Should We Genetically Select for the Beauty Norm of Fair Skin?


ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Should We Genetically Select for the Beauty Norm
of Fair Skin?

Herjeet Marway1

Published online: 21 March 2017

� The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication

Abstract Fair skin is often regarded as a beauty ideal in many parts of the world.
Genetic selection for non-disease traits may allow reproducers to select fair skin for

the purposes of beauty, and may be justified under various procreative principles. In

this paper I assess the ethics of genetic selection for fair skin as a beauty feature. In

particular, I explore the discriminatory aspects and demands of such selection.

Using race and colour hierarchies that many would find objectionable, I argue that

selection for beauty that is underpinned by such hierarchies is not a trivial selection.

Given this, I claim that we should not make such selections.

Keywords Beauty � Fair skin � Race � Colour � Discrimination � Genetic selection �
Procreative beneficence � Procreative autonomy

There is a vast literature on the beauty norm for fair skin (e.g. [23, 30–33]) and

some, though surprisingly less, literature on race and reproductive technologies (e.g.

[4, 8, 22, 50–52, 61]). Much of the former has concentrated on sociological aspects

of the debate and much of the latter on choosing gamete donors by racio-ethnic

group. In this paper I take a different direction and develop ethical analysis on

genetic selection for fair skin as a beauty feature.
1
I draw upon issues at the

intersection of race, colour, reproduction and justice in my ethical analysis. Because

beauty is often trivialised and race rarely is, I seek to uncover ethical concerns of

race and colour (that many will recognise as significant) through the vehicle of

& Herjeet Marway
h.marway@bham.ac.uk

1
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK

1
Thompson [61] is an exception in that she extends the discussion from race/ethnicity to skin colour

specifically and mentions attractiveness as a motivation for egg donor choice (138). I want to expand this

to a focus on beauty specifically and embryo selection.

123

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-017-0341-y

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10728-017-0341-y&domain=pdf
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10728-017-0341-y&domain=pdf
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-017-0341-y


beauty (that many will regard as less so) in order to emphasise what is unjust about

genetic selection for fair skin as a beauty norm. In particular, it is a non-trivial race

and colour claim about discrimination and demand made through that of beauty.

When race and colour underpin selection for beauty in these ways, such selection is

anything but trivial.
2

I proceed in four parts. First I provide some context and demonstrate that fair skin

is a beauty norm for many, though of course not all, African-American and Indian

women. I outline the race and colour hierarchies involved and the arbitrary

distributive inequalities that may motivate conformity to the beauty norm. Second I

indicate what demands the norm makes on this subset of women now through skin-

lightening and what it might entail in the future via selecting lighter-skinned

embryos. I trace the procreative principles that some might appeal to justify such

selection too. In the last two parts, I centralise issues of justice that may counter

these justifications. In part three I examine discrimination and ask what is wrong

with fair skin selection for itself and then for beauty. I argue that the former

naturalises social hierarchies of race and colour and the latter, once seen through

this lens, may be unjust in intent and outcomes. In part four I discuss additional

demands on reproducers and women in general. I submit that these technologies

may result in greater pressure on the women to select embryos for fair skin, or a

greater normalisation of and pressure to observe fair skin as a beauty norm. My

claim overall is that we should not select embryos for the beauty norm for fair skin

because to do so is not simply an insignificant choice but one that is discriminatory

and demanding along racial and/or colour lines.

Fair Skin as a Racialised or Colourised Beauty Norm

There are multiple beauty norms (norms relating to physical attractiveness) affecting

various people. I consider just one: the norm for fair skin and its relation to women of

colour in particular. I will focus on the examples of African-American (while there is

huge variation in skin tone and it is somewhat imprecise, I use ‘black’ interchange-

ably in parts of the paper) women in the US and (with the same caveat, I use ‘brown’)

women in India before I go on to discuss what problems of justice they might raise. It

is important to note that the norm does not affect only women,
3
only women of

2
In this regard, other racialised beauty norms (e.g. hair type or eye shape) may fit this broader argument

though less racialised beauty norms (e.g. breast size or height) would require a different analysis. The

latter may well still be problematic for other reasons (such as being sexist) though I do not explore that

here (though selection for reasons of sex and disability in general—rather than beauty—are mentioned in

part 4).
3
Beauty norms govern appearance for all human beings but my focus in this paper will be women. This

is because beauty is often gendered—in a patriarchal society where women have historically been

associated with the body rather than the mind, women often must do more to meet beauty norms, and are

judged by others and themselves for their success or failure in meeting them [6]. Further, in a hetero-

normative culture, being described as ‘beautiful’ or ‘pretty’ are feminine terms and it would be

derogatory to describe a man in these ways. With regards to skin colour specifically, women who have

lighter skin are judged more aesthetically beautiful (pure, innocent, delicate etc.), whereas men, who are

expected to have darker skin (they should be rugged, tough, sexual etc.), are less so. That women must

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colour,
4
or only these women of colour,

5
but given space constraints these are the

women I will consider. This is in part because much relevant research has been

carried out on these women and in part because they are from relatively developed

and developing to middle-income countries so provide an interesting comparison.

In both the Indian [2] and the American [7] contexts, there is a strong association

between light skin and beauty and conversely dark skin and unattractiveness. In

India, for instance, many women and men across religion, caste, age and occupation

regard fair skin as a common standard of beauty and aspire to it [38]. In one study

[42] involving 100 diverse students with a mean age of 22, some 78% of males and

63% of females included the words ‘light’ or ‘fair’ when describing prettiness (742-

3), though several expressed concerns about this ideal. In the US, too, fair skin is

connected to beauty among African American women [23]. In a study [10]

involving 66 female black students with a mean age of 21.7 at a southeastern

university, 70% thought that lighter skin was perceived as more attractive, and

lightness was idealised by the women, except for those with the darkest skin tone.

Though the briefest of snapshots, this is indicative of fair skin being a beauty feature

in these contexts.

This is not to say all women in these contexts are subject to the norm or have a

desire for fair skin, nor that women of colour are non-agential. For instance, black

women (and judges) in beauty contests who aligned themselves to the Black Power

Movement in the 1960 s and the politics of Black Is Beautiful would not subscribe

to the norm [14]. Likewise, Indian women who are part of the current Dark is

Beautiful campaign by Women of Worth which launched in 2009 do not [42, 66].

Further women may adopt the norm but appropriate it as entrepreneurs (e.g. Annie

Turnbo Malone, who developed fair skin products for other African-American

women without utilising bleach—[23]) or work against it by becoming vocal role

models (e.g. Nandita Das, a Bollywood actress and ambassador for the UNFair

campaign—[33]). This demonstrates a great deal of agency. Thus, women are not

passive recipients of the beauty norm; some reject, some embrace with varying

degrees of reservation and acceptance, and some complicate it. My claim is merely

that fair skin is a norm for many women in these contexts, however they negotiate it.

Footnote 3 continued

have fairer skin when compared to men applies across all racial groups, white and non-white alike [7]. Of

course some men do lighten their skin too (and perhaps this is increasing) so it is not that the norm does

not affect men at all. I want to suggest though that women are subjected to it more.
4
The norm for fair skin does not only affect women of colour. As Amina Mire points out, historically in

the US, women classed as white from eastern and southern Europe but with slightly darker pigment would

use skin lightening products to appear more like Anglo-Saxon women with their fairer pigment [41]. She

further highlights that in contemporary South African, US and European contexts, skin lightening

products have had two sets of users: people of colour to lighten their pigment and white women for anti-

aging (removal of freckles and sun spots, and blemishes) [40, 41]. However Mire also notes the racialised

language and ideologies in these products.
5
The norm extends to other places. This includes, but is by no means limited to, South Asian women in

India [16, 38, 47], African-American women in the US [10, 11, 14, 30], black and brown women in

Jamaica [12], African women in Nigeria [46], Tanzania [37] and Ghana [48], African and Indian women

in South Africa [18], and Southeast Asian women in Japan [62], Korea [38] and Malaysia [26].

