id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_rmqhmm7ckvdetn72fh7isj6x54	J. Ross	Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas	2010		.pdf	text/html	1961	104	49	Several philosophers have attempted to offer metaphysical solutions to this challenge: they have argued that, if we adopt the right view about what happens in fission cases, we can hold on to the Self-Interest Thesis while avoiding counter-intuitive implications. Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment2012, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.I consider three challenges to the normativity of rationality: the ignorance problem (which concerns cases where we are rationally required to do what we have most objective reason not to do), the wrong kind of reasons problem (which concerns cases where we seem to have overwhelming pragmatic reason to have irrational attitudes), and the mere incoherence problem(which concerns cases where a combination of attitudes is rationally prohibited, and yet we have sufficient reason for each of the constituent attitudes). This paper criticizes an attempt by Brian Weatherson to provide a countable additivity-friendly argument for the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.	./cache/work_rmqhmm7ckvdetn72fh7isj6x54.pdf	./txt/work_rmqhmm7ckvdetn72fh7isj6x54.txt