id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_f5d7ticdlfhdzmeu2mgkbg3kmm	Nobuyuki Hanaki	The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games	2019	48	.pdf	application/pdf	15365	2048	80	Potters and Suetens (2009) considered the strategic environment effect on subjects' ability to cooperate in an efficient but non-equilibrium outcome in duopoly games. In a similar line of research, Sutan and Willinger (2009) experimentally studied two different oneshot beauty contest games (BCGs) with interior equilibria.4 In both experimental games, a group While these experimental findings quite convincingly document the existence of a strategic environment effect, i.e., larger deviations of observed outcomes from the Nash or the rational expectations To understand how the strategic environment effect operates for the groups of different sizes, In the beauty contest game (BCG), n players (n ≥ 2) simultaneously choose a number between 0 the slopes of the best reply function for BCG+ and BCG− are different for finite values of group size n. strategic environment effect, which is different from these earlier studies on 2-player BCGs. 3 Experimental design the strategic environment effect experimentally for these small groups size is subjects' thought	./cache/work_f5d7ticdlfhdzmeu2mgkbg3kmm.pdf	./txt/work_f5d7ticdlfhdzmeu2mgkbg3kmm.txt