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There are discriminatory racial and colour hierarchies that underpin this

connection between fairness and beauty and darkness and unattractiveness—and

also between a ream of other positive (cleanliness, chastity, virtue and purity) and

negative (dirtiness, promiscuity, viciousness, sexuality) traits respectively [2, 7].

By racial hierarchies I mean hierarchies (of subordination and domination) along

some dimension (social, political, economic, etc.) in particular contexts between

racial groups, where such groups are demarcated physically by features like skin

colour, hair type, nose shape etc. [28]. By colour hierarchies I mean a parallel

notion: hierarchies along some dimension in particular contexts between lighter

and darker skins (e.g. [31]). Though these hierarchies, and the racism and

colourism (e.g. inferiorisation or antipathy because of one’s race—[9]—or colour)

often associated with them, can occur independently, they are connected in

important ways [31]. For instance, in the US slave owners believed darker-skinned

Africans were physically stronger but less intelligent than their lighter-skinned

counterparts, and that mixed-race individuals (including those who were the

offspring of slaves raped by slave owners) were more intelligent still. Those with

lighter-skins were sometimes handed different roles because of this assumption,

and gained more valuable skills than those with darker-skins [5]. Not only this but

there was elitism within the black community, including the infamous Paper Bag

Test (where anyone darker than a brown paper bag was not permitted entry to

certain clubs, bars and churches) [23] and blue-vein aristocracy (where marrying

other light-skinned people, light enough so their veins were visible, was

encouraged) [10]. In India, there are various explanations, both pre and post

colonisation, put forward for why fair skin is esteemed, including race, class, caste

and geographical origin [33], but importantly race is not absent. For instance, light

skin has been associated with Aryans who migrated into India from the north as

well as with the British during colonial times [23]. Both fairer skinned groups had

more power and privilege over the darker skinned Dravidian (e.g. the Aryans

acquired or came to own agricultural land which became a source of power) or

Indian group (e.g. the British ruled over and instigated divisive policies including

favouring lighter skinned Indians for jobs) [42]. This both reinforced existing

preferences for fair skin and exacerbated them. Thus in both the Indian and US

context, race (and racism) and colour (and colourism) are connected, and often in

complicated ways.

Moreover, there are strong reasons for having fair skin given the sorts of

advantages that might accrue to fair skinned women in these contexts today.

Though space constraints limit the discussion of all of these, two sorts of

advantages serve as an illustration: (1) the sort of educational and career

opportunities one has and (2) the sort of partner one might attract (e.g. [30, 31]).

Both of these can significantly affect women’s lives depending on their skin colour

and perceived beauty.

The importance of women having access to good jobs and education to better

their lives and become financially independent is clear. In the US, Verna Keith and

Cedric Herring [35] have shown that skin tone directly affects the level of

educational attainment and occupational status of women: although darker skinned

women in their study were employed, for instance, they were in less prestige jobs

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than fairer skinned black women.
6
Margaret Hunter [30, 31] similarly argues that

lighter skinned black women have higher educational attainment and are better

rewarded for work. Keeping similar background characteristics constant, for every

grade increase in lightness from 1 (darkest) to 5 (lightest), educational attainment

increases by 4 months (a total increase of 1 year between women at either extreme

of the scale), and income increases by $673 annually (a total difference of $2600

between the extremes) [30, 182–183].
7

In India a recent phenomenological study by Sims and Hirudayaraj [59] explored

the effect of skin tone on Indian women’s career aspirations and opportunities. It

involved six women aged between 30 and 53 born in India, three of whom continue to

live in India and three of whom live in the US.
8
Darker skin was reported to affect

choice of profession: ‘‘there is self-censorship with some girls. Girls do not apply to be

in plays because they expect that they will not be chosen in lead roles’’ [59, 47] because

of their darker skin. It also affects the jobs and opportunities that are available: ‘‘we

don’t see any dark females as air hostesses…I don’t think people prefer dark-skinned
people as front desk people’’ [59, 48].

9
The beauty norm for fair skin does appear to

limit career goals and opportunities for both Indian and African American women.

The second illustrative example is attracting mates, which is important in

patriarchal contexts, such as where women cannot be propertied without being

married [34] or where marrying well is a way to overcome poverty [32] or reach a

higher status [30]. In general, fairness commands a premium and leads to greater

marriage prospects in India, though it is not the only factor (e.g., a higher caste can

have a bearing on marriageability, making skin tone one significant element against

others—[42]). Analysis of matrimonial adverts on the Hindustan Times and Times

of India websites, for instance, reveals that fairness for women (whether they are

seeking a partner or are being sought) was a constant theme, no matter the caste or

religion of the families and was as important as education [42]. Darker-skinned

Indian women tend to be far less successful on contemporary Indian online dating

sites too—in fact their successes compared to lighter-skinned Indian women in one

study are described as ‘‘non-existent’’ [34, 65].
10

6
Note that contra this, Monk [44] argues that educational attainment and occupational status applies for

darker skinned black men too, and that occupational status in particular does not apply as much to darker

skinned black women.
7
Using quantitative data of almost 1310 African American (and 596 Mexican American) women [30]

and later qualitative data from 26 open ended interviews with women from these groups at university

[31], Hunter found statistically significant trends for black women along these measures. So significant is

this difference in income based on skin tone that Hunter regards it as comparable to the differences seen

in residence (urban residents earn $2500 more than suburban residents), age ($84 increase for each year of

age) and education ($1183 increase for each year of education) in determining income.
8
The women have careers ranging from a Bollywood actress (Nandita Das), university programme

directors, human resource consultant, child safeguarding director, and postgraduate student [59, 43–44].
9
It also affects career aspirations through poor self-esteem: ‘‘there are times when my level of

confidence hasn’t been good…there were moments I have thought… I am not sure if I am the right kind
of person to be there’’ (Manisha [59], 48).
10

Though online dating is a more contemporary practice, this trend tracks the higher status often

afforded to fairer skinned girls and women in traditional arranged marriages and in the dowry system

(where fewer gifts and money for the groom are needed to secure their marriages) [33].

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Darker-skinned black women in the US are just as likely as lighter-skinned black

women to be married, but they are less likely to have access to higher-status

(understood as well-educated) partners than their counterparts [30, 31]. According

to Hunter, even when they are otherwise comparable (in educational attainment,

income, and parent’s education) a black woman’s spouse completes a further

0.28 years of schooling with every grade increase in skin lightness (a total of 1 year

difference between the very fairest and darkest on the scale) [30, 186]. However,

other factors, like a woman having a higher class or education level despite her

darker skin tone, could mitigate the perceived negativity of darker skin, thereby

complicating the picture [30, 190]. Monk [44] corroborates the general finding

about fairer skinned women having access to higher status partners, though for him

the difference is slightly less.
11

In both the US and Indian context, skin tone matters

for the sort of partner a woman might attract.

It is not merely having fair skin that generates advantages. Having straighter hair

or lighter eyes and lighter skin in some contexts would bring more benefits than

lighter skin alone, and other factors like education or caste in others can mitigate

having darker skin. Yet light skin does have its benefits, such as getting a better job

or a better partner. This affects one’s social position and prospects and could be an

issue of socioeconomic fairness. Underwriting all this is a beauty norm for fair skin

that exists in particular places and which arbitrarily values particular races or

colours because of a history of racism and colourism—ultimately this is prejudicial.

