us to what degree it was Divisible into particles by Natural Causes , he starts aside to tell us that , being Quantitative , 't is Divisible in Infinitum ; which is quite besides our purpose . This is a Mathematical Divisibility ; whereas a Physical Divisibility , or a disposition to be divided by the Motion of the first-made parts , is only that which can concern his Scheme or do it any service . For had it been insuperably Dense or Hard ( as Epicurus fancies his Atomes ) they could not have been Divided at all , nor consequently , his Three Elements have been made . Or , had it been Rare or Soft , one part would have stuck to another , and could not have been shatter'd and crumbled into those most subtil parts which make his First Element . To declare then how and of what nature it was , in this respect , should have been one of the First Principles in his Physicks , his whole Hypothesis depending on it ; whereas it was not a straw's matter whether it were Divisible in Infinitum or no , so it were but Divisible into parts little enough to make their First Element and the rest . I must then , in behalf of Truth , declare that their Avoiding this point , so necessary to their own Scheme , and to the explication of Nature , is a most manifest prevarication , arising hence that they cannot , notwithstanding they are Men of great Wit , make any sense of it according to their Principles . 36. But tho' they do not treat of the Divisibility of their Matter de professo and purposely , as they ought , yet it is scarce possible but they must , against their Wills , be forc'd to say something at unawares of the Intrinsecal Nature of their Matter as either Easily or Hardly Divisible , while they go about to explicate themselves . Errour then being the best Confuter of it self , let us see what they say of it . The Ingenious Gentleman , now mention'd , * tells us that their First Element is made of Particles , which , like shavings ▪ are rubb●d off by Motion from Bodies . Now , since their Matter is held by them to be Homogeneous or Uniform , a man would verily think by those expressions , that the Nature of their Matter is Dense , Hard or ( in a Manner ) Friable or Crumbling . For what is Rare , Soft and Tenacious , cannot be conceiv'd Proper or Fit to be Crumbl'd or Shatter'd into such very small dust by Rubbing . Yet the same Author * tells us the particles of their First Elements are slender and Flexible accomodate themselves to the Figures of the Bodies they are contiguous to . By which expressions one would verily imagine them to be Fluid , Soft , Moist or Yielding , rather than of a Solid or Hard Nature , for only such can accomodate themselves to other Bodies on all occasions . So that he makes it at once to be both Hard and Soft ; as being very apt to break , and yet at the same time very apt to ply and bow too ; that is , he puts Contrary qualities in the same Uniform Matter : Which shews manifestly that they know not what to make of it , nor how to speak coherently concerning it ; and , withal , that , ( which is the true Genius of Hypothetical Philosophers ) they blow and sup at once ; and say any thing that suites with their present occasion . It was for their turn to make them very Flexible , for otherwise it had been impossible to avoid Vacuum , whenas Millions of those Atomes were jumbled together ; which , had they been Solid , had retain'd their Figure , and then Vacuum must have fill'd the little Interstices : And , it was very fitting too they should be Hard and Friable ; otherwise they could never have been Shatter'd by Rubbing into such minute dust , as they had design'd to make their First Element of . So that they play fast and loose with their Reader ; and , no wonder we know not where to have them , when they do not know where they are themselves . 36. The same untoward way they take in expressing themselves , sometimes as if they and we did perfectly agree in our sentiments . And because the Goodness of our common Reason teaches us that the Nature of a Thing is in it , they do therefore allow our well-meant words , and talk of Intrinsecal Forms both Essential and Accidental ; which granted they cannot deny Formal Mutation . Mr. Le Grand Part 6. cap. 24. § 9 , 10 , 11. gives us all these good words , tho' he chuses sometimes rather to use the word [ Modification ] than [ Form ] and in his § 10 , 11. he discourses altogether as if he were an Aristotelian . But , alas ! what trust is to be given to meer Words ! For , coming to the § 12. he tells us plainly his true Meaning , which is as opposit to ours ( tho' using the same Words ) as the two Poles are to one another , viz. that in the Generation of Plants and Beasts a new Substance is no more produced , than in the Framing a Statue , or building a House : which he there exemplifies in some particulars , and then concludes that Generation is nothing but the Translation or new Ranging of the parts of the Matter , and that