doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.01.010


Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism
Option in Afghanistan

by Austin Long

Austin Long is an assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and
Public Affairs. He presented this paper at FPRI in December 2009 as part of The Hertog Program
on Grand Strategy, which is jointly sponsored by Temple University’s Center for the Study of
Force and Diplomacy and FPRI.

Abstract: Strategy is matching means and ends. If the ends desired in Afghani-
stan are about al Qaeda, the counterterrorism option is the best fit in terms of
means. It is sustainable, always crucial in prolonged conflict, as it limits the
expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. This article fills a gap in the existing
strategy debate by detailing what a counterterrorism option would be in terms
of force structure and operations.

O
ne of the most important debates to emerge over the future of U.S.
strategy in Afghanistan is the so-called ‘‘counterterrorism option.’’
This option would shift U.S. strategy and force posture from one

focused on a counterinsurgency campaign seeking both to protect the Afghan
population and build the central state to a narrower effort focused on
preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a haven for al Qaeda. The most
prominent proponent of this option (though not the only one) has been Vice
President Joseph Biden, who has become deeply pessimistic about the
prospect for state-building in Afghanistan.1 In contrast, respected Brookings
analysts Bruce Riedel and Michael O’Hanlon argue that the counterterrorism
option is essentially an illusion, doomed to fail if attempted.2

While this debate was recently resolved in the case of Afghanistan
by President Obama’s decision to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy rather
than a counterterrorism one, it still has implications for future U.S. operations.
This essay attempts to outline a viable counterterrorism strategy by first
defining goals and resources (or ends and means), then describing what

1 Peter Baker, ‘‘Biden No Longer a Lone Voice on Afghanistan,’’ New York Times, October 19,
2009.

2 http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/09/column-why-we-cant-go-small-in-afghanistan.
html.

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the counterterrorism option in Afghanistan might have entailed, laying out
how the United States might still transition to that posture, and finally
specifically addressing the concerns of Riedel/O’Hanlon and others. If the
Obama administration adheres to the President’s exit strategy, it may still be
necessary to adopt a counterterrorism approach in the future. This article
argues that it the United States can still successfully transition to an effective
counterterrorism mission over the course of the next three years, ending up
with a force of about 13,000 military personnel (or less) in Afghanistan. The
Afghan state would likely survive but would lack de facto control over 35-40
percent of its territory compared to about 20-30 percent today.

First, in terms of overall U.S. strategy, as the senior NATO and U.S.
commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal noted in an October
2009 speech, the key to strategy is aligning resources with goals.3 So, before
discussingtheresourcestobeusedinthecounterterrorismoption,goalsmustbe
clearly defined. The goal as announced by President Obama on March 27, 2009,
is ‘‘to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to
prevent their return to either country in the future.’’4 The meaning of defeat, is a
bit nebulous-what does it mean to defeat an entity that is both social movement/
ideologyandformalorganization?Theothertwogoalsareclearer:disruptmeans
to pressure the organization so that it cannot conduct offensive operations
against the United States and dismantle means to kill or capture the members of
the formal organization along with those that provide it with resources.

If that is the U.S. goal, what resources are then needed? According to
several assessments, including General McChrystal’s, substantial numbers of
troops will be needed to secure and build a stable Afghanistan that will then be
inimical to al Qaeda and deny it the sanctuary it desires.5 However, this does
not directly disrupt, dismantle, or defeat Al Qaeda, which primarily now
operates next door in Pakistan. Only if Pakistan simultaneously takes action
against al Qaeda would this approach succeed, essentially squeezing al Qaeda
into ever narrower spaces along the border, substantially disrupting and
dismantling if not totally defeating.

However, there appears to be little prospect of Pakistan taking these
actions in a substantial way. Indeed, two of the principal al Qaeda allies that the
internationalcommunityisfightinginAfghanistan,theQuettaShuraTalibanand
the Haqqani network, receive sanctuary in Pakistan and support from Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Those operations against militants that Pakistan
has undertaken have been directed at the ‘‘Pakistani Taliban,’’ principally
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

LONG

3 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-mcchrystal2-
2009oct02,0,3727636.story.

4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy.
5 ‘‘COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,’’ August 30, 2009, pp. 1-4, available online at: http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.

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(TNSM).6 It is these groups that threaten the Pakistani state rather than ISI’s
Afghan proxies.

This is not to say Pakistan supports al Qaeda—indeed Pakistan has
been helpful in collecting intelligence against some al Qaeda targets and has
allowed numerous U.S. drone strikes against them. However, in protecting its
proxies, Pakistan has indirectly protected al Qaeda, which shelters in the
shadow of Afghan as well as Pakistani militants. There is no sign that Pakistan
will cease to provide sanctuary to its proxies and by extension to al Qaeda.

