id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_kwamycsux5dwdbkcqqzrrsdsfi	M. Rind	Kant's Beautiful Roses: A Response to Cohen's 'Second Problem'	2003	11	.pdf	application/pdf	5087	243	59	A description,or the testimony of others, may persuade me that a certain thing is beautiful,but I cannot legitimately express that persuasion by saying 'X is beautiful'.Rather, I must say something like 'By all accounts, X is beautiful'; or 'X mustbe beautiful'; or 'X is said to be beautiful'.5 I cannot make an epistemicallyunqualified declaration that the thing is beautiful until I have experienced—in Kant's terms, 'intuited'—the object for myself and thereby found pleasurein the reflective exercise of my cognitive faculties.6 The question whether thisjustifies Kant's claim that the predicate of a judgement of taste is not aconcept is one with which I shall deal later in this paper (section III).Given that judgements of taste are essentially tied to intuition in theway just described, it follows that they must be made on objects one at atime; or as Kant says, 'In regard to logical quantity all judgements of taste aresingular judgements.'7 The point may be supported by considering whatmight seem a counterexample, a judgement to such effect as: 'The flowers inthat vase are beautiful'.	./cache/work_kwamycsux5dwdbkcqqzrrsdsfi.pdf	./txt/work_kwamycsux5dwdbkcqqzrrsdsfi.txt