id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_b3ftiyv34jhylmblxzqccxhcby	GIOVANNI CESPA	The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading	2015	75	.pdf	application/pdf	26680	3119	70	persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors Keywords: price speculation, multiple equilibria, average expectations, public information, momentum and reversal 4Part of the debate over the consequences of short-term trading revolves precisely around its alleged negative effect on the informativeness of asset prices (see, e.g., the "Kay review of UK equity • A negative inference component of the price impact identifies the HIE;7 the observation of a reversal at short horizons identifies the LIE (under the maintained Zhang (2012) shows that short-term trading generates multiple equilibria that can be ranked in terms of price informativeness. where θn = un + βθn−1 and where an and αPn denote the responsiveness to private information exhibited at period n by investors and by the price, respectively (see equations In view of (21), we refer to the three equilibria described in Proposition 1 as (respectively) the low-, intermediate-, and high-information equilibrium: LIE, IIE, and HIE.	./cache/work_b3ftiyv34jhylmblxzqccxhcby.pdf	./txt/work_b3ftiyv34jhylmblxzqccxhcby.txt