This means efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in
Pakistan will continue to be those that have been ongoing—collecting intelli-
gence through various means and then targeting with drone strikes based on
that intelligence. A stable Afghanistan will not change that. Moreover, the
prospects for a stable Afghanistan are grim while Afghan militants retain
support and sanctuary in Pakistan. General McChrystal’s report acknowledges
this: ‘‘While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] failure, Afghanistan does require
Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against
those groups active in Afghanistan.’’7 Thus, even an increase in U.S. troops and
a transformation of counterinsurgency strategy has a high risk of failure if
Pakistan does not take action against its Afghan proxies. Again that seems
unlikely. Moreover, maintaining troops in Afghanistan will cost between
$500,000 and $1,000,000 per individual per year, meaning a force of 90,000
U.S. troops would cost $45-$90 billion per year for an unknown but likely
lengthy duration.8

So the troop increase authorized by the president for Afghanistan will
not directly disrupt, dismantle, or defeat al Qaeda even if executed exactly as
General McChrystal proposes. It will only indirectly be able to do so if Pakistan
takes action against its Afghan proxies, who in turn allow al Qaeda to shelter
with them, yet there is little prospect of that. Finally, the chance of actually
succeeding in making Afghanistan stable in the first place is low if Pakistan
does not take action against its Afghan proxies. Even attempting to stabilize
Afghanistan as General McChrystal proposes will be extraordinarily expensive.
This seems to pose an insoluble problem for the United States.

This insoluble problem is why the counterterrorism option is impor-
tant. If even a costly effort in Afghanistan cannot fully achieve the goal against

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

6 On the different groups, see COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, pp. 2-6; Gilles Dorronsoro,
‘‘The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan,’’ (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2009), pp. 24-25; Omar Waraich and Andrew Buncombe, ‘‘Pakistan Readies
for New Assault on Bin Laden Lair,’’ The Independent (UK), October 6, 2009; and ‘‘Tehrik-e-
Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM),’’ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, October,
2009.

7 ‘‘COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,’’ pp. 2-10.
8 Christi Parsons and Julian Barnes, ‘‘Pricing an Afghan Troop Buildup Is No Simple

Calculation,’’ Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2009.

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al Qaeda, then it is crucial to determine whether a less costly effort can achieve
a similar effect by keeping Afghanistan inhospitable to al Qaeda. This would
be a clear and cost-effective alignment of resources with goals, the essence of
strategy.

Determining the viability of the counterterrorism option requires
detailing what it might look like. Most discussion of the counterterrorism
option has been vague. Riedel and O’Hanlon sum it up as ‘‘a few U.S. special
forces teams, modern intelligence fusion centers, cruise-missile-carrying ships
and unmanned aerial vehicles. . .’’ But there has been little effort to put flesh on
this skeleton in terms of numbers and locations of U.S. troops. The following
section presents a possible counterterrorism force posture.

Possible Counterterrorism Force Posture

First,thisposturewouldrequiremaintainingbasesinAfghanistan.Three
airfields (see map below) would be sufficient: Bagram (about 50 kilometers
north of Kabul), Jalalabad (in eastern Afghanistan) and Kandahar (in southern
Afghanistan). This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target
al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway.

In terms of special operations forces, this posture would rely on two
squadrons of so-called ‘‘Tier 1’’ operators, one at Jalabad Air Field and one at
Kandahar Air Field. These would be drawn from classified U.S. special mission
units (SMUs) attached to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), U.S. Army
Special Forces’ Combatant Commanders in Extremis Forces (CIFs), and allied
units such as the British Special Air Service (SAS) or Canada’s Joint Task Force 2
(JTF2).9 In addition, the posture would require a battalion equivalent of U.S.
Army Rangers, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Marine Special Operations Companies
(MSOCs), British Special Forces Support Group, or some mix, with basically a
company with each Tier 1 squadron or equivalent and one in reserve at
Bagram.10

These forces would work together as task forces, with the Tier 1
operators being tasked with executing direct action missions to kill or capture

LONG

9 On JSOC and special mission units, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold
Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), pp. 30-32. On Army Special
Forces CIFs, see Fred J. Pushies, U.S. Army Special Forces (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2001), pp.
92-93. On the SAS and particularly its counterterrorism capability, see Leroy Thompson, SAS:
Great Britain’s Elite Special Air Service (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 1994), pp. 91-93. On JTF2,
see the official webpage: http://www.jtf2.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp. Special Forces’ CIFs are
not true ‘‘Tier 1’’ operators but author assesses that they have more than sufficient capability for
the role assigned here.

10 On the Rangers, see Mir Bahmanyar, Shadow Warriors: A History of the U.S. Army Rangers
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005). On the SEALs, see Dick Couch, The Warrior Elite: The
Forging of SEAL Class 228 (New York: Crown, 2001). On the MSOCs, see Marine Corps official
website: http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil/msor.html. On the SFSG, see Ministry of Defence official
website: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/DefenceInWales.htm.