This is alike in Natural and Artifieial Compositions . But , by his leave , if he that builds a House does not know the Intrinsecal temperament or Consistency of his materials , viz. that Stones are Dense or Hard , and therefore most fit to be the Foundation ; that Wood is Dense , and Lighter , and so more fit for the Superstructures : Lastly , that Mortar is Soft at first , but Hard when it comes to be dry , and so is most fit to bind the Stones together ; I am afraid that if he be ignorant of these and such like particulars , he will make but a ruinous and bungling piece of work of it , tho' he be never so well verst in the Act of ranging the parts of the several Materials artificially or mathematically . And , as has been shown , no man living , no not themselves , can give any account of the Consistency of their Matter , which is the only Material of which they build ( pardon the Bull they force us to ) their Natural-Artificial Structures . 37. This then being his true sense , and , consequently , the true doctrin ( if we may believe him ) of the Cartesian School ; and the word [ Form ] bearing in its notion that it is in the Matter , and therefore is Intrinsecal to the Thing , and makes it either Another if it be an Essential Form ; or Intrinsecally otherwise or Alter'd , if it be an Accidental one ; and , it being likewise Evident that the Ranging the parts of Matter , is only an Outward Application of them to one another , which is meerly an Extrinsecal Notion ; we may hence clearly discover , that they do not use the words [ Form ] and [ Intrinsecal ] in a proper and Natural sense , but utterly pervert and abuse them . 38. By these expressions of his lately mention'd , and their putting nothing but Extension in their Matter , which abstracts from Motion and Natural Action , one would think they intended , in stead of Physicks to give us a piece of meer Mathematicks , for bare Extension fits it for no other Science . Nor are we mistaken in thinking so ; for he tells us expresly * that Natural Philosophy is one part of the Mathematicks . Tho' the Abstraction which , in the place now mention'd , he assigns to Quantity as a Genus , is very odd and Illogical ; For the Abstraction of Quantity from the Thing or from Motion , is an Abstraction of the Accident from the Subject , or from Another Accident ; and therefore is quite another kind of Abstraction than that of the Genus from the species ; and it looks as if they hanker'd after Plato's exploded conceit of a Subsistent Vniversal ; and that they would have their First Matter , contrary to all Logick and good sense , to be a Body in Common ; and therefore the Genus to all particular Bodies : Nor can any thing sound more awkwardly then to make a Mathematical Treatise of Physicks . But Cartesius was a Greater Master of Mathematicks than he was of Physicks ; and therefore had a vast Design to reduce all Nature and all Philosophy within the Purlew of his own Art ; in which it must be confest he was very Excellent . 39. But , to lay yet a Greater Force upon their backwardness to admit a Formal Change in Bodies , we come now to more Palpable and Plain Instances , not fetch'd from Metaphysicks but from obvious Effects in Nature ; which every man sees , and themselves cannot but acknowledg . Let us then take into our consideration a young lately-planted Oak growing in a Nursery ; which in the space of a hundred years , spreads it self into a vast Tree ; dilating it's large and massy Branches on all sides , and over-shadowing a spacious Extent of Ground . Can any man deny but that this is the same Thing , or the same Tree it was at first ? And yet 't is most evidently not the same in Quantity , it being now a thousand times Greater than it was formerly . 'T is manifest then that here is a Real Divisibility between it's Quantity and it's Entity or Substance ; and a Real Mutation according to the Form of the Quantity , and not according to the Notions of Ens or Thing . The same may be said of an Infant grown up to be a Man ; which , when 't is now Bigger in Quantity , should they deny to be the same Thing or the same Man , it would make mad work in the World by taking away Titles of Inheritances , and altering the Right of Succession . The Infant might , perhaps , retain his Title for some very small time ; but the Identity of it being lost by the accruing of new Matter and new Quantity , he has forfeited his Estate , e'er he comes at age to understand or manage it , by losing his Essenee . 