Attaining Lighter skin: Current Cosmetic and Future Genetic
Techniques

Given the advantages of fair skin, it is no surprise that women are encouraged, and

want, to lighten their skin to attain some of it. The point, again, is not that all women

in these contexts aim to do this or are unhappy with darker skin, but that more are

likely to want to lighten than darken.
12

In what ways might skin lightening be

encouraged and attained? There are answers both now and in the future.

Now: Skin Lightening

Messages about lightening the skin are pervasive for Indian and African-American

women. Female family members often stress the importance of fair skin: ‘‘parents

and grandparents often comment on dark skin as a misfortune, disadvantage, and

disability’’ [33, 67] especially with regards to marriage in India. Such relatives may

encourage girls to use saffron, turmeric and creams to lighten the skin, warn them

11
Ellis found that partners had 0.19 years of additional schooling per fairness increment.

12
Not all women do want to alter their skin colour. For instance, 47% of women in Bond and Cash’s [10]

study said they did not want to change their skin colour, a fact the researchers take some heart in. But it is

still the case that 37% of the black women in the study wanted to make themselves fairer, while only 17%

wanted to go darker. So, of those dissatisfied, more want to lighten than darken (883). Likewise, though

Nandita Das’ campaign is admirable, it is about keeping what one has and certainly not about darkening

skin.

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about dark skin preventing them securing a good husband, and show favouritism of

lighter over darker skinned daughters [42]. The skin lightening market, including

creams, soaps and ointments, is vast (61% of the Indian dermatological market

comprise such products [66] including Indian brands like Fair and Lovely and

increasingly offerings from Western brands such as L’Oreal) and it is lucrative

(worth around $432 m) [3].
13

While in the US there can be strong black pride sentiments in African-American

families, there is often a similar narrative about fairness that comes from mothers,

grandmothers and aunts. This includes, for instance, messages about not playing in

the sun, encouragement to marry light or suggestions to bleach the skin (where

mothers, grandmothers and aunts are lighter-skinned), or having lower expectations

of darker skinned siblings (where those other family members are darker skinned)

[64]. There are also several products marketed at African-American women,

including Ambi Fade Cream, Black and White Cream, and Nadolina [23, 40].
14

The

messages one hears growing up and the products available can perpetuate the ideal

of fairness equating to beauty.

Skin lightening products may, however, include harmful chemicals, and so are

not without health risks. Those products with mercury, for instance, have serious

physical risks including neurological damage, kidney disease, and a reduction in

skin’s resistance to bacterial and fungal infections; psychological risks including

anxiety and depression; and environmental risks including mercury eventually being

discharged into wastewater and entering the food chain through fish, which can

affect pregnant women especially [66]. Those products without mercury can have

different harmful effects, but harmful effects nonetheless. Those with hydroquinone

can lead to damaged skin and ochronosis, and those with corticosteroids bring risks

such as eczema, infection, Cushing’s Syndrome, and skin atrophy [23], and it is

often harder for women to stop using non-mercury products as this can lead to

withdrawal symptoms (e.g. instant flare-ups of rashes) [17].
15

13
So pervasive are skin lightening ingredients in creams that often women (and men) will use them

without realising they are using a skin lightener [42]. The industry also attracts celebrity endorsements

from actresses and beauty queens like Aishwarya Rai, who is often presented as the archetypal modern

Indian woman [33]. This indicates a strong use of and demand for skin-lightening products in the Indian

market.
14

There are also popular examples of women who have lightened their skin in striking ways (such as the

rapper L’il Kim), and popular expressions on internet forums of wanting to look like fair skinned

celebrities, such as Beyonce and Halle Berry [23].
15

While in many poorer parts of the world, stronger and harmful (but cheaper) chemicals (mercury,

hydroquinone and corticosteroids) are used for black or South Asian women for skin-lightening, in more

affluent parts of the world weaker or safer (and more expensive) versions are used for white women for

anti-ageing (hydroquinone, alpha hydroxy acids and kojic acids). Mire argues, though, that the distinction

in how these different sorts of women are regarded for using similar ingredients reflects racist ideologies:

such ingredients in products marketed at white women and promoted as high technology and scientific are

perceived as a rational choice, while these same ingredients in cheaper cosmetic creams marketed at

women of colour are frowned upon as an irrational choice. Thus, even though white and non-white

women may use products with different aims but similar ingredients, there is a distinction in the racial and

colour meanings depending on which women using the products [40, 41].

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Future: Selecting for Fair Skin Through Genetic Reproduction

For reproducers undergoing IVF or artificial insemination, it is possible to select

gametes of a particular race or ethnicity. Indeed it is not just possible; it is the

primary criterion for selection of gametes in the US [22] and globally [4]. Within

these racial or ethnic groupings, there are also classifications of gamete donors by

skin tone. Though there is variation across banks, in one egg donation clinic in the

US, these include fair (Caucasian), medium (mixed, Latino, some Caucasians), olive

(Mediterranean, Southeast Asian, Latin American) and black (African) [61]. This

offers reproducers the chance—though perhaps only a tenuous one [61], as I will

discuss—to have a light skinned child.
16

With pre-implantation genetic diagnosis

(PGD) where embryos can be, or it is assumed (for the purposes of philosophical

debate) will eventually be able to be, tested for disease (like Down’s Syndrome or

mitochondria) and non-disease (like sex, intelligence or height) traits, it may be

possible to extend this to more precise colour tests.
17

A final PGD test on the

embryo before implantation could assess the extent of fairness. So gamete selection

may offer some (albeit sketchy) indication but we might think embryo selection

adds a little more predictability.
18

In other words, the test could enable reproducers

to select an embryo amongst several embryos with lighter or lightest skin for the

purposes of attaining standards of beauty for their children.

At this point, it is worth acknowledging that there may be scepticism about the

availability, cost and desire for reproductive technology by women of colour in

general and, by extension, for fair skin selection in particular.
19
However, given that

there are assumptions that fair skin is more beautiful and there are socioeconomic

benefits to having fair skin, I suggest that selection may be plausible for some

women. In particular, rather than simply lighten skin after birth (an ongoing and,

given the chemicals involved, risky process), perhaps reproducers may be motivated

16
While gametes might offer some indication of skin colour through the donor, for instance, this is much

less than is usually thought. Thompson [61] highlights that the idea that the donor’s skin colour traits get

passed onto the egg (more so than random egg selection or general partner selection), and so the child, is

causally weak. Thompson highlights this is why clinics often warn buyers or recipients about ‘‘the

indeterminacy of the relation between a donor’s qualities and the qualities of a future child to which the

donor’s egg contributed’’ [61, 136], or why one African American donor posted pictures of her two

children, one with fairer skin than the other, on the database because she felt these ‘‘more accurately

suggested the idea of a range of possible skin colors that could be expected among offspring born from

her eggs’’ [61, 141].
17

I recognise here that methods other than PGD, which is often related to disease, might be more suited

to perform this non-disease, appearance-related testing, but I will use PGD for brevity.
18

I consider ethical issues with this notion of predictability later on. It is these latter considerations of

embryonic selection that I will mostly consider in this paper, and in particular ethical aspects relating to

such selection, since these have been considered less.
19

Roberts [50] has pointed out the mistrust of such technology given the history of enforced sterilisation

or birth control of poor African American women and how black women were discouraged from using

reproductive technologies despite their higher infertility rates [50, 51]. Though such technologies are

more available to them now, Roberts notes that it remains a small rich elite that is likely to use them [52].