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al Qaeda targets while the other units would serve as security and support for
these missions. According to Sean Naylor’s reporting, these direct action task
forces are structured like the regional task forces in Iraq in 2006 that were
tasked to hunt al Qaeda in Iraq. Naylor also reports similar units are already in
place in Afghanistan.11

In addition to these ground forces, a battalion task force from the 160th

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) would be used to provide
helicopter transport, reconnaissance, and fire support for the task forces.

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

11 Sean Naylor, ‘‘Spec Ops Unit Nearly Nabs Zarqawi,’’ Army Times, April 28, 2006 and Sean
Naylor, ‘‘Special Ops ‘Surge’ Sparks Debate,’’ Army Times, December 23, 2008.

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The battalion would bring some mix of MH-47 heavy lift helicopters and MH-
60 medium lift helicopters, including the MH-60L gunship.12 The helicopters
have a combat radius of at least 300 kilometers (km), giving the task forces
operational reach to almost any part of the Pashtun region.13 This battalion
could be supplemented with additional aviation assets from other units, such
as CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft from the Air Force’s 8th Special Operations
Squadron or AH-64 attack helicopters from any one of several Army aviation
units.14

The JAF based task force would likely need to operate principally in
the heartland of the Haqqani network (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces)
as this would be where al Qaeda’s principal ally in the east could best protect
its members (who are not generally Pashtun). For similar reasons, the KAF
based task force would principally operate against targets in Kandahar, the
home of the Quetta Shura Taliban, and some of the surrounding provinces
such as Helmand and Oruzgan. Both task forces would nonetheless be capable
of acting against targets elsewhere in the Pashtun regions.

In addition to these two task forces, a counterterrorism option would
retain the three Army Special Forces battalions and other elements that
appear to be assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).15 This provides roughly 54 Special Forces Opera-
tional Detachment Alphas (ODAs), the basic unit of Army Special Forces.
While the task forces would focus purely on direct action, ODAs would
partner with local forces to collect intelligence and secure specific areas.16

Additionally, these ODAs would provide crucial support to critical Afghan
allies and reassure them that the United States is not going to entirely
abandon them. CJSOTF-A should, in addition, have a dedicated helicopter
battalion for its own lift.

This reassurance and support of local allies is a crucial and under-
appreciated part of a counterterrorism option, though such support to local
allies could also be part of a counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the recently
launched Community Defense Initiative (CDI) seeks to use Special Forces
troops to build effective tribal militias to fight the Taliban and other militants.17

LONG

12 Fred J. Pushies, Night Stalkers: 160th Special Ops Aviation Regiment (Osceola, WI: Zenith
Press, 2005).

13 See entry in Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft database. Both have a greater combat radius under
normal conditions but the thin and often hot air in Afghanistan will reduce the radius substantially.

14 See 8th Special Operations Squadron factsheet, online at: http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/
library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3481.

15 Naylor, ‘‘Special Ops ‘Surge’ Sparks Debate.’’
16 On ODA partnering with a variety of local forces, see Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos:

The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: PublicAffairs Publishing, 2004).
17 Jon Boone, ‘‘U.S. Pours Millions into Anti-Taliban Militias in Afghanistan,’’ Guardian,

November 22, 2009. See also Special Forces officer Jim Gant’s paper ‘‘One Tribe at a Time,’’
online at: http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_
at_a_time.pdf.

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With 54 ODAs, the United States could potentially support local allies in
roughly 50 Afghan districts, assuming one ODA per district with a few
deployed in other roles.18 Logistics might prevent this upper limit from being
reached but at a minimum several dozen districts could be supported by
CJSOTF-A’s ODAs. These local allies would in many cases be from non-Pashtun
groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras), which would limit their ability to be effective
in Pashtun areas but would likely include at least a few other tribes that see
more benefit working with the Afghan government and the United States than
against them.

The non-Pashtun groups were the critical allies of the United States in
2001 and remain staunchly against the Taliban and other militants. The Tajiks
of the Panjshir Valley, for example, are probably even more anti-Taliban than
the United States and have made the province one of the most secure in the
country.19 With U.S. support, these groups will be able to prevent the
expansion of militants outside Pashtun areas.

Local allies in Pashtun areas will not only help contain militants but
will also enable collection of intelligence to support the task force operations.
One example is the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar province, which has never
valued the Taliban. Shinwari militias are reported to be working with Special
Forces in the Achin district of Nangarhar.20 The Afghan Border Police
commander on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Spin Boldak, General
Abdul Razziq, also derives substantial revenue from cross-border trade and
will likely continue to fight the Taliban to maintain this revenue, making him a
probable local partner.21 Another potential ally is the Alokozai tribe in the
Arghandab district of Kandahar province, which has a history of resisting the
Taliban.22

Supporting local allies does not mean abandoning the Afghan govern-
ment any more than supporting local allies in the Awakening movement in
Iraq’s Anbar province meant abandoning the Iraq government. However, it
does pose risks, as local allies interests may not always align with those of the

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

18 One ODA per district seems reasonable based on Jim Gant’s description of ODA 316’s
experience in Kunar province’s district of Khas Kunar. See Gant, pp. 16-22.