41. I know that our late Philosophers will hope to evade this last Instance by alledging that the Numerical Identity of a Man springs from his having the same Soul. Which Tenet , ( were it proper to confute it here ) would prove as Unreasonable and ill-grounded as any of the rest . I only note , on the by , that , as it becomes God's Wisdom , as he is Author of Nature , to carry on the Course of Causes by fitting Dispositions to the Production of farther and more Noble Effects ; and consequently , to sute and proportion what Supervenes to what Prae-exists ; and the Embryo in our case Praeexists , and , by having such Dispositions in it as made it fit to concur ( on it's part ) to work Rationally to such a Degree , made it require to have for it's Form such a Rational Soul joyn'd with it , and , thence , determin'd the Author of Nature to infuse it ; it follows that the thing is quite contrary to what they imagin ; viz. that the Soul was to be adjusted and proportion'd to the Exigency of the Bodily part ; and that , therefore the Soul is Determinately such , or of such a Determinate Degree of Rationality ( which Essentially and Numerically distinguishes Souls , and Men , from one another ) as was fit to be infus'd into and work with such a Body . And were not this so , it would be impossible to explicate how Original Sin is connaturally transfus'd from Adam , or how the Soul becomes tainted by being united to a Body made * ex immundo semine . But , this is not the only ill Consequence that springs from this Extravagant Tenet of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body , or that Man is in reality compounded of Two Actual Things , and therefore not to be placed in any one Line of the Predicament of Ens or Substance . For , that odd Opinion does , besides , very much favour ( at least , very well consist with ) the Praeexistence of Souls : Because , if the Soul be not proportion'd to the Disposition of the Corporeal part of Man , and so , be truly the Form of it , but a kind of Assistant Spirit , only apt to joyn with it , and promote it in it's Operations , it might as well Exist before the Body as after it . Whence it will be very hard for them to assign any solid Reason from the Nature of such a Spirit , ( since it might indifferently fit other Bodies or assist more of them ) why there might not be also a Transmigration of Souls from one Man to another ; for it would be , in that case , no more but shifting their Office and assisting now one of them then Another . Not to mention how this Doctrin ( as is discourst in the Preface ) tends to introduce a kind of Fanaticism into the Philosophy Schools , by making all their thoughts run upon nothing but Spiritual Conceits and Innate Ideas , and having a Spiritual communication with God , when they know any Natural Truth , after an unintelligible manner . Not considering that Man , in this Mortal State here , is truly one part or piece of Nature ; and subject to the Impressions of Natural Causes affecting him , both as to his Corporeal and Spiritual Capacity , according to the Different Natures of those Different Recipients . 41. But , to return whence we diverted ; Letting Man and his Individuality alone , what can they say to the former Instance of a young Oak ( or of any other Vegetable or Animal ) increast to it's Full Growth , which all Mankind agrees to be still the same Thing , and yet not the same in Quantity ? It is not hence unanswerably Evident , that there is a Formal Mutation according to it's Quantity and not according to it's Entity , and therefore a Formal Composition and Divisibility in it according to those two Respects ? They cannot say they are the same Physically , or the same Physical Compound : For , since all Natural Bodies , according to their Doctrin , are made solely of their First Matter , or of the Particles made of it ; where there is incomparably more Matter , there must be a New-Compound or a New Body ; in regard more and less must be the Differences of every Notion in the same Line , as has been demonstrated : Wherefore more or less of the Matter ( it being inform'd , and , so truly an Ens or a Body ) ought to outweigh , in constituting Particular Bodies or Entities , all consideration of Accidental Notions or Modifications of it , which are not properly Entities but only Modes of Ens. 'T is a Folly to alledg the Figure or Extension of those Particles ; for , if the Subjects , ( I mean the Particles ) be not the same , all the Accidents which belong to those Numerically different Subjects , must be Numerically different likewise ; and , so , cannot constitute a Thing to be Numerically One , but only add more Numerical Things to it to make it Numerically Many Extension is held by them to be the only Essential Form of their Matter ; they so , ought , if they go to work Logically and consequentially , to say that Particular Extensions of that Matter which come along with those Particles , does give a particular Essence to each of those compounds which are made of that Matter ; and so make the Generical Notion hold in every Species and Individuum of that common Body ; as Entity which is the Form of Ens is found in every Individual Thing in the whole world ; and not to make the Essential Difference of those Bodies consist in such respects as are not Essential . They will tell us of many Modifications of each Compound : But they should consider that Modifications of the Thing or Subject do supervene to it ; and therefore the Thing must first be supposed to be , e'er it can be capable to be Modify'd ; and it looks odd to talk of Modifying what is not , or of modifying a Nothing . Yet tho' it strains good sense , they tell us of other Essential Modifications of the Matter in each Compound ; as if Res were not , by all Mankind and by the Light of Nature , presuppos'd to Modus rei . But this Catachesis they are forced to by their pique against Essential Forms ; the Sense of which the Goodness of Rational Nature forces them to admit ; tho' out of Aversion to the Word , they generally change it into a worse . 