In India, infertility and not having a biological child is seen as a source of stigma such that reproductive

technology is increasingly being used, though as a final option after less intrusive methods [63]. Similarly

with the African-American example, though, it is more urban, middle to upper class, women who utilise it

[63] because of the cost. I acknowledge that such technology is expensive and has had a chequered past.

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to select a child for fair skin (a one-off process, though of course maintenance, like

avoiding too much sun, is still required).

Selection for fair skin as a beauty feature may have two procreative justifications.

One is procreative autonomy or liberty to decide not only whether to have children

and when to have them [20], but—given this strong presumptive right—to decide on

the sorts of children reproducers want [53]. This includes children with traits that

they value, which are picked out in selection—such as, for present purposes, a

beautiful child with fair skin. John Robertson, for instance, argues first that any

genetic trait can be determinative of a reproducer’s decision to procreate at all. The

likely import of such traits to one’s decision may vary: some traits (severe,

untreatable, genetic disability) may be more central than others (eye or hair colour)

to a parent (because they can not look after the child, it does not fit with their ideal

family, or they want what is socially desirable). However, given that any trait can be

determinative, genetic selection as a whole should be protected under procreative

liberty rights [53, 431–432]. Second he argues that the harm associated with

selection is not so great as to warrant interference or prohibition of the strong

presumptive right. There is no direct harm to the child (since it is better to exist than

not) and indirect harms (such as to classes of persons) is not sufficiently compelling,

though the state may offer counselling or withhold subsidies to limit it [53, 428].

The second justification for selecting embryos based on colour is procreative

beneficence [54] and the desire to do the best for one’s child. This includes having

the child with the most well being, such as—in our case—the child who is likely to

get the most benefits because they are fair skinned and regarded as beautiful. For

instance, Julian Savulescu argues that, if parents undergo IVF and PGD, ‘‘couples

(or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could

have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others,

based on the relevant, available information’’ [54, 415]. This principle gives

reproducers a moral obligation in his earlier work [54] or significant moral reason in

his later work [55] to select the embryo that is likely to have the most wellbeing.

This obligation can be overridden, such as if the parents hold ‘‘competing normative

reasons’’ [55, 278], like a commitment to fighting prejudice, harm to others, or the

parent’s welfare. Where it applies, though, the principle includes selection for non-

disease traits, like our example of skin colour for the purposes of beauty.

There are three points to note about these principles. First, beauty is trivial but

may motivate selection. Robertson, for instance, suggests that selection for eye or

hair colour—and, we can infer, skin colour—are not very important but may play a

role in procreative decisions. Second, race is more significant than something like

beauty and perhaps should not motivate selection. Though neither philosopher is

insistent on this. Robertson advocates that states could disincentivise, though not

ban, selection that harms classes (such as races). Savulescu [55, 290, footnote 60]

highlights that fighting (skin colour) prejudice could, but need not, qualify as an

individual reproducer’s competing normative reason to not select.
20

Third, these

20
While I agree with Savulescu’s thought that we should not be prejudiced, I have disagreements with

his general view especially around consistency with non-racial prejudice and with the strength of the

claim. I do not have space to outline this here but these are ideas I am exploring elsewhere.

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views suppose that beauty and race are discrete. Yet we have seen (Sect. 1) that

there are hierarchies and socioeconomic advantages relating to race and colour in

the beauty norm for fair skin. In sum, on these principles, selection for beauty is

likely to be frivolous when compared to race, though race is not especially weighty

to forestall selection at all, and beauty and race are distinct.

In opposition to this, I argue in the rest of the paper that beauty selection is not as

trivial as might be thought, especially where we see this through the lens of race or

colour, and that ultimately this should limit such selection. I do this by paying

attention to the discrimination and demands of embryonic selection for the beauty

norm for fair skin. This analysis will provide grounds to not make such selection,

even if one wants this for a child or if it would create more wellbeing for it. I will

principally discuss women and social classes rather than the embryo or future child

as I assume for the paper, for reasons well traversed, that there is no harm that

comes to the embryo (it is too underdeveloped) or child (it is better to exist than

not).
21

Discrimination

I start by considering what, if anything, is discriminatory about genetic selection for

fair skin as a beauty feature. I mean to ask whether there is something

discriminatory first with fair skin selection (as opposed to non-disease selection

in general) and second with fair skin selection for beauty specifically (as opposed to

for other reasons). My argument is that there are inherent wrongs with selection for

race or colour and much of this underpins, even if indirectly, selection for fair skin

for beauty. Beauty selection for race or colour is therefore discriminatory and non-

trivial.

Fair Skin Selection

Multiple reasons may be given for why selection of non-disease traits, like height,

intelligence or sex, is discriminatory, including because they contribute to greater

inequalities, the creation of genetic underclasses, poor resource distribution,

prejudices to particular classes etc. Though I do not have space to outline all of

these, I do consider why selecting for skin colour in particular at the genetic stage

would be unjust. I argue this is because it makes race (and colour) more of a natural

a category than it is, which is to give credence to the false biological explanation for

race. Let us take race and skin colour in turn.

21
Embryonic selection evades the possibly stronger ethical concerns some may have about harm to the

child that arise either in prenatal testing on the more developed foetus (tests on embryos are carried out

very early, such as when the embryo merely has 8 cells—[27]—or 100 cells—[19] or by taking additional

cells from the embryo (cells are going to be taken during PGD anyway, so this test is on the same tissue)

[54, 58, 65, 67]. While there may be ethical concerns about testing on a (post-conception) embryo rather

than selecting a (pre-conception) gamete, I will assume there are no considerations of harm per se to the

embryo: it being too underdeveloped to claim rights of personhood. Though this will be contentious for

some, I will assume it is the case given a lack of consciousness. I am going to sidestep possible harms to

the child.

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On race, Dorothy Roberts has argued that the preoccupation with reproductive

technology in the US has principally come from whites as a privileged racial group

and is not shared by blacks as a non-privileged group. She points out that ‘‘sharing

genetic traits seems less critical to Black identity than to white identity’’ [50, 263].
22

The fixation with having genetic children, she argues, is connected to ideologies of

racial purity (that races are biologically real and can be delineated and so preserved)

and genetic inheritability (that dispositions or behaviours tenuously associated with

races, like intelligence or industriousness, pass through genes) [50, 51].
23

These

ideologies are incorrect. Race is a social category and one that was created using

false claims about biological difference between groups partly to justify narratives

of superiority and racist policies, like slavery and colonialism. Given this, placing

value on race, by preferring one race to another, in genetic selection of (e.g.)

gametes is racist if the expectation is that stereotypical racial dispositions or

behaviours can be conferred to one’s child [8, 33]. (I explore other reasons for

selecting in the next part). Suggesting that race can be genetically selected, then, is

giving false credence to the racialised claim about these biological differences and

inheritability, and is discriminatory in contexts like the US with its history of

racism.

Skin colour, on the other hand, is a physical feature of the body with some

genetic predispositions to how fair to dark one might be, though as a phenotype skin

colour is not static or immutable.
24

Does that mean that selection for skin tone (a

partly biological feature) is not as problematic as for race (a social category)? That

the former can be selected for purely physical reasons absent of racialised baggage?