19 Ben Arnoldy, ‘‘After Afghanistan Election, Governors Seek Distance from ‘Illegal’ Karzai,’’
Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 2009 and author observations in Panjshir, July 2009.

20 Dexter Filkins, ‘‘Afghan Militias Battle Taliban with Aid of U.S.,’’ New York Times, November
22, 2009.

21 Sean M. Maloney, ‘‘A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in
Kandahar province 2003-2007,’’ Small Wars & Insurgencies v.19 n.2 (June 2008), pp. 217-218;
Carlotta Gall, ‘‘Taliban Rebels Still Menacing Afghan South,’’ New York Times, March 2, 2006;
‘‘Suicide Bombers Strike Kandahar Police HQ,’’ Associated Press, September 7, 2008; and author
interviews, Kandahar, July 2009.

22 Sarah Chayes, ‘‘A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking,’’ Washington Post, November
18, 2007 and M. Karim Faiez and Laura King, ‘‘Anti-Taliban Leader Was Target of Deadly
Bombing, Officials Say,’’ Los Angeles Times, February 18, 2008. The resistance of the Alokozai
declined when two key leaders died in 2007-2008 but could potentially be revived.

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central government.23 Balancing the two will require deftness which will be
discussed later.

In addition to the two task forces and CJSOTF-A, a few more ‘‘enablers’’
would be required. First, this posture would need additional special opera-
tions personnel focused on intelligence collection, along with a substantial
complement of intelligence community personnel to collect both human and
signals intelligence.24 Second, it would require a significant complement of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) including Predators, Reapers, and other
specialized types along with their support personnel, equivalent to perhaps
three squadrons. Third, an AC-130 gunship squadron for air support would be
needed, along with combat search and rescue teams from Air Force Special
Operations Command.

Clearly, ‘‘small’’ is a relative term. This special operations posture alone
would be roughly five battalions of ground forces, eight aviation squadrons/
battalions, and a few odds and ends plus higher headquarters. This would be
approximately 5,000 U.S. and Coalition troops.25

In addition, a conventional force component would be needed to
serve as a quick reaction force, to provide security for the bases, and to protect
convoys. A reasonable estimate for this force would be a brigade or regimental
combat team, giving a battalion to each base with the higher headquarters at
Bagram. This would add about another 3,500 troops.26 In addition, about 500
U.S. personnel would remain as advisers and liaisons to Afghan security forces,
particularly the Afghan National Army where they would be attached at
brigade and corps level.

Additional air support besides the UAVs and AC-130s would also be
needed. Two squadrons of fighter-bombers (F-15E, A-10, etc.) likely would be

LONG

23 On Iraq, see Austin Long, ‘‘The Anbar Awakening," Survival v.50 n.2 (March/April 2008);
Steven Simon, ‘‘The Price of the Surge,’’ Foreign Affairs, v.87 n.3 (May/June 2008); and John A.
McCary, ‘‘The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,’’ The Washington Quarterly,
January 2009.

24 For discussion of these units and what they might look like, see Naylor, Not a Good Day to
Die and Michael Smith, Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations
Team (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2006).

25 Each Special Forces battalion is roughly 400 personnel, while a Ranger battalion is roughly
575 personnel and two squadrons of Tier 1 operators would hypothetically be about 300
personnel total (including some support personnel). A helicopter battalion is roughly 800
personnel and each UAV squadron has roughly 200 personnel in theater (or less depending on
the system). An AC-130 squadron is roughly 500 personnel. See the relevant tables of
organization and equipment (TO&E) for each unit. This totals about 4,775 personnel, with
an additional 225 for intelligence collection and analysis along with higher headquarters
functions.

26 This is the approximate number of personnel for an Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
see Field Manual 3-21.31 The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, pp. 1-17.

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sufficient, adding another 2,000 personnel or so.27 Finally, this posture would
require additional staff, logistics, and support personnel (medical for
instance), some but not all of which could be contractors, adding another
2,000 military personnel.28 This would be a total force of about 13,000 military
personnel and some supporting intelligence community personnel and con-
tractors.

This is a high-end estimate and the counterterrorism option could
potentially be done with fewer troops. Some military personnel with Afghani-
stan experience believe this mission could be undertaken with half this
number of troops but the posture described above errs on the side of caution.29

This is small compared to the current posture in Afghanistan, smaller still than
the forces implied in General McChrystal’s report, and tiny compared to the
peak number of forces in Iraq. On the other hand, it is vastly larger than any
other counterterrorism deployment.

