id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_7hluyfcedrah3kntjpg3whgo6m	P. J. Lewis	Quantum Sleeping Beauty	2007	5	.pdf	application/pdf	2882	139	63	The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum But there is no analogous prebranching probability assignment in the Sleeping Beauty case; there is no sense in which Sleeping Beauty at t0 should assign a probability of 1/2 to each of Monday and Tuesday. Monday to which Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 at t0. probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is not just as if she is woken up on exactly one of According to the first option, the treatment of probability in the Sleeping Beauty case is correct; Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both "Today is Monday" and 'down' result" at b0, so analogously, Sleeping Beauty should assign a probability of 1/2 to both what probability Sleeping Beauty should assign to 'heads' when she wakes up at t1. and the Sleeping Beauty case that could justify different treatment of probabilities.	./cache/work_7hluyfcedrah3kntjpg3whgo6m.pdf	./txt/work_7hluyfcedrah3kntjpg3whgo6m.txt