I believe not. However, before I get to this, it is worth pointing out two caveats

about relationship between race and skin colour, and the biological and social. The

first is that skin colour, especially in heterogeneous populations like the US, is a

prominent feature (though by no means the only one, since other features like hair

type and eye shape are indicators too) of the social grouping of race. So phenotypic

colour and race are not entirely unlinked. In the genetic case, as Thompson [61, 131]

notes about egg donation, many might believe that the skin tone of the donor might

transfer to the child in a way that correlates to social categories of race. Even if one

thinks skin colour as a physical feature is conceptually distinct from race as a social

category, they are, as I have suggested, importantly intertwined in some

reproducer’s decisions in the real world. The second is, as I have shown, skin

colour hierarchies exist in the US and India and these too are a social construct

based on a physical marker of the body. Markets in eggs, for instance, reveal that

22
Roberts has also argued that black women are less wedded to the idea of having children that are

genetic copies of them, accepting instead that ‘‘there are often a melange of physical features—skin and

eye colour, hair texture, sizes, and shapes—within a single family. We are used to ‘throwbacks’—a pale,

blond child born into a dark-skinned family, who inherited stray genes from a distant white ancestor…We
cannot expect our children to look just like us’’ [50, 263], and that this need for this genetic tie is a white

racialised obsession.
23

On racial purity, note the one-drop rule in the US where any black ancestry at all classifies the person

as black. On genetic inheritability, note the claims about (e.g.) intelligence being a white disposition.
24

The biology and passing on of skin colour is important here. As Thompson puts it about egg donation,

‘‘if skin tone is salient in choosing an egg donor, it reveals hope for or belief in some kind of biological

preservation of skin tone’’ [61, 131].

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some donors (predominately white or light-skinned) are paid a premium over others

because they, in part, have the sorts of skin colours that are socially desirable

[4, 22, 61].
25
Thus there are social hierarchies relating to physical skin colour. If one

adds to this that fair skin is superior and that associated dispositions and behaviours,

like cleanliness or virtuousness, can be bequeathed to the genetic child, this sounds

similar to what is problematic about selection for race. These two preliminaries are

intended to highlight the complicated relationship alluded to earlier about race and

colour and that there are social hierarchies attached to the physical marker of colour,

either in itself and/or through the close connection to race.

Getting back to the original point: the suggestion that selecting for skin colour is

(by and large) not discriminatory in itself if it is done for purely physical reasons,

though selecting for race (by and large) is because it is social and assuming it does

not have purely physical reasons.
26

In addressing this I consider the main

justification of skin colour selection: donor and intended parent phenotype matching

so that it appears that the resulting child is naturally conceived.
27

Berkowitz and

Snyder [8] defend what they call Reasonable Phenotypic Approximation (RPA), but

not race selection, arguing that it is not racist. Rather it ‘‘provides the infertile

couple (e.g. a Caucasian male and Hispanic female) a child whose skin colour best

resembles their own…what nature would have provided had the couple not been
infertile’’ [8, 37]. Selection of gametes for skin colour (where Berkowitz and Snyder

equate skin colour to race in this part of their discussion) for physical appearance,

rather than the superiority or inheritability of dispositions or behaviours related to

skin colours (that is races), should occur and would, in fact, prevent racism in

reproduction in their view [8, 35].

Though Berkowitz and Snyder recognise that placing value on skin colour is

integral to racism, their claim about naturalness, and biology that is implicit in the

language of naturalness, speaks directly against Roberts’ concerns about racial

purity in particular (and so seems to not limit racism in reproduction). Phenotypes

may differ greatly within families of the same parentage, as Roberts [50] has argued

about African-Americans and Mishra [42] has noted about Indians, and so the focus

on preserving the ‘natural’ skin colour of a child, as though there is one, is suspect.

Given this, the idea of matching donors for race, and I argue even skin colour,

falsely reiterates the naturalness of each, and that there are the right kinds of

gametes or embryos for parents to select. For instance, in terms of race, as Amrita

Banerjee argues, whether by reproducers or physicians, ‘‘Racial matching via the

‘proper’ kind of eggs…implicitly pushes forward the troubling belief in the
25

Both Banerjee [4] and Fogg-Davis [22] highlight that these are predominately white or light-skinned

donors, and Banerjee that this is despite the higher availability of darker-skinned eggs, though Thompson

[61] believes in time, because of donor shortages, any donor of any skin tone will be used.
26

I say ‘by and large’ here because the reason might make a difference. For instance, if selecting skin

colour is to increase diversity of phenotype in the family (which I discuss later) or selecting by race

occurs in tragic cases of preventing racism (I do not have space to discuss this claim in this paper but am

developing it elsewhere) it may well be permissible for Berkowitz and Snyder [8].
27

Intended parents may want a ‘plausible match’ either per se [61, 139] or to keep the use of

reproductive technologies a secret from others (thanks to a reviewer who pointed this out), and having a

child that most resembles them (including their skin colours) achieves these aims. I focus less on the

secrecy aspects in this paper.

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biological origin of race’’ [4, 123]. That there is the right kinds of egg for this race

that differs from that race. Likewise, in terms of skin colour, reproducers may

recognise the fluidity of racial categories but sometimes insist on more rigid colour

categories in sperm selection, where it is to look like them [49].
28

Yet skin colour

matching implies both ‘proper’ kinds of gametes, when there are high degrees of

variation, and that there are biological origins of skin colour that ultimately connect

to race. The aim of RPA is to stop any value being attached to race by only

permitting approximate natural skin colour selection. However it also assumes there

is a right sort of donor to have and that, in effect, white or light-skinned donors

should be used for white or light-skinned parents (as is the trend). Colour purity

parallels racial purity, and (if there are also expectations about dispositions or

behaviours passing to children) genetic inheritability.
29

Berkowitz and Snyder conflate skin colour and race but, in so doing, this also

demonstrates the similarities between them. Selecting for skin colour solely as a

physical feature still has resemblances to selecting for race as a natural property and

ideas of racial purity, which are false. There is an underlying assumption about the

naturalness of each and that these can be passed to one’s offspring.
30

This is

especially troubling given the history of racism that uses a biological explanation to

justify difference, and when colourism in its contemporary form is closely related to

racism or (if one wants to keep race and colour distinct) has independent social

hierarchies. It is geneticising and valuing skin colour and race, both of which are

endemic in the history of racism, that make fair skin selection discriminatory. If this

analysis is correct, I take it that race or colour selection for itself is inherent

discriminatory; a wrong that many people would accept as such.

28
One can see this in a case study by Seline Szkupinski[49] of couples selecting sperm, and in particular

Raeshell, who is (an unspecified skin toned) African-American, and her partner, Tom, who is light-

skinned African-American. Though Raeshell recognises the fluidity of race and how it doesn’t matter

what racial category the sperm comes from as the child will still be raised and classed as black (given e.g.

one-drop rules from whites), she does want a lighter-skinned donor over a darker-skinned black donor so

the child looks like her husband [49, 155–157]. This indicates that she sees skin colour as more fixed than

she does race and so why matching is important to her. But skin colour hierarchies too are social

constructs and about purity of the lighter-skinned persons within a particular racial group.
29

Matching in fact motivates the trend of typically having eggs from white or light-skinned donors for

white or light-skinned parents—Banarjee notes: ‘‘despite the fact that eggs from women of colour are

now available in increasing numbers within the international market, there is a distinct global preference

for eggs from fair-skinned women’’ [4, 123]—while poorer non-white or darker-skinned women are

typically used to gestate those eggs in surrogacy arrangements. Thompson, however, thinks this trend

may change in time [61]. It also motivates the false assumptions that Roberts identifies about racial purity

and genetic inheritability.