Holding aside for a moment whether this is a sufficient force to prevent
al Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan, how would the United States get to this
posture? It would not do so overnight and the way it transitions will have
consequences. First, the Obama administration should embrace the expansion
of Afghan security forces, especially the Afghan National Army (ANA), called
for in General McChrystal’s initial assessment. This includes accelerating the
growth of the ANA to 134,000 by October 2010 from its August 2009 level of
92,000 as well as pushing to rapidly expand the Afghan National Police
(ANP).30 Though the quality of Afghan forces will likely be low and the goals
may not be met, some increase in total force levels should be possible and will
enable the U.S. transition to a counterterrorism posture.31

Second, the President has directed an increase in force levels begin-
ning this year. A counterterrorism strategy would have these additional forces
concentrate on achieving the expansion of the Afghan security forces that Gen.
McChrystal has called for. 2010 will be a time of feverish arming and training of
Afghan forces while Coalition forces hold the line. President Obama has
already directed that beginning in early 2011, the United States will begin to
draw down its conventional forces as Afghan forces stand up. By the time of

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

27 Each squadron would itself have only about 70-85 personnel but would require significant
numbers of support personnel. For example, the three fighter squadrons of the 366th Fighter
Wing have only about 225 personnel but the wing itself has about 4,000 personnel for
maintenance, logistics, and airfield operations. The analysis here assumes that it will require
about half that number in theater to maintain two squadrons. See 366th Fighter Wing factsheet
at: http://www.mountainhome.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4366.

28 This is slightly more than an old Division Support Command (DISCOM) for a light infantry
division (about 1600 personnel) for a somewhat smaller force. See TOE associated with Field
Manual 63-2-1 Division Support Command Light Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Divisions.

29 Author personal communication, September 2009.
30 COMISAF Initial Assessment, pp. G-1 to G-3.
31 For pessimistic assessments about expansion, Thom Shanker and John Cushman,

‘‘Reviews Raise Doubts on Training of Afghan Forces,’’ New York Times, November 5, 2009.

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the 2012 presidential election or soon thereafter, the United States would
shift fully to the posture described above (essentially a 20-24 month
drawdown).

The strategic goal of this transition is to ensure the survival of an
Afghan state while acknowledging that probably 35-40 percent of the country
(i.e. almost all of the Pashtun regions) will be under the de facto control of
militants. At present, militants control, by fairly pessimistic estimates, perhaps
20-30 percent of the country (though they are able to conduct attacks in a
larger area than that).32 Rather than seeking to reverse this control, the
counterterrorism option seeks to contain it. This will limit al Qaeda’s potential
haven and ensure that the United States has continued access to the bases it
needs through reassurances to the government and local allies.

There are a few critical regions that will have to be defended, but this
should not be too arduous. The first is Kabul and its surrounding area, for both
symbolic reasons and to ensure the viability of Bagram airbase. The second is
Jalalabad and the surrounding area, along with the road links east to the Kyber
Pass and west to Kabul. The third is Kandahar City and the surrounding area,
along with the road link to Kabul. This is a total of about 750 kilometers of
highway along with the three cities.

The 750 kilometers could probably be guarded reasonably effectively
by about ten ANA kandaks (battalions) a total of about 6,000 personnel (less
than 5 percent of the force goal for late 2010). This would yield one kandak for
every seventy five kilometers. These forces could be replaced or supplemen-
ted by ANP along with local defense organizations such as Afghan Public
Protection Program (AP3) or CDI. Similarly each of the three cities could be
allocated ten kandaks to secure it. This total of forty kandaks is less than the
number deemed combat ready in 2007 (forty six according to the Afghan
Ministry of Defense). Consequently, there should be plenty of Afghan security
forces to accomplish this mission even if the expansion of security forces in
2009-2010 is not very successful.33 These forces would retain the ability to call

LONG

32 This is derived from a count of the districts in provinces with substantial insurgent
presence, based on figures in the June 2009 Department of Defense Report Progress Towards
Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 23; Dorronsoro, ‘‘The Taliban’s Winning Strategy,’’ pp.
24-25; and author’s observations and interviews in Afghanistan in July 2009. This gives militants
credit for controlling most (75-100%) of the districts in Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Kunar, Nuristan, and Zabul along with some (25-50%) of the districts in Ghazni, Oruzgan,
Farah, Laghman, Wardak, and Logar. In addition, insurgents control a few districts in Nangarhar
and Kunduz. This gives a range of districts controlled by insurgents from about 92 to 132 out of
398 (23-33%) and probably overstates the extent of insurgent control. If the militants controlled
all the districts in the provinces listed above (except Nangarhar and the Hazara districts of
Ghazni, Oruzgan, and Wardak), which would represent virtually all the Pashtun districts, this
would give them about 155-160 districts (39-40%). However, Nuristan and Kunar (22 districts,
about 5% of the total) are dominated by the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), which is separate
from the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani network and not strongly affiliated with al Qaeda.