42. Their last Evasion then is to say that those Vegetables and Animals are the same Morally . And , indeed , they cannot in all humane Language pick out a blinder Word , and of a more ambiguous Signification ; and therefore , 't is most Proper to make use of for a subterfuge against Clear Reason . I never yet could hear of any man that could define it ; and it is as easy for the Taylor in the Fable to fit the Moon with a Coat , as to fit it with a Definition . But , we will do what we can to show the different senses it may have in our circumstances ; and that none of them can serve their purpose . Either then [ to be Morally the same ] Signifies that the Thing does seem to us to be the same , tho' it it be not so Really . But , this comes over to us instead of opposing us ; for , our Question is what is , and not what seems ; nor is such an Expression to be Tolerated amongst Philosophers , whose Duty 't is to consider what passes Really in Nature , and not what only Appears so . Or else , these words must mean that the Thing is not considerably Chang'd ; and therefore , 't is , morally speaking , the Same . But , this is most evidently False ; for , the over-grown Oak has a thousand times more Quantity in it , and , consequently , according to them , more Matter added to it than it had while it was but a S●yon - Wherefore , it must be more than Morally , that is , Considerably Chang'd according to its Quantity , and yet , not at all Chang'd as it is an Ens or Thing . And this is all I can imagin the Antiperipateticks can any way plead to escape the force of our Argument for Formal Mutation . * Our ingenious Country-man , Mr. Locke , goes more solidly to work , by making it to be the same Plant as long as it partakes of the same Life , in a like continuing Organization , conformable to that sort of Plants . For , Life speaks something Intrinsecal and Essential , ( which the meer Ranging of Particles thus or thus , does not ) unless we will say that a Watch or Clock lives ; And therefore it argues some Formal Mutation of the Matter , while it is disposed , fitted and ( as it were ) digested so as to continue that Life by Nourishing the Vegetable . For , it will seem incredible to any Considerer , that Particles of all sorts should be found , in such vast Quantities , in every little spot of Ground where so many several Plants and Trees do grow , as are Proper to each , and Sufficient to nourish them up , t●ll they increase to such a Prodigious Bigness . yet , this must be asserted , if Formal Mutation be deny'd . But , I can by no means allow what he sayes there that the Principium Individuationis is Existence . For , since Created Entities have not Existence from their being Entia or Things , or ( which is the same ) Individuums : all we can say of them is that they are Capable of Existing ; and this they must have antecedently , in priority of Nature , to their Actual Existence . Wherefore their Individuation must be presuppos'd to Existence ; and , so , cannot depend on it as on its Principle . Again , since Plato's Flash of Ideas existing in common , is now hist out of all Schools ( if indeed that Excellent Man meant them as his Opposers apprehend him , ) and that neither Man nor Horse in Common can Exist , but it must be determinately , and particularly This or That Man , Horse , &c. It must be suppos'd to be constituted Determinately This or That Individuum ere it can be Capable of Existing . Wherefore Existence is an Accidental Formality , supervening to the Individuum already Determin'd and made fit to Exist , that is , to the Individuum already Constituted ; and therefore Existence cannot cause nor constitute it . Had I leasure , and were the place Proper , I would show my respects to the Learned Author by giving him my thoughts of his Chapter concerding Identity and Diversity ; for it is an Important Subject , and I see it is treated by him more elaborately than are some other parts of that worthy Book . 