With regards to embryo selection, if RPA was adopted for gametes, then parents could choose the

fairer embryo from the ones that they have in front of them (as presumably the embryos would all

approximate the reproducer’s phenotypes), believing it to be the sort of child they want or the one with

the best life chances. This would be in line with RPA but it would still facilitate skin colour privilege (and

arguably race privilege).
30

I discuss non-racist reasons in relation to beauty in the section below.

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Fair Skin Selection for Beauty

What about selection for fair skin for the purposes of beauty? To examine this, I

outline first the significance of intent and unjust contexts before second considering

outcomes. My claim is that once we uncover the race and colour dimensions of the

beauty norm for fair skin, it is difficult to deny discrimination in skin colour

selection for beauty. The selection is not inconsequential.

Intentions

Selection for fair skin for beauty could differ from selection for race or colour per se

because of intent or lack thereof. Selecting for beauty would be wrong if the intent

was racist or ‘colourist’—if selection was because of superiority of one race or

colour or related assumptions about dispositions or behaviours passing to children.

If it happens that it is not—e.g. if one thinks fair skin is beautiful, absent of

superiority or expectations about dispositions or behaviours, simply because it is

so—then this would not have the requisite intent. This is similar to non-beauty

arguments about intentions and expectations when selecting for colour or race and is

part of the justification for RPA [8, 22].
31

Contrary to this, I argue first that the absolute lack of intent may be quite unlikely

but second, even if it happens, that we should be cautious about such decisions as

they can underwrite discriminatory patterns. First, I suggest that selection for fair

skin in the pursuit of beauty does include some ideas about what is better and what

benefits might accrue to one’s child that are rooted in some of the problematic ways

discussed. In the Indian and African-American contexts, for instance, where there

are social norms about fair skin and beauty, hierarchies about what is better or worse

and associated (dis)advantages (i.e. colourism) do exist, and a propensity to lighten

rather than darken skin is more likely at least in part because of this, as noted in

Sect. 1. Now it is not necessarily the case that individual reproducers will select to a

significant degree because of these reasons. Physical skin tone could be picked with

miniscule notions of hierarchies or stereotypes being associated. However, what is

important is precisely that there are some aspects of this that are relevant.

Reproducers could select for beauty without appealing to such hierarchies and

stereotypes but I find this implausible in a highly raced or ‘colourised’ context,

31
Possible non-prejudicial reasons here might be that one selects skin colour for purely health reasons in

India (say in the health case where darker skin is better protected against melanoma—[55]—where this

would be because of expectations of better health) or for diversity reasons in the US (say for phenotypic

variance within a family—[8]—where the gains anticipated are only physical differences) such that there

is no appeal to social hierarchies or stereotypes at all.

Interesting, Fogg-Davis argues about partner selection and gamete selection: ‘‘Assisted reproduction,

as the name suggests, brings reproductive decision making into public view. Racial choices made in this

arena publicly reinforce and make explicit the routine use of racial discrimination in the choice of a

partner for procreative sexual intercourse, It is not so much that the former is morally worse than the

latter. Both operate on the level of racial stereotype, prejudging and weeding out certain individuals based

at least partly on their ascribed race’’ [22, 14].

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which is, in part, what makes such a choice meaningful.
32

In this regard, (race or)

colour hierarchies not having a role (the question of relevant degree is up for

debate) in selection in a racist and ‘colourist’ world are unlikely (but certainly not

impossible). Rather than assume the intent is absent, this view suggests it is an open

possibility. If the beauty norm for fair skin is selected for, in part, because of the

discriminatory hierarchies and stereotypes associated with race or colour then such

selection is not insignificant.

Second, imagine, though, that the requisite intent is missing on the part of

reproducers (they do not resort to superiority or stereotype thinking when selecting

for fair skin for beauty). Is selection for beauty here discriminatory? Here I am

concerned with seemingly trivial individual decisions, such as some might think

about beauty and fair skin selection, and the cumulative patterns of these decisions

in particular contexts. Physicians (often motivated by promoting patient autonomy

or beneficence towards the patient) and reproducers (perhaps governed by

procreative liberty or beneficence) use a technology like PGD on a case-by-case,

individual, basis. Yet the worry is that the extent to which the sum of those

individual decisions, including for fair skin selection for beauty, maps onto and

contributes to broader patterns of social discrimination, such as on darker skinned

persons, would rarely be considered.
33
In sperm selection, for instance, Quiroga [49]

has noted how practitioners aim to genuinely help their patients (and so the thought

for us is that they are not necessarily prejudiced), but that, in their advice about

which sperm to select, they use and continue to underwrite racial classifications and

ideas about racial purity and genetic inheritability. In embryonic selection for

beauty for fair skin, one might make the decision without any intention about races

or colours being better, such that many would sideline this as an unimportant choice.

However, it still has meaning in a context of broader discrimination against darker

skinned persons. Perhaps such selection would ultimately not matter in a genuinely

racist or colourist free world. Yet the US and India are not such societies and

decisions occur within and against these backdrops. This includes selection for fair

skin for beauty, which I argue reproduces longstanding patterns that are

discriminatory to certain classes of people.

Outcomes

Beyond intentions, outcomes related to selecting fair skin for beauty may be

discriminatory. Setting aside reservations about the takeup of the technology, one

32
Stephen Wilkinson [65, 226] raises a similar point in relation to sex stereotyping about sex selection:

though strange, one could select for biological features of a sex (ability for a boy to grow a beard, for

instance) without socially stereotyping. However, if part of the reason for the selection is character traits

that the particular sex might have (assuming that the boy will want to go fishing), then this is socially

stereotyping.
33

This worry is similar to the well-stated concern about assumed post-racial or post-colour societies

where it is believed that the discrimination problem is somehow solved with formal equality legislation.

However, policies, institutions, attitudes, beliefs, associations etc., may continue to be prejudicial and

there may be colour-blind discrimination if one assumes an equal playing field or is not vigilant to

discrimination along race or colour lines. This may occur in our case of selection too, as I discuss in the

main text.

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possible outcome is permanent and predictable change to skin colour individually

and overall. While lightening the skin through creams, soaps or lotions can have

powerful and dramatic effects and staying out the sun can help with maintenance,

these practices are temporary and require continuous observance.
34

With selection,

however, there is greater permanency of fair skin for the individual who has been

selected. In addition, given the assumed predictability of fair skin embryonic

selection, we might see a broader outcome. Greater certainty of this technique could

mean more people actually getting fairer skinned children, with the resultant harm

of the loss of diversity of skin colours overall, than when using comparatively less

certain partner or gamete selection.
35

Those individual reproducers that value fairer skin for beauty and are committed

to achieving it may think this permanence and predictability is a positive result: this

achieves what they want once and for all and with greater accuracy than other

means. However, again, contexts and meanings behind this permanent outcome are

relevant. While it might not be that skin pigment is a good in itself worth preserving

longer term for these individuals, the discriminatory (racialised or colourised) ethos

behind lightening—that dark skin is unclean, ugly, or vicious—is a reason to

challenge permanent skin colour change and selection for fair skin as a beauty

feature more generally. While some may initially dismiss a loss of some skin

colours for beauty as insignificant, it is perhaps more disconcerting if the connection

to race or colour is drawn out. In particular, the implication is that certain races or

colours would be eliminated.

If the effect we are more concerned with is the expressed message of disvalue to

existing darker skinned persons, then there are possible ways to mitigate this.