33 http://www.mod.gov.af/.

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on U.S. air support if needed through the brigade level U.S. advisers
and in extremis could be supported by the U.S. conventional forces stationed
at the three air bases, giving high confidence that they can hold these cities.

Both the central government and local allies will also continue to
benefit from U.S. aid, greatly reducing their incentive to turn on the
United States. The United States, via the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and special operations forces, very effectively paid off various groups when it
toppled the Taliban in 2001-2002.34 According to one report, the United States
continues to pay the brother of President Hamid Karzai for his support,
including providing individuals to serve in a paramilitary force.35 If the largesse
continues to flow, there seems little reason to believe support for the United
States will not continue among the beneficiaries (i.e. key elites and their
followers).

During this transition, the United States will have to continue support-
ing the central government even as it builds up local allies. This balancing act is
required to ensure the continued existence of a formal, if weak, central state,
which will in turn simplify the negotiations for the U.S. counterterrorism
posture. Tying the local allies to the central state in some way would help with
this and an expanded CDI or the similar Afghan Public Protection Program
provides a means to do this.36 Some might argue that this increases the risk of
warlordism, which may or may not be true but is also irrelevant to the strategic
goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda.37

The transition will also mitigate the moral hazard endemic to support
to counterinsurgency. Put simply, the United States and its allies are more
committed to a stable, democratic Afghanistan than the Afghan government.
The McChrystal Report rightly notes the massive problems with corruption and
poor governance in Afghanistan that hobble the counterinsurgency effort.38

Yet as long as the United States and its allies are willing to pour ever more

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

34 On this period and pay-offs, see Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the
CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); Gary
Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda (New York:
Crown Publishers, 2005); Dalton Fury, Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander’s Account of
the Hunt for the World’s Most Dangerous Man (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008); and Henry A.
Crumpton, ‘‘Intelligence and War: Afghanistan 2001-2002,’’ in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton
Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2005).

35 Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazetti, and James Risen, ‘‘Brother of Afghan Leader Said to Be Paid
By C.I.A.,’’ New York Times, October 27, 2009.

36 The apparent difference in CDI and AP3 is the level of training and vetting of personnel,
which is apparently higher in AP3. The trade-off is that AP3 takes longer to put in place. See
Boone, ‘‘U.S. Pours Millions. . .’’ and Farah Stockman, ‘‘Shifting Afghan Loyalties Test U.S. Bid
for Permanent Gains,’’ Boston Globe, July 14, 2009.

37 For a critique of the use of tribal forces, see Kim Marten, ‘‘The Danger of Tribal Militias in
Afghanistan,’’ Journal of International Affairs, v.63 n.1 (Fall/Winter 2009).

38 ‘‘COMISAF Initial Assessment,’’ pp. 2-8 to 2-9.

Spring 2010 | 209



troops into the country, it has little leverage over the government.39 In this
circumstance, the threat to cut support, which Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates has suggested, is not terribly credible.40 With a transition to a small
footprint and the development of local allies, a clearer signal will be sent that
the Afghan government has to do more. Clearly the transition will not solve this
problem, but it will at least be a step in the right direction.

It will therefore take about three years to get to this posture. But will it
work? First, this is clearly not the U.S. posture before September 11, 2001, so any
comparisons tothat period are inapt. Second, arguments that this was essentially
the United States posture from 2002-2006 are much closer to the mark. However,
here the argument is that this posture ‘‘failed’’ because the militants have made a
comeback. Yet this misinterprets the strategic goal completely. If the strategic
goal is a stable Afghanistan, then the strategy was a failure. If the strategic goal is
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it was a success: there
are, at present, few al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and certainly no senior
leadership. In an interview on October 5, 2009 national security adviser James
Jones noted of al Qaeda in Afghanistan that the ‘‘maximum estimate is less than
100 operating in the country, no bases, no abilitytolaunch attackson eitherus or
our allies.’’41 The counterterrorism option merely seeks to ensure that this
minimal level of al Qaeda presence continues in the future.

Alternately, this argument conflates all militants under the rubric al
Qaeda. This is problematic: if any thug with a Kalashnikov is a threat to U.S.
national security then readers should prepare for a rough future as there are
millions of them spread across the globe. It is this conflating of the local fighter
with the global terrorist that David Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla rails against,
so it would behoove the United States to avoid this error.42

More generally, Riedel and O’Hanlon claim this small footprint posture
will be ineffective because actionable intelligence will not be obtained without
a substantial conventional force ground presence. Yet this is belied by the fact
that the United States gains actionable intelligence against targets in even very
dangerous areas in which it has essentially no ground forces. In Somalia in
1993, a small U.S. task force, supported by a small conventional force, was able
to collect intelligence on the Habr Gidr clan.43 CIA and special operations

LONG

39 For a lucid discussion of the problem of leverage in counterinsurgency, see Ben Schwarz,
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the
Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991).