43. Lastly , to say no more of Formal Mutation in Bodies , let us cast a short view upon what passes in Spiritual Natures . When a Soul that before was Ignorant becomes Knowing , or a Wicked Soul Virtuous , can it be deny'd that those Souls are Chang'd according to that Form call'd Quality , and yet remain the same according to their Essence ? Surely , they cannot say that this is done by New Atomes aggregated to that Soul , or by any other of those odd Requisites they put to induce a new Accidental Form. And , if not , they must see and confess that Formal Mutation is , beyond all Dispute , found in Spiritual Natures . Much more then may it have place in Bodies ; which , being Subject to Motion , which is Essentially Change , are , consequently , of a nature far more Changeable than Spiritual Beings are . What can be answer'd to those pressing Arguments I cannot in their behalf imagine ; nor , I am confident , can themselves give any Reply that is Solid , or taken from the known and acknowledg'd Natures of Things ; however they may shuffle it off wittily , by throwing in some Unprov'd Supposition , plainly exprest ; and endeavouring to make that pass upon their Readers . But 't is Impossible they should even attempt to perform this by bearing up to any Evident Principles , or by Deductions connected by such Principles , or Reducible to them : only which can satisfy the Judgments of Learned Considerers and true Philosophers . From what is said hitherto is Establisht this Grand Conclusion , that FORMAL MUTATION must unavoidably be granted . Which evinc't , all the Corpuscularian and Atomical Hypotheses fall to the ground , and can need no farther Confutation . FINIS . Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A59232-e2010 † B. 1. ch . 6. ‖ Medit. 3. * Medit 3. Notes for div A59232-e13050 * See 〈◊〉 3. 〈…〉 * B. 3. L. 7 S. 4 , 6. Less . 1.2 . * Less . 1. Sect. 13 , 14 , 15. * L. 1 S. 13 , 14 , 15. † Sect. 6. * S. 7. † S. 6. * L. 1. S. 6 , 7 , 8. † L. 1. S. 13 , 14. ‖ See B. 3. L. 4. S. 12 , 13 , 14. * L. 1. S. 13 , 14. † S. 5. * Sect. 14 ‖ Less . 8. Sect. 7. * Less . 1. Sect. 1 , 3 , 5. * L. 8. S. 7 * Less . 2. Sect. 5. † S. 1. * S. 1. † Less . 4. Sect. 2 , 4. * Sect. 13 * L. 2. Sect. 12 , 13. * Sect. 14. * L. 1. S. 3 , 4 , 5. † L. 2. S. 17 , 18 , 19 , 20. ‖ L. 2. S. 4 , 5. * L. 2. S. 5.7 . * L. 2. S. 11. * L. .1 S. 3 , 5.7 . * Less . 1. S. 6. † Less . 1. S. 6.7 , 8· * S. 18. * L. 3. Sect. 5. † L. 4. S. 4. * L. 3. S. 1 , 2 , 5. * Less . 7. Sect. 1 , 2. * Sect. 8. * B. 3. L. 6. S. 4. * L. 7. S. 10 , 11. * L. 4. S. 1. * L. 3. S. 6. * Less . 3. Sect. 9. † Book 3. L. 7. S. 5. Prop 6 , 7. * See B. 3. L 6. S. 4. * B. 1. L. 1 Notes for div A59232-e46750 * L. 1. S. 7 , & 11. * B. 3. L. 7 * Less . 2. Sect. 6 , 7 , 8 , 9. * See Appendix . * See B. 2. L. 2. Corol. 2. * B. 2. S. 13. * Book 1. L. 2. S. 18. † Book 1. L. 3. S. 1. * B 1. L 2. S. 16. † B. 2 L. 1. S 10. Notes for div A59232-e65020 † B. 2. l. ● . ● . 14. * See §. 10 * B. 1. L. 8. §. 7. † See B. 1. L. 8. § ▪ 8. Axl 1. Prop. 1. Prop. 2 ▪ Ax. 1. Ax. 4. * Ax. 2. † Ax. 3. * Ax. 5. † Ax. 2. † Prop. 5.6 . * Ax. 6. † Prop. 1. † Prop. 2. † Ax. 5. * Ax. 3. * Ax. 6. † Prop. 4. † Ax. 1. * Ax 2. * Ax. 1.2 . † Prop. 5. † Prop. 5. † Ax. 3. * Ax. 5. † Prop. 2.3 . † Prop. 8· * Prop. 4.5.6.7 . † B. 8. L. 6. §§ . 8.9.10 . † ● . 14. * L. 3. §. 30. * B. 2. L. 2. B. 2 L. 2. § ●5 † See B. 3. L. 6. §. 6. * B. 1. Lesson last . * See B. 2. L. 1. §. 15. Notes for div A59232-e101900 The Question be●ween the Peri●●●eticks and Antiperipatetick● , stated in common . The Grounds of the Peripatetick Doctrin concerning Matter and Form. The mistake of the Antiperipateticks concerning Matter and Form. The true Doctrin of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Composition The true Doctrine of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Divisibility and Formal Mutation , which are Essential . The same Doctrin declar'd by an Instance . Of that other Formal Composition and Mutation which is Accidental . That all Formal Mutations are Intrinsecal . The Peripatetical Doctrin prov'd from Logick and the known Method of Discoursing . The Doctrin of the Ant●●peripatetick● is Unprincipled . This last Charge made good . The Indirect Methods us'd by the Antiperipateticks . The summ of Epicurus his Doctrin . That the Ep●curean Atomes are ●ormally Changeable That those Atoms de facto are Formally 〈◊〉 . The same demonstrated from this infallible Ma●xim , that all our Notions are taken from the Things . The alledging Extrinsecal Mutation is both Nonsense , and Incompetent . The Cartesians are forced by their own Doctrine to admit Formal Mutation . The Cartesians can give no account of their First Matter . Th●t 't is impossible the Car●esians should explicate Density in their First Ma●ter , because they deny Formal Mutat●on . Formal Mutation demonstrated from th● Transmutation of Rare and Dense things into one another . That there are Proper Agents in Nature to Condense and 〈◊〉 . The Cartesians Hypothesis is Praeternatural . James c. 1. v. 17. That th●re is also Mu●ation a●c●rding to 〈…〉 . * Entire Body of Philosophy Part 4. ch . 4 §. 11. * Ib. ch . 6. §. 6. * Ib. § , 6. * Part 4. chap. 3. §. 24. * Job . 14.4 * An Essay concerning Humane Understanding . B. 2. Ch. 27.