Selection for fair skin for beauty could arguably continue if more appropriate

messages about those with darker skin were communicated (that they are not

unclean, ugly, vicious etc.).
36

Indeed, some might suggest that any existing person

that has worse wellbeing (including lesser intelligence, athleticism, beauty or

musicality) than another possible person should logically recognise that they should

have been selected against [24, 65]. This would not disvalue them per se and would

be true for any individual; this would be a non-discriminatory and consistent

approach to selection. But what is important is not just what that message is (that

any embryo with a potentially better life should have been chosen) but also how it is

34
More enduring changes are promised online by ‘skin lightening surgery’, but it is unclear whether this

is surgery proper (in the way breast augmentation or eye shaping surgery is) or a combination of other

ongoing treatments (such as laser surgery for removal of sun spots, creams and skin peels).
35

This point draws on arguments about certainty and sex selection through innocuous means outlined by

Stephen Wilkinson [65]. Recall there is assumed certainty because though children may share the same

parents, both African American and Indian families may have darker and fairer skinned children within

them [33, 50], and while there is no guarantee of skin colour in gamete selection as is often declared by

clinics [61], arguably embryo selection could enable more predictability, given it is post-conception and

pre-implantation, than these other methods.
36

This follows similar concerns people might have about selecting against disability and the effect of

this message on existing disabled persons. See (e.g.) [25, 57] for a disability equivalent claim about

sending appropriate messages. Also the Fair is Beautiful campaign attempts to improve messages about

darker skinned persons now, though in relation to ongoing use of temporary skin lightening products (and

with varying success), and this might apply to permanent selection.

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interpreted by those who are the target group of that selection (i.e. persons who are

in a discriminated against class versus those who are not, or who have never have

been, in such a class). Those with darker skinned bodies and who have already

suffered social disadvantages may well be more sensitive to the sort of message that

dark skin can be selected out permanently than suggesting the same for light skin.

Messages can be interpreted and misinterpreted by the recipient, making this an

unreliable barometer for gauging the effect of messages. However there are

differences in the groups hearing it based on their experiences in particular contexts,

such as darker skinned groups that are stigmatised in the US and India. Failing to

recognise this fails to pay attention to the concrete, lived experiences of those

groups. While one might discount fair skin selection for beauty as not being

especially serious, when we consider possible outcomes that relate to race or colour,

like permanent changes to colour or messages expressed to existing darker-skinned

persons, the discriminatory concerns become more visible.

Selecting for race or colour per se is discriminatory since to do this emphasises

the biological aspects of race, which is objectionable given the historical

development of racial difference. Selecting fair skin for beauty may occur with

or without intent about better races or colours, but even if it does not, selection

occurs in racialised or colourised contexts, not neutral ones. In addition, there may

be outcomes that are harmful, especially where it leads to permanency or greater

probability of changes to an already stigmatised group. When viewed through the

non-trivial lens of race and colour, selecting fair skin for beauty can be

discriminatory—which gives us grounds to not select for it.

Demands on Women

Since the theme of this special issue is about demands of beauty, I now turn to the

demands of selecting fair skin for beauty. I explore first the demands on reproducers

and second the demands on women who do not use the technology. I claim that

these demands can be high and, given some of the concerns already outlined in

Sect. 3, discriminatory.

First, with regards to demands on reproducers who make the decision to select,

the issue of autonomy is relevant. I assume for the purposes of discussion that

reproducers are competent, are not coerced or manipulated, and have not necessarily

internalised oppressive norms.
37

Reproducers (or indeed anyone) may still be

subject to more subtle external pressures to conform from others when the

technology is available, and it is this I focus on. This conforming may include

selecting the fair skinned embryo in contexts where many prefer fairer skin as a

37
That is, they are competent and critically reflective (they can endorse desires), are not coerced or

manipulated (this being obviously inimical to autonomy), and have not necessarily internalised norms

(this bringing up a unique set of issues). Within the category of coercion, I might typically include a

severe lack of financial means that pushes one in a particular direction, but I do not think this

straightforwardly applies to the case of embryo selection given what I have said about relatively wealthier

women using the technology. One might think it applies to a case of less affluent individuals using IVF

and PGD as a one-off procedure given the cost.

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beauty feature and where it has benefits. Since decision-making only occurs in

contexts, not in a detached way that is immune to those contexts [39], contexts are

an important aspect to consider since they may be more or less conducive to doing

what reproducers want. Of course, not all of those contexts are problematic. I

suggest it is only those that are unjust—to particular groups based on social

discrimination—that may end up being particularly pressurising and so harmful for

autonomy. Though beauty selection would often be regarded as unimportant and a

free choice that reproducers can make for their children, recognising the gravity and

non-triviality of the race and colour dimension complicates this.

Disability and gender theorists have discussed the implications that genetic

technology can have for women’s choices in contexts where certain sorts of bodies

are preferred over others. In standard prenatal tests, for instance, Shakespeare [56]

has highlighted that, in the UK, the decision to abort Downs Syndrome foetuses (i.e.

non severe disabilities) are not free from value-laden, anti-disability norms. A

woman can be reluctant to choose to keep a foetus, not because she does not want it

(e.g. if she feels she is unable to raise it), but because the information revealed by

tests (that it has Downs Syndrome) brings with it pressure (e.g. condescending

attitudes from loved ones, strangers or medical professionals) to abort.
38

Precon-

ception sex selection may have similar pressures, though at an earlier stage. Some

women may recognise the gender injustices of preferring a boy child, especially in

contexts like China or India, but they may nonetheless feel as though they must

make such selections. Women who fail to provide a boy child may be seen as lesser

in their communities and girl children may also regard themselves as disappoint-

ments [15].
39
In either the disability or sex example, this pressure may be subtle or it

may be obvious, but there is pressure—ultimately stemming from societal

prejudice—on women to do ‘the right thing’ by selecting in a particular way.

Would pre-implantation selection for skin colour as a beauty norm follow suit?

Assuming that such selection is likely to occur in prejudicial contexts and that fair

skin is valued and beneficial as a beauty feature, as discussed earlier, it seems

reasonable that some parents may pick and implant the lighter skinned embryo.

While, in theory, this might be without any attention paid to social norms or

rewards, given (now) mainstream views of persons as social and decision-making as

contextually rooted [13, 45], this seems implausible. Rather, such selection, either

38
For instance, a woman was criticised by her (supposedly nondirective) counsellor when she decided to

keep her child: ‘‘What are you going to say to people when they ask you how you could bring a child like

this into the world?’’ [29, 59]. In another example, a woman who decided to keep her baby after a prenatal

diagnosis of spina bifida says: ‘‘every time there was a knock at the door or a letter we thought ‘here’s

another lecture’. They kept saying things like it was wrong to keep the baby…it would be wicked…They
meant well but…’’ [21, 118]. If the woman chooses not to have the tests, she may be judged as not only
not doing the best for the child but that any subsequent difficulties she encounters raising the child are her

responsibility. A woman who learns her new born daughter has Downs Syndrome says, ‘‘When I started

to cry, I overheard him [the physician] say, ‘What did she expect? She refused prenatal testing’’ [60, 70].
39

Dai, a Chinese born academic in the US with an older sister, for instance, discusses how her parents

having a boy child, instead of Dai, a girl child, as the second child would have fulfilled Dai’s mother’s

role as a ‘good wife’, and the devastation and disappointment her mother and others felt at the ‘failure’ by

delivering Dai. She relays her mothers’ and, despite her commitment to gender equality, Dai’s own sense

of anticipation at the opportunities and possibilities that preconception sex selection as a technology will

allow—to be the ‘good wife’ and avoid being the disappointment [15].

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on the grounds of parental choice or the future child’s wellbeing, is harder not to

make when there are norms that reward lighter skin and where lighter skin is

regarded as more beautiful in society. And it is harder not to do so when one is

subtly, and sometimes overtly, encouraged by others, including family members,

like aunts and grandmothers.