40 Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘‘Gates Says U.S. Could Withhold Aid if Afghanistan Cannot Curb
Corruption,’’ New York Times, November 20, 2009.

41 ‘‘Adviser Downplays Threat of Renewed al-Qaida Haven,’’ Associated Press report,
October 4, 2009.

42 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

43 Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York:
PublicAffairs Publishing, 2004) and Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

210 | Orbis



personnel were also able to collect intelligence in Iraq before the 2003
invasion.44

The United States also has a good track record of gaining actionable
intelligence specifically against al Qaeda in hostile environments without
conventional forces. At least three times in 2007-2009, the United States
collected sufficient intelligence to enable strikes on al Qaeda affiliates in
Somalia, where there are no conventional U.S. forces.45 A similar strike was
launched in Yemen in 2002, another country lacking U.S. conventional
forces.46 Across the border from Afghanistan in Pakistan it has struck even
more targets (according to one source at least thirty eight from September 2008
to March 2009) despite having no conventional presence.47

Some will protest that the Pakistanis serve as the ground presence in
Pakistan, but they do not have a substantial security force (or in some cases
any at all) presence in many areas where the United States has targeted al
Qaeda. For example, in the militant redoubt of South Waziristan, where the
United States has launched multiple drone strikes, Pakistan had no sig-
nificant conventional ground force presence until October 2009.48 Others
argue Somalia and Yemen are poor comparisons because they are mostly
flat and on the coast, making offshore intelligence collection easy. While
true, this argument stresses access, not ground force presence, which
enables collection. Yet with the posture recommended in this article, the
United States is assured vastly greater access than it has in either Somalia or
Yemen.

In the period immediately after September 11, 2001, even with essen-
tially no conventional ground presence in Afghanistan, small teams of U.S.
intelligence and special operations forces worked with local allies to gain
substantial intelligence on al Qaeda in an environment filled with hostile
Taliban. A poorly executed operation at Tora Bora enabled Osama bin Laden
to escape, but this was not because intelligence was unavailable. Even this
failure resulted in the deaths of many al Qaeda associates and forced its

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

44 Michael Tucker and Charles Faddis, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War
Inside Iraq (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2008) and Robinson, Masters of Chaos.

45 Karen DeYoung, ‘‘U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Qaeda Figure,’’ Washington Post,
January 9, 2007; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘‘Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia,’’
New York Times, May 2, 2008; and Ian Black, ‘‘Somalia Raid: Warning that U.S. Can Strike at
Will,’’ Guardian, September 15, 2009.

46 Tony Karon, ‘‘Yemen Strike Opens New Chapter in War on Terror,’’ Time, November 5,
2009.

47 Greg Miller, ‘‘Predator Strikes in Pakistan: U.S. Says Drones Ravage Al Qaeda,’’ Chicago
Tribune, March 22, 2009; Salman Masood, ‘‘Taliban in Pakistan Confirm That Their Leader Is
Dead,’’ New York Times, August 25, 2009; and Tim Reid, ‘‘Former CIA Agent’s Hunt for Bin Laden
in Pakistani Badlands,’’ Times (UK), September 9, 2009.

48 Zahid Hussain and Matthew Rosenberg, ‘‘Pakistan Begins Offensive Against Taliban,’’ Wall
Street Journal, October 18, 2009.

Spring 2010 | 211



leadership to flee the country.49 It seems implausible that a vastly more robust
presence in Afghanistan would be significantly less capable of collecting
intelligence than these small teams, or similar U.S. efforts in Somalia and
Pakistan.

At best, large numbers of U.S. troops make the work of intelligence
collectors easier. Their presence helps prevent militants from massing forces to
attack small units and provides readily available quick reaction forces, allow-
ing collectors to assume more risk in collection. Conventional forces also
collect some intelligence organically via patrols and engagements. With a
reduced force posture, collectors will have to be more circumspect and work
harder. Yet as the above examples of collection in hostile environment
demonstrate, this will not prevent them from operating.