I certainly do not wish to argue that those who select for fair skin because of

(non-coercive) pressure in prejudicial contexts are non-autonomous in their

decisions, since all people have some pressures on them and many contexts are

prejudicial for one reason or another. I do want to highlight, though, that such

contexts can be harmful to greater autonomy realisation.
40

Overall, acknowledging

pressures on reproducers to select for the beauty feature of fair skin in race and

colour discriminatory contexts and how this may be harmful to greater autonomy

realisation reveals that such selection is not trivial.

Second, there may be demands on women who do not select for fair skin but live

in a world where use of the technology for such selection (and so the attainment of

fairer skin) becomes more normalised. Imagine that couples or individual

reproducers do not select either because they cannot (e.g. because of financial

limitations where such selection is privately funded, as is likely in the US and India)

or will not (on principled religious or secular grounds) or need not (because they

simply do not want children), for instance. Imagine too that colour selection is

routine as a procedure despite their non-selection. Imagine finally that fair skin

continues to be beneficial in terms of social advantages in the ways outlined in

Sect. 1, so it is desirable by many (even if not all). In this scenario, the technological

procedure enabling fair skin selection (along with the achievement of fair skin) is

normalised and this makes demands even on women who do not select and on

women in general. In particular, it is likely that ongoing processes of skin

lightening, staying out of the sun, or marrying fairer partners still occurs—and may

well be more intensified—for many of those not selecting and for many darker

women in general.
41

There may be demands on them to continue or to start

40
Feeling pressure can truncate a fuller realisation of what one wants (constrained choices, whether by

time, money, inveiglement, etc., are one’s choices but we recognise them as constrained nonetheless).

Feeling pressure in unjust contexts, whatever that injustice but where that certainly includes racialised and

colourised injustices, is worse because it stems from a morally arbitrary/discriminatory feature to which

one feels she must fold. Of course, many reproducers will resist and not select for fair skin, broader norms

notwithstanding, and many will select for it when fully cognizant about broader norms, and be sure that

they want do it nonetheless (plus many other possibilities besides). However this is not to say that there

are no demands on them to do so where light skin is valued as beautiful and makes a life go better. The

contexts we are discussing, at the very least, reward fair skin as a beauty feature—owing in part to

prejudice—and, as noted earlier, the norm exists however one negotiates it. Pressure to choose, then, does

not equate to non-autonomy, though it limits a fuller autonomy realisation. Yet we should acknowledge

the societal prejudices towards those with darker skins that suggest they are less beautiful than those with

fairer skins, and recognise that these are the contexts in which selection is made and in which pressure to

select accordingly may occur.
41

Though—to be more nuanced—perhaps (in line with Bond and Cash’s [10] study) those with the

darkest skin in the US and (in line with Mishra’s [42] study) those from higher castes in India will not feel

this demand as much. Still, those that do feel it yet who do not select for fair skin may well decide they

need to lighten their skin.

264 Health Care Anal (2018) 26:246–268

123



lightening in other ways to avoid missing out on the socioeconomic benefits and

opportunities associated with having fairer skin.

Of course, the scenario presented is speculative and we could imagine variations

of it. We could suppose, though I think somewhat erroneously,
42
for instance, that—

given widespread use of the procedure—fairer skin becomes more common and less

valuable and conversely darker skin more rare and more valuable. I return to this

possibility shortly but—assuming for the moment that fairer skin stays the norm—

not adhering to a particular beauty norm, if one sees its attainment as important, is

an uncommon trend in beauty. Not conforming risks not being seen as ‘normal’ and

can often lead to lower self-esteem if one subscribes to the norm. (Those that do not,

or who are presented alternative visions of normal, are less susceptible to this. For

instance, black women suffer less from low body self-esteem than white women in

the US in part because they do not identify with the predominately thin white

models and actresses in the mainstream media—[43]—though greater assimilation

into mainstream culture may mean such ideals affect black women increasingly—

[1]. Of course women do reject norms and adopt others all the time. However,

moving away from what is normalised is hard to do, especially where rewards

continue to be linked to that norm and especially where those making the changes

have limited power in particular societies. This suggests that, where beauty is self-

definitional, it can be highly demanding, and discriminatory contexts relating to race

or colour show that this is especially problematic.

Returning to the variation above, despite my scepticism, what if we assume that

the norm does change to darker skin? If fairer skin is less in demand, it is possible

that over time those with fair skin would become fewer and also the more

marginalised, less powerful, less desirable group. However, if this happens, it occurs

in quite a different context and trajectory to that which we know: of racist and

colourist societies in which dark skin is less desirable and less rewarded. It is not so

easy as to say the dynamics would simply reverse since fairer skinned persons have

not undergone the same history (e.g. of slavery or colonisation) as African-

Americans and Indians, though it is not to say this group relationship could not alter

for other reasons over a period of time. Assuming that fortunes may simply switch,

however, is to obscure the race and colour contexts of our world.

Pressures on reproducers to select for the beauty feature for fair skin may be high

and harmful for fuller autonomy realisation. Further, achieving what is normal

42
I think there are problems with this sort of scenario, however. One point (though it does not touch on

demandingness per se) is that it does not seem as though dark skin in racist or colourist societies is valued

in contexts where it is rarer. Aborigines or Native Americans are not more valued now that their numbers

are fewer, for instance. (Thanks to Scott Wisor for this point). Given that there are no pressing reasons for

the trend to go the other way—as some have suggested that disproportionate sex selection for boys would

go given the eventual imbalance of girls to boys [54]—in racist or colourist societies, I am sceptical this

would occur. Even if it did not correct itself, those with darker skin who are fewer in number might be

more valuable but, in racist or colourist contexts (it is not clear these contexts would change), they might

also be regarded as a commodity or as fetished, in the way darker skin has tended to be [7, 14]. This is

similar to Neil Levy’s [36] claim that fewer women in sexist societies because of selection might be

regarded as commodities rather than valued per se. Being commoditised or fetished in this way would be

harmful as it fails to see the person in all their complexity and individuality. In support of the thesis of this

paper, then, selecting fair skin for beauty is by no means trivial where commodification or fetishisation on

account of race or colour occurs.

Health Care Anal (2018) 26:246–268 265

123



(whatever that might be) is important for those who subscribe to beauty standards

including for fair skin. This can be demanding in itself, even for those who do not

select embryos for fair skin, and even if what is normal is not a static concept. Some

may find such demands relating to beauty in general easy to dismiss, but the non-

trivial discriminatory aspects of race and colour relating to the beauty norm for fair

skin make this less easy to do.

Conclusion

I have considered whether we should genetically select embryos for fair skin for the

purposes of beauty. Issues relating to beauty are often regarded as unimportant but I

have used the non-trivial injustices of race and colour that underpin this norm to

reveal that such selection it is anything but. Selection for the beauty norm of fair

skin is discriminatory and demanding. If we take these to be plausible, they provide

reasons for suggesting that we should not make such selections in the pursuit of

beauty.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-

tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original

author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were

made.

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	Should We Genetically Select for the Beauty Norm of Fair Skin?
	Abstract
	Fair Skin as a Racialised or Colourised Beauty Norm
	Attaining Lighter skin: Current Cosmetic and Future Genetic Techniques
	Now: Skin Lightening
	Future: Selecting for Fair Skin Through Genetic Reproduction

	Discrimination
	Fair Skin Selection
	Fair Skin Selection for Beauty
	Intentions
	Outcomes


	Demands on Women
	Conclusion
	Open Access
	References