Another argument against the small footprint is that U.S. ground forces
in substantial numbers in Afghanistan have given the United States more
leverage over Pakistan. According to this explanation, the increase in troops in
Afghanistan provides the rationale for Pakistani offensive operations against
militants in 2009 and also why U.S. drone targeting has been more successful in
the same period. Yet the timing suggests that this change in behavior has more
to do with Pakistani perceptions of the militants’ threat. Pakistani operations
began when in April 2009 militants broke a ceasefire that was only a few weeks
old and sought to expand their control towards the Punjabi heartland of
Pakistan.50 This timing seems significant in explaining Pakistan’s offensives. In
contrast, U.S. drone strikes increased in tempo beginning in late 2008, months
before a decision to send more troops to Afghanistan was made.51

Even if troops do give leverage over Pakistan, how much is that
leverage worth in U.S. blood and treasure? There is no sign that additional
troops will cause Pakistan to stop supporting its proxies. In terms of the
strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, Pakistan was
aiding U.S. intelligence collection and began allowing drone strikes in June
2004 when there were less than 18,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Thus, it
seems likely they will not simply stop it with 13,000 there.52

The final argument marshaled against this small footprint posture is
that it hands al Qaeda a major propaganda victory. It could claim it drove
another superpower out, that the West lacks will, and the like. There is some
merit in this argument but with 13,000 U.S. military personnel in the country

LONG

49 In addition to the sources in fn 34, see Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die and Peter Krause,
‘‘The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora,’’ Security Studies,
October 2008.

50 See ‘‘Taliban Deceived Govt., Staged Withdrawal Drama,’’ Daily Times (Pakistan), April
29, 2009.

51 See Miller, ‘‘Predator Strikes in Pakistan.’’
52 See Lisa Burgess, ‘‘U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan at 17,900, and Expected to Hold

Steady,’’ Stars and Stripes, July 9, 2004 and Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, ‘‘Night Raid
Kills Nek, Four Other Militants,’’ Dawn, June 19, 2004.

212 | Orbis



hunting for al Qaeda day and night, it would probably not prove to be a
resounding victory.

More importantly, it is far from clear what this propaganda victory
would mean in terms of the strategic goal. It would not appear to have much
effect on the first two goals, as al Qaeda would continue to be disrupted and
dismantled by operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the latter of which will
remain highly unsafe for al Qaeda. It might make it harder to achieve the third
goal, defeat. Yet it is this goal that is most unclear anyway. In fact, Thomas Rid
and Marc Hecker argue in War 2.0 that, while it has become impossible for al
Qaeda to ‘‘win’’ in any meaningful sense, its existence as a transnational social
movement using various media means it cannot be totally defeated either.53

Finally, the United States has to leave Afghanistan at some point, so it is
inevitable that it will make the claim to have driven the United States out.

As policymakers have sought to grapple with the challenge of Afgha-
nistan, the lessons of Vietnam have been invoked and debated by both those
favoring an increase in U.S. troops and those against it.54 Yet Vietnam was not
the United States only experience with irregular warfare in Southeast Asia. The
U.S. experience in Laos provides a better historical analogy for U.S. strategic
ends and means in Afghanistan.

In Laos, the United States supported both a weak central state and
minority tribes, principally the mountain dwelling Hmong. The U.S. goal was
limited, seeking both to interdict the use of Laotian territory to supply
Communist forces in South Vietnam and to tie down as many North Vietna-
mese units as possible. Beginning in 1961 and with only a handful of CIA case
officers, development workers, and Special Forces personnel, the U.S. mission
worked with Hmong leader Vang Pao to create an effective guerilla force. This
force had notable successes against the Communists, evolving into a force
capable of holding territory when supported by U.S. airpower and small
numbers of Thai ground forces. Other CIA-supported irregular units and even
a few Laotian government units were also effective. In addition, the strategy
was able to tie down multiple North Vietnamese divisions and ensure that the
Laotian government held about as much territory in 1972 as it did in 1962.55

As with Laos, U.S. goals in Afghanistan are strictly limited and do not
require a major state building enterprise. If anything, U.S. goals in Afghanistan

Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan

53 Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (Santa
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009).

54 See for example Lewis Sorley, ‘‘The Vietnam War We Ignore,’’ and Gordon Goldstein,
‘‘From Defeat, Lessons in Victory,’’ contrasting op-eds in the October 17, 2009 New York Times.

55 See Thomas Ahern, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006-declassified 2009); Douglas
Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962-1970 (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 1972-declassified 1980); Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America’s
Clandestine War in Laos (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1996); and Kenneth Conboy and
James Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995).

Spring 2010 | 213



are more limited than in Laos, as the goal in the former is to keep out at a few
hundred irregular fighters while the latter sought to oppose tens of thousands
of disciplined soldiers. The limited goals in Laos could be achieved with
limited means, making it sustainable for more than a decade. A similar limited
means strategy will likewise make U.S. strategy in Afghanistan sustainable for
the long term.

To return to the point from which this analysis began—strategy is
matching means and ends. If the ends desired are about al Qaeda, the counter-
terrorism option is the best fit in terms of means. It is sustainable, always crucial
in prolonged conflict, as it limits the expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. It is
also less dependent on Pakistan choosing to abandon its proxies, a possibility
that seems remote at present. The counterterrorism option is not only
possible, but as Steve Simon and Jonathan Stevenson argue, it is the
best alternative for the United States.56

LONG

56 Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, ‘‘Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?’’ Survival,
October 2009.

214 | Orbis


	Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan
	Possible Counterterrorism Force Posture